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HEADQUARTERS IX CORPS

G-3 SECTION

JUN 21 1965

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COMBAT OPERATIONS COMMAND REPORT

Reports Control Symbol
CSGPO-28(R1)

JULY

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DATE
22 Aug 83

FILE
CSI - LTC Hixson

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Alexandria, VA 22331

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ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L (Classified Branch)
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
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CONTROL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (TYPE, FILE REFERENCE, UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT OR SHORT TITLE, INDORSEMENTS, INCLOSURES)	CLASSIFICATION/ REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
		OLD	NEW
C-17055.89	Document, Subj: Defensive Tactics (Korea) (U), dated July 1952, by LTC Maurice J. Reynolds, CGSC.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17055.91	Document, Subj: Logistical Capability of Communist Forces in Korea to Support a Major Offensive (U), dated 28 February 1953, by Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, FEC.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17055.95-A	Document, Subj: Inter-Allied Co-Operation During Combat Operations (U), dated 15 August 1952, by FEC.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17055.95-B	Document, Subj: Inter-Allied Co-Operation During Combat Operations (U) Annex, dated 1953, by FEC. Cy 56.	Conf XGDS	UNCLAS
C-17055.117	Document, Subj: Lessons Learned in Korea (U), dated 17 February 1955, by CONARC. Cy 28.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17056.13	Document, Subj: Combat Operations Command Report (U), dated May 1953, by IX Corps. <i>June 53, Jul 53, Aug 53 and Sep 53 (Added per MA ABC, TAG, Wash D.C. on 50-253)</i>	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17160.3	Document, Subj: Administrative Order No. 3 (U), dated 16 July 1952, by Japan Logistical Command.	Conf XGDS	UNCLAS
C-17160.4	Document, Subj: Logistic Plan No. 3-50 (U), dated 28 December 1950, by Japan Logistical Command.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS
C-17160.13	Document, Monograph, Subj: Logistical Problems and Their Solutions (25 August 1950 - 31 August 1951) (U), dated 15 February 1952, by Japan Logistical Command.	Conf Gp 3	UNCLAS

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDANT:

PRINTED OR TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICER
STEWART R. KIDD
Colonel, Armor
Secretary

SIGNATURE


REMARKS

ACTION TAKEN OR RECOMMENDED BY RECIPIENT

INSTRUCTIONS

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
HQDA, TAGO, Alexandria, VA 22331, 13 SEP 1983

TO: Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L
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In answer to basic request, above, subject documents have been declassified.
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FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

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JOHN HENRY HATCHER, PHD
Archivist of the Army

Per FONECON, Mr. Colt, TAG (DAAG-AMR-D) on 5 Oct 83,
the following documents may be declassified
based on declassification of the one
dated May 1953 (see C-17056.13 in the
attached DA Form 1575, 22 Aug 83):

Combat Operations Command Report (4),
TK Coops, dated June 1953, Jul 1953,
Aug 1953 and Sep 1953.

TK

5 Oct 83

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HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED]
APO 264 US ARMY

CNCS-H 314.7

SUBJECT: Command Report for July 1953
(Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28(R1))

THRU: Chief, Army Field Forces
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

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ON 5 Oct 83

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

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Part 1 Intelligence

1. Enemy Operations: The month of July 1953 saw the heaviest ground fighting in the IX US Corps sector since the defeat of the enemy's Spring Offensive of 1951. This represented a continuation of the trend which had developed since April and which had resulted in limited objective attacks of increasing intensity during May and June. The enemy's behavior appeared to be strongly influenced by political developments. Enemy action increased when ROK opposition to an armistice grew strong. When the ROK government released prisoners of war and the armistice talks were temporarily suspended, an increase in enemy aggressiveness became imminent.

Indications of forthcoming enemy attacks in the Corps sector between KUMHWA (CT 6538) and KUMSONG (CT 7852) became more and more evident throughout the early part of the month. A new army, the 54th CCF Army, was identified in forward areas in the vicinity of KUMSONG in an apparent reinforcing capacity. Increased sightings of personnel, vehicles and armor were also reported. A tight counter reconnaissance screening activity was evidenced when patrols from the CAPITOL ROK Division made contact with the enemy nightly at numerous locations across the entire division front. Enemy artillery registration fires were reported on positions along and to the rear of the main battle position east of KUMHWA. Prisoners stated that a large-scale attack was forthcoming.

