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The following significant dates in the history of the First Division are listed in order to facilitate research and study.

1. The organization of the First Division began on May 23, 1917.
2. It sailed for France beginning June 12, 1917.
3. The first troops of the Division landed at St. Nazaire on June 26, 1917.
4. The Division moved to the Gondrecourt training area on July 14, 1917.
5. It first entered the lines on October 21, 1917 and suffered its first casualties on November 3, 1917.
6. Its operations and sectors were:

SOMMERVILLER SECTOR	October 20 - Nov. 20, 1917.
ANSAUVILLE SECTOR	January 16 - April 3, 1918.
CANTIGNY SECTOR	April 19 - July 8, 1918.
CANTIGNY OPERATION	May 28, 1918.
MONTDIDIER-NOYON DEFENSIVE	June 9 - 13, 1918
AISE-MARNE COUNTER OFFENSIVE	July 18 - 23, 1918.
SAIZERAIS SECTOR	August 4 - 24, 1918.
ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE	September 12 - 13, 1918.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE*	October 1 - 12, 1918.
MEUSE ARGONNE OFFENSIVE*1	November 5 - 7, 1918.
March to the Rhine	Nov. 17 - Dec. 13, 1918.
Occupation of COBLENZ Bridge	
Head	Dec. 13, 1918 August 21, 1919.
First Units embarked at BREST for U.S.	Aug. 18, 1919.
Last Units arrived at HOBOKEN	Sept. 6, 1919.
The Division paraded in NEW YORK	Sept. 10, 1919.
The Division paraded in WASHINGTON	Sept. 17, 1919.
Temporary Personnel demobilized at CAMP MEADE, MD.	
September 18 - October 2, 1919,	

* Operation east of the AIRE RIVER.

*1 MOUZON - SEDAN operation.

The 1st Field Artillery Brigade served continuously from October 1 to November 7, 1918 without relief.

B. R. L.

The pages following comprise a complete file of the Summaries of Intelligence of the First Division. The gaps which exist cover the occupation of the Sommerviller Sector, the Aisne-Marne operation and the Mouzon-Sedan operation. During these periods, no summaries were published by the Division.

During the occupation of the Sommerviller Sector, the Intelligence function was exercised by the 18th French Infantry Division, under whose command the First Division served. In its participation in the Aisne-Marne counter offensive, the Intelligence personnel, according to statements of General Staff officers then serving with the Division, were too completely engaged in the examination of prisoners and in assisting the G-3 section with the preparation of situation maps to render formal reports. Due to the rapidity of movement and inadequacy of communications during the Mouzon-Sedan operation, no formal reports were possible. Available information was furnished Corps Headquarters by wireless, telephone and messenger.

Barnwell R. Legge,
Captain, Inf.,
Historical Section.

Headquarters First Division, A.E.F.
France, December 25, 1917.

Intelligence Section Bulletin.

"BRUTALITY AND INHUMANITY OF GERMANS."

(To be communicated orally at once by all unit commanders to their men.)

Today in the midst of ice snow and cold everywhere, women, children and old men in all parts of France and Belgium, occupied by the Germans, are being brutally driven out of their homes to give places to German army horses and to German wagons and dead material.

The mere use of men's homes, without cruelty or suffering to the inhabitants, in our country, was made in our Declaration of Independence one of the causes of our Revolutionary War.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

H. K. Loughry
Captain, C.A.C.,
Asst. Division Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, A. E. F.

Intelligence Section, G. S.

December 31, 1917.

Memorandum No. 62.

Subject: Intelligence Details.

General Order No. 65, these headquarters, prescribed the Divisional, Brigade, Regimental and Battalion Intelligence personnel.

Commanding Officers will see that the best qualified men are selected for Intelligence work, since all of our moves and our eventual success depend largely on the information obtained of the enemy.

All Intelligence personnel will be relieved of all other duties and their entire time will be devoted to Intelligence work under the direction of the Division Intelligence Section until further orders.

By command of Major General BULLARD;

CAMPBELL KING
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, A. E. F.

Intelligence Section, G. S.

December 31, 1917.

Memorandum No. 64.

Subject: Intelligence School Detail.

1. All regimental and battalion Intelligence officers and N.C.O.s will report to the Divisional Intelligence Officer at these headquarters on Wednesday, January 2nd, for the purpose of attending a course of instruction in Intelligence work which will commence January 3rd and be completed January 7th.

2. Uniform and equipment - Equipment A.

Overcoat, poncho or raincoat, blouse and the following additional articles - one or two blankets, one bed sack and one pair of shoes. Officers will bring small bedding roll and cot.

3. Prescribed arms will be brought by all officers and men. Mess-kits will be brought by everyone.

4. Transportation will be furnished by these headquarters as follows:

Two trucks will report at each regimental headquarters on January 2nd at 7:30 A.M. for instructions as to picking up the various detachments.

By command of Major General Bullard:

Campbell King,
Chief of Staff.

Headquarters First Division, A. E. F.
France, January 3, 1918.

Intelligence Section

Bulletin No. 5.

" BRUTALITY AND INHUMANITY OF GERMANS"

(To be communicated orally at once by all unit commanders to their men and posted on bulletin board.)

Information from the Italian front is to the effect that two or more Turkish divisions are on that front. Further confirmation of the fact that Turkish troops are fighting in this oldest Christian country is given by reports from Italian soldiers in the front line trenches. They can at times hear the screams of the Italian women and children who are now in Turkish hands.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

H. K. Loughry
Captain, C.A.C.
Asst. Division Adjutant.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, January 4, 1918.

Memorandum No. 1.

Subject: Change in Intelligence, Scouting, Bombing and
Gas officers.

1. Regimental or Battalion Intelligence officers, Scouting officers, Bombing officers or Gas officers will not be changed unless for very cogent reasons. Whenever a change is made a report in writing will be submitted to this office giving reasons in full for such change.

2. The importance of selecting the enlisted men best qualified for observation and scouting work must be evident to all. Unit commanders will render all possible aid in selecting suitable men from their commands for such work.

3. The observation and scouting personnel in each battalion will be kept together as a unit as far as is practicable.

By command of Major General Bullard;

WM. M. CRUIKSHANK

Adjutant General,
Division Adjutant.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, January 14, 1918.

Intelligence Section.

Bulletin No. 7.

The General commanding the VIII Army (French) announces that the Germans have recently played, at several points of the front line, a kind of comedy consisting in partially jumping out of the trenches, shouting that the war is over and giving our soldiers to understand by signs that they wanted to surrender. Then when our soldiers imprudently showed themselves, the Germans opened fire on them. A Chasseur of the 4th Battalion who had been unwise enough to come out of the trench, notwithstanding the warnings of his fellow sentry, was killed by several bullets.

You are reminded that the foe is not to be dealt with, except by means of rifle and guns. Any demonstration or manifestation by Germans must be interrupted and stopped as soon as it is noticed by our bullets and shells.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

H. K. LOUGHRY
Major, F.A., N.A.
Division Adjutant.

Intelligence
Section.

Headquarters, First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, February 6, 1918.

Memorandum)
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No. 3)

Subject: Battalion Scouts.

1. The Battalion Scout Officer should be considered as the Battalion Reconnaissance Officer as well as the Intelligence Officer for the Battalion Commander, occupying in this latter capacity a position similar to that of the Chief of the Intelligence Section to the Division Commander.

He should be charged by the Battalion Commander in general with the supervision of all reconnaissance work and with the collection of all information relative to the enemy. He should prepare, under the direction of the Battalion Commander, the general scheme of patrolling for the battalion in order that this work may be developed upon systematic lines and it's proper co-ordination insured.

To fulfill these duties it is absolutely necessary that his Battalion Commander take him into his complete confidence in all matters relating thereto.

The commander of every patrol should be required to furnish immediately upon his return a report to the Scout Officer as to the operations of the patrol.

2. One scout should accompany every patrol because of his special training in matters of information and because it is his business to be thoroughly acquainted with No Man's Land, the habits and customs of enemy patrols, etc. He is thus qualified to advise the patrol leader as to favorable features of the ground in No Man's Land in case of attack or to guide the patrol safely back to it's own lines in an emergency.

Patrols consisting entirely of scouts, however, should only be used for special work, under the immediate direction of the Battalion Scout Officer, upon the approval of the Battalion Commander.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

BY TELEPHONE FROM 1ST CORPS.

jd.

February 8, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(1st Corps, AEF).
Noon Feb. 7 Noon Feb. 8.
- - - - -

1. ORDER OF BATTLE.-- Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY.--
 - (a) Infantry: Enemy patrols less active. Few bursts of machine gun fire at long intervals. Very little rifle fire. 25 winged bombs thrown into wire at H1 and H2. Quantity of illuminating rockets during the night.

(b) Artillery:

14	105s.	On Xivray.
1	77s.	" "
7	105s.	" Marvoysen*.
13	77s.	" H1 and H2.
2	105s.	" H2.
5	105s.	" Reinbucourt*1.
5	77s.	" "
15	77s.	" Seichebrey*2.
20	77s.	In rear of I sector.
25	150s.	Southeast of Beaumont.
10	77s.	" " "
50	77s.	On Jury-Reimeres*3.
40	105s.	" " "
40	150	" " "

3. AERONAUTICS:-- Nothing to report.
4. MOVEMENTS:-- Single men at 50.31, 38.32, 19.44. 4 men at 38.43. 5 men at 36.36. 3 men at 36.32 and 38.34. Camion seen at 84.56. 20 men at 71.42 going towards Richecourt. 50 men at 74.46, going towards St. Baussant. At 8:40 A.M. X Beceuville*4 6 wagons going Vigneuvilles*5-Heudicourt. 3:40 P.M. Heudicourt - Beceuville*4.

5. WORK OF ENEMY:-- Work on two dugouts at 519.344. Repairing trench at 61.33 and 71.35.

6. MISCELLANEOUS:-- Patrols found gap in enemy's wire at 56.27. Alarm was given by barking of a dog. Heavy smoke seen back of Bois le Ponce*6 at 2 P.M. Large fire in enemy's lines, direction of Renauville*7, 6 to 9 P.M. A barrage put down by our batteries in front of F. sector from 5:38 to 6:03 A.M. in response to red rocket. Believe enemy's batteries destroyed at 84.56. An explosion heard. Patrols from F. sector found snipers post at 68.34; brought back two steel plates.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:-- Intermittent artillery activity.

- * Correct Spelling - - - - - MARVOISIN
*1 Correct Spelling - - - - - RAMBUCOURT
*2 Correct Spelling - - - - - SEICHEPREY
*3 Correct Spelling - - - - - REMIERES
*4 Correct Spelling - BUKERELLES
*5 Correct Spelling - VIGNEULLES
*6 Correct Spelling - BOIS le PONCE
*7 Correct Spelling - REMENAUVILLE S.G.W.

BY TELEPHONE FROM 1ST CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

February 9, 1918.

5:20 P.M.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Noon Feb. 8 to Noon Feb. 9. 1918.

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1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY:

a) Infantry:-- Enemy patrols in our wire between Porte de Montsec and Courtine Est at about 8:00 p.m. Supposed to have been about 50 men. Surprised a wire patrol, throwing grenades from all sides. No enemy losses known. Machine gun fire in front of H1. About 20 small winged bombs in front of H1, no damage done. Loud calls heard in front of F1 at 1:25 A.M.

b) Artillery:

22	77s.	on	Xivray.
30	77s.	on	I sector.
14	77s.	on	H1.
7	77s.	on	H2.
27	150s.	East of	Beaumont.
15	105s.	on	Beaumont.
15	105s.	on	Jury Remires*.
8	77s.	on	Bois de la Hazell*1.
56	105s.	on	" " " "
15	150s.	"	" " " "

3. AERONAUTICS:-- Enemy planes flying low over enemy's lines west of Richecourt at 2:35 P.M. At 3:15 P.M. two enemy planes flying over enemy's lines towards west. At 3:25 two enemy planes flying low over enemy's lines moving northeast.

4. MOVEMENTS: 7:30 A.M. 125 men at 74.46 toward Maizerais. 9 a.m. 5 men same point; 12:15 p.m. 100 men at 77.48, St. Baussant to Maizeris*2. 4 P.M. 10 men carrying food cans 73.49 to St. Baussant. Small groups of 3 or 4 men seen at the following points: 37.41, 41.30, 37.31, 46.37, 50.31 and on east side of Bois Joli.

Trains:

9:05 A.M. Essey to Pannes.

9:30 A.M. Pannes to Vigneulle*3.

11:10 A.M. " " "

15:05 P.M. Sevastopol to Vigneulle*3.

12:22 P.M. in station at Vigneulle*3.

1:45 P.M. Pannes*4 to Essey.

1:50 P.M. Essey to Pannes.

3:02 P.M. Vigneulle*3 to Essey.

4:2) P.M. Pannes to Heudicourt.

Wagons: -- 3:45 P.M. 5 entered Monsart *5, 54.83.

5. Work:-- Nothing to report.

6. MISCELLANEOUS:-- Smoke seen at center of Richecourt at 7:40 A.M. at 59.29 and 9:45 A.M.; at 2:45 p.m. back of Bois Lissere*6. At X 4:25 P.M. large explosion seen at Northeast end of Maizerais. Two of our men are missing from patrol that was ambushade. Enemy probably has identification. These men belong to the 16th Infantry.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet. A large number of illuminating rockets up at night.

A TRUE COPY:

S. G. WILDER,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L..

- * Correct Spelling - JURY - REMIERES
- *1 Correct Spelling - BOIS de la HAZELLE
- *2 Correct Spelling - MAIZERAIS
- *3 Correct Spelling - VIGNEULLES
- *4 Correct Spelling - PANNES
- *5 Correct Spelling - NONSARD
- *6 Correct Spelling - BOIS LIERRE

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

Intelligence Section,
First Division, A. E. F.
February 12, 1918.

Intelligence

Notice.

The escape of three Prisoners of War is announced from Camp 72, at Beaulieu Farm, Commune of Trois Fontaines.

Three prisoners of war escaped from Camp 72 at Beaulieu Farm in the Commune of Trois Fontaines during the night of the 10th-11th February.

Following is a description of them;

1. Feldwebel, POHLMAN, Eduard, 28 years old, black hair, small black mustache, brown eyes, regular nose, medium mouth, round face, 1.66 meters high, slight beauty spots, dressed in a cloth suit and wearing a "beret" (cap).

2. Unterofficier, HEINZ Adolph, 34 years old, fat, blond hair, small blond mustache, green eyes, large nose, medium mouth, 1.75 meters high, brown blouse

3. KREISEL, Paul, 37 years old, blond hair, green eyes, long nose, medium mouth, heavy mustache cut in the American style.

All of them have their tent cloths with them.

All American soldiers are ordered to apprehend these men if found and turn them over to the proper authorities.

C. P. NOLAND
Captain, Engineers, U. S. R.

BY PHONE FROM 1ST CORPS.

jd.

1st DIVISION INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Noon Feb. 12 to Noon Feb. 13, 1918.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: -- Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY:--
 - a) Infantry:-- 6 small bombs on F2. None exploded. 3 trench mortar bombs at 579.330. Machine gun at 538.330 fired at one of our patrols. Machine gun at 528.327 active during night.
 - b) Artillery:

8	77s.	Il
15	77s.	I2.
16	77s.	I3.
15	150s.	East of Beaumont.
15	105s.	" " "
10	77s.	" " "
15	77s.	Bois de Jury.
50	105s.	South of Bois de Jury.
130	150s.	Bois Chanot.
77	77s.	" "

3. AERONAUTICS:-- Balloon at Paney*, up at 2:17, down 2:55 P.M. Balloon up at 3:50 P.M. down, not stated. Balloon in the direction of Vigneulles, up at 2:18 P.M. at 9:50 A.M. enemy plane low over our lines to the northeast. From 2:45 to 5 P.M. numerous planes high over our lines.

4. MOVEMENTS:-- 4 men seen going from Burley* towards Richecourt at 11:55 A.M. About 100 men seen at point 1-10 at 3 P.M. 4 men seen going from point 583.354 towards Maizerais. Wagons and trains heard north of I sector at 11:45 A.M. Wagons entering Nonsard from 586.386 at 3:45 P.M. Automobile at 594.393 at 3:48 P.M. Two horse wagons 572.359. Decauville at 11:15 AM. trans from Sebastopol going west. 12:06 train from Sebastopol going west. At 1:47 P.M. train from Pannes to Vigneulles. At 3:05 P.M. train from Pannes to Hudicourt*1. At 3:20 P.M. from Pannes to Vigneulles. At 4:15 P.M. train from Euvezin to Essey. Point 595.371 at 3 P.M. two trains on line Givneulles*2 - Chamblen*3. At 4:05 one train on line Dommartin*4 to Sebastopol.

5. WORK: At 565.341 what appears to be new trench along south edge of woods. Road Essey-Nonsard has screen. Large working party heard at 519.317, to 522.322 heard from 8 to 10 A.M. Also heard by patrols at 8:20 P.M.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: - Smoke at 599.329, 522.329 and St. Baussant. Semi-illuminating rockets up during entire night. We fired 80 shells on enemy's wire at 591.332. Damaged, but no gaps made. Heavy smoke from 586.357 while our batteries were at 584.356.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:-- Very quiet. Heavy artillery fire on our batteries in the Bois Chanot.

A TRUE COPY:

S. G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf.,
D. O. L.

- * Correct Spelling - PANNES
- * Correct Spelling - BOIS le BURLY
- *1 Correct Spelling - HEUDICOURT
- *2 Correct Spelling - VIGNEULLES
- *3 Correct Spelling - CHAMBLEY
- *4 Correct Spelling - DOMMARTIN

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

1st Division
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Feb. 13-14, Noon to Noon

1. Order of Battle: Nothing to report.

2. Activity of the Enemy. (a) Infantry: Rifle fire from the following points: 515.312, 527.328 and 526.326. One burst of a machine gun at 519.319. Other guns active opposite F-F sector but not located. Machine guns reported at 595.332, 588.332 and 586.333. Firing on F-1, F-2, and the Seicheprey road. Twenty-three wing bombs into H-1 wire, and 6 in front of H-2.

(b) Artillery:

- 7 77s on H-2.
- 10 77s on H-1.
- 5 150s E. of Beaumont.
- 5 77s on road N.E. of Beaumont.
- 12 105s on F-2 sector.
- 2 150s on the Jury-Seicheprey road.

3. Aeronautics: Nothing to report.

4. Movements: Two workmen on trench at 562.334 and at 576.333. 9.05 a. m., Decauville: Heudicourt-Vignuelles*
12.14 p. m., Decauville: train Heudicourt to Vignulles*
11.09 a. m., smoke of a train seen near Pannes.

5. Work: Sound of blasting heard near 561.331 at 2 p. m.

6. Miscellaneous: Smoke seen at the following points: 519.319, 525.320, 528.327, 514.313, 576.336, 562.339 and at Labayville*¹

7. General Impression of the Day: Extremely quiet.

Correct Spelling:

* Vigneulles

*¹ Lahayville

S. G. W.

1st DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF EVENTS.

Feb. 14-15, Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Few bursts of machine gun fire on 586.333. 3 pine-apple bombs on 583.322. Few wing bombs thrown in the wire at H-1 and H-3. Very few rockets and flares. Patrols from H-3 report enemy wire opposite in good condition. Electrified wire throwing off sparks.

(b) Artillery:

15	77s.	East of Bois de Jury.
25	77s.	South of Beaumont.
30	77s.	On Seicheprey.
25	77s.	Jury-Remieres.
5	105s.	South of Beaumont.
15	77s.	Hazelle.
25	105s.	East of Jury.
33	77s.	H-1
60	77s.	H-2
9	77s.	H-3

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: Two men seen carrying lumber at 540.330, 11 A.M. 11 A.M. 300 men passed 578.340, in groups of ten to twenty going towards Mazerai*. Wagon seen going towards what appears to be gravel pit 3 kilometers west of Thiaucourt. Wagons heard from 9 P. M. to mid-night, direction St. Baussant. 1:20 P.M. Deauville: 8 cars Vigneulle*¹ to Hudicourt*. 1:50 P.M. Decauville: 6 cars 591.364 towards Essey. 2:05 P.M. Decauville: 7 cars Essey to Euvezin.

5. WORK: Nothing to report.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: 6 A.M. to 3 P.M. gas engine in St. Baussant working steadily. Smoke seen coming from dug-out at 589.338.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

Correct Spelling:

* Maizerais
*¹ Vigneulles
*² Heudicourt

B. R. L.

First Division.
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, Feb. 15-16.
Noon to noon.

1. Order of battle: Nothing to report.

2. Activity of the enemy: (a) Infantry: A gap in wire still open at 567.335 and 570.337. Wire opposite H sector in good condition. Fewer flares and rockets than usual. Machine gun at 538.331 fired 100 rounds at 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. at patrols. No casualties. Several automatic rifles also fired at patrols. (b) Artillery:

10	105s on Beaumont	6	77s on H-1
15	77s E. of Beaumont	16	77s passed over and fell S of H-1
10	105s on F-1		
5	105s on F-2	13	77s passed over and fell S of H-2
50	77s on F-3	18	77s passed over and fell S of H-3
7	105s on F-3	19	(?) passed over and fell S of I-1

3. Aeronautics. 12.16 p.m. a plane over our lines at center F. 1.55 p.m. 3 planes over our lines at center F. 2.20 p.m. one plane over our lines at center F. 4.05 p.m. 3 planes over our lines at center F. 5-5.30 p.m. 6 planes over our lines at center F. Very active in the evening over H and I sectors. One plane over Menil-la-Tour at 7.30 p.m. dropped 8 bombs; 4 bombs 210, 2 105, and 2 77. One sausage balloon at Crene*, up at 1 p.m., down at 2.55 p.m. At Beney, up at 3.45 p.m., down at 5 p.m.

4. Movements. 11.40 a.m., 100 men passed 567.346 in groups of 15 or 20 direction of Mesieres*¹. 11.51 a.m., 150 men passed 578.350 in groups of 10 or 15 direction of Lahayville. Considerable movement at gravel-pit, 3 kilometers W. of Thiaucourt*². Wagon movement normal. 10.29 a.m. train 589.343; 2.04 p.m. train from Essey to East: 7 a.m. Decauville: Heudicourt to Vigneulles*³; 7.30 a.m. Decauville: Pannes to Essey.

5. Work. Apparently new trench at 567.355 to 566.351. Big mound made at 566.339. New dugouts at 576.336. Work going on at 534.322 and 540.329.

6. Miscellaneous. Enemy in listening post opposite center waving hands in friendly manner. Several officers looking over ground at this point. One shot and believed killed. This officer had red tabs on his collar with numerals 12. Enemy sent up 6 or 8 rockets in front of center F but no barrage fell.

7. General impression of the day: Very quiet.

- * Correct Spelling: Creue
- *¹ Probably Maizerais
- *² Correct Spelling: Thiaucourt
- *³ Correct Spelling: Vigneulles

B. R. L.

jd.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Feb. 16-17
Noon to Noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Enemy parols seen in front of H-3. (Note: No enemy patrols have been seen for the past six nights). Few bursts of rifle and machine gun fire. 19 bombs on H-1, no damage done. At all points where enemy wire was examined last night it was found to be in good condition.
(b) Artillery:

35	105s.	Hazelle.	22	105s.	South of Beaumont.
36	105s.	East of Beaumont.	29	77s.	South of H-3.
46	150s.	Beaumont.	13	77s.	H-3.
15	105s.	Southeast of Beaumont	17	77s.	I-1
9	150s.	North of Beaumont.	7	77s.	I-2.
			14	77s.	I-3.
3. AERONAUTICS: 12:10 A.M. enemy plane dropped 3 bombs in I-1 back of front line trench, also fired machine gun, no casualties, no damage. 10:41 A.M. one plane flying south. 12:50 P.M. 1 plane flying northeast. At 12:55 P.M. 1 plane flying east. 12:05 P.M. 3 planes circled over our line. Balloon up at Beney 3 to 3:55 P.M.
4. MOVEMENTS: Normal in front of center F. 2 men seen going in what appears to be observation post at 519.319. 3 men carrying rations at 534.332. 2 men in communication trench at 539.330. 9:21 A.M. six groups of about 15 men each going from Nonsard to Vigneulle*. 10 A.M. 200 men in small groups passing 576.340 from Lahayville towards Mazorais*1. 1 P.M. 7 men from Mazeraais*1 to front line, 585.346. 4:45 P.M. several groups of 6 men passing 576.348. 5:45 P.M. 5 men going west at 551.334. Wagons: 6 single wagons seen at different times at Nonsard, Vigneulle*, Mazeraais*1 and Hudicourt*2. Trains: 7:50 A.M. Decauville, 2 cars Essey from East. 8:09 A.M. Decauville, 20 cars Hudicourt*2 to Vigneulle*. 9:35 A.M. Decauville, 20 cars Hudicourt*2 to Vigneulle*. 10:16 A.M. Decauville, 7 cars Hudicourt*2 to Vigneulle*. 11:45 A.M. Decauville, 7 cars Hudicourt*2 to Vigneulle*. Smoke of trains also seen at Essey, Pannes and Sebastopol*3.
5. WORK: Work being done on what is apparently an emplacement at 564.339, also on hill crest east of Creue, on communication trench at 543.346. Screen put up at 553.84. Concrete work being done on possible emplacement at 569.341. Work in front of battery at 584.354 to 561.340. 6 new abris resembling dumps at 561.340.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: 9:21 A.M. white flag waved from trench at 568.330. Apparently strong point at 591.356. 10:15 P.M. night signals flashing numerals 6 and 2 from Lahayville.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet. Amount of work done and movement in front of center F seem to indicate strengthening of enemy's position, more probable for defensive than offensive action.

* Correct Spelling: Vigneulles

*1 Correct Spelling: Maizerais

*2 Correct Spelling: Heudicourt

*3 Correct Spelling: Sebastapol

B. R. L.

HV

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Feb. 17-18
Noon to Noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Several rounds of rifle fire from 538.313. It is reported that the bullets were explosive. Several winged bombs on H-1. Few bursts of machine gun fire from 582.332 and from 579.335.

(b) Artillery:

125	105s	Bois de Jury.	60	105s	East of Beaumont
200	105s	Bois de Jury.	30	150s	East of Beaumont
50	105s	Remieres	25	105s	East of Beaumont
20	150s	Remieres	92	77s	H-1
25	77s	Seicheprey	37	77s	H-3
15	105s	Seicheprey	13	77s	I-1
40	77s	F-3	15	77s	I-3
15	77s	East of Beaumont.			

3. AERONAUTICS: 10:20 A.M. 3 planes flying high to north; 10:25 A.M. 1 plane over our lines to the south; 10:35 A.M. 2 planes over our lines to the south; 10:40 A.M. 3 planes over our lines to the northeast; 11:05 A.M. 2 planes over our lines to the west; 11:45 A.M. 1 plane over our lines to the south; 1:00 P.M. 6 planes flying high to east; 1:30 P.M. 7 planes flying high to the south; 2:05 P.M. 2 planes flying high to the southeast. Balloon up in rear of Montsec at 9:35 A.M.

4. MOVEMENTS: 7:30 to 9:30 A.M. men in groups of from 3 to 18 in Boyau des Bocks, 577.338 to front line. 9:25 A.M. 1 Decauville of 3 cars east from Sevastopol*. 9:30 A.M., 11:00 A.M., 1:00 P.M., 2:45 P.M., and 3:10 P.M., some smoke of trains seen in woods in direction of Lanarde*1. Movements considerably below normal.

5. WORK: None observed.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Enemy used incendiary shells of 105 mm. on F-2 causing explosion of dump containing light rockets and flares. 9:50 P.M., strong smoke coming from battery 584.356. New dugout at 559.339; new dugout, apparently emplacement for O.P. at 569.339; new dugout at 589.342; latrine at 576.338.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Sebastopol

*1 Probably Lamarche

B. R. L.

jd.

1st DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Feb. 18-19, Noon to Noon.

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1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
 2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Few bursts of machine gun and rifle fire. Usual number of flares and rockets. Few wing bombs on H-1. (b) Artillery:

15	77s.	South of Jury.
10	105s.	South of Jury.
5	77s.	Jury-Remieres.
200	150s.	Jury-Remieres.
20	105s.	Hazelle.
52	77s.	Beaumont.
53	105s.	Beaumont.
10	150s.	Beaumont.
13	105s.	Seicheprey.
12	77s.	H-1.
12	77s.	H-3.
10	77s.	H-2.
6	77s.	I-1.
5	77s.	I-3.

3. AERONAUTICS. 11:25 A.M. airplane over our lines going south. 12:35 P.M. airplane over our lines going south. 2 P.M. airplane over our lines going south. 4:25 P.M. airplane over our lines going south. Airplane with French marking flew over our lines in I sector at 2:30 P.M. and fired machine gun into our lines. It is possible that this airplane may be manned by the enemy. Balloon up at Benney* at 2:10 P.M., down at 4:42 P.M. Balloon up at Creue at 2:00 P.M., down at 5:25 P.M.

4. MOVEMENTS: 11:45 A.M. 50 men, Decauville line, St. Gabrin*¹ to 591.365. 2:25 P.M. 9 mounted men from 575.398. Smoke of trains seen at 10 A.M., 12:05, 12:31, 12:40, 12:50 and 12:13 P.M. between Pannes and Nonsard.

5. WORK: Working parties heard at 591.219. 7 men working in trench at 536.333. This party was dispersed by our artillery. 4 enemy working at 539.359.

5. MISCELLANEOUS: Enemy patrol sighted last night seem to have as its mission local attack on our listening post center H. Two men sighted in our wire and on being challenged fired pistol and threw grenades at the sentinel, who immediately opened fire, knocking the pistol from the enemy's hands. Pistol is forwarded with report.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Beney

*¹ Correct Spelling: St. Gibrin

B. R. L.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Feb. 19-20,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Bursts of machine gun fire over 584.334 between 12:30 and 6 a.m. Sniper reported at 535.331. Enemy wire from 556.326 to 557.327 is in poor condition and has not been repaired. A few winged bombs dropped into wire in H-1; also in center F, no damage. Very few flares and rockets. (b) Artillery shells:

25	105s on Remieres	120	105s on Beaumont
25	150s on "	2	150s on Seicheprey
100	105s on Jury-Remieres	80	105s on bis line N. of
35	105s on " "		Beaumont
2	105s on Hazelle	35	105s on H-1
12	150s on "	23	77s on H-1
55	105s on Bois Carre	20	77s on H-2
118	105s E. of Beaumont	16	77s on H-3
32	150s " "	3	77s on I-2

Enemy artillery ranging heavily on center F. Very little fire on H and I.

3. AERONAUTICS. 9:30 a.m., one plane flying S. 9.35 a.m., one plane flying N.E. 10:10 a.m., 2 planes circled over our lines and returned North. 10:35 a.m., 2 planes flying high to North. 11:40 a.m., 6 planes circled over lines and returned North. From 2:30 to 6 p.m., 2 to 6 enemy planes almost constantly over our lines.

4. MOVEMENTS: Nothing to report.
5. WORK: 2 men working at 557.327. One man working at 529.328. One man working 535.332. 5 men working at 519.319. 5 men at 525.324.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY. Very quiet in center H and I. Artillery activity in center F seems to presage possible enemy infantry action.

FIRST DIVISION.
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, Feb. 20-21,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Sniper reported at 518.314. Machine gun reported at 519.316. Several short bursts of machine gun fire. Numerous single and clusters of red rockets.
(b) Artillery shells;

20	77s on Jury	65	77s E. of Beaumont
20	105s on "	75	105s " " "
10	150s on "	120	150s " " "
25	77s on Jury-Remieres	30	77s N. of Beaumont
25	105s on " "	30	105s on Seicheprey
60	77s on Remieres	15	150s on "
10	150s on "	60	105s on F-3
10	77s on Hazelle	30	77s on H-2
10	150s on "	60	77s near Center I.
		30	77s on Remaucourt.

A few gas shells were dropped on Battery 12.

3. AERONAUTICS: 10 a.m., 3 planes flying low over our lines N.E. to S.W., 2 of which were driven back by anti-aircraft guns. 10:42 a.m., 2 planes over our lines flying from E. to W. and then going N. 11:10 a.m., 2 planes going S. 11:30 a.m., 3 planes flying S. and then returning N. 2:15 p.m., 3 planes going E. over enemy lines. 3 p.m., 1 plane going high over our line. Balloon up over Beney at 12:40 p.m. Down at 2 p.m. At 11:20 a.m., 1 enemy plane flew low over Jury. Men in kitchen came out into open and enemy machine gun fired on them. No casualties.

4. MOVEMENTS. 2 men seen in sentry post in front of line at 552.329. 4 men working in communication trench at 539.330 at 9:35 a.m. 3 more men seen at same point at 10:35 a.m.

5. WORK. O.P. at H-2 reports that much more work has been done on the enemy trenches to the right of Richecourt. New loop holes seen at 550.331. New trench as though to listening at 536.336.

6. MISCELLANEOUS. New Barracks at 539.333. Communication trench Richecourt to Montsec, 536.336. At 5:27 p.m., flame and white smoke seen to right of Richecourt.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY. Artillery activity on Center F slightly increased; 650 shells against 611 yesterday. Quiet in Sectors H and I.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Feb. 21-22,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Enemy patrol of seven men was seen coming out of their own trench opposite H-1; dispersed by automatic rifle at 8 p.m. Patrols from I sector located enemy listening posts at 511.312, 513, 312, 515.312 and 517.312. These posts appear to be manned by two men and a dog. Enemy machine guns located at 523.340, 521.320, 513.313, 583.335. Very few trench mortar shells fired. Usual number of flares.

(b) Artillery shells:

5	105s N. of Jury	35	150s E. of Beaumont
15	105s Jury-Hazelle	35	105s North of Beaumont
90	77s E. of Beaumont		and 1 bis position
75	105s " "	15	105s W. of Beaumont
		300	150s on Beaumont

No shells reported to have fallen in Center H or I. At 10 p.m., a new enemy battery opened fire over approximately 664.341.

3. AERONAUTICS. 4:15 p.m., airplane flying E. over Beaumont. 4:30 p.m., 3 planes crossed our lines over Center H, circled over Center F, and returned North. 4:35 p.m., one plane flew down to 400 meters over batteries E. of Beaumont. Balloon at Beney up at 4:10, down at 6 p.m. Balloon up at Hatton-Chatel* at 3:20, down at 4:20 p.m.

MOVEMENTS: Considerably above normal. 9:35 a.m., 200 men from La Marche to Pannes. 4:30 p.m., 200 men coming from Dampvieux*1 to Charey. 2:13 p.m., a few groups of 50 men each opposite 567.348, Mazieres to Lahayville. Several single men seen at this point during the day. 2:50 p.m., 2 wagons Pannes to West. 3:25 p.m., 12 wagons entering Essey from Thiaucourt*2. 4 p.m., wagons entered Essey. 7:25 a.m., 2 wagons from Nonsard coming West. Heavy movement of wagons in Lahayville heard during the night. Smoke from 8 Decauville trains seen during the day in the direction of La Marche, Heudicourt and Pannes.

5. WORK: Enemy repairing wire in front of H-1. New stakes as though marking trench at 537.343. Shell holes have been connected at 573.325.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: 8:40 a.m., 2 columns of smoke seen on the S. edge of Bois du Quartdereserve. Smoke in kitchen at St. Baussant; 576.343. Smoke in Lahayville; 565.336. Smoke in Bois du Sonnard 595.342.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet H and I Centers. Heavy bombardment still continues in Center F. Greatly increased movement opposite Center F.

Correct spelling * - HATTONCHATEL.
*1 - DAMPVITOUX.
*2 - THIAUCOURT.

B. R. L.

First Division.
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, Feb. 22-23.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine gun located at 539.331. This gun fired several times between 4 and 6 a.m. 10 spherical grenades about the size of a baseball fell on H-3. Only 3 exploded. Sample will be forwarded. Enemy sent up 2 red rockets in front of H-1 which was followed by a bombardment which lasted about 5 minutes. Enemy patrol of 3 men penetrated our wire between H-1 and H-2. They retreated.

(b) Artillery shells:

42	77s on Remieres	10	105s on l bis position
30	105s on Jury-Remieres	10	in F-1
50	77s E. of Beaumont	10	77s on Seicheprey
103	105s E. of "	10	105s on Seicheprey
35	150s E. " Beaumont	15	150s on Seicheprey
20	150s on Beaumont	35	77s on F-3
15	77s on l bis position	15	105s on F-3
	in F-1	20	77s on Center I.
		2	77s on Bouconville.

3. AERONAUTICS: One plane in rear of enemy's line at 10 a.m.

4. MOVEMENTS. 8:40 a.m., 20 mounted men going W. of Pannes. 10:38 a.m., 200 men passing 599.384. 11:18 a.m., 50 men going toward Montsec at 509.367. 11:40 a.m., 20 groups of 10 men each Mazieres*-St. Baussant, 576.348. 11:45 a.m., 3 groups of 20 men each towards St. Gabrin*1 passing 591.363. Several single men seen opposite H center. One seen every day watching position near 542.330.

5. WORK: Enemy has repaired wire at 552.329-558.328. About 13 men working on battery at 584.356.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

Correct Spelling: * - MAIZERAIS.
*1 - ST. GIBRIN.

B. R. L.

jd.

1ST CORPS
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Feb. 23-24.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Indications of relief opposite center H. Considerable walking on duckboards was heard, also much loud talking. //Wagon movements in Lahayville all night. Machine guns more active than usual. Short bursts of machine gun fire at extremities of Reichcourt*. Light machine gun at approximately 556.328.

(b) Artillery:

40	77s. Remieres.	5	77s. Seicheprey.
45	105s. Jury-Remieres.	20	105s. Seicheprey.
30	77s. Hazelle.	50	105s. F-1.
30	105s. Hazelle.	20	105s. F-3.
45	77s. East of Beaumont.	44	77s. H-2.
90	105s. Beaumont.	20	77s. H-3.
90	77s. Beaumont.	20	77s. Xivray.
110	105s. Beaumont.	40	77s. In rear of center
110	105s. 1 bis line.		I.

About 44 shells, 40 mm., on H-2, -all but 3 fell on Q. at 534.320. About 50 per cent of these shells did not explode.

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: Visibility poor. Little movements seen.

5. WORK: Work on dugout at 536.336. Working party heard at 582.333. Hammering on steel heard back of Haute Charriere Bois, at 532.325.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Location of enemy's listening posts report at 511.512, 513.313, 515.313, 517.312. These were reported on February 22nd at 511.312, 513.312, 515.312 and 517.312.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

Correct Spelling: * RICHECOURT.

B. R. L.

jd.

FIRST DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Feb. 24-25,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (A) Infantry: 50 shots from machine gun at 585.334. Machine gun 513.313 very active during the night. Also machine gun in Richecourt. Considerably more talking in the front line trenches and more noise than usual confirms report of yesterday that a relief took place opposite Center H. during the night of Feb. 23-24.

(b) Artillery:

15	77s. On Remieres	5	105s. on Beaumont.
120	105s. On Remieres	25	77s. 1 bis position.
5	105s. On Remieres.	10	105s. 1 bis position.
90	77s. Jury-Remieres.	15	77s. F-1.
30	105s. Jury-Remieres.	60	77s. F-3.
5	77s. E. of Beaumont.	60	105s. On H-2.
40	105s. E. of Beaumont.	57	77s. On H-2.
60	150s. East of Beaumont.	40	77s. Bois de Carre.

3. AERONAUTICS: Balloon up at Creue at 1:55 P.M., down at 2:40 p.m.; up at 3:05 p.m., down at 3:40 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: 10 a.m., six enemy carrying posts at 542.330; 11:10 a.m., 10 men seen by road Essey to Pannes. 12:55 p.m., 4 men examining terrain N. of Richecourt. 3:37 p.m., 200 men in groups of 20 Essey-Bouillonville road at 608.388. 11:30 a.m., smoke of train near Heudicourt-Pannes. 3:30 p.m., smoke of train near Heudicourt-Vigneulles. 4:45 p.m., Decauville; Essey St. Boussant.*

5. WORK: 12:30 a.m., working party heard at 578.336. It was dispersed by artillery fire. 7:15 a.m., hammering heard 519.319. Hammering still heard 519.316.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

Correct Spelling: * ST. BAUSSANT.

B. R. L.

HV

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Feb. 25-26
Noon to Noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Gas attack with trench mortar projectiles was launched against our infantry at 1:32 A.M. and 1:45 A.M., about 70 bombs, 210 mm., falling on F-2; casualties, 3 killed; 9 injured by gas. This attack appears to have been launched from vicinity of 583.334. 3 of our ambush patrols in front of centers H and I out all night. Did not see any enemy patrols. Machine gun at 561.330 fired several bursts over H-2 during the night.

(b) Artillery:

70	77s	East of Beaumont	30	77s	On Seicheprey
200	105s	East of Beaumont	5	150s	On F-1
30	150s	East of Beaumont	10	77s	On F-2
20	77s	On Beaumont	40	105s	On F-2
20	105s	On Beaumont	12	77s	On Center 1.

Several gas shells fell on battery east of Beaumont.

3. AERONAUTICS: Balloon at Creue up at 8:46 A.M., down at 9:30 A.M.

4. MOVEMENTS: 10:20 A.M. between 40 and 50 men passed 557.341 going to Bois-Quart-De-Reserve; 11:05 A.M. 40 men passed 591.365 from Essey to St. Gibrin; 10:20 A.M. 200 men passed through trenches to Richecourt; 4:30 P.M. 80 men passed 578.348 from Maizerais to St. Baussant; 4:55 P.M. 36 men passed 591.365 going from Essey to St. Gibrin. Wagons: 1:15 P.M. several wagons seen on road from Pannes to Veney*. Trains: 1:18 P.M. 1 Decauville, Vigneulles to Sebastopol; 1:25 P.M., 1 Decauville of 11 cars Essey to St. Gibrin; 2:00 P.M. 1 Decauville, Essey to Bois-Mort-Mare; 2:02 P.M. 1 Decauville, Essey to St. Gibrin; 5:20 P.M. 1 Decauville, Heudicourt to Vigneulles; 9:05 A.M. smoke of trains seen Heudicourt to Vigneulles; 11:35 A.M. smoke of trains seen Pannes to Thiaucourt.

5. WORK: Enemy wire at 519.319.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Band playing heard N.W. of Montsec at 9:30 A.M.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

*Correct spelling Beney.

B. R. L.,

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Feb. 26-27.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine gun active at 517.313. Fired on patrol in Center H. No grenades or automatic rifle fire.

(b) Artillery:

30	77s.	on Jury	5	105s.	on Beaumont.
25	77s.	on Remieres.	5	150s.	on Bois Carre.
59	105s.	on Remieres.	20	105s.	on Bois Carre.
5	150s.	on Remieres.	10	150s.	on Seicheprey.
25	77s.	E. of Beaumont.	4	77s.	on Rambucourt.
25	105s.	E. of Beaumont.	10	150s.	E. of Beaumont.
15	77s.	on Beaumont.			

Note: No shells into H. or I Centers.

3. AERONAUTICS: 11:32 a.m., 7 hostile planes up over our lines were driven back. One appeared to be driven down back of Lamarche. One hostile plane flew over Center H. very low at 10:30 a.m., firing its machine gun. Balloon up at Bois Lierre and one up at Bois Bas nearly all day.

4. MOVEMENTS: 2:25 p.m. 14 men with 8 wagons at Nonsard. Single men seen going from Quart*de Reserve to Bois Joli several times during the day. 2:25 p.m., 8 wagons going from Nonsard to Essey. 2:15 p.m. 5 wagons from Nonsard to Lamarche. 2:52 p.m., one wagon from Nonsard to Essey. 3:44 p.m., 4 wagons from Lamarche to Pannes. Smoke of trains seen at 1:28 p.m. at Essey, 1:42 p.m., at St. Gabrin*, 3:46 p.m., at Sebastopol; 3:40 p.m., one train St. Gabrin* to Essey.

5. WORK: New work being done in trench at 559.329. New wire seen on parapet at 549.329. Pit dug in wire at 539.328, probably for listening posts. New work is in progress on top of Montsec at 518.343. Working party heard at 520.320 from 8 to 10 p.m.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Relief opposite Center H. is confirmed by new gray-green uniforms seen in trenches. Formerly the enemy in this sector was wearing light gray trousers and dark blue or gray blouses.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

jd.

*Correct spelling St. Gibrin.

* " " Quart de Reserve.
B. R. L.

Intelligence Section
First Division A.E.F.

February 27th 1918.
F/7/C.

S U M M A R Y O F I N F O R M A T I O N .

(Translated from French Army Intelligence Reports).

WEARING OF GAS MASKS. (B.R. of an Army).
(Information obtained from prisoners).

The distribution of new leather masks is being continued. So far only N.C.O.s and machine gunners have been equipped with them.

According to an order issued in the beginning of February the wearing of the mask is compulsory for officers and men on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 10 to 11 a.m.. All troops, including units in reserve must comply with this order.

CONCERNING THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. (B.R. 1st Army).

Prisoners captured on the 20th inst. at Ervantes consider this offensive both likely and near at hand. They expect that the main front of attack will be the British front, but that there will be diversions toward Reims and in Alsace.

Captured documents bring further proof that German troops are preparing for offensive warfare.

The above prisoners heard that the Germans had tanks. It is rumored that there are some in the Northern part of Lorraine.

USE OF LIGHT MACHINE GUNS,- THEIR AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

(Information obtained from a chief-gunner of the 6th Co. of the 49th Res. Regt. (3rd. Res. Div.)).

The 6th Co. of the 49th Res. Regt. has had 6 light machine guns at its disposal since the 2nd of February 1918. Before that date it had only 4.

It appears that the number of guns was increased on the following approximate dates (08/15 machine guns per company):

In December 1916.....1 single machine gun.

In February 1917.....2 machine guns.

In October 1917.....3 machine guns.

Before Xmas.....4 machine guns.

February 2nd 1918.....6 machine guns.

In January 1918, between the 5th and the 23rd approximately, each company of the regiment sent a chief gunner and a pointer to Liege, to attend a course of instruction lasting 15 days. About 2000 men were gathered at Liege. There were also Officers from each Regiment (Lieut. Vedder, a supernumerary of the 6th Co. of the 49th Res. Regt., attended the practice).

The course covered new regulations to be enforced in the 49th Res. Regt. as soon as this regiment is placed at rest, and probably in many other German regiments.

According to the new instructions, each light machine gun will have 8 men at its disposal instead of 4.

These four extra men will serve a double purpose: (1) they will replace killed or wounded members of the crew, (2) they will bring up ammunition to the gun. Each of these men is to carry 4 boxes of ammunition (2 on either side), each box containing 250 rounds.

This will cause a considerable increase in the ammunition reserve of light machine guns.

The importance of this innovation is consequently very great, not only in reference to Position Warfare - here each machine gun will henceforth have its own ammunition carriers (the 4 men formerly constituting the crew of a machine gun could not leave their piece),- but also, and more especially, in reference to Mobile Warfare, where the increased stock of ammunition will follow the gun in all its movements, making it possible to await the arrival of ammunition convoys.

It is reported that henceforth the German infantry company will be divided into two parts, namely (1) light machine guns, and (2) the rest of the company used as a stossstrupp.

The first wave starts, and the six light machine guns follow two or three minutes later, at a maximum distance of 50 to 100 meters to the rear (depending on the terrain), to fill up the gaps left by the first wave of skirmishers.

These are the exercises which are to be carried out by the troops at rest, the machine guns being manned by their crew of eight gunners and ammunition carriers.

Distribution: Chief of Staff
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C.O. 18th Inf.
C.O. 16th Inf.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Feb. 27-28
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Enemy machine gun at 513.317 and 317. Fired two bursts each at 1:35 P.M. Otherwise little activity.

(a) Artillery:

30	77s.	Remieres.	10	77s.	East of Beaumont.
21	105s.	Remieres.	53	105s.	East of Beaumont.
40	77s.	Jurey*-Remieres	3	150s.	East of Beaumont.
35	105s.	1 bis position, F-1.	5	150s.	Beaumont.
13	105s.	Seicheprey.	35	77s.	F-1.
20	77s.	H-1	19	77s.	H-2.
26	77s.	H-3			

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: 4:50 A.M. 15 men going from front line to Bois de la Nonsard. 8 p.m. Decauville heard in Lahayville.

5. WORK: 9:50 a.m. gas engine heard in the direction of St. Baussant. Very little work done during the past twenty-four hours.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: 2:55 p.m. flame lasting one minute and thirty seconds on west edge of de la Nonsard. 12:10 a.m. church yard at Bures*1 displayed light signal. 12:14 signal light on Montsec. 1:40 a.m. signal light seen at St. Baussant.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

jd.

*Correct spelling Jury.

*1 ? Perhaps Beney.

B. R. L.

Intelligence
Section.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, February 28, 1918.

Memorandum No. 10.

Subject: Telephone conversations.

1. The following translation of a document, found in a German shelter, February 14th, 1918, is published for the information of the command:

"Superior Command of
the Groupement
of Reims.

To be placed beside
all telephones.

NOTICE.

Beware of telephone conversations.

1. The enemy uses listening sets to intercept our conversations in the Zone of the Infantry and of the Artillery observation stations.

2. In consequence, take care:

- never to name a unit;
- never to mention the emplacement of our batteries, trench mortars, observation stations, P.C's., shelters, camps, convoy routes, kitchen emplacements, ammunition dumps, workshops, etc.

- never to mention in your conversations, contemplated actions, reliefs, losses, ammunition, effectives in the trenches, number of trench mortars, machine guns, etc.

3. Any infringements of these prescriptions gives the enemy valuable information of the distribution of our forces, saves him the costly obligation of sending out patrols to obtain desired information, and causes the death of a great many of your comrades.

4. Be just as careful, therefore, in your telephone conversations at the front as in your public conversations while on leave, where enemy spies and agents listen to your every word. Use Code exclusively. Never forget that your lack of forethought may cost not only your own life, but also the lives of several of your comrades."

By Command of Major General Bullard:

Distribution "C".

CAMPBELL KING
Chief of Staff.

jd.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Feb. 28, Mch. 1,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmation of prisoners, order of battle 258th, 259th and 260th Reserve Regiments of the 78th Reserve Division in order reading from our left to right.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: At 1:55 A.M. after artillery preparation lasting about 30 minutes about 240 enemy made an attack on F-1 and F-2. They were driven off and left 13 dead and 3 prisoners, two of whom are wounded and are in evacuation hospital No. 1. They are from the 79th Pioneer Co. The 3rd and unwounded prisoners forwarded with document, pistols, etc., to the 32nd Army Corps.

(b) Artillery:

10 77s on Remieres.
10 77s on Jury.
700 to 950 of all calibers, including 210 mm. (?)
Jury-Remieres, F-1, 2, & 3.

15 210 (?) (195 mm. across base) on Mandres.
27 105s. East of Beaumont.
105 105s. East of Beaumont.
35 105s. 1 bis position Center F.
28 77s. H-1
11 77s. H-2.
78 105s. H-3.

(Note: Enemy shells, number not report, calibre
77 and 105s. on H-3 from 5:30 to 6:10 A.M.)

77 77s. I-1.
65 77s. I-3.
30 77 Rambucourt.

3. AERONAUTICS: Balloon up Benney* at 2:50 to 5:30.
Balloon up at Creue all afternoon.

4. MOVEMENTS: 10:25 A.M. 100 men passed 605.385 Essey to Toullonville*¹. 11:45 A.M. about 200 men passing to and from Essey. 7:30 A.M. 2 men seen at 557.339. 2:35 P.M. four-horse wagon at Nonsard. 10 A.M. smoke Decauville seen at Vigneulle*²-la-Marche; 11:20 A.M. Pannes-Vigneulle*³; 1:45 P.M. Thieucourt*⁴-Pannes 2:15 Decauville Essey-Euvezin. 2:32 P.M. 1 Decauville, 12 cars Heudicourt-Vigneulle*³. 4:30 P.M. smoke seen at Vigneulle*³-Heudicourt. 5:30 P.M. smoke seen at Vigneulle*³ and Heudicourt.

5. WORK: Work going on during night in enemy trenches opposite H-3.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Detail report concerning the 3 prisoners will follow later.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet, except during period of raid.

26TH DIVISION, 1ST ARMY CORPS, A. E. F., March 1, 1918.--
Prisoner captured in German raid in front of Chavignon confirms order of battle.

*Correct spelling Beney.

*1 " " Bouillonville.
*2 " " Vigneulles-Lamarche.
*3 " " Vigneulles.
*4 " " Thiaucourt.

B. R. L.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, March 1-2.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Few winged bombs thrown into the wire at H-1. More flares than usual during the night, otherwise no activity.

(b) Artillery:

50	77s.	on Bois de Jury.	15	77s.	E. of Beaumont.
155	105s.	on Bois de Jury.	245	105s.	E. of Beaumont.
55	77s.	on Jury-Remieres.	140	150s.	E. of Beaumont.
10	77s.	on Bois de Remieres.	5	105s.	on Beaumont.
245	105s.	on Bois de Remieres.			

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: 7:50 a.m. 2 enemy seen at 565.335. 7:25 a.m. 2 men seen W. of Richecourt going toward Montsec.

5. WORK: None reported.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: 7:25 a.m. smoke seen at 565.335. 11 a.m. smoke seen at 512.314 and 515.314.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Infantry, quiet, Artillery fairly active.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Mch. 2-3.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Fewer bursts of machine gun fire. No rifle fire. More flares than usual during the night.

(b) Artillery:

90	77s.	East of Beaumont.
5	105s.	on Beaumont.
10	105s.	1 bis position center F.
13	77s.	on H-3.
2	77s.	I-3.

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: 11:20 a.m. 100 men passed 591.363 going to St. Gibrin. 11:30 a.m. 60 men in two groups of 30 each passed 591.363 towards St. Gibrin. 1:10 to 2:05 p.m. 54 men between Bois de Rate and Nonsard. Gap had been made in wire at 556.386. Two 12 horse and one 10 horse caisson and one 6 horse wagon went through gap, men accompanying convoy.

5. WORK: Trench and wire repaired at St. Baussant. New camouflage up along trench 539.329.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Working parties were heard opposite F-2, laughing and talking and seemed very cheerful.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

ERRATUM:

1st Div. Intelligence Report, Feb. 28 - Mch 1.

Par. 2, Line 1, "1:55 A.M." should read "5:55 A.M."

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Mch. 3-4.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine guns active for a few minutes 1:30 A.M. More flares than usual over No Man's Land.
(b) Artillery:
About 2,900 shells of all calibers on Jury -
Remieres. 15 105s. on Beaumont. (1 man killed).
number not report, 105s. on H-1.
8 77s. on H-2.
54 77s. on H-3.
32 77s. on I-1
16 105s. on I-2.
3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.
4. MOVEMENTS: 2 men seen pushing forward machine gun at 531.331. This gun was fired on by our artillery as soon as located. 10:15 A.M. Decauville, 7 cars Heudicourt to Vigneulle*. 10:51 A.M. Decauville Vigneulle* to Heudicourt. 11:27 A.M. Decauville heard Lahayville - Maizeres*1
5. WORK: Sound of work heard at 585.334, sound resembling placing of projector. One man working at 537.331.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

jd.

* Correct Spelling "VIGNEULLES" -

*1 Correct Spelling "MAIZERAIS" -

B.R.L.

Intelligence Section,
First Division, A.E.F.
March 5, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
March 4-5 (noon to noon).

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry. No machine gun fire. Few bursts of rifle fire. Several winged bombs in wire in H-1. (b) Artillery:

20	77s	Remieres
8	105s	Remieres
5	105s	Beaumont
17	77s	H-1
2	77s	I-3

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: Single men seen at 583.333 and at 584.333, going around, but were believed to be in enemy's trenches.

5. WORK: 9:10 A.M. working party was heard hammering stakes in woods near 515.314. This noise was heard until 2:55 P.M. A new trench has been dug in the enemy wire between 575.335 and 578.335. Shell holes have been connected up between 574.334 and 574.335.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Single lights seen blinking at Richecourt and Lahayville. Sounds of hammering metal and driving stakes heard in front of F-1; seemed to be going from Bois-De-Sonnard*.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

* Correct Spelling - "Bois de la Sonnard" -

B.R.I.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Mch. 5-6,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Slight fire of machine guns opposite I-3. Two wing bombs in wire H-1. No damage done.

(b) Artillery:

5	150s.	Jury Remieres.	50	77s.	Remieres.
15	105s.	Remieres.	5	77s.	East of Beau-
5	105s.	East of Beaumont.			mont.
20	150s.	Beaumont.	30	77s.	Beaumont.
61	77s.	On H-2	26	77s.	On H-1.
24	77s.	On H-3.	8	105s.	On H-3.
			31	150s.	On H-1.

3. AERONAUTICS: 11:10 a.m. 3 enemy planes over center H. going south. 3 p.m. 3 planes flying high over enemy's lines. Balloon at Beney up at 12:17 p.m., down 5:10 p.m. Balloon at Creue up 12:40 P.M., down 4 p.m. 7 to 12 p.m. balloon apparently up at Hattonchatel and Beney. Noticed by lights.

4. MOVEMENTS: 9 a.m. 10 men seen at 577.343 from Nonsard. 10:45 a.m. 4 men at 600.365, working. 11:05 a.m. ten men at 611.367 towards north. 11:45 a.m. 40 men in four groups at 581.363, Essey-St. Gibrin. 2:44 p.m. 2 men from Quart de Reserve to trench at 563.391. 4:37 p.m. 1 man from Richécourt towards north. Wagons: 1:05 p.m. two 4 horse, Pannes-Nonsard. 4:31 p.m. 1 two horse Essey-Nonsard. Trains: 1 p.m. smoke la Marche*. 2:35 p.m. smoke la Marche*-Pannes. 2:45 02:50 smoke Vigneulle*1 - Pannes.

5. WORK: 12 men with picks and shovels at 514.313, wearing green coats and light trouseres. Old camouflage at 525.326. Fresh dirt thrown up at 549.339.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: 9 a.m. dugout at 576.345. 9:30 a.m. smoke west edge of Quarte de Reserve*2 9:35 a.m. dugout at 576.338. 1:15 p.m. large reflector at Vigneulle*1. 2:10 p.m. large fire at Vigneulle*1 (like burning of building). 4:05 p.m. smoke at 552.324. 7:10 p.m. flash light Vigneulle*1 4:15 p.m. smoke old mill St. Baussant.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

* Correct Spelling - "LAMARCHE" -

*1 Correct Spelling - "VIGNEULLES" -

*2 Correct Spelling - "QUART de RESERVE" -

B.R.L.

Intelligence
Section

Headquarters First Division
American expeditionary forces,
France, March 6th 1918.

Memorandum No 11.

Subject: Training of German Stosstrupps.

The following translation of a German document is a list of the points in which the Germans consider a man belonging to a Stosstrupp should receive training. The minuteness of the details, the large number of contingencies contemplated, and the stress laid on physical training are points which seem particularly worthy of note. Attention should also be paid to the contemplated use of Stosstrupps in defensive combat and to the fact that the first two items of the paragraph entitled "Defence" (par. IV) are: retirement to a previously prepared position" and "counter-attack".

I. Practice in throwing grenades in the regulation manner, with gas mask on or off.

- Throwing at a distance.
- Throwing at a target situated in the open.
- Throwing at a target situated in the trench.
- Throwing from one trench at a target situated in another trench.
- Throwing over a wire entanglement.
- Throwing from one crater into another crater.
- Throwing concentrated charges against tanks.

II. Exercises conducive to suppleness.

- Jumping out of a trench at a signal or at a command.
- Double timing with complete equipment.
- Very rapid crossing of an area swept by artillery fire.
- Crawling up to a hostile sentinel.
- Cutting wire with as little noise as possible.
- Cutting wire as fast as possible.
- Crossing entanglements.
- Advancing quickly along the enemy's trench (in spite of obstacles)
- Throwing out hand grenades quickly which fall in the trench.
- Advancing in a field or craters (jumping, crawling, rolling).
- Practice in quickly adjusting gas mask whatever be the position of the body.
- Aiming rifle while wearing mask.
- Bringing up materiel for defence while wearing mask.
- Removing wounded while wearing mask.
- Firing, concealing body as much as possible.

III. Attack.

Constitution of a Stosstrupp - Accompanying infantry - carrying parties.

Preparation of an elongated charge.

Carrying an elongated charge at a walk and at double time (practice in lying prone and in crossing obstacles).

Quickly bringing up an elongated charge under artillery fire and placing same in the enemy's entanglements.

Blowing up entanglements.

Occupying portions of the enemy's trenches a) comprising epaulments, b) linear.

Searching, smoking out, and blowing up the enemy's dugouts.

Transmitting orders and information.

Communications between Stosstrupps working on the same line or opposite each other, by means of flash signals, cloths, etc..

Returning to jumping off trench at a command or signal. (whenever possible by the route followed in the advance - explain why?)

Reversing the enemy's position (lateral obstacles).

Bringing back booty.

How to treat prisoners.

How to treat wounded or dead, either German or enemy.

Laying out the route to be followed between the point of departure and the point of attack.

Approaching the enemy's position under fire (crawling, advancing by rushes, using as much as possible the protection afforded by the terrain and craters).

Approaching the enemy's machine guns: frontal combat with rifles, attacks from flank and rear with hand grenades. Concealing the advance on the flank with the help of smoke screens.

Attacking a 2-exit dugout (infantry: with hand grenades and incendiary tubes).

Various methods for penetrating into the enemy's position, with or without artillery preparation (making use of bomber sections)

Reversing a conquered enemy position. Laying emergency entanglements in front of same.

Practical application: for instance

Engaging two stosstrupps each supplied with an elongated charge 25 meters long and with a gas tube (?) 10 meters long.

Taking over jumping off trenches.

Advancing by watch under artillery fire.

Placing the charge, blowing up the entanglement, penetrating into the enemy's trench.

Mopping up the trench to right and left to a width of 150 to 200 meters (to the rear as far as the second line).

Obstructing communications between the first and second hostile lines, and also the lateral communication trenches.

Returning at a flash signal.

IV. Defence.

Retiring to a previously prepared reserve position.
Counter-attacking on enemy's flank and rear along the trench.

Counter-attacking from flank and rear in the open.

Forming a stossstrupp at the entrance of a dugout, during artillery fire.

Driving back a hostile assault.

Fighting tanks with infantry ammunition (S.M.K. - penetrating bullets) and with concentrated charges.

Remark:- Execution of the exercises.

1. With dummy grenades
2. With reduced-charge ammunition - with explosive cartridges.
3. With regulation ammunition.
4. While wearing mask.
5. With or without an opponent.
6. At night.
7. In liaison with a company.

V. Instruction.

German and enemy hand grenades (type, preparation, effect, use).

Priming handle grenades and ovoidal grenades.

Preparing an elongated charge - making an emergency elongated charge - effects of both.

Instruction in methods of close-quarter combat: rifle, bayonet, pistol, dagger, smoke bombs (B-stoff), grenade throwers, incendiary tubes, flame projectors.

Organizing a Stossstrupp into small parties in view of combat in a trench or in a field of craters.

Instruction in methods of signalling.

Tanks, their employment, their effects, and the methods of fighting them.

W. G. Hannam

Acting Chief of Intelligence.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Mch. 6-7,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmed by shoulder straps on dead "unteroffizier."

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: At 4:15 A.M. an enemy raiding party from the 258th Res. Inf. Regt. of about 30 men entered our line in F-3, after cutting their way through our wire at 557.332. Party was repulsed by one of our sentries, who did not open fire till leading man was close to him. This man an "unteroffizier" of the 4th Co. of the 258th Res. Inf. Regt. was killed. Further search showed others of the party were wounded. Four rifles and a stretcher were left in our wire. No casualties on our side. Enemy snipers active opposite F. 1. Short bursts of machine gun fire covering a gap in our wire in front of H-3.
(b) Artillery:

5 shells of unknown calibre on Remieres.
13 105s. Seicheprey.
15 77s. Rambucourt.
12 77s. I-1.
10 105s. I-1.
1 150s. I-1.
17 105s. I-4.

3. AERONAUTICS: 10:50 a.m. 3 planes going south. 12:15 p.m. two planes going south. 2:43 one enemy plane dropped to the West of Tieucourt* after combat with French plane. Balloon up at Creue caught on fire and was hauled down. At 8:30 p.m. an airplane dropped one large wing torpedo, four small torpedos and two 210 mm. shells $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers north of Menil la Tours*1

4. MOVEMENTS: Men: 1:10 p.m. four men at 267.348; 2:20 p.m. 2 men at 578.351. Wagons: 1:10 p.m. 1 eight-horse wagon Nonsard Bois Rate, 563.365. 1:15 p.m. 6 men and 7 horses at the same place. 1:56 p.m. 1 four-horse wagon at same place. 2 p.m. 1 four-horse wagon Bois Rate Nonsard. 2:27 p.m. 1 four-horse wagon Nonsard to Bois Rate. 3:10 p.m. 1 four-horse wagon Bois Rate-Nonsard. 3:25 p.m. 1 two-horse wagon Nonsard - Bois Rate. 3:50 p.m. 1 wagon Nonsard - Pannes.

5. WORK. Working party on wire entanglement and telephone line 505.355. Fresh dirt and logs at 503.332. Wire party opposite H-2. Four new pieces of timber (?) at 556.336.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Four flamenwerfer left by the enemy in front of our line on March 1st were brought in at 3 p.m. March 7th.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet, except for infantry activity.

Correct Spelling

* THIAUCOURT -
*1 MENIL la TOUR

jd.
S.G.W.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, Mch.7-8.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to Report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine guns suspected at 547.329 which fired several bursts during the night. No winged bombs or grenades reported. Bursts of machine gun fire during night opposite F sector.
(b) Artillery:

4	77s.	On H-2.
2	77s.	On Ramboucourt*
46	77s.	On ?
1	105	On F-2.

at 6:18 p.m. enemy started bombardment of batteries on Ramboucourt* - Beaumont Road, using gas shells; approximately 150 shells fired in volley; about 120 gas shells on same batteries at 11:00 a.m. March 8th.

3. AERONAUTICS: At Beney, balloons up for a short time at 5:00 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: Men. One man walking on parapet opposite H-1, killed by our sniper. 20 horsemen from Pannes to Nonsard at 10:00 a.m. 8 men from Beney to Pannes at 10:20 a.m. 50 men from la Marche*1 to Pannes at 10:22 a.m. 10 horsemen from Pannes to Nonsard 10:45 a.m. 2 horsemen from Pannes at 11:00 a.m. 20 men from Nonsard to Bois de Pannes. Trains: 1:30 p.m. freight train of 25 cars from Pannes to Nonsard. Wagons: 2:30 p.m. 2 wagons from Maizerais to Essay*2 10:40 a.m. 1 4-horse wagon from Nonsard to Pannes 10:55 a.m. 1 4-horse wagon from Pannes to Nonsard 11:05 a.m. 1 2-horse wagon from the Bois de Rate 11:16 a.m. 1 4-horse wagon from Nonsard to Pannes 11:22 a.m. 1 two horse wagon from Pannes to Nonsard.

5. WORK: 2 men working at 549.329; heard stakes being driven beyond first line trenches of enemy all night opposite F-2.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Smoke in enemy trenches at 552.233, at 626.327, at 529.328 and 303.333, believed heavy artillery being moved into Nonsard Woods 538.408, 9 p.m. red rocket seen at Richecourt; 2:12 a.m. 3 star rockets sent up by enemy in front of F-2, other flashes at regular intervals all night.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

Correct Spelling - * RAMBUCOURT

*1 LAMARCHE

*2 ESSEY

- S.G.W.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, March 8-9.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine guns active during the night in front center H. At 1:20 a.m., working party at 583.334, consisting of 25 men, was fired at by our men in listening post. At 8 a.m., patrol of 2 infantry men and 2 red cross men came out to remove two enemy bodies. This patrol was not molested. Sniper located at 572.332 in our wire. (b) Artillery:

9	?	Bois de Jury.
12	77s	"
20	105s	Seicheprey.
20	77s	Xivray.
4	77s	H-1.
5	77s	H-2.
20	gas shells on Ramboucourt*.	
800	to 1000 shots from T.M.B. on Bois Carre.	
Heavy barrage on centers H and I-6:10 p.m.		

3. AERONAUTICS: 10:17 to 10:30 a.m., two enemy planes going south from Xivray. Balloon at Creue up 11:56 a.m., down 1:12 p.m. Observation balloon at Beney during afternoon. Three single planes flew south over our lines.

4. MOVEMENTS: None to report.

5. WORK: Working party wiring at 518.315.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Smoke seen Richecourt 6:37 a.m., also at 355.233. In trenches opposite H-3 steam seen rising, presumably pump engine.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

NOTE: Report incomplete on account of the 28th Infantry's report not being in by 4 p.m.

ADDITIONAL: 1. General impression of the enemy's attitude: Aggressive.

2. Activity of Infantry: (a) Movement: 3 p.m., smoke seen in left part of Richecourt. 8:15 a.m., 1 German seen carrying another (dead or wounded) from front line trench east to St. Baussant. 6 men seen entering Richecourt from right part of town. 4 men working east of St. Baussant. 4 men working on what seems to be telephone wires east St. Baussant.

3. Airplanes: 12 noon, enemy scout planes patrolling our lines to 2 p.m. 4 enemy planes tried to cross our lines, but were driven off by our anti-aircraft guns. 4 p.m., observation balloon in rear of Beney.

* Correct Spelling - * RAMBUCOURT - B.R.L.

Intelligence Report.
First Division,
Summary of Events, March 9-10.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine gun emplacements believed to be at 576.513. Several bursts during the night were fired from this point. Enemy is shooting a 3-star rocket which is also our call for bringing down a barrage. The usual number of flares and Very lights.
(b) Artillery:

37 105s on Bois de Jury	23 105s on 1 bis position in F
62 77s on Bois de Remieres	
56 105s on Ct. Jury-Remieres	25 ? on I-1
20 150s on Seicheprey	325 105s on Xivray
25 77s on 1 bis position in F center.	
3. AERONAUTICS: 11:25 a.m., 2 enemy airplanes circled over our lines, one of them flying low. Used his machine guns against our front lines. Heliograph from Lahayville was signalling to enemy planes at 10:40 a.m. Balloon up at Creue 4:40 p.m., down 5:05 p.m.
4. MOVEMENTS: Few isolated men seen moving during the day.
5. WORK: What appears like a sniper's post being built in a tree in edge of Bois de la Sennard at 589.339. New dirt seen at 582.344 and 513.316. 2:16 p.m., men working in trench at 545.332 Enemy seen throwing dirt out of trench at 513.314.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: 3:15 p.m., heavy smoke seen in Richecourt. At 554.331, puffs of steam seen against opposite H-3 presumably steam-engine pumping water. Very lights appear to be shot from second line trenches.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY; Quiet.

Intelligence Report.
First Division.
Summary of Events, March 10-11.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: An address on an envelope found in enemy trench by our raiding party confirms the position of the 259th Reserve Infantry Regiment in front of F-2.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Light machine gun activity in front of entire sector. Usual flares and rockets.

(b) Artillery shells:

60	77s	and 150s	on Bois Remieres.	15	105s	Center F-2
20	77s		E.of Beaumont	5	77s	Rambucourt
12	105s		E.of Beaumont	30	?	Rambucourt
6	77s		W.of Beaumont	10	77s	1-1
25	77s		Seicheprey	4	77s	Bouconville

Heavy barrage on H-1.

3. AERONAUTICS: Between 9:35 A.M and 2 P.M., 5 enemy planes flew over our lines apparently taking photographs and making observation. Balloon up at Creue 2.20 P.M. Down 3:40 P.M. up again 3:55 down 4 P.M. Balloon at Hatton Chateau*up at 4 P.M., down at 6 P.M. Balloon up at Beney several times during the afternoon.

4. MOVEMENTS: One man seen crawling in camouflage suit at 523.326, 4:40 P.M. Sniper fired three shots 526.327, 5 P.M. More working parties seen at 565.355.

5. WORK: Two small parallel trenches connecting shell holes at 573.333. New dirt and two men seen shovelling at 512.313. Enemy seen throwing sticks out of trenches at 517.314.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: At 5:50 A.M., our artillery dropped a heavy bombardment and barrage on salient Remieres. A few pieces of paper were picked up. (We forwarded 32nd Corps of the French Army. Address on wrappers gave 259th Res. Inf. Regt.) When our gas shells were thrown into Rayville* at 5:55 A.M., six green rockets went up. During the barrage 8 orange and 6 white flares resembling sausages were sent up.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct spelling: HATTONCHATEL
* " " : LAHAYVILLE.

B.R.L.

First Division.
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, March 11-12.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: The raid carried out by our infantry in the salient of Richecourt found the trenches practically abandoned. About 10 men were seen, 4 of whom were killed in shell holes in which they had taken refuge. Intermittent bursts of machine gun fire, Center F, between 7:50 and 8:20 A.M.

(b) Artillery:

40	150s	Bois de la Hazelle	15	150s	Seicheprey
60	77s	Bois de Remieres	60	77s	I-1
182	105s	Bois de Remieres	45	(of which 25 were gas) on	
20	150s	Bois de Remieres	battery at Rambucourt		
			2	77s	Rambucourt.

Considerable number of trench mortar shells at Bois Carre and Bois de Remieres, F-1, and seeming to come from left of St. Baussant and Bois de la Sonnard.

3. AERONAUTICS: 3 enemy airplanes over our lines during the day. Balloon at Beney, up 5:40 P.M., down 5:50 P.M. Balloon at Heudicourt, up at 2:05 P.M.

4. MOVEMENTS: One group of 4 men were seen running from trench W. of Meizerais* 574,374, at 5 P.M./ Heavy traffic heard during the night back of enemy lines opposite Center F. 5:44 P.M., one train going N.W. from La Marche*1

5. WORKS: Steam engine at work in St. Baussant. Camouflage put up at 559.352 along road.

6. MISCELLANEOUS. Observation during the two raids made on March 11 seems to indicate that the enemy rockets have the following significance: Call for barrage, 2 red flares; call for gas, 1 green rocket; caterpillar rockets denote "all clear". A number of 6 star rockets, chain sausage, and orange flare, were also used.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct spelling: MAIZERAIS.

*1 " " : LAMARCHE.

B.R.L.

First Division,
INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
Summary of Events, March 12-13.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmed by shoulder straps from enemy dead in front of Center H.

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Short bursts of machine gun fire over Center F, 3 enemy snipers at 541.329, - driven out by our 37 mm. gun.

(b) Artillery:

20	105s	Havelle*
20	77s	East of Beaumont.
35	105s	East of Beaumont.
12	150s	East of Beaumont.
30	77s	North of Beaumont.
30	77s	West of Seicheprey.
40	77s	I-1

3. AERONAUTICS: Usual activity of enemy planes over our lines. Balloon at Beney up 4:01 P.M., down 6 P.M., Balloon at Heudicourt up 3:34 p.m., down 8:25 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: Few isolated men seen in communicating trenches. No wagon or train movements reported.

5. WORK: What appears to be new line of trenches seen at 551.333. New work, possibly emplacement, at 565.348. Work continued on 3 trenches constructed during the night of the 11th, resembling gas projector trenches, seen at 584.344. New wire being put up in front of Lahayville.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Numerous indications seem to point to relief having been made in front of Center H. on night of 11th. An escaped prisoner Gustav Buchler of 113th Res. Regt. was recaptured at Raulecourt by sentinel and forwarded to 32nd Corps. Heavy explosion followed by smoke at Richecourt at noon.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

jd. * Correct spelling: HAZELLE.

B.R.L.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
Summary of Events, Mch. 13-14.
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Various indications of a relief in front of F-2. Confirmation required.

(a)

2. ACTIVITY OF ENEMY: / Usual bursts of machine gun fire particularly during the night in H. Center. Party working in trench 541.328: covered by snipers in camouflage suits: dispersed by our 37 mm. guns.

(b) Artillery:

15	77s. Rambucourt.	10	77s. H-1.
16	77s H-2.	32	77s. Jury.
23	77s Center H.	50	150s. Center H.
53	77s. Remieres	46	77s. Hazelle.
42	? Hazelle.	35	105s. Beaumont.

Harassing fire on Center H. in answer to our barrage.

3. AERONAUTICS: 3 enemy planes over our lines from Noon to 3 p.m. 2 enemy planes over our lines from 9:45 P.M. to 10:15 P.M. One dropped signals of 3 and 5 star white lights. Balloon at Beney and Heudicourt up at intervals from 2:30 to 5:30 p.m., and the latter up from 8:45 until 10:10 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: Usual movement of isolated men in communication trenches. Exceptional number of movements and noises of enemy in front of F. Center. Unusual number of enemy seen observing our lines.

5. WORK: New work on trench at 565.355, going to Quart de Reserve.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet.

jd.

[REDACTED]:

First Division
Intelligence Report,
Summary of Events,
March 14-15, Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Identity disk found on the body of a man of the 79th Pioneer Company in front of F-2 confirms the order of battle. This man was presumably killed the night of March 13.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Short bursts of machine gun fire from 516.315. Snipers active opposite I-3.
(b) Artillery:

2	105s Bois de Hazelle	36	105s Jury-Remieres
37	77s " " Remieres	65	77s Beaumont-Hazelle Road.
20	77s Bois de Jury.	27	77s N. of Beaumont.
		10	77s Beaumont.

3. AERONAUTICS: Between 12.30 and 3.35 p.m., enemy planes flew over our lines. Balloon at Beney up 12.54, down 1.06 p.m. Balloon at Hatton-Chatel* up 8:30, down 10:30.

4. MOVEMENTS: 12 men seen walking in open entering trench at 570.346. Two men at 558.332. Two men at 550.329. Four men N.E. of Richecourt. One wagon Pannes-Nonsard seen at 567.386. Horse with two men Nonsard to Pannes 564.387. Automobile with four men Nonsard to Pannes 564.387. This point has not been visible hitherto owing to the road being camouflaged; camouflage apparently broken down.

5. WORKS: New dirt at 586.335. Hammering on steel heard in enemy's second and third lines in front of F-1. Working party at 537.336.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Numerous signalxlights seen at Vigneulles, St. Baussant, Regnieville, Lahayville and Quart de Reserve. At 8:40 p.m., numerous signals seen between ground and balloon at Hatton Chatel*. Our artillery fired on supposed gas projector trenches E. of St. Baussant. A large flash was seen from point being bombarded. Two fires behind enemy's lines at 8:40 p.m., one behind the town of Montsec and the other to the extreme right of F-1, apparently in front of C. The fire in the vicinity of Montsec was in two tiers, the first being in a straight line as if from a straight trench with 116 separate fires in it; the second was 200 yards to the rear of the first with 34 distinct fires. These fires threw a powerful blast and had the appearance of a forced draft being yellow, then red and then green, as if the heat were being blown out. Dense volumes of smoke rolled up in a Southwesterly direction. There was a signal light to the right of this line of fire which kept continually signalling from observation balloon at Hatton Chatel*. Upon the fire of our artillery, the flames were brightened. The fire to the right of our sector was to all appearances a replica of the one described above, both being reported out at the same time, 11 p.m.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct spelling: HATTONCHATEL.

B.R.L.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, March 15-16
Noon to Noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: At 5:45 A.M. the enemy dropped a box barrage around F-1, taking in Bois de Remieres and extending beyond Sybille*trench in F-2. Barrage lifted at 6:15 A.M. Only 6 of our men were caught in the barrage, who reported having seen about 8 of the enemy, upon whom they fired. 5 of the enemy are reported to be dead in our wire. Considerable damage done to our position by enemy bombardment of Bois de Remieres. Snipers active from 6 to 8 A.M. in front of H-2. Usual machine gun activity.
(b) Artillery:
1,500 to 2,000 shells, 77s, 105s, and 150s on Bois de Remieres.

50	150	Jury Remieres	45	105s	S. of Beaumont
12	105s	E. of Beaumont	16	77s	N. of Beaumont
300	150s	E. of Beaumont	30	105s	1 bis position
58	77s	S. of Beaumont	125	77s	Center I
3. AERONAUTICS: 1 enemy airplane over our lines at 4 P.M. Balloon at Beney up at 5:20 P.M., down at 6:04 P.M. Balloon at Heudicourt up at 7:05 A.M., down at 7:30 A.M.
4. MOVEMENTS: More isolated men seen moving around than usual. A party of 30 men, divided into 3 groups, seen at 551.387, 7 men at 574.372, carrying sacks and lumber. 1 company of infantry going from west to east at Hatton-Chatel*¹. 6 wagons seen at Nonsard between 10:30 and 10:50 A.M. Caisson and 6 horses on road N. of St. Baussant going to wood at 575.355. 7 wagons seen at Maizerais and Nonsard during the afternoon. 1 train N. of Nonsard at 6:18 P.M.
5. WORK: New work at 575.369 and at 545.345. What appears to be 3 tunnel entrances are located at 503.332, 501.331, and 502.332. 6 men working at 538.331. 7 men digging in gravel bank N.W. of Bruxieres*².
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Searchlight on Montsec active during the night. At 8:05 A.M. boards with red and white cloth attached were put up in front of enemy lines.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet, except for artillery activity in F-1.

* Correct spelling: SIBILLE.
 *1 " " : HATTONCHATEL
 *2 " " : BUXIERES.

B.R.L.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, March 16-17
Noon to noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Usual bursts of machine gun fire during the night. Machine gun located at 58.6--33.4. More flares than usual during night.
(b) Artillery:

18	105s	Bois de Remieres	41	77s	Xivray
15	77s	E. of Beaumont	62	77s	Ramboucourt*3
68	105s	E. of Beaumont			Beaumont Road
222	105s & 150s	E. of Beaumont	96	77s	Center I
15	150s	S. of Beaumont	16	105s	Marvoisan*

 Enemy artillery is registering on Xivray, on communicating trenches in Center I-1, and I-2, leading toward Xivray.
3. AERONAUTICS: 11 enemy airplanes were over our lines between 10:20 A.M. and 3:15 P.M. Balloon at Heudicourt up at 9:50 A.M., down at 6:20 P.M. Balloon at Beney, up at 10:50 A.M., down at 6:53 P.M. Balloon at Hatton-Chatel*1, up at 1:04 P.M., down at 3:21 P.M.
4. MOVEMENTS: Visibility very good and considerable movement in rear of the enemy's lines was seen. 6 men in full equipment seen going into Quart de Reserve, 9:35 A.M., 40 men going N.W. on road from Bruxieres*2, followed by several mounted men. 11:15 A.M., 8 men going west out of Bruxieres*2. 2 wagons seen on Pannes-Nonsard road. 11:23 A.M., 1 Decauville (narrow-gauge railway), 6 wagons (cars) from Euvezin to Essey. 11:27 A.M., 1 Decauville, 13 wagons, Heudicourt to Vigneulles. 1:02 P.M., 1 Decauville, 6 wagons, Vigneulles to Heudicourt. 1:48 P.M., 1 Decauville from Heudicourt to Vigneulles. 2:25 P.M., 1 Decauville, 6 wagons, Essey to St. Gibrin. Narrow-gauge railway N.W. of Bruxieres*2. Bodies of troops going west on Bruxieres*2 road.
5. WORKS: New work in progress from 57.7--33.4 to 56.3--33.5. New dugout at 54.2--34.2. Working parties of 12 men digging trench west of Hatton-Chatel*1.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Our patrol was unable to find the enemy bodies reported yesterday to be in our wire. Enemy patrol tried to bomb our listening post in front of H-2.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

- * Correct Spelling: Marvoisin
- *1 Correct Spelling: Hattonchatel
- *2 Correct Spelling: Buxieres
- *3 Correct Spelling: Rambucourt

B.R.L.

[REDACTED]:
First Division
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, March 17-18,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine gun fired intermittent bursts on gaps in our wire between Bois de Remieres and Bois de Jury. A few winged bombs in Bois de Carre. (b) Artillery:

30	105s Jury-Remieres	360	105s Center F.
12	77s Bois de Remieres	44	105s H-2
520	77s, 105s and 150s E.	15	77s I-1
	of Beaumont.	8	77s I-2
32	77s Beaumont		
5	105s "		

3. AERONAUTICS: 10:40 a.m., two enemy planes driven back by our anti-aircraft guns. 11:20 a.m., one enemy plane from N.E. going W. 11:45 a.m., two enemy planes over our lines dropped two smoke rockets over H-1 and one over H-2. 1:10 p.m. to 3:20 p.m., five enemy planes over our lines. Balloons at Beney, Heudicourt and Hatton-Chattel* up during the greater part of the day until 9 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: Visibility very good. Several isolated men seen in the trenches and back areas. Three men at 55.4-33.1 were fired on by our snipers; one man was seen to fall. Four mounted men seen at 56.9-36.4. 15 covered wagons at 53.6-35.2. One wagon at Pannes. 5:04 p.m., one train from Vigneulles to Sebastopol.

5. WORK: New camouflage at 54.5-34.7. Fresh dirt at 60.5-33.2 and 54.0-33.8. What appears to be four parallel trenches at 58.0-34.4. The mill at 56.9-36.4 is still the center of work by infantry. At the following points, work resembling welding is still in progress W. of St. Baussant; 55.9-33.8, 54.5-33.2, 53.0-33.2. Working party of 20 men at 53.5-33.5. One party of 8 men at 53.9-33.8. Party of 12 men carrying materials to 53.9-33.8. Four men working at 53.9-33.1. Five men working at 53.1-33.2.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Three enemy snipers' posts were located by one of our patrols in front of I-2. Smoke seen at 55.1-32.9, at 56.2-33.5, at 53.6-34.7, at 56.9-36.4, at 54.2-33.1, and at 53.95-32.95.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Hattonchatel

B.R.L.

Intelligence Report.
First Division.
March 18-19, Summary of Events,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Usual bursts of machine-gun fire. Enemy machine-gun emplacement for two machine guns found at 53.03-35.10. Enemy sniper located at 56.3-33.4.

(b) Artillery shells:

2	77s on trench Jury-Remieres.	58	77s on Beaumont
31	105s on Do.	64	105s on Do.
25	105s on Bois de Jury	30	77s on Seiche-
22	150s on Do.		prey.
16	105s on Bois de la Hazelle.	20	77s on Xivray
		12	77s on Rambu-
			court.

A large number of gas shells were fired into the Bois de Remieres about 4 a.m.

3. AERONAUTICS: Five enemy airplanes crossed our lines during the day. Balloon at Heudicourt up 1:52 p.m., down 4:15 p.m. Balloon at Beney up 1:06 p.m., down 1:10 p.m. Balloon at Hattonchattel* up 1:09 p.m., down 2:45 p.m. Two enemy airplanes brought down French plane in course of aerial combat.

4. MOVEMENTS: 3:02 p.m., 20 men leaving Nonsard. Several isolated men seen moving during the day. 7:15 a.m., one wagon entering Nonsard. 1:50 p.m., one wagon leaving Nonsard. 3 p.m., one wagon entering Nonsard. 4:10 p.m., 3 ammunition wagons left Nonsard going N.W. and entering woods. One Decauville: 12 wagons went from Heudicourt to Vigneulles. Visibility poor.

5. WORK: Camouflage placed in tree, probably sniper's post, at 55.2-35.3. Apparently a camouflage O.P. at 56.3-33.0. New dirt thrown out of a front line trench E. of Lahayville from 57.0-33.6 to 57.5-33.6. 8:10 a.m., party of 15 men working at 55.1-33.2. New work at 51.5-34.9 and 52.2-34.2.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: An airplane dropped several rubber balls 18 inches in diameter and filled with liquid mustard gas in I-2.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Hattonchattel

B.R.L.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Mar. 19-20
Noon to noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Usual bursts of machine-gun fire throughout the night.
(b) Artillery shells:

100	77s	Bois de Remieres	10	77s	Vouconville*
49	77s	Jury-Remieres	95	105s	Seicheprey
35	77s	Seicheprey	10	105s	On trench at
10	77s	On trench at Seicheprey			Seicheprey
9	77s	E. of Beaumont	42	105s	S. of Seicheprey
			10	105s	E. of Beaumont
3. AERONAUTICS: 2 enemy airplanes flew over our lines at 8:30 a.m. and fired into our front line trenches.
Balloons: Heudicourt, up 8:35 a.m. down 9:18 a.m. up 9:40 a.m. down at noon. Hatton-chattel*¹, up 8:30 a.m. down 8:45 a.m. up 9:20 a.m. down 9:32 a.m. Beney, up 12:55 p.m. down 1:07 p.m. up 8:05 a.m., down 9:45 a.m.
4. MOVEMENTS: Usual movements of isolated men in communicating trenches and along paths throughout the day.
4 wagons moving west from 59.2-39.1 between 1 and 2 p.m.
Gun and caisson moving west from same point at same time.
15 men in single file from 54.3-34.0 to 54.7-34.1. Smoke observed at 57.4-34.6, at 57.7-34.1. Steamy smoke from Lahayville, 56.9-33.9, at 2:35 a.m. Train smoke going west in Bois de Thiaucourt at 2:40 p.m.
5. WORK: 4 men carrying material at 54.1-33.4, at 11:56 a.m. A round mound of earth observed at 55.1-32.9. Working party of 7 men engaged at 55.5-33.5.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Searchlight on Montsec active during the night.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Bouconville
*¹ Correct Spelling: Hattonchattel

S. G. W.

First Division
Intelligence Report.
Summary of Events, March 20-21,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Deserters to 69th French Div. confirm the order of battle.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Short burst of machine gun fire on H-Center at one-hour intervals throughout the night.

(b) Artillery:

Jury,	16	77s, 3	105s
Bois Remieres	6	"	
Seicheprey	92	"	
Trench Seicheprey	22	"	
Trench Lahayville	37	"	
Beaumont	82	"	8 105s
Hazelle	33	"	
Battery 16 and 17	--		
" " " "	--	29	105s
Battery 15	--	20	105s
" 12	6	"	6 105s
Region of Bat'y.199	12	"	

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: Increase in traffic and movement S. of Richecourt. 37 men observed moving through Bois du Malines C.T., to the front lines towards Richecourt. Smoke observed at usual points. Heavy clouds of smoke observed arising from Bois de la Sonnard. Train observed in Bois de la Sonnard going West. 4 trains arrived in Pannes at 1:40 p.m. from N.E. Heavy smoke from locomotives observed back of Bois de l'Etang at 2:25 a.m. 5 wagons observed enroute to Pannes while passing point 59.1-38.6.

5. WORK: One man observed working on telephone lines at 59.2-37.9. 2 men stretching wire on sticks at 54.1-34.2. Fresh earth to the W. of old mill at St. Baussant. Repairs to mill roof. Noise resembling pounding of iron and the sound of a rock-crusher at St. Baussant heard by patrols. This report verified by listening post.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Statements made by prisoners captured by the 69th French Div.: Prisoners were members of the 11th company, 259th Res. Inf. Regt., 78th Res. Div. The 259th Res. Regt. is holding the portion of the line extending from the N.E. corner Bois de la Jury to Len-ozeau monde* trench. About 1000 rounds of front with one battalion in the front lines, one in support, and one in reserve. The battalion in line had two companies in the front line, two in support at St. Baussant. The battalion in support was located in Bois de la Sonnard. The battalion in reserve was in rest billets at Bouillonville*¹ Village. The period of relief is normally 8 days. They knew of no attack planned against this sector and understood there was to be a simulated one. Prisoners could give no explanation of the activity reported by our observers in area St. Baussant-Montsec, but stated that no gas attack was planned. The gas projector attack made against our line on the night of the 26th-27th February was made by 900 projectors. Prisoners claim that about one-half of the bombs fell in their own lines into which they were unable to go for 2 days. In digging out the

Projectors,

- 2 -

projectors, a blind shell exploded killing 10 and wounding 30. The projectors have been shipped away. Confirmation of our report of March 7 as regards silent raid by 30 of the enemy was obtained.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Correct Spelling: Le Nouveau-Monde

*1 Correct Spelling: Bouillonville

S. G. W.

HV

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, Mar. 21-22
Noon to noon

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Machine guns very active during the night.
(b) Artillery:

39	77s.	N.W. of Bois de Jury	57	77s	E. of Beaumont
55	77s	Bois Carre--Bois de Remieres	9	105s	E. of Beaumont
137	77s	S. of Bois de Jury	18	77s	Bois Carre
65	77s	Seicheprey (Gas)	19	105s	Bois Carre
90	105s	Seicheprey (Gas)	6	77s	Rambucourt
18	77s	Trenches N. of Seicheprey	6	105s	Rambucourt
			2	105s	E. of Malvoisin*
26	105s	Trenches N. of Seicheprey	50	105s	Bois de la Hazelle
			29	105s	Battery 24
8	77s	Trenches NW of Seicheprey	60	105s	Battery 180
50	77s	Area Beaumont-Seicheprey			
7	77s	Beaumont			
3. AERONAUTICS: 4 enemy planes flew over our lines at 10.15 p.m., 1 at 1.10 a.m. Balloon at Heudicourt, up 6:26 p.m., down 7:25 p.m.
4. MOVEMENTS: Enemy patrol of 10 men observed in our wire S.E. of Richecourt. Usual movements of isolated men in C.T.'s, and along paths throughout the day. 15 men observed going from St. Baussant to Maizerais along the line of Decauville passing behind 57.9-35.0. Battery located near 58.5-38.7, observed to move after being subjected to fire of our artillery. Smoke observed at 57.5-34.0, at 51.5-31.3, 51.6-31.3, at 53.5-33.3.
5. WORK: Large working parties digging and hammering heard from the first and second line trenches to the S. and E. of Richecourt by our batteries. Working party observed at 53.9-32.9, at 1.555 p.m. Man carrying lumber and working at 53.5-33.1, at 3:49 p.m. A camouflage screen has been erected at 54.5-33.1, during the night. 2 men were driving stakes at 53.3-33.3. Working party of 5 men draining a trench at 53.4-33.3.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Visibility poor.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

*Correct spelling Marvoisin.

B.R.L.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events, March 22-23,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmed by the capture of prisoner, night of March 22-23.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Searching machine-gun fire at intervals throughout the night on trenches between Jury and Remieres. Trench mortars fired on our wire N. of Seicheprey.

(b) Artillery:

Bois de Jury	18	105s	Beaumont	20	77s
Bois de Remieres	4	105s	Do.	20	105s
Trench Remieres	18	77s	Beaumont quarry	10	77s
Region of Seicheprey	300	77s	Trench at Lahay-		
"	"	150	(mostly gas) ville	10	77s
Seicheprey-Beaumont	100	77s	Rambocourt*	6	77s
"	"	112	Xivray-Marvoisin	27	77s
Region of Beaumont			Do.	10	105s
and Bois de Hazelle	118	77s			
Do.	30	105s			

3. AERONAUTICS: 3 planes passed high over our lines at 4:10 p.m. coming from the N; circled and returned. 2 planes from the N. circled over our lines at 5:20 p.m. One enemy plane going S. passed over our lines at 9:30 a.m. Noise of enemy airplanes going S heard at 10:10 p.m. Balloon at Heudicourt broke loose from its moorings and fell in no-man's land at 52.6-32.2. It was completely destroyed by our artillery.

4. MOVEMENTS: One Decauville heard going from Maizerais to St. Baussant. 10 a.m., 5 men observed at 53.4-33.2. 8 men going N. at 53.2-33.8. 15 of the enemy at 20-pace intervals observed moving N.E. at point 58.8-43.0. Smoke observed at 53.5-33.1 Heavy smoke seen in Lahayville 56.8-33.9 at 6:40 p.m. Bugle heard in St. Baussant at 11:05 a.m.

5. WORK: A new C.T. at 58.6-33.5. New trench at 58.8-33.9. New dirt observed along trenches at frequent intervals S. of Bois de la Sonnard; also our front line at 58.5-33.4, and 59.2-33.2. Sounds resembling concrete working and digging and pounding coming from trenches S. of Lahayville.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Information obtained from prisoner captured last night March 22-23 in attached report.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

Attached report of prisoner: Report on the examination of a prisoner captured by the 26th Inf. night of March 22-23. Name, Severin Bauer; Landersdorf, Rhine Province, 6th Co., 2d Bat., 258th Res. Regt., 78th Res. Div. Age, 21½ years, captured at 56.1-35.1. He was one of two sentinels in a listening post at this point. Prisoner gave considerable information in regard to the defences of his battalion sector. This information is plotted on map attached to report. He states that the battalions are in the line for 20 days at a time. His battalion came into the line on the night of March 4-5; relief being completed between 4 and 5 a.m. 2 battalions are in the line and one in rest. One or two companies are at Essey and Pannes. The route followed by the relieving battalion is the main highway from Pannes and Essey through Maizerais, St. Baussant, Lahayville to Camp Demoulin near Richecourt. The next relief is due on the night of March 24-25 and is presumably completed between 4 and 5 a.m. The noises which have been reported in the neighborhood of the mill at Richecourt are caused by

- 2 -

the making of chevaux de frise which are riveted together and carried out where they are used. Wire entanglements are being put in between the first and second lines running N.E. from 56.0-33.0 at Camp Demoulin. Only one bridge across the Mad is passable. This is the bridge at 55.6-32.6, 2 bridges at the Scierie (mill) having been destroyed. These bridges prisoner said are made of planks and are from one to $1\frac{1}{2}$ meters wide. The only batteries of which the prisoner knows are S. of Pannes and are already plotted on the 1 to 20,000 plan directeur. The morale of the prisoner's battalion is apparently good.

*Correct spelling Rambucourt.

B.R.L.

First Division,
Intelligence Report,
Summary of Events, March 23-24,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Trench mortars fired on our wire N. of Seicheprey.

(b) Artillery:

Bois de Jury	10	150s	Beaumont	475	77s
Jury-Remieres	3	77s	Do.	200	105s
Seicheprey-Remieres	17	105s	Do.	2	150s
Seicheprey	3	105s	N. of Beaumont	60	105s
E. of Beaumont	18	77s,	Rambucourt	20	77s
Do.		105s	Do.	10	105s
Do.	14	150s	Xivray	21	77s

3. AERONAUTICS: Single enemy plane high over our lines coming from the N. at 9:25 a.m., 11:26 a.m., 2 p.m., 3 p.m., and 4 p.m. 2 enemy planes from the N. circled over our lines at 10 a.m. One enemy plane from the E. passed over our lines at 11:46 a.m. 7 enemy planes flew over our lines E. to W. at 6:30 p.m. A balloon at Heudicourt up from 10:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., 4:21 to 4:54 p.m., and from 5:05 to 5:35 p.m. A balloon at Hattonchatel up from 11:14 a.m. to 4:50 p.m. Balloon at Beney up from 3:15 p.m. to 3:35.

4. MOVEMENTS: Greatly increased number of individual movements observed. 50 men in 3 groups observed at 59.6-38.6 at 3:57 p.m. going toward Pannes. 2 companies marching in 4 groups with wagons and lorries seen at 59.6-39.2 at 6:10 p.m., going W. from Pannes. 10 enemy seen going E. 57.5-35.5 at 4:46 p.m. 4 of the enemy seen at observation tower near Hattonchatel at 4:58 p.m. Enemy signalling to plane observed 58.6-35.2 at 5:02 p.m. 60 men with 3 wagons observed at 3:45 p.m. and 60 men with 4 wagons at 5:19 p.m., going from Euvezin toward Pannes. At Decauville, 7 cars from Heudicourt to Vigneulles at 3:14 p.m. Numerous wagons seen going to and from Essey.

5. WORK: New dugout under construction at 53.9-33.8. 5 new saps appear in front line in front of St. Baussant 58.1-33.3 to 57.8-33.7, turning behind enemy's line in front of Bois de Remieres. Work continued in enemy's front line at night in vicinity of Richecourt. New work observed at 54.3-33.2 and 54.1-34.1. Work being done behind camouflage at 50.2-33.2 and 55.3-33.8. Sound of sawing wood, hammering and movement of sheet iron heard by patrol in front of H-2. Sound of sawing wood N. of Lahayville heard by patrol.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: At 11 p.m., airplane was observed at great height to shut off his motor, volplane, and throw out over the Beaumont-Jury Road bombs which exploded in the air, giving out a reddish-blue cloud which came down and spread. It is believed to be gas. Visibility good. Two dead men (see Summary, March 16, 1918,) found in our wire. They belonged to the 259th Res. Inf. Regt., 79th Pioneer Company.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Slightly increased activity.

Intelligence Report.
First Division.
March 24-25, Summary of Events,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: 7 trench mortar shells fired from Allemande trench at 56.5-34.0. Intermittent machine gun fire during the night.
(b) Artillery:

20	77s	Jury	15	105s)	
103	105s	Jury-Remieres	13	150s)	Richecourt
3	77s	Hazelle	6	77s)	
16	105s	Seicheprey	40	105s)	Rambucourt
2	105s	E. of Beaumont	12	77s	Hill 242

400 105s, 230 150s, 70 77s and 205 shells of unknown calibre were fired upon our batteries during the day.
3. AERONAUTICS: Enemy observation and photograph plane passed over our lines from N.W. to S.E. 2:32 p.m., 3:45 p.m., 4:10 p.m., 6:10 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. One enemy plane engaged by three French planes N. of our lines at 12:40 p.m. was brought down out of control near Beney. Enemy plane sighted to the N. of our lines at 3:50 p.m., 5:05 p.m., 5:31 p.m. Balloon at Onville-Waville up at 3:10 p.m., down 7:20 p.m. Balloon at Heudicourt up 4:41 p.m., down 7:25 p.m. New balloon sighted at Woel up 5:11 p.m., down 7:25 p.m. Balloon at Quart de Reserve up at 5:30 p.m., down 7:25 p.m.
4. MOVEMENTS: Following traffic observed on road; Benney* to Pannes between 3:00 and 6:00 p.m., one small automobile, 16 lorries, 5 wagons all turned up road at 59.3-40.6 and continued to Lamarche. From Pannes to Beney between 3 and 3:30 p.m., 4 lorries, 4 wagons turned off at 59.3-40.6 toward Lamarche. 1 Motorcycle and 1 wagon from Pannes to Beney 3:15 p.m. Vigneulles to Nonsard between 4 and 5 p.m., 3 automobiles, 5 lorries and 1 motorcycle. From Nonsard to Vigneulles between 4 and 5 p.m., 4 lorries 1 six horse caisson and gun. From Pannes to Bouillonville, at 3:25 p.m., general movements of isolated groups of men in trenches and along paths. 11 enemies emerged from ravine at 58.0-33.6 and disappeared at 59.9-35.4. 26 men went from Bouillonville to Pannes at about 3 p.m. 1 platoon left Pannes at 5:10 p.m. 32 men entered Pannes at 5:51 p.m., accompanying 5 caissons. At 3:30 p.m., about 50 men passed point 58.17-36.90. During the night our listening posts heard sounds of artillery and wagons moving behind enemies lines.
5. WORK: Wire working parties heard near Lahayville early at night. Working parties of 12 men observed on front line trench at 54.8-32.9, men were using saws and hammers. Enemy sniper's post located at 55.7-32.7. Fresh dirt at 51.1-31.2 and 51.5-31.2. Working parties of 25 men engaged in constructing a dump at 49.2-34.2. The following positions discovered, probable machine gun positions at 50.1-30.1 and 49.9-32.9. Tunnel opening at 49.9-32.8. Small camouflage at 50.4-33.2. Probable observation post consisting of small camouflage tower 470 yards west of Montsec church.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Searchlight on Essey active about 7:45 p.m. Visibility good after 3 p.m.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

*Correct spelling Beney.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
First Division.
March 25-26, Summary of Events,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Very quiet throughout the day and night. About 30 grenades thrown from sniper's post at 58.6-33.4 against one of our posts following an explosion of shots.

(b) Artillery.

15	77s)	Bois de Jury	30	77s)	Bois de Remieres
38	105s)	do	40	77s)	do
13	105s)	Seicheprey	3	150s)	at trench Remieres
5	150s)	Seicheprey	31	77s)	do
12	77s)	Beaumont	5	150s)	trench Lahayville
28	105s)	do	148	77s)	Rambucourt
5	150s)	do	8	105s)	Xivray
22	77s)	Rambucourt Xivray	30	77s)	Bouconville
15	77s)	Bois Chanot	29	77s)	Hazelle

Battery 21, 9 77s, 11 105s, 10 150s. Battery 45, 10 77s 10 105s.

3. AERONAUTICS: 1 enemy plane very low over our lines going N. at 5:12 p.m. 1 enemy plane attempted to cross our line from N. at 11:47 a.m., driven back by anti-aircraft guns. Single enemy plane high over our line from W. to E. at 6:08 p.m., 11:10 a.m. and 11:35 a.m. Balloons observed: None.

4. MOVEMENTS: Following traffic observed on road behind enemy lines: Euvezin to Pannes 1 automobile, 8 wagons at 6:15 p.m. Heudicourt to Nonsard 2 wagons, 1 at 10:32 a.m. March 25: 1 at 6:45 p.m. 2 ammunition caissons left Nonsard at 3:05 p.m. and disappeared in the Bois de Pannes, 54.1-37.6. Bouillonville* to Pannes 1 wagon 6:45 p.m. Trains: 1 at 8:56 a.m. and at 6:58 a.m. 1 train observed going N.W. from Vigneulles at 6:14 p.m. Smoke observed at following points: 55.9-35.3, 56.4-34.0, 56.9--33.8, 53.3--33.2, 52.7--32.7 during the day.. Usual movements of isolated groups of men.

5. WORK: Enemy trench at 55.5-32.7 in very good condition well riveted and drained. Wire in front of this point also in good condition, there being 4 belts. The inner belt is very thick and strong. Wire at 56.0-33.3, 55.8-32.8 in bad condition. New work at 59.3-33.2. Suspect new dugout at 56.8-34.2 was observed. The enemy was working on his second line S. of St. Baussant.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Heliograph at Vigneulles sent the following message in Inter-national Code at 2:10 p.m:
F 6 3 2 4 5 - - 9 3 2 3 4 5 - - 3 L L L - - 1 2 9 6 8 - -
F 3 3 3 - - 9 - 6 6 6 - F 7 8 2 4 end of message. 4 explosions seen in Richecourt at 4:21 p.m. at 3 minutes intervals. Visibility good throughout the day. Fair this morning.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* - Correct spelling: BOUILLONVILLE.

S. G. W.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
First Division.
March 26-27, Summary of Events,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Usual machine gun fire. Trench mortar fired a number of shells into Bois de Remieres. Our patrols entered the enemy front lines at Richecourt and Remieres salient finding no enemy.
(b) Artillery:

26	77s-105s-150s East of Beaumont.	145	150s N. of Beaumont.
5	150s Seicheprey	8	77s Beaumont
27	105s-5 150s Rambucourt	30	Center H unknown
200	105s Center I		calibre
		99	77s on H-1.
			(barrage on H 1.)
3. AERONAUTICS: 1 enemy plane crossed our lines at 8:33 a.m. driven back by anti-aircraft guns. Balloons, Heudicourt up 8:30 a.m. down 8:50 a.m. Beney up 2 p.m. down 3:55 p.m. Lamarche up 4:20 p.m. down 7:05 p.m. Pannes up 7:58. 2 new balloons reported to be in ascension, 1 to the right of Beney and 1 at Woelville.*
4. Movements: Usual number of isolated men seen in C.T.'s. and in back areas. 4:25 p.m. 50 men seen in trenches at 57.0-35.8. 20 men left Monsard going toward Thiaucourt at 2:30 p.m. 4 men on horse-back and 12 men on foot going toward Pannes at 5:08 p.m. 20 cavalry from Bouillonville to Pannes 5:10 p.m. 6 groups of horse-men on the road to Pannes 5:15 p.m. 16 wagons going between Pannes and Monsard during the morning. 8 wagons from Bouillonville to Pannes at 5:15 p.m. 1 caisson 59.4-39.2 at 7:21 a.m. 7:27 a.m. 5 wagons Pannes to Lamarche, 8:36 a.m. train to Vigneulles. 3 p.m. trains Heudicourt to Vigneulles. 8:12 a.m. train Lamarche to Pannes. 4 trains seen during the day on narrow gauge railway N. of Montsec.
5. WORK: Work going on at 56.8-38.6 possibly machine gun emplacement. 6:20 p.m. working party of 8 men 53.2-33-5.
6. MISCELLANEOUS: Considerable more movement has been noticed in enemy's front line trenches during the day. Visibility fair.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* Probably WOINVILLE.

B. R. L.

First Division
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Summary of Events, March 27-28,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: 2 machine guns opposite F-1 swept Bois de Remieres at irregular intervals during the afternoon. Few bursts of machine gun fire Center H. during the night. Trench Mortars constantly shooting from 1 to 6 a.m. on C. T. at Bois de Jury. Gaps in enemy wire in front of F-1 still open.

(b) Artillery:

Bois de Jury	10	77s.	Seicheprey	25	105s.
Bois de Jury	26	105s.	Marvoisan	47	77s.
Bois de Jury	6	150s.	I-1 (Xivray Courtine-Est)		
Bois de la Hazelle	190	105s.	.	73	77s.
C.T.; Jury-Remieres	8	77s.	Bouconville	6	77s.
C.T.; Jury-Remieres	9	150s.	Rambucourt	15	77s.
E. of Beaumont	235	150s.			

3. AERONAUTICS: At 8:10 a.m., 8:51 a.m., and 9:35 a.m. an enemy plane attempted to cross our line but was driven back by anti-aircraft gun. 9:55 a.m. 2 enemy planes flying high towards the south. 2 p.m., 2 enemy planes crossed our line. Balloons: At Hatton-Chatel* up at 10:45 a.m., and not reported down; Heudicourt, up 4:15 p.m., down 5:45 p.m.

4. MOVEMENTS: Usual movements of isolated men. 5 men with new uniforms upon parapet at 56.8-35.1, at 10:45 a.m. About 300 horsemen at 59.5-38.0 going towards Essey. 2 men carrying camouflage at 58.2-37.7, at 7:07 p.m. 6 men ran away from 53.2-33.2, being shelled by our artillery. Wagon going S.W. at 55.4-38.5. 2 wagons going E. and 2 W. at 59.5-39.2 at 3:48 p.m. 2 camions going towards Pannes at 59.4-39.2, at 4:08 p.m. 1 wagon from Lamarche to Pannes, at 4:50 p.m. One 8-horse caisson at 59.4-39.3. 5:55 p.m. camion going E. at 59.4-39.3. 11:15 a.m. train going E. from Vigneulles. 10:06 a.m., train going W. through Bois de Thiaucourt. Smoke from trains in Bois de Thiaucourt at 1:20 and 2:50 p.m.

5. WORK: 10 men at work at 58.2-37.7. 9 men working in trench at 53.3-33.2. Fresh dirt at 53.5-33.2 and 53.2-33.2.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Visibility fair. One of our patrols found an enemy listening post at 51.4-31.2, in bushes. Two belts of enemy wire at 51.4-31.3, found to be electrified, burning hands of the leader of the patrol. A dead French Soldier found in the wire near this point.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

jd.

* Correct Spelling: HATTONCHATEL.

B. R. L.

First Division,
Intelligence Report,
Summary of Events, March 28-29,
Noon to Noon.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE: Statement of prisoner taken March 28-29 shows that the 181st Regt., 40th Res. Div. has relieved the 260th Res. Regt., 78th Res. Div. The 260th Res. Regt. is now at rest.

2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: 9:45 p.m., the enemy placed a normal barrage on F-1 between Bois de Jury and Remieres accompanied by searching machine-gun fire. The enemy reported at this to be attempting a raid up the draw between the two woods. In response to our barrage, the enemy's barrage ceased. No raid took place.

(b) Artillery:

Jury	91 77s,	23 105s	Beaumont	63 105s
Hazelle		55 105s	Xivray	15 105s
Trench Remieres	50 77s,		Cortine	*14 105s
Seicheprey		18 105s	Beauqueteau	9 77s
W. Beaumont		813 105s	Rambucourt	1000 high
E. Do.		51 105s	explosive gas and	
			incendiary shells.	

3. AERONAUTICS: Enemy plane passed over our lines going S. at the following times: 9:05 a.m., 10:05 a.m., 11:05 a.m., 11:30 a.m., 12:55 p.m., 1:55 p.m., 3 p.m., 3:15 p.m., 7:08 p.m., and returned apparently observing and photographing. Balloons: at Beney up 11:05 a.m., down 5:05 p.m. Heudicourt up 11:10 a.m., down 4:45 p.m. Vigneulles up 12:20 p.m., down not observed.

4. MOVEMENTS: 12 horsemen apparently officers, Montsec from the N. at 11:40 a.m. Usual movements of enemy in C.T.'s, and along paths in the rear throughout the day. Wagons: Nonsard to Vigneulles, 4 wagons at 9:15 a.m. 9 a.m. into Essey 20 wagons from the S. Euvezin to Pannes, 4 wagons at 9 a.m. One auto from Bouillonville to Pannes and returned to Bouillonville between 11 and 12 noon. 12 lorries and 20 wagons to Pannes at 6 p.m. from the N.E. Trains: Pannes to Nonsard at 10:40 a.m., Essey to Pannes 4:36 p.m., Pannes to Essey 4:36 p.m. Smoke from train from Bois de Thiaucourt 9:20 a.m., 6:42 a.m., and 11:10 a.m. Smoke of train E. of Bois de Thiaucourt at 11:20 a.m. Apparently train smoke in St. Baussant at 5 p.m.

5. WORK: Small pieces of timber have been placed before the enemy's wire at 53.1-33.0. Shell hole in Montsec Cemetery wire filled in during the night. New dirt observed at 53.3-33.1 and 54.2-33.0. Small working parties observed at 53.2-33.2 at 8:45 a.m. Working parties observed 49.4-33.1 at 8:50 a.m., 49.8-33.0 at 9 a.m.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Visibility fair. 4 prisoners were captured by one of our patrols the night of March 28-29 at junction of trench Des Sorciers and Le Nouveau Monde 58.2-33.3. The prisoners belonged to the 1st Co. 1st Bat., 259th Res. Regt., At the time of the completion of this summary, interrogation of prisoners had not been finished. The summary of information obtained will follow later.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet, except heavy shelling of Rambucourt and Beaumont.

Correct Spelling - *BOQUETEAU -

B. R. Legge,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events March 29-30, 1918
Noon to noon.

1. ORDER of BATTLE: Nothing to report.
2. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Nothing to report.
(b) Artillery:

Remieres	15	77s	S.W. Jury	15	77s	
Bois Carre	20	77s	Beaumont	70	77s	119 105s
C.T.Remieres	15	105s	Rambucourt	50	77s	22 105s
Seicheprey	25	77s	12	105s		
Trench Seicheprey			Battery o	30	77s	
	8	77s	Battery 19	20	105s	

3. AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4. MOVEMENTS: The following trains observed in rear of enemy's lines. Pannes to Nonsard, 1 at 8:00 a.m. Train to Thiaucourt; 1 at 9:40 a.m. Thiaucourt* to Pannes, one at 11:18 a.m., 1 at 12:08 a.m., 1 at 6:45 p.m. Dampvitoux to Lachaussee 1 at 10:58 a.m., Heudicourt to Hattonchatel 1 at 5:40 p.m. Nonsard to Vigneulles 1 at 6:00 p.m. The following wagons observed. Essey Flirey 1 at 8:50 a.m. Bouillonville to Pannes 8 wagons, 1 caisson. 1 motor car during day. Pannes to Nonsard 3 wagons during day. 12 wagons reported moving from Montsec to Richecourt at 8 p.m. stopped at 54.3-33.2 and unloaded. Unusual movements of isolated men in C. T.'s and around tracks in front area. Two companies infantry in column of squads from train to Bouillonville at 6:25 p.m., one company infantry in heavy marching order from Bouillonville to Essey at 7:05 p.m.

5. WORK: No new work or working parties observed during the day. Noise of wagons hauling material, pounding of hammers etc. heard behind and along the line of the enemy's front during the night.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Searchlight active Heudicourt. Heliograph flashed messages from Vigneulles at 10:25 p.m. Visibility poor.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Quiet.

Erratum: 2nd line Par. 1. Summary of Events March 28-29, "Res" should be struck out after 40th, change to read 40th Div. instead of 40th Res. Div.

Correct Spelling - THIAUCOURT -

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

First Division
Intelligence Report
Summary of Events-March 30-31, 1918
Noon to Noon.

1: ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.

2: ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY: (a) Infantry: Sharp and intermittent bursts of machine gun fire during the night.

(b) Artillery:

C.T.Jury-Remieres	13	105s	Hazelle,	75	77s	30	105s
Jury	3	77s		95	150s		
Tr. Seicheprey	0	77s	Cortine	12	105s		
Xivray	34	77s	Battery 17	18	77s		
Beaumont	19	77s	Battery 19-21	60	150s		
Rambucourt (vicinity			Battery 12	17	77s		
of Regimental P.C.)	234	77s					
Sth of Lahayville	8	77s	4	105s			

3: AERONAUTICS: Nothing to report.

4: MOVEMENTS: Trains Thiaucourt to Chambley 1 @ 12:05 p.m. 1 @ 1.25 p.m. Chambley to Thiaucourt 1 @ 1:45 p.m. Chambley to Vigneulles 1 @ 12:27 p.m., 1 @ 2:34 p.m., 1 @ 5:28 p.m., 1 @ 7:00 a.m., 1 @ 10:15 a.m. 1 @ 11:08 a.m., Lignellé* to Chambley 1 @ 12:42 p.m., 1 @ 3:40 p.m., 1 @ 5:36 p.m., 1 @ 7:00 a.m., 1 @ 7:45 a.m., 1 @ 9:10 a.m. Decauville-Essey-Thiaucourt, 1 @ 2:00 p.m., Pannes to Lamarche, 1 @ 11:45 a.m., Nonsard-Essey 1 @ 7 p.m., Mesieres-Essey*1 1 @ 6:25 a.m. Several Decauvilles observed circulating between Doimartin, Charry, Danpvitoux*, Lachaussee and Rambucourt. 5 stopped at approximately 51.5-31.0. Wagons: Pannes to Bouillonville 4 @ 12:22 p.m., 2 @ 12:37 p.m., 2 @ 12:45 p.m., 2 @ 1:59 p.m., 2 @ 2:15 p.m., Bouillonville to Pannes 4 @ 12:22 p.m., 2 @ 12:30 p.m., LaMarche*2 to Nonsard 1 @ 1:50 p.m. Nonsard to Lamarche 1 @ 12:25 p.m., Pannes-Essey 2 @ 6:20 p.m. Essey-Mesieres*1 2 @ 6:30 a.m., Nonsard 57.3-36.7. Two wagons loaded with camouflage. Troops: Usual movement of men, motor cars, horsemen, etc., noticed behind the lines. Four companies of infantry entered Hattonchatel from Vigneulles @ 1:50 p.m.

5: WORK: Machine gun located near 51.5-31.3 German front line trench immediately in rear of Etain-deGrand-Croix*3, protected by electrified wire. Small working parties observed at 59.3-39.2, 58.4-34.3, and 57.7-35.8. Wagons unloaded at 56.9-34.7 LaMarche* and 56.8-38.0.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: Visibility poor.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet.

Correct Spelling

* Probably VIGNEULLES -
* DAMPVITOUX -
*1 MAIZERAIS-ESSEY
*2 Lamarche
*3 ETANG-de-GRAND-CROIX - S.G.W.

No. 57

Intelligence Section,
First Division, A. E. F.
April 2, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
April 1st-2nd (noon to noon).

I. ORDER OF BATTLE.
Nothing to report.

II. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.
(a) Infantry: Nothing to report.
(b) Artillery: 77 105 150

JURY		20	
C.T.JURY-REMIERES	15	65	
SIECHPREY*	77	30	
BEAUMONT	64	25	74
HAMONVILLE-MANDRES	40		
RAMBUCOURT	24	6	8
Tr. MARVOISIN	16		
XIVRAY	20		
Bty. 180	10		
Bty. 17			16
Bty. 24		28	

III. AERONAUTICS.
Nothing to report.

IV. MOVEMENTS.
PANNES-BENEY 1 truck. Usual wheel traffic on roads, behind the lines. Ten trains from CHAMBLEY to VIGNEULLES during the afternoon. Other railroad and decauville traffic below normal.

V. WORK.
Nothing to report.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.
Visibility bad.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY.
Quiet.

DISTRIBUTION

C.G. 1st Div.	
C.S. 1st Div.	
G.H.Q.A.E.F.	
1st A.C.A.E.F.	Correct Spelling - * SEICHEPREY - S.G.W.
1st Inf. Brig.	
2nd Inf. Brig.	
1st Arty. Brig.	
32 Corps	
10 Div	
69 Div.	
Esc. 228	
B Co. Balloon	
French Mission	
File	

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT LINE
TRENCHES

Intelligence Section Headquarters First Division
American Expeditionary Forces
France, April 2nd 1918.

Memorandum No. 17

Translation of an Order issued by the 32nd Army Corps on March 31st 1918:

"1. Relieved units should turn over to the units coming into the line, against receipt, the Codes Chiffres Telephoniques and Tableaux Reduits which are in their possession. The receipts should be forwarded to the Intelligence Section of the Army Corps".

"2. Relieving units should forward promptly, to the Intelligence Section of the Army Corps, a report indicating the new distribution of these documents, specifying in each case the name and status of the recipient".

It is requested:

a) that you forward the receipts obtained in compliance with paragraph 1. of the above order to the Intelligence Section First Division, which will in turn forward them to the Intelligence Section of the Army Corps:

b) that you turn over this Memorandum to the relieving unit, for their guidance in reference to paragraph 2 of the above order.

The C.A. of S. (G 2)

W. C. SHERMAN
Major, Corps of Engineers.

Memorandum.

Headquarters First Division, G 2,
American Expeditionary Forces.
April 2, 1918.

No. 17.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM
Army Corps to Hdq. 1st Division.

No. 7332:- Because of the present importance of obtaining identifications of the enemy units in line on our front, the Army will give, pending further orders, a reward of 250 francs for each prisoner captured in the course of patrols.

32 Corps

G 2

576 S/2

True copy sent to:

Commanding General, 1st and 26th Divisions,
A. E. F.

This reward will only be given for a few days. The points where it would be of the greatest value to capture prisoners are: APREMONT - GERECHAMP WOOD - SOUTH OF LAHAYVILLE.

H. Q., April 1st, 1918..
By Order of the Chief of Staff.
Signed: MAUGIN

G 2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
April 12, 1918.

The following abstract from G.H.Q.A.E.F. Summary of Information of April 11, 1918, is published for your information.

GERMAN RUSES ON THE BATTLE FRONT.

The enemy has adopted the plan, in connection with all of his recent offensives, of dressing spies in the uniform of officers of the Allied Armies, who advance with the attackers and who, in the confusion of the attack, seek to mingle among the Allied troops and give orders to officers and men to withdraw, - to the artillery to cease its fire and retreat, etc. These spies have also handed written orders and messages to Allied couriers who have carried them to neighboring units, ordering them to retire also, and giving false information to the effect that terrible reverses have been met, that the whole line is falling back, etc.

Farther behind the front these spies have sought to spread abroad, among both troops and civilians false accounts of reverses and heavy losses and, generally, to create a state of panic. These reports have in certain cases been carried and spread by Allied officers who believed them to be true.

To guard against these attempts at battle-field propaganda, the following orders were issued by the British Commander-in-Chief on April 5th:

"Whenever a message reporting the withdrawal of other troops or an order to, retire, is brought to a party of men, the bearer, whatever his rank, is to be taken to the Officer in Command on the spot. The latter will not act on the faith of the message or in compliance with the order until he has satisfied himself both as to the bona fides of the bearer and as to the genuineness of the origin of the message or order. If he finds the messenger's conduct to be unjustified, he will detain him in arrest, and take steps with a view to his trial by Court Martial.

Similar action will be taken with respect to any person spreading false, alarmist, or discouraging statements or rumors.

This order is to be promulgated in all units at frequent intervals, so that reinforcements may be made aware of it."

Distribution.

"C"

Intelligence
Section

Headquarters First Division
American Expeditionary Forces
France, April 13th 1918.

Memorandum No. 166.

1. Until such time as codes have been printed in English and issued within the Division, messages within the division that may not be sent in clear, will be sent in Playfair Cipher.

2. To use the Playfair Cipher, divide a large square into 25 small squares, as shown below.

Commencing at the upper left hand corner, write first the key-word and then the remainder of the alphabet in regular order, one letter per small square. Any letter repeated in the key word is omitted after its first occurrence. "I" and "J" are put in the same square.

Thus if the key-word is "AMEXFORCE" we will have:

A	M	E	X	F
O	R	C	B	D
G	H	IJ	K	L
N	P	Q	S	T
U	V	W	Y	Z

Now write your message in groups of two letters each. If both letters of a group are the same, place X after the first and use the second as first letter of following group. When a period occurs replace it with Q. Numbers must be spelled out.

Next, find equivalents for each pair of letters, in the following manner;

a) If both letters of a pair occur in the same vertical column of alphabet square, substitute for each the letter immediately below it. If one of them is at the bottom of the column, substitute for it the one at the top of the same column.

b) If both letters of a pair occur in the same horizontal line of alphabet square, substitute for each the letter next on its right. If one of them is at the extreme right of the line, substitute for it the one at the extreme left of the same line.

c) If the letters of a pair occur at opposite corners of a rectangle, each letter of the pair is represented by the letter in the other corner of the rectangle and in the same horizontal line with it.

Referring to alphabet square above we find:

A M	represented by	M E
F E	"	" A X
P R	"	" V H
O U	"	" G A
H T	"	" L P
L A	"	" G F. Etc..

