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JAPAN'S WAR IN ASIA

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Lecture delivered 6 October 1939

by

Professor Albert E. Hindmarsh

at the

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

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INTRODUCTION

The state of affairs in Asia, as in the rest of the world, is one of flux, of alignment and realignment, of diplomatic maneuvers which include the use of perfidy, bribery, ruse, and double-crossing. The uncertainties of the situation are increased by the general loss of faith in the pledged word, by the breakdown of ideological barriers, by a sudden realization that the entire world falls in the range of dictatorial plans and dreams, and by the extraordinary effectiveness with which aggressor states have timed and coordinated their moves. Indeed, we underestimate Japan, Germany, Italy and Russia, if we continue to rate their policies as merely opportunist; they have "planned" their opportunism to such an extent that their leaders must be credited with a diabolically clever insight and foresight far surpassing mere expediency. This is not, historically speaking, a novel condition of international affairs; it is for many of us, however, a new era, for the chief lesson of history seems to be that we do not learn from history. Many intelligent people have kept their idealism intact by ignoring the historical setting of our contemporary "crises"; if you don't like a man's theories you shut him up by hurling a "new era" at him. The Greeks had a better way of saying this: "It is a disease of the soul to be in love with impossible things." Even the stoutest idealists have learned in recent years, however, a lesson which is em-

phasized at every turn of human development: "Right, as the world goes, is in question only between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." We can give our contemporaries credit only for the present crop of violent reminders.

And yet the world does seem to have sunk to a new low in international morality, producing a confusion of outlook so great that no man can safely make predictions based on reason and sanity. It is embarrassing for the many so-called "experts", for the more one studies the complexities of a situation, such as that in Asia, the more one hesitates to predict the outcome. Although Japanese policy has remained, until now, relatively consistent and clear, the recent shift in position of Russia and Germany takes Japan's policy out of even Japanese hands and still more out of non-Japanese heads. Therefore, I am limiting myself here to a study of what we know, or believe to be true so far, of Japan's operations in China; on the basis of these facts perhaps we may make a cautious guess or two as to the outcome. Certainly, there is more reason, on historical and psychological grounds, to expect consistency from Japan than from most powers. Japan is at war and can turn back only with great difficulty; her leaders have held tenaciously to a policy of expansion in China for half a century; she has huge economic and strategic stakes on the continent of Asia; as a people the Japanese are quick to turn a friend into an enemy, but slow to

forgive and forget their grievances. They will, I think, be slow to placate Russia, to get out of China, and to abandon the hope and plan of hegemony in Asia, for their views on these matters are deep-rooted, of long standing, partially realized at great sacrifice; their policies are motivated by internal conditions which are serious and they are executed by men who are less flexible in their outlook than a fanatical dictator.

I. MOTIVATING FORCES

For several years, here and elsewhere, I have sought to emphasize the permanent underlying urges which motivate Japanese expansion plans. Let me quote a few words in summary of what I believe to be the fundamental situation.

It is perhaps too widely believed abroad that the army's hold on Japan is purely a matter of machine guns. This is only part of the picture, just as the repressive aspects of European dictatorships do not fully account for their maintenance of power. The seizure of Manchuria in 1931 (and the present war is only the inevitable sequel to this seizure) was Japan's equivalent of a Bolshevik or Fascist revolution. It is no accidental coincidence that this forward thrust on the continent, with the unilateral renunciation of the self-denying provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, occurred at a time when Japan's economy was at an extremely low ebb, when unemployment among manual and white-collar workers was widespread, when the farmers were crushed beneath the double load of falling prices and mounting debts. The Army showed a way out of depression. To the discouraged graduate engineer unable to find employment in Japan it offered the prospect of supervising railway construction in Manchukuo. To the young farmer, chafing in his village with too many people for the available land, it held out the possibility of settlement in the fertile valleys of Northern Manchuria. To the industrialist, big or small,

worried by loss of orders, it suggested the vista of rich new markets open primarily for Japanese goods. To the people as a whole, distracted with disturbing new ideas, and habits, it proposed a combination of old-fashioned nationalist faith with new-fashioned economics.

"Japan at War" - Wm. Henry Chamberlin - FOREIGN AFFAIRS April, 1939.