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Ground activity during the first half of July was characterized by the pattern of minor assaults and patrol engagements established during the early portion of the previous two months. On the night of 6 July, limited objective attacks were launched against two outpost positions in the vicinity of ARROWHEAD (CT 3538) northwest of CHORWON. Preceded by heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire, an enemy battalion struck at two outpost positions simultaneously and engaged friendly forces in hand-to-hand combat. The defenders were surrounded by the enemy, but retained control of both outpost positions. Fighting continued intermittently during 7 July, and by 8 July friendly counterattacking forces were successful in expelling the enemy from the major portion of the battle positions, despite enemy efforts to reinforce. On the night of 8 July, the enemy renewed his drive against the same outposts, initially attacking with a company on each position. Action continued for the next three days with both sides reinforcing elements in contact. Enemy forces occupied both outposts on several occasions during the see-saw fighting which became intense at night and sporadic by day. On the morning of 11 July, badly depleted enemy forces were engaged in a fierce firefight with friendly counterattacking forces. Just prior to daylight, the enemy was completely driven from ARROWHEAD and friendly units reoccupied the outpost positions.

Outpost positions in the 9th ROK Division sector were probed almost nightly early in the month. As the month progressed, attacks increased in strength and intensity. Activity in the 9th ROK Division sector showed a direct contrast with that in the CAPITOL ROK Division. Only two minor enemy-initiated actions occurred between 1 and 13 July against CAPITOL ROK Division troops. On the other hand, enemy patrols made contact with the enemy several times each night in that sector during the same period.

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The enemy launched heavy attacks along the ~~entire front~~ front on the night of 13 July. These attacks struck at the main battle position along the entire CAPITOL ROK Division sector as well as the right portion of the 9th ROK Division. These attacks were launched in conjunction with similar attacks in the II ROK Corps sector to the east. The enemy, preceding his attacks with intense artillery and mortar fire, committed a force estimated at division strength in the CAPITOL ROK Division sector. Coordinated with this action, a regiment reinforced with one battalion was committed in attacks in the 9th ROK Division sector. Two enemy divisions were in the immediate rear area, one of which was accepted in contact on 21 July. Friendly outpost positions were overrun, and shortly after midnight enemy forces had penetrated the main battle positions to a depth of up to one thousand meters in several places. The enemy continued to press forward in the attack, employing successive waves of infantry and heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar. Friendly forces were forced to fall back to positions south of the NAMDAE River. As the enemy forces pushed forward, friendly elements, in successive blocking positions, fought fierce delaying actions in an effort to stem the enemy advance. Friendly units continued their withdrawal, and by early morning on 15 July were consolidating positions on high ground south of Highway Route 117A. Friendly counterattacks from these new positions, launched on the afternoon of 15 July, were successful in halting the enemy attacks east of the NAMDAE River. The valuable time gained on the afternoon and evening of 15 July as a result of these counterattacks permitted successful occupation of the new friendly defense line. The enemy rapidly reinforced elements in contact as the firefight progressed. On the morning of 16 July, friendly ~~counterattacking~~ forces withdrew on order to the newly established main battle position on the high ground ~~south of Highway Route 117A.~~

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Meanwhile, west of the NAMDAE River, the enemy was building up attacks against friendly outpost positions. On the evening of 16 July, an enemy division attacked southeast of SNIPER RIDGE (GT 6742). Friendly outposts were outflanked and pulled back to the main battle position. Enemy forces penetrated several friendly positions, resulting in a partial withdrawal to high ground south of the areas of penetration.

Three divisions from two GCP armies were identified in the attacks which occurred between 13 and 17 July in the right portion of the IX Corps sector. By employing wave after wave of personnel, the enemy was successful in gaining some ground. However, entire enemy units were annihilated and forces, in general, were badly depleted as a result of the heavy casualties suffered. Except for minor diversionary attacks on the night of 16 July, east of the HANTAN River, the remainder of the Corps front was relatively quiet during this period.