Message having been enciphered as above is divided into groups of three letters each. Complete the last group if necessary by adding any one or two letters. The identifying group is placed before the first group and the signature group, if used, after the last. The message is then given to Signal operator as in case of a code message.

The message:

"Telephone lines cut. Need 20 repair men"

would be enciphered as follows:

TE IE PH ON EL IN ES CU TN EX ED TW EN TY RE PA IR ME NX
QF IF VP GU FI GQ XQ OW NP XF FC QZ AQ SZ CM NM HC EX SA

When handed to operator this will appear as follows:

HO QFI FVP GUF IGQ XQO WNP XFF CQZ AQS ZCM NMH CEX SAK KEL

"Send this message to First Division.

J.M.

Capt. 1st Inf."

3. The identifying group will be HO for official messages and HA for practice messages.

4. The key word will be changed from time to time. Till further notice it will be AMIENS.

April 13th

Received from G-2 First Division copy No.....,
Memorandum No. 116.

.....

.....

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
April 20, 1918.

G 2

Memorandum No. 21.

Subject: Instructions for Intelligence Service.

1. Reports.

(a) In all reports, the continental system of numbering hours from 0 to 24 will be employed.

(b) Daily written reports will be sent so as to arrive at Division P.C. by 12-30 o'clock. These will be sent direct by Intelligence Officers of all regiments in the line and by the Brigade Intelligence Officer, 1st Artillery Brigade to the Division. One copy only need be sent, which need not be typewritten. Reports will cover the 24 hour period from 10 to 10, and will be accompanied where practicable by sketches. Copies of the form to be used will be furnished by G 2.

(c) The Intelligence Officer of each regiment in the line will send a telephone message to the office of Division G 2 daily at 6-45 and 18-45 o'clock stating

- (1) Line held by our infantry at 6 and 18 o'clock;
- (2) Our order of battle;
- (3) Activity of the enemy infantry during the preceding 12 hours;
- (4) Activity of enemy artillery;
- (5) Activity of enemy aviation;
- (6) Circulation;-
- (7) Miscellaneous.

(d) In addition, all Intelligence Officers, must carefully instruct their men to communicate to our artillery, as soon as observed, by telephone priority, batteries in action, adjustment by aeroplanes, and any movement that can be fired upon by our artillery. The proper officers of artillery will then report as soon as practicable these facts to the Artillery Brigade Intelligence Officer, who will in turn report them by priority to the S.R.A. of the 6th Army Corps and to G 2, 1st Division.

2. Prisoners.

Prisoners in general will be searched as soon as possible. In a small operation this will be done by the Regimental Intelligence Officer at the regiment of Battalion P.C. In large operations they will be searched at points determined by the Army. In the former case, papers will be sent with the prisoners without delay to the Division P.C. together with a statement of the exact point where the prisoners were captured. Special points that regiments or brigades desire to be covered in the interrogatory will be requested of the Division G 2.

3. Photographs.

(a) In general photos will be distributed as follows:

1st Urgency: One print to Division G 2 and one to Division Artillery of the trenches and battery zones, as well as a sketch, showing photos taken, to the Division Artillery.

2nd Urgency: One print of trenches and sketch to Division G 2, one print of trenches to each regiment in the line, and one print of the battery zones and the sketch to each artillery battalion Commander.

(b) Units of this Division desiring photographs will send their requests to G 2. They will be accompanied by a sketch, 1:20,000, showing the zone to be photographed, and mentioning the exact points of particular interest. The order of urgency will also be given. In general requests should be submitted at the same hour as the daily reports.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

CAMPBELL KING
Chief of Staff.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
April 22, 1918

The following abstract from "Summary of Information" from G. H. Q. A. E. F. April 19, 1918, is published for your information

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFICATIONS

The far reaching value of identifying the enemy's units along all parts of the front, as well as in the rear areas, is rarely appreciated fully. Intelligence Officers should seek to bring home to the officers and men of their commands not only the importance to the army as a whole, of obtaining these identifications, but also its immediate application to the troops of the sector.

To the Army, identifications mean full knowledge of the disposition and movements of the enemy's larger units. Possessing this knowledge, it is easy to judge the enemy's intentions and plans, and by carefully gauging them, to bring them to nought. To lack this knowledge entails the danger not only of heavy losses, but of severe tactical and strategical reserves.

To the troops of the sector each fresh identification is a guaranty of safety, a guaranty that no surprise can be brought about by the enemy which the commander of the sector is unprepared to meet.

The means of identification should be impressed on all officers and men. A shoulder strap on a uniform, or an identification tag taken from a dead body might very easily, if promptly turned in to the Intelligence Officer, and as promptly reported by him, make all the difference between victory and defeat, might be the means of saving the lives of many thousands of our own men. Under these circumstances, no terms of condemnation are too harsh to describe the conduct of those who either wilfully or through ignorance betray their comrades and their country by pocketing as souvenirs these petty articles which possess for the moment such great military importance, if properly utilized. Any article of uniform or equipment obtained from the enemy may afford the means of securing an identification and should be presented immediately to the Intelligence Officer for investigation. The papers taken from prisoners, or from the bodies of the killed, including diaries, notes, letters, postal cards, and even picture postal cards containing nothing but an address, afford the means of obtaining numerous identifications and are of priceless military value.

It is as important for our success that these facts be made known to every officer and man who is to serve in the front line, as that they be trained in methods of attack and defense. Intelligence Officers should, therefore, use every opportunity to impress upon everyone, tactfully and forcefully, the importance and means of obtaining identifications.

EXTRACTS FROM INTERROGATORY OF GERMAN PRISONERS*

NOTE: Information is given below from prisoners of divisions that are now in line facing our sector, and such information as is of general interest.

1. 30th Division and 99th regiment of infantry.

The 30th division consists of the 99th, 105th and 143rd regiments of infantry and the 84th field artillery regiment (divisional artillery). It was commanded for a long time by General Von Gontard, but at present is commanded by General Von Graff. It took part in the Verdun offensive on the 21st of February, 1916 and suffered colossal losses. The division then rested six months in the Verdun sector (The regions of Vaux and Douaumont). After rest period it was engaged on the Somme at Gouzeaucourt up to the beginning of December, when it returned to the sector of Verdun where it relieved, on the 24th of December, the 39th Division, which had had enormous losses in October and December 1916. It then occupied the sector of Reims, then that of Ville-sur-Tourbe, each regiment passing ten days in line, ten days in reserve, and ten days at rest. On April 2 the division entrained in the region of Vouziers and detrained the next day in the vicinity of Laon, from which it proceeded by marches towards the front of attack in the region of Montdidier. The troops marched by day, in route column, making an average of fifteen kilometers per day, and cantoning in the destroyed villages. The prisoner states that he has heard that the 30th division was considered as a march division but not as an attack division (sturmdivision). The men were told that they would be employed only for the pursuit. But in view of the active operations the 30th division was filled up to its full complement of officers and men while it was in rest in February.

The field recruit depot had received an important reinforcement from the eastern front, and the regiments from this time on had their full complement of officers, particularly the fourth company which had three officers. Two platoons out of the three had formerly been commanded by a feldwebel. The squads had been reorganized and their strength uniformly placed at one non-commissioned officer and eight men.

The 99th regiment was engaged for the first time the night of the 9th and 10th of April. It relieved elements of the 169th regiment (52nd division) before Cantigny.

The 52nd Division had suffered severe losses from the French artillery. The company relieved by the 4th company of the 99th infantry regiment had only 50 men at the time of the relief.

The first battalion of the 99th is in liaison on the right with the first battalion of the 143rd and on the left with the second battalion of the 99th.

The 105th regiment also has elements in the front line to the south of Cantigny.

The men occupy shell holes, holding a line extending toward the west, and around from St. Aignan to Cantigny.

The prisoner states that little work has been done. He believes that it is not desired to permanently hold the line in the present situation. However, some low entanglements have been placed in front of the advanced trench. The fire of the French artillery caused marked losses; from the 10th to the 13th of April 25 men had been killed or wounded in the 4th company. On the other hand machine gun fire, in spite of its density during the night, had caused no losses.

The village of Cantigny, constantly bombarded and on fire, is untenable and has been partially evacuated.

The company commander of the 4th company remains with the reserve platoon; he had been seen in the line only one time in four days; the day after the relief. The prisoner had not seen his battalion commander since the entrance in the line of the regiment.

On April 13, at night the prisoner, detailed to carry soup, departed with his comrades. He was to have followed the edge of the Bois de Lalval and proceed to the kitchens of the company, which appear to have been, or to have come daily, to Framicourt. Having lost his comrades and being informed as to their whereabouts at the edge of the Bois de Lalval, near the machine guns of his battalion, the prisoner after having wandered to the edge of Cantigny, was seen towards midnight by a French patrol and captured at the south-west exit of the village.

The prisoner states that our fire, in addition to the losses it has caused, has considerably interfered with rationing: For two days out of four, the nightly coffee did not come to the trenches.

Our interdiction fire on the crossing of the Ruisseau-de-3-doms seemed effective: during the relief the 99th regiment had had losses in crossing the ruisseau, and the relief, on this account, had been long and difficult.

2. The prisoner from the 52d division states that the telephonic listening post which the Germans had installed, gave them warning of the relief of French troops on the Somme by British troops.

Information on the instructions given the 52d division for open warfare:

The first week was employed for the school of the company and school of the battalion. The division maneuver took place with an outlined enemy. The division was formed with two regiments in line and one regiment in reserve. Each regiment put two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve; each battalion, two companies in the first line and two companies in support. The machine gun companies marched between the battalions of the first line and the battalion in reserve, the light machine guns with the first line at the rate of one or two per platoon (the light machine guns are at the disposition of the company commander). The liaison detachments were taken from the units. Liaison was made by runners, the telephone being reserved for liaison from the battalion eschalon back. The optical signalling station was attached to each battalion. The prisoner did not think there was any liaison by wireless. Only the field artillery took part in the maneuver. The pioneer companies marched with the artillery.

HISTORY OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OF FOOT GUARDS.

The first guard division is commanded by Prince Eitel Frederick, son of the emperor, well thought of among the troops.

Commander of the 1st foot guards, Maj. Count zu Eulenburg.

Commander of the 3rd Battalion, Count Botersing.

Commander of the 9th Co. Lt. Ruhrich.

Commander of the 10th Co. Lt. Von Krowski

Commander of the 11th Co. Lt. Von Blankenstein

Commander of the 12th Co. Lt. Von Pluskof.

The regiment left the region of Charleville on the 11th at night. The 21st, the day the offensive began, division marched out in the direction of St. Quentin where it arrived during the night. It passed through this town, preceded by numerous troops, and arrived in the 2nd British position after having passed on the road many English prisoners. It continued to march, passing the 23rd at Rouppe; the 24th at Matigny where it was bombarded by aeroplanes. On the 30th they saw much field and heavy German artillery. On the 30th the important English dump in the neighborhood of the station of Hargicourt fell into their hands. The third Battalion marched for the lines on the 31st of March in order to relieve the 2nd Battalion which had been engaged on the 30th in front of Grisvenes.*1

The following details of the attack of the 31st of March on Grisvesnes*1 were given. After violent artillery preparation the attack was launched at noon. The entire third battalion was engaged: two companies in the first wave (9th and 10th), two companies in the second wave (11th and 12th), an echelon formation, the 9th company in front and towards the left flank. The three platoons of each company in the same line, each platoon in columns of skirmishers. Three light machine guns per company. No heavy machine guns and no Minnenwerfers. The prisoner states that his battalion attacked alone without liaison the night they left - the direction of the march being north-east, south-west. The attack was carried out brilliantly and in good order. After having crossed the park of the chateau the german troops were engaged to the right of the church of Grisvenes*1. They were taken at that moment in flank by fire of machine guns and automobile machine guns which broke down their spirit and caused them enormous losses. A squad of the 11th company had five men wounded and one prisoner out of a total of eight men. Lt. Blankenstein, commanding the 11th company, disappeared.

3. Sixth Bavarian Reserve Division, 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment. The prisoner joined the 16th Bavarian reserve regiment in February. He detrained about 5 kilometers north of Laon. Trains do not go up to the station of Laon which is in ruins and frequently bombarded by aeroplanes. The 16th Bavarian reserve regiment remained in rest in Laon (near the barracks to the 25th of February the date on which it relieved another regiment of the 6th division in the sector south-west of Chaillevois) The third battalion in the 16th was in line at the railroad south-west of Chaillevois, then in reserve at Molinchart, then in rest at Corny-les-Bussy where numerous inspections of equipment took place but no exercises looking towards a war of movement.

Relieved on the 16th, the regiment passed three days at Laon, then took a sector to the east of that which it formerly held. The 8th Company remains at Urcel as a counter attack company and was relieved by Prussian Land-sturm.

At Laon where the regiment returned on the 25th, Major von Tuboeuf, the regimental commander assembled the 16th regiment, and said that there was no reason to be downhearted because the regiment had taken no part in the offensive because each would have his turn and his part of the glory.

The regiment left Laon the 27th of March, by road, and by stages reached the region of Nesle, then that of Guerbigny-Leschelle-St.-Aurin*2 where it arrived on the 2nd of April. The prisoner states that his regiment was not engaged in the region of Coucy. Major von Toubeuf passed the regiment in review, explained the success already achieved since the 21st of March and said that the result of the offensive was good but not yet enough, that the battle was going to continue, but that the division, until further orders had only to hold its position. Afterwards Lt. Natter, commanding the 8th company, explained to his men that the Prussians whom they were going to relieve, became drunk in Montdidier, that they had lost their advanced positions and that the French attacks were very likely to continue.

On the night of the 2nd-3rd the 16th and 17th regiments relieved Prussian troops of the 206th division, south of the road from Fontaine to Belle-Assise. The prisoner states that he crossed Courtmanche*3, then followed the north-west edge of the Bois des voyeux and took up his position in the small wood 3598 where the company had, as its mission, to hold the ravine south-west of Fontaine*4. The wooded slope of the point 3095 was held by the 17th Bavarian reserve regiment.

Sector of the 16th Reserve regiment to the Southwest of Fontaine sur Montdidier*5. The regiment had, in addition to the battalion in the 1st line, a battalion in the outskirts of Fontaine (which being too heavily shot up, had had to be evacuated) and the third at Courtmanche*3 where also was located the P. C. of the Colonel.

The second battalion of the 16th remained 8 days in the first line. The 8th company having on its right the 7th, received the orders to organize in groups of 2 or three men without making continuous trenches.

By day each group detaches one sentinel at the northwest edge of wood 3598. By night each sentinel post is doubled.

The light machine guns were still first line at the rate of one per platoon. The heavy machine guns of the machine gun company of the battalion were in the rear near the sunken road 3403, placed in such a manner as to enfilade the ravine south of the Chateau-sans-Nom.

The kitchens came to the entrance of Fontaine along the road to Courtmanche*3 near the point 4207.

South of the road from Fontaine to Belle-Assise.

The prisoner states that he crossed Courtmanche*3, then followed the north-west edge of the Bois des voyeux and took up his position in the small wood 3598 where the company had, as its mission, to hold the ravine south-west of Fontaine*4. The wooded slope of the point 3095 was held by the 17th Bavarian reserve regiment.

Sector of the 16th Reserve regiment to the Southwest of Fontaine sur Montdidier*5. The regiment had, in addition to the battalion in the 1st line, a battalion in the outskirts of Fontaine (which being too heavily shot up, had had to be evacuated) and the third at Courtmanche*3 where also was located the P. C. of the Colonel.

During the first days the wood 3598 was not bombarded. But after that it was heavily shelled and the company lost about 20 men. On its right the battalion was in liaison at first with the 170th Infantry regiment, then with the 169th Infantry regiment. On its left were the 17th Bavarian Reserve regiment. The prisoner declared that he does not know where the 20th Bavarian regiment (reserve) is located.

Relieved during the night of the 10-11 by another battalion of his regiment, the 2nd battalion of the 16th went to the sunken road 395095 where there were already some holes. They should have remained there eight days but, having lost 15 men per company in 5 days, from our artillery fire, the battallian commander gave the order to withdraw towards the rear, and the battalion went to Courtmanche*3, where already were, in the cellars to the north of the village, the P. C. of the Colonel and the regimental dressing station.

The P. C. of the 8th company is on the farm 5408 (the building north of the court house, having a very good cellar). The company is established on the embankment south of the road from Montdidier, where it made some shelters with materials taken in Courtmanche*3.

The company has not had any losses other than ten or twelve men gassed during the night of the 15-16. In the other companies the losses have been heavier. The relief plan for the night of the 17-18 was much interfered with by the violence of our artillery fire.

The 8th Company did not arrive at the sunken road 3304 until about 5 o'clock in the morning.

The effective strength of the company on its entrance into line was about 100 men.

The 8th company has only one officer, Lt. Natter. The platoons are commanded by acting officers.

From the 2nd to the 18th of April the 8th company lost a total of about 50 men, almost half of its effectives. The prisoner does not think that the losses have been less in the other companies of the regiment. The general information of the prisoner is that the French attack predicted by his company commander on his entrance into the line was about to take place.

* This document was found without heading or date; the subject-matter and form indicate that it was issued by Headquarters First Division, in April, 1918.

*1 Correct Spelling - GRIVESNES -

*2 Correct Spelling - L'ECHELLE-St. Aurin -

*3 Correct Spelling - COURTEMANCHE -

*4 Correct Spelling - FONTAINE -

*5 Correct Spelling -
FONTAINE sous MONTDIDIER- Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
April 26, 1918.

G-2

Memorandum Number 21: Instructions for Intelligence Service is amended as follows:

Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph B, will be struck out and the following substituted for it.

"Daily written reports will be made by battalion scout officers to cover the 24 hour period from 6 to 6. Regimental intelligence officers will forward their consolidated reports direct to brigades. The regimental reports will cover the period from ten to ten, the battalion scout officer telephoning to the regiments events that happen between six and ten only when these are urgent in their nature. One copy only of all the above reports need be made. It will be sufficient to make them in pencil. The regimental report will arrive at the Brigade P.C. by noon. The regimental reports will be forwarded by brigade to the division P. C. so as to arrive by 13 o'clock. A report will also be sent by the First Artillery Brigade Intelligence Officer to G-2 Division so as to arrive by 13 o'clock.

Where practicable reports will be accompanied by sketches. Backgrounds for these sketches will be furnished by G-2 in limited quantities.

All reports will be made on the printed form which has been issued.

In paragraph 1, sub-paragraph C change the sentence "The Intelligence Officer of each Infantry regiment in the line" to read "intelligence officer of each infantry brigade in the line.

By command of Major General Bullard

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

With A.C. DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
lere Div. U.S. From April 26 (12 hour) To April 27 (12 hour
 (Unit) G-2

I INFANTRY

a) Enemy attacks

Nothing to report

b) Patrols

(Seen or heard by our sentinels) men left our lines from point 22.5 - 24.5 at 21 h 25 min. and proceeded to 22.7 - 29.9 where it was fired upon by enemy riflemen and a light machine gun. Patrol retired, leaving one man dead in the hands of the enemy, after having effected casualties. Enemy had a post near this point of from six to eight men and one light machine gun.

c) Infantry fire

Volleys, hand grenades;
rifle fire, trusts of M.
G. fire, indirect fire
of M.G.(....on such and
such a point....coming
from such and such a
point)

Nothing to report

d) Fire by Trench Mortars

(Point fired on, number
and calibre of bombs, Nothing to report.
origin of lire)

e) M. G. and Trench Mortars

exactly located Light machine gun near 22.9 -
(specifying whether old 29.9
or new. If practicable a
sketch to accompany)

II _ ARTILLERY

a) Activity of enemy artillery. (Note especially gas shells)

	Point of fall	Time	Number of shells	Supposed Calibre	Origin or supposed	Remarks - Note whether fire for adjustment, preparation or reply for our fire.
	Hill 100	Fr.				
	Ravine	6 h.		77s		
	south of	to	100	105s		
	Bois Can	12h				
	tigny-Vi					
	illers					
	Tournelle					
	Bois Fon					
	taine					
	S.E. Vil	12h.		77s		
	lers Tow	to		88s		
	rnelle,	21h.	150	105s		
	Hill 100					
	Bois Can					
	tigny,					
	Bois Fon					
	taine					
Front	Bois Can	21h.		77		
Position:	tigny	to	120	105		
	Bois Fon	23h.				
	taine					
	Villers-					
	Tournelle					
	Belle	8h to	100	77,		Harassing
	Assize*	21 h		105		
	Farm					
	Battery					
	P.C. North					
	Group	2 h.	20	150		
	Btry. 75	4h 40	2	150		
	at 11.6-					
	800					
REAR						
BATTERIES						

b) Total number of shells falling in sector

(From N. to S. in
each sector. A sketch
where practicable.)

(New earth, trenches, entanglements, camouflage, enemy posts)

One enemy heard working with
a pick near 23.0-29.9

Nothing to report

a) Visibility None

None	:	Poor	:	Good	:	Very Good
from....to....	:	from....to....	:	from....to....	:	from....to....

None observed

None observed

[illegible]

d) General impression of the circulation. (circulation normal, greater or less than normal, in certain directions)

a) Balloons

a) Balloons

[illegible]

b) Airplanes.

None observed

[illegible]

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

a) Order of battle,
prisoners, deserters.

Nothing to report

b) Observed results of
our fire on enemy
organizations

?? . ?? ??

c) Observatories located,
construction of telephone
lines, optic signal posts,
searchlights

FF **FF** **FF**

d) Requisitions for intelligence material.

FF FF FF

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION

Calm

OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

* Correct spelling: BELLE ASSISE.

S. G. W.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
April 27, 1918.

G-2.

Memorandum No. 21.

The following code names are assigned to units and localities:

UNIT	Infantry.	CODE LETTERS	UNIT	CODE LETTERS
1st Div.		FG	1st Bn. 106th H.A.	FIO
1st Inf. Brig.		MK	South Groupment(Maj.Quinton	FEO
16th Inf.		MK 1	3rd Bn. 106th H.A.	FNO
1st Bn.		K 11	1st Bn. 318th H.A.	FXO
2nd Bn.		K 12	Army Corps Air Service	FC
3rd Bn.		K 13	Sqd. 42	MG
18th Inf.		MK 2	64th Balloon Co.	B 64
1st Bn.		K 21	47th " "	B 47
2nd Bn.		K 22	89th " "	B 89
3rd Bn.		K 23	Distribution 1st Div.	
2nd Inf. Brig.		FF	Mesnil St.Firmin	BOSTON
26th Inf.		FF 1	Serevillers	PHILA.
1st Bn.		F 11	Mory	YONKERS
2nd Bn.		F 12	Broyes	Ft.WORTH
3rd Bn.		F 13	Bois de Villers	AUBURN
28th Inf.		FF 2	Qt.Belle Assise Fm.	HOBOKEN
1st Bn.		F 21	Quartier Kenifra	JERSEY
2nd Bn.		F 22	Villers Tournelle	BALTIMORE
3rd Bn.		F 23	Quartier Tetouan	ANNAPOLIS
45th Div. (French)		MX	Quartier Casablanca	ATLANTA
162nd Div. "		FA	Hill 126	NORFOLK
Divisional Inf.		MC	Coullemelle	RICHMOND
43rd Inf.		MC 1	Froissy	WASHINGTON
127th Inf.		MC 2	Mesnil & Bonvillers	CHARLOTTE
327th Inf.		MC 3	Chepoix	CHICAGO
97th Reg.Territorial		FD 1	Rocquencourt	SAN ANTONIO
112th Reg. "		FD 2	Thieux	CHARLESTON
Artillery.			St. Andre	SAVANNAH
Col.comdg.A.C.Artillery		FDO	Farivillers	TAMPA
1st Art.Brig.1st Div.		MDA	Bois Coulon	MOBILE
5th Art. Reg.		FRA	Gouy	MONTGOMERY
1st Bn.		MIA	Evanchaux	AUSTIN
2nd Bn.		FNA	Campremy	HOUSTON
3rd Bn.		MXA	Bacouel	CLEVELAND
6th Art. Reg.		MWD	Vendeuil Caply	TOLEDO
1st Bn.		FID	La Neuville St.Pierre	COLUMBUS
2nd Bn.		MND	Viefvillers	CORONADO
7th Art. Reg.		FZU	Noyers St. Martin	EL PASO
1st Bn.		FIU	C.G. or C.O.	JANUARY
2nd Bn.		MNU	Chief of Staff	FEBRUARY
Groupment A.C.11 (228)		FFK	Adjutant	MARCH
1st Bn.A.C. 11 (228 R)		MIK	Operations	APRIL
2nd Bn.A.C. 11 (228 R)		FNK	Administration	MAY
Arty. of 45th Div.		FDX	Intelligence	JUNE
3rd Bn.228 Reg. Arty.		MXK	Signal Officer	JULY
162nd Div. Artillery		FDR		
Field Art. P.C.		MFR		
8th Bn. of 101st Art.		FKR		
Col.comdg.6th A.C.H.Art		F00		
North Groupment(Col.Gros)		FEB		
5th Bn.85th Reg.H.A.		FIB		
6th Bn.		FBB		

6th A.C.
 1st Div., U.S. April 28, 1918.
 G 2. DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
 No.1 From April 27, 12 h. to April 28, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Enemy attacks: Nothing to report.
- (b) Patrols: One of our ambush patrols encountered a small enemy patrol at point 22.8-29.6 at 20-30 h. Our patrol opened fire whereupon the enemy patrol retired.
- (c) Infantry fire: Intermittent rifle fire during early hours of the night. Short bursts of machine gun fire from the chateau in Bois de FONTAINE and from other points in enemy's front line.
- (d) Fire by trench mortars: Nothing to report.
- (c) M.G. and Trench mortars exactly located: None.

II. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery:

Front Position:

Point of Fall	Time	No. of shells	Cal.	Origin	Remarks
BELLE ASSISE FARM	12 to 16h.	200	77-105		
BOIS DE FONTAINE	8 h.	9	77		
HILL 100	7 h.	15	105		Adjust.
BOIS DE CANTIGNY	8 h.	20	105		Harass.
N. W. CANTIGNY	9 h. to 12 h.	30	105		"

Rear Position:

BOIS DE COULON	6 h.	15	150		Harass.
BELLE ASSISE FARM	10 h.	4	77		Adjust.
ROCQUENCOURT					
(N.E. Entrance)	21 to 23 h.	26	105		Harass.
CHATEAU BROYES	11 h.	4	105		"
BROYES shelled during the afternoon with 77 & 105 about 40 in all.					
VILLERS TOURNELLE shelled 105 & 155 from 9 to 17 H. 240 shells.					

Batteries:

Bty. 75s	BOIS DE COULON	8 h.	30	150	Harass.

III. WORKS.

- (a) Advanced work: Nothing to report.
- (b) Rear works: 4 enemy seen working on probable battery emplacement at 26.4 30 5 at 14-10 h.

IV. CIRCULATION

- (a) Visibility: Poor 12 to 12 h.
 - (b) Circulation in front lines: Nothing to report.
 - (c) Circulation in rear zone:
- FIGNIERES-ETELFAY 12-43 h. 1 horseman going northeast at 29.5-31.6

V. AIRCRAFT.

- (a) Balloons: Nothing to report.
- (b) Airplanes:

Pt. of Ob.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
24.94	9-45 h.	2	Enemy lines to east	None	No action
24.94	22-45 h.	2	" " "		"
24.94	12-25 h.	1	Over our front line		Flying very
24.94	19.10 h.	1	Over enemy lines	"	high.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Our artillery fired with good results on MESNIL ST. GEORGES and on S.E. part of CANTIGNY at 5 h.
- (c) Optic signal post east edge of MONTDIDIER flashed a message to west edge of same at 0-45 h.
- (d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery active, infantry quiet.

Distribution.

C. G. 1st Div.
C. S. " "

G 1

G 2

G 3

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1st A.C.A.E.F.

6th A.C. French

1st Art. Brig.

1st Inf. Brig.

2nd Inf. Brig.

16th Inf.

18th Inf.

26th Inf.

28th Inf.

1st Engrs.

G 2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
April 28, 1918.

Memorandum No. 22.

In Memorandum No. 21, G 2, these Headquarters,
April 27, 1918, note the following corrections and
additions:

First Column:

After "Field Art. P.C." insert 162 Div.
After "6th Bn." in last line insert "85th
Reg. H. A."

Second column:

South Groupment (Maj. Quinton) "FEO"
Quartier Kenifra not Quartier Kenefra
Quartier Tetouan not Quarter Tetauan
Bonvillers not Mesnil & Bonvillers
Farivillers not Farivellers
Gouy not Souey
Campremy not Camfremy

1st Div., U.S.
G 2
No. 2

April 29, 1918

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From April 28, 12 h. to April 29, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Enemy attacks: Nothing to report
(b) Patrols: Nothing to report.
(c) Infantry Fire: Intermittent rifle fire during the night. Machine guns fired short bursts from 1822, 1817 and 1915 approximately on our 1st and 2nd lines. Six rifle grenades from 1822 fell on our first lines.
(d) Fire by Trench Mortars: Twenty-five T.M. bombs of undetermined calibre fell on 1611 from 20 to 22 h. These bombs came from 2425 (approximately)
(e) M.G. and Trench Mortars exactly located: Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery:					
Front Position:	No. of				
Point of Fall	Time	Shells	Cal.	Origin	Remarks
Bois de Fontaine	*	552	77, 105	Bois de Haras.	
				H.E. Gas Framicourt & Retal.	
O.P. 94.21		4	77	Bois de Harass.	
				Voyeux	
Bois de Cantigny		137	77, 105	Bois de "	
				H.E. Voyeux & "	
				Bois de "	
				Framicourt "	
Belle Assise Farm		45	77, 105,	" " "	"
			150	" " "	"
Trenches E. of Bois des Glands de Villers		675	105, 150	N.E. Can-	"
				tigny	
Vicinity of Bois des Glands		55	105, 150	Bois de Lalval & N.E. of Cantigny	"
Trenches S. of Bois des Glands de Villers		240	105, 150	N.E. of Can-	"
				tigny	
Rear position					
Villers Tournelle		490	105, 150	N.E. " " "	"
Serevillers		100	105, 150	" " " "	"
Broyes		150	77, 150	Chateau de Fontaine s. Montdidier	"
Bois de Villers		75	77, 150	N.E. Cantigny	"
Chepoix dump		30	150		
Rocquencourt		20	105, 150		"
Batteries:					
Btry. E/5 S. of Broyes		20	77, 105	Unknown	"
Btry. 48 W. of Broyes		17	150	"	"
Btry. III/228		50	105	"	"

* Firing fairly distributed day and night.

Total number of shells falling in sector: 2760

III. WORKS

- (a) Advanced works: Nothing to report.
(b) Rear works: Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility: Very poor from 12h to 12h.
(b) Circulation in front lines: One man observed moving from Cantigny to Cantigny cemetery at 11:25.
(c) Circulation in rear zone. Nothing to report.
(d) General impression of the circulation: None observed.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons: None observed.

(b) Airplanes:

Point of Observation	Time	No.	Region flown Over	Mission	Remarks
Villers-Tournelle	9-12h.	1	Whole sector	Spotting for Ar-	Fired on by M.G.
"	"	13-16h.	1	" "	tillery with no results.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Order of battle, prisoners, deserters: Nothing to report.

(b) Observed results of our fire on enemy: " "

(c) Observatories located, construction of lines etc. Nothing to report.

(d) Requisition for intelligence supplies: Nothing.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Inf. quiet, Artillery active.

G 2.

Memorandum No. 25

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
April 29, 1918.

This code is effective at once and supercedes those previously issued for use in this sector.

UNIT	CODE	UNIT or LOCALITY	CODE
1st Div.	FG	Bacouel	CLEVELAND
1st Inf. Brig.	mk	Bois Coulon	MOBILE
16th Inf.	MK 1	Bois de Villers	AUBURN
1st Bn.	K 11	Broyes	FT. WORTH
2nd Bn.	K 12	Campremy	HOUSTON
3rd Bn.	K 13	Chepoix	CHICAGO
18th Inf.	MK 2	Coullemelle	RICHMOND
1st Bn.	K 21	Bonvillers	CHARLOTTE
2nd Bn.	K 22	Evanchaux	AUSTIN
3rd Bn.	K 23	Farivillers	TAMPA
2nd Inf. Brig.	FF	Froissy	WASHINGTON
26th Inf.	FF 1	Gouy	MONTGOMERY
1st Bn.	F 11	Hill 126	NORFOLK
2nd Bn.	F 12	La Neuville St. Pierre	COLUMBUS
3rd Bn.	F 13	Mesnil St. Firmin	BOSTON
28th Inf.	FF 2	Noiremont	DULUTH
1st Bn.	F 21	Noyers St. Martin	EL PASO
2nd Bn.	F 22	Qt. Belle Assise Fm.	HOBOKEN
3rd Bn.	F 23	Quartier Casablanca	ATLANTA
162nd Div. (French)	FA	Quartier Kenifra	JERSEY
Divisional Inf.	MC	Quartier Tetouan	ANNAPOLIS
43rd Inf.	MC 1	Rocquencourt	SAN ANTONIO
127th Inf.	MC 2	Rouvroy	MARFA
327th Inf.	MC 3	St. Andre	SAVANNAH
97th Reg. (Territorial)	FD 1	Serevillers	PHIL'A.
112th Reg.	FD 2	Thieux	CHARLESTON
A.C. Artillery Comdr.	FDO	Varmaise	TACOMA
1st Art. Brig., 1st Div.	MDA	Vendeuil Caply	TOLEDO
5th Art. Reg.	FRA	Viefvillers	CORONADO
1st Bn.	MIA	Mory	YONKERS
2nd Bn.	FNA	Div. O.P. No. 1	OHIO
3rd Bn.	MXA	Div. O.P. No. 2	OKLAHOMA
6th Art. Reg.	MWD	Amm. Dump No. 1	AMHERST 1
1st Bn.	FID	Amm. Dump No. 2	AMHERST 2
2nd Bn.	MND	Amm. Dump No. 3	AMHERST 3
7th Art. Reg.	FZU	Div. M.G. Bn.	MINNESOTA
1st Bn.	FIU	1st Brig. M.G. Bn.	MALDEN
2nd Bn.	MNU	2nd Brig. M.G. Bn.	CORNEL
Groupment A.C. 11 (228)	FFK	Field Signal Bn.	BUFFALO
1st Bn. A.C. 11 (228 R)	MIK	Trench Mortar Bty.	TEXAS
2nd Bn. A.C. 11 (228 R)	FNK	Amb. Co. at Bacouel	BINGHAM
Art. of 45 Div.	FDX	Field Hosp. Bonvillers	FRISCO
3rd Bn. 228th Reg. Art.	MXK	Sanitary Train	DENVER
Art. of 162nd Div.	FDR	Ammunition Train	ALBANY
Field Art. P.C.	MFR	Hdq. Troop	DAKOTA
8th Bn. 101st Art.	FKR	1st Eng. Reg.	MAINE
6th A.C. H.A. Comdr.	FOO	1st Bn. 1st Engrs.	MAINE 1
North Groupment (Col. Gros)	FEB	2nd Bn. 1st Engrs.	MAINE 2
5th Bn. 85th Reg. H.A.	FIB	C.G. or C.O.	JANUARY
6th Bn. 85th Reg. H.A.	FBB	Chief of Staff	FEBRUARY
1st Bn. 106th H.A.	FIC	Adjutant	MARCH
South Group. (Maj. Quinton)	FEO	Operations	APRIL
3rd Bn. 106th H.A.	FBO	Administration	MAY
1st Bn. 318th H.A.	FXO	Intelligence	JUNE
Army Corps Air Service	FC	Signal Officer	JULY
Squadron 42	MG	Villers Tournelle	BALTIMORE
64th Balloon Co.	B 64		
47th Balloon Co.	B 47		
89th Balloon Co.	B 89		

1st Div. U.S. DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. April 30, 1918
 G 2 From April 29, 12h. to April 30, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Enemy attacks: Nothing to report.

(b) Patrols: Enemy patrol size unknown, approached one of our liaison posts at 2698. Enemy patrol called out "Kamerade", whereupon our post opened fire. Enemy fled, leaving behind one loaded rifle (C.G.HAENEL, SUHL, 1916) and 1 bayonet and belt. (forwarded with this report). One of our patrols (1 officer and 12 men) entered enemy's lines at 1912 and encountered a patrol of 40 Boche. Combat ensued, and enemy patrol retired, One Boche was killed, but it was impossible to recover his body. Evidence of another enemy patrol crossing our wire at 1619, wire cut and stamped down at this point.

(c) Infantry fire. No rifle or grenades fired. M.G.s at 2802 fired short bursts on our front line in Bois de Fontaine during early hours of the night. Light M.G. fire on western edge of Bois de Cantigny throughout the night.

(d) Fire by Trench Mortars: Nothing to report.

(e) M.G. and Trench Mortars exactly located: Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position:	No. of				
Point of fall	Time	Shells.	Calibre.	Origin	Remarks.
Bois de Fontaine	6-21	280	77, 105	Bois de Voyeux	Harass.
Bois de Cantigny	7-15	43	77, 105	Direction Woods 3204	"
Hill 100		70	77, 105		
Bois des Glands	11-12	30	77, 88	N. of Bois de Framicourt	Reg-
Bois de St. Eloi*	15-16	20	77, 88, 105		ulation.
Trenches E. of Villers Tournelle	8-24	380	105, 150, gas.	Unknown	Harass.
Rear Position.					
Mesnil St. Firmin	12-24	23	105, 150	Unknown	Harass.
Chepoix	Int.	10	150	"	"
Bois de Herelle	Int.	14	105	N.E.	Cantigny (Harass. & (reply to our fire
Villers Tournelle & Hill 124	10-23	210	105, 150	" "	"
Bois de Serevillers	Int.	50	105	" "	"
Batteries.					
49, N.W. of Broyes	20-23	12	150	Unknown	Harrassing.
48, " " "	(11-12	3	150	"	"
	(14-16	5	150	"	"
	(4-7	9	150	"	"
Btrys. N.E. & E of Plainville	Int.	21	210	"	"
S.E. Villers Tournelle	13-16	70	105	N.E. Cantigny	Reply to our fire.

(b) Total Number of Shells Falling in our Sector: 1323

III. WORKS

(a) Advanced works. Nothing to report.

(b) Rear works: Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility. Poor from 12 h. to 12 h.
- (b) Circulation in front lines. Nothing to report.
- (c) Circulation in rear zone: Nothing to report.
- (d) General impression of the circulation. Nothing to report.

V. AIRCRAFT.

- (a) Balloons. Nothing to report.
- (b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Ob.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
O.P. Marcelle	11-23	1	Front of sector	Observ.	Not fired upon by
1523					A.A., nor
O.P. Marcelle &			" " "	"	attacked
O.P. Paul 0406	13.45	1	" " "	"	by our
O.P. Marcelle &	15.23	1			planes.
Paul					
Broyes.	18.15	1	Flying high,	could not be	seen. Fired
					on by our
					M.G's.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

- (a) Nothing to report.
 - (b) Results of our fire on enemy: Artillery fire on enemy M.G's. at 1882, not effective.
 - (c) Observatories etc. located. Nothing to report.
- VII (GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Infantry quiet. Artillery - Less active.

* Correct spelling: BOIS ST. ELOI.

S.G.W.

Intelligence
Section

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, April 30, 1918.

Memorandum No.18.

Subject: Codes.

1. The Commanding General, 32nd Army Corps, has issued an order prescribing that all copies of Code Chiffre Telephonique Series 54 be turned in to the Intelligence Section of the 32nd Army Corps on the 5th of April.

2. It is requested that you forward to the Intelligence Section First Division, by return courier, the copy of the above code which was issued to you, or, in case the copy was turned over to a unit of the relieving Division, the receipt received from that unit.

The A.C. of S. G-2.

W. C. SHERMAN
Major, Corps of Engineers.

To all Commanding Officers of Infantry and Artillery
Regiments and Brigades.

Tell your men that Boche prisoners, captured by the French say that on our front they never get a hot meal, and that they are so shot up by our artillery they have lost all communication with their rear, and as isolated units, have to get along as best they can. They have lost heavily.

R. L. BULLARD

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* This announcement was undated but was issued probably early in the occupation of the Cantigny Sector.

S.G.W.

G 2.

No. 4.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 1, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From April 30, 12 hr. to May 1, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Patrol of 10 enemy attacked our liaison post at 2306 at about 3 h. Our patrol killed one man and wounded 3 others. The attackers were dispersed without loss to our side. Identifications obtained from the body confirming the order of battle. FRUER, Alfred, 6th Saxon Inf.Reg., 1st Co., (105 R.I.), 30th Div. Inf.

(c) Intermittent bursts of machine gun fire throughout the night on our front and support lines.

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Old machine gun emplacement at 2804, in the edge of the woods, is still being used.

II. ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of enemy artillery:

Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks
Casablanca	11 h.-16 h.	65	77-88	Bois de FALVAL*	Harass
	2-50 h.	10	105-150	"	"
Tetouan	13 h, 1-3 h.	65	77-105	"	"
		40	77	"	"
Bois Cantigny	Int.	10	105	"	"
" St.Eloi	"	10	105	"	"
Bois de Glands and Hill 100	"	110	77-105	"	Destruc
Bois Fontaine	"	309	77-105	Bois de Vogeau*1	Harass
Belle Assise	"	138	105-150	Unknown	Destruc

NOTE: Enemy lightly shelled our front lines with shrapnel between 20 and 24 h.

Rear Positions:

Broyes	10-25 to 12-05 h.	70	105-150	Unknown	Harass
Plainville		13	210	"	"
Chepoix	21-50 h.	3	105	"	Destruc
Villers-Tournelle	Int.	170	77-105-150	"	Reg., reply Interdictio
Bois de Villers	"	44	105-150	"	Harass
E.Coullemelle	13-17 h.	650	150 How.(?)	"	Mostly g
Batteries:					
E.of Plainville	Int.	58	105	"	Haras.&Des
D 7, F 7-N.W., Broyes	10-11 h.	25	150	"	Harass
F 6 Coullemelle	17-18 h.	50	?	"	Mustard gas
Group N.E.Rocquencourt	22-24 h.	100	105	"	Harass.
1st Group 7th F.A.)					
Bois Coulon	) 21 h.	30	150	"	"

III. WORKS.

(a) Advanced work: Sounds of work resembling digging at 2913 heard by our patrol.

(b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility: Poor.
- (b) Circulation in our front lines: Nothing to report.
- (c) " " rear zone: " " "

V. AIRCRAFT.

- (a) Balloons: Nothing to report.
- (b) Airplanes:

Pt.of Ob.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
Paul 1413	17-19 h.	1	Left of sector back to Viller Tournelle Coullemelle road.	2	This plane reconnoitered our lines at dusk dropping white flares. When fired upon by M.G's it returned to its own lines here upon a rather active bombardment of Bois des Glands, Bois St. Eloi and trenches E. of these woods began. This plane was not fired upon by A.A's.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (a) Confirmed by 2 prisoners from the 3rd Co., 99th Reg. Inf. captured at 1912, and one prisoner of the 105th Reg. Inf. captured at 2201, and one dead body 1st Co., 105th Reg. Inf. recovered at 2306, all four, belonging to the 30th Div. (See attached report).
 - (b) Nothing to report.
 - (c) Reddish white glow seen in MONT IDIER from 21 to 22 h. Believed to be searchlight.
- Report of interrogatory of prisoners herewith.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery active. Most of the shelling done with larger caliber guns than heretofore.

- * Correct spelling: BOIS DE LALVAL.
- *1 " " : BOIS DE VOYEUX
- *2 " " : VILLERS TOURNELLE.

S. G. W.

G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 1, 1918.

SUPPLEMENT TO SUMMARY OF INFORMATION NUMBER 4, OR MAY 1, 1918.

Report on Three Prisoners Captured during the Night of the
30th of April and 1st of May.

1. Gerlach Karl, Corporal, 2nd platoon, 4th Company, 1st Battalion, 105th Regiment (30th Division). He was a member of a patrol sent out the night of the 29th and 30th to ascertain whether one of our outposts, known to be located at about 1226 - 3298, was still occupied. He became separated from the patrol, lost his way and strayed within our lines. He was hailed by our sentries, dropped his weapons, and shouted "Kamerad" with the intention of surrendering. He was fired upon, however, and, fearing that he would be shot, dropped into a shell hole about fifty meters away from the American position. He stayed there all day. On the night of the 30th he decided to attempt to reach the German positions, but was unable to get by our outposts. He was hailed by a sentry and surrendered. Time of capture: About midnight. Place of capture: about 1224 - 3299.

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE: Same as on army corps map of April 26, except that the 83rd Regiment is reported to be to the south and adjacent to the 105th. The 3rd battalion of the 105th is in reserve and the 2nd and 1st are in line, the 1st being south, and having three companies in line (1, 3, 4, from north to south) and the 2nd in reserve.

(b) Prisoner arrived as replacement two days ago with 100 other men. They were distributed equally among the three battalions of his regiment. They had been sent from the replacement garrison in Werdan, Saxony, leaving that place on the 20th of April. Prisoner spent most of his time at the company commander's dugout (see attached map), having been assigned to the Stossgruppe, which was stationed in a portion of that dugout. There are four light machine guns in the company. The Machine Gun Company is in reserve, whereabouts unknown to prisoner. The company sends out one machine gun as an outpost.

Prisoner reports that the 4th Company has been supplied with a sort of rifle grenade apparatus, known as a "tumbler" (Becher) which is to be tested.

Prisoner further reports that there are no more troops (except battalion headquarters, comprising the staff and about twenty men) in Fontaines.*1

Prisoner knew that there were Americans in trenches in front of him but did not know to what Division they belonged.

Combat strength of the prisoner's company: 120 men. Nine of the 100 replacement men had been assigned to his company.

Food is brought up to them so as to arrive before midnight. It is carried from rolling kitchens which come up to Fontaines*1 towards 10 P.M.

2. Erich Tinkler: Lance Corporal, 2nd Platoon, 3rd Company, First Battalion, 99th Regiment, 30th Division, 15th Corps, and Wilhelm Schmidt, Private, Machine Gunner, 1st Platoon, 3rd Company of the 99th Regiment. Both these men were captured by surprise by an American patrol, a little after midnight, on the night of the 30th of April and 1st of May. They were occupying a vorpostenloch (outpost position) with one light machine gun at point 121.92-331.17. The Lance Corporal fired five shots with his pistol, but to no avail. One claims not to have seen the patrol until it was within five yards of him, and consequently, not to have had time to fire the gun. Their company commander, Lt. Louppe, occupies a hole, approximately in the center of the system of disconnected holes, constituting the enemy's first line of defense between the corner of the hedge at 121.9-331.2 and the edge of the wood at 121.92-331.17.

ORDER OF BATTLE. In the neighborhood of Cantigny. 99th Regiment, 3rd Battalion in reserve, 2nd and 1st in first line (2nd north, 1st south) - a battalion of the 105th immediately to the south of the 1st battalion of the 99th. (Confirmation of the order of battle.). There is no wire entanglement in front of the disconnected line of holes constituting the first line of defense on the southern side of Cantigny.

On the western side, however, the first line of defense consists of a continuous trench about four feet deep with traverse and protected by a portable wire entanglement. (ros-eaux brun). For further details see attached sketch.

* Correct spelling WERDAU.

*1Correct spelling: FONTAINE-sous-MONTDIDIER.

S.G.W.

G 2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 2, 1918.

No. 5.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From May 1, 12 h. to May 2, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) M.G. at 2898 fired on our front line in the BELLE ASSISE Quarter intermittently during the night. Short bursts of machine gun fire on our front lines of CASABLANCA and KENIFRA quarters from 8 to 12 hours. Machine guns not located, but were firing from the general direction of CANTIGNY.

(d) None.

(e) M.G. at 2898.

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front position:

Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks
Bois St. Eloi	10,15,1	5	105	Bois de l'Alval*	
		25	77-88	Inter & Reg.	
L. Of Tetouan &	10,14,16	95	105		Harass.
Tetouan support	18-24,1.	305	150	N.E. of Cantigny.	Regul.
Bois des Glands	10,11,14, 23,24	35	77-88	Bois l'Alval*	Dest.
Bois des Glands & Ravine south	3-5	100	105-150	" "	"
		5	210	" "	"
Bois de Cantigny		80	105-150	N.E. Cantigny	Harass
		126	77		& Dest.
Front lines S. of Bois de Fontaine	11-21	210	77	Bois de Voyaux*I	Harass
1st & 2nd lines S. of B. de Fontaine	20-4	864	77	" "	Harass & Retal.
Bois Long Haie*2	Int.	31	150		Harass.
<u>Rear Position:</u>					
Broyes	Int.	100	150		Harass & Dest
Villers Tournelle	10-5	370	105-150	N.E. Cantigny	Reg. Haras
					Dest. Inter
W. of Mesnil	10-11	5	105		
Bois Villers	Int.	148	77-150		
Coullemelle	Int.	115	77-105	(20 gas)	
Serevillers	18-24	rafeles	77		? Harass.
<u>Batteries.</u>					
N.E. Rocquencourt	22	20	105		? "

Bty * 6 W. of

Coullemelle

Bty. N. of Villers 22 20 150 ? Harass

NOTE: Gas and shrapnel were mixed with the H.E. fired on the front parts of our sector. Gas resembled chlorine. No shells fragments have been found.

III. WORKS.

(a) Advanced work: Short belt of heavy wire entanglement (about 20 m.) has been constructed along the top of ridge near point 32.02. A loop hole has been seen in a beet pile at point 32.01, apparently an observation post. One man seen at this point twice during the day. Wire entanglements constructed along Cantigny-Fontaine road around M.G. post at 285065. Wire entanglements have been seen running from 277056 to 28201.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility,

None	Poor.	Good.	Very good
	12 to 12	Intermittently	

(b) Circulation in front lines: Man seen on Cantigny-Fontaine road at 13 & 16 h. at point 8365. One man walking behind trench at 1822, was shot at and hit by one of our snipers.

(c) Circulation in our rear zones: None observed.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons: Nothing to report.

(b) Airplanes:

Pt. of Ob.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
Marcelle	19.20	1	Villers-Tournelle half sector	Observ.	Not fired on same time.

NOTE: This has occurred for three nights and always at the same time.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) " " " "

(c) Possible O.P. at 3201. The church tower of Cantigny is still standing. It commands a good view and is possibly being used as an observatory.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery was active. Infantry quiet.

* Battery letter illegible S. G. W.

* Alternate spelling: BOIS de LALVAL.

*1 Correct spelling : BOIS de VOYEUX

*2 " " : la LONGUE HAIE.

S. G. W.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 2, 12 h. to May 3, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Enemy patrol. 1 sgt. Maj. and 8 men attempted to raid one of our forward posts at 2493, consisting of three men. They captured one of our men, who escaped before reaching the enemy's line. The enemy in attempting to recover this prisoner strayed into our lines, was attacked and the patrol leader wounded and captured. A patrol of ours, 1 officer and 9 men, operating from Kenifra Quarter (2407) was approaching the enemy lines when it encountered an enemy patrol of superior numbers. (32 men were counted). Our patrol fought its way back to our line with no losses. Two men were slightly wounded.

(c) Machine gun at 2803 (approximate) fired on our front line in Kenifra Quarter at 20 h. Machine gun in front of Cantigny fired upon our patrol and Casablanca front lines. Seven rifle grenades (Grenatenwerfer) on Tetouan left at odd intervals.

(d) None.

(e) M. G. at 1724

II ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position:

Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks
Bois des Glands	15 to 17	25	210	Bois de Lalval	Reg.
	10	10	88	" "	" "
Bois de Cantigny	10,19,22	65	105	Unknown	Harass.
Ravine S. Bois des Glands	11	5	88	Bois de Lalval	Reg.
" "	" 15,21-22	160	105,150	" "	" "
Tetouan front	14	25	88,105	Unknown	Des- truction of M.G.
" "	22-6	350	88,105,150,210	" "	" "
Hill 100	Int.	310	105,150	N.E. Cantigny	Destr.
Cassablanca*	Int.	430	77,105,150	Unknown	Harass. Destr
Villers Tournelle	Int.	640	77,88,105,150	N.E. Cantigny	Harass Destr Interdict
Broyes	Int.	70	150	Unknown.	" " "
Bois de Villers	Int.	265	105,150	" "	" " "
Bois de Longue Haie*1	"	46	77,150	" "	" " "
Serevillers	"	100	105	" "	" " "
Mesnil	1-2	25	105	" "	" " "
Batteries:					
D/7 N.W.of Broyes	0:40	6	105	"	Harass.
	10:10	2	105	"	"

III WORKS:

- (a) Advanced Work: Nothing to report.
 (b) Rear works: 8 enemy observed digging a trench
 4693. Fired on by our artillery, and dispersed.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility.

None.	Poor	Good	Very good
	6 to 11	11 to 18	

(b) Circulation in front lines: Man seen at 8765 at 9 h and 10:30 h.

(c) Circulation in rear zones. Seen
 Route Time Number. Point observed from
 Montdidier Etelfay 19:11 1 lorry 8505 Clocher
 Plain ville.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons: Four balloons.

Point of observation	Direction	Time up	Time down	Remarks
O. P. No. 18	Gratibus	13:45	20.	Probably used
Clocher Plainville	"	6:20	6:48	as spotters
"	"	6:20	- -	for 210 Bat-
"	"	7:35	- -	tery.

(b) Airplanes:

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
O.P. No.18	11	1	Cassablanca	*Coullemelle	Obs. Not fired on.
	13:30	5	Le Plessier	Bombing.	Dropped 6 bombs on Le Plessier causing 3 fires (2 bombers 3 battle planes, 1 battle plane brot down by MG 1 k. W of Le Plessier.
	18:30	1	Fontaines*2 s/Montdidier	Obs.	Brot. down by MG, Mesnil St George.
	22:05	1	N.E. Cantigny	Signal Great Morse Lamp	HEFTISSESTFSEHISHRNGBP
	23	1	Front lines to N of sector	?	Heard but not seen.
	1:25	1	Over sector	?	Carried red light
	2:05	1	" "	?	" " "
1596	15:10	2	Bois de Fontaines*3	Obser- vation	Fired on by M. G.
	16:10	6	Enemy front lines		
	19:45	2	Bois de Fontaines*3	"	Driven off by our pursuit planes.
	16:10	1	Belle Assise	"	

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Confirmed by one prisoner captured. FRITZ
 STAUER (Sgt. Maj.) age 20, belonged to 2nd Co. 83 Res. Regt.
 Saxon, 25 Res. Div.

(b) Explosion 5 k. E. of Cantigny caused fire lasting 30 Min

(c) Steady light N. of Montdidier at 6508 (approx.) probably a signal for airplanes. Many caterpillar, red, and white rockets observed in enemy lines.

(d) None.

(e) At 5:30 h. enemy projected liquid gas contained in glass bottles on the front lines of Kenifra Quarter, The noise of their flight resembled an empty bottle flung through the air. On bursting these bottles produced three or four lines of some substance giving off heavy white fumes, transparent in texture. Fumes continued to rise for about 5 minutes. A small bottle was found at daybreak containing a liquid which is being examined. No detonation was heard and it seems evident that these bottles were thrown by springs. Gas caused nausea, sneezing and coughing.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION: Infantry: More enemy patrols than usual. Artillery and Aviation: Active.

* Correct Spelling: CASABLANCA

*1 The woods called "la Longue Haie" on the French maps were generally known to the Americans by this name

*2 Correct Spelling: FONTAINE

*3 Correct Spelling: BOIS de FONTAINE

S. G. W.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
May 3, 1918.

SUPPLEMENT TO SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OF MAY 3rd.

1. Identity of Prisoner and Circumstances of Capture.

a. STEUR, Fritz, 20 years old, Vize-Feldwebel, 2nd Platoon, 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 83rd Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div. Home is at Gera, in Thuringen. He was in command of his platoon.

b. Prisoner was captured about 2 a.m., May 3rd, near point 122.45 329.3 (about 500 meters N. of the bend in National road 30). He was leading a patrol of 8 men. The patrol penetrated to about 122.3 329.25 passing between two M.G. posts without being seen, (enemy claims to know the exact location of these posts and also of a third one in the same vicinity) The patrol then watched the relief of one of our outposts (?). On its way back patrol was fired upon by the two M.G. posts. Prisoner was wounded and, unable to get any further, was captured by us.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

83rd Res. Reg. is south of and adjacent to the 105th infantry, 30th Division, (confirmation of prisoner's statement mentioned in Supplement to Summary of Information No. 4). It has its first battalion in first line - its second battalion in a reserve position about 1.5 Km east of the fringe of wood which runs from 123 - 329 to about 123 - 329.8, its third battalion in rear of Courtemanche (??) The 1st Battalion has its 2nd and 3rd Cos. (2nd N.-3rd S.) in the "Vorposten line" (observation line) about 6 - 10 meters behind the east fringe of the wood mentioned above and its 1st and 4th Companies in the first line of resistance (running through wood 123.17 - 329.25, about 40 meters east of its western fringe). The third company has its three platoons in the "Vorposten linie" (2-3rd from N. to S.) At night each platoon detaches one squad, each squad having one light M.G., as sentries in pits dug in the sunken road running along western fringe of the wood between 123-329 and 123-329.8. These sentries withdraw in the morning to the observation trench.

The company's three other machine guns are kept in the "Vorposten linie".

Prisoner reports that there are many M.G.s in the rectangular wood at 123.17 - 329.25. The 1st line of resistance, which runs through this wood, is not continuous. There is a wire entanglement 40 meters in front of this line, along the entire length of the wood.

3. For description of lines, see tracing which will be attached to tomorrow's Summary of Information.

4. GENERAL INFORMATION.

a. Movements of the 25th Res. Div. Left the Aisne region on or about the 18th of April. Was moved by rail to St. Quentin, arriving April 19. Proceeded by road to its present position, going into line April 25.

b. Armament: Six light M.G.s per Company. Each company also has 3 heavy M.G.s supplied from Bn. M.G. Company. Prisoner knows of no T.M.s in neighborhood. States that there is no Sturm-battalion in Division nor Stossgruppe in company. (Truth of statement doubtful).

c. Miscellaneous. His company has made two patrols within the last week. He states that the call for barrage is a yellow rocket

He knows of the following officers:
25th Res. Div. Commander. General von Mohn.
83rd Res. Regt. Commander Major Ubner (formerly
was C.O. 1st Bn.
1st Bn. Commander, Captain ?
2nd Company Commander Sgt. Schmidt.

Men in division have recently been issued a third
change cartridge for their gas masks.

G 2

No. 7.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 4, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From May 3, 12 h. to May 4, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) In Belle Assise enemy patrol reported heard near 2490.

(c) Few rifle shots were fired from enemy positions in Bois de Fontaines*. Rifle shots from enemy positions in Bois des Fontaines* at intervals during the night. Enemy M.G. near Chateau Sans Nom fire indirect fire on 1404 at intervals during the night

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position:

Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks.
Tetouan Front,					
Quarter C	10,14,18	85	105	N.E.Cantigny	Reg. & Harass
" " " "	23-3	408	88,105	" "	Gas shells
Casablanca					
Front, Quarter D	11,15, 18,23	55	77,88	Bois de Lalval	Gas and Shrapnel
Support lines & rear Lines	20:10- 24:30	1700	77,88 105	?	Gas.
Hill 100	10:15	35	105	N.E.Cantigny	Harassing.
Bois de Cantigny	13	35	105	" "	"
Bois des Glands	20	15	77	Bois de Lalval	"
Kenifra Quarter B	15-18	150	77	?	"
		50	105		
		20	150		
Bois de Fontaines*	22-24	100	77	?	"
		25	105	?	"
Belle Assise					
Quarter A	Int.	227	77,105	?	"
Ridge N.of Broyes	Int.	117	105,150	?	"(These shells fell very near Reg O.P. of 16 Inf. & wounded two observers.
Bois de Longue Haie	Int.	57	77,150	?	Harassing.
Enemy put down a barrage in front of our center at 2:32 h in response to our barrage at 2:26. Our barrage ceased at 2:47 h.					

Rear Position.

Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks.
Villers-Tournelle and environs			77,88,105		Regulating
	10-20	155	150	N.E.Cantigny	Harassing.
	20-3	15000	77,105	" "	Gas attack.
					Yperite (must. gas
Bois de Villers	Int.	98	105	?	Harassing.
Broyes	Int.	41	105-150	?	"
Mesnil	4	20	105,150	?	"

Rear Position. (Cont'd)					
Point of fall	Time	No.	Cal.	Origin	Remarks.
Rocquencourt	4-6	300	?	?	Harassing.
Mesnil-					
Rocquencourt	10	10	77,105	?	"
Serevillers	6	20	105	?	"
Chepoix	9:30	2	77	?	"

III WORKS:

- (a) Advanced work: Nothing to report.
 (b) Rear work Possible battery at 9799

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility.

None	Poor	Good	Very Good

6 to 18

- (b) Circulation in front lines: Nothing to report.

- (c) Circulation in rear zones:

Route	Time	Object	Point observed	Seen from.

Hill 106 (S.W.Malpart)

Enemy detachments
 amounting to 2 cos.
 going E. toward
 trenches.

16 h 2 cos.

O.T.E.Hill
 108

Malpart-La Folie Farme Wagon train Midway between "
 Both fired on and dispersed by our artillery.

V. AIRCRAFT.

- (a) Balloons.

Point of Observation.	Direction in mils	Angle	Time up	Time down	Remarks

Clocher Plainville	S.E.Church spire				Same Balloons were
	Broyes				observed
	440	10:28	18:50		from other
	480			19:50	points but
	490				so accur-
	510				ately
	685			19:40	
	901	9h May 4		7:40	

- (b) Airplanes

Pt. of Obs.	Time	No.	Region	Mission	Remarks

Okla.8362	10:15	1	Mesnil N.W.)	Recon-	Fired on by A.A.
	10:30	1	" " ")	nais-	guns without
	11:00	1	" " ")	sance	effect.

Ohio

Clocher	10:10	1	Plainville	"	Driven off by A.A. guns.

Plainville	11:30	1	Front lines	"	Fired on by M.G. & driven off

	11:40	1	Right & Center	"	Not fired on.

	20:01	8	" " "	"	Attacked by A.A. & 1 brot down in Bois Morliere*1 Believe 1 other plane injured.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) " " "

(c) Enemy is using a 6 star white rocket, also a combination of 1,2,3, and 6 star rockets, fired at very short intervals. Following message received by our wireless during bombardment of - this morning: Call X5-X5-X5 Message SS-ROSWN-SSS-ZLW-SSS-ZRW-SSW-SSS-ZMKN-SSS-SSS-Call X5-X5 ZRKN-SS-ZRKW-SSS-ZRKW-SSS-NON-YE DDDD. Two fires started in Montdidier by our artillery at 4:45 h at points 7497, 7398. Searchlight in Montdidier active during night.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION: Infantry. A little nervous as shown by increase in rifle fire and flares during the night.

Artillery- Extremely active.

Aviation- Active.

Correct Spellings:

* Bois de Fontaine

*1 Bois de Morliere

S. G. W.

G 2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 4, 1918.

The following extract from G. H. Q. "Summary of Information, No. 31, May 1, 1918, is published for your information.

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - NO. 7.
By the British General Staff, April 24, 1918.

Issued down to Divisions.
(For distribution down to Battalions.)

GERMAN ATTACK NEAR GIVENCHY, APRIL, 9, 1918.

From captured German orders which show the dispositions and plans of the 4th Ersatz Division, it appears that the following method of attack was adopted by the enemy:-

1. A very careful study was made of our defences in this locality. It is noteworthy that three days before the attack the enemy issued to platoon commanders detailed information gathered from air reconnaissance carried out at a low elevation on that day, together with a note indicating not only the force expected to oppose the attack but also the estimated quality of the opposition anticipated. As a result of his reconnaissance, the enemy seems to have based his plan on avoiding the strong locality at Givenchy itself, penetrating our line on either flank, and turning inwards so as to take Givenchy from the right rear (south-west and south). The attacking force was divided into two portions, a northern and a southern. The northern attack was undertaken by four battalions of which two were in front line, one in support and one in reserve. The southern attack consisted of two battalions, one being in the front line and one in support. In these attacks, the leading battalions were ordered to push straight forward, while the supporting battalion of the southern attack was to turn north and to take Givenchy in flank and rear from the south-west and south, and the supporting battalion of the northern attack was to deal similarly with Festubert from the south.

This method of dealing from the flank and rear with strong points which are not attacked frontally has been conspicuous in the German operations since March 21, 1918.

2. Our defences consisted of defended localities each of which was held by a complete unit of not less than a platoon; other platoons especially detailed for counter-attack were kept in support. The garrisons of the defended localities had received orders to hold on at all costs-orders which were carried out in every case-and the platoons in support had been instructed to counter attack as soon as the occasion arose without waiting for further orders. Each defended locality was prepared and wired for all round defence. Many of the communication trenches were wired, and lines of wire running perpendicularly and obliquely to the front had been erected to check any lateral advance in the event of local penetration. These

obstacles proved of great assistance in preventing the enemy from extending his flanks after he had forced his way into portions of our front defences.

3. The attack was launched in a heavy mist, which greatly assisted the enemy. The parties of Germans, however, which succeeded in penetrating our positions were held up by the garrisons of the defended localities. As soon as the enemy's advance was thus checked the platoons in support counter-attacked and worked round the flanks of the parties which had pressed forward into our line. The enemy was engaged, therefore, by fire and bayonet from all sides. Several hundred prisoners and a large number of machine guns were captured, and our line was maintained intact. There was very little bombing.

4. The failure of the enemy's attack upon these defences was due to the stubbornness of the defence maintained by the garrisons of the defended localities, and to the promptitude and skill with which the supporting platoons made their counter-attacks. We employed the same tactics against the enemy as he was endeavoring to employ against us. No frontal counter-attack was delivered, but the enemy was defeated by a succession of immediate counter-attacks delivered from the flanks.

Full advantage was taken by the counter-attacking platoons of their knowledge of the ground, with the result that the enemy was outmaneuvered as well as outfought.

From a study of this engagement the fact emerges clearly that an enemy penetrating into gaps in our positions is very much at a disadvantage until he can widen the flanks of the gaps; if the defending troops strengthen the flanks of these gaps and hold on to their positions tenaciously, he is bound to be caught between two fires, and forced to surrender what he has gained.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
May 5, 1918

G 2

No. 8

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 4, 12 h to May 5 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) One German approached one of our advanced posts in the vicinity of 1522 and attempted to bomb it. He was shot and killed. No identification has been received.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Sniper active during day and night at 2895 (approximate) M.G. at Cantigny (location unknown) fired on Belle Assise (Quarter D) front lines during the night. M. G. at 2901 fired on one of our planes. M. G. in woods near Chateau of Fontaines* fired long bursts during the night on Kenifra.

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Nothing to report.

II ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position:

Point of fall	Time	No.	Calibre	Origin	Remarks
Quarter D or Casa-					Reg.
blanca Front	Int.	100	105	N.E.Cantigny	Harass
" " " " "		40	88,105	" "	
Quarter D or Casa-					
blance Support	"	70	88,105	Bois Lalval &	Harass.
"	"	105	105	N.E.Cantigny	
Bois de Cantigny	"	95	105	" "	Reg.& "
Hill 100	10:15	20	105	" "	"
Glands Ravine	Int.	25	88,105	Bois Lalval	" " "
Bois de Fontaines*	"	200	77	" "	Harass.
" " "		150	105	" "	"
" " "		25	150		
Quarters A & B front)					
lines(2588 to 2306))	16	300	77	?	"
Bois de Longue Haie	Int.	78	77,150	?	"
Belle Assise Farm	"	104	77,105,150	?	"

Rear Position					
Villers Tournelle	"	390	105	N.E.Cantigny	Interdic. & Harass.
Bois Villers*1	"	444	77,105,150	?	Harass.
Broyes	"	50	150	?	Harass.& Interdi
Mesnil	"	40	77,105,150		Harass
Serevillers	"	30	77,105,150	?	Registration on Clocher.
Cross-roads 6106	16	30	77	?	Interdict.

Btry.E/5 S.E.Broyes	16:30	6	210	?	Destruction.
C/7 S.Bois de					
Coulon*2	14:00	10	105	?	Harassing.
Btry.23 S.W.					
Cardonnois	15-18	40	77,105	?	"
	14:30	30	77,105		"

Total No. of shells falling in sector 2436					

III WORKS:

(a) Advanced work: Six men digging trench at 6512. This working party was dispersed by our shrapnel. Wire at 3102 has been extended slightly during the night. Camouflage seen around a clump of bushes at 3193

(b) Rear Work: Enemy battery at 619.128 has been definitely located. This battery is a 210mm and fires on Plainville and vicinity.

IV CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility

None	Poor	Good	Very good
-----	-----	-----	-----
	12 to 20		
	6 to 12		

(b) Nothing to report

(c)

Route	Time	Object	Observed Point	Observed	Seen from
Cantigny-					
Framicourt	2:25	2 horsemen	3917		Clocher
" "	"	2 1-horse carts	"		Plainville.
" "					"
Etelfay	3:40	2 horsemen	8692		"

(d) General Impression of Circulation: Normal.

V AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

Pt. of Observation	Direction	Angle	Time	Time	Remarks
		in mils	up	down	
Clocher Plainville	S.E. Clocher	Broyes			
		310		16:30	
		390		14:40	
		935)		12:35	
		935)	14:35	14:40	
		935)	15:15	16:30	

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time.	No.	Region	Mission	Remarks
Plainville	13:32	5	Circled over sector as far back as Mesnil	Reconnaissance	Not fired on.
"	16:25	1	Broyes-Mesnil	"	Fired on by A.A.
Mesnil	18:50	4	" "	"	Not fired on.
Paul & Arthur	13:	3	Villers Tournell*3 & vicinity	" "	" "
" " "	19:25	2	" "	Regulation	Very low over our front lines where it dropped white lights.
2695	20:10	13	Our & Enemy front Lines	Reconnaissance	Not fired on.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to Report. Identity disc found on prisoner does not give his regiment or any data from which an identification might be made. Further investigation will be made (disc forwarded)

(b) Fires in Montdidier and Cantigny began yesterday afternoon and continued into the night. Blinkers system observed in use last night.

(c) From Fontaines* S/Montdidier to E. of Montdidier enemy put up a great variety of flares during the night, probably to sense out our signals. At 20:45 four six-star white rockets, and 3 one-star red rockets were sent up by the enemy between Cantigny and Fontaines* S/Montdidier. Nothing happened.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSIONS. Artillery, Normal, Infantry Passive, Aviation - Active.

Correct Spelling:

- * Fontaine
- *1 Bois de Villers
- *2 Bois Coulon
- *3 Villers Tournelle

S. G. W.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 5, 12 h. to May 6, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
 (b) Nothing to report.
 (c) One of our patrols was fired upon from an enemy post in a tree at 2898 by rifle and M.G. fire. The M.G. located at 3194 fired short bursts of fire during the night on our front lines. The enemy M.G. near Chateau de Fontaines* s/Montdidier executed indirect fire on Kenifra support. O.P. Marcelle was fired on at 5.18 h by a M.G. in Cantigny. An enemy sniper was busy in front of Casablanca. (not located)
 (d) Nothing to report.
 (e) M.G.s have been located at 2898 and 3194.

II. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Point of Fall	Time	No.	Calibre	Origin	Remarks
Casablanca or Quar-	Int.	45	88	Bois Lalval	Destr.
ter D support	10-13	35	77	"	Reg.
	17-19	10	105	"	"
" Front lines	13-15	200	88,105	"	Destr.
Bois de St. Eloi*1	Int.	10	88	"	Harass.
	"	45	105	"	Interdict
Bois de Cantigny	10-11	20	105	NE Cantigny	Harass.
	Int.	100	77,105	"	"
Hill 100	"	40	105	"	"
Quarter C or Tetouan	"	165	88,105,150	"	"
Front					
Tetouan Support	14-17	25	105	"	"
Bois Suisse	12-14	15	105	"	"
		5	88	"	"
Bois de Fontaines	Int.	175	77,105,150	Bois Lalval	"
Bois Longue Haie	"	29	77,105	?	"
Belle Assise	"	102	77,105,150	?	"

Rear Position.

Villers Tournelle	18-6	200	105,150,210	NE Cantigny	"
	Int.	30	105	"	"
Serevillers	"	50	105,150	?	?
Dump Chepoix	14	3	105	?	?
Bois de Villers	Int.	102	77,105,150	?	Harass.

Batteries.

C/7 Bois de Coulon*2	Int.	6	150	?	"

III. WORKS.

- (a) Advanced Works: A trench has been located on Northern side of the road at 1814. There is a C.T. running towards our line from 1622.

Light strands of wire on screw pickets have been erected in front of road from 2906 to 2511. Fresh earth, probably from an emplacement or dugout has been thrown from behind a bank at 2906.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility.

None - - - - - Poor - - - - - Good - - - - - Very good - -

9-12 13-15-16: 18-19:20

(b) Nothing to report.

Route	Time	Number	Point	Seen from
Etelfay-				
Fignieres	12.17	4 lorries	Oll2 These lorries took road to N.on E edge of RR at 9522	Div. Q.P. Ohio.
	12.30	1 lorry	9522	"
	12.36	1 "	"	"
	12.40	1 "	"	"
	18.45	1 "	9521	"
Fignieres-				
Etelfay	12.30	1 "	9522	"
	12.35	1 2-horse wagon	"	"
	12.37	1 1- "	9525	"
	16.41	1 2- "	"	"
		10 men walking	0408	"
	18.45	1 caisson	9521	"
	18.49	1 2-horse wagon	"	"
Gratibus-				
Fignieres	16.03	1 1 "	" 5745	"
Trail 300				
m E.of Natl.				
Route 35	10.04	1 caisson going North	7541	"
To Mont-				
didier	19;06	1 caisson going S	7708	"
Trail N.E.				
Montdidier	19.14	1 Bn Inf. in close order going E	8615	"
		Fired on by our artillery without result.		
Route N.at	19.28	2 platoons Inf		
No. 35		going N.	7211	"
	8.25	2 men going S.	7210	"
	12.10	1 lorry going N.	7043 O.P. Oklahoma.	

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

Pt.of Observation	Direc- tion	Zero at Cantigny Clocher 2114 Angle (in mils) With ref.to	Time up	Time down	Remarks
May 5	Ohio	S.E. 250	12.15	1.30	
	Oklahoma	87	12.05	12.10	
	Ohio	6370	12.15	5.00	
	Oklahoma	87	12.55	Vis. too low to	
	Ohio	254	6.00	6.18	noted descent.
May 6	"	222	5.31	6.57	
	"	6370	5.54	6.57	
	"	35	6.03	7.00	
	"	626	6.05	7.00	
	"	10	6.17	6.57	
	"	110	6.19	-	
	"	795	6.23	-	
	"	S.E. 655	6.27	-	

- 3 -

"	170	7.02	8.55	Visibility
"	672	7.06	- -	possibly
"	35	8.36	- -	preventing
"	170	8.57	- -	observation
	125	7.30	- -	descent.

(b) Airplanes.

<u>Pt. of</u>	<u>Obs.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>flown over</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Div.O.P.	Okla.	18:45	5	Front	center	Reconn.	Fired on by AA guns.
"		20.00	10	Generally over our	Btry. very high	" & Adjust	Not fired on.
		7.30	6	Entire sector.	"	Fired on by AA.	
O.P.	Ohio	5.18	2	"	"	"	"
		5.33	1	"	"	"	"
Broyes		14.20	4	Front lines of	Observ.	Not fired on.	
"		16.30	1	Kenifra and Belle	"	"	
		16.36	2	Assise	"	"	
		17.32	3	"& Belle Assise	Support Lines	Fired on by AA, MG.	
		17/35	4	"	"	Obs.	"

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Order of battle confirmed by identifications secured from dead body of enemy killed in front of one of our posts at 1522, night Mar. 4-5, MUSK SCHUMACHER 99 R.I., III Bn., 9th Co. M.G. Abt., From this it seems that the III Bn. 99 R.I. has recently relieved the I Bn 99 R.I. on the right of the regimental sector.

(b) Fires were observed in Etelfay west of le Ples-sier and near Grivesnes during the night. Our artillery fired 48 rounds on Cantigny, several direct hits being observed.

(c) A wooden frame tower, possibly used for observation, has been seen at 7145. A blinker was observed in action from Cantigny to E., during the night, exact location unknown. A possible heliograph is reported on a building in Mesnil St. Georges at 4087. One shower rocket of orange colored stars was observed in the vicinity of Kenifra.

VIII. General Impression. Artillery: below normal. Infantry, quiet; Aviation, active.

APPENDIX TO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 9.

Extract from letter found on body of German killed at 1522, night Mar. 4-5. This letter was written by the man in person and had not been mailed.

"Here we lie in a village which is completely demolished by artillery fire. The village is near Montdidier. By day we dare not show ourselves. We live in a cellar. We have to go and get our food at night."

"Last night I went out with the detail which brought back the food. We got a direct hit (a shell hit our party) which killed some men and wounded several. I hope we will soon be taken from the Western Army."

Following is translation of a corps memorandum, issued for your information:

1 Following incident occurred in the sector of one of the allied armies:

At about 3.30 p.m. February 23, two strangers, dressed in American Officers' uniforms, coming from the rear, entered the sector of an Infantry regiment and asked to be allowed to cross our lines, for the alleged purpose of studying the ground between the lines in view of using tanks.

The officer to whom they made this request, surprised at their request, declined to answer it and had them escorted to the Battalion Commander's P.C., and thence to the regimental P.C. where their examination soon disclosed that one of them was a German N.C.O., who had been taken prisoner and had escaped from a prisoner's camp, while the other was a German-American, traitor to his country, who had acted as the former's accomplice in his escape and subsequent spying.

Correct Spelling:-

- * - FONTAINE
- *1 - BOIS ST. ELOI
- *2 - BOIS COULON.

S.G.W.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 10 From May 6, 12 h, to May 7, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) An officer's patrol, 12 officers and 9 men, left our lines in the Bois de Fontaines* at 2305 and proceeded due east to 2405, where an enemy working party was heard. No wire, except small mesh chicken wire about twenty yards in front of the hostile working party, was encountered. The enemy had posted a sentinel in front of this wire. Our patrol shot the sentinel and rushed the working party, but was forced to retire, having one officer killed (body brought back) and two men slightly wounded. The enemy used grenades and light machine guns in repelling our patrol. It is probable that our patrol was discovered by the enemy before it reached 2405.

(b) An enemy patrol of unknown size was heard near 2898.

(c) A M.G. in Bois de Framicourt fired on one of our front line observation posts at intervals during the day. M.G. in Bois de Fontaines* fired short bursts on Kenifra front line positions during the night. Another M.G. in the Bois de Fontaines* executed indirect fire on the Bn. P.C. in Bois de Fontaines* from 3 to 4:30 hrs. A M.G. at 3092 (approximate) fired on our planes during the day.

(d) None.

(e) None.

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Point of fall	Time	No	Calibre	Origin	Remarks
Tetouan or Quarter B	:	:	:	:N.E.Can-	
front lines	:14-22	: 30:	77,105	:tigny	: Reg.
Tetouan Support	: 14	: 20:	105	: "	: "
Hill 100	:10,17	: 55:	77,105	: "	:Harass.
Bois de Cantigny	: Int.	: 55:	88,105	: "	: "
Casablanca or Quarter	: Int.	: 15:	77	Bois de Lalval	Harass.
D front.	:	:	:	:	:& des-
	:	: 20:	88 "	" "	:truction
	:	: 35:	88,105	" "	:of O.P.
	:	:	:	:	:Marcelle.
" " "Support	: "	: 85:	88,105	: "	:Harassing.
Bois de Fontaines*	: "	:300:	77,105	:	: "
Bois de Cantigny	: 1	: 25:	105	Bois de Frami-	
	:	:	:	court	: "
Bois de Longue Haie	: Int.	: 85:	77,105,150		
Belle Assise	: "	:109:	77,105,150		

Rear Position.

Bois de Villers	: "	:420:	77,105,150	?	:Harass.
Broyes	: "	: 60:	105,150		: "
Villers Tournelle & entrances	: "	:580:	77,88,105,150	N.E.Cantigny/	Reg.Harass./
Serevillers	: "	: 25:	77	?	Dest.& Int.

Batteries.

E/6 W. of Coullemelle:	15.30	:	12:	150	?	7 duds.
E/7 N. of Bois de	:	:	:	:	:	:
Coulon	:16.40	:	8:	77	?	Harass.
26,25 N.E. corner	:	:	:	:	:	:
Bois de Villers	:	Int.	:450:	105	Harass.& Dest.	a few
:	:	:	:	:	gas shells.	:

b. Total No. of shells in sector 2379

III. WORKS.

(a) Advanced works: Fresh dirt at 3404

(b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility.

None	Poor	Good	Very good
	6 - 12 h.	12 - 15 h	

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point	Seen from
Pierrepoint-Montdidier*1	:29.45	: 6 men	: 7210	: C.P. Ohio.
"	:29.56	: 2 men	: 6932	: "
"	:10.	:1 2-horse:	:	:
"	:	:wagon	: 7042	: "
"	:12.	:1"1-" "	: 7306	: "
"	: 8.08	:1 2-" "	: N.E. at Montdidier O.P.	: Okla.
"	: 8.17	:1 touring:	:	:
"	:	: car	: "	: " "
"	: 8.15	: " " "	: "	: " "
"	:12.55	:1 4-horse:	:	:
	:	:wagon	: "	: "O.P. Ohio
Montdidier-Fignieres	:10.36	:10 men in:	:	:
	:	:small gro:	:	:
	:	:ups	: 8916	: "
Fignieres-Etelfay	:13.05	:12 horse	:	:
	:	:wagon	: 7304	: "
Etelfay-Fignieres	:14.35	:2 lorries:	: 9816	: "

V. AIRCRAFT (a) Balloons

Pt. of Obs.	Direction	Angle*	Time up	Time down	Remarks
O.P. Okla	S.E.	130	8.55	- - Vis.	prevented observing descent.
"	"	263	9.50	10.35	(This balloon
O.P. Ohio	"	250	13.07	15.35-	(moved about 2 kil.
"	"	30	Previous	13.50	(in N.E. direction
"	"	205	to	14.05	(in 3 hours.
"	"	195	report	15.06	
"	"	195	15.35	Visibility	too low to
"	"	120	15.45	obs.	descent.

* Zero at Cantigny clocher.

(b) Airplanes.

<u>Pt. of Ob.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Region flown over</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
O.P. Okla:	13.30	1	Front of sector	Reconn.	Driven off by
:	:	:	:	:	AA guns.
"	13.40	5	High over front of	" &	" " " " "
:	:	:	sector	Adjust.	:
"	14.00	5	Over O.P. High.	In combat with 3 French	
:	:	:	:	planes (driven off)	

<u>Pt. of Ob.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Region flown over</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
O.P. Okla:	18.30):	9	:Over whole of sec-	:Reconn.&	:In combat
	:19.30):		:tor	:combat.	:with 22 Fr.
O.P. Ohio:	18.35):				:1 Boche thot
"	:14.	4	:Over Cantigny	:Reconn.&	:down behind
	:	:		:Combat.	:own line. In
	:	:			:combat with
	:	:			:5 Fr. planes.
	:	:			:Driven back.

NOTE: French plane down in distress at 221-263 Later verified. One plane brought down out of control E. of Fontaine s/ Montdidier. Its identity has not been obtained.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: (a) Nothing to report. (b) Our retaliation fire from 18-19 h. decreased the volume of enemy fire on our position. Enemy's fire on Kenifra and Belle Assise support positions was stopped by our retaliation fire from 11-12 h. An explosion was reported at 9.30 at enemy battery 3517. Our artillery destroyed btry. 3020. confirmed by aeroplane observation. (c) (d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Inf. Quiet slightly nervous in its front lines. Artillery: Below normal. Aviation; Active.

Correct Spelling:-

* Bois de Fontaine. *1 Pierrepont-Montdidier.

S. G. W.

2 G 2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 8, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 7, 12 h. to May 8 12 h.

No. 11.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Two enemy were shot at by our post at 2604 at 22 h. One of the men shot at pretended to be wounded and lay on the ground outside of our wire beseeching help until 4 h.. when about 40 of the enemy attempted to rush our trenches, throwing volleys of grenades. They were repulsed before they crossed our wire. Two of our men were wounded but none are missing. Enemy casualties unknown.

At 3:13 h. the enemy attempted to capture our post at 2407; and were again repulsed, this time without loss to us.

(c) Occasional bursts on Casablanca Quarter from west edge of Cantigny.

(d) Left of Tetouan Quarter reports T. M. Bombs of undetermined caliber. The effect is slight. About sixty were dropped yesterday, apparently coming from West edge of Cantigny. These bombs are not visible during their flight.

II. ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of Enemy Artillery.

Front Position

Point of Fall	Time	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Belle Assise Quarter	Int.	210	77,105 150	?	Harass.
Bois de Fillers*	"	97	105,150	?	"
Bois de Longue Haie	"	277	77,105 150	?	"
Bois de Fontaines*1	"	217	77,105 150	?	"

NOTE: All this fire consisted of short bursts of heavy harassing fire shifted from one part of Quarters A and B to another. The great majority was distributed over the front lines. H.E. and Shrapnel were used.

Casablanca & Tetouan Front

	3:25-				
	4:15	Barrage		?	?
Casablanca Support	Int.	100	77,88, 105	Bois de Lalval	Regula- tion.
Bois St. Eloi	13-14	10	77	"	"
Hill 100	Int.	145	77,105		
Tetouan Support	16.20	5	77	N.E.Cantigny	"
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	50	88,105	"	Harass.
Bois Suisse	15:30	95	88,105	"	"

Point of Fall	Time	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.

<u>Rear Positions</u>					
Villers Tournelle	Int.	415	105,150	N.E.Cantigny	Har-
			210		ass.
Broyes	"	100	105,150	Many probably intended for	Bty.
Serevillers-Broyes	"	30	150	?	Harass.
Villers Tournelle-	"	23	150	?	"
Coullemelle-Road	"	8	150	?	"
Serevillers-Coullemelle	"				
Road.	"				

<u>Batteries</u>					
*2/6	"	10	105	?	"

(b) Total No. of shells in sector 1792

III. WORKS.

(a) Advanced works: Nothing to report.

(b) Rear works: Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility.

None	Poor	Good	Very good.

12 h. to 20 h.

6 to 12

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Nothing to report.

(d) None observed.

V. AIRCRAFT (a) Balloons. Nothing to report.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time.	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.

Oklahoma	16.	1	Front lines	Reconnaissance	Driven back by A.A.guns
	17.45	1	Mesnil-South	"	Not fired on.
Ohio	15.40	1	Front lines	"	Fired on by A.A. guns
	17.31	1	" "	"	"
Marcelle	15.10	1	Casablanca front	"	Not fired on.
					Flew very low and fired on our trenches wounding one man.
Broyes	14.	1	High over sector to our right	?	?
Broyes	15.	2	Enemy front lines	Patrol	Not fired on.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Fire started in Mesnil St. Georges at 4.87

(c) During the night 11 3-star, 3 6-star and 3 2-star rockets were observed on our front. Enemy barrage on our left fell at 3:25. Our barrage was called for at 3:33 and came down at 3:35. After our barrage commenced two 3-star rockets were sent up at 3:36, 5 3-star at 3:42, 1 3-star at 3:55 and 1 3-star at 4:07. The barrage died down at 4:10. All these rockets were observed to come from the left of our sector

The church tower and several adjacent buildings in Cantigny have been demolished.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry: Quiet

Artillery and Aviation: Less than normal.

NOTE: Under I (b) our Summary of May 6-7 should read (2 officers and 9 men) in place of "12 officers and 9 men.")

* Correct Spelling - BOIS de VILLERS -

*1 Correct Spelling - BOIS de FONTAINE -

*2 Battery letter illegible -

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 9, 1918

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 12 From May 8, 12 h. to May 9, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) An enemy patrol of unknown size approached our listening post and were fired on and withdrew.
- (c) There was very little rifle or machine gun fire. Enemy machine gun S.W. Cantigny fired short bursts on Casablanca at 21.20, 0.50, and 2.40 hours.
- (d) Nothing to report
- (e) Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of Enemy Artillery.

Front Position Point of fall	Time	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.

Casablanca or Quarter D					
Front	14-22	65	77, 88, 105	Bois Lalval	Harassing.
Support	Int.	70	"	"	Regulation
Sector	20-22	500	88, 105, 150	"	Counter Preparation.
Hill 100	Int.	80	88, 105	N.E. Cantigny	Harassing.
	20-22	500	88, 105, 150	"	Counter preparation.
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	145	77, 88, 105	"	Harassing.
	22-23	300	88	"	"
Tetouan or Quarter C					
Front	13:45-14	95	105	"	"
Support	21-6	220	105	"	"
Belle Assise or Quarter A	Int.	243	77, 105	E. of Cantigny	Harassing and retaliation.
Belle Assise Farm	"	52	"	Bois Framicourt	"
Bois Longue Haie	"	183	77, 105, 150	?	"
Bois Fontaines*	"	132	77, 105	?	"
Bois de Cantigny	"	125	77, 105	?	Harassing.
E. Belle Assise Farm	"	93	77-105	?	"

<u>Rear Positions:</u>					
Bois de Villers	"	172	77, 105, 150	?	Probably in-
Broyes	"	70	105, 150	?	tended for
Villers Tournelle	"	470	77, 105, 150	N.E. Cantigny	our batteries. Some gas.
					Mostly H.E.
Serevillers	"	100	105, 150	"	Harassing.

Point of fall	Time	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
<u>Batteries.</u>					
C/7 S.W. Bois de	12	10	150	?	Harassing.
Coulon*1	17:30	10	77	?	"
E/6 E. Coulemelle	18:50	8	150	?	"
A/6, B/6 N.Rocquen-	18:50	20	105,150	?	"
court					

Note: Before the enemy's barrage fell last night 2 green and 1 caterpillar rockets went up in rapid succession from Cantigny. Our patrols in front of Cantigny reports that some of enemy's shells were falling short and striking Cantigny.

III. WORKS: Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility: Poor 12h. to 20 h. and 5 h. to 12h.
- (b) Nothing to report
- (c) "
- (d) "

V. AIRCRAFT

- (a) Balloons. Nothing to report.
- (b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time.	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
Ohio	17:44	1	Over right half sec-	Regu-	Fired on by
			tor	lation	A. A. guns.
	18:00	1	"	"	Very little
					A.A.activity.
Villers-			Enemy lines, vicin-	Obser-	
Tournelle	11-12	1	ity Cantigny	vation.	Not fired on
Marcelle	13-14	1	"	"	Fired on by
					M.G.s
	17-18	6	Over left half sec-	" &	Not fired on
			tor	combat	
	3.30	1	Cantigny (heard)	?	"
Paul	16.45	1	Bois de Cantigny &	Observa-	"
			South	tion	"
Kenifra	7	5	High over their	Patrol	"
			lines.		
	7:30	1	Our front lines	Observation	"

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Order of battle confirmed by message captured on a dog in the Bois de Cantigny at 20.06 (approximately) 6th Co. of 99 Regt. was at 11 a.m., May 8, in line on the S. edge of Cantigny.

(b) Fire observed in Mesnil St. Georges at 4284 still burning at 10h. A small fire was observed in Montdidier at 7289. There was a fire in Cantigny from 0.30 to 3.00 hours, apparently an ammunition dump.

(c) An anti-aircraft gun was observed in action east of Cantigny from 0h to 2 h.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Generally quiet. Artillery fairly active between 20 and 22 hours.

* Correct Spelling - BOIS de FONTAINE.

*1 Correct Spelling - BOIS COULON - S.G.W.

G 2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 10, 1918

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 9, 12 h. to May 10, 12 h.

No. 13

I. INFANTRY

- (a) Nothing to report.
(b) An enemy patrol of unknown size attempted to raid one of our listening posts at 2606. Our post opened fire with an automatic rifle, forcing the enemy to withdraw. The enemy used grenades. No prisoners were taken by either side.
(c) Intermittent machine gun fire during the night on our front line positions.
(d) Nothing to report.
(e) Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of Enemy Artillery.

<u>Front Position</u> <u>Point of Fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Remarks</u>

Tetouan or Quarter C					
Front lines	11-18	115	105	N.E. Cantigny	Harassing.
Support "	20-21	45	88, 105	"	"
Whole Sector	17-6	1350	88, 105, 150	"	-(Harassing
Casablanca Sector	17-6	2000	"	"	-(Interdiction
					-(& Barrage
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	45	105	"	Harassing
Hill 100	(11-18	140	105	"	"
	(21-23	150	88, 105	"	"
Bois Suisse	12:30	25	"	"	"
Belle Assise Sector	Int.	239	77, 105	E. of Can-	" &
				tigny	Retal.
Bois de Longue Haie	"	470	"	"	" "
Bois de Fontaines	"	229	"	"	" "
E. Belle Assise Farm	"	85	"	"	" "

Rear Positions.

Villers Tournelle	"	610	105, 150	N.E. Can-	Harass.
				tigny	& Inter-
					diction.
Bois de Villers	"	120	77, 105, 150	"	(Intended
					(for batter-
					ies.
Broyes	"	100	"	?	(
S.W. Mesnil	4-5	30	105	?	?

Batteries.

21, E. of Broyes Int. Salvos 77, 210 ? ?
Note: The enemy artillery was quiet during the day except for the bombardment of Quarters C and D from 19.25 to 20.30 and from 4.10 to 5.10. This reaction was due to the Griv-esnes operation.

Total No. of Shells falling in sector 5743

III. WORKS

(a) Several carrying parties were seen in the eastern end of the Bois de Fontaines, north of the chateau. New dirt observed at 3417, 3616, 3217, believed to be trenches.

(b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: Poor 15 h. to 16 h. and 6 h. to 12 h.

None 8 h. to 13 h.

(b) Ninety men passed back and forth between Fontaines s/ Montdidier and the Bois de Fontaines during the period covered by this report. Several of these men were carrying packs

V. AIRCRAFT

(a) Balloons.

Pt. of Obs.	Direction	Angle	Time Up	Time Down	Remarks.

Clocher

Plainville	N.E.	270	19.45	- -	Evidently same group of 4 balloons seen from both posts.
		250	19.50		
		214	20.04		
		107	20.04		
6282		83	20.02		
		92	"		
		110	"		
		233	"		

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks

Broyes	20.02	4	S. over our lines.	Reconnoiter-	Not
	5.57	8	Over our lines	ing	fired on.
				"	Driven back by A.A. guns.
Clocher	(14.20	2	Very high over sector	"	Not fired on.
Plainville	(18.05	2	"	"	"
	(5.32	1	"	"	Fired on by A. A.
	(5.55	5	"	"	Not fired on.
	(6.03	3	Over center of sector	"	Fired on by A. A.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) At 21.31 1 green, 1 red, 2 green, rockets were observed to come from enemy lines south of Cantigny. These were followed 4 minutes later by 5 green rockets.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry quiet. Artillery retaliating for our action in vicinity of Grivesnes. Aviation active.

G 2

No. 14.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 11, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(From May 10, 12 h. to May 11, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Enemy patrol, size unknown, attempted to raid one of our listening posts in Quarter C. The enemy was driven off without loss to us.

(c) There was little rifle fire during the period covered by this report. A machine gun in the northern edge of Cantigny fired short bursts on the front line in Quarter D during the night.

(d) Twenty-five Minenwerfer shells, caliber unknown, fell on Support Lines of Casablanca near 1010 from 16:30 to 17 hours.

(e) Nothing to report

II. ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of enemy artillery:

Front Position.

Point of Fall	Time	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Quarter D	Int.	70	77,88,105	N.E.Cantigny	Harass.
Bois de St.Eloi*	"	70	88,105	"	"
Quarter C	18:35	25	77,gas	sneezing	"
"	Int.	60	105	N.E.Cantigny	"
Bois de Cantigny	"	70	88,105	"	Reg.
" " "	"	125	105	"	Harass.
Hill 100	Int.	110	105	"	Reg.& Harass.
Bois Fontaine	"	76	77,105	?	?
Bois de Longue Haie	"	269	77,105	Some shrapnel	? Harass.
Belle Assise	"	247	77,105	?	"
(Front & support lines)					
E. Belle Assise	Int.	192	77,105	?	Harras.& Interdic- tion.

Rear Positions.

Bois de Villers	"	302	77,105,150	?	Apparently in- tended for bat- teries.
Broyes	"	154	105,150	?	Harass.
			(some shrapnel)		
Villers Tournelle	"	310	77,105,150	N.E.Cantigny	"
					Reg.Destr.
Serevillers	"	28	105	?	Harass.
Rocquencourt	9:30	40	150	?	" & Destr.
<u>Batteries.</u>					
N.E.corner Bois de Villers	15:45	30	105	?	Harass.
N. Rocquencourt	12	12	105	?	"
	17:30	10	105	?	"

Total No. of shells falling in sector 2200

III. WORKS.

(a) The wire reported along the Cantigny road from 2510 to 2708 consists of three strands on screw pickets.

A line of disconnected fire trenches about 20 feet long and 4 feet deep, at least 15 in number, have been seen running from 2409 to about 2510.

(b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: None from 6 to 12 hrs. Poor from 12 to 20 h.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) " " "

(d) " " "

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons Angle in
Pt. of Obs. Direction degrees Time up Time down Remarks
with ref-
erence to

Pt. of Obs.	Direction	degrees	Time up	Time down	Remarks
(Arthur)	Gratibus	Mg. N 78 E	6	18:30	
		72 E	6:15	18:40	

(b) Airplanes.
Pt. of Obs. Time No. Region flown Mission Remarks

Pt. of Obs.	Time	No.	Region flown	Mission	Remarks
No. 18	1-2	3	over Cantigny	Obs. & Photo- graphy	Not fired on or pursued.
	15-16	9	Villers Tournelle and vicinity	Combat	"
	16-17	1	"	"& Obs.	Fired on.
	18-19	7	Quarter D & Le Plessier	" "	Not fired on or pursued.
	19-19:30	3	"	?	"
	14:25	2	N.E. Bois de Cantigny	Obs.	Not fired on.

VI MISCELLANEOUS

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Two buildings were demolished in Cantigny by
our Artillery fire.
- (c) Nothing to report.
- (d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry and artillery quiet. Aviation normal.

*Correct spelling: BOIS ST. ELOI

S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 12, 1918.

G-2

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

No. 15 (From May 11, 12 h. to May 12, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) " " "

(c) From 17 h. to 4 h. bursts of machine gun fire at irregular intervals on the front line of Quarter D and up the ravine to battalion P.C. Machine gun is at 1910

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) " " "

II. ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

<u>Point of Fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Quarter D front	Int.	420	77,88,105,150	Bois de Framicourt & Reg. Bois de Lalval	Harass.
Quarter D Support	"	300	77,105,150	Bois de Lalval	"
Bois de St. Eloi*	15; 3:30	60	105	"	"
	14,15	30	77,105	"	"
Quarter C Front	Int.	225	77,105	N.E.Cantigny	"
Quarter C Support	21-22	30	105	"	Harass.
Hill 100	Int.	40	105	"	"
Bois de Cantigny	"	350	77,88,105	"	"
(Some of these shells were gas shells. They are thought to be Phosgene and were used in quantities barely sufficient to cause discomfort.)					
Bois de Fontaine	Int.	138	77,105	?	?
Bois de Longue Haie	"	177	77,105	?	?
Belle Assise Support	"	115	77,105	?	?
East Belle Assise	"	190	77,105	(some shrapnel)?	?

Rear Position.

Bois de Villers	"	149	105	?	Intended for Batteries
Broyes	"	57	105,150	?	"
Villers Tournelle	"	205	77,105,150	N.E.Can-	Harass.
				tigny	
Serevillers	"	20	105	"	"
Mesnil	3:35-4:35	37	150 (H.E.)	?	?
Batteries.					

E/6 N. Rocquencourt	Int.	10	105	?	"
Total No. of shells falling in sector 2555					

III. WORKS

(a) Nothing to report

(b) " " "

IV. CIRCULATION

(a) Visibility. None: 21 h. to 4 h. Poor- 4 h. to 10 h.
Good: 10 h. to 20 h.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Circulation in Rear Zone.

<u>Route</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Seen from</u>
Cantigny:House at 2215	14:30	Two men running	No. 18
to Bois de Lalval.			

(d) Nothing to report.

V. AIRCRAFT:

(a) Balloons: Nothing to report.

(b) Airplanes:

<u>Pt. of Obs.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Region flown over</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Oklahoma	16:38	1	South of Serevillers	Recon. & Driven off	
	16:55	2	Serevillers and front of sector		Photog. by A.A.guns. Obs. Fired on by A.A.
	17:45	1	Heard only	?	Not molested.
---	18:23	3	Whole sector		Obs. Fired on by A.A.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Fire in Cantigny between 1 and 3 hours. Looked like an ammunition dump. Two fires occurred in Montdidier accompanied by numerous explosions.

(c) Nothing to report.

(d) " " "

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery normal. Infantry quiet. Aviation normal.

* Correct spelling: BOIS ST. ELOI.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division.
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 13, 1918.

G - 2.

No. 16

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 12, 12 h. to May 13, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
(b) One enemy patrol, numbering about 20 men, met near 1721 by one of our patrols. Fighting ensued. Results upon enemy unknown.
(c) Machine guns were very active around Cantigny, sweeping our front lines:
37 mm (?) gun, presumably located in or near Cantigny, fired on N. edge Bois des Glands at 4 h.
(d) Trench Mortar located near 2216, fired a few shots on left of Quarter D.
Trench mortar projectiles on left of Bois de Fontaine.

- (e) M.G. at 182.175, in bushes. M.G. near 19.20.

II ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

<u>Point of fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Quarter D Front Lines	Int.	70	77,105	Bois Lalval	Regis. Harass.)
					(some shrapnel)
Bois St. Eloi	"	50	77,105	"	"
Quarter D	"	100	77,105,150	"	Scattered over entire Quarter. Regis.
Quarter C	16:45-16:58	25	105	N.E. Cantigny	Harass.
"	Int.	45	105	"	"
Quarter C Support	(10:15	5	105	"	"
	(20:35	35	105	"	"
	(1:30	45	105	"	"
	(4.20	25	105	"	"
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	110	88,105	"	Harass. & Reg.
Hill 100	"	100	105	"	"
Bois de Fontaine	"	?	77,105	In bursts count impossible	
1st lines of support of Quarter A	"	250	77,105		
Bois de Longue Haie	"	76	77,105		
Between Belle Assise and Advanced works	"	25	77		
To right of Rt. No. 30	"	20	77,105	after dark.	
<u>Rear Positions.</u>					
Villers Tournelle	Int.	210	105,150	N.E. Cantigny	Reg. Harass.
Bois de Villers	"	122	77,105	?	"
Broyes	"	94	105	?	"
Coullemelle	"	300	150,210		
<u>Batteries.</u>					
N.E. of Broyes	"	10	105		
"	"	10	77		
Total No. of shells falling in sector 2927.					

III WORKS

(a) 75 men digging trench at 185.175. Two short stretches of wire observed at 185.193 and 1821. Low wire entanglements observed opposite Quarter B, not as yet exactly located.

(b) Nothing to report.

IV CIRCULATION

(a) Visibility: None 21 h. to 4:30 H. Poor 4:30 h to 11 h. Good 11 to 12, May 12, and 12 to 21 May 13.

(b) Germans wearing packs moving between 1st and 2nd lines.

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point Obs.	Seen from.
Guerbigny-Montdidier	19.15	2 sections	9614	Okla. & Ohio.
"		Cavalry		
" - Fignieres	18.45	40	Infantrymen	"
Gratibus-Boussicourt	5.35	25	"	6735
"	6.11	75	"	"

A great deal of circulation (Infantry in small groups) was observed during the early hours of May 13 on the Gratibus-Boussicourt road.)

Boussicourt-Pierrepont 6.18 10 lorries 6945 Okla. & Ohio.

(d) General impression of circulation: Very much above normal.

V AIRCRAFT

(a) Balloons.

Angle in mils

Pt. of Obs.	Direc-	with ref. to	Time up	Time down	Remarks.
	tion	Cantigny steeple			

Ohio	Right	106	16.57		Where time
		270	17.36		not noted
		6390	17.56	18.25	visibility
		750	18.15		prevented.
		620	18.30		

(b) Airplanes

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Marcelle	6.25	1	(Front line on left	Obs.	Not molested.
	16.45	1	(of Div. sector		"
	17.15	2	Front lines on right.	Patrol	"
	18.30	3	"	"	"
	19.25	2	"	"	Fired on by M.G.
	19.55	4	"	"	Not molested.
Ohio	18.12	2	Front lines (low)	Recon.	Fired on a little.
Broyes	19.40	8	Over our lines	Patrol	Fired on.

VII MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) " " "

(c) Searchlight operating at various times during night behind enemy's lines.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Usual artillery activity. Circulation abnormally great seeming to indicate divisional relief.

G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 13, 1918.

The following extract from G. H. Q. "Summary of Information". No. 40, May 10, 1918, is published for your information.

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - No. 9.

By British General Staff, May 3, 1918.

TACTICAL HANDLING OF MACHINE GUNS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

These notes refer to defensive operations only, and do not, therefore, necessarily alter our offensive tactics.

1. Direct fire over the sights is the most effective type of machine gun fire, and all guns must be sited with this end in view. Indirect fire is subsidiary. It may, however, always be employed to harass and inflict damage on the enemy, provided that a sufficient reserve of small arms ammunition is kept in filled belts at the gun for direct fire.

2. During a prolonged bombardment prior to attack, cases have occurred where guns have maintained a useless barrage for several hours. The S.O.S. barrage, co-ordinated with the artillery and put down at the right time, serves a useful purpose.

The justification for opening fire on S.O.S. lines depends upon:-

- (a) The ammunition supply.
- (b) The imminence of the hostile infantry attack.

As regards (a) rear guns should have a larger reserve of small arms ammunition than forward guns, as they have more opportunities for expending it; but a minimum of 4000 rounds filled in belts must be kept intact at all gun positions and reserved for direct fire. (b) Every possible arrangement must be made beforehand for the communication of this to the batteries.

3. Barrage fire cannot be initiated at short notice from a new position. It cannot be carried out with a map of less than 1-20,000 scale. It should not be attempted unless there has been thorough preparation; unless effective communications exist; and unless it is clear that the enemy is actually advancing over the area covered by fire.

4. The positions of machine guns should be chosen with a view to all around defense. Instances have recently occurred where guns have been put out of action by a few of the enemy's bombers, who have worked up close to them without being observed. If there is any dead ground or concealed approach in the neighborhood of a gun position, it must be kept under continuous observation by sentries, or frequently patrolled. If the machine gun commander is unable to provide for his own protection, an escort should be furnished by the nearest infantry commander. It is the duty of the machine gun commander in such cases to ask for an escort if it is not provided.

5. The employment of machine guns singly should be avoided as reliance cannot be placed upon a single isolated gun unless it is in charge of an officer or senior non-commissioned officer. Guns sited in pairs facilitate control and inspire mutual confidence between the teams. Groups of four guns are generally more efficient, but are difficult to conceal. They have frequently been located and shelled out by the enemy before the completion of their tasks. They should not be employed unless efficiently camouflaged.

Instances have occurred, however, of the successful control of a group of four guns, with a gun sited in pairs some distance apart.

6. Care should always be taken to prevent the position of machine guns being disclosed by the movement of the gun detachment in its neighborhood. When siting a gun position on a forward slope, some covered route (e.g., a hedge or ditch) should, if possible, be selected by which communication can be maintained with the gun.

There should be no sniping by machine guns, as this gives away the position of the guns.

7. Machine guns which are placed to cover ground by direct fire under normal conditions must also be able to carry out their tasks by indirect means in case of smoke, fog, etc. At night and in misty weather, guns should always be mounted so that fire can be opened at once. During a hostile attack in fog or darkness, a sentry should be posted under cover in front of the gun position to give ample warning of the enemy's approach.

8. The question of reserving machine gun fire for short ranges depends on the nature of the target, but fire should be opened in sufficient time to prevent the guns being rushed by the enemy.

9. Every machine gun team should have with it the means of destroying the gun. A bomb on the breach casing is an efficient means.

10. When in action machine guns should invariably have condenser tubes attached. Cases have occurred in which hostile machine guns have been put out of action owing to the discovery of their positions by the escape of steam.

11. Empty belts must be refilled at first opportunity; when possible a special party should be detailed for belt filling at battalion headquarters to assist companies. The importance of taking care of belts must be impressed on all ranks, and every effort must be made to salve belts when changing positions. The issue of machine gun ammunition ready filled in expendable belts is being expedited to the utmost.

12. Co-operation between the Infantry and Lewis Guns and machine guns is essential, particularly in open warfare, and must be practiced during training. Instances have been reported during the recent fighting when orders to withdraw were given to the infantry which were not communicated to the machine gunners. This omission resulted either in the guns being withdrawn without orders, or in their being left in their old positions until it was impossible to withdraw them owing to lack of any covering fire. The Lewis guns, as they are merely mobile, should cover the withdrawal of the machine guns.

As soon as the Infantry has withdrawn and reorganized on its new position, a proportion of the machine guns, which have covered the withdrawal should be released to take up fresh dispositions in depth.

13. It is of the greatest assistance to the infantry commander in obtaining a quick grasp of the position if the machine gun officer can prepare a sketch map, however rough, showing the situation of his guns.

14. A definite system of communication must be laid down, and employed at all times between the machine gun company and its transport. This system must apply not only to the conditions of trench warfare; but also to the new conditions which will arise in the event of open warfare.

The fighting limbers should be part of the company and controlled as such. They should not be grouped together under the battalion transport officer.

15. The training of machine gun sections with their transport must be practiced on all possible occasions. The proper use of limbers and pack animals appears to have been somewhat lost sight of during recent operations.

16. During a battle the machine gun battalion commander should establish his advanced headquarters near the advanced divisional headquarters, where he will be in touch with the divisional staff and have access to all divisional means of communication.

17. The machine gun defensive organization must make full use of the existing communications within the divisional area. Machine gun commanders, therefore, must keep in close touch with the headquarters of the infantry and artillery units in their vicinity. In this way they will be able, if necessary, to make use of the infantry and artillery signalling system.

18. Special attention must be paid during training to:-

- (i.) Selection, both deliberate and rapid, of gun positions.
- (ii.) Approach to a position and coming into action.
- (iii.) Protection of flanks.
- (iv.) Training of sections with their fighting limbers.
- (v.) Training of officers in rapid preparation of sketch maps.
- (vi.) Co-operation with infantry in open warfare schemes.

19. Notes on equipment:-

(i) On one occasion during the battle, Lewis guns were issued to a unit in mistake for Vickers. Chests for Vickers guns will in future be marked "Chests, Vickers .303-inch Gun," and not "Chests, Vickers or Lewis .303-inch Gun," as in the past.

(ii.) It is a matter for consideration whether the first aid case ought not to be strapped to the gun when in action, to prevent loss.

(iii.) It is considered advisable to retain the issue of auxiliary mountings on the scale of one per gun, and guns should invariably have the auxiliary mountings attached when out of the gun chests. Where a shortage exists, the forward guns should have preference.

(iv.) All reports show that guns and equipment worked well. Lock springs and the auxiliary mounting attachment band are the only breakages reported.

(v.) One instance is reported of the belt filling machine proving of use.

G-2-
No.17

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
May 14, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(from May 13, 1918 to May 14, 1918.)

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
(b) " " "
(c) Intermittent M.G. fire on our front lines coming from Cantigny.
(d) Nothing to report.
(e) Machine gun at 3407.

II. ARTILLERY

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Point of Fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks
Quarter C.Front	10-17	30	88,105	N.E.Cantigny	Regul.
" " Support	17.50-2	40	105	"	& Harass.
	Int.	40	105	"	"
	21.20	25	88,105	"	Harass.
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	85	105	"	"
	10-15	100	77,88,105	"	"
Hill 100	Int.	105	105	"	Regul. &"
Quarter D	"	105	uu,105	Bois de	" "
				Framicourt	
Bois des Glandes*	"	165	77,105,	" & Bois de	Lalval Harass.
Bois de Longue Haie	"	188	77,105,150	?	"
Bois de Fontaine	"	184	77,105	?	"
Quarter A	"	157	77	?	"
Belle Assise Farm	"	33	77,105	?	"
Route Nationale No.30	"	300	77,105	?	Register-

Rear Positions.

Broyes	"	17	77,105,150	?	Harass.
Bois de Villers	"	200	77,105,150	?	Appar-
					ently in-
					tended for
					batteries,
Villers Tournelle	"	126	105,150, N.E.Cantigny.	Regul.	
				Harass.	
Serevillers	21.24	100	105	?	Concentra-

Batteries.

B/6 N. Rocquencourt	Int.	200	105	?	Harass.
	4-4:30	200	105	?	"

Total No. of Shells Falling in Sector. 2409

III. WORKS.

(a) 50 yards of trench along hill at 2409. Possible dugout at 3105.

(b) Suspected dump along Nat'l Highway 35 at 7210. The battery in the vicinity of 7503 has been seen to fire on the batteries near plainville.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: Poor. 12 h. to 20 h. Good: 5.30 h. to 12 h.

(b) Greater circulation than normal. Most of the circulation observed, being between point 3105 and Fontaine S/Montdidier.

(c) Circulation in Rear Zone.

Route.	Time	Number	Point	Seen from.
May 13				
Fignieres-Montdidier		8 horsemen	6946	Ohio
		2 caissons	*914	
		6 "	8019	
		20 men	7513	
		20 horsemen	8715	
Montdidier-Fignieres	"	1 lorry	9619	
Fignieres-Etelfay	"	2 2-horse wagons	9817	
Becquigny-Etelfay	"	10, men, 1 lorry	0623	
Becquigny-Etelfay	8-10	14 men	7109	
May 14				
Montdidier-Guerbigny	6-8	65 men	8515, 0920	
		25 cavalrymen	9307	
Gratibus-Fignieres	4	4-horse wagons	6735	Okla.
		1 company Inf.	6735	
		in groups of 25,		
		about 235 men in		
		all		
Fignieres-Gratibus		180 men in groups		
		of 25	6735	Okla.

(d) Circulation greater than normal.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons:

Pt. of Obs.	Direction	Angle in mils with ref. to Clocher Can- tigny	Time up	Time down	Re - marks
Ohio	S.E.	76	6.46	6.48	

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Re- marks.
Ohio	7.35	1	Front lines	Recon.	Fired on
Okla.	6	1	"	"	by A.A.
					Not fired on.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Our artillery fired 308 rounds of 155 c. on enemy battery at 4914. Adjustment by high bursts.
- (c) Nothing to report.
- (d) Nothing to report.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

* Figure illegible S. G. W.

* Correct spelling: BOIS des GLANDS.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 15, 1918.

G-2
No.18.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 14, 12 h. to May 15, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) An enemy patrol of three men was sighted at the point 1820 by one of our patrols. Shots were exchanged and both patrols withdrew.
- (c) Intermittent machine gun fire from Cantigny on our front lines during the night.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) Nothing to report.

II ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Point of Fall	Time.	No.	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Quarter D Sector	22-6	1500	Yperite	Bois de Fram- icourt	Harass.
"	"	150	77	"	"
"	"	200	105	Bois de Lalval	"
"	"	75	150	"	Destruc- tion.
Bois des Glands	Int.	125	37	Cantigny	Harass M.G.
Ravine Glands	"	200	77,105	Bois de Fram- icourt	Harass.
Quarter D, P.C.	"	150	77,105	"	"
Quarter C	"	400	77,105,150	N.E.Cantigny	Harass & Regula- tion.
Bois de Cantigny	"	200	77,105	"	"
Bois de Fontaine	"	91	77	?	Harass.
Quarter D, P.C.	18-20	Heavily shelled with light and med- ium caliber.			
Bois de Longue Haie	Int.	95	77	?	Harass
Quarter A	Int.	500	77,105	?	"
Rt. N. No.30	"	194	105	?	Registra- tion.

Rear Positions.

Bois de Villers	"	170	77,105	?	Intended for Btrys.
Broyes	"	33	105	?	"
Villers Tournelle	"	900	105,150	N.E.Cantigny	Regul.& Har- ass. (a few shells were 210) H.E. & Gas, kind not known)
Serevillers	"	100	105	?	Harass & Regis.
Coullemelle	"	425	105,150	?	Harass.
N.W.Rocquencourt	16-17	125	105	?	Harass.
<u>Batteries.</u>					
E/5 (vicinity of)	18:30	40	150	?	"
Vicinity of Bat- teries N.of Bois de Villers	8-11	150	105,150	?	Harass.& Destr.

III. WORKS.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: Poor, 12h. to 20h. Good, 6 h. to 12 h.

(b) Enemy seen at 3105, 3506: probably working parties; Also in Fontaine S/Montdidier E. edge of Bois de Fontaine near Chateau Sans Nom, at odd times during the day. Smoke observed in Fontaine S/Montdidier, coming from buildings.

(c) Circulation in Rear Zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point seen	O.P.
May 14.				
Etelfay-Fignieres	8:10	50 horsemen	9914	Okla.
	9:02	20 men	0013	
	14:48	40 horsemen	0211	
Guerbigny-Montdidier	About 20 wagons and 10 lorries seen passing during the day.			
Gratibus-Fignieres	9:12	70 men	6735	
Fignieres-Gratibus	13:45	18 men	6231	
	18:38	11 men	6735	
Montdidier-Pierrepont	one group of nine men observed at 7036. Seemed to be reconnoitering the ground.			
Fignieres-Becquigny	18:20	50 men	2726	
(6 caissons seem halted at 0716, probably an ammunition train.)				

AIRCRAFT:

(a) Balloons. Nine balloons observed from Oklahoma during the day, two of which were forced down by French plan planes. Thirty-Eight balloons were observed from Ohio during the period covered by this report.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt.of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
	(12:18	1	Bois de Cantigny	Obs.	Driven off by A.A
	(13:08	1	Quarter D	"	Driven off by M.G.
	(16:30	7	Front lines	Patrol	Driven off by A.A.
Baltimore.	(17:05	5	" "	Obs.	Driven off by M.G.
	(19:10	17	" "	Obs.&Combat	Driven off by our plane
	(10:55	5	Broyes	Battle	Attacked by 4 of our planes & Driven off.
Ohio	12:50	I French plane, seen to crash at 4282.			

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Searchlights observed in the rear of Montdidier and Cantigny: Active during the night. They were probably used as a means of liaison with enemy airplanes. Enemy has been sending up caterpillar rockets of 4-6-8-10-12 stars.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery active. Aviation active. Infantry quiet.

APPENDIX to Daily Intelligence Summary
May 14, 12 h. to May 15, 12 h.

V. Aircraft.
(a) Balloons

May 15.

Pt. of Obs.	Direction	Angle*	Time up	Time down	Remarks.
Ohio. (8763)	East	6387	8:28	12:07	
(Clocher Plainville)	"	"	12:30	15:30	
	"	"	16:52	18:25	
		6383	8:28	9:30	
		10	12:00	12:07	
		"	12:17	15:30	
		"	16:51	18:15	
		57	8:29	13:30	
		105	8:30	12:29	
		"	13:30	13:30	
		122	9:03	12:00	
		"	12:20	12:30	
		"	19:00	Down after dark.	
		110	7:36	19:30	
		210	7:44	9:30	
		"	12:00	12:06	
		"	12:20	Down after dark.	
		230	7:25	9:30	
		"	12:56	13:30	
		287	7:52	13:30	
		"	17:40	18:30	
		305	12:00	15:30	
		"	19:10	Down after dark.	
		405	8:31	9:30	
		"	12:55	15:30	
		"	18:30	Down after dark.	
		628	12:00	15:30	
		"	16:52	Down after dark.	
		637	9:07	Down after dark.	
		768	9:07	12:24	
		"	13:30	Down after dark.	
		788	9:08	" "	"
		175	8:20	" "	"
		757	15:52	" "	"

Four balloons up at 8:10 May 15, two in direction of our right center and two in direction of our left center. Visibility too low to orient instrument.

* Angle in mils with reference to Clocher Cantigny. - - - -

Okla.	(6282)	East	Cl.Can- tigny	May 14.
			6340	8:15 15:35
			6240	8:20, 11:46 11:40, Forced down by French plane
			6160	8:21, 11.
			6270	8:26, 11:46 11:40, 11:51 "
			6241	8:56, 12:37 12:34,
			6140	9:35, 14:40
			65	12:42 --
			6290	16:20 --
			255	16:45 17:25 (See appendix)

G-2
No.19

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 16, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 15, 12, h. to May 16, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
(b) " " "
(c) " " "
(d) " " "
(e) " " "

II. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Points of fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Bois de Longue Haie	Int.	35	77	?	Harass.
Bois de Fontaine	"	107	77	?	"

Front and support line trenches along the entire sector were submitted to a heavy bombardment from 3:35 H to 4:10 h, consisting of 77,105,150.

Rear Position.

Villers Tournelle	20	206	77,105	?	Destruction.
Broyes	9-11	120	77,105	?	Harass.
	14-16		150		
	"	60	150	?	"
Bois de Villers	1	113	150	?	"
" " "	Int.	267	150	?	Harass.& Destr.
Coullemelle	22-17	350	77,105	?	" "
<u>Batteries.</u>					
D/7 W. of Broyes	Int.	100	105,150	?	Destruction.
F/7 W " "	15-15:30	10	105	?	Harass.
C/7 W. of Bois de Villers	3.57	12	105	?	"

III. WORKS.

- (a) Nothing to report.
(b) " " "

IV. CIRCULATION

- (a) Visibility: Poor, 5 to 12 hrs. Good, 12 to 20 h.
(b) Four Germans seen carrying timbers into Cantigny at 6 h.

- (c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point	O.P.
Figonieres-Bouillancourt	14.55	2 cos. Infantry	7444	Ohio
		6 wagons	"	

Figonieres-Becquigny 19.20 1 platoon " 2827

Normal motor and horse-drawn traffic on all the roads in the rear area during the period covered by this report.

- (d) General Impression of Circulation: Normal.

V. AIRCRAFT

- (a) Balloons

Nineteen balloons seen on May 15 from O.P. Ohio. Nine balloons seen on May 15 from O.P. Oklahoma. 5 balloons seen on May 16 from O.P. Oklahoma prior to 8 h.

Note: At 13:45 hrs 2 German Observation balloons behind Montdidier were brought down by our planes.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Oklahoma	12:02	1	Broyes	Reconn.	Fired on by A.A. & driven back.

Ohio. & Bois de Villers 16:20 2 German, 4 French Belle Assise ?
 Note: Attacked by French pilots, one brought down between Belle Assise & Bois de Fontaine. one near Courtemanche. The one which came down in our lines was on fire before reaching the ground.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) The following marking discovered on cross-piece of enemy plane fallen near Belle Assise

D 38 -

(b) Small dump behind Cantigny set on fire during the night.

(c) At 1:05 enemy balloon seen up N.W. of Montdidier. Three clusters signal rockets were fired from the balloon. The balloon carried a light. When this light was extinguished at 1:15 two searchlights commenced operating in rear of Cantigny, and so on, alternately until 3 h.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery active. Infantry quiet. Aviation normal.

NOTE: Summary of Information of May 15, should read under the heading "V (a) Balloons"

" Eighteen balloons were observed from Ohio on May 14, and four more by 8 A.M., May 15"

in place of

" Thirty-eight balloons were observed from Ohio during the period covered by this report.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
May 15, 12 h. to May 16, 12 h.

V. (a) Balloons

Pt.of Obs.	Direc- tion	Angle in mils with reference to Cl. Cantigny	Time up	Time down
Cl.Plainville East	230		6.20,13.30	10.20,after dark.
(Ohio	185		8.37,16.05	13.30,19.20
	620		8.40,6.05	13.,19.30
	380		8.39,13.45	12.40,20.20
	145		8.13,20.20	9.57,after dark
	476		6.00	after dark
	780		9.37	"
	760		10.25	20.25
	7		11.12(farther back)	13.20,14.30
	22		12	14.45
	137		11.50,14.19	13.,20.30
	125		16.03,20.39	20.39,
	400		16.06	18.30
Mesnil (Okla.)	60		9.05	9.40,20.03
May 15	6320		13.47,14.05	13.41,14.04, 16.15
	6270		10.12,12.05	10, 11.05
	6235			9.50
	6155		8.45,13.32,13.51	13.25,13.41, 16.15
	50		13.47,14.16	13.41,14.15, 15.50
	70		10.55	--
	245		--	13.41
	6190		19.17	--
Mesnil, May 16.	6340		4.45	
	6307		4.55	
	6195		5.00	
	40		5.45	
	250		6.20	7.30

Clocher Plain- ville	East	Cl. Cantigny		
		6375	8:33	16:30
		6384	7:44	19:30
		10	8:34,12	10:15,14:30
			17:30	19.
		30	8:34, 12.	10:15,19:35
		90	7:56	13:30
		250	8:35	after dark.
			(see appendix)	

82nd Reserve Division.

(See page 113, "German Forces
in the Field.")

Composition May 1, 1918:

82nd Reserve Infantry Brigade.

270th Res. Inf. Reg. (III Corps District -- Brandenburg)

271st Res. Inf. Reg. (VI Corps District -- Silesia)

272nd Res. Inf. Reg. (VI Corps District -- Silesia)

Cyclists: 82nd Res. Cyclist Co.

Divisional Cavalry: 82nd Res. Cavalry Detachment.

Artillery Command: 70th (3 4-guns and 3 4-how. batteries)
Res. Field Artillery Regiment.