Some eighty per cent of Japan's army comes from rural areas, Why are these men apt to favor a policy of active aggression and to receive support from Japan's farmer masses? It is enough to quote a few figures:

The outstanding natural factor that has given rise to Japan's agricultural crisis is the scarcity of land fit for cultivation. Less than 15,000,000 acres, or not quite 16 per cent of her total area, are under crops. Despite the efforts of the last fifty years, the area under cultivation has increased by only about 25 per cent while the population has practically doubled. At present there is only a small amount of undeveloped land suitable for agricultural production: however hard the farmers may try they cannot appreciably increase the cultivated acreage.

"Agrarian Unrest in Japan," - W. Ladojinsky
FOREIGN AFFAIRS January 1939

In general the minimum rental for a one-crop field is about 55 per cent of the crop, and for a two-crop field, 60 per cent. The plight of the tenant is aggravated by the fact that the landlord's only responsibility is, generally speaking, to supply the land and pay the land tax; all expenditures connected with raising the crop, such as outlays for equipment, the all-important fertilizer, farm buildings and numerous other items, must be covered by the tenant, with result that very often his net share amounts to not more than a third of the crop.

"Agrarian Unrest in Japan" - W. Ladojinsky
FOREIGN AFFAIRS January 1939.

According to an investigation made by the Imperial Agricultural Society in 1934, on an annual income of 300 yen a farmer paid 35 per cent in taxes, a merchant 12½ per cent, and a manufacturer only 1½ per cent. These figures reveal the extent to which Japan's stricken agricultural economy is discriminated against in favor of her prosperous and expanding industry and trade.

Estimates of the total farm debt vary, but it is generally conceded that in 1936 it amounted to not less than six billion yen, over 1000 yen per household. Worse still, interest rates are usurious, seven per cent being the exception rather than the rule.

"Agrarian Unrest in Japan" - W. Ladejinsky. FOREIGN AFFAIRS January 1939.

II. THE OBJECTIVES

The ultimate aim of Japanese expansion is clearly to achieve political and economic domination over the world's leading undeveloped market, to tap its raw materials, to organize it as a strategic buffer against Soviet influence, and to eliminate Western influence in Asia. To Japan such hegemony offers potential economic and political self-sufficiency in peace and war. Such is the dream of all aggressive powers in all ages, for it is the history of imperialism. It is futile but real, doomed to fail but bound to be tried.

What are the military plans, the immediate military objectives? Again I summarize by a quotation:

In reviewing the course of hostilities we find difficulty in discerning any clear-cut plan of the Japanese. They seem to have pursued a policy of expediency, with each new expedient involving greater effort and greater risk. At the start, their objec-

tive seemed limited to the occupation of North China. Then they attacked Shanghai and the Yangtse valley. Now they are involved along the entire China coast and far into the interior, and the seizure of Hainan and the Spratly Islands extends their operations beyond Chinese waters. They started to conquer a small part of China. They are now committed to securing the domination of Eastern Asia.

The Chinese have had a great deal to do with bringing this about. They have long been aware of Japan's overweening ambition and they have consciously sought to lead her beyond her depth. An examination of the record of events will show that Chiang Kai-Shek has had a consistent plan. Much of it was developed logically under the pressure of events.

In a nutshell, the Chinese purpose has been to resist desperately, and while so doing, to extend as widely as possible the theatre of operations; to make Japan's progress as costly as possible; to withhold from her the fruits of victory and to seek foreign help for a hoped-for counteroffensive.

In its military aspects the Chinese action falls into three phases: (1) the defensive, until the Japanese were completely extended; (2) a period of guerilla fighting to keep the invaders occupied while reorganizing the main forces; (3) the counteroffensive. The struggle is now in the second phase.

"The Strategy of Chiang Kai-Shek" - Walter H. Mallory
FOREIGN AFFAIRS July 1939.

III. UNFORESEEN OBSTRUCTIONS

Is the war proceeding according to plan? Clearly Japan has run into several unforeseen obstructions. First, the Japanese did not anticipate a European war which might shut them off from essential war supplies, for -

The United States and the British, French and Dutch empires, each with very vital interests in the Far East, provide Japan with more than 85% of her essential war supplies, while the Axis group - comprising Germany and Italy as well as Austria and Czechoslovakia - supplied Japan with only 8.64% of such materials in 1938.

