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Combined Force Operations (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)

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Abstract

The goal of PRTs is to strengthen the capacity of people through funding and expertise provided by team members representing the Departments of Justice, Agriculture and Treasury. PRTs are an important tool in helping achieve economic and political stabilization by bolstering moderates, promoting reconciliation, and fostering economic development. The success of a PRT is determined by the team on the ground, based on local or provincial needs and the security conditions of the area it is serving. In Afghanistan, their job is to extend the reach of the Afghan central government. In Iraq, some PRTs are there to help develop provincial governments, while others are there to assist and advise brigade combat team commanders in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

Are any of these in Iraq fostering economic development

Combined Force Operations (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)

History

The history of United States Military combined force operations is a long and troubled one. From the very beginning, the U.S. Military has struggled with such operations. Specifically, this paper will outline the shortcomings involved with these operations.

U.S. military has been involved in combined force operations since its foundation. During America's fight for independence from Great Britain, problems with civilian control of the military's commissary operations and involvement in control of the state militias almost destroyed the Continental Army. In addition, General Washington's inability to control the militia lost him several major battles and almost cost America her independence. After America entered into an alliance with France in 1778, problems only intensified. The U.S. Congress and General Washington struggled with the French government's desire to take operational control of the war. France believed that due to their commitment of the French Army, Navy, national treasure and belief that they understood warfare far better than the Americans, they should take control of the war.

This attitude caused General Washington great difficulties in getting the French Army and Navy to commit to battle when he needed them. In addition, the U.S. Congresses' attempt to use both civilian and military officials, the PRTs of the day to make peace with those Americans in the southern states that were loyal to Great Britain met with failure and open hostility. Problems such as these and many more can be seen time and again in every conflict the U.S. Military has participated in (Fleming, 2005).

Problems Throughout History

The U.S. Military's involvement with combined force operations did not end with the

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successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War. The U.S. Congresses' distrust of a large standing Army and Navy, in addition to their unwillingness to pay ~~for~~ ^{its} them, left Americas post-revolutionary war professional military almost non-existent. An over dependence on a poorly trained, ill equipped, and badly led militia with discipline problems left America unprepared for the War of 1812. Unable to contest the British control of the sea lanes due to the lack of a Navy, America decided to attack the British in Canada. As in the Revolutionary War, the Congresses' insistence on using non-governmental agencies (civilian contractors) to supply the Army with food and supplies went terribly wrong. Contractor theft, incompetence, and outright fraud left the Army incapable of completing the capture of Canada. Moreover, several U.S. Armies surrendered to British forces in Canada primarily due to several States Militia being unwilling to fight. This sorry military state of affairs invited the British Army to attack the U.S. homeland resulting in the capture and burning of Washington, DC in August of 1814. As in previous battles, the fall of the U.S. Capital was primarily due to the U.S. Army's inability to combine the regular Army and State Militia into a combined arms team. Luckily for America, the war ended in stalemate the next year with the end of the Napoleonic war (Stewart, 2004).

These same problems manifested themselves again during America's war with Mexico. Although the U.S. Army and Navy easily out matched the Mexican Army; problems with non-government supply agencies and poorly disciplined Militia made that fight much harder than it should have been and cost more casualties than expected. America's next war saw the nation torn apart in the war between the states. U.S. forces out matched the Confederate Army in every way at the start of the war and should have been easily dealt with. However, incompetent generals ^{who} ~~that~~ lacked a clear understanding of combined force operations, incompetent and fraudulent non-government logistical agencies and outright political power

struggles between States Militia and the regular Army again resurfaced. This allowed the Confederate Army under General Robert E. Lee to defeat one Army after another for the first three years of the war. Not until President Lincoln appointed General Ulysses S. Grant commander, did the U.S. Army finally have a commander ^{who} that understood combined force operations and was able to drive the southern states to their knees and bring the war to a close.

World War I began with Americas military ranked nineteenth in the world. ^{As in every} previous war, she had allowed her Army and Navy to become almost non-existent. She had no Air Force and the services that did exist refused to work with each other. In fact, they were in open competition for what funds were available. Once America entered the war on the side of the allies she was, in many cases, forced to rely on her partners for equipment. America did, however, begin to understand her role as a world power and begin to understand the requirements of combined force operations. By the end of the ~~War~~, she had become quite good at using her new Army Air Force, Tank Corps and Infantry as a combined arms team. With the end of the war, however, her Army and Navy ^{No} disbanded and those lessons were soon forgotten.