Pioneer Battalion: 86th (Res.?) Pioneer Co. This company was identified with the Division in April, 1918. When the Division was on the Eastern Front the 70th and 246th Pioneer Companies were reported with the Division, but it is not established that they are still with the Div.

287th Searchlight Section.

282nd Minenwerfer Co.

Signals: Telephone Detachment.

Medical and Veterinary: 544th Bearer Co.

119th and 120th Field Hospitals.

-----Veterinary Hospital.

Train M.T. Col 749.

Field Post Office No. 862.

* * * * *

Organization. The 82nd Res. Div. was organized in the Fall of 1914 on the Eastern Front, and originally consisted of the newly organized 270th, 271st, 272th and 273rd Res. Inf. Regs. At the end of 1916 the 273rd Res. Inf. Reg. was detached and sent to the newly organized 197th Div. and the remaining three regiments were grouped under the 82nd Res. Inf. Brigade. In June, 1917, the 271st Res. Inf. Reg. was sent to the 95th Div., but it returned to the 82nd Res. Div. in November.

1915. The 82nd Res. Div. did not take an active part in the operations until the early months of 1915, when it occupied a quiet sector on the Eastern Front. In May, 1915, with the 81st Res. Div., which, together with the 82nd Res. Div. comprised the XLI Corps, it went to the XI Army under von Mackensen and participated in the offensive on the San and the breaking of the Russian line in Galicia. At the conclusion of this operation it took a sector at Pinsk, and remained here until November, 1917.

1917. On the whole this front was quiet and the Div. does not appear to have distinguished itself here, but rather to have deteriorated. In Nov. a man of the 270th Res. Inf. Regt. wrote that he had not fired his rifle since the middle of March.

In the fall of 1917, when the best class of men were being milked from Divisions on the Eastern Front a large number of men were taken from the 82d Res. Div. and sent West.

At the end of November, 1917, it was relieved, and it entrained at IVANOWO December 4 for the Western Front. It proceeded via BREST-LITOWSK WARSAW KALICZ GLOGAU KOTTBUS HALLE BEBRA FRANKFURT MAYENCE KREUZNACH SARREBRUCK METZ CONFLANS, and detrained at Mars-la-Tour December 10.

In this region it went through careful training including divisional manouvers. According to a prisoner of the 272d Res. Inf. Regt. at the conclusion of these manouvers north-west of Conflans, Lt. Gen. FUCHS, commanding Army Detachment "C" declared that the 82nd Res. Div. could only be classed as Kampftruppen #3, or 3d class combatant troops, which would only be a little better than Armierungstruppen, or working battalions.

1918. In the night of Jan. 11-12, the Div. relieved the 11th Bav. Div. in the sector north of St. Mihiel, where it remained until April 24.

Examinations of a number of Alsatian deserters and many prisoners taken from the division in this sector established the fact that a very thorough effort was made before the division left the Eastern Front to bring the division up to a satisfactory condition for western front warfare. Before leaving Russia the division transferred to the 95th Div. a large proportion of its Alsatisans, all of its old men, and most of its recruits of the 1919 class. In return the 95th Div. send many young men to the 82d Res. Div., and in the process of returning the 271st Res. Inf. Regt. to the 82d Res. Div. it greatly improved the character of this regiment by a similar exchange process.

It appears, however, that there are still a few Alsatisans with the 82d Res. Div., although while the Division was north of St. Mihiel a general effort seems to have been made to keep these Alsatisans in the rear. There are large numbers of Poles in the Division, including many Polish officers. In addition there are miscellaneous recruits from various parts of Germany.

Strength: The Division appears to be equal or in excess of the average German Division in number of effectives. Many companies reached the Western Front with 250 on the ration list, and few companies with less than 200. The losses were slight while it was N. of St. Mihiel, but on the other hand only a few handful of recruits were received. In April a few men were released to return home to their farms. In one company it was reported that ten more were to go home for this purpose.

Assault Troops:

There does not appear to be a Divisional Assault Company, but each regiment appears to have an Assault group selected from the companies when occasion requires. These groups amount to 80 or 90 men. In an operation by the 272d Res. Inf. Regt. April 13-14 on American troops facing them, a raiding party of 500 included a regimental raid command under Capt. KLEIN, commander of the 1st Battalion.

Armament: When the division reached the Western Front, it appears to have averaged 3 machine guns per company, but this number was steadily increased, and by April most companies appear to have had 5, and some to have had the maximum number of 6, as well as the normal allotment of trench mortars and grenade throwers.

Moral: The 82d Res. Div. arrived on the Western Front distinctly a poor division, comprised of heterogeneous elements, and, unaccustomed to active fighting. A consistent effort is apparent to bring the division up to fighting ability for western front purposes, and in fact several prisoners have stated that the occupation of a sector in the St. Mihiel salient was to prepare the division for the Spring offensive. Several carefully rehearsed raids were carried out by the Division, but none brilliantly. Accordingly, the division appears to be of mediocre character, at the present time, but it would not be surprising, in view of all its preparations, if it appeared in the offensive with considerable fighting ability.

On February 1 a study of the division resulted in classing it as third class in a scale of four classes.

COMMANDERS: 82d Res. Div. Gen. Lorne von St. Ange	Mar. 16, 1918.
82d Res. Inf. Brig. Col. v. Wedel	" " "
270th Res. Inf. Regt. (?)	
1 Btn. Rittm. Boeckin	Jan. 28, 1918.
Adj.--Lt. Thiese	" " "
3d Co. Lt. Grubert	" " "
10th Co. Lt. Bandekow	Apr. 14 "
271st Res. Inf. Regt. Lt. Col. Friedrichs	Mar. 11 "
1 Btn. Capt. Schlettwein	" " "
II Btn. Capt. Paletta	" " "
5th Co. Lt. Maler	" " "
III Btn. Maj. Hofacker	" " "
272d Res. Inf. Regt. Maj. Holde (?)	
succeeding Maj. v. Grohte	Apr. 14, 1918.
I Btn. Capt. V. Klein	" " "
1st Co. Lts. Freitag and Kunezke	" " "
2nd Co. Lt. Arnold	Mar. 16, 1918.
3rd Co. Lt. Auerbach	" " "
4th Co. Lts. Rudel	
Sprokow	
Auerbach (?)	Apr. 14, 1918.
II Btn. Capt. v. Hersberg	Mar. 31, 1918.
6th Co. 1st Lt. Weihreuch	
Lt. Kliegel	
V. F. W. Ekrzybiza	Apr. 14, 1918.
III Btn. Capt. Axt	Apr. 16, 1918.
10th Co. Lt. v. Fogesag	" " "
11th Co. Lts. Heilmann	
Lukan	
Bodan	
Welzel	Apr. 16, 1918.
12th Co. Lt. v. Beirau.	" " "

G-2 (A-1)

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

May 14, 1918.

G-2
No. 20

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 17, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 16, 12 h. to May 17, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

(a) A German raiding party of 1 non-commissioned officer and 15 men attempted to enter our lines at 2301 on the morning of May 16, after a barrage had been placed on our 1st, 2nd and 3rd line trenches at 3.30 a.m. to 4.25 a.m. The raid failed. The leader was killed and several were wounded; the latter were carried off by the raiders.

(b) German heard talking in the front line positions along the Eastern edge of the Bois of the Chateau Sans Nom. by our listening post.

(c) Intermittent machine gun fire on our first line. Indirect fire on selected spots in the rear.

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Nothing to report.

V ARTILLERY

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.

Point of Fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.

Quarter C, 1st & 2nd lines	Int.	900	105, 150	?	Harass.

Quarter D, 1st & 2nd lines	"	1000	105, 150	?	"

" " Vicinity

P.C. 19-5 140 150 ?

Cross roads 0302	10.15	30	105	?	Interdict.

Point 0201	24.	30	77, 105	?	Harass.

" 8717	24.	25	105, 150	?	"

" 9405	24.	250	150, 210	?	Harass. & Destr.

Quarter B, 2nd

line 3.30-6. Heavy concentration of 77, 105, 150

Quarter A, Front	3.45-4.15	"	"	"	" " " "

Rear Positions.

Villers Tournelle	Int.	190	77, 105, 150	?	Harass. & Destr.

Coullemelle	"	210	105, 150, Bois de Framicourt	"	" " "

Villers-Coullemelle

Road & Coullemelle	18-5	*1	150 (a few 210)	?	Harass.

Coullemelle-Rocquencourt Road

11 80 105 ?

Bois de Villers	Int.	146	77, 105	?	"

Rte. Natl. No. 30	"	79	77, 105	?	Interdict.

Broyes	"	700	77, 105, 150	?	Destr.

Mesnil	"	77	77, 105		

Batteries:

Vicinity A/7 N. of

Bois de Coulon*	6-6	300	150	?	"

Vicinity C/7 W. of

Bois de Villers	8-13	100	105	?	

		50	150	?	Harass.

		100	77	?	"

Batteries: (Cont'd)

Point of fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
25,26, N. Corner Bois de Villers	8-14	500	105,150	Btry. 6112	Destr.(1 gun destroyed 1 out of Commission
Total Shells on Sector		5800			

III WORKS.

(a) Enemy trench at 1713 reported by one of our patrols to have been worked on recently. Our patrol discovered no wire between following points: 1718-2207. 1813-1613

(b) Nothing to report.

IV CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: Good 12-19 h. and 6 - 12 h.

(b) Three enemy seen at 3825 at 17 hrs.

(c) Normal traffic on the rear roads throughout the day. The following roads are used by the Germans. Guerbigny-Montdidier, Fignieres-Lignieres, Fignieres-Etelfay, Etelfay-Montdidier, Lignieres-Becquigny, Montdidier-Guerbigny, Pierrepont-Montdidier, Fignieres-Bouillancourt.

(d) GENERAL IMPRESSION OF CIRCULATION: Normal.

V AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

Six balloons observed from O.P. Oklahoma

Six balloons observed from O.P. Ohio

(b) Airplanes

Pt.of Obs.	Time	No.	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Villers-Tournelle	18.15	8	Over left sub-sector	Patrol.	Fired on by A.A.
	19.20	15	" " "	"	Attacked by 12 or 13 French. Disappeared in the clouds.
	18.32	5	Cantigny	"	
	20.22	2	" to the South	"	Turned back by A.A.
	24.	?	Over our and enemy's sector	?	
	20.52	1	Our front lines	Regul.	Dropped a white flare.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Body recovered of patrol leader mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) belonged to 9th Co., 3rd Bn., 83rd Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div. Killed at point 2301, confirming the order of battle.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Two searchlights active during the night, one in rear of Cantigny and one in rear of Montdidier. Helio-graph on roof of a house in Etelfay at 1006.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Infantry quiet. Artillery more active than usual. Aviation normal.

V. AIRCRAFT (a) Balloons.

Pt of Obs.	Direction.	Angle in mills with Ref. to Cl. Cantigny.	Time up	Time down
Oklahoma (6282)	East	6302	5:05	5:35
		6343	5:15	5:42
		62	5:30	---
		6232	6:30	---
		6160	7:35	---
		6127	?	---
Ohio (Cl. Plain- ville) (8763)	East	150	6:55	---
		6383	7:15	
		283	7:55	
		400	4:42	
		625	5:05	
		655	7:05	

Enemy trench at 1713 reported by one of our patrols to have been worked on recently. Our patrol discovered no wire between following points: 1718-2207. 1813-1613.

Nothing to report.

* Correct Spelling: Bois Coulon.

*1 Number illegible.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division, G-2
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 18, 1918.

G-2

No. 21

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 17, 12 h. to May 18, 12 h.)

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Our listening post heard shouting, noise made by moving men, and the rattling of wagons in Cantigny, last night.

(c) Intermittent bursts of M.G. fire on our front lines during the night. Sniping reported from 2803. Anti-Aircraft M.G. active in rear of Cantigny.

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Nothing to report.

II ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Point of fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
<u>Front Positions.</u>					
Hill 100	Int	139	77,105,150	?	Harass.
Bois des Glands	3	40	77,105	N.E.Cantigny	"
0506	1.30	9	77	?	Yperite
Bois de Fontaine	Int.	500	77,105	?	Harass.
Quarter A	"	250	77	?	"
Quarter B	"	40	77	?	Ranging on 2nd line & new line of resistance.
Belle Assise Farm	"	29	77,150	?	Harass.
Advanced wood	"	183	77,105	?	"
<u>Rear Positions</u>					
Villers Tournelle and Vicinity	Int.	600	77,105	?	"
	6.45	20	150	?	Destruction.
Broyes	Int.	53	77,105	?	Harass
Bois de Villers	"	382	77,105	?	Probably intended for batteries
Coullemelle	12	110	77,105	?	Interdiction & Harass.
Rocquencourt-Coullemelle Road	19-20	60	77,105	?	Harass.
Rocquencourt	20	49	105,150	?	"
Le Plessier-Coullemelle Road	Int	23	105	?	"
Serevillers-Broyes Road	20.30	30	105	?	Interdiction.
<u>Batteries</u>					
C/7 S.W.Bois Coulon	20-21	100	77	?	Harass.
" " " "	2.30-4.00	40	150	?	Destruction.
D/7 W.of Broyes	22-24	25	105	?	Harass.
Total No. of Shells Falling in Sector 2682.					

III WORKS

(a) Nothing to report

(b) Nothing to report.

IV CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility: Poor, 6 to 12 hrs. Good, 12 - 20 hrs.

(b) Three enemy from Chateau Sans Nom to 2803. Working party of eight men in shell hole at 6408.

(c) Circulation in rear zone

Route	Time	Number	Point seen	O.P.
Pierrepont-Montdidier	9.10	1 lorry	6847	Oklahoma.
	11.50	4 horsemen	7042	
	12.55	1 wagon	7037	
Montdidier-Guerbigny	All day	7 lorries	9207-9812	Ohio
		4 wagons	" "	"
Guerbigny-Montdidier	"	5 lorries	9207-9308	"
		3 wagons	" "	
Etelfay-Fignieres	"	2 "	0202	
		4 lorries	"	
Etelfay-Montdidier	12.25	2 Cos.Inf.	9911	
Rte.Natl.No. 35				
towards Montdidier	19.02	1 piece of		O.P. 18.
		artillery drawn		
		by six horses		

(d) General Impression of Circulation. Normal.

V AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

On May 17 4 balloons were seen from O.P. Oklahoma and 13 from O.P. Ohio.

On May 18, 5 balloons were seen from O.P. Oklahoma and five from O.P. Ohio.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
O.P. 18	13.50	1	E. Montdidier	Patrol	Not fired on.
Bois St.Eloi	22.15	1	Over Bois St. Eloi & Front lines.	Recon.& Bombing.	Dropped 2 bombs on P.C. (near Bois St Eloi).
" (May 17)	10.47	1	Front lines	Recon.	Fired on by M.G.
Ohio	22.30	1	Plainville	"	Fired on by A.A.
Oklahoma	19.13	1	Villers Tournelle	"	Driven back by A.A.
	19.40	2	" "		Fired on by A.A.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Our artillery made a direct hit on 2311, believed to be S.A.A. dump. Numerous small explosions followed.

(c) Searchlight played on our front lines in Quarter D at 23.30 hours, coming from the direction of Cantigny.

The caterpillar rockets used by the enemy is apparently an anti-aircraft signal, bringing into action searchlights and A.A. guns in direction of the rockets.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

G-2
No. 22

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 19, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 18, 12 hrs. to May 19, 12 Hrs.)

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) One of our reconniassance patrols penetrated into the eastern outskirts of Cantigny and entered the house at 1813, finding it unoccupied. Patrol reports that the hedge 100 m. west of Cantigny is not held at night. Another patrol found the enemy in force along the southern outskirts of Cantigny in vicinity of 2011. An enemy listening set was discovered along the southern edge of the Villers-Cantigny road at about 1713. A strong German patrol attempted to surround and capture a point of one of our reconnaissane patrols. The main body opened fire and the German patrols scattered. This happened at 2897. Daylight prevented a capture.

(c) Intermittent bursts of M.G. fire during the day and night, sweeping the ravine N. of Villers Tournelle. Rifle and hand grenades from enemy advanced post at 1318.

(d) Nothing to report.

9e0 Emplacement for either T.M. or M.G. at 2705. M.G. emplacement at 1913 (approximate)

V ARTILLERY.

(a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Positions.

<u>Point of fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Quarter C, Front lines	: 3.50 :	15 :	150 :	:	Harass.
	: Int. :	50 :	77, 105 :	:	"
Bois de Cantigny	: 8.30-9 :	620 :	77, 105 :	: Destruction, a few	gas shells, not
	:	:	:	: Yperite.	
Bois de Fontaine	: 9.20 :	12 :	77 :	:	
Belle Assise Farm	: 4.45 :	20 :	77, 105 :	:	

The Villers Tournelle subsector received about 1500 shells of harassing fire during the period covered by this report. They were well scattered over the whole of the area.

Rear Positions.

Broyes	: Int. :	108 :	105 :	: ?	Harass.
Bois Avance	: " :	118 :	77 :	: ?	"
Rte. Natl. No. 30	: " :	23 :	77, 105 :	:	
Villers Tournelle & Vicinity	: " :	500 :	77, 105 :	:	
Rocquencourt-Coullemelle road	: " :	160 :	105, 150 :	:	
Coullemelle	: 2.40 :	50 :	77, 105 :	:	
Mesnil cross-road	: 15-16 :	15 :	150 :	: 8249	
West exit of Serevillers	: 22.40 :	20 :	105 :	: Gas, not Yperite.	

Batteries

A/7 N. of Bois Coulon	: 18. :	150 :	: Btry. 4339	: Destr.
			(by Airplane)	

Total No. of shells falling on sector 3982

III WORKS.

(a) The trench at 2411 is in bad condition. Does not appear to be occupied. An O.P. about 30 yards east of this point is occupied at night.

(b) Three men working on camouflage at 7211.

IV CIRCULATION.

(a) Visibility. Poor: 12-20, 6-12

(b) Isolated groups of men seen moving into and away from Fontaine S/Montdidier. Three enemy seen entering wood at 0531.

(d) Circulation in Rear Zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point seen	O.P. seen from.
Rte. Natl. No. 35	:14-18	:3 ambulances:		:No. 18-
	:	:9 wagons	:	:
	:	:1 lorry	:	:
	:	:3 guns (4-horse)	:	:
	:	:1 tractor (going N.)	:	:
Lignieres-Becquigny	:14.43	:1 lorry	: 2628	: Ohio.
Guerbigny-Montdi-	:	:	:	:
dier	:15-1520	:6 lorries	: 8505	:
Montdidier-Guer-	:	:	:	:
gibny*	:15-17	:10 horsemen	: 949	:
	:	: e lorries	: "	:
	:	: 3 wagons	: "	:
	:	: 1 auto	: "	:

(d) General impression of Circulation: Normal

AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

Five enemy balloons seen by O.P. Oklahoma.

Seven balloons seen from O.P. Ohio.

(b) Airplanes

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Oklahoma	:13.10	: 1	: over our lines	: Recon.	: Driven back
	:	:	:	:	: by French planes.
	:18.56	: 7	: Broys & Villers	: Patrol.	: Fired on by
	:19.20	: 6	: Tournelle	: "	: " " "

(About eight other planes were over our lines individually at intervals throughout the day reconnoitering and photographing. Six of these were fired on by A.A. guns, and two were driven back by our planes.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Explosion heard in Courtemanche at 22.45 hours.

(c) Observatory at 2411 (approximate) Usual searchlight activity.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. Infantry quiet. Artillery quiet. Aviation more active than normal.

Balloons.

-3-

Pt. of Obs.	Angle in mils with ref to C1 Cantigny Direction	Time up	time down	remarks
Oklahoma (6282)	East.6345		9.50	
	6345	21.15		Signal
	671		9.55	
	6265			
	6180			
	125			
Ohio. (8763)	East 45	15.		
	110	5.28	15.30	
	195	5.40		
	195	6.15		
	200	13.	14.25	
	270	5.31	10	
	400	6.40		
	410	13.57		

Correct Spelling:-

* Guerbigny.

S.G.W.

G-2
No. 23

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 20, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 19, 12 hrs. to May 20, 12 hrs.)

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Usual bursts of machine gun fire on our front line positions during the night.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) New machine gun post at 3509.

II. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Positions.

<u>Point of Fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
N.W. corner Bois de Cantigny	8.15	50	77	?	Harass
W. edge of Bois de Fontaine	9-10	100	105,150	?	"
Ravine E. Bois de Fontaine	8-10	85	77	?	"
N.W. Belle Assise Quarter A, Front lines	10-20	420	105,150	?	"
	9-9.50	40	77	?	"
W. Cantigny	8.15	20	77	?	"
Bois des Glands	8.20	10	77	?	"
Quarter C, Front and Support lines	Int.	175	77,105	N.E. Cantigny	"

Rear Positions.

Villers-Tournelle	Int.	123	77,105	?	"
Coullemelle & Vicinity	15.05-17	2500	105(Yperite)	Bois de Framicourt	"
Rocquencourt	18.15	40	105	?	"
Broyes	Int.	118	105	?	Destr.
Bois Avance	Int.	235	77	?	Harass.
Bois de Villers	"	233	77,105	?	"

Batteries.

D,E,F,/6, Coullemelle (same shelling as Coullemelle)					
D/,7, Bois de Villers	16-18	20	150		"
B/7 Bois de Coulon*	10-18	140	150		"
C/7, Bois de Villers	13-18	25	105		Destr.
		10	210		"
		40	150		"
Total no. of shells		4384			

III. WORKS.

- (a) Enemy working party, 15 to 20 men, at 2805. This point is surrounded by a belt of wire. Piece of timber on ground at 2898. Probable dugout at 2411. M.G. emplacement at 23⁵11 on west side of road. Shallow trench from this point along the road about 100 yards. Strong point at 1813 held during the night.

- (b) Nothing to report.

V. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility. Poor: 12 h. to 14 h., 16 h to 20 h., 6 h. to 12 h. Good: 14 h. to 16 h.

- (b) 5.35 AM. One man seen walking on road at point 123.0-330.
 6.17 AM. One man seen on side of hill at point 123.3-330
 7.05 AM. One man seen walking on road at 123.2-330.5
 11.30 AM. Two men seen on road at 125.0-331.0
 12.00 N. Two men at 123.5-330.4
 1.25 PM. Five men coming from 1st line at 123.3-330.4
 1.30 PM. Six men leaving Fontaine with picks.
 2.00 PM. Black dog seen leaving 1st line at 123.3-330.4
 2.20 PM. Three men with heavy packs leaving Fontaine at 123.5-330.4
 2.23 PM. Two men with light packs going into Fontaine.
 2.37 PM. Eight men with packs and fire without going into Fontaine.
 2.40 PM. Five men leaving Fontaine carrying lumber.
 2.45 PM. Two men entering Fontaine.
 2.50 PM. Seven men, two carrying lumber, leaving Fontaine.
 2.57 PM. Two men entering Fontaine.
 3.03 PM. Six men with loose-fitting suits of blue and no helmets entering Fontaine.
 3.07 PM. Two men entering Fontaine.
 3.15 PM. Eleven men, ten carrying lumber, entering Fontaine.
 3.36 PM. Two men leaving Fontaine.
 3.50 PM. Seven men, six with packs, leaving Fontaine.
 3.55 PM. Seven men leaving Fontaine.
 5.00 PM. Four men entering Fontaine.
 7.30 PM. One man walking along path at 24.2-30.1 (Three here at 7.35) same at 7.55. Expect dugout in bank at this point (24.2-30.1

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point	O.P.
Guerbigny-Montdidier	12-12	7 lorries, 4 2-horse wagons, 20 men	9408	Ohio.
		1 wagon unloading	8505	
Fignieres-Etelfay	" 1 lorry, 12 men		0916	
Montdidier-Gratibus	" 1 " , 6 men, 2 wagons, 1 ambulance		9409	
Gratibus-Montdidier	" 7 wagons, 1 ambulance		- Bois de Villers	
Etelfay-Becquigny	" 1 motor, 1 wagon		1625	
Etelfay-Fignieres	" 2 lorries, 6 horsemen		0613	

(d) General impression of Circulation. Normal.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Eight balloons observed in ascension on May 20 at places already reported.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Coullemelle	12-18	Three single flights	observed over this sector, photographing.	
	19.15	6 planes over front lines	Patrol Fired on by M.G.	
Villers-	17.30	5 " "	" "	Recon. Not fired on. High.
Tournelle	17.10	Three single photographic flights	observed.	

At 10.15 this morning an enemy plane flew over Villers Tournelle at altitude of 300 meters reconnoitering and apparently photographing. At 22 h. an enemy plane dropped ten bombs on Coullemelle. Between 4 h. and 8 h. six enemy planes flew very low over our front lines and fired into our front line trenches.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Red flash from east of Hill 100 at 21.30 h. Heavy smoke from Malpart at 7.20 h. An airplane dropped a six-star rocket over our lines which was followed immediately by enemy shrapnel in direction of the flare.

(c) NOTE. A private soldier named Nicoloff, left one of our reconnaissance patrols to answer a call of nature and did not return. Insomuch as he knew the way back to our line it is thought he is a deserter. This happened on the night of May 18-19.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Aviation very active.

Artillery quiet except for bombardment of Coullemelle.

Infantry quiet.

Correct Spelling:- * Bois Coulon.

S.G.W.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division, G-2,
American Expeditionary Forces.

No. 24.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 20, 12h. to May 21, 12h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) An enemy patrol consisting of three small groups, was seen at 2208 at 1.15 h.
- (c) Hostile M.G. fire on our front line coming from north edge of Cantigny, woods in rear of Fontaine S/Montdidier and point 18⁵21. The M.G. at 3407 has been very active against aircraft in the daytime, and at night plays down the valley in the Bois de Fontaine and the Bois de Cantigny. One officer seen at this gun yesterday, evidently pointing out objectives to the crew.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) M.G.s at 1916, 18⁵21, 3407

II. ARTILLERY.

Front Positions.

<u>Point of Fall</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Front line, Quarter D	19.40	10	77	Bois de Lal-val	Harass.
" " , Quarters C&D	6-14	250	77, 105	"	"
Bois de Cantigny	9.50	20	105	Bois de Framicourt	"
Front lines, Quarter A	Int.	29	77	?	"
Bois de Fontaine	"	150	77	?	"
Belle Assise Farm	"	229	77, 105	?	"
Point 0998	4-5	89	Shrapnel	?	"
Bois Avance	Int.	309	77	?	"

Rear Positions

Villers Tournelle	Int	100	77	?	
Coullemelle	15.40	142	Gas, Yperite		
	16-18	50	105	?	"
	12-14	1000	Gas, Yperite		(In this bomb-ardment of gas (100 H.E. were thrown in.
	13-18	400	"	?	
Bois de Villers	Int.	229	77, 105	?	Harass.
Broyes	"	172	77, 105	?	"
Chateau Broyes	"	119	77, 105	?	Destr.

Batteries.

D, E, F, /7 S.W. of ~~Broyes~~ Airplane attempted to adjust on Bois de Villers these batteries at intervals during the day.
Total shells falling 3298

The following enemy batteries were seen in action: 6627, 7986, 6492, 5704, 5702, 5705.

III. WORKS.

- (a) New wire seen at 3406. Working party at 2311 during the night. Working party of 21 men seen at 3906 between 19 and 20 hours. Three men seen carrying wire at this point.
- (b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility: Poor 6 to 12 h. Good 12 to 20 h.
- (b) Parties, ranging from 2 to 5 men, seen going into and leaving Fontaine between the hours of 8 and 12. One party of 8 from Fontaine to Chateau Jenlis. Five officers over same route at 8.15h. (This traffic observed on May 20.)

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point seen	O.P.
Guerbigny-Montdidier	15-16	1 lorry, 2 wagons		
		3 horsemen, 4 men	9409	Ohio
Rte. Natl. No. 35	11-16	3 ambulances 4 wagons, 1 motor	Into Mont-	Bois de Villers
Rte. Natl. No. 30	12.20	60 men	Into Mont-	didier
			from east.	"

(d) General Impression of Circulation. More than normal in front lines and vicinity of Fontaine S/Montdidier, Probably an inter-battalion relief.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons. Three enemy balloons seen from O.P. Oklahoma. Seven enemy balloons seen from O.P. Ohio.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
Oklahoma	19.38	4	Serevillers	Patrol	Not fired on.
	18.49	8	Front lines	"	Fired on by AA. & M.G.
	22.00	2	Over Rocquencourt	?	Fired on by AA.
	22.25	1	Broyes & Serevillers	Recon.	" " " "& M.G.
Coullemelle	15.10	1	Over front lines	"	Fired on by M.G.
	15.45	1	" " "	"	" " " "
	17.45	3	" " "	"	" " " "
	2.00	1	Coullemelle	(dropped 8 bombs)	
Villers-Tournelle	2.25	1	Villers-Tournelle	Fired a red rocket	over the town.
Front lines, Quarter C	7.00	1	Front lines, Quarter C.	Fired tracer bullets along our occupied positions.	

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Nothing to report.

(c) Enemy sent up a 3-star rocket opposite our center at 1.30 hrs. and an orange-and-green flare at 1.35 hrs. Flares at intervals of five minutes during the night from point 1822 and 1852.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet, except for airplane activity.

APPENDIX.

Since our entrance into the sector, in addition to the enemy batteries the Corps artillery has destroyed, our own divisional artillery has fired a destructive shoot on ten enemy batteries. Since the date they were fired on, only two of these batteries have again appeared in action: so we may reasonably assume from this, and from a study of aerial photos, that eight of these batteries have in fact been destroyed.

Headquarters First Division, G-2,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 21, 1918.

MEMORANDUM NO. 27.

1. Carnet Nestor N.N.N. will become void at zero hour May 22nd and will be replaced by Carnet Cesar, of which copies are herewith inclosed. Carnet Cesar will become effective at Zero hour May 22nd.

2. It is requested that you distribute inclosed copies of Carnet Cesar within your organization, the distribution to be the same as was that of Carnet Nestor.

3. It is requested that you render to G-2, First Division, A.E.F., before May 24th, a report stating the name and organization of each officer to whom you have distributed a code Cesar, and indicating in each case the individual serial number of the Code (number marked in upper left hand corner on cover of code.)

EXAMPLE.

Capt. X, Nth Inf. Hdqrs. Carnet Cesar No. n

4. It is requested that you return to G-2, Division Headquarters, before 6 p.m. May 23, all Carnet Nestor distributed within your organization.

5. It is requested that you sign the inclosed receipt, and return it without delay to G-2, First Division, A. E. F.

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, G.S.
A.C. of S. G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 22, 1918

G-2
No. 25

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 21, 12 h. to May 22, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Enemy machine guns fired short bursts during the night on our front lines.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) Machine guns at 2911 and 3711 (approximately)

II. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Position.						
Point of fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks	
N.W. Corner Bois de Cantigny	Int.	37	77	?	Harass.	
Belle Assise Farm	Int.	32	77	?	"	
Quarter A	"	15	77	?	"	
Quarters C & D, Front lines	"	210	77	Bois de Lalval	"	
4.50 - 5.20		136	150	N.E. Cantigny	"	
2nd lines	13	200	77	Bois de Lalval	"	
Hill 100	12.36	60	150	" de Framicourt	"	
Bois des Glands	18.35	38	150	" " "	"	
S.E. of Hill 100	7.20	30	150	N.E. Cantigny	"	
Eastern edge of Bois St. Eloi	8 - 8.30	78	77	(70 duds)		
Res. Positions.						
Broyes	Int.	45	77,105	?	"	
Bois de Villers	"	119	77,105	?	"	
Bois Avance	"	101	77	?	"	
Chateau Broyes						
Villers Tournelle	3.20	40	77	Bois de Lalval	"	
Note: Short bursts of four shots at irregular intervals fell on regimental P.C. and Chateau in Villers Tournelle during the period covered by this report.						
Coullemelle & Rocquencourt	14.19	200	105,150,210	?	Destr.	
Serevillers cross roads	13.40	15	105			
	21.30	20	77			
F/7 W. of Broyes	21-4	30	105	?	Harass.	
A/7 W. of Bois de Villers	21.25	20	105	?	"	
Total No. of shells falling in sector I306						

III. WORKS.

(a) Large working party of 50 men seen in vicinity of Chateau Jenlis and at point 0320. Carrying party of 58 men seen going into and coming out of Fontaine between 5.30 and 11 hrs. They were carrying lumber and tin pails and some had rifles. Enemy working party heard digging at 2211⁵; also at 2609 and from point 2410 to 2010. Five men seen digging at 3504.

(b) Enemy seems to have new heavy batteries located near the following points: 5322, 5916, 7786.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility. Poor 6 h. to 12 h. Good 12 h. to 20 h.

(b) About 40 men seen moving during the day between Fontaine and Framicourt. Eight of these men carried packs.

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point	Seen from.
Rte. Natl. No. 35	15.13	4 wagons, 3 autos, 1 ambulance	Into	Bois de Villers
Point 6845 to Bouillancourt	11.07	1 lorry	6845	
Guerbigny-Montdidier	11-18	2 lorries, 2 autos, 1 wagon	9409	Ohio.
Montdidier-Guerbigny	18-16	2 wagons, 2 autos, 3 lorries	9409	
Becquigny-Lignieres	18-22	1 lorry with white cover	2550	
Fignieres-Etelfay	14-17	1 motor, 1 lorry	Turned at point 9914 toward Montdidier	
Fignieres-Lignieres	17.23	1 wagon	1015	

Sound of motors was heard on road in rear of Fontaine S/Montdidier during the night.

General impression of Circulation: Normal

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons: 5 enemy balloons seen from Oklahoma (May 12 " " " " Ohio. (22

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Villers-Tournelle.	12.20	6	separate flights	observed.	These planes flew over our front lines, Mission: photographing and reconnaissance.
	13.40	5	Over front lines	Combat	Flew low and fired into our front line trenches
	14.20	5	" " "		
	6.40	3	Going west over Villers Tournelle	Photo.	Not fired on.
	8.40	2	Front lines	"	" " "

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) What appeared to be a tank was reported by one of our O.P.s to enter Montdidier on Rte. Natl. No. 35 at 13.25 o'clock.

(b) Fires observed at point 6227 in Mesnil St. George, Montdidier, west edge of Fontaine, 6025, at intervals through the day. A series of explosions was heard at 7015 at 2.45 o'clock. At 0.20 h. the enemy sent up a three star rocket from the Bois de Fontaine.

(d) Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 23, 1918.

G-2

No. 26

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 22, 12 h. to May 23, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Only one M.G. reported to be in action last night. It fired short bursts at intervals along our front line.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) Nothing to report.

V. ARTILLERY.

Pt. of Fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Quarter C & D,					
Front lines	Int.	150	77	Bois de Lalval	Harass.
2nd line	10.25	11	77	" "	" "
Bois des Glands	8.02	26	77	" "	" "
Hill 100	10.58	26	77	" "	" "
Bois de Cantigny	12.30	.30	77	?	" "
Ravine between Bois					
St. Eloi & Bois des					
Glands	0-3	Shrapnel	at intervals		" "
Quarter A, Front	Int.	52	77	?	" "
W. edge Bois de					
Cantigny	7	240	77	?	" "
Point 0998	11	2	150	?	Adjustment.
Belle Assise Farm	Int.	55	77	?	Harass.
Rear Positions					
Coullemelle	17.45	20	105	?	" "
Broyes	Int	18	77, 150	?	" "
Bois Avance	"	51	77	?	" "
Bois de Villers	"	71	77	?	" "
Chateau Broyes	"	71	77	?	" "
Serevillers	"	60	77	Bois de Framicourt	" "
BATTERIES.	12-I	50	105	?	Destr.
II/6 W. of Coulle-					
melle	(15-18	25	270	?	Destr.
B/7 W. Bois de					
Villers	5.40	40	150	?	Adjustment by Airplane
A/7 N. of Bois de					
Coulon*					
(Old Position)	6-16	100	77, 105	?	" "
B/7 W. of Bois de					
Coulon*	17-10	8	77		
Total No. of Shells		1106			

III WORKS.

- (a) Enemy working parties heard at point 2613 and eastern edge of Bois de Fontaine.
- (b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility. Poor 6 h. to 12 h. Good 12 h to 20 h.
- (b) Two men going south at 4506. 30 men seen from 7.25 - 12 h. going into and leaving Fontaine carrying building material. From 12.10 to 15.50 h. 25 men seen in same places. 1 man crawled out of post at 3407. 1 officer wearing tan hat with bright gold band entered Fontaine during the afternoon.

(c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Object seen	Place seen	O. P.
Rte. Natl. No. 35	13-18	1 tank(?)	Towards	Bois de
		100 men, 2 wagons	Montdidier	Villers.
	6.30	1 caisson	"	
Guerbigny-Montdidier	13-18	3 autos, 2 lorries, 3 wagons	9409	Ohio.
Etelfay-Fignieres	15.07	1 wagon	9717	"
Fignieres-Etelfay	15.15	"	"	"
Montdidier-Guerbigny	17.18	2 wagons, 4 horsemen	9409	"
Montdidier-Etelfay	17.40	1 lorry	9219	"
Fignieres-Lignieres	18.32	2 "	1615	"
Bouillancourt to point 6945	19.11	2 caissons	6945	"
Etelfay-Fignieres	19.47	2 lorries	9818	"
Two groups of 20 men seen going north from 8292 at 1 minute intervals at 8 h.				

(d) General impression of Circulation: Normal.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons.

5 enemy balloons seen from O.P. Oklahoma.
14 " " " " " Ohio.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks.
Villers-				
Tournelle	5h 2	Villers-Tournelle	Scouting	
	5.30h 9	(In groups of 2 or 3		Fired on by A.
	- 19 h	Over Bois des Glands	Obs.	
Ohio	*1 h 4	Circled over Plainville	"	"
	6.02 h 3	Broyes	"	

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Following enemy batteries observed firing: 6691, 6492, 4339, 7514.

(b) Fires observed at following points. Mesnil St. George (20.25 H.) Cantigny Valley (21.20 h.)

(c) The enemy is using his airplanes, balloons, searchlights, A.A. guns and artillery in close liaison during the evening. On May 21 our radio intercepted a call meaning "column of troops" followed by designation of point and order to fire. Last night there was an enemy plane indicating the location of batteries in action.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

*Correct spelling Bois Coulon.

*1 Figure illegible.

S.G.W.

APPENDIX TO
DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
May, 22, 12 h. - May 23, 12 h.

V (a) Balloons (Continued)

Pt. of Obs.	Direction.	Angle in mils with Ref. to Cl. Cantigny.	Time up	Time down
Ohio.	East	65	5.15	7.30
		100	5.15	7.30
		235	5.15	7.30
		10	5.15	7.30
		6370	6.30	7.30
		15	6.30	7.30
		760	6.00, 6.23	6.20
		125	6.20, 6.23	
		665	7.30	
			7.30	

G-2
No. 27.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 24, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 23, 12 h. to May 24, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Intermittent M.G. fire on our front line during the night.
- (d) Nothing to report.
- (e) Nothing to report.

V. ARTILLERY.

- (a) Activity of enemy artillery.

Front Positions.

Point of Fall.	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks.
Bois de Fontaine	Int.	100	77	?	Harass.
Belle Assise Farm	"	22	77	?	"
Bois de Cantigny	"	42	77	N.E. Cantigny	" & Regul.
		26	105	"	"

Quarter C,					
Front line	18.43	10	105	"	Harass.
Support	Int.	40	105		"

Quarter D,					
Front lines	6-9	15	77, 105	?	Regul.
Support	Int.	200	77, 105(a few		

Shrapnel) Harass.

Bois St. Eloi	11-1	25	77	?	"

Rear Positions.

Broyes	Int	50	77, 105, 150	?	"
Bois Avance	"	47	77	?	"
Bois de Villers	"	25	77, 105	?	"
Chateau Broyes	"	56	105	?	Destr.
Villers Tournelle	"	45	105, 150	Bois de	

Framicourt Harass.

Batteries.

C/7 W. Bois de Villers	3.30	20	105	?	"
Total Shells falling in Sector			723		

III. WORKS.

- (a) 8 men seen digging a trench at 2606 at 17 h. 100 men seen going into and leaving Fontaine between 6 h and 20 h. May 23. All were carrying engineer material. Working party, size unknown, at 2705.

- (b) Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION

- (a) Visibility. None 7 to 12 h. Poor 12 to 20 h. Good 6 to 7 h.

- (b) Nothing to report.

- (c) Circulation in rear zone.

Route	Time	Number	Point seen	O.P.
Rte. Natl. No. 35 (to Montdidier)	12-20	15 wagons, 40 men, 1 gun	40	Bois de Villers

Guerbigny-Montdidier	12-20	12 wagons, 13 lorries, 4 motor-cycles	9409	

6-8 1 wagon, 3 lorries

Montdidier-Guerbigny	12-20	4 wagons, 3 motors	9409	
	6-8	7 wagons, 9 lorries		
		50 men	9409	

- 2 -

Fignieres-Etelfay	12-20	7 wagons, 1 lorry	1020
		50 men	0613
	6-8	3 lorries, 1 motor	0613
Etelfay-Fignieres	12-20	3 wagons, 1 lorry	9717
Becquigny-Lignieres	12-20	6 wagons	2827
	6-8	2 lorries	2827

Lignieres-

- - Becquigny 12-20 3 wagons 2827 - - - - -

- - (d) Circulation greater than normal. - - - - -

V AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons. Nothing to report.

(b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Remarks
Bois Villers	13-15	1	Broyes	Recon.	Not fired
	15.30	2	Broyes, going N.W.	"	on
	17.40	1	Broyes, going N.	"	"
Villers-Tournelle	7.15	2	Front lines	Obs.	"
	8.10	1	" "	"	"
	8.20	2	" "	"	"
	10.	1	Our line	"	"

- - VI MISCELLANEOUS. - - - - -

(a) Order of battle confirmed by prisoner belonging to 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 118 Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div. Captured at point 2996 at 2 h. May 24. (see attached report.

(b) Explosion heard in southern part of Montdidier at 14.03 h. Fires observed in Montdidier, Mesnil St. George and vicinity of battery 7199 during the period covered by this report.

(c) Searchlight active behind Fontaine s/Montdidier at 22.55 h. Battery at 4914 seen in action.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

- 0 -

REPORT ON A PRISONER CAPTURED MAY 24th, 1918.

1. Identity Landwehrmann X.... 1st Platoon, 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 118th Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div. Age, 42. Home, Orscholz, near Saarburg. Profession: Farmer and Factory hand.

2. Circumstances of Capture: Prisoner had been posted as a sentry in an individual hole at about 122.95-329.60. He was surprised by an American patrol at about 2 a.m., May 24th and appears to have offered little resistance himself, although the outposts on both sides of him promptly opened fire.

3. Order of battle. Prisoner does not know what units are adjacent to his company. He is of the opinion, however, that there is only one Battalion of the 118th in line.

4. Disposition of troops - defences. The prisoner thinks that three companies of the 1st Bn. are actually in line, and that the 4th may be in line also (but he is not sure). The disposition is as follows.

(1) A line of outposts, some 40 meters apart and about three meters inside the western fringe of the Bois Allonge. These posts are held both day and night. No M.G.s

(2) A line of organized craters, about 20 meters behind (East of) the Eastern fringe of the Bois Allonge. This line is held permanently by one platoon and is defended with one light M.G.

3. A second line of organized craters, about 200 meters from the eastern fringe of the wood. This line is held by the main body of the company, the Company Commander also remains there, except at odd times during the night, when he goes forward to inspect the posts. The three other light M.G.s which belong to the company are in position along this line.

Prisoner states that each of the platoons in the first line holds a frontage of about 80 meters, but that there is an interval of some 200 meters between platoons. This would seem to indicate that each company, having one platoon in the first line, defends a frontage of about 280-300 meters, and that the battalion holds 900 meters of front. (Prisoner is not sure which companies are on either side of his, but believes that his is in the center of the Bn., and that the 3rd is to his right. Prisoner states that there is no wire in front of the line of outposts. Neither is there any in front of the first line. As to the 2nd line he is not sure, but believes there is none.

He has not seen any heavy machine guns, nor does he know of any trench mortars or grenade-throwers in the neighborhood.

5. Activity of the enemy. His Company, since going into the line, has made no patrols. He does not seem to expect that any will be made. He has heard of no projected attacks or raids. He has no knowledge as to the artillery situation in this sector, except that lately the American artillery seems to be firing less than previously.

His company is doing no work of any kind. No trenches are being dug in his immediate vicinity nor is any attempt being made to connect the holes which at present constitute the lines of defense. There are no dugouts in the first line.

6. Reliefs and Rest Billets. It would appear that no reliefs take place within the battalion, the companies remaining in position seven days at a time. At the end of seven days the Battalion is relieved and spends seven days at rest. It then returns to the trenches.

Prisoner states that his battalion (1st) relieved the second Bn., during the night of the 20th to 21st of May. The relief was completed at midnight. The prisoner was unable to indicate the route followed by the relief, but stated that the troops were marched along paths, and on roads. The next relief will take place on the night of the 27th-28th.

His battalion, while at rest, was encamped under tents about 8 Kms. from the front, presumably in the neighborhood of Fignieres. They left the camp at 9 P.M., on the night of the relief and probably passed a short distance south of the Ferme Forestel on their way to the front.

While at rest his company did not engage in building works of a defensive character. The men were drilled every day, and spent the rest of the time in cleaning up and resting. Even at their rest camp they were harassed by allied artillery.

7. Food supply. Food is brought part way in rolling kitchens, and thence carried by hand. It usually arrives in the trenches at daybreak. Food is poor in quality.

8. Morale. Poor. Prisoner would "give anything to see the war ended and get back to his family." States that many others are of his opinion. Knows nothing as to a future German offensive.

9. Miscellaneous Losses: 2 killed and a few wounded during relief of company. Since May 21st 2 wounded while in line.

Gen. Comdg. Div. Von Mohn

C.O. 118th Res. Inf. Kuhl.

C.O. 1st Bn. Capt. Steindorf.

C.O. 2nd Co. Lt. Notrot.

N.C.O. in command of 1st Platoon, 2nd Co. Vizefeldwebel Klein.

G-2

No. 28

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 25, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From May 24, 12 h. to May 25, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) Enemy patrol of 2 men seen at 1619 at 23 h. They returned to their lines. A group of ten men was seen at 1919 at 0 h. entering into their trenches. At 1.20 h. one of our patrol fired upon an enemy patrol of 6 men at 1616.

(c) Intermittent bursts of M.G. fire during the night on our front line. Hand grenades were thrown at our patrol from point 1912.

(d) Nothing to report.

(e) Machine guns at 1912, 182175 and 2018 approximately.

II ARTILLERY.

Point of fall	Time	Number	Caliber	Origin	Remarks
Bois St Eloi	Int	90	88(shrapnel)	Bois de Harass.	
				Lalval	
				Regul. &	
Quarter D	Int	190	77,105,	"	Harass.
	3-6	30	105,150	?	Harass.
Bois des Glands	15.20	10	105	Bois de Lalval	Harass.
Quarter C	Int.	120	105	N.E.Cantigny and	
				Bois de Lalval	Harass.
Bois de Cantigny	Int.	20	77	Bois de Frami-	Regul
				court	
	"	20	105	Bois de Lalval	Harass.
Hill 100	Int.	30	77	Bois de Framicourt	"
Quarter A	9.16	60	77	?	"
Quarter B	12	12	105	?	"
Belle Assise	Int.	32	77	?	"
Near Positions.					
Villers Tournelle	Int.	110	105	Bois de Lalval	Regul.
					& Harass.
Broyes	Int.	37	77,105	?	Harass.
Bois Avance	Int.	30	77	?	"
Bois de Villers	Int.	42	77	?	"
Chateau Broyes	Int.	70	77	?	"

Very little firing on our batteries.

Total Number of Shells falling in sector 903.

III WORKS.

(a) Men to the number of 239 were seen passing back and forth carrying engineer material, full packs, etc. between Fontaine s/Montdidier and Chateau Jenlis, between the hours of 10 A.M. May 24 to 10 A.M. May 27. All these men passed point 3504. Four officers were observed giving orders to sentinels at suspected M.G. emplacement at 3407. The enemy has been working on a trench at point 2706. Organized shell hole at 16819. Digging heard at 2503. Three short trenches observed at 2509. Two suspected automatic rifle posts at 2408. Sand bags were being filled at 1819.

(b) Following enemy batteries observed in action: 5736, 5310.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- (a) Visibility. Poor, 4 to 6 and 10 to 23.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Nothing to report.
- (d) Nothing to report.

V. AIRCRAFT.

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Airplanes.

Pt. of Obs.	Time	Number	Region flown over	Mission	Re-
					marks.
Bois de Villers	6	4	Front lines	Obs.	Driven off by A.A.
Villers Tournelle	5.35	1	Front lines	"	Driven off by Fr. planes.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS, (a), (b), (c), (d), Nothing to report.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY Quiet.

G-2
No. 29

Headquarters 1st Division, G-2,
American Expeditionary Forces.
May 26, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From May 25, 12 h. to May 26, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY. Enemy machine guns were active during the night firing frequent bursts along our front lines.

II. ARTILLERY. The Bois St. Eloi, Cantigny and Fontaine were bombarded from 2.50 to 5.10 hours with Yperite and sneezing gas, about 3000 shells in all. The ravine between Bois des Glands and the Bois St. Eloi received 110 105s and 150s at intervals during the day. A strong concentration of 77s and 105s lasting 15 minutes on the front lines of Quarter B from 3.50 to 4.05 hours. 230 shells of medium caliber on Villers Tournelle during the day. 300 shells of medium caliber on the region of Broyes and the Bois de Villers during the same period. One battery west of the Bois de Villers was shelled at 3.40 hours with 100 105s high explosive and Yperite.

III. WORKS. Noise of picks heard coming from point 3097. A group of men were observed digging at 2805. 187 men carrying engineer material were seen going to and from Fontaine S/ Montdidier on May 25. Two men observed working on what appeared to be a machine gun emplacement at point 3407. There is a possible enemy O.P. at point 28506.

IV. CIRCULATION. Visibility was poor except from 17 hours to 21 hours.

(b) Circulation in front lines. Two men were seen crawling at point 2012 at 18.15 hours. Two men walked along the road by point 2312 at 9.30 hours. Three men stopped at point 2906 for several minutes. One wagon was observed entering Fontaine s/Montdidier from the east at 12.05 hour.

(c) Circulation in rear zone. During the period covered by this report only normal circulation was observed in the rear zone. A total of 7 lorries, 7 wagons and 5 caissons were observed moving east of the river Doms.

V. AIRCRAFT.

(a) Balloons. Nine balloons were observed in ascension on May 26.

(b) Airplanes. Three planes passed over our lines very high during the afternoon of May 25. At 15.55 hour 5 planes were observed going south over our front lines. They were fired on by anti-aircraft guns. On May 26 15 enemy planes were observed over our lines between 3 hour and 7 hour. They were all fired on by anti-aircraft guns and three of them were forced to retire without accomplishing their mission.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. Three orange flares were sent up along the Cantigny-Fontaine road at 3.35 hour. 1 white and 1 green flare in Cantigny at 23 hour. No result observed.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Infantry quiet. Artillery increase in activity over that of yesterday. Aviation normal.

G-2
No. 30

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 27, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 26, 12 h. to May 27, 12 h.)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

This morning the enemy put down a strong concentration of gas high explosive and shrapnel on the front line of Quarters A, B, and D commencing at 3:45 h. At 5 h. 50 men, led by one officer, and preceded by a rolling barrage, attempted to raid Quarter D. They were everywhere repulsed with loss, leaving in our hands two prisoners of the 272 Res. Regt., 82nd Res. Div. We lost no prisoners in this encounter. At about 6:15 h. the enemy attempted to raid Quarters A and B. This attack was also preceded by a rolling barrage. The exact strength of the raiding party is not yet known. In some place the enemy penetrated our front line but was immediately driven out by a counter attack and back beyond his own front line trenches in the region of Bois Allonge. Our troops remained in the enemy's front line in the Bois Allonge until ordered to withdraw. In this engagement we captured two prisoners belonging to the 83rd Res. Regt. and lost one prisoner.

II ARTILLERY

Strong concentration of gas, high explosive and shrapnel on the front line of Quarters A, B, and D, especially in the region of Bois de Fontaine, Bois des Glands, and Bois de St. Eloi*, from 3.45 to 6 h. Both Yperite and Phosgene were used in this concentration. Strong bombardment of Villers Tournelle, Bois Avance, Bois de Villers and Broyes from 2.30 h. to 5 h. with Yperite and Phosgene gas. Mesnil St. Firmin and Chepoix were shelled intermittently during the day with 110s and 150s, about 50 shells falling on both places. The enemy registered on the chateau at Mesnil St. Firmin.

III WORKS.

Two men were observed digging at point 4108. 139 men were observed carrying engineers material into Fontaine during the day. The O.P. at 2806 is still occupied. Two men digging trench at point 3504.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- A. Visibility poor throughout the day.
- B. 50 men seen on the Route National No. 30 at point 7380. at 19.25 h.

V. AIRCRAFT.

None observed.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. The order of battle appears to be as follows, as ascertained from the prisoners captured this morning. The 82d Res. Div. relieved the 30th Div. in the region of Cantigny. Disposition from north to south, 271-272-270 R.I.R. The 25th Res. Div. is still in line. Order of battle confirmed (See attached interrogation of prisoner)

b. Explosion observed in Montdidier at 19.45 h. Gave appearance of an ammunition dump.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Very active.

Correct Spelling - * BOIS ST. ELOI - S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 27, 1918.

INTERROGATION OF PRISONER

I. PRISONER X. 1st Co., 1st Battalion, 272 Res. Regt.,
82d Res. Div.

1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE. Captured, while attempting to raid our trenches, at point 1719 at about 7 A.M.

2. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONER.

(a) Between point 1814 and point 17⁵24² the German trenches appear to be held by three companies, each numbering 3 platoons, each platoon numbering about 40 men. Each company has 4 light machine guns in the first lines, these machine guns distributed along the first trench (one of them in particular is located at bend in hostile trench at point 1721⁵ and another at about 1724⁵. Each company, furthermore, has one platoon (weak in numbers) in support in the ravine north of Cantigny. These platoons are in dugouts dug into the side of the hill approximately between points 2821⁵ and 2223. Each of these support platoons has two light machine guns at its disposal. Company commanders dugout is at some point along the line of dugouts occupied by the support platoons. Another company commander's dugout (Co. 3) is at point 1815 about 15 meters behind the German trench which runs along the edge of the town of Cantigny. There is a communication trench between the cemetery at 2018 and the front line at 1817⁹. It is believed that there is a machine gun at point 1724⁵ kept in a dugout dug under the road. The reserve battalion is believed to be at a fairly great distance from the front (near Bouillancourt). The prisoner, on the other hand, states that it may have been moved up.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 28, 1918.

G-2
No. 31.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
From May 27, 12 h. to May 28, 12 h.

I. INFANTRY.

Our infantry to-day attacked the region of Cantigny and everywhere captured its objective. 180 prisoners were taken, of whom three were officers. Our losses were slight. Summary interrogation of prisoners revealed the following facts: 272d Res. Regt. is in the north of the sector held by the 82d Res. Div. with its 3rd Battalion in line. The 271st Res. Regt. is south of the 272d. The front of each regiment is about 600 meters.

272d Reserve Regiment.

Battalion in repose near Davencourt* probably is in the Bois de Maines* with two of its companies in the Bois Lacomte* northeast of Davencourt*. When moving from rest to support position the battalion follows the following trail approximately. Enter Maresmentier*3 at the Chateau, 600 meters south of the village, thence along the road towards Framicourt to cross roads 4428. Thence east along trail to northeast corner of the Bois de Lalval, thence to support position in the northern portion of the Bois de Lalval on the top of the hill. The route followed by relief from Maresmentier*3 to Davencourt* differs slightly, but from the latter place to the support position the route is identical in all important features. Prisoners know of no alert position for the 272d Reserve Regiment in case of attack, nor anything as regards plans for a counter attack.

271 Reserve Regiment.

This regiment has one battalion in line, 1 battalion in support as follows. Two companies in Framicourt, either in cellars or in the sunken road to the south. One company in Maresmontier*3 (?) and the other company along the road between Maresmentier*3 and Framicourt. Framicourt and the valley of the Doms is the alert position for the battalion in support (this statement made by officer prisoner). It was substantiated in part by answers obtained from a private. The P.C. of the battalion commander is in a dugout in the valley near Framicourt.

Further report will follow.

II ARTILLERY.

Enemy artillery activity very slight on account of our intense artillery preparations. No hostile barrage was reported at any time during the attack, and his reaction on our sensitive points was very small indeed.

III WORKS. Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION. Visibility poor from 12 to 20 h. and from from 4 to 12. None from 19 to 3 h.

(b) Circulation normal in front lines and rear zone.

V. AIRCRAFT

(a) Balloons. 9 enemy balloons observed in ascension on the morning of May 28.

(b) Airplanes. 11 enemy planes observed over our lines on May 27. 8 enemy planes observed over our lines on morning of May 28.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle as stated.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

Correct spelling	*	DAVENESCOURT
	*1	BOIS des MOINES
	*2	BOIS LECOMTE
	*3	MARESTMONTIERS.

S. G. W.

G-2
No.32.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 29, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 28, 12 h. to May 29, 12 h.)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

At 16.26 h. enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of Cantigny and our old front line to the west of this town, and at 17.10h. launched a counter attack, preceded by a barrage on our newly captured position. The enemy was caught by our barrage and counter-preparation before reaching our line and was completely repulsed. The attack was over at 17.45 h. Following this attack the enemy again attacked at 18.14 h. our line to the east of Cantigny. Our barrage caught all the enemy except the first line which was repulsed by our infantry fire before they reached our positions; and at 18.40 h. single groups of men were seen retreating towards the Bois de Framicourt. This morning about 6 h. the enemy counter attacked in two waves our new positions but were a third time repulsed with heavy losses without having regained any of the ground lost yesterday. In addition to the attack above reported two small counter-attacks were made on our line to the east of Cantigny, one at 19.45 h. and one between 6 and 7 h. They were both repulsed by the combined fire of our artillery and infantry.

II ARTILLERY

The enemy severely bombarded our new positions in Cantigny from 10 h. May 28 to 22 h. May 28. About 4000 shells calibre: 77,88,105,150,210 fell in this vicinity. From 22 h. to 7 h. the bombardment was continuous with slight decrease in volume, about 2000 shells during this period, of the same calibre as above. The Villers Tournelle Sector was bombarded intermittently with 5000 shells of small, medium and large caliber, including sneezing gas, Phosgene, Yperite, and high explosive. The first aid station at Villers Tournelle received special attention from the enemy's artillery as did also the ambulances drawn up along the road at this point. The building in which the first aid station was situated was completely demolished. There was slight artillery activity on Quarters A and B, in all about 900 77s and 105s fell during the day. The region of Broyes received about 600 shells of the same caliber at intervals.

III WORKS.

No enemy working parties were observed during the period covered by this report.

IV CIRCULATION.

Visibility varied from fair to good all day. From 9.40 h the morning of May 28, the enemy was observed consolidating his reserves for local counter attacks. About 250 men in all were observed moving west in the region of Mesnil St. George and Fontaine sous Montdidier. One enemy tank was reported in the vicinity of Courtemanche yesterday afternoon. We received a report this morning at 9 A.M. from 114th French Infantry on our left that several enemy tanks had been seen from the Bois Lalval at an early hour. Confirmation of this has not been received either from our infantry or from our observation posts.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Eight enemy balloons observed in ascension yesterday. From 11.15 h. May 28 to 20 h. 19 enemy planes were observed over our lines, mostly in the region of Cantigny and none were fired upon. They were apparently observing and spotting for the enemy artillery.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle confirmed. No identifications have yet been secured from the troops which took part in the counter-attacks. The total number of prisoners captured in the operation against Cantigny is as follows: 3 officers 237 men. 19 men were found in Cantigny either last night or this morning. They had been in hiding in dugouts since our attack commenced yesterday morning.

At 20.36 h. two large explosions were observed in Montdidier as the result of our artillery fire.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry reacting weakly. The enemy's artillery reaction has been very vigorous as were also his avions.

G-2
No.33.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 30, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 29, 12 h. to May 30, 12 h)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy made counter attacks against our positions in front of Cantigny at 16.31 h. 17.45 h., and 3.45 h., accompanied by intense bombardment. They were repulsed by the combined fire of our infantry and artillery. At 19.40 h. the enemy was reported assembling in the vicinity of Chateau Jenlis for a counter attack. Our artillery fired on this point at once and no attack resulted. Our lines remain the same as yesterday. It has been reported but not confirmed that four enemy tanks took part in the counter attack at 16.31 h.

II ARTILLERY.

Yesterday afternoon strong concentrations of 77, 105, 150, 210, were placed on Cantigny at 16.30, 18.30, and 19.30 hrs. Intermittent fire of the same caliber throughout the period covered by this report. At 3.30 h. this morning the enemy placed a strong concentration on Cantigny of the same kind as those mentioned above. The Villers Tournelle Sector and support lines were heavily bombarded from 12 to 19.30 hrs. with 2000 105, 150, and 210s; A concentration was also placed on the support lines at 3.30 hrs. Quarters A, and B received 250 shells of small caliber during the period covered by this report. The region of Broys received about 300 shells of small caliber. F Battery, 6th F.A. west of Coullemelle received a concentration at 16.20 hrs. of 150s 210s. Batteries A/7, C/7 and F/7 in the neighborhood of Bois de Villers were lightly bombarded at the same time.

III. WORKS.

Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility good from 12 h. to 12 h.

A concentration of the enemy was observed in the neighborhood of the Chateau Jenlis at 19.30 hrs. They were dispersed by our artillery fire. 25 men were seen moving towards Courtemanche at point 5608 at 12.45 hrs. Small groups of men seen at 3215, 3918, 2209, 3921 and around Framicourt during the afternoon. Six red cross ambulances were observed standing at 4724 at 18.52 h. , Circulation in the rear zone was normal.

V. AIRCRAFT.

One enemy balloon observed in ascension during the afternoon in the direction of Gratibus.

Airplanes. During the afternoon 2 to 6 enemy planes were constantly over Cantigny and our front lines spotting for their artillery and observing. This morning 2 enemy planes were observed spotting over Minneapolis at 10.25 h. They were chased by our planes and returned to their lines. 8 planes flying over Cantigny at 11.30 h. were apparently regulating for their artillery.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

No identification has yet been received from the troops who took part in the counter attack against Cantigny. One German officer, evacuated from Cantigny this morning, Lt. X, commanding the 12th Co., 3rd Bn, 272nd Res. Regt., He had been wounded and had lain in a shell hole in Cantigny since we attacked on May 28.

An airplane dropped two bombs on Chepoix last night, killing one and wounding another.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery active. Infantry nervous. Aviation very active.

G-2
No. 34.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
May 31, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(From May 30, 12 h. to May 31, 12 h.)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY.

A heavy concentration of 77, 88, 105, 150, 210 caliber on Cantigny from 18.21 to 18.24 hours. About 2000 shells in all. Intermittent fire throughout the day and night by guns of the same caliber. The Villers Tournelle Sector received 750-105, 150, 210, on its support position and on the town itself. Night bombardment of Belle Assise Farm, Broys, Bois Avance, Chateau Broys, and Bois de Villers throughout the day. Two batteries west of Bois Villers received a few shells during the afternoon. A group at Coullemelle was bombarded with 50 105s and 150s during the afternoon. About 4000 shells fell on the divisional sector during the day.

III WORKS.

No enemy working parties were observed during the period covered by this report.

IV CIRCULATION.

- a. Visibility was good all day.
- b. No circulation was observed in the enemy's front lines.
- c. Normal circulation was observed along Route Nationale No. 35, Etelfay-Fignieres, Fignieres-Bouillancourt, and Fignieres-Gratibus. 4 wagons were observed leaving Fontaine at 17.28 hrs.

V AIRCRAFT.

- a. Five enemy balloons observed in ascension during the late afternoon. Two enemy balloons were observed in ascension this morning.
- b. Thirteen enemy planes were observed over Cantigny and Villers Tournelle during the afternoon photographing and observing. An enemy photographic plane was brought down near Villers-Tournelle by our anti-aircraft guns at 14 h. The pilot was killed and the observer severely injured. This plane belonged to Observation Detachment No. 247 stationed near NESLE. It has been working for the 82 and 25 Reserve Divisions. The aviator in question had been sent out to take photographs of Cantigny. We salvaged from this machine 2 machine guns, a large photographic camera, a magneto and several documents. One of the documents was a map of our line which showed the supposed positions of our batteries. About 7 of these positions were correctly marked and the old positions of five others appeared to be known to the enemy. We also secured the code for wireless communication between airplanes and the ground.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. (a) One Lt. and 3 soldiers belonging to the 281st Res. Regt. were evacuated from Cantigny early this morning. They had been in hiding since our attack.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery. Decrease in activity. Aviation active.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
May 31, 1918.

ANNEX TO SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE NO. 34.

Interrogatory of Prisoners.

(NOTE: The interrogatory of prisoners, conducted during the operation against CANTIGNY, was confined to points of immediate tactical importance. Due to the number of prisoners, and the importance of exact knowledge of the location of units that might counter-attack, no attempt was made by this division to obtain information that could not be used immediately. The information below is a summary of that obtained during the operation and already sent by telephone to all units it immediately concerned.)

ARTILLERY OBJECTIVES AND P.C.'s.

(a) P.C.'s.

P.C. of the 82nd Reserve Division: ERMES.

P.C. of the 25th Reserve Division: GUERBIGNY.

P.C. of the 272nd Reserve Infantry Regiment at about 4737 (in a dug out on slope east of MARESTMONTIER.*

P.C. support battalion 271st Reserve Infantry regiment: 3290 ?

P.C. Support Bn. of the 272nd Res. Inf. in cellar in MARESTMONTIER*.

(b) Location of Enemy Units.

272nd Res. Inf.

Support battalion of the 272nd Res. Inf. (presumably all four companies) in the Bois de Lalval between coordinates 3228, 3528, 3530, 3231. (approximate area).

271st Res. Inf.

Two companies of battalion in support of the 271st Res. Inf. are in dugouts dug into the side of the sunken road running southwest and due south from the crossroad southeast of FRAMICOURT.

One Infantry Company and one Machine Gun Company of the support battalion of the 271st Res. Inf. are in dugouts dug into the side of the sunken roads branching off from the cross road at 38⁹09⁸ (north of Fontaine sous Montdidier). The Machine Gun Company occupies the dugouts built along the road running northwest while the other company occupies dugouts along the road leading to Fontaine.

One company of the support battalion of the 271st Res. Inf. is located in dugouts near 4814 (dugouts dug in embankments, overhead cover 2 to 3 meters).

At least one company of the battalion in support of the 83rd Res. Inf. is in the Bois de Voyeaux*¹.

The troops in the Bois de Lalval do not occupy dugouts but simply pits dug into the ground as a protection against artillery fire. Those in the Bois de Framicourt are reported to live in similar pits. The battalion at rest of the 272nd Res. Inf. is in the woods around Davenescourt.

83rd Res. Inf.

Battalion at rest of the 83rd Res. Inf. is in the

ravine east of Guerbigny.

Battalion at rest of the 271st Res. Inf. is in the woods around Becquigny.

c. ROUTES FOLLOWED BY RELIEFS.

The relieving battalions of both the 272d Reserve Infantry and the 271st Reserve Infantry appear to proceed across country from their respective rest positions to the ravine east-southeast of Gratibus, crossing National Road No. 35 at point 7034, and passing a short distance south of the town. They then cross the marsh, reaching the Marestmontiers-to-Framicourt road between the southern extremity of Marestmontiers and the house at 4832. All troops of these relieving companies appear to pass by this house; thence some of the troops belonging to the 272d followed the road along the valley about 400 meters, turn to the right at 43⁵25⁰ and enter the wood at 4126 while others turn off at the road at 4529⁵ and enter the wood at 4229. The pits in which they live are about 15 minutes walk from the latter point.

d. DUMPS ETC.

There is an ammunition dump in the millssouth of Marestmontiers at 4833. An ammunition dump is being built (dugouts about 5 meters deep), in the north side of the sunken road southwest of Marestmontiers, at about 4332; this dump will be ready for use in about two weeks. Rolling kitchen comes to fork at 3809 at 2 A.M.

Heavy machine guns in position at 3712 (chiefly anti-aircraft fire) and at 4416.

AVIATION.

Observation detachment 247 is working for the 82d and 25th Reserve Divisions. Its aviation ground is near NESLE. The aviators live in the town of Nesle itself. One aviator who was brought down at about 3 P.M. April 30, had been sent out to photograph the first lines in front of Cantigny. He states that on the way he did not observe any undue troop movements on the road between Nesle and the region around Montdidier. Neither did he observe intense circulation. He did see about two companies of infantry marching from the Somme Canal to Nesle. He states that there has been no recent reinforcement in the rear areas around Erches. He had not heard of any tanks in the neighborhood of Montdidier.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Losses: The losses of the 82d Reserve Division prior to May 28, had not been heavy. The artillery fire, however, had prevented them from accomplishing much work. An officer ex-lains the slightrness of their losses in relief by the fact that they move in very small groups and upon approaching the lines, adopt a very open formation. It is practically a line of skirmishers. One company, while it remained in support (6 days) lost only two men killed and two or three wounded, while another appears to have lost only one killed.

Morale. Morale appears to be fairly good. An

officer states that one of the chief reasons is that when the men come back from the trenches to the rest positions they are well taken care of, and provided with entertainments (cinematograph every day and theaters occasionally.

DIVISIONAL RELIEF.

It is rumored that the 82d Reserve Division is to be relieved in the early part of June (around the 5th ?) , by a division which is now in reserve some 30 kilometers behind the line (30th Div. ?)

ARTILLERY.

It would appear that light artillery in this sector has recently been reinforced but there is no definite data on this subject.

Each battalion of the 272d Reserve Infantry has four light trench mortars. Each company of both in 272d and 271st Reserve Infantry appears to have had their full complement of light machine guns (6). The 272d Reserve Infantry Regiment has an assault detachment of 70 men (part of this detachment made the raid of May 27, west of Cantigny, and suffered severe losses, the Lieutenant commanding it being killed.

BARRAGE SIGNALS, ETC.

On the 28th of May the following were the rockets used for signalling artillery:

Barrage - - - - - Green.
C. P. O.- - - - - Yellow.
Increase range - White, several stars.
Decrease range - Red.

Companies do not have telephones. There was, however, a T.P.S. set in Cantigny but it was unable to function on the day of the attack. Means of Liaison which are used between the company and battalion are:- rocket signals, T.P.S., Messenger dogs, pigeons, runners, and optic signals. All, however, failed to function during our attack.

Correct Spelling:

- * Marestmontiers
- *1 Bois de Voyeux

S. G. W

G-2
No. 35

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 1, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(From May 31, 12 h. to June 1, 12 h.)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I INFANTRY.

The enemy infantry was quiet yesterday and to-day. His snipers showed activity at intervals, firing on our lines around Cantigny. There was intermittent machine gun fire throughout the day and night on our front lines. Trench mortars of large caliber fired shells on Cantigny this morning. We have located their probable emplacement at points 3322⁵ and 3223 from aeroplane photographs of May 30.

II ARTILLERY.

The enemy artillery was less active than usual. During our intense bombardment of his lines from 13h. to 13h. 45, and from 19h.30 to 19h.38 he reacted strongly on Cantigny, the Ravine des Glands, Villers Tournelle and the Support Positions in Quarters C and D with shells of large caliber, about 1300 shells in all. Intermittent firing during the rest of the day with 77s and 105s on Cantigny, Villers Tournelle, Quarters A and B, Belle Assise farm, Broyes, Bois Avance, Chateau Broyes, and the Bois de Villers, about 3000 shells in all.

III WORKS.

No enemy working parties were seen either yesterday or to-day.

IV CIRCULATION.

a. The visibility was good from 12 h to 12 h.

c. Normal circulation on the following routes: Guerbigny-Montdidier, Becquigny-Fignieres, Route Nationale No.35, Gratibus-Fignieres, Fignieres-Bouillancourt. Two companies were observed entering Montdidier on Route Nationale No.35 at 21h. 09

V. AIRCRAFT.

a. Balloons: - One enemy balloon broke loose from its moorings at 4 h 40 this morning and was blown southward over Montdidier. The observers came down with parachutes.

b. 7 enemy planes were observed over the sector on May 31. An air battle was reported at 15 h. 25 but was barren of results. 11 enemy planes over our lines to-day, three of these flying south very high. An ammunition dump on the Mesnil-Chepoix road at the northeastern exit of Chepoix was destroyed last night by a bomb supposedly from an airplane.

VI MISCELLANEOUS.

Fire in Montdidier at 10 h. caused by our artillery fire. At 24 h a searchlight was observed operating in the rear of Cantigny. 4 balloon lights seen at 23h. in the direction of Gratibus and red flares in the same direction.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Infantry quiet, Artillery decrease in activity. Aviation active.

G-2

No. 36

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 2, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.

From June 1, 12 h. to June 2, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy patrol of ten men were seen early this morning in front of point 2420. They were fired on and one man was killed and recovered by us. Enemy snipers continue active in the region of Cantigny. Enemy machine guns fired short bursts on our lines to the northeast of Cantigny. These guns have been reported to be in the vicinity of points 2618 and 1828 approximately.

II. ARTILLERY.

Cantigny Chateau was bombarded intermittently with shells of medium caliber. Quarter M received 300 77s, 105s supposed to have come from battery 5533 during the day. The enemy shelled heavily the region of point 1612 in our line with 77s and 210s evidently believing an observation post was at this point. Much shelling around point 1818 with 77s and 210s. Adjusting fire on the front lines of Quarter N northeast of Cantigny. Quarters A and B and Belle Assise Farm received slight harassing fire at intervals. Fire for adjustment on Bois de Longue Haie, Villers Tournelle Support Positions, region of Mesnil St. Firmin, Broys and Bois de Villers. Battery A/7 southeast of Broys was heavily shelled with 150s yesterday afternoon and this morning by enemy battery 6232. The total number of shells falling on the sector was less than normal, about 2500 in all.

III. WORKS

Our patrol heard enemy working parties digging in their front line to the north, northeast, and southeast of Cantigny.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was good all day.

Nine men with full packs were seen leaving a destroyed house at point 3210 between 19 and 21 h. 2 men seen at points 2911 and 511.

Normal circulation observed along Route Nationale No. 35 and the roads from Fignieres to Gratibus, Fignieres to Etelfay and Guerbibny* to Montdidier.

V. AIRCRAFT.

a. Balloons. Six balloons were observed in ascension between 5 and 7 hours in the direction of Montdidier.

b. Airplanes. Six enemy planes flew over Cantigny and our lines to the west at 15 h. They were fired on by Anti aircraft guns. Nine planes passed very high over Villers-Tournelle going west at 12 h. One plane over Bois de Villers going west this morning at 7 h. 05.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Order of battle confirmed by body of German soldier killed in front of our lines this morning near point 2420. He belonged to the 9th Co. 3rd Bn., 272nd Res. Regt.

b. Fire observed in Montdidier during the day.

c. Enemy is using a heliograph from the house in Mesnil St. George at point 4086.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: The enemy artillery has shown less activity than normal but it has shown a slight increase in fire for adjustment by high bursts and other means. Enemy infantry quiet. Aviation active.

*Correct spelling Guerbigny. S.G.W.

G-2
No. 37

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 3, 1918

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 2, 12 h. to June 3, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy patrol of 1 officer and about 30 men attempted to raid one of our listening posts in the region of point 2402. at 23 h 45. When the non commissioned officer on duty was making a relief. The enemy officer advanced, mistaking our sergeant for one of his own men. In the fight that followed the German officer was killed and our men forced to retire by the enemy's rifle fire. One of our patrol set out immediately to recover the body of the officer but found no one. At the same time the raid took place the enemy bombed one of our listening posts at the southern edge of the Bois de Fontaine, probably as a diversion. No casualties among our men.

Enemy sniper reported at point 2806. One of our daylight patrols drew strong machine gun fire from the vicinity of point 2705.

Two trench mortars and much ammunition have been found in Cantigny, caliber 76 mm.

II ARTILLERY.

Enemy artillery showed a marked decrease, only about 1500 shells fell during the period covered by this report. The region of Cantigny received 400 77s, 105s, 150s, during the day, mostly fire for adjustment. The Valley southeast of Villers Tournelle was bombarded intermittently by the enemy all day. Grivesnes, St. Aignan and Le Plessier received in the neighborhood of 200 shells of light caliber. Light bombardment of Quarters A and B, Belle Assise Farm, Broyes, Bois Avance, Bois de Villers, Chateau Broyes and Villers Tournelle. Fire for destruction on E battery of the 5th artillery southeast of Broyes at 16 h. 30 with 150s.

III WORKS.

Enemy working party in woods at 2705. The enemy has a heavy machine gun in the vicinity of this point and is well protected by wire. Enemy day post reported to be at 28507. Much movement seen on the eastern edge of the road near point 2907. A ration detail was observed moving from point 4106 to point 4508.

Much circulation has been observed in the vicinity of point 7611. Wagons, apparently caissons, drawn by four horses and accompanied always by a mounted man, have frequently been observed stopping at this point.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility good all day.

The circulation was greater than normal yesterday. In the neighborhood of 20 wagons and 20 lorries were observed to enter Montdidier from the north between 13. h 50 and 20 h 30. At 19 h. 20 120 men entered Montdidier from the north. Ten wagons, ten lorries and 3 ambulances seen moving from Guerbigny to Montdidier during the afternoon.

V. AVIATION.

Balloons. Only 1 balloon observed in ascension this morning.

Airplanes. Twenty-four enemy airplanes were over this sector yesterday. One was driven back by our planes and ten were fired on by anti-aircraft and machine guns.

During the night an enemy plane dropped bombs along the road from Chepoix to Mory.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. Fire in Montdidier at 21 h 15. Light seen in Etelfay church tower during the night. There is an enemy O.P. at 2807.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Aviation very active. Infantry and Artillery quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, JUNE 3, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION NO. 60, May 30,
1918.

- 0 -

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - No. 12
By British General Staff, May 23, 1918.

The following points were brought out during the recent operations on the front of a Corps in the First Army:

1. Rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations. The men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them. The personnel of Trench Mortar and Field Batteries used their rifles freely. One Field Battery when the enemy had got round its flank, beat off the attack at a range of under 200 yards, and a forward section of artillery successfully engaged the enemy with rifle fire at short range while he was working round the rear of our infantry.

2. Concreted elephant shelters, although subjected to a very heavy bombardment, proved invaluable as battalion headquarters and as shelters for assembling troops. They were placed inside ruined houses and were protected by three feet of reinforced concrete. In making these shelters, care should be taken that the elephant shelter actually rests on a bed of concrete. The walls, roof and floor should form a box of concrete round the steel of the elephant shelter.

3. The main principle to be remembered in any system of wiring is to organize the defended area into a series of compartments in order to hold up the enemy if he succeeds in penetrating the line and prevent him from obtaining anything but a local and limited success.

4. It is most important that the exits from tunnels should be within works arranged for all-round defense. This enables the garrison to deal quickly and effectively with parties of the enemy working round their flanks or rear.

5. The value of trench mortars during a hostile attack was amply proved. If they are distributed so as to cover communication trenches leading from the front, the enemy, if he succeeds in penetrating our lines, will be obliged to advance over the open and will be exposed to our rifle fire.

Trench mortars also proved useful in support of immediate counter-attack. If a close liaison is maintained between the infantry and the Trench Mortar Batteries, it should generally be possible to arrange for the cooperation of the Stokes and the 6" Trench Mortars in this form of counter-attack.

G-2.

Memorandum No. 32.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 3, 1918.

This code is effective at once. All other telephone codes issued by this Section from the Division area are obsolete.

UNIT	CODE	UNIT or LOCALITY	CODE
1st Division	FG	1st Eng. Reg.	MAINE
1st Inf. Brig.	MK	1st Bn. 1st Eng.	MAINE 1
16th Inf.	MK 1	2nd Bn. " "	MAINE 2
1st Bn.	K 11	Div. M.G. Bn.	MINNESOTA
2nd Bn.	K 12	1st Co.	" No.1
3rd Bn.	K 13	2nd Co.	" No.2
18th Inf.	MK 2	Kitchens fir both	" No.3
1st Bn.	K 21	Div. Dove Cote	ALICE
2nd Bn.	K 22	Bacouel	CLEVELAND
3rd Bn.	K 23	Bois de Coullemelle	CHATEAU
2nd Inf. Brig.	FF	Bois Coulon	MOBILE
26th Inf.	FF 1	Bois de Villers	AUBURN
1st Bn.	F 11	Broyes	Ft. WORTH
2nd Bn.	F 12	Campremy	HOUSTON
3rd Bn.	F 13	Chepoix	CHICAGO
28th Inf.	FF 2	Coullemelle	RICHMOND
1st Bn.	F 21	Bonvillers	CHARLOTTE
2nd Bn.	F 22	Esclainvillers	ODETTE
3rd Bn.	F 23	Evancaux	AUSTIN
1st Art. Brig.	MDA	Farivillers	TAMPA
5th Art. Reg.	FRA	Folleville	FOLLY
1st Bn.	MIA	Froissy	WASHINGTON
2nd Bn.	FNA	Gouy	MONTGOMERY
3rd Bn.	MXA	Grivenes*, north	GIRAFE
6th Art. Reg.	MWD	" , center	GERANIUM
1st Bn.	FID	" , south of,	CAMELIA
2nd Bn.	MND	" , north of,	ROSE
7th Art. Reg.	FZU	Hill 126	NORFOLK
1st Bn.	FIU	La Neuville St.Pierre	COLUMBUS
2nd Bn.	MNU	Le Plessier,west of,	MARGARET
A.C. Art. Comdr.	FDO	" , south of,	VIOLET
Art. of 45th Div.	FDX	" , east of,	MOGADOR
6th A.C. HA Comdr.	FOO	Mesnil St. Firmin	BOSTON
4th Group (Col.Tristan)	FEB	Mory	YONKERS
5th Bn.85th Reg. H.A.	FIB	Noiremont	DULUTH
6th Bn.85th Reg. H.A.	FBB	Noyers St. Martin	EL PASO
1st Bn.106th H.A.	FIO	Quiry le Sec	PORTLAND
South Group(Maj.Quinton)	FEO	Qtr.Belle Assise Fm.	HOBOKEN
3rd Bn. 106th H.A.	FNO	" Casablanca	ATLANTA
1st Bn. 318th H.A.	FXO	" kenifra	JERSEY
A.C. Air Service	FC	" Tetouan	ANNAPOLIS
Squadron 42	MG	Rocquencourt	SAN ANTONIO
64th Balloon Co.	B 64	Rouvroy	MARFA
47th " "	B 47	St. Andre	SAVANNAH
89th " "	B 89	Serevillers	PHILADELPHIA
63rd " "	B 63	Tartigny	RENO
1st Div. O.P. No. 1	OHIO	Thieux	CHARLESTON
" " " " 2	OKLAHOMA	Varmaise	TACOMA
" " " " 3	FOLLY	Vendeuil Caply	TOLEDO
Ann. Dump No 1	AMHERST L	Vieffvillers	CORONADO
" " " 2	" 2	Villers Tournelle	BALTIMORE
" " " 3	" 3	" " ,N.E.of	FARGO
Div. M.G. Bn.	MINNESOTA	" " ,S.E.of	ROCK ISLAND
1st Brig. M.G. Bn.	MALDEN	Bois de Coullemelle)	AUGUSTA
2nd " " "	CORNELL	area.)	INTER
Field Signal Bn.	BUFFALO	)	PAKET

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or LOCALITY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Trench Mortar Bty	TEXAS	C.G. or C.O.	JANUARY
Amb. Co. at Bacouel	BINGHAM	Chief of Staff	FEBRUARY
F. Hosp. Bonvillers	FRISCO	Adjutant	MARCH
San. Train	DENVER	Operations	APRIL
Amm. "	ALBANY	Adminstration	MAY
Hdq. Troop 1st Div.	DAKOTA	Intelligence	JUNE
		Signal Officer	JULY

Correct spelling *Grivesnes.

S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 4, 1918.

G-2
No. 38 DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 3 12 h to June 4, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy's infantry appears to be working very hard consolidating his position. Groups of enemy observed in front of point 2508 evidently working parties, as they were protected by covering detachments.

Intermittent machine gun fire during the night on our front lines in the region of Cantigny, Bois de Cantigny, and Grivesnes.

Machine guns have been located at points 2618, 2233, 1555, 2809, and vicinity of 2625.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery confined itself to harassing and regulating fire except for concentrations on Hill 100 and batteries along Serevillers-Rocquencourt Road. The enemy adjusted his barrage in front of Cantigny during the afternoon. It has been reported that two 77 mm. gun supposed to be located near 2827, fire directly on our first and second lines of N 1 and N 2, and also on the C. T. running from the Bois de St Eloi* to N 1. A new battery (possibly 105) registered on the front lines of N 1. It is thought to be near 3526⁵. Total number of shells falling on the sector was 2100.

III WORKS.

The shell holes in the region of point 2622 are being linked by a trench, as is also the case at 3708. Barbed wire entanglements are being constructed in front of the southwestern edge of Bois de Lalval from 2825 to 3122.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was poor all day.

Circulation in the Front Lines: 3 men seen at 4708. A great deal of circulation of isolated men was observed in the region of Fontaine-sous-Montdidier. Nine men entered and left the old house near 3807 in the afternoon.

Circulation in Rear Zone: Two wagons from Framicourt to Fontaine sous Montdidier at 19 h 30, and one lorry a few minutes later. 40 vehicles were observed entering and leaving Montdidier along Route Nationale No. 35 during the afternoon. Three companies of infantry on the road from Guerbigny to Montdidier were observed at 18 h 08 at 8302. Three sections of infantry on Etelfay-Fignieres road going to Fignieres during the afternoon. 50 men in small groups from Guerbigny to Montdidier. At 19 h 15 one section of infantry moving along Route Nationale No. 35 was fired on when entering Montdidier: Result unknown.

General Impression of Circulation: Greater than normal.

V AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Only one balloon observed in ascension on June 3.

Airplanes: There was great activity on the part of the enemy planes during the afternoon. Our observers reported over 40 enemy planes over our lines observing and ranging.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Order of Battle: Nothing to report.

b. Our artillery apparently hit an enemy ammunition dump at 3122 at 21 h 05. Several fires in Montdidier during the night.

c. Enemy observation posts have been reported at points 2233 and 1455. Searchlights were active in the region of Montdidier. The enemy threw up an unusual number of green rockets and no barrage followed. Green caterpillar rockets have also been reported coming from the enemy's trenches.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Infantry, quiet. Artillery quiet, but regulating. Aircraft active.

* Correct Spelling - BOIS ST. ELOI - S.G.W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 38
June 4, 1918.

HISTORY OF FIRST RESERVE DIVISION.

(See page 8, "German Forces in the Field").

Composition, May 1, 1918: -

1st Res. Inf. Brigade:

1st Res. Inf. Regt. (I Corps Dist. -- E. Prussia)

3d Res. Inf. Regt. (I Corps Dist. -- E. Prussia)

59th Res. Inf. Regt. (II Corps Dist. -- S.E. Prussia)

Divisional Cavalry: ? 3 Squadrons, 1st Reserve Hussar

Schuetzen Regt. (XVII Corps Dist.)

? Artillery Command: 1st Reserve Field Artillery Regt.

(6 4-gun and 3 4-how. batteries.)

Pioneer Battalion: 1st Reserve Co. II Pioneer Bn. No. 1.

(formerly, but now doubtful)

4th Co. II Pioneer Bn. No. 2

1st Co., 34th Reserve Pioneer Bn.

348th Searchlight Section

201st Minenwerfer Co.

Signals: Telephone Detachment

Medical and Vet: 501st Bearer Co.

399th and 1st Res. Field Hospital

Vet. Hospital.

Train: M. T. Col.

(Field Post Office No. 974)

Organization:

On mobilization the 1st Res. Div. with the 36th Res. Div. comprised the 1st Reserve Corps. These were largely East Prussian troops, but because the district is not large enough to keep the entire Corps recruited, elements from the XXth Corps, S. E. Prussia are included, and in the course of the war, these divisions have received many recruits from Districts which have had a surplus, and especially from Alsace-Lorraine. In August, 1914, the 1st Reserve Division consisted of the 1st Reserve Inf. Brigade (1st and 3d Res. Inf. Regts.), and the 72nd Reserve Inf. Brigade (18th and 59th Res. Inf. Regts.) In September, 1916, the 18th Reserve Inf. Regt. was withdrawn to aid in making up the new 225th Division, and the remaining three regiments were grouped under the 1st Reserve Inf. Brigade.

1914 At the beginning of the war the 1st Reserve Division, as part of the 1st Reserve Corps, under Otto von Below, took part in the operations in East Prussia in Hindenburg's VIIIth Army. Later it was in the Campaign at Lodz under Mackensen's Army and in the battles on the Bzura.

1915 In February 1915 the 1st Res. Div. held a sector in the region of Prasnysz*, and in May 1915 it returned to the northern end of the battle line, and participated in the raid on Courland in the Army of Richhorn.

1916 In the early part of 1916 it was on the Dvina in the region of Friedrichstadt, but in the latter part of July it went to Galicia in the Army of von Bothmer at the time when Broussilov's offensive was threatening Austria. Here it suffered very heavily and in September it was completely reconstituted at Warsaw. At the end of September it returned to the northern part of the line and took over a sector on the Dvina near Friedrichstadt.

1917 On January 5, 1917, the 1st Res. Div. was transferred to the region of Mitau, and assisted in the repulse of the Russian offensive. It had heavy losses here from the cold. On the 15th of March it was relieved, and received a two months rest. In the middle of May it returned to the Riga front. In September the 1st Res. Div. took part in the Riga offensive, pushing its way forward from September 3 to September 7, and finally organizing permanent positions 70 K.M. E. of Riga, in the vicinity of Wanden. It was relieved at the end of October, and proceeded for the 1st time to the western Front via RIGA MITAU KOVNO EIDTKUHNEN INSTERBURG THORN POSEN LISSA BRESLAU COTTBUS LEIPZIG ERFURT FRANCFORT-SUR-MAIN SARREBRUECK THIONVILLE SEDAN VOUZIERES, detraining at Semide, S. E. of Vouziers, November 6. After 10 days of rest it entered the line in the sector of Saint-Hilaire, E. of Vaudesincourt-Auberive.

1918 This was a very quiet sector, and it appears that the division in this sector devoted most of its attention to training in western warfare methods, but as the entire division did not receive a relief in the winter of 1917-1918, it did not have an opportunity for divisional training in open warfare. Many deserters came over from the division, most of them being Alsations, and they reported a considerable number of Alsations still in the ranks. In January the division was low in effectives and material.

The 8th Co. of the 59th Res. Inf. Regt., January 21 had only 106 effectives, including only one commissioned officer, and had only the three light machine guns which was the 1917 establishment. It relieved the 76th Reserve Division in the GRIVESNES sector about May 14.

Although data is lacking, it is entirely probable that the division entered the Somme battle with increased effectives, with few Alsations, and perhaps with the 1918 establishment of 6 machine guns. These facts, however, remain to be established.

MORAL At the beginning of the War the 1st Res. Div. was a good unit, and on the Eastern front it continued to have a good record until the progress of the war brought about a deterioration of all units on the Eastern Front as compared with the Western Front. At the time it came West in 1917, it was distinctly a third class division in a scale of four classes. During its stay in Champagne it was not tried out so that its present fighting spirit is a matter of considerable doubt, with the weight of evidence indicating that it was still only a third class division.

COMMANDERS:

1st Res. Div.:	General v. Waldersee,	Jan. 21, 1918
1st Res. Inf. Brig.:	General Volkel	"
59th Res. Inf. Regt.:	Maj. Wilde	"
8th Co.:	Lt. Joksche	"
Section Leader, 8th Co.:	Lt. Koch	"

G-2, A-1,
General Staff,
G.H.Q., A.E.F.,
May 11, 1918.

* Correct Spelling - PRZASNYSZ -

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 5, 1918.

G-2
No. 39

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 4, 12 h, to June 5, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy's infantry continues vigorously his work of consolidating his positions. A small enemy patrol was seen early this morning in front of our positions in the Bois de Fontaine. It was driven away by our rifle fire. There was intermittent machine gun fire on our front line during the night.

II. ARTILLERY.

Yesterday the enemy's artillery fire was very scattered, falling on the front lines of the Divisional Sector, the Support Positions, and the woods east of the line Broys-Villers-Tournelle. A great part of this fire was adjustment by high bursts. Very few shells of large caliber were fired, except on three batteries of the 7th Artillery who received a rapid fire bombardment of 105s and 150s after adjustment had been made by high bursts. The total number of shells falling on the sector was 2500, and the greatest number falling in any particular locality was along our front lines in the region of the Cantigny-St. Aignan Road, where 250 77s, and 105s fell during the period covered by this report.

III. WORKS.

An officer's patrol (1 officer and three men) reconnoitered the enemy's line from 1533 to 1535. They found no evidence of enemy listening posts but heard noise of digging in the vicinity of 145335. The enemy is now consolidating the trench de Munich in the region of/ point 2422. A strong enemy working party was reported near 2619. The enemy is continually at work in the region of point 3708 and also at 4209.

IV. CIRCULATION:

Visibility was poor all day.

Circulation in Front lines: There was considerable movement of isolated individuals in the front positions during the day. 4 men were observed on the Cantigny-Framicourt Road. About 30 men were seen during the day in the vicinity of the old house at 3807. This has been the case for several days, and it is probable that the enemy has a P.C. of some sort at this place.

Circulation in Rear Zone: Normal circulation along the observed routes. A great many individuals were observed going to and from Montdidier in all directions during the afternoon.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: 3 balloons were reported in ascension early this morning.

Airplanes: The enemy's aircraft was less active than usual, only 12 enemy planes being seen during the day.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Our artillery scattered an enemy working party at 3708. Fire on an enemy working party at 2422 was long by 400 yards. During the night fires were seen N.E. of Fontaine and N. of Cantigny. It has been reported that the enemy is now using a single green rocket as a signal to lengthen the range. Confirmation desired.

Searchlights were active in the direction of Fignieres during the night.

ATTENTION; is invited to the following facts. During the last few days the enemy has shown great activity in fire for adjustment on both our trenches and artillery. Intelligence officers will carefully report all further adjustment by the enemy in their areas.

Extract from 1st Army Bulletin, June 4, 1918.

"From new prisoners or deserters made by the neighboring army, we have confirmed the rumors of an impending attack in the region of Montdidier. It is reasonable that this attack will extend to a part of our front. The arrival of the staff of the 26th Corps de Reserve in the region of Tahure on our front seems to confirm this hypothesis.

VII GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Enemy infantry quiet. Artillery quiet but adjusting.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 39, June 5, 1918.

EXTRACT FROM GERMAN DOCUMENTS FOUND IN CANTIGNY.

-0-

A paper, turned over to one of the company commanders of the 271st Res. Inf. when that Company relieved the 85th Co. of the 99th Inf., 30th Div., shows that the company was sheltered in cellars in the town of Cantigny, each platoon occupying one cellar and the company commander living in the cellar occupied by Platoon No. 1. At night the Company sent out 4 double sentry posts. The Company also sent out, both day and night, one machine gun post with a crew of 8 men under the command of one N.C.O. Each cellar was protected by a sentry on duty both day and night and during the night, by a squad armed with a light machine gun. During the night one N.C.O. and two men were sent out on patrol inside of the lines of outposts. General supervision was exercised by two N.C.O.s, one of them only being on duty at a time and for a stretch of two hours. The Company had received orders to hold to the very last man, the post assigned to them at the southeastern exit of the town of Cantigny. In regard to work, the Company had been instructed to build a continuous wire entanglement in front of the main line of resistance. The cellars were also to be reinforced. The Company was to render two daily reports to the battalion commander; one of them at 11.30 in the evening, and the other at 5 A.M. These reports were to be delivered to the Center of Information in Cantigny one hour before they were due at the battalion P.C.

(The Battalion P.C. was about one kilometer from Cantigny.) Under ordinary circumstances the Company would also have had to render a noon report, but while in Cantigny this was not possible because of lack of cover from the enemy's view.

In regard to food, the company sent carrying details every night to the Company Field Kitchen. They were to meet this field kitchen at the southern fringe of Marest-montier* at 3 A.M. (German time. This would be 2 A.M., French time).

All outposts had received stringent orders to keep a very close watch and to open fire at the very slightest sound. They had further been instructed (as had also the light machine gun outpost) to deliver continuous harassing fire upon the enemy. The N.C.O. in charge of the light machine gun, who remained in the advance position both night and day, was also assigned the duty of observer, and reported to his battalion commander in the evening upon what had occurred in the course of the day. In foggy weather combat dispositions were the same as during the night. In place of flare and rocket signals a horn was used, three blasts meaning "general alert". All men had been instructed to carry a loaded fire arm whenever leaving a dugout. The order stated that there were Americans in front of the Company, belonging to the 26th and 28th Regiments of Infantry. The strength of the companies of these American regiments was estimated at 300. It was reported that they displayed considerable patrol activity and that their patrols numbered from 12 to 25 men, some of them armed with automatic rifles. It was also stated that there was a trench gun behind Hill 100 but that its exact position was not known.

Another order, dated May 16, issued by the 271st Reserve Regiment, states:

"We must, in the future, expect much heavier shelling on our advanced positions than has heretofore been the case. Battalion Commanders are hereby instructed to push in every conceivable manner, the building of dugouts."

A Battalion Order, issued May 20, by the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 272nd Reserve Infantry, and addressed to the 7th Company, reads: -

"Herewith brigade order concerning outposts. The Company will promptly submit a scheme for the disposition of outposts in compliance with this order. It would appear that the disposition of the garrison of the present Main Line of Resistance will not be changed for the time being. The only alteration lies in the placing of entire squads, alternating with light machine gun squads, as advance posts in No-Man's-Land during the night; instead of placing a large number of double sentry posts, as was previously the case."

* Correct Spelling - MARESTMONTIERS

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D. O. L.,
Historical Section.

G-2
No. 40

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 6, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 5, 12 h. to June 6, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy's infantry was unusually quiet, only a few scattered rifle shots from sentinels during the night.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery fired 1700 shells on our sector yesterday, most of them 77s and 105s. Fire by 150s after adjustment by airplane on batteries F of the 7th west of Broyes and E of the 5th S.E. of Broyes, this morning. Adjustment by high bursts were noted yesterday and to-day in the region of Villers Tournelle, Coulemelle, Le Plessier, Grivesnes, Belle Assise Farm, Bois de Fontaine, Quiry le Sec, Mesnil St. Firmin, Cantigny, Ravine S.W. of Cantigny, N. of Rocquencourt, Bois Avance, Chateau Broyes and in addition adjustments were made by airplanes on our front lines in the region of Grivesnes and Cantigny and on the two batteries noted above.

III. WORKS.

No enemy working parties were seen during the period covered by this report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was good all day.

Circulation in Front Lines:- 32 men seen passing back and forth from point 4207 to point 4106 during the day. 2 men seen at 4103.

Circulation in the Rear Zone: Normal. 30 men were seen going from Etelfay to Montdidier during the afternoon.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Our Observation Posts reported 7 enemy balloons in ascension by 7 h. June 6.

Airplanes: 16 enemy planes observed over our lines reconnoitering and adjusting during the period covered by this report. 3 of them were driven back by anti aircraft guns without accomplishing their mission. Between 22 h. 30 and 22h 45, 16 enemy planes passed over our lines going west. Our observers report 12 bombs N.E. of Folleville and several bombs in the woods S. of Bonvillers and on the outskirts of Chepoix and Varmaise.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Our artillery registered direct hits on houses at points 3807 and 4104. A fire in Montdidier, followed by numerous explosions, during the night. The enemy's artillery caused explosions in our lines at Coulemelle, Rocquencourt, and Cantigny.

THE ARMY ON OUR RIGHT HAS NOTIFIED US THAT PRISONERS TAKEN NEAR ROLLOT HAVE STATED THAT EXTRA CARTRIDGES FOR THE GAS MASK AND THREE DAYS RATIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED THE GERMAN TROOPS. THE ARMY BELIEVES THAT AN ATTACK ON A 40 KILOMETER FRONT IS IMMINENT. THAT THIS DIVISION WILL BE INVOLVED IS PROBABLE.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery normal but adjusting.
Aviation very active.

G-2,

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 6, 1918.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 40.

(From the bulletin of the First Army.)

ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING THE MONTH OF MAY.

I.

A. INFANTRY.

The enemy executed no important operation on the front of the army during the month. An attack on the Bois de la Gaume, which made a little progress, was thrown back by a counter attack. Besides this operation the enemy activity was shown only in small raids which were particularly numerous the morning of the 27th at the moment of the beginning of the Aisne offensive.

We executed with success several operations: the 9th of May we occupied the Park of Grivesnes; the 14th of May we improved our positions to the north and west of Castel; and finally, on the 28th of May the Americans took Cantigny. In the course of these attacks which were preceded by a violent artillery preparation, the enemy's infantry, in general, opposed only a feeble resistance, but they always sought, by violent counter attacks, many times repeated, to take back the lost ground, in particular, at Cantigny. All these counter attacks were repulsed.

B. ARTILLERY.

The activity of the enemy artillery was, on the whole, moderate. Their fire became very violent only for short periods during infantry attacks and raids; but on the 27th, by way of a demonstration, violent fire occurred along the whole front of the Army. Besides this a violent artillery reaction, lasting three days, followed the taking of Cantigny on the 28th of May.

Harassing fire on the front lines, the batteries, the villages, and the roads was somewhat strong, comprising generally, a mixture of high explosive and gas shells. Long range firing increased during the month; it was particularly directed against the Paris-Amiens Railroad. The fire was executed with 150 long, firing sometimes shrapnel but generally high explosive, and reaching to a distance of about 20 kilometers. Since the 27th of May the villages of the north sector received each day a few shells of caliber 380, coming from a piece located in the region of Chuignolles. Destructive shoots of batteries have been rare. The enemy employed a large number of gas shells, either in a concentration (between 10,000 and 15000 Yperite shells, the 19th of May, on the Bois de Coullemelle) or a small number of shells in the midst of harassing fire.

Observation was better in May than in April, which permitted us to locate a large number of batteries. In the northern sector between Villers Bretonneux and La Neuville Sire Bernard there have been no important reinforcements; however, it must be born in mind that the lack of cover in this region forces the enemy frequently to change his batteries and it might be that the same battery

- has two different emplacements. On account of this mobility the appearance of a new position must be sometimes considered as a change of position and not as a reinforcement. Besides the pieces are scattered and sometimes emplacements for four guns are occupied by two only. Nevertheless an increase of artillery in this sector is certain. In the region of Montdidier there has been an increase also; this was shown in the Cantigny operation, which showed several new batteries and brought about local changes of battle positions.

In conclusion there has been a reinforcement of artillery, particularly towards the north along the entire front of the army. However, this change in the number of the artillery has not brought about a corresponding change in the activity of the enemy artillery. The average of the number of shots fired per day varied from 13000 during the first half of the month to 20000 during the 2nd half. This does not correspond to the possibilities of the enemy's fire.

C. AVIATION.

In spite of good weather conditions the enemy air forces have not been active during the month. In general they remained within their own lines, crossing the front only for long distance reconnaissances, made at a great altitude. The Bombardment aviation did considerable night bombing during the second half of the month.

The pursuit squadrons operated in patrols of from 5 to 12 machines, generally in the vicinity of the enemy balloons. These patrols attacked only such of our avions as crossed over the enemy's line. x

The Observation airplanes were somewhat active along the entire front of the army. Adjustment was done principally during the morning from 6 to 9 o'clock and at night after 18 o'clock. They always remained 3 or 4 kilometers inside of their own lines and frequently were very low. Two adjustments were executed by night, apparently on the railroad station of Breteuil.

Few infantry airplanes were seen during this period, except on the twenty-eighth in the attack on Cantigny where two or three two-seaters worked very low, protected by pursuit planes.

Bombardment aviation was much more active by night in the 2nd half of the month than in the first. Numerous airplanes bombarded the cantonments, stations, and railroads, attacking sometimes, columns on the road and in bivouac with machine guns. Several times the enemy employed powerful flares, thrown from above so as to light up the objective to be bombarded. Two bombardment planes were brought down in our lines.

Many long distance reconnaissances at a great altitude were made in the regions of Conty, Breteuil, Poix, Formerie, Crevecoeur. A few airplanes flew over the rear areas by night without dropping any bombs; the enemy thus seems to be executing night reconnaissances.

The number of enemy balloons, which was 15 during the first half of the month, seems to have diminished towards the end of the 2nd half: on the 30th of May with good visibility only seven were seen, and on the 31st, under the same conditions the same number. It is therefore concluded that the number of balloons has diminished.

D. WORKS.

The enemy has not pushed work on his defenses very much during the month of May. In the first line he was content to join together shell holes and to dig in the parts that were hidden from our view, a few communication trenches in order to gain access to these elements of the first parallel. At certain points on the front, particularly between Villers Bretonneux and the Avre and to the east of Grivesnes there are commencing to appear at two or three kilometers from the first parallel, a few works which seem designated as protection for the artillery. Finally, works which have shown up on the right bank of the Avre in the region of La Neuville Sire Bernard, and which we had previously considered to be the building of a second position in this region, does not seem to have been followed up.

II.

CONCLUSION.

During the entire month of May the enemy preserved a defensive attitude before the front of the Army, but his artillery has been reinforced and pushed forward which gives the impression of offensive intentions; nevertheless in general, the artillery has shown only slight activity, far interior to that of which it is capable. Defensive works are few and are not actively pushed; the enemy works little in the advance zone; on the contrary towards the rear the work is actively pushed: railroad stations are growing up, railroads are being extended, and munitions depots increased.

To sum up the enemy's rear zones are are being equipped. A powerful artillery, up to the present only slightly active, is in place. Therefore it only remains for the enemy, in order to pass to the offensive, to replace the divisions now in the sector (those who are tired or are of the 2nd class) by attack divisions: This operation can be accomplished in a very short time.

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EXTRACT FROM G.H.Q. SUMMARY OF INVORMATION NO. 63, June 2, 1918.

THE AISNE OFFENSIVE, MAY 27, 1918.
From French VIth Army Bulletin, May 28, 1918.

On May 28 the enemy carried out attacks with extreme violence, particularly in the region N. and N.E. of Soissons. According to the latest information the enemy appears to have reached Crouy and, S. of the Aisne and of the Vesle to have gained a foothold on the heights N. of Serches.

On the night of May 27-28, the enemy attempted to take advantage, by a bold advance, of the break in the front which had occurred during the evening in the region of Bazoches. The advance was stopped on the morning of May 28 and some of the hostile elements were driven back particularly at Cuiry-Housse. The German front was (at that time) apparently marked out in a general way by the line Lesges-Bruys-Chery-Chartreuve. Farther E. the front

followed the northern slopes of the crest of hills S. of the Vesle and joined the former front to the N. of Rheims.

The advance of the hostile infantry was observed to be carried out, by virtue of great superiority in numbers, by systematic infiltration, thereby surrounding our centers of resistance and forcing the defenders to retreat, owing to the danger of being cut off.

A very large number of machine guns were reported in action, evidently to keep the defenders in the trenches up to the last moment. Preparation for the first attack on the 27th was made with a large quantity of gas shells, particularly Blue Cross. No Yperite shell was reported.

The first two days of the battle were characterized by the same methods as in the attacks of March 21 and the following day. It is important to note the strict secrecy and camouflage of the German preparations, the success of which was such that the first serious indication was not observed until May 26 in connection with the capture of prisoners on the night of May 25-26.

A TRUE COPY:

B. R. Legge,
Captain, Inf.,
U. S. A.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 7, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From June 6, 12 h. to June 7, 12 h.

G-2

No. 41

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy patrol, of unknown size, attempted to raid one of our outposts in the Bois de Fontaine at 2 h. this morning. Our patrol resisted the attack and drove the enemy off with hand-grenades and rifle fire.

Very little rifle and machine gun fire during the night.

A raiding party discovered two enemy light machine guns in the vicinity of an enemy post at 3097. One of these was destroyed and the other brought back to our lines.

II. ARTILLERY.

There was a marked increase in the enemy's artillery fire during the period covered by this report. Strong concentrations of 88s 105s, and 150s during the night on front line east of Le Plessier, Cantigny, Ravine southwest of Cantigny, and Villers Tournelle. Bois Avance received 312 shells of medium caliber during the period covered by this report. Batteries E of the 5th, southeast of Broys, and F of the 7th, west of Broys, were bombarded by 150s. One of our guns was hit. Adjustments by high bursts during the day on Coullemelle, Region of Folleville, Bois de Coullemelle, Quiry le Sec, Breteuil Embranchment, Tartigny-Quiry le Sec Road, Mesnil St. Firmin, Villers Tournelle, and Bois de Villers.

III. WORKS.

New dirt, very badly camouflaged, seen at point 3807. 11 men were working at 3302 during the afternoon.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was fair all day.

Circulation in Front lines: An enemy observer, apparently looking through glasses, at point 2807. Small groups of men seen going from point 4106 to 3807 during the day.

Circulation in the rear zone: Normal traffic along all routes. Our artillery fired on several groups of men and vehicles seen on Route Nationale No. 35, apparently with good results.

V. AIRCRAFT:

Balloons: 4 enemy balloons in ascension early this morning.

Airplanes: The enemy avions were very active, 34 planes passed over this sector during the period covered by this report. Bombs were dropped on Rouvroys and the battery positions west of Broys during the night.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

During the night we captured two prisoners, near point 3097 on the Bois Allonge, belonging to the 5th Co., 83rd Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div., confirming the order of battle, for that division. One prisoner, taken from a dugout near point 2818 belonged to the 3rd Co., 271st Res. Regt., 82d Res. Div., stated that he had been in this dugout since our attack on May 28th and had been unable to move, on account of serious wounds. (See Appendix)

An explosion was noted in Montdidier, followed by a short fire, at 2 h. The enemy is using many red and green, 1 and 2 star rockets, also caterpillar rockets went up near La Folie Farm. Searchlights active during the night in the direction of Montdidier.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery, increased in activity, Aviation very active.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 7, 1918.

APPENDIX TO SUMMARY OF INFORMATION NUMBER 41.

Extract from Bulletin of Information No. 69, First Army, June 6, 1918.

New deserters taken by the neighboring army confirm the information already given with regard to preparation for an attack; the increasing of munitions depots, the arrival of batteries etc. The attack may be imminent.

A prisoner made on our front who seemed to be sincere and well informed, also stated that an offensive was imminent on the front MONTDIDIER-NOYON. This offensive will have for its object the shortening of the German line. It will be followed by an attack on the British Front.

Report on prisoners captured June 7, at about 2,30 A.M. in the BOIS ALLONGE.

A. IDENTITY OF PRISONERS.

Private X, 22 years old, Home at KOLN DUNNEWALD, belongs to 5th company, 83rd Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div.

Stretcher Bearer Y, home at APPELSTADT (GOTHA), 34 years old, 5th company, 83rd Res. Regt., 25th Res. Div.

B. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

Both prisoners were captured in the vicinity of an outpost at about 3097 (BOIS ALLONGE), by an American Patrol. They were taken by surprise and appear to have offered no resistance. This can be explained by the fact that the artillery fire had obliged them to seek shelter in a little pit and they were consequently unable to see the raiding party as it approached them.

C. ORDER OF BATTLE.

Prisoners state that the 7th Co. is south of theirs, and believe that the battalion has all 4 companies in line (??) The 118th Res. Inf. is to their right and the 168th to their left. The 2nd Battalion of the 83rd Res. Regt. was formerly in front of the CHATEAU DE JENLIS but was relieved from this position at the end of May (30-31) by a battalion of the 118th. It went back to rest for 4 days and was then sent back into line in its present position in the BOIS ALLONGE, relieving the 1st Battalion of the 83rd, night of the 4-5 of June. Consequently the order of battle at the present moment is, for the 25th Reserve Division:- 118 Res. Regt, 2d Bn. of 83 Res. Regt, 168 res. Regt. It is presumed that the 3rd Battalion is at present occupying support positions near the valley of the DOMS and that the first Battalion is at rest near BECQUIGNY.

D. OCCUPATION OF SECTOR.

The company to which the prisoners belong has 4 squads acting as outposts in the BOIS ALLONGE. These squads are subdivided into groups of two men who act as double sentries. It is reported that each squad has one light machine gun. The double sentry posts (occupied only during the night) are about 30 meters apart and about

equidistant from the two parallel edges of the wood. The main body of the company is located well to the rear, presumably in the trench at 3796, where there are good dugouts. There is no wire in front of the outpost line and prisoners report that they have seen none in front of the main positions (?).

As regards the mode of occupation of the sector now held by the 118th, prisoners state that they had one battalion in line, one in support in the woods north of FERME FORESTEL and one at rest in the vicinity of BECQUIGNY. While his company was in line the stretcher bearer was located in a dugout at 3206. He reports that his company commander was in a dugout nearby. In coming up from relief the prisoners state that they passed through COURTEMANCHE and thence across open fields as far as their positions, not passing through FONTAINE SOUS MONTDIDIER. Between the rest position and COURTEMANCHE the prisoners went across country but came down the little ravine northeast of COURTEMANCHE and crossed the valley along the road from that ravine to COURTEMANCHE.

E. P. C.s and HEADQUARTERS.

Divisional headquarters is at ANDECHY, in a building 300 meters outside the town on the road from ANDECHY to GUERBIGNY. The P.C. of the battalion in support, at the time the regiment occupied the sector opposite the BOIS DE FONTAINE was not on the FORESTEL FARM, but in a dugout situated in the wood. The prisoners state that FORESTEL FARM is so heavily shelled that no one can live there.

When proceeding from the rest positions to their present emplacement in the line (BOIS ALLONGE) prisoners crossed the bridge northwest of MONTDIDIER at point 6497 (beside the small mill). They then followed the road south across the railway, turned to the right, passed the quarry 5296, rested there for a short while and went up the little ravine across country. They did not know where the battalion in support could be located.

F. OFFICERS OF THE DIVISION:

C.O., 168th Maj. GORSCHEN.
C.O. 3rd Bn., 168th, Capt. PFEFFER.
C.O. 12th Co., 168th Lt. WEIL.
C.O. 83rd, Maj. HUBNER.
C.O. 2nd Bn., 83rd Capt. PEHN.
C.O. 5th Co., 83rd Lt. TOLLMANN.

General VON MOHN, the C. G., of the Division, is away at the present time, either on leave, or transferred.

G. MISCELLANEOUS:

Private X formerly belonged to the 12th Co. of the 168th Res. Regt., but, after being sent to a hospital near CASFELD he was transferred, upon his return, to the 83rd Res. Regt. He states that all the men who are being sent to hospitals from the 168th are subsequently transferred to the 83rd. He does not know why.

As regards losses, the Company had had none during the two days spent in positions in the BOIS ALLONGE. At the time of the CANTIGNY attack, the company, then in the BOIS DE FONTAINE, lost about * wounded. The troops of the 2nd Battalion of the 83rd have not been receiving any

training in offensive action and have spent their entire rest period taking up and attending to routine duties.

Prisoner states that battery 5917 fired while he was coming down the ravine during a relief. (4 days ago). Prisoners know of no trench mortar positions in this vicinity.

Prisoners knew nothing whatsoever of a contemplated offensive and gave no information bearing on this subject.

* Figure not legible.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 7, 1918.

APPENDIX NO. 2 TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 41

- 0 -

REPORT ON PRISONER CAPTURED JUNE 7th IN FRONT OF
CANTIGNY.

1. Prisoner belongs to the 3rd Company, 271st Res. Regt, 25th Res. Div. He is 26 years old. His home is at Poppelau near Oppeln.

He was wounded on May 28th during our attack, and has remained in a shell hole ever since, subsisting on coffee and tinned meat taken from German bodies lying in the vicinity.

He states that he was endeavoring to get away from our attack when he was hit by a machine gun bullet. After the attack he attempted to crawl back towards the American positions but was greeted with machine gun fire and hastily retreated to his shell-hole. He heard the American counter-preparation and considered it to be "Hellish", adding that he never expected the Germans to break through. According to him the losses suffered by the Germans were extremely heavy.

Prisoner confirmed a number of statements already published concerning the 271st Res. Regt., and gave the following additional information:

His company's rolling kitchen comes up the Marest-montier*Framicourt road to deliver food, stopping at a point between these two towns. This point varies according to the shelling, as does also the time. While in support he lived in a cellar in the village of Framicourt.

He had no inkling of the Americans' intention to attack.

2. NOTE: Andechy, mentioned in Appendix 1, as being Division Headquarters of the 25th Res. Div. is the rear Echelon of Division Headquarters and not the P.C. (which is at Guerbigny.)

Correct spelling - * MARESTMONTIERS.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 8, 1918.

G-2
No. 42

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
From June 7, 12 h. to June 8, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy's infantry was unusually quiet yesterday and last night. Very little rifle or machine gun fire during the period covered by this report.

II. ARTILLERY.

There was a decrease in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday, about 2000 shells fell on the sector of the 1st Division. Intermittent shelling of Cantigny, Bois de Fontaine, Quarters A and B, Région of Le Plessier, Région of Grivesnes, Bois Avance, Bois de Villers, Villers Tournelle and Hill 124. A 150-long fired on the road between Mesnil and Breteuil Embranchment. High bursts noted over the following points during the day: Junction, National Highway No. 30 with road to Serevillers, Cantigny, Villers Tournelle, cross roads north of Ménil, Chepoix Dump, railroad crossing south of Tartigny, railroad southwest of Folleville, Bois de Coullemelle, wood 1 k. south of Folleville, Coullemelle, Grivesnes, Tartigny-Quiry le Sec road, Le Plessier, Belle Assise, and Bois de Longue Haie.

III. WORKS.

No enemy working parties were observed.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was poor all day.

54 men were seen going from the old house at 3807 to point 4209 and returning during the period covered by this report. 2 men at 2807 gazed over the bank of the road at our lines for a short time and disappeared.

Circulation was normal along all routes in the rear zone.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: One enemy balloon observed in ascension during the afternoon. No enemy balloons up this morning.

Airplanes: There was a decrease in the activity of the enemy's planes both yesterday and to-day. Only 15 planes over our lines during the entire period, one of these adjusting for artillery fire and the others apparently observing.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle confirmed by a prisoner captured in the Park of Grivesnes at 3 h 30 belonging to 2d Company, 59th Reserve Regiment, 1st Reserve Division.

Searchlights active in the rear of Bois de Framicourt during the night.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 8, 1918.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 42

From G. H. Q. Bulletin.

Recent information from a reliable source indicates that the Germans, when officers are made prisoners, try, by the use of drinks, to get them into conversation to make them talk freely, and in this way to extract much valuable information from them. Also officers made prisoners are placed together and their conversation overheard by means of an arrangement of microphones.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 66,
June 5, 1918.

NEW GAS PROJECTILE.

A new German gas projectile combining shrapnel action with gas has been reported from the Woevre sectors. It is said to produce a black smoke cloud above and yellow smoke beneath.

Further information is required. Intelligence officers are invited to make every effort to obtain information on this projectile. Special note should be made if its use is reported.

ACCOMPANYING AND INFANTRY BATTERIES.

The practice of sending artillery forward in support of the infantry in attack seems to have come into fairly general use. The possibility of field guns actually accompanying the infantry instead of merely covering them from fixed positions in rear, was mentioned as far back as August, 1917. A captured order of that date, signed by General Ludendorf, states that mobile artillery which advances into the battle zone in close communication with the infantry and uses direct fire on visible targets is in better position to be used against the hostile troops which have penetrated our lines than artillery in positions known to the enemy and therefore that counterattack divisions must have mobile artillery in reserve in division sectors for local counterattacks.

This principle seems to have been elaborated later, resulting in the employment of two different types, infantry batteries and accompanying batteries.

Infantry batteries are armed with 77's or with old guns of equivalent caliber. One gun is assigned to each front line battalion of infantry in the attack and is directly under the command of the Infantry Battalion Commander. Their mission, as shown by a German order of March 30, giving lessons to be drawn from the attack of March 21 (quoted in Summary of Information, No. 30, April 30, 1918) is to destroy nests of machine guns and other strong points impeding the advance of the infantry, which the artillery preparation has been unable to dispose of. For this purpose the guns follow the second wave of infantry closely and use direct fire and ranges under 1,000 meters. Horse-drawn guns were used in this way by the Germans 88th Division in the attack of March 21, but the German regulations of 1917 state that these guns are moved by man power and it is possible that the latter method is generally used. The front line battalions advancing in two waves, 50 meters between waves, were

each supported also by two light trench mortars on wheeled flat trajectory mounts, which advanced 50 to 80 meters behind the second wave and whose mission was the same as that of the infantry guns. In addition to the orders quoted above, the following extract from a document issued by German General Headquarters, February 8, 1918, shows that the general use of this method of attack is contemplated:

"The barrage cannot save the infantry from the necessity for close combat with machine guns, rifle and bayonet grenades, light trench mortars and guns accompanying it It is not only helped forward by the artillery in rear by batteries accompanying the infantry, and by light trench mortars, but principally by machine guns and infantry fire."

Accompanying batteries are assigned to regiments in an attack. To each infantry regiment of the front line is assigned a battery of 77's. These batteries follow the infantry at one or two kilometers. Their mission is to fire on the opposing infantry and to combat unexpected attacks or counterattacks. The battery begins moving when the infantry lines start forward and keeps in close touch with the infantry regimental commander. Except in cases of unexpected emergency, its role begins when the fire of the artillery in fixed positions in rear begins to fail to accomplish its object.

In the attack on Sauvillers (S. of the Luce) April 4, by the 6th Division, each infantry regiment was supported by a regiment of 77's which detached one battery to accompany the infantry. This battery was strictly under the orders of the Infantry Regimental Commander and formed a kind of mixed group with that regiment. The same formation was used by the 56th and 88th Divisions on March 21, the 78th Division on March 30 and the 4th Bavarian Division on April 25 at Kemmel.

According to instructions issued by German General Headquarters, the accompanying batteries are not believed to be apt to suffer much from counterbattery fire (presumably because they are covered by the fire of the batteries in position in rear) and therefore can be moved up close to the infantry.

A captured order of the 4th Bavarian Division for the attack on Kemmel, April 25, states in substance:

"Each regiment of infantry will have assigned to it one company of 12 light trench mortars, two medium trench mortars from the divisional battery, one Field Artillery Battalion staff and two field gun batteries. The regiment in reserve is assigned one field gun battery. (These are the accompanying batteries.)

"Each regimental sector is assigned a battalion for close combat, under the immediate orders of the Artillery Commander. An artillery liaison officer from this battalion and the battalion staff referred to above, will remain near the Infantry Regimental Commander. The latter has the guns absolutely at his disposal.

"The light howitzers will take part in the preparation and barrage, and receive missions from the Infantry Regimental Commander only when the situation makes it necessary. The accompanying batteries will be pushed forward on the slopes south of Kemmel and if possible to the south of Dranoutre."

The following schedule of special training for accompanying batteries was obtained from a prisoner of the 61st Regiment of Field Artillery, which was resting for three months (January to March, 1918) in the region of Lille:

1st Month. School of the Soldier.- All cannoneers receive general infantry instruction. In addition, a certain number are attached to an infantry unit and trained especially in the use of rifle and carbine, the throwing of grenades, etc.

2d Month. School of Battery.- Rapid accompanying position and conduct of fire.

3d Month. Combined Maneuvers.- Execution of maneuvers by four divisions.

In particular the following problems were given to the batteries:

a. Follow the advance of the infantry and occupy a position rapidly, in rear of it.

b. The guns are supposed to be destroyed; take the formation of an infantry company.

(It should be remembered that all batteries are provided with two machine guns, principally for defense against aircraft and that the men are already trained in their use).

APPENDIX NUMBER 2, TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 42.

- 0 -

Brief Report on a Lorrainer who Surrendered to us June 8th in front of Grivesnes.

1. IDENTITY OF PRISONER: X lived, before the war at Corny sur Moselle (Lorraine). He speaks better French than German and states that he was drafted against his will, as he had relatives in France and did not want to fight against that country. He belongs to the 2nd Company, 59th Reserve Regiment, 1st Reserve Division.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Prisoner had been sent to get food during the latter part of the night of June 7th-8th. In returning he did not stop at his own trenches but kept on going with the intention of surrendering to us. He did not know that we had wire before our trenches and ran into it, causing a certain amount of noise. He then shouted "Kamerad", "Republik" etc., but was fired on three times and wounded. He finally crawled to the trench and surrendered: Time: about 3.30 A.M. Place: in front of the Parc de Grivesnes.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE: 59th Reserve Regiment has its 1st Battalion in line, its 2nd in support and its 3rd at rest. The Battalion in line has three companies in the trenches (from north to south- 3rd, 2nd, 4th) and one as "artillery support" in the woods behind Malpart. The Support Battalion is echeloned between Malpart and Bouillancourt, one company occupying cellars in Malpart itself. The Battalion at rest is in a little ravine between Coutoire and Davenescourt, (mean coordinates 84.69)

4. OCCUPATION OF SECTOR. Practically the entire 2nd Company is in line in a small continuous trench. During the night outposts are sent forward about 100 meters. There are no dugouts in the trench. The Company Commander lives in an excavation on the extreme left of the trench. There is no wire in front of the trench.

The P.C. of the Battalion in line is in a cellar in Malpart; exact location unknown.

5. TROOPS SEEN AT THE REAR: Prisoner states that on June 3rd, while at Arvillers, he saw some men belonging to the 47th Regiment who had just arrived and were securing billets.