Between 18 and 23 July, enemy effort was confined to one company-sized attack west of the HANTAN River and several minor patrol actions. East of KUMHWA, the enemy was occupied with organization of defensive positions and resupply activities.

Elements of a new army were introduced into contact and launched limited attacks against outpost and main battle positions southeast of the NAMDAE River on 24 and 25 July. These attacks were shortlived and enemy forces never exceeded the strength of one battalion during any single engagement. Enemy attacking echelons were committed through the units in contact and were apparently withdrawn to rear of the enemy's defense line when these attacks ceased on the night of 25 July. Only minor engagements were reported across the Corps front on 26 and 27 July. Following the signing of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, enemy forces withdrew from the newly established Demilitarized Zone. All enemy activity since that time was in compliance with the armistice agreement.

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There were 103 enemy initiated contacts reported in July as compared with 101 in June and 59 in May. Twenty-six of these contacts were reported as attacks and included five major offensive actions which lasted over extended periods. One hundred forty-seven enemy contacts were the result of friendly-initiated engagements. Of these, eleven were friendly counter-attacks.¹

a. Artillery: Enemy artillery fire received in the IX Corps sector during July decreased by 26 percent below the number of rounds received during June. Over 58 percent of the total rounds received during July were received during the second ten day period. The majority of these rounds fell in conjunction with enemy initiated actions in the CAPITOL ROK Division sector. During the second ten day period artillery units of all GCF armies opposite IX Corps displaced toward the South. The 67th GCF Army, in the eastern portion, displaced southward 2,087 yards. The actions in the CAPITOL ROK Division sector during the second ten day period were heavily supported by artillery fire, principally along the main battle positions. Heavy counterbattery fire was also received. The counterbattery fire by the enemy was effective and demonstrated increased attention to this facet of an attack. During the same period the GCF forces were quite liberal in the allocation of ammunition for harassment and interdiction fire preceding the main attacks.

On the final day of hostilities, the enemy increased his harassing and interdiction fire considerably above his normal rate. This program began at approximately 271000 July and continued until 272030 July. The last enemy artillery round was reported as landing in friendly territory fell at 2050 hours on 27 July 1953.

(1) G-2 Staff Section Report, July 1953

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A total of 256 confirmed hostile artillery positions and 373 suspect hostile artillery positions were carried on the Hostile Battery List at the time of cessation of hostilities. Based on current order of battle information, an estimated 405 artillery pieces and an estimated 80 heavy mortars (120mm) were in forward areas capable of firing on IX Corps main battle positions as of 27 July 1953.²

b. Armor: Thirty-six sightings of armored vehicles were reported during the month and prior to the cessation of hostilities. Seven sightings of armored vehicles were reported after the Armistice. All but two of the armored vehicles were identified as tanks. Tanks were generally sighted individually or in pairs. There was one sighting of a group of four tanks and another sighting of a group of six tanks reported. This represents the largest total sightings of armor since the actions of last fall. Enemy armor was sighted in close proximity to areas in which heavy engagements took place as well as in locations to the rear of such positions. In several cases, armor was employed in actions in a direct fire and supplementary artillery role. The enemy suffered heavy damage and destruction to tanks that were employed in a supporting role. Tanks, however, were not employed in an assault role with infantry.

Prior to and during the attacks, prisoners of war indicated that large numbers of tanks were available to be employed in offensive actions. Some prisoners indicated the presence of JS III tanks. Prisoners also indicated that tank regiments, organic to CCF Armies, had been engaged in training in CHINA and were now being brought into KOREA. Although such an augmentation of armor strength was considered possible, these reports remained unconfirmed at the end of the period. At the

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time of cessation of hostilities, enemy armor was deployed to add depth to the defense. The enemy, with little or no movement of his armor, retained the added capability of supporting his limited objective attacks by direct fire.