Second, they did not expect the United States to take steps to cut off its significant contribution to the war, for Japan has been getting 56% of its essential war materials (especially scrap iron and oil) from us, and we are Japan's biggest foreign customer. Our threatened abrogation of our commercial treaty with Japan is for Japan an evil omen.

Third, the military leaders did not expect that powerful groups in Japan would join together to prevent a closer cooperation with the Axis powers.

It is generally believed in Tokyo that the Foreign Office and big business finally joined the navy side in the dispute, and so turned the scales against having Japan join the German-Italian military alliance. The army believes in force, and force alone, but exports in foreign affairs and Japanese bankers and industrialists realize that Japan cannot prosper without eventual credit, and can never carry out even half her ambitious program on the Asiatic mainland without foreign loans. Hitler and Mussolini have no money to loan. Economic forces may yet enforce a peace. But it is not yet in sight.

This decision was reached only after a prolonged and bitter struggle which almost wrecked the cabinet. The army leaders and the jingoist younger-officer group were insistent upon reinforcing the much-vaunted Anti-Comintern Pact by joining the alliance, but the navy could see nothing but disadvantages and possible disaster by being pledged to fight Britain at Singapore in case Hitler and Mussolini become involved in a war with the European democracies. With the American Navy in the Pacific, the admirals pointed out, Japan would be jeopardizing her very existence by such a commitment.

Fourth, Japan's military leaders did not foresee, the Hitler-Stalin rapprochement which, while it has produced a welcome truce in Soviet-Japanese border warfare, nevertheless undermines Army influence by loss of face and strengthens groups which have advocated less frenzy in planned attacks on Western interests in China. The stop-gap truce with Russia is welcome for the moment but it galls many Japanese because it was more or less forced on them.

Under present conditions it is difficult to imagine any Soviet-Japanese deal of a lasting nature. To use the words of Baron Kimmochi Okura, one of Japan's outstanding authorities on Russo-Japanese relations, "Japan's objective - lasting peace in the Orient - and the Soviet Union's objective - world sovietization - are and always will be absolutely incompatible and it is idle to discuss future relations between the two countries without bearing in mind radical differences in their basic national policies."

Finally, it seems now that Japanese leaders believed that, by harrassing and threatening British interests in China, they could secure British aid in consolidating Japanese economic domination, particularly in currency matters, and also expect Britain to act as a "peace" maker in coercing China into a truce after it became apparent that the Japanese armies were stymied.

Clearly Japan had reason this summer to be worried - deserted by Germany, hindered by Britain, threatened with a trade war by the United States, fighting extensively with Russia in Mongolia, latent tension with France, and a major conflict with China - she was out on the end of a rotten limb.

IV. THE COST

Probably the cost in men, money, and materials of the war in China has surprised and worried Japan's leaders more than any other fact. The estimates are worth citing because they give some clue also as to how long Japan can carry on.

A. Men. By August 1939, Japan had 1,200,000 men mobilized on the continent; she had suffered at least 700,000 casualties, including 250,000 dead.

How seriously the army heads regard the situation is shown by the amended Conscription Law, which was quietly passed through the Diet in March. Under the old law, Japan's standing army was fixed at a peacetime maximum of 250,000 men; while the new law makes the permanent peacetime force 800,000 men, and raises the reserve from 3,000,000 to 6,000,000.

Ordinarily, about 650,000 young men come up for army examinations every year. About 400,000 have hitherto been found fit for military service or two years of compulsory training. These 400,000; in the past, have been divided into Class 1 and Class 2, according to ability, and lots were then drawn for the 125,000 conscripted from Class 1 each year.

Hereafter, however, the entire 400,000 physically fit will go into the army every year. And this number will probably be increased, for the amended law has relaxed requirements as to height and eyesight.

On the other hand,

However great the slaughter, China never needs to worry about man power. In round numbers the nation has mobilized 4,500,000 men, including the present combat force of 2,000,000, a trained reserve of 700,000, a partisan force of 500,000 and 1,500,000 casualties. If China should mobilize the same proportion of men that the United States did in the World War, she would have an army of 15,000,000. If she equaled the German proportion, she would have the biggest field force in world history - 40,000,000 men. Any Japanese soldier who lives to die of old age will still find Chinese coolies in the opposite trenches.

B. Money and Materials. This war will have cost Japan in March, 1940, $12\frac{1}{2}$ billion yen, or about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million dollars daily. Some ninety per cent of this money has been raised by bond issues and less than ten percent by increased taxation. The national debt, therefore, registers the measure of Japan's financial stress and strain.

