


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THE JENA CAMPAIGN

SOURCE BOOK

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

THE GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

Col. LANZA



THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

PREFACE

This volume consists of copies of documents relating to the Jena campaign which are in the library of The General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth. As the library does not contain all of the important documents relating to this campaign, this volume does not pretend to contain all documents which might well be considered. But the number and character of the documents included are more than sufficient to form the basis for tactical and strategical studies of this most important campaign. Particular attention is invited to the documents written by Napoleon himself. These documents are practically complete. They include not only those documents which directly relate to this campaign but also documents which are indirectly related to it. This has been done with two objects in view; first to show the relation between the conduct of the campaign and political matters, and second to show the care and thoroughness with which Napoleon attended to all matters which might even remotely affect the course of his plans.

Particular attention is invited to the following subjects:

- a. The gradual development of Napoleon's plans.
- b. The concentration of his troops.
- c. Napoleon's maneuvers leading to the decisive battle of Jena and Auerstedt.
- d. The pursuit after the decisive battles.
- e. The great care Napoleon took to establish liaison between all parts of his forces and his methods of doing this.
- f. Napoleon's methods of obtaining information concerning the enemy.
- g. The influence of forts on the military operations of this campaign.
- h. The system of supplies employed by both French and Prussians.
- i. The preparation and method of carrying out strategical reconnaissances.
- j. The occupation of enemy territory.

PREFACE

In considering Napoleon's plans of operations, care should be taken in determining dates when important changes were made or new ideas first appeared. For example, compare the plans made on or before September 28th with the development of the plans during September 29th and 30th. In regard to this particular date note the very large number of letters and orders written by Napoleon personally during the night of September 29th and 30th.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WRITING PAPERS (PROBLEMS)

The preceding paragraphs indicate possible subjects for essays. In writing essays, or more elaborate papers on parts of a campaign the following general rules should be followed.

The paper should be headed with a title descriptive of the nature of the contents. If the paper is of considerable length it should be divided into chapters or other suitable subdivisions. Each chapter or subdivision should cover some subject or important part of a subject.

Papers should consist of a narrative based on proper references, together with appropriate comments critically examining the facts brought out in the narrative. The paper may be of a general nature, or may be written from special viewpoints, such as that of supply, methods of obtaining information, etc. The value of the paper will lie largely in the character and appropriateness of the critical part of it. But in order to do this well it is first necessary to have a correct narrative to base the criticisms on. Each statement of fact in the narrative should be supported by proper references. These may be made in the body of the paper, but are usually contained in footnotes.

Footnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively, a new series of numbers commencing with each chapter. The first reference to a document should give the complete title of the document and name of the author, followed by the number of the volume if more than one and the page number, such as: "Correspondence of Napoleon I, *Published by Emperor Napoleon III*, No. 10551, Volume XIII,

PREFACE

page 3." Subsequent references within the same chapter to the same document are made as follows:

- a. If the reference immediately follows the complete reference, use the Latin word *ibidem* (same) or *opere citato* (work cited), which usually appears in the abbreviated forms of *ibid.* or *op. cit.*, respectively.
- b. When the subsequent reference does not immediately follow the complete reference, the reference should be repeated in abbreviated form, followed by words *cit* or *op. cit.*; such as "XIII Cor. Nap. I, 3, *cit.*"

When a document referred to is contained in a publication, which also contains articles on other matter, such as a magazine, the words *loc. cit.* (*loco citato*, Latin for *place cited*) are generally used following the abbreviated reference, in place of *op. cit.*

A reference to pages should give the exact page or pages on which reliance is placed for statements made. This may be given with numbers separated by a dash giving the first and last pages which include all relevant matter, or the number of the first page followed by the abbreviation *et seq.* (*et sequentes*, Latin for *and following*). If however the statements are included generally throughout a document the latin word *passim* (distributed), may be employed.

Footnotes may contain discussions of minor points, and should contain cross references where these would be appropriate. The words *ante* (before) and *post* (later) are frequently used for cross references, such as "*cf.*, *ante*, par. 3, p. 6." The abbreviation of *cf.* stands for the Latin word *confer*, meaning *compare*.

When more than one authority is cited for a statement, these authorities are preferably listed in the footnotes on separate lines. If not so shown they may be numbered, or may be separated from one another by periods.

In writing papers, quotations can be freely used. When a quotation is a translation, the original should if practicable be given in the footnote. If there is doubt as to the accuracy of the translation this may be discussed in the footnote. Quotations may contain omissions, provided the omissions are indicated, and that the making of these

PREFACE

omissions does not change the sense of the original statement. Omissions from the middle of a sentence are indicated by three asterisks or periods. If the omissions include the ends of a sentence, and possibly additional matter, four asterisks or periods should be used. Quotations from separate paragraphs should appear as separate quotations. When proper names are used the full name should be given when it first appears in the paper. If the person referred to is known by several names, this should be explained in a footnote. For example in speaking of Marshal Murat for the first time, his name in full, Joachim Murat, should be given, and a footnote should invite attention to the fact that Marshal Murat was the Grand Duke of Berg, by which title he is frequently referred to. Similarly relations between important personages mentioned in the paper, should be brought out either in the narrative or in footnotes, such as, that the King of Holland was Napoleon's brother, Louis.

It is important that papers prepared by general staff officers on important subjects should clearly indicate the documents on which the report is based, in order that should a further investigation be later required, new information can at once be separated from the old information and proper allowance be made for work already accomplished.

A list of references should appear at the end of the report or paper submitted, as a bibliography. Bibliographies should contain a complete statement of all documents examined by the author in his paper. The list should be divided, where the number of documents is considerable, into suitable divisions, such as: primary sources, secondary sources; or as books, official reports, newspaper narratives, regimental histories, personal correspondence, memoirs, magazine articles, miscellaneous papers, etc.

In a bibliography the name of the work and of the author should be given exactly as it appears on the title page, such as, "The Military Life of Marshal Ney, by *General H. Bonnal*, Paris, 1911."

If the document referred to consists of more than one volume, the total number of volumes should be shown. If only certain volumes relate to the paper submitted, state-

PREFACE

ment to that effect giving the numbers of the volumes should be made.

A brief statement should be made after the name and title of the work and author indicating its value. This statement should indicate whether the work is of a primary or secondary nature, indispensable to a proper understanding of the subject, of very slight value, as containing important items but in many cases very inaccurate, or similar remarks.

References to documents which are owned by individuals, and which documents have never been published, and are not accessible to investigators, should be indicated clearly as being in private possession.

Maps, copies of returns, discussions of minor points too long to include in footnotes, and other similar matter should be placed in an appendix. The entire paper should be completed with an index or table of contents.

It is hoped that the few simple rules given above, and the text following will enable students to make a profitable study of the Jena campaign.

CONRAD H. LANZA,
Colonel, Field Artillery.

The General Service Schools,
January 15, 1922.

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General Map, South Germany.

Battle of Jena, Positions night of 13-14 October.

Battle of Jena, Positions at 10:00 A.M., 14 October.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN
SOURCE BOOK
The General Service Schools
1922

ERRATA SHEET

(1) Changes.

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Reads Now</i>	<i>Should Read</i>
45	14	Davout	Davout
45	35	battalions'	battalions
54	15	N—"La Vie du Marechal Ney," by General H. Bonnal, 1904;	MN=Vol II. "La Vie du Marechal Ney," General H. Bonnal, 1911;
161	17 of	this baggage	your baggage
	CN—10895		
176	date on	2:00 P.M.	2:00 A.M.
	CN—10908		
178	4 of	are worthless	is worthless
	CN—10910		
180	last	force and there	force. There
181	1	a Bavarian front	the Bavarian frontier
195	9 and 10 of	thousand	hundred
	CN—10924		
217		B—218	B—219
221		B—254	B—253
222	9	these reports	the reports
230	19	to support you.	for our support.
231	9 of	Fefebvre	Lefebvre
	B—272		
240	16 of	18th	8th
	B—288		
242	address on	IV Corps	VI Corps
	B—297		
246	7	is making	are making
259	20 of	bridge under	bridge over
	CN—10961		
276	1 of	news at all	news from you at all
	CN—10971		
280	2 of	to continue occupied	to the cantonments occupied
	B—334		
280	heading of	END OF MARCH 8,	END OF MARCH, October 8,
	B—356		
290	28	were charged by	who charging
290	29	which maneuvered	had maneuvered
290	29	its left	their left
290	29	take it	take them

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Reads Now</i>	<i>Should Read</i>
297	4	Jena	Gera
297	4	no doubt that	no doubt but that
297	5	is not an	is an
298	2 of	advance guard	Guard
	B—388		
298	footnote	Soult	Davout
298	footnote	against that town	against Saalfeld
309	8 and 8 of	yesterday	yesterday evening
	CN—10982		
310	1 of	Ronneburg	Ronneberg
	CN—10984		
320	8	get	give
336	3	enemy	Emperor
337	10 of	attack	follow
	CN—11004		
338	12	retreat	right
346	38	lovely	lively
347	3	who	which
352	12	have charged	charge.
352	31	Light Cavalry Division	Light Cavalry
373	13	no longer 700	more than 400
377	24	armistice	hostilities
380	21 and 22	5000 pieces among	5000 prisoners, also
		which	
384	9 and 10 of	up to Elbe	along the Elbe
	CN—11032		
396	37	Darby	Barby
441	date on	22 October	26 October
	M—2607		
549	11	given out	given up
552	3	in the heels	on the heels
568	31	the plan	the plain
582	12	Saudau	Sandau
583	16	Dessau	The Elbe

(2) Additions.

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Add After</i>	<i>Add</i>
109	8	"Wurtzbourg"	The heavy cavalry will be on the line of Wurtzbourg on October 3d.
121	heading on CN—10837		To MARSHAL BERTHIER
197	10	"Mayence."	To this end, you will place your corps in echelon from Frankfurt to Mayence, as soon as you have united all your troops.
214	end of B—220	Signature	Note: For reply see B—221 on page 231.
241	20 of B—290A	"Hof".	GHQ will be at Bamberg on the 6th, at Lichtenfels on the 8th, and at Kronach on the 9th.
259	23 of CN—10961 CN—10961	"Gotha"	I will be at Kronach at two hours after midnight today. (2:00 A.M., 8 October.)
260	heading of 2d document	"B—"	310
289	end of B—379	"Artillery park."	According to information received, Plauen has been evacuated this morning by the enemy who proceeded towards Gera.
295	3	"Saalfeld."	(Information of combat at Schleitz omitted.)
301	heading of B—390	"LANNES"	AT SCHLEITZ.
320	end of MN—2756	"Erfurt."	It is certain that there are no troops between Leipzig and Naumburg.
323	end of MN—277A	"Roda."	The remainder of the army will rest.

CALENDAR

1806

AUGUST

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

SEPTEMBER

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

OCTOBER

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

NOVEMBER

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

PART I

French Accounts

FOREWORD

For general orientation extracts from two French officers who participated in the Jena Campaign follow. In so far as the experiences related are personal the documents constitute an original source of information.

CONRAD H. LANZA,
Colonel. Field Artillery.

Chapter I

THE MEMOIRS OF BARON DE MARBOT

LATE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IN THE FRENCH ARMY

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

ARTHUR JOHN BUTLER

Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge

FOURTH EDITION

SLIGHTLY ABRIDGED

3534

LONDON

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AND NEW YORK: 15 EAST 16th STREET

1893

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GERMANY AND ITALY IN 1806

Scale 1:9,000,000.



Note: The Napoleonic states are shown with names underlined.

Legend : A . Principality of Aschaffenburg (1st Primate)
 I Isenburg
 Hz Hohenzollern
 L Liechtenstein
 Prv

CHAPTER I

Baron Marbot's Account

Extract

* * * * *

At last I reached Paris, and brought Lieutenant N—— to Murat, who resided during the summer at the Chateau of Neuilly. The marshal begged me to complete my task, and to bring N—— to the Quercy. I agreed in the hope of seeing my mother; but observed that I could not start for twenty-four hours, since Marshal Augereau had intrusted me with despatches for the Emperor, and I was going to Rambouillet to find him. I went thither in pursuance of my orders that very day.

I do not know what were the contents of the despatches which I bore, but they made the Emperor very thoughtful. He sent for M. De Talleyrand, and went off with him to Paris, ordering me to follow, and to present myself that evening to Marshal Duroc. I obeyed, and waited for a long time in one of the rooms of the Tuilleries, till Duroc, coming out of the Emperor's study and leaving the door ajar, gave directions in a loud voice for an orderly officer to get ready to start by the post on a distant mission. But Napoleon called out: "Duroc, that is unnecessary, for we have got Marbot here going back to Augereau; he can go on to Berlin; Francfort is half-way there." Accordingly, Duroc instructed me to get ready to go to Berlin with the Emperor's despatches. I was annoyed, because I must give up going to see my mother; but I had to resign myself. I hastened to Neuilly, to let Murat know; and as for my own affairs, thinking that my new mission was very urgent, I returned to the Tuilleries, but Duroc allowed me till the next morning. I turned up at dawn, and was put off till

the evening; in the evening again till next morning, and so on for eight days. Still, I bore it with patience, because each time that I appeared Duroc only kept me a moment, which allowed me to go about in Paris. He had handed me a pretty large sum of money in order to set myself up in entirely new uniforms, so that I might make a good appearance before the King of Prussia, into whose hands I was myself to give the Emperor's letter. You see that Napoleon overlooked no detail when it was a question of raising the French army in the eyes of foreigners.

I got off at last, after receiving the despatches and instructions from the Emperor bidding me take special note of the Prussian troops, their bearing, their arms, horses, and so on. M. De Talleyrand gave me a packet for M. Laforest, our ambassador at Berlin, with whom I was to stay. On reaching Mayence, which was then in French territory, I learnt that Marshal Augereau was at Wiesbaden. I went there and surprised him much by telling him that I was going to Berlin by the Emperor's order. Travelling night and day in splendid July weather, I reached Berlin somewhat tired. In those days the roads in Prussia were not metalled, and one rolled along, nearly always at a walk, on shifting sand, into which the wheels sank deep and raised intolerable clouds of dust. M. Laforest received me most kindly. I put up at the Embassy, and was presented to the King and Queen, and the Princes and Princesses. The King displayed much emotion on receiving the Emperor's letter. He was a tall and fine man, with a face expressing much kindness, but lacking in the animation which indicates a strong character. The Queen was in truth very handsome, but disfigured by the thick wrapping which she always wore round her neck—it was said, to conceal a decided goitre, which, through medical maltreatment, had become an open sore. Her figure was full of grace, and her countenance, at once bright and dignified, expressed strength of will. I was most graciously received; and as it was a month before the answer which I had to take back to the Emperor was ready—so difficult, it seems, was it to settle—the Queen was kind enough to invite me to all the balls and parties which she gave during my stay.

Of all the members of the royal family, the one who treated me, to all appearance at least, with most kindness, was the King's nephew, Prince Louis. I had been warned that he detested French, and especially their Emperor; but as he was deeply interested in military matters, he never ceased questioning me about the siege of Genoa, the battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, and upon the organization of our army. This prince was a splendid man, and, in respect to mental gifts and character, was the only member of the royal family who bore any resemblance to the Great Frederick. I made acquaintance with various persons about the Court, and especially with some officers whom I accompanied every day to parades and manoeuvres. Thus I passed my time at Berlin very pleasantly, and our ambassador paid me every attention; but in course of time I perceived that he wished to make me play in a delicate affair a part which would have been improper for me, and I had to adopt an attitude of reserve.

But let us consider a little Prussia's position with regards to Napoleon, with which, as I learnt later on, the despatches which I brought had much to do. By accepting from Napoleon the gift of the Electorate of Hanover, an hereditary possession of the family now reigning in England, the Cabinet of Berlin had alienated not only the anti-French party, but almost the whole Prussian nation. German self esteem was offended by the successes gained by the French over the Austrians, and Prussia feared, besides, to see her commerce ruined in consequence of the war which the Cabinet of London had just declared upon her. The Queen and Prince Louis sought to profit by this excitement in bringing the King to join Russia, which, though deserted by Austria, still had hopes of taking revenge for Austerlitz, and to go to war with France. The Emperor Alexander was still supported in his plans against France by his favourite aide-de-camp, the Polish Prince Czartoryski. Still the anti-French party, though increasing every day, had not yet succeeded in deciding the King of Prussia to break with Napoleon, but finding itself supported by Russia, it redoubled its efforts. It was clever enough to profit by Napoleon's mistakes in placing his brother Louis on the throne

of Holland, and nominating himself Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine—an act which was represented to the King of Prussia as a step towards re-establishing Charlemagne's Empire. Napoleon, they said, would end by making all the sovereigns of Germany come down to the rank of his vassals. Exaggerated as these assertions were, they yet produced a great revolution in the King's mind, and from that time his conduct towards France became so equivocal that Napoleon decided to write to him with his own hand, regardless of ordinary diplomatic efforts, to ask, Are you for or against me? Such was the drift of the letter which I had handed to the King. His council, wishing to gain time to arm, delayed the answer, which was what kept me so long at Berlin.

At length, in the month of August, a general explosion against France broke out, and the Queen, Prince Louis, the nobility, the army, and the whole population cried out loudly for war. The King let himself be carried away, but since, although he had decided to break the peace, he still cherished a faint hope that hostilities might be avoided, it appears that in his answer he undertook to disarm if the Emperor would recall to France all the troops that he had in Germany. This Napoleon would not do until Prussia had disarmed, so that they were revolving in a vicious circle, from which war was the only escape.

Before my departure from Berlin I had evidence of the frenzy to which their hatred of Napoleon carried the Prussian nation, usually so calm. The officers whom I knew ventured no longer to speak to me or salute me; many Frenchmen were insulted by the populace; the men-at-arms of the Noble Guard pushed their swagger to the point of whetting their sword-blades on the stone steps of the French ambassador's house. In all haste I betook myself back to Paris, taking with me copious information on the state of affairs in Prussia. As I passed through Francfort I found Marshal Augereau in much grief, having just heard of the death of his wife, a good and excellent person, whom he deeply regretted and whose loss was felt by the whole staff, for she had been most kind to us.

When I got to Paris I gave the Emperor a reply in the King of Prussia's own hand. He read it, and questioned me on what I had seen and heard at Berlin. When I told him how the guardsmen had whetted their sabres on the steps of the French Embassy, he brought his hand to his sword-hilt, and indignantly exclaimed, "The insolent braggarts shall soon learn that our weapons need no sharpening."

CHAPTER XXIV

My mission being at an end, I returned to Marshal Augereau and passed the whole month of September at Francfort. We prepared for war by getting all the amusement we could, for we thought that, nothing being more uncertain than soldiers' lives, they had better make haste to enjoy them.

Meanwhile, the different divisions of the Grand Army were concentrating on the banks of the Main. The Emperor had just reached Wurtzbourg, and his guard was crossing the Rhine. The Prussians on their side were marching, and on their way through Saxony had compelled the Elector to join his forces with theirs, this compulsory and therefore insecure alliance being the only one which the King of Prussia possessed in Germany. It was true he was expecting the Russians, but their army was still in Poland, behind the Niemen, more than 150 leagues from the country where the destiny of Prussia was to be decided. It is difficult to conceive the blundering which, during seven years, controlled the decisions of the Cabinets of states hostile to France. We have seen how, in 1805, the Austrians attacked us on the Danube, and allowed themselves to be beaten in detail at Ulm, instead of waiting till the Russians could join them and Prussia declare against Napoleon. Now, in 1806, we had these same Prussians, who a year before might, by joining them, have hindered the defeat of the Austrians and Russians, not only declaring war against us when we were at peace with the Cabinet of Vienna, but imitating its fault by attacking us without awaiting the Russians. Then, three years later, in 1809, the Austrians renewed the war against Napoleon single-handed, just when he was at peace with Prussia and Russia. This want of

unanimity secured victory for France. Unhappily it was not so in 1813, when we were crushed by the coalition of our enemies.

The King of Prussia's mistake in 1806, in declaring war against Napoleon before the Russians had come up, was aggravated by the fact that his troops, although well taught, were so badly organized that they were not fit to match themselves with ours. In fact, at this period a company or troop in Prussia was the property of its Captain. Men, horses, arms, accoutrements, everything belonging to him. He farmed it at the price of a fixed sum paid to the government. Thus, all losses being at their expense, it was to the interests of the captains to spare their companies, whether on the march or on the battle-field; and as the number of men which they were bound to have was fixed, they enrolled in the first place all the Prussians who presented themselves, and then all the vagabonds in Europe whom their agent's sergeants could enlist in the neighbouring states. But as this did not suffice, the Prussian recruiting sergeants carried off a great number of men by main force, and these having become soldiers without their own consent were bound to serve till they were past the age for service. Then they were given a beggar's licence, for Prussia was too poor to give them a hospital or retiring pension. During their period of service these soldiers were mingled with genuine Prussians, the number of whom had to be at least half of the strength of each company in order to prevent revolts.

To maintain an army compounded of such heterogeneous elements an iron discipline was needed, wherefore corporal punishment was inflicted for the slightest fault. The numerous non-commissioned officers, all Prussians, carried a cane, which they frequently used. According to the recognized saying, they reckoned one cane to every seven men. Among the foreign soldiers desertion was mercilessly punished with death. You may imagine the terrible position of these foreigners, who, having enlisted in a moment of drunkenness, or been carried off by force, found themselves far from their own country, and in a bitter climate, condemned to be Prussian soldiers—that is to say, slaves during

their lives. And what lives they were. With scarcely food enough to keep them alive, sleeping on straw, very lightly clothed, no cloaks, even in the coldest winter, and with pay insufficient to meet their wants. Indeed they did not wait to beg until they had received licence to do so with their discharge, for when out of sight of their officers they would put out their hands. Both at Potsdam and Berlin it has happened more than once that grenadiers at the King's very gate have begged alms of me. The officers, for the most part were educated and did their duty well; but half of them were foreigners, poor gentlemen from almost every country in Europe, who, having taken service only to get a living, felt no patriotism or devotion towards Prussia. Naturally most of them deserted her when she was in trouble. Again, promotion going only by seniority, the great majority of the Prussian officers were old and worn out, and in no state to undergo the hardships of war. It was with an army thus composed and thus officered that the conquerors of Egypt, Italy, and Germany were to be withstood. Madness it was indeed, but the Cabinet of Berlin, misled by the victories which the great Frederick had gained with mercenary troops, thought that it was going to be the same thing again, forgetting that the times had greatly changed.

On October 6 Marshal Augereau and the 7th corps left Francfort to march towards the frontier of Saxony, of which the Prussians were already in occupation. It was a splendid autumn, a little frost at night and a brilliant sun by day. My little establishment was well organized. I had a good campaigning servant, Francois Woirland, an old soldier of the Black Legion, a regular swashbuckler and a grand marauder. But these make the best servants on campaign, for with them one never runs short of anything. I had three good horses, good accoutrements, a little money. I was very well in health, so I marched gaily to meet coming events.

Our road lay by Aschaffembourg, whence we went on to Wurtzbourg. There we found the Emperor, who held a march-past of the troops of the 7th corps, amid great enthusiasm. Napoleon, who was in possession of notes about

all the regiments, and knew how to use them cleverly so as to flatter the self-esteem of every one, said, when he saw the 44th of the line, "Of all the corps of my army you are the one where there are most stripes, so your three battalions count in my eyes for six." The soldiers replied with enthusiasm, "We will prove it before the enemy." To the 78th Light infantry, composed mainly of men from lower Languedoc and the Pyrenees, the Emperor said, "There are the best marchers in the army; one never sees a man of them fallen out, especially when the enemy has to be met." Then he added, laughing, "But to do you justice in full, I must tell you that you are the greatest rowdies and looters in the army." "Quite true, quite true," answered the soldiers, every one of whom had a duck, fowl, or goose in his knapsack. This was an abuse which had to be tolerated, for Napoleon's armies, once on campaign, only received rations at rare intervals, each living on the country as best he could—a method which doubtless had great inconveniences, but also one immense advantage: It allowed us to push constantly forward, without being hampered by provision wagons and stores. This gave us a great superiority over our enemies, whose movements depended on the baking or the arrival of bread, on the pace of herds and the like.

From Wurtzbourg the 7th corps marched to Cobourg, where the marshal was quartered in the prince's palace. All the family had fled at our approach, except the prince himself, a celebrated Austrian field-marshal. The old soldier had fought the French long enough to estimate their character, and had confidence enough in them to await them. His confidence was not misplaced, for the marshal sent him a guard of honor, made a point of returning his visit, and ordered that the greatest respect should be shown him.

We were now at no great distance from the Prussians, the King being at Erfurt. The Queen was with him, and rode about the army on horseback, seeking to kindle the army by her presence. Napoleon, conceiving that this was not a part befitting a princess, published in his bulletins some very insulting remarks about her. The French and Prussian outposts met at length on October 9, at Schleitz, and a slight engagement took place under the Emperor's

eyes, where the enemy was beaten—an ill-omened commencement. On the same day, Prince Louis, with a force of 10,000 men, was in position at Saalfeld, a town on the banks of the Saale in the middle of a plain, which is reached by crossing very steep hills. As the divisions of Lannes and Augereau had to advance on Saalfeld through these hills, if Prince Louis wished to await the French, he should have taken up his position in that country, full as it was of narrow gorges where a few troops could stop much greater numbers. He neglected this advantage, however, probably owing to his persuasion that the Prussian troops were worth much more than the French. He even carried his contempt of all precautions so far as to place a part of his forces with a marshy brook in their rear, thus making their retreat in case of reverse very difficult. General Muller, an old Swiss officer in the Prussian service, whom the King had attached to his nephew in order to check his impetuosity, made, indeed, some remarks to this effect, which Prince Louis took in bad part, adding that there was no need of so many precautions to beat the French—it was enough to fall upon them as soon as they appeared.

They appeared on the morning of the 10th, Lannes's division leading; Augereau's, which followed, did not come up in time to take part in the battle. Nor was its presence required, Lannes's force being more than sufficient. Augereau, while waiting for his division to issue into the open ground, took up his position with his staff on a hillock, from which we had a perfect view of the plain and could follow with the eye all the turning points of the battle.

Prince Louis might yet have fallen back on the Prussian force which was occupying Jena, but having been the prime instigator of the war it seemed to him unseemly to retire without fighting. He was cruelly punished for his temerity. Marshal Lannes, cleverly taking advantage of the high ground under which Prince Louis had so impudently deployed his troops, first played upon them with artillery, and when they were shaken sent forward his masses of infantry, who, rapidly descending from the high ground, poured like a torrent on the Prussian battalions and broke them up in a moment. Prince Louis, losing his head, and probably seeing the mistake he had made, tried to repair it

by putting himself at the head of his cavalry, with which he impetuously charged the 9th and 10th Hussars. At first he gained a slight advantage, but our Hussars, returning to the charge with fury, threw back the Prussian cavalry into the marshes, their infantry at the same time flying in confusion before ours. In the middle of the scuffle Prince Louis found himself engaged hand-to-hand with a sergeant of the 10th Hussars, named Guindet. Being summoned to surrender he answered with a sword-stroke which laid open the Frenchman's face, whereupon the other ran the Prince through the body, killing him on the spot.

After the battle and the complete rout of the enemy the Prince's body was recognized, and Marshal Lannes had it borne with due honour to the castle of Saalfeld. There it was handed over to the princely family of that name, connected with the royal house of Prussia, with whom Prince Louis had passed the previous day and evening in making merry over the coming of the French, and even, it was said, in giving a ball—and now he was brought back to them vanquished and slain. I saw his body the next day laid out on a marble table; he was naked to the waist, still wearing his leather breeches and his boots, and seemed to sleep. He was indeed a handsome man. I could not refrain from sad reflections on the mutability of human affairs as I gazed on the remains of this young man, born on the steps of the throne, but lately so beloved and so powerful. The news of his death caused consternation in the enemy's army, and, indeed, throughout Prussia.

The 7th Corps passed October 11 at Saalfeld. In the next two days we reached Kahla, where we fell in with some fragments of the Prussian troops who had been beaten before Saalfeld. Marshal Augereau attacked them, but they offered little resistance, and laid down their arms. Among the rest was captured Prince Henry's regiment, in which Augereau had once been a private. As it was difficult in Prussia for any except men of high rank to become field officers, and as sergeants were never promoted to sub-lieutenants, his company had still the same captain and the same sergeant major. The Prussian captain, brought by a whim of fortune back into the presence of his former sol-

dier, now become a marshal and distinguished for many brilliant services, recognized Augereau perfectly, but behaved like a man of sense, and talked to the marshal as if he had never seen him. The marshal invited him to dine, made him sit next to him, and, knowing that his baggage had been captured, lent him all the money that he required, and gave him introductions in France. How curious must that captain's reflections have been. But no words can paint the astonishment of the old sergeant-major at seeing his former subordinate covered with decorations, surrounded by a numerous staff, and in command of an army corps. It seemed to him like a dream. The marshal was much less reserved with this man than he had been with the captain; he addressed him by name, shook hands with him, and gave him twenty-five louis for himself, and two for every one of the soldiers of his time who were still in the company. This struck us as in very good taste.

The marshal reckoned on sleeping at Kahla, which is only three leagues from Jena, but just as night was falling the 7th corps received orders to proceed at once to the latter town, which the Emperor had entered without opposition at the head of his guards and of Lannes's troops. The Prussians had abandoned the place in silence, but it had been set on fire, probably by some candles having been forgotten and left in stables, and part of the unhappy city was a prey to the spreading flames when Augereau's corps entered about midnight. It was sad to see the inhabitants, women and old men, half clothed, carrying away their children and trying to escape destruction by flight, while our soldiers, whom their duty and the neighbourhood of the enemy had not allowed to leave the ranks, remained impassable with shouldered arms, like people who made light of the fire in comparison with the dangers to which they were shortly to be exposed.

As the fire had not reached the quarter of the town by which the French were arriving, the troops could move about freely, and while they were being massed in the open spaces in the larger streets the marshal and his staff took up their quarters in a handsome looking house. I was just returning from carrying an order when I heard piercing

cries coming from a neighbouring house, one door of which was open. I hurried up, and guided by the cries made my way into a handsome suite of rooms where I perceived two charming young ladies of eighteen to twenty years old, in night dresses, struggling with four or five Hessian soldiers belonging to the regiments which the Landgrave had sent to join the troops of the French 7th corps. The men were far gone in liquor, but though they did not understand a word of French, and I very little German, the sight of me and my threats produced an effect on them, and being used to the stick from their officers they took without a word the kicks and blows which, in my indignation, I administered to them freely as I drove them down the stairs. Perhaps I was imprudent, for in the middle of the night, in a town where utter disorder prevailed, being all alone with these men, I ran the risk of being killed by them; but they ran away, and I placed a guard from the marshal's escort in one of the lower rooms. Then I returned to the young ladies's rooms; they had hurriedly put on some clothes, and I received from them warm expressions of gratitude. They were the daughters of one of the university professors, and he, having gone with his wife and servants into the quarter that was on fire, to help one of their sisters who had just been confined, had left them all alone, when the Hessian soldiers appeared. One of the girls said to me with much energy, "You are marching to battle at the moment when you have just saved our honour. God will requite you; be sure that no harm will happen to you." The father and mother who came back at the same moment bringing the young mother and her child, were at first greatly surprised to find me there, but as soon as they learnt the reason of my presence they too heaped blessings upon me. I tore myself away from the thanks of this grateful family to report myself to Marshal Augereau, who was resting in the neighbouring house while waiting his orders from the Emperor.

CHAPTER XXV

The town of Jena is commanded by a height called the Landgrafenberg, at the foot of which flows the Saale. This is very steep on the side towards Jena, and the only road

there existing is that to Weimar through the Mühlthal, a long and difficult passage, the exit from which, covered by a little wood, was guarded by the Saxon troops in alliance with the Prussians. A cannon-shot in rear of them, part of the Prussian army was drawn up in line. The Emperor, being able to reach the enemy only by this passage, was prepared for heavy losses in attacking it, for it did not seem possible to turn the position. But Napoleon's lucky star, which still guided him, furnished him with an unexpected means. So far as I am aware no historian has spoken of it, but I can vouch for the fact.

As we have seen, the King of Prussia had compelled the Elector of Saxony to join forces with him. The Saxon people saw with regret that they were involved in a war which could bring them no advantage in the future, and which in the present was bringing ruin on their country. The Prussians were therefore detested in Saxony, and the Saxon town of Jena shared the feeling. A priest of the town, excited by the sight of the conflagration which was devouring it, and regarding the Prussians as the enemies of his Sovereign and his country, thought he might give Napoleon the means of driving them from the land by pointing out to him a little path which infantry could use to climb the steep sides of the Landgrafenberg. He therefore guided a detachment of voltigeurs and some staff officers to the place, which the Prussians, thinking the passage impracticable, had omitted to guard. Napoleon however, took a different view, and on the strength of the report which the officers made went up there himself, accompanied by Marshal Lannes and guided by the Saxon parson. Having observed that between the highest point of the path and the plain which the enemy occupied there existed a little rocky platform, the Emperor resolved to assemble there a portion of his troops, who might issue from it as from a citadel to attack the Prussians. The difficulty of the task was such that no one but Napoleon, commanding Frenchmen, could have surmounted it, but he sent at once for 4,000 pioneering tools from the wagons of the engineers and artillery, and ordered that every battalion should work in turn for an hour at widening and leveling the path, and that as each finished its task it should go

and form up silently on the Landgrafenberg, while another took its place. They were lighted at their work by torches, the light of which was concealed from the enemy's eyes by the blaze of Jena. The nights being long at this period of the year, we had time to make the climb accessible not only to the columns of infantry but even to the wagons and the artillery, so that before daylight the corps of Lannes and Soult, and Augereau's first division, together with the foot guards, were massed on the Landgrafenberg. The term massed was never more correct, for the breasts of the men of each regiment were almost touching the backs of those in front of them. But the troops were so well disciplined that in spite of the darkness and the packing of more than 40,000 men on that narrow platform, there was not the least disorder, and although the enemy, who were occupying Cospeda and Closevitz, were only half a cannon-shot off, they perceived nothing.

On the morning of October 14 a thick fog covered the country and favoured our movements. Augereau's second division made a feigned attack, advancing from Jena through the Mühlthal by the Weimar road. Believing this to be the only point by which we could issue from Jena, the enemy had massed a considerable force there. But while he was preparing to defend the narrow passage with vigour, the Emperor Napoleon caused the troops which he had assembled on the Landgrafenberg during the night to debouch into the plain, and drew them up in order of battle. The first cannon-shots, aided by a light breeze, dispersed the fog, the sun shone out brilliantly, and the Prussians were aghast at seeing the French army deployed in line in their front and advancing to the contest. They could not understand how we had arrived on the plateau while they believed us at the farther end of the Weimar road, which they were carefully watching. We engaged without loss of time, and the first line of the Prussians and Saxons, under the Prince of Hohenlohe, was forced to give way. Their reserve was advancing, but we received a strong reinforcement on our side. Ney's corps and Murat's cavalry, which had been delayed in the defile, emerging into the plain came into action. A Prussian army corps commanded by General Ruchel

checked our columns for a moment, but it was charged by the French cavalry and almost annihilated, General Ruchel being killed.

Augereau's first division, on descending from the Landgrafenbergh into the plain, joined the second arriving at the Mühlthal, and the corps, following the road from Vienna to Weimar, captured Cospeda and then the woods of Isserstedt, while Lannes took Vierzehnheiligen, and Soult Hermstedt. The Prussian infantry fought badly and the cavalry did not do much better. We often saw it coming on with loud shouts, but intimidated by the calm attitude of our battalions, it never dared to push the charge home. On getting within fifty paces of our line it would wheel about, pursued by a hail of bullets and the hoots of our soldiers. The Saxons fought with courage; they resisted Augereau's corps for a long time, and only after the retreat of the Prussian troops did they form in two great squares and begin to retire firing. Augereau, admiring the courage of the Saxons, and wishing to spare these brave fellows unnecessary bloodshed, sent a flag of truce to invite them to surrender, as they had no longer any hope of support. But just at that moment Prince Murat, coming up with his cavalry launched his cuirassiers and dragoons on the Saxon squares; by their resolute charge they broke them and compelled them to lay down their arms. But the next day the Emperor let them go free and sent them back to their Sovereign, with whom he lost no time in making peace. The whole Prussian force retired completely routed along the Weimar road. The fugitives, with their artillery and baggage, were crowded at the gates of the city when the French appeared. Panic-stricken at the sight of them, the whole mob fled in the greatest disorder, leaving a great number of prisoners, flags, guns and baggage in our hands.

The town of Weimar, which has been called the "modern Athens," was at that period inhabited by many distinguished artists and men of science and letters, assembled there from all parts of Germany under the enlightened patronage of the reigning Duke. The noise of the cannon, the passage of the fugitives, the entry of the conquerors caused a lively emotion in this peaceable and studious popu-

lation. Marshals Lannes and Soult preserved perfect order, and beyond having to supply the necessary provisions for the troops, the town underwent no exactions. The Prince of Weimar was serving in the Prussian army, nevertheless his palace, in which the Princess had remained, was respected, and none of the marshals took up his quarters there. Marshal Augereau's were established near the gate of the town, in the house of the Prince's chief gardener. All the servants of the establishment having fled, the staff found nothing to eat, and was reduced to sup off pineapples and hothouse plums—light food for people who had eaten nothing for twenty-four hours, had passed the previous night on their legs, and the whole day in fighting. But we had won and that magic word makes privation easy to bear.

The Emperor returned to sleep at Jena, where he received news of a success no less than that which he had himself won. The peculiarity of the battle of Jena was that it was, if one may say double, for neither the French nor the Prussian army was wholly before Jena. Both were divided into two parts and fought two separate battles. While the Emperor, issuing from Jena at the head of the corps under Augereau, Lannes, Soult, and Ney, with his Guard and Murat's cavalry, was beating in the manner described the Prussian force under Prince Hohenlohe and General Ruchel, the King of Prussia, at the head of his main army, commanded by the famous Duke of Brunswick and Marshals Mollendorf and Kalkreuth, had marched from Weimar towards Naumburg, and slept at the villiage of Auerstädt, not far from the French corps of Bernadotte and Davout, who were in Naumburg and the neighbouring villages. In order to rejoin the Emperor on the side towards Apolda, in the level ground beyond Jena, Bernadotte and Davout had to pass the Saale in front of Naumburg and traverse the narrow hilly defile of Kosen. Although Davout supposed the King of Prussia and the bulk of his army to be in front of the Emperor, and had no idea that they were so close to him as Auerstädt, the careful soldier took possession during the night of the defile of Kosen and the steep hills enclosing it. The King of Prussia and his marshals had omitted to occupy them, imitating the mistake which the Prince of

Hohenlohe had committed at Jena in not guarding the Landgrafenberg. The united troops of Bernadotte and Davout amounted only to 44,000 men, while the King of Prussia had 80,000. At daybreak on the 14th the French marshals learned the superiority of the forces which they had to fight, so on all accounts it was their duty to act in concert. Davout, realizing this, declared that he was quite willing to put himself under the orders of Bernadotte; but the latter making small account of laurels which he had to share with another, and unable to make a sacrifice in the interest of his country, thought fit to act independently. His pretext was that as the Emperor had ordered him to be at Dornburg by the 13th, he must proceed there on the 14th, although Napoleon had written to him in the night that, if by any chance he was still at Naumburg, he was to stay there and support Davout. Bernadotte, thinking this duty below his reputation, left Davout the task of defending himself as best he could, while he marched along the Saale to Dornburg. Though he did not find a single enemy there, and from the high position which he occupied could see the terrible combat which the intrepid Davout was waging two leagues away, Bernadotte ordered his division to bivouac and quietly prepare their sup. In vain did his Generals reproach him with this culpable inaction; he would not stir. Whence it happened that Davout, having only the 25,000 men composing the divisions of Friant, Morand, and Gudin, had to oppose them to more than 80,000 Prussians, inspirited by the presence of their King.

Issuing from the Kosen defile, the French had drawn up near the village of Hassenhausen, and it was really at this point that the battle took place, for the Emperor was mistaken in thinking that he had in front of him at Jena the King and the bulk of the Prussian army. The fight sustained by Davout's troops was one of the most terrible in our history. His division after having triumphantly resisted all the attacks of the enemy's infantry, formed a square, repelled numerous cavalry charges, and, not content with that, advanced with such resolution that the Prussians gave way at all points, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded. The Duke of Brunswick and

General Schmettau were killed, Marshal Mollendorf severely wounded and taken prisoner. The King of Prussia and his troops executed a retreat on Weimar in pretty good order, expecting to rally in rear of the victorious corps, as they supposed, of Prince Hohenlohe and General Ruchel. These, meanwhile, beaten by Napoleon, were from their side coming to seek a support from the troops under the King. The two huge bodies of beaten and demoralized troops having come together on the Erfurt road, the appearance of some French regiments was sufficient to throw them into the greatest confusion. The rout was complete. Thus the bragging of the Prussian officers was punished. The results of this victory were incalculable and made us masters of nearly the whole of Prussia.

The Emperor expressed his great satisfaction with Marshal Davout and the division under him in a general order which was read to all the companies and even to the wounded in the ambulances. In the following year Napoleon created Davout Duke of Auerstädt, although the battle was fought less in that village than in Hassenhausen; but the King of Prussia had had his headquarters at Auerstädt, and the enemy had given that name to the battle which the French call Jena. The army expected to see Bernadotte severely punished, but he got off with a smart reprimand. The Emperor feared as it would seem to vex his brother Joseph, whose sister-in-law, Mademoiselle Clary, Bernadotte had married. We shall see later on how Bernadotte's behaviour on the day of that battle was in some sense his first step to the throne of Sweden.

I was not wounded at Jena, but I was taken in, in a way which after forty years it still awakens my wrath to remember. At the moment when Augereau's corps was attacking the Saxons, the marshal sent me to General Durosnel, commanding a brigade of chasseurs, with orders to charge the enemy's cavalry. I was to guide the brigade by a road which I had already reconnoitered. I hastened to place myself at the head of our chasseurs, who were dashing on the Saxon squadrons. These latter resisted bravely, but after a short melee were compelled to retire with loss. Towards the end of the fight I found myself face to face with a hussar

officer in the white uniform of Prince Albert of the Saxony's regiment. I summoned him at the saber's point to surrender, which he did by handing me his weapon. The combat over, I was generous enough to give it back to him, as is the practice in such cases between officers, and I added that, although by the laws of war his horse belonged to me, I did not wish to deprive him of it. He thanked me warmly and followed me in the direction which I was taking to return to the marshal, to whom I looked forward to presenting my prisoner. But as soon as we were 500 paces from the French chasseurs, the confounded Saxon officer, who was on my left, drew his sabre, laid open my horse's shoulder, and was on the point of striking me had I not thrown myself on him, although I had not my sabre in my hand. But as our bodies were in contact he had room to bring his blade to bear on me, seeing which he caught me by my epaulette—for I was in full uniform that day—and pulled hard enough to make me lose my balance. My saddle turned round, and there I was with one leg in the air and my head downwards, while the Saxon, going off at full gallop, returned to what remained of the enemy's army. I was furious both at the position in which I found myself and at the ingratitude with which the stranger repaid my kind treatment of him. So, as soon as the Saxon army was captured, I went to look for my hussar officer and give him a good lesson, but he had disappeared.

I have said that our new ally, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, had united his troops to those of the Emperor. This brigade, which was attached to the 7th corps, had a uniform exactly like that of the Prussians, so that during the action many Hessians were killed or wounded. My young friend, Lieutenant Stoch, was on the point of meeting the same fate, our hussars having got hold of him, when he recognized me, and called to me, and I made them let him go.

The Emperor richly rewarded the parson of Jena, and the elector of Saxony, when, as a result of the victories of his new ally Napoleon, he had become king, also rewarded this priest, who lived very peacefully till 1814, at which time he took refuge in France to escape the vengeance of the Prussians. They carried him off and imprisoned him in a

fortress for two or three years, then the King of Saxony interceded in his favor with Louis XVIII, and he claimed the priest as having been arrested without authority. The Prussians agreed to release him, and he came to live at Paris.

After the victory at Jena the Emperor gave orders to pursue the enemy in every direction, and our columns made a vast number of prisoners. The King of Prussia only reached Berlin by way of Magdeburg with great difficulty, and it was even asserted that the Queen was on the point of falling into the hands of our advanced guard.

Augereau's corps crossed the Elbe near Dessau. It would take too long to recount the disasters of the Prussian army; it must be sufficient to say that of the troops which had marched against the French not one battalion escaped; they were all captured before the end of the month. The fortresses of Torgau, Erfurt, and Wittenberg opened their gates to the conquerors, who marched on Berlin. Napoleon halted at Potsdam and visited the tomb of Frederick the Great; then he went to Berlin, where, contrary to his practice, Davout's corps marched at the head of the procession, an honor which it well deserved, for it had done the most fighting of all; Augereau's corps followed, and then the Guard.

CHAPTER XXVI

My first feeling on returning to Berlin, which I had left not long before a brilliant capital, was one of sympathy with a patriotic population thus brought low by defeat, invasion, and the loss of relations and friends. The entry of the "noble Guard," however, disarmed and prisoners, aroused in me very different sentiments. The young officers who had sharpened their sabres on the French Embassy were now humble enough. They had begged to be taken round, not through, Berlin: not caring to be paraded in view of the inhabitants who had been witnesses of their old swagger. For this reason the Emperor gave directions to the troops guarding them to march them through the street in which the French Embassy stood. This little bit of revenge was not disapproved by the Berliners, who had no love for the "noble Guard," and charged them with having driven the King into war. Marshal Augereau was quartered outside

the town at the chateau of Belle Vue, belonging to Prince Ferdinand, the only surviving brother of Frederick the Great, and father of Prince Louis, killed at Saalfeld. The venerable old man was plunged in grief, aggravated by the fact that, in opposition to all the Court, and especially to his lamented son, he had been strongly against war, and had foretold the ills which it would bring on Prussia. Marshal Augereau felt bound to call upon Prince Ferdinand, who had removed to a palace in the city. He was most kindly received, and the poor father told him that he had just learnt that his younger and only remaining son, Prince Augustus, was among the prisoners at the gate of the town, and that he would like much to embrace him before his departure for France. As his great age prevented him from going to his son, the marshal, certain that the Emperor would not disapprove, ordered me to mount at once, find Prince Augustus, and bring him back with me. The meeting of the young prince with his aged parents was a most touching sight. To console the family as much as lay in his power, the kind marshal went in person to the Emperor, and returned with authority to leave the young prince with his family as a prisoner on parole, for which Prince Ferdinand was deeply grateful.

The victory of Jena had immense results. Not only the campaigning troops, but the garrisons of the fortresses were utterly demoralized. Magdeburg surrendered without attempting defence, Spandau did the same, Stettin opened his gates to a division of cavalry, and the governor of Custrin sent boats to our side of the Oder to convey the French troops into the place which it would otherwise have required a several months's siege to capture. Every day we heard of the capitulation of an army corps or the surrender of some fortress. The faulty organization of the Prussian troops became more obvious than ever. The foreign soldiers, especially those who had been enlisted by force, seized the chance of recovering their freedom, deserting in bodies, or remaining in the rear to surrender to the French.

Besides the territory conquered from the Prussians, Napoleon confiscated the estates of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, a punishment which his duplicity deserved. This

Prince, though summoned some time before the war to declare for Prussia or France, had put both off with promises, waiting to array himself on the side of the conqueror. The avaricious sovereign had amassed a large treasure by selling his own subjects to the English. They were employed to fight the Americans in the War of Independence. Disloyal to his relations, he offered to ally himself to the French, on condition that the Emperor would give him their estates, so nobody regretted him. But his hurried departure was the cause of a remarkable incident which as yet is little known.

When forced to leave Cassel in a hurry to take refuge in England, the Elector of Hesse, who was supposed to be the richest man in Europe, being unable to bring away the whole of his treasure, sent for a Frankfort Jew, named Rothschild, an obscure banker of the third rank, known only for the scrupulous practice of his religion. This seems to have decided the Elector to entrust to him 15,000,000 frs. in specie. The interest of the money was to be the banker's, and he was only to be bound to return the capital.

When the palace of Cassel was occupied by our troops the agents of the French treasury seized property of great value, especially pictures, but no coined money was found, yet it appeared impossible that in his hasty flight the Elector could have carried away the whole of his immense fortune. Now since, by what are conventionally called the laws of war, the capital and the interest of securities found in a hostile country belong of right to the conqueror, it became important to know what had become of the Cassel treasure. Inquiry showed that before his departure the Elector had passed a whole day with the Jew Rothschild. An imperial commission visited him and minutely examined his safes and his cash books; but it was in vain; no trace of the Elector's deposit could be found. Threats and intimidation had no success until the commission, feeling sure that no personal interest could induce a man so religious as Rothschild to perjure himself, proposed to administer an oath to him. He refused to take it. There was talk of arresting him, but the Emperor, thinking it a useless act of violence, forbade it. Then they had recourse to not a very honorable

method. Unable to overcome the banker's resistance, they tried to gain him over by the bait of profit. They proposed to leave him half the treasure if he would give up the other half to the French administration. A receipt for the whole, accompanied by a deed of seizure, should be given him to prove that he had only yielded to force and to prevent any claim from lying against him; but the Jew's honesty rejected this suggestion also and his persecutors, tired out, left him in peace. Thus the 15,000,000 frs. remained in Rothschild's hands from 1806 till the fall of the Empire in 1814. Then the Elector returned to his estates, and the banker returned him his deposit as he had received it. You may imagine the sum which a capital of 15,000,000 frs, would produce in the hands of a Jew banker of Frankfort. From this time dates the opulence of the Rothschilds, who thus owe to their ancestor's honesty the high place which they now hold in the finance of all civilized countries.

But I must resume my narrative. The Emperor reviewed every day the troops which kept passing through Berlin on their way to the Oder in pursuit of the enemy. During his stay in the Prussian capital Napoleon performed that well known act of magnanimity in granting to the Princess of Hatzfeld the pardon of her husband, who held the office of burgomaster at Berlin, and availed himself of the facilities which that post offered to inform the Prussian generals of the movements of the French army.* Such conduct among civilized nations is regarded as that of a spy, and punished with death. The Emperor's generosity on this occasion produced a very good effect on the minds of the Prussian people.

*As a matter of fact he seems merely to have sent an account to the King of the entry of the French into Berlin. It was on this occasion that Napoleon, "in order to destroy the only proof of her husband's guilt," burnt before the eyes of the Princess a letter of which he had kept a copy. The prince's life was really spared mainly at the instance of Rapp, Duroc, and others. "Never before," says Lanfrey, "was a reputation for clemency earned by sparing the life of an innocent man."

Chapter II

LIFE OF NAPOLEON

BY BARON JOMINI

General-in-Chief and Aid-de-Camp to the General of Russia

*“Je fus ambitieux; tout homme l'est, sans doute;
Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef, ou citoyen,
Ne conçut un projet aussi grand que le mien.”*

VOLTAIRE, MAHOMET.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH WITH NOTES

BY H. W. HALLECK, LL. D.,

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ETC., ETC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES—WITH AN ATLAS

VOL. II

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Colonel Jomini's Account.

Prussia Abruptly Decides on War.—Although the propositions relative to Hanover had no results, they nevertheless produced at Berlin an explosion like powder. The queen, Prince Louis of Prussia, the duke of Brunswick, and Baron Hardenburg, had been, since the treaty of Potsdam, at the head of the war-party. They now had no difficulty in influencing the king, who had been able to claim public opinion only by the advantages of the acquisition of Hanover in exchange for all the vexations which he had suffered.

They profited by these appearances of felony to incite all minds against me, without inquiring whether I would really demand back Hanover, and if, even supposing that I did, I would not have given Prussia ample compensation. They pretended to see in me only an ally of bad faith, who took back with one hand what he bestowed with the other; a violator of territory, who arbitrarily disposed of what did not belong to him. They went even so far as to publish that I had bribed D'Oubril, and that, to induce his master to make peace, and to recognize me as emperor, I had proposed to him the partition of Prussia, giving Warsaw to the Grand Duke Constantine.

It was not necessary to resort to such absurd stories to completely turn heads which for a whole year had been in ebullition. Suddenly the Prussians recollect that they are the depositories of the glory of the great Frederick; the government which had restrained these impulses now sets the example. The king can see in this apparent loss of Hanover only the real loss of his monarchy, of the last pledge of his security, of the personal honor of the king himself. It only remained for him to fall gloriously, or become disgraced as a coward. The general cry, To Arms! is heard from Potsdam to Königsberg; war is decided on without even waiting for the cooperation of Russia. An alliance is negotiated with

her, but they are unwilling to wait for her troops, as a war of honor allows of no delay.