The start of World War II found the United States military in almost the same state as the beginning of World War I. Worse yet, the U.S. Army and Navy refusal to work as a combined arms team at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii resulting in a intelligence failure that cost both branches of service dearly on December 7, 1941. Interservice rivalries, failure to cooperate properly with other government agencies and allied nations hampered the American military war effort until the end of the war. Time and again throughout history the U.S. Military has been unwilling to learn or has forgotten the lessons of combined force operations (Stewart, 2004). ^{page no.}

Combined Force Operations during the Global War on Terrorism

The Global War on Terrorism has found America better prepared than ever before and

with a clearer understanding of combined force operations. However, many of the same problems seen in previous wars have resurfaced. PRTs in particular have been a problem. Host nation relations, inter-service rivalry, issues with chain of command, supply responsibilities, enforcing internal administration and discipline, UCMJ authority, are just a few of the problems that, in many cases, cause many PRTs to, at best be ineffective, at worst a danger to themselves and those around them. Perhaps the best example of Combined Force Operations gone wrong in recent history is Operation Eagle Claw (more commonly know as Desert One). The aborted attempt in 1980 to free the American hostages being held captive in Iran. This operation, the first major U.S. military operation attempted after America's exit from Vietnam ended in disaster, mainly due to every branch of the military wanting involvement. The Air Force provided fixed wing aircraft and crew, the Navy provided rotary wing aircraft and crew, and the Army provided wheeled vehicles and Special Forces personnel none of which had trained together or could even talk to one another by radio. However, because each service wanted to be part of the operation this mixed bag came together at the last minute, and deployed, expecting to carry out a very complex Mission. Operation Eagle Claw failed without even getting close to its objective when Navy and Air Force aircraft collided at a refueling base in the Iranian desert during a sandstorm costing American service men their lives. Operation Eagle Claw is only one of a long list of Combined Force Operations dating back to our nations beginning that due to poor training, improper or lack of equipment, inter service rivalry or just plain bad leadership ended in mission failure (Bowden, 2006). *page no?*

It is clear that the United States Military has always struggled with Combined Force Operations. It is also clear that these operations are the way of the future. If these operations are to be successful, much work must be done to solve the shortcomings listed in this paper.

Current Strategy of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRTs have not been completely successful in their mission due to security, resources, poor staffing, lack of guidance and the divergent operation environment. Although PRTs have made an impact in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress is questioning the amount of success these teams report. The Department of State and Department of Defense expected better results when establishing these teams (Crocker, 2004).

PRTs began operations in Afghanistan in 2002 and later in Iraq in 2004. The need to establish these teams are undisputable in our efforts to rebuild these countries. While assisting in the rebuilding of these countries it has become very difficult to persuade the locals to support the development of democratic governments. Establishing infrastructures while developing a new system of government is always a difficult task. If this were the only problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, we would only need PRTs. Instead, coalition forces are still fighting an extremist Islamic organization that has undermined the efforts to rebuild these countries (Perito, October 2005).

Intent of PRTs

The United States developed PRTs to assist provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promote security and rule of law, promote political and economic development, and to provide a provincial administration to meet the basic needs of the population (General office, 2006).

The PRTs most difficult task was to assist in the development of new local and national governments. Provincial governors and local leaders in both countries expected PRTs to settle disputes or funds projects. The United States expects these local leaders to go to the governmental counsels and solve these issues themselves. In some cases, it has been difficult to

get these leaders to understand that the PRTs are not the local government but an agency there to assist in the development of their government. In other cases, provincial governors in both counties are working against the PRTs in order to accomplish their own personnel agendas. A number of provincial governors and police officials were old-line warlords, militia commanders, or in other positions of regional power (Perito, October 2005). These crooked leaders continue to work against the PRTs and have their own agenda.

they are all crooked?