(NOTE: The 47th Regiment of Infantry belongs to the 10th Division). This report is as yet unconfirmed from any other source.

6. SYSTEM OF RELIEFS. 1st Battalion left the rest position June 6th at 8 P.M., and went direct to the 1st line. Consequently it appears that the rotation is as follows: Each Battalion remains about six days in line, six in support, six at rest and again six in line etc.

NOTE: Erratum in yesterday's Appendix 2, to Summary of Information No. 41. It was stated that the 271st Reserve Regiment belonged to the 25th Reserve Division. This should read "82nd Reserve Division."

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 42.

- 0 -

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY'S POSITION IN THE BOIS ALLONGE, TAKEN FROM THE REPORT OF THE RAIDING PARTY, JUNE 7, 1918.

The raid consisted of five groups, each under the command of an officer, and were numbered consecutively from right to left. The coordinates of the sector raided are 2992-2996. The raiding party entered the wood from the west and went through the wood to its eastern edge.

Number 1 Party: While moving through the woods in a northeastern direction this party located a lighted and occupied dugout. On the occupants' refusal to come out it was destroyed by offensive and phosphorous bombs.

Number 2 Party: An automatic rifle opened on this party as they entered the wood. The gun was rushed, three of the gun crew killed, and the gun captured. The party then moved to the eastern edge of the woods where three men were found in a light shelter. One of these tried to escape and was killed, the other two were taken prisoners.

Number 3 Party: This group was led by the Raid Commander. On entering the woods it was fired upon by an enemy light machine gun, and also bombed. This machine gun was also rushed and its crew killed, the gun itself was chained to a tree and could not be brought back.

Number 4 Party: This group saw several of the enemy retiring over the hill and opened on them with rifle fire. Four of the enemy were seen to fall.

Number 5 Party: This group moved directly through the woods until it reached the eastern edge, from there it moved south along the edge for about 50 yards. Several shelters and dugouts were located and destroyed by incendiary bombs. The recall was sounded as soon as the raid commander had assured himself that at least two prisoners had been sent to the rear. In his report he says "Judging from the number of shelters and dugouts encountered by

the raiding party, I would say that the Bois Allonge is held by one platoon of Infantry. Very little wire was found and what was found consisted of loose wire thrown in among the trees in a haphazard manner. There are no well organized trenches in the Bois Allonge. The wood itself is very thin and pitted with shell holes."

* * * * *

The following facts have been revealed from a study of photographs made since June 1 : The enemy now has a continuous trench running from southwestern corner of Mesnil St. Georges northwest along the hedge, thence north along the ravine de la Fosse Dieu to point 3798, thence northwest to the southern edge of the Parc of the Chateau de Jenlis and along this edge to the road junction at 2906. The quarries in the vicinity of 3997 are most probably occupied. Much passing to and from at point 4303. Shelters have been dug in the side of the road, 3504. The old house in this vicinity appears to be occupied.

Around Cantigny the enemy is consolidating the trench de Munich by joining shell holes. The communication trench along the road running east from point 1822 has been converted into a fire trench and a line of shell holes established about 100 yards to the front. Dugouts are beginning to appear in the trench De Dresde, and the trench De Vienne. There are many tracks in the rear of this road. Dugouts are being constructed in the western edge of the Bois Lalval near point 2530.

G-2
No.43.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 9, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 8, 12 h. to June 9, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

Intermittent machine gun fire during the night.

II. ARTILLERY:

Fire for adjustment during the afternoon on : Grivesnes, Parc Grivesnes, Le Plessier, Bois Coullemelle, and Esclainvillers, From 23 h 50 to 3 h. there was an intense bombardment of our old sector east of the line Plainville-Broyes-Esclainvillers with gas and high explosive, some shrapnel in the woods and along the road. The gas used was Chlorine Arsenic, and Bromine Arsenic and a small percentage of mustard gas. At times the number of shells falling on the various towns was as high as 25 per minute. Neutralization fire on batteries B of the 6th, E of the 5th, E of the 7th and F of the 7th with Phosgene and Yperite shells. Intermittent shelling on our front positions with gas and H.E. this morning.

III. WORKS.

The enemy is digging a new trench at 3801. Fresh dirt has been seen at 5914, 3207, and 2806. The old hangar in the vicinity of Mesnil St. Georges was removed during the night by the enemy.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was poor all day.

Numerous men seen passing back and forth from the old house at 3807 and point 4106, carrying lumber.

The circulation on the routes in the rear zone was slightly less than normal, probably due to the poor visibility. One of our observation posts reports what appeared to be a column of infantry with transport moving near Malpart at 23 h 45. This column was imperfectly silhouetted by a fire in Malpart.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Two balloons were in ascension from 5 h 05 to 5 h 45 this morning.

Airplanes: Twelve enemy airplanes observed over the sector during the period covered by this report.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Order of Battle; Nothing to report.

b. Fire observed in the direction of Bouillancourt at 22 h 25. At 23 h our observers reported large flashes, evidently from a burning dump, south of Montdidier.

c. Probable enemy observation posts have been located at points 2807, 4880. Numerous six star rockets from the enemy's lines during the night. The enemy either uses this as his own signal, or continues, as in the past, to affect our artillery fire by using our signals, which he well knows.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery very active, from 0 to 3 h. Aviation quiet.

G-2
No.44

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 10, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 9, 12 h. to June 10, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

One of our patrols encountered an enemy patrol, size unknown, near point 1253. No identifications were gained or lost.

Machine Guns fired short bursts on our front lines during the night.

II. ARTILLERY.

There was a decrease in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday and to-day, about 1500 shells fell on our sector; Most of these in the vicinity of the 1st and 2nd lines. One of our observation posts was shelled yesterday afternoon with H.E. and shrapnel, rendering it untenable. Following battery positions in the region of Broys were heavily gassed with Yperite on June 9: 306,313,343,312,327. The enemy decreased considerably his fire for adjustment by high bursts during the period covered by this report.

III WORKS.

An enemy working party was seen at 0456.

IV CIRCULATION.

Visibility was poor all day.

There was an increase in the circulation opposite our front. During the afternoon 37 wagons, 18 of which were drawn by 6 horses; 16 guns, and 8 caissons were seen entering Montdidier from the north-east and east. 340 mounted men from Guerbigny to Montdidier during the same period. There was an abnormal amount of circulation in front of the sector of the Division on our right, during the afternoon. From 15 h 15 to 16 h, when visibility failed entirely, a heavy movement of infantry, mounted men, wagons, and light artillery observed moving on the Piennes-Montdidier road. These troops later appeared to be moving in a southwesterly direction, as if to reinforce the line. From 17 h. to 21 h. our airplanes flew low over the Bois Lalval and fired into it with machine guns. Our observers could see no enemy movement in the woods at that time.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: One enemy balloon observed in ascension during the afternoon.

Airplanes: 16 enemy planes passed over our lines yesterday afternoon. They were all fired on either by machine guns or anti aircraft. 8 enemy planes reported over our rear areas this morning between 4 h 30 and 7 h. At 6 h 40 4 of these over Tartigny were heard in combat with French planes above the clouds.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A patrol (1 N.C.O. and 5 men) entered the enemy's trenches in front of the Chapel St. Aignan yesterday afternoon and encountered several of the enemy. The patrol leader states that the enemy seen wore very clean and new looking uniforms.

3 of the enemy killed in the encounter which followed, our men escaped without a casualty. No prisoners were taken by either side.

At 21 h 45 an explosion was observed in the direction of Montdidier and a large fire seen there as late as 4 h.
VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 44
June 10, 1918.

I.

Extract from Interrogatory of Prisoners Captured by Division on our Right.

The prisoner belongs to the 168th Regiment, 5th Reserve Division. From the 26th of April to the 20th of May, the 11th Company of the 168th Regiment remained in reserve to the west of Montdidier.

The men were used for carrying parties, both soup and materiel, making two trips per night. While going for soup in Montdidier 20 men of the Company were gassed. From the 21st to the 28th of May the 3rd Battalion was in rest in the Bois de la Famille. On the 28th, at 8 o'clock, the alert was given because of the American attack on Cantigny and the battalion proceeded, in daylight, to the rear of the 83rd Reserve Regiment which it relieved on the night of the 29th-30th of May, because of the heavy losses which the regiment had suffered. The Third Battalion remained three days in line in front of the ruins of the Chateau de Jenlis, and was relieved by the 118th Infantry Regiment the night of the 1st-2nd of June. The 11th Company now occupies dugouts situated at 6285 near the road which joins National Road Number 30 to the road from Montdidier to Abbemont. The 11th Company is on the left of the 168th Regiment. Probably the 9th Company is on its right. Prisoners believe that another Company (the 10th or the 12th) will be also in the first line, and the remaining company of the 3rd Battalion in support.

At present the rockets used are the following:

Barrage, Green.

Destruction fire, Red.

Increase the range, Yellow.

II.

Extract from Supplement to Corps Bulletin.

Notes on the Morale of the Germans in the Recent Champagne Offensive.

-0-

Thirty-four prisoners of the 12th Regiment, 5th Division, were in accord that this war could not be ended by a 2nd or a 3rd offensive, even if it took them to Paris, nor yet in a 4th, if it should take them to Bordeaux. For the French can always counter attack and take back the lost terrain, and it would be impossible to disarm them or to overwhelm them. Moreover they fear that the present offensive, notwithstanding its favorable start, will end like the first, in a stabilization.

Even in the midst of the first day's success the morale of this regiment did not seem at all high.

Prisoners of the 10th Division, captured during this offensive agreed that, in spite of the successes attained, the men were discontented, since they did not know either when or where they would be relieved, and were pushed forward without rest in the present offensive, which but adds to their fatigue and exhaustion, without serving in any way to bring an end to the war.

G-2
No.45

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 11, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 10, 12 h to June 11, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

At Oh30 the enemy commenced a bombardment of our front lines and support positions in the zone of Villers-Tournelle, and at Oh50 the barrage on the front lines in the northern portion, lifted from left to right. The enemy, following closely his barrage, entered our trenches in the vicinity of point 2528. One group of the enemy proceeded southwards and another northward in our trenches protected by covering parties between the trenches and our barbed wire. Our men retired slowly in both directions, throwing hand grenades. Our automatic rifle posts opened fire on the enemy outside of the trenches but they were bombed out by those who had succeeded in entering our front lines. One man was taken prisoner from our post at the point of entry, and two others are missing. The total number of the enemy taking part in this encounter is estimated at about 40. Our men inflicted several casualties on their assailants but no identifications were secured, the enemy removing his dead and wounded.

Intermittent Machine Gun fire on our front lines throughout the night. An enemy machine gun is reported in the vicinity of point 1726.

II. ARTILLERY

There was a marked increase in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday and to-day, about 5000 shells in all. Interdiction fire early this morning on Grivesnes, Esclainvillers, and the Rocquencourt-Villers Tournelle Road. From Oh30 to 1h40 bombardment with 77s, 105s, 150s, followed by a barrage, on our front lines in the zone of Cantigny. This morning the enemy shelled our lines from Cantigny north with H.E., shrapnel and gas, for one hour at the rate of about ten per minute. Fire for adjustment was made on the villages of Grivesnes and Esclainvillers. The village of Grivesnes received approximately 300 shells of small and medium caliber during the enemy's raid last night.

III WORKS.

No enemy working parties were observed in their front areas.

One enemy working party of ten men and 1 wagon seen removing dirt from the Warsy-Montdidier road during the afternoon, and also enemy soldiers were seen working in the fields just south of Etelfay, apparently harvesting.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was poor all day.

Eight men seen at intervals moving from the front lines opposite Chapel St. Aignan to the Bois de Lalval.

Normal circulation along all routes in the rear-zone. At 16h50 one company of infantry was seen moving from point 0916 into Fignieres.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons:

Enemy balloons made 14 ascensions during the afternoon, from 17 to 19 h. Signal lights seen from balloons in the direction of Montdidier and Cantigny during the night.

Airplanes:

There has been a great increase in the activity of enemy planes. At 23h30 an enemy plane dropped 14 bombs in the vicinity of Coullemelle and this morning bombs were dropped by a plane carrying British or allied markings on our front lines, the Bois derriere la Ville and Breteuil Embranchement. This plane also wounded one horse. This occurred at 9h30, 12h30 and 13h27. At 12h30 an enemy three-seater flew extremely low over Broys. It was a large plane with black wings and grey fuselage and had a white cross on both wings. The bombs dropped by the plane this morning have a very local effect and evidently explode in the air, as practically no craters were formed by the explosions. A total of 29 planes were observed over the sector during the period covered by this report.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 22h30 2 three-star white rockets from the enemy lines in front of Grivesnes.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery increase in activity. Aviation very active.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 45.

Extracts from 1st Army Bulletin No.65, June 2, 1918.

Translation of an Order found on the body of Lt. UTTA,
killed while in command of a party which attempted to raid
American trenches west of Cantigny on May 27.

.....
272d Res. Inf. Reg. May 23, 1918.

Subject: 'Tarnopol' Operation Regimental Order.

I. On the morning of May 27 the Jagdkammando (com-
bat detachment) supported by elements of infantry, of artil-
lery, and of minenwerfer, will accomplish a task which will
be explained in detailed orders to be issued later. The
following will take part in this operation.

a. The Jagdammando, consisting of one officers, three
sergeants, and five squads.

b. Four heavy machine guns (with expert gunners and
two N.C.O.s), to be supplied by the 3rd Battalion.

The task assigned these guns will be explained to
the N.C.O.s verbally. They will report at 4 p.m., May 24
to Lt. Nenke (Regimental P.C.)

c. Four light trench mortars to be supplied by the
first battalion. The first battalion trench mortar officer
will report at 4 p.m. May 24th at the Battalion P.C. in
order to obtain instructions regarding the emplacements of
these trench mortars.

d. One squad from Co. a of the first Battalion and
two squads from Co. b. These squads will be withdrawn from
the trenches at dusk of May 26th. The task assigned these
squads will be explained in special instructions.

e. Two light machine guns, to be supplied by Com-
pany b, and one light machine gun to be supplied by Company
a. During the operation these machine guns will be in pos-
ition at the point of departure of the assault troops, ready
to open fire promptly.

II. a. Herewith one time-table and one sketch
showing the different phases of the operation. The bat-
talions will issue whatever instructions appear to be nec-
essary. They will submit a report on the morning of May
26, stating that platoon commanders have been informed as
to their tasks and that the preparations have been duly
made.

b. Requisition has been made for the following:
For heavy machine guns: 16000 rounds of ammunition.
For light machine guns: 6000 rounds of ammunition.
For the 4 trench mortars : 400 projectiles.
For the Jagdkammando : 500 handle grenades, (8 per
man), 200 ovoidal grenades (4 per man).
Double rations for May 27.

III. After having fulfilled its task, the Jagdkommando should attempt, to leave its own trenches and to proceed to the dugouts in the quarry in view of obtaining better shelter. These dugouts are now occupied by a section of pioneers.

The Jagdkommando will carry with it rations for May 27 which, if necessary, will consist of reserve rations. In the quarry the additional rations will be held ready for consumption - both food and coffee.

IV. First Lt. Bessler will take all the necessary measures to insure proper attention for the wounded in the first line. The 1st Battalion will place at his disposal the necessary medical personnel (doctors, stretcher bearers, stretchers) and will see that proper measures have been taken to insure the dressing of wounds and the evacuation of the wounded before nightfall, at the latest.

V. The Marestmontier* dressing station will be prepared to receive and attend to the wounded. The regimental surgeon will issue orders directing that three doctors be employed in this duty and arrange for the evacuation of the wounded. The 3rd Battalion will detail a Medical Corps N.C.O. to the dressing station in the Santats Waldchen. This N.C.O. will draw up a list of the wounded passing through this dressing station (the 271st Regiment has been notified).

VI. The Jagdkommando, equipped for the assault, will proceed to the jumping off position (trench of Company b) at 2 h 30 on the morning of May 27.

VII. Arrangements to be made for transmitting information will be covered in a special order issued to the 1st and 3rd battalions. The chiefs of the liaison sections of the 1st and 3rd Battalions will report at the regimental P.C. at 4 p.m. May 24.

(Signed) GROTHE.

* * * * *

272d Res. Regt. (Commander of First Line Battalion)
Subject: "Tarnopol".

SPECIAL ORDER FOR THE JAGDKOMMANDO.

- - - - -

Composition of the Jagdkommando.

Stosstrupp a : Vizefeldwebel Weichenhahn, and one squad.
Stosstrupp d : Lt. Utta, vizefeldwebel Donath, and
2 squads.
Stosstrupp c : Vizefeldwebel Kuhn, and 2 squads.

Scheme of Operations.

After the enemy's artillery has been neutralized with gas, and after the two hours destruction fire on the enemy's trench, the stossstrups will jump out of the trench in the neighborhood and to the north of the orchard. The purpose of the operation is to capture prisoners and to bring back materiel. As soon as prisoners are captured Lt. Utta should be notified. He will then give the signal to withdraw (blast of a whistle). The withdrawal of the three Stossstrups to their own trench will then be quickly carried out. A report concerning prisoners, booty, and our losses, will be rendered by telephone to the commander of the battalion in line and also if possible, in written form, sent by runners. Each stossstrupp will be supported by a light machine gun and crew located in the first German trenches. Particular attention should be paid to maintaining silence before the assault in order not to alarm the enemy. The assault troops should leave the trench exactly on time (0 hour). The enemy's trench should be rushed.

If necessary, stossstrupp b will proceed along the communication trench north of the orchard to the 2nd enemy trench, in order to capture prisoners. A rapid capture and a quick withdrawal will make success certain. After having returned to our trenches the troops will endeavor to proceed, in small groups, to the assembly point (small quarry). The prisoners and booty will be brought there also. One blast of the whistle means "withdrawal".

(Signed) Illegible.

TIME SCHEDULE.

- 3.00 a.m. to 5.00 a.m. Bombardment of the hostile artillery with gas shell.
- 5.00 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. Fire of destruction by the artillery; entire front.
- 6.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. Concentrated fire of destruction by the artillery on KASPAR, the hedge, the "Quadrilateral", the orchard (upon the zone of barrage fire), the machine guns in the Tiergarten (some smoke shells will be fired).
- 7.00 a.m. to 7.20 a.m. Fire of destruction by the trench mortars; 4 medium trench mortars upon the orchard; 2 medium trench mortars upon the first trench north of the hedge; 4 light trench mortars (272d Regt.) upon the first hostile trench north of the orchard.
Light trench mortars (270th and 271st Regts.) on the first hostile trench in front of them.
- 6.50 a.m. to 7.20 a. m. Machine gun fire upon the first hostile trench north and south of the "Quadrilateral" Limits: to the north, point W (hedge); to the south, road Cantigny - Plessier.
- 7.00 a. m. to 7.20 a. m. Light trench mortars (270th and 271st Regts.) upon the former objective. Harrassing fire. Assault sections assemble.

7.00 a.m. to 7.10 a.m. Medium trench mortars north of the hedge, near point W.

(Signed) GROTHE.

TIME SCHEDULE FOR "TARNOPOL"
(Corrected)

May 26, 1918.

272d Res. Inf. Regt.

In accordance with Order Ia 715 of the 82d Reserve Division, the time schedule has been modified as follows:

4.15 a.m. to 5.30 a.m. Artillery neutralization fire with gas shell.

6.00 a.m. to 6.30 a.m. Fire of destruction upon hostile position.

6.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. Concentration fire upon the objective of the attack (without change).

7.00 a.m. to 7.20 a.m. Box fire by the artillery.

TRENCH MORTARS.

6.30 a.m. to 6.40 a.m. 4 medium trench mortars upon the orchard.

2 medium trench mortars upon the hedge.

6.45 a.m. to 6.55 a.m. 4 medium trench mortars upon the orchard.

6.45 a.m. to 7.20 a.m. 2 medium trench mortars upon the hedge.

5.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. 4 light trench mortars (272d Regt.) upon the trench, then the orchard and 200 meters to the north.

4 light trench mortars (272 Regt.) upon trench W, and 200 meters south of point W.

6.50 a.m. to 7.20 a.m. 4 light trench mortars (270th Regt.) upon the hedge.

4 light trench mortars (271st Regt.) upon the first trench and 300 meters south of the orchard (northern limit).

7.00 a.m. to 7.20 a.m. 4 light trench mortars (272d Regt.) 300 meters south of the orchard. Box fire.

3.30 a.m. The infantry and machine guns must be in position at 3.30 a.m. (Otherwise, no change). The assault troops must, in any case, be back in their trench by 7.20 a.m. at the latest.


SYNCHRONISATION.

In the Regiment at 8. p.m., May 26. There will be present: the liaison agent of the trench mortar officer of the 1st and 3d Battalions and the liaison agent of Lieutenant Utta with their watches.

At 3.15 a.m., May 27, the time will be communicated by runner from the Regiment to the Command Post (K.T.K) which will transmit it.

* Correct spelling: MARESTMONTIERS.

S.G.W.




*Plan of Attack
of a Jagdkommando
West of Cantigny on May 27, 1918.*

-LEGEND-

- Stosstrupp
- ← Route of Stosstrupp
- ÷ Light M. G.
- ÷ Heavy M. G.
- Direction of fire of Heavy M. G.
- ||||| Artillery Box Fire.
- Artillery Destruction Fire.
- Medium Trench Mortar Fire.
- Light " " "

*Sketch N° 2 Firing after 7 A.M.
Sketch N° 1 Firing until 7 A.M.*



Scale - 1:25,000

Reproduction of the sketch appended to
one order

T. D. G.
1st Div. A. E. F.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 45.

III.

Brief report on Prisoners Captured on our Front During
the Night of June 11 to 12.

A. Private X, 9th Co., 3rd Bn, 271st Res. Inf., 82nd Res. Div.

1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

On the night of June 11-12 the first battalion of the 271st relieved the 2nd Battalion at about 24 o'clock. Private X, together with eight other men and an N.C.O., had been detailed to occupy three Rocket Signal Posts, situated behind the German First Lines. The nine men and the N.C.O. started out from the Bois du Clos, proceeded through Framicourt through point 4519, through point 4414, as far as the cross roads at 3909. There he and two other men were sent out without a guide to take position in Rocket Signal Post Number 2. They were given instructions as to the way to get there, and safely reached the German First Lines in the vicinity of 2713. Here they inquired as to the location of the post and were told to "turn to the right, go straight ahead a certain distance and then turn to the left again". The three men followed the instructions implicitly and finally found themselves in the American First Lines. Here they were greeted with gun fire, two of them were killed and the third one, Private X, was taken prisoner.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

Prisoner reports that the 271st Reserve Regiment has been moved south but is unable to give its exact limits. It would appear that the 272nd now extends almost as far as the Cantigny-to-Framicourt Road. The 271st still has one battalion in line, one in support and one at rest, the rotation being:- from line to rest, from rest to support, from support to line. Prisoner does not know how many companies there are in line. The 1st battalion is now in line, the 2nd at rest and the third in support.

3. EMPLACEMENT OF SUPPORT AND REST BATTALIONS.

There appears to have been no change in the emplacement of the rest battalion. One company of the rest battalion had been kept in the forward area in order to do some work on the lines. It was probably located in the Bois du Clos (P.C. of the battalion support also in that wood). That company's rolling kitchen used to come up to about 4327 to bring them food. Prisoner does not know where this company is moved to now. Prisoner states that the P.C. of the Battalion in line is now near point 3909. He also reports that the regimental P.C. has moved out of Marestmontieres*1. He does not know where.

4. PRISONERS EXPERIENCES DURING THE OPERATION AGAINST CANTIGNY

The prisoners platoon, at that time located in the Bois de Lalval received orders at 6 A.M. on the morning of May 28 to stand by, fully equipped, and be prepared to move at a moments notice. They waited around until 7 A.M. at which time the sound of the firing appeared to draw closer to them. Fearing that the enemy's infantry was approaching, and having no one to restrain them (their platoon commander had been wounded) prisoners platoon then decided to retire to a safe distance. A little later, they came upon their company in the act of assembling, in view of occupying the support positions. Most of the company were assigned this task, but two squads were detached and were sent forward, together with squads taken from all the other companies of the third battalion, to reinforce the first battalion in front of Cantigny. Prisoner states that his Company only sent two squads because they could not spare any more men, having themselves, already lost from 20 to 30 men from artillery fire. Prisoner does not know exactly what happened to those two squads but states that the few men who came back said that they had counter attacked, but had been unable to penetrate into Cantigny. Prisoner states that the 1st Battalion of the 271st and the 3rd Battalion of the 272nd suffered extremely heavy losses in that day's fighting. The First Company was "practically wiped out". Prisoner reports that the 2nd Battalion, at rest, was brought up towards evening but did not know whether it counter attacked or not. Prisoner, himself, is unable to give any detailed information as to the actual fighting, as he did not leave the Bois du Clos during the attack or counter attacks.

B. PRISONER Y., 7th Company, 59th Res. Regt., 1st Res. Division. 23 years old, lives in Fritzlar near Hessen, Nassau.

1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

Prisoner's company is at present situated in the Bouillancourt wood, his battalion being in support. His particular company has been sent forward to work on wire entanglements practically every night during the last few days. On the night of June 11 to 12, his company, having been again sent forward to build an entanglement in front of German trenches at about 1344, he followed along as far as a shell hole about 30 yards behind the first German trench in that region. Upon passing this shell hole he decided he would rather stay in the shell hole while the rest of the company worked, and felt quite certain that they would not notice his absence in the dark. At about 3 A.M. he left his shell hole, intending to rejoin his company before it started home. He crossed the first German trench, walked along as far as the Malpart-to-Grivesnes Road, turned to the left and walked along that road in the direction of Grivesnes. He could not find his Company, however, which must have stopped working earlier than usual and gone back to the Bouillancourt Wood along the northern side of the Malpart-to-Grivesnes Road. He was just wondering what to do when a pistol shot was fired behind him. He promptly jumped into a shell hole and shouted "Don't shoot". An American patrol found him in this shell hole and brought him back,

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

The 59th Reserve Infantry has one Battalion in line (the 1st), one in support, and one at rest. The rotation is: line to support, support to rest, rest to line. The northern limit of the 1st Battalion is probably near the hayrick at 1451, while its southernmost limit extends to about 15365. Prisoner states that it has four companies in line but is not absolutely certain. The support battalion is located in the Bois de Bouillancourt. The P.C. of the Battalion in line is in Malpart, but has moved out of the cellar in which it was previously located. Its exact emplacement is not known to the prisoner. The company which used to be in Malpart has been moved out on account of the shell fire. The Battalion at rest has presumably still southeast of Contoire.

4. OCCUPATION OF SECTOR.

The Second Company holds a front of about 200 meters, between point 1546 and 1343. All three platoons are in line. During the night each platoon sends out one or two advance posts (double sentry posts). There is a wire entanglement along the entire company front. Prisoner does not know exactly how well built this wire entanglement is but states that it has iron posts and good thick barbed wire. Prisoner states also that the Second Company remains on the alert all night, the men only sleeping during the day. The Second Company seems to have four machine guns, all of them being in the trench, distributed at about equal distances along the entire front. There are no dugouts in the first line.

5. The Company Kitchen comes up to about point 5152 on the Hargicourt-to-Bouillancourt Road. The time varies.

6. The Company's trench strength is now about 90 men. It has suffered losses while in support, but very little while in the line. On one single day fourteen men of the Seventh Company were wounded in the Bois de Bouillancourt while only two men were wounded during the five days which the Company spent in line (1st to 6th of June)

Prisoner states that he heard of the Cantigny attack, but the only details which he was able to obtain were that some Americans had been captured.

7. MISCELLANEOUS:

Prisoner has only been in this sector since the 4th of June. He was previously in Champagne, on detached duty. He states that the preparations for the German offensive in that region were easily visible and that he suspected an attack as early as the beginning of May. In regard to the latest German push, he says that on the evening of June 7 there were rumors that the German artillery was to open fire along this front and that an infantry attack was to be launched further south.

C. Neither of these two prisoners seem to have any knowledge as to offensive intentions on the part of the enemy in this sector.

Prisoner Y states that he feels sure that they would never try an attack with this division.

Prisoner X states that they were expecting that the Division would be relieved during the night of the 11th to 12th of June but that instead of that there was simply a Battalion relief.

Correct Spelling:

* Plessis - Cacheleux

*1 Marestmontiers

S.G.W.

G 2.
No. 46

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
June 12, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 11, 12 h. to June 12, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. Infantry:

There was intermittent rifle and machine gun fire on our front lines during the night. Enemy machine guns have been reported at 2808 and 2800.

II. Artillery:

The enemy artillery reacted against our artillery fire yesterday. Concentrations were placed on Grivesnes, Cantigny and C Coullemelle, and also rather heavy fire on Broyes during the afternoon. Fire for adjustment by high bursts on Esclainvillers, Serevillers, Breteuil Embranchement and Rocquencourt. There was some interdiction fire along the roads in the front area last night. Reprisal fire was carried out on batteries 339 west of Broyes from 16 to 18 h. with 77's. Our observers confirmed the report as to at least one 77 mm. and one 105 mm. in the vicinity of point 3128.

The total number of shells falling on the sector was not less than 3000

III. Works:

Enemy working parties were heard last night by one of our patrols in the vicinity of point 1438, 1443, and 1444. The trench at 1435 is reported by this patrol as being heavily camouflaged. It is $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft. deep and 4 feet wide. Yesterday afternoon enemy working parties were observed in the vicinity of La Folie Farm.

IV. Circulation:

The visibility was poor all day.

The circulation in the rear zone is reported as being less than normal yesterday and today. 50 men in small groups-seen entering Montdidier along the route National No. 35 and also 60 men in small groups from Warsy to Montdidier yesterday.

V. Aircraft:

One enemy balloon observed in ascension at 16 h. in the direction of Fignieres

18 enemy planes over the sector from 15 to 20 h. photographing and observing. They were all fired on by anti-aircraft and machine guns and four were chased by our planes.

The planes with British markings which dropped bombs on our front and rear positions yesterday have been identified as a British plane which lost its way and mistook the Breteuil Embranchement for the Amiens-Montdidier Railroad.

VI. Miscellaneous.

Order of Battel confirmed by capture of two pris-

oners, one belonging to the 7th Company, 59th Res. Regiment, 1st Res. Division, taken at point 1445, and one belonging to the Signal Section, 9th Company, 271st Res. Regiment, 82ns Res. Division, taken in our front lines at 2513. (See interrogation of prisoners).

The enemy is using numerous 3 and 6 star rockets in the region of his front lines. These are identical to those used by us for barrage signals. 4 balloon lights were observed during the night in the direction of Montdidier.

VII. General impression of enemy activity:

Quiet.

NOTE: Error in summary for June 10 to 11, Par. I. Zone of Villers Tournelle should read Zone of Coullemelle. Point 2528 should read 1528.

Hq. 1st Division, G-2, A.E.F., June 12, 1918

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 46
IIIRD Army, G-2 Army Headquarters, June 11th, 1918
No. 1031 / 2 I.
TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN THE COURSE OF
THE PRESENT GERMAN ATTACK.

51st Regt. of Inf.

51st Regt. of Infantry.

June 7th, 1918.

ORDER OF ATTACK.

The 51st Regiment of Infantry, located at the center of gravity of the forward push, will be echeloned in depth.

Width of the combat sectors: 700 meters.

IIInd Bn. of the 51st Inf. in the first line.

IIIrd Bn. of the 51st Inf. in the second line.

Ist Bn. of the 51st Inf. in the third line.

The regiment will take position at the places shown on the map. A special order will show the jumping off positions.

The Infantry attack will be preceded by an artillery preparation lasting several hours. This preparation will commence at 0450. It will paralyze with gas shells the enemy's artillery and will prevent the movements of the enemy's infantry.

The IIInd Bn. of the 51st, the left half of which is in the sector of the 10th Grenadiers, will move into the combat area of the 51st in order to make room for the 10th Grenadiers.

The 1st Battalion of the 51st will remain in its waiting positions.

At 4.20 a.m. the trench mortars will carry out a surprise fire of 1000 H.E. projectiles on the enemy's first lines. This will be the signal for the commencement of the attack.

The IIInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 51st Inf. will advance well closed up so as to get across the zone covered by the enemy's barrage as quickly as possible.

The echelonment in depth will only be adopted after the capture of the enemy's first position.

The infantry attacks will be supported by a rolling barrage which will cover the entire area of attack with a violent combing fire. Further sketches will be issued to the battalions showing the advance of the rolling barrage. This barrage will make longer pauses on the important points. The rolling barrage will cease along the general line of the artillery positions: south of Ecouvillon-Attiche heights.

During the rolling barrage and under cover of the artillery fire the regiments will draw up as close as possible to the first line, and will then push forward towards the south as rapidly as possible.

FIRST OBJECTIVE.

The 51st Infantry will take the Kapellenberg (Col-line St. Aubin) which will be submitted to particularly heavy shelling by our artillery.

Advanced elements of the 2nd Battalion are assigned the task of pushing forward to this objective as fast as possible. They should not waste their time in attending to prisoners etc. The thorough mopping up of the captured positions will be done by the rear elements of the battalion. If it becomes necessary, the 3rd Battalion, which will follow along, will lend assistance.

The 3rd Battalion of the 51st Infantry will follow immediately to the rear of the 2nd battalion of the 51st, and will remain in constant touch with the latter.

Interval: 1 kilometer.

This distance will be taken after we are inside of the enemy's positions. The Colonel himself will govern the advance of the 1st Battalion of the 51st Regiment.

We will be masters of the heights of La Chapelle St. Aubin only after having taken the Sperlingslust Quarries (Carrieres Ouvertes) (see plan director), and reached the fringe of the wood 400 meters southeast of these quarries (Loermont Wood and La Cave Wood), thus obtaining a view across the plain.

The accompanying artillery and the light trench mortars will hold themselves in readiness with caissons and guns limbered, at the point where the Sceaucourt-Dives road bisects our former second position east of Plessis Cachleux* (see Divisional Order No. 108, of June 6). The battalions concerned will see that these guns get under way in due time to support the attack. The 10th Grenadiers (on the immediate left of the 51st will capture Thiescourt with its forward battalion; its 2 other battalions will follow in close liaison, and will oblique in the direction of Loermont which they will capture from the west and southwest. The 10th Grenadiers will then advance in the direction of the Attiche Farm. The attack proper against this farm will be carried out by the division immediately to the left. The 10th Grenadiers, held up by the attack against Loermont and the engagement in the neighborhood of the Attiche farm, will be unable completely to cover the left flank of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st Inf. The 38th Regiment will follow in close touch with the 51st.

SECOND AND THIRD OBJECTIVES.

After having captured Chapelle St. Aubin, the second battalion of the 51st Infantry will push forward without halting, following the rolling barrage, and will cross the Ecouvillon Hill (2nd objective.)

The 3rd Battalion of the 51st Infantry will close in to within 500 meters of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st after reaching the woods. When the rear columns of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st will have reached the Ecouvillon Peninsula the forward company of the 3rd Battalion of the 51st will debouch into the plain between the Ecouvillon Peninsula and the sunken road Citadelle Orval Ravine. The task of the 3rd Battalion of the 51st will then be as follows: to cover the left flank of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st, as this flank will have been weakened by the advance of the 10th Grenadiers in the direction of the Attiche Farm.

Troops will advance in open order and make a considerable use of machine guns. These forces, which will advance from the line Ecouvillon Peninsula-Orval Ravine in an easterly and south-easterly direction, will also relieve the pressure against the 10th Grenadiers, while the latter regiment attacks the Attiche Farm. This task will be accomplished by one company and a few heavy machine guns at most. If special circumstances make it necessary, larger forces can be engaged. While the 10th Grenadiers advances towards the Attiche Farm the 2nd Battalion of the 51st, still following the rolling barrage, will cross the enemy's artillery post near the Cense Farm and proceed in the direction of Matz (3rd objective). In case a further advance is made great care should be taken to insure proper protection of the left flank.

The rolling barrage will cease approximately abreast of the Cense Farm Hill. From there to beyond the Matz, the attack will be supported by Divisional Artillery which will be pushed forward on the line Attiche Farm-Ecouvillon. When the 10th Grenadiers, continuing their advance towards the south, will have insured the protection of the left flank of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st, the elements detached from the 3rd Battalion of the 51st will rejoin their unit. After having reached the Matz, the 2nd Battalion of 51st will use sufficient forces to capture the passages south of the creek and the southern outskirts of Melicocq.

EVENTUAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ATTACK:

The Caumont Hill, the Gancion Hill (which will be taken from the northwest) and finally Compiègne, which will be outflanked from the west by the 51st Regiment, operating east of the 10th Grenadiers.

- 0 -

II

NOTES ON THE GERMAN ATTACK BETWEEN MONTDIDIER AND NOYON,
WHICH BEGAN JUNE 9, 1918.

These notes were made about noon June 11.


There have been sixteen German Divisions engaged, 9 of which were fresh ones put in for the attack. Except for the two sector divisions on the extreme right and left of the zone of attack, sector divisions did not take part in the attack. The main part of the attack was delivered by the nine divisions, which leapfrogged through the

divisions in line. The two divisions on each flank did not push the attack vigorously, but simply went forward slightly, in order to conform to the push in the center. It is believed that three of the divisions engaged, to wit: the 19th, the 4th Guard and the Chasseur Division, are habitually used side by side, constituting an attack group. These three divisions were used side by side in the same manner in the attack on Villers Bretonneux in April. The artillery preparation began at 12.30 A.M. on the morning of the 9th and extended to a considerable distance in rear. Harassing and interdiction fire was carried on as far back as Compiègne. High explosive and non-persistent gas shells were employed. The only Yperite which was used on the front of attack was in the vicinity of Domfront.

The infantry attack seemed to start on the left and extend to the right as far as the Oise. There was no infantry action east of the Oise. About 9.30 A.M. the enemy pushed his artillery forward, particularly, near Assainvillers Rollot. The attack was made by infiltration and outflanking, very few direct frontal attacks being made at any point. Some tanks were used on both sides and some flammenwerfers by the Boche.

The interrogation of a German prisoner from one of the regiments on the right of the attack shows that, at the end of the first day, the strength of the battalions of his regiment was reduced to about a company each.

Position alert
Art. & T.M.'s.



DIAGRAMATIC SKETCH
To accompany Field Order for Attack
51 R (German Inf.).

Morning of June 9, 1918.

Scale - 1:80000

T.D.G-2 1st Div.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 13, 1918.

G-2.

No. 47 DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
 ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy machine gun at point 3404 fired on our raiding party last night as it was returning. This is evidently the machine gun which has been sweeping the ravine south of the Bois de Fontaine and point 2292.

II. ARTILLERY.

There was a decrease in the enemy's artillery fire both yesterday and today. From 2h to 2h55, this morning the enemy bombarded our front and support line trenches from the north of Cantigny to the southern extremity of the sector fairly heavily. Fire for adjustment on Grivesnes, Bois de Coullemelle, Belle Assise, Esclainvillers, and cross road 2685 southeast of Tartigny. Interdiction fire along the following roads: Route Nationale No. 30, Coullemelle-Le Plessier, Coullemelle-Villers Tournelle, Rocquencourt-Villers Tournelle. About 2000 shells in all were reported.

III. WORKS.

An abandoned enemy post was discovered by one of our patrols at point 1628. 15 men were seen entering and leaving a dugout on the northern side of the road at 5917.

An officer's patrol in front of Grivesnes last night reports a large enemy working party, estimated at 250, in the region of point 14⁶506. They were working on trenches and also parties of 2 men each were seen carrying what appeared to be short heavy timbers, about 4 feet in length. The working party was silhouetted by a fire in Malpart.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was poor all day.

Two men seen entering Bois de Lalval at point 2332. 4 men walked from 1631 to 1632. 11 men with full packs passed from the enemy's front lines, opposite the cemetery of St. Aignan, to Bois de Lalval at 20 h.

Less than normal circulation in the rear zone. Only 18 wagons, 1 lorry, and 1 ambulance observed all day.

V. AIRCRAFT.

a. Balloons: Three enemy balloons observed in ascension early this morning.

b. Airplanes: 20 enemy planes flew over our lines during the day hours, observing or photographing. During the night numerous bombing planes were overhead from 23h40 to 1h. Bombs were dropped in the vicinity of Mesnil, Serevillers, Tartigny, and Coullemelle.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

From 2 to 4 hours an unusual number of rockets and flares of all kinds observed in rear of the enemy's lines: 3 star, 6 star, green star, red flares, and caterpillar rockets were reported.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 47,
June 13, 1918.

I.

1. Intelligence Service is again reminded that our duty is not alone to ascertain information about the enemy, but also, as far as possible, to prevent the enemy from ascertaining information about us. Acts of thoughtlessness constantly occur and give information to the enemy. Intelligence officers must take advantage of every opportunity to instruct and correct such deficiencies as come to their knowledge.

2. For example, it is a very simple matter for the enemy to locate, with fair accuracy, our wireless sending stations. Yesterday a wireless (T.S.F.) operator sent out a message in clear, stating "from the Commanding Officer--- Infantry, at -----." This message was without doubt picked up by the enemy and constituted, not alone an identification, but also located approximately the Regimental P.C. for the enemy's benefit. It is possible that the enemy may think this a ruse, but he is much more apt to guess at the truth.

II.

1. There is no case on record in the whole war of a German airplane flying with the allied markings. This fact is due, of course, not to any Boche prejudice against sailing under false colors, but the thing simply does not pay. It is more dangerous to fly with the enemy's colors than with one's own. In every case where airplanes with allied markings have been reported firing on their own lines, it has turned out to be an allied aviator, who had thought himself inside the Boche lines. Such mistakes are bound to occur from time to time. They are regrettable; but before condemning aviation, remember the hundreds of cases where troops on the ground have fired on their own airplanes.

III.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information, No. 54, May 24, 1918.

INDICATIONS OF RAIDS AND RELIEFS.

(From the Experience of a French Division.)

RAIDS

The Germans try to take prisoners by sending out at night large patrols of from 20 to 50 men, which form ambushes. When this method does not succeed, as is usually the case, they resort to a raid with artillery support. Their recent practice has been to open suddenly and without warning a very violent bombardment, usually at nightfall or dawn, although when there is a moon it may come at any hour of the night. A strong and thick box barrage is put down on a part of the line. Meanwhile the storming troops, who have slipped up close to our wire, work into our lines in several columns. Rapidity of execution is characteristic. They try to penetrate to a considerable distance so as to take our sentries from the rear.

Although there is nothing certain in the indications, the following points should be carefully considered, as they have often been noted immediately preceding a raid:-

1. Unostentatious registering by the enemy's batteries on our batteries and defensive organization, on our wire, on breaches in our wire. Fire on other points at the same time to divert attention from his real objective.

2. Registering by trench mortars.
3. The infantry airplane flies over the point of attack, usually rather low.
4. Small patrols are also noticed, reconnoitering the wire, not only to see if it is destroyed, but also to make sure of their itinerary. It is occasionally possible to pick up some of these patrols.
5. When the raid is very important, the usual indications of a serious attack are also present, namely fire with gas shells and high explosive on the sensitive points in the sector.
6. Artillery fire of neutralization on our barrage batteries, especially if gas shells are used.
7. Registering on the supporting points.
8. Any fire of destruction by artillery or trench mortars, or fire with larger caliber than usual.
9. Fire on rear organizations. The more serious the effort, the greater the amount of fire on sensitive points in rear.
10. Continued fire on breaches in the wire.
11. Gas bombardment on any reserve positions or the bottoms of ravines.
12. Balloons in observation, especially if the general visibility is not good enough to warrant the ascension. They are usually up the day before the raid.
13. Artillery fire against observation posts or command posts.
14. Shiny points in the wire, either the German wire or our own which are freshly cut ends indicating recent cutting of breaches.
15. Any abnormal movement in the German lines.

RELIEFS.

In the case of a relief, the indications are usually given by a change in the habits of occupation or regime of fire of the enemy.

1. In some divisions smoking is permitted well forward, in others it is not; some divisions allow fires where others prohibit them. The appearance or absence of smoke thus becomes an indication of relief.
2. Night firing is common in some organizations and unusual in others.
3. Some organizations do much more indirect fire with machine guns than others.
4. Some organizations use the rifle more than others.
5. The reconnaissances by officers of the organization taking over are sometimes noticed. They usually attract attention by the fact that they walk around in an unusual manner and in very small groups.
6. Activity of wireless ground telegraphy, telephone, or visual signals is always suspicious.
7. Increased circulation on communications in rear.
8. Noticeable decrease in artillery activity, due to batteries being relieved.
9. Considerably increased amount of registering for several days; firing practically everywhere in the sector, ordinarily with time shell. (New batteries registering on all objectives).

G-2
No. 48

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 14, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 13, 12h. to June 14, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

One of our patrols (1 officer and 12 men) encountered an enemy ambush patrol of about 40 men in the vicinity of point 1550. Our patrol attempted to fight its way back, and the officer and six men succeeded, (5 of the latter being wounded). Six of our men are missing.

Enemy machine guns have been reported in the beet pile at 2027 and at point 265335. These two machine guns have been firing frequently on our front lines in this region.

II ARTILLERY.

There was an increase in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday, especially in the zones of Esclainvillers and Coullemelle, about 3000 shells in all. Heavy fire on the region of Grivesnes from 14 to 4 h. with 88, 105, 150, a few 210s on the Parc to the N.E. Cantigny and the front lines to the north of this village were shelled rather heavily with shells of large caliber during the afternoon. Fire by guns of 150 mm caliber on Grivesnes, cemetery of Cantigny, Belle Assize* Farm, Villers Tournelle, Coullemelle, and Broys. Fire for adjustment by high bursts on Esclainvillers.

III WORKS.

No enemy working parties seen yesterday.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day.

At 18h10 one wagon and 5 men seen in Mesnil St. Georges. An artillery Observation Post/ reports having seen 31 wagons, 7 motors, and 7 ambulances moving back and forth between Courtemanche and Montdidier during the afternoon. The wagons are reported as having made several trips and are therefore probably counted more than once in this report. About 30 men engaged in loading carts near point 2436 at 7h30.

Greater than normal circulation was observed in the rear zone yesterday, especially along the Guerbigny-Montdidier Route where between 12 and 21 hours 45 wagons, 200 men, 6 lorries, and three motorcars passed point 7502 going to Montdidier.- 70 men passed from Monchel to Faverolles between 16 and 18 h. 60 men from point 8505 to Montdidier during the same time. The increase in circulation herewith noted is to some extent due to better visibility.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Eight enemy balloons were in ascension yesterday afternoon and one early this morning. During the night balloon light observed west of Montdidier.

Airplanes: 15 enemy planes passed over our sector photographing and observing during the period covered by this report. No bombing was reported either yesterday or to-day.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle. There is nothing to report.

Our artillery fired on and destroyed several wagons on the Warsy Montdidier Road yesterday afternoon. At 22h45 an enemy ammunition dump exploded in the direction of Forestel Farm. A fire, followed by a series of large explosions, occurred in Montdidier at 3h.

- 2 -

The enemy is using a large number of 1 and 2 star red rockets, 1 star green rockets, and 6 star white rockets. One of our O.P.s intercepted a cipher message from an enemy blinker station.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Infantry quiet. Artillery, increase over yesterday, Aviation normal.

*Correct spelling BELLE ASSISE.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 48,
June 14, 1918.


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NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - No. 13
By British General Staff, June 4, 1918.

(Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 73,
June 12, 1918)

GERMAN TACTICS IN THE ATTACK.

1. The method of concentration of the attacking troops and their movement to the position of assembly in the recent operations on the Western Front were very similar to those employed by the Germans in the attack on Riga in September, 1917. Several of the attacking and second line divisions were brought forward by night marches and by easy stages. In certain cases these marches were so regulated as to bring the divisions into their assembly positions at the end of their last march. This method of attacking after long marches was a feature of the training and manoeuvres carried out by the German divisions in the back areas during the early part of this year. In some cases, the starting point of the attacking divisions was at a considerable distance behind the enemy's line. Prisoners who have been captured from divisions which adopted this practice state that their losses during the advance were comparatively light.
2. The enemy has employed two or three methods for the deployment of his assaulting troops. There is evidence to show that in some cases an assault division was brought up through a division already in the line. The 3d Naval Division, for instance



is stated to have marched through another division to attack Contalmaison, and in the attack north of the Scarpe on March 28 the three attacking divisions passed through the regiments of the two divisions which were holding the line. As a general rule, however, the enemy appears to have distributed his divisions in depth in groups of two or three, and the assaulting division attacked with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in reserve. Thus, the German IXth Corps (St/ Quentin Group) for the attack on March 21 was organized with three divisions in the front line and three divisions in reserve. The Corps frontage was about three miles, so that each division attacked on a frontage of about 1,760 yards, with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in divisional reserve. The heads of the central reserve division were ordered to arrive at positions about 4,500 yards behind the German front line at the moment of the assault. The leading regiments of the assaulting division had two battalions in front and one battalion in reserve. The leading battalions had two companies in front and two in close support.

3. The general dispositions adopted by a company in the attack are shown in the diagram above. This diagram is based upon a prisoner's statement, and shows the formation adopted during training. It is probably typical of the formation generally employed by a company in the attack, but the strength of the various waves naturally depends upon the fighting strength of the company. It will be seen that a fourth platoon is temporarily formed, consisting of runners, signallers and carriers. The task of this platoon, in addition to maintaining communication, is to supply the forward infantry with ammunition and engineer material.

4. The special assault detachments which form the first wave of an attack advance in extended order, but there is no definite formation adopted by the succeeding waves of the leading battalions.

It is probable that the usual method of advance is in line of groups in file until the battalions reach our trenches, when the men deploy into line. The reasons for this kind of formation are obvious. Casualties from artillery and machine gun fire are reduced to a minimum and the strength of the attack is liable to be underrated. The reserves follow the assaulting battalions in artillery formation, taking advantage of every form of natural cover.

5. The enemy's maxim that the light machine gun is not an auxillary weapon, but just as much the chief weapon of the infantry as the rifle, has been acted upon throughout the recent offensive. Light machine guns have always been well forward with the assaulting troops. On one portion of the front it was noticed that the system adopted was for one big man to carry the gun until the attacking troops came within our rifle fire. The No. 1 then took the gun from the carrier and crept forward as far as possible before opening a machine gun barrage, under the protection of which the infantry attacked.

6. The enemy's light trench mortars have usually followed close behind the assaulting infantry. They have been used to support the attack if it appears to have been definitely checked and to reinforce machine guns in the defense of captured localities against our counter-attacks.

7. In some cases, as in the attack carried out by the enemy on April 24 between the Somme and Hangard, attacks have been delivered by mixed groups of infantry and artillery, a minimum of one field gun battery accompanying an infantry regiment. Although this form of attack may not have been universally adopted by the enemy, it has been employed on all known occasions by various divisions during the recent operations on the Somme and Lys battle fronts. It should be noted that the constitution of mixed groups was laid down by the Germans for the engagement of intervening divisions during the fighting in Flanders in 1917.

8. In the majority of cases, the objectives of the attack appear to have been unlimited and the orders to the troops have been to push on until an organized resistance was encountered. In this connection, it is of interest to note that many of the prisoners who have been captured have been in possession of maps, complete in every detail, of the country into which they might penetrate.

9. In the development of his offensive operations the enemy has aimed at establishing continuous action. He has, therefore, allowed his unit commanders of all grades the fullest initiative, and has endeavored immediately to exploit any success which he obtains. His tactical methods during the recent fighting constitute a complete return to the principles laid down in the training regulations of German infantry before the war.

APPENDIX II.

Colonel Friederichs, formerly commanding the 271st Reserve Regiment, has now been superceded by a major whose name is not known. It is rumored that the reason for this change in command may be found in the reverses suffered by the 271st during the operation against Cantigny.

APPENDIX III.

Extract from Army Bulletin of June 13.
PROBABLE ENEMY ATTACKS.

The British Army on our left has informed us that prisoners have spoken of a coming attack on Amiens. Besides this, prisoners on our front who seem to be well informed, have already stated on several occasions that the attacks on the Aisne and on Noyon will be followed by an offensive on the British front. Moreover it is to be noted that the Group of Armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria still has a considerable number of fresh divisions (2 only were engaged on the Aisne and 3 between Montdidier and Noyon). Finally the enemy seems to have about finished organizing his front (new railroads, stations, and numerous munition depots); he has also a powerful artillery, which fires little.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
June 14, 1918.

The following changes in and additions to Memorandum
No. 32, this Section, are effective this date:

Changes: Broyes, heretofore FORT WORTH, to be BROWNSVILLE.
Esclainvillers to be YVONNE
Esclainvillers, P.C. west of, ... ODETTE

Additions: Breteuil MENOU
10th Army Corps RENNES
1st Division FUNSTON
60th Division PRINCESSE

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
June 15, 1918.

G-2 DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
No. 49 From June 14, 12h. to June 15, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Usual bursts of machine gun fire on our front lines during the night especially from emplacements at 2027 and 26533.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery fire showed a considerable increase yesterday. Bombardments of our front lines were reported in the regions of: the Cantigny-St Aignan Road, cemetery of Cantigny, ravine N.E. of Villers Tournelle, west of the Bois Allonge, Bois St. Eloi. These bombardments were repeated in exactly the same places this morning. They were very severe both times and were carried out with 77s, 105s and 150s. The bombardment of the front lines in the vicinity of the Bois Allonge lasted for over an hour, this morning, and ceased only after we had commenced counter battery fire. At some times the intensity of the fire was as high as 10 to 15 shells per minute. One barrage was placed in our wire in front of our front line trenches in the zone of Coullemelle, yesterday afternoon for five minutes. Bombardments of the Parc of Grivesnes and Coullemelle with 210s during the afternoon. Fire for adjustment on Bois de Coullemelle, west of Grivesnes, Esclainvillers and the Boyau Lewis. At least 4500 shells fell on our sector yesterday.

III. WORKS.

The enemy has erected three strands of wire in front of the Trench Bulgare and this trench is reported as being occupied. At 19h35 five men were seen crawling into a machine gun emplacement at point 2734.

Work on the roads is being done at 6333. 5 men unloaded a wagon in the vicinity of point 7109. 17 horsemen were exercising at 6840. The enemy has frequently been observed harvesting the crops in the rear areas.

IV. CIRCULATION

Visibility was good all day.

5 enemy and 2 wagons were seen this morning at point 3436. 5 men from St. Aignan to the Bois de Lalval at 7h05.

The circulation in the rear zone was somewhat greater than normal, 300 men were seen on the Montdidier-Fignieres road between 16-20 hrs. at point 6118; and 125 men on the Etelfay-Montdidier road during the same period. From 10 to 11 hrs. this morning one of our observation posts reports having seen a large cloud of dust, indicative of heavy traffic, on the Roye-Montdidier road, near Montdidier. This report was confirmed by a balloon, which also reported the same occurrence on the Montdidier-Couchy les Ports* road.

V. AIRCRAFT

Balloons: Three enemy balloons were in ascension yesterday afternoon and 2 this morning.

Only 9 enemy planes over our lines, 6 of whom were flying very high, during the period covered by this report.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A train of 11 4-horse caissons on the Guerbigny-Montdidier road at point 9914 was completely dispersed by our artillery fire, at 18h45. At 2h05 an explosion was noted in the direction of Forestel Farm. An explosion occurred in Montdidier at 3h15. During the period in which our artillery fired gas on the enemy's lines the enemy sent up a large number of green flares. A red blinker station in operation near Malpart last night. 4 balloon lights observed during the night.

VII: GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Increase in artillery activity. Infantry and aviation quiet.

NOTE: Intelligence and Scout Officers will take great care to report all ranging shots fired by the enemy and likewise all shots which have for a purpose the destruction of our wire. The importance of this can not be too greatly impressed on all ranks.

* Correct Spelling - CONCHY-les-POTS -

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 49, June 15, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 74, June 13, 1918.

-O-

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - No. 15.

By British General Staff June, 6, 1918.

Issued Down to Divisions (for distribution down to Battalions)

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE BRITISH FRONT OF THE AISNE ON MAY 27.

1. - INDICATIONS OF THE ATTACK.

The enemy was very successful in concealing his preparations for the attack. Hostile artillery was exceptionally quiet during the fortnight preceding the attack, and there was an almost entire absence of gas shelling. There was little aerial registration and very little aerial and wireless activity of any kind; airplane photographs, the latest of which were taken on May 23, disclosed few new ammunition dumps and no new gun positions.

In this connection, however, it must be remembered that the whole front was covered with old gun positions and that about three weeks previous to the attack some of these were reoccupied by the enemy. Except for the re-occupation of these positions, there were no indications of the attack until May 24 and 25, when abnormal lorry and train movement was noticed in the back areas behind the enemy's lines. In the late afternoon of May 26, whole battalions were seen on the march in the forward areas. The enemy made no attempt to conceal the movements of these troops and did not reply when they were shelled.

2. - HOSTILE ARTILLERY PREPARATION.

During the night of May 26-27, as it was evident that the enemy intended to attack, harassing fire was carried out by the heavy and field artillery on the enemy's roads and approaches. The tracks, however, were numerous and the country very open, so that it is unlikely that the enemy experienced much interference in his approach. There was no artillery retaliation, and the enemy's bombardment opened with a crash at 1 a.m. on May 27 without any previous preparation. The bombardment is described as the heaviest there has been during the recent offensive. Our front line system of trenches was bombarded mainly, if not entirely, by trench mortars. Instantaneous fuzes were used and the wire, which is described as particularly strong, was destroyed. The shelling of our batteries was very accurate. The bombarded zone included practically the whole of our battery positions. Gas was not used in the front system, but was freely employed for counter-battery work and in every suitable locality in rear. The gas employed was chiefly, if not solely, "blue cross". Its effects were felt as far back as the Valley of the Vesle.

3. - THE ATTACK.

The infantry attack is believed to have begun at about 4.30 a.m. It was preceded by a very heavy barrage, extending to a depth of about 400 yards, which appears not to have been a regular creeping barrage, but to have been moved from zone to zone at some distance in front of the assaulting troops. The enemy throughout the fighting adopted his usual tactics of working round flanks. On the British front, at any rate, the enemy appears to have made little use of tanks. It is reported that a few tanks worked along the valley of the Miette and thence up to La-Ville-au-Bois, but their co-operation was no real factor in the success of the attack in this sector. From the beginning of the battle the enemy had a great superiority in the air, and he was exceedingly quick in getting forward his balloons. A balloon was working from Juvincourt before 11 a.m. Another feature of the advance was the rapidity with which the enemy succeeded in bringing up his light trench mortars. They were drawn by horses and got into action more quickly, and were of greater use, than the field artillery which also accompanied the infantry in the advance.

4. - LESSONS.

There was nothing new in the enemy's tactics, but the success which he again obtained emphasizes more strongly than ever the following points:-

(a) The outpost system must be lightly held. It is useless to expose to the preliminary bombardment a single man more than is absolutely necessary.

(b) It is none the less essential to organize some form of forward or outpost system, otherwise the enemy will simply destroy the main defensive battle line by his preliminary bombardment, and will then overwhelm such elements as remain by the strength of his infantry attack.

(c) Reserves should not be sent up piecemeal as reinforcements to the troops holding the line, but must be used as distinct units with definite tasks.

(d) It is essential that a mobile reserve of guns should be retained.

(e) Little registration was reported during the period immediately preceding the attack. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that registration can always be done unobtrusively when the light is unfavorable for ground or aerial observation, or when the wind makes sound ranging difficult. There is also a general tendency not to report a few apparently aimless rounds which do not cause any inconvenience. The importance of reporting all shelling, especially on quiet days, cannot, therefore, be too much emphasized.

APPENDIX II.

It is to be noted that the Boche, in his observation line (petites postes) makes it a point to change the position of his combat groups from time to time. Rarely does an automatic rifle, for example, fire from the same shell hole, or same part of the trench for any great length of time. Moreover, in parts of his line, his observation groups have orders to retire at once, when the slightest suspicious sound occurs. This makes it more difficult to get out a prisoner by patrols, or by raids which do not go deep.

Recently where the Boche successfully raided us, it was found that the automatic rifle post had remained in exactly the same place for a considerable length of time. It had undoubtedly been located, and with considerable accuracy, by the Boche. It is believed it would make it much more difficult for him, if the location of posts were changed as often as other considerations permit.

APPENDIX III.

The British Army on our left states that prisoners have declared that many divisions in the sector of the II^d German Army are going to be relieved about the 15th by attack divisions. (The II Army extends from Albert to 10 kilometers south of Moreuil). The number of munition depots has increased in the region of Rosieres.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 16, 1918.

G-2
No. 50

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 15, 12h to June 16, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

One of our patrols which visited an enemy outpost at 1529 last night did not see or hear anything of the enemy.

Intermittent bursts of machine gun fire during the night.

II. ARTILLERY.

Fire for adjustment, followed by slight concentrations on Le Plessier, Coullemelle, Bois Villers, Broys, Belle Assise, Rocquencourt, during the period covered by this report. 25 210s were fired at the Grivesnes-Sep-toutre Road yesterday afternoon. The greater part of the enemy's fire was directed at our front and support lines in the center of the sector. Total number of shells falling was about 3600.

III WORKS

The enemy is digging a new trench north from point 1346. An enemy observation post has been located at 268356.

Soldiers were seen working in the fields near Faverolles yesterday afternoon.

New camouflage has appeared near Forestel Farm at 6212. A large object has been covered with a tarpaulin at 6388. There is a tent fly at 6589.

IV. CIRCULATION

The visibility was good all day.

At 19h50 3 men were seen walking along the western edge of the Bois Vicomte. 2 men seen in the wood near La Folie Farm during the afternoon.

At 11h40 large clouds of dust were seen on the Guerbigny-Montdidier and the Montdidier-Etelfay Road, indicating heavy traffic. At 17h27 1 motor train entered Lignieres from Etelfay. The Balloon reports a considerable movement of automobiles between Dancourt, Lancourt* and Roye yesterday afternoon. Normal circulation along the other routes in the rear zone.

V. AIRCRAFT.

a. Balloons. An enemy balloon was observed on the ground near Faverolles at point Q195 after it had descended.

12 different enemy balloons were reported in ascension by 3 different observation posts, yesterday.

The total number of ascents made is 18. During the night nine separate balloon lights observed.

b. Airplanes. The enemy's planes showed an increase in activity yesterday and to-day.; 40 separate planes having been reported. Of these, 35 were fired on by our A. A. guns. An enemy plane dropped 9 small bombs near Esclainvillers last night. Bombs were also dropped near the Chateau at Villers Tournelle, at point 9303, and on a working party at 9808.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Enemy machine guns at 2027 and 6535 have been silenced. Fire was observed in the direction of Fontaine sous Montdidier during the night.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry and Artillery quiet. Aviation active.

Appendix to Daily Intelligence Summary, No. 50,
June 16, 1918.

METHODS OF SURMOUNTING THE MACHINE GUN ZONE.

Translation of a German Document: To Accompany Notes on Recent Fighting No. 14, G.H.Q., A.E.F., Summary of Information No. 74.

XIII Corps Hq.
Ia No. 576 op.
Not to be taken into the
front line.

Corps Headquarters,
April 17, 1918.

Recent fighting has shown that special consideration and preparation is essential in order to overcome hostile machine guns. For further offensive operations, all troops (commanders as well as men) must possess a thorough knowledge of the methods of engaging machine gun nests and must be provided with the necessary means to meet all possible emergencies.

A uniform method of engaging machine gun nests does not exist. A successful issue must be sought by the cooperation of all arms and means of warfare, and by an intelligent use of ground.

1. The enemy's means of defense opposite this front consist of a deep, defensive zone, provided with a large number of machine gun nests. The machine guns afford one another mutual flanking support. Heavy machine guns are situated farther in rear and are supported by light machine guns. Alternate positions are employed. According to prisoners' statements, an extensive use is made of indirect fire in order to conceal the machine gun positions.

2. Our preparatory bombardment for the attack must be so arranged that it is suited to this scheme of defense.

The artillery and trench mortars, which will be specially concentrated at the points of penetration, must open an intense fire with H.E. shells upon a zone extending from the enemy's foremost outpost line to a depth of about 300 yards, while, at the same time, the zone situated at about 660 to 1,100 yards in rear of the line (according to the wind) will be bombarded with Blue Cross Gas Shell. The wave of H.E. and gas shell will then move slowly forward in front of the infantry.

Located and suspected machine guns will be engaged with aimed fire. In addition, every endeavor must be made to discover as many hostile machine gun nests as possible before the day of attack, by means of a continuous reconnaissance by ground and air observation and by patrols, and, by a careful study also of the country in rear, to determine the points where machine guns would probably be encountered in the event of a further advance.

The object is to annihilate as many machine gun nests as possible prior to the assault by means of this preparatory bombardment.

3. The neutralization of the majority of hostile machine guns will have to be carried out after the commencement of the assault, Infantry and artillery must be prepared for such tasks from the outset.

4. The means by which this can be carried out are:-

(a) Single light field howitzers in action in or immediately in rear of the assault trenches; at least one per battalion.

It is preferable to allot sections or single guns to battalions, rather than to employ the battery as a whole under the command of the infantry regimental commander.

(b) Batteries accompanying the infantry (as far as possible only the field gun, 96).

Direct laying is the best method of fire for the guns under (a) and (b), being quicker and surer. It is desirable to take up positions on crests and to shoot at close ranges. The section commander should observe and fire as much as possible himself. Fire control requires specially careful consideration and preparation. The infantry commander selects the targets. The single light field howitzers and the sections of artillery accompanying the infantry must maintain constant communication with the foremost infantry line (observer) and with the infantry commander (battalion) to which they are attached. This communication must be short and must be insured by various means (word of mouth, telephone, runner, mounted orderly), in order to prevent its failing.

(c) Light and medium trench mortars.— They will be employed in the first instance in the positions allotted to them for the preparatory bombardment, and they will be allotted, for the advance, to the battalions which are to deliver the main blow.

As regards their communications, the same principles apply as for the artillery (see (a) and (b)). Experience has shown that the light and medium trench mortars have often been unable to keep pace with the infantry. Thorough preparations must therefore be made to enable these weapons to push rapidly forward close behind the infantry.

(d) Light and heavy machine guns.— The emplacements of the heavy machine gun must be so sited that the guns can, in the first place, support the assaulting infantry by means of overhead fire, which should, as far as possible, be flanking fire. It is recommended that these guns be sited in groups, forming batteries. If the nature of the ground prevents the strike of the bullets being located, effective use can be made of tracer ammunition (the available supply is limited).

5. The penetration of the machine gun zone may develop roughly as follows:—

(a) The infantry, which is held up by a machine gun nest, lies down and engages the enemy with heavy fire from machine guns and rifles. If the hostile machine gun has not been accurately located, patrols must work forward and reconnoiter the position. A commander should not shrink from this loss of time; it will always pay. While the enemy's fire is kept down by a large number of heavy machine guns, assault detachments of formations in rear or of neighboring troops, making skilful use of the ground, work their way up to the nest approaching it from the flanks and, if possible, from the rear. Light machine guns, advancing in echelon, will also accompany and support this movement. The main point is to prevent the enemy, by means of frontal and flank fire with a considerable expenditure of ammunition, from developing his fighting powers to the fullest extent. The moral effect of uninterrupted fire is of great importance.

Meanwhile, the battalion commander provides for artillery and trench mortar support. Furthermore, he must be able to view the fighting of his battalion and to maintain complete command. Concentrated fire, directed against the "nest" which is to be attacked, is the quickest means of gaining the desired result. Flanking machine guns, which cannot be attacked simultaneously, will be neutralized by artillery (smoke shell), trench mortars or machine guns. The assault detachments can protect themselves from flanking machine guns by means of smoke (smoke bombs, smoke grenades).

As soon as the assault detachments are ready to assault, they will cause the fire which endangers their further advance to cease, by a signal which has been definitely agreed upon beforehand.

The assault will be carried out with hand grenades, fixed bayonets and cheering.

(b) Troops will gradually force their way through the network of machine guns by making use of every local success. The attack must proceed uninterruptedly. The Battalion commander must arrange for the artillery batteries accompanying the infantry, the trench mortars and the heavy machine guns to follow up in good time. In doing so, he must insist very strictly on the fact that the transmission of information is not interrupted. The artillery observer must always be in the infantry front line, and there should be an additional representative of the battery with the battalion commander. They must both maintain communication with the officer controlling the fire. Individuals who have themselves located hostile machine guns will be sent back to notify the accompanying artillery or trench mortars direct.

Sufficient ammunition of the right kind-for artillery, the 1915 pattern H.E. shell with delay action fuze and shell with armor piercing head for use against tanks-must be sent forward.

(c) When a number of field artillery and heavy batteries have been brought up by the orders of the division, additional artillery will become available for the engagement of (machine gun) battery nests. It is recommended that these batteries should be allotted to (infantry) regimental commanders for employment at points where the attack is checked.

(d) Machine gun nests which are exceptionally difficult to destroy will be engaged with tanks.

6. Divisions must train their troops in the engagement of machine gun nests. Resting troops will carry out extensive training in this respect. The training will be carried out from the beginning with the various arms co-operating and against a skeleton enemy. The destruction of several nests, situated one behind the other, will always be practised.


The place and time of all such training will be telephoned at 8 p.m. to Corps Headquarters.

signed, von Staabs,

General der Infanterie.

* Correct Spelling - "LAUCOURT" -

Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.



RECTIFICATIF to Presumed
Order of Battle of June 8th 1918.
According to Prisoners captured
June 11/12th 1918.

T.D.G.2.

Scale $\frac{1}{20,000}$.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 17, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From June 16, 12 h to June 17, 12 h.

G-2

No. 51

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

An enemy patrol of about 15 men endeavored to surround one of our patrols consisting of 1 officer and 5 men at point 1446. Our men escaped.

Short bursts of machine gun fire during the night.

II. ARTILLERY.

Coullemelle was bombarded heavily with Yperite this morning from 3h19 to 6h40, about 1200 shells in all. Occasional gas shells followed as late as 10h. The region of Rocquencourt received approximately 500 105s, 150s during the period covered by this report. Some incendiary shells were reported at 19h25. Heavy concentration fire for five minutes on our front lines east of Le Plessier at 19h55, and a concentration lasting for 17 minutes on the Cantigny front lines at 21h. Interdiction fire along the Rocquencourt-Villers Tournelle; Coullemelle-Villers Tournelle, and Rocquencourt-Mesnil St. Firmin Roads. Fire by a 150 long on Breteuil Embranchement from 1h to 5h. Some 210s fell on Rocquencourt and Serevillers. The Bois Avance was shelled intermittently all day with 77s and 105s. The following enemy batteries were reported in action yesterday: 6407, 6918, 6000, 4949, 2098, 6227, 8708, 7132, 5522, 6214. The total number of shells falling on the sector is estimated at 4000.

III. WORKS.

Our raiding party which visited the Bois Allonge last night reports wire at 2994. Graves or mounds were seen in the vicinity of the Bois Rectangulaire but absolutely no sign of any trenches. The raiding party entered at point 2994 and proceeded to point 3204 without encountering any resistance.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day.

At 20h50 2 men passed out of sight at point 2554.

Circulation was normal along all routes in the rear zone yesterday. At 11h40 4 companies of 150 each, followed by 5 wagons passed point 4594 going S.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: 19 enemy balloons were seen in ascension yesterday, and 34 different ascensions were made. Of the 19 balloons only 11 are properly in front of our sector. To-day 11 enemy balloons had been seen before 8h.

Airplanes: The enemy's planes showed a great increase in activity yesterday and to-day. At 21h10 an observation balloon to the north of our sector was brought down by an enemy plane. At 20h35 last night a patrol of 11 enemy planes was observed flying over our lines to the north of Cantigny. At 8h40 this morning an enemy plane near Ailly was brought down by French planes. One of our O.P.s reports a plane down in distress to the east of Cantigny at 6h45. Bombs were dropped yesterday on the Bois de Villers, in rear of Villers Tournelle and on points 1894 and 1581. A total of 30 enemy planes were seen, of whom at least 24 were fired on by our anti-aircraft guns.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A dense column of smoke observed in the enemy's lines east of Le Plessier at 15h15. A fire was seen to the south of the Bois Houssey at 16h15. Another explosion occurred in Montdidier last night.

Eleven balloon lights reported between Cantigny and Montdidier during the hours of darkness. Searchlights were active in the direction of Forestel Farm.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry quiet. Artillery increase in activity. Aviation very active.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 51, June 16, 1918. EXTRACT FROM G.H.Q. SUMMARY NO. 76.

I.

NOTES ON THE CONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF RECENT FIGHTING.

Translation of a German Document: From British Summary, June 12, 1918.

The following translation is that of a document, probably issued by the 13th Res. or 44th Res. Div., found on a prisoner captured on June 3, 1918:

1. Over-run the first hostile positions quickly. During the course of the attack, do not give the enemy any time to re-organize. Subordinate commanders to act quickly and forestall the enemy. The infantry to push boldly forward under cover of their own auxiliary weapons. Do not wait for orders.

2. The attack should be launched immediately on top of the preliminary bombardment, in order not to give the enemy time to get his machine guns into action. Keep close up to the barrage.

3. It must be taken into consideration that, even during the heaviest artillery preparation a few hostile machine gun nests will remain in action; these will have to be dealt with by the infantry, making use of the rifle, machine guns (light and heavy), light trench mortars and hand grenades. The accompanying artillery cannot be expected to follow up quickly in this crater area.

4. Concrete dugouts cannot be destroyed by the artillery; they will offer holding-on points for the enemy's machine guns. Keep the entrances under rifle and machine gun fire and attack them from the flanks. If several of these concrete dug-outs lie close together, attack them simultaneously. Do not crowd together when attacking these strong points. Captured concrete dug-outs to be marked by a small flag, or similar means. Do not pass by concrete dug-outs without clearing them out, unless they have been marked as captured.

5. Do not attack in dense formation. Numbers will not decide, but the use of the auxiliary weapons at the right moment. Put in reserves at the points where the enemy is giving way, not at the point where he is holding out. Break through and roll up from the flanks.

6. The following formations should be adopted:
Very thin first wave, to ascertain where the enemy is still holding out. Behind this, light machine gun groups, reinforced by rifle-men; these groups advance in rushes. Heavy machine guns and light trench mortars cover these rushes and follow on in longer rushes. Do not all rush at the same time; there must be mutual fire support. When the enemy has been located, smother him with rifle and machine gun fire, so that he cannot make deliberate use of his weapons.

7. Tanks are best attacked from the rear.

8. Low-flying airplanes to be driven off by machine-gun fire. Do not bunch together; reserves, especially, must avoid close formations and bunching together.

9. Positions should be taken up quickly on reaching the objective (organized in depth against counter-attacks).

10. The strictest discipline must be maintained. Pillaging must be prevented. Men who rob the dead are to be shot.

II.

STATEMENT OF A PRISONER CAPTURED BY THE DIVISION ON OUR RIGHT THE NIGHT OF THE 15-16 OF JUNE.

Prisoner states that on the 14th of June he heard officers of his battalion speak of a great attack on Amiens, which would be pushed forward without any halting. At the same time a diversion (Scheinangriff) would take place in the region of Montdidier. This will probably be similar to the diversion which was made on the Division on our right on the 9th of June, which was made by probably four companies of the 4th Grenadiers.

III.

EXTRACT FROM ARMY BULLETIN OF THE 16th OF JUNE.

A sketch, annexed to an Attack Order of the 33rd Division in the Sector of Cerny for the 27th of May, shows the following about the accompanying artillery fire:

1. Duration of the preparation: 2 hours 40 minutes.
Duration of the accompanying fire: 5 hours 30 minutes.
Total duration of the fire for the attack; 8 hours 10 minutes.

2. The barrage adapts itself to the terrain. It is not rectilinear and the speed of its advance is not strictly uniform. The average speed was about 35 kilometers a minute during the first six kilometers of advance, except for mounting the Chemin des Dames.

3. Each bound seemed to be made so as to take one objective and to approach within assault distance of the following objective. The depth of the bounds varied from 500 to 1200 meters. The periods of halting were short, varying in general from 15 to 30 minutes, the longest being just after the complete capture of the organization of the Chemin des Dames.

4. For the first two bounds (to a depth of 700 meters), up to the Chemin des Dames, a rolling barrage and a semi-fixed protective barrage were provided. After that the two barrages were combined. From leaving Vendresse (4500 meters from the jumping off trenches), the protective barrage no longer existed. It is probable that the batteries making this barrage were, at that point, at the limit of their range.

NOTES ON RECENT AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

The enemy is consolidating very rapidly his front line position to the northeast of the park of Grivesnes. A new trench is being dug from the haystack (1551) due south to point 1544, connecting the trenches already dug and forming a kind of bastion. As yet this new trench appears to be unoccupied. A combination fire and approach trench has been constructed between the Trench des Hongrois and the Trench des Bulgares. A strong point has been organized in the vicinity of point 1343. Many individual shelters can be seen near this point.

A company P.C. has been located at 1645 on the north side of the Boyau (confirmed by prisoners). Probable Machine gun emplacements at 14⁵44¹ and 20⁸39⁸. A shelter of some kind is being constructed on the MALPART-St. AIGNAN road at 2142⁵. An observation post is located north of LA FOLIE FARM at 2735. Tracks leading to dugout entrances in the buildings of La FOLIE FARM. Emplacements for trench mortars at point 21⁴45⁵.

Many new tracks around northwest corner of Bois LALVAL. A hitherto undiscovered quarry in the Bois de FRAMICOURT 19⁵19² appears to be occupied. Many fresh tracks in this neighborhood. The enemy is endeavoring to connect his trenches northeast of CANTIGNY. The ground is filled with organized shell holes. Dugouts are seen in the Bois LALVAL at 2829, and two emplacements for guns at 3129. Probable machine gun emplacements at 2428⁸, 26⁵26, 2923, 2719, 2919, 2712⁵, 3409⁵. An observatory and shelter at 2914⁵. In the region due east of CANTIGNY the enemy has dug few trenches. Organized shell holes are numerous and are being enlarged. The hedges along all the roads in this vicinity appear to be used as means of communication.

Very little change in the region of FONTAINE sur MONTDIDIER. The town itself is completely destroyed and appears unoccupied (confirmed by prisoner).

G 2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 17, 1918.

██████.

Additions to Memorandum No. 32, this Section,
effective this date, are as follows:

1st Army.	BANVILLE
9th Army Corps	BOLLE
3rd Division Infantry	GRENADIERE
152nd Division Infantry	JEAN BART
58th Division Infantry	MONTEBELLO

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 18, 1918.

G-2

No. 52

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 17, 12 h. to June 18, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Nothing to report.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery continued its activity of the last two days. Bombardment yesterday afternoon from 5h to 5h30 of Cantigny, and the front lines north and east of this village with shells of all calibers. Practically the same bombardment repeated this morning on our front lines in the region of the Bois Fontaine and the Bois Cantigny. A gas concentration was placed this morning from 1h10 to 3h45 on Le Plessier and the Bois Coullemelle, about 1000 Yperite shells in all. Interdiction fire on the Villers-Rocquencourt, and Rocquencourt-Coullemelle roads both yesterday and to-day. Harassing and destruction fire on Coullemelle, Esclainvillers, Rocquencourt, Broys and Villers Tournelle with 105s and 150s. Fire for destruction on Battery B of the 7th - 344 with 250s, 150s from 13h30 to 18h. The total number of shells falling on the sector was 5000, approximately.

III. WORKS.

For the last two nights the enemy has been working in the Munich trench at point 2521 and is also reported digging a trench from 2619⁵ to 2718. Working party was heard last night in the region of point 2221. Men seen carrying materiel in the neighborhood of La Folie Farm and in the vicinity of point 3643.

A group of men were loading hay on wagons yesterday afternoon at point 6647.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day.

Men observed at the following points during the period covered by this report: 1144⁵, 1536, west edge of Bois Vicomte*. A group of 7 men apparently reconnoitering, near point 7640.

Circulation along routes in the rear zone was less than normal, only 10 lorries and 22 wagons being reported during the period covered by this report.

V. AVIATION.

Our observation posts report having seen 19 enemy balloons in ascension this morning in the same places as yesterday. Of these 11 are in front of our sector.

Airplanes: Thirty-four enemy planes reported over our front lines yesterday afternoon in the region of Cantigny and Grivesnes, observing and reconnoitering. They were all fired on by anti-aircraft guns. At 6h45 5 enemy planes passed southeast over Mesnil St. Firmin. One of these was brought down by our anti-aircraft guns in the direction of La Folie Farm. Two enemy planes over Rocquencourt at 9h were fired on by anti-aircraft guns and attacked by a French plane without result.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 0h5 a large explosion in direction of Montdidier.

The usual searchlights and balloon lights along our front during the hours of darkness. At 1h10 numerous red rockets (1 star) in the direction of Grivesnes.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery and aviation active. Infantry quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 52. JUNE
18, 1918.

TRANSLATION OF A DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE XXVth RESERVE
GERMAN ARMY CORPS IN REFERENCE TO THE CAPTURE OF CANTIGNY
BY THE AMERICANS ON MAY 28th.

Note: The 82nd Res. Div., which held Cantigny before
the American attack, belonged to the 26th Res. Corps.

* * * * *

Reports rendered by Commanding Officers of Regiments and Battalions which took part in the fighting around Cantigny on May 28th show that the reverse suffered on that day can be ascribed in part to mistakes made by Commanding Officers and troops. Following are the most important points. I demand that these faults be remedied immediately, for the enemy might quite possibly launch another attack within a short time.

1. The fact that the enemy's attack took one of the first line battalions by surprise is explained by stating that the battalion had accomplished a relief during the night of the 27th to 28th and that there had consequently been an interruption in the observation of the enemy. Never should a relief jeopardize the defense of a sector. Relieved troops should leave only when the relieving troops have definitely established themselves and are ready for combat.

2. To be ready to go into action immediately it is, above all, necessary to secure continuous observation of the enemy. It should never be possible - even under the heaviest bombardment - to surprise a garrison while it is located in dugouts and cellars. And yet this seems to have occurred in Cantigny.

One man is placed in charge of each abri or cellar - assuming that it is absolutely necessary to use these cellars. He is responsible for the safety of all the occupants against every surprise. He depends upon continuous observation to ensure this safety.

3. One regiment explains the failure of the supporting company's counter-attack against the advancing enemy by the fact that the young company commanders had not appreciated the importance of the task of the battalion in support at the time of the enemy's penetration.

It is the duty of Commanding Officers of Regiments and Battalions to see that the Commanding Officers of all units liable to take part in counter-attacks be prepared by drills and especially by maneuvers on the terrain itself (on the position), to accomplish their task in such a fashion that the counter-attack is launched automatically and without delay as soon as the enemy penetrates our lines. ("Instructions", Part 8, page 42, paragraph 1).

4. The time set for the counter-attack of May 28 was at first 6 p.m. It was then retarded to 6:45. As a matter of fact the infantry was not yet ready to attack at 6:45. As a result:

a. There was lack of unity in the infantry attack, isolated battalions attacking at different hours.

b. There was a lack of coordination between the artillery preparation and the infantry attack. As a result the infantry was obliged to attack an opponent who was ready to give combat.

Precipitated counter-attacks will always result in failure.

5. It would appear that the destruction fire of the artillery against the enemy's organizations north and east of Cantigny, in preparation of the counter-attack of May 28, was badly regulated. Accuracy in the observation of artillery fire while preparing an attack forms the very basis of the efficiency which may be expected from this artillery.

6. According to the reports of the Commander of a battalion which went into action in this counter attack, there was no artillery liaison officer with the officer in command of the attack. Neither were there any artillery observers in the first lines of his sector.

The presence of an artillery liaison officer is indispensable in order to obtain complete coordination between infantry and artillery during a combat. The absence of such an officer is a very grave fault.

It is particularly necessary, during a combat which includes many fluctuations, to send artillery observers forward into the first line (with the necessary personnel and liaison materiel), because of the back and forward movement of our front lines and of the enemy's lines. These observers make it possible for artillery fire to adapt itself quickly to every change in the situation. Even when, because of the lack of liaison, these officers are not able to regulate artillery fire completely, their presence is of the highest importance, for it increases to a very large extent the confidence of the infantry in the artillery's cooperation.

7. A counter-attack will always cause the intermingling of units. The resulting problems should always be solved beforehand in the drills of battalions at rest. These difficulties should never cause a failure in the execution of an attack.

The Commanding General.

(Signed) Freiherr von Watter.

NOTE: In Appendix III to Daily Intelligence Summary No. 51 the third line of the 2nd paragraph reads "35 Kilometers a minute". It should have read "35 meters a minute". In line 1 of paragraph 4, it reads "to a depth of 700 meters". This should read "to a depth of 1700 meters".

* Correct Spelling; Bois du Vicomte.

S. G. W.

G-2
No.53.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 19, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 18, 12h to June 19, 12 h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

One of our patrols in the vicinity of point 1822 was fired on with machine guns, rifle grenades, and artillery. Some of the enemy's shells fell very near his front lines, whereupon the occupants immediately sent up red rockets.

Enemy machine guns were very active last night in the region of Cantigny, firing on our front lines and support position and on the Bois Fontaine*, the Bois Longue Haie*, and the valley between these two woods.

150 pineapple grenades are reported to have fallen on point 2517 between 23h and 6 h.

II ARTILLERY.

There was a decrease in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday. Bombardment of the following points with shells of large caliber: 1313, 1906, 2138, 2115. 15 210s on the NW edge of Coullemelle at 9h30 this morning. Harassing fire on the Serevillers-Rocquencourt Road. Total number of shells falling on the sector was about 2000.

III WORKS

Yesterday a man was seen cutting limbs from a tree to the south of the house at La Folie Farm. There is probably an observation post in this vicinity. Smoke observed coming from the woods at 2233. One of our patrols reports that the enemy wire in front of G-2 is very strong and consists of 2 rows of concertina wire, well staked. The wire itself is heavy and has long barbs. There is a second row of light smooth wire attached to the front row. A large enemy working party was heard by one of our patrols from 2815 to 2812, supposedly linking shell holes. Another working party was heard driving stakes and digging in the vicinity of point 2427.

IV CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day.

Men were seen at the following points: 2636, 2101, 2582, 2656, 2141 to La Folie Farm.

The circulation along the routes in the rear zone was greater than it has been for the last week. A total of 24 lorries, and 20 wagons was observed in front of our sector. 33 wagons observed from Warsy to Piennes via Montdidier. At 13h, June 19, smoke, evidently from a train, going North, on the Roye Chaulnes railroad, was observed by both Ohio and Folly. At 18h58 one company of infantry on the Becquigny-Lignieres road disappeared in the woods at point 3024. Two sections of infantry from Etelfay to Montdidier this morning. 60 men from Montdidier to Fignieres yesterday afternoon.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: No enemy balloons were observed in ascension this morning.

Airplanes: 21 enemy planes passed over our sector during the period covered by this report. 3 of these were reported as adjusting for the enemy's artillery. The remainder appear to have been either observation or photographic machines.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Men seen running out of the Bois Lalval*2 after our artillery had fired on this wood. At 22h30 an enemy ammunition dump burned in the direction of Montdidier, and another in the direction of Forestel Farm at 22h56.

A small fire in the northern end of Malpart from 20-24 hours.

Three 1-star green rockets from the enemy's lines in front of Cantigny were relayed back. Three 1-star orange rockets from in front of Malpart were relayed back by 1-star red rockets. Numerous red rockets from the enemy's lines in front of Cantigny from 21h10 to 1h30. At point 9208 south of Lignieres the enemy is operating a rocket signal post which works in conjunction with his artillery and seemingly regulates it. Rockets are noticed both during the day and the night, but only when artillery is firing.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet.

* Correct spelling: BOIS de FONTAINE.
*1 " " la LONGUE HAIE.
*2 " " BOIS de LALVAL.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 53, JUNE 19,
1918.

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Translation of a German Document Issued in the Beginning
of 1918 by the Chief of the General Staff, German G.H.Q.

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Memorandum for Commanding Officers of Brigades, Regiments and
Battalions of Infantry in connection with battles of rup-
ture.

I. PREPARATIONS.

1. As a general rule preparations in the position it-
self are made by the Division in sector (Stellungs division).
The purpose will remain secret. The executants should re-
ceive timely information as to the amount of work to be done
and as to the proper manner of doing it. If necessary, in
case the preparations have not sufficiently approached com-
pletion, the attacking troops will lend assistance.

2. It is of the utmost importance, for offensive
actions and mobile warfare, to give the attacking troops
thorough and complete training; cooperation between the
assaulting Infantry and the machine guns, trench-mortars, and
accompanying artillery. To follow closely behind the rol-
ling barrage or to rush positions immediately behind the
machine gun preparation are two principles which should be-
come second nature with the Infantry. Blank cartridges should
be used for training. The rolling barrage is not the main-
stay of the attack. It can not save the Infantry from hand-
to-hand combat. All it can do is to facilitate matters for
the Infantry when the latter comes to close quarters with the
enemy.

Advance of the Infantry on the Battle Field - in prin-
ciple protected by a screen of heavy machine-gun fire.
Fight as do the stossstrups, do not offer the enemy large
targets. Train subordinate commanders. Above all, insist
upon discipline and a firm bearing on the part of the officers.
A C.O. must be thoroughly acquainted with his subordinates
in order to use them to the best advantage. Good moral amongst
the rank and file produces dash and determination. Maneuvres
with packs. Verify the strength of the units (taking into
account the men who have been detached). For the attack,
frequently decrease the amount of luggage to be carried, as
speed is of great importance.

3. During manœuvres, test the various methods of liaison
rendering everyone familiar with them. Do not use too much
personnel for liaison.

4. Absolute Secrecy. Only at the very last moment
should the troops be told the time and place of the attack.
Notifying the troops of the time and place of the attack
should be practiced beforehand. Strict disciplinary measures
should be taken in case of indiscretions even against officers.
Men not absolutely trustworthy should be kept in rear and
watched without their knowing it. Teach troops constantly
to seek cover from ground and aerial observation.

5. Inspect men's equipment, horses' harnesses, wagons,
gas-protection service, protection materiel of every kind.

Avoid lugging useless paraphernalia and luggage.

Draw up a precise statement of the loads to be carried by wagons. Calculate the weight. Inspect the luggage of officers and sergeants. Reduce to a minimum the number of orders and papers to be carried. If necessary, the combat train and the rolling kitchens will be supplied with suitable horses drawn from the Regimental trains.

After thinking the matter over, decide what each man will carry during the assault. Do not make the packs too light. Excessive lightness does more harm than good.

6. Food Supply.

Make sure of the condition and quality of rations (iron rations). Each man should go into action well supplied with water and food. Condensed soup is useless.

It will be difficult to bring up water into the advanced battle area. Men should consequently carry two canteens. The combat train will carry casks of water. It must be expected that during the first few days it will be practically impossible to bring up food.

All food supplies captured from the enemy should be kept with great care and used to advantage. Smoked viands are particularly useful. On days when there is heavy fighting alcohol will be distributed.

7. Distribution of maps. Following should be distributed to include platoon commanders. Maps, airplane photographs, oblique photograph sketches of the zones of attack and of the enemy's artillery positions. The infantry, the artillery and the aerial forces should be supplied with identical maps, bearing the same conventional signs.

8. Reconnaissance of the sector of attack. It should be made by the Command in liaison with the divisions in sector. Avoid any movements of officers or staffs which might draw the enemy's attention. Locate on the terrain, in reference to landmarks, the sectors of attack indicated by the Command on the maps. When marking sectors of attack on maps do not show them all with a single schematical width, but make the sectors where the advance should be the most rapid narrower than the others. Show the location of enemy points of support, of woods, etc.- in a word, of everything which may demand special action (for instance the use of artificial fog or of turning movements) Designate beforehand special stoss-trupps for the capture of certain definite points of support. Designate before the combat safety garrisons for the captured towns.

9. Commanding Officers of Infantry Brigades, Regiments and Battalions will be given detailed information regarding the preparation of the attack and the support to be rendered by artillery, trench mortars, airplanes, and in some cases by tanks.

Subaltern officers and N.C.O.s should have an approximate notion of these matters.

The commander of the artillery will have a brief conference with Infantry officers regarding the action of the artillery.

10. It is necessary that perfectly clear orders be issued governing the use of all optical and luminous signals, and even covering liaisons with neighboring units. Detailed instructions should be given as to the utilization of these liaisons and as to the amount of liaison materiel to be given to each particular unit.

II PLACING THE TROOPS IN POSITION FOR THE ATTACK.

11. Detachment of guides. They must carefully reconnoiter the routes leading to the jumping off positions, and the positions themselves. This should be done with extreme discretion. Routes and emplacements should be chosen for

a. Assaulting infantry and the stossstrups armed with light machine guns. (The machine gun squad is the tactical unit of the infantry).

b. Light and heavy machine guns (usually with the battalions Machine guns and trench mortars should not be massed together.

From the very outset the task of heavy machine guns is to protect the assaulting infantry at the moment of departure. Hence these guns should not remain in reserve at the rear. At the beginning of the attack certain machine guns should be assigned the task of anti-aircraft defense.

c. Accompanying batteries: With the headquarters of the engineer forces : (battery commanders should be with the commanders of Infantry regiments).

d. Carrying parties and police detachments. Materials for crossing trenches filled with barbed wire (scaling ladders 4 meters long): Prepare ammunition supplies for rifles, machine guns (full belts) and light trench mortars; for rifle grenades and hand grenades, prepare wagons and push carts.

e. Combat train. Arrange the route to be followed. Road discipline should be extremely strict. Subaltern officers will inspect the dispositions at the starting point.

12. Have a number of supernumerary officers and N.C.O.s available, destined to be used as replacements. Make arrangements for bringing them up to the front. As a general rule, for the first attack, a company only needs its commander and one additional officer.

13. Loaded wagons with materiel for crossing obstructions and shell holes (fagots and, with batteries, mobile bridges). See how much of this materiel each wagon needs. Give the men belonging to the field and combat trains proper training with regard to crossing obstructions.

14. Brigade and regimental commanders should be located in the position of departure. Prepare liaisons.

The positions of brigade and regimental commanders will be as far forward as possible. It is important that the commanders have proper view over the terrain of the attack.

Telephone liaisons. between regiments and brigades, and between brigades, divisions, and artillery groupings. In drawing up these plans proper provision should be made for alterations caused by the advance. If a division has pushed its center of information further forward than the brigade, the regiments will connect directly with the center of information and not with the brigade.

Liaison by wireless: between regiments and battalions and sub-groupings of artillery; also between brigades and the centers of information. Wireless liaison also between brigades and divisions.

Liaison by blinker.: Prepare plans for liaison by blinker and reconnoiter the terrain of attack in view of its establishment. Avoid increasing traffic before the attack. **Severe** discipline governing telephone messages and conversation. Apply the instructions on liaison. The eventual development of the system of liaisons during the attack will be studied beforehand and shown in its main lines, on maps. Not only the signal officer, but the entire staff must be familiar with this system of liaisons.

15. Regulate the echelonment in depth of the first attack. Constitute a regimental reserve and a brigade reserve. Distribute machine guns. Explain his mission to everyone. Assign to each unit the sector in which it will attack mentioning in detail the particular objective of each unit. State, for instance, the position which is to be captured, the machine gun nests which will be encountered, and the dugouts in the position. Mention the positions or points which should be taken by flanking or turning movements. Insure the protection of flanks. Make arrangements for mopping up trenches. Cause the officers to synchronize their watches by comparing them several separate times. Set the watches and see that they all agree.

III. EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK.

A. First line Regiment.

16. Shortly before the attack again compare chronometers.

17. Rush into the enemy's positions with the last artillery and trench mortar shots. Avoid anything which might prematurely divulge the hour of assault. (no machine gun fire, no cheering, etc.) A quick advance offers the maximum of protection and insures success. Beware of traps. Machine guns should always be held ready to deliver protective fire (as should also rifles, rifle grenades, trench mortars, and accompanying artillery).

18. The minimum objective is the enemy's artillery: In consequence cross the positions without stopping, penetrate into the isolated battery positions, and advance beyond them. The quicker the troops reach these positions, particularly those of the heavy artillery situated on reverse slopes, the slighter will be the losses.

19. On starting, adopt a formation of echelonment in depth towards the front, (also echelonment and protection of the flanks).

20. According to circumstances, accompanying batteries must be advanced by sections, or by double sections, from sector to sector, in such a fashion that there will always be some artillery in action. Bring along a sufficient supply of ammunition. Few guns with much ammunition are better than many guns with little ammunition. This same rule applies to trench mortars. The commander of a double section of artillery will open fire independently on any suitable target. The commanders of battalions and regiments of infantry must know how much ammunition is at the disposal of their accompanying artillery, to prevent their wasting ammunition on objectives of minor importance. All reserves, whether specially detailed to do this work or not, must spontaneously assist in bringing forward both guns and ammunition.

21. Reserves should follow the attacking troops more closely than they would in mobile warfare, nevertheless, they should not be engaged too soon.

22. Marking the location of the commander(pennant). The battalion commander leads his troops to the terrain. As a general rule he should remain near the Company placed at his immediate disposal. (Battalion reserve). Brigade and regimental commanders will issue orders from points where they command the terrain. They will advance by bounds to the next place allowing them a view over the terrain. (They should bring along their horses). P.C.s should be used as long as possible, otherwise there is an absence of liaison and it becomes impossible to command troops. Commanders should push as far forward as possible in order to maintain their personal influence over the troops. In certain cases the commander should go up to the first line himself or send up a staff officer detached from his staff.

23. Liaisons during the attack.

a. Liaison is indispensable within the regiment and also between the regiment and the brigade, the accompanying position artillery, the airplanes, and the units which are abreast of and adjacent to it. As a general rule it is useless to count on obtaining immediate telephone liaisons in the advanced combat zone. Consequently liaison will be established by means not dependent on wires (liaison officers, messengers, cyclists.)

b. The division will constantly push forward (when-ever possible abreast of the regimental headquarters) an information center which will be connected by telephone with the division via the brigade, and which will be supplied with abundant means of liaison other than by wire.

All orders and reports will be sent to this center of information which will see to their proper transmission.

It is of the utmost importance that this central be kept informed as to the successive emplacements of regimental P.C.s. In case the P.C. is changed sufficient personnel should be left at the old P.C. to receive orders until the new P.C. is in proper working order. The center of information will connect itself by telephone with the regiments as soon as the forward movement ceases.

c. Liaisons by means other than wire. (Messengers'): Within the regiment and between the regiment and the neighboring regiments and the center of information.

d. Liaison with the position artillery through an artillery liaison officer detached with each battalion.

Each battalion should have a liaison detachment. Liaison with the accompanying artillery should be established by keeping the echelons of command concerned in touch with each other, or by means of artillery liaison officers.

e. Liaison with aviators : by unfurling panels near P.C.s and near the terrains arranged for dropping messages. Panels should be laid out as soon as the infantry aviator shows up. The advanced line unfurls its panels as soon as it has reached its objective or when the forward movement ceases. Furthermore it does this whenever the airplane requests it.

24. The attack will progress in an irregular manner: reserves should only be sent into action at points where initial success has been obtained. This success should be driven home by carrying out turning movements or by mopping up the defences which are still holding. Continue methodically to attack by surrounding movements carried out with the help of supporting troops. The advanced attacking waves continue, in the meantime, to push forward in the zone of combat. The personnel action of infantry commanders and their own ability to come to quick decisions are all-important in this matter. They should always know very clearly where the center of gravity of the attack is located. It is of the utmost importance to occupy heights. Do not mass troops. Always seek cover from the view of aviators.

25. Quickly concentrate machine guns, artillery and trench mortars against centers of resistance which outflank our advancing troops. Push forward assault troops, who will attack from the sides by an outflanking movement. Do not, however, deflect excessive forces for this purpose nor lose sight of the general direction of the attack.

26. Enemy centers of resistance and battery positions break up the first line of the assailants. Officers and troops should spontaneously attempt to get into touch with the command. The task of the command is constantly to keep their troops under control and to establish the echelonment in depth. They should also constitute fresh reserves.

27. The first wave should be assigned the most distant objective and this wave should be pushed forward, as far as possible. The first and second waves rush past the enemy's trenches. It is strictly forbidden to capture prisoners or to search dugouts.

28. Do not assemble in towns nor forests. Such places should be avoided as much as possible, passing around them along their edges. As soon as a town has been captured, withdraw the main body of the troops and only leave a safety guard. Search deep dugouts and caves in order to find enemy "nests" and also those of our men who are hiding or who have lost track of their units.

29. Do not lose sight of cooperation between battalions and regiments. Don't wait for each other, but nevertheless see that the flanks of bodies which are advancing alone are covered by reserves and particularly by machine guns.

30. Ammunition supply for machine guns, (full belts), for trench mortars and for artillery; supply of grenades, and of water for machine guns. Cause the terrain and the push carts to follow along. Keep machine guns, ready to fire, in the vicinity of the wagons. Fill belts. Bring back to the wagons empty cases and empty belts.

B. Second line Regiment.

31. Its mission, as a general rule, is to push forward the attack when the power of the first blow begins to wane. As a general rule this regiment should go into action upon an order from the brigade. Nevertheless it is the regimental commander's duty to act independently in case of need.

32. The later the regiment gets into action, the better. Don't lose your nerve in case of small reverses. Go into action only at places where the attack is progressing.

33. Liaison by sight with the first line regiment. The commander of the 2nd line regiment should have a clear view over the field of combat; Otherwise he will be unable to conduct his regiment.

34. Liaison with the brigade. (Or in case the unit is in divisional reserve, with the division), with the artillery, etc. (according to the principles enunciated in Paragraph A, Article 23.)

35. Reconnoiter the jumping off positions and obtain a good idea of the terrain in view of launching the 2nd blow. The areas subjected to hostile artillery fire will determine the final choice of routes and the formation to be adopted in view of carrying out the attack.

36. Collect the disseminated elements of the first line regiment, keep them in hand, and cause them to follow along as second line reserves. Keep within reach, for this purpose, a number of energetical officers. The sergeant major of the headquarters company will assemble stray individuals and check the wounded. As a general rule the rear zone should be very strictly policed.

IV. FOR REPULSING HOSTILE COUNTER-ATTACKS.

37. The study of the enemy's position, of the terrain, of the enemy's attitude during raids carried out by patrols, and during small attacks made by the divisions in sector, give a good idea of the location of the principle line of resistance of the enemy. It must be expected, as a general rule, that the terrain in front of the enemy's lines will be abandoned without great resistance. Counter attacks by local reserves must only be expected in the principal line of resistance. Attacks by reserve units must only be expected behind the principal line of resistance. Consequently give thought beforehand to the points where hostile counter-attacks will probably take place and also where the enemy is liable to launch attacks. If the echelonment in depth is constantly maintained, it is practically certain that all counter-attacks will be repulsed. Machine guns, accompanying the batteries light trench mortars and companies of trench mortars (medium) should cooperate in repulsing counter-attacks. In this connection, heavy machine guns should be used * accompanying batteries, being located on dominating positions. These also serve to protect the advancing infantry. These heavy machine guns should be pushed forward quickly, echeloned in depth, from one sector to another. They should take up positions in checker-board formation. Companies in action will use their light machine guns the very first line.

38. As soon as a counter-attack or enemy attack is repulsed, push forward immediately and pursue the enemy. The chief thought of the commander should be to see that the general forward movement is resumed in the entire framework of the attack and that the enemy is always closely pursued. It will be the special task of fresh reserves sent into action to repulse counter-attacks, to continue the forward movement. New reserves should be formed by gathering together all available units. Keep them well under control.

V. Proper line of conduct after reaching the objectives.

39. Quickly adopt the formation which makes it possible to hold against counter-attack the ground which has been gained pending the resumption of the attack. The troops should be well echeloned in depth, in a formation which lends itself to the eventual renewal of the attack. Constitute reserves and also combat reserves in view of counter-attacks. Send forward small screens of troops. Constantly make reconnaissance. Insure effective flanking with machine guns arranged at points (often on reverse slopes) which are difficult for the enemy to locate. Neighboring units should cooperate at points of junction. Machine guns for anti-aircraft defense should be installed.

40. Reorganize the units. Constitute reserves. Establish lateral liaisons and liaisons with superior echelons. The new commanders will make themselves known by name to the N.C.O.s and the N.C.O.s to the troops.

41. Artillery will quickly organize artillery defense. It is very important that the artillery obtain direct views in order to observe enemy counter-attacks, this for the purpose of opening fire upon them as soon as they are launched. Immediately notify the artillery of any point lending itself to the establishment of an O.P. Forward to the artillery by the most rapid means all observations made by the infantry.

42. Insure proper ammunition and food supply. Bring up the rolling kitchens.

43. Building of the positions. Dig in quickly. The exact trace of the line will be decided upon later. See to the distribution of the forces and to their arrangement. Arrange for reliefs and rests. Protection from aerial observation is of the utmost importance.

44. Sanitary service.

45. Exhausted troops will be duly relieved as far as circumstances permit.

46. When the counter-attacks have been repulsed, push forward immediately and pursue the enemy with fresh troops. Come to a very thorough understanding with the artillery and with neighboring troops with regard to all matters mentioned above.

VI. Completion of the rupture.

47. When the enemy's artillery positions have been captured, the combat assumes the character of mobile warfare. Methodical preparation ceases. Personal decision and vigorous action again become valuable. Prove and take advantage of the German superiority in mobile warfare. The proper place for the command is well forward. Quickly form up marching columns. Cause the accompanying artillery to follow along the roads as also the light trench mortars.

48. The pursuit of the enemy should be rapid and unceasing. Do not give the enemy any respite, not even during the night. Don't wait for each other. Nevertheless, always keep within reach of a sufficient volume of fire to take care of any unforeseen opposition (machine guns, position artillery). Keep in close touch with the artillery. Double sections of artillery or sections of artillery should be brought along with the advanced guard.

49. Send out patrols to the front and flanks. Supply the units with bicyclists and messengers. Cover the flanks with reserves echeloned in depth, chiefly with machine guns.

50. Keep in touch with superior echelons and combat trains. Insure ammunition and food supply. The supply officers and N.C.O.s of the train will remain in close personal liaison with the battalion staff.

51. Arrange for the rest periods for the troops during the halts. Bring up rolling kitchens or issue orders to issue iron rations, Immediately replace used rations.

VII. How to attack the rear enemy positions.

52. Take them by a single rush, constantly pushing forward (supported nevertheless by a sufficient volume of fire). It will often be sufficient to deliver a brief concentration fire by machine guns, trench mortars or accompanying artillery. If the rupture of these positions is retarded, it will usually mean greater losses. In principle, cause patrols to attack a fair distance ahead of the main body of troops. Very often these patrols will drive back the enemy who is already shaken. At all events these patrols will at least occupy the advanced enemy zone. Bring forward quickly isolated heavy guns for they will often gain a decision.

53. If the enemy has had time to guard his rear positions with fresh reserves, first drive him out of the advanced zone of these positions, in order securely to hold the terrain necessary for the development of the eventual attack to be made later. Make very complete contact patrols in order to determine the location, the depth and the occupation of the enemy's positions. Find out where are his weak points, and also where it will be easiest to reach his positions. The attack will then be ordered by the higher command, with proper coordination of all means of attack. This attack will be preceded by an artillery preparation. In this attack the same mode of procedure should be followed as that mentioned above for the first attack, but everything should move more quickly.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 20, 1918.

G-2
No. 54

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 19 12h to June 20, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Short bursts of machine gun fire at intervals during the night on our front lines and on the C.T. east of Le Plessier.

II. ARTILLERY.

Concentrations on Grivesnes, Cantigny, Cantigny front lines, Villers Tournelle, with 77s, 105s, 150s. Fire for adjustment on Grivesnes and the front lines south of Grivesnes. Harassing fire by salvos on Le Plessier, front lines east of Le Plessier and P.C. Magador*. Intermittent fire on Broys, Bois Villers, Boyau Lewis, Bois Avance, Bois Cantigny, during the period covered by this report. Harassing fire, about 30 shells in all, on the line of resistance in the zone of Esclainvillers at about 14 h. The total number of shells falling on the sector was about 4000.

III. WORKS.

New enemy works have been observed at 2923 and 2647.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was fair all day.

During the day men were seen at the following points: 2040, 3141, Malpart to La Folie Farm, 1725. At about 21h one group of 50 men passed from the Bois Vicomte to La Folie Farm in small groups and at the same time a few men were observed going in the opposite direction. The same thing occurred again at 22h30.

There was an increase in the movement of troops along routes in the rear zone yesterday. At 19h30 what was estimated as one battalion was seen moving from Fignieres to Gratibus, both on foot and in lorries. This battalion detrucked on Route Nationale No. 35 and passed out of sight in the valley of the Three Doms. There was an intermittent circulation between Fignieres and Gratibus of 250 men in small groups during the day. At 21h15 three sections of infantry passed point 5343 on their way to Gratibus. Four 2-horse wagons were seen unloading materiel at point 0819.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: One enemy balloon was observed in ascension yesterday afternoon.

Airplanes: Two enemy planes reported over our lines last night.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle confirmed by the capture of a prisoner belonging to the 3rd Company, 272nd Reserve Regiment, 82nd Reserve Division. (See Interrogation of Prisoner)

Large fire, followed by an explosion, in the direction of Mesnil St. Georges. During our artillery fire on the Bois Vicomte*1 men were seen running away from the shelled areas.

Numerous red and green rockets from the enemy's front lines.

-2-

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.
Artillery active.

NOTE: At 9h05 this morning one battalion of infantry was observed going from Montdidier to Etelfay in close order.

* Correct spelling: P.C. MOGADOR.
*1 " " : BOIS du VICOMTE.

S. G. W.

Headquarters First Division, A.E.F.

Appendix to Daily Intelligence Summary No. 54, June 20, 1918.

I.

LIAISON BETWEEN INFANTRY AND AIRPLANES.

From French Xth Army Bulletin, June 9, 1918.

The following two documents, one captured on the front of the Army, the other by a neighboring Army, show the enemy's concern for establishing liaison between the infantry and the air service. These documents, which are issued by the Air Service addressed to the infantry, indicate by their tone the difficulty which the infantry aviators experience in effectively fulfilling their missions.

A. Translation of a German Document Issued by the 27th German Air Squadron and Captured by a Neighboring Army.

Infantrymen:

Remember when you are meeting with resistance in the course of the advance, that the aviator can come to your aid.

1. The aviator can make known your position to the Command and to the artillery, so that you may be given support.
2. The aviator can let you know what he observes within the enemy's line.
3. The aviation can attack hostile batteries in action and hostile infantry with his machine gun.
4. The aviator can direct the fire of our own batteries.
5. You can call the aviator with your small radio stations.
6. When the aviator approaches at a low altitude:
 - (a) Indicate your command posts in accordance with the instructions regarding infantry airplanes.
 - (b) Report information to the aviator by means of the regulation signal panels.
 - (c) Indicate your advance line by means of Bengal lights, rockets, or white panels.

B.- Translation of a German Document, Captured on the Front of this Army, without date or indication of Source, and Appearing to be a Tract dropped by a German Airplane Within its Own Lines.

From the Infantry Aviators to the Infantrymen.

When communication between you, your commanders or the artillery is cut off, we can inform them where you are, whether you still have ammunition and if you need assistance.

We carry to the rear the news of your achievements, report upon the success of the attack and whether you are valiantly defending yourselves in a difficult position.

We think of you. In order to bring you help, we do not fear storm, machine guns, or hostile airplanes. Most of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men who fly over you have themselves been infantrymen and know how urgent it is to have assistance when you need it. It is for this reason we risk our lives for you. Assist us in accomplishing our difficult task.

Let us know the location of your first line by using panels. If you are not supplied with them, light fire flares in the most advanced shell holes. Spread out newspapers or maps, wave a piece of cloth or even use visual signals.

In the fighting before Arras, Bavarian infantrymen who had nothing with which to signal their presence, took off their coats and waved them and their light colored shirts made them more visible. Our reports enabled assistance to be brought to them.

In the fighting before Verdun, about 200 of you were surrounded by the enemy for three days and completely cut off from the rest of the infantry. Death or capture seemed certain. These men were discovered by infantry airplanes which dropped them ammunition and provisions and went in search of help. Three days later they were rescued by their comrades.

The command posts must likewise get into communication with us by using the regulation signals. If ammunition is beginning to run low, a panel in the shape of an "M" will immediately be shown.

We, the infantry airplanes, fly very low and are easily recognizable by the streamers attached to the tips of our wings. A White rocket from us means that we wish to communicate with you. When we are no longer flying in your vicinity remove your panels to prevent mistakes.

II.

ORGANIZATION OF A GERMAN INFANTRY COMPANY.

From British Summary, June 13, 1918.

A captured document shows the organization of the fighting strength of the 10th Company, 253 Res. Inf. Reg. (76th Res. Div.) on March 3, 1918, and again on May 4, 1918:

I.- On March 3, 1918.

(Note:- At this date, the 76th Res. Div. was still in Rumania, about to leave for the Western Front.)

	Officers	N.C.Os	Lance Cpls. (group lead- ers)	Men.
Company Commander.	1			
1st Platoon	1			
1st Group(light machine gun)	1			8
2nd " (assault detachment)	1			8
3rd "	1			8
4th "			1	8
Runners, buglers and drummers				5
2nd Platoon	1			
1st Group(light machine gun).			1	8
2nd " (assault detachment)			1	8
3rd "	1			8
4th "			1	8
Runners and drummers.				4
3rd Platoon	1			
1st Group(light machine guns)	1			8
2nd " (assault detachment)	1			8
3rd "	1			8
4th "				

	Officers	N.C.O.s	Lance Cpls.	Men
4th Group (including 4 telephonists and 3 signallers).			(group leaders)	
			1	10
5th " (including 5 stretcher bearers, 3 men carrying signal-throwers, 1 runner and 1 NCO in charge of signalling cloths).		1	1	9
Men in charge of pigeons and messenger dogs, attached to Battalion Hdq.		1		3
Total Fighting Strength	2	12	6	119

II.- On May 4, 1918.

(Note.- At this date, the 76th Res. Div. had been in the line south of Moreuil for three weeks, and expected relief shortly.)

	Officers	N.C.O.s	Lance Cpls.	Men
Company Commander	1			
1st Platoon	2			
1st Light Machine Group	1			8
2nd " " " "	1			4
1st Assault Group	1			6
1st Group of Riflemen	1			7
2nd Platoon	1			
3rd Light Machine Group				7
4th " " " "	1			3
2nd Assault Group	1			5
2nd Group of Riflemen	1			7
3rd Platoon	2			
5th Light Machine Group	2			4
3rd Group of Riflemen	1			5
3rd Assault Group	1			4
4th " " " "	1			5
Signallers	1			4
	1	18		69

Remarks.

Strength.- The difference in strength is accounted for by the fact that, on May 4, 1918, the 76th Res. Div. had been in line for three weeks in an active sector.

Armament.- It will be noted that, on May 4, 1918, the company had five light machine guns. When the issue of the '08/'15 light machine gun began in March, 1917, three guns were issued to every infantry company, the full establishment being six guns per company.

The German "Manual of Infantry Training during War", 1918, lays down that a light machine gun group is composed of a team and a reserve team, each of 4 men, under a light machine group commander.

According to a pamphlet entitled "Instructions for the Employment of Machine Guns in the Attack(Ia/47875)."published in February, 1918, (see Summary of Information, No. 15, April 15, 1918), the ideal to be aimed at was the organization of two light machine groups in each infantry platoon, so that they could mutually support each other in action. However, owing to the infantry fighting strength at that time, and the number of horses then available, an infantry company could only reckon on having 4 light machine guns (with one gun in reserve) for carrying out an attack.

The fact that in March, 1918, the 10th Company, 253rd Res. Inf. Reg. had only 3 light machine guns is explained by its being still on the Eastern front. Many of the divisions brought from the Eastern front received no light machine guns at all until they arrived in the Western Theater.

Organization.- The most interesting feature of the document dated May 4, 1918, is that it shows an entirely new system of numbering the groups in an infantry company. Hitherto, the groups have been numbered in each platoon from 1 to 4 (or 5) as in the earlier document. From the latter document it now appears that they are numbered in categories, viz., Light Machine Groups, Assault Groups and Groups of Riflemen, and distributed as equally as possible among the three platoons. The 3rd Platoon receives an extra Assault Group in place of the non-existent 6th Light Machine Gun Group.

This remembering of groups points to a general reorganization with a view to the offensive and open warfare. Under this organization, in an infantry company going into action about 120 strong, each platoon may normally be expected to be organized as follows:

	N.C.O.s	Men.
Platoon Commander (officer or N.C.O.)	1	
2 Light Machine Groups	2	16
1 Assault Group	1	8
1 Group of Riflemen	1	8
Total Platoon	5	32

GERMAN AIR FORCES, JUNE 6 TO 12, INCLUSIVE.

Changes in Location.

The following additional flights have been located in the Laon region; six pursuit, four reconnaissance, and five protective. These were sent to the Aisne previous to the offensive of May 27. The pursuit flights were all drawn from the Bapaume-Moreuil Region, and the other flights uniformly from northern armies.

Airdromes.

Reports indicate construction is mainly in River Lys-Vimy, Rheims, and Champagne regions. Many structures have been removed from Flahders and the Moreuil-Noyon region.

Activity.

During the first part of the week the enemy seemed most concerned in shielding his back areas from aerial reconnaissance, and used strong defensive tactics on all active fronts. At night he continued heavy bombing of lines of communication between Paris and the battle front. In the latter part of the week infantry planes and strong combat patrols were active between Flanders and Rheims. Activity on the Woevre and Lorraine fronts against our air units has been conspicuously small. This might be attributed to poor visibility, but there are indications that pursuit flights have been transferred north, although confirmation has not been received.

* * * * *

APPENDIX III.

It is of interest to note that the letter issued by the 26th Reserve Corps, relating to the attack on Cantigny (published in Divisional Intelligence Summary No.52), was addressed to the Commanding Officer, 143rd Infantry, 30th Division. At the time this division was in reserve in rear of the corps facing us. Whether this copy was sent him simply for his information or whether the German Command expected the 30th Division to return to the Cantigny Sector, is not known. However, it seems not improbable that the 30th Division was expected to return and retake Cantigny, when developments farther south caused it to be put into line there, where the document referred to was captured. (at Courcelles on June 14.)

* * * * *

APPENDIX IV.

Enemy Artillery Activity during the first fifteen days of June.
(Extract from Army Bulletin)

This period was characterized by feeble activity of artillery, which has fired less than formerly. The exception to this was the southern sector of the army, which was involved in the bombardment accompanying the attack of the 9th of June on the 3rd Army. The enemy fired chiefly harassing fire; especially to be noted was the fire by long range pieces on the rear areas. Gas shells were less numerous than during the preceding period. There were no intense concentrations of Yperite. The total number of batteries located during the period, amount to 331, as against 408 during the preceding 15 days; this diminution can be explained by the fact that, on the whole, conditions were less favorable for locating batteries than during the 2nd half of May.

The sector of Montdidier seems to have been reinforced by borrowing batteries from the sector of the Haute Avre. The daily average of shells falling on the front of the army was about 15000 as against 20000 during the 2nd half of May.

To sum up, the enemy artillery appears to be about the same. There has been an unusually large number of reg-lages, particularly by high bursts. The number of shells fired in proportion to the number of batteries is still small.

APPENDIX V.

1. Identity of Prisoner: (Paul Muller) X Machine Gunner, 3rd Co. 272 Res. Reg., 82nd Res. Div. Home at Zerbst (Anhalt). Age 38.

2. Circumstances of Capture.

Place: 24.20 (N.E. of Cantigny)

Time: about 1.30 a.m.

An American raiding party went out at about 1.30 a.m., June 20th with the purpose of raiding the Munich trench. Coming upon the trench running parallel to the St. Aignan - Fontaine road near point 2420, the raiding party encountered a strong garrison of Germans. In the first few moments of the combat which followed X , then engaged in baleing mud out of the trench, was taken prisoner by an American auto-rifleman. The remainder of the garrison appears to have offered little resistance, most of it scattering to all sides upon seeing the Americans.

3. Order of Battle. Confirmed.

(a) Regimental: The 272nd Res. Reg. at the time of the attack against Cantigny had its right wing at about 1725 and its left wing at 1814. The boundry between the 272nd Res. Reg. and the 271st Res. Reg. followed the Cantigny-La Folie road as far as the southwest corner of the Bois de Framicourt. After Cantigny, the boundry line seems to have been changed, the 272nd Res. Reg. taking over a part of the line held by the 271st Res. Reg., and extending its left wing as far as the Cantigny-Framicourt road.

(b) Battalions: 1st in line, 2nd at rest, and 3rd presumably in support.

(c) Companies: The 1st Battalion has four companies in line. From north to south, -1st, 3rd, 2nd, 4th. The 3rd Company extends from 2222 to about 2719. It has all four platoons in line, all of them being in the trench shown on photo B 744 which runs about parallel to the St. Aignan-Fontaine road between the two points mentioned above.

4. Organization of Sector.

(a) Trenches: The trench held by the 3rd Company is practically continuous. It is 6 feet deep at most places, and wide enough for one man to move about freely. There are no dugouts in it. The men sleep in small excavations dug into the forward wall of the trench (visible on photos). An attempt has been made to camouflage the trench by laying strands of grass and wheat over it, but the attempt does not seem to have been very successful. (See photo, B 744).

(b) Wire: Prisoner states that there is an entanglement about 50 meters in front of the trench. He is rather uncertain as to its strength, but thinks that it is concertina wire held in place by iron stakes. It is well concealed in the grass and cannot be seen from the prisoner's position in the trench.

(c) Machine guns: There are 6 light machine guns in the company. Four of them are in line and two of them at the rest billets (east of Davenescourt). Prisoner states that there are no special emplacements for these machine guns, but that they are usually simply laid on the parapet.

5. Trench Duty. Prisoner states that no outposts are sent forward during the night (?). The men in the company work at night, deepening their trench.

6. P.C.'s. Prisoner seems to know nothing of their present location. He says, however, that the P.C. of the Battalion in line had to be changed on account of our artillery fire. The Company Commander does not live in the trench, but in a pit slightly to the rear (possibly in clump at 26205.)

7. Itinerary from rest to support seems to be : across railroad at 5130, across marsh to Chateau at 4531, to left along road a few hundred yards and thence into Lalval wood.

Itinerary from support to line varies according to shelling.

Kitchens come up along Marestmontiers to Framicourt road.

8. 3rd Company relieved 6th Company probably on night of June 14-15.

9. During the last 6 days, Company has lost 10 wounded and one or two killed (artillery fire).

10. Prisoner states that on the evening of May 28th he saw troops (not his battalion) being sent down towards Cantigny, presumably to counter-attack.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 20, 1918.

The following information was obtained from prisoners and aeroplanes photographs taken in the region of the Chateau de Jenlis.

It must be born in mind that the latest prisoner taken from this region was captured on the 30th of April and the latest photograph bears the date of June 7.

Prisoner states that the region of the Chateau de Jenlis was held by one battalion with four companies in the front line. Each company holds approximately 300 meters of front, having 2 platoons and 2 squads in the first trench and its remaining 3 squads in the line of surveillance. The first line trench runs parallel to the western and southern edge of the wood and only a few meters from it. (Photograph). The line of surveillance is about 100 meters in front of the edge of the wood and appears to be very poorly organized. During the day each platoon has one double sentry post in the front line trench while at night each platoon sends out one squad to the organized quarry running from 2802 to 2804. One of these squads is equipped with a light machine gun. With reference to dugouts, the prisoner states that quite a number of them were being built in the front line trench, and by the 30th of April they had already reached a depth of four meters.

The regiment holding the Bois de Fontaine at the present time is probably the 118th Reserve Regiment, belonging to the 25th Reserve Division. This fact has been deduced from the statements of prisoners captured from other regiments.

At this time there was a Company P.C. at point 3205 and another at 31²04⁵, also a number of shelters along the embankment at 3105.

In addition to the above, aeroplane photographs disclose the following:

The beginning of a strong point in the northwest corner of the Parc of the Chateau. Four very probable machine gun emplacement in this region.

A forward post in the region of point 27⁵05, probably equipped with a light machine gun.

Many tracks in the vicinity of the Chateau itself. A dugout entrance with tracks leading to it on the northern side.

Another probable machine gun emplacement at 3204. Many dugouts along the Fontaine-Cantigny Road, (indicated on the map). These are most probably occupied by many Germans. A probable P.C. in the ruined house at 3503.

NOTE: The enemy has recently placed his machine guns in the open, in organized shell holes, in trees, or in a simple trench. The number of organized shell holes in the region of Fontaine sous Montdidier is very great, but all that show any signs of occupation are indicated on the map. Those from which machine guns have been reported as firing or appear suspicious are marked as machine gun emplacements.

G-2
No. 55

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
June 21, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 20, 12 h. to June 21, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Intermittent machine gun fire during the night on our front lines. Indirect fire on Le Plessier and Death Valley. Enemy snipers active yesterday in front of G-2.

An enemy machine gun has been reported as firing from the vicinity of La Folie Farm and another from about 2228.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery fire showed a marked decrease yesterday. No 210's were reported and very few 150s. Heavy shelling on the Graveyard of Cantigny yesterday afternoon with 77s, 105s and some 150s. This morning from 7h03-7h23 the enemy placed a heavy box barrage around Cantigny and the trenches to the east. There was harassing fire during the afternoon and night on the Bois de Fontaine, Grivesnes, and the front lines to the north and south of Cantigny. The total number of shells falling on the sector was 2100.

III. WORKS.-

At 16h40 a small working party was observed to the west of the Bois de Lalval. During the afternoon 6 men were seen loading hay onto two four-horse wagons northwest of Etelfay at 0409.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was poor all day.