Her Extraordinary Ultimatum.—This long torpor is followed by romantic rage. General Knobelsdorf, who has replaced Lucchesini as ambassador at Paris, remits me an extraordinary ultimatum, wanting in the proper respect due to a great power. That summoned me: 1st, to evacuate Germany, commencing on the day when the king could receive my answer and continuing without interruption; 2d, to detach Wesel from my empire; 3d, to send my answer before the eighth of October to the headquarters of the king! Assuredly Scipio before Carthage would not have held more imperious language to the conquered! Anyone would have thought that this was the day after the battle of Rossbach!

The cabinet of Berlin acted the more foolishly toward me in this matter, inasmuch as its interest was to gain time. If it had demanded in suitable terms, the evacuation of Germany within a reasonably stipulated period, it would have acted rightly, and thrown on me all the odium of the aggression. In attacking me when I was engaged with the Russians, and Austrians, the Prussians could have done me much injury; but to thus, unreasonably and alone, declare war against me, was so extraordinary that I could not, for some time, believe it. Nothing, however, was more true, and it became necessary to prepare for the campaign.

First Movements of the French Army.—I knew that the Russian army, cantoned on the Niemen, would be an inevitable auxiliary; but this required time, and I might reach Berlin before it could; moreover, I hoped that Sebastiani would succeed in inciting Turkey to war; for a treaty signed between England and Russia had given to the latter Moldavia and Wallachia, as the price of the efforts which she would make against France. But I was not a man to wait for the uncertain cooperation of Selim III before falling on my adversaries, who were now fully exposed to my attacks; I ordered the assembling of my army, and departed for Mayence.

The sixth of October I arrived at Bamberg. My army was one hundred and eighty thousand strong. The main body, composed of five corps of Bernadotte, Davout, Soult,

Ney, Lannes and the cavalry of the grand duke of Berg, assembled at Cobourg, and at Bamberg; Augereau left Frankfurt to threaten the road to Cassel and then in include to the right; Mortier assembled the eighth corps on the confines of Westphalia; my brother Louis, with fifteen thousand Gallo-Batavians, took the direction of Wesel; Marmont remained in Illyria with the second corps, charged with covering Ragusa, occupying the Cattaro, etc.

Position and Plan of the Prussians.—The Prussians had advanced into Saxony and induced the elector to unite his troops with theirs. The elector of Hesse-Cassel prepared to do the same. They posted themselves on the northern side of the forest of Thuringia. The corps of Ruchel of twenty thousand men formed on the right at Eisenach. The principal army, of fifty thousand men, commanded by the king, and under him by the duke of Brunswick, took position in the environs of Erfurt. The army of the left, commanded by the Prince of Hohenlohe, of about fifty thousand Saxo-Prussians, was concentrated on Blankenhain; a corps of this army was detached under the orders of Tauentzien, in order to cover the extreme left at Schleitz.

Napoleon's Plan of Operations.—There were only three plans by which we could operate against Prussia: the 1st, by my left, debouching from Mayence and Wesel on Westphalia; but this would have been absurd; the 2d, to act in mass at the center by the road to Eisenach on Cassel or Leipzig; the 3d, to throw myself in mass by my right, to turn the enemy's left and cut off the Prussians from Berlin by Hof and Gera, as I had cut off Mack from Vienna, by Donawerth, and Melas, by Marengo. It was evident that this last was not only the best, but the only feasible plan.

Faults of the Prussians.—To avoid the catastrophe there remained to the Prussians only two courses: that of falling, by the middle of September, on my cantonments which were scattered through Franconia, or of awaiting me defensively, with their forces concentrated on the upper Saale, supporting their left on the frontiers of Austria. I might have beaten them in front; but they would have had a secure retreat on Dresden and Silesia. They could have united with the Russians on the Oder, and thus have saved

their monarchy. On the contrary, they pushed forward their right to Eisenach, set down their center under Erfurt, and permitted their isolated left to remain in the environs of Schleitz. This was precisely what I desired.

Their Generals.—The king, in putting himself at the head of his army, had exhumed, as it were, the old generals of the seven years' war to serve him as guides; the duke of Brunswick and Mollendorf were to lead the army to victory. The former, a vanguard general under his father, the great Ferdinand, had never, since that period, fought except at Kaiserslautern against Hoche, where he had bravely defended his camp. A good administrator, valiant in combat, but timid in council, he had learned nothing during the past fifteen years; although these years had been rich in lessons for every military man capable of profiting by them. Mollendorf, not less brave, was equally unskillful; age had paralyzed within him those qualities which had formerly given him so great a reputation; but age had not given him genius; genius is never a fruit of age or experience. The Prince Hohenlohe and Massenbach his right arm, had just enough mind and knowledge to select the false in war. In a word, there was not, in all that brilliant circle of the counsellors of Potsdam, a single individual who sufficiently comprehended my system of war to judge the three simple hypotheses which I have mentioned, and to conclude that this was by Cobourg and Hof that I would turn my army, if they ventured to cross the Saale. They ran to their own destruction with a presumption that can hardly be described.

Plunged in a lethargic sleep for the last ten years, they were so certain of driving us back to Mayence, that they made no preparations for putting in a state of defense the fortifications of their first line, not even those situated within a few yards of our cantonments; while I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau!

On the other hand, their army was fine, well armed, and admirably disciplined, the artillery was excellent, the cavalry had not yet forgotten Siedlitz and his immortal lessons;

the staff was well instructed, but instructed in details, to the neglect of principles; so that, in fact, this army, so superb in appearance, was a body without a soul.

Views of the Duke of Brunswick.—The duke of Brunswick, in pushing forward his army to Eisenach, hoped to hurry along the Elector of Hesse who had already assembled a contingent of twenty thousand men to reenforce the army. His project was afterward to cross the debouches of Franconia on three points so as to fall on my line of the Main, where he imagined I would remain on the defensive. This was judging very singularly of my character, my position, and my former practice. How was it possible for him to suppose that a captain, who had thrown himself, with the rapidity of an eagle, before the united forces of Austria and Russia, would go to sleep in rear of the Main, when opposing the isolated forces of a power of the second rank, especially when there were such strong motives for acting vigorously before the arrival of the Russians, and before the Austrians could be aroused to action?

At the news of my first movements on Cobourg, the duke recovered from an illusion which proved all his simplicity of character; he renounced the offensive, and resolved to concentrate his army near Weimar in order to await us in front. This concentration was wise, but it should have been made on the left of Hof, instead of drawing this left wing to the corps-de-bataille, and thus opening the road which led directly to my object.

Napoleon Seizes the Enemy's Communications.—My plan was very soon decided on when I arrived at Bamberg and learned what had taken place about Erfurt. An ordinary general in my place would have been satisfied with defeating the enemy; I carried my views still farther, and resolved to effect their total destruction. I arranged my plan to cut off their army from the heart of the Prussian monarchy, to turn them by the left, and establish myself between them and the Elbe. It was true that in acting thus on their communications, I should somewhat expose my own; but this could be done without danger since we were superior in numbers, and by inclining from Gera to the west, I could cover the roads of Hof, Nordhalben, Cobourg, which in case of reserve would carry me to Franconia.

My army penetrated Saxony on three routes, at the right, Soult, Ney, and a Bavarian division marched from Bayreuth by Hof on Plauen; at the center, the grand duke of Berg, Bernadotte and Davout, marched from Bamberg by Kronach on Saalburg; at the left, Lannes, and Augereau, setting out from Schweinfurt, took their direction by Cobourg and Grafenthal on Saalfeld. The first engagement took place on the eighth of October. A Prussian detachment which attempted to defend the Saale at Saalburg was driven away by the grand duke of Berg; the next day my column of the center, pursuing its way, found at Schleitz the corps of Tauenzien. Bernadotte attacked it, gaining a decided victory. My left also began with success. On the tenth, Lannes attacked, at Saalfeld, the advance guard of the army of Hohenlohe, commanded by Prince Louis of Prussia. The enemy was beaten and lost a thousand men and thirty cannon. Prince Louis, a young man of great promise, not wishing to survive the shame of a defeat, preferred being slain; he had lived as a valiant knight, and he died like a hero. After having been my admirer, this Prince became my sworn enemy, because he deemed me dangerous to Prussia; his patriotism carried him astray, and notwithstanding what he did against me, I am happy to do him justice.

I had expected greater resistance. The recollection of Frederick, of Seidlitz, of Leuthen, of Prague, had given me the highest opinion of this army, and I had remarked to one of my officers at Mayence, that this campaign would not be like that of Ulm; that we should have earth to move in this war. These first victories undeceived me; they were a good augury for the campaign. I then felt that I could cheaply dispose of the Prussian army, which did not exhibit sufficient consistency to sustain the weight of a great reserve.

Decisive Manoeuver.—By these first movements we had succeeded in turning the enemy's left by anticipating him on the twelfth at Gera; it was now my object to cut him off entirely. For this purpose my left served as the pivot for a grand change of the front of the whole army. The thirteenth, we occupied the following positions: Da-

vout, Bernadotte, and Murat with his light cavalry only, moved on Naumburg, where we captured considerable magazines intended for the Prussian army; Soult was in march from Gera on Jena; Ney at Roda; Lannes at Jena; Augereau at Kahla; a Bavarian division flanked my right by establishing itself at Plauen.

Before leaving Gera on the twelfth, I wrote a letter to Frederick William to offer him peace. I intrusted this letter to an officer of staff, Montesquiou, with directions to take it to the king. This step was ill-judged; Montesquiou, if we are to believe Prince Hohenlohe, was arrested on the night of the thirteenth, by the outposts, traveling alone and without the usual precautions of a flag of truce; the prince took him for a spy, and retained him near himself, sending the letter to the king, who did not receive it till after the battle. It might be confessed that it was now rather too late, and difficult to avoid war. I nevertheless had two chances in writing this letter; either the king would make peace by subscribing to all my conditions, or he would persist in the resolution taken on leaving Berlin, to conquer or die. In either case it might serve to keep him in suspense on the night of the thirteenth, and the morning of the fourteenth, so that he might not have time to decide on making a forced march by night to avoid being taken in reserve. This was a justifiable *ruse-de-guerre*. I appeared the friend of peace while advancing to my object. This letter was not the worst manoeuver of the campaign; if the king had received it as I had supposed, it would have prevented him, whether he accepted peace or not, from marching with all his army on Freyburg. It then depended on him to save himself militarily and politically. The date of this letter written at Gera was sufficient to tell him to hasten his retreat and escape from the embarrassment by answering it.

Battle of Jena.—The enemy, concentrated in the environs of Weimar, had no apprehension of my manoeuvres till after their success; but at least, seeing that we were already masters of the road from that city to Leipzig, and of the magazines of Naumburg, he resolved to retreat in order to reach the Elbe before us. On the evening of the thirteenth, the king and the duke of Brunswick, with the prin-

cipal army, moved toward Sulza. The Prince of Hohenlohe, charged with covering this march, remained near Kappellendorf on the height of Jena; he was supported by the corps of Ruchel, which fell back to Weimar. I took care not to give the enemy time to escape. Already in possession of his communications, I resolved to secure his ruin, by giving him battle. Although the defile of Jena, through which we had to debouch, was difficult, it was not an obstacle to us who had crossed the St. Bernard and passed the rock of Bard; Lannes, in pursuing the advance guard of Tauenzien toward Jena, had had the audacity to climb the mountain of Landgrafenberg, and to place himself on the summit opposite the Prussian army, which I myself discovered encamped in three lines. I did not know that it was divided; I believed that it would fight in one body according to the system of Frederick. I hurried the march of my guard, and made it climb, at ten o'clock in the evening, a very steep path to the plateau of Closewitz, which it was important for us to occupy as a kind of *tete-de-pont*, to enable us to ascend the mountain and debouch from this chasm; Soult followed near by; he arrived during the night on my right, and Augereau on my left; Ney bivouacked at Roda.

Supposing the entire army of the king to be collected on this point, and that his left extended in the direction of Apolda, I ordered Bernadotte to march to Dornburg, and Davout to move from Naumburg by the left of the Saale on Apolda, in order to fall on the extremity of the enemy's line and take him in reverse. Murat joined me at Jena with his light cavalry. These dispositions were good for the position I supposed the enemy to occupy; but if I had foreseen that the king of Prussia would attempt to pierce by Naumburg, and that Bernadotte had already reached there, I should not have exposed Davout alone to sustain the shock of the mass of the enemy's forces, and have sent Bernadotte away to Dornburg, where he was equally useless to me and to Davout.

On the fourteenth, at break of day, the combat began. The night had been cold; a thick fog obscured the horizon; we could hardly see two steps before us; this was a double good fortune to us, since the enemy could not discover

whether we were yet in readiness on the plateau. I mounted my horse at eight o'clock, and, riding in front of Suchet's division, I exhorted his battalion in these words: "Soldiers! This proud Prussian army is turned, like that of Mack at Ulm; it will now fight only to find means to retreat; the corps which shall allow it to escape will be dishonored!" The advanced guard of Prince Hohenlohe was driven back by Lannes, from the defiles of which it still held the head; we possessed Lützeroda and Closewitz. At the noise of this combat, Hohenlohe raised his camp of Kapellendorf and advanced to meet us on Vierzehnheiligen. For two hours I satisfied myself with this feeble success, merely keeping up the combat till the arrival of my cavalry and the three corps which I was expecting. Ney, by a deplorable excess of zeal, dissatisfied at being in reserve in rear of Augereau, attacked alone, with three thousand men of the elite, the whole Prussian line of Vierzehnheiligen; he suffered for an hour the whole fire of the enemy, and forced me to sustain him by Lannes. This premature attack vexed me the more as I still supposed that we were dealing with the entire army of the king, concentrated on this point. At length, the columns of Soult and Augereau having at last debouched, as also the main body of Ney's corps, I renewed the attack: the duke of Dalmatia threw himself on the left of Hohenlohe, Ney and Lannes on the center toward Vierzehnheiligen, and Augereau on Isserstedt.

The victory was not for a moment doubtful; the whole Prussian line was completely routed. Ruchel, arriving from Weimar with the reserve, out of breath, had not sufficient *coup-d'oeil* to perceive that affairs were in too bad a state for him to repair them with his twenty thousand men. Instead of limiting himself to recovering the retreat of Prince Hohenlohe, he had the imprudence to engage himself against the main body of our army, and being unable to take us in flank, he met us in front. His troops were defeated and he himself severely wounded. His defeat only added to the enemy's losses. The flying foe was closely pursued and thrown beyond the Ilm, which they passed below Weimar. This city was occupied by our troops on the very night of the battle, though situated six leagues from where it had commenced.

Battle of Auerstädt.—While we were gaining the victory of Jena, Davout obtained at Auerstädt a no less signal success against the army of the king. The latter had put himself in march the night before to gain Naumburg and Freyburg. The division of Schmettau, which led the march, advanced to Gernstett, and his reconnoitering parties, pushed into the defile of Kosen, made prisoners of a similar reconnoitering party sent out by Davout. The duke of Brunswick, being informed of the presence of his marshal's corps at Naumburg, persisted in the opinion that it was merely a detachment of partisans; instead of pushing forward Schmettau to Kosen the same night, he left him in position and caused to bivouac the two other divisions and the reserve between Eberstedt and Rannstedt; the headquarters were at Auerstädt. It may be inferred how little the King expected the fate that awaited his army, when it was known that the queen even remained there, with an inconceivable security; he had great difficulty in inducing her to return to Weimar.

In the meantime the duke of Brunswick, informed of the existence of a corps of our troops at Naumburg, and knowing that there was a road from the plateau of Kosen directly to Freyburg on the Unstrutt, hoped to reach that city without being obliged to fight his way through our troops. He ordered, for the next day, Schmettau's division to establish itself on the heights of Kosen, and to protect the march of the four other divisions which would defile in its rear. This was very well for his escape, if Davout had remained immovable at Naumburg; but even supposing the king's army had thus effected its escape, what must have become of Hohenlohe's corps of fifty thousand men, thus deserted in the midst of our army? If they had wished to steal away, ought not Hohen to have been directed to march in the night on Sulza with his infantry in order to effect a junction there with the king and to render the operation more certain? This was the only means by which the army could be saved from impending ruin. The division of Tauenzien and all the cavalry of Hohenlohe should have remained in the camp of Kapellendorf to mask the march, and even if the ten battalions should be compromised alone,

they ought still, at daylight, to have taken the road to Erfurt, or even have followed the king by that of Eckartsberga. It is evident, however, that the duke of Brunswick understood much better how to get an army into difficulty than to devise the means of extricating it.

The king's army moved at break of day; the fog, of which we have already spoken, retarded its march. Nevertheless, the division of Schmettau, arriving near Hassenhausen, encountered the division of Gudin which Davout had sent during the night to secure his debouch from the defile of Kosen. An hour more, and it would have been too late; our troops, crowded into the defile, would have never been able to effect a debouch, but would have been roughly handled. Davout, having reconnoitered the ground the night before, and having received my orders at two o'clock in the morning, proposed to Bernadotte to march with him by Kosen on Apolda, and even offered him the command of the two corps. The order of the prince of Neufchatel to Davout, was to the effect that if the first corps had already joined him they should march together; but this phrase had not been repeated to Bernadotte. The latter insisted on the literal wording of his order, to march on to Dornburg. All that his colleagues could say to convince him was useless; he in fact took the road by Camburg. This obstinacy, which it is difficult to explain, was very near compromising the corps of Davout and preventing the success of the battle, as we shall soon see.

The king of Prussia had repaired in person to the division of Schmettau, and, impatient from the fog that prevented him from seeing what was going on around him, he directed Blucher to advance with two thousand five hundred horse and charge the troops which had debouched on the plateau. Gudin had just arrived with his column near Hassenhausen; our light cavalry opposed itself to the superior cavalry of Blucher and was forced back; but the brigade of Gauthier now had time to form its squares; the king ordered them to be charged; but the artillery placed on the road, and sustained by the infantry, rendered vain all the efforts of Blucher and his squadrons.

This unexpected resistance frightened the duke of Brunswick; he wished to put his army in the battle array

and wait the clearing up of the fog. The old general, Mollendorf, pretended that we had there only a flying corps, and that it ought to be driven back into the ravine of Kosen. The king being of the same opinion, ordered the divisions of Wartensleben and the prince of Orange to cross the ravine of Auerstädt. It was a great fault that, after having resolved to take the initiative, they did not cause this defile to be passed during the night; the Prussian army would have then reached, in good order, our columns while in march. Wartensleben, who debouched on the first, formed on the right and attacked the left of Gudin. At the same time Blucher, having advanced on Punschrau, found himself in rear of our right flank, and charged it with as much vivacity as the fog, which had begun to clear up, would permit. The movement was decisive. Davout, placing his squares checker-wise, assisted by Gudin and the heroic firmness of his infantry, repelled several successive charges. Blucher had his horse killed under him; his squadrons, finding in all directions a barrier of iron and a murderous fire which strewn the ground with their brave men, took to disorder the road to Eckartsberga. The arrival of Friant's division on the right secured our success on this point. But Gudin was soon assailed on the left by the troops of Wartensleben; Schmettau, who had already lost half his men, was sustained on the two flanks by the prince of Orange.

It was now nine o'clock; the duke of Brunswick resolved on a general attack on our left; he put himself at the head of the division of Wartensleben. The immovable Gudin held firm against this new effort, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers. The attack was not very vigorous, though courageously made; the Prussians sought too much to preserve their lines and distances as though they were on parade. Our soldiers, squatting behind the hedges, the little ditches, the willows and the gardens which surrounded Hassenhausen, poured into them a murderous fire of musketry. Several battalions fell back, and the duke of Brunswick in endeavoring to rally them, was mortally wounded; Schmettau experienced the same fate; Wartensleben had his horse killed under him. Deprived of its chiefs, the Prussian line hesitated and halted, but did not fall back.

Gudin was likely to be defeated, when the division of Morand appeared on the plateau, and directed itself on our left. This powerful reenforcement of fresh troops, ardent for the fight, was decisive. The Prussians, having been driven out of Hassenhausen and unable to make a stand in rear of that place, the king resolved to make another charge of cavalry like that of Blucher in the morning. Prince William executed with courage several charges against the troops of Morand, arranged in squares by battalion and disposed checkerwise. The devotion of this prince, carried to obstinacy, failed against the formidable front presented by our brave infantry; arrested in his progress by the close array of our bayonets, and exposed to a murderous musketry and the grape of our batteries, the prince, himself being wounded, was unable to check the disorder of his squadrons; a part fled on New Sulza and a part on Auerstadt.

Friant, on his side, penetrated as far as Taugwitz, turned the left of Prince Henry and the extremity of the enemy's line. No sooner was Morand clear of the enemy's cavalry than he threw himself on Rehhausen. The king was found in the hottest of the strife; one horse had already been killed under him; showing great courage and *sang-froid*, he himself directed a part of his reserve against our left; but beaten in flank by the artillery and infantry with which Davout had crowned the Sonnenberg, it was impossible for him to restore the combat and prevent Morand from carrying Rehhausen. Disorder and confusion was beginning to appear in the Prussian infantry.

Davout judged that this was the moment to strike the decisive blow: the heights of Eckartsberga commanded the enemy's left; the possession of this gave us at the same time the tactical and strategic point of the field of battle, since it secured the direct road to Freyburg and closed the enemy's only line of retreat. Gudin's division marched there by Taugwitz and Gernstett; that of Friant, by Lisdorf. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of their attack. The aged Mollendorf, being wounded by a ball, gave the command to Kalkreuth; but as the last remaining portion of his reserve had been unable to check the attack on Eckartsberga, there was now not the slightest hope of restoring the

combat, his troops passed in disorder the deep ravine of Auerstädt.

The king, ignorant of Prince Hohenlohe's defeat, ordered the retreat on Weimar; the ruin of his army would have been complete if Bernadotte had executed even one-half of what there was for him to do. Leaving Naumburg at three o'clock in the morning and arriving at Camburg toward six o'clock, he could still debouch from that place on Sulza, attack the king, and completely cut off his retreat; he preferred to continue his march on Dornburg, where the ravine of the Saale is much more difficult, so that he did not reach the environs of Apolda till night. Nevertheless, his unexpected appearance on these heights, which at a distance flanked the road to Weimar, and the rencounter of the stragglers of Hohenlohe's corps, completed the despair of the Prussian troops who fled in all directions. The king received in the midst of this catastrophe the letter which I had sent him on the twelfth from Gera, by M. Montesquiou to avoid the war. A glimmer of hope seemed for a moment to animate his torn heart; he sent me Count Denhof, his aid-de-camp, to propose an armistice; but I could not now stop in my victorious career; the war, begun with a thunderbolt, would place Prussia at my feet, and I could treat only at Berlin.

Such was the issue of the celebrated battle of Auerstedt. Frederick William could say with Francis I: *All is lost save honor*. Although beaten by a corps inferior, by one-half, he could attribute it only to the inexperience of his troops and of his generals. Three hundred and twenty-four officers slain or wounded, ten thousand men *hors-de-combat*, the duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mollendorf, Prince William, Generals Schmettau and Wartensleben wounded or slain, proved that they manoeuvred badly, they nevertheless fought heroically. The division of Gudin had alone three thousand five hundred men and one hundred and thirty officers *hors-de-combat*, an enormous loss, being one-half the force present. No better proof can be given of the intrepid efforts of the enemy; Davout and all his other soldiers rivaled them in glory; they won indisputable claims to the admiration of posterity. No battle in all the wars

of the Revolution offers a contest so disproportionate, with a success so brilliant. I could hardly believe the reports, which I regarded as very exaggerated, but which the Prussian accounts proved to be moderate. Davout had purchased this victory with the blood of seven thousand brave men; but happily a good number of them were only slightly wounded, and more than half returned to the ranks.*

Extraordinary Results of these Victories.—The night following this double battle was not less fatal to the Prussians than the battle itself. The army of the king, taking, in disorder, the road to Weimar, met near Buttelstedt the fugitives of the army of Hohenlohe, and the confusion was then at its height. Prince Hohenlohe had reached Vippach almost alone. Nothing had been provided for the retreat. To make no provisions for the case of a retreat is one of the greatest faults that a general can commit; even where one

*Alison, in giving an account of this battle, with his usual disregard of facts, and readiness to accuse Napoleon of falsehood and meanness, says, "Napoleon's official account of this battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign (it was the fifth bulletin) is characterized by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and increasing jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which, in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible." After pointing out his meanness, jealousy, and neglect of Davout, he quotes the bulletin itself as proof of these charges, thus: "On our right the corps of Marshal Davout performed 'prodigies.' Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues, etc., etc." Now what will the reader think of Mr. Alison's veracity when he finds that not only are his charges in this case utterly untrue, but that he has falsified the language of Napoleon in order to give plausibility to his malignant accusations? The sentence which he translates, "but maintained a running fight for three leagues, etc.," is in the original, "mais mena battant pendant plus de trois lieues," etc. Instead of treating Davout with neglect, he mentioned him with unqualified praise in his short and hasty bulletin, placing his name before all the other marshals, made him duke of Auerstädt for his heroic conduct on that occasion, and to honor him still more, designated him as first to enter the Prussian capital—thus showing to the whole army his right to the precedence. Moreover, a few days afterward, in reviewing his troops on the road to Frankfurt, he called Davout and his officers around him and addressed them in terms of respect and the highest admiration. Davout, deeply affected by the approbation and generosity of the emperor, replied, "Sire, the soldiers of the third corps will always be to you what the Tenth Legion was to Caesar." Both he and his corps showed in many a hard-fought field how much they were gratified with the manner in which Napoleon had taken to prove his "falsehood," "unceasing jealousy," and "reprehensible meanness," and we doubt that there was a man in the whole army who would not have been delighted at similar proofs of neglect.

can gain battles as I did, this neglect is hardly pardonable. Undoubtedly he ought not to render these dispositions public, but he ought to prepare a rallying point for a corps which may be momentarily cut off.

The two chiefs were *hors-de-combat*, the third in flight; there was no one to remedy the evil. The different crowded upon each other, mingled together, and then dispersed; never was there so deplorable a scene, except the night after the battle of Waterloo. Some took the road to Erfurt; others to Colleda, the main body reached Sommerda, but in horrible confusion. Blucher, coming from Colleda to Weissenensee with six thousand horse, found himself anticipated there by Klein's division of dragoons; but he saved himself by declaring that an armistice had been concluded. Kalkreuth, hotly pressed at Greussen by Soult's corps, tried to use the same strategem, but he was attacked and defeated; he gained Sondershausen in a deplorable state. Hohenlohe there rejoined the remains of his forces. Mollendorf, who had taken refuge at Erfurt with six thousand men and eight thousand wounded, was there surrounded by Murat and Ney. The governor of this place, susceptible of a good defense, capitulated the next day, and even surrendered the two citadels which commanded it.

The operations of a single day had decided the fate of the Prussian monarchy; we already had in our hands sixty colors, two hundred pieces of field artillery, and twenty-five thousand prisoners. But to give the enemy no time to reorganize his forces, it was necessary that we should not give him a moment's rest; I took my measures accordingly.

Although the duke of Brunswick had manifested the design of concentrating his forces, he had either not done so, or had begun to do it so unskillfully that his army had been taken *en flagrant delit*. While one-half of his army had fallen at Jena and another had fought in retreat on Freyburg and Naumburg, two other corps under the duke of Weimar and General Winning were marching on the other side of the forest of Thuringia and to Eisenach; a fourth corps of fourteen thousand men formed a reserve under the duke of Wurtemberg, at Halle. The thunderbolt which had just struck the Prussian army, thus situated,

would have consequences the more grave as there was no chief, and the king himself had not a moment to loose if he hoped to regain the capital and the Oder; each of his corps had to save itself as well as it could. Here Bulow could have found a fine model of eccentric retreat! Hohenlohe and Kalkreuth saved themselves by the Harz on Magdeburg. The first was there to take the command in chief, rally all he could find, and march on to the Oder toward Stettin; but he was forced to describe the arc by Magdeburg, and as we held the cord of this arc, we could have anticipated him at any point, had it not been for the difficulty of passing the Elbe. While Murat, Soult, and Ney, followed him on Nordhausen where his rear-guard was cut to pieces, I took, with Bernadotte, Lannes, Davuot, Augereau, and my guard, the road to Dessau, in order to pass the Elbe at that place, to direct myself on Berlin, to cut off the enemy from the Oder, and at the same time to seize on the enemy's capital and communications. The result of these marches, well combined, and rapid as lightning, ought to find favor even with the detractors of my glory; but how can we expect that blind men should appreciate my system of war, when even the duke of Brunswick could not understand it?

Combat of Halle.—Bernadotte encountered, at Halle, on the seventeenth of October, the corps reserve under the Duke Eugene of Wurtemberg. This prince had just received indirect news of the battle of Jena, with circumstances so terrible that he could not believe it. He was waiting for two thousand men of his corps who were on the march from Madgeburg, on the left bank of the Saale by Sandersleben; whether he was surprised, or whether he could not venture to cut the bridge on the Saale before the junction of his detachment, he was so abruptly driven back by Dupont's division that he had not time to complete his dispositions to gain Madgeburg as he had intended. To assail the battalions' left at the bridge of the Saale, to enter pell-mell with them, was, for our troops, the work of but fifteen minutes; the main body of the Prussian corps, encamped in rear of the city, committed the foolish act of attempting its recapture; a very warm combat ensued. Dupont debouched by the Leipzig gate, sustained by Rivaud and the cavalry of Tilly, which attacked the enemy in the

direction of Neumark, and gained possession of the road to Magdeburg. The enemy could not long hold out against the superiority of Bernadotte, who, to complete the victory, endeavored to cut off the road to Dessau; the duke exerted himself to save this last communication; he succeeded in doing so, and put himself in retreat, closely pursued by the columns of Dupont and Rivaud. He passed the Elbe at Dessau, and, after having imperfectly burned the bridge, reached Magdeburg, weakened by the loss of thirty pieces of cannon and five thousand men. The regiment, which was approaching by the left of the Saale, completely surrounded in the defile of Krollwitz by Drouet and the cavalry of Tilly, were made prisoners.

This contest of twelve thousand Prussians against the superior forces of Bernadotte was favored by the excellence of the post, but the result did no great honor to its defenders. The duke would have done much better by sending to the absent regiment an order to save itself at Magdeburg as best it could; he could then have destroyed the bridges of the Saale, and retaken, untouched, the road to Dessau and Wittenberg. This would have retarded our march for two or three days, and have saved the corps of Hohenlohe and Blucher, and the place of Stettin.

March on Potsdam and Berlin.—At the same time Davout, who had entered Leipzig on the eighteenth, took the direction to Wittenberg, and my headquarters followed to the same place. Considerable captures of English merchandise were made in this rich city. Lannes marched to Dessau; Bernadotte descended the Saale as far as Bernburg and Aschersleben, and received orders to throw a bridge across near Zerbst, so as to cut off the corps which he had just beaten, but which had already taken refuge under Magdeburg. Lannes caused the bridges of Dessau to be restored, and Davout, followed by Augereau, entered Wittenberg, on the twenty-third, without resistance. A feeble Prussian detachment found there had the mal adresse to set fire to the bridge without burning it. We immediately directed our march on Potsdam, and entered this place on the twenty-fourth.

Visit to the Cabinet of Frederick the Great.—It would be difficult to describe my feelings in ascending the steps of

the palace of Frederick and in visiting, at Sans-Souci, the places immortalized by the great king. For seven years he had resisted the attacks of half of Europe; in fifteen days his monarchy had fallen before my eagles: thus move the affairs of nations, according to circumstances and the men who preside over their destinies. I found in his cabinet his music-desk, and another on which was the Art of War by Puisegur. The book was open at the chapter entitled *du port de l'épée*: it was here, undoubtedly, that Frederick had been reading. My surprise was extreme at finding here the gorget, the sword, the belt, and the grand-cordon of his orders, which he had worn in the seven years' war. Such trophies were worth a hundred flags, and to forget them is proof of the disorder and stupor which reigned throughout Prussia on hearing of the disaster which had befallen their army. I sent them to Paris to be deposited in the Hotel des Invalides; many of these old soldiers were cotemporaries of the disgraceful defeat of Rosbach; I was proud to send them these proofs of the signal vengeance I had taken for that defeat.

On the twenty-fifth of October, Davout entered Berlin, where we found a superb arsenal and immense stores of provisions. Our march had been so impetuous that the capital had not received a single courier from the army, and was in nearly the same state as when the king departed. They had carried off the archives, but they had left all the instruments of war. The same day the fortress of Spandau, which they had been so imprudent as to leave unarmed, surrendered to Marshal Lannes. They found eighty pieces of cannon in the arsenal and one thousand two hundred men as the garrison. I marched at the head of my Guards to Charlottenburg to sustain Lannes; I remained there the twenty-seventh, in order to direct measures for the pursuit of the corps of Hohenlohe.

Napoleon Enters Berlin.—I made my entrance into Berlin on the twenty-eighth; I had already made a triumphal entrance into Milan, Cairo, and Vienna; but nowhere had I been received with so much empressement as by these Prussians who had so much declaimed against me without taking the trouble to examine the causes of these com-

plaints. They received me rather as a liberator than as a conqueror. In truth the bourgeois class, so numerous and respectable in the German states, regarded me as the defender of the principles which had triumphed in the Revolution; jealous of the pretensions of the nobility, this class had taken no part in those petty and absurd stories that had provoked the war.

Operations of Hohenlohe.—The campaigns of Jena and of Ulm will some day serve as models to teach the generals the art of concentrating their forces at the proper time, and then to divide them after the blow has been struck. The destruction of the Prussian army was so extraordinary that to explain it I shall be obliged to enter into details.

While I was marching on Berlin, Murat, Soult, and Ney had pursued the *debris* of the Prussian army on Magdeburg. The king, correctly judging their desperate condition, took the road to the Oder, and left the command-in-chief to Prince Hohenlohe, with the care of reorganizing the army under the cannon of this important place. The thing was impossible without his being besieged there; for Soult had followed with so much impetuosity that the rear-guard had scarcely entered the camp under Magdeburg when Legrand's division threw itself on the enemy, driving everything within the place, where there reigned the greatest confusion.

Prince Hohenlohe here learned the issue of the combat of Halle, and my march on Dessau and Wittenberg, he nevertheless hoped that the destruction of the bridges of the Elbe would give him time to reach Stettin before us. It has already been seen that those bridges had fallen untouched into our power. He had now to choose between three plans: first, to remain and reorganize a force of fifty thousand men under the protection of Magdeburg, keeping the field as much as he could on the two banks of the Elbe, and waiting the effect of the arrival of the Russians on the Oder; even shutting himself up in the place, if he could not do better. For this plan there would have been necessary an abundance of provisions and munitions; but he had neither. The second, was to throw himself on Soult and open a road to Hanover so as to unite with the division of

General Lecocq, and fight in Westphalia as long as he could. The third, was to lose not a minute in gaining Stettin; he chose the last, and, under the circumstances, the resolution was a very natural one.

Hohenlohe hoped to leave Magdeburg with sixty-eight battalions and one hundred and fifty-nine squadrons, including those which the prince of Wurtemberg had saved from Halle and destined to cover his march; the disorder was so great that Kalkreuth, instead of echeloning his numerous cavalry on the left bank, had sent them to canton on the right bank of the Elbe near Sandau, and instead of leaving twenty-six feeble battalions to guard Magdeburg, fifty-two entire squadrons, through mistake, remained in the place.

There are two roads leading from Magdeburg to the Oder; the best and most direct is that by Brandenburg and Berlin; the other is to the north of Rathenow, Ruppin, Zehdenick, Prenzlau, and Stettin. The prince could not take the first without encountering our columns which were debouching from Sandau on Neustadt, and would prolong the time when we could reach him. He could, in fact, take no other course; but he ought to have provided the best measures to execute this movement, and to have marched as compactly and rapidly as possible. The road to Stettin, which he followed meets at Zehdenick with that of Oranienburg which I had taken; he should have allowed neither delay nor rest till he reached this city with the main body of his forces, or at least with his numerous squadrons. It was the more probable that he would arrive there before our troops, as Murat had followed in rear by the Harz, and had just caused Magdeburg to be summoned by General Belliard. How was it possible for the French troops, scattered as they were beaten Halberstadt and Magdeburg, having to cross the Elbe, to arrive at Zehdenick before the prince of Hohenlohe? This, however, actually occurred, Murat having reached Zehdenick by rapid marches, before the columns of Lannes, who led my march.

The prince of Hohenlohe, leaving Magdeburg the twenty-third of October, marched in three columns on Rathenow at the head of twenty-eight battalions and thirty squadrons;

the main body of the cavalry passed the Elbe lower down, and rejoined the rest of the army near Neustadt. Blücher took command of the corps of the duke of Wurtemberg, destined for the rear-guard. Hohenlohe had, therefore, on the twenty-fifth, at his disposition, fifty battalions and one hundred and sixty squadrons; but instead of marching in a single compact mass and bivouacking on the road, making the inhabitants and the Prussian authorities furnish him with provisions, he took it into his head to distribute his troops in cantonments in the villages, thus fatiguing them by useless marches to and from the cantonments, and producing disorder and want of discipline by an absurd dispersion. The system was the more objectionable as they were likely to be forced to cut their way sword in hand, and were not in a situation to make the slow marches required by magazines. In addition to all these faults, instead of placing his numerous cavalry on his right to flank him in the direction that we were approaching, he threw it on the extreme left at Wittstock, while the infantry marched on Neuruppin, and a feeble advance-guard under Schimelpenninck on Zehdenick. This city, situated, as we have said, at the debouch of the road which I had taken, was therefore the decisive point which it was necessary to reach before us; and as the advance-guard arrived there, it is certain that the rest of the corps might very well have reached it, if the dispositions had been better made.

Fall of Spandau.—The fall of Spandau, which took place the same day (the twenty-fifth), acquired so much the greater importance by the approach of Hohenlohe's corps. Bernadotte, who was informed of his march on Brandenburg, soon gave me advice of it, and advanced in the direction of Fehrbellin and Cremmen.

Dispositions to Destroy Hohenlohe.—The grand-duke of Berg, having nothing further to do in the environs of Magdeburg after the enemy had reached this fortress, received orders to turn rapidly toward Barby or Dessau to pass the Elbe there; he marched with so much celerity that he arrived at Spandau at the moment of its surrender, and immediately directed himself by Oranienburg on Zehdenick. Lannes, who was to follow him, only reached Oran-

ienburg on the twenty-sixth. I kept Augereau and Davout in the environs of Berlin, to be prepared in case the enemy should escape the other corps and attempt to fall on our rear. The first guarded the important bridge of Neu-
bruck on the Havel; the second was to throw its light cavalry as far as Oderberg.

The prince of Hohenlohe, on the twenty-sixth, learning the presence of our troops at Oranienburg, took the tardy resolution to force his march, moving his infantry by Gransee on Zehdenick, and the next day Prenzlau, so as to gain the defile of Löckenitz near Stettin, on the twenty-eighth, where he would be safe. The cavalry took the same direction by Wittstock and Woldeck. On his arrival at Gransee, Hohenlohe received the unexpected news that General Schimelpenick had been beaten at Zehdenick by the cavalry of the grand duke of Berg, and had saved himself in disorder on Prenzlau. It was ridiculous to lose his direct communication in consequence of a skirmish of cavalry, when ten thousand Prussian horse were marching to Wittstock without any object. Nevertheless Hohenlohe, renouncing all hope of opening a passage, resolved to gain Boitzenburg near Prenzlau, by making a detour by Furstemberg and Lychen where he waited Blucher and a part of the column of cavalry which he had ordered to join him in place of Schimelpenick's troops. This idea was absurd, for as our troops held the direct and shortest road to Templin, the enemy must expect to meet them in column with the chance of being sustained the more easily by the *corps d'armee* which arrived first at Berlin (Lannes and Davout). Hohenlohe reached Lychen on the twenty-seventh, and in vain waited there for Blucher, who had been informed too late of this forced march, and had not yet passed Templin; not being joined by the expected cavalry, and as he had no time to lose, he continued his march on Boitzenburg.

Murat was not a man to allow himself to be easily passed. Informed, in his march from Templin on Prenzlau, of the direction taken by the Prussians, he moved with the divisions of Grouchy, Beaumont, and Lassalle on Wichmansdorf, where he attacked the gendarmes of the guard which flanked the march. To assail, turn, and overthrow

this superb regiment of cuirassiers on the shores of the lake, was the work of a moment. Some of the officers of this corps had insulted the French ambassador, in order the more surely to involve the king in the war; they expiated this conduct by the disgrace of being forced to capitulate in the open field, which cavalry should never do.

Hohenlohe, frightened at this news, formed his infantry and hesitated whether to enter Boitzenbourg or to take the cross road between Prenzlau and Pasewalk; this last course was certainly the most prudent; but on the report of a patrol, he decided to enter Boitzenburg for the night, and, the next day, to take the road to Prenzlau, where he would find provisions and forage for his troops.

Combat and Capitulation of Prenzlau.—On the twenty-eight, the corps advanced on Shönermark and Gustrow; it entered Prenzlau without any great obstacle; but the grand duke of Berg, arriving by the road to Templin, and not being able to occupy a city with his cavalry, he caused it to be turned by a detachment of dragoons, while he advanced with two divisions on the small stream of Golmitz, fell impetuously on the rear of the Prussian column, pursued it even to Faubourg, cut to pieces and captured the regiment of the king, cut off the rear guard of Prince Augustus, and forced him, after a good defense, to surrender with his battalion.

The Prussian infantry had passed Prenzlau and taken, for some unknown reason, the road to Pasewalk instead of that to Stettin. Murat summoned the prince of Hohenlohe to surrender, and Lannes, who arrived there himself, although his corps was still distant, also summoned the enemy in order to deceive him. Convinced that he had no more hopes of gaining Löckenitz, which he supposed to be in possession of our infantry, attacked in front by a division of cavalry and in rear by two others, the prince laid down his arms with seventeen battalions and nineteen squadrons, amounting to not less than twelve thousand men.

Fall of Stettin.—The grand-duke of Berg seemed almost omnipresent; no sooner had we obtained this brilliant success than LaSalle's division of light cavalry advanced on Stettin, whose imbecile governor surrendered to our hus-

sars, with a garrison of five thousand men. Murat immediately directed himself on Pasewalk, where the great column of Hohenlohe's cavalry had taken refuge on learning of the disaster of its chief. Six regiments of cuirassiers and a brigade of infantry, fatigued, it is true, by forced marches, surrendered without the slightest resistance. A single brigade, cut off from Prenzlau the night before, presented itself at Stettin; the governor refused to open his gates, on the twenty-eighth, to his own troops, but the next day he opened them at the first summons of our advance-guard. This brigade reached Anklam, where General Becker's division attacked it and forced it to surrender.

Blucher Retires on Mecklenburg.—Of all this army, which a few days ago was so brilliant, there remained only Blucher and the old corps of the duke of Weimar, commanded by General Winning, who, after having given the slip to Soult, had passed the Elbe near Sandau and gained Mecklenburg. Blucher, informed of the defeat of Hohenlohe, immediately inclined toward Neu Strelitz, where he joined this corps, which now formed a little army of twenty-one thousand men.

PART II

French Documents

FOREWORD

The following documents have been selected from sources as indicated below to illustrate the main features of the Jena Campaign up to and including November 10, 1806.

ABBREVIATIONS

B="La Manoeuvre d'Iena," by General H. Bonnal, 1904; translated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery.

CN="Correspondance of Napoleon the First," published by Napoleon III in 1863; translated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery.

M="Lettres et Documents pour servir a L'Histoire De Joachim Murat, 1767-1815," published by S. A. Le Prince Murat, 1910 ed. Translated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery.

N="La Vie du Marechal Ney," by General H. Bonnal, 1904; translated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery.

UCN="Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon the First," by Ernest Pieard and Louis Tuetey; translated by Louise Seymour Houghton, 1912.

NOTE:—Reference to War Department (WD) Files, and to the Imperial Files refer to the corresponding French archives.

CHAPTER III

Preparations for War, 26 August, 1806, to 27 September, 1806

B—5

ORDER OF BATTLE

FRENCH ARMY

From commencement of March, 1806, until September, 1806

G H Q Chief of Staff: Marshal Berthier—PC at Munich.

	<i>Billeting Area</i>
I ST ARMY CORPS Marshal Bernadotte -----	Anspach
1st Division, General Rivaud -----	Anspach
2d Division, General Drouet -----	Furth
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Walthier ---	Seehof
1st Division, Heavy Cavalry, General Nan-	
souty -----	Ellingen
4th Division Dragoons, General Sahuc -----	Kitzingen
III RD ARMY CORPS, Marshal Davout -----	Oettingen
1st Division, General Morand -----	Noerdlingen
2d Division, General Friand -----	Hall
3d Division, General Gudin -----	Oehringen
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Viallanes ---	Mergentheim
IV TH ARMY CORPS, Marshal Soult -----	Passau
1st Division, General Saint-Hilaire -----	Braunau
2d Division, General Lewal -----	Landshut
3d Division, General Legrand -----	Passau
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Margaron ---	Neuhaus
2d Division, Heavy Cavalry, General d'Haut-	
poul -----	Cham
3d Division Dragoons, General Beaumont ---	Amberg
V TH ARMY CORPS, Marshal Mortier -----	Dinkelsbuhl
1st Division, General Suchet -----	Dinkelsbuhl
2d Division, General Gazan -----	Schweinfurth
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Treilliard ---	Bischoffsheim
VII TH ARMY CORPS, Marshal Ney -----	Memmingen
1st Division, General Dupont -----	Cologne
2d Division, General Marchand -----	Memmingen
3d Division, General Mareognet -----	Altdorf
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Colbert -----	Altshausen
2d Division, Dragoons, General Grouchy -----	Fribourg and Brisgau

VIIITH ARMY CORPS, Marshal Augereau	Francfort
1st Division, General Desjardins	Friedberg
2d Division, General Heudelet	Dietz
Light Cavalry Brigade, General Durosnel	Francfort
1st Division, Dragoons, General Klein	Siegen

The total strength as of July 11, 1806 is reported as:

Infantry	140,000 men
Cavalry	32,000 men
Artillery	20,000 men
Total	192,000 men
Light Artillery	1,500 horses
Trains	12,000 horses
Breidt Company (contractor) ..	3,000 horses with 600 wagons
Total	16,500 horses, with 600 contractor wagons

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER*

CN—10696
(WD Files)

Rambouillet, 26 August, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I presume that you have not forgotten for a moment to inform the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine of current affairs. If you have not done so, do it at once. Place Bavarian troops in Nurnberg and its territory. Have signs erected on the frontiers having the arms of Bavaria on one side and the arms of the Confederation of the Rhine on the other side. Having done this, you will withdraw my troops from Nurnberg, in such manner as to indicate our withdrawal to the Rhine, you will leave the Bavarians in contact with Bayreuth. You will advise the King of Bavaria to place good troops at Nurenberg and vicinity.

You will arrange with the King of Wurtemberg to do the same in such manner that my troops may be as little in contact as possible with Prussian territory. Finally, you will cause in every possible manner, information to be given out that the troops are returning home. You will actually cause some artillery to be put in march, and will direct all the heavy trains to make some movement towards the Rhine. Give orders that no troops at Strasbourg and

*Chief of Staff of the Grand Army.—C.H.L.

Mayence shall pass the Rhine and that all troops which arrive on the Rhine from the interior shall wait at Strasbourg and Mayence.

The cabinet at Berlin have been seized with panic. They imagine that in the treaty with Russia, clauses exist as to seizing several of their provinces. It is for this reason that we must attribute the ridiculous mobilizations which they are making and to which we must not pay any attention, my intention being absolutely to cause my troops to return to France. Finally, I hope that the moment is not far distant that you will be back in Paris; I have no less impatience than you and the army to see you all back in France.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL NEY

N—265

*Anspach, 2 September, 1806.**

I arrived here yesterday evening, and I leave at noon for Nurnberg.

I have issued all the orders for the marches. The troops (VI Corps) are not too fatigued. The Minister, (Marshal Berthier) states to you that he is displeased that our corps is not further forward; why did he leave it so far to the rear? We had troops as far as Feldkirch.

I will be glad, Marshal, to see you again. Count on my devotion and zeal; in any case I will do everything possible to justify your confidence and merit your esteem.

Respectfully,
DUTAILLIS.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10743
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 5 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Recent circumstances in Europe, cause me to seriously consider the situation of my armies. I have already raised

*NOTE:—Marshal Ney was on leave in Paris at this date. His chief of staff, General Dutailis was in charge of the VI Corps.

50,000 men of the 1806 Conscription. This is being done with ease and they are enroute. My intention is to cause 30,000 men of the reserve to march within a few days.

The six regiments of Marshal Bernadotte, have each three battalions. Issue them orders to send to their depots the cadres of the 3d Battalions with their majors, after having filled up the first two battalions up to 140 men to a company. The existence of the cadres is necessary in order to receive the new conscriptions which I am raising.

Issue the same orders to Marshal Augereau, my intention being that all regiments shall have at least one battalion in France; the 3d for those regiments which have three battalions, the 4th for those that have four battalions.

Please give all the attention of which you are capable to see that the cadres of the 3d and 4th Battalions, and the majors and the adjutants of the 3d and 4th Battalions leave the Grand Army for the interior.

If necessary, make the same arrangements for the cavalry. Organize all the regiments with the army, with three squadrons and send to the depots the cadres of the 4th Squadrons, in order that they may be able to receive remounts. I had issued orders to cause all troops to stop at Strasbourg and at Mayence; revoke this order and cause not only the personnel but also the materiel to join their organizations. Have a conversation with the King of Bavaria, and make him understand the importance of not allowing himself to be exposed to any aggression by either Prussia or Russia, and that his army must not leave Germany until it is pacified. The country about Wurtzbourg has been the most gone over; there is no objection to placing troops there to assist Bavaria. I am going to withdraw all prohibitions and cause everything possible which can be found in the interior to be sent to the army. Issue orders to the 21st Light Infantry of Gazan's Division, which is at Dusseldorf to rejoin its division with the two first battalions; the 3d Battalion will remain at Wesel. The 100th and the 103d Infantry, have, I believe, 2,800 men present with the army; all three battalions must be retained organized with 8 companies each, and send cadres of three companies

to the depot; for 2800 men cannot be formed into two battalions.

Have made up and send me a report on the general situation of the Grand Army.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10744
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 5 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Send engineer officers at any risk to make thorough reconnaissance on the roads which lead from Bamberg to Berlin. Eight days after I shall have given the order it is necessary that all my armies including those at Francfort, at Passau and at Memmingen shall be concentrated at Bamberg, and within the principality of Bayreuth. Send me a march table for each unit commenting on the roads. I presume that Marshal Soult will march via Straubing; Marshal Ney by Donauvert; and Marshal Augereau by Wurtzbourg. I calculate that within eight days all my army corps will be united beyond Kronach. Now from this point on the frontier of Bamberg, I estimate the distance from Berlin as 10 days' marching.

Report to me on the nature of the country to the right flank and to the left flank; as to the roads, and as to obstacles which the enemy might occupy. How about the streams of the Saale and the Elster at Gera? How about the streams of the Luppe and Pleisse opposite Leipzig? Finally, how about the Mulde at Duben, and from there on until it empties into the Elbe below Dessau? Finally, how about passing the Elbe at Wittenberg? How is this stream for the 30 or 35 leagues down from the frontiers of Bohemia; what bridges exist over it? How are the towns of Dresden, Torgau and Magdeburg fortified? You should have a thorough talk at first on all of the above subjects with some Bavarian officer who is well acquainted with the country. You will obtain the best maps that can be found at Munich and Dresden.

You will send intelligence officers to Dresden and Berlin by different routes; they will inquire from MM. Laforest and Durand what is the meaning of the movement and concentration of the Prussian troops; they will state that you are appearing to be very much disturbed at all these movements, not having any orders from Paris relating thereto and that you are ignorant of what plans may be in view. The one who goes to Dresden, in case he learns nothing will proceed to Berlin also. They will halt en route for lunch, dinner and to sleep and will not march by night, but will thoroughly study the locality through which they pass. Send me details also on the Spree. I have no need to tell you that it is necessary that the greatest prudence be used to acquire the information desired, as I have no projects against Berlin; I simply desire these details in order to be prepared. I believe that between Bamberg and Berlin, there is no other fortress than Magdeburg. I believe also that food supplies can be found in the country about Bamberg. I can easily supply Wurtzbourg. They should be some small fortress belonging to Wurtzbourg or Bavaria, which it would be well to occupy in advance. Let me know about this.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN*

UCN—625

Saint-Cloud, 5 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, order that all artillery effects, horse-trappings, harness, baggage and equipments of corps now in depots, which these corps have requested of the Grand Army and which I formerly ordered to have kept in Strasbourg and Mayence, be sent on without delay, to the points which will be indicated by Marshal Berthier. Order 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 sergeant-major, 4 sergeants, 1 quartermaster and 8 corporals with 400 men of the 3d battalion of the 13th Light, to set out without delay to join their corps in Germany. On arriving, this detachment will be incorporated in the two war battalions. Order

*Minister of War.—C.H.L.

a detachment of the 3d battalion of the 48th, also composed of 400 men and similarly organized, to join its first two war battalions in Germany, to be incorporated with them on arriving. Issue the same order for the 108th.