The national debt on the eve of the Mukden "incident" was about six billion yen. By September 1936 it had reached ten billion. The figure of sixteen billions was passed in December 1938, and a debt of over twenty billions may be anticipated, on the basis of prospective appropriations, before the end of the fiscal year ending April 1940.

A portent of difficulty is the fact that the Bank of Japan failed this year to dispose of 15 per cent of its bond purchases (5,562 million yen) and this retained surplus is useful to the Bank only for the issue of currency - a tempting beginning for inflation. In fact the currency printed in 1938 was double that in 1936, whereas industrial production remained nearly stationary and agricultural production actually declined because of loss of man power. These inflationary moves are reflected in rising price levels (30 percent since August 1937) and higher cost of living

(14.4 per cent advance). But these are not as yet serious results, for wages have advanced nearly as much as living costs and nearly all productive units save export lines and agriculture are enjoying a war boom. Monopoly concerns like munitions makers are currently enjoying 20 per cent profits and paying ten per cent dividends.

Japan's international economic position also has steadily deteriorated. Her export trade to Europe, America and Africa has dropped thirty per cent below that of 1936 and has thus deprived her of foreign exchange badly needed to purchase essential war supplies abroad. In this connection Japan started the war in a weak position. Her startling trade boom of 1932-36 did not result in an accumulation of gold or foreign exchange, for these were used up by re-armament and capital investment in Manchuria, which drained off some 400 million yen a year. True, Japan has come close even this year to a balance in her import and export figures, but that is only by virtue of including her trade with the so-called Yen-bloc (China and Manchuria) which is in non-convertible currency. The result is that Japan has been compelled, since the beginning of 1937, to export large amounts of specie and bullion - 892 million yen in 1937 - 634 million in 1938 - 660 million in 1939 (Estimated). She began the war with 2,250 million yen in gold stocks; it is now reduced to less than 500 million yen.

Moreover, foreign exchange supplies are being cut down by a steady decline in shipping revenue (dropped 46 percent in 1938

over 1936;) in January 1936 Japan had 900,000 tons of foreign shipping under charter, while 1,700,000 tons of her own revenue-producing shipping were being used by the military in the China war. Also tourist income has dropped by 55 per cent since the war started.

To offset these losses Japan has taken these steps:

1. Drastically reduced imports, automatically limiting exports and causing a shortage even of some war materials.
2. Liquidated her foreign investment assets.
3. Arranged for compulsory collection of all privately owned gold and silver articles except pen points and gold teeth.
4. Rigid currency, exchange, and customs control in occupied China, including an attempt to confiscate specie and bullion in foreign banks - the outstanding issue with the British in Tientsin.
5. Resale of imports from China, including a great deal of loot.

It is generally agreed that at best these expedients will carry her through 1940 if the war is not enlarged - hence Japan's desire to avoid involvement in Europe or an immediate show-down with Russia. There are some economic experts who believe that any prolonged shutting off of her trade with the United States or Great Britain would be sufficient to topple Japan's economic structure. At the same time a realistic student on the spot has declared:

The chances are that Japan will not experience shipwreck because of its lavish issue of war loans. The experiences of the Soviet Union, of Germany and Italy, show that a system of rigorous state control over economic life makes practicable more flouting of the laws of normal finance than orthodox economists have regarded as possible. If the weight of the debt becomes too crushing, a government armed with wartime dictatorial powers could reduce it by drastic devaluation of the currency. (W.H. Chamberlin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1939).

C. The Risks. In addition to these unprecedented expenditures of men, money and material for stakes as yet undefined and uncertain, Japan's expansionist policy is incurring great risks and increasingly exposing her deficiencies.

The conflict of China has demonstrated the strength and the weakness of Japan's war economy. Its strength is self-sufficiency in food. Foreigners in Japan may miss luxuries and comforts, but the Japanese masses are not likely to feel any pinch of hunger so long as sea communications with nearby Korea, Manchukuo and Formosa are maintained. Its weakness is a complete lack of several important materials and a serious shortage of others. This weakness makes Japan theoretically vulnerable to sanctions. A concerted withholding of such key commodities as oil, scrap-iron, copper, lead, nickel and rubber would not yield immediate results because the military and naval authorities have laid in stocks of such vital supplies. But a prolonged blockade would cause great industrial dislocation and might finally bring the continental adventure to an unsuccessful end.