Strength of armor capable of intervention in the IX Corps sector continued to be accepted as two tank regiments, subordinate to the III and XIII Army Groups, and organized each with five companies, four of these equipped with nine T-34/85 tanks, and one with four JS-II heavy tanks and four JSU-122 self-propelled guns, representing a total of 88 armored vehicles.³

c. Supply: Prior to the attacks of June and July, the enemy facing IX Corps had attained its greatest logistical capability since the beginning of the Korean War. While the attacks of June somewhat depleted the enemy's forward area stockpiles in the western and central portions of the IX Corps sector, the stockpiles in the eastern portion of the sector remained almost untouched.

Status of ration supply continued to improve and, except during the actual attacks, all prisoners indicated an adequate and varied ration. Based on available information, CCF units in contact were accepted as having a 60 to 90 day subsistence level.

Throughout the month, by the identification of weapons utilized against friendly forces, it was determined that the enemy's program of standardization of weapons continued to improve. The number of weapons in the hands of frontline troops also continued to show an improvement, and prisoners indicated that replacement items were available.

Enemy ammunition expenditures remained at the high level established during the previous month. During July, the heaviest expenditures were in the eastern sector. It was possible to replenish frontline stocks, depleted during the

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fighting, from stockpiles in intermediate rear areas while the attacks were being conducted. Thus, although an effective distribution of frontline stocks for a planned operation may not have been immediately accomplished, there was no shortage of ammunition in forward areas at the close of the period.

Ground and aerial observation and the study of photographs revealed that a large resupply effort was accomplished during July and that supplies continue to be stocked in previously developed supply areas. Vehicular movement close to the enemy's defensive positions continued to show an increase, even over the greatly increased traffic reported during June. Large numbers of sightings of personnel carrying supplies were also reported. The enemy was accepted as retaining the capability of maintaining 7 to 10 days of ammunition supply on position and immediately available for normal usage. His capability for supplying an offensive will steadily increase during the period of the Armistice should he desire to exercise this course of action.⁴

d. Enemy Propaganda: Enemy loudspeaker broadcasts continued to be the main method of dispensing propoganda in forward areas. Occasionally, leaflets distributed by artillery or mortar shells were reported. Broadcasts were heard almost nightly when ground action was light; they were not normally reported during periods of heavy ground action. The great majority continued to be directed at the ROK troops and were designed to encourage desertion and disaffection. Some made reference to the release of prisoners of war by SYNGMAN RHEE and others, usually directed at US Forces, referred to the coming Armistice and found fault with the ROK government for causing the delay.⁵

(4) G-2 Staff Section Report, July 1953

(5) Ibid.

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2. Counterintelligence: There were no positive reports of bandit activity in the IX Corps sector during the period. The number of refugees and displaced persons apprehended in unauthorized areas showed a 27 percent decrease below the month of June. This represented an all-time low for 1953 and was attributed to the close cooperation which has been developed between the Civil Affairs personnel, Military Police, and the CIC Detachment. As yet, no notable trends have been detected on the part of the civil population concerning their feelings about the signing of the Armistice.

Prior to the signing of the Armistice, an apparent lack of enemy espionage and subversion activities during periods of favorable weather was explained by the anticipation of a truce and the belief that the enemy may have been training a reserve of agents who would infiltrate South Korea and endeavor to obtain positions in various governmental offices for the purpose of espionage and subversion. With the signing of the truce, an increase in subversive activities can be expected.⁶

3. Personnel Losses: During the period, a total of 26,945 casualties were assessed against the enemy. Of these, 70 were prisoners of war; 1,744 were counted killed; 7,188 were estimated killed; and 17,943 were estimated wounded. This total is 10,283 more than the total of 16,662 for the month of June. The increase in the number of enemy prisoners and casualties was attributed to the increase in enemy initiated action across the IX Corps front during the month.⁷

(6) G-2 Staff Section Report, July 1953

(7) Ibid.

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4. Order of Battle: At the beginning of the period, the following enemy units were carried in contact:

Elements of the 199th Regiment, 67th Division of the 23d CCF Army (Corps).

The 205th Regiment, 69th Division, 23d CCF Army (Corps).

The 207th Regiment, 69th Division, 23d CCF Army (Corps).

The 74th Division, 24th CCF Army (Corps).

The 70th Division, 24th CCF Army (Corps).