Order 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 sergeant major, 1 quartermaster, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals and 300 men of the 3d battalion of the 25th line to leave Boulogne and join the first two war battalions in Germany. Issue the same order to a similar detachment of the 3d battalion of the 36th, a similar detachment of the 43d, a similar detachment of the 55th, a similar detachment of the 28th, a similar detachment of the 50th, a similar detachment of the 75th, and to a detachment of the 46th organized in the same way, but of 450 men.

Order the first two battalions of the 21st Light Infantry, completed to 140 men per company, if possible, at the expense of the 3d battalion, to set out to join General Gazan's division at Wurtzbourg.

Let me know if there are other orders the execution of which I have suspended. Present a report for despatching without delay certain cavalry generals to go through all depots of cavalry regiments of the Grand Army and send thither all available men and horses, my intention being that each cavalry regiment beyond the Rhine have with the army three squadrons 600 horses strong. The cadres of the 4th squadrons will be sent to France to receive fresh horses.

Let me know the situation as to horses of the various cavalry regiments. The 4th Dragoons has only 459 horses; issue immediate orders to make contracts for bringing it up to 800. Order that the 26th Chasseurs be also brought up to 800 horses.

Present me with a plan by which the 1st, 3d, 5th, 9th and 15th Dragoons may each procure 200 additional horses, in order that these five regiments, even if they should have sent forward all that they had available for the army, may within six weeks from now have a body of 1000 horses ready to go anywhere. I have 28,000 dragoons, 26,000 of them present under arms, and only 18,000 horses. I therefore have 8000 unmounted men. It is my intention that measures be taken to mount them without delay, in order that

if hostilities be resumed, these men may render me all the service of which they are capable. I have 16,000 chasseurs and 14,000 horses. With what is lacking for the hussars a levy of 10,000 horses must be made. I desire a memorandum to that effect by which I may understand the present condition of the cavalry regiments, those in France, and, in Italy, those with the army, in depot, the strength of their masses and what is necessary to bring them up to full war footing.

Make me a report upon the Breidt Company, the number of horses it has in various places, and the measures necessary to be taken if I desire to levy additional brigades.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10756
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 9 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I note in the situation reports of the Grand Army, dated August 1st, (I have not received the one of September 1st), that all the cavalry regiments have more horses than men; while there are lots of men yet at the depots. Issue orders that there shall be sent to the regiments not only enough men for the horses, but that there shall be 50 extra per regiment to replace the wounded and sick.

If I enter into war against Prussia, my line of operations ^{Communications} will be: Strasbourg, Mannheim, Mayence and Wurtzbourg, where I have a strong place in such manner that convoys will upon the fourth day after their departure from Mannheim or Mayence be safely at Wurtzbourg. I would like to have at four days' march from Wurtzbourg on Bavarian territory some small places which might serve as a depot. I am ignorant as to what forces may be at Kronach, Lichtenfels, Schesslitz.

Forchheim would be 10 leagues too far; nevertheless, it may be necessary to use it if we cannot find anything else.

Have reconnoitered Königshofen in the territory of Wurtzbourg beyond Schweinfurt; I believe that Bamberg

will not object. Have reconnoitered the Main from Wurtzbourg as far as where it crosses the frontier of Bayreuth. Also reconnoiter the Upper Palatinate as far as the frontiers of Saxony; see if you can find a place where the trains could be assembled after crossing the Rhine, or which might serve as a strong point for my operations. Have the Naab reconnoitered and have a large map made of this stream; in case of war, it may become most important. I do not believe that there are fortified places on this stream, but let me know about this. In any case Forchheim must not be neglected. Arrange with the King of Bavaria that a commandant be sent there with munitions and rations. It is well to advise everybody to use the greatest care and above all to remain in good relations with the Prussians. We wish to maintain good communications with them; but it would not be bad to announce in addition to the 50,000 men which I am raising, that I am asking for 100,000 men extra. Have Gotha, Naumburg and Leipzig examined as fortifications and let me know what places between Bamberg and Berlin are protected from raids and which might serve as a center for positions of the army. You will understand how much tact will be required for this. Make engineer officers understand how much importance attach to Braunau and how much to Augsburg. It is necessary that these reconnaissances shall be made with the greatest care by experienced officers.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10757
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The movements of the Prussians continue to be very extraordinary. They wish to receive a lesson. I am sending my horses on tomorrow and in a few days my Guard. They leave on pretext of going to the Diet of Francfort. Just the same it will require considerable time before they all arrive. Make arrangements therefore to obtain some horses for me; You have not answered as to what the King of Bavaria might lend me, should I have need of horses. If the news

continues to lead me to believe that Prussians have lost their head, I will go direct to Wurtzbourg or Bamberg, I presume that within four or five days GHQ with the horses and baggage can be gotten to Bamberg. Let me know if I am wrong as to this. When you talk with the King of Bavaria, tell him very secretly, that if I get into trouble with Prussia, which I don't believe will be the case, but that if Prussia does get crazy, he will gain Bayreuth. I presume that Braunau is always kept supplied and in a state of defense. Perhaps it would be a good thing to have Bavaria supply the Chateau of Passau, although Austria says and protests that she desires to be left alone. M. de Knobelsdorf has made many protestations to them but I note, nevertheless, that Prussia is continuing her armaments and really I do not know what they want.

I have ordered the 28th Light Infantry which is at Boulogne and a battalion of Elite which is at Neufchatel to proceed to Mayence. There will then be nothing left at Neufchatel. I have ordered the King of Holland to organize a camp for 25,000 men at Utrecht. If the news which I received continues to be the same, I expect to send on Friday an advance guard of a 1000 horses of my Guard, and eight days later, the balance. Thus, I will have 3,000 horses, 6,000 Elite infantry and 36 guns.

I have written you to keep an eye on the citadel of Wurtzbourg and all the little citadels in the vicinity.

How many days will it require for the artillery park at Augsburg to assemble at Wurtzbourg? How much time will it require to send to Strasbourg the greatest part of the material now at Augsburg?

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10758
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

You will find enclosed herewith a report which I received on the Breidt Company. I wish to know in detail all the equipment this company had with different organiza-

tions, and what service they are being put to; which organization has the wagons and other materiel which they should have in accordance with my orders. It is very important that I shall know in detail the situation as to this service, whether ambulances are organized and whether the Breidt Company has made a distribution to all brigades. I note in the reports of the sub-inspector at the review by Barbier that he has two horses belonging to this company; that Marshal Davout has eight; and there is a large number of horses at Augsbourg. Understand that it is my intention that no general or officer should have any horses or wagons belonging to this company. I gave orders on this subject while at Vienna; see that these orders are carried out and that everyone returns what he has taken. The wagons are intended for transportation of bread, 500 wagons is not too many for this purpose for such a large army. I desire that there should be about 2 wagons attached to each battalion to carry 2000 rations, that is 2 days' rations complete, or 4 days' of half rations for emergency. I have 120 battalions; that then, requires 240 wagons. A regiment of cavalry may be considered as a battalion, as all the regiments of cavalry have less than 500 men. I have less than 50 regiments of cavalry with the army; I will therefore require about 100 wagons for the cavalry. As to the artillery they have their own transportation and do not need any more wagons. There will remain about 200 wagons which I can dispose of to supply central magazines. Report to me on this subject. Inform me as to the ambulance service; it appears to me that the wagons furnished by the Breidt Company are not suitable for this purpose. Each regiment should have its own ambulance. If there were to be given also to the cavalry we would never have enough, but cavalry has no need of ambulances. At the present season, they can everywhere farm wagons.

I will hold you responsible twenty-four hours after you receive this order that there shall be horses and wagons attached as given above. Many regiments may have poor horses. Authorize them to buy in Germany any horses which they can find. For example, each regiment may buy 20 horses. You will allot 10,000 francs to each regiment for this purpose. This in addition to what I will independently

purchase in France through the depots; but France is exhausted as to horses. I believe that each regiment of all arms has at least 20 dismounted men for remount duty and duties necessary in connection with the purchase of horses. I understand that the artillery have field forges and is supplied with horse shoes so as not to only be prepared to enter on a campaign, but to also have some excess.

You have assured me that the army is well provided with shoes. Mayence will be considered from now on as the main depot of the army; but you will not announce this change. Speak about it with the Intendant General of the Army in order that many things may be better directed to this town than on Augsburg.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL CAULAINCOURT,

GRAND EQERRY

CN—10759
(Files of M. Lefebvre)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR CAULAINCOURT:

Have my field glasses put in order. Have 60 of my horses sent tomorrow, among which eight which I ride. You will report on the condition of the horses which you select. I desire that this movement be arranged with every possible secret. Give out that there is going to be a hunt at Compiègne. As they must pass through Compeigne, two days will be gained. Send along my mules, also, and my lockers packed with all that is necessary, also my small dispatch cases which I used with so much success in my last campaign. Tomorrow, prepare my wagons, I wish one to carry my tent with an iron bed. If you haven't got one, get one from the Princess Caroline, and have it replaced later on. I wish the tent to be a real tent and not a stage tent. Have some strong carpets sent along. Have sent tomorrow with the horses, my little war desk. My wagons with the rest of the horses, my war baggage, clothes, arms, etc., together with all things which the Grand Marshal will get together

must be ready to leave Sunday. It is necessary that the Advance Guard shall gain four days. They will proceed first to Mayence and thence to Francfort; where I must go to attend the Diet. Marshal Bessieres, the Grand Marshal of the Palace, you, General Lemarois, one aide-de-camp, Prince Borghese, the palace adjutant Segur, will also send on their horses. In talking to these officers about it, you will tell them that they are to accompany me to the Diet of Francfort.

NAPOLEON.

P.S. In advising you that Sunday is to be the day of departure, my intention is that you will prepare everything on this line, and that you will get my orders on Saturday evening.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND*

CN—10760
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

You have learned of the arming of Prussia and the non-ratification of peace with Russia. My negotiations with the English are not broken, but they are making extraordinary demands. They wish to have Surinam, Berbice and to retain all your colonies. Under these conditions it is important to make you acquainted with the condition of affairs.

If war recommences, it is my intention, to give you the command of the sector from Boulogne as far as Wesel, and all of Holland. Assemble without delay at the Utrecht camp, under guise of exercising your troops and in order to prepare for war against England, and send me your plans and memoranda of the fortified places on the Prussian side. It is necessary that you be able within a period of four days to arrive yourself with the greater portion of your army at Wesel. It is not intended that your army will have big marches to make. Wesel being supplied with stores, and in view of the fact that you can obtain subsistence from

*The King of Holland was Napoleon's brother, Louis.—C.H.L.

your own country through the canals, I do not believe that you will need any large number of wagons. If you can unite a division of Dutch cavalry of 1,500 to 2,000 men, two divisions of Dutch infantry of 6,000 men each, one French division of 5,000 men, in all a corps of 18,000 men with 25 guns, provided with ammunition it will be sufficient. I will place under your orders a French division of 12,000 men; this will give you a corps of 30,000 men to defend Wesel, the northern portion of your country; and in accordance with the progress of my operations, and the events of war advance in the country between Münster and Wesel. I do not need to tell you how much all this must be kept secret. In assembling your troops at Utrecht I suppose that you will be able within four days to be at Wesel; let me know if this is correct.

General Michaud is an excellent man, who could very well be the commander of this corps under your orders. It is useless to alarm the country. No one will know the real object of the camp at Utrecht. I am confiding in you because I wish you to know my projects in order that you may take all precautions to carry out the mission which I propose if events lead to war.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10761
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

The 1st and 2d Chasseurs have plenty of men at their depots. I have issued orders that these detachments should leave; there appears to be some counter-order. One regiment has its depot at Tournay and the other at Ghent. Issue orders that the available men and horses of these regiments now at the depots leave to join the Grand Army.

Issue orders to the 20th Chasseurs to organize with three squadrons of 200 men each, to leave a skeleton of the 4th squadron at the depot, and direct the three other squadrons under the colonel or under the major if the colonel is

still absent, to proceed to Frankfort, where they will become a part of the corps under Marshal Augerau.

Issue orders to General Watier to cause all available detachments of the 1st, 3d, 5th, 9th and 15th Dragoons to leave. You will place all the detachments under the orders of a major who will conduct them to Mayence, where they will receive new orders from the Prince of Neufchatel to cross the Rhine and rejoin their commands.

Issue orders to General Watier to take measures with the regimental councils of administration which are at Paris to buy 200 new horses for each regiment. You will furnish the necessary funds for this purpose. It is desired that these 1000 horses be available before the end of October.

You will issue orders to the 4th Dragoons to organize with 3 squadrons of 200 men each, and to leave its 4th squadron and its depot with the major at Moulins; and you will cause them to leave for Strasbourg where they will receive orders from the Prince of Neufchatel as to their final destination. You will order this regiment to buy 200 extra horses in addition to what it has today in order to mount its 4th squadron.

Examine closely the condition of the depots of the cavalry in the 15th Military Division. Order all that are available, as well as all infantry detachments of this division, to proceed on to Mayence.

Give orders to the 14th Infantry to discontinue its work at Saint Quentin, and to mobilize by means of its depot and the 3d battalion, so as to have 1150 men per war battalion, and order them to Mayence where they will receive new orders.

Issue orders to the 22d Infantry, which is at Wesel, to prepare its two first battalions reenforced by all men available from the 3d battalion for the field, in order to form part of the Grand Army.

You will issue orders to the 7th Infantry which is at Grenoble, to proceed to Turin, and to the 27th Infantry which is at Turin, to proceed to Alexandria. You will issue orders to the 28th Light Infantry, which is at the camp of Boulogne, to proceed to Mayence where they will receive

new orders. You will issue the same order to the special battalion which is at Mayence.

Direct the director and inspector of artillery of the division which is at Wesel, to inspect together this place and to put it into condition to sustain a siege.

Let me know the conditions of the depots at Strasbourg, Mayence and other places on the Rhine. Take measures that the supplies which M. Vanlerberghe is to send to Wesel are ready at the latest in October. Let me know if it will be advisable to send towards Wesel a part of the supply of hard bread which I have at northern cities. It is necessary that Wesel be provided with stores for two or three months; but what appears to me to be necessary is to send for forage, flour, baking materials and brandy.

The commander of the department of the Roër will take immediate steps in case of necessity to furnish necessary fresh meat.

It is necessary that the engineers provide a sufficient quantity of stakes and materiel for fortifications.

It is necessary that prior to September 18, I have a report on the condition of Wesel to sustain a siege from the viewpoint of the artillery and infantry.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA

CN—10763
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

SERENE AND MOST POWERFUL PRINCE:

MY VERY DEAR AND VERY GOOD BROTHER:

We have received the letter in which Your Majesty has been kind enough to inform us of the resolution which he has taken and carried into effect of abdicating the dignity of supreme chief of the German Empire and of the Imperial Crown of Germany. This communication, of which we have taken careful note, is for us a precious regard of the sentiments of Your Majesty, and we beg you to believe that we are earnestly desirous to reply with all possible terms of

friendship. We believe with pleasure that the new order of things established in Germany and the measures which Your Majesty has believed necessary to take relative to his hereditary German states far from preventing the good harmony which happily exists between us, can only, by removing all future causes between the two empires from every foreign interest, consolidate and unite more closely each day the bonds which unite us. Our greatest desire is therefore in the future to have only the most neighborly and friendly relations with Your Majesty, and we continue to express our wishes for his personal prosperity and for that of the people of his government.

NAPOLEON.

NOTE FOR A LETTER TO M. LAFOREST*

CN—10765
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 10 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR:

The new minister of Prussia has sent to His Majesty, the emperor, his letters of appointment, and M. De Lucchesini his letter of recall. His Majesty has had a long conversation with these two ministers, and he has convinced them of his desire to live in peace with Prussia and the political impossibility of a war because for a prince who reflects on his operations, to make war with a power from which he desires nothing, and with which he has nothing to complain of would be a veritable act of folly. It would be necessary that the emperor would be susceptible of yielding to the desires of young officers who would like to make war with Prussia, and to different parties which we have in our large cities.

The emperor cannot understand the conduct of the Berlin cabinet; it is the same with all Europe. If he should at some time consult his heart, it would not be impossible to humiliate the cabinet of Prussia but reasons of state requires that the emperor remain the constant friend of

*French minister at Berlin.

Prussia. His political interests extend over central Europe, and not over northern Europe. It is ridiculous to think that the emperor would like to make war with Prussia in order that Bavaria shall have Bayreuth and the Duke of Cleves, Munster. France has never thought of anything to cause disquietude in Prussia. On the contrary it has under all circumstances given assurances of its protection and of its desire to make close its relations with Prussia. Nevertheless Prussia has taken up arms without any excuse; its movement continues and even today when the cabinet might acknowledge that it was wrong and that it had no reason to believe that France desired anything against Prussia they continue on the same line. The emperor seeing his system for peace upset, his troops which had commenced to evacuate Germany are compelled to remain there, especially as mobilization of Prussia coincides with the non-ratification of the treaty with Russia and he has found himself in the necessity of having to prepare for a new war and to raise new troops. It is true that from different points of the interior of France, troops are in march and that the emperor is only waiting for your courier to start the reserve now at Paris and his Guard. We will therefore pass the winter together. Prussia will exhaust itself in maintaining on a war footing a useless army and the least movement which Russia or any other power may make or which may given rise to suspicions will cause the commencement of hostilities.

Explain these matters to M. de Haugwitz; explain to him that a mobilization which the emperor would consider as folly before the refusal of the emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty now becomes an offence. Ask him if it is true that Prussia gayly wishes war, that is its own ruin. M. de Haugwitz understands that it will be impossible for the emperor to recognize anything if it is not the integrity of the kindom of Prussia, and his disposition not to ask anything whatever from him; that it will be impossible for him to adhere to any arrangement or any confederation of the North if there will be any appearance of dictation by force; that as long as he remains in this attitude he will obtain nothing but that if on the contrary he disarms or announces that his mobilization has been the result of fears which have

been calmed by the assurances which I have given; if he makes such declarations sufficiently soon as to prevent troops which his majesty has placed in march, from passing the Rhine and especially His Majesty himself and the Guard drops, none of these troops will pass the Rhine; counter orders will be given to all offensive movements of France corresponding to the demobilization which will be ordered by Prussia, and gradually the French troops, as was the intention of his majesty, will evacuate Germany. They would already be near the Rhine if it had not been for the new condition of affairs. If he wishes war we remain armed; if he wishes peace we disarm.

You will make these communications with prudence, moderation and wisdom as the emperor strongly desires not to fire a gun against Prussia. He will regard such an event as a misfortune, as it will interfere with affairs already sufficiently complicated which prevents the evacuation of Germany with honor, and it is a fact that the emperor expected the army to be at Paris on October 15.

But above all be prudent, and of pleasant manners and reasoning so as to induce Prussia to demobilize, while being imperious and exacting if the Prussian troops should enter Saxony and force her to arm against me. You will inform M. de Haugwitz in advance and verbally that if this case should arise you have orders to demand your passports and from that moment war will be declared. You will advise by a special courier Marshal Berthier of such a fact in order that his troops may be prepared; and if in spite of all Prussia persists in occupying Saxony you will depart from Berlin.

NAPOLÉON.

NOTE FOR A LETTER TO M. BIGNON

CN—10767
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 12 September, 1806.

Write to my minister at Cassel that if the Elector mobilizes he must leave the country, in view of the fact that the former should not take part in the quarrel with Prus-

sia. If the Elector does not mobilize, he is to say nothing; but without delay he will inform M. de Weiss that if the Elector mobilizes he has orders to ask for his passports.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA

CN—10764
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 12 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR MY BROTHER:

I have received Your Majesty's letter. The assurance which he gives me of his sentiments are the more agreeable to me, as everything that has passed during the last fifteen days has given me reason for doubt. If I am obliged to take arms to defend myself, it will be with the greatest regret if I employ them against Your Majesty's troops. I should consider this war as a civil war, so much are our interests bound together. I wish nothing from her; I have not asked for anything. Every time that the enemies on the Continent have spread false rumors I have given the most positive assurance of my intention to persist in our alliance, that is to say, if you have not too lightly given confidence to the parties in your court which have so promptly and warmly seconded the designs of our common enemies. I have such an opinion of your justice that I have recourse to it, to know who is wrong in this case, Prussia or France. All the information which has been given to you is false. This alone should convince you that I am without reproach. If Your Majesty had told me that the troops which I have in Westphalia gave you some disquietude I would have retired them in order to please you. I am frankly either a friend or an enemy. Those of your ministers which have had charge of your affairs and which I have met can testify to you on this. I am attracted to Your Majesty not only by heart but also by reason. At the same time I am taking measures to prepare myself to meet his troops who are threatening to attack my army in Germany. I am doing this because I will be culpable towards my own people if I do not take preparatory measures against the formidable

preparations which you are making: preparations which have advanced so far that the troops at the capital left even after the letter which you wrote me. I must say to Your Majesty that this war will never be made by an act of mine because I would consider myself a criminal in such a case. It is for this reason that I appeal to a sovereign who is making a fantastic war which is not justified by the policies of his States. I remain firm in my terms of alliance with you. If in reply you advise me that you repulse these, that you wish to place confidence only in the force of your army I would be obliged to accept the war that you have declared; but I will remain the same in the midst of battle, after victories, if the justice of my cause enables me to accomplish this. I ask for peace as I look on this war as a sacrilege because it can only cause the enemies to triumph and laugh at us. I hope Your Majesty may reply that he has countermanded his orders and I will countermand mine with the greatest pleasure; our enemies will be undeceived, and I dare say that my cold and impassive conduct in this circumstance will constitute for you and your ministers a guarantee of the confidence which you can place in my dispositions, which will never be swayed neither by intrigue nor by foreign instigations, nor by the passion of heated sentiments, but which will always be solely guided by sane policy in the interest of my people.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BESSIÈRES

CN—10768

(furnished by the Duke of Istria)

Saint-Cloud, 12 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Have assembled all the horses of my Guard now in the country; complete the harness so as to be able to have 1200 harnessed horses. Have horseshoes made not only for the present needs of all the cavalry, but also so as to be able to have a good reserve. Have the bakeries assembled with all the personnel necessary to place them in march. My idea is that the Guard should have at least twenty-four

caissons for subsistence alone. If each regiment of cavalry and of infantry needs caissons for baggage, let me know the number which will be necessary. Issue orders to the engineer officer to be ready to leave with the Guard. See the Minister and General Marescot and procure 2000 good tools which will be loaded on six large caissons which will follow the Guard. Send me a situation report informing me of what can be forwarded from here within four or five days. Make arrangements to have the arms retempered as necessary, that uniforms are repaired and that equipment be completed for the cavalry as well as for the infantry and finally do everything necessary to put everything in perfect order to leave. Advise me of the number of tools carried on each caisson of the Guard and on ambulances. It appears to me that these ambulances are an excellent idea; there should be twenty instead of ten. If the Guard remains in reserve there will be many wounded; if it is not so used, these ambulances will serve the army. The experience of the last campaign will indicate to you what is necessary in the way of bakeries. The Guard will have 8,000 men. I will probably add to the Guard 8,000 troops of the line which will make 16,000. It will be necessary to have double the number of bakeries. The ordnance might have several field bakeries. A good bakery can make bread for 3000 men. Thus with four bakeries there can be supplied a complete ration for the Guard and a half ration for 16,000 men. You should remember that the Guard is often obliged to leave its bakeries in rear and to send the bread forward.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES*

CN—10771

(War Department Files)

Saint-Cloud, 12 September, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have to advise you that Russia did not ratify the treaty. Prussia is mobilizing in a ridiculous manner; nevertheless she will soon demobilize or pay dearly. Nothing is more uncertain than this cabinet. The court of Vienna

*Napoleon's brother, Joseph.—C.H.L.

makes great protestations which its extreme impotence makes understandable. Whatever may happen, I will be able to meet all. The conscription which I have just started is proceeding on all sides; I am calling up my reserve; I am provided with anything and want nothing. War or peace, I will not decrease your army. It is possible that within a few days I will assume personal command of my Grand Army. I have nearly 150,000 men and with these I can capture Vienna, Berlin and Saint Petersburg. There will be a formidable army in the north of Italy. Keep all these matters secret, it is useless that they become public; it is best that they be learned of by victory.

* * * * *

Do not be disturbed in any way by political matters; proceed as if nothing were going on. If I must actually strike once more, my preparations have been well taken and are so sure that Europe will not learn of my departure from Paris except by the complete ruination of my enemies. It is advisable that your newspapers describe me as occupied at Paris with social matters, hunts and negotiations. If they speak of the mobilizations of Prussia, let them state that this is by arrangement with me; finally, M. de Humboldt is to receive orders to proceed to you as Minister from Prussia. I will not lay down arms until you have Naples and Sicily.

* * * * *

NAPOLEON.

TO M. DE TALLEYRAND*

CN—10772
(from Foreign Department Files)

Saint-Cloud, 13 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR, THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO:

Bring me tomorrow a draft of the circular to be sent to the Kings of Bavaria and of Wurtemberg and to the other

*French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prince of Benevento.—*C.H.L.*

Princes of the Confederation to apprise them of the conditions of affairs. You will bring up the question of the independence of Saxony. I think that you ought to send for the Minister from Saxony and ask him if he has not something to tell you.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10773
(War Department Files)

Saint-Cloud, 13 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I have sent orders to my minister at Berlin to leave at once if Prussia invades Saxony. At the first moment that you hear of this, move your headquarters and the Corps of Marshals Ney, Augereau and Davout, and the division of Dupont towards Wurtzbourg which will be the assembly place for the army. Bavaria will furnish 6,000 men to reenforce Marshal Bernadotte's Corps. Hesse-Darmstadt will furnish 4,000 men to reenforce Marshal Augereau. You will advise, without delay, the allied courts that in view of the fact that Prussia has invaded Saxony I have given orders to my ministers to leave as we have guaranteed the independence of Saxony. You will designate as an assembly point for the troops from Wurtemberg and from Baden the vicinity of Noerdlingen on the Wurtzbourg road. Write to Rapp at Strasbourg to advise me by telegraph and one hour afterwards I will leave for Wurtzbourg. You will arrange matters so that I will find at Mayence your situation reports. In the meantime all letters from Prussia are amicable and I do not believe that they will invade Saxony, but my resolution is fixed not to any more allow the invasion of Saxony than to allow the invasion of Bavaria. Do not forget to advise the Grand Duke of Berg to proceed in person to Wurtzbourg, notifying the Commandant at Wesel to advise the King of Holland in order that Wesel may be provided with stores and placed in a state of defense. In case M. Laforest should leave Berlin, Bavaria must take measures to arm and supply the Chateaus of Kufstein and Pas-

sau and to assemble their troops, except one division of 6,000 men, in front of Munich in such manner as to be able to advance to the assistance of Marshal Soult but without too much alarming Austria which desires to remain neutral if war breaks out. There is no objection in advising the generals who command the corps of Marshals Ney and Davout to be ready to leave at any moment. Have also all the cavalry without any exception march; there will then remain on the line of the Inn only the corps of Marshal Soult and 20,000 Bavarians. The corps from Wurtemberg and Baden will be near Nordlingen. All the rest of my army will be united between Wurtzbourg and Bamberg. The same day that you learn that M. la Forest has left Berlin, Marshal Bernadotte is to enter Bayreuth.

When I speak of the invasion of Saxony, I do not mean the invasion of a few cantons but the invasion of a province; you will learn about this from the departure of La Forest and Durand.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10774
(War Department Files)

Saint-Cloud, 13 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

When I ordered you to move my troops away from Nurnburg circumstances were different. Today on the contrary, it appears necessary to assemble many troops near this city which, being rich, is in a position to stand the expense. Until good sense returns to Prussia and she has demobilized, it is well to be in force at that place. It is quite possible that I may soon give orders to Marshal Ney to move up closer to Wurtzbourg.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2532
Imperial Files

11 September, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

Everything in this country points to war; nothing can reassure the inhabitants. News from commercial sources announce the march of a Russian army of 100,000 men for Saxony, and there is a rumor that the King of Prussia has given orders to his merchants who have funds in France to withdraw these. That which has most caused the rumors of war, is that Lauenburg has been seized by the Swedes in the name of the King of England, and the continuous movements of the Prussian army. I am doing everything possible to reassure the alarmed people; I have told them that very certainly your Majesty would not have left me a few leagues from the Prussian outpost after the departure of the 21st Infantry, if there was the least possibility of a rupture. I feel myself very reassured as I note that your Majesty is at Paris with his Guard.

MURAT.

NOTE:—This message appears to have been received by Napoleon about September 15th.—C.H.L.

General Marescot submitted a report on the state of defense of Wesel, to the effect that with some engineer materiel and some repairs this place, if provided with munitions and subsistence, was in condition to sustain a siege. On this report, Napoleon made the following:

DECISION

CN—10785
(War Department Files)

Saint-Cloud, 15 September, 1806.

It appears from this report that some engineer material is needed. It is necessary to know what there is on hand, what is required, and what is lacking. It is with wood that places are defended and repairs made. Prussia should have much of this material at Wesel. Lippe should have much and it can also be obtained from Holland. If within three leagues of Wesel on both sides of the river one can find woods

about the place, these alone should suffice. In addition some articles can be obtained from the upper Rhine which may be needed. Finally, issue orders to the engineers to do whatever is necessary on the supposition that this place is to sustain a siege from the end of October.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10786
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 15 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 9th. I wrote you the day before yesterday in detail that M. de Laforest was to leave Berlin if Saxony was invaded by Prussia, and that in such a case he was ordered to advise you of it. As soon as M. De Laforest shall have left Berlin, you will take care to place in march the corps of Marshals Ney, Devout and Augereau towards Bamberg; 4000 men from the Hesse—Darmstadt troops will reenforce Augereau's Corps, and 6000 Bavarians Marshal Bernadotte's Corps. 24,000 other Bavarians will assemble before Munich less those necessary to garrison the fort of Kufstein and the entrances from the Tyrol. The Wurtembergers and the Badeniers will assemble near Noerdlingen. The four divisions of dragoons and the divisions of heavy cavalry will march toward Bamberg and Wurtzbourg. Let me know by courier when all this can be carried out at the designated points; but do not make any movements until Laforest shall have left Berlin.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10787
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 15 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have received your letter of September 10th. I wish you would send me in detail the returns of troops that will leave each corps in order to organize third battalions and

fourth squadrons. You will forget that several regiments of cavalry and infantry already have many men at their depots. I presume that these will comprise all the officers and non-commissioned officers on hand, that is to say in other words that every regiment of infantry and cavalry will have retained officers and non-commissioned officers for the two first battalions and three squadrons. If this is incorrect and they have sent away more they must be directed to return. As I have already said, there should be with the army the colonel (1 major should be in France), the Major if the Colonel is absent, the two squadron commanders in the cavalry, and six captains, in a word all the officers and non-commissioned officers necessary for six companies or three squadrons; and the same for the infantry.

I have read the returns of the Bavarian army. Organize a division of 6,000 Bavarians which can be assembled at Ingolstadt ready to act under the orders of Marshal Bernadotte. It would seem that four line regiments, two battalions of light infantry, three regiments of cavalry, with fifteen and sixteen guns would make a good division of 6000 men. Let the King assemble a similar division at Munich, ready to send anywhere as circumstances require; and that the remainder be stationed so as to guard the entrances of the Tyrol and form garrisons for Kufstein and Passau.

I have started a grand movement in the cavalry. Horses are being purchased on all sides, and the depots which were entirely empty are being refilled. This morning 1000 horses left for my Guard.

Each time that you forward returns of the Grand Army, add on returns of the Bavarian Army for the two divisions assembling in the vicinity of Ingolstadt and Munich and the detachments of troops directed towards Tyrol. Show names of Generals and Colonels. It is necessary that I familiarize myself with this army. If in the last campaign I had been well informed as to the forces, the affair of Iglau would not have occurred.

Here is how I desire the Bavarian divisions to be organized:

Division for Marshal Berthier's Corps:

4 regiments of infantry of the line which I suppose are present under arms-----	4500 men.
2 battalions of light infantry-----	1000 men.
3 regiments of light cavalry-----	1200 men.
Artillery -----	500 men.
Total about -----	7000 men.

Division intended to be stationed between the Iser and the Inn:

5 regiments of infantry of the line which I suppose are present under arms -----	6000 men.
2 battalions of light infantry -----	1000 men.
3 regiments of cavalry -----	1200 men.

Total about 9,000 to 10,000 men including artillery.

This division can be increased by all the recruits and means of Bavaria.

Troops stationed in the Tyrol:

- 1 regiment of infantry.
- 2 battalions of light infantry about 1200 men.
- At Passau, one regiment of infantry, etc.

All together this will make about 20,000 men, and including troops at depots about 25,000 men. If there are more men than this, so much the better. I wish to have a detailed return as to the condition of these divisions.

NAPOLÉON.

You have given orders for the 21st Light Infantry to leave very late, as I had already given orders as to this to Minister Dejean, I hoped that they would leave early.

* * * * *

TO PRINCE EUGENE

CN—10789
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 15 September, 1806.

DEAR SON:

Prussia continues to arm. I hope that it will disarm quickly or it will soon repent. I am on good terms with Austria which advises me of its desire to maintain pleas-

ant relations. Under the circumstances it is necessary that Palmanova shall be well provisioned and that there shall be in Istria forces sufficient to prevent the enemy from seizing it, so that I will be able to retire promptly to Palmanova. If Osoppo is in condition to be provisioned, take measures to do this. In the meantime do not make any movements. These dispositions are only precautions, as nothing is more pacific than the language of the Austrian court. Issue orders to the three cuirassier regiments which are in Italy to prepare to depart. Each of these regiments will be organized with three squadrons of 160 men each, and will leave their 4th Squadrons at their depots in Italy. You will issue orders that each regiment will have their field forge and horseshoes for thirty days' march, my intention being, if affairs get worse, to have them march to Germany via Inspruck. Advise me if in case of necessity, Venice can be defended in its present condition by adding thereto the depots of the armies of Naples, Dalmatia, Istria and Frioul and if there are sufficient commissary stores. I say again, I have nothing to fear from Austria. These precautions are undoubtedly not necessary, but it is well to provide for everything.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—641

Saint-Cloud, 15 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean: order General Dupas to report at Mayence to take command of the 14th regiment of the line and the 28th Light Infantry which are under orders to report at that place. Other regiments will report there without delay to complete this division. Order Brigadier-General Schramm also to report at Mayence to serve under General Dupas.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF BATTLE, FRENCH ARMY

B—69

September 16, 1806.

G H Q: at Munich.

1st ARMY CORPS—Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo—
PC at Anspach.

1st Division—General Rivaud—PC at Anspach.

8th Infantry	-----at-----	Heilbronn
45th Infantry	-----at-----	Anspach
54th Infantry	-----at-----	Schwarzenburg

2d Division—General Dreiat—PC at Furth.

27th Infantry	-----at-----	Nurnberg
94th Infantry	-----at-----	Furth
95th Infantry	-----at-----	Schwabach

Light Cavalry Brigade—General Wathier—PC at Seehof.

2d Hussars	-----at-----	Schesslitz
4th Hussars	-----at-----	Lichfeld
5th Hussars	-----at-----	Schesslitz
5th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Hochstadt

1st Heavy Cavalry Division—General Nansouty—PC at Kitzingen.

1st Carbineers	-----at-----	Ochsenfurt
2d Carbineers	-----at-----	Marckbreit
2d Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Kitzingen
3d Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Gerotzhofen
9th Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Wolkach
12th Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Gorchsheim

4th Dragoon Division—General Sahuc—PC at Eltingen.

15th Dragoons	-----at-----	Allesberg
17th Dragoons	-----at-----	Hilpolstein
18th Dragoons	-----at-----	Gunzenhausen
19th Dragoons	-----at-----	Greding
25th Dragoons	-----at-----	Ohrenbau
27th Dragoons	-----at-----	Heydeck

IIId ARMY CORPS—Marshal Davout—PC at Oeltingen.

1st Division—General Morand—PC at Nordlingen.

13th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Rolingen
17th Infantry	-----at-----	Dischingen
30th Infantry	-----at-----	Heidenheim
51th Infantry	-----at-----	Nordlingen
61st Infantry	-----at-----	Wallerstein

2d Division—General Friand—PC at Hall.

33d Infantry	-----at-----	Gaildorf
48th Infantry	-----at-----	Winnenden
108th Infantry	-----at-----	Obersentheim
111th Infantry	-----at-----	Schmidelfeld

3d Division—General Gudin—PC at Ochringen.

12th Infantry	-----at-----	Knittlingen
21st Infantry	-----at-----	Benigheim
25th Infantry	-----at-----	Wimpfen
85th Infantry	-----at-----	Gaagsthausen

Light Cavalry Division—General Viallannes—PC at Mergentheim.

1st Chasseurs	-----at-----	Calw
2d Chasseurs	-----at-----	Weikersheim
7th Hussars	-----at-----	Masbach
12th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Krantheim

IVth ARMY CORPS—Marshal Soult—PC at Passau.

1st Division—General Saint-Hilaire—PC at Braunau.

10th Infantry	-----at-----	Berghausen
36th Infantry	-----at-----	Wart
43d Infantry	-----at-----	Thamm
55th Infantry	-----at-----	Chostran

2d Division—General Lewal—PC at Landshut.

24th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Wasserburg
4th Infantry	-----at-----	Voluzach
28th Infantry	-----at-----	Geissenhausen
46th Infantry	-----at-----	Au
57th Infantry	-----at-----	Aibach

3d Division—General Legrand—PC at Passau.

26th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Obernzell
Light Riflemen	-----at-----	Passau
Italian Riflemen	-----at-----	Waldkirchen
3d Infantry	-----at-----	Passau
18th Infantry	-----at-----	Nidraltar
75th Infantry	-----at-----	Vilshofen

Light Cavalry Brigade—General Margaron—PC at Neuhaus.

8th Hussars	-----at-----	Pfarkirchen
11th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Zwigel
16th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Wasserburg
22d Chasseurs	-----at-----	Altdorf

2d Heavy Cavalry Division—General d'Hautpoul—PC at Cham.

1st Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Straubing
5th Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Furth
10th Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Neuburg
11th Cuirassiers	-----at-----	Dekendurf

3d Dragoon Division—General Beaumont—PC at Amberg.

5th Dragoons	-----at-----	Nadburg
9th Dragoons	-----at-----	Kemmeth
12th Dragoons	-----at-----	Neustadt
16th Dragoons	-----at-----	Soultzbach
21st Dragoons	-----at-----	Utzenhof

Vth ARMY CORPS—Marshal Lefebvre—PC at Dunkelspuhl.

1st Division—General Suchet—PC at Dunkelspuhl.

17th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Schwaning
34th Infantry	-----at-----	Rothemburg
40th Infantry	-----at-----	Feuchtwang
64th Infantry	-----at-----	Creilsheim
88th Infantry	-----at-----	

2d Division—General Gazan—PC at Schweinfurt.

100th Infantry	-----at-----	Eibelstadt
103d Infantry	-----at-----	Schweinfurt.
21st Light Infantry,	enroute from Dusseldorf	

Light Cavalry Brigade—General Treilliard—PC at Bischoffsheim.

9th Hussars	-----at-----	Landa
10th Hussars	-----at-----	Wertheim
13th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Hassfurt
21st Chasseurs	-----at-----	Neustadt

VIth ARMY CORPS—Marshal Ney—PC at Memmingen.

1st Division—General Dupont—PC at Cologne.

9th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Crevelt
32d Infantry	-----at-----	Cologne
96th Infantry	-----at-----	Neuss
1st Hussars	-----at-----	Coblentz

2d Division—General Marchand—PC at Memmingen.

6th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Mattsics
39th Infantry	-----at-----	Oberingen-Gunzberg
69th Infantry	-----at-----	Lentkirch
76th Infantry	-----at-----	Memmingen

3d Division—General Gardanne—PC at Altdorf.

25th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Schassenried
27th Infantry	-----at-----	Lindau
50th Infantry	-----at-----	Mosskirch
59th Infantry	-----at-----	Morsburg

Light Cavalry Brigade—General Colbert—PC at Althausen.

3d Hussars	-----at-----	Waldsee
10th Chasseurs	-----at-----	Hirbelle

2d Dragoon Division—General Grouchy—PC at Fryburg.

3d Dragoons	-----at-----	Donaueschingen
6th Dragoons	-----at-----	Doningen
10th Dragoons	-----at-----	Bittersheim
11th Dragoons	-----at-----	Fryburg
13th Dragoons	-----at-----	Emendingen
22d Dragoons	-----at-----	Merdingen

VIIth ARMY CORPS—Marshal Augereau—PC at Francfort.

1st Division—General Desjardins—PC at Friedberg.

16th Infantry	-----at-----	Guedran
44th Infantry	-----at-----	Homburg
105th Infantry	-----at-----	Aschaffenburg

2d Division—General Heudelet—PC at Dietz.

7th Light Infantry	-----at-----	Ober-Hadamar
24th Infantry	-----at-----	Kamberg
63d Infantry	-----at-----	Francfort

Light Cavalry Brigade—General Durosnel—PC at Francfort.

1st Division Dragoons—General Klein—PC at Siegen.

1st Dragoons	-----at-----	Attendorn
2d Dragoons	-----at-----	Altenkirchen
14th Dragoons	-----at-----	Dillenburg
20th Dragoons	-----at-----	Schwarzenraben
26th Dragoons	-----at-----	Riedenkopf

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10797
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 16 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have just seen Marshal Davout who has informed me as to the good condition in his army corps. I believe I have already asked you for information as to whether each corps has its ambulances. I wish a prompt reply on this. Each regiment should have its own ambulance. Each division should have its own and each army corps should have one. Each division of an army corps should have four or five hundred pioneer tools, besides 1500 for each army corps. Do not lose a moment in attending to such an important matter. Without tools it is impossible to intrench nor to construct any works, a condition which might have most undesirable and even terrible consequences. I presume that you have a general officer commanding the engineers; if he is only a colonel, it is indispensable that he should be an officer who commands and who corresponds with other engineer officers. A third item which requires your attention is as to pots and pans; order each corps to purchase the necessary number.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10800
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

If Prussia declares war against us, Mayence would seem to be the pivot for movement against this power; via the Main, one can arrive at Wurtzbourg in a few days. I wish that the commissary shall obtain with the least possible delay 15,000 quintals of flour in order that if necessary they may be rapidly sent to Wurtzbourg.

However, it is necessary that this be without extra cost, that is to say, that 15,000 quintals shall be part of the ordinary rations. This quantity I figure is necessary for 150,000 men for 10 days. A commissary need not take too much trouble to procure this. If the army returns, a large part will return via Mayence and this flour will be useful to it. If on the contrary the army enters into war, and necessity requires it, this flour can be paid for and then sent to Wurtzbourg. Send me a report as to the best manner to accomplish this object.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10801
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

3,600 metric quintals of wheat are not sufficient for Wesel; double this, that is, make it 7,200. Of this quantity one half will be always available in case of siege and the other half will be available for troops passing through and for any period preceding a siege. The commissary will provide for obtaining this flour in such a manner that it will not cost anything for there will always be plenty of troops at Wesel and vicinity. Take steps to see that there shall be at Maestricht, Juliers et Venloo commissary stores sufficient to supply a garrison for some time. Direct the commissary to send to Wesel, rice and vegetables in quantity corresponding to other commissary stores, as well as brandy.

Send to Wesel the 102,000 rations of hard bread, which are at Wissembourg and Hagenau, to be part of the commissary depot.

Make certain that there are mills at Wesel and if they can be used; and in case the mills are not independent of the enemy, give orders that there should always be a large quantity of flour in the depots.

NAPOLEON,

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10803
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am sending you the outline of an order which I have drawn up for remounting the cavalry. As all the regiments have received 20,000 francs at Strasbourg for their forage, on their return to France, you will order them to take 10,000 francs from these funds to buy horses. This sum will be reimbursed for the purchase of forage when the finance officer or Minister Dejean arrives and he will repay them these 10,000 francs. I have prepared a decree which will place 1,000,000 at your disposition. The order will not be received by the finance officer for several days; but this will not prevent you from attending to the matter and of disposing of such sums as may be necessary for urgent and pressing services. See to it that each corps has its ambulances and obtains its pots and pans. You will retain out of this million francs what will be necessary for your secret expenses.

Take measures to ascertain the names of the regiments which compose the camps at Magdeburg, Hameln and Breslau, and all movements of the Prussians.

I believe that it will be necessary to manufacture hard bread at Bamberg and Wurtzburg. However, I wish that this should be done without ostentation so as not to draw attention to the idea which I have in mind if the enemy forces me on.

I presume that Braunau is in good condition. I presume that each of the cavalry regiments have their field

forges and their horseshoes, and that all troops have their overcoats. You may dispose out of the million francs for necessary funds to manufacture overcoats in accordance with the arrangements made with Minister Dejean who will distribute this money to the clothing manufacturers.

Use if necessary 250,000 francs for commissaries and assemble plenty of flour at Bamberg and Wurtzbourg. You may arrange with M. de Montgelas as to the method of purchasing these things and of sending them in a most secret possible manner to the different points. But it is necessary that this should be attended to very promptly.

Issue orders to the chief pay-master and to the park which is not at Augsburg to be ready to march at any moment. Provide a commander for the engineers who will correspond with the engineer officers of the different army corps. Whether this officer will be a general or colonel is of little importance. He should have attached young engineer officers who can be sent out on missions. See that each army corps has the quantity of tools which I have prescribed. Mayence is to be the supporting point for all the movements of the army. Let me know how many days are required for boats to go from Mayence to Wurtzbourg. Notify the engineer officers that it is my intention in the approaching campaign to do a lot of field fortification work, and that it will be necessary to have plenty of tools.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10804
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I note on the returns of the Grand Army that you have only five aides; I think it will be necessary that you add on three lieutenants, young, active men who can be used to carry orders. I note that you have only five captains attached to the General Staff; there should be three times this number. I also note that General Andreossy has only one aide; he should have two more. It seems to me that there are too few engineer officers with the General Staff;

there should be twice as many as I note are present, especially there should be plenty of first and second lieutenants. I note that the corps of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo has no Adjutant Generals; and that the Chief of the General Staff has only one aide; he should have the three which he is supposed to have. The General commanding Rivaud's division has only one aide; General Maison one, General Werle one; General Van-Marisy, one; General Nansouty, one; Generals Lahoussaye and Saint-Germain one; General Sahuc one: this is not enough. In Marshal Davout's Corps, General Daultanne has only one aide; General Morand's division has only two; he is short one; General Brouard has only one of them; General Kister has none at all; the general of Dufour's brigade has only one; General Merle one; General Saint-Hilaire two; Generals Ferey and Raymond-Vivies, each one; Generals Ledru and Dufour have not a sufficient number; General Milhaud has only one; the general of Beaumont's division, one; General Lasalle one; the general of Dupont's division one; General Conroux one; the general of Beker's division has only two aides; General Maillard hasn't any. I note that Gazan's division has only one adjutant; it should have two. Issue orders to all these Generals to complete the number of aides which they should have according to Tables of Organization but not to detail any officers from the Grand Army but to take them from among those attached to divisions in the interior or from cavalry or infantry officers at the depots in France.

The general of Legendre's brigade may be sent to Dupont's division; you will give him orders to be ready to rejoin this division as soon as they come in proximity to each other.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—647

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, I am informed from Strasbourg that, since the last inspection by General Schauenburg, there have been at the depots a large number of cripples from

the Grand Army, who have been reviewed, and others, arrived since; this renders it necessary to hold another review. There is no regiment from which might not be removed one hundred individuals who are an incumbrance and an expense without being of the least use.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—648

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, order Major-General Loison to report at the 25th Military Division, of which he will take command. Let him reside at Wesel and correspond with you in order to take measures for the armament and ordering of that place. Charge him to do in the 25th Military Division that which General Rapp is under orders to do in the 5th, and to render to you an account of it.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—650

Saint-Cloud, 17 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, inform me how many days are required for boats to pass from Mayence to Wurtzbourg.

NAPOLEON.

MARSHAL BERTHIER TO NAPOLEON

B—56

17 September, 1806.

(Received about 21st September)

[EXTRACT]

Information has been received by the King of Bavaria from Dresden dated on the afternoon of September 9th, that the Prussian Army intended to remain on the Elbe, is

advancing towards Hof in the Baireuth country; and that Prince Louis-Ferdinand who has been designated commander of the advance guard has left for those countries.

What is certain Sir, is that all Germany is on the point of war.

I am waiting from moment to moment for news from you and for your arrival; as I believe that if the negotiations which are carried on at Paris do not make certain to you what are the real intentions of Prussia, there is no time for your Majesty to lose in ordering dispositions in accordance with the plan of war and of operations which will be adopted.

Your Majesty will recollect that you have directed me to do nothing, that is to say, not to move any of the Corps of the Marshals without further orders. I will exactly obey your Majesty's orders, but will keep everything in readiness for action.

Neither Wurtzbourg nor the little fortress of Koenigshofen are armed.

* * * * *

TO PRINCE EUGENE*

CN—10809
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 18 September, 1806.

DEAR SON:

Prussia is constantly continuing its mobilization and it is not impossible that there will be a rupture between the two powers in October. Up to now nothing has been decided. However, preparation is being made with considerable activity. Austria insists upon its neutrality and we can believe in view of the actual situation of its internal affairs, that she will wait on the result of events before coming to a decision. While there is yet time to give your instructions, I believe it best to advise you in advance of the mission which you will have to follow in order that you may be prepared for it.

*Viceroy of Italy.—C.H.L.

You will be commander-in-chief of my army in Italy which will be only an army of observation in view of the fact that I am on good terms with Austria; but it is nevertheless necessary to keep good guard and to act with great prudence. You will have under your orders the corps of Frioul consisting of 15,000 infantry with thirty pieces of light artillery. To provide this number General Seras with the 13th Infantry will proceed to the Frioul while there is time so that none of my troops will remain in Istria except the governor in command, the battalion of Istria, and one company of Italian Artillery. In order to conceal this movement my idea is to first order General Seras to join the division in the Frioul taking with him one battalion of the 13th Infantry and leaving a general of brigade to command after his departure.

The hospitals in Istria will be very quietly and without disturbance evacuated on Italy. Two 4-pounders will be left with the battalion of the 13th Infantry in Istria, the remainder of the light artillery will join Seras's division. Guns and magazines should be gradually evacuated on Palmanova; you should leave in Istria only the coast artillery, three companies of artillery to defend the coast and serve the batteries, but no rifle depot. Eight days after the 1st battalion of the 13th Infantry and General Seras have arrived in the Frioul you will direct the remainder of the 13th Infantry to join them, leaving in Istria only one company of this regiment. In this manner they will be gradually accustomed to see none of our troops in Istria. But if the departure of troops attracts too much attention, you may send there another battalion withdrawing it later. That will have the advantage of giving doubt as to my plans and my people in Istria will not believe themselves altogether abandoned. All artillery not needed for the defense of Palmanova and Osoppo should be evacuated to Venice, and there should be nothing between the Isonzo and the Adige which might interfere with the movement of the army or fall into possession of the enemy, if the enemy should in the course of several months ever penetrate into this country. All the magazines necessary for the defense of Palmanova should be assembled in that place.

I have learned with surprise that the 1,000,000 rations of hard bread which we had sent to this place had been distributed in neighboring villages; this has no sense. There are churches and national buildings; it may be necessary to billet the inhabitants elsewhere and dispose of their houses to shelter the magazines. Everything should be organized gradually and without attracting attention which is necessary for the defense of this place. Artillery and engineer officers, a commandant, adjutants, a colonel second in command, should be stationed there. The garrison should consist of 500 cannoneers, half French and half Italian and of 1500 men of the 3d battalions of the Frioul corps which you will organize while there is yet time. The eight depots of the armies of Dalmatia, those of the Frioul army and those of the Naples army in all twenty-eight depots will have before the end of October more than 16,000 men present under arms and a little later more than 20,000 men will be present. Should it be necessary after having reinforced the war battalions to their full complement the remainder at the depots will furnish garrisons for Palmanova, Venice, Osoppo, Mantua, Peschiera and Legnago. But these dispositions of war measures should be made when war is declared and when you are certainly threatened with invasion. For these reasons you will understand the importance of maintaining a scrupulous surveyance in the organization of the depots, on replacement of officers, on the appointment of sergeants and corporals, on clothing and arming conscripts, and in returning all men not fit for marching or for service.

The defense of Venice may be entrusted to General Miollis who with the assistance of the navy and 6000 or 7000 men from the depots ought to make a long and brilliant defense until such time as the general operations disengage it.