Although the PRTs are successful in many areas of promoting political and economic growth, they continue to face many setbacks which are slowing the rebuilding process. PRTs are responsible for promoting small projects that will win the hearts and minds of the local populations. They have been successful in creating jobs and identified numerous business opportunities. Iraq's economic success depends on its ability to enter the global market. The United Nations and many other countries are now cooperating in this process. Although the PRT do not have a responsibility for national economic growth, they are making some impact in the local markets. The United States hoped to accomplish this in the short and medium term by pumping large amount of money into the economy through reconstruction projects. With this approach it would create jobs and opportunities for Iraqi firms (Crocker, 2004).

but UN not in Iraq

Concerns of PRTs

The major issue that all PRT teams have experienced has been a lack of security. Given the responsibilities of the PRTs, it is surprising to find the teams providing their own security. In a report from the Department of Defense Inspector General, security was the number one concern of all PRTs. In some cases, team members were unable to accomplish their mission. Face to face meeting between PRT personnel and provincial governments officials are minimal or don't take place. Both U.S. and Iraqi provincial leaders are at risk while traveling which

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limits their contact. There are cases when member of the PRT teams are not able to interact with the local population, therefore they have no ideal what is needed in their area. With little contact, they loose the hearts and minds of the community. The Department of Defense Inspector General recommended the shut^I down of PRTs in Anbar and Basrah Iraq. These teams have been unable to defend themselves which has caused more harm than good. The Defense Department suggested it would only get worse as coalition forces withdraw and turn over areas to the Iraq government. Security will continue to be a major concern with all PRTs. Until recently, the ^D ^D defense department had no way of tracking attacks on the members of the PRTs (General Office, 2006).

Other major challenges the PRTs faced were a lack of resources, a lack of infrastructure, logistical support and qualified personnel to fill staff positions ^{that} have hinder the mission of some teams. One of the biggest problems in logistical support is the lack of an agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of the State. The Department of Defense and Department of State had not completed the agreement on PRT operational requirements and responsibilities as of October 26, 2006. The lack of an agreement left the PRTs with unclear boundaries between U.S. Embassy and military components. Personnel shortages are always an issue and the PRT program was no exception. In many cases the teams were short of vital individuals both military and civilians. The State Department found it difficult to hire enough qualified individuals to meet the growing needs of the PRT program. The military was experiencing difficulties filling the rank in the areas of military police and civil affairs personnel. Shortages often left the teams at or below 60% since the year 2005 (General Office, 2006).

Prior to receiving any funding for the PRT program the Department of State was to submit a complete report to the congressional appropriations committee which outlined the

progress of the PRT program, budget and staffing requirements, guidelines for operations, and the plan for transition of the PRT in Iraq by the end of FY 07. The initial plan did not budget for unexpected cost and logistical support. Although most teams have found alternate ways to accomplish their mission, they wasted precious time looking for these resources. According to the PRT members, 40% of their work time is spent solving support issues (General Office, 2006).

PRT Operations

The lack of communication in this divergent operation environment often causes issues between combative commanders and PRT leadership. For example, infrastructure projects conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supported by the Commander's Emergency Response Program relate to the PRT mission and program. Often PRTs are unaware of conflicting projects. Military commanders express concerns of the PRTs operating in their zone with no communication or command and control. Several agencies addressed the issue of command and control. Situations identified by the Department of Defense found PRT were ineffective and unproductive due ^{to} a loss of command and control. Lessons learned in Afghanistan prove that a lack of specific guidance led to confusion about military-civilian responsibilities within PRTs and authority boundaries (Perito, October 2005).

Understanding the problems that occur between the State Department and the Department of Defense we can now look at the problems that have trickled down to the coalition forces and how they affect the outcome of the PRTs.

The coalition's involvement with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Joint Command/Unit

~~Even though PRTs have a strategic purpose, and are necessary to the rebuilding process in both~~
~~Iraq and Afghanistan~~ they should receive better tactical training before deploying and have a clear and concise mission statement. Civil military operations sometimes interfere with and compromise tactical missions. The coalition's involvement with PRTs was established by U.S. forces during Operation's Enduring Freedom in early 2002 (Perito, 2005,) and Iraqi Freedom in October 2005 (2006). The coalition's involvement is evolving in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the beginning of both conflicts, almost all PRTs fell under the command and control of the U.S. military. The goal is to eventually transition all PRTs to civil State Department authority under USAID, and ~~other~~ various international agencies. But with continuing strife in both Afghanistan and Iraq this is not feasible at this time. The goal is to begin transitioning the teams by late 2008 and 2009.