There was a little movement of small groups of men in the afternoon in the vicinity of La Folie Farm and Malpart.

Slightly less than normal circulation on all routes in the rear zone; only 14 wagons, 8 lorries, and 5 motors were seen all day. This morning between 100 and 150 Germans were seen near point 7037 and were fired on by our artillery.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Two enemy balloons were observed in ascension yesterday afternoon.

Aeroplanes: One enemy plane over Cantigny at 17h35 observing.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A german soldier killed behind our lines at 5h30, June 20, belonged to the 3rd Company, 271st Reserve Regiment, confirming the Order of Battle. This man had previously deserted and surrendered to an officer in the vicinity of point 1816 and had later escaped.

An enemy ammunition dump east of Cantigny exploded at 3h11, and another east of Framicourt at 1h15.

During the night the enemy put up a large number of flares. At 3h45 this morning 30 red rockets were sent up to the east of Cantigny, and at 1h20 1 green rocket east of the Bois Vicomte.*

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

Correct Spelling - * Bois du Vicomte - S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 55, June 21,
1918.

Extract from G. H. Q. Summary of Information
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING - No. 16 . Issued by the
British General Staff, June 11, 1918

USE OF GAS BY THE ENEMY PRIOR TO HIS ATTACK ON THE BRITISH
ON THE AISNE MAY 27, 1918.

Particulars of the Bombardment.

There was practically no gas shelling on our front up to the morning of May 27. At 1 a.m. that day an intense bombardment with gas and H.E. shell was opened along the whole sector, and apparently extended on both flanks. There is no reliable information as to how much gas was used on our front line system, but various targets- notably woods and villages in the back areas- and battery positions were very heavily shelled with gas. The enemy attacked about 4.30 a.m., and the whole of the area affected by the preliminary bombardment appears to have been free from gas by about 7 a.m.

Nature of Gas Shells Used by the Enemy.

Everywhere the gas seems to have caused sneezing, but there is no evidence to show that the enemy employed any new gas. It is clear that a large number of blue-cross shells were used, but, as it is impossible to distinguish this shell from H.E. except for the gas effect, it is difficult to arrive at an estimate of the proportion of blue-cross shells actually fired. The matter is further complicated by the enemy's employment of shells containing ethyl dichlorarsine (Yellow-cross I.) the gas effect of which is similar to that of blue cross. A considerable amount of ethyl dichlorarsine was used in the bombardment. Green-cross shells were definitely recognized by the characteristic smell of phosgene. The evidence as to the employment of yellow-cross shells (dichlorethyl sulphide) is inconclusive, especially as it is uncertain how far the effects of ethyl dichlorarsine (yellow-cross, I.) may resemble those produced by dichlorethyl sulphide.

Effects of Gas.

The gas formed a continuous invisible cloud of low concentration with pockets where it was more concentrated. It was noticeable as far back as Corps Headquarters, about eight miles from the nearest point in the line.

The casualties caused by the gas appear, however, to have been few and mostly slight. They were caused by:

- (a) Shells bursting close to men.
- (b) Removal of respirators owing to the difficulty of seeing.
- (c) Men being surprised when sleeping.
- (d) Blue-cross shells being mistaken for H.E.
- (e) Respirators being damaged.

The protection given by the Box Respirator appears to have been complete so long as the respirator was in good condition. On the whole, the gas discipline was excellent and the system of alarms worked quickly and well. The sector was well provided with gas-proof dug-outs and staffs were able to work without wearing respirators.

Conclusion.

As the whole bombardment prior to the attack only lasted four hours and was directed against a highly-organ-

ized trench system, the main intention of the enemy was probably to cause a temporary paralysis of the defence. For this purpose, a combination of gas shell and H.E. appears to be more effective than either gas or H.E. would be alone.

The effects of the gas may be regarded as practical and moral. The practical effects arise from the physical discomfort which it causes and the difficulty of seeing when men have to wear their respirators for any length of time. Reports, however, show that the majority of our artillery continued firing in spite of the gas and that in some cases the rate of fire was not even reduced to any appreciable extent. The moral effects are uncertainty as to whether it is necessary to wear respirators, and a tendency for men who have smelt the gas to believe that they have been poisoned.

For defence against this use of gas three things are essential:

- (a) Discipline.
- (b) Careful instruction of officers in the properties of the various kinds of gas used by the enemy.
- (c) Thorough and consistent practice with the respirator by all ranks.

* * * * *

NEW GERMAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT PROJECTILE.

From French G.Q.G. Bulletin, June 15, 1918

According to information furnished by our Air Service, the enemy's anti-aircraft defense in the Somme region is using a new projectile which appears to be an incendiary shell. Upon reaching an altitude of about 1,800 metres, this shell explodes violently, producing a reddish flash and a very heavy incandescent shower. About 200 metres below the level of the first explosion a second occurs which is characterized by exactly the same phenomena. The fall of the incendiary matter, which is not very rapid, is almost vertical and has the appearance of an immense mass of streamers.

The attention of intelligence officers is invited to the importance of collecting specimens of projectiles of this kind.

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APPENDIX II. Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 80

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY IN AMERICAN SECTORS- JUNE 8 to 15 INCLUSIVE.

Picardy Sector:

Activity was more pronounced than in the previous week. Adjustment was somewhat less frequent, the greater part of the fire being concentrations on towns and rear areas, at times very heavy. Grivesnes was heavily bombarded by all calibers, including 210. Front lines were shelled scatteringly, with several heavy concentrations, particularly around Cantigny. Little interdiction fire was reported. Gas was used freely for battery neutralizations and a small amount, together with shrapnel, on front lines.

Oise Sector:

Artillery was active on the left, but comparatively light on the right. The fire consisted mainly of

scattering fire along front lines and concentrations on points just in rear, particularly on Bouresches and Belleau Woods. Gas was largely used with several heavy concentrations. A small number of 210's reported.

Woivre Sector:

A slight decrease in activity was noticeable, but the character of the fire remained the same as last week. There was a great deal of night harassing and extensive use of gas extending to open roads and rear areas. Most of the activity remained in the southern part of the sector, the woods in this area being constantly gassed. Very few 150's were reported. On June 16, Boucq, Jouy-sous-les-Cates*, Mesnil-le-Tour* and other towns in rear were bombarded by 150 mm high-powered guns at a range of 16 to 18 kilometers.

Lorraine Sector.

There has been a very marked decline in activity in this sector. The fire was merely scattering, harassing with small calibers. A very few 150's were used and no 210's. No gas was reported.

Alsace Sector:

Activity, slightly heavier than last week, was of the same character as in Lorraine. Only 77's and 105's were reported in action.

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APPENDIX III.

The prisoner taken yesterday northwest of Cantigny states that the Commanding Officer of the 272nd Res. Regt. has gone on leave. Prisoner heard rumors that this "leave" is simply "camouflage", and that this officer has really been relieved because of the reverse suffered by his regiment on the 28th of May, at the time of our attack against Cantigny. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that according to the statement of another prisoner belonging to the 271st Res. Regt. the Commanding Officer of the 271st was also relieved for the same reason.

Correct Spelling:

* Jouy-sous-les-Cotes.

* Menil-la-Tour. - S. G. W.

G-2
No. 56

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 22, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 21, 12 h to June 22, 12 h.

Activity of the Enemy.

I. INFANTRY.

Indirect machine gun fire on Le Plessier last night. Frequent bursts of machine gun fire on our front lines from Grivesnes to Route Nationale No. 30, during the night.

II ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery adjusted with 210's on the village of Grivesnes and our front lines north of St. Aignan. Two concentrations were placed on our front lines in the vicinity of Grivesnes and St. Aignan last night. Fire for adjustment on G-1, the line of resistance, Coullemelle, and Mesnil St. Firmin. The following places were rather heavily shelled during the period covered by this report: Cantigny, Valley southwest of Cantigny, A-1, A-2, Belle Assise, and the Bois Avance. Ten shots from 105L on Serevillers at 3h this morning.

III WORKS.

At 7h50 a group of men carrying buckets was seen passing point 2635. One of our patrols has reported that there are no enemy works from point 2595 to 3097.

Approximately 100 men seen erecting camouflage on Route Nationale No. 35 at 7h20.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was poor all day.

During the day isolated individuals were seen in rear of St. Aignan, southwest of Malpart, La Folie Farm, and the Bois Vicomte*.

Circulation along the routes in the rear zone was normal and was mostly in the area Fignieres-Guerbigny, Laboissiere-Montdidier. At 6h54 one company of infantry was observed marching from Guerbigny to Montdidier. Yesterday afternoon about 50 horses were seen grazing at point 2946. One train observed going north on the Roye-Chaulnes Railroad at 14h55.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Two balloons were observed in ascension in the region of Hangest.

Airplanes: Only one enemy plane reported over our lines yesterday. At 13h40 an enemy plane descended east of the Bois de Vicomte* near point 3037.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

At 10h45 three three-star rockets from Route Nationale No. 35. From 21h to 24h numerous white and red star single rockets were put up by the enemy in front of Cantigny.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:
QUIET.

* Correct Spelling: Bois du Vicomte - S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 56, JUNE 22,
1918.

THE ROLE OF A FRONT DIVISION (SECTOR DIVISION) IN THE
ATTACK OF MAY 27.
(From an Army Bulletin)

The following example of the dispositions made in order to put a special storm division in place of the sector division, which was accomplished even during the artillery preparation, shows the ability to maneuver that the German infantry has; but shows also how our artillery, by well directed counter preparation fire, can smash up the attack. On the 26th of May, the 197th Division was in line on the front Chevigny*-Colliges*-Chamoiville*, holding six kilometers. During the night of the 26-27, the division put out numerous patrols in order to cover the building of bridges over the Ailette and to be able to get up within assault distance of the Chemin de Dames. At the moment when the artillery preparation commenced, the storm divisions (the 1st Guard Division, the 33rd Division, and the 10th Reserve Division), which constituted an attack group, relieved the sector division. The 197th Division then furnished to each one of these divisions a support regiment. The 197th was brought back on the night of the 27th of May to the north of the Ailette. It was not thereafter engaged until the first of June, relieving a part of the 10th Reserve Division.

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APPENDIX II.

Translation of a German Document. (From an Army Bulletin)
PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID AEROPLANE OBSERVATION.
Staff, 18th Army
1a1b No. 700

May, 1918.

In order to make observation by enemy aeroplanes more difficult, and to avoid useless losses from aerial attacks by machine gun and bomb, the following principles, for protection against aeroplanes, must be constantly followed:

1. All large troop movements and all marches for the purpose of changing station, will take place, in principle, by night. Whenever troops on the march are surprised by parachute flares dropped by aeroplanes to light up the ground beneath, they will immediately halt and make no movements at all.

2. As, in the Zone of the Armies, almost all the villages are destroyed, it will be necessary, in choosing cantonments in the first line, to resort to camouflage against aeroplanes.

3. In the daytime, circulation on the roads must be the minimum possible whenever the state of the atmosphere permits flying. Whenever an enemy aeroplane is sighted, seek cover immediately under trees or bushes; enter houses, barracks, or dugouts, or keep out of sight behind walls and hedges. Do not move a step. To expose one's self to view by an enemy aeroplane, under the pretext of observing it, is absolutely forbidden.

4. Never park wagons or artillery in an open fields. Always park them under trees or alongside of hedges; if possible, always isolated or in small groups; enter court yards of farms or draw up as closely as possible to walls, houses, etc. When the sun is shining always march in the shade.

5. All vehicles, cannon, and cars, as well as everything which can draw the attention of the aerial observer, such as dumps of timber, munitions, and other materiel, ought to be freshly camouflaged every day, with grass, or, according to the nature of the surrounding ground, with other materials (such as, for instance, the debris of walls in destroyed localities).

6. For any new work, make the camouflage before commencing the work.

7. By night, carefully shield all lights, even where aeroplanes may not habitually come. Mask the windows with dark cloth, pieces of clothing, old tent flies, etc. Every officer must see that these orders are strictly followed for his command, and town majors for their localities. Check up each day to see if all measures have been taken for camouflage against aeroplanes. In all the Zone of the Army the execution of these orders will be supervised by our own aeroplanes and balloons. Offenders will be punished.

The Chief of Staff of the Army:

VON SAUBERZWEIG

General of Brigade.

These instructions will be distributed, in numerous copies, to each company and battery; they will be posted in cantonments, canteens, etc., and will be the subject of numerous lectures to the troops. Furthermore they will be posted in stations, villages etc.

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APPENDIX III.

The enemy now appears to be using a red rocket as a signal for increasing the range. It is suggested that our troops take advantage of this when suitable occasions occur.

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APPENDIX IV.

GERMAN INFANTRY TACTICS DURING THE ATTACK.

(From an Army Bulletin)

1. General Dispositions:

Assault divisions are organized in depth, so as to be able to reinforce the attack with the means at their disposal, and to exploit, without delay, any local success. In general there are two regiments in the first line and one regiment in reserve for the exploitation.

The regiments of the first line often have their three battalions, each behind the other. The leading battalion generally adopts the formation of three companies in line and one company in support, machine guns being assigned to each echelon.

2. The Assault:

The tactics of the assault are based upon an extremely violent and short preparation: at least a partial demoralization of the opposing artillery by a heavy concentration of gas shells, annihilation of the defending troops by minenwerfer and shells of all calibers, and gas shells on the rear areas and the roads which would be used by reinforcements.

In moving out the battalions are organized in several successive waves, very close to each other, and protected by a dense and minutely regulated rolling barrage, as well as by a dense fire of heavy machine guns in position. The first waves are closed in towards the enemy before the hour of the assault.

Distance between the waves is not taken until the enemy position is reached, after having crossed the zone of the hostile barrage. The first waves push straight across the first position, as far as possible, and without worrying itself with the nests of resistance, the mopping up of which is the business of the last wave and of the tanks, if there are any in the attack.

The battalions of the 2nd line support the movement closely, ready to intervene on the flanks or to reinforce the front line.

The reserve regiments also are closed in along the axis of attack of the division, as well as the field batteries which accompany the attack.

3. The Progression:

As soon as the resistance of the enemy becomes strong, and the assaulting line is compelled to halt, it covers itself by a machine gun barrage, to take the place of the artillery barrage, and begins a maneuver of infiltration. This proceeding has nothing new about it: It is simply the moving forward of a skirmish line in open country, from cover to cover and from shell hole to shell hole, by single men and by small groups of men, who take advantage of the terrain and the vegetation, in order to slip in between the resisting points of the enemy, so as to turn them and to facilitate the forward movement of neighboring groups. These nests of resistance are subjected, during the infiltration, to a neutralization fire by heavy machine guns, and to artillery fire, if the batteries accompanying the attack, have been able to take position.

The first line, in this way, is composed of automatic rifles and groups of riflemen, at intervals of a few paces, the latter sticking close to the former, and conforming to their movement. The forward bounds are always undertaken by groups of automatic machine guns, supported by the fire of neighboring groups and by heavy machine guns, echeloned in rear on commanding and flanking positions.

4. The Counter Attack:

If the enemy counter attacks, his first line is met by the fire of groups of light machine guns and riflemen, scattered over the terrain and presenting a small target, while his supports are submitted to a dense fire of heavy machine guns, which attempt to put down a barrage. However, the advanced elements have orders not to fall back a step. Several reports, found upon officer prisoners of Companies in the first line contain requests for reinforcements and for munitions. One brigade commander writes:

"Not one of our soldiers would dare retire from the fight."

A company commander, who had left only one non commissioned officer, six men and one light machine gun writes:

"The enemy has approached to within 100 meters of us. I need ammunition".

To sum up, there is a first phase as quick and brutal as possible, during which the infantry assaults,

covered by a mass of artillery. Then a second phase, more or less slow, according to the resistance of the enemy, of infantry maneuver alone, where the utilization of the terrain and the employment of an intense fire of rifles and machine guns gives an economical forward movement, causing the enemy nests of resistance to fall by the simple menace of envelopment. A close and cut up terrain is very favorable to this maneuver, on which account the Germans have chosen certain regions for their principal attacks. It is necessary to have small units, (squads, companies and battalions) thoroughly trained, with "punch" and initiative and with confidence in the power of their own arms.

Headquarters 1st Division, G-2, A. E. F.

Enemy Divisions, Classification June 20, 1918.

Since the 21st of March these have attacked:

Between Montdidier and Ypres	126 Divisions,
	different.

Between the Oise and Reims	40 " "
(Of these 23 had been in the preceding attack,	
and 17 were new.)	

Between Montdidier and Noyon	19 Divisions,
(Of these 12 had previously	different.
attacked and 7 are new.	

This makes a total of 150 different divisions which have attacked since the 21st of March. Of these 63 have been engaged two times; and ten, three times. Moreover, 20 new divisions, without participating directly in the attack, have been placed in line in the sectors of attack before the battles have completely ceased, and ought not, therefore, to be considered as strictly fresh.

Correct Spelling:

- * Chevregny
- *1 Colligis
- *2 Chamouille

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 23, 1918.

G-2

No. 57

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

The enemy's infantry appears to be everywhere on the alert. Our patrols met with grenade, rifle and machine gun fire whenever they attempted to approach his lines. An enemy patrol of 4 men was seen last night near point 2601.

Intermittent machine gun fire on our front lines during the night.

Machine guns have been reported firing from the vicinity of point 1353, 2805, 2899, 2619, 1728 (approximate). This last gun fired only at night and is probably removed at dawn.

II. ARTILLERY.

Twenty-two hundred shells fell on our sector yesterday, none of which were 210's. Fire by 150's on our front lines east of Grivesnes, Grivesnes Village, the Grivesnes-Le Plessier Road, Le Plessier, Point 2018, Villers Tournelle, Belle Assise, Coullemelle, Rocquencourt, and our line of resistance in the zone of Esclainvillers, about 400 shells in all. The enemy fired more than his normal proportion of shrapnel yesterday, about 10 per cent of his total.

A light adjusting fire by heavy trench mortars was reported this morning on Cantigny and the lines to the north of this town. The trench mortars are thought to be in the Bois Framicourt.

III. WORKS

Smoke seen coming from La Folie Farm at 18h.

A large enemy working party seen on Route Nationale Number 35, in rear of Gratibus.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good from 16h to 21h, poor the rest of the period.

At 19h30 two trucks seen moving from the Bois Vicomte* to La Folie Farm and from there eastward. 53 men passed between La Folie Farm and the Bois de Vicomte* during the day. Men seen at the following points: 1735, 2042, 2809. At 18h8 6 men were seen running from a bursting shell in Mesnil St. George at point 4285.

There was more than normal circulation along all routes in the rear zone yesterday. A total of 49 wagons in small groups were observed moving back and forth between all towns in the rear area. 23 wagons from Piennes to Faverolles late in the afternoon. 400 men were reported to have entered Assainvillers at 21h35. This has not been confirmed. One feature of the circulation was the abnormal number of automobiles observed, 19 in all. Four automobiles were reported in Gratibus and two in Pierrepont yesterday. 50 horsemen from Pierrepont to Fignieres at 20h12.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Four enemy balloons were observed in ascension early this morning.

Aeroplanes: One enemy plane over our front lines yesterday, and two early this morning.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Fires observed in Mesnil St. Georges, Montdidier, and Courtemanche caused by our artillery fire.

At 2h15 this morning three green rockets were put up by the Enemy in front of Grivesnes. At 22h02 two 1-star orange rockets from in front of Le Plessier. At 1h28 numerous caterpillar rockets from Forestel Farm. From 1h to 2h a balloon light was observed in rear of Forestel Farm, also numerous caterpillar rockets parachute flares and anti aircraft activity.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY: The enemy's infantry appears to be on the alert. All of our patrols were met by grenade rifle and machine gun fire. Artillery normal. Aviation, no activity.

*Correct spelling Bois du Vicomte.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 57, June 23, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 81, June 20, 1918.

LIAISON BETWEEN TROOPS AND AVIATION

Translation of a German Order: From Xth French Army Bulletin, June 12, 1918.

33d Reserve Division Division Headquarters, May 24, 1918.

To be Copied by Officers Only Special orders for the cooperation of troops and aviation.

1. INFANTRY.

(a) An infantry aviator will reconnoiter the battle area at X hour plus 240 to observe the progress of the attack, and especially the crossing of the canal in the sector of the right regiment.

(b) The infantry attack will be followed mainly by ground observers, and in order not to cause any pause in the advance of the infantry, an infantry aviator will only call upon them to display their panels at X hour plus 290. The signal will be a rocket with one white star. This is the time when the first objective of the attack should be reached. The first line will show the panels. The progressing elements of infantry will continue the attack. As to the scheme of displaying panels see Annex No. 1.

(c) At 8 o'clock in the evening an infantry machine will definitely ascertain the trace of the infantry first line. At other times aviators will be sent by the Division, depending on the situation.

(d) On days following Y day, an infantry machine will regularly, morning and evening, call for an indication of the first line by the infantry.

(e) The infantry aviator will first mark the trace of the first line on a weighted sketch supplied by the flight; he will then photograph the line. The message bags will be dropped near the C.P. of the division, 500 meters N.W. of Neufchatel. Important information such as concentration of enemy reserves, hostile counter-attacks, and requests for barrage and fire for effect, will be sent by wireless. The receiving stations of the Artillery Commander, and of counter battery and heavy artillery groups, will be in readiness to receive such messages. The flight will inform the

Artillery Commander by wireless of the departure of every infantry aviator for the line. Tank signals will be sent by means of parachute flares.

(f) In order that fleeting targets may be immediately dealt with, the infantry aviator will notify one of the batteries in observation to engage such targets; and if desirable indicate the necessary adjustments by the methods shown in paragraph 2c. The infantry aviator need not pay attention to batteries actually in action.

(g) Infantry elements which are surrounded by the enemy may be furnished by the infantry airplane with ammunition, medical supplies, and rations in small quantities. Supply will be effected by means of baskets with parachute attachment, each containing either 30 rations, 980 cartridges, 40 grenades, or medical supplies.

The following signals are used for communication between infantry and aviators:

"We are surrounded" - A rectangle formed by laying four panel strips together, or the letters G O sent by wireless or visual signalling.

"We need food" - A "T" shaped letter with L base or the letters B M in code.

"We need ammunition" - The letter M in panels or the letters M U in code.

"We need surgical dressings" - The letter Z in panels or the letters V Z in code.

2. ARTILLERY.

(a) The Artillery Commander will be assigned four artillery airplanes. He will prescribe the manner of their employment. On the day of the attack one artillery airplane should always be in observation on the front. If possible, two observation planes will not be used unless hostile batteries are particularly active.

(b) Assignment of Batteries in Observation.

(Assignment followed here).

Each observation battery will be furnished with a wireless receiving outfit. Arrangements in regard to this will be decided by the Chief of Liaison Service in consultation with the Artillery Commander. For each apparatus the Artillery Commander will detail a wireless officer. The duties of this officer are of the utmost importance for liaison between batteries and airplanes. Wireless officers should be chosen who are thoroughly trained in their work, and only highly efficient officers should be detailed. The Chief of Liaison Service of the division will furnish the flight with suitable wireless personnel to receive artillery messages.

For the two receiving stations at divisional C.P. (the Staff and Artillery Commander's stations) the Chief of the Liaison Service will furnish one officer of the wireless service and one orderly. All wireless messages received or sent will be directed to this officer, who will be responsible for encipherment and decipherment, and for the transmission to proper destination.

(c) Employment of artillery airplanes wireless communication.

The classes of artillery aviators are:

1. Aviators of artillery in observation who make reconnaissances of targets and signal for fire against isolated batteries and fleeting targets.

2. Aviators for artillery adjustment, where fire is delivered on battery groups by order of the artillery commander.

1. The aviator for artillery in observation is mainly charged with the reconnaissance of hostile batteries in action; but he also observes the general effect of our own or hostile fire, and such movements in the battle area and in back areas, as columns on the march, reserves, concentrations, tanks. etc. He advances beyond our lines under protection of pursuit flights. He reports by wireless as follows:

a. To the batteries in observation on isolated hostile batteries in action; using his judgment as to whether or not he shall adjust the fire. He determines from the artillery target maps which batteries are known and which are new. He calls first the observation batteries of Groups "Aka" and "Feka".

b. If many batteries are in action at the same time, the artillery aviator notifies the Artillery Commander by wireless as to the section in which the hostile activity is the most marked. The Artillery Commander then gives his counter battery orders and designates on which batteries fire will be adjusted by airplane, sending out a machine for this purpose.

2. For the above purpose a machine for artillery adjustment will be in readiness on the intermediate landing field of Avaux. This field will be connected directly by telephone with the Artillery Commander; he will instruct the adjustment airplane concerning the hostile batteries and the order in which adjustment is to be made.

3. The following is a list of dropping stations:

For-	Location -	By -	Identification Panel.
Divisional Information Center. . .	Hill 100	-- ..66th Res. Brigade	Large white circle with a red cross in center.
Aka Group	Point 02.09, Art. 23 b	Commander	Large white letter "A".
Feka Group. . . .	Point 01.11	25c Art. "	Large white Letter "F"
C.P. of Division.	Hill 98 N.W. of Neufchatel	Aviation liaison Officer.	

Some one will be continuously on duty at these stations, the personnel of which should be trained in the use of light and smoke signals.

4. AVIATION.

a. When returning to the lines, all airplanes will land at Avaux. The observer will immediately telephone his report to Cavalry Captain Voss at Section Ia of the General Staff; besides artillery aviators will telephone the Artillery Commander.

b. The first report on the examination of photographs will be telephoned immediately to the Division, and in case of important developments an unfinished proof will be sent at once.

c. The flight will report each evening the number of machines available for the next day to Captain of Cavalry Voss.

(Signed) VON BARFUSS.
May 24, 1918.

Annex 1.

Note Ia 280 of the
33d Reserve Division

DISPLAY OF PANELS

(1) Liaison panels for infantry airplanes will not be shown for the purpose of marking the line, except upon signal by the aviator. This is a rocket with one white star.

Panels will remain displayed until the infantry aviator has left the sector. He can be recognized by long red, white, and black streamers attached to his lower plane.

C.P.'s of battalions and regiments may signal to the infantry machines by use of panels without waiting for a flare from the plane.

(2) Four or five panels formed end to end in a straight line will always be displayed. Single panels are not distinguishable. Do not stretch panels in the trenches or in shell holes, but on the parapet or parados. On a light-colored background display the red side, and on a dark-colored background display the white side. Substitute newspapers for panels if necessary.

Only the first line of the infantry should display panels. This is extremely important in order to avoid confusion. In advancing do not leave old panels behind. To help in marking the trace of the line, the infantry is authorized to use white flares with one or more lights, Bengal fire, or red fire. In woods Bengal fire will always be used. Generally panels should be used in addition to flares.

APPENDIX II. (From G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 82,
INDIRECT FIRE WITH MODEL '08 MACHINE GUN.

Order Issued by German G.H.Q., May 20, 1918 (Ic.86.703 op);
From French IIIrd Army Bulletin, June 17, 1918.

"It has been shown on various occasions that there still exists some uncertainty as to the purpose and method of indirect fire with the Model '08 machine gun.

"Before opening fire, a thorough examination of the ground must be made, taking into consideration the flat trajectory of the Model '08 machine gun.

"Select a firing position and an observation post.

"Use the aiming apparatus with absolute precision.

"Establish sure liaison-

"1. Between the observer and the firing position.

"2. With the infantry over which the fire is directed.

"In order that the indirect fire may be effective, observation must be made during the ranging fire as well as during the fire for effect.

"Indirect fire, when executed without using the regulation aiming apparatus or with a makeshift to replace it and which is confined to firing with high elevation over the undulations of the ground, amounts to nothing but a confused spray of bullets. It is a useless waste of ammunition which is wholly unjustified and which must be forbidden in the same manner as indirect fire with the Model '08 - '15 machine gun.

"The peculiar characteristics of indirect fire require some time for its preparation and execution. This time depends upon the skill of the commanding officer and the ability of the men. Indirect fire belongs rather to the sphere of defensive operations, as the latter permit realising all of the preliminary conditions required for the serious application of this method of firing. It may likewise be

employed to advantage in the preparation and even in the first phase of an attack.

During the progress of an attack, on the other hand, it is nearly always necessary to make use of direct fire. Furthermore, during occasional lulls in the fighting, if hostile fire forces the Model '08 machine guns to resume distribution in depth, it will be of advantage to employ indirect fire.

"One company in each detachment of picked machine gunners will always be equipped with the new aiming apparatus, graduated circle, goniometer, sighting triangle."

(Signed) LUDENDORFF.

G-2
No. 58

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 24, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(From June 23, 12h to June 24, 12h.)
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY

I. INFANTRY.

Enemy machine guns were active during the night, firing along our front lines at frequent intervals. Indirect machine gun fire on the Village of Le Plessier at 21h45.

The following enemy machine gun emplacements have been reported: Points: 2334, 1728, 19²23³, 20422⁷, 196248, (?) 2999⁵, 2805, 3109 (near road, southwest corner of the small wood).

II. ARTILLERY.

2100 enemy shells during the period covered by this report. Fire by 150's on Grivesnes, Septoutre Ravine, Grivesnes Parc, Grivesnes-Le Plessier Road, Bois Coullemelle, Villers Tournelle, Broyes, about 200 in all. Adjusting fire on Grivesnes, P.O. Magador, Cantigny, Coullemelle, Mesnil St. Firmin, and trenches west of Serevillers. Very heavy harassing fire on the Bois Avance and the Bois de Villers.

From 9h30 to 10h. June the 23rd 15 trench mortar shells (220's) (?) fell on the region of point 2118.

III. WORKS.

At 17h30 three men were seen erecting wire at point 2037. The enemy is organizing a shell hole at point 1931 near a hay-stack. Three enemy machine guns have been reported within 100 yards of this hay-stack. Germans were seen digging in the vicinity of point 3193.

Camouflage has been constructed at 8607. Four men observed carrying logs at 7502. Men seen loading hay at points 8505 and 0112.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good from 12h to 20h yesterday, poor the rest of the period.

There was considerable circulation of isolated individuals from La Folie Farm to the Bois Vicomte* and Malpart, also in and around Gratibus and Bouillancourt. Several men were seen going from the front lines opposite St. Aignan to La Folie Farm. Isolated groups of individuals seen at points 2498, 2909, 3109.

Circulation was normal along all routes in the rear zone. Very few troops observed. Approximately one platoon was seen going from Montdidier to Laboissiere via Etelfay, yesterday afternoon. One lorry en route from Montdidier to Guerbigny was hit by a shell at point 8101 at 7h50 this morning and completely destroyed. Only three motor cars were seen this morning. Three lorries and four wagons entered Gratibus from Fignieres, yesterday afternoon, at about 20h.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: 8 enemy balloons seen in ascension this morning. All of these down by 10h45.

Airplanes: The enemy's planes showed a considerable increase in activity over that of the last few days. Our anti-aircraft and chase planes appeared very effective. 6 enemy planes endeavored to cross our lines in the region of Cantigny several times this morning and were repeatedly driven back by our anti-aircraft and chase planes. A group of enemy planes over Cantigny last night dropped 9 bombs on our forward positions.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Fires observed in Montdidier and Mesnil St. Georges during the night. The usual balloon lights, searchlights, and rocket signals throughout the hours of darkness.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Enemy's infantry appears still to be very alert. The artillery fire is normal. An increase in air activity.

*Correct spelling Bois du Vicomte.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 58, JUNE 24,
1918.

I.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information, No. 83, June 22,
1918.

GERMAN POWER BUZZERS

From French IIIrd Army Bulletin, June 18, 1918.

Information obtained from a captured specialist:

The power buzzer service is carried out by the same divisional detachment as the radio service (Divisions Funker Abteilung, abbr. Difua or Divfunka)

Within the divisions the power buzzer stations are distributed as follows:

One station for the brigade, one station for each regimental headquarters, one station for each battalion in line; that is to say, seven stations for the division.

The number of stations varies slightly at times; it happens for example, that the distance between two stations requires an intermediate one, but this is always considered as exceptional.

In general, the power buzzer station (Erdfunkerstation) is in the same dugout with the command post to which it pertains.

No regulations fix the pitch of sending; it is left to the judgment of the operator who regulates it in order that the receiver may hear as well as possible.

A commutator permits of five different pitches, from low to high.

The German power buzzer system has been considerably extended and has been accompanied by a reduction in the use of the telephone.

Each station can communicate not only with the station of the unit immediately above or below it, but also with all its neighbors.

In this connection the usefulness of multiple bases with several orientations permitting sending in all directions has been recognized.

At present German machines are constructed for a maximum of five bases with lengths varying from 50 to 150 meters.

Each machine can be used either for sending or receiving.

The artillery sometimes uses the power buzzer system as far as the brigade which telephones to the batteries concerned.

The power buzzer is much used in stable sectors, but is not employed during an advance, when the telephone alone is employed.

It seems that the Germans have a very important power buzzer system. The degree of perfection reached by its organization shows that they intend to increase the importance of its role with regard to communications in the advanced zone.

* * * * *

APPENDIX II.

GERMAN RUSE

From French IIId Army Bulletin, June 18, 1918.
Information Obtained from prisoners:

In order to deceive the French and simulate concentration of troops during the nights preceding the offensive of May 27, hostile regiments resting in rear of the Montdidier front were ordered to light fires during two successive nights.

* * * * *

APPENDIX III.

GERMAN ATTACK TACTICS

From French IIId Army Bulletin, June 18, 1918.

While training in the region of Maubeuge the Guard Cavalry Division (dismounted) carried out maneuvers with a view to open warfare only. The attack drill was made according to a new method, intended to avoid the heavy losses suffered in the offensive of March 21. Instead of continuous waves of assault, the squads were echeloned and placed unmasking each other at about 60 meters distance and interval.

APPENDIX IV. From an Army Bulletin.

While the Balkan Front has occupied little of our attention, yet it is interesting to note that there are now 14 Bulgarian Divisions, 2 Austrian ones and a few Turkish battalions. That the morale of the Bulgarians is far from being high, is shown by the fact that there were 86 deserters during a few days in May, 38 of which were from one Division. The deserters displayed considerable hostility towards Germany, and had no desire to continue a war which was to Germany's profit alone. The most hostile elements were the men who had been most recently in contact with the civilian population, men who had returned from their regiments from the Roumanian front during the winter and had passed some time in the interior of Bulgaria. While the morale of certain regiments was particularly bad, the belief is that even their best regiments are disaffected. The deserters stated that many of their comrades were hostile towards the present government because of the concessions which Germany had forced Bulgaria to make to Turkey. They stated that the hostility towards Germany was becoming greater and greater.

APPENDIX V. From an Army Bulletin.

A document from the 7th German Army, dated the 8th of May, has been recently captured, and is of interest primarily because it shows the proportion of various shells employed in the May offensive.

For counter battery work and long range firing (77's, 105's, 150 Howitzers, and 10 cm. guns) 20 per cent was high explosive, 70 per cent blue cross (sneezing gas), and 10 per cent green cross shells (Diphosgene and mixtures of that with Chloro Picrine). The 150 guns, used only high explosive. In order to form an idea of the rapidity of fire during the preparation for an attack, it may be noted that, for the later attack of the 9th of June, one battery of 77's fired an average of one shot per piece per minute.

For the fire against infantry (77's, 105's and 150 Howitzers), rolling barrage, the proportions were: High explosive, 60 per cent; blue cross, 30 per cent; green cross, 10 per cent. The 210 mortars fired only high explosive.

For the fire against infantry, box barrages, the proportions were: high explosive, 30 per cent; blue cross, 60 per cent; and green cross, 10 per cent.

The document particularly warned against the danger of confusing the yellow cross with the yellow cross No. 1, stating that the former would be fired under no circumstances. The distinction made by the German's between the yellow cross (Yperite) and the yellow cross No. 1, is to be noted. In the order it stated that the yellow cross No. 1 could be used in place of the green cross. It seems that the yellow cross No. 1 shells are charged with Ethyldichloroarsine, which has an effect not unlike that of blue cross, but more violent.

APPENDIX VI. Desertion in the Turkish Army.

On the Mesopotamian front, during the last half of May there were 179 desertions to the English, 5 of whom were officers. This brings the total of desertions, for one year on this front, to 1571.

G-2
No. 59

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 25, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(From June 24, 12h. to June 25, 1ah.)
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Intermittent machine gun fire during the night on our front lines. Indirect fire on P. C. Magador and the C. T. connecting it with Le Plessier. Our raiding party in the Bois Allonge last night, was fired on by machine guns from points 3399, 29⁵99⁵, and also rifle fire was directed against it from a trench reported to be about 35 yards in rear of the crest in the Bois Allonge.

A new machine gun has been reported at 1920. The machine gun at 1728 has been silenced by our artillery.

II. ARTILLERY.

Twenty-one hundred shells fell on our sector yesterday. There was little adjusting or destruction fire, mostly harassing and retaliation. A concentration on the Grivesnes-Le Plessier Road and rather heavy fire on Cantigny during the period covered by this report. Very few 150's were reported.

III. WORKS.

An enemy working party heard in the vicinity of 29599⁵.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good from 18 to 21 hours. Poor the rest of the period.

Thirty-two men from the Bois Vicomte* to La Folie Farm during the day. Isolated individuals seen at 3109, 2909, 2498.

There was an increase in the circulation along the routes in the rear zone.-7 lorries from Bouillancourt to Fignieres and 13 lorries from Fignieres to Bouillancourt between 20h and 21h. 13 wagons, 20 men and 2 carts along the same route during the same period. 10 wagons entered Pierrepont from Fignieres at 20h10. A total of 51 wagons and 28 lorries was observed yesterday afternoon.

One of our observation posts reports that the small stretch of the secondary Fignieres- St. Martin Road; visible at point 7006 was the first road in the enemy's rear area to become dusty after the last rain. As there is practically no traffic on this route in the daytime it is possible that it is used for heavy night traffic.

Thirty men were seen yesterday in a field near point 7507 at 18h40. They later moved to point 9207 and disappeared.

One train going south on the Roye-Chaulnes Railroad at 19h10.

V. AIRCRAFT.

No enemy balloons reported in ascension.

Seven enemy planes over our lines yesterday and today.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

From 22h16 to 24h large explosions occurred to the south of Montdidier.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Artillery- Normal. Infantry- Quiet. Aviation - No activity.

* Correct Spelling - "Bois du Vicomte" - S.G.W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 59, JUNE 25, 1918.

I.

1. The following is a short summary of the kinds of gas shells more commonly used by the enemy, with their characteristics.

2. All the types of gas shells enumerated below were fired by each of the following guns, the only exception being Green Cross 2, which was not fired by 77 field guns:-

77 field guns, 96 n/A and '16
105 light field howitzers, '98/'09, '16 and Krupp.
10 cm. guns '04 and '14.
15 cm. heavy field howitzers
15 cm. long gun.
21 cm. Mortar.

Type	Filling	Nature
Green Cross	Diphosgene	Lethal
Green Cross 1	Diphosgene with 30-66% chloro picrin	Lethal
Green Cross 2	60% Phosgene 25-30% Diphosgene 10-15% Diphenylchlor-arsine	Causes sneezing in addition to lethal effects
Blue Cross	Diphenylchlorarsine and high explosive.	Causes sneezing in addition to H.E. effect.
Yellow Cross	Dichlorethyl sulphide	Lethal and attacks skin and eyes.
Yellow Cross 1	Probably ethyldichlorarsine	Similar to blue cross, but more violent.

APPENDIX II. PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE. (From an Army Bulletin)

(Translation of a German Document, with neither date nor signature, captured on an officer).

Attention is called to the following points:

The garrison of a strong point ought to provide a defence in depth. In the strong point one or more of the elements constituting it, placed toward the rear, and organized for a resistance to the death, will be furnished a picked garrison, for the purpose of holding back the enemy and assisting a counter attack.

The strong point should be covered on its flanks by barbed wire. The accessory defences of the strong point itself should not be placed only on the edge of the strong point. On the contrary it is better to place them in the interior so that they can not be easily destroyed by the enemy.

It is essential to have machine gun nests placed on the sides of the strong point so that the enemy attack against the flanks of the strong point can be itself taken in enfilade. During the attack on an enemy strong point and during the counter attack against a lost strong point, one should, in general, make the principal effort on the flanks, rather than on the front. Once the flanks have been forced, the strong point will be mopped up with strong detachments and the face opposing the enemy will be at once occupied. Of course local conditions may cause a modification of the direction of attack.

During the mopping up, the destructive fire of our artillery will be regulated by placing panels.

The reserves must follow close so that they may not be caught in the enemy's box barrage. They will thus be placed to repulse the enemy's counter attack, which will certainly come.

As the continuity of our larger attacks frequently leads the army into a country covered with hedges, orchards, and forests, it is essential that our troops should be exercised and trained with a view to operation in such a country. This should be practical, if possible, otherwise theoretical. During the march and combat in close country, particularly in woods, liaison must be very close in every direction. Formations in long lines of skirmishers, employed in an open country, must be abandoned, as well as the bringing up of reserves in deployed formations. The leading elements will advance, by preference, in lines of platoons, at least in lines of squads, in order to avoid dispersion (non commissioned officers or picked men in the rear). The chief of platoon or of squad thus has his men in hand and can deploy them immediately as skirmishers when the enemy is encountered.

Commanders of companies, platoons, and squads have, therefore, the true direction of the fight. Success depends on their resolution, their prudence, and their ability. A sharp and rapid attack with the rifle, the grenades and the bayonet will succeed well in woods.

No enemy resists our rush. The light trench mortars, grenade throwers, and the accompanying artillery, are of undoubted utility. The battalion commander ought to fully utilize these and have them advance at any cost. The reserves ought to follow close up and the accompanying artillery stick close to the infantry.

The staffs, including the Division Staff, will be pushed to the front. Liaison, not only from front to rear, but also from rear to front, and the lateral liaisons, must be kept up with the utmost energy. The supply of munitions for the infantry in the front line and for the trench mortars, grenade throwers and accompanying artillery, must be particularly looked after.

Follow out these principles in advancing, and success is assured.

APPENDIX III. LEAVES IN THE GERMAN ARMY.

(From an Army Bulletin).

Information obtained from interrogatories of prisoners captured from the 13th to the 19th of June.

In all the known divisions the question of leaves seems to have been settled as follows: Leaves, which were suppressed toward the end of February, remained so to the end of April, exception being made in very unusual cases only. During the last part of April the reopening of leaves was announced; but in fact in each company only a very few farmers benefited by this.

The men, many of whom had not had a leave for more than a year, showed very strongly their discontent, and even at this time certain isolated cases of insubordination occurred.

The high command judged it advisable to give better satisfaction to the troops, and, in all the divisions, leaves were reopened on the 15th of May, although only a very small proportion is permitted to leave (3 to 5 per cent).

Every company, including those in the front line, has three or four men on leave (duration 21 days). As soon as they return to their unit, an equal number of leaves are granted. Even during an offensive this holds true.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 25, 1918.

G 2.

Memorandum No. 35.

1. It is proposed to print at these headquarters, and issue maps, according to table herewith:

	1:10,000				1:5,000			
	Ordinary:Background:Secret:Ordinary				Ordinary:Background:Secret:Ordinary			
	N.	S.	N.	S.	N.	S.	A:B:C	A:B:C
Cos.A1 and A3 each:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:	:
Cos.A2 and A4 each:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:5:	:
Bn. A Hdqrs.	:	2:	:	2:	:	10	5:5:	5:5:
Reg. Hdq. 26th	:	5:	:	5:	:	10	5:5:	5:5:
Cos.D1,D2,D3,D4, each	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:
Bn. D Hdqrs.	:	2:	:	2:	:	10	5:	5:
Reg. Hdq. 28th	:	5:	:	5:	:	10	5:	5:
Brig.Hdq.2nd Brig:	:	5:	:	5:	:	10	5:5:	5:5:
TOTAL BRIGADE	19		19		50		15:25	25:35
Cos.G1 and G3, each:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:
Cos.G2 and G4, each:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:5:
Bn. G hdqrs.	2	:	2	:	10	:	5:5:	5:5:
Reg. Hdq. 16th	5	:	5	:	10	:	5:5:	5:5:
Cos.K1,K2,K3,K4, each	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5:
Bn. Hdqrs. K.	2	:	:	:	10	:	5:	5:
Reg. Hdq. 18th	5	:	5	:	10	:	5:	5:
Brig.Hdq.1st Brig:	5	:	5	:	10	:	5:5:	5:5:
TOTAL BRIGADE	19		19		50		15:25	35:55
TOTAL DIVISION	19	19	19	19	50	50	15:40:25:35:50:55:	
ISSUE								

2. They will be issued from time to time as our facilities permit, until the full number indicated in table shall have been issued. Intelligence officers of each echelon will see that issues are made in strict accordance with table.

3. Steps will be taken by intelligence officers to insure that the maps are issued as indicated, each officer reporting when this fact has been ascertained by him, to the intelligence officer of the next higher echelon.

4. On each occasion of a relief of a front line battalion, the regimental intelligence officer will caution the old battalion to turn over all maps of this issue to the incoming battalion.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 26, 1918.

G-2 -
No. 60

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 25 12h, to June 26 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Intermittent machine gun fire on our front lines during the night.

Eight trench mortar shells on our lines to the north of Cantigny at 10h yesterday.

II. ARTILLERY.

A heavy bombardment of our lines from Cantigny northward, commencing at 3h45. At 3h55 our artillery started counter preparation, and at 4h08 the enemy's fire slackened. All quiet at 4h15.

Fire by 150's on Grivesnes, Grivesnes-Septoutre Road, Parc of Grivesnes, Bois de Coullémelle, Cantigny, Bois Fontaine*, Broyes, Bois de Villers, and Boyau Lewis. About 40 per cent of the total number of shells fired yesterday were 150's which is an increase over that of the last few weeks. No 210's were reported. The total number of shells falling on the sector was about 2200.

III. WORKS.

A small enemy working party observed at 3109. There is a new trench in Mesnil St. Georges at point 4686. The sounds of digging and of the driving of stakes were heard last night to the southwest of the Bois de Lalval.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was poor all day.

Men seen circulating in the front lines in the vicinity of point 1631.

The circulation was less than normal along all routes in the rear zone yesterday, probably due to the bad visibility. Only three lorries, 12 wagons and four motors were observed during the period covered by this report.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Four enemy balloons observed in ascension yesterday afternoon, and nine this morning. One enemy balloon made three ascensions yesterday afternoon, and three this morning before 5h20.

Aeroplanes. Nine enemy planes flew over our lines yesterday afternoon, observing and patrolling. They were all fired on by A.A. or Machine guns and two over Broyes were chased by French planes. One plane very low over Rocquencourt at 5h30 this morning. Ten other planes over our lines this morning.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

An enemy machine gun at 1728 has been silenced by our Stokes mortars.

Previous to the enemy's bombardment last night the following rocket signals were sent up in succession from his front lines: 1 3-star white, 1 4-star white, 7 1-star green, 1 5-star white.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet.

Correct spelling * BOIS de FONTAINE.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 60, JUNE 26, 1918.

The accompanying map is a tracing made from a battle map of the 28th German Division, and was captured by American troops at Bois de Belleau about June 13, 1918. The map undoubtedly accompanied the divisional attack order for the original advance of the 28th Division in the Aisne offensive on May 27, 1918.

The heavy red lines mark the limits of the divisional sector; the light red lines, those of the regiments. The purple lines indicate the routes of advance of the regiments, and their local objectives.

It is to be noted that the normal manner of printing names and conventional signs is departed from and that they are inverted so that, for use during the advance, the map may be oriented and names easily read from the enemy's viewpoint.

It is extremely interesting to notice the attack tactics used. While one battalion attacked on a front of over two kilometers, the remaining eight battalions were concentrated on a front of about one kilometer. The turning movement executed in this very audacious plan of attack, is shown in the accompanying sketch.

APPENDIX II. Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 85.

ACCOMPANYING BATTERIES.

Prisoners and documents recently captured give the following additional information on the use of accompanying batteries in the last offensive. (See Summary of Information No. 66, June 5.)

The mission of the accompanying batteries was in the main the same as in the March and April offensives, i.e. reduction of machine gun nests and strong points which had not been destroyed during the artillery preparation. In addition they were used to give general support to the infantry after the latter had begun to pass beyond the range of the creeping barrage.

During the March attacks the allotment of accompanying artillery was one battery to each infantry regiment. In the attack on Mount Kemmel, the latter part of April, a few regiments were assigned two batteries. In the offensive of May 27 and June 9, the regular allotment seems to have been one battery for each battalion in the first line and one battery for each regiment in the second line.

The batteries were furnished by the divisional artillery and were under the direct orders of the commander of the infantry unit to which they were assigned. Groups of mountain artillery, infantry guns and marine landing batteries were also assigned to infantry units in certain cases.

The necessity for a large supply of ammunition for these batteries is insisted upon. Each gun was assigned an additional caisson taken from the battalion combat train. Infantry battalion and regimental commanders under whose orders the batteries were placed were required to keep themselves informed of the ammunition supply in order that it might not be wasted in fire against targets of minor importance.


Batteries are instructed to advance by echelons of sections or double sections in order that there may always be guns in position ready to engage a target. All reserve troops, whether especially detailed for this purpose or not, must assist in moving guns and ammunition forward if required. The infantry commander


designates the targets but the commander of a double section may open fire on any suitable targets on his own initiative. Direct fire from positions on a crest at short range is recommended. Fire against an isolated machine gun nest should be executed by a single piece, and conducted by its chief. Instruction of section commanders in observation and conduct of fire, with this end in view, is especially emphasized.

Communication between the battery and the battalion which it supports is of vital importance. Artillery observers should accompany the first infantry line, and a liaison officer from the battery should be with the battalion commander. Several separate means of communication must be established in order that one at least may always be in operation.


When a number of field and heavy batteries have been brought up by orders of the division, additional artillery will become available for the engagement of machine gun nests. Where the infantry advance is checked it is recommended that some of these batteries be assigned to infantry regimental commanders for use against these points.

A Ludendorff order of May 13 prescribes the use against centers of resistance of long H. E. shell or model 1916, H. E., half of which should be provided with delay fuse and armor piercing head if targets sufficiently protected are anticipated, and the other half with instantaneous fuse (EKZ). A certain number of Blue Cross gas shells should also be included. Smoke shells may be employed in case of need. Against visible machine guns in the open H.E. with instantaneous fuse should be used, or Blue Cross shell if the friendly infantry is not too near the objective. Against machine guns not accurately located, rocket fire with delay fuse or salvos of Blue Cross are recommended.





LEGEND

Heavy Red =  + 
 Light Red = 
 Purple =  110

T.D.G-2 1st Div A.E.F.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 27, 1918.

G-2-
No. 61

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From June 26, 12h to June 27 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

One of our outposts to the north of Cantigny was attacked by three of the enemy at 3h this morning. They were driven off by rifle fire. Indirect machine gun fire on Le Plessier and the vicinity of the Chateau Cantigny last night, short bursts along the rest of the front.

Between 13 and 14h 26 trench mortar shells of large caliber fell in the vicinity of point 2516 and 2313.

Two enemy machine guns have been seen firing from the vicinity of point 1921⁵. Machine guns fired at an aeroplane from the Bois Carriers. Machine gun emplacements at 3109 and 3807 are reported to be occupied.

II. ARTILLERY.

There was a marked decrease in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday, about 1200 shells in all. Bombardment of the Bois Coullemelle from 11h to 14h with 105's and of the village of Coullemelle with 150's from 11h30 to 12h30, about 350 shells in all. About 30 shells, gas, H.E. and shrapnel, on the northwest corner of the Bois de la Herelle in the afternoon. 25 150's in the vicinity of the railroad station at Breteuil Embranchment last night at midnight. An adjustment by aeroplanes on battery positions 341 west of Broyes, early this morning. Rather heavy fire on Cantigny from 9h30 to 10h30.

III. WORKS.

Working parties were heard last night in the southwestern edge of the Bois de Lalval and in the Bois de Framicourt. A wiring party of 25 men in front of the trench running along the western edge of the Parc of the Chateau Jenlis last night. One of our scouts reports 12 men working at point 3007 at 1h30.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was poor all day.

Considerable movement observed at point 3326 and 2828. The usual circulation of isolated individuals between La Folie Farm, Malpart, and the Bois Vicomte. Six men seen at point 2334.

At 18h30 30 horses were observed grazing in the field at point 9502. The Boussicourt-Montdidier and the Fignieres-Montdidier roads have been reported as being much used each afternoon at dusk, whereas there is practically no traffic on them in the daytime. This would probably indicate that they are used for night traffic in place of Route Nationale No. 35. Very little circulation observed on the routes in the rear zone either yesterday or to-day.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: One balloon observed in ascension in front of our sector yesterday afternoon.

Aeroplanes: Nine enemy aeroplanes over our lines during the period covered by this report. One plane circled over the rear areas from 22h35 to 24h, dropped four bombs on La Faloise, and sent up several flares.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Ten direct hits by one of our 37mm guns on a machine gun emplacement at 3909.

A green rocket up in front of Cantigny at 23h15.

A balloon light observed in direction of Courtemanche at 1h.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 61,
JUNE 27, 1918.

---:
ARTILLERY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE THIRD RESERVE DIVISION,
IN THE SECTOR SOUTHWEST OF ROLLOT ON THE 9th OF JUNE.
(From an Army Bulletin.)

Documents captured during recent attacks mention the composition and various tasks of the artillery placed at the disposal of the 3rd Reserve Division for its attack, on June 9, in the area bounded:

To the northwest, by the line - Le Tronquois*
(excluded) - Eastern Fringe of Tricot:

To the east by the line: Eastern Fringe of Mortemer-Western Fringe of Beloy.*1

The attack started on a frontage of 4 kilometers, but the area of attack became wider as the attack progressed, ultimately reaching a width of 5½ kilometers.

The attack was checked on the front Courcelles-Mery.

AMOUNT OF ARTILLERY PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE DIVISION.

20 batteries of 77's

9 batteries of 105's.

5 batteries of 15 cm. howitzers, Model 1902.

7 batteries of 15 cm. long howitzers, Model 1913.

13 batteries of heavy howitzers and of mortars.

Total: - 54 batteries.

During the recent offensives of May and June, the tactical groupings of artillery appear to have been constituted as follows:

1. Artillery of Attack. at the disposal of the division.

This artillery includes:

The IKA (Infanterie Kampf Artillerie - Infantry-fighting-artillery), directly supporting the infantry attack with barrages and box barrages and consisting of field artillery and howitzers, subdivided into several sub-groupings.

One heavy grouping (mortars), assigned the task of destruction fire and other shoots which may become necessary during the attack.

Accompanying batteries, consisting, as a rule, of a group of 77's per division (one battery per regiment of infantry).

2. Counter Battery Artillery.

AKa (Artillerie Kampf Artillerie = Artillery-fighting-artillery).

The artillery of attack is no longer charged with all the counter battery work; a number of artillery groupings placed under the division and Army Corps are specialized in engaging enemy batteries. This class of artillery probably comprises a larger proportion of long range guns.

For instance, in the attack of the 222d Division against Le Ployron on June 9, the artillery groupings in action in the division's sector included:

- 6 batteries of heavy howitzers or mortars;
- 4 batteries of 10cm. long or 15cm. long guns.

Hence it seems probable that to the 54 batteries placed at the disposal of the 3rd Reserve Division there should be added the AKA batteries, which are not mentioned on the captured documents, and which may have numbered some ten or fifteen batteries (4 to 5 batteries per kilometer of frontage).

3. Long Range Artillery.

Feka (Fern Kampf Artillerie, "Distant-fighting artillery) and "very heavy artillery" (called "Barbara", in the offensive of May 27) which is at the disposal of the Army Corps or Army, and which is charged with long range destruction-, interdiction, and harassing shoots. The author of the 3rd Reserve Division's plan of operation wished to engage successively each of our points of support or zones of resistance. He arranged for successive box fires around each one of them with the intention of pinching them between the rolling barrage proper and a curtain of fire which would cut them off from the rear and blind the batteries. At the same time the mortars pounded the important points of the area thus surrounded.

In order to deliver these successive box barrages there was constituted a special grouping. This grouping consisted solely of 77's, for it had to be extremely flexible and be able to change from one objective to another with great speed, even though these objectives lay in different directions. This was grouping B (IKaB) which will be mentioned later.

Thus these three separate tasks were carried out by three groupings:

Grouping A (IKaA), delivering the rolling barrage proper and including:

- 10 77 batteries.
- 9 105 batteries.
- 5 15cm. howitzers, Model 1902
- 7 15cm. long howitzers.

Grouping B. (IKaB) including 10 77mm. batteries.

A grouping of mortar batteries and of surveillance batteries, including 13 batteries, the calibers of which are not given in the document.

The batteries of this last grouping made a larger number of destructive shoots on P.C.s, O.P.s and batteries, beyond the zone of the rolling barrage but not as far as the barrage of the (IKaB)

It is difficult to understand the exact meaning of the term "surveillance artillery" in this case, for all the batteries of the grouping seem to have been used constantly against predetermined objectives.

The rolling barrage of the IKaA was less minutely regulated as regards timing than was that of the attack of March 21. The jumps of the barrage varied in length: at first it jumped 125 meters every 5 minutes. Later it jumped the same distance every 10 minutes. It

finally jumped a maximum distance of 250 meters every 20 minutes. This barrage included, however, the same fan-movement around probable centers of resistance as during the attack of March 21.

In order to obtain a definite idea of the IKaB batteries, we can take the 9th Battery of the 265th Artillery Regiment as an example:

From Y minus 10 to Y plus 5; it fired on our second positions in front of Mery, on a frontage of 375 meters.

From Y plus 5 to Y plus 15 it delivered a box barrage behind Mortemer on a frontage of 125 meters.

From Y plus 15 to Y plus 100, box barrage and rolling barrage on Courcelles on a frontage of 125 meters.

From Y plus 100 to Y plus 170 it resumes its original shoot on our second position in front of Mery.

From Y plus 170 to Y plus 360, it delivers a box barrage and rolling barrage east of Mery on a frontage of 500 meters.

After that this battery was to fire until reaching its extreme range, jumping 200 meters every 10 minutes.

AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION USED.

The maximum number of H.E. shells to be fired per hour per battery was:

400 rounds per 77mm. battery.

300 rounds per 105mm. battery.

180 rounds per 15 cm. howitzer battery.

75 rounds per mortar battery.

* Correct spelling: Le Tronquoy

*1 " " Belloy.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX II.

From G.H.Q. Summary No. 75, June 14, 1918.

SECRECY IN OPERATIONS

From British Summary, June 11, 1918.

An order of the 183d Div., dated March 13, 1918, for the approach march prior to the attack on March 21, shows the precautions taken by the enemy to conceal his movements and intentions:-

(a) **SECRECY OF ORDER.*** The heading of the order states that it is conveyed by an officer. It is further stated that only extracts from these orders are to be communicated to the troops.

(b) **CONCEALMENT OF MOVEMENT.-** The division was to move into the assembly area during the night of "zero minus 2" to zero minus 1" day. The infantry, two field batteries and four horsed trench mortar wagons were to start immediately it was dusk.

"The baggage sections of the train will remain in their localities as ordered.

"Traveling kitchens will accompany units on the approach march. The supply and forage wagons will remain with the baggage section of the train, and will follow on later. The ration wagons will not be sent up to the troops on "zero minus one" day: during the night "zero minus two" to "zero minus one," rations for "zero

minus one" and "zero" days will therefore, have to be carried on the travelling kitchens or any other transport. Traveling kitchens will not be sent back."

(c) CONCEALMENT IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA.

"All units of the division must be completely established in their areas by daybreak on "zero minus two", or, as the case may be, "zero minus one" day, and must be so disposed as to be completely protected from balloon and airplane observation. The strictest discipline must be maintained in the bivouac grounds. Every officer and man must remain under cover. The position must on no account be disclosed to the enemy, otherwise heavy casualties must be expected. Each individual man must realize this.

"The necessary reconnaissance of the bivouac grounds and the placing in readiness of materiel for concealment against air observation will be carried out forthwith. A bivouac commander will be appointed for each bivouac ground, and will be responsible for maintaining order and for seeing that protection from air observation is complete No camp fires will be allowed.

"The grazing of horses by day is strictly prohibited."

G 2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 27, 1918.

Memorandum for Brigade and Regimental Intelligence
Officers.

1. A recent communication from the Corps calls our attention to the fact that this division has been issued almost three times the number of maps normally issued a French division. This is in addition to the complete allowance which was issued us by another Corps on entering the sector, and in addition also to the maps issued us by the former Army, and the large number given us by the divisions we relieved.

2. In effect, the Corps has informed us that facilities permit only a certain number of maps to be made; that they can continue to give us maps at the rate they have been, only by depriving French divisions of their badly needed number; and that we shall have to get along in future with the same allowance, our numbers considered, as the French do.

3. It is believed that our officers and men do not take the same care of maps that the French do. Intelligence and scout officers must make every effort to teach our men that maps represent labor, and have value. Economy in preserving them must be practiced in this as in other matters. Cases have occurred of valuable plan directeurs being employed for a change of position of a smaller unit, where no map or at most a background would have been equally well.

4. To meet the present emergency, the division is undertaking to print a limited number of maps, as indicated in Memorandum 35, G 2. However our facilities are inadequate for this, and very few more can be expected.

By command of Major General Bullard:

(SGD.) W. C. SHERMAN
 W. C. SHERMAN
 Major, G.S.
 A. C. of S., G 2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 28, 1918.

G-2 -
No.62

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(From June 27, 12h. to June 28, 12h.)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY..

I. INFANTRY.

One of our patrols reports hearing a small enemy patrol to the north of Cantigny this morning. One of our outposts in the zone of Broys exchanged rifle shots with an enemy patrol at point 2707 at daybreak.

Intermittent bursts of machine gun fire on our front lines.

Probable machine gun emplacements in the haystack at 2222, 1746, 2807.

II. ARTILLERY.

Only 820 shells fell on the divisional sector yesterday. The highest number of shells reported in any vicinity fell on the region of Grivesnes, about 200 shells in all, of which 15 were 150's. Fifteen 150 longs on Breteuil Embranchement at 23h30. An adjustment fire by aeroplanes on battery position 341 at 20h45. Some shrapnel on the Bois Coullemelle and along the road in the front areas during the afternoon.

III WORKS.

Several belts of high wire and a machine gun have been reported in the vicinity of point 2802; probably a small strong point. Heavy metallic materiel was unloaded from a wagon at point 3108⁵. Work is being done at point 3098. Last night a working party was heard cutting grass in front of the trench de Munich. Another working party was heard in the vicinity of point 3014. One of our patrols reports an occupied shell hole at point 26155.

A large camouflage screen, with fresh dirt showing underneath, has been observed at point 8779.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day.

There was extremely little circulation in the front lines yesterday.

Normal circulation along all routes in the rear zone. At 19 h eight 2-horse wagons were observed moving from Hangest to Davenescourt. Smoke seen coming from an engine on the narrow gauge railroad running north from point 1887 to 1998. Five wagons and two motor cars from Fignieres to Pierrepont late in the afternoon. Nine lorries were seen going from Etelfay to Laboissiere this morning, at 11h.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: Four enemy balloons were reported in ascension yesterday afternoon and eight this morning. At 15h an enemy balloon in the direction of Fignieres was brought down in flames by one of our planes. At 14h33 two parachutes were observed while descending from a balloon in the direction of Etelfay, and at 15h08 four more parachutes descended, apparently from the same balloon.

Aeroplanes: Ten enemy planes were reported over our lines yesterday afternoon. One of these brought down a French balloon to the north of our sector at 20h48. About 20 enemy planes were over our sector early this morning scouting and patrolling. Last night the enemy's bombing planes were very active from 23h30 until 2h. The following bombs were dropped: Paillart, 10; La Falloie* -Paillart Railroad, 5; region of Tartigny, 7; Villers Tournelle, 5; Breteuil Embranchement 3; Bombs were also dropped in the region of the following places: Quiry le Sec, Coullemelle, Folleville, Plainville, Broys, Bois deSablons*¹, Mesnil St. Firmin, Le Ples-sier.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 20h45 fire was observed in Montdidier at point 7594. An enemy ammunition dump exploded at point 6338 at 21h. Our artillery fire was very effective on the enemy's front lines in the region of St. Aignan yesterday.

Several enemy searchlights reported operating to our north last night. At 3h three green rockets from the Bois Lalval; at 0h5 1 2-star white rocket from an aeroplane over the enemy's lines.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet except for the aeroplane activity during the night.

* Correct spelling: la FALOISE.
*1 " " BOIS des SABLONS.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 62, June 28,
1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary No. 87.

GERMAN RUSES.

From British Summary, June 23, 1918.

The following is an extract from the diary of a man belonging to the 30th Inf. Div.:

Near Roye,

May 12, 1918.

"Tonight we are going to light what will appear to be big camp fires (Scheinbiwakfeuer) to make the enemy's air-men believe in the presence of a large concentration of troops. During our stay here, others will make a big push, possibly at Ypres.

"Wagons are ordered to raise clouds of dust in the daytime."

FUNCTION OF THE 1st COMPANY OF GUARD RESERVE PIONEERS IN
THE ADVANCE

From French G.Q.G. Bulletin, June 24, 1918

During an advance the pioneers have a double function: they are attached to the artillery or to the infantry.

When the company is assigned to the artillery it is distributed in the following manner:

The first platoon, reinforced, has the mission of constructing bridges (Schwere, Kolonnenbruecken) for the crossing of guns. The remainder of the company is distributed among the batteries in the proportion of four men to each gun. These men clear obstacles when the guns are moved, cut wire entanglements, blow up whatever cannot be otherwise removed, construct trench elements quickly for the protection of the personnel, and perform other similar duties.

When assigned to the infantry the company, which may or may not have the divisional bridge detachment under its orders, distributes its sections as follows:

The first section is in charge of building bridges.

The two remaining sections are attached to the two infantry regiments in line (the divisional distribution being generally two regiments in line and one in reserve), one to each regiment.

Each section is divided into two-half sections assigned to each of the battalions in line (each infantry regiment having two battalions in line and one in reserve). Thus each battalion in line has a half-section of pioneers at its disposal.

The pioneers march in front and ascertain whether the bridges are in good condition, prevent the enemy from blowing them up and throw temporary bridges (Schnellbruecken) across the rivers. Furthermore, if progress is checked they prepare roads for the attacking columns, make crossings for tanks over trenches, if necessary and act as a protection to the battalion headquarters, thus acting as infantrymen.

GERMAN OFFENSIVE TACTICS.

Translation of a Document rtaken from a Captured Officer from the 171st Regt., 115th Div., From French VIIth Army Bulletin, June 30, Ia/II No. 7745.

■. (a) Attack launched with the object of abandoning position warfare and against an enemy who has succeeded in reorganizing a defensive system:

These attacks require the most careful preparation similar to that which preceded the offensive of March 21 and will be carried out by the High Command according to a uniform plan.

(b) Continuation of the attack against an enemy who is not yet established on an organized line:

The important point in this case is to dispense with detailed preparations in order that the enemy may not have time to take counter-measures.

Success depends above everything on the skill and determination of the subordinate officers who must by quick action pass beyond the enemy, independently of the dispositions made by the High Command.

Vigorous attacks by the infantry, using its regular weapon and with a few accompanying guns, may achieve great success.

Often it is difficult to wait for the orders of the High Command. It is the duty of the leaders, including the general commanding the division to act on their own initiative in the advanced zone.

It is of the utmost importance to bring up the artillery and trench mortars (including the heavy) together with an abundant supply of ammunition.

(c) In the Meanwhile a Number of Other Tactical Situations May arise; It is the work of the command to exploit them to advantage.

(Signed) Chief of the Army General Staff.

Note.- The above document was written in pencil and was without date or letterhead. It seems to be a copy of a note of the German General Headquarters or an extract from it.

GONIOMETRIC LOCATION OF RADIO STATIONS.

It has been suggested that the enemy may be able to locate radio and earth-telegraph stations by radio-goniometric methods with sufficient accuracy to permit the shelling for destruction whenever deemed advisable.

That this is not true is shown by the fact that successive locations of the same station usually cover a square kilometer or more.

No means for locating earth-telegraph stations with greater accuracy than within three or four kilometers are known.

It may be accepted as certain that if a radio or earth-telegraph station is ever "intentionally" hit by enemy shells, its location has been determined by means other than radio-goniometry.

The following extract from a captured German order is of interest in this connection:

"Commanders need not fear the betrayal of the exact position of their command posts to the enemy by the presence of a wireless station, as the means for locating such stations are far too inaccurate."

ARTILLERY POSITIONS.

It seems to be a recent, but general practice with the Germans to place a large part of their light artillery in the open fields, away from known emplacements, and usually close to the front line, for immediate action, especially at night. This was reported by two French armies and by one of our Divisions with a third army on almost the same date, June 18-19. One report states:

"More than fifty '77's were in action in the open fields between Les Commelles and Cernay-les-Rheims, about one or two kilometers from the front line. No unusual movement had been noted in this area, so these batteries were evidently placed at night."

Another ruse to lessen the effect of our counter-battery fire consists in having one gun do all the firing for its battery, and in having this gun placed relatively far away from the real battery emplacement.

The attention of Artillery and Ranging Section Officers should be especially directed to the above.

APPENDIX II.

STATEMENTS OF PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE DIVISION ON OUR LEFT.

I. Identity of Prisoners: Two privates belonging to the 11th Company of the 1st Res. Regt., (1st Res.Div.)

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE. Prisoners were occupying an outpost in front of their company, together with two other privates and one Sergeant. A French detachment consisting of one lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 4 corporals and one private, crawled through the wheat fields to within a few meters of the enemy outpost. The occupants of the outpost were completely taken by surprise and were unable to defend themselves. The sergeant and two privates were killed with pistols, and the other two privates were brought back without difficulty.

III. ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmed, namely from North to South:

3rd Res. Regt.

1st Res. Regt.

59th Res. Regt.

The boundary between the 1st Res. Regt. and the 59th Res. Regt. was not exactly known to the prisoners, but probably passes through the hay rick at 1451 (confirmation of report appended to S. of I. Number 45).

IV. DISPOSITION OF THE REGIMENT.

1 Battalion (the 1st) at rest, with three companies in wood southwest of Arvillers (2885) and one company on eastern slope of Filescamp Wood (4775).

1 Battalion (the 2nd) in support, with three companies along the eastern side of the Aubvillers-to-Chapelle St. Aignan road and one company in the wood north of the Bois de Bouillancourt (Dreichwald).

1 Bn. (the 3rd) in line in the sector south of the Fourchon farm.

V. DISPOSITION OF THE BATTALION IN LINE.

Three companies in first line (N. to S.: 11th, 10th, 9th).

One company in support slightly to the rear of the other three companies, around point 1057.

VI. DISPOSITION OF THE 11th COMPANY. Three platoons in line.

It occupies the "OTTOMAN" trench between the Ferme Fourchon- to- Bois Allonge road and the Ferme Fourchon-to-Grivesnes road, and extends along the latter road to about 0856.

There are three outposts held by 5 men. No light machine guns in these outposts. The company commander is in the trench at about point 0959⁵.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF THE LINE.

a. The first line trench is about 6 feet deep. There are no dugouts in this trench except that of the company commander, which is protected by about 7 meters of earth. The men live in excavations dug into the parapet.

b. In front of the first line trench there is a wire entanglement one meter high and two meters wide (attached to iron posts).

In front of the outposts there is only concertina wire.

c. The 11th Company has 6 light machine guns distributed along the company's front.

Prisoners report that a heavy machine gun company is in position behind the 1st line, probably abreast of the support company.

d. Prisoners state that they have seen light trench mortar emplacements to the rear of the Battalion in line, either at 1360 or at 1559.

VIII P.C.'s.

Regimental P.C. in the wood North of the Bois de Bouillancourt, probably near 3260 (?).

P.C. of Battalion in line at 1860, in the Boyau des Ostrogoths.

IX. Reliefs every 6 or 7 days. Rotation is from rest to support and support to line (this is in contradiction with information given by prisoners of the same regiment captured on June 14th). Route followed by reliefs. Pierrepont-to-Hargicourt road as far as 3407; thence across fields to first line.

X. Prisoners state that there are a number of batteries in the Bois de Bouillancourt.

XI. Prisoners state that they have not heard of any attack in their sector.

Neither have they heard anything about a relief of their Division.

XII. The losses of the 11th Company of the 1st Reserve Regiment have been extremely light: 3 wounded since their arrival in the sector.

XIII. Prisoners complain of their food.

The barrage signal is a green rocket.

G-2
No. 63

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 29, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
From June 28, 12h to June 29, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY

I. INFANTRY.

Very little machine gun fire on our front lines during the night.

A few trench mortar shells of medium caliber on point 2610 and the valley southeast of Villers Tournelle yesterday morning.

A raiding party, consisting of five officers and 85 men penetrated the enemy front lines in the region of the Chateau Jenlis this morning at 3h, at point 2804 and proceeded to point 29506 without encountering serious resistance. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and our men returned twenty minutes later bringing with them 33 prisoners, one of whom was an officer. Several dug-outs and machine guns were destroyed. Our casualties were extremely light.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery fire was less than normal yesterday. Registration fire with 150's on our front lines in K2, the Le Plessier Road and the vicinity of Broyes. Last night the enemy's counter preparation commenced at 2h54, 4 minutes after our artillery had commenced firing. At 3h05 his counter preparation changed into a barrage which lasted until 3h45. This barrage was very heavy and covered our front lines from the ravine between the Bois Fontaine and the Bois Cantigny, inclusive, to Grivesnes. From 2h57 to 3h20 numerous 1 and 2-star green rockets were put up by the enemy opposite our left and center. This afternoon from 1h20 to 1h30 the enemy bombarded very heavily our positions between Villers Tournelle and Cantigny, about 30 to 40 shells per minute of large and medium calibers. From 1h45 to 1h55 about 10 shells per minute on Belle Assise. The total number of shells falling on the sector was about 2200.

III. WORKS.

Enemy working parties were carrying wire, cutting grass and digging along the following line: 1535-1536-15537. The enemy listening post at point 3115 was unoccupied last night. One of our scouts occupied the enemy listening post at point 2718 last night; no enemy appeared. An enemy working party in front of the Trench de Munich last night was bombed by one of our patrols, and another heard in the Bois de Framicourt was dispersed by our artillery.

The suspected strong point in the region of point 1921 was visited by one of our patrols last night and found unoccupied. Moreover it appears to have been unoccupied for some time, as the grass had been allowed to grow up in front of it and though some wire had been scattered around, no attempt had been made to fasten it down.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good from 12 to 21 h, poor the rest of the period.

Two men to La Folie Farm from point 1735 at 18 h. Four men were seen in a shell hole near the haystack, at approximately 2610.

Circulation was normal along the routes in the rear zone yesterday. From noon to dusk two Lorries, five wagons, one motor, and 35 men entered Bouillancourt from Fignieres. During the same period 7 lorries, 5 wagons and 3 motor cars were seen going from Laboissiere to Etelfay. A train of 20 wagons in groups of twos or fours observed on the Hangest-Davenescourt Road at 19h50, and at 20h13 7 more wagons moving towards Davenescourt* from Le Plessier (Rozainvillers)*. There was very little circulation around Montdidier.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: The balloons reported in ascension yesterday morning continued their activity during the afternoon. One balloon observed in ascension this morning at 10h34, descended at 10h36.

Aeroplanes: Yesterday afternoon at 16h30 an enemy plane attempted to destroy a balloon to the south of our sector. It was fired on by anti-aircraft guns and forced to return without accomplishing its mission. At 20h10 three enemy planes over the left of our sector attacked three of our balloons, forcing two to descend, one in flames. One of these planes was later brought down in flames by a French plane and fell near Esclainvillers. The enemy bombing planes dropped small bombs at midnight last night on Serevillers, the Rocquencourt-Mesnil Road, vicinity of Coulemelle, Villers Tournelle, and Le Plessier, about 60 bombs in all.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle was confirmed by the capture of one officer, five N.C.O.'s, and 25 privates, belonging to the 118th Reserve Regiment, and two privates belonging to the 70th Artillery (liaison agents), 25th Reserve Division, in the vicinity of point 2906 at 3h this morning (see appendix).

Our artillery fire was reported as being very effective on the enemy's front lines opposite Le Plessier.

At 23h11 one single-star rocket was dropped from an aeroplane behind the enemy's lines. From 2h57 to 3h20 numerous 1 and 2-star green rockets from the enemy's lines opposite our left and center.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Quiet.

Correct Spelling:

* Plessier-Rozainvillers

S. G. W.

G-2 Hdqs. 1st Div., A.E.F.
June 29, 1918.

Report on prisoners captured in the PARC de JENLIS.
on the morning of June 29, 1918.

I. IDENTITY OF PRISONERS: The majority of the prisoners belonged to the first and second platoons, 1st company, 118th Res. Inf. Reg., 25th Res. Div. There were also a number of machine gunners belonging to the 1st Machine Gun Company (attached to the 1st Battalion) and two artillerymen belonging to the 70th Regiment of Field Artillery. The officer commanding the 1st Platoon was also captured.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: After an artillery preparation which lasted about 20 minutes our troops made a raid on the parc of the Chateau de Jenlis, entering the wood at about 2805 and proceeding north along the trench which bisects the end of the Bois de Fontaine. Apparently our artillery preparation was very effective. Many of the men state that they were forced to lay down in the bottom of the trench to escape the shells, and that as soon as the shelling subsided, they were attacked from the rear by the Americans. The greater part of the light machine guns appear to have been neutralized. The officer states that when our artillery opened fire he was at the Company Commander's dugout, and was unable to get through the barrage to his platoon. When he finally managed to reach his trench he found it full of Americans and was captured without offering any resistance, not having any arms upon his person.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE. Confirmed. The 118th Reserve Regiment appeared to be holding the Parc de Jenlis, from about point 2806 to 2801. On its right is probably the 271st Reserve Regiment and on its left the 83rd Reserve Regiment.

4. At the present time the regiment appears to have one battalion in line (the first), one battalion in support, and one at rest (near Lignieres). The rotation appears to be from front to support and thence to rest. Reliefs take place at intervals of from 6 to 8 days.

5. The battalion in line has two companies on the western edge of the Parc de Jenlis (from north to south, the first and third). The second is reported to be in reserve, while the fourth may be occupying the southern edge of the wood (prisoners are not certain about this point).

The 1st Company extends from the northern edge of the Bois de Fontaine to about point 2004. Both platoons are in the first line trench (visible near fringe of wood on photograph B 647). One squad, however, is slightly to the rear, engaged in digging and laying wire. During the day the company sends out two outposts, and during the night four. These outposts are held by two men. None of them have machine guns. They are located about 40 meters in front of the main trench (referred to above), and are protected by a belt of wire about 30 meters in front of them. This wire consists of four rows of iron posts, to which is fastened ordinary barbed wire. There is also another wire entanglement about 1 meter wide, 5

meters in front of the trench running from 2805 to 2806, but the latter is not yet completed. There are no dugouts in the trench. The men live in excavations dug into the sides of the trench. The Company Commander lives in a dugout (two meters overhead cover) situated slightly to the rear of the main trench.

6. LOSSES: The 1st Company has lost about 40 men since its arrival in the sector. It has not received any reinforcements recently. It is stated that the reason the 118th Res. Reg. took over the 83rd Res. Reg. sector in that the latter had suffered very severe losses at the time of our attack against Cantigny.

7. MISCELLANEOUS: One of the prisoners heard it rumored that one of the battalions of the 83rd Res. Reg. had taken part in a counter-attack against Cantigny. He further heard that the losses suffered by that battalion on that occasion had been very severe (one company practically wiped out).

Another prisoner speaking of the operation against Cantigny stated that until then they had not had a great deal of respect for the American troops, but that the attack "was made with such" dash" that all unanimously agreed that they must "beware of those Americans". An officer explained our success at Cantigny by the fact that this "division is made up of picked troops".

ROCKET SIGNALS:

Green flare	Barrage
Red flare	Increase range
Yellow flare	Decrease range
Green 2-star	C. P. O.

Further detailed information will be published in maps and in later summaries.

G2, First Division, A. E. F.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 63,
June 29, 1918.

Extract from G. H. Q., A. E. F. Summary No. 80.

GERMAN SPIES.

It is reported by one of our men who escaped and returned to the Allied lines that while with the enemy he saw men in khaki with blouses, without coats, wearing the American helmet and carrying two gas masks, both the French and the English. They reported to an officer, whom they did not salute, and later left in the direction of the lines. He also saw six men in French uniform with blouse and helmet. The men all spoke German to the officer. It was noticed that the men in khaki were clean shaven while those in French uniforms wore mustaches.


The above report calls attention to the constant danger of the presence of spies sent from the enemy's line. It is to be observed that the men in khaki were wearing two masks, whereas for ten days past the American troops have been wearing English masks only. Inconsis-

tencies of this kind will frequently disclose the presence of strangers.


MARKS ON GERMAN AEROPLANES
(From an order of German G.H.Q.)

Experiments made at the front have shown the necessity of making German aeroplanes more easily recognizable. Considerable study has demonstrated that the cross is more easily visible if its branches, instead of being curved, as formerly, are rectilinear and intersect at right angles.

Old Mark



New Mark



Bring this to the knowledge of the troops.

P. O. (Signed)
LUDENDORFF.

* Correct Spelling: DaVenescourt

*1 Correct Spelling: Plessier-Rozainvillers

G-2
No. 64.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
June 30, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From June 29, 12h to June 30, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

Intermittent machine gun fire on our front lines during the night. Some indirect fire on Le Plessier and Death Valley during the same period.

A few winged trench mortar shells of small caliber fell on our lines to the south of Cantigny at 3h15.

Machine guns have been located at points 1536 and 3210. The latter fired on an aeroplane yesterday afternoon.

II. ARTILLERY.

About 1400 shells fell on the divisional sector yesterday. A concentration, which lasted for about 20 minutes was placed along the line which runs from point 1022 to point 1296 yesterday afternoon. A short bombardment with small and medium calibers of G-1 and G-2 early this morning. A surprise fire of 150's and 210's on Grivesnes between 9h20 and 9h22 and an intermittent fire of 105's on the northwest corner of the Bois Villers, commencing at the same time. About 30 gas shells, kind unknown on the Bois des Glands at midnight. Slight harassing fire on the rear areas.

III. WORKS.

Enemy working parties continued cutting the grass and improving the trench along the line-1438-1536. Working parties were heard in the vicinity of points 26⁵18⁸ and 2421⁵, last night. Smoke observed coming from point 4382. A white flag was seen at the corner of an aeroplane hangar in Mesnil St. Georges. Something resembling a small tent was observed yesterday at point 3124⁵.

Working party of 8 men seen at point 0704 in the vicinity of Etelfay. There is possibly an enemy picket line in the Bois d'Avesne. (9697).

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was intermittently good all day.

Ten men passed back and forth between La Folie Farm and point 1735 during the day.

At about 3h50 yesterday morning, just after our artillery had ceased firing on the Chateau Jenlis, about 40 to 50 Germans were seen moving southeast from the Bois de Fontaine. They scattered upon being fired on by our rifles and ran towards Fontaine sous Montdidier. A heavy wagon was heard moving in rear of the enemy's lines opposite Cantigny at 5h10. One man seen at 2829.

Only normal circulation along all routes in the rear zone yesterday and to-day. The Laboissiere-Etelfay Road is by far the dustiest of any road in the rear area under our observation. About 8 wagons from Fignieres to Gratibus during the afternoon. 4 wagons and 2 caissons from Fignieres to point 5731 at 20h30.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: 11 balloons observed in ascension this morning. Only 3 of these are properly in front of our sector. One balloon was moved 55 miles while in ascension.

Aeroplanes: The enemy's chasse planes have shown an increased activity lately. One French plane was brought down near Villers Tournelle, yesterday afternoon, and another north of Folleville, this morning. An enemy plane

was shot down at 11h15 about two kilometers northeast of Folleville, by a French plane. A few bombs were dropped by enemy planes last night on our front lines in the region of Le Plessier. None were reported on the rear areas. A total of 15 enemy planes were reported over our lines during the period covered by this report.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: One propaganda balloon came down in our lines this morning.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

G 2, Hdq. 1st Division, A.E.F.
June 30, 1918.

Additional information obtained from prisoners captured in Parc de Jenlis, June 29, 1918.

A. DISPOSITIONS OF THE 118th REGIMENT.

1. The 118th Regiment is holding the front between point 2806 and the Fontaine sous Montdidier to Belle Assise road.

It is echeloned in depth, having:

1 battalion at rest east of Lignieres, in the Bois du Crotale (mean coordinates 4723).

1 battalion in support, probably along the slope northwest of Courtemanche. One company of this battalion is living in shallow dugouts at 4914.

1 battalion in line.

2. The battalion in line has:

1 company (the 1st) in the trench which bisects the eastern edge of the Bois de Fontaine. This company extends from 2806 to 2804.

1 company (the 3rd) in the southern portion of the above trench. This company extends from 2804 to about 2801.

Probably one company along the southern fringe of the Parc de Jenlis, in trench shown on photo B 647, and extending to about point 3201.

One company in reserve in dugouts along the sunken road between 3808 and 38⁵08⁸.

3. The 1st Company has only two platoons. Both of them are in the line, the 1st from 2806 to 2805, the second from 2805 to 2804.

For details regarding wire, outposts, etc, see appended sketch.

B. P.C'S. AND HEADQUARTERS.

Division Headquarters seems to still be at Andechy.

P.C. of battalion in line at 3808, in dugout in sunken road.

P.C. of 1st Company in dugout (2 meters overhead cover) at 28²05⁵.

P.C. of 1st Machine Gun Company is reported to be in vicinity of 3808.

P.C. of 3rd Company may be in dugout about 10 meters south of the Chateau de Fontaine (29⁷03³).

C. MISCELLANEOUS DETAILS CONCERNING 1st COMPANY SECTOR.

1. Trenches and Dugouts: Prisoners state that the trench on the fringe of the Parc de Jenlis is in good condition except on extreme right, where it is considerably shallower at places.

There are no dugouts in this trench. The men sleep in excavations in the sides. At the present time two small excavations are being built to store ammunition. Otherwise there seems to be but little work being done. The second platoon has detached a squad as "working detail". This squad is chiefly occupied in reinforcing the wire entanglements in front of the outposts and in working on the two ammunition dumps mentioned above.

None of the prisoners have any knowledge of a second line trench in the Parc de Jenlis.

It is reported that there are at least 10 men (and possibly the commander of the 3rd Company) in a dugout the entrance of which is at 297033.

2. Machine guns:

(a) Light: 1st Company has three in first line trench, one of them at 28045.

(b) Heavy: The 1st Machine Gun Company, belonging to the 1st Battalion, has 12 heavy machine guns.

4 of them are reported to be at the rest camp (near Lignieres), in reserve.

2 of them are at the P.C. of the commander of the 1st Machine Gun Company.

6 of them are in position; of the latter: 2 were in a nest at 282055, 8 meters from the dugout of the commander of the 1st Infantry Company. One of these was completely destroyed by our artillery, and the crews of both of them, numbering 11 men in all, were captured by us. The emplacement is in a camouflaged trench 10 m. long. The crews live in a dugout the entrance of which is in the little trench. The dugout is 9 meters long, and probably has 5 or 6 meters overhead cover. 2 are reported to be at about 2904 (not certain). The supply of ammunition for the nest at 282055 was of about 5000 rounds.

3. No trench mortars or grenade shooters reported.

D. ARTILLERY.

There is a battery of 4 105 mm. howitzers at 5633. It would appear that one of its missions was C.P.O. in front of the Parc de Jenlis. The guns are not casemated.

There is a battery of 77 mm. guns at 5631.

An interesting detail is that two observers belonging to the 105 mm. battery had a telephone in the 1st line trench connected with the P.C. of the Artillery Liaison Officer. This telephone was put out of action by our artillery.

E. RELIEFS ETC.

(From a document) The 1st Battalion, 118th Res. Inf. arrived at Andechy April 25th, coming from St. Quentin.

April 26th Marched via Querbigny* and Lignieres to a position near Montdidier, remaining there 10 days.

May 6th Marched to 1st line position between Mesnil and Cantigny, remained there 7 days.

May 13th Marched back via Lignieres to a camp in a wood near that town, remaining there 8 days.

May 21st Marched via Lignieres to a support position near Montdidier.

May 22nd Marched to 1st line position near the Bois de Voyeux, remained there 11 days.

June 2nd Left 1st line position and marched to "road behind Fontaine", (3808?).

June 3rd Left "road behind Fontaine" and marched to the slope near Courtemanche (4914?).

June 4th Marched via Courtemanche to rest camp in the wood near Lignieres remained there 10 days.

June 14th Marched via Lignieres, Courtemanche, Fontaine, to position in "shell wood" (Parc de Jenlis), remained there 7 days.

June 21st Marched from position vis Fontaine, Courtemanche, Lignieres to wood camp near Lignieres, remained there 6 days.

Night of June 26-27 Marched to position in Parc de Jenlis (relieved 2nd Battalion).

F. TROOPS SEEN AT REAR.

Single prisoners report having seen while at rest soldiers wearing shoulder straps bearing the following numbers (all with infantry braid). None of these reports are confirmed by other prisoners.

68 (states he is sure it was not 168)

44 (seen on or about June 26th)

397 (seen on or about June 20th)

G. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Morale: The morale is mediocre. Many of the men, particularly the married ones, are "fed up with the war". For instance, following are a number of statements made by some of the prisoners:

"What do I care whether I become a Frenchman or remain a German, so long as I get back to my family".

"This is a war of capitalists who send us to our death in order to make money".

"We never get any news except occasionally through the papers, and they lie half the time".

2. Information about neighboring units: One prisoner reports that the 8th Company of the 271st Res. Reg., on the left flank of that regiment, was relieved, presumably by another company of the same regiment, on the night of June 28-29. The regiment occupying the Bois Allonge front (Fosse Dieu ravine) may have its support battalion in the quarry near St. Madard, (0296). There are many large dugouts (very deep ones) in the side of this quarry, and it appears to have been used by several regiments successively. When the 118th Res. Reg. occupied the Bois Allonge sector its rest battalion, together with the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Surgeon, were in this quarry while in support. The Forestel Farm wood seems to have been evacuated because of excessive shelling.

*Correct spelling Guerbigny.

S.G.W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 64, JUNE 30, 1918.

RECONNAISSANCES BY OFFICERS

Translation of a Captured German Document: From French Vth Army Bulletin, June 24, 1918.

86th Division

Sections Ia and Ic

No. 2739

Headquarters, June 18, 1918.

BULLETIN.

(1) It is necessary that reconnaissances of hostile positions carried out by officers be concealed from the enemy's notice; consequently, such reconnaissances are authorized within the zone visible to the enemy only in misty weather, at daybreak, or in the evening. It is forbidden to wear officer's caps with colored band, overcoats of light color, or eyeglasses (all of which are visible at a great distance); it is also forbidden to spread out large maps in the course of reconnaissances. An effort will be made to deceive the enemy; for example, by carrying a tool, a haversack, or some such thing.

Neither leather leggings nor riding boots will be worn.

In order to recognize the exact details of the enemy's position it is necessary to reach the point from where it is desired to observe the enemy before daybreak and not to leave it until after nightfall.

Corps Commanders will give all officers sent on reconnaissance detailed instruction on all measures of prudence which may be necessary.

(2) In the zone visible to hostile balloons, no automobile traffic is allowed when such balloons are up. At night all vehicles will put out their lights when in the division zone or south of the line Montigny-sur-Vesle-Cormicy-Evergnicourt

By order
(Signed) von Bunau
Captain, Headquarters

ARTILLERY IN RECENT ATTACKS.

The present use of a short, heavy artillery preparation had its first striking example in the German attack against the Russians at Riga on Sept. 3, 1917. The methods used there, with some modifications, were the same as those used in the March, April and May offensives.

The element of surprise required the concentration of artillery as well as of other troops to be carried out with the utmost secrecy. Batteries moved in and constructed all emplacements at night. The adjustment was conducted by one battery at a time for several days before the attack, each battery firing not more than 20 or 30 shots a day. Some batteries had no opportunity to adjust until the morning of the attack. The large number of trench mortars used was not placed in position until the night before the attack.

The artillery was separated into two distinct groups under separate command, a counter-battery group and an infantry support group. The trench mortars were also grouped under a separate command. This was the first time that this definite division had been made, counter-battery work previously having been considered one of the functions of divisional artillery.

The preparation consisted of two hours neutralization of Russian batteries and important points with gas, followed by two hours and fifty minutes of gas and destruction fire on batteries, approaches, sensitive points and infantry positions. The heavy and medium trench mortars participated in the fire on the trenches. The last fifteen minutes of the preparation included rapid fire by all pieces.

The methods used in this battle have been only slightly modified in the Spring offensives of this year. A number of captured orders and other documents, together with information from prisoners, enables us to follow these modifications. The separation into counter-battery (Aka) and infantry support (Ika) groups has been regularly followed in all the large attacks. In some cases a third group of long

range guns for interdiction fire has been formed (FeKa).

The preparation for the attack of March 21 lasted for five hours, of which the first two hours consisted of gas and H.E. (with a large proportion of gas) on battery positions by all the available guns, followed by three hours continued neutralization by the counter battery group and fire on infantry positions by the infantry support group. The heavy and medium trench mortars participated during the last hour and the light trench mortars during the last half hour.

In the subsequent attacks the preparatory fire was shortened:

Armentieres, April 8 2 hrs. 45 min. preparation.

Merckem-Bixschoote, April 17 . . 2 hrs. 30 min. preparation.

Dranoutre, April 25 3 hrs. 30 min. preparation.

In each of these cases the first two hours consisted of a gas bombardment of battery positions.

The attack on Chemin des Dames, May 27, was preceded by two hours and forty minutes preparation, mostly with Blue Cross (sneezing) gas. In the Montdidier-Oise attack of June 9, the preparation lasted four hours and twenty minutes with the same preliminary gas bombardment, and interdiction to a depth of 15 kilometers.

On June 12, south of the Aisne this method was slightly varied. The gas bombardment lasted from 8 to 11 p.m. followed by a period of calm and a renewal of the preparation from 2.30 to 4.30 a.m.

Many of the batteries taking part in the preparation for the recent attacks have not been well adjusted and the preparation was often insufficient, but always succeeded in destroying the means of communication. The object of the preparation seems to be not so much destruction, but simply sufficient neutralization to permit the infantry to advance. BARRAGE.

A memorandum from the XVIIIth German Army dated March 8, 1918, gives the following general instructions for barrage:

The barrage should be made as heavy as possible. All batteries, not otherwise assigned to special missions, take part in it. This includes, however, only the field artillery and the 150mm howitzers. Heavy guns, on account of their dispersion, will not take part in the barrage. The creeping barrage will begin with an initial bound of 300 m. for all guns. Thereafter it will progress by bounds of 200 m. every four minutes for light artillery and 400m. every eight minutes for heavy howitzers. The 150's will lift one minute ahead of the field guns on each bound. Counter-batteries (except heavy guns) will join the creeping barrage when it passes the battery positions on which they are firing. Batteries must be pushed forward to continue the support after the limiting range of the barrage is reached. The barrage must be conducted by a carefully worked out timetable, supplemented if necessary by signals from infantry battalions. These signals should be as simple as possible and should preferably include only "halt" and "lift". In case the "halt" signal is given the barrage will move on again at the normal rate after ten minutes halt unless the signal is repeated. The response to the "lift" signal will be an immediate 200 m. bound followed by the normal progression. These signals should be rarely used as they break the continuity of the barrage line and expose the troops

to enfilade fire. Constant supervision by ground and aerial observation is necessary.

In case the barrage passes strong points which hold up the infantry advance and which the accompanying batteries are unable to reduce, it may be brought back on demand of liaison officers or observers with the infantry.

The rules laid down in this memorandum seem to have been followed in the March 21 attack. The creeping barrage advanced at the prescribed rate of 50 m. per minute, stopping on various objectives of assault for periods of seven to 25 minutes. The total time of the barrage was two and a half hours, when it reached the limit of range. Thereafter the infantry was supported by batteries moved forward under the orders of the Division commanders.

In later attacks the rate of advance was materially reduced. At Merckem, April 17, it was about 15m per minute. In the Chemin des Dames attack, May 27, the rate averaged 35 m. per minute for the six kilometers of the contemplated advance, except along the slope of Chemin des Dames, where it was about 25m. per minute. Barrage lines conformed to the ground and the rate of advance was not uniform.

Stops of from 15 to 30 minutes on several objectives ranging from 500 to 1200 meters apart, were provided for, in order to give time for the infantry assault and taking of the position. For the first and second objectives (a depth of 1700 meters) in addition to the creeping barrage, "a semi-rigid protective barrage" was prescribed. This seems to have been a standing barrage placed on the first objective until the creeping barrage reached it, and then moved to the second objective. The creeping barrage covered a total depth of 6100m. in 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ hours. In order to get this range, a number of guns were placed within 1000 or 1500 meters of the front line, several days before the attack. These formed the framework of the barrage group. Many of them were not defiladed and probably used direct fire during the preparation.

The same method of successive protective or box barrages on particular points of resistance was used by at least one division in the Montdidier-Oise attack of June 9. For this purpose a special group of 77's was designated. These guns had a wide field of fire and swung from one point of resistance to another, according to a separate time table. At this point the creeping barrage advanced first by bounds of 125 m. every five minutes, then 125 m. every ten minutes and finally 250 m. every 20 minutes. The average rate throughout the June 9 attack seems to have been about 12 to 15 m. per minute. The length of bounds was variable and in general the barrage was apparently less minutely timed than in previous attacks, and very much slower.

In an attack on a one-division front south of the Aisne, June 12, a barrage chart was captured. This showed bounds of about 250 m., conforming to the contour of the ground. In general there was one bound every ten minutes, but several bounds were at 15 minute intervals. The total depth of the barrage was only 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers although the final objective was four kilometers distant.

SICKNESS IN THE GERMAN ARMY

From British Summary, June 24, 1918.

Information from various sources shows that there is at present an epidemic in the IVth and VIth German Armies. It is apparently a fever, and the symptoms are a high temperature and sudden faintness. The illness lasts for a week or ten days, and is referred to as "Flanders Gripe".

According to prisoners' statements, men with a temperature of 105 degrees are evacuated to Germany.

Several divisions are known to have been affected and it is reported that one division was prevented from coming into line owing to this epidemic.

GERMAN DISCIPLINE.

Translation of a Document Issued by the German VIIth Army found on an Officer of the 21st Regiment, 105th Division, Captured June 17, 1918: From French Xth Army Bulletin, June 23rd, 1918.

VIIth Army
Headquarters

IIa No. 250 Pers. This document will be transcribed by an officer only.

Army Headquarters, March 14, 1918.

Grave lapses of both personal and march discipline have lately come to my notice in so displeasing a manner that I have been forced to punish the offenders severely.

Referring to my note of March 24, 1917, No. 337, IIa/ March 1917, I make Corps Commanders responsible for the execution of our so frequently repeated orders.

Henceforth it will be expressly indicated on confidential reports whether Regimental Commanders are capable of enforcing their will on their subordinates and of maintaining strict discipline within their units.

(Signed) The General Commanding the Army
To Army Groups and Divisions. von Boehn
General of Infantry.

The following is a translation of the document to which reference is made in the above order:

VIIth Army
Headquarters
II a/ Ia No. 337
March 17

Army Headquarters, March 24, 1917.

To the Generals Commanding Army Corps and Divisions in the VIIth Army:

While reviewing some resting battalions the very unsatisfactory military conduct of the men struck me particularly.

It seems that the importance of drill as a means for training and particularly of maintaining an iron discipline is no longer understood anywhere. Nevertheless it is actually more necessary than ever as it is only by these means that the troops can be held together and their qualities, undermined by the influence of position warfare, restored.

The belief that our famous training has become superfluous is false. It will be conducted not as an aim in itself but as a means to an end. I shall explain: the man must, through training, become accustomed to subordinating his will to that of his superior.

When the men have the effrontery to salute their military superior of the highest grade with their uniform and bearing as deplorable as I have seen it several times, it is evident that they lack the most elementary understanding of personal discipline. It is that discipline, however, which is the outward sign of the interior discipline of a unit.


Much as these facts are self-evident to the oldest chiefs, they should also be made plain to the youngest officers, in order that they may vigorously and usefully cooperate in the absolute maintenance of discipline, beginning furthermore by setting the example themselves.

(Signed) The General Commanding the Army
von Boehn

General of Infantry.

There is a pencil notation on this order, probably by the Brigade Commander, as follows: Discipline must not only be "incorporated in the soldier" but must also be reflected "in the uniform", or if I may so express myself "in a military manner". In that case, it begins with the cap and ends with the boot.

(Signed) von Massow.



G-2
No. 65

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 1, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From 12h June 30, to 12h July 1.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Indirect machine gun fire from the northern edge of the Chateau Jenlis on our lines in the Bois Cantigny, near the P.C. of A-2. Intermittent machine gun fire on our front lines.

Six small trench mortar shells on our front lines north of Cantigny.

II. ARTILLERY.

About 1500 shells on the divisional sector yesterday. Two shoots, apparently intended as destruction fire, were carried out on the battery positions 341 and 349, west of Broyes, yesterday, about 400 150's in all. About 100 105's on the Villers Tournelle-Serevillers road between 9h and 13h, and 60 150's on Villers Tournelle during the same period. 12 shots from a 150 Long on the region of Mesnil St. Firmin at midnight last night. Very little artillery fire on our front lines.

III. WORKS.

An enemy working party was heard in the Parc of the Chateau de Jenlis yesterday, and another in front of the Trench de Munich, cutting grass and wiring. New wire has been constructed running north from point 1646 in front of the Trench de Hungrois.

An enemy working party seen yesterday afternoon at point 9003.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good all day except between 18 and 20 hours when our shell fire behind the enemy's lines made observation of traffic difficult.

The usual circulation of individuals between the Bois Vicomte and La Folie Farm during the period covered by this report. Wagons were heard being unloaded in rear of Fontaine Sous Montdidier last night, apparently tools or some other heavy material.

Slightly less than normal circulation along the routes in the rear zone yesterday. Three ambulances seen on the Guerbigny-Fignieres road at about 16h. 5 lorries from Route Nationale No. 35 to Pierrepont between 16 and 17 hours. One lorry went from Bouillancourt to Malpart at 19h15 and a wagon along the same route at 20h25. Between 20h and 22h the enemy's traffic leaves the main Fignieres-Bouillancourt Road at point 6745 and takes the trail across the field, running in a northwesterly direction, towards Bouillancourt, in order to escape our interdiction fire on this point.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Ten balloons observed in ascension this morning.

The enemy's chasse planes were busy over our lines yesterday and to-day. About 30 having been reported. All of these were fired on by A.A. and machine guns. Most of the enemy planes seem to confine their activity to the north of our sector and the south of the divisional sector on our north. No planes were reported brought down during the period covered by this report. An enemy plane over our rear areas this morning left a wide broken ribbon of white smoke, seemingly very long. The plane was not on fire nor out of control, and the position of the smoke was not that of a tracer shell.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Order of battle confirmed by the capture of a prisoner belonging to the 3rd Company, 59th Res. Regt., 1st Res. Div., at point 15⁵46⁵ at 17h, yesterday afternoon, by one of our daylight patrols.

From 1h15 to 1h45 a fire, apparently an ammunition dump, was observed to the west of Forestel Farm.

At 23h50 one 1-star green rocket from the left of our sector in the enemy's lines. No action observed. White flag placed at the southern end of the hangar at Mesnil St. Georges at 12h10, was removed at 13h20. Two aerial lights ascended behind Courtemanche at 23h25. These lights appear to be a warning signal of the approach of our planes, as the enemy's AA commences firing at once.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Aviation more aggressive than normal.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 65, July 1, 1918.

NOTE FROM A GENERAL COMMANDING THE 7th GERMAN ARMY RELATIVE TO ALSACE-LORRAINERS.

VII Army
General Staff
No. 84

Q.G. March 2, 1918.

TO OFFICERS.

The reinforcing of the army by divisions coming from the eastern front, containing a large proportion of Alsace-Lorrainers, and the attaching of such elements to divisions on the western front who have, at other times, returned their Alsace-Lorrainers, to the eastern front, or who have not heretofore had any of them; makes necessary, for all the Chiefs, the strict duty of busying themselves with the difficult question of the exact treatment for the Alsace-Lorrainers.

The Generals commanding the corps and divisions have received, under another secret order of this army, some instructions of the High Command which stated that we are not able, and ought not, moreover, to withdraw the Alsace-Lorrainers from the western front, and says in what manner we ought to employ them in this regard.

The experiences learned since have confirmed the old experiences, because, unluckily, each chief who has under his orders some Alsace-Lorrainers; has complained of frequent cases of infidelity, of desertion, and of treason.

But it is necessary to put side by side the good faith and even the exploits of certain Alsace-Lorrainers whom we ought not to ignore. The Alsace-Lorrainers ought to be observed carefully. If even more than this be done, most surely one will be able to find among them, the good subjects, and to reward and praise these.

The doubtful have the principal need to be watched: the uncertain will be handled with an iron hand.

The fact of lessening their work and also the danger by retiring them from the zone of combat acts as a primer to the tacit adherence of some Alsace-Lorrainers to their French sympathies.

It is not necessary to admit the excuse of those, who invoke the presence of relatives in the French army and who do not wish to fight against them.

It is necessary to explain clearly to these men that if they would not risk an encounter, their French relatives would have less scruples than themselves. The contrary has been shown for a long time.

On our side we have not the right to diminish one hair our requirement, that the Alsace-Lorrainer ought to defend his country against the intention of conquest by the French as if it was a piece of the German Empire.

The High Command draws attention, in a telegram, especially to the fact that all ought to be avoided which would possibly be an encouragement to the infidelities, or perhaps excite the distrust of, the Alsace-Lorrainers for us.

In some exceptional cases and in some situations particularly strained it would be equally recommended to limit most completely the employment of the Alsace-Lorrainers at critical points.

Never should they be left alone in the zone of combat. While there have occurred lately in the zone of the Group of Armies some new cases of desertion of Alsace-Lorrainers, the Group of Armies has given the order that the Alsace-Lorrainers ought to be employed in the zone of combat, in company with men of absolute fidelity, and that in strained situations, it might be shown necessary not to employ Alsace-Lorrainers in the front lines.

His Imperial Highness has ordered, by his telegram, to take absolute measures in the above sense and to make known the issuing of this order to the generals commanding the divisions and the regiments.

(I.S. No. 65)

Hdq. 1st Division, A.E.F.,
July 1, 1918.

Extract from II Armee Bulletin de Renseignements No. 853.

GERMAN TACTICS IN MAKING SMALL RAIDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING IDENTIFICATIONS.

(From an Order issued by the 222nd German Division,
May 22nd, 1918.)

Mission of Scout Detachments.

(a) The chief task of scout detachments is to bring in prisoners as often as possible. Observation is also an important task, but not as important as securing identifications. This principle should be followed when instructing scout detachments.

As a general rule prisoners can be obtained by sudden attacks or by surprising patrols or enemy outposts, either in no-man's land or within the enemy's positions. Scout detachments should not be afraid of staying out in ambush for several hours every night. Men chosen for this class of work should be self reliant and full of initiative. They should have a knowledge of the terrain and should be prepared to attack the enemy at sight.

Weak and hesitating men who do not know how to take advantage of a favorable opportunity are not suitable for scout detachments.

The commander of a scout detachment should be a model for his men. He should do his utmost to teach his men to act on their own initiative and should instill in them the offensive spirit.

To have as complete a knowledge as possible of the enemy's activity is an essential for the success of a scout detachment. All this information should be obtained within two or three days after arriving the sector. For the purpose of obtaining this necessary information, scout detachments, immediately upon their arrival in the sector, should post observers who see and hear what the enemy is doing both night and day.

Following points should be observed:

Patrol movements-work on obstacles, indicating the type and size of these obstacles-breaches in the entanglements - protected or defiladed points - condition of the terrain - circulation within the enemy's lines - sounds of digging, fresh earth - sounds of voices, barking of dogs - smoke columns - O.P.'s. in trees - P.C.'s - movements of runners - visual signal posts.

This data will be completed by the study of photographs (air), and by exact information as to the location of troops.

Execution of the raid

(b) In this manner it is possible quickly to obtain a complete idea of the enemy's activity and habits and this will form the basis for the plans of the Commanding Officer of the scout detachment.

The execution of the raid is then a relatively simple matter.

It is always necessary that the reconnaissance detachments making a frontal attack be fairly large (about 20 men), for many of the men are diverted from their mission proper to cover the flanks, and sometimes even the rear. It is a good thing to equip these covering parties with light machine guns.

When patrolling in no-man's land, the main thing is to post the detachment at a point where the enemy is in the habit of passing. The detachment should be posted as soon as possible after night-fall, before the enemy patrols go out. Large enemy parties should be attacked suddenly, and captured after a brief but violent engagement with rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. When attacking single men it is better not to shoot.

Accurate observation of work being done on the enemy's obstacles makes it also possible to take him by surprise from the rear while he is working.

(c) Captured prisoners should be brought back by force and all insignias (collars, emblems, buttons), and papers should be taken off dead bodies.

Furthermore it is the duty of the scout detachment not to leave any prisoners wounded, or dead, in the enemy's hands. If a man is in danger, all his comrades should help him to escape from danger. If a man is captured despite the efforts of his comrades, his military honor must prevent him from revealing anything to the enemy. He will not want to betray his comrades.

It is absolutely necessary that our wounded and dead be brought back to a safe place.

(d) Before a reconnaissance patrol starts out and before a raid it is absolutely necessary that the first line battalions notify the artillery, by means of the artillery liaison officer, in order that our own artillery may not prevent the detachment from accomplishing its important mission.

(e) The armament and equipment of the detachment depends upon the aim of the operation. The proper use of small arms is particularly important. Wire cutters are always indispensable. Before leaving, take off regimental and other insignias, and also the stamp marks which are sometimes on the clothes; do not carry any papers or sketches; in a word, do not carry anything which might give the enemy any information. Men taking part in the operation are only allowed to carry on them a card bearing their name, and place and date of birth.

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(Summary No. 65)

Hdq. 1st Division, A.E.F.,
July 1, 1918.

Report on Questioning of a Prisoner Captured East of Grivesnes at about 5 p.m., June 30th, 1918.

I. Identity.

Private X, 3rd Company, 59th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 1st Reserve Division.
Prisoner's home is in Klein Rudlauten, Ost-Preussen. He is a laborer by profession.

II. Circumstances of Capture.

Time of capture: about 5:00 P.M.
Place of capture: 15°46'.
Prisoner had just been relieved from sentry duty in the trench. Four Americans suddenly appeared beside him, pointed their pistols at him, and summoned him to surrender. This he promptly did.

III. Date of Last Relief.

Prisoner's company left Arvillers on the night of 26-27 June, and marched up to the first line trench in front of the Parc de Grivesnes. Prisoner is not absolutely certain what company they relieved, but states that it belonged to the 2nd Battalion.

IV. Order of Battle.

There has been no change in the order of battle of the 1st Reserve Division. It remains as before, from north to south:

3rd Res. Reg.
1st Res. Reg.
59th Res. Reg.

V. Disposition of the 59th Reserve Regiment.

The regimental boundaries are unchanged. According to the prisoner, the disposition of the regiment, however, has been changed considerably since the beginning of June. The prisoner does not seem to be very sure of the facts which he states, and consequently his statement in regard to the present disposition of the regiment should not be regarded as absolutely certain until it has been confirmed from some other source.

It would now appear that the regiment now has:

One battalion at rest at Arvillers. This battalion is housed partly in cellars, partly in tents pitched in the gardens of the town. The battalion staff also lives in Arvillers.

One battalion in support very close to the first line trench, having at least two of its companies in position in the second line trench. One of its companies in holes south of Malpart. Possibly one of its companies in wood north of Bouillancourt (coordinates 5155).

One battalion (the 1st) in the front line trenches.

VI.. Disposition of the Battalion in Line.

Prisoner states that the battalion in line has four companies in the first line trenches. The order of battle of the companies from north to south is 1st, 3rd, 4th, (2nd ?).

VII. Disposition of the 3rd Company.

The 3rd Company has three platoons in line, occupying the trench recently dug between points 1646 and 1548. The company front extends from about 1645⁵ to 1548.

VIII. Occupation of Trenches.

Each platoon of the 3rd Company send out three outposts about 50 meters in front of the trench. The outposts occupy holes, changing from one to another in order to keep the enemy from knowing where they are. As a general rule the outposts are posted beside the wire entanglement which runs parallel to the first line trench and about 50 meters in front of it. This wire entanglement is about 5 meters wide at some points but at most places its width is of only three meters (3 rows of posts). It is about 1 meter high. During the last few nights parties have been sent out to reinforce the entanglement mentioned above. A certain amount of work is also being done on the trenches (deepening them).

The trench occupied by the 3rd Company is about 1 m. 50 deep, and has traverses. There are no dugouts. The Company Commander lives in a dugout in the second line trench.

The 3rd Company has five light machine guns, all of them being in the first line trench, but none of them being sent out with the outposts.

Prisoner states that the heavy machine gun companies of both the battalions in line and the battalion in support are in position. A number of them are in pits just in front of the second line (i.e. trench which runs from the Trenches des Hongrois to the Malpart-Grivesnes road). The other heavy machine guns are echeloned in depth to rear of the second line trench. There are no boyaux.

IX. P. C's.

P.C. of battalion in first line: in Bois du Vicomte.

P.C. of regiment: in Bouillancourt.

X. Miscellaneous.

When at rear the prisoner states that he saw troops wearing the numbers 48 and 49 on their shoulder straps. He adds that these were infantrymen, but does not know whether they belong to Active or Reserve units.

Names of Officers:

Division Commander:	Graf von Waldersee.
C. O. 3rd Company:	Lieutenant Koch
C. O. 1st Platoon:	Lieutenant Vollend.
C. O. 2nd Platoon:	Lieutenant Katzmallek
C. O. 3rd Platoon:	Offizierstellvertreter Muller

Prisoner states that the trench strength of his company is about 120 men, and that its losses since entering the sector have been fairly light - 3 or 4 killed and a few wounded.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 2, 1918.

H-2 --
No. 66

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(From July 1, 12h to July 2 12h)
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy patrol of 10 men was seen early this morning returning to their lines at point 2610.

Twenty rifle grenades are reported to have fallen on our front lines near St. Aignan between 15h and 17h.

There was intermittent machine gun fire last night. An enemy machine gun near point 3211 fired at one of our aeroplanes yesterday. Another machine gun has been located at point 2913⁵.

II. ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery fired about 1300 shells on our sector yesterday, of which about one-half fell on our lines in the vicinity of Cantigny, the northern edge of the Bois Fontaine, and the valley southwest of Cantigny during two short concentrations between 21h and 22h. A slight harassing fire on the front lines A-1, and A-2, at noon yesterday. 150's on Villers Tournelle and Coullémelle between midnight and one oclock this morning. An adjustment by aeroplane with 105's on Battery Position 317, now occupied, in the Bois de Sablons.*

III. WORKS.

Enemy working parties were heard last night in front of the Bois Framicourt and in the region of point 2712⁵, cutting wheat and digging; and another in the Parc of the Chateau Jenlis. Our outposts heard wagons moving in the rear of Fontaine sous Montdidier and sounds resembling the unloading of lumber. Carrying parties with logs, sacks, etc., were seen crossing the street in Montdidier at point 7390, nearly all day.

IV. CIRCULATION.

The visibility was good from 17h to 20h; poor the rest of the period.

There was practically no circulation in the front lines, and very little in the rear areas. Five motor cars were observed moving back and forth between Montdidier, Fontaine, and Etelfay. Even when the visibility was good there was extremely few indications of traffic, very little dust on any of the roads.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons: The balloons reported yesterday continued active during the afternoon. One enemy balloon in ascension very early this morning.

(b) Aeroplanes: The enemy's planes displayed quite a little activity this morning. One patrol of 5 chasse planes over our lines from 6h42 to 7h25 was fired on by anti aircraft and machine guns without effect. Last night three bombs were dropped in the vicinity of an ammunition dump north of Bacouel, 7 near Ruvroy, and 7 more on the Rocquencourt-Villers Tournelle Road, between 23h and midnight. It is to be noted that yesterday morning what was apparently an enemy photographic plane, passed over these places. Five photographic planes reported over our lines during the period covered by this report.

An english one-seater, Sopwith-Dolphin, was forced to descend at point 1540 north of Folleville before 23h last night. One of our observation posts reports hearing planes in combat at about this time. A front line observation post in the region of Cantigny reports one plane brought down by a French plane at 9h5 inside the enemy's lines.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A captured postcard shows that a man belonging to the 2nd Battery of the 28th Foot Artillery passed through a hospital near St. Quentin on June 7, 1918 on his way to the rear.

Our artillery is reported to have made a hit on an enemy ammunition dump in rear of the Bois Framicourt, by one of our front line observation posts.

Balloon lights observed in rear of enemy's lines at 3h45. Several relays of one-star white rockets in direction of Forestel Farm. One green rocket from La Folie Farm at 16h30 was relayed twice to Malpart.

Two enemy artillery adjustments and four messages were intercepted by our radio.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet except for two artillery concentrations.

Correct Spelling - * Bois des Sablons -
- *1 Rouvroy - S.G.W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 66, July 2, 1918.

Order issued by Ludendorff on the Subject of Information Obtained from German Prisoners.

Bulletin of the 5th Army.
Chief of the General Staff,
of the Army in the field
G-3, No. 8626

G.H.Q., June 10, 1918.

A captured document issued by the 2nd French Army Corps on May 26, proves that two German soldiers, belonging to the 7th Jaeger Regiment (197 Division), taken prisoners north of the Chemin des Bames on the night of May 25-26, revealed to the enemy the attack which we were about to make. It is probable that these two men told everything they knew of the preparations which had been made in their own and neighboring sectors. The enemy was thus furnished valuable details concerning the hour and the form of our attack, the artillery preparation, the units engaged, etc.

Another captured document, dated May 26, shows that the enemy, expecting our attack, ordered a gas alert and brought up to the heights between the Aisne and the Vesles the reserves at his disposal in this part of the front (13th French Division) The resistance offered by this division cost the life and health of many German Soldiers. If it had not been for the betrayal by these two prisoners, the surprise of May 27 would have been completely successful and the success which we would have received would have been even greater.

It has also been ascertained that our attack of June 9 was known to the enemy from prisoners' statements, these statements alone causing him to prepare for this attack.

One is surprised at the amount of detailed data which the enemy obtains from German prisoners. I ask that orders be given to have the troops in the field and in the rear very thoroughly and insistently instructed in the proper line of conduct in case of capture; the shameful character and dangerous results of a weak attitude should be brought to their notice. I also ask that the armies publish in their newspapers the text of the present order and articles dealing with the same matter. Most of the men who are unlucky enough to be captured do not appreciate how apt their statements are to bring about the death of many of their comrades and how liable they are to jeopardize the success of our attacks and raids. The dastardly conduct of some men can even have a very great influence on the victorious issue of this war and can cause the greatest injury to the whole Fatherland.

A soldier who refuses to talk gains esteem, maintains a clear conscience in his own eyes and in the eyes of his supreme commander and of his country, and finally, forces his opponent to respect him.

APPENDIX II.

From a French Army Bulletin.

Prisoners captured during the last few of days have admitted that they have recently been made to attend conferences during which they were reminded that a German Soldier, if captured, must, under no circumstances, give any information to the enemy. They have been told also that during the recent offensive on the Aisne the Germans captured a large number of reports on German prisoners, and that these reports gave the names of the prisoners and information of value to the enemy. The names of these German prisoners were read out to the troops, and it was said that if they returned to Germany they would be shot and that the same treatment would be given to any German prisoner who might, in the future, give the enemy information liable to prove harmful to his country. These threats seem to have considerably impressed the men.

S. I. 66

Correct Spelling - *VESLE - S.G.W.

APPENDIX III.

NOTES ON RAILWAYS IN REAR OF ENEMY'S LINES.

Region South of Chaulnes:

The narrow gauge line which starts at the dump near Belair Farm and which was known to extend as far as Punchy, now extends further to the southwest and meets in the Bois d'Hallu the recently built line which starts from the station of Fransart-Hattencourt.

A one meter gauge track passes south of Beaufort and Rouvroy en Santerre and runs in the direction of Fransart-Hattencourt (It probably connects with the track previously reported between Fransart and Fouquescourt.

Region south of Peronne. The St Christ Bridge across the Somme Canal, has been repaired. (English Photograph of June 25).

APPENDIX IV.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE GERMANS AGAINST OUR NEW GAS SHELLS.

(Statement of Prisoners taken June 27.)

Before going into line, the 2nd Battalion of the 81st Regiment attended a conference by the gas officers. This conference dealt with the new French gas.

It would appear that this new shell can not be recognized by its explosion.

The gas smells strongly of horse-radish and garlic. The new canister of the German mask is reported to be effective even against this new gas. (The men do not place much confidence in this statement.)

Any part of the body on which liquid from this shell has fallen should be sprinkled with chloride of lime pending inspection by a doctor.

Contaminated clothes should be taken off immediately. The ground which has been contaminated should be covered over with earth. Puddles which have been contaminated should be avoided. The men have been given the new canister, which has been put on the mask, the old one being held as a reserve cartridge pending the time when it also will be replaced. (In appearance the two canisters differ only by the dates).

Squad leaders have been given a box of chloride of lime.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 2, 1918.

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 37.

Subject: Addendum to Carnet Reduit "Napoleon".

Beginning upon receipt of this note, the group of letters - K A H - corresponding to the group of figures - 402, will be used to represent:- General C. P. O.

By command of Major General Bullard,

(SGD.) W. C. SHERMAN
W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

Please notify the units to which you distributed "Carnet Napoleon".

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 2, 1918.

██████.

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 38.

Subject: Coding of Wireless Telegrams.

Wireless messages sent in Code Chiffre Telephonique must always be in double coding. This means that the message in clear should first be coded in numbers, and then these numbers should be coded in letters with the help of the Tableau de Concordance which will be found in each Code Chiffre Telephonique. These groups of two letters will not be sent singly, but will be joined together in groups of six letters. This method of sending the message has been adopted in order to do away with the loss of time incurred by separating each group of two letters with some wireless signal, such as - ... -

Example: Let it be supposed that the message in clear corresponds to the following groups of three figures: 698 783

In double coding this would read: NB ' NA' GM

For sending by wireless these three groups of two letters would, in turn, be assembled to form a group of six letters:

NBNAGM

The last group of the message may comprise either two letters, four letters, or six letters.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

(SGD.) W. C. SHERMAN
W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

G-2-
No.67

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 3, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From July 2, 12h to July 3, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Usual machine gun fire during the night.

During our raid last night in front of Cantigny the enemy's machine guns did not fire on our front lines or in No-Man's Land, but indirectly on Cantigny. A machine gun at 1723 and one in a tree at 2619 were very active at this time.

II. ARTILLERY.

Very little activity on the part of the enemy's artillery yesterday, about 1000 shells in all. A concentration of about 200 105's was placed on the front lines of A1 and A2 at midnight. In reply to our fire on the enemy's lines in front of Cantigny, the enemy placed a barrage on our front lines from Cantigny to Grivesnes, commencing at 1h24; approximately 150 per minute. All quiet at 1h40. About 100 77s, 105s, on the Bois des Glands last night. Ten 150s on Coullemelle early this morning.

III. WORKS.

The following report on the enemy's wire in front of Grivesnes has been submitted:

From 1346⁵ to 1549 the wire consists of 1 belt of heavy accordion wire, 3' high, 3' wide, firmly fastened to the ground. It is connected to our wire at 1549. There are probably other belts in rear. From 12³⁴¹ to 12³⁴¹⁸ the wire consists of two belts of heavy accordion wire. The forward belt has two rolls and the inner three. Some of the enemy's wire has been damaged by our shell fire.

Organized shell hole at 1448. Our patrols and outposts report noise of working parties and of the handling of sheet iron in the western edge of the Bois Framicourt. Noise of wagons distinctly heard behind enemy's lines in front of Cantigny and Fontaine early last evening and this morning. Working party heard at 2917 and another at 2912; the latter was dispersed by our artillery fire. A new trench is reported in the vicinity of 3215.

Our raiding party failed to find any connected wire in front of the Trench de Munich in the region of the Cantigny road. The trench itself was deep and in good condition. Party of 30 men working all day on trench in vicinity of point 2810. Snipers post at 2998. Group of 15 to 20 men were seen working around the bushes at 1312 yesterday afternoon.

IV CIRCULATION.

The visibility was fair yesterday and good to-day.

There was very little circulation in the front line.

Very little circulation yesterday afternoon on routes in the rear zone. Early this morning our observation posts reported clouds of dust on the roads in rear of Montdidier before the visibility was sufficiently good to distinguish traffic. Later in the day the circulation between: Etelfay-Montdidier, Etelfay-Fignieres, Montdidier-Laboissiere, Montdidier-Etelfay, Becquigny-Etelfay, Fontaine-Gratibus and Etelfay-Laboissiere was distinctly greater than normal.

A total of 30 lorries, 50 wagons and 13 motors was observed along these routes between 6h and 11h this morning. 80 men in small groups from Montdidier to Etelfay this morning. One motor car from Framicourt to Fignieres at 8h10. A 4-horse caisson going north on Route Nationale No.35 left the highway at point 7310 at 9h53 and disappeared at point 7415.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Three enemy balloons were observed in ascension by 8h this morning. One balloon was seen to descend at point 3010 northwest of Etelfay at 9h25 this morning, (the coordinates obtained by intersection).