Mantua where you will also station 6000 or 7000 men from the depots should be promptly provisioned. All your Frioul corps should be available for this. The 106th Infantry, the 30th Light Infantry, the seven regiments which I have in Piedmont, will form for you three new divisions which will bring your army corps up to 36,000 infantry; which with the light cavalry, cuirassiers and the cavalry

depots of the Naples army will form for you an army of nearly 40,000 men—an imposing force, which considering the final operations of Germany should contain the enemy. In any case you should be able to maneuver between Venice, Palmanova, Osoppo, Mantua, Legnago, Peschiera, without being obliged to weaken yourself to assist these places since they will have been armed and provisioned in advance. If political events become very serious it is probable that you will be reenforced by the Naples Army in which will be a reinforcement of 40,000 men. In the season which we are about to enter, all diseases will be cured.

It is desirable that you advise me of General Miollis's opinion on the possibility of defending Venice; and also General Chasseloup, as well as that of your aide-de-camp Sorbier, as to how to place this city in a state of defense with the least possible work; as my intention is that you will not seriously work on these fortifications until events have turned in a more pronounced way. If the opinions of these different officers is that 6000 or 7000 men can defend Venice for a long time you will quietly assemble there suitable commissary stores, especially wheat and flour. I have never given orders that any of my forts should be disarmed; so I presume they are all armed including Venice. It is nevertheless essential that you arrange with General Sorbier to have all the artillery not needed for the defenses of these places, sent back to Pavia repassing the Adda. It is necessary that there shall not be left even at Verona but one field park for your entire army. In this manner you will leave nothing to the enemy, if circumstances should oblige you to retire in rear of Mincio, or the Adda.

As for Dalmatia, in such a case, General Marmont should leave a sufficient garrison at Ragusa, as I do not suppose at all that he has captured Cattaro. He will concentrate all his men near Zara to threaten the frontier of Croatia, to attack them even, to push detachments out and to oblige the enemy to remain in force opposite him. The provisions which he will take care to assemble in large quantities at Zara, with the munitions of every kind which he will concentrate there, and the forces which he will have, should put him in a position to assume the offensive

or to assist in the defensive on the Isonzo and to oblige the enemy to keep a corps of observation there. At the worst, Zara will enable him to defend himself for many months while awaiting the general solution of conditions.

I will take care to and I will have the time to write to you if anything decisive comes up. At the same time I desire to give you these general instructions which will serve you as a guide. From now on, you can quietly and without impropriety concern yourself with provisioning your forts, arming them and providing for the defense of the country beyond the Adda. It is necessary to take from the finances of the Kingdom of Italy all that can not be taken from the monthly funds, and under different pretexts you will secure the funds for provisions; the remainder will soon be obtained.

Independent of the returns which you will send me on your army, I wish you would send me a return showing the number of guns in forts, the principal commissary items on hand at each place, together with the names of the generals in command of the forts, and the adjutants, the artillery and engineer officers to be assigned to the defense of these places. As I know the least about Venice, I wish you to add a general plan to this return which will show the different works in their condition.

It is necessary at this time not to change our disposition with Austria, nor to provoke her in any manner, nor to give her any alarm. This instruction is entirely hypothetical and based on supposition as to future events which may not occur. It is therefore necessary that no one should know that you have received these instructions, even your assistants which you will need to carry out the measures indicated; but undertake your task gradually in such a manner that Palmanova and Osoppo shall be in condition for defense, provisioned and ready to sustain a siege by the end of October and the other places one month later. See that your executive corresponds continually with the chief of the different services and that your aides de camp work without cessation with their inspections but without letting them know the object at which you are driving; for operations once commenced, if this condition arises, it is neces-

sary that there should be nothing evacuated, that nothing should give alarm, and that everything should be in place where it ought to be.

As to General Marmont, it is necessary to write him simply that in view of the fact that there is war with Russia, that if he has not captured Cattaro, there will no longer be time to do so as the enemy there will have been reinforced and provisioned; that considerable mobilization will take place in Russia and that it is not impossible that war may break out with this power; that Austria announces its neutrality and its firm intention of doing nothing towards mobilization; that nevertheless in view of the distance at which he is, he must act according to circumstances; that Zara should be his point of support and that he should proceed for its defence as a detached force and reuniting all his troops on the front of Austria, menace them constantly and oblige them to keep an army corps in front of it; that in case he is attacked by superior forces, he should retire on Zara; that his munitions and commissaries should be concentrated in this place; that he should construct an entrenched camp at this place, so as to be able to await there the result of the operations; and if Austria should not divide its forces, he should menace it in Croatia by making a powerful diversion. It is necessary that you send him a cipher very difficult to discover, which he can use when he corresponds with Lauriston who will be in command in Ragusa with a considerable garrison. By means of this cipher he will communicate with Lauriston by sea and by land. You will understand the importance of having a good cipher which you can confide to Mejan; it is even necessary that you try it out in times of peace so as to see that you can understand one another well. If war breaks out it is desirable that General Marmont organize postal services which starting at Venice, and thence going to Rimini and on to the Romagna will carry and receive news, especially as to whether Ancona is blockaded. General Vignolle may send returns in war times by cipher which will be of no inconvenience and will let me understand thoroughly the situation of affairs. Write to General Marmont that all this is only a general instruction for him alone which he will

carry out only in case war breaks out with Russia. Affairs should be thought out ahead of time; in order to arrive at success one must think of things several months in advance.

Read these instructions every day and report each day to yourself what remains to be done, but without attracting attention, without losing your head, and without anywhere causing alarm.

NAPOLEON.

MARSHAL BERNADOTTE TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

B—59

18 September, 1806.

The small place of Koenigshofen should have been occupied long ago by General Gazan, Vth Corps. I had arranged for this with Marshal Mortier on the occupation of the country of Wurtzbourg, March, 1806.

NOTE:—The foregoing note appears to be in reply to an inquiry made on this matter by Marshal Berthier, on September 16.—Ed.

* * * * *

TO THE KING OF NAPLES

CN—10810

(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 18 September, 1806.

I have issued an order as to the number of men which I will assign to the French regiments for your Guard. I can not give you more. Do not make your Guard too large. It is good politics not to give cause to the Imperial Guard for jealousy. One should look ahead to remedy obstacles which may one day become impertinent. Three thousand men! My Guard has no more. I am obliged to send for officers to replace those you have taken which may cause me considerable expense. My fifteen special gendarmes have not been well treated at Naples; you will send them to Milan. This is very important as they will write about

it to their comrades, and I will be blessed for giving proof of my esteem, and for having sent some men of my Guard to Naples.

* * * * *

The horizon in Europe is somewhat troubled. It is possible that I will soon be at war with the King of Prussia. I have already written to you about this. Occupy Calabria, Scilla and Reggio without attracting attention, without ostentation, and send to the rear all your sick; in such manner that if circumstances imperatively require it, all your troops may be concentrated without difficulty in front of Naples without being in any way delayed. You are the only one to know about this; it should be carried out in a natural way and in any case, it is in conformity to the principles of war and with wise military dispositions. The end of the boot is taken in flank; if the English mobilize in strength, it will be well for your sick to be sheltered in a town such as Naples or Capua; in my opinion Capua is the place to which to send all your sick. At the present time there is nothing else for you to undertake. Later it is possible that within eight or ten days everything will be arranged, for if they are not arranged, the Prussians may be so badly beaten in the first battles that everything will be over in a few days. In any case carry out literally everything that I tell you. If Capua is thought to be in a condition to sustain a siege, you may arm it as it will contain your hospitals and as it will be impossible to leave it exposed to pillage or to a raid. You may commence to send the artillery there as a central point for you. I repeat again that if this letter is read by anybody except you, you will mix up all your affairs. I am accustomed to look ahead three or four months as to what I ought to do and I calculate on the worst. You will therefore spoil everything in letting people know what I am writing to you about.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10811
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 18 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

The 1st Grenadiers of my Guard consisting of two battalions, 1000 men in all, will leave at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow and will be billeted at Claye. It will leave there at daybreak on the 20th for Meaux.

The 2d Grenadiers will leave Paris on the 20th at 6:00 A.M. billeting for the night at Meaux.

The Chasseurs of my Guard consisting of four battalions, 2000 men in all, will leave on the 20th and will be billeted for the night at Dammartin.

At Dammartin and at Meaux there will be 100 four-horse wagons, each holding ten men which will be ready at the Meaux Plaza at 10:00 A.M. on the 20th to transport the same day to La Ferté the 1000 men of the 1st Grenadiers of my Guard. On the same day there will be at Dammartin one hundred similar wagons which will be ready at 8:00 A.M. to transport the 1st Chasseurs of my Guard to Villers-Cotterets. There will be two routes, that for the Grenadiers via Metz and that for the Chasseurs via Luxembourg. On the first route there will be fourteen relays between Meaux and Worms, and on the second, thirteen relays between Dammartin and Bingen. The table attached will show you the organization of the relay and their location.

If any four-horse wagons are wanting, the 2-horse wagons will replace them.

You will require two commissaries to leave before 10:00 A.M. to arrange with the sub-prefect of Meaux to have the relay at Dammartin and Meaux ready on the 20th. That at Ferté-sous-Jouarre ready to follow them the 21st at 6:00 A.M.

As soon as the sub-prefect has made his dispositions, one of the commissaries will proceed to the sub-prefect at Soissons in order to organize the relay of Villers-Cotterets and Soissons. The other commissary will proceed to the sub-prefect at Epernay to organize the relays of Paroy, Epernay, Chalons and Sainte-Menehould.

The first one will then proceed to the prefect of Aisne to arrange for the relays at Laon, Neufchatel and Rethel. From there he will go to the sub-prefecture of Rethel to prepare for the relays at Rethel and Vouziers and so on.

As the time for the first relay is very short, I have directed Bessieres to write to the sub-prefect at Meaux, to the General Staff officer who will arrive there before 4:00 A.M. so that when the commissary arrives, the sub-prefect should have already made his arrangements.

Every horse will be paid for on the rate of five francs per day. Owner of horses will provide their own forage.

You will advise every sub-prefect that wagons will be paid for by the commanding officer of each regiment at the time the wagons arrive at their destination and on order from the sub-prefect which will have been given from the commander of the relays, in such manner that each sub-prefect will send you a receipt for payment.

My intention is that there will be assembled at Worms, enough boats to transport the grenadiers to Mayence by water as soon as they arrive.

You will authorize the commissaries to make the same arrangements at Bingen in accordance with circumstances as they find them.

These movements must be carried out in such a manner that all the regiments of grenadiers and foot chasseurs of my Guard shall have arrived at Mayence by the 28th at the latest.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10815
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

Circumstances every day become more urgent. My Guard has left by truck and will reach Mayence from Paris in six days. The troops at the camp of Meudon leave in the same manner. My intention is that upon receipt of this letter you will direct the 65th and 72d Infantry to leave for Wesel in time to arrive there by October 1st; and that you

will also direct one half of your own troops towards the same destination with all the artillery batteries, as and when you can make them ready to leave, and that you will organize your batteries with six pieces.

I will be at Mayence before October 1st; it is necessary that you shall be in person at Wesel by the 1st or 2d of October with the two above mentioned regiments, making nearly 5,000 men, all our cavalry and one half of your troops with twenty or thirty pieces of artillery; which all together will form a corps of eleven to twelve thousand men. You will billet these in the vicinity of Wesel. You will receive later orders as to the operations which you are to undertake.

You will keep the remaining division of your troops between Utrecht and Wesel in such manner that you can either call it up to your own command, or serve as an Advance Guard, or march to the seacoast, as circumstances require.

It is not my intention to attack from your side, I desire you to start the campaign and threaten the enemy; the obstacles of Wesel and the Rhine will in any case serve to protect you.

You will receive new instructions later.

Send me a return of the organization of your divisions and of your camp.

If you have hard bread in Holland send several hundred thousand rations to Wesel which is in need of provisions.

Even if you are not well organized, march nevertheless on Wesel where you will keep to the defensive before actually assuming the offensive. You have more than a month in which to make all your preparations.

But it is none the less very important that you be at Wesel in the first days of October.

Direct all your cavalry to march out so as to cover the duchy of Berg and the territories of the Confederation of this side.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10816
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have been dictating to Clarke for two hours this morning, drawing up orders for all the movements of the army but it seems that it will be nearly midnight before he will have his work finished. As among the large number of instructions which I have dictated to him, some relating to the fort of Braunau and the defense of the Inn, is finished, I do not wish to lose a moment in sending it to you. I have no need to tell you that absolute secrecy must cover these operations. The King of Bavaria will thus be protected by a corps of his own troops and by my position on the Inn. In addition, Austria will not move, at least until she sees what is going to happen. I wish you to say nothing of this to Andreossy but that he shall continue to remain at Vienna and continue to correspond with you and keep us advised of the situation.

I have sent direct to Marshal Ney the order for assembling his corps at Ulm, also as to the cavalry of the Dragoon Division of General Beker.

I have issued orders to Marshal Davout to assemble all his corps at Oettingen. These movements are the most urgent. You will issue orders to the Park which is at Augsburg, and to GHQ to be ready to march. Issue similar orders to all the corps of Marshal Soult. Everything is leaving here via truck and by special means.

The King of Holland commands the Army of the North. It will not be inadvisable to have appear in the German newspaper that the camp at Utrecht which has been hardly formed has disbanded; that the 16,000 Dutch troops of this camp reinforced by 15,000 auxiliary French troops and with 30,000 men joining from the depots of the interior will compose the Army of the North under the command of the King of Holland and which will be 80,000 men strong.

NAPOLEON.

Within 12 hours at the latest you will receive all the orders for changes of station.

(The following is an enclosure to the preceding)

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10817
(WD Files)

NOTE ON THE DEFENSE OF THE INN AND THE
OCCUPATION OF BRAUNAU

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

Marshal Soult will leave all of the 3d Infantry at Braunau under the orders of Major General Merle. The adjutant, Major Lomet, one colonel and six other officers of the engineers, one artillery colonel, 1 squad of pioneer troops, one company of sappers, four of five garrison artillery officers and two commissaries will also be left there together with one regiment of cavalry.

The citadel of Passau will be armed and provisioned; it will be guarded by a Bavarian Battalion.

The fortress of Kufstein will be armed and provisioned; it will also be occupied by a Bavarian Battalion.

The Bavarian Army Corps, 15,000 strong, will take position between the Inn and the Iser. Its advance posts will be intrenched at the chateau of Burghausen. It will keep patrols along the Bavarian frontier in such manner as to prevent the garrison of Braunau from being disturbed by small operations of Austrian Generals.

Marshal Soult will proceed personally to Braunau together with general officers of the engineers and artillery and the commissary designated by the Quartermaster General of the Army, in order to assure themselves as to the artillery ammunitions and the commissaries of every kind in Braunau. They will furnish everything that is lacking and the most express orders will be given that the garrison shall be daily furnished from Munich with supplies in order that its magazines may be kept intact against a blockade should one take place. The supply of Braunau must be established in such a manner as to absolutely carry on.

The Bavarian battalion detailed to occupy this place with the French garrison will be encamped on the left bank of the Inn at the bridgehead of Braunau on the Bavarian

side. They will construct a bridgehead and a strong redoubt, constructed in such a manner as to be protected by the fire of the fort, and which will be defended as long a time as possible, even in case the fort should be surrounded and the enemy appears on the left bank of the Inn.

Marshal Soult will arrange with General Merle as to a cipher, and this cipher will be sent to the Chief of Staff of the Grand Army.

Eight months' rations should be in Braunau.

General Merle will select a brigadier general in whom he has confidence, to be second in command and who will be useful for special cases.

It appears that General Merle will have under his orders:

3d Infantry	3000 men.
Artillery	400 men.
Sappers	100 men.
1 Bavarian Battalion, camped at the bridgehead ..	800 men.
1 Battery Bavarian Artillery	100 men.
Total	4400 men.

With such a large garrison of 4000 or 4500 men or more, having eight months' rations, abundantly provided with artillery, and having among its engineer officers only those selected and known to be desirous of distinguishing themselves, and having especially two or three months available to do everything that is advantageous for the fort, it should be possible to make the most brilliant resistance and in any case it should not surrender without having sustained several assaults on the main works.

See that plenty of wood is sent from the Tyrol; with wood, tools, workmen, a fort can be constructed where none existed before.

At Braunau there is the advantage of water obstacles, and advance works can be constructed with lines of counter-attack in such a manner as to prolong the defense of the place until it is relieved.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that Austria may have hostile views and we should act accordingly.

No one must be allowed to pass through the town, not even travelers. The governor must never be absent beyond cannon range; he must never take his meals outside the

town; and when he proceeds outside, the second in command must remain on the ramparts.

The funds for the payment of the garrison of Braunau should be provided for three months and the necessary money deposited with the finance officer. As to the works which the soldiers must construct, they will not be paid for this, and cannot be; it would be dishonorable to a soldier who ought to do work of this kind for honor's sake.

The best terms will be maintained with the Bavarians.

Signs will be posted at a cannon range from the fort marked "*Territory of Braunau.*" No foreign armed parties must pass them.

The governor will communicate frequently with my minister at Vienna and will take care that should the letters be intercepted they will not compromise any one. He will send each day a full report of what has occurred to Munich and to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

He will be especially advised that no officer of the garrison will hold communication with the Austrians; but remain on the best terms with them, but on guard.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10818
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

I have sent orders direct to the King of Holland for him to be at Wesel with his army corps on October 2d.

Marshal Augereau will assemble at Francfort October 2d, with cavalry posts and a small advance guard at Giessen.

Marshal Lefebvre will assemble at Koenigshofen on October 3d. This movement will be executed earlier if the enemy appears in force at Halle.

Marshal Davout will assemble at Bamberg with his entire corps not later than October 3d.

Marshal Soult will be assembled at Amberg (less 3d Infantry which remains in Braunau), and will be ready to march October 4th with his entire corps.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo will be assembled at Bamberg on October 2d. He will be thus assembled earlier if it appears that the Prussians are making hostile movements.

Marshal Ney will be assembled at Anspach October 2d. The six divisions of the Reserve Cavalry will be placed in march and will have arrived in position along the Main from Kronach as far as Wurtzbourg. On October 2d the chateau of Wurtzbourg will be seized, armed and provisioned. Koenigshofen and the chateau of Kronach will be prepared for defense.

The general park will proceed to Wurtzbourg, advance GHQ to Bamberg, heavy baggage to Wurtzbourg, all this by October 3d. All commandants of Swabia and Bavaria will be recalled except those of Augsburg and Ingolstadt and directed towards the new line of operations as far as Wurtzbourg and Bamberg.

The general now commanding in Souabe will be in command at Francfort. Another general will command all the country of Wurtzbourg.

The Military Police of the various army corps will be distributed in such a manner as to establish at one day's march in rear of each main road utilized, a detachment under a superior officer to arrest all stragglers and marauders and to prevent disorder.

Orders will be issued that the generals will have complete organization of aides and General Staff, but without detailing them from the Grand Army other than from depots.

The Chief of Staff will issue all the orders without delay and send me the itinerary of the route of each column. Each corps on arrival at the place of assembly should have four days' rations of bread. It is necessary to order that ten days' bread be prepared so that they will always be four days' supply of bread on hand when we desire to start a campaign.

The Baden troops will assemble at Mergentheim; Wurttemberg troops at Ellwangen. The Bavarian troops will take position which has already been prescribed between the Isar and the Inn, and will occupy the fortresses of Pas-

sau and Kufstein. One division of 6,000 men will be under the orders of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and will be assembled ready to march with the corps on October 2d. The Darmstadt troops consisting of 7,000 men will assemble under the orders of Marshal Augereau.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL FRIANT AT OETTINGEN

B—227

Paris, 19 September, 1806.

The army corps will assemble on the 26th or 27th instant between Wassertrudingen and Nordlingen.

The 1st Division, (General Morand) will be billeted at Oettingen and Wassertrudingen; the 2d and 3d between Oettingen and Nordlingen; the reserve park will be established at Nordlingen.

DAVOUT.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10819
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Issue orders to Marshal Augereau and to all my generals to openly prevent the mobilization of any horses for Prussia, but on the contrary to increase their own numbers as much as possible.

I received your letter of the 15th instant; I have just placed a million to your credit; with this pay the most pressing expenses. Distinguish clearly between the expenses of Minister Dejean and those of your own department; classify them according to the budget headings; you will have charged that which applies to administration separately from what applies to your department.

It has taken too long to assemble the pots and pans; buy them from the inhabitants, paying them for them. Issue instructions to prevent any disorder and pay for these out of your own funds.



All my Guard have left; they will be at Mayence on the 30th. My horses will also, I think, be there the same day. However, it is necessary that I should find some horses at Bamberg if mine are delayed a few days in arrival.

Please investigate what is going on at Halle; I am advised that Prussian troops are already assembling there.

I have given orders that a large quantity of pots be sent to Mayence, but once again, they will not arrive on time.

Arrange to distribute the 2500 overcoats to those who have most need of them. Send the shoes to Wurtzburg. As to overcoats write to the colonels to have them made in France. By October 1st the clothing establishments will be so largely increased that they will be well able to make these.

Write to the finance officer of the army, who ought to be at Strasbourg, to proceed to Mayence, where he should arrive by the 29th of September.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BESSIERES

CN—10821
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Issue orders to your Chief of Staff to proceed on the 23d as rapidly as possible to Mayence to prepare for the organization of the Guard as soon as he arrives. It is necessary to send all the bakers, and all the other workmen of the Guard by the trucks arranged for the transportation of the Guards so that they will arrive together with them. Issue orders also to the commissary, surgeons, and employees of the Guard to all be at Mayence on September 30th. You yourself with your aides and the rest of your staff will proceed on the 24th in order to arrive at Mayence on the 28th to hasten the organization of my Guard and to prepare whatever is necessary for your depot. You will cause all the rest of the Guard which is mounted of all arms to depart on the 21st so that by evening of the 21st, none is left at Paris.

The following are the troops which are to complete my Guard:

2 regiments of chasseurs, mounted	1200 men.
2 regiments of grenadiers, mounted	1200 men.
1 regiment of military police	400 men.
1 Mameluke squadron	80 men.
2 regiments of chasseurs, foot	2000 men.
2 regiments of grenadiers, foot	2000 men.
4 batteries of artillery, 24 guns;	
1 park of 12 pieces, plus 1000 artillerymen	1000 men.
4 battalions of dragoons, foot, each battalion of 4 companies	2400 men.
4 battalions of grenadiers and of riflemen composed of the 3d and 4th battalions, taken from the 5th, 25th and 26th Military Divisions	2400 men.

All together this will make more than 12,000 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery. As these battalions will need majors, captains and adjutants, leave only with the depot battalions one major, directing the remaining major to leave with the four best captains, 1st lieutenants and second lieutenants, who will be at Mayence by September 30th for assignment to the different battalions.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE JOACHIM*

CN—10822
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

I have your letter. I do not know the strength of your regiment; consequently I can prescribe nothing in regard to it.

The King of Holland will command my Army of the North which will be 80,000 strong; its headquarters will be the Wesel. Your Duchy will be subject to his military orders. If your regiment is in condition to do something it will take its orders from him and will form part of his army. But leave a military commandant in your Duchy and a minister at Wesel to maintain communication with the King of Holland, and to procure for him all that is necessary. The King will be charged with covering and guaranteeing your States.

*Marshal Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg.—*C.H.L.*

Send your baggage and horses to Francfort as promptly as possible. It will be satisfactory if they arrive there by September 29th. If this is more time than enough you may direct them to march by the left bank of the Rhine in order to conceal your movements. Remain for some days in your country at Dusseldorf, and do what you can to assist in the provisioning of Wesel. Send a return of your regiment to the King of Holland and push its organization as much as possible. Have reconnoitered the cantonments of the Prussians and ascertain the names of the regiments which occupy the camps at Hameln and vicinity as well as the strength of the companies of battalions.

Keep all these orders secret, and say nothing whatever about them.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10824
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

Send an order to Major General Dupont to leave without delay with all his regiments, infantry, cavalry and artillery and proceed to Mayence which you will leave on the 28th for Wurtzbourg. In passing through Mayence, he will complete his ammunition, armaments and artillery materiel. He must arrive at Wurtzbourg on October 2d.

NAPOLEON.

By the same messengers which are carrying to Major General Dupont, his order to leave, you will send to the commanding generals of the 25th and 26th Military Divisions the order to mobilize on a war footing the grenadier and rifle companies of the 3d and 4th Battalions which are present in their divisions and belong to the corps of the Grand Army. You will direct them to Mayence with orders to report to General Dorsenne who will organize them into six company Battalions. It is indispensable that these companies arrive at Mayence by September 30th.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10825
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 19 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

Issue orders to the Governor of Paris to organize the 2d Light Infantry with two battalions of 1000 men each if possible to do so; to do the same with the 4th and 12th Light Infantry; and send these battalions; those of the 2d Light Infantry on the 21st via the Meaux road; those of the 12th Light Infantry by the Dammartin road, and those of the 4th, one battalion by the Meaux road and one battalion by the Dammartin road.

The two battalions of the 4th will leave on the 22d. Have these troops proceed by the truck relays established for the Guard. Send orders to the detachment in the camp of Boulogne and to the 28th Light Infantry as well as to its special battalion not to make any rest halts, but to march straight to Mayence in order to arrive there as early as possible. If the special battalion of the 28th Light Infantry is near the Rhine, it would be suitable for it to proceed by water; in this manner it will arrive at Mayence very promptly and without being fatigued.

You will give orders to the Senator, Marshal Kellermann, to leave tomorrow for Mayence and there assume command of the reserve corps consisting of the troops which are there of the 5th and 6th Military Divisions. He will command the National Guards of these two divisions and he will assemble at Strasbourg and at Mayence the grenadiers and chasseurs of the National Guards which he raised in these divisions in the last campaign.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10827
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806, 6:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

I am sending you an outline for the moving of the army. It is now 6:00 A.M., September 20th. I am hoping

that you will receive my letter during the 24th and that before the 3d or 4th of October all my directions will have been carried out. I expect to be at Mayence September 30th and probably on the 2d or 3d at Wurtzbourg. There I will decide as to my final operations.

It is necessary that General Songis take measures that General Dupas's division which is assembled at Mayence have ten pieces of artillery but without having to decrease the army artillery. This division consists of the 2d, 12th and 28th Light Infantry and the 14th Infantry; I expect to add two other regiments to them. This will be the observation corps for France and the support corps for the King of Holland's army.

It is desirable that as soon as you have issued orders for all the movements that you proceed to Wurtzbourg. Examine the situation in this place and note the condition of the roads to Bamberg, to Dusseldorf, up to Magdeburg and Berlin, and where the mountains end. You will take care to treat the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg well. You will establish your own headquarters without saying anything about my coming, but take the best without however, attracting attention or extra expenses.

You will examine the situation of the chateau, what garrison it ought to have and the positions to occupy. From there proceed to Mayence unless unforeseen and extraordinary events occur, in which case you will understand that I will not stop over-night in Mayence.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BESSIERES

CN—10828
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

Send forward by truck, in the same manner as the Infantry of the Guard, a detail of sailors of my Guard consisting of 100 men for Mayence.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BESSIERES

CN—10829
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I see that it is not necessary that my Guard pass through Worms in order to go to Mayence; but that from Kaiserslautern and from Durkheim they can proceed directly via Alzey. By taking advantage of this information you will spare the Guards at least one day's march.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10830
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

Wesel and Mayence must be placed in the best state of defense. The final preparations should be made. If certain construction is required to fill the ditches at Wesel with water, this should be undertaken. If the flood cannot be controlled at Mayence it should be attended to. If the field works on the other side of the Rhine are not armed, this should be done. If there are no barracks for the garrison troops in the field works on the islands, they must be constructed. If the earthworks which prevent a flood are not established, revetted and cleared, they should be constructed and revetted. If the fort which is to protect the mouth of the Main is not yet finished it must be constructed together with all provisional works and hurried to completion, without discontinuing the permanent works at Cassel.

There should be at least four engineer officers of all grades at Mayence and six at Wesel. One company of miners should be sent to Mayence and another to Wesel in order that everything that is necessary for the subterranean defense of Fort Meusnier and the exterior forts may be organized both at Mayence and at Wesel; in addition to these, miners may act as foremen for engineer workshops.

Four companies of artillery should be at Wesel, and one colonel, one major second in command, two staff cap-

tains besides the officers of the four companies. It is necessary that there shall be at least four companies of artillery at Wesel and four at Mayence, I mean that these companies should have all their officers, non-commissioned officers and eighty cannoneers present and will be at least four hundred men strong.

It is also necessary that there should be a detail of mechanics in each of these places to repair gun carriages and place the artillery in proper condition. If there is any lack of artillery materiel either at Wesel or at Mayence, or of equipments they must be sent there.

It is my intention that the engineer and artillery officers who are stationed at Wesel and Mayence are there by my order and that no one can remove them from these places during the entire campaign. You should recommend to me for each of these places one colonel and one major of each arm who will be charged with defending Wesel and Mayence in what concerns his own arm and who will be given a commission *ad hoc*. You understand that they should be distinguished officers who love glory and have the necessary ability for such an important task.

At the first hostile event, senior inspectors will take care to throw the necessary number of officers into these two places. I suppose that twenty officers will be needed for Mayence and twelve for Wesel. They will not be sent there until the last moment. But what is important is that the two commanders with the two majors of each arm be detailed by order, stay there without leaving either on account of sickness or on leave, as no one except me is to have the authority to grant them leaves. My intention is that the senior engineer inspector should proceed to Mayence where he will establish his headquarters. From there he can supervise all construction at Mayence, Wesel, Juliers, Venloo, Antwerp and frontier places opposite Prussia. He will prescribe all works ordered by the plans and will stop or will order of his own initiative those works which are most pressing according to circumstances. He will be charged, if a fort is threatened with investment to furnish in time the necessary engineer officers, materiel and everything that pertains to its own arm.

The principal objects required for sieges are: flour, wood for bakeries, brandy, rice or vegetables, which should be furnished by the supply officers, who should assemble in each place the quantity of flour necessary for 10,000 men for six months. It is particularly necessary that you issue orders to provide the quantity of wood required to convert the flour into bread.

These commissary stores will be withdrawn either by shipments to Germany to subsist the Grand Army, or for sieges, or for daily issues to the army. It seems to me that you will not have to issue instructions on this.

Send me a report on this matter; but do not lose one hour in providing the necessary quantity of vegetables, wood and subsistence articles required for these two places.

Have 400,000 rations of hard bread made also for Mayence.

Therefore without waiting for the action on the report which you are to make to me on the subject of funds, do not lose a single hour in supplying the indicated articles to the places prescribed above.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10834
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

Brigadier General Andreossy is too old to command the engineers of the army; I have issued orders that he proceed to Paris. I have not enough engineer officers with the army; I need twenty more. Issue orders to the officers shown on the attached list to proceed to Mayence and to be there before October 1st. Issue orders to General Chasseloup to proceed by post across the Tyrol to Augsburg where he must arrive before October 1st; I intend to assign him to the command of the engineers of the army. General Marescot is too much needed in France for the kind of war which I intend to make. It is not impossible that the enemy may make some expedition across our frontiers. It is therefore necessary that he be within reach to provide for this. You

will charge Colonel Liedot with the works of Alessandria, and who if necessary will command the engineers in the fort of Alessandria. Issue orders to General Chambarlhac who is at Naples to proceed by post as rapidly as possible to Augsbourg via the Tyrol. Issue orders to the 3d Company, 4th Sapper Battalion which is at Belle-Ile-en-Mer, to the 5th Company which is at the Saint-Marcouf Islands, and to the 9th Company which is at Ostend, to proceed to Mayence to rejoin the Grand Army. Issue orders to the 5th Sapper Battalion to join the Grand Army. General Lery will command the engineers of the army of Italy.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—659

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have spoken to you of the occupation by the Bavarians of the strongholds of Wurtzbourg, Königshofen and Kronach, as well as that of Forchheim; *send an order to Marshal Augereau to have the small places in their environs reconnoitered and occupied by small detachments of troops from Hesse-Darmstadt, provisioning and equipping them. This will protect our rear.* Marshal Kellermann is setting out for Mayence, where he will command 6000 men of the National Guard. General Rampon goes to Saint-Omer to collect 6000 other National Guards (sic) to protect Boulogne. I have given General Chasseloup command of the engineers. Marescot is too useful at home for work upon fortifications. I have summoned 20 engineer officers to the army; there were not enough. I hope to turn up much ground. Conscription is going on wonderfully. Of 50,000 men whom I called for, 20,000 have crossed the Alps, 30,000 remain on this side, I shall soon call out my reserves of 30,000 men.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—660

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have had orders sent to General d'Hautpoul to join his division before the 1st of October, there to take command and proceed direct to Wurtzbourg.

I have sent orders to Brigadier-General Defrance to join General Nansouty's division to take command of the brigade of carabiniers, and I have ordered Brigadier-General Durosnel to proceed to Francfort to take command of the cavalry brigade of Marshal Augereau's army corps. For your part, do you order Major-General Grouchy to take command of the division of dragoons commanded by Brigadier-General Beker, who himself will command half of this division under General Grouchy's orders.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEANCN—10835
(WD Files)*Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.*

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

You will find attached hereto an order for the organization of a Polish Legion. You will send for General Zajonchek and have him nominate Polish officers for the 1st Battalion. My idea is that at least two-thirds of the officers should be Poles; the remaining third will be taken from those officers which have not served in our ranks, but who desire to serve and shed their blood for their country.

You will issue instructions to the commander of the legion to provide for uniforms and to send some officers to the outposts of the French Army to assemble Prussian deserters and to organize these. When the 1st Battalion is completed, start organizing the second.

I desire that General Zajonchek shall not take Polish officers on duty in the army and who are useful there, but that he take them from the interior where there are many of them.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10836
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

I ordered some time ago at Braunau that an order be issued to assemble discharged officers and form them into a command to attend to the correspondence of the army; I particularly required that they be able to speak German. Send me a copy of this order and explain what has prevented carrying it out. Marshal Kellermann was charged in organizing these. It seems to me that he said that experience had shown that the organization should be differently made. Ask him for information on this.

NAPOLEON.

CN—10837
(from WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I note from the returns that there is one engineer officer at Ulm, three at Augsbourg, two at Braunau and one at Passau. I had ordered that there should be four engineer officers at Braunau; one will be sufficient at Augsbourg, none are required at Passau or at Ulm.

General Malher's division of Marshal Ney's corps has no engineer officer; detail one there. There are sapper troops at Augsbourg, Kehl, and Ulm; none should remain in these places except the 7th Company which will remain at Braunau. Send orders to the 1st Company, 2d Sapper Battalion which is at Palmanova to rejoin its battalion via the Tyrol; it will proceed to Ulm where it will receive new orders.

No Brigadier General of Engineers will command his troops in a corps. The generals will be attached to the General Staff. Issue orders to Brigadier Generals Kirgener, and Cazal to report to headquarters. General Andreossy is too old; order him to proceed to Paris, reporting to Minister Dejean for orders. Brigadier General Kirgener will provisionally command the engineers of the army. General

Cazal will be director of the park. I have issued orders to send a second engineer officer who will be at the disposal of the Chief of Staff. You understand that I already need five for Wurtzbourg and the two other posts.

I have issued orders to General Chasseloup to proceed by post to Augsburg to command the engineers of the Grand Army, and that General Chambarlhac proceed to Augsburg. I have issued orders that the 3d, 5th and 7th Sapper Companies shall proceed to Mayence to rejoin the Grand Army. I have also issued orders that the 5th Sapper Battalion join the Grand Army. It is necessary that there should be a small engineer park consisting of three or four thousand tools, one mining company, engineer mechanics, a dozen engineer officers, one thousand sappers, one ponton company with several wagons and material for crossing a stream. This command organized as indicated will be commanded by General Cazal, director of the park, and will have its own commissary and will receive individual orders. It must be practicable to divide it into two parts when the situation is doubtful, my intention being to have it always within reach of the place where I may need it. I believe that according to the Tables of Organization, all sappers, pontoon troops and mechanics are armed with muskets.

Have we a bridge train? I do not see any on the returns; it would be absurd for General Songis to have left such a large army without means for crossing a stream. In any case, I believe that the bridge equipage must be at Augsburg before October 4th. If it is at Strasbourg, how could I cross the Elbe without a bridge train?

Marshal Bernadotte's corps has eight companies of mechanics and a detachment from another company. These are too many. Marshal Davout's corps has no ponton troops at all, and only eighteen mechanics. Marshal Soult's corps has only twenty-four mechanics and no ponton troops. In general, there are insufficient mechanics with the army corps. Each corps should have at least thirty-six mechanics. Marshal Bernadotte's corps is the only one that has ponton troops, and according to the returns, it seems that all the ponton troops are at Augsburg and at Ulm.

It is necessary that you send one company to Marshal Davout, one to Marshal Soult, one to Marshal Augereau, one to Marshal Lefebvre, one to the reserve cavalry, one to the Guard, the remaining one will remain with the park.

In the 4th Dragoon Division commanded by General Sahuguet, General Laplanche commands two regiments; 2 brigadier generals are lacking for the six regiments present. There is a shortage of one brigadier general for the light cavalry of Marshal Davout. Two brigadier generals are needed for General Beaumont's divisions. One brigadier general is needed for General Nansouty. One general is needed for Marshal Augereau's light cavalry. I therefore need one brigadier general for cuirassiers, four brigadier generals for dragoons, two generals for light cavalry for Marshals Davout and Augereau. I have here Durosnel and Defrance; I am issuing orders to Generals Margaron and Saint-Sulpice to rejoin their brigades and to General Grouchy to join his division. There will be in the cavalry reserve under the orders of Prince Murat, two brigades of hussars and chasseurs. One will be commanded by General Lasalle and the other by General Milhaud. The brigade of General Lasalle will consist of the 5th and 7th Hussars; that of General Milhaud of the 11th and 13th Chasseurs. In this manner the 1st Army Corps, the IIIrd, IVth, Vth and VIth Corps will each have three regiments of light cavalry and the VIIth only two. The regiments of these light cavalry brigades may be relieved when they are exhausted. Brigadier General Dumoulin's name should be removed from the return of the Grand Army. There is an extra general in General Suchet's division. General Rey should be attached to the General Staff. General Dupont has an extra Major General; he is short one brigadier general. I am issuing orders that all adjutants and general staff officers in the interior join the Grand Army.

I am sending General Defrance to Nansouty's division to command the Carbineers and General Durosnel to Marshal Augereau's corps. Issue orders to assemble the two light cavalry brigades; the Hussar Brigade at Kronach and the Chasseur Brigade at Lichtenfels.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10838
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

As Koenigshofen, Kronach and Wurtzbourg may become points of support for the Grand Army, it will be necessary to designate good commandants for them and to send them artillery companies and engineer officers. The sum of 30,000 francs will be placed at the disposal of the senior engineer officer at each of these places to start field works. A commissary will be detailed for each place, and each of them will be given 30,000 francs to start provisioning, it will not be used for daily issues, at least not until a place is invested.

The three places which I have mentioned above will be seized on October 2d; they will be placed in condition so as to be safe from raids. On the 3d or 4th of October at the latest, the artillery should be emplaced at these three places and will be sent there from Forchheim, Wurtzbourg and from Augsburg. The local magazines will be arranged for on the grounds, as well as what is locally necessary for the army hospitals, and in general whatever is necessary in these places to make them suitable for points of support for the army.

If the little place of Koenigstein on the road between Limburg and Francfort belongs to a prince of the Confederation of the Rhine, it will be occupied on October 2d and prepared for defense. It is necessary that the King of Bavaria issue orders for arming and provisioning Forchheim; that he detail for that place a good commandant, good artillery officers and that the place be protected against a raid.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BRUNE

CN—10841)
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Prussia has thrown down its mask and run to arms. Different detachments of your army corps have been given

orders to leave and proceed as rapidly as possible to the Rhine. The King of Holland is at the head of the reserve of 30,000 French and Dutch troops which will defend Holland on the North. His principal forces are based on Wesel. Correspond with him in order that should you be in need, he may rapidly come to your assistance. General Rampon is proceeding to Saint-Omer to assemble the National Guards of the Nord Department, and form a corps of 6000 men which will assemble at Saint-Omer. This corps will be divided into two brigades of 2000 men each which will be commanded by Generals Girard, called the elder, and Moreau. General Rampon will assemble at the first hostile movement 2000 men of the reserve corps and as many of the mounted military police, which will make a considerable body to assist you.

Work on your field fortifications. Exercise your sailors at target practice. 7000 conscripts have been ordered to join the corps under your orders. I count upon you to defend my flottille at Boulogne and to protect Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend and the points of your command between the Somme and the channel. I know your zeal and your talents. I am counting on both of these. Let me know the condition of your lines; make repairs where they are in bad condition. Allow no communication between the English coast and your city. Perhaps it will be necessary to send couriers of the British representative secretly by night, but see to it that there are plenty of troops along the route taken by him; this is a deception of a kind to which we are not accustomed but which may nevertheless be useful, in order to spread the idea that there are a large quantity of troops at Boulogne. Complete the organization of your marine battalions. There will always be at Paris a body of 5,000 or 6,000 men who by means of special relays will be able to reach you within four or five days. I am sending my Guard by this method and the troops at Meudon in eight days to Mayence. Double your surveillance and activity.

NAPOLÉON.

¹ Keep this to yourself as a great secret, and say nothing that will lead any one to infer that a war is certain.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10845

(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter of September 17th. The messenger who left yesterday carried an order to you to assemble the 65th and 72d Infantry with all your cavalry, one half of your Dutch infantry and 15 horsed-guns at Wesel. It is necessary that you have inserted in the newspapers, information that a large number of troops are arriving from all parts of France; and that there will be 80,000 men at Wesel commanded by the King of Holland. I desire that these troops be in march on the first days of October; as you are to attract the attention of the enemy by a secondary attack whilst I maneuver to turn him. All your troops should be in the territory of the Confederation, spread out as far as the frontiers without going beyond them nor committing any hostile act. This is no time for frequent complaints; energy must be shown. I have already helped out your finances considerably. Bring your troops up to the prescribed strength. Form National Guards, direct the conduct of your newspapers. I will never make anything except an honorable peace or else crush my enemies. If you cannot be personally at Wesel on October 2d, General Michaud should be there as commander of your advance guard. Organize the two first battalions of French regiments to a strength of 1150 men, and station the 3d Battalions at posts where conscripts can be received and equipped; more than 600 of them will arrive for each regiment within a month. Do not have any fear for the Island of Walcheren; the English will not so easily take Flushing; besides the general in command there will cut the dikes and they will be drowned. Independently of the camp of Boulogne, I am gathering at Saint-Omer a division of 6,000 men of the National Guard under General Rampon. I will be at Mayence September 30th. All this is solely for your information; all of it is to be kept completely secret. As the Empress intends while I am in Germany to proceed with her court to Mayence, the Queen of Holland can go to the same place if convenient. If you cannot be at Wesel by October 1st, it is necessary that you be there by the 6th. As I

presume that you have need of several generals I will send you, if you like, Major General Lagrange. I understand that all the artillery at Berg-op-zoom, Breda, and the forts protecting my north frontiers are ready and that within the fortnight you can have them armed. The result of all this will be to increase your States and form a solid peace. I say solid as my enemies will be struck down, without power to rise again for ten years.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—662

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have drafted a decree to form a Legion of the North which will wear the Polish costume. General Zayonchek is to command it. I shall name the officers of the first battalion, and these officers will immediately proceed to the outposts with a commission from General Zayonchek to gather in and organize deserters. When the first battalion is filled up I shall organize the second.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—669

Saint-Cloud, 20 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, General Grouchy, to whom I have given command of a division of cavalry, is not yet with the army. Inform me if he has set out; it is necessary that he join his division before October 1st. Issue orders that before the first of October General Cazal must be at headquarters of the Grand Army; that General Margaron must have joined his brigade and by the same date General Saint Sulpice must also be with his division. Order the major of the 5th regiment of chasseurs to return to his regiment in view of the absence of the colonel; the majors of the 8th and 19th regiment of dragoons to join their corps to replace their colonels who have been made generals, and order

the colonel of the 3d regiment of cuirassiers to be with his regiment before the first of October.

NAPOLEON.

MARSHAL BERTHIER TO NAPOLEON

B—104-10

Munich, 20 September, 1806.

(Received 24 September)

[EXTRACT]

It is my duty to call the attention of your Majesty to the fact that the Prussians are no longer concealing their intentions to make war with us. Their armies are assembling at those points on the Prussian territory which are nearest our advance posts. All Germany speaks of nothing but war; important measures are undertaken openly.

* * * * *

ORDERS FOR GENERALS DUROC AND CAULAINCOURT

CN—10847

(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

I intend to be at Mayence September 29th. I will therefore leave on Wednesday or Thursday at 6:00 AM. I wish to go via Metz where I will stop as long as I can with a view to arriving at Mayence before noon on the 29th. However, I do not desire to stop more than eight or ten hours at Metz. Write to Metz to the commanding general or some one else, or to the cavalry depot to have seven or eight horses and a carriage for me in order that I may visit all the establishments.

The Empress will be in my carriage; Prince Jerome will be in another carriage accompanying mine.

I do not wish to have more than four carriages with me unless others are sent ahead or marched in rear.

The Empress will take only Mme. Turenne with her. MM. de'Harville and Ordener will accompany her; M. Remusat will proceed in advance to Mayence.

The Grand Marshal of the Palace may go ahead so as to be at Mayence a day ahead of me.

MM. Caulaincourt, Mortier and Savary will go with me.

The two general equeries, who have their own horses, may proceed directly to Mayence.

It is unnecessary that I have with me a convoy of wagons and baggage. As there are two roads, they may go by the other road, or go ahead, so as to arrive at Mayence the evening before I am due there.

Marshal Bessieres and all the officers of the Guard should leave in advance; Marshal Bessieres and the Chief Equery will arrange matters so as not to block the routes.

M. Maret will leave twenty-four hours after me and proceed direct to Mayence.

General Clarke will proceed directly to Mayence where he should arrive on the evening of the 28th.

NAPOLÉON.

TO THE KING OF BAVARIA

CN—10850
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

MY DEAR BROTHER:

More than a month has passed since Prussia has commenced arming and all the world knows that she is arming against France and the Confederation of the Rhine. I seek motives for her but without being able to discover them. The letters which the Prussian Majesty writes us are friendly. His Minister of Foreign Affairs has notified our envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary that Prussia has recognized the Confederation of the Rhine and that there was no objection against the arrangements made in Central Germany. Is the mobilization of Prussia the result of a coalition with Russia? or only of intrigues between different parties at Berlin and the irresponsibility of the

cabinet? Is their object to force Hesse, Saxony and the Hanseatic towns to contract obligations which these two latter powers apparently do not wish to form? Does Prussia wish to depart from the declaration which we have made that these Hanseatic towns can not enter into any special Confederation, which declaration is based on the interest of commerce between France and Central Germany, and on what England has informed us that any change in the present situation of the Hanseatic towns would be one more obstacle to a general peace? We have also declared that the princes of the German empire who do not form part of the Confederation of the Rhine must be allowed to consult their own interests and obligations; that they must be considered absolutely free; that we would do nothing to force them to join the Confederation of the Rhine, but that we would not allow any one to force them to act against their wishes, their political interests, or the interests of their peoples. Has this declaration which is so just antagonized the cabinet of Berlin, and do they desire to force us to retract it? Between all these motives which can be the true one? We do not know how to decide this, and only the future will reveal the secret of a conduct which is as strange as it was unexpected. One month has passed since our attention was attracted to this. Our forbearance has only caused Prussia to harden in the meddling which the Berlin court wishes to precipitate into a most inconsiderate war. At the same time the mobilization of Prussia has brought up the case provided by one of the articles of the treaty of July 12, and we believe it necessary that all the sovereigns who compose the Confederation of the Rhine should mobilize their interests, to guarantee their territory and to maintain their inviolability. Instead of the 200,000 men which France is obliged to furnish, it will furnish 300,000 and we are ordering the troops necessary to make up this number to be transported by truck to the lower Rhine. As the troops of your Majesty have been on a war footing, we invite your Majesty to order them to be placed without delay in march order with all their field equipment, in order to assist in the defense of the common cause, in which we hope success will correspond to its justice, if nevertheless

contrary to our desires and even hopes, Prussia put us under the necessity of meeting force by force.

NAPOLEON.

Similar letters were sent to the King of Wurtemberg, to the Grand Dukes of Berg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, to the Prince Primate, and to the League of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

CN—10853
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

You will send me a return of the forces of Hesse-Cassel with the names and strength of regiments and their organization; you will add thereto their stations and their present location.

Send me a memoir as to the best manner of attacking Hesse-Cassel, what resistance it can oppose to an army attacking it, what obstacles are to be met, and what number of troops the Elector has.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL BERTRAND

CN—10854
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

DEAR GENERAL BERTRAND :

You will leave tomorrow; go to Worms and cross the Rhine. You will take all necessary measures to assure the passing of my Guard through Mayence. You will proceed to Cassel and assure yourself that that place is being prepared for defense and that all orders for provisioning it have arrived.

You will proceed with suitable precautions to look over the fortress of Hanau. Could it be captured by a raid? If practicable you will observe the fortress of Marburg. Continue then on to Cassel (Hesse). You will be given letters

for my *chargé d'affaires*; you will take good care to assure yourself in advance that he is there.

There are several small forts near Francfort; you will inform yourself as to these. Do not travel by night between Francfort and Cassel, and make note of anything that might interest me.

From Cassel proceed by the direct road to Cologne, always traveling by day. Observe conditions in the country between Wesel, Mayence, Cassel and Cologne. How many roads are there and how many main roads? Obtain there also information regarding the roads from Cassel to Gotha, from Cassel to Goettingen and from Cassel to Paderborn. What kind of a place is Cassel? Is it armed and capable of resistance? Glance over the troops of the Elector, and their posts, of his artillery, his militia, his strong points. From Cologne you will proceed to join me at Mayence; you will go by the right bank and look rapidly over the country between Dusseldorf, Wesel and Cassel. I will be at Mayence on September 29th where I will need your reports as to your reconnaissance. You will gather at Cassel every kind of information on everything concerning the country. You will understand how important it is that you be thoroughly informed on these things, not only for the beginning of the campaign, but also for what follows.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

CN—10855
(Imperial Files)

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Send an intelligent engineer officer under the pretext of taking letters for M. Bignon to Hesse-Cassel, but really to observe everything that he can. He will go from Francfort to Hesse-Cassel, and return from Hesse-Cassel direct to Coblenz. He will travel by short stages, will lunch, dine and sleep enroute. He will observe everything with care; the nature of the roads, mountains, streams, population of towns, villages, districts; he will make a report on the

strong points of the Elector, such as Hanau, Marburg, Geissen and other fortified posts; he will make sketches of anything unusual which he has observed.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—677

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, the 9th principal battalion of the train is set down on the field returns of September 1 as having 577 men present and no horses. The 1st, 2d, 4th and 6th companies have set out as if to go to Augsburg; let me know the day when they left Wesel, and where you suppose they now are. The 3d and 5th are put down in the return as being at Metz, each 100 men strong; if they are still in that garrison, levy immediately the horses that they need and order these companies to proceed as rapidly as possible to Mayence where they will be attached to trains of artillery or miners according to necessity and the orders of General Songis.

The 10th principal battalion of the train is set down as having 536 men present at Alessandria, but without horses; arrange for funds for procuring for it 910 draft mules; it will be easier in Italy, and these beasts are more useful.

The 11th principal battalion is credited with having 420 men present at Douai, but without horses. Issue orders immediately for it to procure 800 horses, and as fast as the companies are so provided, send them on to Mayence where General Songis will employ them in transporting his baggage wagons.

The 5th battalion is set down as having its 3d company at Strasbourg, as also its 2d. Inform me if they are still there or whether they have crossed the Rhine. As Mayence has become the centre of operations perhaps there should be greater activity in the arsenal of that place, at least under the head of repairs of the army convoys which are there.

The 5th battalion of sappers has two companies at Juliers. Order one to remain in that place, and the other to join the Grand Army.

I think I have already given orders to direct upon Mayence the 9th company of the 4th battalion which is at Ostend, the 5th which is at Saint-Marcouf and the 3d which is at Belle-Isle-en-Mer.

The 3d battalion has three companies at Alessandria. That is sufficient. Inform me if there would be any inconvenience in directing to the Grand Army the four companies of the 1st battalion of sappers, which are in Alessandria.

As to the companies of miners, one must be sent to Wesel. It would appear that this one should be the 9th, which already has a strong detachment there.

Order the 8th company of miners, now at Boulogne, to proceed to Mayence, to be attached to the defence of that place.

Inform me what would be the inconvenience of sending to the Grand Army the 3d company, which is at Metz.