Generally, PRTs are manned by both military and Department of State (DOS) personnel. A typical PRT task organization has a Team Leader (O-5 command billet), Deputy Team Leader (O-4), DOS representative, and 55 to 85 ~~various~~ military and civilian personnel (Perito, 2005). Most PRTs have one or two Civil Affairs teams, which are made up of four personnel each. PRTs also have Military Police, military staffing personnel (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5, and S-6), DOS personnel and U.S. government contractors. Some PRTs in Iraq are actually transitioning *As known* to a DOS member as the actual team leader with a senior (O-4 or O-5) as the assistant team leader. Combining all of these different entities is creating a confusing and sometimes counter-productive command and control relationship. The focus and mission of the PRTs is not clearly defined and thus limits the effectiveness of these joint teams.

The most important difference between the original PRT model and the embedded PRTs is that instead of it being led and comprised of primarily military personnel, the team leader will be a State ^D department official and the deputy team leader will be a senior military commander. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) will work alongside PRTs providing “security, life support and operations.” In a soon ~~to be~~ published United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, the operational concept, command and control, and funding for embedded PRTs ^{will be} clearly outlined (Arvantis, 2007).

Affects of Military/Civil Affairs Operations

When the Navy and Air Force decided to offer up its personnel to support the ground aspects of the two wars that we are currently fighting, this opened up command billets for senior officers. The teams formed in the United States, train rapidly, and are sent overseas with the intent of further training being on the job training. The teams receive rudimentary cultural training, but no focus is put on training the teams in tactical situations. Even though their mission is not to perform combat operations, ~~and~~ ^{these} teams generally comprised of Reservists, put themselves in harms way by not having a tactical mindset. An example would be when a PRT commander will tell a local Mayor or Provincial Governor when the team will arrive for a meeting. This places the team at risk by giving locals an exact time that they will be traveling from the PRTs base to wherever the meeting is to take place. The most important rule in Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) is to not give the time and place of coalition movements to locals. In most cases, word of the impending movement will be spread and insurgents are then able to effectively target convoys. This was experienced during my rotation in OEF. The PRT was constantly advised to not talk about specific times and movements, but local officials constantly knew of specific times and movements. The PRT

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commander would talk about specific events and movements in front of interpreters, and in many cases, the interpreters would call the local officials and inadvertently give away the specific information. This attributes ^{is caused by} to the ad hoc ^{note} fashion of the teams composition and the lack of intense ground tactical training.

I experienced naval personnel who had no ground combat experience or cultural awareness training and “showed” up in Afghanistan. This sometimes created a hazard to the security of my missions when we attempted to coordinate operations in the same Area of Responsibility (AOR). I witnessed PRT personnel who routinely violated basic customs of the local populace such as, waving with their left hands, using hand signals that in Arabic cultures are seen as offensive, and eating with the bottom of their feet pointing in the direction of the hosts. These are basic violations of cultural awareness that are easily preventable by placing more emphasis on this pre-deployment training.

Routinely, in both OIF and OEF, combat operations and civil reconstruction programs are occurring concurrently in the same AOR. This creates a hostile atmosphere between the coalition combat forces and the PRTs. In some cases the PRT commander tries to “command” the combat forces and “advise” on whether operations can be performed in “his or her” sector. With the combat forces prior knowledge and distrust of the security measures ^{used by} with PRTs, the distrust inadvertently places both elements in vulnerable positions while “outside the wire.” In one instance, my unit and the local police were targeting specific insurgents in a village. We planned on PRT support for a medical and veterinary mission (MEDCAP/VETCAP) in the village later that day. When word leaked out of the MEDCAP/VETCAP mission we called off the mission, due to a compromise of mission security. The day after the planned mission, five Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were found in the road leading into the village. The locals

located these IEDs and reported them to the police. The IEDs were in place for the PRT mission that was going to be traveling this route into the village. Again, my detachment tried to assist and advise the PRT in information security but basically ended all relations with this particular PRT due to security concerns.