Five enemy planes over our lines yesterday afternoon. One flew low over our front lines in the region of Grivesnes and fired its machine gun. Four planes reported over Cantigny this morning.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A captured document shows that a 105 Howitzer battery at 5633 near Gratibus, used the center of Belle Assise Farm as its registration point. A destruction shoot was conducted on this battery yesterday.

Fire in Fignieres at 1h50.

During our raid last night the enemy sent up numerous one and two star green rockets. There were sent up promptly following our first shells and the enemy barrage came down four minutes after ours. During the barrage two red rockets were sent up and the fire was lengthened. Ten orange rockets were also sent up during the barrage,

Usual balloon lights during the night.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Quiet.

Headquarters 1st Div.-G-2.A.E.F.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 67, July 3, 1918.

(Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No.91)

GERMAN METHODS OF ENSURING SECRECY OF OPERATIONS.

From British Summary, June 27, 1918.

The following extracts from German documents, captured by the French, indicate the precautions taken by the Germans to ensure secrecy, prior to the Aisne offensive:-

(a) Notes taken at a lecture, some days before the attack by an officer belonging to one of the divisions which went into line the day before the offensive:-

"English perfectly quiet. Football. No artillery. Encourage this indifference. All movements to take place by night. At night keep off white roads. Keep a strict watch on unreliable men. Keep the surrounding country absolutely quiet. Examine the papers of any stranger who asks the way. Send only reliable men on errands. No fires. Tell the men nothing."

(b) Notes taken by an officer of the 67th Res. Inf. Regt.

(33rd Res. Div.) at battalion and regimental lectures:-

"Feb. 3, '18.- A column on a road is visible at once to balloon observers. In a field or against a brown background, it is invisible.

"Feb. 17, '18.- Do not put Alsations on sentry duty.

"Feb. 25, '18.- There are spies about. Military identification papers. Make sure all entries are filled in on second page of pay book. No one to leave his post without a pass.

"March 12, '18.- (Battalion resting in a camp).- Conceal lights, No electric torches. Observation balloon.

"April 22, '18.- Taking presents from inhabitants absolutely forbidden. Stricter vigilance than ever. Arrest suspects without hesitation.

"May 24, '18.- Examine the identification papers of any soldier who does not belong to the battalion."

(c) The diary of a N.C.O. shows that the offensive was kept secret from the rank and file of the 33d Res. Div., who were told, on May 11, that the enemy was preparing an attack against their front, with a view to holding up the German offensives on the Somme and in Flanders.

APPENDIX II.

ACTION OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN THE COURSE OF THE ATTACK OF THE 12th OF JUNE, BETWEEN THE AISNE AND THE FOREST OF RETZ, AS SEEN BY OUR INFANTRY. (Extract from the reports by a Brigade Commander and two commanders of the corps).

I.S. 67

The artillery which took part in the action was numerous, and consisted of all calibers, from the light trench mortars to 210's, and including 77's, 105's and 150's. The method of employing the German Artillery had nothing new about it. In this attack, as in preceding ones, the artillery was assigned the same missions of counter battery, destruction, interdiction, and accompanying the infantry.

The same method was employed : putting into action a very large number of batteries, making the preparation comparatively short in time, but extremely violent. An observer placed in a brigade P.C. counted, for a period of four hours, an average of 15 shots per minute.

The result was a very impressive bombardment, but of too short a duration to unnerve good troops. With men who have been determined to hold on, the preparation must last at least one day in order to secure the desired result. Perhaps in 1916 and 1917 our preparations were too long and too minute. But, on the other hand, that of the Germans in 1918 was incomplete and could only give large results on inferior troops. If the troops charged with the defence are well echeloned in depth, in such a way as to avoid complete destruction by minenwerfer: If the distribution of the troops on the different lines is well made, a preparation of a few hours, however violent, can not break through.

Counter battery was done by the heavy caliber guns, which began discreetly during the day of the 11th and continued during the night of the 11-12, becoming intense about 2h30 on the 12th, and reaching its maximum intensity at 4 o'clock. A great quantity of gas shells was used, but no Yperite, the enemy's objective being the zone of the field batteries. One fact is particularly to be noted : the employment of large quantities of 77 high explosives against the personnel of the batteries. Instantaneous shell caused most of the losses in the personnel of the 75 batteries.

The destructive fire developed nothing new. There were many 105's and 150's used, but few 210's. As usual the fire was well regulated and very precise. Fire did not commence on the lines until about one hour before the attack. Much fire was directed on the lines, but as they were not densely occupied, combat groups moved over the places that were not beaten. The wearing down of the morale of the defenders was not marked, because of the short length of duration. There were many gas shells, and the men had to put on their masks. But losses were slight from this source, Due to the difficulty of seeing the shell holes where our riflemen were, the enemy was not able to precisely determine our first lines, which in consequence, suffered less than the position of our reserves.

Interdiction was carried out upon the certain chosen points, but it was utterly lacking in mobility and suppleness. The enemy's artillery systematically shot up ravines, cross-roads and villages, but with no great results as these places were thinly or not at all occupied.

Even at the point which had been signalled to the enemy by his observers as occupied, results were not decisive, due to the lack of réglage and precise observation. The consequence of this was that as soon as the character of his fire had become known reserves were enabled to reach their positions almost without losses. For example, a battalion conducted by Lt. Wahl, of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, who had already been over the ground, had no losses.

The rolling barrage (77's, 105's, and 150's) moved very slowly, being fixed for 15 to 20 minutes on points that were considered important by the enemy. The barrage was lacking in effect, as are all barrages which are not closely followed by the assaulting infantry; the combat groups let the storm pass, and when the enemy infantry was seen, the barrage was far away and our lines could use its arms unmolested. With an infantry determined to hold on, the rolline barrage can only be effective if it follows fire which has used up the nerves of the defenders, that is to say, fire which has lasted a long time. The barrage was very dense but lacked depth. With a short preparation, if one expects to succeed, one must employ a deep barrage (1200 to 1500 meters), so as to neutralize at the same time the machine guns of several successive lines of defense. The Germans did not try to obtain this result, either because they had not considered it indispensable, or because they did not have the necessary artillery (3 groups of light and one group of heavy on the front of each battalion).

To sum up, outside of the use of the 77's in counter battery work, the method of employing the artillery for the attack of the 12th of June showed nothing new. The rolling barrage adopted by the enemy does not seem to be suited to the present method of war. Artillery can not hope to plow up every bit of ground; nor is its duty ended when it has launched a fierce fire on a given zone and has moved forward mechanically without determining whether it is followed by its infantry. It is better to fire upon well known points, to intensify the interdiction fire, the counter battery fire and destructive fire on known points, all the while reserving a certain portion of the light batteries to accompany the infantry, in close liaison with it.

The rolling barrage began only at the support line. According to the statements of Battalion commanders, it was terrible to see and to hear; but it caused comparatively small losses to the men who had taken cover. Deep holes, without parapets, and isolated, gave excellent protection.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 3, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 39.

Attention to officers in possession of codes is
drawn to the fact that

Code Chiffre Telephonique
Carnet Redit, and
Clefs et Bandes de Chiffremont
are personal property, and not to be turned over to rel-
ieving units.

By command of Major General Bullard,

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

G-2
No. 68

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 4, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From July 3, 12h to July 4, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY. A few rifle grenades on our front lines in the region of St. Aignan. Very little machine gun fire on our front lines during the night. Snipers fired on our front lines in A1 and A2 from points 2811 and 3815.

II. ARTILLERY. 1100 shells on the sector yesterday. Concentrations on Cantigny, the front lines north of Cantigny and the trenches to the west of Grivesnes between 22h and 23h. Interdiction fire on the exits to Villers-Tournelle, the region of Grivesnes, and the Villers Tournelle-Broyes Road during the period covered by this report. No very heavy fire on any particular point throughout the period. At 19h15 three shrapnel were fired at one of our observation balloons northwest of Folleville. The balloon descended. The enemy has adjusted in the neighborhood of Chapelle St. Aignan for the last 48 hours. (see statement of prisoners).

III. WORKS. An enemy wiring party was heard last night at point 2921. A working party in the vicinity of 3110. Wagons heard on the Cantigny-Framicourt Road at 1h at approximately point 4515. A carrying party of two men was seen at 3215. Wagons heard in rear of Fontaine sous Montdidier at 21h05 and 5h15. This has happened for the last two nights.

Small working party of four men at 9499. There is new work at 9302.

IV. CIRCULATION. The visibility was poor all day.

One man was seen to enter the trench at point 16⁵38, coming from the east. About ten men passed back and forth between a clump of bushes at 2825 and point 2818 in the Bois Framicourt.

Circulation was slightly greater than normal in the area: Fignieres, Etelfay, Montdidier, this morning. Three motors from Fignieres to Etelfay between 8- and 10 hours. Three groups of 20 men each passed point 9504 at 6h47 en route from Etelfay to Montdidier.

V. AIRCRAFT. No balloons observed in ascension this morning.

Three enemy planes over our lines yesterday afternoon. One enemy plane over Broyes early this morning.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. Order of battle confirmed by the capture of three prisoners belonging to the 8th Company, First Reserve Regiment, First Reserve Division, at point 16⁵28, at 2h45 this morning (see interrogation of prisoners). It is presumed that the 59 RJR has relieved the 270 R.JR

Fire in Mesnil St. Georges at 23h.

A large explosion occurred between Etelfay and Faverolles at 21h50 last night.

A possible enemy observation post has been reported at 3992. It is partly camouflaged and a bright object is visible in a loophole.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 68, JULY 4,
1918.

- 0 -

REPORT ON THREE PRISONERS CAPTURED ON THE MORNING OF THE
4th OF JULY SOUTH OF THE CHAPELLE SAINT AIGNAN.

1. Identity of Prisoners.

X., Lance corporal, home at Berlin.

Y. private, home at Neukoln

Z. Private, home at Medien, near Heilsberg (wounded).

All of them belong to the 8th Company of the 1st
Res. Regt., 1st Res. Division.

2. Circumstances of Capture.

Time: 2h45, July 4th, 1918.

Place: Tranchee de Vienne, approximate coordinates
16528.

On the evening of July 3rd the 8th Company was told to be "doubly on the alert", as it was expected that the Americans would attempt some operation on Independence Day.

The American raiding party went over the top in three groups, supported by a box barrage. The Germans offered strong resistance, but were overpowered, leaving three prisoners in the hands of the Americans and suffering heavy losses in dead and wounded.

3. Order of Battle.

It is presumed that the present order of battle is, from north to south:

59th Res. Inf.

1st Res. Inf.

272nd Res. Inf.

It is reported that the 270th Regiment has been withdrawn from the line on account of a large number of fever cases. It is not certain, however, whether the 1st Res. Regt. has taken over the entire sector of the 270th Res. Regt., or whether it has simply lent its second battalion temporarily and is still occupying its normal sector north of Grivesnes with its two other battalions. The former hypothesis is the more probable, especially as the 82nd Res. Div. has suffered very heavy losses since its arrival in this sector (operation against Cantigny and subsequent counter-attacks).

4. Disposition of the 2nd Battalion.

Prisoners are not sure whether there are three or four companies in the first line. The 8th Company, however, is on the battalion's extreme left, having the 5th Company adjacent and to the north.

The companies are slightly echeloned in depth. The 8th, for instance, has about two-thirds of its trench strength in the first line trench, and the rest echeloned to the rear, chiefly in the small trench at 1728.

The first line trench is in very good condition. It is about 6 feet deep at all places. It is protected by a concertina wire entanglement 30 meters in front of the trench, extending beyond the company's front on both sides. This wire entanglement, according to the prisoners, is only two meters wide. It is to be reinforced within the next few days.

There are no dugouts in the first line trench. The men sleep in small excavations in the side of the trench.

During the night the company sends out three listening posts, (2 to 3 men), about thirty meters in front of the trench, just inside of the wire. (visible on photos). In case of an enemy raid or attack, the men in the listening posts shoot in order to alarm the garrison of the trench, and then retire to the trench without offering resistance. If the enemy is not in force (2 or 3 men), the listening post garrison defends itself on the spot.

Both night and day 5 or 6 double sentries, armed with light machine guns, and three single sentries, are posted in the first line trench.

During the night the entire company is on the alert. They do but very little work, leaving that to the companies of the support battalion.

5. Miscellaneous.

The 2nd Battalion seems to do quite a little patrolling. One of the prisoners stated that almost every night there is sure to be at least one patrol out.

The 2nd Battalion was to make a small raid on the night of July 3rd to 4th. Four men of the 8th Company were to participate in it, but the orders were delayed, and when finally they did come (1 a.m.) it was too late to carry out the operation. The objective of the raid seems to have been the American trenches in the vicinity of the Chapelle Saint Aignan Cemetery. Prisoner does not know whether there was to be any artillery preparation.

Prisoners did not know that there were Americans opposite them.

Each battalion has an assault detachment.

The 8th Company has also a special group of 8 to 10 men detailed to carry out patrols and participate in minor operations.

G-2
No. 69

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 5, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

July 4, 12h- July 5, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY

I. INFANTRY. A few rifle grenades on Chapel St. Aignan yesterday. Short heavy bursts of machine gun fire sweeping the Bois Fontaine from 2h to 4h this morning. The usual machine gun fire along the rest of the front.

Heavy trench mortars in the Bois Framicourt and the Bois Lalval are reported to have fired on the front lines around Cantigny from 21h30 to 23h30. The trench mortar fire usually preceded the artillery concentration.

II. ARTILLERY. The enemy retaliated for our fire on the Bois Lalval with Yperite early last night, by firing heavily on our front lines from the Bois Fontaine to the Parc of Grivesnes (both included) and on Grivesnes, Le Plessier, St. Aignan, Villers Tournelle and Valley southeast, Cantigny, and Coullemelle. Very heavy bursts of fire on these places from 22h4 to 22h10, 22h14 to 22h18, 23h20 to 23h25, 23h44 (shifted to north almost immediately) with 77s, 105s, 150s. The enemy's fire slackened or ceased each time, almost immediately after our artillery had started counter preparation. Our observers report a new battery in action in the Bois Lalval and also state that most of the batteries firing appeared to be to the north of our sector.

III. WORKS. Enemy working parties heard in the Bois Allonge last night. A small strong point is evidently being constructed in this woods near point 3093. Work is also being done at 3097. Wagons were heard unloading last night in rear of this position.

The enemy was seen unloading hay at point 8700.

IV. CIRCULATION. The visibility was poor all day.

There was very little circulation in the front lines and in the rear zone yesterday. Not over 20 wagons, 8 lorries, and 4 motors observed during the period covered by this report.

V. AIRCRAFT. One enemy balloon observed in ascension yesterday afternoon. 8 enemy balloons up by 10h this morning.

A patrol of 9 enemy planes flew south over our front lines late yesterday afternoon. They were fired on by anti aircraft guns but continued their mission. At 1h44 a group passed southeast over Mesnil and dropped 5 bombs. Three observation planes over our lines this morning. 15 small bombs were dropped in the Parc of Grivesnes and 4 on Le Plessier by an aeroplane this morning. One white star rocket from a plane over the Bois Halle at 22h55.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. At 9h24 a large column of smoke observed on or near Route National No. 35 in the direction of Davenescourt. At 9h30 a fire was observed at 8035, evidently an ammunition dump (sudden burst of white smoke, lasting for 7 minutes). At 24h a large explosion occurred in the direction of Fignieres, followed by several small explosions.

The enemy's fire at 22h14 was preceded by 2 one star red rockets. The usual balloon lights during the night. An enemy search light was working last night to the east of Malpart and to the N. of Courtemanche at 24h30.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet except for artillery reaction last night.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 69, JULY 5,
1918.

ENEMY ACTIVITY ON THE FRONT OF OUR ARMY DURING THE
MONTH OF JULE, 1918.

(From an Army Bulletin)

1. ORDER OF BATTLE.

During the month of June no new division appeared on our front. About the 20th the 14th Bavarian Division (which had only two regiments in line), was withdrawn and its sector taken over by two divisions on its right extending their front. The number of divisions facing the army having, therefore, decreased from $9\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{1}{2}$.

Of these divisions, two (the 109th and 25th Res.) have been in line more than two months, three (the 21st, the 6th Res. and the 2nd) nearly two months, and four (the 225th, the 192d, the 1st Res. and the 32d Res.) more than one month.

These divisions are all second and third class, and are believed incapable of participating in an offensive. But one can not conclude from this that the enemy does not intend making an offensive in this region. The long stay of these divisions in sector may be due to a desire on the part of the enemy to prevent the troops learning the interesting things that are going on in rear, thus preventing prisoners from giving away the show. At the moment of an important attack, these divisions could be relieved or passed through by fresh divisions.

II. ENEMY ACTIVITY.

A. INFANTRY.

On June 9, at the time of the enemy offensive on the army on our right, the regiment in line at the extreme right of our army was attacked and drew back its line slightly in the region of Monchel. Outside of this attack, the only enemy infantry activity has been a few attempts at raids at different points of the front.

B. ARTILLERY.

The activity of the enemy artillery which was already somewhat feeble during the month of May, diminished even further during the month of June. The only exception was the extreme southern portion of the sector which was involved in the bombardments of the attack of the 9th of June.

Harassing fire on the advance zone has been light and consisting generally of short bursts of fire.

The range firing on the rear areas also diminished during the second half of the month. The most frequent targets were the Breteuil Embranchement and the St. Just-Amiens Railroad. The 380 piece of Chuignolles continued harassing the northern sector of the armies during the first half of the month, but was completely silent during the last half.

Concentrations on the first lines, the villages, and the battery zones has still continued frequent, but has diminished in volume. These have been most frequent in the vicinity of Cantigny.

Gas concentrations have also decreased. There was no concentration of Yperite. The offensive of the 9th of June on the Army at our right extended north to Grivesnes,

consisting of a very violent bombardment of the first lines and of the batteries with H. E. and gas shell.

Minenwerfer played a small part.

Adjustments have been rather numerous, particularly in the northern part of the Army. Adjustments by high bursts have been frequent; they show that although the enemy has made very few shoots for effect, nevertheless, he has methodically verified the firing data of his batteries.

As regards the number of batteries, the sector of the Luce has preserved its usual aspect, with a large proportion of long guns firing in the direction of Amiens.

The sector of Moreuil remains heavily held. Several new emplacements have been located in this region. The sector of Montdidier seems to have been reinforced, during the first half, by borrowing batteries from the sector of the Haute-Avre. The latter sector, which constitutes the extreme right of the XVIIIth German Army, is particularly weak in artillery. This condition has lately been accentuated. However, the terrain in this sector lends itself readily, by reason of the many ravines, to the deployment of numerous batteries.

The average daily consumption of ammunition has been steadily diminishing; while during the first half of May the average was 20,000 per day, it dropped to 13,000 during the first half of June, and to 7300 during the 2nd half.

To sum up: The artillery situation seems, on the whole, to be stationary with a tendency towards drawing together the lines in the region of Montdidier and to the south of Moreuil. The sector of the XVIIIth German Army between La Neuville and Gratibus is still weak. Adjustment fire continues frequent in the northern sector.

The daily consumption, which has always been feeble, as compared with the number of pieces employed, has even further decreased during the second half of June. It would seem that the enemy governs the amount he shoots by the amount we shoot, always keeping just beneath our consumption so as to liven up the sector as little as possible.

C. AVIATION.

Aeroplane activity was slight from the first to the 27th, except towards the 9th, when it became noticeably stronger, in the sector of Montdidier, at the time of the attack on the Army on our right. Since the 27th, pursuit aviation has become more numerous and more aggressive.

Pursuit aeroplanes remained in their own-lines up to the last part of the month. Since the 27th, patrols of 6 to 8 machines have made their appearance, have frequently crossed our lines and have taken an aggressive attitude. Fokker biplanes have been seen. On the 27th and the 28th, several of our balloons were attacked towards the end of the day.

Regulating aeroplanes were more active in the second half of the month than in the first; most of the signals intercepted came from the region of Moreuil.

Bombing aeroplanes continued rather weak, on the whole, except during the last days of the month, when it was greater than formerly.

A few long distance reconnaissances have been noted in the regions of Poix, Conty, Crevecoeur, Formerie, and

Beauvais.

The number of enemy balloons which reached 15 at the beginning of May, was reduced to seven at the beginning of June, and came up to ten towards the end of the month. The balloons on the northern front of the army made numerous ascensions and descents daily, during the second half of the month. Aerodromes situated west of the line Peronne-Chaulnes-Roye have nearly all been evacuated. On the other hand, east of this line new aerodromes have appeared.

D. WORKS.

The defensive works have been pushed very little. A few communicating trenches have been dug to give access to elements of the first line trenches which are not hidden from view. The organization which began to show up on the right bank of the Avre has not been continued.

But if new works have not been numerous in advance, on the other hand towards the rear the railroads increase; depots of material and of munitions are growing. South of Chaulnes in particular the stations of Fransart and Fresnoy continue to grow, and railroads extend out from these stations towards the west up to Quesnel and Hangest where they connect with the lines from Albert to Montdidier. Another railroad has appeared which joins the station of Fransart to that of Bel-Air Farm (3 kilometers southeast of Chaulnes). This permits them to avoid the station of Chaulnes, where the traffic seems to have considerably decreased.

3. CONCLUSIONS.

The enemy preserved, during the month of June, the same passive attitude as during the month of May. He does little work on his defensive organization. His artillery activity, which was already small enough during the preceding month, has decreased even more in June; It corresponds in no way with possibilities of fire of the located batteries. The density of the divisions in sectors has diminished. No new division has appeared.

The calm of the first lines can have as its object only to make us believe he intends no offensive.

If the front works are very little pushed, those of the rear, on the other hand, are actively worked on. Stations are increasing, railroads being extended, aerodromes are increasing.

To sum up the enemy does not seem to have given up his plan of attack on the British front: Amiens and Abbeville are probably still among the principal objectives of this next offensive, which, with the condition of the enemy's present organization, can be launched in a very short time.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 5, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 42

1. Each unit of this Division will turn over to relieving units the following:

(a) O.P. dossier showing for each O.P. the location, visible and invisible areas, means of liaison, crew, and equipment.

(b) File of Divisional and Corps summaries, except that of the appendices, only the interrogatory of prisoners will be turned over.

(c) All maps pertaining to sector. This does not include 1/80000 and 1/200000 maps which are not sector property, and will be taken out by units.

(d) All aeroplane photographs.

(e) Plan Navettes.

(f) Any other files and papers of local interest only. Where practicable, these papers will be translated into French.

2. Units will not turn over intelligence equipment.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

(Sgd): W.C. SHERMAN
W.C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

Distribution:

I.O. 1st Inf. Brig.

I.O. 2nd Inf. Brig.

I.O. 1st Art. Brig.

16th Inf.

18th Inf.

26th Inf.

28th Inf.

G-2

G-2
No. 70

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 6, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From July 5, 12h to July 6, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

A few rifle grenades on point 1043⁵ at 20h5.

Intermittent machine gun fire in direction of Bois Fontaine throughout the night. Yesterday afternoon an enemy sniper fired from point 2709.

II. ARTILLERY.

Very little action by the enemy's artillery yesterday, only about 1000 shells. About 150 150's on Coullemelle between 11h and 1h. A fire for destruction on a battery west of Coullemelle commencing at 3h30, with 150's.

III. WORKS.

An enemy working party heard driving stakes behind the lines at 3313. A new mound of dirt at 2915. A wagon was unloaded at point 3313 at 5h. Six men seen in a pit (probable machine gun emplacement) at point 2808 at 19h15.

Working party of 15 men at 8901.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility was good at intervals during the day. Very little circulation along the routes in the rear zone except between Laboissiere and Etelfay where abnormal circulation was observed yesterday afternoon between 12h and 20h.: 24 lorries, 19 wagons and 7 motors passed point 2203 during this time.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons. Seven enemy balloons observed in ascension this morning.

From a study made of the enemy's balloons visible from our posts the following facts have been deduced:

1. Only 3 of the balloons have fixed bases, but these, in descending, pass from view while still at a considerable height.
2. Eight of the visible balloons are mobile and frequently change their positions while in the air as much as 2 kilometers.
3. The balloons operate in a zone 8-10 kilometers from our front lines.

Aeroplanes. Very little activity by the enemy's planes either yesterday or to-day.

At 12h27 an enemy plane brought down a balloon in flames in the sector to our south. One of our planes brought down an enemy observation balloon near Montdidier at 15h45.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 1h44 an ammunition dump exploded in Montdidier. At 22h27 one 1-star red rocket from the enemy's lines in direction of the Bois Allonge. No apparent result. At 23h36 one 1-star green rocket (enemy) to north of Grivesnes. From 1h53 to 1h56 during steady exchange of machine gun fire numerous flares were sent up. 28 green rockets from enemy lines opposite St. Aignan at 2h20. Aerial light up east of Cantigny at 22h30.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Quiet.

G-2
No. 71.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 7, 1918.

Daily Intelligence Summary.
From 10 a.m. July 6 to 10 a.m. July 7.
Activity of the Enemy.

I. INFANTRY

- a. Enemy attacks. None.
- b. Patrols. None.
- c. Infantry fire. At 18:15 4 machine guns firing from Chateau de Jenlis on Fontaine wood. At 18:40 2 machine guns firing from Mesnil Saint Georges on Bois de Longue Haie.
- d. Fire by Trench Mortars. None.
- e. Machine guns and Trench Mortars exactly located. None.

II. ARTILLERY.

- a. Activity of enemy artillery.

POINT OF FALL	TIME	NO. OF SHELLS	CAL.	REMARKS.
Front: Bois Avance	2.2 to 7.30	10	105	Harassing.
Bois de Cantigny	8.10 to 13.00	32	105	"
Belle Assise	13.00 to 14.30	10	105	"
Cantigny	14.10 to 21.10	70	77-105	Destructive.
Bois St. Eloi	7.20 to 8.30	10	105	Harassing
Bois des Glands	8.10 to 9.30	10	105	"
Bois de Villers	8.40 to 24.30	100	150	Shrapnel Harassing
Rear Villers				
Tournelle	10.00 to 10.00	10	150	Harassing.

III. WORKS.

- a. Advanced works. Enemy working party at 1.10 heard at approximately point 2912.
- b. Rear works. None.

IV. CIRCULATION.

- a. Visibility. Fair.
- b. Circulation in front lines. None observed.
- c. Circulation in rear.

From 8.29 to 8.45 4 wagons observed on Assainvillers to Faverolles Road. At 10.12 55 men on road No. 30 leaving Montdidier.

V. AIRCRAFT.

- a. Balloons: 1 balloon observed at 9:35 Northeast of Montdidier.

1	"	5.00 to 11.25	opposite Le Plessier.
1	"	5.15 to 10.05	opposite Cantigny.

- b. Airplanes.

Number	Time	Region flown over
1	5:25	Our lines going South.
1	6:25	" " " "
1	6:45	" " going north
1.	10:15	" " " "
5	20:00	" " " south

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Order of battle. Prisoners, deserters etc., No new identification.
- b. Observed results of our fire on enemy organizations: Explosion in Montdidier, near Railroad at 15:49 hours.
- c. Observatories located, construction of telephone lines, optic signals, searchlights: Unusual number of enemy flares during the night.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Unusually quiet.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 10, 1918.

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 43.

1. The Scout Platoon of each battalion, consisting of the present authorized intelligence personnel, and including scouts, snipers, and observers, will be billeted together at such place as the battalion commander may direct, and will be attached for rations to the organization most convenient to their billets.

2. They will stand reveille and retreat at their billets, the roll being called by the senior N.C.O. present, and reported to the scout officer.

3. At the discretion of the battalion commanders the personnel of the scout platoon will be exempt from guard duty and fatigue.

4. A special course of training will be prescribed in G-3 orders from these headquarters.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 14, 1918.

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 46.

Code Chiffre 60 is canceled. Request that copy issued to you be returned to this office without delay. For the moment it will not be replaced by another series of Code Chiffre.

By Command of Major General Bullard:

W. C. SHERMAN
Major, General Staff.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 14, 1918.

G-2
MEMORANDUM No. 40-D.

Herewith copies of 1/80000 Soissons maps. Intelligence Officers, or adjutants of units having no intelligence officers, will be responsible for the distribution of these maps in accordance with the following table:

Infantry.

Each Infantry Brigade Headquarters	2
Each Regimental Headquarters	2
Each Battalion Headquarters	2
Each Machine Gun Battalion	2

Artillery

Artillery Brigade Headquarters	2
Each artillery regiment headquarters	2
Each artillery battalion headquarters	2
Trench Mortar battery	2

Engineers

1st Regiment of Engineers	2
Each battalion of Engineers	2

Trains.

C. O. Trains	2
Horse Battalion Ammunition Train	2
Motor Battalion Ammunition Train	2
Supply train	2
Sanitary train	4
M. T. S.	2
Engineers' Train	2

Division Machine Gun Battalion	4
Field Signal Battalion	9
Headquarters Troop	1
G-1	1
A. P. M.	3
Division Quartermaster	1
Division Surgeon	1
Division Adjutant	1
Division Signal Officer	2
Division Ordnance Officer	1
Division Inspector	1
G-3	5

By Command of Major General Bullard:

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 16th 1918

NOTES FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

I.

All Intelligence Officers and Scout Officers must remember that their duties are two-fold: to ascertain all possible information about the enemy, and to transmit this information to the commanders concerned. One is useless without the other. Therefore the duty of the Scout Officer is not alone to obtain information about the enemy in the front of his battalion, but to insure that this information be given to his battalion commander and be passed to the next higher echelon through the medium of the Regimental Intelligence Officer. In the same way the Regimental Intelligence Officer keeps his regimental commander informed of the enemy's movements and dispositions, and transmits this information to the Brigade Intelligence Officer. The Brigade Intelligence Officer is responsible for forwarding this information to G-2 only in the case where the latter has not sent a liaison officer to Brigade. While this sounds simple, unless the greatest attention is paid to this matter, information will not reach the next higher echelon in time to be of use. It must be borne in mind that the higher commanders can only assist their own troops provided they know where they and the enemy are. Every battle has demonstrated anew the difficulty of sending back timely information to the higher commanders, so that they may dispose of their reserves in the best manner possible. The duty of obtaining and getting back this information of the enemy devolves upon every echelon of the Intelligence Service. Study the system of liaison. See that your patrols and O.P.s can connect in with the axis of liaison. Where possible use the telephone, but don't count on it; runners are the only certain means.

II.

Remember that in the past we have frequently deduced intended enemy attacks from unusual traffic in forward areas; reconnoitering groups of officers obviously strange to the sector and other unusual signs of movement.

III.

NOTES ON GERMAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS.

FRONT LINE DEFENCES.

As a general practice the German front line positions are held by comparatively few infantrymen. This is particularly true in clear weather and at night when visibility is good. These infantrymen, frequently separated by many yards, are armed with automatic rifles or machine guns, one rifle or machine gun to each isolated post. It is expected that these machine guns or automatic rifles, aided by artillery barrage, fire of machine guns and grenatenwerfer placed farther in the rear; will be sufficient to resist any attack. Gaps between front line defensive works are closely guarded by machine gun fire from the rear and by flanking fire. Such gaps are under constant observation by both infantry and artillery. At night and during misty weather they are guarded by outposts. The greater part of the front line garrison is held in the lines farther back.

All trenches and the ground both to the rear and in front of the first line, are under flanking and cross fire from machine guns and rifles. A general reserve is held far back to the rear at such points as afford cover. They are held in readiness at all times for counter attack.

IV.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN DEFENSE.

The Germans rely chiefly, in the defense, upon armament, not upon numbers of men. They rely especially upon artillery, trench mortars and machine guns in defensive operations.

Distribution in depth is the basis of German defensive measures.

V.

THE GERMAN STRONG POINT.

The garrison of a German Strong Point is organized in depth with its flanks strongly protected by wire entanglements. Accessory defenses of the strong point will not be found exclusively on the outer parts of the position, but inside. This is a measure for preventing the systematic destruction of such accessories by the enemy. Machine guns are extensively used in strong points. These are arranged in nests and are so placed that a flank attack against the strong point can be enfiladed.

VI.

SHELL HOLE ORGANIZATIONS.

The Germans are making use more extensively, of shell hole organization. During the early phases of an attack they invariably abandon the trenches of the front line and seek new positions in shell holes which are quickly connected and organized for defensive purposes. This is in keeping with the principle of making the front line garrison as mobile as possible so as to move quickly from heavily shelled areas into new positions from which the defense may be carried on.

Shell holes are exclusively used for machine gun posts in flanking organizations. When so used they are strongly echeloned in depth.

VII.

TRENCH MORTARS.

The Germans do not use trench mortars near the front line in defensive action. They are used, however, in the defense, to command the communicating trenches so as to force the enemy, if he enters the German lines, to advance in the open.

VIII.

ARTILLERY.

It is a recent and general practice of the Germans to place a large part of their light artillery in the open fields, away from emplacements and usually close to the front line. These are frequently within one or two kilometers of the front line.

I. GENERAL.

The front now occupied by the enemy presents the aspect of an open warfare rather than an organized front. In general there are no continuous trenches, men using individual shell holes except that certain use has been made of old French trenches which are perpendicular to the front. In consequence the exact location of troops undoubtedly varies from time to time and can not be accurately stated. The enemy's morale is not believed to be high. He has suffered heavy losses, is now greatly fatigued, and has, it is believed, suffered also from the prevailing epidemic of Grippe. The sector is calm and the enemy unquestionably has instructions to let it remain as calm as possible. The enemy fires little offensively, but puts down counter preparation at the slightest evidence of activity. Every morning at dawn, for the past several days, he has put down counter preparation. This is concentrated chiefly on the heads of the ravines at Cutry and St. Pierre Aigle and is rather light in between. Also at dawn every morning an enemy aeroplane has flown over the sector watching for possible attack. The counter preparation has not been violent except at the points indicated above, and has resulted in very slight losses to our men in the sector. His artillery is not strong and contains only small and medium calibers. In short his attitude is distinctly defensive. It is clear that the Germans have greatly weakened this front in order to be strong at other points, and have told the divisions on this front that the situation is such that the divisions can not be given rest but must hold, with their weakened force, until a decision has been reached elsewhere.

II. INFANTRY.

The order of battle map herewith shows the sectors held by the enemy divisions. The 6th Division was a very good division (first class). It is recruited from Brandenburg (Prussia). It has been in sector since the 30th of June. It is composed as follows:

Infantry-12th Infantry Brigade, (the 24th, 64th, and 396th Regiments).

Cavalry- 5th Squadron, 3rd Hussars.

Artillery- 3rd Field Artillery (6 4-gun and 6 4-howitzer batteries).

3rd and 5th Field Companies, 1st Pioneer battalion.

6th Minenwerfer Company

6th Telephone Detachment.

8th Bearer Company.

34th Field Hospital.

It is probable that its trench strength is 60 men. In spite of its weakness it may be considered as a division that will offer stubborn resistance.

The 42nd Division, recruited from Westphalia and Lorraine, is fresher than the 6th Division (which arrived in line tired), but is a third class division. It has been in the sector since the 1st of July. Its composition is as follows:

Infantry- 65th Infantry Brigade (17th, 131st, and 138th Inf. Regiments)

Cavalry- 3rd Squadron, 7th Dragoons.

Artillery- 15th Field Artillery Regiment.

3rd Field Company, 1st Pioneer Battalion.

42nd Minenwerfer Company.

42nd Telephone Detachment.

263rd Bearer Company.

327th Field Hospital.

The probable trench strength is 60 men also.

The exact location of battalions and companies has not been determined. However, it is very probable that each regiment has one battalion in front line, one in support, at a distance of 3 to 5 kilometers, and the 3rd battalion in rest from 6 to 10 kilometers in rear of the front line. The battalions in front line have, as a rule, two companies in front and two in battalion support at a distance of 200 to 400 meters.

The support battalion, as a rule, uses the old French trenches (in which dugouts have been constructed), quarries, and such other cover as the terrain affords. (see location of quarries on maps furnished.)

The disposition in the front line companies is, as a rule, as follows: The main strength of the company occupies the line of resistance of the outpost positions, sending forward as outguards one and sometimes two platoons which establish posts consisting, as a rule, of one non commissioned officer and two men. The distances between the various elements of the first line (Out Posts) Companies, varies, of course, with the terrain.

No wire has been located, except the wire of the old French positions. However, an order has been captured directing that wire be placed in front of the line of resistance without delay. The terrain is covered with wheat now several feet high, so that concertina wire would be difficult to discover. But it may be safely assumed that no thick bands of wire exist, as these would almost certainly show up. It is worth noting that the old French trenches form switch lines for the enemy.-

Each enemy division occupies 5 to 6 kilometers.

III. ARTILLERY.

It is probable that the strength of the artillery opposing us consists, on each Divisional front of the enemy, of two Divisional Artilleries. The enemy artillery map, shows such batteries as have been located. These batteries are in the open fields, concealed by grain. It has been very difficult to locate these batteries exactly. It is probable that the pieces of divisions in rest are in position, but served by the personnel of the Divisional Artillery in line.

IV.

Maps showing the order of battle, the organization of the enemy (1:20000) and artillery objectives, are being issued, as well as a large number of 1:80000. Suitable aeroplane photographs for issue, are not obtainable, nor do any 1/10000 and 1/5000 maps of this terrain exist.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 17, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 48.

1. It is absolutely forbidden to use telephone farther forward than the P.C.'s of Regiments except in special cases where permission has been given by Division Commander.

2. The use of a telephone should be as limited as possible. Other means of liaison will be employed.

3. The use of the English Language will be carefully avoided. Interpreters will be employed.

4. Units will not be named in clear but will be given code names.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

1st Inf. Brigade.

2nd Inf. Brigade.

16th Inf.

18th Inf.

26th Inf.

28th Inf.

G-1

G-2

G-3

1st Artillery Brigade.

Chief Signal Officer.

Headquarters 1st Div., A.E.F., July 19, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 49.

Code Chiffre 61 will continue to be in use within this Division until further notice. It will not be used for lateral liaison with French units as the latter are supplied with another code. Any message to be sent in code to French units will be transmitted in Code 61 to Division Headquarters, which will forward same properly coded.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

Headquarters 1st Div., A.E.F.
July 22, 1918.

G-2

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From July 21, 6 p.m. to July 22, 6 p.m.

A) ORDER OF BATTLE:

No new identifications. Additional information obtained from prisoners captured late in the morning of the 21st and brought in to this P.C. this morning, seems to point to the presence of the 17th Division in the region of NOYANT. 3 prisoners, stating that they have seen elements of the 72d Regt. (active) in this region.

The elements of the 42d and 11th Divisions which were still in line, mixed in with troops of the 28th Division, 34th Div, and 46th Res. Div., seem to have been relieved, and prisoners captured towards 10 a.m. July 21, at Berzy only include units of the 28th Division and a few stragglers of other divisions.

B) GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE DAY: Fairly quiet.

C) ENEMY INFANTRY:

No apparent activity.

It was reported that hostile troops were assembling behind Buzancy late in the afternoon of the 21st, but these elements were subjected to artillery fire and no counter attack followed.

D) ENEMY ARTILLERY:

Enemy artillery displayed considerable activity on the left of our front lines at about 19h30. This bombardment was followed by heavy interdiction.

Enemy artillery was fairly quiet during the night.

At 10h30 July 22 the enemy artillery became active on both forward and rear areas, especially on our front lines and BERZY le SEC. Fire on rear areas consisted chiefly of interdiction on different routes.

At 12h15 the enemy dropped some large calibers on VILLERMONTAIRE* and some medium calibers southwest of PLOISY, near Hill 153, also a few shells northwest of VOUVRAY*1 on the PARIS-SOISSONS road. Enemy also shelled battery positions and conspicuous buildings which might serve as concealment for batteries. Considerable interdiction on roads and paths leading into MISSY from the northeast.

E) ENEMY AIRCRAFT:

Airplanes: Considerable bombing during the first part of the night. They were fairly active over our sector at about 16h15, July 22. At that time one French balloon was set on fire (region of DOMPIERRE*2).

Balloons: Two enemy balloons were in ascension opposite our sector during the afternoon of the 22nd. No reports on observation at other times.

F) CIRCULATION. No reports have, as yet, been received regarding circulation.

G) The line appears to be the same as last night. It is confirmed that we are in possession of the Sucrerie southwest of NOYANT that our line passes slightly to the west of BUZANCY.

Correct spelling *VILLEMONTAIRE, *1?, *2DOMMIERS.

S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, July 23, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 50.

All Codes ChiffreTelephonique, Carnets Redit, Bandes et Clefs de Chiffremont, Trench Codes and Enciphering Tables now in the hands of officers of this Division, will be turned in to G-2, Division Headquarters not later than 6 P.M. July 26.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

W. C. SHERMAN,
Major, General Staff.

Distribution to include
Battalions of Inf. Eng. & Sig. Corps,
Batteries of Artillery,
G-1
G-2
G-3

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 31, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 52

Following message forwarded for your compliance.

32nd Army Corps

"Two prisoners of Prisoners' Camp 29 at Dounoux, escaped during the night of July 28/29.

1. SULZE, Herman. Identity disc Number 207; 1 m. 67 tall, long mustache, blond hair, German uniform.

2. ESMUR, identity disc Number 251. 1 m. 71 tall, clean shaven, blond hair, dressed in a green cap and coat."

By Command of Major General Summerall;

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav.,
Acting, G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
July 31, 1918.

G-2
MEMORANDUM NUMBER 53.

GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE

8th Army,
G-2

By Order of G.H.Q. all anti-tank rifles and ammunition for same captured on the front of the Army, will be forwarded to G-2, 8th Army. Rewards will be allotted as follows:

100 Francs for the first anti-tank rifle sent to G-2
50 Francs for subsequent " " rifles
5 Francs for each one of the first 25 cartridges.
2 Francs for the 50 subsequent cartridges.

By Order, the Chief of Staff,
Signed, C R U E G H E.

1st Ind.

32d Army Corps

G-2 1. For compliance.

NOTE. Description of the anti tank rifle, according to a prisoner of the 70th Res. Regt., captured at Nomony, July 9, 1918.

The rifle is of the Mauser model, very crude and very strong; single shot.

Length of rifle 1m.69 - weight of rifle: 17 kilogs - calibre 13 m/m - Diameter of barrel (exterior) 30 m/m/

The stock is of the "pistol stock" type.

The sight is graduated up to 500 meters.

Length of cartridge: 13 cm. The cartridge case alone is 9 cm. long. The rifle is usually fired from a stand, shaped like a fork (one of these stands has been captured).

Weight of the stand: 1 kilog 200.

Height of the stand above ground: 29 cent. 5.

Cartridges are carried in a grey cloth bag, which holds 20 cartridges. (one of these bags has also been captured).

It seems that the Germans do not expect one of these rifles to fire more than 20 shots against a single target, on account of the slow rate of fire, the heating of the barrel, and the excessive strain caused by recoil.

2nd Ind.

G-2, 1st Div., A.E.F., July 31, 1918. To- Intelligence Officers of Brigades, Regiments and Battalions.

1. For compliance.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 2, 1918.

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS.

I. GENERAL.

In a general way it may be stated that the machine gun is the framework about which the German infantry organization is built. A clearer idea of its employment is formed if one regards the German infantry as consisting of combat groups, each with its machine gun and an escort of riflemen. This is true as well of offence as of defence. For example, we find an order of Von Hutier's speaking of the light machine gun in the attack, as "the backbone" of the infantry, and further stating that it constitutes the essential fire strength. The machine gunners also are selected men. It may be stated that the highest quality of men is employed in the Stosstruppe. But immediately after these, in point of quality, comes the heavy machine gunner.

II. HEAVY MACHINE GUNS.

I. Heavy machine gun companies, like our own, are assigned to battalions, and are numbered in the regiment with the number of the battalion. Their employment is neither that of infantry nor of artillery; that is to say, they do not follow in rear as a separate unit in the advance, like accompanying batteries, nor are they employed in the first waves as are riflemen. But they follow forward the infantry by large bounds, adapting themselves to the terrain and the enemy's fire, and endeavor to secure a flanking or a dominating position from which they may protect the infantry by well directed fire. The object they seek, of course, is to keep down the enemy's infantry fire during the advance of the infantry by rushes. During the advance the machine guns are disposed in depth and move forward by alternative sections. The heavy machine guns are specially looked to to repel hostile counter attacks. In no case are the heavy machine guns employed as a whole in the capacity of reserves at the disposition of a single chief. The assignment of heavy machine guns to companies is exceptional.

However great the importance the Germans attach to the heavy machine guns employed in the offensive, nevertheless it is in the defensive that the heavy machine gun finds its greatest field of employment. Every attempt is made to secure the greatest possible field of fire, and especially is direct fire sought after. It is true that the heavy machine gun is employed in indirect fire for interdiction on back areas, roads and sensitive points, but it may be stated that its employment consists very largely of direct and enfilade fire. The guns are disposed in checker-board formation, in order to localize the penetration of the line. The guns are rarely used singly, but; forward, are grouped in pairs; and in the rear, in groups of 2, 4, or 6, in order, the more easily, to control a very large volume of fire. In this connection it is interesting to note the German methods of attacking such machine gun nests. On encountering nests, the line immediately halts

and lies down. First an effort is made to turn and overcome the machine guns by small infiltrating groups. In the event that this proves unsuccessful, as is the case where the terrain offers no facilities for advance of such small groups, the light trench mortars, which follow closely behind the infantry, are sent for and are expected to destroy the nests. In case this is unsuccessful recourse is had to the accompanying batteries, or even to the batteries which have remained in position. In no case is any serious attempt made to attack machine guns by a line of infantry. The costliness of this has been fully realized.

2. It is interesting to note that in 24 "storm divisions" that we know of, there are attached special combat groups or detachments of heavy machine guns known as "Sharf-Schutzen M.G. Abterlungen" (Sharpshooter Machine Gun Detachments). These are permanently attached to these divisions, and, in offensive action, are rendered more mobile by having three of the guns withdrawn and left in rear. These three guns are returned to the detachment as soon as the Division assumes a defensive attitude, or is sent in rest. What has been previously said about machine gunners applies: They are men of greater intelligence, adaptability, and courage, than their fellows.

3. For offensive purposes the German heavy machine gun company has six guns with three in reserve. 120 men, 88 of whom are machine gunners, constitute the total personnel of the machine gun company. Five men are employed for service of the gun with one N. C. O. in charge. Each gun has a reserve personnel of 4 gunners and 4 ammunition carriers. The normal allowance of ammunition is 5000 rounds per day for each gun. Each company has also 24000 rounds of ammunition in wagons at the starting point.

In defensive actions each heavy machine gun company is equipped with 12 guns; 9 in line, 3 in reserve.

4. The personnel of the heavy machine gun company consists of especially trained troops, both commanders and men being tested as to their fitness for carrying out peculiar battle tasks. They must be trained in the most minute details of all tasks which may fall to their lot in an advance. They must be trained in the following:-

1. The use of special ammunition.
 2. Use of signal apparatus, flares, etc.
 3. Employment of every form of observation and communication.
- The following are deemed essential characteristics of a machine gun commander :
1. A quick eye.
 2. Ability of forming decisions.
 3. Intimate knowledge of the technical side of a machine gun.
 4. Energy and driving power.

5. Equipment for heavy machine gunners.

Equipment of the N.C.O.:- 1 water reservoir, 1 large shovel, 1 pair of glasses 03, 1 pistol 08, 1 spare barrel.

Equipment of No. 1:- 1 box cartridges, (Model 15), 1 loading band, 1 pistol 08, 1 complete combat tool case.

Equipment of Nos. 2 & 3. Nos. 2 and 3 have, jointly, 1 cart with machine gun and movable shield, 1 extra barrel, 1 pincers, 1 tube for steam escape on piece.

Equipment of No. 2:- In addition to this joint equipment No. 2 carries 1 aiming glass in his pocket, 1 cartridge extractor (large model), 1 pistol 08, 1 strap.

Equipment of No. 3: No. 3 also carries 1 tool box on his belt, 1 pistol 08, 1 loading band.

Equipment of No. 4 :- 1 cartridge box, (model 15) with armor piercing cartridges, 1 loading band, 1 pistol 08, hand grenades.

Equipment of No. 5 :- 1 box cartridges, (model 15) or 1 shield (model 08), or one box of cartridges (model 15) and a water reservoir, 1 cartridge belt, 1 pistol 08.

III. THE LIGHT MACHINE GUN.

The light machine gun is regarded by the Germans, not at all as an auxilliary weapon, but in fact, as the principal weapon of the infantry. With the present reduced strength of effectives in the German Army (from 40 to 100 men per company) about two-thirds of the effectives are employed in the service of the light machine guns. An effort is now being made to teach every man the use of the light machine gun. In the offensive, as a rule, the machine gun is placed in the center of the platoon in advancing. If there are two machine guns to a platoon they are placed on the flanks. Machine gun squad will advance by rushes of from 25 to 30 meters. In open terrain, as a rule, the greater dependence will be placed on the light machine gun, which will precede the riflemen in the attack. In close country this procedure is reversed, the riflemen advancing ahead of the machine guns. The aim of the machine gun is that of their infantry, during the advance, namely, to make the hostile infantry keep under cover, and to silence or neutralize hostile machine gun nests and supporting points. They are, in fact, an essential portion of the infantry. Whereas the heavy machine gun, as before stated, has a role between that of infantry and artillery, the light machine gun is distinctively infantry in its employment. Even the small groups which attempt to infiltrate and to overcome machine gun nests and supporting points by outflanking them, consist of groups of light machine guns escorted by infantry. As mentioned before, under "Heavy Machine Guns," the attack against nests of hostile machine guns is conducted very largely by these groups attempting to infiltrate. It is only when these have failed that recourse is had to light trench mortars and artillery. In the recent offensive the enemy employed the light machine gun as his chief weapon for infantry. They were carried well forward with the assaulting troops, usually by one large man, until the attacking troops came within range of rifle fire. At this point No. 1 would take the gun from the carrier and creep forward slowly and cautiously as far as possible, before opening heavy machine gun fire, under the protection of which his infantry would attack. During the attack the light machine gun kept up an active and uninterrupted fire, not only in the form of continuous rolling fire, but in short and sudden bursts under the protection of which the riflemen advance to the assault.

Equally, on the defensive their role was similar to that of riflemen, being to check counter-attacks from enfilade fire. To sum up, it may be said that, with the Germans, the light machine gun is simply a supre-riflemen.

The usual type of light machine gun employed in the German army is the machine gun 08/15. It has been the intention of the German Command to equip each infantry company with 6 light machine guns. In practice the equipment of companies has varied from 4 to 6. Recent information obtained from prisoners indicates that the Germans are now rapidly achieving their aim of 6 light machine guns per company. From information obtained from prisoners during the month of July it was found that no company participating in the June and July attacks was possessed of less than 5 machine guns.

Equipment of Light Machine Gunners: The N.C.O.:, 1 water reservoir with tube for steam escape, 1 extra barrel, (if not already on the piece or in the combat kit), 1 large shovel, 1 wire cutter, 1 pistol, 1 pair of glasses, 2 hand grenades.

Equipment of No. 1: 2 cartridge boxes (or portable case, Model 16), 1 pistol, 2 grenades.

Equipment of No. 2: 1 light machine gun 08/15, with stand, 1 cartridge box, (model 16) with loading band and circular guidon on the machine gun, 1 pistol, 1 cartridge extractor, 1 oiler.

Equipment of No. 3: 1 complete combat kit, 2 cartridge cases, (Model 15), 1 pistol, 1 tool box carried on the belt.

Equipment of No. 4: 2 cartridge boxes, (Model 15), with armor piercing bullets, 1 pistol, 2 grenades.

Equipment of No. 5: 1 rifle, 2 grenades.

Equipment of No. 6: 1 rifle, 2 grenades.

Equipment of No. 7: 1 rifle, 2 grenades.

Equipment of No. 8: 1 rifle, 2 grenades.

Necessary sand bags are carried by Nos. 5, 1, and 8. If push-carts are used the munitions and reserve tools, the receptacles for the oil, and petrol, as well as the machine for reloading, are carried. The bands may be carried on them. Each light machine gun has a minimum of 2000 rounds of ammunition.

Things which the Light Machine Gunner Must Know.

1. How to utilize the ground.
2. How to make a rapid use of his gun.
3. How to observe firing discipline.
4. How to take the initiative.
5. How to hold his ground.
6. How to care for his guns.

Training of Light Machine gunners.

1. Practice in dismounting the machine gun quickly and noiselessly.
2. Practice in carrying the gun long distances.
3. Practice the men in alternating in carrying the supplies and accessories.
4. Practice in bringing the light machine gun and ammunition into position without attracting attention.
5. Practice in clearing obstructions with the machine gun dismounted.

IV. CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, it is believed that the German use of the machine gun may best be summed up by a recent Ludendorff Order which stated that the Germans must no longer look to masses of men to achieve victory. It was not numbers of men that would win, but superiority of fire, and that this would be found in the increased use of machine guns.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 5, 1918.

Memorandum No. 60.

Carnet "URBAIN", issued you under separate cover,
will become effective at Zero hour, August 7, 1918.

By command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE
2nd Lieut., Cav., U.S.R.
Acting A. C. of S., G 2

NOTE: Notify units to whom you have issued Carnets.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 6, 1918.

G-2
MEMORANDUM NUMBER 59

To : Brigade Commanders.

Subject: Identifications.

In accordance with instructions from the 32nd Army Corps Brigade Commanders in this Division will see that the following orders are enforced within organizations of their command.

* * * * *

1. In the Zone of the Trenches:- Officers and N.C.O.'s in their sectors, and Military Police making their rounds, will ascertain the identity of all members of the military forces (including officers of all ranks) circulating alone or in small groups. Suspects will be escorted to the nearest P.C. and questioned immediately.

A police station, functioning both night and day (sentinels, & armed orderlies) will be installed in all P.C.'s.

Sub-sector commanders will cause circulation on the various routes leading to the sub-sectors to be checked (by fixed or mobile posts) for the purpose of establishing the identity of individuals circulating singly, whatever be their rank. No one (including officers) will be allowed to circulate singly unless armed.

Any N.C.O. or officer appearing at a post or battery must establish his identity, failing which, he will be escorted to the nearest P.C. for the purpose of being questioned.

2. In the Entire Sector:- Officers must carry an identity card bearing the stamp and signature of the commander of their unit or organization. Enlisted men circulating singly must carry a pass bearing the stamp and signature of the commander of the unit or organization by whom they are being employed. The identity card of French officers circulating in the American sector will be in English. The identity card of American officers circulating in the French sector will be in French.

The Major of Cavalry, Provost Marshall of the Army Corps, and the Provost Marshalls of Divisions, will establish a service of surveillance in the advanced zones of the Divisions and Army Corps.

It is important, for the safety of everyone, that the foregoing prescriptions be strictly followed. Consequently, agents employed in the service of circulation must not hesitate to carry out the orders which they have received, whatever may be the rank of the member of the military forces with whom they are dealing. No blame can be laid upon them for the inevitable errors which will certainly take place. Members of the military forces, particularly officers, who are stopped, must submit with good grace to the establishing of identity ordered by the Command in the interest of all.

* * * * *

By Command of Major General Summerall:

Distribution:		CAMPBELL KING,	
		Chief of Staff.	
C.G.	1	G-3	1
C.of S.	1	C.G. 1st Inf.Brig	10
G-1	1	C.G. 2nd Inf.Brig.	10
G-2	3	C.O. 1st Art Brig.	12

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 6, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM TO BRIGADE AND REGIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS:

No. 70

The following reports will be submitted to G-2, 1st Division:

1. 6h.30- Telephonic reports covering events of the preceding night; to be made through Brigade Intelligence Officers to G-2, 1st Division.

2. 12 h. 30 - A written report from regiments to reach these headquarters at this time, will be sent through Brigade Intelligence Officers. This report will be made on blank forms to be supplied by G-2, 1st Division, and will be compiled from data obtained from regimental and battalion O.P.'s. This report to cover period from 10 h. to 10 h.

3. 16 h. 30 - Telephonic report to be made through brigade to Division.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution:
1st Inf. Brig.
2nd Inf. Brig.
16 Inf.
18 Inf.
26 Inf.
28 Inf.
1st Art. Brig.
5th F. A.
6th F. A.
7th F. A.
C. of S.
G-2
G-3

Hq. 1st Div., G-2, A. E. F.

August 6, 1918.

HISTORIES OF GERMAN DIVISIONS OPPOSITE THE 1ST AMERICAN DIVISION.

255th DIVISION,
(Field Post Office # 831)
Formerly Metz Garrison Detachment.
31st Landwehr Brigade. C.O. Maj. Gen. Sproesser.
30th Landwehr Inf. Regt. June 6, 1918 (XVI Corps District)
86th Landwehr, Inf. Regt. May 18, (III and IX Corps District). C.O. Col. Bussee.
1st Bn. 9th Ldw. Brig. Erz. Bn. C.O. Capt. Hanor.
2nd Bn. 33rd Ldw. Brig. Erz. Bn., C.O. Lt. Kind.
3rd Bn. C.O. Capt. Btangheit.
153rd Landwehr Inf. Regt. (IV and VI Corps Districts)
C.O. Col. Kundsbruck.
1st Bn. C.O., Capt. Rademaker.
2nd Bn. C.O. (?)
3rd Bn. C.O. (?)
32nd Landwehr Brigade.
68th Landwehr Inf. Regt. (VIII Corps District).
94th Landwehr Inf. Regt. 30th June 1918, (X and XI Corps Districts.)
37th Ldw. Brig Erz. Bn., C.O. Capt. Gerlach.
43rd Ldw. Brig. Erz. Bn., C. O. ?
44th Ldw. Brig. Erz. Bn. C. O. Capt Streicher.
Cavalry 5th Squ. 7 Hussar Regt. C.O. ?
Artillery 301st F.A. Regt. (12th May 1918, C.O. ?)
302d F. A. Regt. C.O. ?
Pioneer Bn. 1st Ldw. Pion. Co. of VIII A.
2nd Ldw. Pion. Co. of XI A. C.
3rd Landst. Pion. Co. of XI. A.
1st Erz. Landst. Pion. Co. of VII A.C.
15th Searchlight Section.
Signals: 255th Telephone Detachment.
Medical and Veterinary - 275th Bearer Co.
385th Field Hospital at Hoveant*.
366th Vet. Hosp. (D. May 1917).

Train M.T. Column.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY.

Satisfactory data is not at hand as to the early history of this division, except that it was organized in the winter of 1916-1917 and was made up entirely of Landwehr and Landsturm units, most of which had been holding the sector which the division began to hold, just east of the Moselle river, and that the staff as well as much of the units was made up from the Metz Garrison.

The division was in line and identified on the east bank of the Moselle continuously from at least Jan. 1, 1917, (See Ordre de Bataille, 6/6/1917) to the latter part of October, when units appeared on the west bank of the Moselle, to relieve the 44th Landwehr Div. which was sent to Upper Alsace (VIII B. R. 5/11/17 and B.R. 28/11/17)

It is rated by the British (Serial May #24) as not having been engaged in battle since at least April 1, 1917, and there is no indication that it has ever been really engaged in heavy action. The sector has been exceedingly quiet, on both sides of the Moselle. There are some indications in Dec. 1917. (B.R. 14/12/17) that two of the five regiments may have been withdrawn to help form the new 48th Landwehr division, which took over a sector in Lorraine in December.

Without any specific data, it may be assumed that the fighting spirit of the 255th Division is not high.

MORALE. The French rate the 255th Div. as in their fifth of five classes which they define as a second quality of the reserve division, put into a fight only in an emergency. Its combatative value, according to this, would be low. There have been deserters from the division rather regularly during the past four or five months. The French propaganda tracts which have been thrown into the area held by this division have been well received by the men, although with how much influence, it is difficult to tell. And now that the division is back in a quiet sector the men find the war more bearable, although they assert that they are sick of it and of the hierarchy over them.

SPECIAL TRAINING.

Some members of each company are trained for patrolling. Stosstrupp to the extent of 80 per company are employed under a subaltern officer. He is charged with all the patrolling in the regimental sector and with the raids. The patrols are always strong, about 40 men, and armed with machine guns.

The number of machine guns per company seems to be 5 or 6 light machine guns.

STRENGTH.

The strength per company seems to be from 180 to 200 Rationnaires with about 100 rifles in line. The ages of the men are from 37 to 45. There are some of the Nineteen Class. Very recently a few men of more than 40 years of age have been sent to the division.

LOSSES. This division appears never to have been in positions where it suffered losses. It has probably been drawn upon for its younger men. There is no reason to believe that their places have not been taken by others of more mature age.

OFFICERS.

We have no data on the quality or ages of the officers.

77th RESERVE DIVISION.

Field Post Office No. 780.

C.O. Lt. Gen. Adams (May, 1918)

Composition of the 77th Res. Div., Aug. 2nd, 1918.

332nd Inf/ Regt. C.O. Maj. Kuehl.

257th Res. Inf. Regt. Jul. 20, 1918) (VIII Corps District)

419th Inf. Regt. (Formerly of the 92nd Div.)

1st Mob. Erz. Bn., 19th R. I.

2 Cos. Ostrowo (V/22) Landst. Inf. Bn.
 2 Cos. Aschen (VIII/2) Landst. Inf. Bn.
 Coblenz (VIII/11) Landst. Inf. Bn.
 Cyclists. - 77 Res. Cyclist Co.
 Divisional Cavalry. - 4th Squ. 2nd Jaeger zu Pferde
 Regt.
 3rd Artillery Command - 59 Res. F. A. R. (21 Jul. 1918)
 (52 Res. F.A. Jul. 6, 1918.)
 Pioneer Bn. - 78 Res. Pioneer Co.
 1st Ldw. Pion. Co. VII A.C.
 39th Res. Searchlight Section
 277 Minenwerfer Co.
 Signals.- 477th Telephone Detachment.
 Medical and Veterinary. - 529 Bearer Co.
 103 Res. Field Hospital.
 104 Res. Field Hospital.
 105 Res. Field Hospital.
 Veterinary Hospital.
 Train. - 744 M.T. Column.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY.

The 77th Res. Div. was formed in January 1915, it was comprised at first of the 255th Inf. 256th Inf. the 257th Inf. beside auxiliary troops.

It operated on the Russian front where it participated in the raid on Courland (May, June 1915), and in the Grodno offensive. (Sept. 1915). At the end of 1915 it was stationed in the region south of Deinsk* where it remained until August 1917. During this period the 256th Inf. was transferred away from the division and (August 1917 the 332nd Inf. was assigned in its stead.)

The 77th Res. Div. was then sent to the Riga vicinity and in October to the island of Oesel and then to Mittau*1. On the 17th of March, 1918, it started from Romotski*2 for the western front and came into line at Villers-Bretonneaux*3 on the 16th of May, from which position it was relieved the 1st of July and sent into the Woevre. Here it was relieved the 11th of July but has since come back into line.

As this division was leaving the eastern front the 255th Res. Inf. Regt. was replaced by the 419th Inf. formerly of the 92nd Div. Landwehr.

MORALE. The French rate this division as good #2, which is the 3rd of their classes. They define it as a Battle Division, but they consider that its combattant value is below the average. The division contains a good proportion of Alsacians.

LOSSES. The losses in May-June on the western front were heavy and the division was said to be in an exhausted condition. On the 4th of July it lost a thousand prisoners at Villers-Bretonneaux*3 It was reported that a Major was heard to tell his Regimental Commander that his battalion had lost seven officers and was reduced to 60 men. Since being stationed in the Woevre sector it has lost a few men by capture and desertions.

Correct Spelling - * DVINSK -
*1 MITAU -
*2 RAMOTSKI -
*3 VILLERS - BRETONNEUX - S. G. W.

G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.

No. 1

August 7, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
From August 6, 10h. to August 7, 10h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

No firing or other activity of any kind whatever throughout the entire sector.

II. ARTILLERY

Activity normal. Harassing fire on Bois de Jolival, Vallon de Grignon, St. Jacques (Bois de St. Jacques), Bois dit la Lampe, Ferme le Puits, Region la Pepiniere, Region Val Dieu, and trenches at 68¹34¹.

III. WORKS. Nothing to report.

IV. Circulation.

Nothing observed in the rear areas. Single individuals seen twice in the Trenches de Settin and des Oeufs.

V. AVIATION.

No aeroplanes or balloons noted.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

An observation post located by the 16th Infantry at 66⁵36⁸ Bois du Four.

III. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry absolutely quiet; artillery normal.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
August 7, 1918.

Memorandum to Assistant Provost Marshall.

A prisoner of war belonging to P. G. 70 stationed at REMIRECOURT escaped from the CORROY Yard on the 6th of August, 1918.

REINIZER, Alfred, No. 240 - blond hair - blue eyes - normal nose - small mouth - height 1 m. 62 - age 20 years.

For customary action.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE
2nd Lieut., Cav., U.S.R.
Acting A. C. of S., G 2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 8, 1918.

G-2
No. 2.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 7, 10h to August 8. 10h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY

Intermittent machine gun fire at night in small bursts, principally against the patrols of the 26th and 28th Infantry. Machine guns are suspected at 715364 and 729371.

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing fire by field guns and 150s on trenches and rear area. (St. Jacques, east and west of Mamey, and north of Foret de Puvenelle) from 10 o'clock to 22 o'clock. Last evening our aircraft was fired upon by 77s located in the Groupes Bois des Vencheres and Bois des Rappes. A total of 150 enemy shells was fired on the sector.

III. WORKS. Nothing to report.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Apparently normal. Two men seen entering and leaving dugout at 6458 around noon. Men in parties of from 2 to four and two wagons seen at point 7908 from 6 to 18 o'clock. Single men observed with horses grazing near 4547 and 5615 at 19 hours. Circulation of individuals on the Vandieres-Pagny-Preny Road throughout the day. Men also seen fishing and paddling in the Moselle. Visibility poor.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Slight aerial activity. Avions in groups of 2 and 3 flew along infantry lines for observation between 11 and 17 hours. Between 21 and 22 hours four avions flew over the rear area and dropped five small bombs in the Foret de Puvenelle. Our anti-aircraft guns drove them off.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Nine enemy searchlights observed in operation in rear areas at 22h15. Signal station suspected at 9.02-7.06.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery normal. Aircraft slightly active.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NUMBER 2.

Extract from 32nd Army Corps Bulletin of Aug. 1st.
Report on questioning of prisoners.

.

Enemy's Intentions.

It is reported that the enemy is preparing a raid in the sector of the 332nd Inf. (Remenauville - Regueville*).

The objective is to be the small triangular wood (8553) South of Fontaine Grignon, and the purpose the taking of prisoners.

It is to be carried out by about 50 men of the Divisional Sturm Kie. supported on the flanks by 4 squads of Infantry drawn from the reserve companies of the Bns. in line.

About 15 pioneers are also to take part in the raid.

According to the prisoners, this operation is to take place very soon.

Correct Spelling - * REGNIEVILLE - S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 8, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 71.

Pursuant to G.O. 1411/M, French G.H.Q., the attention of all officers in possession of codes is directed to the importance of preventing codes and enciphering tables from getting lost or falling into the hands of the enemy.

In case a code book should be lost, G-2 Division Headquarters should be notified immediately.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

Distribution:

To include Bns. of Inf. & Eng.,
Btrys. of Artillery
C.O. 1st M.G. Bn., Field Sig. Bn.
G-1
G-2
G-3
D.S.O.
D.M.G.O.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 9th, 1918.

G-2
No. 3

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From August 8, 10h to August 9, 10h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

At 22h50 an enemy patrol of 40 men tried to surround and capture an advanced post near 0555 (18th Inf). Our men fell back slowly, hoping to draw the Germans to our stronger body, but the enemy refused to follow. He suffered no losses. A hostile patrol fired on a 16th Inf. patrol in front of Remenauville.

A machine gun, located in a dead tree trunk, surrounded by brush at 4573, fired on our trenches and avions. At 6h40 a sniper fired from behind Remenauville. Eight medium sized T.M. shells fell at 9359, coming presumably from near 9268.

II. ARTILLERY

During the day 240 enemy shells (77,105,150) were fired in the sector. From noon to 19h35 half of them, principally 77s, fell near points 6333, 6949, 7535, 7638 and 8961. From 18h30 to 10h-Maidieres, Jezainville, Griscourt, Blenod, Dieulouard, Atton and Villers en Haye areas and road were shelled, principally by 150s. The following batteries were in action: Grandes Portions 8784, Vencheres 9897, Rappes 2410, 2321. Norroy 3589 or 3790. A new battery of 150s is thought to be located south of the Carrieres de Norroy.

III WORKS

The enemy was observed digging at 4573 where the machine gun later fired. At 10h two men were seen working at a dugout 8365.

IV. CIRCULATION. Civilian men and women, singly and in groups were working in fields and gardens,- West of Norroy and along the Moselle. Civilian traffic on the valley roads Norroy-Vandieres-Pagny continues normal. Kitchen smoke observed in Norroy at 17h55. Enemy in twos and threes seen at 8572, 8568, and 6164, shortly before noon. At 18h20 six enemy, visible from head to knee seen at 8665, observing our lines for 10 minutes.

V. AIRCRAFT. Balloons:- (Bois St. Claude, Bois du Beau Vallon, La Grange en Haye) up for ten to forty minute periods at dusk and dawn. At 18h30 two avions fired on enemy trenches. At 19h30 seven avions flew over our lines in observation. Two bombs dropped in Pont a Mousson at 20h10.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

From 20h35 to 21h30 the enemy displayed 4-star caterpillar rockets in the subsector Gascogne (opposite 18th Inf.)

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry quiet. Artillery somewhat active.
Aircraft normal.

G-2

APPENDIX NUMBER II TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO. 3.
August 9, 1918.

EXTRACT OF 8th ARMY BULLETIN NO. 220, dated August
8th, 1918.

ARRIVAL OF AN AUSTRIAN DIVISION ON THE WESTERN
FRONT.

An Austrian Division, possibly the 35th Division, seems to have arrived in the ARLON region between the 12th and 16th of July. This Division was still in the Arlon region on the 23rd of July.

Soldiers from this Division say that they arrived directly from the UDINE region.

The Division's artillery arrived without its guns and expects to be equipped with German guns.

The 35th Division was last identified on the 23rd of June in the HAUTE-PIAVE (Exam. of Prisoners). The Division was withdrawn from the front and sent to rest in the VITTORIO region. It is therefore possible that they entrained at UDINE. - -

The 35th Division comprises the 69th Brigade (62nd and 63rd Regts.) and the 70th Brigade (51st and 64th Regts.)

The presence of Austrian troops on the Western front has already been mentioned. Deserters from the 208th Div., and prisoners from the 8th L. D. report Austrians in the WOEVRE. On the other hand rumors were current in the 197th Div., (sector north of Verdun) and in the 77th Res. Div. (Romenauville sector), that the Division would soon be relieved by Austrians (Exam of Prisoners). Finally a secret order by Ludendorff is reported to have appeared on the 29th of July announcing the arrival of Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western front and inviting both officers and soldiers to give their comrades in arms a hearty reception.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 9, 1918.

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 72.

Subject: Prisoners and Enemy dead.

I. PRISONERS.

Wherever prisoners are captured, following procedure will be followed:

a. The battalion scout officer will immediately telephone in clear the following information to the Regimental Intelligence Officer, who will in turn telephone it in clear to G-2, Division Headquarters.

Number of prisoners.

Regiments to which they belong (1)

Place where captured (coordinates)

Time when captured.

b. Prisoners will be disarmed as soon as captured and then escorted to Regimental P.C. where they will be searched. All papers found on men will be placed in separate parcels for each prisoner.

Prisoners will be kept at Regimental Headquarters until sent for by G-2 (usually a light truck will be sent up for them).

Note: As a general rule Alsations are to be well treated, as they are often willing to give much valuable information.

II. DEAD

Every effort should be made to recover all papers (2) etc. from enemy dead. In any case a shoulder strap and cap should be secured. Papers, shoulder straps and caps will be forwarded to G-2 with the utmost despatch, together with a statement giving:- The place where the body was found (coordinates)

The date and time when found.

Whether enemy appeared to have been killed recently or not.

Circumstances under which body was found.

In the case of an officer, blouse and cap will be removed and sent to G-2.

- - - - -

(1) Stating whether active, Reserve, Landwehr or Landsturm.

(2) Papers are most often found in the coat-tail pocket (generally in the right coat tail. Germans sometimes carry documents in the double cuff of their coat.

By command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U. S. R.,
Acting A.C. of S., G-2

Distribution to include Battalions.

G-1 C.G.
G-2 C. of S.
G-3 Div. Adjt.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 10, 1918.

G02

No. 4

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From Aug. 9, 10h to Aug. 10, 10h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Approximately 15 machine guns are in position in the Languedoc subsector from 500 to 2000 yards from our lines. During the night several bursts of M.G. fire came from around 9766 directed on Fey en Haye. At 8h10 six medium caliber T.M. shells fell at 3363. Two of them were duds. In the afternoon 25 shells from around 0268 were fired at Fen*en Haye and the region to the west.

II. ARTILLERY.

Enemy batteries in the Bois de la Rappe, Bois du Four and Grandes Portions groupings were again active.- The 77s harassed our lines at 7939, 6843, 8861, 8843, 7638, 8961, and in Fey en Haye throughout the afternoon. The 105's harassed 6531, 6230, and 9940. Four 210's landed in Regnieville. The Bois du Pacquemont*1, St. Jacques, Mamey; Bois de la Lampe*2, and the region northwest of Martincourt were shelled. During the 24 hours 310 shells fell in the sector (4 210s; 16 150s; 49 105s; and 241 77s)

III. WORKS.

Hammering on wood and iron heard due north from 3068.

IV

CIRCULATION. Visibility fair. Enemy seen at 1965. Six men including two officers, seen at 6859 at 18h; and at 19h 20 enemy seen there. Two enemy at 8878 at 19h40.

IV. AIRCRAFT:

Balloons visible north of Bois de Villers 16h05 to 16h10; rear of Vieville 12h40 to 13h; Wardigny 5h20-5h40. Observation aeroplanes flew over front lines at 7h30, 16h, 18h and 19h30, in two cases being driven off by our anti aircraft guns.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. Suspected O.P. or M.G. emplacements at 2569 and 1965. There has been an unusual amount of testing done on enemy T.P.S. sets. From June 21 until the last day or two the post "Elephant" had failed to intercept any TPS communication. That date coincided with that of the relief of enemy divisions. Yesterday the renewal of T.P.S. communications gives us to believe that the troops in line have been relieved. Especially important is a message starting with the indication letter L which is the Austrian Postal Key. Lately the noises caused by motors have made impossible the intercepting of a number of enemy messages.

Our infantry post at 4367 reports gun firing in its immediate front so close that the command to fire and the closing of the breech block can be heard. The discharge of the gun is deafening. It is firing in the direction of the regiment on the right. Probably this is a sniping gun with no permanent emplacement.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. Infantry quiet. Artillery more active than usual. Aviation inactive.

Correct spelling: * - FEY en HAYE
*1 BOIS de HOCQUEMONT
*2 BOIS dit la LAMPE.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 4. 8/10/18

EXTRACT FROM IIND ARMY BULLETIN No. 891, August 6, 1918.

GERMAN MACHINE GUNS DURING THE SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1918.
(From a document issued by the 18th German Army)

MATERIEL.

Both heavy and light M.G.'s have given good results. Heavy M.G.'s have been used with sledge carriages. The auxiliary carriage (Hilfslafette) has been to a great extent done away with.

The protection shield appears more cumbersome than useful.

The paper cartridge belts have not given good results.

The hand-cart has only been practical on exceptionally favorable ground.

The actual means employed for anti-aircraft fire are not sufficiently resistant and do not give satisfaction.

PERSONNEL.

The document insists upon the necessity of having strong and well trained machine-gunners.

The firing squads should not include more than one piece commander and five or six men per gun.

The losses amongst the light M.G. personnel have been very heavy due to close formation.

Heavy M.G. squads should adopt, when advancing, a formation similar to that of the infantry, thus hiding their location from the enemy.

Officers and N.C.O.'s having to act upon their own initiative, must know the ground, the purpose of the action and the objective in view.

The equipment of the men in the firing squad must be as light as possible; no haversack, no grenades, no portable entrenching tool. - They should be armed with pistols.

One carriage per company has been supplied for the transportation of light M.G.'s. This carriage follows the company. In battle, the gun crews, when advancing, will do well to carry the parts of their gun beneath the arm.

MUNITION SUPPLY.

A process which has given gratifying results, is the assigning of a truck to each division for the purpose of carrying cartridges. The regimental carriages supply themselves from the truck.

For the supplying within the regiment three echelons have been provided:

1. P.C. of the company commander; approximately 1000 cartridges in reserve for each M.G. in line.

2. P.C. of the Regimental M.G. Officer, where the belts are armed with cartridges and urgent repairs carried out.

3. Combat Train.

The transportation from one echelon to another is carried out by squads of carriers furnished by the machine gun companies.

Light M.G.'s supply themselves with ammunition at the company commander's P.C. (Infantry). This first echelon is supplied by the battalion which in its turn is supplied by the regiment.

TACTICAL USAGE.

Light Machine Guns - These should be placed:

1. In front of the Infantry yet behind a few scouts.

2. On the company wings, in order that they may advance without causing the company to cease its fire.

3. The Company Commander keeps one light machine gun in reserve.

Heavy Machine Guns.

The M.G. Company Commander's post is with the battalion commander.

Good results have been obtained in adopting the usual fighting formation: two sections behind the last wave of the first line companies. Their mission is to protect the flanks and ward off counter attacks. The 3rd Section is in reserve at the disposal of the company commander. In case of strong resistance on the part of the enemy, these M. G.'s may be brought forward to assist the infantry fire. This intervention of heavy M.G.'s in first line should, however, be exceptional and only for a definite period of time.

CENTERS OF RESISTANCE.

Both light and heavy M.G.'s have been of great value in breaking up centers of resistance.

The role of the light M.G., in displacing itself rapidly, is to harass the enemy from the front and from the flank and thus enable the infantry to advance.

The role of the heavy M.G. often consists in neutralizing a point of resistance by frontal fire and thus enabling the infantry to effect an enveloping maneuver.

ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.

Heavy M.G.'s have rendered from this point of view a valuable service. One regiment, although handicapped by the lack of a special sighting apparatus brought down four planes.

Only planes flying at low altitudes should be fired at and then only with special cartridges (S.M.K. with steel strengthening) Firing at a plane flying over 500 m. high is a wastage of ammunition.

METHODS OF FIRE.

The light M.G.'s are unable to maintain a well adjusted and continuous fire; they must fire by short bursts and at short ranges (not over 600 meters and always a direct fire). They should never be brought to fire over friendly troops.

Heavy M.G.'s. Direct fire in between infantry units in 1st line has given poor results.

Heavy M.G.'s should be placed on high ground so as to be able to fire direct and indirect barrages in front of the infantry.

These barrages require:

1. That the machine gunners have a very complete instruction (all N.C.O.'s and gunners should be able to figure at sight the difference in altitude. They should also know how to use a trajectory table.)

2. That the infantry be accustomed to being fired over. (numerous rehearsals should be given the infantry).

A Company's heavy M.G.'s or those of several companies, have, in certain cases, before infantry attacks, fired concentrations on the outskirts of woods and villages. This preparation fire has been as efficacious as an artillery preparation.

SPECIAL M.G. UNITS.

Mountain M.G. Units. These units have been employed in reserve of the division for the purpose of protecting its flanks and also for neutralization fire and offensive preparation. Pack mules have given satisfaction in torn-up areas.

Crack M. G. Groups. (3 companies). These have been employed: either, as detached sections detailed to supporting batteries; as companies: as an entire group. In this last case their principal mission has been that of occupying points of support, points of intersection of divisions, and also high ground or flank positions from which they can execute preparation fire.

M. G. sections with artillery units. These have given good results against enemy aircraft. In certain cases they have given valuable assistance in throwing back infantry attacks.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 10, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 73.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

In the preparation of Intelligence reports
Intelligence officers will observe strictly the following:

- (1) The Continental method of numbering the hours will be used.
- (2) Careful distinction will be made between artillery fire on the front lines and on the rear areas.
- (3) In the writing of coordinates a decimal point will be placed after the kilometric numbers in every case unless the Hectometric system of coordinates is employed.
- (4) The spelling of proper names will be checked before submitting them in the daily report.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt. Cav., U.S.R.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

Distribution to
include Battalions,
G-1
G-2
G-3
C. of S.
C.G.
Div. Adjt.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 11th, 1918.

G-2

No. 5.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From August 10, 10h to August 11, 10h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Our patrol in subsector Provence heard a small enemy patrol inside the new belt of wire. Enemy withdrew. During day and night small bursts of M.G. fire directed at Fey-en-Haye from 0766 and 0368. Two machine guns fired on patrol from 8566. Outpost at 2166 shot up a flare and threw 2 grenades at patrol. M.G. post at 4673 visited and found unoccupied. It is probably only a day post; the enemy has been seen there during the last three days. A new belt of wire was encountered near this point.

II. ARTILLERY. Our aeroplanes drew the fire of the 77s from 15h to 19h30 no less than 223 shots being wasted on them. Our trenches at 7859, 8963, 7638, 7249, 6050, 6754, 7535, 7452, and 9354 were harassed principally by 77s. St. Jacques, Bois Brule, and the rear areas of Sector Languedoc, were shelled. Batteries active in the groups Bois du Four, de la Rappe, St. Claude, Grand Portions, and Vencheres. Expenditure equals 77s- 432; 105s- 47.

III. WORKS.

Outpost probably located at 2466. Suspected O.P. or M.G. emplacement at 5392; suspected O.P. at 5291.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Single soldiers at 7264, 7461, 7170, 9767, during the day. At 19h20 seven enemy at 7564. At 22h four near 2267. Single men mounted at 7705. The usual civilian circulation along the Moselle. Grazing and boating as usual. A soldier noted occasionally entering Norroy.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons at rear of Bois de la Rappe and Mardigny at 13h30 to 14h15. The usual flight of scout planes over our front lines. In two cases the avions were too high to be molested by our anti-aircraft guns. At 22h30 a group of 3 or 4 planes flew over the entire sector and dropped 5 bombs in the Bois de Puvénelle.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Four star rockets at regular intervals from 22h throughout the night. Propaganda balloons flew over the sector from noon to 20h. Copies of the Gazette des Ardennes with its illustrated supplement were found. They contain the usual extravagant stories and the proper proportion of photographs showing the "generous treatment" the Hun accords the civilians of the occupied areas.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Infantry quiet. Artillery more active than of late: aircraft slightly active. Considerable talking by the enemy, according to T.P.S. reports. Although no information of value has been obtained to-day through this source.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 11, 1918.

G-2

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO. 5.

EXTRACT FROM THE 8th ARMY BULLETIN No. 222, DATED
AUGUST 10, 1918.

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE GERMAN COMMAND TO THE LIGHT
MACHINE GUN.

(Translation of a document captured by the army on
the 23rd of July.)

██████████.
TO ALL BATTALIONS.


The inspections of light machine-gun instruction units and those of light machine-gun units belonging to infantry companies have, except in the case of one battalion, proved lacking in instruction. The importance of light machine guns has not been sufficiently borne in mind.

I draw attention to the fact that the light M.G. is the infantry's WEAPON. The company of infantry has practically become a light M.G. company. Its principal volume of fire, in the offensive, as in the defensive, is attained by means of the light M.G. which corresponds to a volume of fire of 30 rifles or more. The remainder of the infantry is there especially for sentry duty, patrols and liaisons, the formation of stossstrupp units etc.

A number of officers do not realize these facts. Some are not interested in the weapon, others are ignorant of its qualities. I find continual instances of companies forming their light machine gun squads, of men lacking in education and lacking the requirements desired. I find companies totally neglecting the instruction of their light M.G. squads, the instruction units being called to perform other duties. These mistakes will have a disastrous influence at the crucial moment. I order, therefore (1) that the Battalion Commanders hold frequent conferences with company commanders and section leaders, and insist upon drill instructions, the care of the materiel and inspections thereof. Battalion M.G. officers will attend these conferences. (2) That light machine gun instruction units be exempted from all other duties.

Signed PAGENSTACHER.

SKETCH OF ALLIED ADVANCE Aug 11th 18.



SCALE 1:200,000

T.D.G.2, 1ST DIV. A.E.F.

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO
FRONT LINE TRENCHES.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 12, 1918.

G-2
No. 6

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 11, 12h to August 12, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Our patrol of 21 men was fired on near Regnieville by M.G.s at 7365 and 8265. At 19h30 enemy post 7666 fired 5 V.B.'s at 7662. Snipers active during the day; machine guns intermittently at night. Indirect fire in short bursts on 1964. T.M. at 7570 fired on our patrol.

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing fire on a dozen points in our front lines during the day. In the rear areas the Bois de Hocquemont, de la Lampe*, and de Puvencelle, Mamey and St. Jacques were shelled. All calibers were used.

Groupings in action:- Mont Mare*1, Grandes Portions, Vencheres, Rappes, Norroy and Haie l'Eveque. Expenditure:- 150s, 34; 105s, 84; 77s, 166; total - 285.

III. WORKS.

Enemy observed cutting tree branches at 6960, camouflaging O.P. in tree at 6568, and digging in trench at 8165.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Group of from 2 to 4 seen around noon at 7464, 7865, 8164, 9966. The customary circulation in the rear areas, near Bois Gerard, Vandieres, Norroy, and Pagny. Smoke seen in these three towns. Fewer civilians noticed along the Moselle. Visibility good.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons of Preny, Grange-en Haie and S. of Rembertcourt made several ascensions during the day, remaining in observation most of the afternoon. Single scout planes flew over the trenches, in one case attempting to photograph. Our anti-aircraft guns drove them back. Balloon No. 7 was destroyed at 17h30 by enemy avion. Both of the American observers alighted without harm.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Suspected outpost at 1864. Four star rockets in Dauphine every 5 minutes from 20h30 to 23h30.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry quiet. Artillery and aircraft slightly active. Circulation normal.

Correct Spelling - T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.
Acting A.C. of S., G-2

* Bois dit la Lampe -
*1 Mortmare - S. G. W.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 12, 1918.

Memorandum No. 75.

Code "SUWANEE" will become effective at Zero hour, August 14th.

It will be used for communication within the division and with other American units.

It does not replace or cancel Code Chiffre and Carnet Redit.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE
2nd Lieut., Cav., U.S.R.
Acting A. C. of S., G 2.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE "SUWANEE" CODE.

Herewith "SUWANEE" codes to be distributed in accordance with the following table:

UNIT	CODE NO.	UNIT	CODE NO.
C.O. French Mission	2171	C.O. 6th Arty. Reg.	2203
C.G. 1st Inf. Brig.	2172	C.O. 1st Bn.	2204
C.O. 16th Inf. Reg.	2173	C.O. "A" Bty.	2205
C.O. 1st Bn.	2174	C.O. "B" Bty.	2206
C.O. 2nd Bn.	2175	C.O. "C" Bty.	2207
C.O. 3rd Bn.	2176	C.O. 2nd Bn.	2208
C.O. 18th Inf. Reg.	2177	C.O. "D" Bty.	2209
C.O. 1st Bn.	2178	C.O. "E" Bty.	2210
C.O. 2nd Bn.	2179	C.O. "F" Bty.	2211
C.O. 3rd Bn.	2180	C.O. 7th Arty. Reg.	2212
		C.O. 1st Bn.	2213
C.O. 2nd M.G. Bn.	2181	C.O. "A" Bty.	2214
		C.O. "B" Bty.	2215
C.G. 2nd Inf. Brig.	2182	C.O. "C" Bty.	2216
C.O. 26th Inf. Reg.	2183	C.O. 2nd Bn.	2217
C.O. 1st Bn.	2184	C.O. "D" Bty.	2218
C.O. 2nd Bn.	2185	C.O. "E" Bty.	2219
C.O. 3rd Bn.	2186	C.O. "F" Bty.	2220
C.O. 28th Inf. Reg.	2187	C.O. T.M. Bty.	2221
C.O. 1st Bn.	2188		
C.O. 2nd Bn.	2189	C.O. Field Signal Bn.	2222
C.O. 3rd Bn.	2190		
		Division Engineer	2223
C.O. 3rd M.G. Bn.	2191	C.O. 1st Eng. Reg.	2224
		C.O. 1st Bn.	2225
C.G. 1st Arty. Brigade	2192	C.O. 2nd Bn.	2226
C.O. 5th Arty. Reg.	2193		
C.O. 1st Bn.	2194	C.O. 1st M.G. Bn.	2227
C.O. "A" Bty.	2195		
C.O. "B" Bty.	2196	G-3	2228
C.O. 2nd Bn.	2197	G-2	2229
C.O. "C" Bty.	2198	G-1	2230
C.O. "D" Bty.	2199		
C.O. 3rd Bn.	2200	Division Signal Of-	
C.O. "E" Bty.	2201	ficer	2231
C.O. "F" Bty.	2202	Division M.G. Officer	2232
		32nd Corps d'Armee	2233

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE
2nd Lieut., Cav., U.S.R.
Acting A. C. ov S., G 2.

G-2

No. 7.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 13, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From August 12, 12h. to August 13, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY

Four of our men going into Regnieville on reconnaissance were fired on enemy post at 7464. They returned to our trenches. At 14 h. from 30 to 50 enemy appeared in the trenches Braquet la Tenaille and des Levains. Some of them advanced in skirmish line to our wire where they lay down and waited. After 15 minutes they returned to the above named trenches and remained there until 16.45 when all retired except a guard left at outpost 7464.

At 6 A.M. on August 11th an advanced post encountered more than a squad of the enemy near 9659, apparently in ambush. Grenades were exchanged and the enemy disappeared leaving a rifle, pistol and hand grenades.

Occasional bursts of machine gun fire towards Fey-en-Haie. Machine gun post 9465 fired on our patrol. Over 50 medium sized trench mortar shells, a few of them from 0269, fell on points 3068, 9958, and 3264. A machine gun located at 7464, 9465, 0966: trench mortar at 0269.

II. ARTILLERY.

Batteries in Bois de la Rappe, du Four, de Friere, and Grandes Portions were active again. The 105 was used more than heretofore on our front lines, points 7343, 7246, 4233, 7538, 0562 being harassed. St. Jacques, Bois de Jolival and 2849 also fired upon. Over 290 shots at avions. Totals : 150 - 23; 105 - 109; 77 - 396; all calibers - 528.

III. WORKS.

Working party heard at 1869 digging. Stakes driven at 2975, plainly heard. Wagon heard at point 72.25-36.80 unloading planks. Considerable talking. About 20 men working in that vicinity dugout suspected.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility good 10-18 h; poor 18-21 h. Three to six men seen at 9367, 9267, 9767 in afternoon. Mousser*post reports the usual Moselle Valley circulation. Men and wagon seen entering Vieville-en-Haye from the northeast. Isolated men and wagons seen at 7703-7705 during the afternoon.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons at Preny, Rembercourt and Grange-en-Haie up at intervals during the afternoon. Aircraft patrols as usual over our lines in some cases driven off by our A.A.fire. Around midnight three of more planes visited the rear areas, dropping 12 bombs in the vicinity of a railroad in the Bois de Puvenelle.

VI. Miscellaneous.

Single star white rockets from 21 to 23.30 h. in Gascogne. O.P. at 9465 night ; 9767 day. Flashes from signal light seen at 7199.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry slightly active. Artillery active. Aircraft normal. Circulation normal. Unusual enemy T.P.S.activity.

* Correct spelling: MOUSSON.

B. R. L.

G-2
No.8.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 14, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 13, 12h to August 14, 12h.
ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Snipers active in region of Le Bonnet. M.G. bursts from 0466 before midnight, and other M.G. fire during the night. Four shots from T.M. in vicinity opposite point 3166 fell short near 4367. Early in the morning and evening 23 T.M. shots fell on 3069. At 17h15 one shot on 3156. Suspected T.M. $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers N.W. of 2063.

II. ARTILLERY.

Usual harassing of our front lines by the 77s. At 20h and thereafter fire by 105s and 150s on the routes east of the Foret de Fuvnelle.* Batteries in the groups of Vencheres, Rappes, Gr. Portions, and in Bois du Four and Bois de Friere again active. Considerable fire on our avions. Totals; 77s-338; 105s-57; 150s -18; all calibers 413.

III WORKS.

Sounds of moving heavy timber and steel plates were again heard near 371.45-236.42 at 24h and 2h30. Music heard from 2476. At 9h15 M.G. Practice was conducted behind the enemy lines for half an hour. Voices and work on wire heard at 2468: possibly strong point there.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility poor 10h to 15h, good from 15h-20h. During our shelling at 7268 three enemy seen in flight up a trench to the Trenches des Oeufs. The enemy is becoming careless about his movements. At post 7464 four men were seen with maps at 19h40; six were there at 10h35; and at 19h25. One man with a M.G. was seen leaving there. A band was heard playing at 8h30 in rear of the Bois du Four and a train was heard at the same time behind the Bois de Friere. Civilian traffic and work as usual near Vandieres and Pagny. More single soldiers than heretofore seen on the roads near these towns. Soldiers, some of them mounted, seen more frequently than usual on the southern edge of the Bois Gerard. At 6h40 our Mousson post saw a train leave Pagny going northeast.

V. AIRCRAFT. Throughout the day avions (1-3) passed over our sector in observation, in some cases being driven off by our A.A. guns. Balloons up for half hour periods in direction Mardigny, Rembercourt, and Grange en Haie, Around midnight one near Preny showed lights.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.- Observation posts suspected at 7368, 7195, 7371. In subsector Dauphine 4-star rockets at 5 minute intervals between 20h35 and 23h45. Propaganda balloons alighted at 17h and 19h delivering the expected copies of the Gazette des Ardennes with illustrations. In an appeal to the Poilus it was finally settled that "Germany did not begin the war."

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.: Infantry normal, artillery normal, aircraft normal. Circulation of soldiers in Moselle Valley and around Bois Gerard more frequent than heretofore.

* Correct spelling: PUVENELLE.

B. R. L.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 8.

German documents captured in the recent offensive reiterate the seriousness of the economic situation at home. The usual precautions are urged upon the army to practice economy, in the use of foodstuffs as a most important duty. Furthermore, relief is to be obtained by foraging. "Now and during the coming weeks, (June 20) the crops on the territories occupied and conquered by us must be harvested. Vast stretches of land, huge fields under good cultivation; promise us a rich harvest". Labor difficulties are hinted at but considered solved "by proper organization". "Every available man must be used without reserve. For example, in the higher staffs, servants, orderlies, etc. will be used to form special working parties".

Other documents show that more stress than formerly is being laid on the use of aircraft against the allied land forces, not only on the battlefield itself, but also far behind the lines where the reserves are being brought up. (July 24). "Scouts; two-seater fighters and bombing machines should be methodically employed on this task. The holding up for an hour or even half an hour of the enemy's troops trains or motor transport and troop columns, by the air service, may have a great influence on the issue of a battle than shooting down a greater or smaller number of hostile machines."

"Disturb all traffic on certain lines for long periods by the following means:

"1. Night bombing raids by several flights and groups of Giant airplanes placed under one command on railway junctions. Bombs should be dropped at short intervals on the same objective by all machines.

"2. Night attacks carried out by single two-seater machines belonging to bombing squadrons; flying at low heights, on trains and convoys, en route.

"attacks by day, carried out by the same machines, as far as our mastery of the air will permit."

- - - - -
LUDENDORFF.

The Germans have anti-tank mines which have caused numerous accidents in practice. Little is known about their make-up.

G-2
No.9

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, August 15, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 14, 12h to August 15, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

Machine gun fire at infrequent intervals. Some bursts in the direction of Le Mouchoir. At 18h30, 18h45, twelve medium caliber on Tr. de Calvaire, origin not certain. Three T.M. shells on 2469 at 17h. Nine T.M. shells on 7469 from 17h50 to 19h30.

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing of trenches and general front areas. St. Jacques, Bois du Bouchot, de Hocquemont, Foret de Puvenelle, Bois de la Lampe*, and Auberge St. Pierre also shelled. Our avions were fired upon throughout the day and night. Batteries in the Bois de la Rappe, du Four, and de Friere again active; also the Vancheres and Grandes Portions groupings. Total:- 485, of which 4 were 150's, 70 105's and 411 were 77's.

III. WORKS.- At 19h50 two enemy were seen throwing dirt out of trench at 7465. Five men were digging at 9067. Camouflage which seems to cover heaps of dirt is visible at 4488 and 4489.

IV. CIRCULATION.

At 9h one enemy crossing over top from O.P. at 7464 to a trench. He carried a machine gun. At 9h15 twelve enemy followed over same route at intervals. They were probably members of a night post. At 15h30, 18h40, 20h50, single enemy in and out of 7464. Three men seen going toward Vieville-en-Haie at 12h03. The usual activity along the Bois Gerard. Throughout the day single men and an occasional wagon seen there by our observers at 0241. At 6h20 a train was seen to leave Pagny. Activity of civilians and soldiers along the Moselle as usual. A trail leading from the Villers-Vandieres road appears to be much used. Visibility poor 4h to 13h; good from then until 20h.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons over Grange-en-Haie, 19h20 to 19h40, 6 ascensions; Preny, 10h30 to 16h45, 3 ascensions; Rembercourt, 14h25 to 16h45, 3 ascensions. Avions, singly and in twos and threes over front lines around noon and in the evening. One of them dropped 3 illuminating rockets at 21h45.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 21h50 an ammunition dump appeared to explode in rear of the enemy lines opposite to subsector Languedoc, and one opposite Dauphine at 22h45. Our avions were bombing those areas at that time. Probable O.P. at 7174. At 21h30 two Germans at 0162 shot a flare and ran away. From 22h to 3h many 4-star caterpillar rockets. Searchlights active 1h10 to 1h20. At 22h. seven 1-star rockets from near Preny. It is reported that sounds resembling caterpillar tractors or tanks were heard in the direction of 1665.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Everything normal.

* Correct spelling:

BOIS dit la LAMPE.

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lieut. Cav., U.S.R.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France.

August 16, 1918.

G-2
No.10

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From August 15, 12h-to August 16, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY:

Several bursts of M.G.fire during the night. An unconfirmed reports says that the enemy is using heavy trench mortars against our airplanes.

II. ARTILLERY:

Harassing of trenches at points 6546, 8957, 7449, and around Fey en Haie, and Gross Chene. Trails near 4657 shelled. St. Jacques, the Bois de la Lampe and the rear areas of Dauphine and Languedoc harassed. The usual fire on our avions. Totals:- 77s 206; 105s, 60.

III. WORKS.

At 19h45 four enemy seen shovelling dirt at 8466. One man working on wire entanglements in rear of enemy front lines opposite Languedoc. Sounds of hammering on pipes in same locality. O.P. suspected at 1661. Work there from 22h30 to 24h and from 2 h to 3h.

IV. CIRCULATION. Visibility good.

At 13h10 one enemy at 7463. At 13h20 two at 7364. At 16h05 two enemy officers at 7466 viewed our lines and pointed out places on the terrain. At 19h36 enemy running from 7566 to 7464. At 19h56 two enemy at 7466. Circulation along the Bois Gerard and the Moselle less than during the previous days. Civilians as usual in the fields. Smoke rising from chimneys in Vandieres, Norroy, and Pagny.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons of Preny and Grange-en-Haie up and down frequently. Usual serial patrol of our front lines by single planes.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Many yellow flares during the night. O.P.suspected at 9037 and 1661. From 20h30 to 3h45 four-star caterpillars and occasionally one and five star rockets. Searchlights active. Blinker seen working at 5808 at 20h28.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Infantry, artillery and circulation below normal. Aircraft normal.

T.C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

G-2
No.11

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France.
August 17, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 16, 12h. to August 17, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY. A heavy bombardment of our front lines in the subsector Languedoc took place last night between 2h10 and 3h. Approximately 1400 shells of all calibers fell, chiefly heavy trench mortar shells. A few shots reached the line of resistance. A very heavy machine gun barrage was put down in the same bombardment.

In Subsector Gasconne an enemy party, number unknown, entered one of our advanced posts at 2h and opened packs there. Trenches leading to our advanced day posts were filled with wire by the enemy and were impassable during the day. The enemy left behind many of the old stick grenades and some small egg-shaped bombs of an apparently new type.

A patrol of 10 men were seen in front of Fey-en-Haie near 0562. A patrol of about 40 men was heard near 4873. Snipers fired several shots from near 4673.

II. ARTILLERY. Considerable artillery fire during the T.M. bombardment. Number of shells undetermined. During the afternoon the customary harassing on the front lines and of St. Jacques, Known total 247:-77s, 161:105s-24;150s-62.

III. WORKS. At 13h40 one enemy was seen at 6563 camouflaging trench with brush.

IV. CIRCULATION. Visibility good. At points 7365, 7470, 7464, 7461, 7270, 6564 and 6562 single men were observed occasionally going about in the trenches or using field glasses on our lines, and pointing out parts of our terrain. Smoke seen at 8866. Near Vandieres from 14h to 16h about 25 soldiers were seen in squad formation, apparently drilling. Civilian activity as heretofore. Soldiers again seen along the Bois Gerard.

V. AIRCRAFT. Usual balloon ascensions during the day, especially in the afternoon. Patrol avions flew over our lines frequently in some cases being driven off by AA guns. About 21h from 5 to 8 avions flew over the sector on route to the south for bombing. Our area was not molested.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS. Enemy caterpillars from 20h30 to 24h30.

GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: The enemy's infantry and artillery were unusually active last night. His aeroplanes continue quite active. One of our listening-in posts reports considerable T.P.S. activity. The enemy continues to be very careless in his movements and doesn't hesitate to show himself in the trenches.

T.C.VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lieut., Ca., U.S.R.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO
FRONT LINE TRENCHES

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 18, 1918.

G-2

No. 12.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From August 17, 12h to August 18, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

A patrol in subsector Dauphine heard enemy parties moving about but was unable to get them because of the wire. At 18h55 two enemy threw 6 hand grenades into their own wire at Dauphine. A sniper is working from a concealed position near Le Bonnet. Bursts of machine gun fire on 4973 coming from 4675 at 19h15. Two men at 4575 fired on M.G. post in Provence at 19h15.

At 18h45 twenty large caliber T.M. shells on 4667. Also some T.M. fire from around Bois La Dame on Languedoc. M.G. at 7464. This post was formerly used as an O.P.

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing on points 7356, 7735, 7337, 8159, 4360, and Bois Jolival, Chambrotte, de la Lampe, Puvénelle, and St. Jacques. Of the 460 shells fired 260 were against avions. Totals:- 150s, 24; 105s, 10; 77s, 426.

III. WORKS.

Two enemy shoveling at 7866 at 13h56.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility poor 10h-16h; good 16h to 20h.

Enemy singly and in pairs seen at 9247, 4576, 7365, 7265, and 7270. Enemy observers seen in tree at 6464 and 6174. Three soldiers seen at 6985 going in a northeasterly direction. The usual circulation along the Bois Gerard throughout the day. Normal civilian and military activity around Pagny, Vandières and Norroy.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons made their usual intermittent ascensions. At 22h one signalled in the Morse Code but too fast for our observers to read. Fewer airplanes flew over the sector in observation than heretofore.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Four deserters from the 419 R.I. were brought in about 22h in Dauphine. Order of battle confirmed. (A detailed account will be issued tomorrow.) From 24h20 to 2h there were 15 red ground flares in the direction of Quart en Reserve. At 8h27 a man was seen wigwagging from 7707.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Below normal in the sector; the day was unusually quiet.

(SGD): T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.
A. C. of S., G-2.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 12, Aug. 18,
1918.

I.

Extract from 8th Army Bulletin No. 227 dated August 18,
1918.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

Extracts from letters found on Prisoners Captured by the
Army.

Harvests.

Obersaasheim 5/8/18

"The harvest has been poor, as the mice have done much harm. Tomorrow we are going to thrash our grain, for we have to deliver it by the 15th, as it has been ordered us. Whilst we thresh, a policeman will stand by and count and check everything strictly. You can easily understand what will be left us of our grain!"

Food.

Obersaasheim, 2/8/18

"The harvest will be through this week and we will immediately start in thrashing the grain. Unfortunately everything has been weighed very strictly."

"We have nothing left. No bread. Last Sunday we had meat but no more is to be found anywhere. It is sad that we have nothing to send you."

Morale.

(Letter written by a soldier belonging to the 257th
(77th R.D.) 10/8/18 and unmailed.)

"When we read the papers we can not but feel disheartened. First of all the serious defeat near Soissons, the consequences of which we know nothing of, and then this morning we learn that we have suffered a bad blow in Champagne. If these happenings were to hurry the end it would not be so bad, but there again we have no hope. At the most if those stupid pan-Germans come down a notch on their demands. Our sector is again calm. However, we have gassed the Americans a great deal and therefore continually expect reprisals. So far everything has gone well. All sorts of rumors are afoot, some that we stay here, others that we leave, but nobody knows anything definite."

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 18, 1918.

G-2
MEMORANDUM NUMBER 77.

Code Chiffre, Serie 62 is now suspected of being known to the enemy. The copy in your hands will be returned to G-2 these Headquarters immediately.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
A. C. of S., G-2

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO
THE FIRST LINE TRENCHES

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 19, 1918.

G-2
No. 13

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
From August 18, 12h to August 19, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

At 4h20 the enemy delivered a heavy fire (artillery, M.G. and T.M.) on the outposts, line of resistance, and communication trenches in the subsector Dauphine. About 5 shells a minute dropped at the bridge on the Metz Road at 7937. The enemy artillery covered the whole regimental front. The barrage became weaker at 5h15 and ceased at 5h40. Approximately 1800 shells were fired. The enemy did not get within bombing distance, being seemingly held off by our rifle fire and retiring when our barrage fell.

Previous to the enemy barrage a patrol from Gas-cogne was at work near 9067 and an ambush was out from Dauphine. It is possible that both were seen and the barrage came in response to the red rockets fired by the enemy at that time.

At 20h50 four hand grenades were thrown near Regnieville. This was repeated twice in the next two hours accompanied by M.G. bursts. A sniper was active near the Croix des Carmes (subsector Languedoc).

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing of points 6834, 7454, 4649, 7745, Bois de Pouillot, de Bouchot and Hocquemont. Destructive fire on avions much below normal. Totals: 150's, 20; 105s, 31; 77s - 120; and in the barrage 1800 of all calibers.

III. WORKS.

At 18h enemy seen digging at 75.15-38.15.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility good. Enemy singly at 6865, 7365, and in pairs at 8165, 7270. At least 25 were seen around 7464 at 7h12. This must be a strong outpost. Three horses seen grazing at 7575. All day the usual circulation of single men along the Bois Gerard.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons of Preny, Rembercourt, and Grange on Haye up early in the morning. Planes flew over our lines once or twice, two of them during the barrage.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

At 4h20 one green and 5 red star rockets in Dauphine. A great many two-star red rockets were seen coming from the enemy lines during the barrage. A 77 gun has been heard firing frequently close to our lines in Languedoc.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: Artillery unusually active; infantry normal, aircraft below normal.

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt. Cav., U. S. R.,
A. C. of S., G-2

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 13, Aug. 19,
1918.

INTERROGATORY OF PRISONERS.

Information obtained from four deserters taken the night
of August 17, 1918.

Four Alsatian deserters, surrendering to an outpost in Dauphine oone on the evening of August 17 confirm the order of battle. All of these men belonged to the 419th Regiment. They state that previous to April 8 their regiment had been engaged on the Russian front. On that date they entered the line in the region of the Somme. On July 19 they entered their present position.

The strength of the companies of their regiment average from 60 to 70 men, a large proportion being Alsations. The morale of these troops is low. They are friendly towards the French and express the most bitter hatred for the Prussians. They state that many of their comrades would like to surrender. Five others had started out with them but grew timid and turned back.

They did not know that Americans were opposite them and thought they were surrendering to French troops. They state that German officers are accustomed to tell their men that Americans kill all of the enemy who fall into their hands.

The following is the organization of their sector:

The first two of the front line trenches are practically abandoned except for a few outposts in the second trench. Two of these posts, one on either side of Romenauville road were definitely located (see sketch). These posts are occupied both day and night, ten men and a machine gun to each post. Two sentry posts are located in the northernmost houses of the village of Romenauville.

Two battalions hold the lines of the regimental sector, two companies per battalion occupying the front line trenches (see sketch), withdrawing during the day to the woods in the rear. Two companies per battalion occupy positions in the northern edge of the woods. The remaining companies occupy billets in villages in the rear; - some in Vieville-on-Haye, others in Thiaccourt.


These men believe the companies of their regiment to be fully equipped with light and heavy machine guns. They know of the existence of trench mortars in the Bois du Four and believe they are located at points indicated in sketch.

The deserters stated that they had been kept in rear positions most of the time and had purposely been kept in the dark as to what was going on in their sector because of their French sympathies. They know of no preparations for an attack. They stated that the enemy is strengthening his dugouts in preparation for an offensive which they believe to be in preparation against them in this sector.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Confirmed by Deserters August 18, 1918.

419 R



Dotted line indicates day position of companies in line.

Headquarters 1st Division,
NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE American Expeditionary Forces,
FRONT LINE TRENCHES August 20, 1918.

G-2 DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
No. 14

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

The enemy was heard cutting wire at 3367 at about 3h30. There was a brief exchange of M.G. fire and grenades. The sniper working around Le Bonnet has not yet been located. Short M.G. bursts from near 8367 and 4475.

II. ARTILLERY.

Points 7952, 8459, 3852, 3952, 4576, and 7896 harassed. Batteries in the Bois du Four Rappes, Friere, Vencheres and Norroy groups in action. Totals:
150's - 28; 105's - 5; 77's - 225; all calibres
- 258.

III. WORKS

One enemy seen working in trench at 659.361

IV. CIRCULATION.

Visibility-good until 18h50.- Activity again around 7464-and also at points 7367, 7468, 6562, 6961, 6972, 4676, 9568, and 5863. Civilian circulation normal. Train heard in the Bois de la Rappe at 2h and 3h. At 7h40 a group of 40 men in formation was observed on the road at 740.241 going toward Pagny. The circulation of the enemy, somewhat above normal, may indicate a relief in the subsector near the Moselle.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Several ascensions in the afternoon by balloons at Grange-en-Haie, Preny, and near Cheminot. Several avions patrolled our lines; at 21h25 from 3 to 5 patrolled our rear areas.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

An Alsatian deserter was received at 7250 at 22h. He belonged to the 419 R.I. Order of battle confirmed. (detailed information in "Appendix" herewith. O.P. suspected at 7368. Four star caterpillars, 20h30 to 24h30.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Everything normal.

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
A. C. of S., G-2

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 14, Aug. 20,
1918.

INTERROGATION OF PRISONER.

On the night of August 19 an Alsatian deserter belonging to the 7th company, 2nd battalion, 419th regiment, entered the sector Dauphine and surrendered. He had been stationed in an outpost and consequently possessed a considerable knowledge of the organization of the enemy front line.

He believes his own company to consist of about 110 men, some replacements having come in recently. Of the 110 men at least 20 are Alsations. There are 6 light M.G.s in his company. His statements concerning the organization of the battalions in line coincide generally with the statements made by deserters of August 17. Two battalions are in line, one in reserve between Thiaucourt and Jaulzy* in Bayern Lager, approximately at point 3843. The companies per battalion occupy the front line. the positions being in Tr. de Dresde and Tr. de Baquet, two companies per battalion occupying positions in the edge of the Bois du Four and the Bois l'Eveque.

An outpost composed of 9 men and 2 non commissioned officers, is located at 6154. During the day this post moves to point 6156. It is not equipped with a machine gun. The second outpost is located at point 6557 in projecting angle of trench. This post consists of 15 men, one vizefoldwebel and 2 non commissioned officers. It is equipped with one machine gun which occupies a position during the night, in front of the trench. During the day it is concealed in a dugout nearby.

A post of four sentries is located in the trench south of Reminauville*¹ at point 6352. This point is not occupied regularly, but is only one of a series of alternate posts. It is occupied at night only. The men are relieved at 4h30 and retire-together with the men of post number 1, to the Bois du Four at point 6367.

During the night patrols are sometimes sent forward of the Tr. de Dresde and the Tr. de Baquet.

Thick barbed wire entanglements are being constructed on the southern outskirts of the Bois du Four along the Tr. du Fagot. In the rear of this trench a number of trees have been cut down recently.

P. C. of the 7th Company is located in a dugout at point 6367. The company kitchens of the 5th and 7th companies are located near the path at point 5969. Trench mortars are probably located near point 5867.

The route followed by reliefs of the 5th and 7th companies is generally as follows: Logemangin (point 5178), along the edge of Haie l'Eveque Wood, passing in front of company kitchens, through the woods, issuing at trench du Fagot. The battalion P. C. is probably in the Bois l'Eveque near point 6373.

The prisoner stated that rumors have been prevalent for a long while that Austrians would relieve the 419th Regiment. Some of his comrades had seen Austrians in the neighborhood of Metz on coming back from leave. He himself saw a number of Austrian officers about three weeks ago inspecting the sector. He believes, however, that plans have been changed and that the Austrian who were to relieve them have gone elsewhere. He knew that Americans occupied the sector opposite his regiment but believed the 82nd division was opposite. For some time the pris-

oner has heard rumors of a raid to be carried out with the object of capturing prisoners, but on account of the large number of deserters it has been postponed.

This raid was to have been undertaken by the Sturm Troops of the Division. The prisoner knows nothing of preparations for an attack. The 3 battalions of the 419 Regiment relieve each other systematically. The 2nd Battalion will be relieved on the 22nd, going to the Bayern Lager for ten days rest. The 3rd Battalion, which is now at the Bayern Lager, will relieve the 2nd Battalion on the 22nd. The 1st Bn. will be relieved on Sept. 2 and will proceed to the Bayern Lager. Its place in line will be occupied by the 2nd Bn. The companies of each Bn. alternate in taking over the advanced and reserve positions.

* Correct Spelling: Jaulny

*1 Correct Spelling: Remenauville


S. G. W.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Confirmed by Deserter

August 19, 1918.

419R



Scale: 1:20,000

- +235 365 Area occupied by a part of 1st line Co's during day.
- Outpost with M.G. (light)
- Sentinel outpost 4 men.
- ⊕ Co. Echelon frequented especially by day.
- ⊗ Trench Mortar.
- ⊞ Kitchen's 5th & 7th Co's.
- - - Route of Relief.

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO
FRONT LINE TRENCHES

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 21, 1918.

G-2 DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
No. 15. From August 20, 12h to August 21, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

An enemy patrol of one officer and twenty men, rushed one of our day posts this morning at 7h15 and was quickly repulsed with two men wounded, one of whom was taken prisoner. We suffered no losses.

An enemy patrol of 10 men was reported seen at 3267. During the night there were intermittent bursts of M.G. fire. An M.G. near 3669 fired 40 rounds on point 7365 - 36.85. An M.G. day position reported at 3368.

II. ARTILLERY.

The usual harassing of our front lines, notably at 8353, 7654, 7555, 8152 and 7438. Rear areas in the Bois de Bouchet*, St. Jacques, and Bois de la Lampe shelled. Batteries in the Bois de Rappe, Four, Vencheres and Grandes Portions active. Totals: - 150's 19; 105's - 72; 77's - 166. All calibers 257.

III. WORKS.

A large mound of earth at 72.8 - 37.2 has the appearance of an M.G. emplacement. Working parties were heard at a distance behind the front lines near 8065.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Enemy seen again at 7464. At 13h35 three enemy seen at 7370; enemy also observed at 7266, 7376, 7367, 7468. Several men were seen crossing field at 7375 at intervals. Four two-horse wagons and 18 men seen at 6887. Six soldiers with packs and rifles went west from Norroy at 4686 and disappeared behind the woods at 4485. Trails along the Bois Gerard again used freely by individual soldiers.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Rembercourt, Preny and Jaulny balloons ascended as usual. The enemy continues to signal at night from these balloons. Single planes flew over our lines around night-fall. At 19h45 and 21h55 four planes flew over on patrol.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

A wounded Prussian was captured in the attempted raid this morning. He belonged to the 94th Landwehr Regiment. Order of battle confirmed. From 1h24 to 1h32 white flares visible north of Preny. At 22h 10 searchlights active in same direction. Four-star rockets as usual. Four large columns of smoke in the lines opposite subsector Gascogne were observed; there was neither shelling nor gas fire at this time.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Everything normal except that the enemy is a bit more active in patrolling.

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U. S. R.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

*Correct spelling Bois de Bouchot.

S. G. W.

APPENDIX TO DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 15, August
21, 1918.
METHODS OF LIAISON EMPLOYED BY THE GERMANS DURING THE ATTACK.

During offensive operations the Germans employ two distinct forms of liaison.

1. DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTUAL FIGHTING.

Means of communication without wires are chiefly employed. These include radio, earth telegraphy, visual signalling, flares and rockets, panels, carrier pigeons, messenger dogs, mounted scouts, runners and cyclists. Where luminous signals are employed the number of such signals is strictly limited and the meaning of each is fully determined prior to the advance. Signals in relays, although employed extensively during the first part of the war, have been, for the most part, abandoned as impracticable on account of their drain upon man power.

Generally speaking, the means of communication which do not require wire are found to be more dependable within battalion and even regimental areas during the period of the attack immediately preceding the advance.

2. THE USE OF THE TELEPHONE.

When the initial fighting is over and the advance begins, the telephone replaces other means of communication, connecting the higher headquarters and the regiments. During this stage of an offensive operation the zone of fire, even in front of the regiment, permits the exchange of results of operations by telephone. The use of the telephone, for this purpose, is, however, unusual. All non-aerial lines are quickly destroyed by troops following the advancing units with the result that materiel and labor are wasted in establishing such lines. Lateral communications with metallic circuits, may be employed successfully, well forward. These lateral lines should in all cases end in forward centers of information where all information and orders are received. Direct communication is necessary between all signal units and the commanding officers for whom they are working.

The Germans do not employ the advanced centers of information singly, but in pairs. This requires a very large personnel and an extensive materiel equipment, but during the advance they are made to relieve each other alternately. One of these should be installed as far in advance as possible in order to avoid premature change of location. During the actual advance the center of information changes its position rapidly; the successive positions having been determined beforehand.

The position of the posts of command as well as the observation posts of the infantry are established by means of maps and sketches, previous to the advance. Likewise the map furnishes sufficient information to aid in the establishment of visual signal stations.

Especial attention is paid during the attack, to telephone discipline and all means of wireless communication are made available.

3. USE OF THE AIRPLANE IN THE ATTACK.

During the early stages of the attack ground observers alone are employed to report on the progress of the line and to stake out its position. After the attack has been in progress for a certain time, usually from 2 to 3 hours, an aviator is sent out to observe its progress. By means of rockets he calls upon the infantry to display its panels.

The first line only responds to the signal. The aviator then makes a tracing of the front line on a weighted sketch, photographs the line, returns to the Division P.C. and drops the messages and sketches resulting from his reconnaissance. When this staking out by the aeroplane is completed the responsibility of marking the line is again left to terrestrial observers for several hours. Towards evening the aviator again goes out. The times for staking out the line by the aviators are determined beforehand. Meantime the aviator is sent on special missions only when the situation is perplexing and terrestrial observation of the line proves impossible.

The displaying of panels by the front line is governed entirely by the wishes of the aviator. His aeroplane is furnished with understood distinctive marks and the signals employed by him for asking "where are you?" are simple and clearly determined beforehand. Regiments and battalions may display their signals at any time without waiting a signal from the aeroplane.

The Germans regard as useless single panels displayed here and there in an infantry line - they must be placed end to end in a straight line so that they may be clearly distinguishable. Under no circumstances are panels displayed in trenches or shell holes, but on parapets and paradoss. The opposite sides of the panels are in red and white; the red being displayed on light colored backgrounds, the white on dark backgrounds. In cases where it is difficult for the panels to be seen the infantry is authorized to use flares, white or red. In wooded areas Bengal flares are invariably employed.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 21, 1918.

Memorandum No. 77.

1. Each unit of this division will turn over to relieving units the following:

(a) O.P. Dossier showing for each O.P., the location, visible and invisible areas, means of liaison, crew, and equipment.

(b) File of Divisional and Corps Summaries, except, that of the appendices, only the interrogatory of prisoners will be turned over.

(c) All maps pertaining to sector. This does not include 1:80,000 and 1:200,000 maps which are not sector property, and will be taken out by units.

(d) All aeroplane photographs.

(e) Any other files and papers of local interest only.

2. Units will not turn over intelligence equipment.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

T. C. VAN CLEVE
2nd Lieut., Cav., U.S.R.
A.C. of S., G-2.

Distribution

I.O. 1st Artillery Brigade
I.O. 1st Infantry Brigade
I.O. 2nd Infantry Brigade
I.O. 16th Infantry
I.O. 18th Infantry
I.O. 26th Infantry
I.O. 28th Infantry.

G-2
No. 16

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 22, 1918.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
From August 21, 12h to August 22, 12h.

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY.

I. INFANTRY.

At 3269 our patrol saw an enemy patrol of 15 men moving to the west. Intermittent machine gun fire as usual. An M.G. post probably at 9369. Fire also from 3371 on 4636.

II. ARTILLERY.

Harassing of FEN-en-HAYE* Bois de la CHAMBROTTE, Bois du BOUCHOT and ST. JACQUES. Fully 500 shells, almost entirely 150's were fired during the afternoon and evening on roads in the Foret de PUVENELLE. Totals: 77's 147; 105's, 62; 150's 506. All calibers 715. Groupings NORROY, VENCHE-RES, and RAPPES again active.

III. WORKS.

At 10h30 one enemy seen digging at 7062.

IV. CIRCULATION.

Enemy observed at 6663, 64.6 - 36.7, and 6660. Men again seen at 7464. Three men seen crossing field at 5750. Smoke observed at 9178. Usual traffic on Bois GERARD trails.

V. AIRCRAFT.

Balloons of Grange-en-Haie, Preny, and Rembercourt made several ascensions during the afternoon. The enemy planes patrolled our lines in pairs several times and at 21h three avions visited our rear areas for bombing. Balloon No. 6 was attacked at 17h25 without being damaged.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

Caterpillars with from one to four stars were observed in GASCOGNE subsector from 20h30 to 23h. Searchlights and anti aircraft guns were again very active in the distant rear areas.

VII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

Infantry below normal.; aircraft normal. Artillery unusually active. During the afternoon and evening, owing to our increased circulation the Foret de PUVENELLE was the target for sustained interdiction fire.

Correct Spelling:-

* FEY-en-HAYE.

S.G.W.

T. C. VAN CLEVE,
2nd Lt., Cav., U.S.R.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

1st Division, U. S.,
G-2, American E. F.
August 23, 1918.

No. 17

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

12h to 12h.

P A R T I

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Infantry activity below normal; aircraft normal. Artillery somewhat more active in harassing fire. Heretofore there has been only registration fire (in addition to the one or two barrages put down during the past three weeks) and very light harassing fire.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE:

No change.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

No change.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY:

Normal intermittent machine gun fire.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY:

Approximately 100 rounds fired by 77's on Fey-en-Haie*, Bois Chambrotte, Bois Bouchot, St. Jacques, and points 7536, 7949, 8251, 8417. In the vicinity of Montauville, Maidieres, and Pont a Mousson, fully 60 105's fell. The 150's fired 8 shells on points 4856 and 5267 last evening. Considerable automobile traffic on the roads near these points. All of the fire was harassing or interdiction except occasional fire on avions totalling 50 rounds. Groupings of Norroy, Vencheres, Rappes and Grandes Portions active. During the night there was considerable anti-aircraft fire in the enemy's far rear.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

Visibility: Good throughout the day.

Railroads: One train northeast from Pagny at 6h23.

Decauvilles: Nothing to report.

Roads. The usual civilian traffic on the roads from Norroy to Vandieres, Pagny and Preny. Also a few soldiers from time to time in these localities and along the Bois Gerard.

VII. ENEMY WORKS:

Nothing to report.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS:

Balloons: Preny Rembercourt and Grange-en-Haie balloons made several ascensions during the day. One observer of the Rembercourt balloon came down in a parachute at 14h56.

Airplanes: Several planes, singly and in pairs, flew over our lines at noon and in the evening, in almost every case being fired on by our anti-aircraft guns.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

Fire was seen at 8898 at 12h10. Rocket signals from direction of S.W. corner of Bois de Bonvaux. At 22h20 a large flash, apparently a fire, was seen in the region Mars-la-Four*. Four star rockets opposite our sector from 20h30 to 22h50 and 23h45 to 24h. Enemy searchlights active during our bombing raids.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS.

Very little fire by the artillery. Two cover patrols sent out by the infantry without incident a N.W. of Preny at 22h24 during one of our bombing raids an ammunition dump was struck, resulting in a fire and many explosions.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

T. C. VAN CLEVE, A.C. of S. G-2

Correct Spelling: * Fey-en-Haye.

*1 Mars-la-Tour. S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 25, 1918.

ORGANIZATION OF ANTI TANK DEFENCE.

Extract from VIII Army Bulletin of Information No. 236.
(Translation of a German Document

ANTI TANK DEFENCES.

In the course of the offensive of August 8 we captured a number of interesting documents concerning German methods for fighting tanks.

The following methods are especially insisted upon:

1. Anti-tank field pieces.
2. Anti-tank rifles.
3. Anti-tank mines.

"Woods, swamps and rivers are obstacles for tanks. They must therefore be considered in the preparation of an anti-tank defence. It is absolutely necessary that all means of anti-tank defence be planned out in depth formation, and be ready to enter into action.