Inform me also whether these companies are furnished with their crews of miners to serve when on campaign to undermine and blow up bridges. I believe that the men are well armed with muskets and that in each company there are labourers whose tools should be with the mining crews.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—679

Saint-Cloud, 21 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, the 2d, 3d, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th companies of the 1st battalion of artillery are half with the Grand Army and half at Metz. Inform me how that happens. The 7th regiment of artillery has four companies of its 1st battalion at Strasbourg and five of the 2d battalion are also at Strasbourg. You may draw from these regiments enough to form four complete companies and send them to Mayence, all the more because the 2d company is already there; but that company is only 45 men strong.

Three companies of the 8th regiment are at Wesel, a fourth should be sent there and all should be completed, for these companies have only 70 men each.

Two companies of the first regiment of foot artillery are already at Antwerp. It is necessary that from those at La Fere you complete a company of 100 men, or least of 80, and send them to Mayence to be attached to the reserve of the park of the Guard. The 6th regiment of mounted artillery has three companies at La Fere. Have one completed to 80 or 90 men and the same number of horses and send them to Mayence at once, to be under the orders of the general in command of the artillery of the Guard, the gunners of the Guard being insufficient to serve 36 pieces. Instruct Marshal Bessieres as to these dispositions, and the day when these men should arrive.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10860
(WD Fles)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

Issue orders to have a ponton bridge thrown across the Rhine at Wesel before October 1st. This bridge will remain in place until new orders issue. I wish a field fortification constructed opposite the Island of Buderich, and that the engineers who are to construct permanent works make this one a good bridgehead.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL LACUEE

CN—10861
(Imperial Archives)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

I wish to call out a reserve. The order for this should be prepared. The following is how I desire to organize it:

200 men, consisting of two selected men from each Department, for rifle regiments;

600 men, consisting of six selected men from each department, for the twelve cuirassier regiments;

600 men, specially selected, for the eight regiments of the
foot artillery;
2000 men, specially selected for the four regiments of marine
artillery;
3400 specially selected men in all.

36,400 men will remain, which I wish distributed in the following manner; 6000 men among the fourteen 3d and 4th Battalions in the camp at Boulogne, and between the Somme and the Channel including Antwerp; 2000 among the four regiments in Brittany; 2000 among the four regiments on Oleron Island and in the 12th Military Division; 4000 in the six regiments at Paris and 12,400 in the forty regiments of the Grand Army on the Rhine. In assigning these men, you will consult the needs of each corps. You will give less consideration to the general situation of the regiments than to that of the 3d Battalions, and see that they receive the conscripts of 1806. These are new reserves which are being formed. Little matters as to the number of men in the Grand Army. The more they have the more they will lose. But what does matter is that I should have in Boulogne, in Brittany and in my reserve on the Rhine a large number of men.

See to it that no corps receives more than one thousand men, outside from what it receives from the reserve and the conscripts of 1806.

You will not call up from the detachment of Brittany any Piedmontese nor any conscripts from the eighteen departments known as the departments of the West. You will not assign to any regiments in Paris any men from the eighteen departments of the West. You will assign all Piedmontese to the 31st and 111th Infantry. For the rest assign the largest possible number to the depot battalions nearest to where the conscripts actually are, so as to avoid as many changes as possible. It is nevertheless proper to assign to regiments or conscripts from the depots from which they receive their recruits.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10862
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

The following is my itinerary: I leave Saint-Cloud Thursday, the 25th. I will be at Metz on the 27th and will remain there seven or eight hours. I will be at Mayence either on the evening of the 28th or the morning of the 29th. I expect news from you on the 30th or the 1st. Arrange as necessary for your messenger service.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10863
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

The following is the route to be taken by the army: Mayence, Francfort, thence on the left bank of the Main which will be crossed at Aschaffenburg, Wurtzbourg and Bamberg. Put commanding officers at these places and indicate the lengths of marches. Reconnoiter the road to Mayence, Darmstadt and Aschaffenburg. The road for the army to communicate with Ulm, Augsbουργ and the hospitals which are in this direction, will be from Bamberg to Nuremberg, Anspach, Ellwangen, and Ulm. It is necessary that here also march lengths be indicated. My intention is that all the sick evacuated from the hospitals in Bavaria, in Suabia, and on the right bank of the Danube be evacuated to Ulm, where after a rest they will be formed in detachments of one hundred men to rejoin the army at Bamberg. On the other road is to be reconnoitered: from Wurtzbourg to Boxberg, Neckarelz and Manheim. This route has two advantages: first, it is the shortest from the direction of Strasbourg, and I believe the best; second, it may be useful in case communication with Francfort be interrupted by partisans.

I wish that you would send a topographical engineer to reconnoiter and make detailed sketches of the following three routes:

- 1st, Mayence, Francfort, Aschaffenburg, Wurtzburg;
- 2d, Mayence, Darmstadt, Aschaffenburg;
- 3d, Manheim, Neckarelz and Wurtzburg.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10864
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I am giving instructions to Minister Dejean to send Brigadier Generals Laroche, Ruby and Grandjean to Wesel. My idea is that you should organize an advance guard in the following manner:

Commanding officer: Advance Guard, General Michaud.

Artillery: General Drouas.

Engineers: One of your officers.

Chief of the General Staff: Major Ferriere, unless General Michaud prefers to take one of the Brigadier Generals which I am sending you.

1st Brigade: One of the Brigadier Generals I am sending you; 65th Infantry, 2000 men; Dutch troops, 2000 men; 8 horsed guns, Dutch artillery.

2d Brigade: One of the French Brigadier Generals; 77th Infantry, 2000 men; Dutch troops, 2000 men; 8 horsed guns, Dutch artillery.

You may add to each brigade a Dutch Brigadier General and a Dutch Major Adjutant General.

These 8000 men will be reinforced by a battalion of 1000 men from the Duke of Cleves. They will assemble without delay at Wesel and will be concentrated in a military position, one or two leagues beyond Wesel. You will also add to this advance guard 1000 men, Dutch cavalry, which will make a total of nine or ten thousand men. You will assemble the remainder of the Dutch troops, which I estimate to be eight or nine thousand men at the Camp of Utrecht, under General Dumonceau. They will be divided into two brigades; they may join your troops or proceed to the seacoast according to circumstances.

This advance guard is intended to cover my Rhine frontiers and will act to disturb the enemy ; but it will maneuver in such manner as to never be cut off from the Rhine.

Your command will extend from the Moselle at Coblenz as far as the sea.

After the first fifteen days of the operation, at the moment when the war will have taken on an energetic aspect, it may be possible that this corps may be withdrawn to protect my French frontiers. It is also possible that I may push it forward as far as Munster and Cassel according to circumstances. I will give you more detailed instructions after hostilities have commenced.

See that I find at Mayence, one of your aides who will bring me a situation report of your army corps. Issue funds to mount your cavalry. You should have at least 2000 cavalymen. The VIII Corps of the Grand Army will also be at Mayence and will maneuver so as to never be cut off from the Rhine.

I am leaving at Paris some men to form a reserve of 8000 men, and I have fifteen or sixteen thousand men in my camp at Boulogne. General Rampon with 6000 National Guards is at Saint-Omer.

I authorize you to do what is necessary according to circumstances to defend any French territories attacked. There is no necessity at all that you should be personally at Wesel on the 2d, 3d or 4th, if the affairs of your kingdom require you in Holland ; it will be sufficient if your advance guard is there ; but it is desirable that you be there on the 8th.

Direct General Michaud to correspond with Marshal Kellermann, with the Commander of the VIII Corps, and with the Grand Army as may be necessary.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10865
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

Give me tomorrow evening a report in thirty columns, each column showing the place where the troops in march

will be between the 25th of September and the 25th of October, including the detachments which I have sent forward and those of my Guard. I am in need of this report tomorrow, Tuesday.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10866
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

Herewith is a report on the Breidt Company. I have issued an order that 250 wagons be horsed and prepared as early as possible at Strasbourg where they will receive orders for their movement. My intention is not that these wagons go into Germany without being equipped, but that men and horses be taken from Sampigny, Brussels and Paris and that from these three places they be sent to Mayence where they will await orders.

Write to the Quartermaster General that if he has three hundred large horses he will have them assigned to wagons which the artillery at Augsburg may have. I would prefer the wagons called *prolonges*. Local country carts may be purchased; the three hundred horses will be assigned to seventy-two of these carts, which will be able to serve for any kind of transportation.

As to the pots and pans which are at Strasbourg, send four-fifths of all to Mayence where they will be issued. Notify Marshal Berthier that his corps should purchase pots from the peasants, paying for them, as the pots mentioned above will never arrive in time.

Write to all the depot Quartermasters to have overcoats manufactured for their corps; the funds are sufficiently large to enable them to stand for this expense. Of the overcoats which are at Augsburg issue 1800 to the 21st Light Infantry.

Let me know the numbers which will be given to the 250 new wagons and the time when the brigades may be assembled at Mayence. Write to all the depots to have man-

ufactured as many pairs of shoes as they have men in the Grand Army.

What most deserves my attention are the engineer tools. Send them from all places to Mayence; it is impossible to assemble 30,000 of them for the Grand Army. What has become of those which I sent there and which I have paid for out of this year's budget? I know a place within an army corps area where there are 5000 of them. The engineers do not believe they have them; the engineers do not know what they do have; this corps up to the present has been poorly organized within the Grand Army.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—682

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, an VIIIth corps of the Grand Army is to be formed, composed of two divisions. This corps will be assembled at Mayence. The two generals in command of the divisions will be Generals Lagrange and Dupas. Adjutant-general Cortez will be attached to General Dupas's division, Adjutant-General d'Halancourt to that of General Lagrange. Brigadier-Generals Veaux, Laval and Desenfans will be under General Lagrange's orders, Brigadier-Generals Buget and Schramm under those of General Dupas. General Lagrange's division will thus be composed of the 4th and 12th Light Infantry, the 1st Italian regiment of the line and the 1st Italian Light Infantry. The division of General Dupas will be composed of the 2d and 28th Light Infantry and the 14th line. This VIIIth corps will be under the orders of a marshal whom I shall name without delay. The 4th regiment of dragoons will be attached to this VIIIth corps. Each of these two divisions will have 8 pieces of artillery. Detach from the regiments of foot artillery which are at Strasbourg, Metz and La Fere the men needed to serve this artillery and a train company of 200 men. Nominate one artillery colonel and two battalion commanders of artillery to command the artillery of this corps, also a major of engineers with two officers. Nominate an orderer to organize

all its administrations. Order Brigadier-Generals Laroche, Ruby and Grandjean to proceed without delay to Wesel, where they will be under orders of General Michaud, commanding the vanguard of the Army of the North under the King of Holland.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—683

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have formed an VIIIth corps of the Grand Army. I enclose a copy of the orders on this subject which I am giving General Dejean. Inform General Songis, the commander of engineers and the Intendant-general, in order that this corps may be provided with everything necessary. It makes a part of the Grand Army. I destine it to protect the line of the Rhine, and it must so maneuver as never to be divided. You will also find the orders which I am giving the King of Holland for the organization of his army corps. It is essential that you send me a field return, that I may have it always before me. This corps will take the name "Vanguard of the Army of the North."

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER*

UCN—684

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Cousin, Marshal Augereau has no light artillery. It is necessary to make up a company for him. I have seen light artillery in park; that is not its place.

NAPOLEON.

*From file of Commander P. Foucart—*Campagne de Prusse (1806)*. Prenzlau-Lubeck, p. XII.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—685

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, order General Bisson to proceed to Strasbourg to take command of the 5th Military Division. The 6th Division will be commanded by Brigadier-General Valette.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—686

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have your letter of September 17th. I see by the Intendant-general's report that there are 117 caissons at headquarters; that is too many and can only be a matter of embarrassment; 126 caissons are enough to allow one to each battalion of infantry. I desire that a third more be allowed, that is to say, that following each army corps one be allowed for each infantry regiment. Thus, for example, 6 may be allowed to the 6th army corps, 4 to the 3d, 14 to the 4th, 10 to the 5th, 12 to the 6th and 8 to the 7th. General Dupont's division should always be considered as making part of the 6th corps. This, then, will employ 64 caissons. There will still remain some fifty in the rear of chief headquarters and that is quite enough. It is very necessary that the Intendant-general and first inspector of artillery come to an understanding as to the caissons necessary for the light artillery. Only the light artillery attached to each army corps should be counted; the rest to the cavalry reserve. The place where it may be at any moment does not signify. Independently of one caisson per regiment a few additional caissons should be put at the disposal of the cavalry reserve. The caissons of the Breidt company must not be used for carrying shoes and clothing. For this, wagons of the country should be employed. If new hospital caissons have been made there is not a moment to lose in sending them toward Wurtzbourg. Our means should not be directed upon Donauworth and Augsburg, but upon Bamberg and Wurtzbourg. If the Breidt company has 300 loose

horses, it would be absurd to leave them thus; with these horses 75 carts could be drawn. The artillery must have at Augsburg wagons to lend, or the country may furnish carts which can be bought and which may be used until the caissons arrive. I do not at all approve of sending caissons from Brussels and Sampigny to the army; they should be assembled at Mayence, horses and all.

The saucépans which are being sent from Strasbourg will no doubt reach Mayence, but you perfectly understand that they will never arrive in time. The soldiers when setting out must buy them of their hosts and pay for them; that will prevent recriminations and will wrong no one. The 21st Light Infantry which has just arrived is without cloaks; forward to them 1800 of those that are at Augsburg. The engineers do not know where their implements are. This arm is badly organized. Nevertheless, Marshal Davout informs me that in the circuit of his army corps there are 5000 implements belonging to the engineers. Take measures to have them in the rear of each army corps.

As for shoes, I have had those which were in Paris and Strasbourg sent to Mayence; they will suffice; I do not think any magazines of them need be formed. I have made known that I am giving a pair of shoes as a gratuity to each soldier of the Grand Army. Order the depots to have them made and sent to Mayence. Thus each soldier should be furnished with three pairs of shoes, two in the knapsack and one on the feet. Order the boards of administration to have a fourth pair made and sent to Mayence, where orders will be given for their ulterior destination.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—688

Marshal Berthier, Major-general, reports to the Emperor that General Songis has despatched to Verona 28 loaded caissons of munitions of 12. This movement will deprive the park of 50 horses which might be useful if the Grand Army were destined to act.

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

This arrangement is without sense. It had indeed been ordered that these caissons should be sent back to Italy, but only in case the Grand Army returned to France. If these caissons have not yet crossed the high mountains they must be recalled to Ulm.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER*

UCN—689

Saint-Cloud, 22 September, 1806.

Cousin, you report 28,000 horses with the Grand Army; you do not include the 4th Dragoons nor the 20th Chasseurs. Nor do you report a thousand men who left Paris to join you, making 30,000 men; but you are mistaken if you think that those are all troop horses. The officers' horses are included in the number. You know that a lieutenant has two horses, a captain three, a squadron commander and a colonel still more, which greatly increases the number of non-combatants. To distinguish these with greater clearness you should put the officers' horses in one column and the troop horses in another. You ask for 4000 foot soldiers; that is not an error, though it is a little excessive; the maximum should have been 80 men per regiment.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—690

Saint-Cloud, September 23, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, order Major-general Oudinot, now at Paris, to proceed to Mayence, where he should arrive on October 1st. Also order Adjutant-general Jarry, now at Neufchatel, to proceed to Mayence as soon as possible.

NAPOLEON.

*From Commandant P. Foucard—*Campagne de Prusse (1806)*. Prenzlau-Lubeck, p. XIII.

DECISIONS

UCN—691

The Minister of War for Administration proposes to issue orders to the generals in command of the 5th and 25th Military Divisions, that no man shall join the army without being completely uniformed and equipped.

Approved.

The Minister of War asks for camp equipment, shoes and cloaks for the army.

Send to Mayence the shoes that are in Paris.

The Minister of War for Administration requests the Emperor's orders on the subject of fresh supplies to be sent to the Island of Elba to supplement the provisions which have been ordered to be given out.

Show: 1st, what is now in hand; 2d, what ought to be given out for use; 3d, what would remain after these things are given out.

Shall the supplies of the counties of Bentheim, Steinfurth and Horstmar, since their union with the Duchy of Cleves, be at the charge of France?

Decidedly Not.

The Minister proposes to recall purveyor Nourry from Dalmatia; he has made contracts too onerous for the government.

Approved.

Request proffered by H. I. H. the mother of the Emperor, for a portion of the land dependant upon the Saint-Joseph House, upon which to build a chapel.

Refer to the Minister of Finance.

GENERAL FRIANT'S ORDERS

B—227a

On September 23, 1806.

General Friant temporarily in command of the III Corps received on September 23d Marshal Davout's order

(see B-227) and then issued in compliance with it, a message directing: On the 26th of September; 1st Division assemble at Oettingen and vicinity; 2d Division east of Ellwangen on the road to Nördlingen; the 3d Division by brigades at Ellwangen and at Dunkelspuhl.

On September 27th; the 1st Division concentrate at Gnosheim; the 2d Division billet between Nördlingen and Oettingen; the 3d Division by brigades at Wallerstein and at Fremdingen.

The light cavalry will be at Erlangen by October 1st.

GENERAL BELLIARD TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

B—104-9

September 23, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

Prussia appears to have made many movements, which are long and uncertain. It appears, however, true that the enemy are still being reinforced, are concentrating and are approaching our forces, who appear to me pretty well scattered, particularly the troops which form the advance guard. In spite of the amicable protests of the King of Prussia one would certainly suppose from appearances, that Prussian intentions were hostile.

NOTE:—General Belliard also reported that the citadel of Wurtzbourg was of good construction but was absolutely empty.—B.

* * * * *

MARSHAL BERTHIER TO NAPOLEON

B—105

19 September, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

It appears that the Prussians are assembling at HOF, on the frontier of Bayreuth, at MAGDEBURG, where is their main body and at HANOVER.

[This message appears to have been received by Napoleon on September 24th.—B.]

* * * * *

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10878
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 24 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN :

As it is believed that Marshal Kellermann will assemble 20,000 or 30,000 men in the 5th and 26th Military Divisions, which will upset the Departments* of these Divisions, see that he thoroughly understands that it is my intention that he shall only raise one detachment of Chasseurs of 2000 men in the 5th Division and one in the 26th Division of the same strength. Make him understand that in any case, even the most urgent, he can only pay 6000 men; but that at the present moment, 4000 will be sufficient. It would be better that they be in small number but well chosen and without disturbing the Departments.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10881
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 24 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I am sending you a copy of the orders for the movement of the army which I sent you on the morning of the 20th instant, and which I am sorry were not sent you twelve hours after the departure of my messenger of the 20th of September, as he might have been intercepted. However, I have no reason to fear this. You should have received by noon of the 24th my message of the 20th. When this letter reaches you, and undoubtedly by the 25th, orders will have been issued by Marshal Soult, who will have left by the 26th; and as it will take him three or four days to go to Amberg, he can be there on the 30th, although his orders did not require him to be there until the 3d. You will receive this message the 27th, so you can hasten Marshal Soult's movement. It is necessary that he arrive quickly at Amberg, since the enemy is at Hof, a dangerous proceeding of which I did not believe him capable, thinking that he would remain on the defensive along the Elbe. If instead of

*These are French territorial departments.—Ed.

arriving at Amberg on the 3d, Marshal Soult can arrive there the 1st of October, direct him to be there that day.

Marshal Davout's corps should be assembled the 25th since he received your orders at Oettingen. I suppose that he will only need two or three days for this. However, I did not order him to be there before the 3d of October. If he can be there the first or the second, there will be no objection. He will detach his cavalry towards Kronach, will take possession of that place and will prepare it for defense on the ground. I presume that Marshal Ney will leave Ulm September 26th; I do not think that he can be at Anspach* before the 2d or 3d of October. Marshal Lefebvre has orders to be at Königshofen before the 2d or 3d; if he can take possession of this place October 1st, this will be all right. He is definitely assigned to command the V Corps of the Grand Army. The old Chief of Staff who was with this corps whilst Marshal Mortier commanded it, will continue to remain in the same capacity. General Menard is not sufficiently experienced for such an important post. All my reserve cavalry divisions should be assembled at their destinations of the 3d. If this can be done by the 2d, I see no objection. I have directed the Duke of Cleves to be at Bamberg on October 1st. Please direct all officers of his staff to be there on that day, and to the commanding generals of the cavalry divisions to send them their situation reports and to receive the orders. I will be at Mayence on the 28th, that is to say, I can be with the advance guard on October 1st, if circumstances require it. The object of this note is to advise you that I wish you to hasten the movements which I have ordered, without tiring the troops and without giving too much ground for alarming the Prussians.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG [MURAT]

CN—10882
(WD Files)

Saint-Cloud, 24 September, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have ordered all the cavalry divisions to expedite their march and if instead of being assembled between

*Ansbach on some maps.

Kronach and Wurtzbourg October 3d, they can be there by the 1st or 2d without too much fatigue, I will be much pleased. It is necessary that Major General Belliard and your staff be at Bamberg by the evening of October 1st, or at the latest by noon of the 2d. Send your horses by rapid marches to Bamberg. You will await me at Mayence ready to leave one hour after my arrival, so that you can be at Bamberg by noon October 1st.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—694

The Minister of War proposes to the Emperor to despatch to the Grand Army the four companies of the 1st battalion of sappers now at Alessandria, and the 3d company of miners now at Metz, and to have the entire 9th company of miners assembled at Wesel.

September 24, 1806.

These movements approved.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—695

The Minister of War requests the Emperor's approbation in the matter of sending to the Grand Army a company of the 8th battalion bis of the train, remaining at Boulogne, and 100 gunners of the 8th foot regiment also detained at Boulogne, and designed to complete the companies of this regiment which are employed with the army.

September 24, 1806.

These movements approved.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—700

Saint-Cloud, 24 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, the Minister of the Interior will have communicated to you the circular which he has issued to the prefects to make up two corps of orderlies, one of foot, the other mounted. Send instructions to this effect to Marshal Kellermann, and when you are informed that a sufficient number of individuals are actually on the way from the departments to Mayence to form two corps, foot and horse, be sure to send two good majors to organize them, one of infantry, the other of cavalry. .

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—701

Report of the Minister of War to the Emperor regarding measures which have been taken to complete the arming and victualling of the three strongholds of Mayence, Wesel and Antwerp.

*September 24, 1806.*APPROVED. *The pieces to be taken from Strasbourg.*

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—704

Metz, September 26, 1806.

I cannot but express my displeasure that the colonel of the 14th regiment has gone on recruiting service; a colonel should always remain with his corps. As I am despatching the 14th and 28th Light Infantry to their posts the colonel should be at Mayence by the 30th.

NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER IV

The Preparations for Maneuver, 28 September, 1806, to 7 October, 1806

CONVERSATION BETWEEN COLONEL JOMINI AND
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AT MAYENCE,
28 SEPTEMBER 1806

(Taken from Sainte-Beuve's Account)

NAPOLEON: Who are you?

JOMINI: Sire, I am Colonel Jomini.

N: Oh, I remember, you are the one who sent me a very important study. I am charmed that the first study which has brought out the true principles of war has appeared during my reign. Nothing like this has been taught in our military schools. We are going to fight the Prussians. I have called you to me because you wrote on the campaigns of Frederick the Great, because you understand their army, and because you have thoroughly studied the theater of operations. You may assist me with valuable information. I believe that we will have something more to do with the Austrians; we will have to move them off.

J: Sire, I have thought the same; since 1763, the Prussians have only made the poor campaigns of 1792-1794, they are little accustomed to war.

N: Yes, but they have the memories of the experienced Generals of the Great King. However, we shall see.

J: If your Majesty will give me four days' leave I can re-join him at Bamberg.

N: And who told you that I am going to Bamberg?

J. The map of Germany, Sire.

N: What, a map? There are one hundred roads besides that to Bamberg on the map!

J: Yes, Sire, but it is probable that your Majesty will act against the left of the Prussians in the same way that he maneuvered via Donauvert against the right of Mack, and via the Saint Bernard against the right of Melas; now this can only be done via Bamberg on Gera.

N: You are right, be at Bamberg four days from now, but do not say a word about it, not even to Berthier; nobody must know that I am going to Bamberg.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—705

Saint-Cloud, September 28, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, despatch from the 32d without delay 1 officer, 1 sergeant major, 2 sergeants, 4 corporals and 200 men to Mayence, where they will receive orders to join their regiments. Detach also 100 men each from the 2d, 12th and 4th light infantry. Send this detachment of 500 men under orders of a superior officer to Mayence, where they will receive further orders. At the same time issue orders to the thirteen battalions now in camp at Boulogne or along the coast to hold in readiness a detachment of 200 men from each corps, making a total of 2600 men for the thirteen battalions. These detachments are to take up their march for Mayence on October 10. I have made known to General Lacuee my ideas as to the distribution of conscripts of the reserve. There is not a moment to lose; you will find herewith the decree which I have just issued. The muster roll will be drawn up by M. Lacuée. I have advised him to give the larger number of conscripts to those regiments which have received none this year. In accordance with this decree you will at once issue orders in conformity with the muster roll to be drawn up by M. Lacuée. I simply desire that you will neither have this list printed nor the decree, which you will communicate in portions to each prefect. You will report to me at once, distinguishing the conscripts of the departments of the West from those of the South, that I may know the exact moment of each departure.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10884
(WD Files)

Mayence, 28 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have received your letters of the 24th. I arrived this morning at Mayence. All the dismounted troops of my Guard have arrived, as they came by truck; but the mounted troops of the Guard and my artillery will not arrive for five or six days. It is therefore desirable that you issue orders to General Songis to have twelve guns from the reserve park ready at Wurtzbourg, in order to attach them provisionally to the foot troops of the Guard as they pass through this place. Assemble as much flour as possible at Wurtzbourg and Bamberg.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG

CN—10885
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 28 September, 1806.

MY DEAR BROTHER:

I have arrived at Mayence. My entire army should at this moment be in march. As the last messenger from my minister at Berlin crossed me, I do not positively know the latest conditions of affairs. I beg your Majesty to write me what he knows about this. I request that he let me know what will be the composition of his troops, who will command them, when they will be assembled, how he desires that I employ them.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF BADEN

CN—10886
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 28 September, 1806.

The Grand Duke should have received the requisition for his contingent. Advise me if you intend to command them. Let me also know what is its strength, and when

it will be at its assembly point. Expedite your movements as much as possible. Please send me information concerning the road from Manheim to Neckarelz and Wurtzbourg.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE DUKE OF NASSAU-WEILBURG

CN—10887
(Imperial Files)

Mayence, 28 September, 1806.

I beg your Highness to let me know the strength of the troops which he will be able to furnish, the day when they will be assembled near Mayence, and the name of the officer who will command them.

NAPOLEON.

MARCH TABLES FOR THE I CORPS OF MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

B—225

From September 28th to October 2d, inclusive.

Dates	Billets at end of March			Nature of Billet	Depth of Billet	Length of Marches		Remarks
	Advance Guard	Head	Tail			for head	for tail	
28 September	Bruck	Furth	Heilbronn	March billet	24 kilom.	"	"	The advance guard, and the distance to the advance guard, are included in the depths of billets. The advance guard was composed of the Werle's Brigade (27th Light Infantry). The distances to the advance guard were: On 28 Sept. -----10 kilom. On 29 Sept. -----9 kilom. On 30 Sept. -----10 kilom. On 1 Oct. -----6 kilom. On 2 Oct. -----16 kilom. On 3 Oct. -----12 kilom. counting from the tail of the advance guard brigade to the head of the main body.
29 September	Forchheim	Baiersdorf	Furth	March billet	22 kilom.	22	24	
30 September	Bamberg	Hirschaid	Forchheim	March billet	12 kilom.	20	30	
1 October	Staffelstein	Ebensfeld	Bamberg	March billet	20 kilom.	32	24	
2 October	Kronach	Hochstedt	Staffelstein	March billet	15 kilom.	20	25	
3 October	Echelon from Kronach to Kronach	Redwitz	Lichtenfels	March billet	14 kilom.	6	7	
4 —								
5 —								
6 —								

MARCH TABLE FOR THE III CORPS OF MARSHAL DAVOUT

B—230

September 28th to October 2d, 1806, inclusive.

Dates	Billets at end of March			Nature of Billet	Depth of Billet	Length of Marches		Remarks
	Advance Guard	Head	Tail			For Head	For Tail	
7 September	Gnosheim	Billets ----	(see sketch)					The 1st Division, General Morand, forms the advance guard with the 1st mounted chasseurs, attached to the 3d Division. The distances of the advance guard is: Sept. 28 -----12 kilom. Sept. 29 -----12 kilom. Sept. 30 -----8 kilom. Oct. 1 -----12 kilom. Oct. 2 -----14 kilom.
28 September	Aurach	Erlbach	Gnosheim	Billets in depth	18 kilom.	35	32	
29 September	-----Rest-----		-----Rest-----	Billets in depth				
30 September	Furth	Stein	Schwabach	Billets in depth	12 kilom.	27	33	
1 October	Hirschaid	Forchheim	Erlangen	Billets in depth	12 kilom.	38	38	
2 October	Ebensfeld and Oberndorf	Rosdorf	Forchheim	Billets in depth	18 kilom.	20	14	

TO MONSIEUR CAMBACERES

CN—10888
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Colonel Arrighi is able to furnish all the palace guards since he has the dragoons. But the size of this guard should be decreased; in general Paris should become accustomed to not seeing so many sentinels. It is the only method to withdraw the 6000 men which I have left there and to employ them on the frontiers should circumstances require it.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR FOCHE

CN—10889
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

I have received your letter of the 27th. I advise you to give attention to the conscription. I have called out the reserve. It is quite important that it leaves. All my troops are in march. We are here on the ground. My Guard which did not leave Paris until the 22d, has this moment already passed Francfort. Fatigues and dangers are nothing to me. I will regret the loss of my soldiers, if the injustice of the war which I am obliged to sustain, does not result in causing humanity to feel the disturbance created by weak kings.

NAPOLEON.

It is desirable that Monsieur Bourrienne advise the King of Holland and yourself of what is going on in Hanover.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10890
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

Each corps has one hundred or two hundred maimed men who have been evacuated from the hospitals of the

Grand Army since the last inspection. I have issued an order that on the first of October, Generals Schauenburg and Muller commence inspections everywhere. If there are places to be inspected other than what are assigned to these two, I authorize you to detail acting inspectors. Independently of the inconvenience within corps, there results from this condition of affairs other great inconveniences; first, a large number of men who deserve rewards are sick at the depots and desire to return home or go to the Hotel; secondly, there are many officers, and sergeants among them: they are still carried by their corps and have not been replaced. There is a certain 3d Battalion at Mayence which has twelve officers, all about to be discharged or sent away, so that although this battalion has plenty of officers on paper, it has few available for duty.

I have directed General Macon to inspect tomorrow seven regiments which are at Mayence. As soon as the reports reach you, expedite action on them, and consider my signature as a matter of form; I will sign whatever you have done.

As to the positions which appear vacant as the result of these inspections, send to the corps on the field as replacements, a good number of young men from the school at Fontainebleau and from the Polytechnic School. They will perform marvelous things. It must be recognized that our officers are exhausted, and that without them our army will be lacking. Ask Lacuée for fifty officers and for another one hundred from Fontainebleau, in addition to those which I have previously designated, and send three of them to each of the depots of the army. You will send me the necessary orders to sign. But again consider my signature only as a matter of form. Keep an eye on all the young men at Fontainebleau which I have designated before my departure and see that they join without delay. Write to this effect to the Commandant of the School and to the Governor of Paris.

A major part of the 3d Battalions are only skeletons which can only be re-animated by these young men; however, they have good majors. I authorize you to take from Saint-Cyr two young men, seventeen years old for each regiment as quartermaster corporals; they will be assigned

to the first vacancy of that battalion. One colonel of artillery is needed at Mayence. The major who is here is a good officer, but he has not the head for such a big job. Send here a colonel who will remain here and who can organize the immense material at this place. It might even be suitable to have a general of artillery.

General d'Hautpoul and General Grouchy have not yet arrived. I have designated a large number of major adjutants, and adjutants to join the army. I recommend the Swiss regiments to you. I authorize you to appoint the officers for the 1st Battalions of each regiment. Provide funds for their recruitment, so that these regiments will finally amount to something. Monsieur Maillardoz is the major adjutant; he has good intentions and understands the habits and conditions of the Swiss. Work with him, and take necessary measures so that within two months I will have one regiment each at Lille, Rennes, and Avignon to act according to circumstances. The small Valais Battalion which I have assembled at Geneva, is quite important to me to protect this town. Remove obstacles, appoint officers and see that within two months these four hundred or five hundred men will be ready at Geneva.

An Italian Regiment should have arrived at Paris and another at Orleans; direct both of them to proceed to Mayence.

The legion of the north which Zajonchek commands is too far to the north, towards Juliers; I prefer that it be at Landau. I authorize you to appoint their officers. But there is not a moment to lose. Deserters will commence to come in, and they are being lost to us as no one knows where to send them to.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10893
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Write to Marshal Bernadotte to start his march for Kronach and to occupy the exits of the Saxon Mountains,

while keeping within the frontier, but taking up a good position to protect and advance into Saxony. Have him reconnoiter the roads to Leipzig and to Dresden. I understand that Kronach and Koenigshofen are being armed and provisioned. Marshal Lefebvre will reconnoiter the exits of the mountains leading to Saxony and the roads to Erfurt and to Leipzig. Let him take a good position for his advance guard and arm and provision Koenigshofen. Have him send out some spies and reconnaissances to obtain reports from travelers towards Fulda.

For the present, war has not been declared. A sharp guard must be kept and reports daily sent in. The cavalry must not be uselessly fatigued. All Marshal Bernadotte's light cavalry should be placed in advance of the Kronach; that of Marshal Lefebvre beyond Koenigshofen, Marshal Bernadotte will have his headquarters between Lichtenfels and Kronach. Marshal Soult's light cavalry will take position on the frontier of the Bayreuth, opposite Kreussen; he will post his advance guards in a good position. Between Koenigshofen and Bruckenaus there must be a road which goes through Neustadt. It is necessary that Marshal Lefebvre reconnoiter this road, under the supposition that there are Prussians at Fulda so that from his position at Koenigshofen he may be able to fall upon the enemy if he attempts to go from Fulda towards Wurtzbourg.

It is necessary that Marshal Bernadotte carry out his reconnaissances and dispositions secretly so that he can from Kronach interrupt the route from Erfurt to Hof.

Issue orders to Marshal Ney to assemble all his corps at Nurnberg.

NAPOLEON.

War has not been declared; communications must be pacific; no hostilities must be committed.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10894
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

My intention is to assemble the I Corps of the Grand Army at Nurnberg. However, in going over my notes I find that I wrote you "to Bamberg." In consequence, issue orders to Marshal Ney to hasten his march so as to be assembled at Nurnberg on October 3d, instead of Anspach. Give orders to all the cavalry divisions which have remained in the rear to continue their march to take their positions between Wurtzbourg and Lichtenfels.

NAPOLÉON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG [MURAT]

CN—10895
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

Proceed in person to Wurtzbourg. From there you will write to Marshal Lefebvre at Koenigshofen, to Marshal Davout at Bamberg and to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who should be at Kronach. Cause the reserve divisions to march in such manner that they will be as far as possible between Schweinfurt and Kronach. You will take care that the citadel of Wurtzbourg is occupied, armed and provisioned, so as to be safe against a raid. You will send spies towards Fulda. You will advise me as to the condition of the cavalry divisions and of their need for men, in order that what is not needed by you may be retained at Mayence. You will place cavalry posts beyond Karlstadt, to the limit of the territory of Fulda, to ascertain clearly the movements of the enemy. You will send me the information which you may be able to procure at the entrances of the roads from Koenigshofen to Erfurt and from Kronach to Leipzig. You will send a greater part of this baggage to Bamberg, while retaining at Wurtzbourg that which may be necessary. I have ordered Marshal Lefebvre to take a good position at Koenigshofen and to reconnoiter the route to Fulda so as to fall upon the enemy should he approach too close to Wurtzbourg.

War has not been declared. The frontiers of Wurtzbourg and Bavaria must consequently not be crossed. But it will be permissible to cross some small parties if it will be necessary in order to occupy a good position controlling the entrances to Saxony. Send engineer officers to Koenigs-hofen and to Fulda to thoroughly reconnoiter the roads; they will make reports on military positions which they note.

NAPOLEON.

You will be perfectly frank with the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg. You will notify him that the treaty which places him within the Confederation has been signed in Paris. In order to be freer in your movements you will not stop at the chateau; you will stop outside the town.

You will send me two messages a day.

SITUATION REPORTS FORWARDED BY MARSHAL BERTHIER TO NAPOLEON ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1806

B—107

[These reports appear to have been sent about 11:00 P.M., September 26, when Marshal Berthier was leaving with GHQ from Munich for Wurtzbourg. Apparently through poor work of the courier system the report was not delivered to Napoleon at Mayence until the afternoon of September 29.]

1. A letter from Marshal Bernadotte, dated September 23, advising him that if the Prussians made a forward movement, Suchet's Division would be placed rapidly between Anspach and Uffenheim ready to move either on Bamberg, on Schewinfurt, or on Wurtzbourg.

2. Reports under date of the 24th, as to the billeting areas of the six divisions of cavalry of the reserve, and reporting on the execution of orders as of September 24, for movements of the Grand Army.

3. Report from Captain Beaulieu, Engineers, from Berlin, where he had been sent by Marshal Berthier in compliance with Napoleon's orders of September 5. In this report Captain Beaulieu states positively that the Corps of Gen-

eral Tauenzien, estimated at 2,000 men, had fallen back from the defiles from Bayreuth and Borneck on Munchberg and Hof. Captain Beaulieu added: "Our enemies have taken advantage of the position of our army with respect to the Prussian frontier to inspire distrust with his Majesty the King of Prussia."

4. A report from Marshal Soult, dated September 24, 1806, stating that:

(a) According to General Beaumont commanding the 3d Division of Dragoons at Amberg, there are 9,000 to 10,000 Prussians at Hof.

(b) An army of 30,000 to 40,000 men has entered Saxony, and is advancing very slowly.

5. Summary of reports from Marshal Bernadotte, dated September 24, stating that the King of Prussia had left Berlin for Halle.

6. A letter from Marshal Lefebvre, Vth Corps, dated Dunkelspuhl, 24 September, 1806, stating that Meinungen had been occupied by Prussian hussars belonging to a regiment other than that stationed in the principality of Coburg, and that one regiment of infantry of 4 battalions (the Nerembauer Chasseurs) was marching from Erfurt towards Cobourg.

7. A second letter from Marshal Lefebvre dated the 24th, reporting that in accordance with measures agreed upon between himself and Marshal Bernadotte, a brigade of cavalry of the Vth Corps had been stationed at Hamelburg to cover Wurtzbourg and to protect the left flank and rear of General Gazan, near Schweinfurt. The 2d Brigade of Light Cavalry under General Treilliard was reported as having moved to Munnerstadt in order to cover Schweinfurt, and to reconnoiter the roads towards Meinungen, Koenigshofen and Hildburghausen.

8. A letter from Marshal Bernadotte, dated September 25, 1806, reporting that Gazan's Division being too much scattered in the vicinity of Schweinfurt, one brigade from Suchet's Division had been placed between Dettelbach and Wurtzbourg in support.

9. Summary of reports from Marshal Bernadotte dated September 25, stating:

(a) In the vicinity of Hof a camp has been established for 60,000 or 70,000 men.

(b) The greater part of the troops that were in Magdeburg have proceeded to Halle.

(c) The troops from Hanover under the orders of General Ruchel have arrived at Eisenach, Gotha and Erfurt. Detachments have advanced towards Meinungen and Co-bourg.

(d) Nothing exceeds the presumption of Prussian officers.

(e) It is estimated that the Prussian and Saxon troops which are at Halle, Leipsig and Dresden or en route thereto consist of 120,000 to 130,000 men.

(f) There is considerable desertion in the Prussian Infantry; each regiment has already lost 200 men.

(g) Reports from Bohemia state that the Austrians are making movements.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10896
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, 3:30 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have received your letter of 11:00 P.M. of the 26th.

The Grand Duke of Berg has left for Wurtzbourg, where he will be tonight.

I sent you a letter this morning of which I enclose a copy in case the first messenger failed to find you. You will see that my intention is that Marshal Lefebvre takes a good position beyond Koenigshofen, Marshal Bernadotte's corps near Kronach and Marshal Soult's as close as practicable to Bayreuth; that Marshal Ney's corps assemble at Nuremberg; and that all the cavalry divisions, to whom the Grand Duke of Berg will send separately orders directly, proceed to their positions between Schweinfurt and Bamberg.

As to the Bavarians they are not bothering themselves to become a part of Marshal Bernadotte's corps. I will retain them under my direct orders.

Issue orders to General Wrede's corps to leave for Eichstedt and to assemble as soon as possible at Nurnberg. I assume that General Wrede's corps is independent of the garrisons of Forchheim, etc.

Dupont's division will be at Wurtzbourg during October 1st; it stopped last night at Francfort.

The dismounted part of my guard will be at Wurtzbourg about October 2d; it left Mayence this morning.

I have sent a detachment of 800 men belonging to Marshal Davout's corps along with my Guard under the orders of Adjutant Major Levasseur. From Wurtzbourg this detachment will continue on to Bamberg, and Marshal Davout will incorporate it in his corps.

I have sent this morning from Wurtzbourg 2000 quintals of flour which will arrive at Wurtzbourg October 2d. I have sent 6 howitzers, 24-pounders, with 400 rounds per gun and 6 Austrian guns, 12-pounders, to arm the Wurtzbourg citadel. These guns will not arrive until the 10th day, that is, October 9th. See that General Songis sends an artillery officer towards Aschaffenburg to hasten the march of these guns if it can be done. I have also sent 1500 quintals of flour from Spire to Wurtzbourg. I have taken several measures to provision Mayence and Wesel, not in as gigantic a manner as the quartermaster general desires but sufficiently so for current events.

There will be at Mayence within a few days flour, rice and brandy for issue to the army.

The cavalry, heavy baggage, and the artillery of my Guard crossed the Rhine at Manheim and continue toward Wurtzbourg. I desire that you organize this Manheim route as I wish it to be the army route for everything from Strasbourg and for all the most important objects. It will therefore be necessary that there be a commander at Manheim in correspondence with you.

I have just received your letter of the 28th from Wurtzbourg.

I wish that Marshal Lefebvre be at Koenigshofen on the 2d since he can be there. I approve thoroughly of the measures that you have taken to have the Bavarian artil-

lery at Ingolstadt, proceed to Wurtzbourg. I note that it will be there on October 2d or 3d. I am sorry to note that Marshal Ney's corps is still behind its schedule.

NAPOLEON.

What is important is that there shall be on the ground at Wurtzbourg a Commandant, some artillery officers and two companies of artillery and that provision be promptly placed in this citadel.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10897
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

It is necessary to appoint a general to command at Wurtzbourg.

It is necessary to see the Elector and make him understand the necessity for requiring a large quantity of wheat and flour to abundantly provision Wurtzbourg, not only for issue to the troops, but also to provide for the citadel. I have written to the prince Primate to send a quantity of flour to Wurtzbourg.

You do not mention any movements nor the arrival of the park. The principal thing is have something to live on at Wurtzbourg; accounts can be settled later.

I assume that you have some spies at Fulda. If you can go quickly to Koenigshofen to observe the defensive position of Marshal Lefebvre and his arrangements at this place to fall upon the enemy in case he marches from Fulda to Wurtzbourg do so. I would particularly like to know the relations of Koenigshofen with Cobourg and Kronach, and of Kronach with Hof. Send some engineer officers who will not only reconnoiter the exits from Koenigshofen on the main road towards Halle, from Bamberg to Cobourg, and from Kronach to Saalburg to Schleitz and which leads to Leipzig, but who will also report on the relations of Koenigshofen with Cobourg and Kronach. If after having

posted Marshal Lefebvre beyond Koenigshofen it does not become convenient to me to have them advance on Hildburghausen to avoid compromising himself with the enemy, and should I wish him to come to Cobourg, stealing a march on the enemy without crossing the frontiers of Saxony and the small chain of mountains which I suppose are between Saxony and Wurtzbourg, what road should I take for Marshal Lefebvre's corps? How far will he have to withdraw? For it may be possible in not wishing to have an engagement with the enemy who may advance as far as Hildburghausen, that I may support him on my center at Cobourg, and that my center being assembled, I may cause him to fall back on Kronach. It is therefore necessary that I should know what road Marshal Lefebvre should take in order to reach Cobourg, in rear of my outposts, and from Cobourg to Kronach also in rear of my outposts. Send a staff officer to Marshal Soult with orders to rejoin you as soon as that Marshal is in position. It is there that I wish to commence, if I am still obliged to make war. I think that it will be useless for you to come to Mayence. Remain at Wurtzbourg. I expect to join you myself in order to ascertain the last reply to the King of Prussia; he has sent a chamberlain to me who has not yet reached me; he has been seen on the road to Metz. Have all the territory studied between Hof and Koenigshofen from a viewpoint of an advance and also of a flank march.

NAPOLÉON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10898
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

I have only just received your letter of September 24th, from which I note that you will be at Wesel on October 1st.

Here is a brief statement of the situation: war has not been declared by the Prussians; but every one believes it will be in a few days.

Send me an exact return of your army corps, and have them billeted about the town. Send your light cavalry to

the frontiers to observe the enemy, but without committing themselves.

Unite with your troops the Duke of Cleves's Battalion. Have a bridge thrown across at Wesel; see that this place is armed and provisioned; make plenty of demonstrations with your army corps. Have inserted in the Dutch newspapers that new divisions are arriving from France, and are going to join you. Spread abroad the statement that your army will have 80,000 men. Send spies towards Munster. According to my information the Prussians cannot have more than five battalions; but you must not commit yourself. I will acquaint you with my plan of campaign, but for your information only, through an officer which I will send to you tomorrow. It is very important that you have a bridge at Wesel in order that you may withdraw beyond the Rhine, if I decide to drive a large detachment of the enemy towards the Rhine. There are newspapers at Dusseldorf; have notices inserted in them as to your arrival and see that the inhabitants believe that you have plenty of troops and are expecting still more.

Send a message to Monsieur Bignon, my minister at Cassel, with a letter so written that it will not be objectionable should it be intercepted. Ask him as to the intentions of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, whether he is friendly or hostile and such information as his position allows him to give. You will advise him that you are assembling 80,000 men on the lower Rhine, but that the Elector need not be in any way alarmed about this, if he does not declare himself against France.

I sent yesterday a message to General Loison at Wesel not knowing that you were there.

All my army is in march. I do not know if your messenger will find me at Mayence; but he will receive there orders from Marshal Kellermann as to how to reach the point where I am. It is desirable that you send me an intelligent officer by whom I can send you my instructions.

I strongly approve your idea of having some gun boats come to Wesel. Send me two of them if you can to Mayence; but they must be light. Correspond with Marshal Kellermann, who will advise you about everything.

Prince Murat tells me that he has turned over his command of the Duchy to General Damas, whom you used to know in Egypt. He will send out spies and will correspond with you.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—10899
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

The King of Holland has sent me an invoice for 200,000 rations of hard bread at Wesel. I found practically nothing at Mayence; the commissary has only 2,000 quintals of flour in warehouse, which I am sending to Wurtzbourg. The measure to provision Mayence by requisition has not yet been taken. The commissary did not even know of the order. It is very necessary, nevertheless, that I have in this town all the provisions that I have asked for.

Neither the pots nor pans nor shoes have arrived at Mayence from Strasbourg. It seems that this depot has not yet received the order as to this.

The cavalry regiments have not yet received information as to the funds which I assigned to them to purchase horses. This has become very important; bestir yourself on all these matters. Require the corps to march by markets. Authorize the Hussars and the Chasseurs to purchase horses smaller than four foot three inches. Also authorize the heavy cavalry and the Dragoons to purchase horses below the prescribed height; there are this type of horses everywhere in France, and it is better to buy six year olds from the peasants than to buy three or four year old remounts which will not be available for use for two years.

NAPOLEON.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN
TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10900
(WD Files)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I hope your army corps will have arrived at Amberg on October 3d. I am leaving tomorrow with my headquarters for Wurtzbourg. War has not yet been declared; but things hang by a thread. You should consequently continue to be specific. But you will prepare to carry out the following plan. My intention is that you should be able to arrive at Baireuth with your entire corps on the 5th having four days' rations of bread and field equipment; and that you will be able to arrive at Hof dislodging the enemy on the 7th. But as I will be at Bamberg, based on the reports which you will make to me during the 5th you will receive more detailed instructions for the 6th and the 7th. Reports from you as to the enemy's situation at Hof are necessary for me.

This is not an order of execution, but an instruction to advise you while waiting my orders to enter Bayreuth. You will proceed to the limit of the frontier between Bamberg and Baireuth. According to this plan you will be the first one to enter into the enemy's country. You and your army corps should note the regard I have for you. I await with pleasure the moment when I may see you again. Send me by the officer whom I am sending to you, an exact return of your command, organization by organization as well as the condition of the materiel of your artillery. In principle, in all your battle formations, form in two or three lines, one division composing the right of the two or three lines, another division the center of the two or three lines, another division the left of the two or three lines. You saw at Austerlitz the advantage of such a formation, where the division commander is at the center of his division.

In sending you the order to enter Bayreuth I will advise you how to treat that country. On October 3d, Marshal Ney with his army corps will be at Nurnberg; Marshal Davout at Bamberg; Marshal Bernadotte at Kronach; Marshal Lefebvre at Koenigshofen; Marshal Augereau at Wurtzbourg; all the reserve cavalry between Kronach and the

Main. I believe it necessary to give you an idea of the general positions of the army. As soon as you are at Bayreuth your time of operations must be based on Nurnberg; it is on this town you must send your evacuations. Prisoners which you take may be sent to Forchheim.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL RAPP

CN—10901
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

It is necessary that you be at Wurtzbourg October 2d; Go there directly. The two battalions of dragoons have arrived. From the last return which you have sent me, it appears that the infantry can forward 1248 men; the light infantry 634; the cavalry and dragoons 195 mounted men; and the chasseurs and hussars 66. Please let me know if all these detachments have left. As Mayence is not on the direct line order them to proceed straight to Wurtzbourg; but have them march in order under the orders of a staff officer, and send me their march order so that I may know the day they will arrive.

I have appointed General Bisson to command the 5th Division; but as he may be late in joining, have the most competent brigadier general command the division in the meantime; at the same time write General Bisson who is at Besançon that it is important that he come to Strasbourg; that you are proceeding to the army, and that there is no one present to take your place and supervise matters. In proceeding to Wurtzbourg you will go through Carlsruhe where you will visit the Grand Duke. You will also see the Hereditary Prince to find out if he is in command of his corps, what will be its force, and what day it will be assembled. You will also visit the Princess. I wish that you would go personally as far as Manheim and follow the Wurtzbourg road to determine if everything is ready for the mounted troops of my Guard and for the artillery which are to pass this week. I have authorized you to detail aides. I presume you have one of them; order him to Augsburg

to note what troops have left there and the situation of the French who remain. He will make the similar notes at Ulm, and will then proceed with both sets of notes to Wurtzbourg.

Why is not the finance officer yet here? If he has not received the order give it to him and see that he leaves without delay. I presume you will receive this message on the morning of the 30th. Return the messenger at once with the answers to these questions. Do not forget to send me also a return of General Oudinot's materiel, personnel and equipment which you have ordered to Mayence.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

CN—10902
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, Midnight.

DEAR COUSIN:

Please inform me what you have noticed towards Cassel and Fulda. As it is possible that you will receive an order to proceed to Wurtzbourg, it will be necessary that you procure four days' rations and prepare to withdraw your detachments, so as to be at Wurtzbourg, October 3d. I will send you orders tomorrow, the 30th, before midnight. Do not disclose your movement, march in such manner that the route that you take will not be suspected. I assume that the 20th Chasseurs has joined your army corps.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL MERLE, GOVERNOR OF BRAUNAU


CN—10903
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, Midnight.

DEAR GENERAL MERLE:

I am sending you a message to advise you that I have arrived at Wurtzbourg, that the army is assembled there. Hostilities with the Prussian Army have not commenced;

2. POSITIONS OF THE GRAND ARMY PRESCRIBED FOR 3 OCTOBER 1806,
BY THE ORDER OF 29 SEPTEMBER.



but what is important is to have a report on your post and what is going on there. I hope that there will be no occasion to have you give me proofs of your courage, in view of my relations with the Austrian Empire; but if such a case should arise, I am counting on you, on your talent, and on the bravery of the troops which you command. It will not be unsuitable if without appearing to make a point of it, you will allow the information to be given out that everything is arranged with Prussia.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR OTTO

CN—10904
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, Midnight.

I am sending you a messenger to Braunau to obtain news from General Merle as to affairs in his vicinity. I am giving him the order to return via Munich, and I wish that you would advise me of everything that you know. Our headquarters will be at Wurtzbourg tomorrow, and probably on October 5th at Bamberg. Ask General Deroy for a return and list of the stations of each of his regiments. I would like to have him send me these to Wurtzbourg, so that communication may be frequent. If the messenger needs special instructions about going to Braunau, you will give them to him.