In my experience with PRTs in Afghanistan the relationship was cordial and lukewarm. The DOS representative constantly sent out his weekly situation reports (SITREPS) criticizing the actions of my detachment. This fueled distrust between my detachment and the DOS element of the PRT. The DOS representative had differing views on how local reconstruction projects should be performed and how we, a US Army combat arms unit, viewed PRT operations. Introducing DOS personnel into remote areas too soon counters the tactical missions and is a hindrance to counter-insurgency operations.

doesn't make sense

Even though PRTs have a strategic and critical mission, manning and training lack emphasis for mission success with coalition units. Iraqi and Afghani public support is fragile and easily swayed by terrorist group propaganda. As quoted by Thomas Paine, "Those who expect to reap the blessings of liberty must undergo the fatigues of supporting it" (Bradley & Powers, 2000, p. 73). PRTs are crucial in the fight against terrorism but by having occasional differing [?] ideals than combat unit's missions, success is sometimes not achieved. PRTs and combat units will have to work together, but clearly defined parameters need to be defined and exact mission sets established. With more focus placed on basic ground tactical and enhanced cultural awareness training, the PRTs will actually enhance the coalition's efforts at targeting insurgents and securing the peace in both OIF and OEF. In the next few paragraphs we will discuss the lessons learned and how these affect current and potentially future operations.

Lessons Learned

Operation Enduring Freedom

Currently there are 34 Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT) operating in Afghanistan led by both United States and International Security Assistance Force members (ISAF). Lessons are very important for all current and future PRTs operating in Afghanistan; PRT's help further governance, security, and reconstruction around the country. Due to the absence of clear guidelines for both military and civilians, PRT commanders had to concoct their own. Many officers and civilians often came from various cultures and had different, sometimes battling mandates. Without any pre-agreements on roles, missions, and duty descriptions it took trial and error to attain mission priorities. Civilian agency's often showed up without their own logistic agencies, which meant disagreements with most commanders as to who controlled most of the resources. Civilians were restricted in their movements due to no dedicated vehicles or security, which in turn caused them to be unable to meet with non-government officials or project developers. PRTs were most effective when military and civilian agencies fused together and supported each others missions (Perito, 2005).

Recruiting was another issue for the State Department that affected all U.S. government and civilian proponents. Usually younger officers or recalled retiree's were representing the state but it limited the ability of the staff to develop effective civil-military relationships.

Whereas assigning senior officers with previous deployments in the area of operation ~~it~~ helped in aiding relationships between the agencies. While energy and interest ~~are~~ ^{were} critical the lack of language skills, expertise in the area of operation, and job experience were non-existing. PRT staff never received official language training and therefore had to rely on there small number of

their

Afghan interpreters, who, most of the time, had limited competency. The outcome of this was very costly because most of the conversations were lost in translation (Perito, 2005).

See Kurarel

The PRT reconstruction mandate lacked precise statistics, suitable staffing, and quality control. Short tours and many turnovers aggravated many PRTs. Since they often reverted to what was familiar to them and stayed in areas where there was heavy establishment of U.S. forces, many of the remote areas went un-inspected. This caused a problem because inspections could not be conducted to guarantee that companies were not stealing cement and other supplies. In many cases, where buildings were sponsored by PRTs, they became unusable and had structural problems (Perito, 2005).

There would ^{be} little room for debate if the names of the teams would be changed to "Provincial Security Teams" due to most of the missions mirror what they are doing today. As dominant military organizations, PRTs are better fit to security-related tasks than to furnish development assistance. PRTs ^{excelled} prevailed at providing a security presence and performing duties related to disarmament, demobilization, and de-mining. As military organizations, PRTs had a peculiar difficult time coordinating projects (Perito, 2005).

See Kurarel

Information was a subject that was not published or readily available through the agencies throughout Afghanistan. This caused problems due to that information about funds expended, projects complete, and programs underway were not available (Perito, 2005).

Some of the recommendations that past PRTs have brought up are:

- The U.S. should develop a detailed concept of operation manual
- Assignments should be of appropriate rank and prepared for the area of operation
- PRTs need to be properly funded in all areas of interest and logistical ^{best} supported ^{ly}

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Let me switch to Iraq now, while there are unknown numbers of PRTs in Iraq. They have the same mission as the teams in Afghanistan, but are encountering different issues. To date work in Iraq by the PRTs have made gradual progress in unfolding Iraq's provincial and local capacities to handle its recovery program. However the problems don't stop there, there are still problems with ethnic conflicts, political, and security difficulties, they still continue to get in the way of the overall development. The varying degree to which these severe problems agitate Iraq across the country has, proportionately, affected progress (Bowen, JR, 2007).

