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A Comparison between the Philippines and Iraq Warfare's

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Class 58

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19 March 2008

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Abstract

The War on Terror has alarmed our nation as well as the rest of the world. Our planet has been faced with a broaden guerilla struggle. Numerous nations around the world have united forces to end the flood of terror, while the rebels made it problematical to accomplish the missions. In prior wars of this degree, the U.S. can pass on lessons erudite to aid them and the coalition allies in restraining the rebels' abilities in transporting panic to the world. The U.S. and its cohorts must formulate a successful plan to counteract these insurgents.

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Introduction

This comparative analysis will compare, analyze and show the contrast of counterinsurgency campaigns within the Philippines to those within Iraq. I will analyze the tactics used today to those of the past. It will also show contrast to success or failure and if counterinsurgency operations from the past can aid us in today's war on terrorism, specifically the Philippines insurgencies.

In previous wars of this magnitude the Philippines War and Iraq have many elements such as tactics, success, and failures during war, and Counterinsurgency. The U.S. and other countries must devise an effective plan to neutralize the enemy on a strategic level. Finally, it will show differences and similarities of operations, those of the Philippines and those of Iraq.

Tactics

In the tactical and planned traits, the similarities between the Philippines and Iraq conflicts parallel one another. The insurgent assaults were the key issues in the campaigns. An examination of the Philippine War helped paved the way to convey democracy to the U.S. The United States military are more organized for urban conflict resulting from superior groundwork.

What is the carrot stick policy? This policy was first implemented by owners who own donkeys to keep them moving. If the donkey stopped, the owner/rider would dangle a raw carrot in front of the animal's nose. If the donkey was still reluctant to move, the owner used his stick to pound on him. In other words, the carrot sticks policy reward individuals who do their jobs and punish those that do not perform their jobs. General Elwell S. Otis, the American Commander, carrot stick policy was designed to strategically conquer and divide

the Pilipino population. The encouraging aspect of the carrot routed a positive victory, while the thrashing of the stick led to an inapt leader who was widely despised.

General Order 100, the Lieber Code, was a code that was inclusive and practical that it served as the root for most ensuing regulations and international agreements, which was “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field,” according to the website at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lieber_Code.

MacArthur, the new military governor, implemented General Order 100. MacArthur implemented a policy based on the carrot of amnesty (official pardon) for surrendered guerillas.... and when this did not prosper, he followed with the stick of concentration camps, confiscation of property, and ruthless retaliation in areas where resistance persisted.

Though there were callous strategies used, profits were gained. Their strategies were intimidation and torched villages, while the benefits allowed the commanders ample time to prepare for ambushes. “Wisely, the U.S. military did not attempt to impose a uniform solution over this checkerboard strategic landscape but instead modified its tactics to fit local circumstances” (Donnelly & Serchuk, 2003).

Success/Failure

The Bush administration is creating momentous steps in Iraq and its valiant resolutions to recommit assets there have established the platform for additional development. It was critical that the U.S. officials oppose enticement to deal with the insurgency as insignificant. Conciliation strategies that attested effectual in one part may have been severely unsuitable for another part. Yet, to have knowledge of the populace with vital information and determining an ambiance for the community may possibly be adept with elements in position.

While the Department of the Defense has been severely doomed for failing to expand an inclusive, integrated plan for postwar Iraq, it bears examining that the Philippine counterinsurgency was a success largely given that it did not unfurl as a cohesive operation, except rather, as a handful semi-independent regional counterinsurgencies conducted in collaboration. The development in both conflicts is not calculated either by the summation of encounters with the enemy or fatalities obliged. Ultimately, the end result of the conflict past and present has been a gradual transfer of power from the residing forces to a reliable regime.

Moreover, the examples of both conflicts were that counterinsurgency was an analysis of American political leadership to the extent of its armed forces power. The judgment of the population became the legitimate “nucleus” of gravity in both conflicts, collectively. The typical guerilla tactic was not to win, but to persevere and avert the contenders from victory. “In the Philippines, insurrectors anticipated to protract the war until either the U.S. Army broke down...or the American public demanded a withdrawal” (Donnelly & Serchuk, 2003). Today, the analogous strategies are used in both Iraq conflicts.

Differences and Similarities

There were differences as well as similarities in both the Philippine and Iraq conflicts. During the Philippine conflict, the insurrectors had a well-written political plan vehemently advertised to the local citizens. Rebellious leaders allocated communal letters disputing their situation, captivating to feelings of allegiance, independence, and self-control. On the contrary, as the insurgents crave to declare the dictatorship of an unelected minority above the general public, the U.S. has made an effort to establish Iraq ruled by their own populace.

Throughout the Philippine War, the armed forces used the idiom, “boots on the ground,” which is currently used in the military, today. Though this was understood to bring

supremacy in both wars, it confirmed to be inadequate then and now. The outcome is mainly that the insurgents do not want the military in their country making our mission extremely tough. They [insurgents] will continue to make our mission in their country grueling and perilous. Moreover, the quantity of Soldiers on the ground did not reveal the strength of authority, but the rebel's purpose was to control the willpower of our stay. They wanted to conquer this by way of bombings and isolated attacks in the Philippines and Iraq.

The insurgent's solitary display of terrorization is to create mayhems in the community. The policy of forceful influence may possibly be an efficient plan in Iraq; however, recent appeal has been unsuccessful while generating nominal outcomes. The ultimate goal was to eradicate the most important figures of command as it was during the Philippine conflict. The huge battle arched toward the insurgents who were persistent to interrupt the slightest opportunity of a solid and sovereign empire. In the Philippine conflict, the U.S. finally enforced their willpower on the insurgents, just as our current goal in Iraq. As long as the battle among the diverse spiritual groups continues, the U.S. will continue on their mission to produce a steady and independent nation.

Counterinsurgency

Still, the political schedule of the U.S. becomes uncertain as it was during the Philippine warfare. There are discussions regarding the U.S. attention in both politics and economics. The isles were affluent in capital and the U.S. wanted to increase on its economic earnings by being independent and steady during the Philippine war. Presently, the productive oil foundation in the Middle East is parallel to how it was during the Philippines.

At the same time, as the actions of the insurgency continue to develop in Iraq, the discussion of sanctions versus the adjoining nations in the vicinity continues to emerge due to

unlawful activity and infractions of U.N. declarations. The U.S. pressure strategies in the Philippines persuaded politics gained custody of valuable assets.

Conclusion

Throughout the Philippine and Iraq conflicts, we are in tuned of the variations of what succeeded and failed. The focus in these conflicts was to empower a self-governing regime. Yet, the task changed when the rebels initiated, but also resisted to inflict their willpower. In similar occurrences, the Iraqis and Filipinos refused to include any U.S. support.

Now, Soldiers are more suitable in extensive warfare preparation and training not only in the United States, but abroad. Soldiers in basic training are exposed to a vast increase in skills needed to be efficient combat fighters in the War on Terror. This indicates an encouraging step in cultivating and refining our Armed Forces readiness. So much has been done to ensure combat training. Indeed, the analytical factors attained have, by far, enforced our higher echelons to orchestrate a strategic approach to surpass the latter conflicts plans. The insights gained today have better prepared our Soldiers for a better tomorrow.

Reference

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