Write by messenger to the viceroy of Italy, giving him news of what is going on. Clear up false rumors so common in war; write to the viceroy to send on news from Naples by courier. Each time that rumors of disastrous events arise, or when you learn of important events, do not fail to send a messenger to Milan, charged with nothing more than to secretly deliver a letter. It is desirable that you have rumors started towards Braunau that everything is arranged with Prussia, but without appearing too much in this. I am not writing to the King of Bavaria, as you can tell him of everything that I could write him.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL RAPP

CN—10905

(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, Midnight.

I have received today at midnight your letter of September 28th. I sent you a messenger six hours ago and I am now sending you another to advise you that my intention is that the four battalions which you have organized should debark at Mannheim and proceed as rapidly as possible to Wurtzbourg. Are these three battalions composed of grenadiers and riflemen or of line companies? Let me know in order that I may determine what I can do with them.

Order the battalion of the 28th Light Infantry to Mayence, this battalion should rejoin its regiment near this place. Ponton trains are useless at Mayence, send them to Bamberg.

Do not carry out the order of the minister who has directed dismounted men to be sent from the depots of the cavalry regiments to the war squadrons; at the same time let me know what the minister has asked for, and a report as to such of these dismounted men which you have already forwarded and as to those who remain in the depots.

The twenty-five boats are very important; give your entire attention to them; have them escorted by a strong detachment commanded by a superior officer; give them if necessary funds to overcome obstacles which they may meet enroute, and see that they are at Bamberg by October 5th.

Take good care to send the army at Wurtzbourg whatever you can draw from depots, leaving with the 3d Battalions such officers and non-commissioned officers as are necessary to receive conscripts who are about to arrive from all directions.

Also visit the trains; direct them to purchase draft horses, there is a deficiency within the army; put in march all that you can of these trains for Wurtzbourg, where I have already informed you that you are to be by October 1st at the latest.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—706

Mayence, 29 September, 1806, Midnight.

You must no longer include the Oudinot division in the returns of the 5th corps; this division is dissolved and no longer exists.*

NAPOLEON.

UCN—707

NOTE

(Joined to the despatch of September 29, 1806)

I see by a map which I have, that there is one road from Koenigshofen which leads straight to Cobourg, passing by Heldburg, on this side of the watershed, in such a way that, masking the heights, Cobourg may be reached without dislodging the enemy who might be at Hildburg-hausen.

From Cobourg to Kronach I find a road which joins the highway from Lichtenfels to Zeulen. Ascertain if this road is in good order.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—708

Mayence, 29 September, 1806.

M. Dejean, I have your letter of the 26th; order General Bourcier to proceed to Wurtzbourg, where he will resume command of his division of dragoons.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE PRINCE PRIMATE

CN—10907

(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have received your letter. The movements of the Prussians oblige me to hasten my own. Large numbers of

*In the hand of General Mathew Dumas.

troops arrive every moment at Wurtzbourg. I would like if possible that you send them 20,000 quintals of wheat or of flour. They will be promptly paid for at the current price. The haste required to have this flour arrive at Wurtzbourg is the only reason why I write to your Highness about it. I beg you to charge one of your ministers to see that the flour arrives as soon as possible to provision that place. I also beg you to send me through the officer whom I am sending to you, news which you may have about Cassel, Fulda and vicinity. I am unable to give you any news as to the negotiations with Prussia. It seems that a Prussian courier crossed me enroute. At the same time do not be alarmed and never doubt as to my constant and firm intention to protect the Confederation and especially to be agreeable to you.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR DE MONTESQUIOU

CN—10908
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806, 2:00 P.M.

Monsieur De Montesquiou will leave at 2:00 A.M. to carry the attached letter to Marshal Soult at Amberg. He will bring back to me the return of his troops, a general idea as to the roads, and will seek me as early as possible at Headquarters. If Marshal Soult has not yet arrived at Amberg, he will go to meet him. He will be particularly careful to ascertain the day when all the troops of the general will be assembled there. The letter which he carries is of the greatest importance. He will destroy it rather than allow it to be captured. In any case, it is advisable that he carry it in a secret manner.

NAPOLEON.

NOTE:—The enclosure appears to be CN—10900 which was apparently dictated earlier in the night and was sent out about 2:00 A.M.—C.H.L.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10909
(WD Files)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

In considering as to how to supply my army with munitions, I have felt the necessity of having two strong points where I can establish my depots, Wurtzbourg and Forchheim.

I have already given you orders about Wurtzbourg and I need not add to them. Have places selected for the depots and shops. As for Forchheim, appoint a commanding officer for that place; direct that the place be armed and provisioned, send and find out its present condition; have designated, places for infantry ammunition and artillery ammunition; for wood dumps; and see that a small arsenal be established without delay the same as at Wurtzbourg. In prescribing dispositions so important for the artillery, you will understand the need of informing the General Staff and administration services. All the prisoners which may be made will be sent either to Forchheim or Wurtzbourg according to circumstances. Forchheim will probably be the point more often used.

Have a hospital of 500 sick, and ration depot established at Forchheim. Have sent to Forchheim the 35,000 rations of hard bread at Passau. Have bakeries constructed there with the necessary personnel and have assembled there 15,000 quintals of flour, in such manner that whatever may happen my corps may depend on either Forchheim or Wurtzbourg to find their ammunition, rations and a place of support.

These two places are equally sheltered against raids; both places are fairly strong. Bavarians are at Forchheim; an artillery company may be sent there. I believe that there are two companies at Wurtzbourg, who are working at fortifying the place. Issue orders to the quartermaster general to have everything organized as indicated. I do not like Bamberg, as it is an open place; and it is important that my depots be within a fortified place.

You are sufficiently experienced in war and of my manner of directing operations. You understand the importance of Forchheim and Wurtzbourg; note that Forchheim has the double advantage of serving me against Bohemia, and that an operation may arise, when by entirely refusing my left, I may be deprived for a considerable time of the use of the strong point of Wurtzbourg. Have therefore ten bakeries constructed at Wurtzbourg and ten bakeries at Forchheim, and do not lose time in supplying these places with flour, brandy and forage. Plenty of commandants will be useless to you in Bavaria; send them to these places. Determine a route for the artillery from Augsbourg to Forchheim, and from Augsbourg to Wurtzbourg.

Forchheim is going to be in this new campaign what Braunau was a year ago.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10910
(WD Files)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806, 3:30 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I received your letter of the 25th only at midnight today. General Songis is wrong to make excuses; an artillery park without bridge materiel is entirely too absurd; and if that from Vienna are worthless obtain lighter ones of which idea I strongly approve. I have ordered General Rapp to send twenty-five pontons from Strasbourg to Bamberg. They will be there October 5th I hope. I have issued orders to trains in France and Italy; I am sending you a copy. I have allotted funds for remounts; I sent you the memorandum. General Songis's idea to purchase 1000 horses is none the less excellent. Send orders by special messenger to the Director of the park to buy 2000 horses, if he can find good ones. We cannot have too many artillery horses, and certainly I have today wagons with the Grand Army requiring 20,000 horses. Finally, it is at last time for the park to do something. I no longer wish to have eleven or twelve thousand wagons following me. Tell Songis that this is

only of use to the enemy. I do not wish more than 400 wagons. But I do not understand that one-half are tool wagons or artillery baggage wagons, etc. I understand that these are wagons for infantry ammunition and artillery ammunition, for repairs, and for twenty or thirty spare cannon ready for the day of battle. Out of these 400 wagons I do not want more than 30 of them to contain spare parts for the park, the remainder should contain cartridges and munitions. This is my wish. In this manner the park may be of some use to me, will never interfere, and if it slightly delays my operation, it will be a reasonable delay according with conditions. Therefore, write to General Songis that if I have 30,000 horses I do not want in the organization of my army more than 400 wagons in the park.

Have General Songis make a return of wagons, and send them to Bamberg if they are yet at Augsbourg, or to Wurtzbourg if they are already enroute; that he have with the munition park, cannon, cannoneers and one or two companies of mechanics, the Conductor General of the park and all the artillery personnel not assigned to army corps. This park will be of immense use to me. A repair shop will be established in the citadel of Wurtzbourg and one in the citadel of Forchheim. A dump for artillery ammunition and for infantry ammunition will be established at Wurtzbourg and another at Forchheim.

The supplies from the country will suffice to rapidly provision these two depots. Some munitions and provisions may even be left at Augsbourg. As I go forward I will select a central fortified point, and I will order that depots be established there according to the means of the country; but this has nothing to do with the mobile park.

My park therefore must be divided into four parts: 400 wagons will follow the army with a company of mechanics, all my ponton troops and all the artillery personnel; a large repair shop will be established in the citadel of Wurtzbourg and at Forchheim; mechanics and tools will be sent there; dumps for ammunition, spare parts and all kinds of material will be sent there; but in such manner that at least one-third of what I have will remain at Augsbourg, so that if I retreat on Augsbourg or on Forchheim or if I maneuver on

Wurtzbourg, I may find at these places supplies to refill my wagons and repair my artillery. The park reduced to absolute necessity will follow the army.

General Songis will report to me every day how things are going, what he is doing, and I will give orders for re-supplies and for forming new depots. This is the way to make war; all other ways are absurd.

Summary. Independent of the orders that you will send to General Songis, direct him to buy 2000 horses. I have sufficient wagons with the army to require more than this number; but they must not be used for private purposes, they must not be attached to the wagons of officers or generals. I will be inexorable as to this and I will not allow any one to use artillery horses or wagons.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10911
(WD Files)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I see no objection to occupying Neustadt. What led me to send an advance guard to Koenigshofen is that I thought that there was on the territory of this country beyond Koenigshofen, and within Bavaria, a good position which could command the entrances to Meinungen and Hildburghausen. My intention being not to advance by Meinungen and Gotha but to concentrate my left on Cobourg, it is necessary that the two divisions of Marshal Lefebvre occupy a position in rear of Neustadt, and that he have a route reconnoitered that he can follow by flank march, and which will be concealed from the enemy via the road from Wurtzbourg to Cobourg without passing through Bamberg to avoid interference with the other army corps. It will therefore be necessary for him to have cavalry detachments on the high ground between Meinungen and Neustadt as far as the Bavarian frontier in order to prevent, at the proper moment, all communications and to mask the movement from the enemy, my intention being to arrive at Saalfeld before the enemy is there in very great force and there-

fore send an engineer officer to reconnoiter a Bavarian front as far as Heldburg and even as far as the streams which I believe are beyond Cobourg. Send another to reconnoiter the stream lines between Meinungen and Melrichstadt, beyond Neustadt. See that Marshal Lefebvre assembles his army corps. I do not wish to see General Gazan's division scattered in the mountains; a few pickets or at the most a few detachments are all that are needed; have his division with its artillery assemble in rear of Neustadt; have him send reconnaissances and cavalry pickets on to the high ground as I have indicated above. I await information of these two reconnaissances which are very important. If you have any tools at Wurtzbourg, I would not be displeased to have the pretense made of constructing a redoubt on the ground between Meinungen and Neustadt, on the high ground of the ridge lines on the Wurtemberg frontier, also on the ridge line between Kronach and Lobenstein. At the same time it is necessary that Marshal Bernadotte have on this high ground an infantry advance guard; it will suffice if it there on the 4th. I am sorry not to have received a report of a reconnaissance of Kronach; I would much prefer this place if it is as good as Koenigshofen; have it armed and provisioned without delay.

NAPOLEON.

GENERAL ORDERS

IV ARMY CORPS

B—234

Ratisbonne, 30 September, 1806.

General Lewal, 2d Division, will issue orders to the 2d Division to occupy on the 2d of October close billets in the vicinity of Sulzbach, within a radius of $1\frac{1}{2}$ leagues at the most, without however passing the Vils.

General Legrand, 3d Division, will issue orders to the 3d Division to also occupy very close billets by October 3, beyond Amberg, on the left bank of the Vils, from Hahnbach and Gebenbach inclusive, to Pernvied near Amberg, also inclusive.

General Saint-Hilaire, 1st Division, will issue orders to the 1st Division to also assemble by the 3d of October complete at Amberg; it will be billeted in this town and in the nearest villages not occupied by the 2d and 3d Divisions, but at no greater distance than one league.

General Milhaud commanding the light cavalry will regulate the movement of the light cavalry division now at Neuhaus in such manner as to be assembled on October 3d between Hahnbach and Vilseck, occupying this latter town, while leaving the first at the disposal of General Legrand, 3d Division.

General Lariboisiere, commanding the artillery, will issue orders to the artillery park to continue its march towards Amberg, and will regulate its movements in such manner that it will arrive on the evening of October 3d in line with Ebermansdorf, in rear of Amberg, and will have it billeted in this vicinity. Troops will establish military guards about their billets and will be ready to continue their movement on the 4th. General Milhaud will have the main highway from Vilseck to Bayreuth guarded and General Legrand, 3d Division, those which lead to the Naab.

Headquarters will be on the 1st at Amberg, but the Marshal commanding will not be there personally until the 2d. General officers will take care to report as to the execution of these orders.

MARSHAL SOULT.

TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG

CN—10912
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

MY DEAR BROTHER:

I received the letter of your Majesty of the 27th which was brought to me by one of his officers. As I believe that a messenger will arrive more quickly, I am sending my reply directly. I will be very glad to see your Majesty. This is my itinerary: I will be at Wurtzbourg October 2d and at Bamberg the 5th. It would be a great pleasure to me to

have an hour's talk with him on present events. I would have been very glad to await him at Mayence if I were not the greatest slave in the world, obliged to obey a heartless master, calculating events and estimating situations.

I would much like to have his troops assembled by the 10th or 12th about Wurtzbourg or Bamberg. If he has ready at hand a thousand infantry and some squadrons, they can be sent to Wurtzbourg where I will station them until their corps can assemble.

If your Majesty has resolved to look ahead we can arrange the conditions concerning the marriage which we have suspended. It seems to me that the ceremonies should be arranged as they ought to be. It will however, be necessary to act according to circumstances. As for me, your Majesty will thoroughly understand that I am the one man in the world who at this moment is least able to make calculations. It is not as if war was already declared. I do not know if Marshal Laforest has yet left Berlin; I have been told about a Prussian officer bringing me a letter from the King of Prussia; but 3 days have gone since I have heard about this, and I haven't yet seen him.

The Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg has joined the Confederation.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE HEREDITARY GRAND DUKE OF BADEN

CN—10914
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

DEAR SON:

I received your letter of the 27th. I approve of your wish for war service. I will be glad to see you near me. You may proceed to Bamberg by the 4th or 5th of October and send your horses there. If you can at once send to that place your regiment with some cavalry squadrons and some artillery pieces it would be very suitable. As for the rest, I will leave the infantry at some stations near Bamberg until your entire corps can assemble. I presume that for all these arrangements you have the approval of the Grand Duke.

Hasten the departure of your troops as much as possible. The princes of the Confederation are moving. The Prince Primate alone is furnishing 2000 men, and it is therefore well not to be too late.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL JUNOT

CN—10916
(Imperial Archives)

*Mayence, 30 September, 1806.**

GENERAL JUNOT:

The 15th and 58th Light Infantry should be assembled complete at Paris. My intention is that they should have little duty to perform and that this duty might be performed by regiments by week, so that each regiment for eight days will have nothing at all to do. You will have target practice for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. You will pay special attention to the instructions of the conscripts and to the proper organization of these two regiments, so that on the slightest notice I may have them available. They are about to receive conscripts. I hope that these two regiments will have 6000 men between them; the colonels and officers are good; they should make within a month two very good organizations. Also look after the guard duty in Paris, as I am thinking of sending these regiments to Boulogne, Cherbourg and Brittany; and if the Dutch army which is at Wesel needs to be reinforced, my intention is that these two regiments, the 15th and 58th should proceed by truck to the threatened points. This will be a reinforcement of 8000 which is not to be overlooked. It is even possible that events may arise which will require me to have you march with these troops. You see that is important to give your entire attention to them.

Your dragoon depots will soon have 2000 men. I include the 4th which is at Moulins, and the 10th which is at Amiens. Should it be necessary for these troops to march, military police will be assembled for duty in Paris. Be-

*The date of this letter is the date it was sent out, but it appears to have been written on the 29th.—C.H.L.

sides the 3d Battalions which you have you will soon have sufficient conscripts to suffice for police duty in Paris. Pay great attention to all these depots.

NAPOLEON.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MARSHAL KELLERMANN COM-
MANDING THE ARMY OF THE RESERVE
ON THE RHINE AT MAYENCE

CN—10917
(WD Files)

*Mayence, 30 September, 1806.**

It is necessary that Marshal Kellermann have four to six thousand National Guards at Mayence kept under pay. He will billet twelve to fifteen hundred at Passau, with one company of artillery complete, one superior officer to command them, one staff adjutant, one engineer officer and one artillery officer. All these officers and soldiers will be most positively ordered not to sleep outside of and not to go out of Cassel. It is necessary to drill these National Guards with cannon, so that they may be able to assist the artillery. One hundred men will be stationed on the Island of Saint-Pierre, 50 men in the redoubt which protects against inundation, one company in each detached fort who can be relieved weekly or even oftener if necessary. The garrison at Cassel will furnish 200 men for the redoubts at the mouth of the Main. They will be relieved as indicated above. One officer will command Saint-Pierre's Island, and the other the mouth of the Main. The troops which are at Mayence are not to be considered as going to stay there, the defense of this place is a special duty of the National Guard and the four companies of artillery, and in case of emergency to the 6th Reserve Battalions which by reason of the conscripts which they are about to receive, will have a strength of three to four thousand men.

The VIII Corps of the Grand Army consisting of the divisions of Dupas and Lagrange will be assembled at Mayence in the first half of October with a view of being sta-

*The date of this letter is the date it was sent out, but it appears to have been written on the 29th.—C.H.L.

tioned at Francfort. They will act according to circumstances in connection with the garrison of Mayence.

Marshal Kellermann will correspond with the King of Holland who is at Wesel. He must not allow the bridge at Mayence to be crossed by a single detached soldier wishing to join the Grand Army; but he will assemble all men traveling individually, whether they come from hospitals, or have some other good reason for traveling thus, and when they will be one hundred in number, he will send them forward under charge of one or several officers and will take care in sending them that they are properly supplied with whatever is necessary. The route of the army will continue to be from Mayence to Wurtzbourg; but it is possible that orders will issue that no one will later cross the bridge at Mayence and that the route of the army will be from Mannheim to Wurtzbourg. It is therefore desirable to have at Mannheim a staff officer who will receive from Marshal Kellermann and will advise him of everything that he notes. It would be useful for this staff officer to have a National Guard company with him; and a detachment of Military Police might also be necessary for him, so as to enable him to suppress all kinds of disorders and enforce discipline, etc.

There will also be at Mannheim a military commander from the Grand Army, who will report to the chief of staff. It is necessary that Marshal Kellermann hasten as much as possible the equipment and especially the instruction of conscripts; and when they have reached the school of the platoon, they will start target practice; in time of war this is what is most important. It is necessary to impress upon them with the most scrupulous care how to properly clean their muskets and to properly place the flints on their muskets.

As to the cavalry the order has already been given that no horses should be purchased below five year olds. I prefer horses 4'3" high, 5, 6 or 7 years old of which there are a great number of this type in France.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—710

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

Cousin, I have ordered the legion commanded by General Zayonchek to assemble at Landau instead of Juliers. Juliers appears to me too far north.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—711

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, the troops composing the VIIIth corps of the Grand Army should receive campaign rations. The National Guard should receive merely ordinary rations and not the campaign ration.

NAPOLEON.

MEMORANDUM FOR MONSIEUR DE TURENNE

CN—10919
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

M. DeTurenne will leave during the day to take a letter to the King of Holland. He will proceed along the left bank of the Rhine. This note is of the greatest importance. He will deliver it in person and will bring back the reply. When he has delivered the letter, he will proceed to Dusseldorf; he will see the officer who commands there for the Grand Duke of Berg, and ascertain if he has any information to give. When he finds out what is being done and what is being said there, he will return to Mayence and ascertain the route which he should take to rejoin GHQ.

NAPOLEON.

NOTE:—The note carried by Monsieur Turenne referred to above is CN—10920 which follows.—C.H.L.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10920

(Imperial Archives)

*Mayence, 30 September, 1806.**

I am sending you Monsieur De Turenne who is my orderly officer; he will deliver to you in person this letter whose mission is to advise you of the plan of operations which I propose to follow. It is probable that hostilities will commence on October 6th.

1st NOTE

My intention is to concentrate all my forces on my extreme right, leaving the entire space between the Rhine and Bamberg entirely devoid of troops so as to have nearly 200,000 men assembled in the same field of battle. If the enemy sends detachments between Mayence and Bamberg I will be little troubled about it as my line of communications will be based on Forchheim which is a small fortification placed beyond Wurtzbourg. It is therefore necessary that you have all your most important couriers go via Manheim and from there proceed to Forchheim thus reaching me by the surest route. It is impossible to calculate the events of the future as the enemy who thinks my left is on the Rhine and my right in Bohemia, and who believes my line of operations is parallel to my front of battle, may have a great interest to turn my left, in which case I will be able to drive him on the Rhine. Occupy yourself with putting Wesel in the best possible condition, so that you may if circumstances require it, withdraw your entire army across the bridge at Wesel and along the Rhine so as to contain hostile forces and prevent them from passing this obstacle. The VIII Corps of the Grand Army of 18,000 to 20,000 men will be at Mayence on October 10th or 12th, and its orders are not to allow itself to be cut off from the Rhine, to conduct minor operations as far as a line through Francfort, but in case of necessity to withdraw behind the Rhine and support its left on your troops.

*This letter is divided into four parts, all four were dictated during the night of 29th-30th September but at different hours as can be readily seen by comparing one part with the other. All four parts were attached together, signed, and sent off by Monsieur De Turenne.—C.H.L.

2d NOTE

The remarks in my first note given above are all hypothesis. My first marches will threaten the heart of the Prussian monarchy, and the deployment of my forces will be so imposing and so rapid, that it is probable that the entire Prussian army of Westphalia will concentrate on Magdeburg, and that they will all proceed by rapid marches to the defense of the capital. Then, but then only, it will be necessary to send forward an advance guard to seize the county of Marck, Munster, Osnabruck and Ost-Frise by mobile columns who will concentrate in case of need on a central point. As a consequence, the enemy will be unable to obtain either recruits or supplies from the country, while you on the contrary may derive some advantages. You must understand that the mass of your troops are not to get too far from Wesel, so that you will be able to defend your kingdom and the seacoast near Boulogne, if circumstances require it. During the first period of the war, you are to be only on observation; that is to say, as long as the enemy has not been forced beyond the Elbe, I do not count on your corps except as a diversion and to keep the enemy amused until October 12th, which is the date when my operations will be unmasked; and so that if one hostile corps should find itself cut off, and unable to do anything other than to throw itself against Holland or France, it may be unable to penetrate; or finally, in case of a serious and unlucky emergency such as a great battle lost, you will be able, whilst I retreat on the Danube, to defend Wesel and Mayence with your army and the VIII Corps of the Grand Army, which will never go beyond Mayence, while preventing the enemy at the same time from crossing the Rhine and raiding my States.

3d NOTE

It is necessary that you correspond frequently with Marshal Brune, as well as with the Texel in order to be able to reach the seacoast should the English debark there, which I do not however consider probable. It is more probable that they will attempt to debark in Hanover and that by uniting with the Swedes they will soon have 25,000 men. Have no further fear then for Brittany, for Cherbourg nor

for Boulogne, as I have ordered a detachment of 8000 men which I have at Paris to join you by truck, which will take ten days. Having no further fear yourself you can reinforce yourself from the troops at the camp at Zeist and in case of absolute necessity all or part of the VIII Army Corps will leave Mayence to join you by forced marches by the Rhine road. These measures together will give you about 40,000 men, who should be able to sufficiently occupy the Swedes and the English as to prevent them from attacking my army. In all this I see as far as human foresight permits. Besides in spite of the distance we may find ourselves from one another, certain as I am as to Central Germany, I can always within a few days send you similar instructions in accordance with circumstances.

4th NOTE

As soon as the first act of war has occurred it will be possible that I may charge you with occupying Cassel, chasing out the Elector and disarming his troops. The VIII Corps of the Grand Army, a part of your own troops and possibly a detachment from my army to whom I will give this mission, will enable you to carry out this operation. The Elector wishes to remain neutral. But this neutrality does not deceive me, however useful it may be. You must humor him on the ideas which he has shown on this subject without however compromising yourself, by words of esteem for himself, frequent statements of your intention to comply with your orders to remain on good terms with him; all ideas of this kind will keep him for a while on the neutrality to which he has had recourse. As for me, I am well pleased to see the enemy with 10,000 to 12,000 men less on the field of battle than he might have, but I say again the first result of a great victory will be to clear out my rear areas from this secret and dangerous enemy. I only tell you this in order that you may study the terrain; see how much confidence I show you in this.

In any case the garrison of Wesel should consist of the 22d Infantry which I have left there, four companies of artillery which are there now, the Grand Duke of Berg's battalion and if necessary a thousand men drawn from the depots of the 26th Military Division, by organizing 150 men

from each depot taking care not to assign to this number of men more than two officers, 2 sergeants and 4 corporals per depot; in order that if the place should be taken I might not have to regret the loss of a large number of officers and particularly the failure in replacements which will occur in my corps on account of the non-organization of conscripts. I am leaving General Marescot, the senior engineer inspector in rear of the Rhine, with orders to stay either at Mayence or at Wesel, Venloo, Antwerp, Julieres, Maestricht, to fortify these different points and take necessary precautionary measures as circumstances require. You will shortly see him at Wesel.

It is impossible for me to give you more detailed instructions. Have some of your staff officers at the headquarters of Marshal Brune at Boulogne, and some of Marshal Brune's staff officers at your headquarters. Take note of all kinds of news which Marshal Kellermann may gather at Mayence. Write frequently to M. the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès and to Minister Dejean in order to receive news from them. Write even sometimes with the same object in view to General Junot who is in command of my troops in Paris. Never expose your army corps and do not endanger your own person, since they are only a corps of observation. The least check which you might experience would disturb me; my measures might thereby be interrupted and such an event would place the entire north of my empire out of order. Whatever event, on the contrary may occur to me, if I know that you are in rear of the Rhine, I will act more freely and even if a great misfortune occurs to me, I will beat my enemies if I have only 50,000 men left, because free to maneuver, independent of all lines of operations, and undisturbed as to the most important points of my states, I will always have resources and means.

It is possible that actual events are only the commencement of a grand coalition against us, and which circumstances will bring to light. It is therefore well that you take means to increase your artillery. There will be no deficiency of troops; they will come from all directions; but they will not bring with them teams and wagons of which they will have need. You have today thirty pieces of horsed

artillery; it is more than you strictly need, but it will not be enough in case of emergency. Take steps to gradually procure teams in good shape, in such manner that you can be able to assemble 60 horsed guns by the end of November. As we need a cipher I am directing General Clarke, my private secretary, to send you one. But place in cipher only that which is important.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10921
(WD Files)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806, Midnight.

DEAR COUSIN:

I approve of the appointment of the General* whom you have recommended to command Wurtzbourg. I have not received the report on Kronach. This position with those of Wurtzbourg and Forchheim will very well cover my rear. Kronach fortified may be a support point for my advance guard; and with my right supported on Forchheim and my left at Wurtzbourg I will be surrounded by strong places. See then that these places are armed.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL MARESCOT

CN—10922
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

GENERAL MARESCOT:

I thoroughly approve of your recommendation concerning wagons. Submit to me by this evening a plan or order by which the wagons will be attached to sapper battalions as you recommend, and which will regulate the method of purchasing them, of employing them, etc. It is time to do something with regard to these wagons, the service of which is indispensable. It is necessary that the

*General Thouvenot was the officer recommended for this position.—C.H.L.

engineers have with them everything of which they have need. It would be a good idea to place in the wagons a proportionate part of mining tools. I am advised that plenty of tools have left Strasbourg for Wurtzbourg. If that is true, it will probably suffice to send about 15,000 tools to Wurtzbourg which can be loaded on 12 to 15 artillery wagons drawn by requisitioned horses. These wagons can then be attached during the campaign of engineer corps. In this manner the changes and movements of tools from one place to another will be no longer a disgrace to the service. It will be known where everything has been placed; and without a well-established order for all these things in detail, all will be lost, the expenses of the State will be enormous, and I will wind up without having anything.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—709

Mayence, 30 September, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, my decrees of September 17 as to the remounts, and of the 24th as to the victualling of the places, have not yet reached Mayence and here we are at the 30th. I have asked you to send me weekly the number of horses levied, as well for the Breidt crews as for those of the trains in Italy and at Douai. I have authorized General Songis to buy 2000 horses in Germany, to reinforce the artillery train. I do not know whether I have notified you that I do not want horses less than 5 years old, nor any that are unfit to take the field at the beginning of November. That if the chasseurs and hussars and even the dragoons are unable to find horses of the requisite height, they must buy those which are below it. Thus they may be very easily mounted in France, whereas otherwise, it would be impossible. They are to have horses 5 years old and thoroughly serviceable, and they are even to economize on the price, in order to be able to buy more of them. Write a circular despatch to all the corps, and exercise the greatest activity in all these matters. Carry on an uninterrupted correspondence with the depots, and inform me weekly of the number of horses which have arrived.

If you find that there are more men at any depot than can be furnished with horses from the money I have granted, authorize the purchase of enough in addition to place themselves upon a full war footing. I send you a decree to form the 5th squadron of carabiniers and cuirassiers in conformity with the decree of August 31. It is therefore essential that horses be procured by whatever means in order that the 4th squadron, now in depot, may join the army in early November. The 5th squadrons must be formed of men chosen among the invalided officers. There are still some very good ones among them. Only have a care not to name officers of the Grand Army who are on furlough; that would weaken it unjustifiably.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10923
(WD Files)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806, 2:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

Marshal Lefebvre will select a good position beyond Schweinfurt suitable for 40,000 men. I prefer that he remain near Schweinfurt than to go to Neustadt. He will place an outpost on the hills beyond Neustadt and Koenigshofen. General Dupont's division should be at Wurtzbourg; my Guard should arrive there tomorrow. Marshal Augereau will be there the 4th. I will give him orders for this. Marshal Davout remains in the vicinity of Bamberg; and Marshal Bernadotte in the vicinity of Lichtenfels, with advance posts beyond Kronach and in the exits of Cobourg.

Wurtzbourg, Kronach, and Forchheim will be armed and provisioned and hospitals, depots, park, all will be assembled in these places. The small cavalry depots will be assembled at Forchheim. It must be assumed that the enemy will come to Wurtzbourg. I am asking Hesse for 600 men who will be at Wurtzbourg October 6th, to take station there. All the convalescents of the army to the extent of 12 or 15 per regiment will be stationed, those of the corps of Marshals Augereau, Lefebvre and Davout at Wurtzbourg, those

of the corps of Marshal Bernadotte at Kronach, those of the corps of Marshals Ney and Soult at Forchheim. All prisoners and sick will be evacuated to Forchheim and Wurtzbourg.

See that General Songis is at Wurtzbourg on October 3d.

Send a messenger to find out where Marshal Ney is and where he will be on October 3d. Let the Bavarians advance from Eichstaedt from Nurnberg and Forchheim.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

CN—10924

(Furnished by the Countess of Sainte-Aldegonde)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

You will leave with your army corps the corps of Hesse-Darmstadt and whatever troops from Nassau and from the Prince Primate which you can assemble, so as to arrive at Wurtzbourg on the evening of the 4th. You will have four days' rations distributed and you will have four more days' rations follow you, as there are large numbers of troops at Wurtzbourg. If the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, and of the Prince Primate need a few days more, they may arrive at Wurtzbourg on the evening of the 8th, less six or eight thousand men from Hesse-Darmstadt, who are to garrison Wurtzbourg and should be there at the latest by noon of the 5th or 6th.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—10925

(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have assigned you to the command of the VIII Corps of the Grand Army. You will correspond every day with the Chief of Staff, sending him at the same time a daily sit-

uation report. You will always have staff officers with him, who will be able to bring orders to you. The VIII Corps of the Grand Army is to be organized into two divisions, one commanded by General Dupas and the other by General Lagrange. Six Brigadier Generals and two major adjutants have been ordered to report at Mayence. The regiments composing the VIII Corps are the 2d and 4th and 12th Light Infantry. The 2d and 4th will arrive at Worms on the 8th or 9th of October. Take necessary measures for transporting them by water to Mayence. The 12th regiment will arrive October 8th via Bingen. The two Italian regiments left two days ago, one for Paris and the other for Orleans; enroute to Mayence. You should have eighteen artillery pieces, one company of sappers, with the necessary staff for both of these arms. The 26th Chasseurs and the 4th Dragoons will be part of your army corps. I have also ordered the 58th Infantry to be at Mayence before October 2d. As soon as you have 5000 men and nine horsed pieces of artillery, you may proceed to Francfort. You will find herewith instructions* which will guide you in case of emergency. You should have 24 wagons from the trains. It is necessary that you should always have 8 days' rations of hard bread in reserve at Mayence, and that you can take with you 2000 pioneer tools.

NAPOLEON.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—10926
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

On October 4th and 5th you will send officers to the Prince of Nassau, to the Prince Primate and to the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt advising them that you are in command of a corps of 25,000 men, the head of which has arrived at Mayence and whose special mission is to protect

*See CN—10926.—C.H.L.

their States and the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine. You will make all preparations necessary for this number of troops at Francfort. You will receive from me on October 10th special orders. Nevertheless I believe it convenient to give you today and as a precaution a general order to serve you as a guide. As soon as one of the divisions of the VIII Army Corps shall have more than 5,000 men, it can occupy Francfort, and you may even move your headquarters there, taking at all times good care not to permit yourself to be cut off from Mayence. Note carefully all movements of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel. This position will attract him sufficiently so that he will not evacuate his States, and will force him to remain neutral. You will keep open as far as practicable and without committing yourself the road from Mayence to Wurtzbourg, and you will take measures to surely receive every day news from the Commandant of the citadel at Wurtzbourg. If it should ever happen that the latter be invested by superior forces, you should be notified of the fact by some signal which you will arrange in advance with the Commandant. You will not go to his assistance unless the forces which are investing him are very inferior to those which you can oppose to them, and it will always be necessary that a third of your force remain, near Mayence, so that this place will be in no danger. If as a result of a battle lost by France the enemy should advance on Mayence and on Cologne, you will correspond with the King of Holland, who is at Wesel, about everything which is to be done to oppose the progress of the enemy. You will re-cross the Rhine, if his forces are too strong, and you will support your right at Mayence, facing along the Rhine, connecting your left with the right of the King of Holland as arranged by you with his Majesty. Under circumstances which are as improbable as unexpected, you will take counsel; and if it should appear that Mayence may be invested, you will occupy it with your army corps.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

CN—10927
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806, 1:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I leave at 9:00 o'clock for Wurtzbourg. I will not pass through Francfort. I will stop for two or three hours about 6:00 or 7:00 A.M. at Aschaffenburg. It is very important that you arrive at Wurtzbourg with your entire army corps by the 4th; this is a war measure. You must leave neither depots or hospitals at Francfort; all that is not to follow you must be sent back to Mayence. You will leave a commanding officer at Francfort who will correspond with Marshal Kellermann. Tomorrow the 14th Infantry will billet for the night at Francfort; the day after tomorrow some other regiment. These troops are all marching towards Wurtzbourg. You may inform verbally the Prince and the principal people of Francfort that an army is assembling at Mayence and that it is possible that its advance guards may be pushed out to Francfort. As to my general plan, I am refusing my left, it is possible that communications of my army may run during the campaign in different directions.

Leave nothing at Francfort.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE PRINCE PRIMATE

CN—10928
(Archives of the Empire)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

If the Prince of Cassel is sincere, and really wishes to remain neutral, I have no intention of interfering with him. I beg your Highness to send him a message which will assure him on this point; but it is necessary that he be really neutral. None of my troops will pass over his territory, and I will be very glad to spare the terrors of war to this poor country; the misfortune of Europe does not require that I should not as the master bring the same benefits to other people. I have not in fact any grounds of complaint against Cassel, I will never attack it of my own desire.

I hope to see your Highness tomorrow at Aschaffenburg, through which I will pass at 6:00 A.M.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10929
(WD Files)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806, 2:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am leaving this evening at 9:00 o'clock. I will be at Aschaffenburg tomorrow morning at about 6:00 or 7:00 A.M., and at Wurtzbourg probably before 6:00 P.M. I have appointed Marshal Mortier to command the VIII Army Corps, which will be composed of the 2d, 4th, and 12th Light Infantry, the 58th Infantry, 2 Italian Regiments, the 4th Dragoons and the 26th Chasseurs, 18 pieces of artillery horsed, and 24 caissons.

I have sent the 14th Infantry to Wurtzbourg where it will arrive the 5th; I have ordered the 28th Light Infantry to leave Mayence on the 6th; it will therefore be at Wurtzbourg on the 9th or 10th; I will then determine to which division it will be assigned.

All these troops are in march except the 58th Infantry; I will not issue it orders until it leaves Bamberg; in 6 days I will have it proceed from Paris to Mayence by truck.

I wish that you would keep at Wurtzbourg the engineer officers who make route reconnaissances, in order that I may talk with them concerning the nature of the country. Have made a report of the population of cities, villages and principal places of Saxony, especially of those on the road from Leipzig to Dresden. What is the population of Cobourg? It is necessary that some Bavarians should be there who are thoroughly acquainted with Saxony; it is important that one of them be with us.

I have no new orders to give you. I presume that you have had everything possible done at Wurtzbourg, Kronach, and Forchheim. I have just sent out 2000 tools which will be desirable to have them go to Bamberg.

You reported to me that Bernadotte had 250,000 rations of hard bread; send these to Kronach, where they can

be drawn on to supply the army should it become necessary to stop several days in order to deploy in safety. Have constructed within the citadel of Kronach, but secretly, eight ovens which can be used for the army, as it is not impossible, as there are mountains, that the 4 days' rations of bread with which it will be supplied in leaving Bamberg, will not last until they arrive in the country where they will find new provisions. If you have 200,000 rations at Wurtzbourg, send them to Kronach. This is not for use in case of siege, but for issue in case of delay during deployment. Have flour also sent to this place.

I presume that at Bamberg and vicinity there are sufficient means to furnish four days' bread for 80,000 men; it is necessary to establish a depot at Bamberg and to construct ovens there if none exist; all this within four or five days. I have asked the Prince Primate for 2000 quintals of flour; it is necessary to extend these requisitions in the vicinity of Bamberg and to assemble the supplies. Bamberg is to be the central point for the main movements of the army. I wish to be entirely ready to commence operations before the 10th, if we are forced to it.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL KELLERMANN

CN—10930
(Imperial Archives)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

Detachments of 1400 or 1500 men coming from the army of Boulogne will arrive at Kaiserslautern on October 4th. I calculate that these detachments should be at Mayence on the 8th, send them orders to proceed from Kaiserslautern to Manheim, there crossing the Rhine, and thence proceed directly to Wurtzbourg; by this shortening the march of these detachments by four days, so that they will arrive at Wurtzbourg on the same day that they were to have been at Mayence. Another detachment of 1200 men also coming from Boulogne should arrive at Kaiserlautern on the 6th; issue them orders also to proceed to Manheim and from there to Wurtzbourg.

Detachments of the 1st, 15th, 9th, 5th and 3d Dragoons coming from Paris will be at Kaiserslautern October 5th. I wish you would give orders to these detachments to cross the Rhine to Manheim and proceed to Wurtzburg.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—718

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, you will see by the return herewith that the 25th regiment of Light Infantry is in need of many things. See that this corps is furnished with all things needful for the formation of many recruits.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—719

Mayence, 1 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, order that the 26th regiment of chasseurs be formed into three squadrons including all the mounted men, and despatched to Mayence by the shortest road.

NAPOLEON.

TO MURAT

M—1544

(File of Prince Murat)

Mayence, 1 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have received your letter. Review your regiments and cavalry and issue orders recalling majors and other officers absent. D'Hautpoul should have joined his division. I pray God, dear Brother, that He keeps you in good health.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR

M—2545

1 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The Emperor desires that the citadel of Wurtzbourg be occupied, that it be armed and provisioned in such manner that it will be safe from a raid. I beg therefore, that you issue orders to the Chief Quartermaster and the engineer and artillery commanders. I advise you that 4000 quintals of flour have been sent from Mayence and Worms to provision this citadel. The Emperor directs that 8 pieces of artillery be drawn from Forchheim and sent quickly to Wurtzbourg; 12 should have left Mayence this morning, for the same destination. I therefore beg you to write to the Bavarian commander at Forchheim and advise him of these dispositions of the Emperor, and give such orders as you may think necessary to carry out his Majesty's intentions.

MURAT.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR

M—2546
(Murat's File)*1 October, 1806.*

DEAR COUSIN:

The Emperor has directed me to place cavalry posts beyond Carlstadt on the frontier of Fulda, in order to properly observe from this point hostile movements, I advise you that I have no cavalry at all at my disposition, I have written to Marshal Lefebvre to send some from his army corps.

MURAT.

TO GENERAL SAMSON

M—2547
(Murat File)*1 October, 1806.*

GENERAL:

The Emperor directs that the road from Worms to Wurtzbourg via Weinheim and Wertheim be immediately re-

connoitered. If you have not already done so send an officer for this reconnaissance.

The Emperor also directs that the citadel at Wurtzbourg be armed, provisioned and put in condition against capture by raid. Please report to me on its situation.

I would be obliged if you could send me for a short period a map of Saxony and of the territory of Wurtzbourg, marking on it the position of the Grand Army and what you know about the enemy. Receive General, etc.

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2548
(WD File)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806.

SIRE:

I left Mayence yesterday at 1:00 P.M. and notwithstanding the haste which I made, I was unable to arrive here until 8:00 A.M. this morning, so bad is the post service. I first saw the Prince of Neufchatel and immediately afterwards went to the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg with the letter of your Majesty, and also with the news which I gave him that the treaty which admits him to the Confederation had been signed in Paris, which removed all his fears, as he thought he might not be admitted. The sentiments of good will which I announced to him in behalf of your Majesty touched him greatly. He seems very well disposed to do everything for the service of your Majesty's army. The proclamation announcing his admission into the Confederation of the Rhine was published today. Everything has been prepared at the chateau to receive your Majesty, and it appears that nothing has been neglected to make your stay comfortable and pleasant.

I have only been able to learn through the Prince of Neufchatel the first news on the position and movements of the Prussians, information which he has communicated to your Majesty. The following is what I obtained by myself.

A corps of 14,000 or 15,000 men under General Tauenzien occupied Hof, which corps it is said is the advance

guard of an army of 30,000 men commanded by Prince Hohenlohe. Cobourg and Meinungen are also occupied. According to the latest news the King of Prussia is at Gotha. It is stated that the entire army is concentrating on Erfurt. The Prussians will carefully avoid any small battles, they desire only one big battle. The Saxons are decidedly a part of the Prussian army.

M. Dumontier, Secretary of the Legation of Dresden who arrived here this morning has given me the information which he collected and which he guarantees. I hasten to pass them on to your Majesty. * * * * * I will send during the day spies toward Fulda, and others if I can find them to Dresden and Leipzig. I am sending your Majesty General Belliard's report on a reconnaissance which he made himself to Koenigshofen.

My staff officers have not yet arrived here, which prevents me from sending the officers over the road which you ordered me to have reconnoitered. The Prince of Neufchatel told me this morning that the army would not be arranged at the time fixed by your Majesty; he particularly desires your presence, a sentiment which is fully concurred in by the whole army. * * * * *

* * * * * I am sending General Klein an order to press his march as much as possible for Wurtzbourg.

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2549
(WD File)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

SIRE:

According to reports which I have just this moment received from Marshal Lefebvre, it seems that the Prussians have not yet entered the principality of Fulda. They have placed two battalions with two guns in front of the village of Gross-Harbach on the road from Fulda, with orders to defend themselves there in case they attack to the last extremity.

One regiment from Dupont's division will occupy the citadel of Wurtzbourg today.

I am sending to your Majesty a report from the engineer general as to the condition of that place.

I am having considerable trouble to assemble my cavalry at the place indicated by your Majesty at the time desired. I am sending to the different commanding generals, instructions to accelerate their march.

General Ruchel joined the army of the King on the 23d instead of on the 25th and I am just informed that Prince Hohenlohe, who after having passed the Elbe seemed at first to proceed towards Hof, has moved towards Erfurt where it is said the entire Prussian army is to assemble; the Prince of Neufchatel is sending you all the information which he has been able to obtain. As soon as General Belliard, whom I am expecting from Bamberg has arrived, I will hasten to forward his report to your Majesty.

I am just sending two young students with orders to proceed from Wurtzbourg to Schweinfurt, Rowild, Meinungen, Gotha, Erfurt, Naumburg, Leipzig and Dresden from where they are to return to me via Hof, Cobourg and Bamberg. One of the two has orders to note at Erfurt if the entire army is actually assembled at that place. I inclose my itinerary which your Majesty seems to have desired from Manheim to Wurtzbourg.

The chief of staff has not caused to arrive the guns from Forchheim, but I am hoping to receive them at Ingolstadt on October 3d. I am with the greatest respect,

MURAT.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR

M—2550

(File of Prince Murat)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I beg you to advise me if the light brigades of Generals Lasalle and Milhaud have actually received the order to assemble at Lichtenfels and Kronach, and what day they are to be there. I would also like to know if the Neumarck

where D'Hautpoul's division should be today, is the town of that name on the Ratisbonne-Nurnberg road. This information is indispensable to me in order that I may give this division an entirely other direction than that from Winzenheim, etc.

MURAT.

TO GENERAL NANSOUTY

M—2551
(Prince Murat's File)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

You will leave with your division tomorrow to proceed in two days to Hassfurt on the Main, where you will establish yourself in the most comfortable manner. You will have the two villages along the two rivers occupied. You are advised that Bamberg, Schweinfurt and Koenigshofen are occupied by French troops. You should therefore watch your front and carefully observe the exits from Cobourg. I expect to establish my headquarters at Bamberg the day after tomorrow; in the meantime continue to send your report here.

* * * * *

MURAT.

TO MARSHALS LEFEBVRE, SOULT AND DAVOUT

M—2553
(Prince Murat's File)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806.

MARSHALS:

I hasten to advise you that I have just arrived at Wurtzbourg, where I shall establish my headquarters. I beg you to send me all information which you can obtain in the positions and movements of the Prussians and Saxons. I am going to hasten the arrival of the reserve cavalry on the line Schweinfurt to Kronach. I left his Majesty at Mayence and I believe that he will soon be at the head of his army. As war has not yet been declared, the frontiers of Wurtz-

bourg and Bavaria must not be crossed, but you are authorized to cross them if necessary in order to occupy a good position overlooking the exits from Saxony, etc.

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2554
(WD Files)

Wurtzbourg, 1 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I had the honor to write to your Majesty this morning; since then I have received no new information; however General Belliard informs me that several regiments of Hussars have approached Cobourg, but it is generally believed that the army will assemble about Erfurt. General Belliard has gone to Kronach from where he will write to me.

I have visited the citadel with the Prince of Neufchatel; the place only needs a few cannon to be safe against a raid.

I have ordered Nansouty's division to proceed to Hasfurt on the Main, it will be there October 3.

On the same date the light division will be at Kronach and at Lichtenfels.

I have ordered D'Hautpoul's division to proceed from Nurnberg to Bamberg instead of continuing its march towards Wurtzbourg; it will be on the Main October 3.

The 3d Dragoon Division will be at Hallstadt on the 3d, it will occupy Zapfendorf and Rattlesdorf.

The 4th Division will be at Eltman on the Main on October 3.

The 2d Division cannot be in line before October 8th.

Sire, I cannot obtain information here, but only if I go to Bamberg, because I then can often visit the outposts, but I require an order from your Majesty for this movement.

I am in great need of funds and request that your Majesty send me some. I have not one cent and I am unable to borrow.

I have just learned that Klein's division cannot be located. I am sending out to look for it.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO GENERAL DUPONT

B—213

GHQ, 2 October, 1806.

It is necessary, General, that you should leave one battalion in the citadel of Wurtzbourg, that the remainder of this division be billeted along the route to Fulda and that your advance posts be established in a military manner. I believe that you should relieve a small observation post which Marshal Lefebvre has placed on the route to Fulda, at the exit which leads to Hamelburg.

I advise you that we are not at war and that your advance post should not proceed beyond the territory of Wurtzbourg.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

B—213a

General Dupont having arrived at Wurtzbourg on October 1st, issued orders for billeting his division, a summary of which is:

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

1st Hussars to Retzbach with an observation post at Karlstadt and another at Arnstein on the roads to Fulda.

9th Light Infantry; 1 battalion to Retzbach in support of the cavalry, 1 battalion to Thungerstein;

32d Infantry and the artillery at Veitshochheim.

96th Infantry: 1 battalion to the citadel of Wurtzbourg; 1 battalion to Versbach.

"All billets will have security posts and will be guarded in a military manner."

TO THE EMPEROR

B—235

Amberg, 2 October, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

Your Majesty has instructed me through his note of September 29 last which I have just received, as to the dispositions which the IV Army Corps are to carry out on leaving Amberg.

In order to carry out his intentions, I have the honor to report that tomorrow October 3, all the troops of the army corps will be assembled beyond Amberg, and will be ready to leave from there on the 4th in order to enter the territory of Bayreuth, if your Majesty directs.

SOULT.

GENERAL ORDERS

IV ARMY CORPS

B—237

Amberg, 2 October, 1806.

General Milhaud* commanding the light cavalry division, will give orders to the regiments and companies of artillery of the division to assemble tomorrow by 10:00 A.M. at Schlicht, near Vilseck; he will send them towards Thumbach, on the main road from Baireuth, and will billet them between Thumbach and Thurnsdorf, occupying all the villages in this vicinity which are on the frontier of the kingdom of Bavaria, taking care not to place any troops in Prussian territory, nor to commit any act of hostility.

General Milhaud will establish military guards and will establish his headquarters at Thumbach.

General Legrand, 3d Division will move the head of his light infantry as far as Schlicht and Vilseck, and will billet his division between these two points inclusive as far as Hahnbach also inclusive. He will himself be either at Schlicht or at Vils.

*General Milhaud left the IV Corps October 2d or 3d, to assume command of the reserve chasseur brigade at Lichtenfels. General Guyot replaced him in the IV Corps.—C.H.L.

General Lewal, 2d Division will have all his troops which he has billeted in rear of the Sulzbach approach on the Nurnberg road, and will billet his division between Sulzbach and at Vils, from the village of Poppenricht as far as the village of Weissenberg; he will issue orders to his regimental colonels to reconnoiter the communications which extend from their billets to the main highway from Amberg to Baireuth, in order that when the order is given them to proceed towards this main highway to take their position in column, they will have no detour to make but may proceed by the shortest road.

General Saint-Hilaire, 1st Division, will billet his 1st Division at Amberg and in the villages on the right and left of the road from this town to Hahnbach exclusive.

General Lariboisiere, commanding the artillery will issue orders to the artillery park to billet at Germersdorf in rear of Amberg, and he will have assigned to him as billets for his men and horses this village and the two farms on the right and the left of Germersdorf.


Orders contrary to the present orders contained in orders of September 30th, are hereby revoked.

The chief quartermaster will have the wagons of military equipments belonging to regiments returned to them during tomorrow for transportation of bread; this return of wagons will take place at Amberg, and for this purpose regimental commanders will send officers to receive them.

All the regimental wagons assigned to transportation of bread should be at Amberg tomorrow evening to draw bread which should be distributed to the troops after new orders are received. The quartermaster will assemble the number of local wagons necessary to receive the excess bread assembled at Amberg which cannot be loaded on the regimental wagons. He will also assemble wagons for the transportation of the brandy and salt which has been gathered at Amberg. The quartermaster will also complete returning tomorrow to Amberg the ambulances with their equipment which should be done to divisions, he will report during the day to the Marshal commanding as to the carrying out of this requirement.

MARSHAL SOULT.

5. BILLETS ORDERED FOR THE IV CORPS FOR 3 OCTOBER 1806.



TO GENERAL LEFEBVRE

B—216

GHQ, Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806, 11:00 P.M.

The intention of the Emperor, Marshal, is that your troops should neither be placed in barracks nor bivouac; you should billet them in the vicinity of Schweinfurt, but in such manner that you can assemble them within three or four hours in the position which you have chosen.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEONM—2555
(WD Files)*Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806, Noon.*

SIRE:

I hasten to inform your Majesty as to a report from Cassel, and two others sent to me by Marshal Bernadotte and General Belliard. It appears quite certain, according to information from all parts, that the Prussians are assembling on the line Erfurt, Weimar.