During many visits, officials gave mixed decisions among their provinces' effectiveness at governing and managing their governmental establishments, but made it clear that each had improved immensely over the past year. Another issue that came up was that they said they are coaching their counterparts to ensure proper allocation of their budget. Most report that they are ahead of their spending for 2006 and on course for 2007, and report that most of the funds are spent on construction projects (Bowen, JR, 2007). The need to work on the local level -- as opposed to the massive and largely unsuccessful infrastructure projects that characterized initial U.S. reconstruction efforts -- described by Rice as an important "lesson learned" during four years in Iraq (DeYoung, 2007).

In many locations due to the suspected links to militias and criminal mischief the populous views many official agencies with doubt. Many of the official agencies throughout the towns are routinely ignored because ~~they are~~ ^{Iraqis} feared of what might happen to them or their families. Judges and the judicial process are the most threatened due do lack of security, ^{because} of this the courts are unable or unwilling to hear cases do to security issues so many cases go unheard and the bad people continue to roam the streets (Bowen, JR, 2007).

The unemployment rate and living standards continue to increase due to the dangerous security issues throughout the provinces and they continued to undermine efforts by the PRTs.

*doesn't
make sense*

Due to very little foreign and Iraqi investments it becomes difficult to ship raw materials into provinces and transport agricultural and manufactured products to markets. Many of the provinces suffer from inadequate amount of fuel oil and electrical power. Without a stable power source advisors report employment opportunities are becoming hard to create (Bowen, JR, 2007).

It will likely take years of steady engagement to ^{convert} make the dangerous conditions for the military and civilian PRTs ^{into} ~~to be able to work in~~ a safe environment. This will be a slow process to resolving these issues but in the end it will improve the political ^{situation} ~~state~~ at the national level (Bowen, JR, 2007).

Building on past recommendations it is recommended that some of the actions ^{to} be taken: ^{include}

- Jointly build a comprehensive plan for all PRTs and include objectives, milestones for objectives, funding requirements, and agencies that are responsible for implementation of the plans
- Proper guidance on the use of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) monies ,

I have only touched on a few of the lessons that the U.S. and civilian forces are encountering in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is important to note that both forces are providing a positive influence in both countries where there otherwise would have been only military forces executing kinetic operations. In the following chapter we will discuss the benefits and successes of these teams and why we must continue to support these teams with highly qualified, trained, and motivated personnel.

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Opposing View

Benefits of PRTs

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provide support by establishing and strengthening relationships with local Afghan and Iraqi business leaders, community leaders, and elected officials who are committed to building prosperous, peaceful, and democratic nations. PRTs support these countries through targeted help (e.g. loans and grants) to assist with starting new businesses, creating new jobs, providing services that meet the needs of local communities, and develop the capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable way (Bureau Of Public Affairs, 2007).

The expanded PRT program provides targeted help to communities rather than serving to employ large scale reconstruction projects. Also, there is a new emphasis on creating civilian-armed forces teams that work toward common objectives. These civilian and armed forces leaders then create a common plan, which draws upon combined civil and armed forces resources. The armed forces command is responsible for providing life and operational support, as well as security, for all U.S. personnel collocated with brigades in the field.

The Impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams on Civil and Armed forces

During a natural disaster or peacekeeping operations, there is continuity in the efforts of civilian and armed forces leaders as they perform their missions. This analogy is usually not an issue during combat operations, as shown in Afghanistan and Iraq. When civilians are involved as combatants' significant conflict disrupts the civil-armed forces relationship. Armed forces operations designed to defeat insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq created conflict with Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) efforts to ease human suffering (Oliker, 2004). As the roles of the armed forces transitioned from combat

operations to stabilization, the introduction of PRTs created a new framework for civilian and armed forces interaction, however, certain issues continued to disrupt the rapport between civilians and the military, particularly their conflicting views on providing security and information sharing (Oliker, 2004).