The rational cooperation of the different means of defence must be regulated.

I. ARTILLERY.

The anti-tank defence must be prepared in such a way that the greatest possible number of guns take part in it. These guns should be in depth formation. We must distinguish:

a. those anti-tank guns, which, echeloned in depth between the principle lines of resistance and the artillery zone, only serve against tanks.

These guns must have a direct zone of fire over the ground where the tanks might advance.

While the withdrawal of these guns from the barrage fire and special missions, will cause inconvenience, this will be counter-balanced by their extreme importance in the defence against tanks.

200 to 300 rounds will be sufficient allowance of ammunition for these guns.

b. Anti-tank field sections.

Each division will designate an anti-tank section.

This section will be drawn from the Field Artillery and sent to rest. It will be horsed and maintained in constant readiness.

The limbers will contain armor piercing shells. The guns will each have two ammunition caissons. These caissons will carry shrapnel as well as armor piercing shells.

These sections will only be placed in position after numerous emplacements have been reconnoitered, even in the advanced zone of the infantry. It will not be necessary to form ammunition depots on these emplacements as the ammunition caissons will be brought up there.

c. Guns already in position.

(field guns, light and heavy howitzers)

These guns will intervene in the anti-tank defence by direct fire. A number of these guns should be selected. When these guns are unable to fulfill their missions from the positions which they occupy they will be promptly withdrawn. Frequent exercises will be made to facilitate the rapid entry into action against assaulting tanks.

The appropriate ammunition will be kept on hand.

d. Heavy batteries.

The anti tank defence will include the heavy batteries whose observation facilities render them particularly useful for this work.

The fighting area will be divided into zones for tank-defence purposes. The distance between certain important points will be determined beforehand and made known to the gunners.

II.

HEAVY MACHINE GUNS.

In general, all heavy machine guns, even those held in reserve, are to be provided with armor piercing ammunition. Each heavy machine gun has, as its most important mission, the counter-fire against tanks penetrating into its zone. Machine gunners who are placed in positions favorable to the advance of tanks must be imbued with a special sense of responsibility. For this reason they will be known as "anti-tank machine guns".

III.

ANTI TANK RIFLES.

Anti-tank rifles will be generally posted behind the main line of resistance. Their short range of fire (500 meters) must be considered.

IV.

MINENWERFERS.

Light minenwerfers, echeloned in depth and in groups of at least two, will be distributed in the infantry zone according to the principles governing the distribution of machine guns. The anti-tank defence will also be their permanent mission. Some minenwerfers primarily intended for barrage fire, may, whenever possible, intervene in the anti-tank defence. Those light minenwerfers which are placed at points favorable to the advance of tanks will be called "anti-tank minenwerfers."

Often both light and heavy minenwerfers can officiciously intervene in the defence against tanks.

V.

TANK MINES.

These complete the action of the other arms of anti-tank defence. They should be kept in the forward zone and in a sufficient quantity in the supporting points of the echelon zones and in the supporting positions. The rank and file will be shown their use.

In the case of a tank attack, all means suitable to fight them must be kept in mind, and the personnel must remember that their mission is to see that the last tank is destroyed.

If the tanks are destroyed by our fire, the attack has probably failed. This fact must be made known to everyone.

- - - - -

INSTRUCTION TO THE ARTILLERY

In all divisions, the anti-tank guns will be carefully examined. Their efficaciousness against tanks in direct fire must be made certain. The artillery must be able to counter-fire tanks even in subdued light and at nightfall.

The gas discipline must be strictly observed in anti-tank positions.

Divisions will cooperate so that all ground over which tanks might advance can be swept by direct fire.

On July 15 a map (1:25,000) will be sent to the Army Corps indicating the position of anti-tank guns as well as their angle of fire. A report will accompany this map stating that the artillery has verified and regulated the artillery anti-tank defence.

Each division will designate from the field artillery at rest, a mobile anti-tank section which will, in the case of a prolonged alert be kept harnessed and hitched. The alert emplacement of anti-tank sections as well as their firing positions, will be marked on a 1:25000 map which will be sent to the Army Corps on July 20.

- - - - -

GERMAN FUSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BLOWING UP AMMUNITION.
Extract from French VIII Army B.R. No. 236.

A German document issued by the German G.H.Q., Jan. 9, 1918, shows that a new special fuse has been put into service.

This fuse, known as the Lgz. Z, 17, is meant, not to be fired on shells, but to blow up projectiles to which it is attached within a time varying from one to seventy-two hours.

In appearance this fuse is absolutely similar to the Gr. Z, 04 usually utilized on 10 cm. and 21 cm. shells (the detonator, painted red instead of blue, but when the fuse is screwed on the detonator is concealed.)

The firing pin is driven by a spring. It is held in the cocked position by a wire which is slowly corroded by a liquid. According to the density of the liquid used the wire breaks after a given time and releases the firing pin, the latter setting off the percussian cap. In case of a retreat, certain special officers are detailed to attach these fuses to a number of shells in ammunition dumps, dug-outs, billets etc. No outward signs differentiate these shells from ordinary ones.

The density of the liquid is measured at 15 degrees centigrade, and consequently, in cold weather the shell may go off after more than 72 hours. The greatest precautions should, consequently, be taken for four days.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 28, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 79.

"SUWANEE" Codes are cancelled upon receipt of this memorandum and will be returned to G-2, Division Headquarters as soon as practicable.

"WABASH" codes herewith inclosed will become effective at 0 hour August 30

Request that inclosed collective receipt be accomplished and returned to G-2, Division Headquarters at once.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Capt. Inf., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces

DISTRIBUTION OF THE "WABASH" CODE.

Herewith "WABASH" codes to be distributed in
accordance with the following table.

UNIT	CODE NO.	UNIT	CODE NO.
C.O. French Mission	1	C.O. 6th Art. Reg.	33
C.O. 1st Inf. Brigade	2	C.O. 1st Bn.	34
C.O. 16th Inf. Reg.	3	C.O. "A" Btry.	35
C.O. 1st Bn.	4	C.O. "B" Bty.	36
C.O. 2nd Bn.	5	C.O. "C" Bty.	37
C.O. 3rd Bn.	6	C.O. 2nd Bn.	38
C.O. 18th Inf. Reg.	7	C.O. "D" Bty.	39
C.O. 1st Bn.	8	C.O. "E" Bty.	40
C.O. 2nd Bn.	9	C.O. "F" Bty.	41
C.O. 3rd Bn.	10	C.O. 7th Art. Reg.	42
C.O. 2nd M.G. Bn.	11	C.O. 1st Bn.	43
		C.O. "A" Bty.	44
C.G. 2nd Inf. Brigade	12	C.O. "B" Bty.	45
C.O. 26th Inf. Reg.	13	C.O. "C" Bty.	46
C.O. 1st Bn.	14	C.O. 2nd Bn.	47
C.O. 2nd Bn.	15	C.O. "D" Bty.	48
C.O. 3rd Bn.	16	C.O. "E" Bty.	49
C.O. 28th Inf. Reg.	17	C.O. "F" Bty.	50
C.O. 1st Bn.	18	C.O. T.M. Bty.	51
C.O. 2nd Bn.	19		
C.O. 3rd Bn.	20	C.O. Field Signal B.	52
C.O. 3rd M.G. Bn.	21		
		Division Engineer	53
C.G. 1st Art. Brigade	22	C.O. 1st Eng. Reg.	54
C.O. 5th Art. Reg.	23	C.O. 1st Bn.	55
C.O. 1st Bn.	24	C.O. 2nd Bn.	56
C.O. "A" Bty.	25		
C.O. "B" Bty.	26	C.O. 1st M.G. Bn.	57
C.O. 2nd Bn.	27	Division M.G. Officer	58
C.O. "C" Bty.	28	G-1	59
C.O. "D" Bty.	29	G-3	60
C.O. 3rd Bn.	30	Division Signal	
C.O. "E" Bty.	31	Officer	61
C.O. "F" Bty.	32		

By command of Major General Summerall:

T.R. GOWENLOCK
Captain Infantry
A.C. OF S. G-2.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
August 31, 1918.

The following information is submitted for the approval of the Commanding General, 1st Division, and his staff.

This report is the result of information collected from the French Army, French Cpros, American Army, American Corps, Army Observers, old residents of the ST.MIHIEL sector, deserters and prisoners.

There is a wide difference of opinion regarding certain subjects, particularly the description of streams. In "Summary Number 1 will be found our conclusions to date regarding the RUPT de MAD. Additional information will be forthcoming shortly as the result of actual patrol reconnaissances.

Summary Number 2 contains information collected strictly from, the 8th Army and goes more into detail regarding the area and the enemy's strength.

Supplements to the following Summaries will be submitted by G-2, as additional information is collected.

SIGNED: THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Inf., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2,

THE GERMAN POSITION BETWEEN ST. MIHIEL AND PONT-A-MOUSSON.

In the sector of the St. Mihiel-Pont-a-Mousson, the German defensive system consists of three main positions parallel to the front, with an intermediate position between the first two. The withdrawal position for this sector, which is that for the whole St. Mihiel salient, extends across the base of the salient from northwest to southwest, resting on the defenses north of Verdun and join, at Pagny-sur-Moselle, the second position to which it is almost perpendicular.

FIRST POSITION.

Starting at the Meuse and the Fort du Camp des Romaines, which overlooks the valley of the Meuse, the position crosses the Forest of Apremont and then turns northwest. At the foot of the Cote de Pata the position consists of wire only, except around the village of Loupmont. It follows the edges of the Bois de Gerchamp*, de Haute Charriers and le Tombois, then passes, via Richecourt, the high ground overlooking the valley of the Ranaux, Lahayville, the southern edges of the Bois de la Sonnard and the Bois de Friere, crosses the communal woods of Norroy and of Pont-a-Mousson and extends along the wooded ridge which dominates the valley of the Moselle ending at the river east of Norroy. Strong points forming salients for flank defense are found at Apremont, Richecourt, the high ground 300 meters south east of Lahayville, Remenauville, and south of Norroy.

The position consists of two lines of trenches at an average distance apart of 100 meters, with a support trench about 300 meters in the rear. The latter is not continuous behind the entire front, but in some places is doubled. Trenches are in general of the old type with deep dugouts and subterranean galleries. Along a great part of the front the entanglement contains electrified wire.

INTERMEDIATE POSITION

Beginning in the Bois de Gereschamp* and extending eastward to the Moselle, and intermediate position parallels the first position at a distance varying between 300 and 400 meters. There are intervals in the position in the Bois le Tombois and northwest of Richecourt. It consists generally of a simple continuous trench of the old type, but is doubled or tripled in places. The strongly organized village of St. Baussant forms an important supporting point in the line.

SECOND POSITION.

The second position extends from the eastern outskirts of St. Mihiel to Pagny-sur-Moselle, where it joins the withdrawal position. It parallels roughly the first position at an average distance of 2000 meters from the first line, utilizing commanding ground throughout practically its whole extent. A particularly strong sector of this line is constructed along the crest of the steep Bois le Mont-Montsec ridge, which commands the country in

* Correct spelling: BOIS de GERECHAMP.

front to a great distance. Apparently the enemy considers that trenches are unnecessary at the foot of the Bois le Mont slope; however, he has organized the village of Loup-mont, which is connected by tunnels with the camps on the northern side of the ridge. Near its eastern end, at Pagny, the position dominates the valley of the Moselle.

The second position, which is not yet complete, consists, for the most part of a single continuous trench of the old type, re-inforced in places by advance and support trenches.

THIRD POSITION.

A third position is in process of construction from Varnivay*(near the defenses of the western face of the St. Mihiel salient) via Bruxieres*1, Nonsard and Jaulny towards the withdrawal position at Rembercourt-sur-Mad.

As yet this position consists only of wire with elements of trenches at intervals, Concreted shelters in places and parts of support trenches on reverse slopes, indicate that the position will have some of the characteristics of the new type fortifications.

WITHDRAWAL POSITION.

This position cuts across the St. Mihiel salient from northwest of southeast via Etain, Haddonville and Dampviteux*2, and crosses the Moselle at Pagny. It consists of two lines of trenches of new type, 300 or 400 meters apart, each having a double wire entanglement. Shelters of reinforced concrete are constructed in both trenches at intervals of 80 to 100 meters. These shelters are about 5 meters square and are supposed to be intended both for machine guns and for personnel. Besides these, other concrete shelters, apparently for machine guns, appear at irregular intervals between the lines. One, and sometimes both lines, are constructed on reverse slopes. The whole portion seems to conform to the latest German regulations for the construction of field works.

The withdrawal position is entirely independent of the front defensive system. It does not conform to the trace of the latter, but turns away from it in an almost perpendicular direction. Its role is not to reinforce the front lines, but to serve as a withdrawal position pure and simple, should the enemy find it necessary to evacuate the St. Mihiel salient. In such a case, the position would protect the Conflans-Chambley-Arnville line of communications and the Briey Basin.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Railways: The sector is connected with the main network of German railways in rear by the Metz-Arnville-Pagny line and the Conflans-Chambley-Dampviteux-St. Benoit-Vigneulles line. These two lines are connected by the Chambley-Waville-Arnville switch line, which is approximately parallel to the withdrawal position and about 5 kilometers behind it. From Waville a branch line runs to Thiaucourt, which is between the second and third positions.

South of this system of normal gauge railways there is a network of narrow gauge lines with antennae extending into the trenches of the first and second positions.

There are important railroad junctions at Metz-Sablon,

* Correct spelling: VARVINAY *1 BUXIERES *2 DAMPVITOUX

Thionville, Mars-la-Tour, Conflans, Chambley and Arnaville
There are dumps at Conflans, Chambley, Donmartin,*Sebastopol (near St. Benoit). Vigneulles, Rembercourt, Thiaucourt, Onville, Bayonville and Noveant. Most of the dumps are in immediate proximity to the railroad system, usually in the stations.

Roads: The roads most used by the Germans are:

(a) Chambley-Dampvitoux*1, St. Benoit-Vigneulles.

This road forks at Vigneulles, one branch running toward St. Mihiel via Creue and Chaillon, the other to Hendicourt,*2 from which one feeder runs towards the Forest of Apremont and another towards Wionville*3.

(b) St. Julien-Charey-Xammes-Thiaucourt-Bouillonville (with branches to Essey and Pannes).

This road is joined to the Chambley-Vigneulles road by the parallel road Thiaucourt-Beney-St. Benoit.

(c) Besides the above roads which are well kept up, there are a number of others of less importance, which feed all the important points. The wooded region between Thiaucourt and the Moselle is the only part of the sector which is not well supplied with roads. As the circulation on all important roads is under terrestrial observation from the French side of the line, it is rare that a relief takes place without being reported by the observation posts.

Trenches - In General.

Trenches are about one meter wide and two meters deep. The mine dugouts of the first line, and the saps, covered over with small logs, rails and stones, in second line, are from seven to eight meters deep - not concreted.

Wire - In General.

Wire in the various lines varies from three to four meters wide and one meter high to seven to eight meters wide and 80 centimeters high. The wire is of different kinds and is laid in various fashions; the barbed saw-tooth is most prevalent. - Zig-Zag in construction.

It is estimated that in the initial "jumping off" our wire cutters will be confronted with at least fifty rows - twenty-five of the enemy and twenty-five of our own.

Withdrawal of the Enemy.

It is considered that the third position is nothing but a withdrawal position designated to cover the withdrawal to the main position. This third position is more strongly held at this time than has been the case for some period but still is not considered serious obstacle.

Correct spelling: DOMMARTIN;*1 DAMPVITOUX;*2 HEUDICOURT;
*3 WOINVILLE.

S.G.W.

Looking forward to possible withdrawal the enemy has planned a systematic destruction of villages, strong positions, railroads, roads, etc. On his main roads he has constructed small tunnels perpendicular to the axis of the road. The gallery is about two meters high; the thickness of the earth over it about one meter. These small mines completely cut under the roads. A complete electrical system for springing these mines is ready for use.

The railroads cannot be salvaged and will probably be destroyed.

The contamination of the water is a part of the enemy's withdrawal plan.

Another obstacle which the Germans used to a great extent in their withdrawal from the Somme will be inundations. On account of its marshy generally level nature the Plain of the Woevre can be very easily denied to an enemy with relatively little water. The line from Jonville to Rembercourt crosses all the beds of these streams which run down from the region of the woods towards the Valley of the Moselle. There is no doubt that under these extremely favorable conditions the Germans have prepared an extensive system of inundations by the construction of dikes which will dam up these streams. Two successive lines for damming water are indicated - the road from Woel to Beney, which will control the whole wooded region situated to the west of St. Benoit and the Hassavant Farm; and the line Jonville-Dampvitoux where the establishment of dikes could extend considerably the surface of the Pond of Lachaussee. Near the front it seems that inundations could be very easily created in a similar manner in the region of Montsec in the valley of the Creue and the Marsoupe. The effect of such inundations would be more local and temporary.

To sum up, the material obstacles which might be placed by the enemy along his line of retreat will be numerous and varied, and will necessitate considerable repair work.

The situation at the End of the Withdrawal.

(1) Topography.

the trenches in the fourth position are partly constructed on the counter slopes on small folds of the ground whose altitude increases very slightly as one moves from the north west to the south-east. The most important of these heights covers the village of DAMPVITOUS* and DOMMARTIN, which are organised as supporting points of the new position. Towards the east a second line of small folds in the ground extend parallel to the first and about 1500 m from it. It dominates the first position and is in turn dominated by the little hills which stretch to the banks of the MOSELLE.T

The ground is open and easy to observe, but unfortunately the nearest good observation post is the height of HATTONCHATEL which is more than 10 klm away.

* Correct spelling: DAMPVITOUX.

(2) The positions.

The defensive organizations before which we will find ourselves comprise two positions, the first position composed of 2 lines of trenches separated by 200-250 meters. Each trench is protected by a double band of wire, each band about 3 or 4 meters wide and interlaced so as to form compartments, corresponding usually to a position where, in the trench immediately in rear there is a pill box prepared for flanking fire, the effectiveness of the wire entanglements is to be increased by placing in front of the first band, mines made of long cylinders of sheet iron filled with explosive with an electric train. The shelters which are constructed from 80 to 120 meters apart are all of concrete. They hold from 8 to 10 men. They all appear to be of the same kind, It is possible, however, some of them are so arranged as to serve for flanking machine guns or observation posts. The trenches, are not yet entirely finished.

Up to now, study of photographs has not revealed any advance in trenched positions, west of the line Jonville-Rembercourt. Prisoners have stated that there exists a fortified position at Haumont-Les-LaChaussee. A second position on the line of the villages of St. Julien-Chambley-Mars le Tour*2etc., of which we know very little, is also in existence. It stretches towards the south as far as Rembercourt. It appears to be formed of closed works each of which occupies the summit of one of these little hills immediately east of the Mars le Tour*2 Chambley road. Two of these works have been identified between Chambley and St. Julien. They are surrounded by a triple band of wire.

(3) The occupation.

The project of the Bavarian Ersatz Division was that at the end of the withdrawal each regiment would put one battalion in the first position (La Chaussee*-Bois de Bon-sell*1 and Dampvitoux); one battalion in support two kilometers in the rear at the outside) (Hadonville. Bois la Dame Hageville); one battalion in repose (Mars la Tour, two battalions and Puxieux, one battalion). Parks and convons in the region of Conflans-Jouaville. This disposition which is in conformity with Hindenburg's principles will probably be followed in the neighboring division.. Concerning the disposition of battalions in the 1st line the general disposition adopted by battalions which occupied the Hindenburg line on the Somme may be recalled; 2 companies on the Hindenburg and 2 companies in advance. (Forward combat posts without trench not wire) the men being in shell holes guarded by small posts pushed to the front).

(4) Artillery.

It is possible that the new position has concrete shelters for batteries, none however, have been identified up to now. The field artillery will find good position at distances of 1500-2000 meters from the 1st trenches,

The Germans will have a great advantage in the use of the Railroad from Conflans to Chambley which runs parallel to their front and can be utilized for the A.L.V.F. Two emplacements for large caliber pieces have already been prepared two kilometers northwest of Chambley.

If the withdrawal takes place as foreseen the German artillery will have (1) registered on targets in front of the 1st line:

*Correct spelling: LACHAUSSEE.
 *1 " " : BOIS de BOUSEIL.
 *2 " " : MARS la TOUR.

S.G.W.

(2) The Positions. -6-

(2) Picked out our probable emplacements of both artillery and observation posts: (3) Registered on all emplacements recognized.

(5) Communications.

The supplying of new positions will be assured by the railroads from Conflans to Mars la Tour. This last station will necessarily become the great center of supply for the whole region - at least for artillery and munitions.

REPORT ON THE RUPT DE MAD.

This stream runs in front of FRAMERVILLE* and joins the MOSELLE at ARNAVIE,*1 a length of 20 kilometers. At the present time it is from 3 to 10 meters wide and will probably remain in that condition until November.

That part of this stream which lies in the course to be taken by this Division averages from 3 to 5 meters in width and about 1 meter in depth.

The banks are vertical and about $\frac{1}{2}$ meter to 1 meter above the average water level.

The bottom of the bed is muddy and very moving. A few fords only are to be found. The best ford is located at XIVRAY. The mud at the bottom of the stream averages $\frac{1}{3}$ meter in depth.

Vines along the left bank.

At the present time several days hard rain would not swell this stream to any extent, but during the winter it widens out considerably.

From APREMONT to THIAUCOURT there are many fordable places. However, the bottom is shifting. The stream is dotted with pools of greater than the average depth and the water is deep near mills.

A deserter from the 227th Division states that between RICHECOURT and MAIZERAIS he has seen men bathing in the stream and has bathed and washed clothes there himself. He was quite positive in confirming a width of 3 to 5 meters but was equally positive that in places the stream is 5 to 6 meters deep. He further states that the bed of the stream in parts of its course between RICHECOURT and LAHAYVILLE, is firm and pebbly but can not give exact locations.

The First Army offers the information that the RUPT DE MAD has an average width of about 25 meters, east of ESSEY, and a depth varying from $\frac{3}{10}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ meters. This opinion is disproved by the testimony of old residents of the district along the river, by deserters and by the study of the most recent aeroplane photographs.

A man whose integrity is unquestioned and who has been in charge of an Army Observation Post for the last 4 years in this region, states that in the region from RICHECOURT to THIAUCOURT the RUPT DE MAD is in no place over 10 meters wide and he is sure that in many places it is considerably less. This man, prior to the war, was a mason and builder and traveled continually among the small towns of this sector. He states that at this season of the year and until October when the rains normally begin, the RUPT DE MAD is very shallow indeed; that the flow of water almost ceases and that, although in places there are pools 1 meter or two meters deep, perhaps and even ten meters wide, there is always nearby a place where it is much narrower and much shallower. He states that, during August and September, unless there are heavy rains, the RUPT DE MAD can be crossed by a man almost anywhere southwest of THIAUCOURT without wetting his knees.

* Correct spelling: FREMERVILLE.
*1 " " ARNAVILLE.

OPINION.

There are many conflicting estimates in regard to the width and depth of this stream but an analysis of all information prompts us to draw the conclusion that the stream is fordable at only a few places and that it represents a formidable obstacle to advancing troops.

ENEMY ARTILLERY IN 4th CORPS SECTOR

On the front of the 4th Corps there are about 70 German Batteries of which 31 are 77's; 26 are 105's; 3 are 10L's; 9 are 150's; 1 a 203. The 77's and 10L's are cannon. The 105's and 150's are German Howitzers, and the 203 a captured Russian Howitzer. Three quarters of these batteries are clustered in the woods of GARGANTUA and MORT MARE on the left of the sector. The rather high proportion of Howitzers is probably due to the wooded nature of the country. There are 203 known and suspected emplacements and the Germans occasionally occupy many of these with platoons or singles guns. A deserter has reported that many batteries have not their full quota of guns as their losses in materiel in the recent offensives have not been replaced. The enemy strength per kilometer is probably fifteen guns. All these figures are exclusive of a dozen anti-aircraft batteries which are evenly distributed along the front.

Distribution according to lines of Defense.

There are no batteries in front of the intermediate line or in rear of the 3rd line. No emplacements or positions of retirement have been discovered back of the third line and the French Artillery Information Service believes that none exist.

Between Intermediate and Second Lines.

From X - 351 to X - 358 (GARGANTUA GROUP) there are no batteries.

From X - 358 to X = 362 (MORT MARE GROUP) there are 6 of 77's; 11 batteries of 105's and 2 of 150's.

From X = 362 to X = 367 3 batteries of 77's; 1 of 105's and 2 of 150's.

Between Second and Third Lines.

From X = 351 to X = 356 (GARGANTUA GROUP) 3 batteries of 77's, 9 of 105's, 1 of 150's, 1 of 203's.

From X = 356 to X 358, no batteries.

From X = 358 to X = 367 (Mort Mare, Bois d'Euvezin and Haie l'Eveque Groups), 9 batteries of 77's, 2 of 10L's, 2 of 105's 3 of 150's.

10th DIVISION.

Major General Grueter, commanding.

The 10th Division faces the sector from which our division will "jump off". The following information regarding its strength and history may be of interest.

I. COMPOSITION:

(a) Infantry:

6th Grenadier Regiment.
47th Infantry Regiment.
398th Infantry Regiment.

(b) Artillery:

56th Field Artillery Regiment.

II. HISTORY.

(a) Former fighting experience:

Since the beginning of the war the 10th Division has seen heavy fighting. In 1916 and 1917 the 10th Division saw action at VERDUN, on the AISNE and CHEMIN DES DAMES.

(b) 1918.

After training in open warfare in February, it was used in the March offensive around La Fere. Its losses before being relieved amounted to, in some companies, 70%.

In the May offensive on the Chemin des Dames it pushed forward as far as the MARNE without suffering very heavily.

In the offensive of July 15th it failed in its attempt to cross the MARNE, being opposed by the 3rd U.S. Division.

Relieved from the line about July 18th it entered the line South of SOISSONS, and suffered losses in the allied counter-offensive.

Since August 3rd, when it was finally relieved the Division has been in rest. The losses during July for the Division as a whole are believed to be above 50%.

III. ORGANIZATION:

(a) Training:

(1) This Division has had training in open warfare in both January and February of this year.

(b) Strength:

(1) There is, as yet, no available information as to its present strength, the reinforcement it has received, or its armament.

(c) Racial Composition:

(1) Formed in Polish Silesia, this Division has a considerable percentage of Poles, particularly in the 47th Infantry Regiment. These men with their tendency to desert, have been a source of weakness which the injection of Prussians into the Division has been an attempt to improve.

IV. RATING:

(a) French:

This Division was formerly rated as in Class I - a good attack division. However, since its reverse at VERDUN in December 1916 and now, on account of its recent losses, a lower rating may perhaps be more correct.

NOTES ON INDICATION OF WITHDRAWAL.

1. Large fire in PANNES, burning two days, August 25th and August 26th - apparently no attempt made to put it out. At the same time other fires, and a considerable fire in back area.

2. August 27th. Considerable movement in back area of 10th Division, which had come into line only two days before -- relief had apparently been finished.

3. Three intercepted messages from Headquarters, 10th Division. These messages were three times as long as usual, indicating necessity for haste. They were apparently directed to three sector commanders directing these commanders to report to Division Headquarters for orders. They contained the words "moderate marches".

4. August 28th. Three American balloons shot down. At the same time the balloons at WOEL, HATTONCHATTEL and BENEY were moved three or four kilometers forward.

5. From August 25th to date considerably increased shelling on BERNECOURT, NOVIANT* and the woods of BRULE and BOUCHOT.

6. No indication whatever pointing toward German attack.

It is the opinion of G-2, as stated in an earlier paragraph, that the Division will meet with little resistance from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd enemy positions. The following instructions of Ludendorff to the German Army bears out this opinion in advocating withdrawal from advanced posts.

Instructions of Ludendorff to the German Army published July 6, 1918.

The gist of this General Order is as follows:

The Germans still find that the occupation of their foremost lines has been too dense on the defensive, and that the depth of the advanced zone has not been sufficiently great. This Advanced Zone should be at least 700 to 1200 meters in depth, and even more, where the artillery is weak or where the position is not well organized. The weaker the artillery and the poorer the defensive organizations, the deeper the Advanced Zone must be. It is unnecessary for the garrison of the Advanced Zone to be distributed greatly in depth; it will be used rather as patrols, sentries and small posts.

Distribution in depth, properly so called, of the combat garrison begins at the principal line of resistance.

The advanced Posts are supported by the fire from the principal line of resistance. Rifle fire, light and heavy machine guns, light bomb throwers and batteries in observation will be used for this supporting fire. Groups of storm troops may even be left in front of the principal line of resistance.

In case of an attack, methodically prepared by

* Correct spelling: NOVEANT.

S.G.W.

artillery, no efforts should be made to retain control of the Advanced Zone; it is better to evacuate it.

Whenever the manner in which the enemy attacks permits of a doubt as to whether the garrison in the Advanced Zone would do better to retire or to hold on, the decision will always be for withdrawal. This will always be better than to suffer losses in a useless defence of the Advanced Zone.

In carrying out the above order the following remark is made by the Staff of a German Division:

The elements of the companies which are stationed on the principal line of resistance constitutes the fixed garrison of security for the principal line of resistance, and ought not to be sent forward in counter attack even though the enemy penetrates the advanced zone.

Counter attacks made for the purpose of throwing the enemy out of the Advanced Zone will be executed by the garrisons of the Advanced Zone, and the supporting companies of the battalions in line as well as by the Storm Troops of the Battalions in reserve, and in support.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

It is recommended that the following information on "Enemy Ruses" be published as a Divisional Memorandum and distributed so that the message will reach every member of this command.

ENEMY RUSES.

During the retirement from the CHATEAU-THIERRY pocket the Germans again used many many of the ruses which they prepared during their retirement on the SOMME in 1917 in the Spring, and-on the AILETTE last October.

A farm west of BRAISNE* was mined and was blown up the day after the Germans had evacuated it. Cases were noted where grenades were exploded when the door was opened. At PASSY a mine was discovered in the cellar. This mine consisted on three boxes of cheddite. Wires led from this package of explosives to some rings, which, when pulled, would cause the explosion of the mine. Cases were noted where shelters had been filled with mustard gas.

In the region of THILLOIS, the mines placed in the dug-outs consisted of charges of about 25 kg. of perdite or donarite. All of them were exploded by fulminating primers plugged with small corks, some by complete primers (fulminating primer, a slow.30 fuse, a tension igniter provided with a lanyard). These charges were placed at the bottom of the stairs so as to demolish them or both the stairs and the passage simultaneously.

The greater part of the combat post dugouts had been demolished.

Similar charges were found in cellars; they were placed either at the foot of the stairway or in the middle of the cellar. Some misfires had not been connected up, showing the precipitation of the enemy's withdrawal. The cellars in THILLOIS had not suffered any damage.

Some man-traps have been found; they were made, as a rule out of a box of hand grenades, 1 of the grenades having a priming string attached to the lever. The string was connected by means of a small metal wire to a pick buried in the ground in the communicating trench some meters from the box.

In the region of MONT ST. PIERRE eight mine chambers in the dugouts have been dismantled and removed.

Characteristic devices used by the enemy during his retreat between ARTOIS and the AISNE included:

1. Within dugouts: Strings attached to branches, apparently used to camouflage the entrance, were attached to mines; Strings tied to books or other objects laid

* Correct spelling : BRAINE.

S.G.W.

on tables; Detonators placed in charcoal or rubbish heaps; Fuses connected with explosive charge fastened in stoves or fire places; Protuding nails, when stepped on, explode mines; Shovels, picks, etc., apparently stuck at random in a heap of earth, when removed, will explode a mine; Doors, stove lids, bureau drawers, when opened, or removed will set off a mine. The loose board of a step or stairway, when trod upon, sets off an explosion.

2. Along the roads: The slight depression caused by the passage of vehicles will explode the detonator in a mine gallery under the road where 150 or 200 mm. shells are located.

3. In barbed wire entanglements; The wire carefully dissimulated, or in the grass, will explode a mine.

4. Houses: Intact houses, remaining among others which have been destroyed, should be approached or entered with the utmost circumspection.

5. Stables: Mines are often found under bricks or tiles covered over with hay or manure. The hay, fodder, etc., should be removed with the utmost caution.

6. Poisoned food: Abandoned food should be carefully inspected and investigated.

In this connection attention is invited to means that have been used successfully to offset these devices.

First, no shelter should be occupied before it has been carefully examined by scouts detailed for the purpose and provided with the proper materials, (tools, explosives, electric lamps, etc.) The examination should begin with the telephone lines leading in from outside; they should be cut. On entering, any signs which would reveal recent work should be looked for; fresh masonry work; new camouflage, etc. No dugout should be entered without exploring the path step by step. Examination should be made with an electric lamp. Any suspicious construction should be taken down. All objects scattered around in an apparently careless manner (arms, tools, munitions) should be examined and none should be picked up unless it is sure that it is not connected with a wire, cord or telephone line. The furnishings of the house should be examined in the same way; beds, boxes, trunks, stoves, pipes, etc., should be carried outside. Framework of the doors and windows should be examined. The doors should be opened on a crack sufficient to allow them to be inspected from the outside before entering. Buried wire should be looked for by means of ditches cut in the ground. The walls should be examined by listening with a view to discovering any mechanism actuated by clockwork. If there are any wires stretched which appear likely to cause the explosion of a mine which it is impossible to reach directly, the building or dugout should be evacuated and the wire broken from outside by means of a cord about 50 yards long, at least, and during this operation the personnel should be sheltered behind a wall.

If necessary, any mine which can be identified should be destroyed by means of explosives. Even if the shelter or building presents no trace of trickery, careful examination should, nevertheless be made to make sure that no delayed-action mine is concealed. In general, signs should be put up at all suspicious points and at all points where mines which have been found which have not yet been destroyed. The entrances to suspected shelters should be barred.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 4, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. Confidential Summary of Information No.
154.

GERMAN TRAPS AND MINES.

From British Summary, August 29, 1918.

I. Abandoned Positions.

Attention is drawn to the practice of the enemy, when making an organized withdrawal, of leaving certain positions, dugouts, dumps, etc., mined, the firing arrangements being such that the charges are exploded after the positions has been occupied by our troops.

2. Likely Traps.

The following should be regarded with special suspicion until investigation has been carried out by experts:

Attractively furnished dugouts.

Dugouts under roads.

Single houses left standing when others have been destroyed.

All new work, or new trench or other equipment, in the midst of weather-worn ground or articles, e.g., recently disturbed soil, new metalling, new trench boards. Souvenirs, such as helmets, shells, badges, and bayonets, left in conspicuous positions. Articles sticking in the ground, such as stick grenades or shovels.

3. Methods of Firing.

German traps and mines may be classified under the following headings according to the nature of their firing arrangements.

(a) Delay action fuses.-- The action of these fuzes depends on the eating away of a wire by a corrosive solution. The "delay" may be any time up to one month. Two patterns are known:

i. Automatic detonating device.-- This device differs from any other German fuze and can be easily identified. It is employed with bulk charges and placed in the explosive.

ii. 1917 long delay action fuze.-- This is a counterfeit 1904 pattern German gun fuze and can only be identified by the fact that the gaine is painted red, but when screwed into a shell is indistinguishable from the ordinary fuze. For description see Summary of Information No. 142, August 21, 1918. It is primarily intended for destroying guns and ammunition. The 1904 fuze is principally used with the 10-cm., 13-cm., and 15-cm. gun shell and with the 15-cm. and 21-cm. howitzer shell. It is not used with any field artillery shell.

These fuzes are absolutely silent and require no connections outside the charge. New work or signs of the ground having been disturbed will probably be the only indications of their presence.

(b) Clockwork devices.-- These are of complicated manufacture and will probably be rarely met with. They may possibly be discovered by the ticking.

(c) Percussion devices.-- The percussion may be set in section by treading or pressing on a board hidden under earth or by pressing against a railing, etc., when a safety pin will be withdrawn releasing the spring of a spring lighter, or a striker may be driven into a detonator.

(d) Electrical devices.-- Electrical devices depend on a pull on a wire or pressure on some article completing a contact.

(e) Mines fired electrically from a distance.-- This method is chiefly applicable to bridges and billets used as headquarters where telephone wires can be utilized for the firing circuit. These mines can be fired at will by the enemy at any moment so long as the wires remain uncut.

As a rule, suspicious wires should be cut at once, but care must be taken not to cut taut wires (those may be found mixed up with slack telephone wires) as they may be simply supporting a weight, which if the wire is cut, will drop on and ignite a detonator. Wires, if cut, should not be pulled out, but the cut ends should be turned away from each other and carefully marked, both ends of each wire alike, so that experts when they arrive can investigate, trace and remove the charge.

4. Typical Examples of Traps.'

1. Dugouts.

a. A shovel stuck into the side of dugout between the timbers; when the shovel is removed, it pulls a wire which explodes a mine.

b. A French stove with stove-pipe dismantled; one wire attached to leg of stove and the other to stove-pipe near by. When the stove-pipe is picked up a mine is fired.

c. A charge of 2,000 pounds Perdite in a seemingly dead end of the gallery of a dugout and connected to ordinary telephone wires. Face of the gallery made up to look like undisturbed ground with pick marks on it.

d. A window weight suspended by fine cord stretched across the entrance of a dugout. On a man entering, the cord would be broken and the weight fall into a box of detonators connected to a charge of explosive.

e. Cap badges, artificial flowers, bits of evergreen, pieces of shell, and other articles likely to be picked up as "souvenirs", left in dugouts and attached to charges.

f. Hand rails on the steps of dugouts attached by wires to a charge.

g. One of the timbers on the side of a staircase of a dugout was noticed to be projecting slightly inwards at the top, though it was in place at the bottom. A nail had been driven through its lower end, the point of which was placed against the cap of the cartridge, which had a charge of explosive behind it. Thus, if driven home, the nail would have struck the cap and exploded the charge.

h. In dugouts constructed with casing, mortice, and tenon jointed, the position of the charge is sometimes indicated by the wedging of the timber where the sides have been cut and removed.

i. A dozen stick grenades to be fired by means of a wire attached to a sandbag, which has to be moved before the door of a dugout can be opened.

j. Charge in a chimney, with length of fuze attached, which would be ignited if a fire were lighted.

k. Detonators in lumps of coal.

l. Book on table, with wire down leg of table, Charge would fire if book were lifted.

m. A blown-in entrance to a dugout is not always a safety sign. Charges may be concealed in the unblown portions. They are generally crudely arranged contact charges.

n. A branch placed over the entrance of a dugout as if to conceal it; on moving the branch, an explosion was caused two minutes later, the dugout being completely destroyed.

o. A false step in the stairway of a dugout of thin planking making contact when trodden on.

2. Trenches.

a. Hand grenades liable to explode when kicked or trodden on.

b. Trench boards (new in every case) on fire-step, which detonated grenades when trodden on.

c. Barricades interlaced with wires attached to stick grenades.

d. Hand grenades buried in a trench, with telephone wire just showing attached to the grenade.

3. Roads.

a. A cavity hollowed out under the road, leaving only the crust. A 8-9 inch shell placed in the cavity with a contact fuze arranged to fire at the slightest pressure.

b. An automatic box-mine, designed apparently to explode under a weight greater than that of man has been found on a road. The box was a few inches below the surface of the road.

4. Stables.

Grenade placed in a hole in the floor of a stable and covered with a brick, the whole being concealed under straw. Any pressure on the brick causes the grenade to explode.

Distribution to include companies and batteries.

G-1

G-2

G-3

C.G.

C.S.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Capt., Inf., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 5, 1918.

It is learned that on August 21, 1918 the Germans had 70 divisions in reserve - that is, divisions that were held in reserve positions in rear of the line. The following recapitulation shows how they are distributed from the standpoint of "period of rest"

RECAPITULATION.

In Rear of Line there are 70 divisions

First Quality	17	"
Second "	25	"
Third "	26	
Fourth "	2	
Total	<u>70</u>	

36 Divisions have had 1 week or less of rest.

9	"	"	"	1-2	"	"	"	"	"
5	"	"	"	2-3	"	"	"	"	"
13	"	"	"	3-4	"	"	"	"	"
4	"	"	"	4-5	"	"	"	"	"
2	"	"	"	5-6	"	"	"	"	"
1	"	"	"	6-7	"	"	"	"	"

The following translations of German documents show the order of the combat liaison groups and detachments - also German regulation of traffic:

COMBAT LIAISON DETACHMENTS

Translation of German Documents: From French Xth Army Bulletin August 30, 1918.

The Germans at the present time attach very great importance to the maintenance of combat liaison between their various units. Companies and groups are especially assigned to this duty (Nahtgruppe, Nahtkompagnie). Their importance is further indicated by the special call letters assigned to them in the cipher books (for example, 53d Reserve Division). The two following orders from the commanders of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 160th Infantry Regiment, 15th Infantry Division, indicate the mission of these detachments.

A

2d Battalion, 160th Regiment.

B.T.K. July 10, 1918.

The B.T.K. (Bereitschafts-Truppen-Kommando: first line battalion) will detach to the right a combat liaison group with a light machine gun and to the left an entire company for combat liaison.

I. COMBAT LIAISON GROUP OF THE RIGHT (Nahtgruppe).

"B" Company of the front-line troops (K.T.K.: Kampf-Truppen Kommando) will detach one group with a light machine gun as a combat liaison group.

If a barrage is requested, the liaison group will proceed, under the orders of the company commander, behind the right wing of the 1st line battalion and will take up the position designated, 200 to 250 meters in the rear of the right wing of the main line of resistance.

Case I.- The enemy has penetrated at a point on the front of the regiment. The left wing of the liaison group will fall back, execute flanking fire upon the enemy, and prevent him from penetrating farther.

Case II.- The enemy has penetrated at the boundary line. The liaison group will prevent him from advancing farther along the boundary line.

Case III. The enemy has penetrated at a point on the front of the regiment on the right. The right wing of the liaison group will fall back and execute flanking fire upon the enemy.

III. COMBAT LIAISON COMPANY OF THE LEFT (Nahtkompagnie)

If a barrage is called for the liaison company, without awaiting order, will proceed to the left wing of the first-line battalion and occupy trench II of the main line of resistance.

Case I.- The enemy has penetrated into the advanced trench at the boundary line. The company will prevent him from advancing along the boundary line.

Case II.- The enemy has broken through at a point on the front of the regiment. Part of the company will occupy the trench marked II on the accompanying sketch, execute flanking fire upon the enemy, and prevent him from rolling back the line toward the left.

Case III.- The enemy has broken through on the front of the regiment on the left. Part of the company will occupy trench III and prevent the line being driven back toward the right.

NOTE.- The company commander concerned will place himself in liaison with the neighboring regiment.

B.

3d BATTALION, 160th REGIMENT. K.T.K., August 1, 1918.

ORDER OF THE COMBAT LIAISON GROUP ON THE LEFT.

The combat liaison group on the left is furnished by "C" Company (Combat liaison company on the left). It consists of one group with a light machine gun, which is set up in the grotto in Grive Ravine. At night the group will establish a sentry post with flares on the height above the grotto. If the violence of the enemy's artillery fire, and especially gas and smoke shell, leads to a fear of a raid, or attack, the group will immediately and without awaiting orders take up a position in the intrenchments on the edge of the grotto and occupy it to the right and left of the junction with the trench "des Francais". Any gap which may arise in the main line of resistance between us and the unit on the left will be immediately and in every case filled up.

Maintain liaison!

ROAD SPACES OF COLUMNS AND TRAINS.

Translation of a German Document : From French Vth Army
Bulletin, August 29, 1918.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
March 31, 1918.

Recently the progress of marching troops and convoys on the move has been frequently marked by stops and serious delays. These experiences have led many of the staffs to considerably increase the factor of safety in their marching orders and to establish march rates less than that which can be effectively maintained.

This practice uselessly reduces the period of rest and imposes excessive fatigue upon the troops and convoys. Furthermore, it only aggravates the evil, for the fact that the roads are occupied for a longer period increases the chances of blockades and stops. It will be better to give the troops and convoys orders of such a nature that they will find themselves upon free roads and will be able to proceed according to their time schedule. For this purpose it is necessary to carefully arrange the marching orders and to take measures to clear the roads of stationary units.

Well arranged marching orders imply a knowledge of the road spaces. The regulations on this subject in the "manual for Staff Officers" are out of date. There follows below a table giving the road spaces of the principal units. This table is based upon the present effective strength of the most nearly complete divisions. It will, however, in no way absolve those whose duty it is to give march orders from the obligation of computing the road spaces in each particular case and framing orders accordingly.

(Signed) LUDENDORFF.

ROAD SPACES.

UNITS	Road Space of Combat Train Meters	Road Space of Field Train Meters
<u>I. INFANTRY.</u>		
Battalion with machine-gun company.....	520	130
Regiment with machine-gun and trench- mortar companies and Headquarters Staff	1700	450
Elite machine-gun detachment.....	450	90
<u>II. CAVALRY</u>		
Squadron.....	100	50
<u>III. ARTILLERY.</u>		
Field Battery.....	220	60
Group of field artillery.	700	200
Light Ammunition column.....	350	50
Battery of heavy field howitzers.....	300	70
Mortar battery.....	350	70
Battery train.....	250	40

UNITS	Road Space of Combat Train Meters	Road Space of Field Train Meters
<u>IV. TRENCH MORTARS</u>		
Trench mortar company.....	350	70
<u>V. PIONEERS.</u>		
Battalion (headquarters;4 companies, automobile echelon and horsed trans- port).....	1700	200
Pioneer company.....	150	30
Divisional Bridge train(horsed).....	300	50
Corps bridge train.....	750	70
<u>VI. SANITARY UNITS.</u>		
Sanitary Company.....	250	
Field hospital.....	200	
Veterinary hospital (Pferdelazarett).400		
<u>VII. CONVOYS AND TRAINS</u>		
Ammunition column.....	600	
Supply train and auxiliary supply train.....	600	
Field bakery	500	

NOTE:- The signal troops, the automobile, aviation and aeronautical formations, do not figure in this table, because in general they do not march in the columns made up of units from all arms of the service.

SIGNED: THOS. R. GOWENLOCK
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Capt.Inf.,U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

September 6, 1918.

9th DIVISION.
Maj. Gen. Weber, Comdg.

I. COMPOSITION:

- a. Infantry.
 - 7th Grenadier Regiment.
 - 19th Infantry "
 - 154th Infantry "
- b. Artillery.
 - 5th Field Artillery Regiment.
 - 6 4-gun batteries
 - 3 4-Howitzer batteries.

II. HISTORY:

- a. Former Fighting Experience:

Since 1914 this Division has seen considerable heavy fighting in various offensives.
- b. 1918:

After two months of training in open warfare the 9th Division was used in the March 21st attack on the British front around Montdidier. Before being permanently withdrawn from the line on April 1st or 2nd, the whole division had suffered very heavily.

The 9th Division was again used in the Aisne offensive of May 27th, and later to help stop the allied counter-offensive south of Soissons beginning July 18. It is believed that this Division has received, as replacements, the dissolved 455th Regiment, 235th Division. The Division has already had 29 days of rest.

III. ORGANIZATION:

- a. Training:

The 9th Division has had two months of training in open warfare in January and February 1918.
- b. Strength: There is no information as to its strength since reconstitution. With the dissolved 455th Regiment as replacements, its strength is probably not far from normal.
- c. Racial Composition:

The units were originally from the Vth District in Silesia.

IV. RATING:

First Class - one of the 45 best German Divisions.

Commanding General 1st Div.

The 9th is in reserve, back of 10th Prussian Division.

(SGD.): Thos B Gowenlock
Capt. Inf U.S.A
G - 2

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
September 8, 1918.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

Extract from First Army, A. E. F., Summary of Intelligence, dated September 6, 1918.

ENEMY FRONT LINES:

In the region of QUART de RESERVE the enemy appears to have advanced his outpost line. West of REMENAUVILLE, he is reported to have increased the density of his outposts.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

Situation of enemy reserves:

The 9th Division which was reported by statement of a prisoner as in the CHAMBLEY area August 10th, is now reported by statement of prisoner as near BRUYERES in the LAON area, August 24th. Accordingly is not now considered to be reserved opposite our army.

Enemy intentions:

At the present time the enemy's intentions are to await eventualities in the defensive lines so long occupied by him in the ST. MIHIEL salient.

In the region of the Bois d'APREMONT, near the tip of the ST. MIHIEL salient, German telephone conversations have greatly increased since September 2nd with a corresponding decrease of ground telegraph communication.

Experienced observers in this region report that advanced trench mortar posts have been reoccupied which have not been used for a long time; that on September 4th no work on telephone lines was noticed and a telephone conversation was overheard in which the voices were noticed as having a strange accent.

The enemy's telephone personnel were unfamiliar with the sector and the location of the posts.

ENEMY INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Our wire northeast of MORVILLE was out. A small enemy raid on our observation post in the region of SEICHEPREY was easily repulsed.

ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Considerable harassing fire on that part of our sector extending from the MOSELLE to MARVOISIN. Some of this fire was from 150's. Gas shell was used particularly on BEAUMONT and to the east.

Feeble activity on the remainder of the front.

ENEMY MOVEMENTS:

Visibility - fairly good from 16 to 20 h. very poor for the rest of the day.

Activity on the railroads - normal.

Narrow gauge lines - normal.

Roads - Circulation of horse drawn vehicles still slightly more active than usual in both directions on the VIEVILLE-VANDIERES-PAGNY roads. Active circulation in both direction on the DONCOURT-ST. HILIARE* and DOMMARTIN-DAMPVITOUX roads. This activity appears to be a continuation of the movements reported yesterday.

ENEMY WORKS:

Photos of September 4, 1918, in the region south of THIAUCOURT, show a new munitions dump extending over a kilometer along the VIEVILLE-JAULNY road and another beside the road at the southwest corner of the Bois d'HEICHE (64.7-40.1); also two new red cross signs are seen west of the Bois GERARD (665-40.8), not far from the 17 centimeter naval gun lately reported active.

DISPOSITIONS OF GERMAN ARTILLERY
FOR THE ATTACKS NORTH OF THE AISNE, AUGUST 17-20, 1918.

From French 10th Army Bullatin, August 27, 1918.

The enemy, who had been expecting an attack since the first days in August, had adopted a disposition which clearly marks an evolution in his conception of the employment of artillery on the defensive since the operations of July 18.

This disposition is characterized:

1. By a very deep distribution;
2. By reinforcement of the anti-tank defenses;
3. By the formation of a mobile artillery reserve in all the echelons, as a rule directly under the orders of the small infantry units assigned to the counter-attack.

1. Disposition in Depth.

Extract from the plan of defense of the 206th Infantry Division dated August 13, 1918:

"The distribution in depth of the artillery will be reorganized along the following principles:

"(a) The battery position will as a rule be in the rear of the line of artillery protection (this line, formerly the reserve position, is at an average of 4 kilometers from the front line)

"(b) In advance of the line of artillery protection there will be as a rule only a few pieces for anti-tank defense, close combat or flanking fire, either on our own front or the front of neighboring units.

"(c) Immediately behind the line of artillery protection will be the long range combat batteries, which are placed as far in advance as possible in order to utilize their range to maximum

"(d) Behind the long range combat batteries is the main force of the close range combat batteries, at such

a distance that its barrages will still be effective in front of the advance zone.

(e) Further back along the rear edge of the effective zone of the main force of the enemy's batteries are the barrier batteries (Rueckhaltbatterien), and especially the batteries without teams functioning as surveillance batteries; they must be able to act effectively as far as the front limit of the battle zone, and being well camouflaged, will remain silent so as to retain their powers of intervention.

(f) A group of field artillery will be designated as the mobile reserve of the Army Corps. Positions will be prepared with a view to engaging it. Under normal conditions, artillery units, in addition, are designated as mobile divisional reserve."

(g) Besides the reserves thus taken from the divisions, the Army Corps and the Army have artillery units at their disposal.

In the Woyna Corps (5th Reserve Division and 223d Division) each division had a battery as mobile reserve; the Corps had four groups of field artillery (223d Field Artillery Regiment, 3d Battalion of the 78th Field Artillery Regiment, the IXth Army and two battalions of heavy artillery, 149th Regiment and 3d Battery G. Reserve Regiment).

In the Hofman Corps the disposition was as follows (an extract from an order of the 53d Reserve Division, August 8).

"For the deployment of a second line of artillery, the Army Corps holds in readiness a field artillery regiment and two battalions of heavy artillery. The positions will be established by the divisional artillery so as to serve either for an attack on the plateau north of Vingre or the plateau north of Fontenoy."

2. Anti-tank Defence.

Anti tank defence, which was originally assured by 3 or 4 fixed guns per division, was considerably reinforced beginning August 10.

Extract from an order of the 5th Reserve Division, August 11:

"Anti-tank defence in the divisional sector will be assured by:

"1. one battery assigned to execute direct fire from advanced positions.

"2. One surveillance battery (Tanklauerbatterie) occupying positions in the line of artillery protection.

"3. The horsed reserve of the division (two batteries), positions for which will have to be reconnoitered.

"4. The surveillance batteries (5 batteries including 2 heavy.

"5. All other batteries if necessary."

The use of a mobile artillery is in force from this date.

Extract from an order of the 14th Infantry Division, August 10:

"A battery of the 14th Infantry Division in Army Corps reserve will be assembled in the hollow 2 kilometers north of Juvigny and will be assigned mainly to reinforce the anti-tank defence in the sector of the division."

3. Allotment of Batteries to Reserve Infantry Units.

Extract from an order of the 53d Reserve Division, August 10:

"The field battery in Army Corps reserve will constantly be ready for action near its position northwest of Bagneux (hitched). Its principal duty is to accompany the reserve battalion of the Army Corps (resting battalion of the 243d Regiment)."

Extract from an order of the 5th Reserve Division, August 13:

"The 10th Battery of the 17th Regiment will be withdrawn from position and remain at the wagon lines as the horsed divisional reserve. It will execute an exercise in occupation of a position every week."

The capture of the line of artillery protection on July 17 and 18 obliged the German Command to modify its dispositions, but it endeavored to preserve these mixed intervention detachments.

Extract from an order of the 53d Reserve Division, August 19:

"The Rosenberg Regiment of the Jaeger Division will take over the mission of the resting battalion of the 242d Regiment with one battalion of the 242d Regiment with one battalion and one-half battery and retain two battalions in the ravine northwest of Bagneux. The resting battalion of the 241st Regiment, less its half-battery, is placed at the disposal of its regiment. The half-battery is attached to the resting battalion of the 242d Regiment at Valpiez Farm.

* * * * *

MOTORCYCLE MACHINE GUNNERS (Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 158 - From French Xth Army Bulletin. Aug. 3)

A deserter from the 6th Bavarian Motorcycle detachment (Bayrisch Kraftrad Abteilung 6: VIIth Army) who left Lille on July 26, 1918, has given the following information concerning motorcycle machine gunners:

The Bavarian Machine gun Detachment was equipped early in May 1918, with 50 Lewis machine guns. All the men were then put through a machine gun course, and 30 of them were selected from among the most robust and the most expert shots.

The detachment consists of five squads of ten men each, each squad being under a non-commissioned officer, squad leader.

Equipment - Leather breeches, field-gray tunic with leather jacket, boots or leggings, aviator's helmet.

Armament.- Machine guns carried on the men's back by means of two slings; six magazines, each containing 100 cartridges, loaded on the baggage rack, and carried by the motorcyclist (when dismounted by means of an arrangement at each end of which three magazines are carried suspended from the shoulders. No bayonet: a revolver is authorized.

Combat Train.- Motorcyclists with side-car carrying an anti-aircraft machine gun and a fast motor truck (Schellaeufer^{td}) of two tons capacity for the transportation of four mechanics, ammunition and spare parts.

Marching Order.- On the roads the motorcycle machine gunners proceed in single file at 4 meters distance; the squad leader at the head of his squad.

Tactical Use.- The motorcycle machine gunners are used as flying infantry. In trench warfare, their mission is to intervene rapidly at threatened points. In open warfare, their principal duty is to cover the flanks of engaged units.

According to the deserter, the 6th Bavarian Motorcycle Detachment completed its training in August, 1918. Up to the present time only the VIth Army has formed such a detachment. But all the motorcyclists of the Bavarian Motorcycle Detachment of the four armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group have taken the course for machine gunners.

The precise details given by this deserter indicate that this is a new organization. Attention is directed to this point. Prisoners should be questioned on this subject, in order to find out to what extent such an organization is becoming general in the German Army and whether the armies are forming their own motorcycle machine-gun detachments.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 159
Sept. 7, 1918.

BARRAGE FIRE AND ANNIHILATING FIRE.

Translation of a German Document: From French VIIth Army.
Bulletin, August 30, 1918.

IIId Army.

Ia/ Artillery, No. 173/May 2, 611/18

May 7, 1918.

1. Barrage fire must be retained as a necessary evil.

2. It may be requested.

a. At night, in a thick fog, and on ground defiladed from view.

b. When the two opposing lines are near together and when our positions are not protected by accessory defences; in other words, when it is not sufficiently certain that the infantry could repel a hostile surprise attack.

c. When the communications become uncertain or are cut off.

3. It is not to be asked for when you know the extent of the attack sufficiently early; in this case annihilating fire is more effective. The latter is possible in general:

a. When our positions, protected by sufficiently strong accessory defences, have in front of them sufficiently deep covering zone, lending itself to effective observation, and when there are absolutely certain communications with the artillery.

b. When the enemy gives indication of an attack by artillery preparation of some duration.

4. Request for barrage fire by light signals in the front line must not be made excepting by officers or men whose calmness has been well proved. All precautions must have been taken so that the transmission of light

signals will be assured, and that they operate only towards the rear and not laterally. The infantry, even in threatened sectors, must accustom itself to a moderate use of these signals. It must realize that a barrage fire requested hurriedly and without necessity provokes hostile retaliation fire on our front lines.

The artillery must execute barrage fire at a rapid rate for only three minutes. During the two following minutes the fire gradually diminishes in intensity and ceases unless it is again called for by repeated light signals. The artillery should make every effort to transform the automatic barrage fire into a methodical annihilating fire.

5. Like barrage fire, the annihilating fire must be prepared, if necessary, in the form of concentration fire against all dangerous points in each sector.

For these two kinds of fire the ranges must have been determined beforehand by observation (ground observation, airplane, balloon, range-finding section). In these firings allowance will be made, as far as possible for atmospheric conditions. By the term "dangerous points", these areas are meant which the enemy habitually chooses or might choose as departure points for his raids, executed by night or in cloudy weather, or those places which might be of use to him as direction landmarks for his advance, such as roads, depressions, slopes, etc.

For the General Commanding the Army:

THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

Signed Von TSCHISCHNITZ, Colonel.

Correct Spelling:

* St. Hilaire

*1 Schnell laeufer

S.G.W.

Translation by G-2 1st Division of Captured German Document showing Plan of Defense.

10th Infantry Division
Operations Order 1713.

Division Headquarters,
September 9, 1918.

To : 4th Company.

Sector Material to be turned over in case of relief.

PLAN OF DEFENSE.

1. The main thing is that each commander of a company or leader of a platoon or squad be thoroughly familiar with his mission. Here and there in regard to a few detachments of our troops the dugouts in which the men live are not situated in a favorable position in reference to the battle positions of the troops but this must in no way cause misunderstanding. (This is the case in regard to the 398th Regiment and to the right flank company of sub-sector G-2.

Alert Positions.

2. The alert order can be issued by the battalion, regiment, brigade or Division. Greatest vigilance, both in the forward trenches and in regard to the artillery and rest battalions. Every officer and man must put on his battle equipment, have his gun at hand, machine gun free from its case; everything ready for rapid battle preparation. See to ammunition supply; check up on communications, particularly with the artillery. Load immediately all important papers and documents and secret orders on wagons and keep them ready constantly to leave for Charey. (In case of alert occurring suddenly this should immediately come to the mind of all commanders). No especial alert will be ordered in case of fog. It is evident that, in case of fog, orders can be given to increase the vigilance or in case the situation is tense the order to be given to be on the alert. At all events in case of fog everyone should be waked up.

3. The alert should be given as soon as it is ascertained that the enemy is approaching or as soon as alarm blasts are heard from the horns. The alarm will be given with all available sound instruments: gongs, bells, sirens, whistles, fog horns, calls. (In case of alarm the bugler blows the "Ganze" (Stand by) and repeats it twice.

In case of fog this is also the accoustic signal for artillery). The difference between combat alert and gas alert.

4. There is no barrage along the entire front but only counter preparation A and B. Counter preparation fire A is put down in front of the outpost line. Counter preparation B always in front of the main line of resistance. Be careful about calling B, for this may endanger the line of the occupants of the outpost zone. Both of these counter preparations are only put down on certain probable points of attack. The commanders of the front line battalions have sketches showing them.

5. Garrison of the outpost zone. This garrison consists of advanced outposts and squad posts and they should never consist of more than 1/3 of the garrison of the main line of resistance. These posts should wait until they see the enemy and then alarm the garrison of the M.L.R. through musketry and then retire promptly. They must be absolutely certain as to the path back to their company (where counter preparation B may be laid, not to run into the fire of the zone machine guns, where the main line of resistance is occupied by the advanced companies.) During the night no one sleeps. Change the situation of the outposts repeatedly so that the enemy will not be able to locate them or smother them. Repuls or capture enemy patrols.

6. Main line of resistance runs along the following line. (southern foot of Mt. Sec - Mt. Sec town - Hill 240, 2 (see 1/25000 map).- close north of Richecourt - close north of Lahayville - southern fringe of Sonnard Wood.

It must be held at all costs and must be in our hands at the end of the fight: There is no such thing as a retirement without order and no man must leave his post. The C.P.O. is uncertain. Consequently infantry must repulse the enemy with their own means. In case of alert everyone rushes out of the dugouts to man the firing step. Every man must have a place assigned him along the trench, machine guns must be in position, squads should be held together so that they can fight both forward, to the flanks and to the rear. If necessary man the rear side of the trench for protection against detachments of the enemy who might have penetrated. Place masks at alert position. In case of danger from gas give the order "put on the masks". The main target for M.G.s and riflemen is the enemy's riflemen, and not the tanks. The latter should only be engaged when within less than 400 meters and then with machine guns and armor piercing bullets. Tanks are not dangerous. They can not aim.

7. Artillery protection line. This line, from the right flank of the 398th Regt. to and including the town of Mt. Sec, is identical with the main line of resistance; then it runs along the southern fringe of the wood (through the Canonen Waldchen*), through the Quart En Reserve, then to the Maizerais Hill to the Heckenlager. It is being built at present.

As a garrison for the artillery protection line there are assigned one company to the right and one company to the left of the Kannonenwaldchen (on the edge of the wood which is in the left part of G-1 sector, one company on the hill of Maizerais (from G-2 left), one company at the southern edge of the Quart en Reserve (from G-2 right) and one company on the hill southwest of the Heckenlager astride the road. In case of alert the positions will be occupied at once. Every squad always occupies the same place and must be able to proceed there at night and in the fog without possible mistake.

8. Support companies (one from G-2 right, one from G-2 left, one from G-3 right, and two from G-3 left) will assemble upon the alert being given, immediately at

the K.T.K. The latter will decide, according to the situation, whether the support companies must stop the enemy by their fire (which will usually be the case on account of the large extension of front) or whether (for instance in the case of G-3 left) there is occasion for a counter attack.

9. Rest Battalion:

In regard to alert see paragraph 6. In case of alert the rest battalions will assemble. As the camps will, in all probability, be subjected to artillery fire, the rest battalions will assemble as follows: the 398th to be the Pionierlager, the 47th in the region northwest of Maizerais and 6th Grenadiers southeast of Essey. This may be altered slightly, according to where the enemy is firing.

10. Staffs will take up their battle positions. Division staffs will be on Hill 255 southwest of Bouillonville.

11. Artillery. In case of an alert the gun crews will have small arms at hand. Machine guns must be in position. Limbers must be hitched up. Horses for the sector batteries must be ready at the order lines. The field artillery batteries which are at rest (excepting the army reserve battery, which goes into position 3081) will immediately proceed to the rest battalions of the infantry regiments (one battery to infantry regiment 398 and 1/2 battery each to Infantry regiments 47 and Grenadiers 6). In case of alert the batteries in position, if there is fog or if there is some doubt as to the meaning of rockets, will deliver one "wave" of C.P.O.A. If the signal comes from the front for general C.P.O., another wave will be fired.

12. Small reserves, in case of alert, report to the commander of the town or camp. These commanders must also watch for stragglers from units which have suffered heavily and they increase the reserves. They must watch for the approach of the enemy. They must be entirely clear as to which positions they must occupy (this should be checked by regiments and by brigade)

Distribution: Division

(G-1, G-2, G-3) 3. 20th Inf. Brigade - 1. Grenadier Regiment 6 - 20. Infantry regiment 47 - 20. Infantry regiment 398 - 20. Artillery commander - 22. Division Engineer - 1. Division Signals - 1. Balloon Company 214 - 1. Aviation detachment 206 - 1.

Extracts to commanders of towns and camps.

Signed. Baron Von Gruter.
Commanding Division.

OFFICIAL.

Oelsner, 1st Lt.

(SGD.): Thos R Gowenlock
Capt. Inf. U.S.A.
G - 2 1st Div.

* Correct Spelling: Kannonenwaldchen
S. G. W.

G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 11, 1918.

Memorandum No. 84.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

During the operations Intelligence Officers of each organization will maintain the closest possible liaison with the next higher unit.

It is particularly important that the following information be transmitted to G-2, 1st Division with the least possible delay (locations to be given by coordinates)

ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY

Infantry.

1. Points, if any, of unusual resistance.
2. Massing or new formation of troops.
3. Location of anti-tank guns.
5. Flanking movements.

Artillery.

1. Origin of heavy fire.
2. Point of contact of heavy fire.
 - a. Calibre.
3. Gas - location and kind.

Aeronautics. - Enemy

Balloons:

1. Location by coordinates.

Aeroplanes.

1. Region flown over.
2. Activity - kind.

Movements - Enemy

1. Troops.
2. Wagon and truck trains.
3. Artillery.
4. Trains and Decauville.

Work - Enemy

1. Any new work on wire, trenches, or emplacements.

Estimate of Enemy's Intentions.

1. Based upon important activity and movements.

Location of Front Lines. (Both our own and the enemy's)

During the advance the Intelligence personnel is charged particularly with the mission of obtaining information concerning our own and the enemy's front line. No effort will be spared in the fulfillment of this mission. Forty blank coordinate sheets, with squares, have been furnished to each battalion for the purpose of indicating its front line whenever an important change is made. These sketches will be sent, through regimental Intelligence Officers, to G-2, Division Headquarters at frequent intervals so that these headquarters may be constantly informed as to the exact location of the front lines.

In the event sketches are delayed Regimental Intelligence Officers will exert every effort to learn the location of our and the enemy's front lines and transmit this information at once to G-2 by telephone.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Capt., Inf., U.S.A.
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution:
To include Platoon
Commanders.

G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.
September 12, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

At 1h our barrage came down as per schedule. Visibility at this hour was poor but some results of the destructive fire were observed. At 1h37 an enemy ammunition dump east of St. Baussant was destroyed.

Accompanying the barrage signs of enemy nervousness were apparent. At 1h53 searchlights from the rear of Hill 380 were active.

At 2h numerous enemy rockets of many stars were sent up west of Richecourt. This use of rockets was continuous till after daylight. At 2h57 a fire of considerable size was started in the rear of Heudicourt.

At approximately 3h30 the enemy counter-battery work reached its greatest intensity. The guns firing most heavily were located in the region of Hattonchatel. At no time was the enemy counter-battery work heavy. At 4h the enemy artillery fire was decreased materially.

Several ammunition dumps were destroyed between 4h and 5h; two of these in the vicinity of Heudicourt and one near Hattonchatel.

At 5h our infantry started moving forward as per schedule. The initial forward movement was met with heavy machine gun fire of the enemy. At 5h30, reports from the observers, later confirmed by reports from organization commanders, showed the infantry moving forward with little resistance from the enemy. At 5h45 visibility became good and the line was observed through the southern limits of Richecourt. The western limit of the line being one-half kilometer north of Marvoisin. At 5h55 and again at 6h our line was observed well in advance of Richecourt.

During the initial advance the tanks were little in evidence owing to difficulty in crossing the river. Their movements were concealed partly by our heavy smoke barrage. At 6h32 the tanks were observed at a point just southwest of Richecourt, moving in a northeasterly direction. At 6h30 ten tanks were seen southwest of Marvoisin moving in a northeasterly direction.

At 7h09 our troops were observed in St. Baussant and at 7h55 they were reported advancing on the southern edge of the Quart de Reserve. After this time our troops met with little resistance from the enemy, advancing swiftly into the southern edge of the Bois Joli and Quart de Reserve. Tanks were observed moving forward with the infantry.

The 3rd objective was attained at approximately 10h.

Prisoners taken up to 12h confirmed the enemy order of battle, the greater number coming from the 47th Regiment. The total number of prisoners at 12h was approximately 600, 5 of whom were identified as officers. Prisoners state that the time of the attack was a surprise to the enemy. It has been rumored among them for some time that the Americans were massing for an attack in this area. The Division seems to have credited this rumor but the Army Group did not.

Prisoners state that few tank traps have been constructed but many have been planned. Prisoners report a great deal of material in the Village of Pannes.

The German Battalion Scout Officer who captured two American prisoners (89th Division) last night has been captured. Through these prisoners the Germans knew of our attack at 1h40, September 12th.

(SGD.) THOS.R. GOWENLOCK
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK
Captain, Infantry
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 12, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS.

At 14h30 7 German Officers and 630 men had passed through the Division cage. The following identifications have been made:

1. 12 companies of the 47th Regt.
2. 1 company (7th) 6th Grenadier Regt.
3. 1 battery (6th) 4th Bn. Field Artillery.
4. 1 company (3rd) 3h Pioneer Bn.
5. The 47th M. W.
6. 1st M. G. Company
7. 3rd M. G. Company
8. 13th Sanitary detachment.

One prisoner reports that on return from leave he saw at Mars la Tour on September 7, men of the 174th Infantry. No other prisoner has confirmed this statement.

The division at the time of the attack had all three regiments in line in the following order: - west to east: 398th Regt., the 47th and the 6th Grenadiers. The 47th had 2 battalions in line in the following order: west to east: 1st Battalion, 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd Battalion in support. The support battalion was altered at 1h, September 12, took up its combat position along the Tr. de Moulin.

For some time the enemy has expected that an attack would be made in this sector by American Troops, but that later there had been so much nonchalant strolling about by American soldiers in this sector that some officers decided that there were no offensive intentions on our part. On the evening of the 11th the 47th captured two Americans who stated that there was to be an attack on a large scale on the morning of the 12th. Consequently the Division Staff sent out a warning which reached the first line companies by 24h30 and alerted the rest battalion.

The Regimental P.C. is located just south of Pannes at approximately point 8687.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution:
4th Corps.
C.G.
C.S.
G-3
G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 13.

G-2

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 12 noon Sept. 12 to 12 noon Sept. 13.

At 13h40 big fires seen burning in Nonsard Woods, Vigneulles, and the woods north of Hattonville. Our troops have advanced to 5995 - 6597 and are still advancing.

At 14h our troops advancing in the direction of Bois de Lamarphe* reached a point half way from the road to the woods when they retired again to the road, though not because of enemy resistance.

14h08. Our troops entering Bois de Nonsard. Very little resistance.

14h50. Fire at 0997. Troops have disappeared in the Bois de Nonsard and Bois de Thiaucourt. Fire in Bois de Nonsard.

15h30. Prisoners from Landsturm Battalion 13-8 with 2 machine gun companies. It is learned that this battalion consists normally of 4 infantry companies plus 2 machine gun companies. The 4 infantry companies used as "Armierangbattalion"*1 The 2 machine gun companies used for A.A. work and artillery protection. The 2 machine gun companies arrived two days ago coming from the Verdun area; it is believed by rail at night to Tourny les Grands. Sent to reinforce 10th Division.

20h. Austrian prisoners with insignia K.K. 65, 10th Field Company 3rd Battalion.

21h30. Prisoners from 129th Field Artillery (motor traction) battery, 150 mm. guns. Had been in sector only 2 days, coming from Cambrai.

22h40 prisoner from 3rd Squadrilla Kringe-Jag-zu-Phered*2 was observer on Hill 380. At 22h30 his detachment left on wheels for Nonsard telling him to meet them there. He started but met Americans.

1h55. Fire near Nonsard. 2 fires near Heudicourt.

2h25. Reconnoitered foot of Mt. Sec to part of Bois de Cote. Hill strongly held by M.G. nests. Trenches filled with barbed wire.

2h38. Large fires in Hattonchatel.

8h08. Troops leave Nonsard on road to Vigneulles.

10h25. First Infantry Brigade reports patrols advancing. Hard to get contact with the enemy. Much materiel captured, including one battery of 6 inch Howitzers.

28th Infantry now occupying village of Vigneulles. 16th Infantry patrols going through Hattonville towards the village of Vieville.

The following identifications have been made to date.

According to code sheet found in the territory of the 10th Division, the division at that time included the following units: 47th Inf. 398th Inf., 6th Grenadiers, 56th Field Art. (3 Bns) 2 Bns. of 11th Foot Art., 13th Sanitary Co., 146th Wireless detachment, 10th telephone detachment, 543 KK ?, 10th M.W. Co., 2nd and 3rd Cos. Pioneer Bn. 5, 3rd Squadron 1st Royal Chasseur Cav. Regt.

(SGD.)

Correct spelling:

* BOIS de LAMARCHE

*1 ARMIERUNGSBATTALION

*2 KRINGE-JAEGER-ZU-PFERDE.

S. G. W.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK;

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,

Capt., Inf., U.S.A.

A.C. of S. G*2.

G-2 1st Division, American E.F. September 15, 1918.

Extract from Corps Summary No. 12 of August 21, 1918
(German)

Paragraph 11. GENERAL IMPRESSION.

Signs of a large enemy attack do not exist at the present time. Following points indicate that the enemy has no offensive intentions but rather defensive intentions:

1. The placing in line of the exhausted 1st and 2nd American Divisions west and east of the Moselle.
2. Considerable depth distribution of the enemy artillery, which displayed but slight activity at the time of our series of raids on the 19th of August.
3. Remarkable nonchalance of the enemy's reconnaissance parties.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 15, 1918.

INTERROGATION OF A GERMAN SERGEANT MAJOR EMPLOYED AT THE
AUTOMOBILE PARK OF CONFLANS.

Before the attack the headquarters of Army Detachment C (General Lieutenant Fuchs) was located at the Chateau de Moncel, near Conflans.

The 12th Saxon General Kommando Headquarters were at St. Benoit en Woivre. The 192nd Division Headquarters was on the Wilhelmscohe (about a kilometer northeast of Heudicourt).

Extremely large ammunition dumps are reported at the following two points:

(a) In the mine shafts one kilometer east-south-east of Jarny, not far from the Jarny-Doncourt Road.

(b) About 1/2 kilometer west of Batilly in a wood. (Both of these towns are about 15 kilometers south of Briey.)

About 12 days ago the Germans decided to withdraw from the St. Mihiel salient and proceeded to remove their artillery. Because of a lack of horses this took considerable time and was not quite finished when the American attack was launched. It had been decided that the Michel eins Stellung would be occupied after the withdrawal and the consensus of opinion amongst the Germans was that the line would prove impregnable (concrete work etc.) On the evening of our attack, which occurred sooner than was expected, the the order was issued at 7 p.m., instructing the companies in line within the St. Mihiel salient to retire immediately to the Michel eins Stellung, leaving only one officer and six men from each company as a rear guard. This rear guard was ordered to hold at all costs until the next morning.

Prisoner states that on that evening there was considerable confusion in Heudicourt. He was sent down in charge of a convoy to carry away officers' baggage, provisions etc. from the headquarters of the 192nd Division. The roads were already under fire. He accomplished his mission and, upon reaching the region of Vigneulles, decided to stop for a short rest as he thought he was out of reach of the enemy. Suddenly one of his men called out that the Americans were coming. He would not believe it, thinking that the Americans which he saw were only prisoners of the Germans. Upon approaching, however, the Americans called upon him to surrender, which he promptly did, with the rest of his drivers.

Prisoner states that allied bombs have caused much damage at Conflans, and that 25 people were killed in a trolley car one day at Cologne.

Prisoner reports that the 31st Division left for the region of the Avre after being relieved in the St. Mihiel salient. (needs confirmation.)

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 18, 1918.

G-2

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information, No. 164, Sept. 12, 1918.

METHOD OF DESTROYING TRENCHES FOR THE PASSAGE OF ACCOMPANYING ARTILLERY.

Translation of a German Document: From French Xth Army Bulletin, September 8, 1918.

1st Army
IA/Pioneers, No. 57046/4842/10.
Supplementary to 1st Army Memo.
Ia/Id/Pioneers. No. 56020/4266/18. March 29, 1918.

Experiments carried out by the 239th Battalion of Pioneers (XVIIIth Army), as well as by the 1st Pioneer Recruit Depot, for facilitating the crossing of trenches by blowing up their walls have given very good results.

Execution.- Every two meters concentrated charges (geballe Ladungen) each weighing 8 kg., are buried to a depth of about 50 cm. on each side of the trench at a distance of 75 cm. from the edge of the trench. The charges are well tamped, then set off simultaneously. The explosion produces a depression which, when smoothed over with picks and shovels, gives a practicable passage. Covered with branches, fascines, or boards, it is practicable even for heavy guns.

Personnel required. - For each crossing: One pioneer and one chief of artillery section, whose duty it is to reconnoiter and determine a suitable place; four detachments, each consisting of one non-commissioned pioneer officer, four pioneers, and four artillerymen (to economize pioneers). Each man carries an explosive charge weighing 8 kg., a pick or a shovel; each pioneer, in addition, a saw; the non-commissioned officer, a hatchet.

Each gun and each caisson will carry two explosive charges and a small number of fascines. All attacking troops will be informed that at the moment of the assault we are going to blow up the trenches, so that they will not believe that the artillery is firing upon these points.

CHIEF OF STAFF,

For the Army Commander:

(Signed) VON KLUBER,
Lieutenant Colonel.

In transmitting, on March 11, 1918, the results of experiments conducted by the 238th Battalion of Pioneers, the Army Group of the German Crown Prince added:

"The method suggested is a valuable addition to the methods at present recommended, especially when the trenches are in hard and stony ground.

"However, for the passage of trenches defended by wire entanglements, drainage trenches, water holes, shell craters, it will continue to be necessary to provide trail bridges or pontoon materiel."

For the Army Group: Chief of Staff,
(Signed) Count Von SCHULENBURG.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 19, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information No. 169.

USE OF ANTI-FLASH PACKETS BY THE GERMAN ARTILLERY.
From French Xth Army Bulletin September 10, 1918.

We learn from documents captured on the army front and from prisoners that anti flash packets (Kartuschvorlage) are commonly used by all German artillery, except the 77 gun.

These packets are made of chlorate of potash (Duneberg-Salz) in the form of round flat additional charges. They are introduced into the shell case on top of the powder just before firing (the lid of the shell case which has been removed being immediately replaced.)

They are packed in tin boxes. The prescribed allowance is one-third of the number of rounds authorized from March to November and half the number of rounds from December to February.

The following regulations are issued for their use: "The anti-flash packets increase the dispersion. They must therefore be used only when tactical, local, or atmospheric circumstances require it. Damp packets must never be used. Damp packets can be used after thorough drying and pulverization of their contents.

"Anti-flash packets have the greatest effect on small charges."

The decrease in initial velocity and range caused by the use of these packets is shown in tables. The 10-cm. gun shows a loss in initial velocity of 4 meters with the heavy charge and of 8 meters with the light charge. The corresponding losses in range are 45 meters and 155 meters at 8000 meters. These figures are correct for a used bore and must be reduced by half in the case of a new bore. The prisoners say that the use of these packets does not cause noticeably more smoke than ordinary charges.

It would seem that the use of these packets is one of the causes of the increasing difficulties encountered by our observation service in obtaining intersections of batteries, even when these do not attempt to secure very deep defilade.

PRECAUTIONS RELATIVE TO YPERITE.

From French 1st Army Bulletin, September 9, 1918.

Troops should be instructed to leave yellow-cross shell No. 1 and smoke shell exposed to the rays of the sun as little as possible. It is not yet known whether heat produces a decomposition or expansion of the gas liquid, but prudence should be observed (Order of XVIIIth Army June 24th).

In spite of regulations to the contrary, gas-shell dumps are often too large and improperly located, as, for example, on the edge of roads. After the explosion of yellow cross

shell, caused by hostile bombardment or fire, it must be expected that the immediate surroundings (roads, battery emplacements, and munition dumps) will be impracticable for a considerable period, eight days or more. Yellow cross shells must be dumped, when possible, in places free from vegetation. If this is not done, the slashes of liquid gas will be scattered over trees, thickets, wheat and grass and will make it very difficult to clear the ground and do other work.. Attention is also called to the necessity of establishing dumps of chloride of lime as soon as practicable (Order of the XVIIIth Army, May 29, 1918.)

REGULATIONS FOR BATTERY EMPLACEMENTS SHELLED BY YPERITE.
XVIIIITH ARMY

Ia General of Artillery.

Gas Officer No. 3662

General Headquarters, July 15,
1918.

1. Under the condition that the emplacements must be occupied or can be abandoned for a short period only:

Gun emplacements are particularly dangerous when shelled with yellow-cross gas, and the persistence of this danger is increased by the fact that the construction and the camouflage of emplacements are unfavorable for ventilation. In addition, it is hard to see the slashes on bushes, camouflage, and the guns. Keep the mask on and remove the camouflage with long poles (gun sponges, or better, poles already prepared and kept under cover; sprinkle with chloride of lime if there is danger from slashes). The chief of section must examine his piece for slashes. Pieces which have been in contact with Yperite will be cleaned in the following manner: sprinkle with chloride of lime; rub with a wet object, a broom or similar implement; wash freely with water. Restore the camouflage (after leaving the piece exposed to the sun and air as long as possible) with branches taken from an unshelled area. Shell holes in the neighborhood of the position will be disinfected, whenever they can be reached, with a layer of chloride of lime (among bushes, in fields of wheat, etc., this can not be done), then concealed from airplane observation by a layer of earth. Instead of the ammunition which was near at hand, ammunition which was well covered and protected from slashes, will be used as far as possible.

2. When an alternative position is to be occupied.

Clean the piece as in the first case. When withdrawing the guns from the shelled position, avoid passing through bushes, wheat, and high grass, and anything on which slashes may have fallen, even at a distance from the position. Always keep on the mask, even if the withdrawal takes considerable time. The eyes of horses cannot be protected; horses, therefore, cannot be used until the shelled area has been cleared.

Everything which is not indispensable is left in the shelled position. Ammunition for the alternative position will, as far as possible, be brought up from the rear.

3. The position must not be again occupied until the Divisional Gas Officer has declared it safe for use. Disinfection is only possible where the ground bears no vegetation and where the gas shells have not fallen thickly.

• Chloride of lime must always be on hand, in well-closed receptacles and protected from dampness (about 10 kg. for each piece, in small dumps of about 2 kg. each), if for no other reason than that we must reckon with our own yellow-cross shells and our own gas bombardments.

THE WINTER TIME-SCHEDULE IN THE GERMAN ARMY.

The summer "daylight saving" plan ceased in the German Army the night of September 15 at 3 a.m. according to the Munchener Neueste Nachrichten of September 11, German time, therefore, now corresponds with French time, and will continue to do so until the re-establishment of the winter time-schedule in France. A special summer time-schedule was adopted in Germany in 1916 and has been continued every summer since then, as this measure justified itself in the saving of raw materials used for illuminating purposes. The summer time schedule began this year April 15, at 2 a.m. In 1917 the Germans changed to the winter schedule on September 17 and the French on October 6.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 21, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM.

The following memorandum from G.H.Q. is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

* * * * *

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.
SECOND SECTION, G. S., G-2 (b)

September 14, 1918.

B-2(b) MEMORANDUM NO. 5:

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2:

Information received from the Inspector General of Prisoners of War (French) indicate that the Germans are planning to start uprisings in the depots of Prisoners of War; and some of the prisoners have allowed themselves to be captured in order to carry the above plan into execution.

It is further reported that in the southern part of France the Germans are seeking to recruit agents who are to be charged with the mission of setting fire to grain depots and hay stacks.

The above is brought to the attention of all concerned to the end that proper precautionary measures be taken in connection with above report.

(4032 D.A.)

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
A. C. of S., G-2,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.

Distribution to include
Companies and Batteries.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 20, 1918.

G-2

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.

The following translation gives a good idea of the very complete instructions issued to German M.G. N.C.O.'s. Interest lies in the fact that the N.C.O.s are given considerable latitude as to the location of their guns in case of artillery preparation and that the "machine gun nest" itself is only to be used in extreme cases.

MACHINE GUN POST "LAURA".
Instructions for sentries.

1. Each sentry must be thoroughly familiar with the land lying in front of him and must know the names of towns, lakes and strong points in his vicinity.

2. What sentry posts are to my right? - left? What sentry posts are there in front of me?

Answer:

To my right is M.G. strong point "Claus" (light M.G.)

To my left is M.G. strong point "Willde" (light M.G.) and light M.G. post "Schlenke."

In front of me, between Loupmont and Gerechamp is light M.G. Hedwig.

At the salient formed by the nearest corner of the Gerescham wood are points of support of the company on my left.

3. Where is the enemy?

Answer:

The enemy holds the nearest edge of the Besenbusch and also the little three-cornered wood.

4. How do I give the alert?

(a) combat alert:- With a shrill whistle, by calling and by firing shots. When necessary, a runner is sent from both sentry posts by the shortest route to the dugout.

(b) Gas alert: With all sound producing instruments and with the bell.

5. What shall I do in case of "stand to"?

Answer.

(a) Attack with artillery preparation

In this case the M.G. must be brought from their dugouts, and an attempt made to reach the obverse slope of the mountain.

The chief gunner must judge the situation and establish his gun where he can best cover the enemy and do him most harm. He is not held to any particular position with his gun.

If absolutely impossible to go forward from the dugout, on account of strong artillery fire, then, and then only, he can resist at the dugout itself and must defend it in the most stubborn fashion.

(b) Surprise Attack. After having alarmed the occupants of the dugout I must hold the sentry post until they arrive. If this is not possible and if the attack threatens to overrun us then I may move laterally and defend myself with every possible means in a nest of resistance. If the nest of resistance is also subjected to artillery fire, I move either laterally or forward, according to the situation.

7. How does the line of resistance run towards the left?

Answer:

Through the Siebold trench to the Loupmont, to Mont Sec Road.

8. (a). Where are the right and left boundaries of my field of fire?

(b) What strip of land of the first lines must I cover with fire?

(c) What range must I use?

Answer:

(a) and (b) (see sketch).

(c) Range 400.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
September 25, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 32.

INSTRUCTIONS TO INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

Whenever this division is in position warfare, and daily intelligence reports are to be submitted to G-2, Division Headquarters, the following method should be employed in reporting the activity of the enemy airplanes and balloons:

1. A. AIRPLANES.

Pursuit Patrols:- Time, Size, Height, location, if possible by towns, with respect to the front line.

Reconnaissance:- Time, height, part of sector over which reconnaissance was made. If a deep reconnaissance the general direction, expressed in towns of the rear area should also be given.

Adjustment:- Time, location, degree of success as shown by ground observers reports at the time.

Bombing:- Time, size of formation, height; course taken while over Division Sector, General direction expressed in towns of the rear areas. Size of bombs dropped. The course taken by day bombing squadrons is important.

B. BALLOONS.

Location, time in ascension, total hours of enemy balloon observation opposite the corps sector.

C. VISIBILITY.

The visibility should be reported as "Very Good", "Good", "Fair", "Poor" or "Impossible".

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 25, 1918.

Extract from G.H.Q. S.S. 734.

GERMAN TRAPS AND MINES.
(Supercedes Ia/31737, "German Ruses.")

1. ABANDONED POSITIONS.

Attention is drawn to the practice of the enemy, when making an organized withdrawal, of leaving certain positions, dug-outs, dumps, etc., mined, the firing arrangements being such that the charges are exploded after the position has been occupied by our own troops (Sec. SS 163 "Hints on Reconnaissance for Mines, etc.").

2. LIKELY TRAPS.

The following should be regarded with special suspicion until investigation has been carried out by experts:-

- Attractively furnished dug-outs.
- Dug-outs under roads.
- Single houses left standing when others have been destroyed,
- All new work, or new trench or other equipment, in the midst of weather-worn ground or articles, e-g., recently disturbed soil, new metalling, new trench boards
- Souvenirs, such as helmets, shells, badges and bayonets, left in conspicuous positions.
- Articles sticking in the ground such as stick grenades or shovels.

3. METHODS OF FIRING.

German traps and mines may be classified under the following headings according to the nature of their firing arrangements.

(a) DELAY ACTION FUZES.- The action of these fuzes depends on the eating away of a wire by a corrosive solution. The "delay" may be any time up to one month. Two patterns are known:-

(i) AUTOMATIC DETONATING DEVICE.- This device differs from any other German fuze and can be easily identified. It is employed with bulk charges and placed in the explosive. For description see S.S. 733, "German Automatic Detonating Device."

(ii) 1917 LONG DELAY ACTION FUZE.- This is a counterfeit 1904 pattern German gun fuze and can only be identified by the fact that the gaine is painted red, but when screwed into a shell is indistinguishable from the ordinary fuze. For description see S.S. 732, "1917 German Long Delay Action Fuze for Demolition Purposes." It is primarily intended for destroying guns and ammunition. The 1904 fuze is principally used with 10 cm., 13 cm., and 15 cm. gun shell and with 15 cm. and 21 cm. howitzer shell. -It is not used with any field artillery shell (see S.S. 306, "Notes on German Fuzes", page 6.

These fuzes are absolutely silent and require no connections outside the charge. New work or signs of the ground having been disturbed will probably be the only

indications of their presence.

(b) CLOCKWORK DEVICES.- These are of complicated manufacture and will probably be rarely met with. They may possibly be discovered by the ticking.

(c) PERCUSSION DEVICES.- The percussion device may be set in action by treading or pressing on a board hidden under earth or by pressing against a railing, etc., when a safety pin will be withdrawn, releasing the spring of a spring lighter, or a striker may be driven into a detonator.

(d) ELECTRICAL DEVICES.- Electrical devices depend on a pull on a wire or pressure on some article completing a contact.

(e) MINES FIRED ELECTRICALLY FROM A DISTANCE.- This method is chiefly applicable to bridges and billets used as H.Q.s where telephone wires can be utilized for the firing circuit. These mines can be fired at will by the enemy at any moment so long as the wires remain uncut.

As a rule, suspicious wires should be cut at once, but care must be taken not to cut taut wires (these may be found mixed up with slack telephone wires) as they may be simply supporting a weight, which, if the wire is severed, will drop on and ignite a detonator. Wires, if cut, should not be pulled out, but the cut ends should be turned away from each other and carefully marked, both ends of each wire alike, so that experts when they arrive can investigate, trace and remove the charge.

r. TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF TRAPS.

1. DUGOUTS.

(a) A shovel stuck into the side of a dugout between the timbers; when the shovel is removed, it pulls a wire which explodes a mine.

(b) A French stove with stove-pipe dismantled; one wire attached to leg of stove and the other to stove-pipe near by. When the stove-pipe is picked up, a mine is fired.

(c) A charge of 2,000 lbs. Perditite in a seemingly dead end of the gallery of a dugout and connected to ordinary telephone wires. Face of the gallery made up to look like undisturbed ground with pick marks on it.

(d) A window weight suspended by a fine cord stretched across the entrance of a dugout. On a man entering, the cord would be broken and the weight fall into a box of detonators connected to a charge of explosive.

(e) Cap badges, artificial flowers, bits of evergreen, pieces of shell and other articles likely to be picked up as souvenirs, left in dugouts and attached to charges.

(f) Hand rails on the steps of dugouts attached by wires to a charge.

(g) One of the timbers on the side of the staircase of a dugout was noticed to be projecting slightly inwards at the top, though it was in place at the bottom. A nail had been driven through its lower end, the point of which was placed against the cap of the cartridge, which had a charge of explosive behind it. Thus, if driven home, the nail would have struck the cap and exploded the charge.

(h) In dugouts constructed with casing, mortice and tenon jointed, the position of the charge is sometimes indicated by the wedging of the timber where the sides have been cut and removed.

(i) A dozen stick grenades to be fired by means of a wire attached to a sandbag, which has to be moved before the door of a dugout can be opened.

(j) Charge in a chimney, with length of fuze attached, which would be ignited if a fire were lighted.

(k) Detonators in lumps of coal.

(l) Book on table, with wire down leg of table. Charge would fire if book were lifted.

(m) A blown-in entrance to a dugout is not always a safety sign. Charges may be concealed in the unblown portions. They are generally crudely arranged contact charges.

(n) A branch placed over the entrance of a dugout as if to conceal it; on moving the branch an explosion was caused two minutes later, the dugout being completely destroyed.

(o) A false step in the stairway of a dugout of thin planking making contact when trodden on.

2. TRENCHES.

(a) Handgrenades liable to explode when kicked or trodden on.

(b) Trench boards (new in every case) on fire-step, which detonated grenades when trodden on.

(c) Barricades interlaced with wires attached to stick grenades

(d) Hand grenades buried in a trench, with telephone wire just showing attached to the grenade.

3. ROADS.

(a) A cavity hollowed out under the road, leaving only the crust. An 8-in. shell placed in the cavity with a contact fuze arranged to fire at the slightest pressure.

(b) An automatic box-mine, designed apparently to explode under a weight greater than that of a man, has been found on a road. The box was a few inches below the surface of the road.

4. STABLES.

Grenade placed in a hole in the floor of a stable and covered with a brick, the whole being concealed under

- 4 -

straw. Any pressure on the brick causes the grenade to explode

GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
24th August, 1918.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
A. C. of S., G-2. 1st Div.
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.

Distribution.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 26, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM:

Subject: Enemy information.

1. We submit herewith certain data regarding enemy positions and organization located opposite our sector to the north.

2. Most of this information applies to those enemy sectors and organizations located on the west bank of the Meuse.

3. Supplementary to this summary will follow complete data concerning the enemy located east of the Meuse River. At the same time the supplementary data is furnished there will be made complete distribution of enemy information maps covering all sectors both east and west of the Meuse River.

	(SIGNED)	THOS. R. GOWENLOCK;
Distribution:		THOS. R. GOWENLOCK;
Commanding General,		Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
G-3		A.C. of S., G-2.
C.G.1st Inf.Brig.		
C.G.2nd Inf.Brig.		
C.G.1st Art.Brig.		
G-2		

DEFENSIVE ZONES IN THE REAR OF THE ENEMY'S FRONT.

There exists in the rear of the enemy's front a system of lines of defense differing in date of construction and purpose. In accordance with their new regulations, the Germans have used these lines to form combat zones. The German regulations provide for three zones of combat:

A. The zone of ordinary combat, considered as an outpost zone (Vorfeldzone).

B. The battle zone, in which all hostile attacks are to be stopped (Grosskampfzone).

C. Rearward combat zone (Ruckwaertigo Kampfzone)

The designation of the various lines has been furnished by enemy documents: those names permit those lines to be followed out without confusing them with the switch lines.

I. ZONES OF COMBAT.

1. Left Bank of the Meuse.

A document of the 80th Reserve Division, dated January 1, 1918, at the time when it was occupying a sector in the AIRE VALLEY, gives us the various combat zones.

According to this document, the southern limit of the battle zone is the ZWEITE STELLUNG, a northern prolongation of the HAGEN STELLUNG. In the ARGONNE this line curves in so as to include HILL 263.

The northern boundary is the VOLKERSTELLUNG.

The outpost zone coincides with the battle zone in ARGONNE and becomes deeper toward the east. The AIRE sector is a connecting zone between the very narrow defensive systems in ARGONNE and those of the group west of the MEUSE, which are distributed in great depth.

The document insists upon the necessity of holding HILL 263 at any cost. Mention is also made of the role of Vauquois. This spur, although in the outpost zone, is not to be abandoned; it is considered as a closed work, and the garrison has been equipped to hold it even though it should be completely isolated.

2. From the Meuse to the Southern Edge of Spincourt Forest.

The location of the combat zones in this region is more difficult. There are, however, certain facts from which it is possible to determine the near boundary of the battle zone.

1. The line which runs from HAUMONT to BEAUMONT, formerly known as the HAUMONT RIEGEL (switch line), has been rechristened and is now known as the BRABANTER STELLUNG, and now constitutes a real line of defense. This line probably forms a part of the battle zone. By covering the BOIS des CAURES, it facilitates counter-attacks from the region of FLABAS and BOIS de VILLE. It is also intended to limit an advance by us along the MEUSE by restricting its frontage.

2. The WAVRILLE.- A German document of April 5, 1917, insists upon the necessity of maintaining the WAVRILLE at any cost. This observation point, highly valued by the enemy, would render his rear areas untenable if it fell into our possession. According to the document, a very clayey ground makes it impossible to construct a continuous position, and the enemy, in order to assure the defence, has had to have recourse to a series of closed works, the plan for which is in our possession.

3. CAURRIERES CREST. - For a year the enemy has attached a capital importance to the possession of this crest. The sacrifices made and the works undertaken indicate that this crest is a part of the battle zone. To abandon it would permit us immediately to bring our lines to the foot of the JUMELLES d'ORNES, a position of the highest importance to the enemy.

From these facts it may be deduced that the southern limit of the 1 zone is, from west to east, as follows; BRABANT, the HA GENSTELLUNG, the BRABANTERSTELLUNG, the organizations at BEAUMONT UPSTELLUNG NO. 1.

The northern limit is the VOLKERSTELLUNG, in the region of COURT, and of VILLODEVANT-CHAUMONT*, connecting with the withdrawal position passing through CROPION*1, MOLLEVILLE Farm, and the southern part of the BOIS de CHAUME. The outpost zone only exists in entirety in the region north of SAMOGNEUX, where it reaches some depth (2 kilometers); it coincides with the battle zone from west of BEAUMONT to east of CAURRIERES CREST. (See note below)

3. Switch Lines.

In addition to these lines, a number of switch lines, or "bolts" (Riegel), have been constructed so as to partition the zones of combat and limit our advances. The most important are:

(a) The GREMILLYRIEGEL, limiting an attack by us toward the east, running from the MEUSE to the CAURRIERES, and securing the JUMELLES d'ORNES to the enemy.

(b) The two RIEGEL of the HERMEVILLE WOODS - one on the northern edge of the woods, limiting on the south an attack along the front CHATILLON to BEZONVEAUX*2, the other the MICHELANSCHLUSSRIEGEL, limiting on the north an attack along the front LES EPARGES to CHATILLON. The junction of these two RIEGEL (Switch lines) is in the BOIS de FRESNE*3. The wooded region of HERMEVILLE thus appears as an angle with the vertex toward us, a strongly organized angle, constituting an important position for the enemy.

II. GENERAL WITHDRAWAL LINE:

Farther to the rear is the general withdrawal line. This line is defended by GRANDPRE, DAMVILLERS, ROMAGNE, SENON, PAREID, DAMPVITOUX, REMBERCOURT. It consists of a series of elements which differ from one another in the data of commencement of construction and in the amount of work expended upon them.

(a) The section from GRANDPRE to the MEUSE was begun in October and November, 1917; the work has not been pushed to any extent. Only a very few bomb-proof shelters exist along this line.

(b) The section from the right bank of the MEUSE to SPINACOURT*4 FOREST was begun in April, 1917; the work has been carried on with considerable activity, especially between HARAUMONT and REVILLE, where numerous concrete dugouts, distributed in depth, have been constructed. This part of the line, in the present state of its development, could offer a serious resistance.

(c) The SENON-AMEL section, as far as near ROUVRES, was begun in April, 1917. Very little work has been done; there are a few concrete dugouts.

(d) The junction of the preceding line with the withdrawal line of the ST. MIHIEL salient consists, according to German documents, of isolated works encircling the villages of AUCCOURT*5, LANLIERES, BECHAMPS. In this section photographs do not show any trenches, but some dugouts under construction around the villages.

The entire line from the ARGONNE to SPINCOURT FOREST is called the KRIEMHILDESTELLUNG and is a continuation of the general withdrawal line in the region of ST. QUENTIN and in CHAMPAGNE, whose various sections have been christened SIEGFRED, HUNDING, BRUNEHILD, and correspond, as does the KRIEMHILDE, to the names of characters in the "NIEBELUNGEN".

✓ NOTE: Omissions: in these paragraphs were missing on the original. -

S. G. W.

* Correct spelling: VILLE-devant-CHAUMONT.
*1 " " : CREPION.
*2 " " : BEZONVAUX.
*3 " " : BOIS de FRESNES.
*4 " " : SPINCOURT.
*5 " " : AUCOURT.

S.G.W.

ENEMY'S ARTILLERY WHICH WOULD PROBABLY REVEAL ITS
PRESENCE IN CASE OF ACTION, on the Front of
the French IInd Army.

The Artillery Organization Map shows batteries which were soon to be in action between August 1 and September 10, 1918, to which have also been added the long range heavy batteries which were not reported during the month of August but which were reported during the preceding three months.

This map shows what is known of the short range combat artillery and of the long range combat artillery.

The front has been divided into sections conforming to those held by the enemy's divisions. The number of batteries reported corresponds in the main in each sector with the artillery allotted to divisions.

The heavy artillery batteries can be divided into several groups:

- (a) The west of the ARGONNE GROUP which fires on the Valley of the BIESME and the HAUTS-BATIS.
- (b) The east of the ARGONNE GROUP firing on the Valley of the AIRE, FORIMONT and the western part of the Forest of HESSE.

These two groups are not very important.

- (c) The group in the woods of MONTFAUCON, CHEHEMIN, CHEPPY and MALINCOURT, which is a very important group firing on the valley of the AIRE, the northeastern part of the ARGONNE, the forest of HESSE and the vicinity of HILL 304 - ESNES - MONZEVILLE.*

This group whose batteries were, before August 1st, about equally distributed north and south of the Ravine of LAI-FUON has been changed during the month of August by the withdrawal north of LAI-FUON of the majority of batteries which were in position in the CHEPPY and MALINCOURT WOODS.*1 There are some 15 cm. high power guns in the CHEHEMIN WOODS.

- (d) The CUISY-GERCOURT GROUP which has a greater proportion of 15 cm. high power guns than the former and which fires on the eastern part of the Forest de HESSE, the region HILL, 304, ESNES MONTZEVILLE, LE MORT HOMME, LES BOIS BOURHUS*1, and the COTE DU TALON.

(e) The group on the right bank of the MEUSE as far as the HAUMONT WOODS is less important than the two preceding ones, or at least has that appearance because all of the batteries in this group do not reveal their presence. A document found on a prisoner reveals the existence of some artillery which hardly ever fires. This group fires on Hill 344, COTE DU POTVRE and sometimes on the region of BOIS BOURRUS.

- (f) The FLABAS-AZANNES GROUP which is very important and can fire on COTES DE MARRE and COTE DE POIVRE.

NOTE: It must not be forgotten that the enemy is always in a position strongly to reinforce his artillery there by using all or a part of the emplacements which have not been active since 1916.

(Shown on the 1/20,000 Plans Directeur map) or by putting batteries at points other than the position known.

DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH. It can be stated that there are no batteries in the outpost zone except a few pieces which will execute flanking fire. During the month of August, the enemy has progressively withdrawn further to the rear all of the pieces which were in this zone.

Correct spelling:*1 LES BOIS BOURRUS.
Correct spelling: ** MALANCOURT

B. R. L.

-2-

Attention is called to the possibilities for flanking fire by the groups of heavy artillery whose fields of fire are very great.

This flanking fire would be felt especially in the Forest of HESSE, HILL 304, HILL 310, and the BOIS BOURRUS.

* Correct spelling: MONTZEVILLE.
*1 " " : LES BOIS BOURRUS.

S.G.W.

STATEMENT OF FRENCH PRISONER WHO ESCAPED FROM GERMAN PRISON CAMP, AT MONTMEDY and CROSSED INTO OUR LINES SOUTH OF FORGES ON THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 22-23, 1918.

Private Joseph Richard, 2nd Company, 147th French Infantry was taken prisoner at BEAUCOURT 5th January 1918, during a German raid. He has been in a German Prison camp at MONTMEDY since that time. He escaped from MONTMEDY at noon, September 21, 1918.

He was working in the woods near MONTMEDY, cutting trees for the artillery, went to the toilet and made his escape into the woods. He came down the right bank of the MEUSE to DUN-sur-MEUSE, was arrested there, but again made his escape and crossed the MEUSE on a bridge at that point and came down the left bank of the MEUSE, walking on the railway.

At the point where the road from CONSENVOYE meets the railway, he entered the border of the BOIS DE FORGES and rested all day Sunday. The railway is in use for the transportation of munitions as far as the CONSENVOYE road but further south the rails and road bed are in bad repair and partially destroyed. Eastward he could see that the bridge across the MEUSE at CONSENVOYE was in use, but repaired with timber.

There are munition dumps along the northern side of the road near the river and north of the BOIS de FORGES. Dugouts and large camouflaged munition dumps are located near the northeastern corner of the BOIS de FORGES approximately at 21.0 - 79.0. A 77 mm. gun which was laid to fire in a south-westerly direction was seen at approximately 21.0 - 78.0. Machine gun fire was heard west of the latter point but he was unable to locate the guns although he presumed them to be in position on the high ground in the forest.

On the morning of the 22nd, four 77's were heard firing in the vicinity of CONSENVOYE. The prisoner judged that they were located just northeast of the village from approximately 21.9 - 78.5 to 22.1 - 79.3. At point 21.3 - 78.2 there are kitchens and a dressing station established in old wooden barracks. In the reverse slope of PIMPANE ravine there are dugouts occupied by artillery.

The fugitive continued southward on Sunday night, walking again along the railway. He encountered little or no German wire between the BOIS de FORGES and FORGES BROOK. What little he saw was in very bad condition. He described it as being practically destroyed. The BOIS de FORGES is said to be quite open with comparatively little under growth. Here and there within its borders there are evidence of new work on dugouts and shelters. The FORGES BROOK was crossed between FORGES and the railway track east of FORGES on a small partially destroyed wooden bridge; the banks were dry and approximately 1 meter high. The width of the stream is from 4 to 5 meters, and its depth approximately 1 - $\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 meters. After crossing the FORGES BROOK, the prisoner continued southward over the COTE de l'OIE where he saw evidence of old French trenches and dugouts but no movement. He reached the railway at approximately 23.0 - 74.3 unchallenged, but was picked up by an American outpost several hundred meters further west.

During the entire journey Richard saw no extensive movement of troops and encountered but few individuals. He states that the German morale is not good and that both German and Austrian soldiers at MONTMEDY constantly spoke of their intentions to surrender at the very first opportunity, should they be sent to the front. Little or nothing was seen of French civilians along his route as he travelled only at night and concealed himself during the day time. While at the prison camp at MONTMEDY other prisoners who had been at work discharging freight at the railway station told him that they had seen a dozen or more large tanks made of wood pass through on flat cars. He supposed that they were dummies intended for camouflage.

COMPOSITION:

NOTES ON 1ST GUARD DIVISION.

1st GUARD DIVISION * (Field-Post No.979)
(Col. PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH)

1st Guard Infantry Brigade.
(Maj.Gen.v.d.OSTEN)

1st FOOT GUARDS REGT. 2nd FOOT GUARDS REGT. 4th FOOT GUARDS
REGT.

Divisional cavalry:

Body, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Squadrons, Body Guard Hussary
Schutzen Regiment **, and 2nd Squadron, 6th Dragoon Regiment.

1st Guard Artillery Command:
1st Guard Field Artillery Regiment.

Pioneer Battalion:	Medical and Veterinary:
1st and 2nd Field Coys, 1st	1st Bearer Coy.
Guard Pioneer Bn.	Field Hospital.
1st Guard Minenwerfer Coy.	Vet. Hospital.
Signals.- 1st Guard Telephone Det.	Train - M.T.Col.

VALUE AT END OF 1917:

The 1st Guard Division may be considered to be one of the best German units. It has always shown exemplary courage under fire. On the AISNE as well as on the SOMME it displayed energetic and resolute defensive qualities. Although the Division has suffered heavy losses, few prisoners have been included. For example, during August 19-20, 1917, and in the unfortunate defense of CIERY on September 3, the losses of the Division totalled 3,000, but only 300 men were made prisoner; again, as a result of the attacks of May 5 in the AILLES-HURTEBISE sector the losses totalled 2,500 to 3,000, but only 141 prisoners out of the entire Division were taken. On the AISNE in April and May 1917 the Division again displayed its noteworthy military qualities.

In June 1917 the normal high value of the unit was momentarily reduced owing to the arrival of new elements which had never been under fire. Prisoners captured at this time appeared less aggressive than formerly.

* Reinforced with elements of the 1st Reserve Ersatz Infantry Regiment, (221) Div.) which was disbanded June 15, 1918.

** Possibly detached to 1st Cavalry Division.

NOTES ON THE 117TH DIVISION.

VALUE:

Although the 117th Division is rated as second class, it nevertheless is considered as among the best of the new Divisions created since the beginning of the war. It was recruited for the most part in the mountainous mining districts of Upper SILESIA. The elements of the Division have on occasion been used as mountain troops, notably in the CARPATHIANS and in ITALY.

The division was opposed to the British during their advance on the SOMME the latter part of August and is said to have lost more than 2,000 prisoners at that time. The 11th Reserve Infantry Regiment, one of the three regiments composing the Division, was recently disbanded owing to its reduced strength through heavy losses. A prisoner of the 157th Infantry Regiment captured 22.9.18 is stated that the 11th has been replaced by the 11th Grenadier Infantry Regiment (302 Div.) which has recently come from the MACEDONIAN front. The same prisoner states that the 22nd Reserve Infantry Regiment had been withdrawn from the 117th Division in August on account of its losses on the SOMME during the British offensive, and has not rejoined the Division.

RECENT MOVEMENTS:

From August 1916, until March 1918, the 117th Division was successively in the CARPATHIANS, ROUMANIA and ITALY.

March 21, the Division took part in the German offensive on the SOMME. In the latter half of August it was again identified on the SOMME during the British offensive at which time the Division was severely handled and suffered severe losses. It was withdrawn from line and later identified resting at SEDAN in reserve to the Vth Army (a prisoner of the 157th Infantry Regiment captured 22.9.18 stated that the Division actually rested at SENUC near GRANDPRE, and has never been at SEDAN).

COMPOSITION:

117th DIVISION. (Field-Post No. 859).
Lt. Gen. v. Drabich-Waschter.)

233rd Infantry Brigade.
(Maj. Gen. v. Weise)

157th Infantry Regt. * (11th Res. Infantry Regt.) ** 22nd Res. Inf.
(4th Schles) () Regt.
VI Corps District) ((VI Corps District)) (VI Corps
District)

*** 11th Grenadier Inf. Regt.

Divisional Cavalry:- 1st Squadron, 8th Cuirassier Regt.

? Artillery Command:- 233rd Field Artillery Regt.

117th Pioneer Battalion:- 233rd and 263rd Pioneer Companies
233rd Searchlight Section.
117th Minenwerfer Company.

Signals:- 117th Telephone Detachment.

Medical and Veterinary:- 117th Bearer Company.
Field Hospital.
Vet. Hospital.

Train:- M.T. Col.

* Disbanded

*** From 302 Division (Macedonia), and reported
attached to 117th Division (P.S.

** Reported withdrawn from the 117th Division (P.S. 22.9.18).
117 Division in the last half of August.
(P.S. 22.9.18)

NOTES ON THE 37th DIVISION.
rated 1st class.

Movements:

In February 1918 the 37th Division relieved the 14th Reserve Division near ST. GOBAIN, where it was replaced by the 14th Reserve Division at the beginning of March. On March 21st the Division entered the line west of NOYON (SUZOY) and remained until April 24th. On May 27th it was near FLAIN (S. of LAON) where it took part in the advance until June 3rd (S. of LONGPOINT). From July 15th until the beginning of August the Division was re-engaged on the MARNE near MAREUIL. On August 13th it entered the line before AVOCOURT relieving the 231st Division.

Composition:

37th Division (? - Maj. Gen. v.d. GOLTZ transferred)
147th I.R. 150th I. R. 151st I.R.
(v.HINDENBURG, 2nd MASUR) (1st ERMLAND) (2nd ERMLAND)
Div.Cavalry - 3rd Squadron, 10th Jager Zu Pferde Regt.
37th Artillery Command - 73rd F.A.R.
134th Pioneer Battalion - 3rd Field Company, 1 Pion.,
Bn.26.
250th Pioneer Company.
250th Searchlight Company.
37th M.W. Company.
Signals - - - 37th Telephone Det.
Medical and Veterinary - 49th Bearer Company.
317th and 318th Field Hospitals.
194th Vet.Hospital.

There are no indications to show that the battalion infantry strength of 4 companies has as yet been reduced, or that the number of L.M.G's. per company has been increased from the usual 6 pieces.

Recruitment:

The 37th Division was originally recruited from the provinces of East and West Prussia. Because of the scantiness of its territorial conscriptions however, the Division includes elements from various other districts, such as the Duchy of Posen and Silesia. While operating in Russia during the first two years of the war a number of Alsace* Lorrainian recruits were received.

When the 10th Landwehr Division was disbanded at the end of August elements of the 372nd I.R.were attached to the 37th Division.

Value.

During 1917, when the 37th Division first appeared on the western front, it attacked with extreme energy, and appeared to be a Division of good quality and high morals. In the course of the past year, however, a reaction has been noticeable. A good illustration is found in the following statement of a recent prisoner of the 151st Regiment:

"The morale of the 37th Division has fallen quite low owing to losses in recent attacks. The troops no longer have any illusions concerning the probable outcome of the war. The fighting quality of the Americans has made a strong impression. There is almost total ignorance as to the number of Americans arriving in France; the prisoner believed that no more than 15000 U.S. combatant troops were in line.

Last Identification:

Two prisoners of the 151st I.R. captured near MALANCOURT September 11th, 1918.

NOTES ON THE 115th DIVISION (rated 3rd class):

Movements.

Early in February 1918, the 115th Division appeared on the western front from Roumania. In April it was identified at ANTWERP where it entrained May 21st for St. QUENTIN. From ST. QUENTIN it moved to VERSIGNY and was engaged at the beginning of June west of LONGPOINT where it was relieved July 18th by the 3rd Reserve Division. Early in August, the Division entered the sector FORGES-MELANCOURT* previously held by the 33rd Reserve Division.

Composition:

115th Division (Lt. Gen. KLEIST)
136th I.R. 171st I.R. 40th R.I.R.
(4th LOTHRING) (2nd OBER-ELSASS) (XIV Corps District)
Div. Cavalry - 2nd Squadron, 22nd Dragoon Regiment.
? Artillery command - 229th F.A.R.
FUSS. ART. I/94
115th Pioneer Battalion - 229th Pioneer Company.
2nd Company, 33rd Res. Pioneer Bn.
229th Searchlight Section.
115th M.W.Co.
Signals - - - - - 115th Telephone Detachment
Medical - - - - - 115th Bearer Company.
376th and 377th Field Hospitals.
? Vet. Hospital.

In all three regiments, one infantry company in each battalion has been disbanded.

Each regiment has a newly-created L.M.W. Company.

1 Regt. (3 Battalions having each (3 Infantry Companies.
(1 L.M.W. Company. (1 H.M.G. Company.

Recruitment:

Mainly from the Grand Duchy of Baden and from the Rhine provomces.

Value:

Never considered a division of the first order, heavy losses and inadequate recruitment have reduced the value and morale to a low ebb. Severe casualties in the vicinity of the FOREST of VILLERS COTTERETS reduced many companies to a rifle strength of 20 to 25 men. At the end of July, the Division received a reinforcement of 300-400 recruits from the Depots near Baden. They were distributed between the 136th I.R. and the 171st I.R. Since that time, others have been received, mainly liberated prisoners from Russia and returned wounded. The majority were attached to the 40th I.R. at the rate of 25-30 per company.

The following statement by a prisoner of the 136th I.R. captured September 8th, 1918, illustrates the attitude of the troops of the 115th Division.

"The morale is very low, During the French attack of July 18th, the entire Division would have gladly surrendered, but at the appearances of negro troops, the majority abandoned their arms and fled, even the artillerymen deserting their pieces.

"The desire to be taken prisoner is universal. The

-2-

Prussians dare not to desert because of the consequences after the war. The Alsatians on the other hand, are anxious to cross the lines but often hesitate because of the reprisals inflicted on their families by the authorities.

Last Identification;

One prisoner of the 136th I.R., captured September 13, 1918.

Correct spelling: * MALANCOURT.

B. R. L.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 29, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 85.

1. Inclosed herewith are copies of "Addenda to Mohawk Code" to be distributed to all holders of Mohawk codes.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.
A.C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 30, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 86.

To Regimental Intelligence Officers and Battalion Scout Officers.

In any action, which may ensue, the following instructions will be carried out by Regimental Intelligence Officers and Battalion Scout Officers.

1. There will be at least one O.P. established and maintained by Regimental Intelligence Sections. Two telephones and two rolls of cable Leger wire will be furnished by the Regimental Signal Section.

2. In case of no friendly barrage preceding the advancing troops, detachments from Battalion Scout Platoons will be used essentially in keeping contact with the enemy. They will precede the first wave at sufficient distance to develop any situation which might arise in time to enable the Battalion to combat it. The size of the detachment and the distance they will precede the first wave, will depend entirely upon conditions such as, nature of terrain, and disposition of troops, and will be determined by the Battalion Commander.

3. The Regimental Intelligence Officers and Battalion Scout Officers are responsible for the quick despatching of all information gathered by their units, to the next higher unit; for reporting the location of their and the enemy's front lines from time to time during the advance (coordinate sheets will be used for the latter); for the proper employment of their respective sections.

4. Brigade Intelligence Officers will only make a hasty survey of all information gathered by the Regiments and will forward same at once to G-2.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Distribution:

C.G. R.I.O.s
C.S. B.S.O.s
G-3 Adjt.
G-2

G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, September 30, 1918.

Memorandum for Intelligence Officers:

1. Information has been obtained to the effect that there are tank traps at the following points:

F. 9118
9412.
0609
1710
1519
1822 (Information obtained from German
2524 tracing)
2609
3612
9508
9507

2. Information has been obtained to the effect that the following dug-outs are mined:

dug-outs at - 9698
9609
0613
1010
1709
1810

3. Attention of both Infantry and Artillery is drawn to trench shown on German Plan Directeur at French Co-ordinate F. 1505 (also shown on French Plan Director) It is believed that the Germans are occupying this trench or its immediate vicinity.

G-2, 1st Division.

Copies to 26th Infantry-
28th Infantry.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 30, 1918.

CAMBRAI FALLS

16,000 PRISONERS CAPTURED WITHIN ITS WALLS
TOGETHER WITH ENORMOUS STORES AND SUPPLIES.

BELGIAN REPORT

King Albert's troops, in a brilliant attack, have made further progress north of the HOULOUST* WOOD, and east of YPRES. Great numbers of guns have been captured. Our troops have, at some points, advanced to a depth of 15 kilometers.

FRENCH REPORT.

The day has been marked by further progress on our entire front. Our assault north of the AISNE has forced the enemy to withdraw. Our troops are in pursuit of the German rear guards. We have captured PINON and the forest of that name, VANDESSON*1, CHAVIGNON, and the MALMAISON FORT. Further south we have progressed on a wide front north of VAILLY and CHAMPAGNE. In the center and on our left we have maintained our advance. We have captured MAURES*2 and have reached the outskirts of ST. MARIE-a-PY.

BRITISH REPORT. (September 30)

Our troops have captured CAMBRAI. Further advance on the whole CAMBRAI front is in progress.

AMERICAN REPORT. (September 29)

The attack begun on September 26, continues to develop successfully. We have reached the outskirts of BRILLIHULLES*3 and d'EXERMONT. More than 20 towns and enormous quantities of materiel have fallen into our hands. The number of prisoners continues to increase. Our aviators have brought down 12 balloons and 69 planes while only a third of that number of our own planes are missing.

MACEDONIAN FRONT.

The pursuit of the remnants of the Bulgarian forces continues. Serbian Cavalry and Infantry have captured VELES and are pushing towards USKUB. Serbian Cavalry has captured KOCANA, 60 miles northeast of KRLOVAK*4. Little resistance is opposed to their victorious advance. North of MONASTIR the French and Italians continue their advance, driving before them towards the ALBANIAN frontier, the routed remnants of the Bulgarian 3rd Army. On the right Greek and British troops are advancing into BULGARIA. They have captured STRUMITZA and have pushed beyond this town into BULGARIA.

THE BULGARIANS SUE FOR PEACE! !

PALESTINE REPORT.

General ALLENBY'S forces have reached the SEA OF GALLILEA*5, and have occupied SAMARIA without opposition. All of SYRIA is now open to our occupation and a part of Gen. Allenby's forces are free for operations in other theaters of war.

OVER 45,000 TURKS ARE PRISONERS IN OUR HANDS.
This splendid news of the glorious Allied Victories
in every theater of war is to be brought to the notice
of everyone in this command.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
A. C. of S., G-2

Correct Spelling - * - HOUTHULST
*1 - VAUDESSON
*2 - ?
*3 - BRIEULIES
*4 - KRIVOLAK
*5 - GALILEE.

S. G. W.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

1st Division, U.S.,
Second Section G.S.
October 1, 1918.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

September 30 to October 1, 1918.
(16h to 16h.)

P A R T I

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Day characterized by continued enemy aeroplane and artillery activity. Otherwise quiet.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE

It is believed the enemy has withdrawn from our immediate front and that his front line of resistance runs east and west just north of Exermont; that to the front of this line has sent out small detachments for the purpose of gaining and maintaining contact with our troops, also to act as combat outposts in the event of our advance.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Nothing to report.

It is noticed from the prisoner records of the 35th American Division that no identification of the 45th R.D. has been made.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY

The enemy occupies Montrebeau Woods but it is not known, to date in what numbers. Enemy was seen filtering into Montrebeau Woods all the day of September 30th. One of our patrols penetrated these woods from the south and has identified four machine guns. The exact location is not confirmed and will be reported later.

Our O.P.s report that at 15h the enemy was seen digging in at the southeastern edge of Montrebeau Woods. Battalion Scout patrols are now reconnoitering.

No concentrations or numbers of troops observed at any point. On our right flank patrols advanced about two kilometers but failed to find the enemy.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Heavy fire has been registered continuously on our front positions and on the road paralleling our front line.

Intermittent shelling of our second line positions, which run from N.E. to S.W. and about parallel to road from Eclisfontaine to Charpentry; also towns of Very, Charpentry. and Baulny, and of 58:66. H.E. 150s and 77s are being used in almost equal proportions. Gas shells are mixed in with H.E.s but not in sufficient numbers to cause damage.

Origin of fire as follows:

Vicinity north of Cornay.

Vicinity of Cote 223.

Vicinity of Cote 240

Woods north of Cote 212.

Vicinity of Cote 269.

S of I.
Sept.30,Oct.1.

-2-

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS

Nothing to report.

This Division has just established its O.P.s with telephone connections and the 35th Division had nothing to report.

VII. ENEMY WORKS.

Enemy is observed digging in at southeast edge of Montrebeau Woods.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Enemy planes flew over our front positions and back areas during good weather periods covered by this summary.

One allied plane brought down at 15h30 at 64:65 and one at 12h37 behind enemy lines to the right of our sector.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS

Company "L", 18th Infantry, gassed while digging in gassed area. Few casualties.

No captured enemy material reported.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS.

Our front runs just south of and parallel to the road from Cote 231 to l'Esperance. Our second line parallel to the road from Eclisfontaine to Charpentry. We have liaison with the Divisions on our right and on our left. At each of these neighboring divisions we maintain a liaison officer and we have established direct telephone lines to their P.C.s. In addition we are maintaining mixed posts on our flanks to insure contact.

One patrol from the 2nd Infantry Brigade progressed north to the Mayache Stream, and followed it west and north to the main road running west to Exermont. No enemy were seen. One patrol penetrated the woods to the southwest of this stream. No enemy seen. Strong patrols now in these woods and along the stream with orders to prevent enemy occupation of these areas. As a result our own flank barrage has been lengthened. Our Battalion Scout patrols will reconnoiter well forward day and night for the purpose of developing any situations which may exist and of gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy.

Not to be taken into front
line trenches.

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.
American E.F.

No. 2.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

October 1 - 2, 1918
(16.00h to 16.00 h.)

PART I

1. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY

Day characterized by increased artillery, aeroplane and machine gun activity. Otherwise quiet. It is believed the enemy considers our attack on this front temporarily checked and that we are stabilizing our line. He shows nervousness, however, not knowing when to expect renewed activity on our part. As a consequence of his estimate, he is continuously shelling our front line positions and is stabilizing his own positions while his combat outposts and advanced observation groups are functioning.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE

The enemy's front line (first main line of resistance) is believed to run from east to west along the northern slope of hill 224, south of Exermont, and supported by a line running parallel to this just north of Exermont.

To the front of this main line of resistance the enemy is maintaining strong outpost positions and forward observation groups. It is estimated that a battalion (20th Regiment, 5th Guard Division) lays in the Montrebeau Woods. This estimate is confirmed by prisoners, from that organization, captured the night of October 1st. His forward line skirts the southern edge of Montrebeau Woods.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Nothing to add to present enemy order of battle, 1st Army Corps.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY.