All the corps are arriving at their destination. Dupont's division is entering the city now; one regiment will occupy the citadel. The Prince of Neufchatel promised me that he will have artillery in position this evening, and also at Kronach, a post which it is said is very important.

With regard to the cavalry reserve, it appears that there are more men than horses; both are in the best possible condition. The artillery attached to my corps is also in very good shape.

I have the honor to advise your Majesty that artillery horses can be very easily obtained here; everybody wishes to sell them, as it is believed that they will undoubtedly be requisitioned.

Sire, I will not send messengers to your Majesty unless I have news to communicate; but I ought to say again I am here still a little far away to obtain information as easily as I would like.

I beg you, Sire, to place funds at my disposal as I have absolutely no money at all. I am impatiently awaiting the arrival of your Majesty.

MURAT.

TO GENERAL BELLIARD AT KRONACH

M—2556
(Prince Murat's File)

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

Issue orders to the commanding generals of the General Reserve Cavalry Corps to send to Forchheim the small regimental depots which are under their orders. You will evacuate all sick and prisoners to Wurtzbourg.

I advise you that the marshals will receive orders to return to the different divisions of the reserve cavalry of the extra caissons which their corps should have. The Quartermaster General is sending out a special order to comply with this requirement.

Direct the Generals of the Cavalry Reserve to send deserters received by them to Landau and not to Juliers. *

* * * * *

MURAT.

TO MONSIEUR AGAR

M—2558
(Prince Murat's Files)

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

SIR:

I request that you appoint four messengers and that you send regularly to me two each week. They should bring me a statement of work from the ministers and general reports which you may have to submit to me. They will also bring me the dispatches from the General, commanding the Duchy.

Keep constantly agents among the Prussians and send me all the information which you obtain.

In any case you are not to furnish money to the King of Holland but you will furnish such provisions as you may

be asked for for provisioning Wesel, so far as is possible, but taking care not to take any belonging to my domains.

* * * * * In case of a serious invasion I authorize you to establish yourself either at Neuss or at Cologne as may be most convenient. * * * * * Notify the principal merchants in the town of Elberfeld and Barmen that I do not think that the Prussians intend to mistreat them. *

MURAT.

TO MAJOR GENERAL D'HAUTPOUL

M—2560
(Prince Murat's Files)

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

Hasten your march so as to be able to be with your division on October, at Bourg-Ebrach where you will receive new orders. Send me your reports at Bamberg where my headquarters will be established the 3d.

MURAT.

TO GENERAL SAHUC

M—2561
(Prince Murat's Files)

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

You should proceed forward with your division by the shortest road and within two days to Eltman on the Main. You will occupy the neighboring villages on both banks of that river; at Hasfurt on your left will be Nansouty's cavalry division, you will cover it properly. My headquarters the day after tomorrow, October 3, will be at Bamberg where you will send me your reports.

MURAT.

TO MAJOR GENERAL BEAUMONT

M—2562

(Prince Murat's Files)

Wurtzbourg, 2 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

If it is true that you arrived today at Forchheim you should continue your march towards Bamberg so as to be able to be in position on the 3d at Halstadt, from where you will have occupied Jaffendorf and Rattlesdorf. You will be covered on the Kronach road by the light cavalry division; from Rattlesdorf you should observe the road to Cobourg if no one covers you on this side. You will also have observed the exit of Ebern; if contrary to all hopes you are still at Nurnberg, you will nevertheless do everything possible to be at your destination on the 3d. You will send me your report to Bamberg where my headquarters will be the day after tomorrow the 3d.

MURAT.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—220

2 October, 1806.

The essential object is to know what position I should take with my army corps.

Colonel Sicard has my entire confidence * * *
* * * Your Highness may without reserve state to him everything that you should tell me.

This officer will advise you of the dispositions which I have made, in accordance with the orders of the Emperor and your Highness.

MARSHAL AUGEREAU.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—262

Bamberg, 1 October, 1806.

The King of Prussia has been for several days at Naumburg. It is reported that his army is 80,000 strong.

Prince Hohenlohe must have his headquarters at Chemnitz; he has constantly troops at Zwickau and at Plauen; a small detachment of 2000 men under the orders of General Tauenzien is constantly at Hof.

The small fort at Culmbach is still occupied by militia commanded by an old retired general.

BERNADOTTE.

NOTE:—The above message appears to have been delivered October 3.—C.H.L.

GENERAL ORDERS

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

B—203

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

The Emperor has arrived at GHQ at Wurtzbourg.

His Majesty has noted with pleasure the activity which the corps of the Grand Army have shown in proceeding to their positions.

The Emperor directs as follows:

Each of the Marshals will inspect his army corps and will organize a depot for convalescents, and exhausted men; he will appoint an officer to command such men of his army corps and will direct them to proceed to organize these depots at the following places:

I Corps -----	} Kronach
III Corps -----	
IV Corps -----	} Forchheim
VI Corps -----	
V Corps -----	} Wurtzbourg
VII Corps and Dupont's Division -----	

All small cavalry depots, that is to say those who are immobile and unable to follow, will be billeted in the vicinity of Forchheim and will be withdrawn into that fort if necessary. The Grand Duke of Berg will appoint a General to command these.

As soon as the army is in movement all who arrive from France or from the depots in Bavaria, will join directly in one of the three places where are the small convalescent

depots of their corps, and it is expressly prohibited for any man to leave these places without an order from the chief of staff, who will indicate the route which they should follow. At each of these places detachments will be formed commanded by officers and noncommissioned officers. His Majesty directs that articles which are not absolutely necessary, both for the staffs and for infantry and cavalry troops; as well as women and all kinds of impedimenta, be sent to the places designated for the small corps depots in such manner that the army may be mobile and light, and have the least possible amount of impedimenta.

As we advance into the hostile territory, new fortified places suitable for depots will be designated in General Orders and the chief of staff will give orders when first line depots, which are the three designated below, should leave for the new line.

Generals and corps commanders will note that their depots being within fortified places, whatever they leave there is in no danger whatever.

Regimental registers, papers, stores, all other objects of whatever nature, in fact everything that the soldier cannot carry in his pack and the officer in his valise, should be left in these depots.

The commanders of the forts and depots of Wurtzbourg, Forchheim and Kronach are ordered to designate as many separate depots as there are army corps having convalescents within their command.

Some corps have taken along the arms belonging to men in hospitals; they are hereby ordered to leave these in their field depots.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—262a

3 October, 1806.

According to a messenger who has just come from Fulda, there was not a single Prussian at Fulda at noon yesterday. The territory about Hesse, from Cassel as far

as Fulda is absolutely free of troops of this power. * *
* * It seems, according to reports from travelers, that
the Prussians are in force at Eisenach, Erfurt and Gotha.

LEFEBVRE.

NOTE:—The above message appears to have been delivered October 3.—C.H.L.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—226

3 October, 1806.

I am echeloned from Lichtenfels to Steinweisen.

MARSHAL BERNADOTTE.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—218

3 October, 1806.

The Prussians are afraid of being attacked and are guarding themselves poorly; they do not send their advance posts out to six leagues. To be safe it is necessary to be within a pistol shot of the enemy vedettes.

SUCHET.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—216

Schweinfurt, 3 October, 1806.

The V Corps occupies the line extending on the left from Berg-Rheinfeld, through Eggenhausen, Gressthal, Sulzthal, Eltingshausen, Rottershausen, Lauringen, Steinach, and continuing on the right to Gadheim.

The cavalry is in rear of Schweinfurt on the left bank of the Main in the villages of Grafen-Rheinfeld, Rothleim, Schwebleim and Weyer.

GENERAL LEFEBVRE.

INSTRUCTIONS

UCN—721

3 October, 1806.

It is His Majesty's intention that the II corps of the Grand Army be composed of two divisions, formed in the following manner:

The 1st, under command of Major-General Seras, to be composed:

- Of 2 battalions of the 13th regiment of the line;
- 3 battalions of the 35th line;
- 2 battalions of the 53d line;

The 2d, under command of Major-General Broussier to be composed:

- Of 3 battalions of the 9th line;
- 3 battalions of the 92d line;
- 2 battalions of the 84th line.

These corps should be completed from all available men of the 3d and 4th battalions, and should include, before the end of October, 14,000 infantry present under arms.

Major-General Lacoste will command the light cavalry, composed of the 8th regiment of chasseurs and the 6th of hussars, making 1200 men.

The artillery and all other matters will continue upon the present footing.

This corps, which will continue to be called the 2d corps of the Grand Army, will thus furnish a force of more than 16,000 men.

As for administration and command, this corps is in every respect to be a part of the Army of Italy, and will be under the orders of the Viceroy.

Preparations should be made at Verona for teams, personnel and material sufficient to draw 40 pieces of cannon, which, with the 24 of the Friuli will make 64 pieces of artillery. Only a modest supply of stores will be needed.

Venice will be armed and put in the best state of defense. General Miollis will be in command. The commandant of engineers will send thither engineer officers, who will not quit the place. The commandant of artillery will

send thither two artillery officers, a general and a colonel, who are likewise forbidden to leave. All measures will be taken to put this stronghold in the best condition of defence.

The strongholds of Palmanova, Osoppo, Porto-Legnago, Peschiera, Mantua, and Venice must be provisioned and armed quietly, and without observation, especially as to heavy material. Work upon the fortifications must be so directed that they may be of immediate service.

The kingdom of Italy is to bear the expense of the supplies for all strongholds, except Alessandria, Placentia and the citadel of Turin. It is important that everything not needed between Isonzo and Adda be evacuated and brought into fortified places.

A copy of these orders has been sent to His Imperial Highness the Viceroy of Italy, charged by His Majesty to give detailed instructions to the General of artillery and the Commissary general.

DEJEAN.*

TO MONSIEUR DARU

CN—10931
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR DARU:

Proceed to Mayence. See beforehand Minister Dejean to find out the dispositions I have made for supplying Mayence, in order that when you arrive in that place you may prescribe effective measures, because whatever is being done at the War Department and by the Supply Department is of an inconceivable slowness. When you will have assured yourself at Mayence as to the supply arrangements, so that they can supply Wurtzbourg if necessary, and so that twelve hours after I may issue orders it will be possible to send

*Appended to these instructions is the following postscript, in General Dejean's hand: "Extract from a letter from the Emperor, who does not find included in the above order these words: 'It is expedient to throw into Mantua all that might be embarrassing at Verona, except things movable.' October 3, 1806.—DEJEAN."

10,000 or 12,000 quintals of flour to Wurtzbourg or other places, you will proceed as rapidly as possible to Bamberg to rejoin my headquarters.

NAPOLEON.

GENERAL ORDERS

IV ARMY CORPS

B—241

Amberg, 3 October, 1806.

Tomorrow the 4th, the troops of this army corps will carry out the following dispositions:

General Guyot, commanding the light cavalry since the relief of General Milhaud, will assemble the light cavalry division at Thurndorf, in Bavarian territory without in any way occupying any part of the territory at Bayreuth, and will be ready to execute during the day orders for movements which will be sent to him.

General Legrand, 3d Division, will march his division towards Thumbach, but on the main road to Bayreuth, and if he has not received new orders by noon, will billet in the farms on the right and left of this road without scattering his troops too much.

General Lewal, 2d Division, will assemble his division beyond Schlicht and, if he has not received new orders by noon, will billet between this point exclusive and Thumbach.

General Saint-Hilaire, 1st Division, will assemble his division at Hahnbach and if he has not received new orders by noon, will billet between that town and Schlicht and Vilseck inclusive.

General Lariboisiere, will issue orders to the artillery park to proceed beyond Bamberg following the same road, where he will remain ready to carry out new orders which will be sent to it. The marshal commanding will inform the command in a new order as to the location of headquarters; in the meanwhile it will remain at Amberg.

All troops will be in march at an early hour, so as to be ready to carry out new orders which may be given to them.

The quartermaster will have the wagons filled with two days' rations of bread and which are assigned to regiments leaving for their divisions, and he will send them to the points where the divisions are directed to be in compliance with the present order. He will also send to the divisions beef cattle sufficient for two days' supply of fresh meat; salt for 15 days and brandy for two issues. Excess bread, beef cattle, brandy and salt will be transported on wagons belonging to headquarters.

Issues of bread, fresh meat and salt will be made to the troops on the day they reach camp, but not earlier; until this time they should be rationed by the inhabitants at their billets.

The quartermaster will leave an administrative officer at Amberg to assemble and have transported in rear of the army corps all the bread which can be furnished by the civil authorities, in accordance with the requisition which has been made upon them on this matter.

MARSHAL SOULT.

TO COMMANDING GENERAL, VI CORPS

MN—266

GHQ, Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

The intention of the Emperor, Marshal, is that your army corps united at Nurnberg shall extend its billets between that town and Baireuth, without however, crossing the frontier of this country. You will provide for four days' fresh bread, and for 4 days' hard bread, in order to be ready to march October 5th, if you receive orders to that effect.

BERTHIER.

TO PRINCE MURAT

B—254

3 October, 1806.

The Emperor directs that your Highness direct Generals Lasalle and Milhaud to keep their brigades assembled with outposts on the Cobourg roads.

I have ordered Marshal Bernadotte to have his light cavalry scout the roads toward Leipzig.

In compliance with instructions of the Emperor, Generals Lasalle and Milhaud are daily sending in duplicate reports to Marshal Bernadotte as to what is happening along the frontier; they will use horses as little as possible and keep them in condition for campaign.

I have written to Marshal Bernadotte to send your Highness these reports of his light cavalry.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—722

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, things seem to go on somewhat slowly in your offices. The measures which I prescribed for the provisioning of Mayence are not carried out. The depots of the cavalry, chasseurs, hussars and dragoons have many unmounted men but no horses. Put a little movement into these matters. The regiments of cavalry, chasseurs, hussars and dragoons are reduced to 450 horses in the army.


I suppose that the conscripts of the reserve have been called out, and that this operation is well under way; take prompt measures to have uniforms ready for them.

Summon to Mayence from strongholds in France a sixty (*sic*) ammunition or artillery wagons. There are not enough vehicles of that sort in this place, and yet they are very important.

Order the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the 3d battalion of the 14th line to make all speed to Mayence where they will receive further orders.

NAPOLEON.

6. POSITIONS OF THE IV CORPS 3 OCTOBER 1806.



ORDER OF THE DAY
IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

UCN—723

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

The Marshals are informed that the Emperor has just organized a Legion of the North, commanded by General Zayonchek, of which two-thirds of the officers are Poles.

Consequently, all deserters arriving at different points of the army will be sent with road orders to Landau, where they will be mustered into this legion.

In a few days several Polish officers will report at various army corps.

His Majesty orders that in each corps of the Grand Army a staff officer be appointed to receive the deserters and direct them to Landau.

The VIII corps of the Grand Army is being forced at Mayence.

Another army corps is being formed at Wesel under orders of the King of Holland taking the name of Vanguard of the Army of the North.

The Major-General, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MONSIEUR LA ROCHEFOUCAULD

AMBASSADOR TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA

CN—10932

(Imperial Files)

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

I have been at Wurtzbourg since yesterday, which has given me the opportunity to have a long conversation with his Royal Highness. I informed him of my firm intention to break all ties of alliance which connect me to Prussia, without regard to actual conditions. According to my latest news from Berlin, it is possible that there may be no war; but I am determined not to be allied to such a versatile and independable power. Undoubtedly, I will remain in peace with Prussia, as I have no right to shed the blood of

my peoples on vain pretexts. In the meantime there is need to turn my efforts towards my navy which requires of me an alliance on the Continent. Circumstances led me to the alliance with Prussia, but this power is the same today as it was in 1740 and all other times, without importance and without honor. I have considered the Emperor of Austria even in the midst of his reverses and of events which have separated us; I believe him dependable and certain to carry out his work. You can explain matters to him in this sense, without however putting too great emphasis on it. My position and my forces are such, that I do not have to fear anyone; but all these matters affect my people. Of the three powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria, I need one for an ally. The navy used to flourish in France, by reason of our alliance with Austria. This power besides needs rest, a sentiment of which I heartily approve.

An alliance based on the independence of the Ottoman Empire, on the guaranty of our States and understandings which will consolidate the peace of Europe and will enable me at the same time to concentrate my efforts towards my navy would suit me. The house of Austria has often made insinuations to me, and the present moment, if she knows how to profit by it is the most favorable of all.

I have said nothing about this to you before; I have explained my ideas more in detail to the Prince of Benevento, who will not fail to advise you about it. Finally your mission is completed the day you will have made Austria understand as easily as possible that I am inclined to adhere to a system which would bind me to them.

Do not forget to keep an eye on Moldavia and Valachia, in order to advise me of any movements which the Russians may make against the Ottoman empire.

NAPOLÉON.

TO GENERAL CLARKE

CN—10933
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

The aide-de-camp for duty will leave tomorrow, two hours before daylight for Hammelburg, via Fulda; he will

ascertain if there are any news at Fulda. He will take with him a courier to be furnished by the chief equerry, to be an intelligent man speaking German; he will accompany him as far as Cassel; he, individually will continue to Fulda taking care to obtain news as to whether the Prussians have entered the principality. Arrived at Fulda he will seek information as to all Prussian movements about Cassel. As soon as he obtains information of the enemy, he will return at utmost speed.

General Clarke will write a simple letter to our representative at Cassel, advising him that he has received his latest letter.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—10984
(Imperial Files)

Wurtzbourg, 3 October, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter of the 26th and 28th September. Marshal Augereau is no longer at Francfort. The VIII Corps of the Grand Army which is assembling at Mayence to occupy Francfort or to maneuver on France according to circumstances, is commanded by Marshal Mortier. I am returning your aide. I have been at Wurtzbourg since yesterday, where I am having a very pretty fortress occupied; I am provisioning and arming it. This is a central point to which you can send to ask news at any time you feel in need of it.

Send me staff officers often acquainted with the country and the situation of things. Direct them to make notes along the roads they follow, league by league, noting the condition of the roads, nature of obstacles, names and sizes of towns and villages, etc., so that before having to maneuver on this line, you will be perfectly acquainted with it.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—263

Lichtenfels, 3 October, 1806.

In the direction of Hof there is no increase of troops. The detachment of General Tauenzien remains constant at about 2000 men; he expects all the troops which have been at Plauen. Prince Hohenlohe was expected at Plauen the day before yesterday. * * * *

The main Prussian army is assembling at Merseburg and at Naumburg.

BERNADOTTE.

BILLETING AREAS OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON
OCTOBER 4, 1806.

B—200

(See Maps Opposite)

Ist Corps, near Lichtenfels with an advance guard of light cavalry and of reserve cavalry between Kronach and Steinwiesen with advance posts beyond these places in the direction of Nordhalben.

III^d Corps, about Bamberg

IVth Corps, north of Amberg

Vth Corps, about Schweinfurt

VIth Corps, about Nurnberg

VIIth Corps, with Dupont's Division, and the infantry of the Guard at Wurtzbourg

1st Division of Cuirassiers, General Nansouty, at Eltmann

2d Division Cuirassiers, General d'Hautpoul, at Burgebrach.


3d Division Dragoons, General Beaumont, at Hallstadt

4th Division Dragoons, General Sahuc, at Bannach


The two Light Brigades of Generals Lasalle and Milhaud at Kronach and beyond.

The 1st and 2d Divisions of Dragoons, Generals Grouchy and Klein, had not yet joined.


3. BILLETS OF THE I CORPS, ARMY ADVANCE GUARD, BETWEEN 3 OCTOBER AND 6 OCTOBER 1806.




4. BILLETTS OF THE III CORPS, BETWEEN THE 2D OCTOBER AND 6 OCTOBER, 1806.



7. BILLETTS AND BIVOUAC OF THE IV CORPS ON 4, 5, AND 6 OCTOBER, 1806.



8. BILLETS OF THE VI CORPS ON 4, 5, AND 6 OCTOBER 1806.



TO MARSHAL BERTHIER*

UCN—724

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

Cousin, I see by a statement sent me by General Rapp, that 730 men from various cavalry detachments, dragoons, unmounted hussars and chasseurs, left Strasbourg for Mannheim on the 26th, where I suppose they arrived the 29th. From thence they should have been directed upon Wurtzbourg. I have therefore reason to think that these detachments will arrive today. 350 men from various detachments of dragoons, unmounted chasseurs and hussars left Strasbourg on the 29th. It should therefore not be long before they arrive; that will then make more than 1000 unmounted men from cavalry detachments without horses. 150 men from various cavalry detachments, but mounted, set out about the same time. Also, one battalion of light infantry and 3 battalions of the line, provisionally formed by General Rapp, making a total of 2000 men, set out on October 1 and apparently should arrive here about the 10th, as also 200 men of the 9th battalion of the train and 200 men from the 5th and 1st regiments of cuirassiers. These together make nearly 4000 men. Orders must be issued that the 1000 unmounted cavalry men composed from the following regiments, namely: 30 cuirassiers, 305 dragoons and 613 hussars and chasseurs, be reviewed on arriving at Wurtzbourg; that the 30 cuirassiers belonging to the 11th regiment purchase 30 horses and 30 saddles from the 10,000 francs which I have granted each body of cavalry that they may be mounted and equipped here. The 305 dragoons are to be directed upon Bamberg and Kronach, where they will receive orders to join those detachments of their regiments which form a part of the four battalions of dragoons which are serving with my Guard.

The 613 hussars and chasseurs will form a battalion to serve in the defence of Wurtzbourg, but not a moment must be lost in buying horses, even though small, with saddles, to mount these 613 men. As for all the mounted men, they are to join their regiments by way of Bamberg and Kron-

*Captain P. Foucart—*Campagne de Prusse* (1806), Jena, pp. 293-295.

ach. Finally, the 200 men of the artillery train are to remain at Wurtzbourg where General Songis will provide them with horses. There remain the four battalions which are to be reviewed on their arrival at Wurtzbourg, where they will rest one day and then join the army by way of Bamberg and Kronach. As for the cuirassiers, the colonel of the 11th will look after them. As for the hussars and chasseurs who are of various regiments, horses and saddles must be bought for them. A sub-inspector of reviews might be intrusted with the purchase of these horses; a sum of about 180,000 francs should be put at the disposition of the inspector of reviews. As soon as these men are mounted they should join their corps. As for the 8th Hussars, which has 125 men, the 9th which has 100, and the 10th which has 92, I suppose that the detachments of these regiments have officers who could oversee the purchase and making of saddles. If otherwise, when they have been reviewed, the colonels might send officers to oversee the organization and equipment of these men.

NAPOLEON.

P.S. As it may be possible that you do not clearly understand this letter for lack of returns, I send you General Rapp's livret. Send detailed orders to the commandant at Wurtzbourg, notify the colonels of the corps to which the detachments belong, and charge an inspector of reviews with the purchase of horses. If it happens that the inspector of reviews thinks it will be too difficult to find 600 horses here, keep the chasseurs here and send the hussars to Forchheim. The important thing is to put some one in charge of the matter.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—725

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

Cousin, you will find herewith a return of the goods now in army stores at Strasbourg. You will see that there are 25,000 cloaks and many useless things. Order that all

effects which belong to no particular corps be sent to Wurtzbourg and placed in the clothing magazine.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

B—231

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

The emperor believes, Marshal, that you ought to occupy and move up your reserve park and all your divisions to the vicinity of Bamberg; that you have done well in billeting your troops in such manner that they can obtain the maximum rest; but in such a way as to be able to leave within a few hours after receiving the orders.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—262b

Koenigshofen, 4 October, 1806.

We have in front of us the advance guard of the Prussian army commanded by General Blucher. It is in rear of the forest of Thuringia. Erfurt is being fortified. * * * General Blucher has had abatis constructed in the forest. The Prussians are afraid of being attacked and have poor guard service. * * * *

According to our latest information, it is noted that the Prussian officers with which it has been possible to have conversation at our outposts, have replaced their tone of insolence and pride with a good deal more of honesty and modesty.

LEFEBVRE.

TO MARSHAL LEFEBVRE

B—268

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

The Emperor directs, Marshal, that on October 6, you place a cavalry post at Munnerstadt on the road to Meinun-

gen, and another beyond Koenigshofen; these two posts will be withdrawn during the day of the 6th.

The intention of the Emperor is that you should send out all your cavalry, as well as General Gazan's division on the 5th along the road to Hasfurt.

At daybreak on the 6th, you will march your army corps with a view to assembling at Hasfurt, on the Cobourg road; you will take care to send a squadron of cavalry to the high ground in rear between Hasfurt and Cobourg, in order to prevent all communications and keep your movements as secret as possible.

On the 7th you will billet between Hasfurt and Cobourg; on the 8th you will enter at Cobourg in such a manner as to arrive there with your entire army corps; and so that one hour before the arrival of your grenadiers no one in Cobourg will believe that hostilities have commenced; having arrived at Cobourg on the 8th, you will take position beyond this town in such manner as to be on the 10th at Grafenthal, where you will take position to support you.

You will find inclosed* the order which I am giving to Marshal Augereau; you will take to correspond frequently with one another, so that you can support one another if necessary. GHQ will be at Bamberg on the 6th, at Lichtenfels on the 8th and at Kronach on the 9th.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

REPORT OF GENERAL SAVARY TO GHQ

B—217

Munnerstadt, 4 October, 1806, A.M.

[EXTRACT]

At Munnerstadt are three companies of the 21st Light Infantry and 25 horses which their commander is sending at once to Neustadt.

*See B—272, page 231.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

B—221

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

The intention of the Emperor, Marshal, is that you should billet your army corps in the vicinity of Wurtzbourg along the road to Bamberg; you will leave a battalion in the citadel and its vicinity; you will place a detachment of cavalry along the road to Fulda.

I advise you that Marshal Lefebvre is in position beyond Schweinfurth.

Advise me this evening as to your billets. Make sure that Marshal Lefebvre has a cavalry post at the exit of Hamelburg; write to him to advise you if this post should learn anything about the enemy.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

B—272

Wurtzbourg, 4 October, 1806.

The Emperor directs that you proceed on the 5th with your army corps in time to be assembled on the 7th at Bamberg; on the 8th you will take an intermediate position between Bamberg and Cobourg.

I advise you that Marshal Lefebvre will arrive at Cobourg on the 8th.

You should have your cavalry with three pieces of light artillery assembled one hour in advance of your army corps in order to support Marshal Lefebvre if necessary. You will correspond often with Marshal Lefebvre in order to ascertain what there is in front of him. * * * * GHQ will be on the 6th at Bamberg, on the 8th at Lichtenfels and on the 9th at Kronach.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO DIVISION COMMANDERS

HEADQUARTERS, VI CORPS

N—267

Nurnberg, 4 October, 1806.

The intention of the Marshal is that when troops are bivouacked and no rations have been issued, you will designate for each regiment the towns or villages from which they shall procure subsistence. You will designate to each organization commander, the number of detachments which are to be commanded by experienced and active officers. The commanders of these detachments will not forget that disorder destroys all resources, as in such cases the inhabitants hide their provisions and flee, carrying with them their cattle and their means of transportation. They must then maintain the strictest discipline, in order to obtain in the places to which they are sent the necessary resources. On the return of these detachments, colonels will make issues by companies, and captains will see that the distribution is made in the ordinary manner or individually according to the nature of the provisions. Local wagons and horses will be returned with the greatest promptness. Finally the commissaries going through the country will gather or cause to be gathered all possible information as to the resources in their vicinity, and you will so inform them as well as the chief quartermaster; they will also undertake to regulate equipment as necessary.

CHIEF OF STAFF.

TO NAPOLEONM—2563
(WD Files)*Bamberg, 4 October, 1806.*

SIRE:

I have just reviewed the 4th Dragoon Division which had orders to assemble this morning at Staffelbach, and the 3d Division which is assembled in the vicinity of Hallstadt. I found them in every way in the best possible condition. They marched by repeatedly crying: "Long live the Em-

peror;" no troops have had better morale. However some regiments need a few saddles; I have authorized the colonels to buy in general all of these which are indispensable. I have had the heavy baggage sent to the rear and in general all useless articles. * * * *

The following, Sire, is the position occupied today by the reserve cavalry corps:

Nansouty's Division at Eltman.
D'Hautpoul's Division at Burg-Ebrach.
3d Dragoon Division at Hallstadt.
4th Dragoon Division at Bannach.
The Light Division at Lichtenfels and Kronach.

The dragoon divisions which are not covered have been ordered to establish guards to carefully watch all roads leading to Saxony.

Beaumont's division which is billeted from Hallstadt as far as Lichtenfels is mixed up with all the infantry of Marshal Davout's corps and is consequently badly arranged; it would be much better in front of Rattlesdorf as far as the frontier of Saxony, but I will not send it there without receiving your Majesty's authority so as not to get away from the line of operations.

The day after tomorrow I will review the divisions of Nansouty and D'Hautpoul. Tomorrow morning I will see the light cavalry. This evening I am going to Kronach.

I have the honor to send to your Majesty different reports which I have obtained on the movements of the Prussians.

I have not yet received any news of the divisions of Klein and Grouchy. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

ORDERS

B—286

5 October, 1806.

By order of his Majesty, Marshal Lannes will assume command of the V Army Corps which is now at Schweinfurt.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MONSIEUR CAMBACERES

CN—10936
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have been at Wurtzbourg for two days; I am billeted in the Palace of the Grand Duke. He and his principality are behaving very well; he is furnishing his contingent. The armies are in observation. They will soon be fighting. No more diplomatic explanations; I am so busy I have no time to write. Tell General Dejean that General Lacuée reports on the organization of the reserve of conscripts looks good to me; tell him not to lose a minute in putting it into force.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR TALLEYRAND

CN—10938
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO:

The King of Wurtemberg has been here for two days. He understands nothing of what is going on. The Duke of Brunswick has written him a very caustic letter; it is in general German patriotic terms; the King is very angry about it. I have talked a great deal with the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg about current affairs. He thinks that the Emperor of Austria will do badly if he does not profit by present circumstances to increase his bonds with me. Time will show what is to be believed about this. All columns are in march. I leave tonight for Bamberg.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—231a

Bamberg, 5 October, 1806.

I have the honor to advise your Highness that the III Corps is billeting in such a manner as to be capable of assem-

bling at Bamberg within five hours; and in such manner as to be able to march on the first order which your Highness may send me.

DAVOUT.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10940
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

The Commandant of Wurtzbourg must be billeted in the citadel. He should have an assistant in the town in charge of details; he himself should leave the citadel and the lower town which is a part of the citadel as least often as possible.

The commanding officer of the artillery should be advised that 500,000 cartridges, 12 cannon, six of which are 24-pounders, plenty of cannon balls and powder will arrive at Mayence on five boats; he will have them placed in battery; 30 cannon will also arrive from Ingolstadt; this will make more than 40 cannon for this place which is more than they need. Independently of this the general of artillery is leaving a part of the field pieces with equipment which he may recall at any time. Today there should be two battalions at Baden; more should arrive until there are 3000 men there. 1000 hussars, chasseurs or dismounted dragoons will arrive today or tomorrow. On the 8th, all the mounted detachments of the Guard arrive at Wurtzbourg via Mannheim. On the 9th a large number of dismounted and mounted detachments arrive by the same route. On the 10th or 11th, the 28th Light Infantry will arrive via Mayence, and a considerable number of large detachments.

The 28th Infantry should continue its march for Bamberg.

All the mounted cavalry detachments should continue their march towards Bamberg. All the large infantry detachments should also continue on; but no detachments will be less than a hundred men strong.

From now until October 15th all these movements will be so numerous that they should be there an assistant commandant to keep the chief of staff advised as to the arrival

of each detachment and their conditions, and to give them orders as to continuing on to Bamberg. My intention is that all of this place shall be defended against hussars or even a hostile light infantry detachment, and to withdraw into the citadel and the lower part of the town on the left bank of the Main, if an army corps of considerable size should appear before Wurtzbourg, as they will not be strong enough to defend the entire town against a sudden attack. If instead hostile cavalry starts the campaign, it will be most important that the commandant send two officers along the roads from Manheim and from Mayence, in order that all detachments from Manheim may be detoured to Bamberg without passing through Wurtzbourg, and to turn back all those coming from Mayence or have these make a detour to Bamberg. Care must be taken to advise all messengers.

During the 7th, the country of Wurtzbourg will be uncovered from Fulda and from Gotha. It is necessary that on the 8th, the commandant have raised the drawbridges and close the gates, as on the 9th or 10th it will be physically possible for hussars to appear before the town. It will however be easy for him to scout along the roads and to ascertain through spies and the inhabitants all that is happening. But it is desirable that each morning on opening the gates of the town and of the citadel that all precautions be taken to avoid a surprise and to surely ascertain that there has been no change in the situation. One hour before daylight a reconnaissance patrol should be sent out, so that by daybreak it will be certain that there are no hostile forces around.

The entire artillery park must be placed within the lower town forming part of the fortress.

Sandbags should be provided and obstacles, to block the bridge gate, if necessary. But it is not necessary, to alarm the inhabitants about this.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10941
(WD Files)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806, 11:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

The Chief of Staff has just sent you orders which you will receive today. My intention is that you be at Bayreuth on the 8th. You will return to me the orderly officer which I am sending to you, as soon as you have arrived at Bayreuth with all information on that place which you have gathered. This officer will probably find me either at Bamberg or at Lichtenfels.

The country between Bayreuth and Hof is little suitable to cavalry.

I consider it advisable that you should know my plans, in order that such knowledge may guide you in important circumstances.

I have had the citadels of Wurtzbourg, Forchheim and Kronach occupied, armed and provisioned, and I advance with all my army on Saxony by three routes. You are at the head of my right, having one-half day's march in rear of you, the corps of Marshal Ney and one day's march in rear, 10,000 Bavarians; making more than 50,000 in all. Marshal Bernadotte is at the head of my center. He has in rear of him Marshal Davout's corps, the greater part of the reserve cavalry and my Guard; in all more than 70,000. He advances by Kronach, Lobenstein, and Schleitz. The V Corps is at the head of my left. In its rear is the corps of Marshal Augereau. It advances by Cobourg, Grafenthal and Saalfeld. This makes more than 40,000 men. The same day that you arrive at Hof, the remainder will be in line with you.

I will remain constantly with the center. With this immense superiority of forces assembled in such a narrow space, you will understand that I am in a position to hazard nothing and to attack the enemy wherever he may halt with double his force.

It seems that what is most to be feared from the Prussians is their cavalry; but with the infantry that you have and by keeping it always in position to form squares,

you have little to fear. Nevertheless, no means of war must be neglected. Take care that 3000 or 5000 pioneer tools are always with your divisions, so in case of need to be able to construct a redoubt or a simple ditch.

If the enemy should appear against you with less than 30,000 men, you may in agreement with Marshal Ney, assemble your troops and attack him; but if he is found in a position which he has occupied for some time, care will be taken to reconnoiter it and to intrench; in this case act with prudence.

After having arrived at Hof your first care will be to establish communications between Lobenstein, Ebersdorf and Schleitz. On that day I will be at Ebersdorf. According to the information which you will have concerning the enemy, at the time of your arrival at Hof, you may close in slightly on my center or take a position in advance so as to be able to march towards Plauen.

According to all information which I have today, it seems that if the enemy makes any movements it would be towards my left, as it appears that the main body of his forces is at Erfurt.

I cannot too strongly recommend to you to correspond very frequently with me and to keep me advised of all that you learn along the Dresden highway.

You can well understand that it is some task to advance about this place in a square of 200,000 men. This requires some knowledge of the art of war and of situation.

When you write to me take care to describe fully to me the terrain through which you have passed and that which the enemy will or may occupy. Have a diary kept about this in great detail by an engineer officer. This information is very important.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

CN—10942
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

I have assigned only two divisions to your army corps, as I intended to give you the Bavarian army; but in view

of your expressed wish sent to me, not to have this corps any longer under your orders, I have disposed of it otherwise and I have ordered Dupont's division which has 7500 men present under arms and eight guns to be placed under your command. This division will be at Bamberg on the 6th. You will advise it of the position which it should occupy, billeting it without delay near Lichtenfels and Kronach. All the detachments of the 1st Hussars which are with this division should remain at Bamberg as I have detailed this regiment to my headquarters for duty until the arrival of the mounted portion of my Guard. See that the fort of Kronach is armed and provisioned. It is on this place that your depots are to be placed. All commissary trains should be directed there. Select a good position on the ridge lines, which might be occupied while the center of the army marches through Kronach on the Leipzig road.

I will be tomorrow the 6th at Bamberg. My intention is to start in operations immediately. Arrange for four days' rations of bread and have in your wagons as many days' rations of bread and hard bread as possible, without danger of bread becoming mouldy, making eight or ten days.

You should find at Lichtenfels and Kronach inhabitants sufficiently acquainted as to give you information on the nature of the roads from Grafenthal to Lobenstein, and from Lobenstein to Hof and Plauen. These are so close that I suppose there are some men who can give you this information. Return to me by the officer whom I am sending you information on what you have ascertained.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—10943
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

I will probably be tomorrow at Bamberg. It is a long time since I ordered that bakeries at Bamberg be repaired or constructed. You should take the road to Lichtenfels; do not billet your troops far from this route.

The dismounted part of my Guard should arrive tomorrow at Bamberg. See that it is well billeted in the town and as close as possible to the place where I will stop.

Have as much bread and hard bread made as possible.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—726

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

Cousin, order the colonel of the 8th regiment of dragoons to join his regiment at once.

NAPOLEON.

NOTE:—He is attached to Marshal Lefebvre as aide-de-camp.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—288

5 October, 1806.

The V Corps will leave at daybreak the 6th and will assemble half way between Schweinfurt and Bamberg, in such manner as to arrive on the 7th at the fork of the roads to Bamberg and Cobourg, and early on the 8th at Cobourg.

On the 9th you will push your posts beyond Neustadt in order to make place for Marshal Augereau's VII Corps who should arrive on that day at Cobourg.

You will take position as soon as possible on the ridge line; you will arrive at Grafenthal on the 10th. You will be constantly supported in your movements by Marshal Augereau's corps who will march in rear of you.

In order to mask and secure your movement, it is desirable that during the days of the 6th and 7th, 20 cavalrymen be in rear of Melrichstadt and make the usual reconnaissances; that another detachment be beyond Koenigshofen. During the 18th all the detachments will rejoin you.

In passing through Bamberg on the 7th you will report to GHQ in order to receive more detailed instructions as to your operations.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU

B—290

5 October, 1806.

Orders are that Marshal Augereau will proceed on the 6th with his army corps, to assemble at Bamberg in such manner as to be there early on the morning of the 8th.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

B—290A

5 October, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

The Emperor, Marshal, directs that you take your measures so as to enter Bayreuth on the 7th at the earliest possible hour. You will enter there in mass, in such manner that one hour after the entry of the first of your Hussars your entire army corps will be at Bayreuth and will be able to go several leagues further on the road to Hof; you will continue your march on the 8th in such manner as to have your army corps during the night of the 8th and 9th on the heights of Munchberg.

During the 9th you will proceed with your army corps to Hof.

I advise you that Marshal Ney will be a half day's march in rear of you; I am ordering him to constantly keep his cavalry one hour ahead of him, so that he can proceed to your support if necessary.

You need not, Marshal, trouble yourself in any manner as to the chateau of Culmbach. General Wrede commanding the Bavarians, who is marching in rear of Marshal Ney's corps has orders to surround and take this place, provided the enemy is not in force at Hof.

You will take care to send an officer daily to the chief of staff to report your position and such news as you have concerning the enemy.

His Majesty is assured as to the good understanding that exists between you and Marshal Ney; if you should have only an affair with a detachment of 20,000 men his

Majesty understands that Marshal Ney's corps will arrive before you attack, not that his Majesty has any doubt but that your corps would overthrow another corps of equal force, and even much larger, but in being more numerous, blood is spared and battles are more decisive.

His Majesty would have sent you more cavalry but the country from Hof is so cut up that he believes that between you and Marshal Ney you will have sufficient.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL NEY (IV CORPS) AT NUREMBERG

B—297

5 October, 1806.

Marshal Soult will enter Bayreuth on the 7th and from there proceed toward Hof.

The VI Corps will be at Bayreuth on the 8th and will constantly keep one-half day's march from the IV Corps and be ready to support it. General Wrede (Bavarians) who is following the VI Corps has orders to occupy Culmbach. GHQ will be at Bamberg on the 6th, at Lichtenfels on the 8th, and at Kronach on the 9th.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

NOTE:—See map opposite.

TO MARSHAL BESSIERES (GUARD)

B—298

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

Marshal Bessieres will proceed with all of the Guard so as to be on the 6th or the 7th at Bamberg.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

B—298a

Wurtzbourg, GHQ, 5 October, 1806.

GHQ will leave at 10:00 A.M. for Bamberg where it will arrive on the 6th.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE MOBILE
ENGINEER AND ARTILLERY PARKS

B—298b

5 October, 1806.

The mobile engineer and artillery parks, each divided into two sections, will leave Wurtzbourg on the 6th and the 8th for Bamberg, the engineer park preceding the artillery park by two hours. Generals Songis and Kirgener will leave the 5th in order to be at Bamberg on the 6th.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

ORDER FOR MONSIEUR CUSTINE

AIDE-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL SAVARY

CN—10945
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

The aide for duty will remain at Wurtzbourg until October 8th. He will leave there on the 8th at 8:00 P.M. in order to arrive at GHQ at Bamberg on the 9th. He will bring with him the return of all the corps and detachments which will have arrived at Wurtzbourg from now until the 8th via Mannheim and Mayence. He will also bring to Bamberg a memorandum of artillery and commissary trains which will have arrived at Wurtzbourg on the 7th or 8th of October. At noon on the 8th, the aide will visit the citadel of Wurtzbourg. He will count the guns which are in battery and will note the manner in which guard duty is being performed, in order to report thereon. Before leaving he will

take the letters of the commandant, commanding officer of the artillery and of the commissary for GHQ. In proceeding to Bamberg he will inform himself as to where are two detachments of the park of artillery enroute from Wurtzbourg to Bamberg. He will personally count the number of wagons of these detachments and on the 9th will make to me an exact report on all subjects comprised in this order.

NAPOLEON.

INSTRUCTION FOR MONSIEUR DE MONTESQUIOU

ORDERLY OFFICER OF THE EMPEROR

CN—10946
(Imperial Archives)

Wurtzbourg, 5 October, 1806.

You will remain all day the 6th at Wurtzbourg. You will leave there on the 7th at 4:00 P.M. You will proceed at noon on the 7th to the citadel. You will observe the number of guns in battery and the quantity of ammunition, the condition of the garrison and its magazines, finally the manner in which the duty is being performed. You will note all kinds of artillery which will arrive at Wurtzbourg on the 6th and 7th, also all trains of hard bread and flour which will arrive during the 6th and 7th at Wurtzbourg. You will observe the 1st division of the general army park which will have left, you will probable meet it enroute. Talk with the officer in command of it. Count the number of wagons, the companies of artillery and of sappers which are with them. You will arrange matters so as to arrive at Bamberg on the 8th, making notes of everything which you have seen.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2564
(WD Files)

Bamberg, 5 October, 1806, Midnight.

SIRE:

I have just arrived from Kronach where I have been, as I had the honor to inform your Majesty yesterday, in order to review the light troops of Generals Lasalle and Milhaud. They had been obliged to scatter themselves in so many different places that in spite of the order given them yesterday evening to assemble, they will be unable to do so until some time tomorrow. I had therefore to return without seeing them; but General Lasalle and the colonels of the 5th and 7th Hussars assured me that these two organizations lacked nothing and were ready to take the field. They each have 500 horses. The 13th, which I met enroute going from Lichtenfels to Kronach appeared superb and in very fine condition; they have about the same force. General Milhaud has not yet appeared with the 11th Chasseurs; I have sent him orders to proceed to his destination.

The citadel of Kronach is in very good shape; 8 guns were in position this evening. The platforms were to be finished this evening. The greatest activity is going on in constructing ovens, also in repairing the exterior works. There are casemates and fairly large depots. It is inconceivable that the Prussians, since they had determined on war, did not seek to capture this place, which would have been all the easier as this fort was defended by only about a hundred men without artillery, and without provisions.

This occupation would have been for them of the greatest importance; it is difficult to find a finer position; it can be regarded as the key to three important roads. We have light troops at Nordhalben, at the far frontier of Bamberg. Colonel Mario of the Engineers is having an intrenched camp constructed on the high ground in front of that village. We are also watching all the other approaches.

I have noted the corps of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo which he reviewed. It seemed to me finely equipped and in perfect morale. The horses of the trains are in the best possible shape.

Marshal Davout also reviewed his corps today; there is nothing wanting as to its equipment nor as to its morale.

The ovens which your Majesty ordered constructed at Bamberg will be completed tomorrow evening.

Tomorrow I will review the two cuirassier divisions.

Sire, the country here is suffering considerably as all the army corps is making requisitions at the same time. The central administration of Bavaria has complained to me in regard to this. It would seem desirable that the quartermaster general should send one of his agents here to be in charge of the requisitions of all the different army corps for their extraordinary requirements.

I send to your Majesty the various reports which I have received on the movements of the enemy. There is a rumor generally current that Prince Hohenlohe is marching on Bayreuth, and the King via Neustadt towards Schleitz. Already billets have been prepared and food requisitioned, which are reasons for not believing this, as the Prussians are in the habit of spreading similar rumors and then doing something else. Everything leads to the belief that they are assembling at Erfurt and Naumburg. The Queen who was there some days ago, has left for Berlin. I expect to have soon positive news to send you, as it seems impossible that some one of the agents whom I have sent among the Prussians would not soon return.

I invite your Majesty's attention to the fact that the crossing of the Main on the road from Wurtzbourg to Bamberg is a defile, and that there is no bridge there. I have the honor, etc.,

MURAT.

PROCLAMATION

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS


CN—10948
(WD Files)

Bamberg, 6 October, 1806.

SOLDIERS:

The order for your return to France had been issued; you had already taken several marches in this direction.

10. BILLETS OF CORPS, 5 OCTOBER 1806.



Triumphal celebrations awaited you, and preparations to receive you had commenced in the capital.

But after we had abandoned ourselves to a too confident sense of security, new plots arose under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries for war were heard at Berlin. Every day for two months we have been provoked.

The same faction, the same giddy spirit which by reason of our internal dissensions led the Prussians fourteen years ago to the middle of the plains of Champagne, has ascendancy in their counsels. If it is no longer their wish to burn Paris and level it to its foundation, today they desire that their flag shall be planted in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony who they wish to compel by an odious transaction to renounce its independence and become one of their provinces. Finally they wish to wrench the laurels from your brows. They desire us to evacuate Germany under threat of their arms! Such stupidity! Let them know that it would be a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to blemish the honor of the children of the grand people and their allies! Their plans will be confounded; in the plans of Champagne they found defeat, death and shame. But the lessons of experience have disappeared and they are men among whom sentiments of hatred and jealousy never dies.

Soldiers, there are none among you who wish to return to France over any other road than that of honor. We must only return there under triumphal arches.

And what! Have we then braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts, conquered Europe allied against us several times, carried our flags from the Orient to the Occident, in order to return today to our homeland as refugees, after having abandoned our Allies, and acknowledge that the French eagle has been frightened by the sight of the Prussian armies! But these have already arrived at our advance posts. For then, as moderation has been unable to keep them from this astonishing idea, let the Prussian army meet the same fate it met fourteen years ago! Let them learn that if it is easy to acquire an increase of territory and of power by friendship with the great people, the enmity of the latter, which can only be provoked by the abandonment

of every idea of wisdom and of knowledge, is more terrible than the tempests of the Ocean.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—727

The Minister of War proposes to appoint officers to vacant positions in the 1st Legion of the North, of whom some shall be Poles the others Frenchmen.

6 October, 1806.

Appoint Poles; the others are with the army which must not be disorganized at the present time.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—728

The Minister of War submits to the Emperor the arrangements which have been made with a view to having the pontoniers build a bridge of boats across the Rhine at a point opposite Wesel.

6 October, 1806.

Military pontoniers are not needed for throwing a bridge across at Wesel. The artillery office which makes this proposition has no tact. Instead of writing so much the bridge should have been built.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—729

Bamberg, 6 October, 1806.

His Majesty orders all cavalry officers whose squadrons or company is with the army to join the colours at once. The Emperor's orders, and their duty, prescribe that they should be with their regiments; they should not absent themselves for any service foreign to their company or

squadron. All who are employed as aides-de-camp, correspondence officers or otherwise will at once join their company or squadron. Honour calls each officer to his flag.

The Major-General, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL DUPONT AT BAMBERG

B—301

6 October, 1806.

The Emperor directs that you leave tomorrow the 7th at daybreak to join Marshal Bernadotte; you will leave the entire country between Bamberg and Lichtenfels entirely clear for other army corps which are following you.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL LANNES AT HASSFURT

B—302

Bamberg, 6 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

The instructions which I sent you yesterday, Marshal, advise you that you are to stop for the night on the 7th at the roadfork of the Bamberg to Cobourg and the Bamberg to Schweinfurt roads; at this roadfork is the village of Dorfleins, where I have just ordered a bridge be constructed over the Main.

It will be desirable that your First Division and your cavalry be able to pass the Main over this bridge tomorrow the 7th, and that you take advantage of the balance of the day to reach Oberndorf, and there cross the Main on the second bridge which I am having constructed there, and billet your army on the right bank of the Main, without having any detachments or men on the left bank which is occupied by the other army corps. The 8th instant, this division which will therefore be quite close to Cobourg, will march so as to also approach this village.

You will assemble during the 7th all the remainder of your army corps in such manner that before daybreak on the 8th instant, all troops which pertain to your command will have crossed the Main and all the country between Halstadt, to the north and close to Bamberg, and Oberndorf, in such manner that by 8:00 A.M. this part of the road will be clear.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPEROR AT WURZBURG.

B—302a

[EXTRACT]

Bamberg, 5 October, 1806, Midnight.

I report to your Majesty that the crossing of the Main from Wurtzburg to Bamberg is a defile where there is no bridge.

GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

B—307

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

The Emperor directs Marshal, that you move your headquarters during the 7th to Lichtenfels and that you also advance your leading division so as to billet at Lichtenfels; your two other divisions will be billeted between Bamberg and Lichtenfels, in such manner that tomorrow the 8th, your entire army corps may be assembled in mass for combat beyond Kronach, and be ready to support Marshal Bernadotte who should during the 9th proceed toward Lobenstein and the Saale.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

9. BILLETS OF THE RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS FROM 3 TO 6 OCTOBER IN-
CLUSIVE.



TO PRINCE MURAT

B—308

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 4:30 A.M.

The Prince will proceed today the 7th to Kronach where he will receive during the day detailed instructions.

Beaumont's division (3d Dragoons) will leave as early as possible for Kronach.

Sahuc's division (4th Dragoons) will proceed today to Lichtenfels.

The two heavy cavalry divisions will billet on the 8th between Bamberg and Lichtenfels.

The divisions of Klein (2d Dragoon), and Grouchy (1st Dragoon) should continue their march of concentration.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

NOTE:—See map opposite.

TO ADJUTANT DESNOYERS

B—309

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 4:30 A.M.

The staff adjutant, Desnoyers, is directed to proceed personally along the road from Bamberg to Bayreuth; he will question the inhabitants and travelers to ascertain news concerning Marshal Soult who should have entered Bayreuth by noon; he will say nothing about this to anybody, and, as soon as it is certain that the French army is at Bayreuth, he will so write to me by an orderly or by an inhabitant; M. Desnoyers will proceed in person to Bayreuth, reporting to the Emperor all the information which he has been able to procure as to the situation of Marshal Soult's command, as well as everything which he has been able to find out as to the situation of the enemy at Hof. He will also make notes as to the quantity of subsistence stores and method of supplies in the territory of Bayreuth.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

CN—10949
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

SENATORS:

We have left our capital to proceed to the midst of our army in Germany, from the moment that we certainly knew that they were menaced on their flanks by unexpected movements. Scarcely arrived on the frontiers of our States we had occasion to recognize how important our presence was, and to applaud the defensive measures which we had taken before leaving the center of our empire. Already the Prussian armies, brought up to full war footing had assembled from all parts, they had crossed their frontiers; Saxony had been invaded and the wise Prince which governs her had been forced to act against his will and against the interests of his people. The Prussian armies had arrived opposite the billets of our troops. Provocations of every kind including acts, have indicated the spirit of hatred which animated our enemies, and the moderation of our soldiers who remaining tranquil in view of all these movements, and astonished at not receiving any orders, remained under the double confidence of courage and right.

Our first duty has been to ourselves cross the Rhine, to organize our camps, and to hear the cry of war. It has re-echoed in the heart of all our warriors. Rapid marches and combinations have brought them within the flash of an eye to the places which we had indicated to them. All our camps are completed; we are about to march against the Prussian armies and repel force by force. At the same time we must state our heart is sorrowfully affected by the constant preponderance which the evil genius has in Europe, occupied without cessation in crossing the designs which we had formed for the peace of Europe and for the repose and well-being of the present generation, by attacking the cabinets, by all means of seduction, misleading those which it could not corrupt, blinding them to their true interests, and driving them in the midst of parties without other guides than the passions which they have known how to inspire in them.