This view is generally held, but it must be pointed out that the figures commonly quoted to show the extent of foreign aid to Japan by sale of war materials refer to percentage of imports, not of totals used by Japan. In fact, Japan is self-sufficient not only in food, but also in munitions, implements of

war, most "heavy" chemicals (nitrates, sulphates, soda ash). Substitutes, expanding sources in Manchuria, North China and other overseas possessions, domestic stores - all have increased her supplies, actual and potential, to a point where there is increasing skepticism about the effectiveness of any embargo, boycott or other economic sanctional action against Japan. We must remember that the pressure of the war and the very threat of sanctions have induced Japan to expand her resources. For example: Japan now supplies two-thirds of her own scrap iron - an embargo on its export from the United States would merely force Japan to turn for the other third to a larger use of pig-iron in open hearth production. Among absolutely essential war supplies oil seems to be the only one creating a lasting problem, for Japan produces at home less than ten percent of her total consumption of 3.3 million tons. Five per cent comes from Russian Sakhalin, the rest from Mexico, Venezuela, the United States and the Dutch Indies. But even here there is a warning - it is reported that high octane gas is being made with German equipment by a hydrogenation process.

With regard to the unofficial consumer boycott in the United States of Japanese goods, it is estimated that Japan has lost thereby about thirty million dollars in all to date.

V. THE PROFITS

If Japan's primary purpose in attacking China is to secure markets and materials sufficient to industrialize at home and thereby alleviate her population problem, a proper realistic measure of the war's success lies in balancing her expenditures against her profits, actual and potential. The profit column as of July 1939 is as follows:

A. Raw Materials. Japan is one hundred per cent dependent on foreign sources for cotton and that item is, next to silk, the most important basis of her export trade. In 1936 her cotton imports totaled four and one-half million bales, 850 million yen. In 1936 China produced four million bales, all of coarse quality, 96 per cent of it used and usable only by Chinese mills. All of China's cotton fields are now in Japanese lines, but the guerillas have induced farmers to reduce production by seventy per cent. In any case, China can hardly increase production by more than twenty per cent above the 1936 figures. Even if Japan takes and exploits China she will still have to import three-quarters of her cotton.

Japan imports ninety-nine per cent of her wool from abroad. In 1936 she imported 250 million pounds, 200 million yen. The total production of North China and Inner Mongolia in 1936 was 35 million pounds, fourteen per cent of Japan's needs. In 1937 Japan bought all of this at a price forced below the market, so

in 1938 the growers refused to sell to the Japanese monopoly, which got only one third of the production.

In 1936 Japan imported six million tons of iron (all kinds), 188 million yen. This included nearly all of China's output of one and one-third million tons. At best China can supply twenty per cent of Japan's annual needs, which are now up to ten million tons.

The point to be emphasized with regard to these and similar raw materials is that Japan had full access before the war to such of China's resources as she needed. The war has reduced Japan's share and has permanently endangered production.

B. China Market. In 1936 Japan controlled sixteen per cent of the China market; in 1938 she controlled forty-six per cent of all China and sixty-five per cent of the Japanese-conquered areas in China. In the same period the same period the United States trade in China dropped fifty-two per cent; Britain's share dropped forty-six per cent; and Germany's thirty-five per cent. Japan's trebled share was clearly due to her imposition of her own paper money in North China (a currency convertible only into yen), control of railroads, evasion of Customs, and establishment of monopolies. Her enlarged share is impressive, but it must be remembered that the market in China has been cut in two by war damage, refugee status of millions, flight of capital, etc. Superficially, Japan has made some net profit, but it is small as compared with the cost of war; it is largely in paper not

convertible into needed foreign exchange; and it is insignificant as compared with the billions of yen needed to restore the market to its pre-war status.

C. Plunder. An unknown but huge quantity of loot has been garnered by Japan in China. Chinese factories, power plants, scrap iron, narcotics profit, squeeze money, have added to the total, but all of it is certainly a small fraction of the war cost.

While a small temporary net profit may have been gained by Japan in her control of China's market, it is probable that profits sufficient to relieve the economic strain at home have not been realized. Japanese leaders have yet to tap the real wealth of China; the creation of new Japanese currency (the Federated Reserve Bank notes) is designed to do this.