The 72nd Division, 24th CCF Army (Corps).

The 597th Regiment, 199th Division, 67th CCF Army (Corps).

Elements of the 595th Regiment, 199th Division, 67th CCF Army (Corps).

These units were supported by 42 battalions of artillery, organic and non-organic, with an estimated 405 pieces capable of firing on the IX US Corps MLR. Additionally, and also considered in the role of supporting artillery, were 20 heavy mortar companies (120mm) with an estimated 80 mortars capable of firing on the IX US Corps MLR.

a. Order of Battle Changes: During the month the following order of battle changes in enemy armies facing IX US Corps were accepted:

23d CCF Army (Corps): Two prisoners captured in the vicinity of CT 346386 on 7 July by elements of the 2d ROK Division identified the 218th Regiment, 73d Division. They stated that the Command Post of the 218th Regiment was located in the vicinity of CT 358438 and that the 219th Regiment was on line to the west of the 218th Regiment. This indicated that the 69th Division had been relieved by the 73d Division and that elements of the 73d Division were engaged in attacks on ARROWHEAD. However, because of conflicting statements made by both of these prisoners and in light of the common CCF practice of attacking

an objective by using reserve elements to attack through units already on line, the possibility of a relief at that time was questionable.⁸

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Two prisoners captured in the vicinity of CT 345385 on 9 July by elements of the 2d BOK Division also identified the 218th Regiment, 73d Division. One prisoner said that the 73d Division Command Post was in the rear and that the 69th Division was on the east and the 67th Division on the west. These dispositions given by this prisoner were in accordance with currently accepted order of battle.⁹

On 19 July, based upon document identifications and prisoner of war statements identifying the 218th Regiment in the area heretofore accepted as occupied by the 199th Regiment, 67th Division, and locating elements of the 219th Regiment of the 73d Division in frontline positions, the relief of the 199th Regiment, 67th Division, by the 73d Division was accepted. It was further accepted that the 219th Regiment was on line in the new 73d Division sector and that the 218th Regiment had been committed through enemy defensive positions while attacking ARROWHEAD. The 217th Regiment was accepted in unlocated reserve of the 73d Division. The 199th Regiment, which had been identified in attacks on PORKCHOP in the I US Corps sector, was accepted in unlocated reserve of the 67th Division along with the 201st Regiment.¹⁰

(8) Annex 4, PIR 1015, July 1953

(9) Annex 4, PIR 1017, July 1953

(10) Annex 4, PIR 1027, July 1953

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On 18 July, based upon statements made by a prisoner captured in the vicinity of CT 362403 by elements of the 2d US Division, a major shift of the 23d CCF Army's eastern boundary was accepted. This prisoner, who identified the 95th Regiment, 32d Division, 16th CCF Army (Corps), established that the 69th Division had been relieved by the 32d Division, 16th CCF Army (Corps). The 16th CCF Army (Corps) had previously been carried east of the YOKKOK River. The accepted boundary shift resulted in a narrower sector for the 23d CCF Army (Corps).¹¹

At the close of the period, the strength of the 23d CCF Army (Corps) was estimated at 29,600 and its combat efficiency and morale were considered to be good. This army was accepted in contact on 26 February 1953. As of 27 July (the cessation of hostilities), units of the 23d CCF Army (Corps) were carried between the north-south grid lines listed as follows:

23d CCF Army (Corps)	CT 32 - CT 35
73d Division	CT 32 - CT 35
219th Regiment	CT 32 - CT 35
217th Regiment	*Reserve unlocated
218th Regiment	*Reserve unlocated
67th Division	I Corps Sector
69th Division	*Reserve unlocated

*Tentative

16th CCF Army (Corps): A prisoner of war captured in the vicinity of CT 541421 on 9 July by elements of the 3d US Division identified the 136th Regiment, 46th Division. While this prisoner stated that elements of the 16th CCF Army (Corps) were in contact within the sector of the 24th CCF Army (Corps), no order of battle changes were accepted on 10 July because of lack of additional evidence to support entry of this army into combat.¹²

(11) Annex 5, PIR 1026, July 1953

(12) Annex 4, PIR 1018, July 1953

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