When military forces provide relief, it is usually related to other objectives such as engaging the enemy, base defense, or the security and welfare non-combatants under their control. In hostile situations, the actions of the military may mean the difference between life and death, their role is acceptable under these conditions. However, sometimes these obligations place a strain on the capabilities of the military and providing support creates tension within the IO/NGO community if performed in a manner that compromises reconstruction efforts.

There are also fundamental differences in what non-military personnel and the armed forces consider a secure environment. Military leaders place their emphasis on security, public order, and base defense, all of which are improved by lowering the risk of threats. Non-military personnel associate security with making certain that insurgents do not distinguish them as threats. PRTs are also influenced by widespread chaos and criminality that military leaders are not trained to handle. Even though civil and military objectives may differ the coordination and sharing of information can affect the allocation of resource and security.

Success of PRTs

→ Major reconstruction projects completed successfully in Afghanistan, such as the construction of wells, bridges, schools and roads, which facilitate the transportation of goods and services throughout the country. Construction is also under way for a \$1.7 million bridge across the Farah Rud River. This bridge will span 300 meters and rise 12 meters over the center span and will benefit not only the residents of Tojg, but the districts of Shib Koh, Qalay Ka, Lashe Juwain

and Farah City. This project, funded by the Farah PRT, will also employ several hundred Afghans for a couple of years. Addressing the needs of agriculture in Afghanistan PRTs have constructed or rebuilt over 250 miles of irrigation canals, roughly 240 irrigation structures, and over 100 market structures such as retail market stalls, grain and vegetable storage sheds (U.S. Federal News Service, 2007).

In the Anbar province of Iraq PRTs repairs to water systems, schools and medical clinics stood in contrast to al-Qaida's actions, and helped convince tribal leaders to join together with coalition forces. The efforts in Anbar have helped to restore tribal authority, and give its leadership the ability to improve the quality of life of its people. The citizens of Anbar have begun to safeguard their communities by joining the army and police, army units have grown to full strength and over 20,000 new police officers are on the streets, twice as many as in 2006. In July the PRTs also rebuilt government office buildings enabling government and tribal leaders to communicate their needs to authorities in Baghdad (Mckeeby, 2007). how?

A civil affairs officer of Ramadi's PRT stated in a joint briefing that since April 2005, when the skirmishes seemed to end, Ramadi has become a city ^{the} on mend, dominated by reconstruction. This is symbolic of what PRTs are accomplishing in Iraq. Thousands of Iraqi lives are being improved through this program, which begun in 2005. Its focus is to rebuild infrastructure while supporting local government, business and civil society (Oliker, 2004).

Meeting the Intent

The intent of the PRTs, are to rebuild infrastructure, assist in establishing local government systems and transition local areas from combat zones to business developments or residential neighborhoods. We must understand that the missions of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are different. The ethnic makeup of an area and the education level of the populace are

variables that shape the conditions and challenges PRTs face and determine their potential for success. Thus, what may be a great success in one province may look like failure in another. PRTs in Afghanistan focus on improving road networks, adding to the supply of electricity or water, and building schools and clinics. PRTs in Iraq, place a stronger emphasis on capacity building such as mentoring and training in governance, stressing their importance on establishing and growing local and provincial government (U.S. Federal News Service, 2007).

While PRTs may not serve as a model for future stability operations, the challenges they have had to deal with in tackling the issues of information sharing, security, and the role of the armed forces in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts are likely to arise whenever civilian and military organizations are working together in combat environments. The global war on terrorism has made the search for open dialogue and positive interaction between civilians and the armed forces a vital requirement. There is a compelling need to understand these challenges and implement procedures and processes to cope effectively (United Nation General Assembly Resolution, 2005, 85).

Conclusion

Although PRTs have made an impact in OIF/OEF they have experienced their share of major setbacks. The successes of these teams are due to the individual efforts of its members. Reconstruction of any country can be very difficult. Different ideologies and religions in these regions will continue to make progress difficult. Security will remain the top priority for these teams and once they can improve those issues, the PRTs will become more productive. It is also important to note that these teams combined of international, civilian and military personnel are providing a positive influence in both countries. For continued success we must continue to support these teams with highly qualified, trained, and motivated personnel. The evidence is

conclusive; while reasonably successful in many areas of operations, the PRTs will only achieve total success when security, resources, and manning issues are under control.

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