This new paper money is being issued in large quantities for the purpose of mobilizing Chinese wealth to carry on Japan's war. Also, a new Chinese currency linked to the yen under a rigid control system would aid in diverting Chinese trade to Japan and to Japanese traders and in appropriating for Japan the exchange of Chinese exports to third countries. Again, the displacement of the old yuan in the occupied areas would destroy an important psychological link between the Chinese National Government and its people.

Such controls, however, must extend to the entire banking system in order to be effective. Inclusiveness is essential, and this means especially such business centers as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankow.

The future of Japan's "Federated Reserve Bank" currency in North China is as uncertain as its present condition is pitiable. F.R.B. notes are being refused by everybody who is out of reach of Japanese physical coercion. Whoever has to accept them, however, spends and passes them on as quickly as he possibly can, thereby increasing the velocity of their enforced circulation and driving up prices continuously. Their discount against

Chinese legal tender rose to as much as 40% early in May, instead of giving place to the premium of that amount which was legally decreed.

G. Stein, Americas, July 1929.

VI. THE OUTCOME

So far as the future of Japan in China is concerned, the sole plausible generalization one can make is that Japan can achieve the mastery of China only by substituting complete economic domination for military conquest. That will require a vast outlay of capital, which she does not have and is not likely to have for a long time; hence her constant anxiety concerning her relations with the United States, for deep down her leaders hope (a few even believe) that American capital will eventually add in a restoration of the China market under Japanese political control. With this doubtless in mind the Japanese Government spent \$2,000,000 in the United States last year on propaganda. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis credits Japan with having the "biggest, the most impressive and by far the most expensive" of any foreign propaganda machine in the United States. Its objectives are stated to be to persuade the United States "to keep hands off the war, to buy Japanese goods, to invest money in Manchukuo and Japanese dominated China, and not to build up its fleet." It is to be noted that the number of Americans sympathizing with China increased from forty-seven per cent to seventy-

four per cent during the period of operation of this machine. If Japan wins it means the ousting of the Westerners and of Western influence from Asia.

If China wins the same result is likely to follow in effect, although by a different method. China will surely be tempted to free herself from Western economic control.

In the first place, the so-called "prestige" of the white race, already shaky, is now gone. It was finally forfeited with the submission in helplessness to the indignities inflicted on the British in Tientsin, the destruction of American and other foreign properties and the restraints and injuries all foreigners have suffered without retaliation. The old fear of Western might is gone. In the second place, once China escapes this most serious threat to its independence, it will never again permit its territory to be interspersed with physical denials of its sovereignty. It has learned in this war how such enclaves can be jumping-off places for its enemies. And, having observed in the past year how much the Western powers can and will endure, China will not consider that it has to submit.

The concessions and settlements must be surrendered sooner or later in any case, and they should be surrendered, not only in the interests of China but as a condition of peace. As a matter of logic the Japanese cannot be refuted when they say that East Asia must be freed from Western encroachments which make it a spoils ground. But, there is a crucial difference between freeing East Asia from Western encroachments so that it will no longer be an international battlefield for spoils and freeing it so that it will be the spoils exclusively of Japan.

Long range considerations are not now in order, however. Fundamental redress of the Far East is not only impracticable but impossible at present. Withdrawal from concessions now would not be an act of political adjustment but a retreat before the Japanese army's threats. It would merely be a factor of aggravation in an already dangerous world situation in China. And it would also lessen Japan's difficulties in China and by so much add to the chance of

Japanese victory, which would be the originating cause of future international embroilments in the Far East. So, far from forcing the situation to decision, the only course Western powers can now follow is to postpone decision as long as possible.

Both capitulation and compromise at the price of "cooperation" are ruled out therefore. The only expedient for the West is postponement. The longer decision can be put off, the more nearly it can be reached on terms that will avoid a world war in the Far East and contribute to a lasting peace in China. In the interval the West has an ally - the Chinese armies, organized and guerrilla. If the object of the West be to escape the necessity to fight in the Far East, as manifestly it is or should be, then it can be said that the Chinese armies are now fighting in the cause of the West as well as their own. Therefore it is good strategy and political policy to give as much support to China as possible without provoking open clash with Japan. The longer the Chinese are able to maintain resistance, the better the chance that Japan will have to abandon the hope of conquest out of economic weakness.

Peffer, Asia, Sept. 1929



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