Machine guns active against our patrols, firing from Montrebeau Woods and the woods directly east of la Neuville-le-Comte* Farm. One patrol located 8 machine guns placed several meters apart along the southern edge of Montrebeau Woods. Patrol leader and nine men killed by M.G. fire from these woods. Exact coordinates not well confirmed, but our artillery furnished all information.

No concentration or appreciable movement of troops.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Increased artillery activity during the day and night. Front, support and reserve positions, roads and back areas shelled almost **constantly** by 77s and 150s. Gas shells, mixed in with H.E.'s and occasional shrapnel, to the rear as far as Divisional P.C. Some abatement between 7h and 8h30.

Enemy battery of 77's located at 3022.2791. First point blank at our patrol.

*Correct spelling: La Neuville-le-Compte.

B. R. L.

Enemy artillery located in woods at 3033.2812.

Enemy artillery located at LeGouffe*1.

Patrols fired upon from newly located points above; also from the vicinities of the following Cotes: 223, 240, 212, 269.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS

Noticeable activity at and near La Neuse Lorge*2 Farm - reason unknown.

VII ENEMY WORKS

From daybreak to 8h enemy seen entrenching M.G. positions, in depth, southern and southeastern edge, Montrebeau Woods. Two officers and about fifty men at work.

VIII ENEMY AERONAUTICS

Planes over all positions and back areas during the day. Few planes at night. Use of machine guns on roads. Photographs taken of four forward positions.

9h40. Enemy plane brought down by allied plane one kilometer north of Very.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS

New anti-tank gun captured in woods wouth-west of Mayache. River at 6h50. No additional enemy material reported captured.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS

Four of our patrols, averaging one platoon in strength, one from each regiment, went forward on definite missions this morning. To be reported by G-3, 1st Division.

Note: See prisoner memorandum attached.

SIGNED: THOS. R. GOVENLOCK
THOS. R. GOVENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.
A.C. of S., G-2.

Correct spelling: * Le Gouffre.

" " : *1 La Neuve Forge Ferme.

B. R. L.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 2, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 87.

To : Brigade and Regimental Intelligence Officers.

1. Pursuant to instructions from the First Army Corps, full coordinates will be given, in the future, when repor-ting locations.

2. It is highly necessary that important information reaches these Headquarters promptly. The most important information, improperly transmitted, is generally valueless.

3. Regimental Intelligence Officers will so organize their personnel that at all times G-2 of Division Headquarters, will be informed as to the location of our own and the enemy's front line; also the location of enemy's artillery, machine guns, and all enemy obstacles.

4. Brigade Intelligence Officers will maintain intimate touch with R.I.O's and also report important developments and information to G-2, First Division.

By command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Distribution:

C.G.	I.O.16th Inf.
C.S.	I.O.18th Inf.
G-2	I.O.26th Inf.
G-3	I.O.28th Inf.
Div.Adjt.	I.O.1st Inf.Brig.
	I.O.2nd Inf.Brig.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 2, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 88.

To : Intelligence Officers of Brigades and Regiments:

1. When sending in prisoners singly, or in small groups (1 to 5) regimental intelligence officers should give the escort a slip of paper indicating what American organization captured them, the time at which they were captured, and, if possible, the place of capture. This greatly facilitates intelligence work at the division.

2. When sending in documents, intelligence officers of brigades and regiments should send with them a slip stating when and where and under what circumstances they were picked up.

By command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces
October 2, 1918

**** BULGARIA CAPITULATES ****

-:-

INTERNAL UNREST IN GERMANY CONFIRMED - CHANCELLOR HERTLING
RESIGNS

-:-

DRIVE ON WESTERN FRONT EXTENDS.

* * * * *

- BULGARIA ACCEPTS ALL TERMS AND ARMISTICE IS SIGNED -

The armistice was signed last evening (September 30) at SALONICA between the COMMANDER-inCHIEF of the Allied Armies in the Orient and the Bulgarian delegates, who accepted all the conditions laid down by the High Command.

Hostilities are suspended. Instructions have been given to General Franchet d'Esperey to proceed immediately to the execution of the conditions of the armistice.

BELGIAN REPORT.-

The brilliant advance of King Albert's troops continues. The Belgians have reached ROULERS and are progressing beyond the ROULERS-MENIN Road.

BRITISH REPORT - (Sept. 30)

Further progress has been made north of ST. QUENTIN, where the 46th Midland Division alone captured over 4000 prisoners and several guns. Americans, Australians and British troops have gained ground and made numerous prisoners. The heights dominating THORIGNY were carried with great dash and gallantry. New Zealand troops, on their side, have reached the SCHELDT Canal as far as CREVECOEUR on the north.

FRENCH REPORT. (Oct. 1)

We have occupied part of the town of ST. QUENTIN. The Italian troops cooperating with the French Army have taken SOUPIR, north of the AISNE. Between the AISNE and the VESLE, our troops have realized Considerable progress, and have captured REVILLON, ROMAIN and MONTIGNY sur-VESLE. Further progress has also been made in CHAMPAGNE.

AMERICAN REPORT. (Sept. 30)

From the AISNE to the MEUSE, our troops have maintained and consolidated their newly-captured positions. Since September 26 our aviators have shot down more than 100 hostile planes and 21 captive balloons.

PALESTINE REPORT. September 30.

The remnants of the Turkish forces operating in Palestine have been captured and the number of prisoners taken in the course of General Allenby's offensive totals 55,000

4th LIBERTY LOAN.- During the first hour, was subscribed for at the rate of \$1,000,000 a minute. This record is unique in history. NEWS OF THE ALLIED VICTORIES is being spread broadcast amongst the enemy and the enlightenment thus derived is causing numerous enemy desertions.

The foregoing news for the information of all members of this command.

By Command of Major General SUMMERALL:
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK, Capt., Inf., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

REPORT ON PRISONERS.

I. Identification.

8th Company 20th Inf. Regt. 5th Guard Division.

II. Circumstances of capture.

Prisoners were part of a detail sent out to bury dead and pick up wounded. They strayed into our lines south of the Bois de Montrebeau at 20 hours Oct. 1 1918.

III. Order of battle.

Both prisoners were doubtful as to the order of battle of their regiment and knew nothing whatever of the units on their flanks. They are under the impression that their regiment had all three battalions in line, III II I from West to East. IInd Battalion is reported to have all four companies in line, each company having its three platoons echeloned in depth. The entire IInd battalion is reported to be in the Montrebeau wood.

On Sept. 30th the 20th Inf. Regt. was brought up to support positions on the northern slope of hill 224. They remained there until 5 hours Oct. 1st, when they were marched up the hill and into the Montrebeau wood. There they relieved fractions of the 3rd Grenadier regiment (same division) which was moved up further forward (?).

IV. Enemy disposition. IInd Battalion has all four companies in line, each with its three platoons echeloned in depth. Each company sends forward outposts to the edge of the wood, where they will be able to observe. The main body of the companies seems to be several hundred meters back of the southern edge of the wood. Enemy is occupying fox-holes.

V. Enemy intentions. No withdrawal contemplated, according to prisoners. No counter-attack contemplated.

VI. Enemy reserves. No definite information. One prisoner states that when they moved up from their rest positions (about 1500 meters north of Montrefagne) to their support positions their place in the rest position was taken by troops of another division.

VII. Reinforcements.

One prisoner arrived Sept. 30 at Grandpre with 800 reinforcements. Only three squads of these reinforcements were sent to the 20th Inf. Regt. at the same time as the prisoner. He is not certain to what divisions they were to go.

VIII. Strength. Company strength about 150 men (?)

Morale. Fairly good.

The troops were told that there were many Reserves behind them, but one of the prisoners, who walked from Grandpre to Exermont on the 30 September and 1 October, states that he saw practically no troops at all. He adds however that they were probably concealed from the view of airplanes.

Mission. To hold.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.,
American E.F.

No. 3

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
October 2 - 3, 1918.
(16.00h to 16.00h)

I - GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY.

Continued enemy aeroplane activity. Decreased artillery activity during the latter half of period covered by summary. Generally quiet. It is believed the enemy is stabilizing his lines opposite our front and that he has suffered generally from our artillery fire.

II - ENEMY FRONT LINE.

The enemy's front line (forward positions) runs along the southern and southeastern edges of Montrebeau Woods and of the woods between Montrebeau Woods and the Mayache Stream. His main lines of resistance (front and support) are believed to run east to west, the former just south and the latter just north of Exermont.

Our own front line remains approximately the same as in yesterday's summary; sketch attached. Line of outposts forward. Complete liaison with divisions on our right and left.

III - ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

Nothing to report.

IV - ENEMY INFANTRY.

Enemy machine guns located at the following points:

3015-2816	3025-2817
3015-2815	3026-2815
3016-2814	3027-2815
3015-2813	3022-2793
3023-2818	3025-2796
3024-2818	3027-2797
3028-2797	3034-2806

Patrol leader (officer) and nine men, 18th Infantry Regiment, killed. Division Sergeant Observer killed.

V - ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Decreased activity during the night and to-day. Many gas shells fell on all of our positions. Few casualties. Very accurate fire on roads. Unusually accurate shrapnel fire on back area points. Gas shells, mostly H.E.'s. Locations of enemy batteries reported as follows:

3727-2798
3026-2817

VI - ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

Party of enemy seen working at 3031:2800.

VII - ENEMY WORKS.

Note above (Para VI)

Parties of enemy working on positions just in front of and to the rear of Exermont.

VIII - ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Planes over our lines and back area, day and night. Careful reconnaissance accomplished, planes returning repeatedly to points of interest. Many planes flew low over roads and lines using their machine guns.

It is reported that Sergeant Clark, Headquarters, 26th Infantry, brought down an enemy plane with captured anti-tank gun. Plane fell at fifth shot.

Enemy plane brought down by allied plane, 17h30, 500 meters north of Very.

Enemy plane fell in sector to our right.

IX - MISCELLANEOUS.

No captured materiel reported.

Enemy prisoner, belonging to Division on our right, questioned by our outpost. Stated 250 reserves brought down last night to position northeast of our right flank.

Large explosion north of Apremont, reported.

Enemy observation posts located at 3022-2794 and 3016-2787.

X - ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS.

Patrols active. (see G-3 report)

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

October 3-4, 1918
(16h to 16h)

PART I.

I. - GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Greatly increased enemy artillery, machine gun and aeroplane activity as the result of our attack at 5h25.

The enemy has orders to hold his positions at all costs and is resisting stubbornly our determined advance; contesting every meter of ground.

It is believed that all the available local reserves are contesting our advance. This belief is the result of identifications made to-day (Part II, attached), and of information obtained from prisoners captured by us.

II. - ENEMY FRONT LINE.

The results of to-day's operations confirm the "Enemy Front Line", both of advance posts and main line of resistance, as given in our summaries dated October 1-2 and October 2-3, 1918. At 16h it is difficult to definitely locate the front lines as reports from R.I.O.'s are somewhat delayed and arrive at different periods. Our and the enemy's front lines are believed, at 16h, to run, east to west - abreast of FLEVILLE.

Partial liaison with divisions on our right and left.

III. - ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

See Part II. (attached)

IV. - ENEMY INFANTRY.

Enemy machine guns very active at every period of our advance. Machine gun locations, as given in recent summaries of the 1st Army Corps and of this Division, confirmed.

Infantry of the 52nd Division offers the most stubborn resistance, and was in much superior fighting condition, physically and morally, than were any other troops attempting to check our advance. This Division was well organized for defence. (See Part II, attached).

V. - ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Fired constantly on our advancing troops and on roads and crossroads over our entire divisional area.

VI. - ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

Nothing to report. Poor visibility.

VII. - ENEMY WORKS.

Nothing to report.

VIII. - ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Planes active all day. Generally flew in fleets of five to fifteen. Very low over our advancing lines, using machine guns, directing artillery fire on rear points.

IX. - MISCELLANEOUS.

No captured materiel, other than two new anti-tank rifles, reported to date.

327 prisoners had passed through our Divisional cage at 16h, including 4 German Lieutenants and 1 warrant officer. Our prisoners were delivered to the Corps Cage as early as 9h30 and were the first to reach the 1st Army Corps.

X. - ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS.

See G-3 report.

At the time of closing this summary our troops continue to advance.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

(SGD.): THOS. R. GOWENLOCK
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Note: Attached is list of prisoners, with data.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
October 4, 1918.

PART II.

PRISONERS' STATEMENTS.

1. Presumed Order of Battle.

From the AIRE east.

3rd Guard Grenadiers.

20th Infantry.

3rd Guard (Zu Fuss)

122nd Ldw ?

111th

170th ?

169th ?

Boundary between 5th Guard Div. and 52nd Div.
2398-Exermont.

2. Enemy Intentions.

Company commanders had simply received the order to hold. They did not expect an attack because they had observed our troops digging in (confirmed by three company commanders). A few soldiers state that they expected an attack because they heard tanks at about 10 p.m., October 3rd, but the officers examined to date were entirely unaware of their expectations, probably through the failure on the part of their men to tell them what they had heard.

3. Identifications to date.

5th Guard Division	20th Inf.	1st Co.
		3rd Co.
		4th Co.
		5th Co.
		6th Co.
		7th Co.
		8th Co.
		9th Co.
		11th Co.
		12th Co.
		M.W. Co.
3rd Garde Zu Fuss		2nd Co.
		6th Co.
		7th Co.
		12th Co.
		1st M.G.
		2nd M.G.
3rd Grenad. Garde		7th Co.
		9th Co.
		10th Co.
		11th Co.
		3rd M.G.
		M.W. Co.
2nd Ldw. Div.	122nd Ldw.	3rd Co.
		9th Co.
		M.W. Co.

52nd Div.	111th	5th Co. 8th Co. 2nd M. G. Co..

170th	8th Co. M.W.Co.

Infanterie Geschutz Batterie 45

M.G.S.S. 45

4. Miscellaneous.

a. Comparative value of 5th Gd. Div. and 52nd Div.

It is to be noticed that the 5th Gd. Div. seems very weak from losses (some companies down to ten men), while the 52nd Division seems to have suffered but little.

The morale of the 5th Gd. Div. seems shattered; that of the 52nd seems fairly good.

The 5th Guard Division has all three battalions in line, reinforced by elements of the 122nd Ldw. and (?) by 1st Company Jager cyclists.

The 52nd Division, on the other hand, seems to be properly organized in depth (two battalions in line - one in reserve - each front line battalion with two companies in line and two in support).

5. No large fresh reserves reported by prisoners.

6. Total number of prisoners counted at cage by 15 hour:
320 (including 4 officers and 1
officer stellvertreter)

(SGD.): THOS R GOWENLOCK
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 4, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM:

Prisoners state they have seen Jagers, that their organization has had phenomenal losses - regiment about the size of battalion (20th Regiment).

Prisoners from the 120th say they have no infantry forward - all artillery and machine guns.

Prisoners also state that morale is very low. The following is extract from letter written by one of them:

"We are now living in fox holes despite the cold, and are nearly frozen. If we do not soon get relieved we will be obliged to do what we shouldn't (run away), for what they ask from us is inhuman - to get practically nothing to eat or drink during this cold weather - to await death hourly.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 4, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

Prisoners from many organizations captured by this division this morning state that the morale of their troops is very low. Most of the prisoners are hungry, cold and insufficiently clothed.

The following is extract from letter written home by one of them.

"We are now living in fox holes, despite the cold, and are nearly frozen. If we do not soon get relieved we will be obliged to do what we shouldn't (run away), for what they ask from us is inhuman - to get practically nothing to eat or drink during this cold weather - to await death hourly."

Reports just received by wireless state that on all fronts the Americans, French, and British are meeting with glorious success. Tens of thousands of prisoners and vast quantities of ammunition and materiel have been captured. On many fronts the enemy is rapidly withdrawing.

The above account of the allied successes will be published to every member of this command.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK, Capt. Inf., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 4, 1918.

STATEMENTS OF WOUNDED MEN.

Captain Co. A, 28th Infantry. We took Exermont at 9h but the right and left did not seem to progress as fast as his company. All officers from third battalion have been lost, except the adjutant who took command and organized the men and led them forward. Captain said that he and another officer went to look for the Colonel of the Regiment but could not find him, so they decided to leapfrog the 3rd battalion with the first battalion and go forward. Whether this had been done or not he could not say, as he was wounded before it was carried out.

Officer said that troops on the right were meeting with heavy machine gun fire from the enemy which appeared to be in trenches 10 to 25 feet long and echeloned 4 or 5 in depth.

Private Adams, Co. ", 28th Inf.

We progressed within 600 feet of first objective at 9h45 and began to dig in there.

They started forward again, at which time I was wounded.

Private Lench, Co. G, 26th Inf.

Advanced about 3 kilometers up to time he was wounded, which was about 12h. His company was then held up by heavy machine gun fire.

Private Johnson, Co. 4, 18th Inf.

Reached 1st objective at 11h30. Machine gun fire from enemy very heavy.

All of the above men say that the support they were receiving from the artillery was fine and it was doing good work in destroying enemy machine gun nests and artillery. All say that the morale of our troops is excellent.

One man from 91st Division said that they were advancing on a line with our troops on the left and also one from the 28th Division said that they were advancing on a line with our troops on their right.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Capt. Inf., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
October 4, 1918.

G2

Lt. C. V. Cross, Ammunition Officer, 16th Inf. talked to Lt. Fritz, who was wounded and had been commanding a company. About 12h30 he came from the front. When he left they had just passed the 2nd objective and were held up because of the fact that there were Germans in trenches in front of them. The 18th was held up by machine guns in Exermont. He understood that heavy artillery was called for to fire upon Exermont before the 18th attacked. Casualties not especially heavy

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.
American, E. F.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

October 4-5, 1918
16h to 12h

PART I

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY

Severe fighting continued up to dusk, when our advancing troops organized their position for the night.

No appreciable activity of the enemy during the night - their machine guns and artillery active this morning. Our own artillery hammered enemy positions from dusk to dawn.

Our belief that the enemy has enlisted against this division all of his local reserves, is confirmed by identifications and prisoner statements. The 1st Guard, 5th Guard and 52nd Divisions together with several miscellaneous organizations have been identified.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE

The enemy's front line extends east from FLEVILLE thru PETIT BOIS along the d'Arietal Farm.

Our own front line parallels the enemy's and our troops are steadily advancing.

We have liaison with the divisions on our right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

(See Part II. attached.)

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY

Quiet during the night. Stubborn resistance and machine gun fire this morning. Prisoners from all organizations state that they have orders to hold their positions at all costs.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY

Fired on our positions during the night and on our advancing lines during the morning.

New battery located at 301.2-284.6.

Many H. E.'s contain strong mustard gas composition.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS

Large convoy reported moving southwest on road from Landres et St. Georges to Sommerance.

VII. ENEMY WORKS

Nothing to report.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS

Enemy planes over new lines at dawn and heavy machine gun firing on our advancing lines.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS

Several 77's reported captured; also quantity of shells and small arms ammunition.

119 prisoners passed thru our cage since yesterday's summary, bringing the total up to 446, including 6 officers and 2 acting officers.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS

At 6h 30 we resumed our advance and at 12h we are pushing steadily forward.

PART II

I. REPORT OF PRISONERS from 12/170 (5th Guard Div.)

12th Company was in reserve for 3rd Battalion. It was sent forward at 3 A.M., October 5, to protect left flank as Germans were uncertain as to situation in Ravine de Gouffre. Prisoner was captured at about F.3216, a little after day break, as he was attempting to gain contact on his right with 5th Company, same Regiment. In regard to order of Battle see attached sketch.

II. MESSAGE CAPTURED ON GERMAN OFFICER BELONGING TO
12/170 Inf. Regt. (52nd Div.)

111/170 To 12th Co. M. W. Platoon 4.10.18 14.10 hours. To the right situation is not clear, and seems not good. Consequently it is of the utmost importance to watch on the right, so that the enemy may be prevented from crossing the ravine N. E. of Farm Beauregard.

III. PIGEON MESSAGES
9 a.m. Oct 4th.

The enemy has reached the south slope of Chehery-Exermont Valley, and des Granges Farm. We are holding north slope of same valley. On des Granges-Fleville road we have put tanks out of action. Tank guns urgently needed for ravine at K 9514. Large numbers of fugitives are coming back. They are being assembled.

By command of Major General Summerall:

(Signed) THOS. R. GOWENLOCK;
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.
October 5, 1918.

GREAT ALLIED ADVANCE CONTINUES !

FIRST DIVISION ADVANCES AGAINST FINEST GERMAN DIVISIONS.

All along the western front the allies continue to smash the German defences. Thousands of prisoners and much valuable materiel is falling into our hands each day. With Bulgaria out of the war it is expected that Turkey will soon surrender. The Austrian people are tired of German oppression.


The First Division, during yesterday's and today's attack, lived up to its reputation as a "Shock Division". Fighting against Germany's finest troops, our infantry advanced to its objectives, capturing hundreds of prisoners, much materiel, and causing frightful casualties among the enemy.

The attached sketch shows the progress of our troops.

The foregoing will be read or circulated by Company and Battery Commanders to every member of their command.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2



Scale-1-50,000.

T.D.G 2-1st Div. A.E.F.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

October 5-6, 1918
12h00 to 12h00

PART I.

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Continued and constant enemy artillery, machine gun, and aeroplane activity. The enemy fought desperately all day zealously contesting the ground which was gained by our advancing troops. All of his reserves are organized against our advance with unmistakable orders to hold the positions at all costs. The morale of the enemy's best divisions, the 52nd and 37th, was very good at the beginning but prisoners now state that our determined advance against his vicious artillery and machine gun fire, and the casualties which our artillery and infantry have inflicted in his ranks, has lowered his morale considerably.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE.

For our own and the enemy's front lines, see sketch attached. In front of this line the enemy maintains contact with our troops by a forward line of strong outpost positions, heavily equipped with machine guns.

We have liaison on the right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

From west to east (known)
150th Regt. 151st Regt., 111th Regt., 170th Regt., 169th Regt. (see attached sketch)

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY.

Highly organized with machine guns. Active during the day - quiet at night.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Active all day - some abatement during the night. H.E.'s, 77's, Gas. It is believed that the artillery of enemy divisions relieved opposite sector during the past week or ten days has remained. It is estimated that his artillery strength is greatly superior to our own.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

16h, large convoy of wagons, autos, horses, and some troops seen moving northeast in the direction of Imecourt and Alepont.*

13h50. Noticeable traffic from St. Juvin to St. Georges. Caissons seen.

9h35. Enemy troops seen concentrating northeast of Montrefang.*1 Enemy forces seen moving southwest from Landres et St. Georges to Bois de Romagne.

8h10. Four guns seen moving north at 301.7 - 286.4. Troops observed in Sommerance.

8h30. One gun entering Sommerance from the northeast.

VII. ENEMY WORKS.

Enemy stretching wire in rear of Sommerance at 11h36.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Planes active over our lines and back area.

Enemy biplane shot down by allied plane 500 meters north and west of Champigneulle.

Enemy plane calling for line just south of Landres et St Georges - 2 star rocket.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

Captured material reported: Eight 77's; 1 Belgian 2" gun; 75 machine guns; quantities of ammunition.

14h. Fire in Beffu et le Morthomme; fire at 7045.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS.

Advanced till dusk, then consolidated lines.

Patrol occupied Hill 269 last night and is now holding it for division on our right.

By command of Major General Summerall:

(Signed) Thos. R. Gowenlock.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

NOTE: Total prisoners through division cage - 550 - 9 officers.

Correct Spelling: * Alliepont.
*1 Montrefagne.

S.G.W.

PART II.

I. REPORT ON 37th DIVISION.

The 150th and 151st regiments of the 37th Division were in the region of Landres October 3rd. During the early morning of October 4th they were alerted and marched forward to the rear area of the 5th Guard Division with a view to supporting it.

The 151st was assembled in wood at F 1335 at about noon October 4th. The 1st Battalion was then informed that the enemy had gained possession of the Montrefagne Hill and that it would have to counter-attack. A little later, however, it developed that the 10th and 11th companies of the 150th had already occupied the hill and that a counter-attack would not be necessary.

At about 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion, 151st was marched up towards the Montrefagne Hill to fill in a gap between the 11th Regiment and the 5th Guard Division. When it arrived at Montrefagne*Hill at dusk it found that there was not only a gap between Montrefagne Hill and Exermont, but that the 10th and 11th companies, 150th Regiment, had been driven off Montrefagne Hill itself. As a result, two companies were sent up to regain possession of it, which they did without meeting any resistance.

It would appear that the order of battle on our front is as per attached sketch.

II. ENEMY INTENTIONS.

To hold position and regain vantage points by local counter-attacks.

III. ENEMY OCCUPATION AND RESERVES.

Between Fleville and Montrefagne Hill the Germans have four battalions in line, (in all about 1000 men). Two more battalions are in immediate support (about 500 men). The division has probably an additional regiment in reserve, the 147th.

Between Montrefagne Hill and Hill 269 the Germans have five or six battalions in line or in immediate support. Each of these battalions probably numbers about 200 men.

IV. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Seems to be very strong. It is probable that the artillery of the 5th Guard Division is not yet withdrawn.

V. ENEMY MORALE.

The 37th Division, when it came into line October 4th had a morale vastly superior to that of the 5th Guard Division, which was shattered by a week of continuous fighting and had lost at least two-thirds of its effectives.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

The situation during the last two days may be summed up as follows.

October 4th, 5 a.m. - Our division was confronted by two of the three regiments of the 52nd Division and by all three regiments of the 5th Guard.

At about 8 a.m. our troops engaged one regiment (4th Guard) of the 1st Guard Division, occupying support positions west of Exermont.

During the morning the 5th Guard Division suffered very heavily and was completely disorganized. There was a gap between its left flank and the right flank of the 52nd Division. The 150th and 151st Regiments of the 37th Division brought up as a tactical reserve near Landres, were sent into line to support the 5th Guard Division and to close the gap between the latter and the 52nd.


To date, no reinforcement of the 52nd Division has been reported.

By command of Major General Summerall:

(Signed) Thos. R. Gowenlock
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Correct Spelling: * Montrefagne.

S. G. W.




Front Line of 1st Div., A.E.F.
Oct. 6 - 1918
Scale 1:20,000.

300
285

03
285

Presumed Order of Battle 3 P.M. Oct.-5th



Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.
October 6, 1918.

G-2

REPORT ON PRISONER
TAKEN IN BOIS DE MONCY ON THE EVENING OF OCT. 5th.

I. IDENTIFICATION: 52nd Division, 169th Regiment, 3rd Company.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

Prisoner was in command of a platoon on southern edge of Bois de la Morine. On October 4th his position was subjected to artillery fire, but his platoon was not attacked by infantry. They held their position during October 4th and the night of the 4th - 5th, suffering few casualties, except for one squad put out of action by a direct hit. On the morning of the 5th a shell knocked prisoner down and bruised him. He was evacuated to a sanitary formation near Sommerance, but there was ordered back to his Regiment. No one seemed to know, however, where his regiment was. He started off towards the Bois de la Morine and met a number of fugitives from the 3rd Company. They told him that they had lost their company and were bound for Sommerance, hoping to find it there.

Prisoner kept on going; but upon arriving at the Bois de la Morine, could not find his company. He started back along Ravine du Gouffre. He states that the Bois du Chene Sec was held by German Machine Guns, and believes that there were also Germans in southern point of Bois de Moncy. Further north, however, (near Ferme d'Arietal?) he met Americans and was captured.

FIRST DIVISION.
Second Section, G.S.
American E. F.

No. 7. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
October 6-7, 1918
(12 h. to 12. h.)

PART I.

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Continued enemy artillery, machine gun and aeroplane activity. It is believed the enemy divisions opposite us have no immediate reserves. The enemy's intention is, however, to hold his positions at all costs. His morale is somewhat lowered by the persistancy of our infantry and by the terrific results of our artillery during the past 48 hours.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE.

For our own and the enemy's front line see attached sketch.

We have liaison with divisions on our right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

See attached sketch.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY.

Organizing against attack. His outposts have been pushed out in shell holes to within 150 to 300 meters from our own, consolidating and strengthening his main line of resistance.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Active, but decreased results.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

Party of enemy seen at 11.29 at 15H15.

Enemy column marched southwest towards Sommerance but unable to enter because of our artillery fire. Turned southeast and entered woods.

VII. ENEMY WORKS.

Strengthening positions north of Fleville and in woods 301.4 - 283.0.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Active.

One of our own planes dropped a bomb on enemy infantry column, evening of October 5, and on road running northeast of Sommerance, killing and wounding more than 50.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

Large fire near Sommerance.

Captured materiel reported to date:

1 Belgian 2 inch gun.

10 77's, 100 M.G.'s

Total number of prisoners 610: including 53 wounded and 10 officers.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS.

Quiet.

PART II.

REPORT ON PRISONER.

I. IDENTIFICATION.

52nd Division, 169th Regiment, 12th Company.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

a) Place: F 2627 (Bois de Moncy)

b) Time: Noon October 6th.

c) Prisoner was in command of the only remaining platoon of the 12th Company/169th Regiment, holding the edge of the Bois de Moncy, northeast of the ARIETAL FARM (F 2627). His company commander had been wounded, and the acting Company Commander had left at about 11 a.m. to try to establish liaison on his left. An American patrol came through the woods and took them by surprise from the rear, capturing the entire platoon (about 16 men).

III. ENEMY INTENTIONS.

To hold position.

IV. ENEMY OCCUPATION.

At noon October 6th the IIIrd Battalion was disposed as follows:

One Company (12th) facing southwest at F 2627

Two Companies (9th and 10th) on edge of wood between F 2730 and F 2931.

The Battalion Commander was with the 10th Company.

Prisoner's battalion was formerly in line, along southern edge of Bois de Moncy, but was withdrawn on the morning of October 6th to the position mentioned above.

V. ENEMY STRENGTH AND LOSSES.

Prisoner states that the losses from artillery fire have been very heavy. His was the only platoon left in the 12th Company. The 11th Company was dissolved and the remnants distributed among the three remaining companies of the battalion. Prisoner estimates the strength of the 9th and 10th Companies at 50 men each.

When asked where the other two battalions of his regiment were prisoner answered that they were "zersprengt" (shattered) by artillery fire. This should be taken with the utmost reserve but it is interesting in this connection to note that an officer of the 3rd Co., 169th Regt., returning from Summerance* to the front saw fugitives from his company on their way to Sommerance and that he was unable to find his company in its former position.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

a) Prisoner states that his battalion counter-attacked on the morning of the 6th, but that the men broke and never reached the Americans. He himself states that he hoped to be captured then and that the only reason he was not was that the Americans did not come and get him.

b) Just before being captured, prisoner noticed gunfire from Hill 269 in his rear and was about to report that Americans must be occupying it, when he was taken prisoner.

NOTE.

It is presumed that the 52nd Division will soon have to be relieved. Several prisoners have heard of an impending relief, but can state nothing definite.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

(SGD) THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Correct spelling *Sommerance.

S.G.W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 7, 1918.

REPORT ON TWO PRISONERS FROM 4th Company, 147th Regt.

I. IDENTIFICATION.

37th Division, 147th Regiment, 4th Company.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

Prisoners were taken at about F 2433 during the early afternoon of October 6th in the course of a small attack by Americans.

III. ORDER OF BATTLE:

The 147th is presumably on left flank of the 37th Division as shown in appended sketch.

IV. OCCUPATION OF SECTOR.

There appears to be one battalion of the 147th in reserve.

V. LOSSES.


Regiment, which marched up from Landres, October 5th, was assembled in valley to rear of the ridge running from F 1129 to F 1832 on the evening of the same day. The greater part of the regiment remained in that valley during the night, and was very heavily shelled. Prisoners platoon lost 2 men killed.

On the way up from Landres the Regiment lost about 50 killed or wounded by an airplane bomb.

VI. ARTILLERY TARGETS.

See attached sketch.

VII. Prisoner reports that he heard that his regiment was to be relieved night of Oct 6/7 by the 125th Regt. (?) just arrived from Alsace.



Front Line-Oct. 7, 1918-12 Hours.
1st Div., A.E.F.
Scale-1:20,000.

Presumed Enemy Order of Battle

0 Hour Oct. 7th

Boundaries very uncertain

25th Div. (doubtfull)

94

37th Div.

52nd Div.

34

Presumed Enemy
Front line

Fleville

02

150th

151st

147th

111th

170th

169th

Prisoners,
4th Co. / 147th
3 P.M. Oct. 6th.

Prisoners,
12th Co. / 169th
noon, Oct 6th.

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.
American, E.F.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE
October 7 - 8, 1918.
(12h00 to 12h00)

Part 1.

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY

Decreased enemy artillery, aeroplane and machine gun activity. Increased number of rockets and flares during the night, signifying uneasiness on the part of the enemy, who is constantly on the alert.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE

No change in our own and the enemy's front line since yesterday.

We have liaison with divisions on the right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

No change since yesterday.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY

Quiet. Bursts of Machine Gun fire during the night with no apparent reason, indicating nervousness. Constantly expecting renewed activity of our infantry.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY

Active on our front lines and in ravines and valleys during daylight hours.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS

Periodically during the day troops seen moving from Sommerance to Romagne.

15th two caissons and two horse wagons moving west at 3080:2862.

VII. ENEMY WORKS

Nothing to report.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS

Decreased activity. Weather and visibility poor. Some planes over our lines and towns to the rear during hours of better weather.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS

Fire in St. Juvin at 16h.

Total prisoners - 614, including 10 officers.

Captured material reported: 100 M.G.'s; 10 77's; 1 Belgian 2-inch gun; quantities of artillery and small arms ammunition.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS

Quiet

By command of Major General Summerall:

(Signed) Thos. R. Gowenlock.

Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.,
American E. F.

No. 9 SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
October 8 - 9, 1918
(12h00 to 12h00)

PART I.

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Decreased enemy artillery and machine gun activity up to H hour (8h30), since which time, machine guns very active. All immediate enemy reserves engaged - orders to hold positions at all costs.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE.

For our own and the enemy's front line see attached sketch.

We have liaison with divisions on our right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

See Part II, attached)

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY.

Morale - Poor to fair. Organized in depth. Well equipped with machine guns.

Little activity preceding 8h30; Now fighting stubbornly to hold positions. Attack made on Hill 269 repulsed by our engineers.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Echeloned in depth and moved somewhat to the rear. 150's and 77's predominant. Gas mixed with H.E. shells.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

12h30. Troops moving along road from Sommerance to Romagne. 13h00. 2 caissons and wagons moving east at 8062. 13h42. Train of 15 cars from Beffu et le Morthomme to Champigneulle.

VII. ENEMY WORKS.

Nothing to report.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS.

Planes very active during daylight hours. At 16h45 planes flew very low over our front lines, using machine guns on our troops.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

16 H. Fire in Marcq

No new captured materiel reported.

Total prisoners captured: 664, including 10 officers.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS.

Jumped off at 8h30. Heavy M.G. resistance but advancing steadily.

PART II.

REPORT ON PRISONERS CAPTURED OCTOBER 8, 1918.

I. IDENTIFICATION.

45th Res. Div., 211th Res. Regt., 1st and 3rd Cos.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

Date : October 8th, about 6 p.m.
Place : Near P 3528.
Resistance: None.

Prisoners' battalion (1st), formerly engaged west of the ARGONNE, was brought by truck to the neighborhood of LANDRES, October 4th. It remained in reserve (back of Hill 272)? during the night of October 4/5th. On the fifth it was moved towards the front, but subsequently moved back and then east, finally being engaged in the sector of the 169th Regiment on the morning of the 7th.

Prisoners state that when moving by truck they only saw the 1st and IInd Battalions of the 211th Reserve.

They do not know whether the III/211 Res. was moved east with the 1st and IInd Battalions.

They have not seen either of the two other regiments of their division since entrucking on October 4th.

One prisoner reports that the IInd Battalion was engaged to the west of the 1st Battalion.

III. ORDER OF BATTLE:

Uncertain. It is presumed that it is as follows:
West to East:

111th - IInd Bn./211th Res. -
170th - 1st Bn./211th Res. -
169th.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS OF THE 9th CO., 169th.

Prisoners state that they were stationed as outposts for the 9th Company, 169th Regiment, and that they relieved elements of the 109th yesterday afternoon as they went out to occupy their outpost positions (Southern edge of Hill 269).

NOTE: The 109th belongs to the 26th Division, which is supposed to have all three regiments engaged further east.

PART II.

REPORT ON PRISONER FROM 9/169.

I. IDENTIFICATION.

52nd Division, 169th Regiment, 9th Company.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

Date : October 8, 6 p.m.

Place : F 3528

Resistance: Slight.

Company (about 60 men) climbed up to summit of Hill 269, towards 11 a.m., October 8. The whole top of the hill was unoccupied at that time. The company dug itself in, intending to defend the hill. They had three light M.G.'s and one heavy M.G., and were in liaison towards the rear with K.T.K., towards left (east) with 10th Company. Believes there were Americans in front of the company (south), and is certain that there were Americans to his right (west).

At about 6 p.m., prisoner, acting as outpost, with about three squads, at F 3528, was captured by Americans who took them from the rear by surprise. The remainder of his company was just behind the crest of the hill (F 3429)

III. ORDER OF BATTLE:

West to East.

Regiments : 170 - 169 (confirmation)

Battalions: IIIrd - IInd; 1st in Reserve (?)

Companies : 9th - 10th; 12th in Reserve (?)

12th Company presumed to be at F 4035 (?)

IV. ENEMY INTENTIONS:

To hold.

V. LOSSES 9th COMPANY:

About 10 since entering sector. Also about 10 men, their morals shattered by artillery fire, ran away. All losses caused by artillery. When asked whether the artillery fire was very heavy, prisoner answered that it was frightful at times.

VI. They are still expecting to be relieved.


VII. MORALE:

Not good.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Presumed Enemy Order of Battle
 18 Hours Oct. 8th.
 (Boundaries uncertain)



Not to be taken into front
line trenches.

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G.S.
American E. F.

No. 10

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE
October 9 - 10, 1918
(12h00 to 12h00)

PART I

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY.

Day characterized by severe fighting all along our front. With two more new divisions identified (the 28th Division, and the 41st Division) it is shown conclusively that the enemy is determined to retard our progress at all costs. It is believed that he will draw upon all available reserves with which to hold the Kriemhilde Stellung positions.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE.

For our own and the enemy's front line see sketch attached.

We have liaison with the divisions on our right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

See Part II, attached.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY:

Machine guns active against our entire advance.

Morale:- Poor to fair. Well equipped with machine guns. Now somewhat disorganized due to heavy casualties and to the fact that elements of reserve divisions have been thrown promiscuously into weakened points of the line. Great confusion and lowered morale have resulted from our intense artillery fire.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY:

Active, but shows decrease. It is believed that our artillery has silenced many batteries and that others are being moved well to the rear.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS:

At 12h20 enemy seen retreating $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers north of Fleville.

P. C. of 111th Regiment located at Immeccourt*.

10h30 wagons and caissons moving rapidly north on road from Marcq to St. Juvin and northwest from Marcq. to Chevières.

VII. ENEMY WORKS:

At 12h20 enemy seen fortifying positions at Ravine de Coiches.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS:

Active over our lines during entire day and over rear area during the afternoon.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

18h. Fires in Marcq and St. Juvin and small fires in the vicinity of these towns.

11h30. Big explosion northwest of Martincourt Farm, presumably a dump.

Total prisoners through our cage - 1186; 53 through hospital. 28 officers captured, classified as follows:-
1 Lt. Col., 1 Capt., 22 Lieuts., 2 Feldwebel Lieuts.,
2 Offizier Stellvertreter. Grand total, 1267 prisoners.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS:

At 12h. all of our troops have reached the 2nd exploitation line.


PART II.

(See sketches attached)


By Command of Major General Summerall:

(SGD) THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Correct Spelling - * IMECOURT - Stuart G. Wilder,
Captain, Inf., D.O.L.,
Historical Section.



Presumed Enemy Order of Battle
6 P.M. Oct. 9th



G-2

FIRST DIVISION
Second Section, G-3.
American, E.F.

ENEMY SITUATION ON OUR FRONT

I. When attacked yesterday morning the enemy had in line, from West to East, the following units:

151st 150th 147th 170th 111th 169th
1 -- 37th Div. -- ' ' - - - 52nd Div. -- '

(See sketch)

In addition:

a) The 52nd Division had two battalions of the 211th Rss. at its disposal.

b) Three companies of the 10th Regiment, 28th Division, were marched up thru the Bois de Remagne* to counter-attack Hill 269 (which they took about 8 a.m.)

II. The situation of the German forces at about noon became critical, and the units in line were withdrawing very fast. Thereupon the 18th and 148th German Infantry Regiments (41st Division) in corps reserve near St. Georges, were alerted and marched up to occupy Cote de Moldah*1, and stem our advance in the contour.

By command of Major General Summerall;

SIGNED: THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

* Corrett spelling: BOIS de ROMAGNE
*1 " " : COTE de MALDAH

S.G.W.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.
October 10, 1918.

GERMANY'S TRIBUTE TO THE FIRST DIVISION.

To-day a captured Colonel of the German Army arrived at our Division Cage. He was cold, hungry and broken in spirit. After four years of severe fighting and constant service in his army, he was taken prisoner by the troops of the victorious First Division.

The following is the substance of his remarks:

"Yesterday I received orders to hold the ground at all costs. The American barrage advanced toward my position and the work of your artillery was marvelous. The barrage was so dense that it was impossible for us to move out of our dugouts. Following this barrage closely were the troops of the First Division. I saw them forge ahead and knew that all was lost. All night I remained in my dugout, hoping vainly that something would happen that would permit me to rejoin my Army. This morning your troops found me and here I am, after four years of fighting, a prisoner.

"Yesterday I knew that the First Division was opposite us, and I knew that we would have to put up the hardest fight of the war. The First Division is wonderful and the German Army knows it. We did not believe that within five years the Americans could develop a division such as the First Division. The work of its infantry and artillery is worthy of the best armies in the world."

The above tribute to the First Division comes from one of Germany's seasoned field officers. It is with great pleasure that we learn that even our enemies recognize the courage, valor, and efficiency of our troops. The work done by the First Division during the past few days will go down in history as one of those memorable events which will live in the hearts of the American people for generations to come.

Every member of this command well deserves the enthusiastic congratulations from, and the high respect in which it is held by our comrades in arms and by the entire American Nation.

The above will be published to every member of this command.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

██████████:
Not to be taken into
front line trenches.

FIRST DIVISION,
Second Section, G.S.,
American E.F.

No. 11.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.
October 10-11, 1918.
(12h00 to 12h00)

PART I.

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY:

Decreased artillery and aeroplane, and continued machine gun activity. Enemy resistance less formidable. It is believed the enemy is attempting to reorganize for defense of the Kriemhilde Stellung positions.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE:

For our own and the enemy's front line see attached sketch. We have liaison with the divisions on our right and left.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

No known change from yesterday. See Part II, attached.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY:

Machine guns continue active and apparently still well organized in depth. Morale - poor.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY:

Less active and less accurate firing. 210 calibre gun fired on back area roads. Silenced by our artillery.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS:

Nothing to report.

VII. ENEMY WORKS:

Nothing to report.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS:

Active over our lines. Bombed roads and towns during the night.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS:

13h30 Large fire in CHAMPIGNEULLE.

13h35 Explosion N.W. of MARTINCOURT FARM.

19h50 Fire in vicinity of ST. JUVIN.

No new captured materiel reported.

Total prisoners to date:- 1311, including 28 officers:- 1 Lt. Col., 1 Capt., 22 Lieuts., 2 Feldwebel Lieuts., 2 Offizier Stellvertreter.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR TROOPS:

Exploitation by our troops advanced our lines nearly two kilometers.

PART II.

REPORT ON PRISONERS CAPTURED NIGHT OF OCTOBER 10th/11th.

I. IDENTIFICATION:

41st Division, 18th Regiment, M.W. Company.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

Four prisoners (including a cook) left a camp in the woods northeast of IMECOURT with their rolling kitchen, to bring food to the M.W. Company of the 18th Regiment. They passed through IMECOURT and SAINT GEORGES and continued on the road to SOMMERANCE. They were unable to find their company, and drove right into our lines, being captured by our troops, together with their kitchen.

III. ORDER OF BATTLE:

Prisoners do not furnish additional data concerning Order of Battle, as they were unable to find any of their units. It is presumed, however, that the 18th and 148th Regiments have inserted themselves between the 147th and 170th Regiments, or relieved parts of these regiments.

Hence, order of battle from west to east seems to be as follows:

	18th - 148th -	
151st - 150th- 147th-		170th-111th-169th-171st.


IV. MISCELLANEOUS.

Up to the morning of October 8th the rolling kitchens of the M.W. Company were in BAYONVILLE. When they left the town it was still being occupied by the rolling kitchens of three companies of the 18th. ST. GEORGES is reported unoccupied.

Very little traffic on the IMECOURT to ST. GEORGES road on evening of October 10th.

By command of Major General Summerall:

SIGNED: THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.



Second Section.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
October 13, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE "ALLEGHENY" CODE.

Herewith copies of the "Allegheny" Code to be distributed in accordance with the following table.

UNIT	CODE NO.	UNIT	CODE NO.
C.O. French Mission	289	C.O. 6th Arty. Reg.	321
C.O. 1st Inf. Brig.	290	C.O. 1st Bn.	322
C.O. 16th Inf. Reg.	291	C.O. "A" Bty.	323
C.O. 1st Bn.	292	C.O. "B" Bty.	324
C.O. 2nd Bn.	293	C.O. "C" Bty.	325
C.O. 3rd Bn.	294	C.O. 2nd Bn.	326
C.O. 18th Inf. Reg.	295	C.O. "D" Bty.	327
C.O. 1st Bn.	296	C.O. "E" Bty.	328
C.O. 2nd Bn.	297	C.O. "F" Bty.	329
C.O. 3rd Bn.	298	C.O. 7th Arty. Reg.	330
C.O. 2nd M.G. Bn.	299	C.O. 1st Bn.	331
		C.O. "A" Bty.	332
C.O. 2nd Inf. Brig.	300	C.O. "B" Bty.	333
C.O. 26th Inf. Reg.	301	C.O. "C" Bty.	334
C.O. 1st Bn.	302	C.O. 2nd Bn.	335
C.O. 2nd Bn.	303	C.O. "D" Bty.	336
C.O. 3rd Bn.	304	C.O. "E" Bty.	337
C.O. 28th Inf. Reg.	305	C.O. "F" Bty.	338
C.O. 1st Bn.	306	C.O. T.M. Bty.	339
C.O. 2nd Bn.	307		
C.O. 3rd Bn.	308	Division Signal Officer	340
C.O. 3rd M.G. Bn.	309	C.O. 1st Field Bn.	341
C.O. 1st Arty. Brig.	310	Division Engineer	342
C.O. 5th Arty. Reg.	311	C.O. 1st Ehg. Reg.	343
C.O. 1st Bn.	312	C.O. 1st Bn.	344
C.O. "A" Bty.	313	C.O. 2nd Bn.	345
C.O. "B" Bty.	314		
C.O. 2nd Bn.	315	Division M.G. Officer	346
C.O. "C" Bty.	316	C.O. 1st M.G. Bn.	347
C.O. "D" Bty.	317	G-1	348
C.O. 3rd Bn.	318		
C.O. "E" Bty.	319	G-3	349
C.O. "F" Bty.	320		

By command of Brigadier General Bamford:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry,
A.C. of S., G-2.

G-2

Headquarters First Division
American Expeditionary Forces
France, October 16th, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION OF EMERGENCY CODE SHEETS WITHIN FIRST DIVISION

Division Headquarters:	
G-1	.I
G-2	.I
G-3	.I
D.S.O.	.I
D.M.G.O.	.I
D.E.O.	.I
Divisional Troops:	
I M.G.Bn.Hdrs.	.I
2 Cos.	.2
I Sig.Corps Bn.Hdhrs	.I
I Eng.Reg.	.3
Regt.Hdhrs	.3
2 Bn Hdhrs.	.2
6 Cos.	.6
2 Brigades Infantry.	.92
I Brigade Artillery	.38
	<u>154</u>

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION OF EMERGENCY CODE SHEETS WITHIN INFANTRY BRIG.

Brigade Hdhrs.	.3
I M.G.Bn.	
Hdhrs.	.I
4 Cos.	.4
2 Infantry Reg's	
2 Reg.Hdhrs	.6
6 Bn.Hdhrs.	.6
24 Rifle Cos	.24
2 M.G.Cos.	.2
	<u>46</u>

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION OF EMERGENCY CODES WITHIN AN ARTILLERY BRIG.

Brigade Hdhrs.	.3
1 Trench Mortar Battery	.I
2 Reg. 75"	
2 Reg.Hdhrs.	.6
4 Bn.Hdhrs.	.4
12 Batteries	.12
I Reg. I 55"	
Reg.Hdhrs.	.3
3 Bn.Hdhrs.	.3
6 Batteries	.6
	<u>38</u>

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
American E.F.
October 17, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 92.

To : R.I.O.'s and Bn. Scout Officers.

Every effort will be made to immediately bring the Battalion Scout Platoons and Regimental Intelligence Sections up to full strength as specified by standing division orders. A most careful selection of this personnel will be made and whenever either officer, non-commissioned officer, or private is found unsuitable in the section, he will be replaced at once.

By Command of Brigadier General Bamford:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, Infantry, U.S.A.,
A.C. of .S., G-2

Distribution:

C.G. 1

C.S. 1

G-3 1

G-2 1

Adj. 1

1st Inf. Brig. 1

2nd Inf. Brig. 1

16th Inf. 24)

18th Inf. 24)

26th Inf. 24)

28th Inf. 24)

For C.O.'s of Bns. and Cos., R.I.O.'s
and Bn. Scout Officers.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
October 25, 1918.

From Vth A. C. Summary.

APPENDIX.

NATURAL DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NORTH OF THE KRIEMHILDE LINE.

The main strength of the Kriemhilde Stellung lay in the two wooded massifs east and west of Romagne. Each of these positions was a strong defensive position in itself and each had an additional element of defense in front of it. The wooded heights between Romagne and Brieuilles had before them the valley of Ruisseau de Wassieu, whose bare slopes were enfiladed for a considerable distance from the high ground held by the enemy in the eastern bank of the Meuse. The heights on the west of Romagne, in turn, had before them a series of spurs running off to the southwest, - Hill 265, 269, 240 and, farther north, Hill 263 and Cote de Maldah. These hills, which also were covered with woods, offered an advance zone of protection so strong as practically to constitute a position in itself, a position which corresponds probably to the Giselhor Stellung shown on several captured German maps (already noted in the Summary of Intelligence) and which was defended quite as stubbornly as the main line of the Kriemhilde itself.

North of the Kriemhilde is another strong natural defensive position, which has strikingly similar defensive features in front of it: a deep enfiladed valley on the east, and a spur running down toward the southwest, which, like the Giselhor Stellung serves both as an advance line of defense for the main position and as a switch connecting it with position further west, i.e. the section of the Kriemhilde Stellung west of Landres-St. Georges. Neither of these positions has been organized in the past but within the last few days the enemy seems to have begun hastily digging himself in along the switch line.

The main position consists of the great ridge which begins above Villers-devant-Dun (Cote 243) and turns to the northwest just above Andevanne, crossing the Bois de Barricourt and the Bois de la Folis*, and continuing on to the bare and very irregular slopes north of Fosse. It may conveniently be called the Barricourt Crest.

On the east this position dominates completely the valley of the Andon below Bantheville, and enfilades the valley from Bantheville south. In the center it bars off an advance along the ridge covered by the Bois de Bantheville and the Bois d'Andevanne, while on the west it dominates the whole series of valleys and spurs stretching away to the northwest, past Buzancy. As these valleys drain toward the southwest, the spurs between them lie across the path of an advance in the direction of Buzancy, while the valleys are enfiladed from the main crest. The crest itself is very high: Cote 243, just above Villers, is 388 meters high, throughout its length the crest is above 300 meters; whereas the highest point of the Kriemhilde was of 288 meters. This great height, together with the direction of the valleys which open out to the south and southwest give the Barricourt Crest unusual fields of observation; a special study of these has been made by the II Army in a map published Sept. 27, 1918. In addition, the whole position is easily accessible from the northeast, and can be easily supplied as long as the railroad along

the west bank, of the Meuse is not out, and the bridges across the river not destroyed. Narrow valleys lead up close to the crest on the north. Through one of them a narrow gauge line runs up from Montigny to Villers, and thence over the crest to Andevanne, Landres St. Georges (another branch leading down to Bantheville). Nouart, at the head of another of these valleys further north, has been one of the principal munition dumps in this whole region. Finally, the road which has been the main transverse line of communication behind the enemy's front north of the Kriemhilde runs just in front of the crest (Sassey-Villers-Andevanne - Remonville-Bayonville-Buzancy).

In front of the Barricourt Crest proper is a covering position formed on the east by the spur which runs down toward the Meuse, ending in a bare narrow ridge (Cote 251) just above Clery-le-Beht.*1 The chief strength of this position is the extent to which it is protected by enfilade fire from across the river. Further west, another spur begins in the Bois d'Andevanne (Cote 300) and turns to the southwest, running just above Landres-St. Georges, and ending a short distance beyond it. A captured German document, dated September 12, 1918 (noted in the Summary of Information of the 1st Army Oct. 16 - 17) gives the general outline of a line called the Freya Stellung, which indicates an intention of defending these two natural positions, more or less as a continuous line. On the east, this line begins on the crest of Cote 251, drops down to the foot of the slope and follows the Andon, then turns off just north of Bantheville and crosses the spur to the west (roughly, along the line of the road north of the Bois de Bantheville), rejoining the Landres St. Georges spur somewhere above the La Dhuy Farm.

The line indicated on the map seems to have a different significance in the two parts of the whole sector. On the east it seems to represent rather the southern limit of a defensive zone made up of successive positions on the spurs to the north. It is not to be supposed that there was ever an intention either of constructing a position or of maintaining a garrison of any strength, along the bottom of a valley, completely exposed to observation from the hills rising immediately above it on the south. West of Bantheville, however, the line seems to represent, in a general way, the line on which the enemy intends to resist. It is to this general line that he seems to have withdrawn his main force out of the Bois de Bantheville, - as soon as he was driven from the Cote de Chatillon.

West of the Bois de Bantheville, however, there are clear indications that he intends to hold the ground immediately in front of it, by digging himself in on the reverse slopes just north of the Cote de Chatillon and in the region of La Dhuy Farm, - and to stand his ground there, - rather than to withdraw to the high ground just to the north. The reason for this is obvious, for once these reverse slopes are lost the section of the Kriemhilde position which he still holds south of Landres-St. Georges will be taken in the rear.

In the whole region of Landres-St. Georges, in fact, this line along the heights on the north is practically bound up with the defense of the Kriemhilde trenches in front of it. (It is actually linked up with them by the trenches which cross the valley from north to south on both sides of the village). West of St. Georges the ridge

dies out and the weakest section of the Kriemhilde is that between St. Georges and Champigneulles. A break here would turn both the line to the west and the whole line of the spur behind Landres-St. Georges,- and thus open the way to an advance up the valley of the Agron. It is to prevent this that the enemy is bringing up new divisions, - the best of which, the 13th seems to have been given the task of defending the reverse slopes west of the Bois de Bantheville. From the enemy's point of view, the greatest danger at present is a converging attack against the section of the Kriemhilde line still in his hands, - from the S.W. striking the line west of St. Georges,- and from the S.E. from the direction of the Cote de Chatillon and the Bois de Bantheville.

Distribution:

To include Bns. of Infantry.

G-3

C-of-S.

Correct Spelling - * BOIS de la FOLIE
*1 CLERY-le-PETIT.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
October 29, 1918.

G-2

Extract from H.G.Q. Summary No. 208

GASSING OF DUGOUTS.

(Translation of a German Document: From French 1st Army Bulletin, October 21, 1918.

Directions for using the Gas Bomb Case.

Each case contains two bombs. One is enough to gas a dugout of a capacity of ten men.
Before entering the dugout:

Tear off the label and return it. Open the wooden box, then the tin box, tearing the bands. (Note).

Take out the bomb and carry it into the dugout, holding it by the handle of the grenade.

Caution! Do not let it fall.

Prime the grenade.

In the dugout:

Unscrew the cover.

Place the bomb on the ground, in the middle of the dugout, grenade turned upward.

Draw the pin of the grenade. Time of combustion - 20 seconds.

LEAVE THE DUGOUT AT ONCE.

In the trench:

Wait for the detonation, then get away quickly from the vicinity of the dugout.

In case of misfires:

Wait at least five minutes in the trench, then place a second bomb, beside the first so that the two grenades touch, and proceed as before.

After detonation:

Dugouts where a bomb has been exploded shall not be entered, even with mask on - danger of death. Avoid the vicinity of gassed dugouts.

Make all possible effort to bring back the case or, at least to collect the cases in abandoned trench-mortar emplacements.

These instructions will be returned and then destroyed.

(Note.) Bombs containing badly stoppered or broken bottles (evidenced by the dampness of the packing will not be taken from the case; they will be exploded in the dugout by placing another bomb in the open case.

* * * * *

ANTI-TANK MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES.

(From British Summary, October 23, 1918.)

(a) The following order issued by German General Headquarters, No. Ic. 100572 op., dated September 29, 1918, makes it appear that: -

(i) An anti-tank machine gun, on the same lines as the 13-mm anti-tank rifle, is being manufactured by the enemy.

(ii) Both the anti-tank rifle and the anti-tank machine gun are also intended for anti-tank aircraft work.

(iii) The official name of the anti-tank rifle has been changed to "Tufgewehr (Tank-und Fliegergewehr. For the manufacture of 13-mm. anti-tank rifles (Tufgewehr), anti-tank machine guns (Tufmaschinengewehre) and anti-tank ammunition (Tufmunition), which is a matter of urgency, technical specialists will be demanded direct from corps by name by the War Ministry.

b) Another General Headquarters document refers definitely to the anti-tank rifle as the 13-mm Tank-und Fliegergewehr.

NOTE: Attention is directed to the need for further details regarding the anti-tank machine gun.

* * * *

THE LIGHT MACHINE GUN IN THE GERMAN RETREAT.

(From French IVth Army Bulletin, Oct. 13, 1918.

The light machine gun has been the chief factor in the German rear-guard defense; the hostile detachments, well entrenched, are almost rooted to the soil.

According to present information, the rear-guards conduct their combat as follows:

2. Rear-guards composed of groups of infantry, well-officered with one or two light machine guns. The number of these groups is variable. In some divisions (242d Division for instance), a group has been left for each company in the line; in others (as Prussian Guard Cavalry Division and 13th Division) only one group for each regiment in the line.

Each rear-guard group is composed of four to eight men, with one or two light machine guns; it is commanded either by a non-commissioned officer or by a vize-feldwebel, vigorously assisted by a non-commissioned officer.

The tendency of the enemy, it may be noted, is to choose for these rear-guards, troops and officers who have already done similar duty in previous retreats.

3. The combat of the rear-guard groups is carried on according to schedule indicating the successive points at which the rear-guards will make their stand..

INDICATIONS OF ENEMY TRAPS.

A British Army notes that the following method for discovering mines consisting of projectiles hidden behind woodwork has given good results.

A compass is fastened on a lath and drawn along the planks. A deviation of the compass indicates the presence of iron, and accordingly the possible presence of a projectile.

In a report received from the Belgian Army mention is made of the following signs which the enemy has used to indicate the location of mines.

a) In a wall near the mine there is a white stone, or one marked with chalk; on this stone is marked a black circle 4 cm. in diameter. This stone is sometimes found in the ground at the foot of the wall.

b) At the foot of a wall in front of a house, for instance, the Germans have arranged a little garden in which there are some flowers, a chair, a table, etc. In the garden there is a circular patch of lawn, on which is a circle of black pebbles.

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 5, 1918.

G-2

Extract from G.H.Q. Summary of Information, No.215.

DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS.

Translation of German Documents: From French 1st Army Bulletin October 25, 1918.

The principles contained in the two documents below, captured by the 1st Army, are confirmed by recent fighting and by the study of photographs taken on the front of the Xth Army.

No more continuous lines. The points of support, mutually flanking one another and concealed by camouflage as well as possible, must be chosen with care and with particular attention to detail. The work is to be done rapidly and to be evenly distributed in view of the frequent changes in the front.

Few Dugouts. Especially, few deep dugouts, which are regarded as traps are to be built. Deep or concrete dugouts are still found in the lines constructed last year.

Resistance at all costs, on the main line of resistance. This line has an outpost zone in front of it, which should be retaken by counter-attack in case the enemy breaks through.

The forces necessary for resistance on the main line of resistance are concentrated on that line or in the immediate vicinity.

I

1st Reserve Division. Divisional Headquarters, Oct.2, 1918.

As it is necessary to occupy our line with few troops, scattering our forces by placing isolated men here and there will be avoided at all costs. It is absolutely necessary that they be grouped under the command of one leader and under constant supervision, consequently the main line of resistance will be defended by a series of points of support. If these points of support are well chosen and properly protected by barbed-wire entanglements, if the intervals between them are covered by the fire of machine guns in rear, if night patrolling is done, the defense of the line, including the unoccupied parts, will be fully assured.

Deep dugouts in the main line of resistance are real traps. They will be abandoned immediately.

The heavy machine guns will be withdrawn from the main line of resistance if they can fulfil their mission outside of the trenches as well as or better than in the trenches. This exposes the heavy machine guns to less danger than when placed inside the trenches, especially if the latter are particularly subjected to the enemy's fire. On September 18 in the Le Verguier sector, of the 12 guns in the machine gun company of the "Munich" Landsturm Battalion, placed in the second line of resistance, 10 were destroyed even before the enemy's infantry came into view.

In certain places the position of the field of fire and the possibilities of flanking permit of placing machine guns directly behind the wire entanglements. It is necessary to take advantage of such opportunities, especially at night and in misty weather.

(Signed) Von Bodelschwingh.

II

1st Reserve Division

Divisional Headquarters, Oct.
2, 1918.

DIVISION ORDER.

The defense in the Flecknase position will be organized in the following manner:

The Schneinstellung becomes the main line of resistance. The old main line of resistance becomes the line of outposts. The latter must be occupied, as the outpost zone is necessary, the garrison of that zone will be absorbed by that of the line of outposts.

The two garrisons, together, will offer renewed resistance in the line of outposts, aided by the enfilade fire of machine guns placed on the flanks of the regiments and also, when possible, by the fire of machine guns in the main line of resistance.

The two garrisons will not withdraw to the main line of resistance (Schneinstellung) except in case of absolute necessity. They will then retire fighting, and will, if necessary, sacrifice themselves to give the garrison of the main line of resistance time to prepare for combat.

The Schneinstellung will be held at any cost. The forces necessary will be concentrated, for that purpose, in the main line of resistance, or in close proximity to that line.

If the enemy penetrates and makes progress in the Flecknase position, it is necessary first of all to stop him in front of the main line of resistance and to cover him with well directed fire of trench mortars, rifle grenades, and machine guns. At the same time the artillery will put down a barrage and keep the extreme limit of the Flecknase position under fire.

The shock troops, who always hold themselves ready for that purpose, will then be launched in counter-attack. As they advance the trench mortars, machine guns, and other weapons will lengthen their range. The artillery, at the signal "lengthen range" will put down a rolling-barrage which will move slowly forward to just in front of the first line.

Under cover of this rolling barrage the garrison of the outpost zone will return to that zone.

As soon as this movement has been successful, the forces take up their former distribution.

In any case, the enemy will not be permitted to establish himself in front of the main line of resistance.

(Signed) von Bodelschwingh.

COMBAT TACTICS.

From First Army Summary, October 30, 1918.

Ainereville was taken by our troops this morning.

On the extreme right of our sector E. of the Meuse, a number of our patrols succeeded, apparently, without difficulty, in penetrating deeply into the enemy's lines. The indications are that the enemy holds this part of his front with scattered elements only. At times, particularly in the region of the broken terrain immediately W of the Meuse, the same conditions have appeared to exist. They would seem to follow from the enemy's conception of an outpost zone as a part of his defensive system.

Nevertheless, the key to successful local operations appears to exist in those facts, and the enemy has not failed to exploit the infiltration method suggested thereby during his own operations in broken country.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A., A.C. of S., G-2.

G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E.F.,
November 8, 1918.

Memorandum:

The following is published for the information, guidance and strict compliance of all concerned:

1. The map-paper supply is becoming a serious problem with the American Army. Already new maps are being printed on the backs of old issues.
2. It is requested of all officers that they exercise the greatest care in the handling and use of maps. In the past this Division has always been issued a liberal allowance of maps and it was possible to replace maps which were worn or had been lost. This practice can not obtain in the future because of the serious shortage.
3. At the present time the Division is well supplied with Plan Directors, 1/80000, and 1/50000 maps covering a large area bordering the Meuse. It is quite possible that the Division will remain in the vicinity of the Meuse for a number of weeks. Since full distribution of maps has been made it is a question whether additional maps can be supplied, in quantities. Therefore unusual care must be taken of the maps now on hand.
4. In compliance with instructions from the Army is is requested that, upon leaving definitely a sector, all maps be turned in to G-2 of this Division.
5. The foregoing will be published by Company and Battery Commanders to all concerned in their commands.

By Command of Brigadier General Parker:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Distribution:
To include company and
battery commanders.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E.F.,
November 11, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM TO ALL ORGANIZATION COMMANDERS.

The following wireless messages were intercepted at Division Headquarters last night and this morning. While certain words and parts of sentences were missing, the gist of their meaning is hereby transmitted to you.

It is requested that the news contained herewith be transmitted to the troops as soon as is practically by organization commanders.

I.

To U.S. from M.P. 2-Marshall Foch to Commander in Chief S
l l l les Hol cq- Fl.Marshall Foch to Commander in Chief.

"Hostilities will cease upon the whole front from 11 November, 11 o'clock, French o'clock. The allied troops will not, until a further order, proceed beyond the line reached on that date and that

II.

Paragraph 5: "Satisfaction is given to the remark made by adding to this paragraph the following sentence:". . .inhabitants, nobody will be molested for taking part in warlike activity prior to the signature of the armistice."

III.

In order to facilitate the resumption of order of troops, this paragraph will read as follows: "Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine Provinces, right bank, and left bank, will be arranged so as to be completed within a period of 16 additional days, that is, within 30 days after the signature of the armistice.

IV.

To all organizations: At 11.45 a.m. cessation of fire. Strict compliance must be maintained.

(Signed) Superior Command of the 5th Army.
(German source)

V.

Comrades! The soldiers council of Brussels is founded and has assumed control over the military and civil authorities. The government and the Commandant have placed themselves under the orders of the Soldiers' Council. In general, the change took place quietly. Comrades! The soldiers council of Brussels appreciates thoroughly your difficulties and your great responsibilities. . . . The withdrawal of troops will be its task. Maintain iron discipline; only thus can an orderly movement be possible. Avoid all disturbances. Everyone must remain at his place in order to maintain order, so that we will soon return to our homes, there to take up the great tasks which confront us. (German source)

(Signed) Soldiers Council of Brussels.

VI.

Paragraph 6. Satisfaction is given to the remark by modifying the text of this paragraph as follows: "All supplies of Coal, of railway material, of signal material, will be left on the spot. The upkeep of these supplies, in so far as they relate to the exploitation of communications in the regions of the left bank of the Rhine, will be seen to by Germany.

9. Paragraph 1 is modified by an addendum giving the desired guarantees. This paragraph will read as follows: "The right of requisition will be exercised by the Allied Armies and the Armies of the United States in all occupied territories, except that payment will be made to the proper parties.

10. Paragraph 2: "Satisfaction is given to the remark made by adding to this paragraph the following sentences: "Nevertheless the return of German prisoners of War interned in Holland and Switzerland will continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of War will be arranged at the conclusion of the peace preliminaries.

12. Due consideration to the remark made is given in writing of the text of this clause which will be as follows: "All German troops at present in territories which, prior to the war, belonged to Austria, Roumania, or Turkey, will immediately return to within the German frontiers as they were prior to August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in territories which, prior to the war, belonged to Russia, will also return to within the German frontiers, defined as above, as soon as the Allies judge that the proper moment has come due regard being paid to the interior conditions of these territories.

14. Due consideration is paid, in the wording of this clause, to the remarks made. The wording will be as follows: "Immediate cessation on the part of German troops, of all requisitions seizing, or coercive measures in view of procuring in Roumania and Russia (boundaries as of August 1, 1914), resources for Germany.

16. The following new text answers the request made: "The Allies will have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on the oriental frontiers, either through Danzig or by way of the Vistula; this for the purpose of supplying the population and maintaining order.

17. Due regard is shown for the remarks made in changing the text as follows: "Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within 30 days.

18. The paragraph added to Article 34 gives satisfaction to this remark.

22 - 5 - In consideration of the remark made the text will be changed to read as follows: "All submarines, including all submarine cruisers and all mine layers now existing, together with their complete armament and equipment, will be turned over to the allies and to the United States. Those submarines which can not go to sea will be disarmed both as regards personnel and material and will remain under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready to go to sea will be prepared to leave German ports as soon as orders are received by wireless, in order to proceed to the ports in which they are to be turned over to the Allies and the United States. Other submarines will be ready to go to sea as soon as possible. The conditions of this article will be brought into effect within 14 days after the signature of the armistice.

23. The following is added to this article: " All ships designated to be interned will be ready to leave German ports 7 days after the signature of the Armistice. Orders for the voyage will be given by wireless.

26. The allies expect that the continuation of the blockade will not prevent the supplying of Germany, as far as the Allies judge it to be necessary, after the conclusion of the armistice.

The following phrase is added to the text with this end in view: " The Allies and the United States expect the supplying of Germany, during the Armistice, in so far as they consider it necessary.

28 This clause should be understood to mean that the designated material must be left intact, in such a fashion that the Allies and the United States may utilize it as they deem fit. It is impossible to comply with Paragraph "C" of the "Remarks" because the ships mentioned in this paragraph are to be used for another purpose. This clause will read as follows: "When evacuating the Belgian ports Germany will abandon, on the spot, and intact, all harbor material and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all aeroplanes and aeroplane material and supplies, all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

29. It is requested that the Allies be informed as soon as possible of the agreements mentioned.

34. The new text of this clause will, consequently be as follows: The duration is of 35 days, and can be extended. During this period, if the clauses of the armistice are not complied with, the armistice can be called off by one of the contracting parties, the latter to give 48 hours notice. It is understood that the execution of Article 3 and Article 28 will only give cause for calling off the Armistice on account of inadequate execution within the prescribed time, if this execution is in bad faith. In order to insure the best possible execution of the present conventions, the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission is agreed upon. This commission will function under the high authority of the superior naval and military allied command.

VII.

From German Plenipotentiaries, to High Command.

No. 43 W 60 I O. Entire commission will return to-day to Spa via prearranged route. It will arrive during the night.

Captain Geyer will return by aeroplane by the route HIRSON, FUMAY, PHILLIPPEVILLE, landing at AMORVILLE at 16h French time. Please send him as quickly as possible to Spa. The French Aeroplane will bear two white pennants.

(Signed) WINTERFELD.

VIII.

From Nauen to Eiffel Tower.

Wireless station Nauen is operating in the hands of the Council of Workman and Soldiers. We would like to have information concerning everything that is going on over there.

(Signed) Council of Workmen and Soldiers.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E.F.,
November 16, 1918.

The following extracts of the terms of Armistice, as announced by G.H.Q., are published for the information and guidance of all concerned. They will be read by Organization Commanders to everyone in their command.

* * * *

I. Cessation of operations by land and in air six hours after the signature of armistice (5.30 Nov. 11, 1918)

II. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from signature of armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with A note (Annexure 1).

III. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 14 days of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages and persons under trial or convicted)

IV. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment:-

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field).
30,000 machine guns.
3,000 minenwerfers.
2,000 aeroplanes (fighters and bombers,
firstly D 7's and night
bombing machines).

The above to be delivered in situ to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed condition laid down in the note. (Annexure 1.)

V. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by the Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30 kilometre radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be set up on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a zone drawn 10 kilometers distant, starting from the Dutch frontier.

In the case of inhabitants no person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the Armistice.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhinelands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all, 31 days after the signature of the armistice.

All movements of the evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the Note (annexe 1).

VI. In all the territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants, no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food, munitions and equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food; munitions and equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved.

VII. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs and telephones shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 wagons and 5000 motor-lorries, in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the same period, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of the railways in the country of the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ, and kept in an efficient state by Germany, as far as the means of communication are concerned during the whole period of the armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note appended as Annexure 2 regulates the detail of these measures.

VIII. The German command shall be responsible for revealing all mines or delay-action fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of springs, wells, etc.,) under penalty of reprisals.

IX. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all the occupied territory save for the settlement of accounts with authorized persons. The upkeep of troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

X. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detail conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war; the Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish. However, the return of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the peace preliminaries.

XI. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from the evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

* * * * *

GENERAL CLAUSES.

XVIII. Repatriation without reciprocity within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with the detailed conditions, hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other Allied or Associated States than those mentioned in Clause III.

XIX. With the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are required.

* * * *

REPARATION FOR DAMAGE DONE.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of or reparation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares and paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

* * * *

DURATION OF ARMISTICE.

XXXIV. The duration of the armistice is to be 36 days with the option to extend. During this period, on the failure of the execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice.

* * * *

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 17, 1918.

G-2

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

From 5h30 October 17, to noon October 17.

1. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY. Quiet. Visibility poor. Advance as per schedule. No enemy seen.
2. ENEMY FRONT LINE: - Russian and French prisoners of war, returning to France, stated that there were no Germans in Conflans, November 16, evening.

A reconnaissance at 7 a.m. November 17th, proceeded to within one kilometer of Spincourt without encountering any enemy. A Russian prisoner stated that there remained only one German in Spincourt, the latter being an officer engaged in turning over some artillery material.

3. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:- Nothing to report.
4. ENEMY INFANTRY:- Nothing to report.
5. ENEMY ARTILLERY:- Nothing to report.
6. ENEMY MOVEMENTS:- Nothing to report.
7. ENEMY WORKS:- Nothing to report.
8. ENEMY AERONAUTICS:- Nothing to report.
9. MISCELLANEOUS ENEMY DATA:- The enemy appears to have complied with the armistice conditions. No road destructions. Wires still up at many places. No mines reported. Very little equipment left behind.

Two engineer dumps on Etain-Spincourt road, just west of Eton, have been left intact (wire, girders, etc.).

Trees along Aboucourt* - Etain Road mined but not fired.

ROADS:- Aboucourt* - Etain: Good two-way road
Etain - Spincourt : Excellent two-way road.
Etain - Warcq : Poor

It is estimated that three hundred Russian, Roumanian, Italian, and French prisoners of war have passed through Etain during the period covered by this report. A number of Russians had been made to work in the Bricy* mines, despite the fact that Russia was at peace with Germany.

10. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS:- Advance in two columns along Aboucourt* - Etain - Eton and Moranville - Warcq - Rouvres Roads. Line reached, approximately: Domremy - Gondrecourt. No enemy seen.
11. OUR AIR ACTIVITY: - One American plane over Etain at about 9.00 a.m.

Correct Spelling:

* Abaucourt

*1 Briey

S. G. W.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 18, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From Noon November 17 to Noon November 18.

- I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Quiet. No contact with enemy. Visibility good.
- II. ENEMY FRONT LINE:- Our troops not in contact.
- III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: No identifications. It is reported that Landres was occupied by Foot Artillery troops until Friday, November 13th. Number of units unknown.
Box found at Regimental P.C. in Etain addressed to C.O. 3rd Garde zu-Fuss Regt. No date.
- IV. ENEMY INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Nothing to report.
- V. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Nothing to report.
- VI. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY: Nothing to report.
- VII. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Civilians report that the last German troops (trucks and trains) passed through Landres, Nov. 16th at about 5 a.m., but that most of the German troops had left by the afternoon of the 15th.
- VIII. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS: Infantry outposts approximately along railroad between Mercy le Haut and Sancy, as per schedule. Artillery columns clearing Etain at noon Nov. 18th.
- IX. ACTIVITY OF OUR AIRCRAFT: Nothing to report.
- X. MISCELLANEOUS ENEMY DATA: a) Materiel: One large tractor on road between Houdelaucourt* and Haucourt. One battery wagon and one train of 42 cm. Howitzer on Avillers-Romprix*¹ road about 300 meters west of Domprix (are somewhat blocking road) One large tractor at Domprix. One wagon and two limbers at Domprix.
b) Roads: Vaudancourt-Haudelaucourt*- Haucourt - Avillers - Domprix. Good one way. Eton-Landres, excellent two-way.
c) Compliance with armistice conditions: The Maire of Landres states that the station is in good condition and all instruments intact, as far as he knows. No mines found. No destruction of roads etc. reported.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.

(SGD.): for and in the absence of
Y.G.B.

Correct Spelling:

* Houdelaucourt

*¹Domprix.

S. G. W.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 19, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

From Noon, November 18 to Noon, November 19.

I. IDENTIFICATIONS: Inhabitants of MAIRY report that Prussian and Bavarian troops have been in the vicinity of MAIRY Bavarian troops belonged to 167th Regt. of Infantry.

II. TIME OF EVACUATION:

A) ANDERNY. With the exception of the Chef-de-Gare and a few stragglers, who left on Saturday, November 16, the last German troops left that town November 15. A Labor Company, composed of troops from various units, was located at ANDERNY for seven months. These troops included the 12th Company of Pioneers, railroad engineers.

The attitude of the troops lately was not changed. No personal harm was done by the troops but they took practically all horses, cattle etc., even after the signing of the Armistice.

B) MAIRY. German troops, before the town of MAIRY, at noon, November 16, 1918.

Prussian troops, occupying the vicinity of the town, marched away in perfect order, but the Bavarian troops were very unmilitary and poorly disciplined. Many of the men wore red brassards, flew red flags, and forced the remaining officers to wear red brassards also.

III. MISCELLANEOUS: "At 1.45 p.m. Nov. 19, three representatives of the working people of MILVANGE arrived at these headquarters asking that patrols be sent to their town to restore law and order. Tye Boche had departed and they have no police system. There is a great shortage of food and considerable rioting. One Russian being killed and a woman shot through the hand. Town has a population of 10000."

At about 3.30 p.m. a messenger delivered to a member of the French Mission a document, the translation of which is as followw:

"The Kreisdirektor (Sub-Prefect) of the Arrondissement of Thionville-West, makes an urgent request that 300 or 400 soldiers be sent without delay to protect the factories from destruction, and to prevent troubles among the workmen.

"It will be necessary to send the troops by trucks, the situation being very serious. Riots among the workmen have already taken place yesterday and will likely become more serious. To-day the totality of the miners of the FONTOY and ALGRANGE valley have struck work. Attacks against property and life are threatened.

The destribution of the troops among the factories will be indicated by telephone by the Sub-Prefect. Kindly state the place where the troops will arrive to permit getting in touch with the Commanding Officer.

Please indicate your decision to the messenger. The factories referred to above are at Knutange." The messenger did not wait for an answer.

The town of KNUTANGE referred to above, is situated 8 kilometers west of THIONVILLE and numbers 3,445 inhab-

- 2 -

itants." In the territory of the Commune are a part of the steel mills of the Societe d'Lorraine - Aumetz - Friede of ALGRANGE.

The three representatives of the working people of NILVANGE stated that the town numbered 10,000 inhabitants, but the French Notice sur Al-Lorraine gives its population as 2267. It is presumed that the three representatives referred to were speaking of the population of both Nilvange and Knutange, the two towns being very close together.

Both the report on the disturbances at NILVANGE and the one referring to the factories of KNUTANGE were reported in extenso by telephone to G-3, 4th Corps, as it was not possible to get communication with G-2.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters ;1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 19, 1918.

G-2

Translation of a Document.

The Kreisdirector (Sub-Prefect) of the Arrondissement of Thionville-West, makes an urgent request that 300 or 400 soldiers be sent without delay to protect the factories from destruction, and to prevent troubles among the workmen.

It will be necessary to send the troops by trucks, the situation being very serious. Riots among the workmen have already taken place yesterday and will likely become more serious. To-day the totality of the miners of the Fontoy and Algrange valley have struck work. Attacks against property and life are threatened. The distribution of the troops among the factories will be indicated by telephone by the Sub-Prefect. Kindly state the place where the troops will arrive to permit getting in touch with the Commanding Officer.

Please indicate your decision to the messenger. The factories referred to above are at KNUTANGE.

KNUTANGE.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 19, 1918.

A. Herewith instructions received from Fourth Corps.

B. Brigade and Regimental Intelligence Officers and Battalion Scout Officers will make every effort to obtain information mentioned in Paragraph 1 of instructions, and forward same to G-2, Division Headquarters, either in the form of a special message (important matters) or in the report mentioned in Paragraph 2 of the instructions.

C. Regimental Intelligence Officers will render daily written reports to G-2, Division Headquarters, through Brigade Intelligence Officer, these reports to comply with Paragraph 2 of instructions and to reach Division Headquarters by 2 p.m.

D. Brigade Intelligence Officers are responsible for compliance with Paragraph 3 of instructions. They will be furnished with sufficient details of M.P.'s. Ex-prisoners will be evacuated direct from Brigade to Corps Cage. (not through Division P.C.)

By Command of Brigadier General Parker:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution:

1st Brig. I.O. (9 copies for distribution to R.I.O.'s and B.S.O.'s
2nd Brig. I.O. (" " " " " " and B.S.O.'s

Art. Brig. I.O.	1
C. G.	1
C. of S.	1
Div. Adjt.	1

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 19, 1918.

ANNEX NO. 1 TO ARMISTICE CONDITIONS.

1. Evacuation of invaded territories: BELGIUM, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, as well as ALSACE-LORRAINE.

This will be carried out in three successive phases under the following conditions:

1st Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between the present front and line No. 1, of the attached map: - to be completed within a period of five days after the signing of armistice.

2nd Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 1 and line No. 2: to be completed within a period of four more days (a total of nine days after the signing of the Armistice).

3rd Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 2 and line No. 3: to be completed within a period of six more days (a total of fifteen days after the signing of the Armistice.)

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will go into these territories upon the expiration of the periods accorded to the German troops for evacuation of each of them.

Accordingly:

--the present German front will be crossed by the Allied troops beginning with the sixth day following the signing of the Armistice.

--Line No. 1 beginning on the tenth day;

--Line No. 2 beginning on the sixteenth day.

II. Evacuation of the Rhine territory:

This evacuation will also take place in several successive phase

1st Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between lines No. 2 and No. 3 and line No. 4: - to be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 19 days after the signing of the Armistice.)

2nd Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between Line No. 4 and Line No. 5: - to be completed within a period of four more days, (a total of 23 days after the signing of the Armistice.)

3rd Phase: Evacuation of territory situated between Line No. 5 and Line No. 6 (line of the Rhine): to be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 27 days after the signing of the Armistice.)

4th Phase: Evacuation of bridge-heads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine: - to be completed within period of four more days (a total of 31 days after the signing of the armistice.)

The troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States will enter these various territories upon the expiration of the period accorded to the German troops for evacuation of each of them.

Accordingly:

--They will cross line No. 3 on the 20th day following the signing of the Armistice.

--They will cross line No. 4 on the 24th day following the signing of the Armistice;

--Line No. 5 on the 25th day;

--Line No. 6 (Rhine) on the 32nd day for occupation of the bridge heads.

III. Delivery by the German Armies of War Material provided for by the Armistice.

This war material should be delivered under the following conditions:

The first half before the 10th day:

The second half before the 20th day;

This material will be turned over to each of the Armies of the Allies and of the United States by each tactical group of the German Army in proportion which will be determined upon by the permanent Armistice Commission.

--:-

ANNEX NUMBER 2 TO THE ARMISTICE CONDITIONS.

CONDITIONS CONCERNING MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

(Railways, navigable rivers, roads, sea and river ports, telegraph and telephones).

I. All means of communication in territory up to and including the Rhine, or located in the territory constituting the bridgeheads on the right bank of that river occupied by the Allied Armies, will be placed under the full, and entire authority of the Chief Command of the Allied Armies, who will have the right to take all measures which he may judge necessary to ensure the occupation and exploitation. All documents relative to means of communication will be made ready for transmittal to said command.

II. All material and all civil and military personnel now employed for the maintenance and exploitation of Means of Communication will be maintained as they stand on said means, in all the territories evacuated by the German troops.

All the additional materiel necessary for the maintenance of these means of communication in the country on the left bank of the Rhine, will be furnished by the German Government during the entire existence of the armistice.

III. PERSONNEL.

The French and Belgian personnel belonging to the railway lines of the Chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine will be maintained or restored to its place so as to assure the exploitation of this line.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will have the right to make such changes and replacements as he sees fit in the personnel of the means of Communication.

IV. MATERIEL.

(a) Rolling stock. The rolling stock turned over to the Allied Armies in the zone comprised between the present front and line No. 8, excluding Alsace-Lorraine, shall consist of at least:

5000 locomotives

150, 000 cars.

This delivery will be effected within the period fixed in clause 7 of the Armistice, the details of the conditions to be fixed by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this materiel will be kept in good maintenance and rolling condition and provided with all the usual spares or equipment. It may be operated with its own personnel or any other, on any part of the railway systems of the Allied Armies.

The materiel organically belonging to the line operated by the railway system of Alsace-Lorraine will be maintained or restored and placed at the disposition of the French Army.

On the other hand, the material to be left as it stands in the regions on the left bank of the Rhine as well as within the territory of the bridgeheads must ensure normal

operation of the railway lines in those territories.

(b) Road, Signalling and Workshop Materiel.

The signalling materiel, the machine tools and the equipment taken from the workshops of the French and Belgian railway depots, will be turned over under such conditions as will be fixed by the Government International Armistice Commission. There will be furnished to the Allied Armies trench materiel, rails, small materiel, implements, bridge materiel and the necessary ties to repair the lines destroyed beyond the present front.

(c) Fuel and Maintenance Supplies. During the Armistice the fuel and supplies for the maintenance of the lines will be delivered, by the German Government at the depots normally belonging to the railway system in the regions on the left bank of the Rhine.

VI. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS.

All permanent telephone and telegraph lines, all wireless stations will be turned over to the Allied Armies with all the civil and military personnel and all the materiel, including all the supplies stored on the left bank of the Rhine.

The additional supplies necessary to maintain the lines must be furnished during the armistice by the German Government as they are needed.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will institute military occupation of this system; he will ensure the direction thereof, and, among the personnel, will make such changes and replacements as he may deem necessary.

He will send back to the German Army all the military personnel which he will not consider necessary for the operation and up-keep of the systems.

All the plans of the German telegraph and telephone systems will be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution to include
Company and Battery Commanders.

Headquarters First Division,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, November 21, 1918.

G-2

1. IDENTIFICATIONS.

Following troops passed through the town of
Hesperingen during the last few days:

Kursus Company, Feld Rekruten Depot der 228 I. Division.
Nov. 11.

3 Company, " " " " " "
1st Battalion, 19th Res. Foot Artillery Battalion Nov. 18
1st Company, Feld Rekrutendepot der 19 Res. Division ?

The artillery of the 63rd Division is reported to
have passed through the town of Dudelingen on November 19.

Two battalions of the 10th Res. Regt. (Bavarian)
left Ettingen Sunday, November 17.

The 5th Regiment of Heavy Artillery is also reported
to have passed through that town on the same day.

2. MATERIAL FOUND.

4 Anti-aircraft guns and about 1600 shells in Dudel-
ingen.

Nothing further to report.

THOS..R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 21, 1918.

G-2

IDENTIFICATIONS
8h45 (French Time)

Following troops passed through the town of Aspelt.

Nov. 13. F. R. D. of 76th Res. Div.

Nov. 18th Sax. San. Company 28

Nov. 19th Feldintendantur of 33rd Inf. Div.
3rd and 4th Companies, Landsturm Infantry
Battalion Rentlingen XIII /4 -
1st Company, Armierungs Battalion 96.

November 20th San. Company 42.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U. S. A.
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 21, 1918.

G-2

IDENTIFICATIONS.
Thursday, 19h30

Following troops passed through the town of Weiler
zum Turm

Nov. 13. Staff of Fuss. Art. Battalion (Attached to 28th
Div. according to a document).
Nov. 15. 2nd Battalion, 151st Inf. Regt.
Nov. 16 Mun. Kol. 356.
Nov. 17 Staff of 63rd Sax. Inf. Brig. (132nd Div.)
Magazin Fuhrpark Kolonne 319
Nov. 18 Strassenbau Company 30
5th (Company ?) Armerungsbattalion 23.
Staff and troops of 103rd Inf. Regt.
Nov. 20th Staff of 130th Inf. Regt.
1st and 3rd Battalions, 130th Inf. Regt.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 22, 1918.
16h30

G-2

REPORT to G-2, 4th Army Corps, A.E.F.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

Following troops passed through Gostingen on the dates mentioned, the last leaving the town at 13h, November 21.

35th Sanitary Co.	November 16	
Leichtermun Kol. 1214, Res.Feld Art.Regt. 239,		Nov. 21
4th Battalion, 84th Ldw. Inf. Regt.		Nov. 21
3rd Battalion and Staff of 40th Fus. Regt.		Nov. 16
2nd Battalion of 474th Inf. Regt.		Nov. 17
Staff of the 2nd Abteiling*of 192nd F.A.Regt.		Nov. 18
Pioneer Bn. 241		?
2nd Bn. 137th Inf.		?
4th Co. 31st Armierungs Bn.		?

Following troops passed through Wormeldingen on the dates mentioned.

4th Co. M.W. Bn. XV.	Nov. 21
1st M. G. Co., 84th Regt. Inf.	Nov. 21

REPORT on strength of certain units:

21	21 men.
2nd Bn. 474th:	19 officers.
1	- Feldwebel and Vize Feldwebel.
	63 Unteroffiziers
	475 men
	98 horses
3rd Bn. Fus. Regt. No. 40.,	
	13 officers
	1 Waffenmeister
	6 Offizier Stellvertreter
	388 Unteroffiziere and men
4th Bn. 84th Ldw. Inf. Regt.	
	20 Officers
	15 Feldwebel and Vize Feldwebel
	72 Unteroffiziere
	429 men
	67 horses

NOTE: These figures are taken from Quartier-Zettel (Billeting receipts) and presumably refer to total ration strengths.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U. S. A.,
S. C. of S., G-2

* Correct Spelling - ABTEILUNG - B.R.I.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 22, 1918.
11h53

G-2

IDENTIFICATIONS.

Following troops were billeted in Canach, leaving that town on the dates mentioned. (Documentary identifications)

Staff of the 1st Landwehr Div.	Nov. 21
Divisional Funker Abteilung 190	Nov. 21
1st Battalion 69th Regt. of Inf.	Nov. 21
2nd " " " " "	Nov. 20
Staff, 34th Landwehr Brigade	Nov. 21
1st Battalion, 40th Regt. Fus.	Nov. 16
1st Battalion, 137th Regt. Inf.	Nov. 17
F. R. D. of 228th Inf. Div. .	Nov. 13

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 23, 1918.
12h.

G-2

Report to G-2, 4th Army Corps, American E. F.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

The following troops were billeted in the town
of BAYERN, leaving on the dates mentioned.

Ldst. Inf. Battalion Kitzurgen	Nov. 19, (Doc.)
San. Komp. 253	17 (Doc.)

The following troops were billeted in the town
of FLAXWEILER, leaving on the dates mentioned.

Leichte Mun. Kol. 1189	Nov. 17 (Doc.)
M.W. Battalion XIV	" 19 (Doc.)
6th Comp., 47th Inf. Regt.	" 21 (Doc.)

STRENGTH OF UNITS.

(From billeting receipts, - presumably ration
strength)

Leichte Mun. Kol. 1189
3 officers
60 men
252 horses.

M.W. Battalion XIV
29 officers
652 men
97 horses

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 23, 1918.

G-2

MEMORANDUM NUMBER 102.

The following memorandum from General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, to G-2, First Division, is published for the information, guidance, and compliance of all concerned.

"1. Reliable reports received indicate that the Russian Bolsheviks have shipped a large amount of literature to be distributed in France among the Allied troops.

"2. It is imperative that proper steps be taken:

- (a) To detect the distribution of such literature among American troops;
- (b) To report to G-2, G.H.Q., A.E.F., immediately when the presence of such literature is discovered;
- (c) To trace the manner in which it is distributed and arrest the distributors;
- (d) To seize all such literature as far as practicable.

"3. Officers in charge of Contre-espionage organizations in divisions and in separate units should devote special attention to this situation.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, G.S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

Brigade and Regimental Intelligence Officers are charged particularly with the duty of detecting and reporting any activities of the Russian Bolsheviks to G-2, Division Headquarters.

By command of Major General McGlachlin:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution:

To include Battalion commanders and Brigade and Regimental I.O.s

C.G.
Adjt.
G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.
November 23, 1918.

G-2

Orders from Army direct that all copies of the
publication "Lavague" of November 21, 1918, be suppressed.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S. G-2

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.;
November 24, 1918.

G-2

GP de FL - RP Nr. 3 - For G.P. von C.L. No. 164 to British, G.H.Q.

General Nudant, president Permanent International Armistice Commission - A.C. 44 24/11/18. The following memorandum has been handed to me with warning by German foreign office representatives at Spa. Memorandum begins, 'To the British President General Haking. The Esthonian Government requests following note to be transmitted by British navy to British Government:

Note begins "The Bolsheviks have established their battle front between the Gulf of Finland and the Esthonian. The first attack on the 22nd of November was repulsed by German troops, according to order of the day of Commander in Chief Posern, the Bolsheviks contemplate a general attack on the whole front this evening, Esthonian militia ordered to the battle front support of German troops. Mobilization of the Esthonian National Army is in progress, but not yet complete. It is urgently necessary that a fleet of the allied powers should appear in Reval at the earliest possible moment, in order to prevent anarchists and the inevitable massacre. Please have acknowledgement sent from London to Reval, to the Esthonian government. Note ends.

Spa, Nov. 24, 1918.

Signed) von HAMEL.

Memorandum ends. Addressed President International Armistice Commission and British G.H.Q. from General Haking. copy for information to

American Mission
Belgian Mission
German Mission

C.G.

C.S.

G-1

G-2

G-3

Div. Surg.

C.G. 1st Art. Brig.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 24, 1918.

G-2

Memorandum to Brigade and Regimental Intelligence Officers:

The following paragraphs, referring to counter espionage, are reproduced for your information and guidance. It is requested that you select, immediately, an officer in each Battalion and Company, and at least one non-commissioned officer or private in each platoon, to handle this work. Only those of unquestioned loyalty and good judgment must be selected and the responsibility and dignity of their mission must be thoroughly impressed upon them; also the absolute necessity of maintaining secrecy regarding this work.

CONTRE-ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION WITHIN MILITARY UNITS.

Note: The following circular is a condensation of the principles laid down in two secret pamphlets, dated May 22, 1918, and August 31, 1918, respectively, which have been approved and issued by order of The Secretary of War for the information and government of the Army of the United States, copies of which are not at present available for general distribution in the A.E.F. The strictly secret nature of these instructions is emphasized and the necessity for maintaining absolute silence, not only as to the details of the system, but the very fact of its existence.

1. It is imperative that an effective contre-espionage service be maintained at a high state of efficiency wherever troops are stationed so that nowhere within the Army can the activities of enemy agents or enemy sympathizers be carried on unobserved. Therefore, the service will be continued in those organizations in which it now exists and it will be established immediately in all other units.

2. Contre-espionage within military units is not a separate service but is a function which each unit must undertake for itself, just as it provides its own guard. It is the duty of each commander of an independent unit to see that his command is protected by a proper contre-espionage system administered under his own authority according to the principles laid down by the General Staff.

* * * * *

5. The contre-espionage service is of a strictly secret nature, and the nature of its functions within the unit is not communicated to any officer thereof save the Commanding Officer, the Intelligence Officers and, to a limited extent, to those officers and men who form a part of the organization.

6. The object of the service is to detect enemy propaganda, espionage, sabotage or other activities tending to destroy military efficiency and also such dissention, disloyalty, and general disturbance of morale by individuals or groups as may or may not be inspired directly by the enemy but, nevertheless, operates directly in his interest.

7. The function of the contre-espionage service is informational and preventative rather than punitive. It collects information upon which proper authorities may act to prevent or suppress disloyalty or sedition and to apprehend enemy agents or sympathizers, but it does not usurp the functions of executive officers in making arrests and directing punishment, nor that of the Judge Advocate in preparing evidence for courts martial.

8. The organization whereby the Intelligence Officer obtains the desired information and keeps in touch at all times with the situation within each group is based upon the selection of a number of men of approved loyalty and discretion throughout the unit who are charged with the duty of observing and reporting such suspicious circumstances as fall within their observation. The proportion of such men in any body of troops varies according to circumstances within the discretion of the Intelligence Officer, but there should be in general, two such operatives, unknown to each other, in such group of men so that there may be counter-check.

9. The operatives so selected are not placed on special duty nor do they require a detailed course of instruction. They should be advised that their duties as observers are important and necessary for the protection of themselves and their comrades against enemy activity and that they are not expected to tell tales on their companions regarding matters not connected with disloyalty and espionage.

10. Each operative will be impressed with the dignity of his position as a man of tried loyalty charged with a duty of grave importance and peculiar value to his country, also with the strictly confidential nature of the service in which he is engaged and the necessity that the existence of his mission be kept inviolably secret.

11. Reports of operatives should be in writing, except in case of great emergency, and each operative should be required to report weekly, even if he has only to report that nothing has been observed.

* * * * *

20. Direct communication between Intelligence Officers, without regard to ordinary military channels, is specially authorized by the Secretary of War on all matters pertaining solely to Military Intelligence, and this makes possible the maintenance at headquarters of a central pool of information derived from the reports received from various sources and from which each Intelligence Officer may be supplied promptly with information as to particular matters.

21. The primary duty of the C.E. officer of a unit is to his commanding officer. The service is an information one and through it the commanding officer is advised of the situation within his unit in order that appropriate action may be taken at the proper time. The administration of the C.E. system as a whole distinguished from the actual command of C.E. officers of units, lies with G-2, and through the privilege of direct communication, specifically authorized among Intelligence Officers, it is possible quickly to collate and distribute information in order that there may be unity and uniformity of action.

22. Reports made to G-2 are of three varieties, namely, Individual Reports, Special Reports, and Situation Surveys. Individual reports are, as the name indicates, reports as to individual cases; they are made as the case arises and are supplemented from time to time as the case develops. Special reports cover such circumstances or occurrences as may not properly be made the subject of an individual report, as, for instance, the growth of some dangerous tendency within the unit. Situation surveys are rendered weekly and are in the form of an estimate of the current situation from a contre-espionage standpoint; such as; status of the organization within the unit; important changes, if any, morale of troops, circumstances affecting

the status of the work and other matters of interest in forming an idea of the situation within the unit.

* * * * *

24. Each Intelligence Officer is charged not only with the duty of maintaining the contre-espionage system within his own unit, but of aiding in every possible way in maintaining the entire system so that there may be complete and continuous cover of all troops. He will, therefore, assist Intelligence Officers of nearby units so far as may be practicable, and when a portion of his unit is about to become separated from the main body, will take steps to install an independent contre-espionage service therein. Similarly, when an organization in which there exists an independent contre-espionage service becomes attached to a larger unit, the Intelligence Officer of the smaller unit will report himself to the Intelligence Officer of the larger, so that the service may be amalgamated.

25. In the event of a cessation of hostilities, all Intelligence Officers engaged in contre-espionage will be required to exercise extraordinary vigilance in the matter of MORALE within their units. The entire contre-espionage system will be utilized for this duty. Where, through circumstances incident to operations in the battle zone, the contre-espionage service has become to a degree disorganized, steps will be taken at once by unit Intelligence Officers to rehabilitate the system as outlined above. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the importance of the service in the interim between the cessation of hostilities and demobilization, which in several cases may be considerable in duration.

26. The only effective method of truly gauging the morale status of a unit is through the contre-espionage system. Particular vigilance must be employed to detect insidious propaganda of Bolshevik, I.W.W., Socialistic, Pacifistic and Anti-Ally origin. It is known that strong efforts will be made to promote disaffection in the ranks of the allied forces after the actual hostilities have ceased, and the operations of our present enemies and the enemies of law and orderly government may take different forms and courses. Consequently extraordinary and constant vigilance will be essential during all the time the troops of the United States are in occupation of European territory.

27. Throughout both S.O.S. and the Advance Zone are stationed Intelligence Officers charged with the observation and control of civilian suspects within their designated areas. This relieves the Intelligence Officers of military units of responsibility in this regard. Area Intelligence Officers are charged with the administration of the C.E. service locally and are in liaison with the French Military and civil authorities in this regard. There should be the closest cooperation and understanding at all times between the Intelligence Officers of military units and Intelligence Officers of areas wherein the unit is situated.

28. The confidential nature of these instructions render it necessary that they be communicated only to the commanders of independent units and through them to the Intelligence Officers of the units. In order that there may be no miscarriage in this regard, it is made the duty of the Area Intelligence Officer to transmit this circular to each Commander of each independent unit stationed within his area and, if desired, to aid the Intelligence Officer of the unit in establishing his C.E. system.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, G.S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

All cases with reference to contre-espionage will be reported immediately and directly to G-2, Division Headquarters, by Regimental Intelligence Officers. It is unnecessary for these reports to go through military channels.

On Sunday of each week a report covering all cases for the preceding 7 days will be forwarded to G-2, Division Headquarters. If no case has arisen during the week a statement: "Nothing to report will be forwarded.

By command of Major General McGlachlin:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

Distribution to Brig.
and Regt. I.C.'s.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 25, 1918.

G-2

Memorandum Number 103:

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PUBLISHED FOR THE INFORMATION, GUIDANCE, AND COMPLIANCE OF ALL CONCERNED:-

For the present the personnel of Battalion Scout Platoons will be returned to their respective companies for administration and training, but will be reconstituted at a later date.

There will be formed, immediately, in each battalion, an Intelligence Group, consisting of one officer and four men, whose duty it will be to gain as much information about the enemy as is possible. This information will consist of:

(a) Identifications of German units which have evacuated the territory through which this Division is marching.

(b) All information regarding the enemy. i.e. morale; condition of personal equipment; condition of carriages and animals; amount of transportation; effective strength of enemy units; discipline; health; attitude regarding peace; destination, etc.

This information will be obtained by questioning civilians, ex-prisoners, and deserters. All information of interest and importance will be reported.

It is suggested that Intelligence Groups visit the Mayor of each town for the purpose of examining the requisitions and receipts signed by German officers. These requisitions and receipts always bear the name of the organization, and in this manner practically all of the identifications can be obtained.

The officer in charge of a Battalion Group will report identifications and all other information of interest to Regimental Intelligence Officers, daily, the time to be determined by R.I.O.'s. Regimental Intelligence Officers will immediately forward their reports to Brigade Intelligence Officers who will report to G-2, Division Headquarters, not later than 20 h. daily.

The Battalion Intelligence Group, of one officer and four men, will be composed of those who have a working knowledge of the German language. An inventory of the Division is now being made by G-2 for the purpose of supplying German-speaking personnel.

At each Brigade and Regimental Headquarters will be maintained an Intelligence Group consisting of not more than one non-commissioned officer and two privates, assistants to the Intelligence Officer, whose duties and qualifications will correspond to those of the Battalion Group.

By Command of Major General McGlachlin:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Distribution to include
Battalions of Inf. and Art.
and Int. Officers.

Headquarters 1st Division,
American E. F.,
November 25, 1918.

G-2

Information has just been received from the 4th Army Corps by G-2, First Division, that the movement towards ports of embarkation of the 26th and 79th Divisions will not be continued.

The information further states that, for the present, the American Army in Europe will consist of the following:-

3 Armies, 9 Corps, 30 Divisions (Combat)

The thirty divisions will be as follows:

Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 42, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 92.

The 41st Division will remain a depot Division.

All Divisions included in the list of 30 divisions that are not marching to the Rhine will immediately go into training in France. This does not include the one corps acting as a reserve of the 3rd Army, which for the present will remain immediately behind the line as of Nov. 11, 1918.

Other divisions (31, 34, 38, 39, 40, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87) will be used to furnish replacements for the 30 divisions constituting the three armies.

While nothing definite has been forthcoming from official sources it is thought that the divisions which are now advancing on the heels of the retreating Germans will be among the first divisions to be returned to the United States.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters 1st Division
American E. F.,
November 25, 1918.

G-2

REPORT ON PRISONER TAKEN AT GREVENMACHER.

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

Date, November 24, 1918.

Time, 21 hour.

Prisoner was returning to the home of his wife in Grevenmacher and was met by our guards on this side of the bridge crossing the Moselle. He was immediately taken into custody.

II. IDENTIFICATION:

Prisoner belongs to the Second Company, 98th Res. Regt. 207th Div. He was on detached service with the Grosse Bagage.

III. ROUTE FOLLOWED BY HIS DIVISION:

When the armistice was signed the 207th Div. was in the northern part of Belgium, near Altz. It was marched back via Diest - Aachen to Wickrath. The entire Division marched together, the three regiments following a single axial road. The march was made in good order, as far as the prisoner knows, although certain men carried red flags. He knows of no material abandoned.

IV. MUSTERING OUT:

Prisoner was mustered out by the signature of his company commander, "in accordance with provisions of O.H.L. Ib No. 105455 op." All men living on the left bank of the Rhine or in Alsace-Lorraine were being mustered out at that time and sent back to their respective homes. The prisoner understands that men living in territory east of the Rhine are to be mustered out later, as soon as the paper work can be attended to. He states that he could have left his unit before reaching Wickrath but that in that case he would have forfeited his pay, which he did not want to do, being a poor man.

V.

Prisoner left Wickrath November 23, travelling by railroad via Trier to Wellen. On the train there were a number of soldiers returning home as he was and also French prisoners being sent back to Metz. In Trier he saw German soldiers, but understood that they were leaving November 25, as Trier was to be evacuated by the 26th.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

There is a Soldatenrat in the 98th Res. Regt. Prisoner did not pay great attention to it but states that several officers belonged to it. Amongst the orders issued by this Rat is one which states that soldiers need not salute their officers except when on duty.

Prisoner is of the opinion that the troops are glad of the armistice, in spite of the hard conditions, arguing that it will be impossible to start the war again.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 26, 1918.

From : A.C. of S., G-2, First Division, A.E.F.
To : A.C. of S., G-2, Fourth Army Corps, A.E.F.
Subject : Information of the Enemy.

1. The following reports have been received this date from forward echelons:

* * * * *
"The following reports have been gathered from the civil
Population.

On November 20 and 21 about 100,000 German troops retreated across the Moselle River, the majority of whom came thru this town, Gravemacher*. Their morale was very low and there was much disorder among them. Very few carried rifles and their retreat resembled a mob.

The troops were composed of Prussians and Bavarian Regiments. In many instances there seemed to be friction between the Prussian and Bavarian outfits.

From several sources it is reported that when the news came of the abdication of the Kaiser, the German troops threw off all former restraint and cut off all their insignia and destroyed all means of identifications, so they could not be re-organized. In some regiments the soldiers removed all insignia from their officers.

The German soldiers broke into their supply stores, taking boots, shoes, clothes, etc. and later sold these stores to the civilians.

It is claimed by the civilians that there are many German soldiers disguised in civilian clothes, the main idea being to break up the organization.

The Germans had sufficient horses for their needs but they were unfed. In many cases the troops sold their horses to the civilians for a small sum."

* * * * *
The following information of the Germans who left this
Sector is Submitted

"Civilians who had German officers billeted in their homes state that some of the officers thought that Germany would resume the war in a few years. One Major stated that in ten years Germany would be ready to start again. They also state that, on the whole, the Germans who passed through this town, were well behaved, but that since the armistice was signed, some of the officers were afraid to try to enforce discipline, and that the soldiers were selling their arms and equipment."

* * * * *
The following information was picked up to-day (Nov. 25) in
the town of Gravemacher*, by my agents:

"On Saturday, Nov. 23, 1918, it is reported that the road on the right bank of the Moselle was used by two divisions which were proceeding north under the command of their officers. It is variously reported that these divisions were the 10th, the 98th and the 63rd. Nearly all informants are agreed that the troops passing were from Wurtemberg and

Posen. All informants state that it is hard to find out what unit is passing now because nearly all of the insignia is pulled off the shoulders of the men and that the officers are also without markings much of the time.

"On buildings of the town, and from inhabitants it is learned that the following units or portions of units were billeted in Gravemacher* within a short time.

398th Uhlans, Regimental Staff.

228th Division?

10th Regt.?

And portions of the 5th Army Headquarters

"It is suggested that the following, looked upon as German spies by the authorities, and suspected by nearly everyone interviewed, be taken into a rear area for questioning and investigation: Karl Guill

Kain Lewis

"The former acted as a denouncer for the Germans during their occupancy of the town, and is regarded as an active German spy at the present time. He is under observation but should be taken into the rear where he can be made to give up his information. The latter is regarded as a very pro-German but little has been discovered about any possible activities."

* * * *

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.

*Correct spelling Grevenmacher.

S.G.W.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 26, 1918.

G-2

Appendix A to Report:

Nicholas Becker-Govers, of Grevenmacher, Luxemburg, submitted a report, the substance of which is, briefly, as follows:

At about 2h., November 19, a German truck stopped before the door of his house. Three soldiers stepped out, one of them armed, and wearing an arm band marked:- "Soldatenrat Trier" (Soldiers Council of Trier). "The soldier wearing the arm band ordered me to show him my stables in the name of the Soldiers Council of Trier. Noticing some pigs in a box-stall he stated that he must take two of them back to Trier. I replied that I needed the pigs and that I understood that it was forbidden for Germans to requisition in this country. I also asked for some paper showing his authority to exercise the right of requisition. He thereupon answered that two pigs would not be sufficient, and that he would return on the morrow and take my two best horses and some cattle. I answered by ordering the soldiers out of the stable."

"One of the soldiers grasped his gun and held it against my breast, saying: 'If you raise any objection I will shoot you.' In the meantime the two other soldiers took the two best pigs and loaded them into the automobile. I was alone with the soldiers and could not prevent this occurrence. "Then the three soldiers drove away in the truck with the pigs, without showing me any paper proving that they had the power to act as they did."

- Inclosed: 1. Signed Statement by Nicholas Becker-Govers
2. Note by Grand Ducal Police Department, giving names of witnesses and the name of the man suspected to have committed the theft.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 26, 1918.

G-2

Report on German Divisions opposite First Division in
Montdidier Sector:

A. Period of April 26 to May 27, inclusive.
30th Div. (Relieved May 16 by 82nd Res. Div.
25th Res. Div.

B. May 28.
82nd Res. Div.
25th Res. Div.

NOTE: The attack on Cantigny involved chiefly two
regiments of the 82nd Res. Div., namely the 271st
and 272nd Inf. Regts. The 271st, holding the town
of Cantigny itself, suffered the most heavily and
was later very harshly criticized by the German
Corps Commander.

C. Period from May 29 to July 7, inclusive.
82nd Res. Div.
25th Res. Div.
1st Res. Div. (After extension of front of June 1.)

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 27, 1918.

G-2

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

1. The greater portion of the civilians of the Treves region are reported to be resigned to the occupation, but some are decidedly anti-American. Civilians say to be on the alert when we cross into German territory as there are many German sympathizers who have threatened our men.

2. It is also reported that five or six weeks ago about six American planes, after bombing expedition on Coblenz, were forced to descend during a storm near Berncaston* on the Moselle River. The population did not treat the aviators as prisoners of war should be treated but were very brutal and two were killed. (Unconfirmed).

3. The above was gathered from the inhabitants of Gravenmacher*1 and they are of the opinion that the Germans feel unusually hostile toward the Americans in that sector.

4. The man, Karl Guill, reported yesterday, is an ex-convict and has also been in trouble without arrest.

5. The Cafe Rheinhart at Wasserbillig is reported as a German rendezvous at the present time.

6. The following identifications were made in MACHTUN*2.
Nov. 19. - On the morning of November 19th thirteen officers, 476 men and 147 horses, belonging to the 192nd J.D., left MACHTUN*2. During the night of Nov. 19-20 two officers, 15 N.C.O's and 115 men and 625 Russians stopped in the town leaving on the morning of the 20th. These Russians were used as labor troops for digging graves, etc.

Nov. 20. On the night of Nov. 20, a party of pioneers, numbering 6 officers, 295 men, and 50 horses, passed through the town. This detachment was attached to the 15th J.D.

In addition to the troops mentioned above, some artillery also stopped in the town over night, but it was impossible to find out to what organization they belonged. The mounts were in good condition but the other animals were in very bad shape. Discipline among the retreating troops was very poor. Soldiers sold part of their equipment and also threw some in the river.

7. Appendices inclosed: Report on Landing of German planes at Mertert.

Report on situation in Trier.

Report on retirement of German troops through Gravenmacher.*1

Report on three ex-prisoners.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK, Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S G2

* Correct spelling: BERNCASEL
*1 " " : GREVENMACHER
*2 " " : MACHTUM.

S.G.W.

G-2

First Division Headquarters
American E.F.
France, November 27th 1918

Report on the landing and willful destruction of German military planes at Mertert, Nov.10th and 13th.

On November 10th, four German scouts landed near the village of Mertert, 3 Km northwest of Gravenmacher.* The pilots stated they had come from Liege and were on their way to Trier. They abandoned the machines and walked over to Gravenmacher* where they spend the night. The next morning they proceeded on foot towards Wasserbillig and apparently crossed the frontier. These machines were set on fire on Nov.11th by some German soldiers, mounted on trucks.

Another plane landed a Mertert on November 13th. The Maire of Gravenmacher* proceeded to the spot and requested the pilot to proceed on his way, as he was unable to protect the machine if left without a guard. The pilot then endeavoured to renew his flight but in so doing put his machine out of commission. He then telephoned to Wasserbillig requesting that some mechanics be sent to repair or remove his machine. This plane was set a fire on Nov.13 apparently by these mechanics.

* Correct spelling: GREVENMACHER.

S.G.W.

G-2

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 27, 1918.

Report on Situation in Trier.

An inhabitant of Grevenmacher, in Trier on November 25, made the following statement:

" There are still quite a number of German soldiers in uniform in Trier, but all German troops must leave the town by ten A.M., November 26, as American troops are expected there very soon.

" A number of wounded, in the hospitals, are being gradually evacuated. Several Cantines and Soldatenheim have been demolished and utensils destroyed, rather than have them profit the Americans"

This person made the following statement concerning the frame of mind of the inhabitants of Trier;

" The people of Trier are exceedingly depressed and in many cases embittered at the prospect of seeing Americans in their town. Some say - "Der Krieg Fangt nur an fur uns" (The war is only starting for us). Other people desire the prompt arrival of the Americans as they believe the Americans will bring food.

"Trier is quiet and orderly. A number of liberated soldiers in civilian clothes are to be seen. A few red emblems are displayed but no manifestations have taken place lately".

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 27, 1918.

G-2

Report on the Retirement of the German troops through
Gravenmacher*, November 12, to November 22.

The first German units to cross the frontier, were, for the most part, composed of men serving on the lines of communication (Etappen). These detachments lacked discipline altogether and were much criticized by the inhabitants of Gravenmacher*. Numerous red emblems were displayed (especially on trains and trucks). Shoulder straps and insignia were discarded by both men and officers. Some officers, were heard to make the statement, that they would wear their insignia only as long as they remained on Luxembourg territory. Military equipments were sold indiscriminately to civilians (arms and clothing).

These men (Etappen troops) were perfectly cognizant of the situation and spoke vociferously of the Soldiers National Committee. They mentioned that the troops from the front would arrive shortly and cautioned the inhabitants against them, stating that these troops were utterly disorganized and undisciplined.

The first regular detachments arrived on November 17 (The second squadron of Jaeger zu Pferde). On November 18, (the 35th Fus.Regt. and the 39 Regt. of Field Artillery), Armierungsbattalion 187. On the 19th, Pion.Co. 395, Div. Sig. Detach. 10, Div. K.K. 543, On November 20, 10th Art. Regt. and Staff, Div. Funk Abt. 146, Pion.Co. 5, 398th Inf. Regt., San. Co. 218, On the 21st; Wttbg. Geb. Regt, 2nd Posen Field Art. Regt No. 56 and Staff. On November 22, Div. Staff of 10th Inf. Div.

All these troops showed good discipline. The officers spoke but little, seemed depressed. The men seemed much in ignorance of armistice conditions and of the general situation. They expected to be demobilized. These troops left Gravenmacher* by the Trier highway.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2

* Correct spelling: GREVENMACHER.

S.G.W.

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 27, 1918.

G-2

REPORT ON THREE EX-PRISONERS.

- 1 Canadian)
- 1 Irishman) British forces.

- 1 Frenchman) French forces.

1. Ex-prisoners journeyed together by rail from Mainz via Trier to Wellen, and crossed the Moselle at Grevenmacher. On their way they noticed very intense eastbound military traffic on roads between Wernberg and Simmeru*, including detachments of Uhlans. On the other hand they met no troops between a point about 8 kilometers west of Trier and the Luxembourg border. They were unable to identify any units.

The German troops were marching in poor order, many of them displaying red flags. Some detachments were driving cattle before them.

When passing through Trier the ex-prisoners were told that the Americans were to arrive there at 3 p.m. Nov. 26th.

All troops passing through Mainz continued towards Darmstadt.

2. Treatment

While in a camp near Mainz the ex-prisoners were treated with the utmost brutality, being beaten and practically starved. They also failed to receive any medical attention whatsoever. The Canadians states that there were seven deaths at the Mainz Officers' P.W.E. just before he left, all of them being attributed to Spanish Influenza, aggravated by bad living conditions and lack of medical attention. There were 700 officers and 250 servants in this officer's P.W.E.

3. Red Guards.

Mainz, according to the ex-prisoners, is completely in the hands of the Red Guards (Soldier's Council). This organization appears to have as its sole aim the abolishment of militarism and the maintenance of order. Its uniform is the German Field service uniform, minus insignia, but plus a red arm band. Some of the Red Guard are armed.

All troops returning from the front are immediately disarmed and their rifles and equipment loaded into barges on the Rhine by women. Ex-prisoners had no idea where the barges were going.

In regard to the maintenance of order the Red Guards issued a proclamation to the effect that any one caught looting would be shot. The ex-prisoners are unanimous in stating that the Red Guards are maintaining excellent order.

-2-

The population of Mainz seems to be concerned with the nationality of the troops which are to occupy the city, expressing the hope that they will be Americans.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G.S., U.S.A.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

* Correct spelling: SIMMERN.

S.G.U.

Headquarters First Division,
American E.F.,
November 27, 1918.

G-2

Gen. Franchet d'Esperey at Constantinople:

The arrival of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, who disembarked Tuesday at Constantinople, was the occasion of a truly moving popular manifestation. The conqueror of the orient passed through the main street of Pera to the French Embassy amid popular acclamation.

Destruction by the Germans:

Messrs. Raoul Pret, President, and Louis du Bois, Reporter of the Commission of the Budget, continuing their inquest into the nature and importance of the damages of the war, proceeded to the regions of the North, of Pas de Calais, and of the Somme. They visited a great number of towns, some of which, such as Lens, La Bassée, Bapaume, Albert are entirely destroyed; others, such as Douai, and Arras, are for the most part uninhabitable. At Douai, the Germans carried off almost all the furnishings in the private houses. The deputies also saw several factories which had been completely emptied of the machinery by the enemy. Besides this the enemy had practically destroyed all the mines by blowing up the bridges with dynamite and by turning aside the water courses they inundated the mines and thus render them useless. It is extremely important to note that these destructions took place a few days before the armistice. The Germans, seeing themselves beaten, wished to completely ruin this region before leaving it.

French troops at Brussels.

On Tuesday Brussels feted the First French troops passing through the town. A whole Infantry Division, with General Berlon at its head, entered the town by La Chaussee de Ninove and paraded down the Boulevard de Regent in front of the French embassy. Infantry with yellow fourragers, cavalry, artillery and sappers, advanced upon a carpet of flowers accompanied by shouts and the singing of the Marseillaise. Gen. Degoutte, commanding the Army, and the Minister, reviewed the parade.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 28, 1918.

G-2

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

Statements of an inhabitant of Grevenmacher who had been in Trier some days.

German Troops have displayed good discipline and order. Many have been taken away, but it is thought that about two regiments remain. Morale fair to good. All equipment and transport in good repair is being taken along. The troops are giving the impression of being unbeaten and ready to fight again on command of their officers, who are in full control. The soldiers are not throwing away their arms

Population bitter towards Americans. Have stated in conversations that they would harm any found alone. Are short of food and those who are passive towards us are so because they hope for food. (In this respect it is interesting to note that the soldiers are well supplied with food). Informant strongly believed that, unless we go over in force, there will be trouble of a serious nature.

Destroying Property: The troops, as they retreat, are destroying their barracks and their war or field bakeries. Also such foodstuffs that they cannot move.

Political Conditions: Informant believes that the peace will be concluded if the Socialists keep the upper hand. In our immediate zone of advance, however, the population is militaristic and only the lack of food compels their obedience to the armistice terms. The old hatred of the French is paramount and the statement is frequently heard: "We are not beaten. We are going home for Christmas and in five years we will start this war all over again." To the question of payment for the war the most frequent answer is "Rothschild is to pay for it." The civilians have been badly treated, in so far as general conditions are concerned, by the military, and for that reason alone the Socialists have the upper hand. The civilians have been told that they must look to America for their food and this is given as a reason for the destruction of foodstuffs and bakeries.

Animals: All good horses are kept by the army and all poor horses are sold to civilians.

THOS. F. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 29, 1918.

G-2

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

1. Following German organizations passed through the village of Buchholzshof:

33rd Regt. of Inf.- 3 Off., 45 men, 100 horses.
249th Regt. of Inf.- 6 Off., 250 men, 290 horses.

The horses were in good condition, and the morale of the men was not distinctly bad, although there was some dissention among the men, and the officers had little control over them in some cases. According to some of the soldiers these units were part of the 5th Army and were going to Treves.

2. A conductor on a train having a 59 mile run and going through Treves, reports that German soldiers are being drawn back hurriedly: That there are less than half as many now as a few days ago.

Regiments 33, 183, 10 and 76 were identified as being at Treves or surrounding territory.

3. The attitude of a captain of Field Artillery, who was billeted in this town (Buchholzshof) for two days, is interesting. This officer was from Dresden and was very much annoyed at the reports that had begun to filter through about the flight of the Kaiser. He stated, in conversation with one of the young women of the town, that Germany would never be able to get along without the Kaiser and that he hoped that the monarch would be given his throne again. He added, "We need the Kaiser, for without his guiding hand and influence we will not be able to wage war again for 150 years."

4. A large trainload of French prisoners of war passed Wormeldingen, November 28, going south.

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Headquarters First Division,
American E. F.,
November 30, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

A. Identifications.

13th Res. Div.

39th Res. Regt in Dusseldorf Nov. 27.

B. Movements of enemy units.

18th A. C. is to establish its headquarters in Bad Nauheim.

Ldst. Inf. Ers. Pan. 18/31 (Frankfurt) is to move to Dillenburg.

81st Inf. Regt. is to move to Braunsfels*.

63rd F. A. Regt. is to move to Schluctern.

Note: The moves referred to above have been necessitated by the Allied occupation of the Rhein provinces.
(Frankfurter Zeitung)

"Murchen-Gladbach. Nov. 28 - After the passage to-day through this town, of several more divisions belonging to the fourth Army, it is presumed that the passage of troops through our district will come to a close tomorrow."

(Kolnische Zeitung. 29/11)

"Dusseldorf. Nov. 28 - For the last few days the stream of Fourth Army troops returning from the field, has been flowing practically without interruption, across the bridge over the Rhine. Several Divisions marched into the town yesterday, in closed formation the march continuing until after dark. The troops are passing through in excellent order.

(Kolnische Zeitung. 29/11)

"Worms. Nov. 28. The crossing of the von Below Army is expected here to-day. A pioneer battalion is building a bridge near Oppenheim with materiel belonging to the ship-owners living in that region. Similarly bridges have already been built in the Rheingan* and near St. Goar."

(Kolnische Zeitung, 29/11)

"Ludwigshafen. Nov. 25. Yesterday began the passage through Ludwigshafen, of troops coming from the West and also their crossing of the Rhine. All Sunday morning Austrian troops, with their trains, passed through the southern part of the town. At about 1 p.m. German M.W. detachments crossed the Rhine-bridge. All troops passed through the neighboring city of Mannheim, proceeding to Heidelberg, whence part of them are to continue their journey by rail. Every morning of the present week troops will be passing through Ludwigshafen and crossing the Rhine."

"Cologne, Nov. 26.- . . . The points of the 6th and 17th Armies have reached the Rhine and have crossed the bridge, headed by the Imperial Banner, the Prussian banner and the "Jager" banner. The German Jager-Division . . . Marched by its commander, General-Major von Dassel, and General Stein."

(Germania, 26/11)

"Cologne, Nov. 25. General Oberst Boehn made following statement: "The 7th Army has entered the Rhine Provinz and Hessen - Nassau. . . ."

(Germania, 26/11)

"Duisburg, Nov. 26. We hear that 35,000 men of the 4th Army are expected within the next few days. They are to march via Hamburg - Ruhrort - Meiderick*1- Oberhausen. The remainder of the 500,000 men, constituting the 4th Army, will follow the main highways through Dusseldorf. Their objective is Westfalen, where the army is to be demobilized."

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Major, G. S., U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Correct Spelling - * BRAUNFELS -
 *1 MEIDERICH - S.G.W.

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