The cabinet of Berlin itself has in no way chosen with deliberation the course which it has followed; it has been directed in this direction by art and by malicious intention. The King suddenly found himself one hundred leagues from his capital, on the frontier of the Confederation of the Rhine, in the midst of his army and opposite French troops dispersed in their billets, who thought they could count on the ties which united the two states and in the numerous protestations which under all circumstances came from the court of Berlin.

In a war which is so just, where we only take up arms to defend ourselves against those whom we have not provoked by a single act or by any pretention, and where it will be impossible to assign the true cause, we count absolutely on the support of the law and our peoples where circumstances require them to give us new proofs of their love, of their devotion, and of their courage. On our side no personal sacrifice would be difficult, no danger will stop us, at any time when it will be necessary to act to assure our rights and the honor and prosperity of our peoples.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR CAMBACERES

CN—10951
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The Prince of Benevento will send you my communication to the senate; these will acquaint you with the conditions of affairs. You will see what are the pretensions of the court of Berlin. It is a dream. Hostilities have commenced on the 7th. I have caused my troops to enter the territory of Bayreuth. Immediately after the communications to the Senate, it is desirable that the ministers of the interior and of divine worship issue the same proclamations as a year ago.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR TALLEYRAND

CN—10953
(Imperial Files)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO:

You will find enclosed herewith the letter from the King of Prussia. I have read it only very hastily. It is a pure libel. However, you may prepare a reply, if he ever causes it to be published. I am sending you my letter to the Senate, signed; you will send it to them by special messenger, with your report, which you will modify according to latest events. We ought to be on good terms with the court of Berlin, for having furnished us such an important document that explains all. You will add copies of the letters sent to Monsieur de Knobelsdorf at the time I caused my troops to leave Paris. What is pleasant in all this is that the Prussians are giving me their ultimatum on the 8th, while I without knowing this, have entered the territory of Bayeuth on the 7th and have commenced my movements. I am hoping that great events will occur within a month, and that the King will see that counsels of women are undependable. The King of Wurtemberg assures me that a messenger has left for Saint-Petersburg with a political note and a letter from the Queen of Prussia asking the Czar for 100,000 men. You will understand that that old fool, the Duke of Brunswick, has written a letter to the King of Wurtemberg threatening him with planting the Prussian eagle at Stuttgart. This will not be bad considering his proclamation of fourteen years ago.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR OTTO

CN—10955
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

I am sending you a letter for the King of Bavaria;* I am sending it under removable seal so that you may acquaint yourself with it. Send a messenger to Prince Eugene, to

*See CN—10956.

advise him that I am at Bamberg and that hostilities commenced on the 7th. I wish that he and you would keep this to yourselves. It is even desirable that the King of Bavaria should not know about the commencement of hostilities for several days. Hurry the Bavarians in their mobilization. As it appears that Austria does not intend to concentrate troops on the Inn, it is necessary to imitate these movements. I wish that General Deroÿ's corps be divided into two parts, and that 8000 men moving on Ingolstadt can be within a few days on the Regnitz in rear of Bamberg if that should become necessary. Answer the questions above and let me know which general will command this new division.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF BAVARIA

CN—10956
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I finally received the King of Prussia's letter. I cannot send you the letter which he has written to me; it is a twenty page rhapsody copied from English newspapers; but inclosed herewith is Monsieur de Knobelsdorf's letter which I have just received. You will find there also my answer in my proclamation to the army. The King of Prussia has then declared war! He threatens me with starting it on the 8th! Without doubt he would like to prevent the junction of forces which I am bringing from France; he does not doubt that they have arrived, and that even my Guard which did not leave Paris until September 22 was at Bamberg from October 5th. I cannot however but praise myself for being so careful to establish my right before the eyes of Europe.

NAPOLEON.

NOTE:—Similar letters were sent to the King of Wurtemberg and to the Prince Primate. In the letter to the Prince Primate is the following postscript:

"I believe it desirable that your Highness send this note confidentially to all the princes of the Confederation to advise them as to the situation of this question."

TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG

CN—10957
(Imperial Files)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

After what your Majesty told me, I count on his army being ready at Mergentheim on October 10th. I beg him to send me a return by one of his officers in order that I may issue march orders without delay.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE MURAT

B—313

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

As the IV Corps is to enter Bayreuth today, the enemy will not know of the commencement of hostilities until about noon or towards the evening of the 8th.

The advance guard has three brigades of light cavalry; thorough order should be enforced there.

A cavalry brigade attached to Marshal Bernadotte's I Corps is commanded by General Wathier (2d and 4th Hussars, 5th Chasseurs); it will advance tomorrow morning, make as many prisoners as possible, advance as far as practicable, and will comb the entire country for information.

Brigadier General Milhaud (13th Chasseurs*) after having passed Lobenstein, will advance towards the left and reconnoiter towards Saalfeld and Grafenthal.

The intention of the Emperor is that the Grand Duke (Prince Murat) will remain in position, having the brigade of General Lasalle in front of him, which he will keep as united as possible to form a reserve; but he will send reconnaissances on the right towards Hof, and as General Wathier is proceeding forward with one regiment out of three, the Grand Duke will be able to assemble four regiments and will be covered in front by General Wathier with one regi-

*Milhaud's brigade consisted of the 1st Hussars and the 13th Chasseurs, but at this time the 1st Hussars were on detached service at GHQ pending the arrival of the Guard Cavalry.—B.

ment, on his left by General Milhaud, on his right by General Lasalle.

The cavalry under the orders of Prince Murat will explore the sector: Hof, Schleiz-Saalfeld.

The three Generals (Wathier, Milhaud, Lasalle) will cross the Main tomorrow to a distance of one or two leagues each in his own direction, combing and scouting the country.

An engineer officer will be attached to each of these brigade commanders to reconnoiter the country, in such manner that by midnight tomorrow the Emperor may receive at Kronach, where he will be, the reports of these officers, and of the three brigade commanders; these reconnaissances should be directed with the following points in view:

Can one proceed from Saalburg to Saalfeld?

Can one proceed from Saalburg to Hof?

Can one proceed from Lobenstein to Grafenthal?

Can one proceed from Lobenstein to Hof?

What are the nature of the roads?

Are they suitable for infantry, cavalry or artillery?

What is the situation of the enemy towards Hof, towards Saalburg, and especially along the main highway to Leipzig?

What is the enemy position about Grafenthal and Saalfeld, that is, along the road from Cobourg to Naumburg.

The emperor is sending the Grand Duke Murat in person on this reconnaissance expressly to enable his Majesty to ascertain as much as possible on the enemy's position and to take advantage of our first advance to strike a big blow.

If there is an infantry brigade of Marshal Bernadotte's command which can be placed tomorrow evening in a good position beyond Lobenstein and Ebersdorf, this will be done.

Marshal Bernadotte with his army corps should take a good position on the heights of Saalburg.

Probably all the bridges over the Saale will be cut; it will be necessary to repair them, and for this purpose it will be necessary that ponton troops of Marshal Bernadotte be towards the front.

In order that the Emperor may certainly receive news at Kronach tomorrow, it is necessary that the Grand Duke Murat have staff officers along the road.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10960
(WD Files)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I sent you from Wurtzbourg on October 5th one of my orderly officers. He has not yet returned, nor the officer who brought you the orders from the Chief of Staff. But I do not less doubt that today you have assembled at Bair-euth. My headquarters will be at midnight today at Kronach, where I wish to obtain reports of you and ascertain what you yourself have learned. I desire to ascertain at the same time, positively, the name of the place where you will be on the night of the 8th-9th. The light cavalry of the reserve will advance the 8th via Lobenstein pushing detachments towards Hof, with a view of having information of you on the 9th.

This morning I received the ultimatum of the King of Prussia dated October 1st. It is the sum of stupidity and folly. He wishes nothing more than we should evacuate Germany by daily marches. He gives me until October 8th to reply. You should enter his territory on the 7th; so he should not have cause of complaint against us. Some carbine shots have been fired on his left. You will receive my general order for war; it will be distributed tomorrow morning.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—10961
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 2:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

I had appointed General Victor to a division composed of two special regiments in Marshal Augereau's corps. State to him on my part that I do not approve what he has said about the 14th Infantry, which is one of the best regiments of the army. At the same time I note with pleasure that you have taken him for chief of staff. Marshal Berthier will expedite his commission. He is a solid man in whom I have confidence. I will give him proof of this as soon as circumstances permit.

You will arrive tomorrow at Cobourg. Take a good position beyond this town. The enemy may be on two directions from you ; he may come by the Gotha road, and by Eisfeld and Saalfeld. The light cavalry in the center, which advances on the morning of the 8th through Lobenstein, will reconnoiter towards Grafenthal. Marshal Augereau will go beyond Bamberg tomorrow in order to be tomorrow evening near Cobourg. It is necessary before going yourself too far in advance along the Grafenthal road that you have positive information that Marshal Augereau passed across the bridge under the Main to Oberndorf. According to all information which I have been able to procure, it appears that the principal hostile forces are at Naumburg, Weimer, Erfurt and Gotha.

As soon as you enter Cobourg, you will send all your reports to Kronach. It is very important that these reach me quickly in order that I may compare your reports with those which come to me from other sources and judge of the enemy's plans. I believe that you ought to post two communication posts, each consisting of 5 chasseurs between Cobourg, and Kronach in order that your reports may arrive rapidly and frequently.

In all cases your line of retreat is on Bamberg. It is possible that I may attack the enemy at Saalburg. I will attack him the 9th. Have letters in the postoffices at Cobourg and Neustadt opened ; that may give you some infor-

mation. Post your command in a very good position. I note with pleasure that you will arrive very early at Cobourg; this will give you an opportunity to take good military position and to have reconnoitered all the routes which center at Saalfeld and at Eisfeld.

Write to me very frequently. After having arrived at Cobourg or at Neustadt, send me all information which you can obtain concerning the road from Grafenthal, to Lobenstein and to Saalburg. Arrange matters on the assumption that two or three days after having passed Cobourg the enemy might be there. It will actually be possible that the enemy do this. Send all surplus materiel which you may have to the citadel at Kronach, as today you are too far from Wurtzburg to send them there.

In stating above that your retreat was to be towards Bamberg, I should add that this is not to be by the road which you used in moving forward, but by the main road; you will find intermediate positions in rear of Cobourg which will give you an opportunity to cover the route from Lichtenfels and from Bamberg. As I have plenty of troops at Lichtenfels and at Kronach, you will be supported not only by Marshal Augereau but also by all the corps of the center.

This morning I received a note from Prussia dated October 1st. She wishes nothing more than to oblige us to evacuate Germany by daily marches. When the nation hears of this letter, it will shake with indignation.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—

*At the Frontier about Four Leagues from Bayreuth Near
Busbach, 7 October, 1806, 3:00 P.M.*

I have the honor to report to your serene Highness that the French troops are in possession of Bayreuth since this morning, without having entered it.

Marshal Soult is half a league from that town.

There is no enemy in the town.

Up to the present I have been unable to procure more definite information worthy of note. I am proceeding to Bayreuth; as soon as I obtain details as to the position of the two armies, and as soon as I ascertain the resources of the country, I will proceed quickly to GHQ.

DESNOYERS.

TO GENERAL THOUVENOT

COMMANDANT OF WURTZBOURG

CN—10962
(WD Files)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806, 7:00 P.M.

MONSIEUR, GENERAL THOUVENOT:

It is necessary that you give great attention to provisioning the storehouses of Wurtzbourg and in making hard bread, and that you forward every day 30,000 or 40,000 rations of hard bread to Kronach. This is of the greatest importance for the supply of the army. Send also each day 300 quintals of flour to Kronach. Take care that a large quantity of hard bread is made every day, as the issues are going to be considerable in the position which the army is about to take.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—731

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, I note with pleasure that you have despatched couriers to call out the reserve conscription. I have given orders that conscripts of the general depot at Strasburg be no longer sent to Italy, but divided among the depots of infantry and cavalry which are on the Rhine. Marshal Kellermann will be charged with this operation. I recommend to you the remounts, and the despatching of cloth for clothing the conscripts. I have called to the army a great number of adjutant-generals and staff aides; hasten their departure. I have issued a decree for the formation

of a fifth squadron of cuirassiers; organize it without delay. The first Legion of the North is to assemble at Landau; look after the Swiss regiments and the battalion from the Valais. Give colour to all this.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—732

The Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen informs the Emperor that he has just set on foot a company to take part in His Majesty's army in the campaign about to be opened.

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

The Major-General will issue orders for this company to proceed to Forchheim.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL LEFRANC, AT FORCHHEIM

CN—10963
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

Orders have been given for constructing bakeries at Forchheim. The commissary should have taken measures to supply the storehouses with flour. Have 30,000 rations of hard bread made for the supply of Kronach; this is necessary for supplying the army. I suggest that you watch carefully the armament of the town. 400,000 rations of hard bread should be sent from Passau to Forchheim. Write or send someone to find out about this. Circumstances being urgent, take steps to have 30,000 rations of hard bread sent by the morning of the 9th. Make requisition in the Prussian country of Erlangen and on the bailiwick of Nurnberg, for your own supply and for the most pressing needs of the army.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE EUGENE

CN—10964
(Imperial Archives)

Bamberg, 7 October, 1806.

DEAR SON:

Hostilities commenced today, by my having my troops enter the territory of Bayreuth. In order not to alarm the public, it is useless to speak about this. Have assembled at Brescia under pretexts of having a review, the nine cuirassiers squadrons, in order that if I should have need of them, you may cause them to proceed by the Rocca d'Anfo and Inspruck to join me. You will have these squadrons placed on a war footing by utilizing all available men of the 4th squadrons. All information which I have indicates that Austria is not making any movements, but that on the contrary she is sending troops towards Galicia and Silesia. You should yourself note what she is doing in Italy. The conscripts should be reaching you.

I have sent the 15th Infantry to Genoa in order that it may be nearer, so that there will be two good regiments in this town which cannot help to be very useful to you.

Send me via Tyrol some of your aides who will take care to take precautions when seeking news concerning the army. They should go to Forchheim, a small fortified place on the Regnitz. They will make notes as to what they have seen in my rear areas, in order to be able to make a report about them on their arrival.

Up to the moment that news arrives of some major event, have rumors started that everything has been arranged with Prussia; that will greatly decrease any possible alarm.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE HEADQUARTER COMMANDANT
AND TO THE GUARD

B—335

7 October, 1806.

GHQ and the Guard will proceed at 3:00 A.M. on the 8th to Lichtenfels.

GHQ will be prepared to leave Lichtenfels during the night of the 8th-9th for Kronach, to be there at 6:00 A.M. on the 9th, with a view to interfere as little as possible with the movements of the troops during the morning of that day.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—340

7 October, 1806, P.M.

The 3d and 2d Divisions, Generals Leval and Saint-Hilaire, have marched ten leagues today; they have nevertheless arrived two hours before night and taken position, they have not left more than 20 men in rear.

SOULT.

POSITIONS OF THE IV CORPS AT END OF MARCHES OF OCTOBER 7, 1806

B—340a

At Berneck; the advance guard consisting of the 8th Hussars.

At Benk; the 11th and 16th Chasseurs, less detachments and one light battery: at Bindloch 3d Division: General Legrand.

Just north of Bayreuth: 2d Division, General Leval.

Just south of Bayreuth: 1st Division, General Saint-Hilaire.

Neu-Drosenfeld: detachments of the 16th Chasseurs.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

M—2565

(Prince Murat's Files)

Kronach, 7 October, 1806, Midnight.

I advise you that I am proceeding tomorrow at day-break from Nordhalben for Lobenstein with your cavalry

and the brigades of Milhaud and Lasalle. From Nordhalben I will have Saalburg reconnoitered by General Wattier, Hof by General Lasalle and Graffenthal and Saale by General Milhaud. I will myself remain in position in reserve with three regiments beyond Lobenstein or Ebersdorf, in order to sustain the three generals to whom I have given instruction for the reconnaissance which they are to make, and for taking as many prisoners as possible. I will also dispose of the regiment of light infantry which is at the head of your leading division. I will advise you tomorrow evening as to the position which circumstances will require me to give it. As it is possible that the enemy will have cut the bridge beyond Saalbourg over the Saale, I beg you to have the pontoneers march at the head of the advance guard of your army corps. I beg you to advise General Wattier and the general commanding the advance guard of your infantry to be ready to march at daybreak tomorrow morning. I will direct them to report to you their positions and what information they may obtain as to the movements of the enemy. I believe that H.M. will have you advised as to these different dispositions.

MURAT.

P.S.—H.M. desires that some engineer officers be attached to the brigade generals to accompany them during their reconnaissance. It is therefore necessary that three engineer officers shall be at daybreak tomorrow on the plateau of Nordhalben, where they will find assembled the six light regiments and the infantry regiment which is to march with me.

CHAPTER V

The Maneuver, 8 October, 1806, to 14 October, 1806

TO GENERAL WATTIER

M—2566
(Prince Murat's Files)


Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 1:00 A.M.

GENERAL:

Hostilities commenced yesterday. Marshal Soult should have occupied Bayreuth and his advance guard should be today at Munchsberg. March at the head of the 2d Husars on Lobenstein from which place I will direct General Lasalle with one regiment on Hof, and General Milhaud with another on Grafenthal and Saalfeld. I will be in position in reserve at Lobenstein with three regiments united; you will send all your reports to that place. You will attack the enemy wherever you find him, without however compromising yourself, and you will attempt to take prisoners. I am issuing orders to an engineer officer to accompany you, and to report to me on the condition of the roads. One squadron should form your advance guard; you will march in person at the head of the other troops. As it is probable that the enemy will have cut the bridge over the Saale at Saalburg, I am placing at your disposition the pontoniers of Marshal Prince Bernadotte's corps to repair it as promptly as possible.

Arrived at Saalbourg, you will have Saalfeld, Hof and Schleitz reconnoitered. The officer charged with these reconnaissances should report to you everything he learns as to the movements, force and position of the enemy; on the nature of the different roads, and especially that toward Leipzig and on the resources which the country which you will have reconnoitered offers. A special report will be

11. BILLETTS ON NIGHT 7-8 OCTOBER 1806.



made as to whether the roads are suitable for cavalry, infantry and artillery, or for only one of these three arms. I particularly desire to have information on the position of the enemy on the Leipzig road. You will post safeguards at all postoffices, and you will direct them not to furnish horses except to general staff officers, charged with dispatches for the Emperor. You will arrest all messengers, and you will send me the mail sacks. You will carefully question all travelers, and you will send me those of them who may have important news to communicate. You will also send me the prisoners and deserters. You will require the strictest discipline from the troops; you will have the people and property respected; you will advise the authorities that we are not coming to make war on the Saxon people but to free them from the presence of the soldiers of a power who first violated their territory, etc.

MURAT.

TO GENERAL LASALLE

M—2567

(Prince Murat's Files)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 1:00 A.M.

GENERAL:

Hostilities commenced yesterday. * * * * Arrived at Lobenstein, march with the 5th Hussars to reconnoiter Hof. March with care, with an advance guard of one squadron. You will remain personally at the head of your other troops. * * * * I desire to have Hof reconnoitered so as to positively determine whether it is occupied by the enemy, and if so whether he is in force, whether the road from Lobenstein to this point is practicable for artillery and what resources the towns and villages in that country offer.

MURAT.

[Information concerning General Wattier's mission and Murat's position in reserve omitted.—C.H.L.]

TO GENERAL MILHAUD

M—2568

(Prince Murat's Files)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806.

GENERAL:

Hostilities commenced yesterday. Marshal Soult should have occupied Bayreuth and his advance guard should be today at Munchberg, you will march with the 13th Chasseurs to reconnoiter Grafenthal and Saalfeld by strong reconnaissances. You will stop personally with the main body of your troops at the first village near the roadfork from Lobenstein to Grafenthal and Saalfeld. You will march with care and you will attack the enemy wherever you find him without however compromising yourself. You are advised that the corps of Marshal Lannes should occupy Cobourg today and that his light troops are undoubtedly approaching Grafenthal; that General Wattier has orders to reconnoiter Saalburg and General Lasalle, Hof. The mission of your reconnaissance is to ascertain the position of the enemy about Graffenthal and Saalfeld, that is along the road from Cobourg to Naumburg and particularly the condition of the roads from Lobenstein to Grafenthal and Saalfeld. I especially desire to know if they are practicable for artillery and what resources the villages along them offer. I am ordering an engineer officer to accompany you with directions to submit to me a detailed report on the condition of the roads. I will be myself at Lobenstein.

MURAT.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 1

CN—10967
(WD Files)*Bamberg, 8 October, 1806.*

Peace with Russia having been concluded and signed July 10th, and negotiations with England being in progress and almost completed, brought alarm to Berlin. Vague rumors multiplied and the knowledge of this cabinet, of wrongs committed against all the powers, which it had suc-

cessively betrayed, led it to give credence to rumors that one of the secret articles of the treaty concluded with Russia gave Poland to the Prince Constantine with the title of King, Silesia to Austria in exchange for the Austrian portion of the Poland, and Hanover to England. Finally it persuaded itself that these three powers had united with France and that consequently an imminent danger for Prussia had arisen.

The wrongs of Prussia against France date back to very distant periods. First she armed in order to profit by our internal dissensions. She ran to arms at the time of the invasion of Holland by the Duke of York; and after the events of the last war, although she had no reason for discontent against France, armed again and signed on October 1, 1805, the famous Treaty of Potsdam which one month later was replaced by the Treaty of Vienna.

She had wrongs against Russia, who could not forget the failure to execute the treaty of Potsdam and the subsequent conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna.

Its wrongs against the Emperor of Germany and the Germanic Corps, more numerous and more ancient, have been known of for all times. She has always been in opposition to the Diet. When the Germanic Corps was at war, she was at peace with its enemies. Her treaties with Austria were never carried out and her constant study was to excite the powers to war, in order to be able when peace was made to gather the fruits of her intrigues and their success.

Those who might suppose that so much versatility was due to defect of morality on the part of the Prince commit a great error. For fifteen years the Court of Berlin has been a ring where parties fought and triumphed in turn. One wishes war and the other peace. The least political event, the slightest incident, gave an advantage to one or the other, and the King in the midst of all these opposed passions, in the midst of this mass of intrigues, floated around uncertainly, without for a moment ceasing, being an honest man.

On August 11th, a messenger from the Marquis of Lucchesini arrived at Berlin, bringing in most positive terms

assurances concerning the supposed dispositions by which France and Russia had agreed by the treaty of July 20th to reestablish the kingdom of Poland and to take Silesia from Prussia. Partisans of war started up at once; they opposed violently the personal sentiments of the King; 40 messengers left in one night, and all ran to arms. News of this sudden explosion arrived at Paris on the 20th of the same month. Complaints were made against an ally so poorly abused; hasty explanations and precise assurances were hastily given, and as the only reason for this unforeseen mobilization was manifestly an error, it was hoped that reflection would calm a disturbance having so little reason.

In the meanwhile the treaty signed at Paris was not ratified at Saint-Petersburg, and information of all kinds did not cease to make known to Prussia that the Marquis de Lucchesini had taken his information from the most suspicious circles of the capital and from intriguing individuals who composed its habitual society. In consequence he was recalled. It was announced that M. Baron Knobelsdorf, a man of all full and frank nature and of perfect morals, would succeed him.

This Envoy Extraordinary soon arrived at Paris bringing a letter from the King of Prussia dated August 23d.

This letter was full of nice expressions and of specific declarations and the Emperor replied to it in a frank and reassuring manner. On the day following the departure of the messenger with this answer, it was learned that outrageous songs against France had been sung in the Berlin theater; that immediately after the departure of Monsieur de Knobelsdorf mobilization was being redoubled; and that although some men who had remained cool headed flared up at these false alarms, the war party noting the discord on all sides had so excited everybody, that the King found himself powerless to resist the torrent.

Afterwards it commenced to be known at Paris that the peace party, having itself become alarmed by false assurances and deceiving appearances, had lost all its advantages, so that the war party taking advantage of the error in which its adversaries had allowed themselves to be drawn, had added provocation to provocation, and insult to insult,

and things had come to such a point that it was impossible to escape from this situation except by war.

The Emperor saw then the force of circumstances, and that it was impossible to avoid taking up arms against his allies. He gave orders for preparations.

Things moved very quickly at Berlin; Prussian troops entered Saxony, arrived on the frontiers of the Confederation and insulted our advance posts.

September 24th, the Imperial Guard left Paris for Bamberg where it arrived October 6th. Orders were sent to the army and everything was put in movement.

September 25th the Emperor left Paris; the 28th he was at Mayence; October 2d at Wurtzbourg, and on the 6th at Bamberg.

On the same day two carbine shots were fired by Prussian hussars at a French staff officer. The two armies could consider themselves in touch.

On the 7th his Majesty the Emperor received a messenger from Mayence, written by the Prince of Benevento, bringing two important dispatches: one was a letter from the King of Prussia, 20 pages long, which was really nothing more than a bad pamphlet against France; of the same character as those which the English cabinet had written by its writers for 500 pounds sterling per annum. The Emperor did not finish reading this when he said to persons near him: "I complain against my brother the King of Prussia; he does not know French; he surely has not read this rhapsody." To this letter was attached the celebrated note of Monsier de Knobelsdorf: "Monsieur," said the Emperor to Marshal Berthier, "we are asked to a meeting of honor for the 8th: no Frenchman is ever missing from such a meeting; but as it is reported that a handsome queen wishes to be a witness to this fight, let us be courteous and let us march without resting for Saxony." The Emperor had good reason to speak thus; for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an amazon in the uniform of her dragoon regiment, and writing twenty letters a day to stir up everybody on all sides. It looks to me as if Armide in his excitement was trying to set fire to his own palace. After, her, Prince Louis of Prussia the young prince of bravery

and courage, excited, believes he can make a great name for himself through the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of these two great persons, the entire court cries "To war." But when war will have appeared with all its horrors, all of them will excuse themselves from being to blame and for having brought terror to the peaceful northern provinces; therefore, as a natural consequence of the ill reasoning of the court parties, we will see the authors of the war not only incensed, making excuses for having provoked it, and stating that they wished it but at some future time, but also in laying the blame on the King, an honest man whom they have made the dupe of their intrigues and deceptions.

The following is the disposition of the French army:

The army marches by three routes: the right, consisting of the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney, and one division of Bavarians, coming from Amberg and from Nuremberg, assembles at Bayreuth, and marches on Hof where it will arrive the 9th;

The center consisting of the reserve under the Grand Duke of Berg, the corps of Marshal the Prince of Pontecorvo and of Marshal D'Yvetot, and the Imperial Guard, marching via Bamberg on Kronach will arrive at Saalburg on the 8th, and from there will proceed via Saalburg and Schleitz towards Gera;

The left consisting of the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau is to march from Schweinfurt towards Cobourg, Grafenthal and Saalfeld.

TO M. MARET

CN—10968
(Imperial Archives)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR MARET:

I arrived this morning at Kronach; I shall leave to-night. The entire army is in motion. Send news of me to the Prince of Benevento and to the arch chancellor; a word also to the Empress.

Send me one of the messengers whom I left at Bamberg to advise me of all that has happened in that town and as to all the detachments of troops which have arrived there. See the commandant of that place, the supply officer, the regency, to provide for forwarding flour, hard bread, baked bread, towards Kronach. Stop the entire day of the 9th and of the 10th at Bamberg for this purpose. If you hear the slightest rumor as to hostile hussars having appeared towards Fulda or Cassel, send my messengers to Manheim.

NAPOLEON.

DECISIONS*

UCN—733

Marshal Berthier submits for decision as to whether needed matters of armament should be sent to the French troops in the Army of Naples from the arsenals of the Empire, or whether the King of Naples should be asked to provide these arms, to be replaced later.

The King of Naples has no arsenal.

Shall the Emperor's orderly officers receive the pay and forage rations appointed for cavalry captains of the Guard or those fixed for cavalry captains of the line?

They are to enjoy the same pay and rations as cavalry captains of the Guard.

Shall the four lieutenants of artillery who have been called to the Guard, and who were to have been made captains in their corps, be nevertheless advanced to that grade?

The grade of lieutenant of the Guard is equivalent to that of captain of the line.

*Without date or signature; extracts from "Communications of Marshal Berthier, Minister of War, with the Emperor, October 8, 1806."

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10969
(Imperial Files)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806.

Prince Jerome will assume command of the Bavarian Division which should be at Bayreuth tomorrow, will surround the fort of Culmbach and cause it to surrender. You will advise the Bavarian general of this, so that he can send a squadron to meet the Prince. General Hodouville will perform the duties of the chief of staff of this corps. After Culmbach has surrendered the Prince will send me a report advising me of the condition of the artillery and of the fortifications. For this purpose one of the two engineer officers who is at Kronach should proceed to Culmbach, to personally visit this fort independently of the report which the Bavarian officers will make. The prince will send me an exact return of the infantry, cavalry and artillery and will stop tomorrow night at Culmbach where he will await new orders. He will draw rations from General Legrand who commands the territory of Bayreuth.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—351

8 October, 1806.

[EXTRACT]

Five Prussian regiments were on the 7th at Saalfeld, and have taken up a position near Grafenthal.

If the enemy is stronger than is believed, it would be desirable to await the arrival of Marshal Augereau, but if he has only 10,000 or 12,000 men, Marshal Lannes may attack them after having reconnoitered them, and hastening the arrival of Marshal Augereau.

As the Emperor will attack Saalburg tomorrow it is desirable, if you do not attack the enemy yourself, that you watch him and hold him, to prevent him by a flank march going to the support of Saalburg.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10970
(WD Files)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 3:30 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

I received your letter of October 7th brought by my orderly officer. I suggest that hereafter you indicate the hour at which your letters are written.

I believed that 100,000 rations of hard bread were following you; I do not think they can be far away. I have not yet received news from the advance posts of the center. Prince Murat and Marshal Bernadotte were at Lobenstein at 8:00 A.M. If Saalburg is not held, it is possible that I may interrupt the communications of the corps at Hof with Schleiz.

I will be near Lobenstein at 2:00 A.M. tomorrow. The entire corps of Marshal Davout is three leagues in rear of Marshal Lobenstein. Marshal Lannes is at Neustadt; he entered Cobourg this morning at daybreak and captured several hussars. If you have news of the Bavarians send it to me; I much wish that they arrive tomorrow at Culmbach.

Send me your news more frequently; in a combined operation such as the present one, good results cannot be obtained except through very frequent communications; consider this as one of the most important matters before you. Now is the most important time of the campaign; they will not wait for what we wish to do; bad luck to them if they hesitate and if they lose a single day!

If you have any sick or other encumbrances which bother you, and if you find Forchheim too far away, you may send them to Kronach, where there is a fortress and depots.

It is certain that some regiments which left Dresden with Prince Hohenlohe coming from Silesia were Monday in position at Saalfeld.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—10971
(Imperial Archives)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 4:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have no news at all. I am angry that you entered Cobourg yesterday: your instructions were to enter there this morning and in mass. If you had done this it would have been easy to arrange your operations so as to have captured at break of day whatever was at Cobourg. The capture of some 50 horses would have been agreeable.

Marshal Bernadotte has passed Lobenstein. His advance guard at noon today was at Ebersdorf. Marshal Soult has captured several hostile posts; he was today at Munchberg, this evening he will be at Hof. March as rapidly as possible on Grafenthal. Marshal Augereau will follow you at a half day's march in rear. I will be at Lobenstein personally at 2:00 A.M.

As you form the left of the army, I believe it would be very useful when you bivouac your divisions, that you have each division bivouac in square formations.

See to it that I receive frequently news; this is important in order that I may know the movements of the enemy. Send me also, as you advance, a description of places. Send out communication posts to connect yourself with the center.

Marshal Davout with his entire army corps is at the gates of Steinwiesen. He is sending patrols to Grafenthal, to Neustadt and to Judenbach to connect himself with you.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2569
(WD Files)

Lobenstein, 8 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

SIRE:

The advance guard of the troops of which your Majesty has given me command have just entered Lobenstein; 50 Prussian hussars left this place yesterday for Saalburg, where it is reported there are about 500 infantry who it is believed left during the night.

The scouts have already found Prussians in front of Ebersdorf, they retired as soon as they were seen. Generals Milhaud, Lasalle and Wattier are just leaving to make the reconnaissance which you have ordered, and I will not lose a minute to send to your Majesty the report which I may receive; in the meanwhile here is what I have learned:

The army is concentrating on Naumburg, it is reported that Prince Hohenlohe is at Jena; a single regiment is at Hof; it will withdraw; no troops between here and Leipzig; the road is very good; the first Russians have arrived at the frontier of Saxony; however, merchants who left Leipzig on Saturday state that Russian merchants have said that no Russians had arrived at all, it was the princess of Lobenstein who told me that they were at the frontier of Saxony toward Silesia, but she was not sure about it. This evening I will have better information, I am told that there is a fairly good communication from here to Grafenthal, Saalfeld and Hof. From here to Grafenthal is six leagues, to Saalfeld 7, to Hof 6, to Saalburg 2. The 27th Infantry is taking position beyond Ebersdorf, the two regiments of Davout's division in rear of Lobenstein are in a good position and ready to proceed anywhere as circumstances require; they are watching the exits of Hof, Saalfeld and Grafenthal. The division of Rivaud is on the high ground of Neundorf, in rear of Lobenstein. I send herewith some letters found at the postoffice. I will have the honor to forward your Majesty promptly all information which I may receive concerning the enemy.

I have the honor, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—364e

8 October, 1806.

It is reported that Prussian forces are concentrating at Saalfeld.

DAVOUT.

*NOTE:—This report appears to have been received by the Emperor at Kronach about 4:45 P.M., October 8.—C.H.L.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG, AT LOBENSTEIN

CN—10972

(Imperial Archives)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

I am in receipt of your letter written at 10:00 A.M. You have not stationed cavalry communication posts as I had told you to do; I hereby notify you of my displeasure, as your letter written at 10:00 A.M. did not reach me until nearly 4:00 P.M.; you ought to know that the postal service is not at this moment a sure method of correspondence. Marshal Soult arrived at Bayreuth yesterday. He was at midnight today at Munchberg, and will be early tomorrow at Hof. Marshal Lannes entered Cobourg at daybreak and will billet this evening at Neustadt. Marshal Davout is two hours beyond Kronach, in the direction of Lobenstein, and I will be at 4:00 A.M. at Nordhalben, from where it is probable that I will ride out to the advance guard. Send me constantly via Nordhalben all information which you may obtain.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR SCHERB

CN—10973

(Imperial Archives)

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

Monsieur Scherb, orderly officer will proceed to Cobourg where he will arrive at 9:00 P.M. If Marshal Lannes has already proceeded to Neustadt, he will go there. He will bring back to me the reply and all information which he can procure from the army or from the country. He will proceed to join me before 5:00 A.M. at Nordhalben where he will find me.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—364f

8 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

SIRE:

According to all information which I have been able to procure it seems that the enemy's line runs through Wei-

mar, Erfurt, and Gotha, and that the corps which his Majesty wishes to attack at Saalburg is only in observation to watch the movements of our right. It seems that a combat will be avoided.

GHQ, that is to say, the King, has been at Naumburg for three days.

LANNES.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—346

Lichtenfels, 8 October, 1806.

Information on the Prussians is still very obscure; all that is known is that they are in march and that there is great activity among them. Yesterday the 7th instant, everything led me to believe that they had arrived at Cobourg about 4:00 P.M., where they allowed no one to either enter or leave. Up to now, only 30 or 36 Hussars have appeared at Cobourg, and these have been there for five days. I have been assured that a part of the Prussian army should have arrived the same day at Saalfeld with an advance guard at Grafenthal. According to reports, the main forces of the Prussians should assemble on Jena and Saalfeld.

DAVOUT.

ORDERS

B—334

Kronach, 8 October, 1806, P.M.

1. The 3d Dragoon Division, General Beaumont, will be on the 8th between Zeyern and Steinwiesen inclusive.

2. The 4th Dragoon Division, General Sahuc, will be billeted on the 8th with the head at Neuses and the tail at Zettlis.

3. The 1st Cuirasseur Division, Nansouty, will proceed on the 9th to Kups and will continue during the following days along the road to Schleitz, by ordinary marches.

4. The 2d Cuirasseur Division, d'Hautpoul, will proceed on the 9th to Lichtenfels joining the reserve cavalry park, which will park one-half league to the rear.

5. The 1st Dragoon Division, Klein, will proceed on the 9th to Zapfandorf, to continue occupied on the 8th by d'Hautpoul's division.

MURAT.

POSITIONS OF THE IV CORPS AT THE END OF MARCH 8, 1806

B—356

1st Division, in line, bivouacked in the Sparneck woods.

2d Division, in line, on left of the 1st Division; to the right rear of Sfrass and west of the road from Berneck to Hof; with the 4th Infantry across the road.

3d Division, advance guard, bivouacked on the high ground of Munchberg, 3000 meters beyond the main body. This division detached 3 battalions as follows:

1 battalion north and near Ahornberg covering the road to Selbitz, and supporting the cavalry division billeted at Weissleinreuth.

1 battalion in the small wood of Markersreuth, watching the exits of Weissleinreuth and Schwarzenbach.

1 battalion outpost reserve, near the main highway.

The 11th and 16th Chasseurs south and near Weissleinreuth, 5000 meters beyond the 3d Division; with the 8th Hussars and the Po rifle battalion 4000 meters still further to the front. The 8th Hussars had a platoon near and watching Hof. The 11th and 16th Chasseurs had about a squadron each, watching Schwarzenbach and Seblitz.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—359

8 October, 1806.

On the road from Bayreuth to Munchberg the position in rear of Benk has been observed; this position is capable of being nicely developed; it commands the terrain for a great distance. The ground is a steep slope, wooded, cut up and in some places swampy; the bottom of the valley is also swampy and full of swamps. If an army corps occupied

this position, it would be desirable that its advance guard be placed at the head of the defile of Berneck which can be readily defended even against superior forces; however, the position of Benk and of the defile of Berneck require to be studied with considerable care.

SOULT.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE V CORPS AT END OF
OCTOBER 8, 1806

B—363

8 October, 1806.

Cavalry near Cobourg on the roads to Neustadt and Kortendorf. Reconnaissance detachments were out as follows: (a) by the 9th Hussars to Neustadt and Grafenthal; (b) by about a squadron towards Hildburghausen; (c) by another squadron to Eisfeld.

The last two detachments reported that nothing had been seen of the enemy.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE VI CORPS AT END OF
MARCH ON 8 OCTOBER

B—363

Entire corps billeted about Berneck, along the road to Bayreuth inclusive, along the road to Culmbach, and along the road from Bayreuth to Neu-Plos.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE III CORPS AT END OF
MARCH ON OCTOBER 8

B—364a

Entire corps echeloned along the defile of Kronach, head of column at the stream junction of Roadach and the Kronach. Tail near Theisenort.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE
CAVALRY AT END OF MARCH ON
OCTOBER 8

B—364-B

The dismounted Chasseur brigade at GHQ.

Balance of Guard in rear of the III Corps.

The reserve dragoon and cuirasseur cavalry divisions billeted between Steinwiesen and Bamberg.

DISPOSITION OF MARSHAL AUGEREAU'S CORPS
AT END OF OCTOBER 8

B—364b

Entire corps billeted in vicinity of Bamberg, on both banks of the Main.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2570
(WD Files)

EBERSDORF, ONE LEAGUE FROM LOBENSTEIN

8 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

SIRE:

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo has received the report from one of his spies who has gone through the entire hostile army. Everything which I received on my part agrees with his information. It is very certain that the army is concentrating at Naumburg and Erfurt. The Prince of Hohenlohe has his headquarters at Jena. Every one agrees in saying that the Russians will not arrive; what is very sure is that they have not yet entered Saxony, and I do not think even Silesia.

I come from Saalburg which I have reconnoitered with General Wattier, having left on the high ground in front of Ebersdorf the 7th and 2d Hussars and the 5th Chasseurs, and in rear of this village the 27th Light Infantry with three guns. I was flanked by Generals Lasalle and Milhaud. I found the bridge of Saale held by the enemy

with a force of two or three squadrons, about a thousand infantry and two guns posted on the heights of Saalburg which commands the river which flows through a very narrow valley. Our hussars were received with musketry fire which at first was not replied to and I was received by several rounds of artillery. Having noted at Kloster that the Saale was crossed by a ferry and that by threatening that point, I would force the enemy at Saalburg by threatening his retreat, I sent my aide Legrange* to reconnoiter* and attempt to pass the river. The enemy who noted this movement at once brought up his forces opposite this point. He was so fearful that we would cross that he hurriedly fired 30 rounds from the artillery on my leading troopers. However I brought up four companies of light infantry with one gun to force the crossing of the Saale, and seize Saalburg. Sire, the voltigeurs of the 27th Light Infantry as well as the chasseurs of this command fell upon the enemy with cries of "Long live the Emperor." They did not fire a single musket shot, they passed the Saale on the bridge which was not badly damaged and ascended the heights of Saalburg which at the first round from my gun was hastily evacuated by the enemy. The enemy had several men wounded. When I left Saalburg at 5:00 P.M. General Wat- tier who had passed the Saale with the 4th Hussars and 500 light infantry was pursuing the enemy; he will probably take some prisoners. As soon as his report comes in, I will have the honor to forward it to your Majesty. I inclose herewith a letter which I have just received from General Lasalle; that from General Milhaud has not yet been received from me. Tomorrow morning reconnaissance will be pushed in all directions; I will try to obtain positive news from Neustadt and from Poseneck. I will very surely receive news during the night from Saalfeld. Schleitz will certainly have been reconnoitered this evening, and may be even occupied. Apparently Marshal Bernadotte will proceed tomorrow morning with his army corps beyond Saalburg; in this case I will proceed toward Schleitz, a place

*It seems that this expression should have read "Legrange, with *one squadron to reconnoiter for a ford.*" The words in *italics* do not appear on the original letter but do appear in copies.—P.L.B.

which appears to me it is very important to occupy, as it is the center of a large number of roads; at least unless I learn that it is very strongly held. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S.—I am not sending to H.M. the letters referred to above, as they do not contain anything interesting.

ORDERS FOR 9 OCTOBER 1806

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS GRAND ARMY

MN—271

Bayreuth, 8 October, 1806.

The advance guard, commanded by General Colbert, will leave at exactly 6:00 A.M. tomorrow the 9th instant, its positions in front of Bayreuth, and will proceed via the Hof road towards Gefrees to a point between Gefrees and Berneck until the arrival of the 2d Division.

The 2d Division at an early hour tomorrow morning the 9th instant, will leave its positions near Creusen and in rear of Bayreuth in time to be completely assembled beyond St. Georgenstadt, at 8:00 A.M.; it will immediately afterwards march for Gefrees via Berneck.

The 3d Division will leave at exactly 4:00 A.M. tomorrow morning the 6th instant, its positions between Schnabelswaid and Bottenstein and will proceed from Bayreuth toward Berneck.

Generals Colbert, Marchand and Marcognet will receive new orders enroute, which I will have issued as to the positions of the respective divisions of the army corps.

NEY.

SUPPLEMENT TO MARCH ORDER

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS

MN—272

Gefrees, 9 October, 1806.

The advance guard will occupy Munchsberg, extending its left through outposts as far as Elbrecks, on the Kopfer-

berg road, and with its right extended a similar distance, and its rear as far as Schweinsbach.

MARSHAL NEY.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—365c

Nordhalben, 9 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

I advise you Marshal, that the Emperor will be this evening at Ebersdorf.

Marshal Davout will be at Lobenstein.

Prince Murat at Schleitz.

Marshal Bernadotte at Saalburg.

Marshal Soult opposite Plauen.

Marshal Ney at Hof.

It is supposed that the enemy wishes to defend Saalfeld; if he is in superior force, he will not be engaged unless Marshal Augereau has joined you.

During the day news concerning the enemy will be had, and if considerable forces are at Saalfeld, the Emperor will march during the night with 20,000 or 25,000 men in order to arrive about noon tomorrow at Saalfeld via Saalburg.

Under these circumstances, Marshal, where the enemy unites all his forces at Saalfeld, there is nothing else for us to do except to take position near Grafenthal.

The enemy cannot risk marching against you with such considerable forces on his left flank; if however, he does do so in greatly superior force, there is no doubt whatever that you should not retreat, as he would in such a case be attacked in flank by the center corps; but if the enemy has only 15,000 to 18,000 men you should after having thoroughly studied his position attack him; it being understood that Marshal Augereau's corps is with you.

What is most important under these conditions, Marshal, is to send you news concerning the enemy to the Emperor three times a day.

If the enemy retreats before you, arrive as promptly as possible at Saalfeld, and arrived there, post your troops in good position.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2571
(WD Files)

Ebersdorf, 9 October, 1806, 6:00 A.M.

SIRE:

I received at 4:00 A.M. the letter from your Majesty dated Kronach 6:00 P.M. I am very sorry and very astonished that my letter sent at 10:00 A.M. from Lobenstein did not arrive at Kronach until 4:00 P.M. I did not deserve the reproaches which your Majesty has directed to me, as the officer whom I had the honor to send arrived at Kronach with the horses of the cavalry pickets which I had placed along the road in compliance with your orders.

I hasten to send to your Majesty the reports which I have just received, dated 4:00 A.M. from Generals Lasalle and Milhaud, also a sack of letters found at Hof. I am ordering General Lasalle to proceed from Lichtenberg via Tanne to Muhltroff, the roadfork from Plauen to Schleitz and to Pausa. I am directing him, if he arrives at Muhltroff early, to proceed to Pausa, from where he will send a reconnaissance to Gablau to intercept if possible the communication between Plauen and Gera; he will connect by his left with General Wattier, who will apparently be at Schleitz this morning.

I am ordering General Milhaud to proceed from Lehesten to Gross-Pausen, the roadfork of the roads from Pose-neck, to Schleitz, Neustadt and Auma; he is to connect on his right with General Wattier, examine during the march the road from Saalfeld to Poseneck, and from Gross-Peusen. He is to send reconnaissances towards Poseneck, Neustadt, Auma, and Schleitz. He will also reconnoiter Ziegenruck.

I will proceed to the heights beyond Saalburg with three regiments of light cavalry which are here and with the 27th Light Infantry, and probably from there towards Schleitz, if the enemy does not occupy it with too great force. I believe that Marshal Bernadotte will follow my movement with the rest of his army corps to sustain me and make room for the army corps of Marshal Davout.

A part of the troops that were driven out of Saalburg came from Hof and Plauen, which seems to confirm information that the enemy has all his forces on our left.

I will hasten to send your Majesty from Saalburg and from Schleitz the latest information which I may obtain concerning the enemy.

Beaumont's division has orders to proceed today to Lobenstein and Ebersdorf, all the other divisions are following this movement at a day's march. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

Murat

TO THE EMPEROR

B—377

9 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

The IV Army Corps has arrived at Hof, and is continuing its march to a position to be selected half way between Hof and Plauen.

Hof was evacuated on the 8th by the enemy who retired partly to Schleitz, partly to Plauen, some fractions on Elsnitz, finally the trains and led horses to Plauen, which confirms my view that the enemy has no one assembly point.

One squadron is being sent to Schleitz via Gefell and another squadron to Oelsnitz, the first to provide liaison with the center column and transmit to the Emperor the IV Corps report, the other to scout on the right of the army corps.

The rear division (Saint-Hilaire) and its park remain on the heights of Hof on the left bank of the Saale, until such time as I may have a perfect knowledge of the enemy's dispositions.

SOULT.

maia

TO THE EMPEROR

B—376

Grafenthal, 9 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

This has been a terrible day for the troops and the artillery; the roads are frightful; there are absolutely no resources in the country.

There are one dozen deadly leagues between Cobourg and Grafenthal.

8 Prussian hussars have been captured.

LANNES.

ORDERS

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ADVANCE GUARD

MN—272a

Munchsberg, 9 October, 1806.

The 2d Division will have its headquarters at Gefrees; it will occupy all the villages on the left of the road, from Wizleshofen, Straitau, Hofler, Mezlerdorf, Stambach, to this point holding a line as far as Fruisandorf; it will deploy similarly on its right.

The 3d Division will have its headquarters at Berneck with its head at Gefrees exclusive. It will occupy the villages on both sides of the road, within a distance of one league.

The divisions will assemble at 6:00 A.M. tomorrow, October 10th, in column on the road from Bayreuth to Hof; the advance guard at Munchsberg; the outposts which the latter may have further out will remain there; the 2d Division from Gefrees, where will be its tail, as far as Fruisandorf; the 3d Division from Berneck to Gefrees exclusive. If by 6:00 A.M. they have not received further orders, they will march towards Hof.

The artillery park, which is at Bayreuth, will leave there tomorrow the 10th for Munchsberg. The company of the 59th Infantry, which is attached to it, will remain with it until further orders.

NEY.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—379

9 October, 1806, 6:00 P.M.

The light cavalry is at Rosenthal and Rosemberg on the Elster; its advance guard consisting of the 8th Hussars and one light infantry battalion (Po riflemen) is at Messbach, one league from Plauen; it has orders to push forward to this town if there is no enemy there.

The divisions commanded by Generals Legrand (3d) and Leval (2d) bivouac in the hills of Gross-Zobern and occupy Geilsdorf.

The division commanded by General Saint-Hilaire (1st) has remained in position in the hills of Hof, together with the artillery park.

SOULT.

Enata shell

TO THE EMPEROR

B—373

9 October, 1806.

The hostile cavalry which had turned and attacked the right of the 4th Hussars and wished to take the 5th Chasseurs in rear while in march came upon five companies of skirmishers of the 27th and 94th Infantry.*

BERNADOTTE.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—380

9 October, 1806.

The squadron of the 11th Chasseurs sent from Hof via Gefell to Schleitz met in line with Tanna, two detachments of the 5th Hussars of Lasalle's brigade enroute to Muhltrof.

Yesterday evening in entering Hof a reconnoitering patrol of the 8th Hussars met a squadron of 5th Hussars coming from Lichtenfels (Lasalle's brigade) and the two commands not recognizing one another came to blows.

SOULT.

DISPOSITION OF THE BAVARIAN DIVISION AT END OF MARCHES OF OCTOBER 9th

B—381

Division attached to the VI Corps arrived at Bayreuth, and prepared to blockade the fort of Plassenburg near Culmbach.

*See M 2572, page 290.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2572
(WD Files)

Schleiz, 10 October, 1806, 2:00 A.M.

SIRE :

When I rejoined the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, the scouts of the 27th Light Infantry attacked the town of Schleitz with the greatest valor; the enemy appeared to wish to defend himself; the Prince of Ponte-Corvo then sustained the 27th Light Infantry by all of General Drouet's division.

Already I had sent for General Wattier and his regiments, with orders to hasten at a fast trot; noting that the enemy was evacuating the town, I crossed it with the 4th Hussars, to fall on the infantry which was leaving and which were already on the heights; I then maneuvered by my right attempting to turn the enemy's left, and arrive before him at the defile before Rodersdorf. The hostile cavalry followed our movement while constantly covering its infantry which succeeded in reaching the first woods. In the meantime, I had reached the high ground where the entire Saxon and Prussian cavalry were assembled, sustained by infantry resting on the wood. The 4th Hussars at first charged with great vigor, and succeeded in overthrowing the leading squadrons; it being too far distant, it was in its turn vigorously repulsed; I rallied it, it charged again, it overthrew the enemy and a second time was repulsed. I waited with the greatest impatience for the 5th Chasseurs who did not arrive in spite of repeated orders which I had sent to them; they finally appeared, very opportunely, at the moment when after a new charge the 4th Hussars had been again repulsed. The brave 5th Chasseurs charged with its usual bravery, and cut the enemy's line in two. The Red Dragoons of Prince John were charged by the 4th, which maneuvered by its left to take it in flank. The Prussians made the same maneuver by their right, but already the skirmishers of the 27th Light Infantry whom I had sent for, deployed on the hill and were charged from the rear by these same Dragoons. These incomparable soldiers which I had only time to make a half wheel, and who had not had the time to form in square, opened fire at point blank range; one-half of the dragoons remained on the

ground, the rest saved themselves in the greatest disorder. Then the 4th rallied and with the 5th pursued the enemy closely, killing and wounding many of them. Their colonel was wounded by my aide, Major Dery; some prisoners were taken and the enemy lost many killed and wounded. All the enemy's cavalry then fled into the defile, which was guarded by four or five Prussians and Saxons infantry battalions. Then cries of "Long live the Emperor" were heard all along the ranks; the charge was beaten, the trumpets sounded again and all the troops started to attack the defile. In the meantime, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo had brought up artillery on the left, when noticing that the first shells shook the battalions which defended the defile, I ordered the 5th Chasseurs to charge. This regiment carrying out my orders with the speed of lightning; the enemy was thrown in disorder into the woods, throwing away along the road their arms, packs and hats in order to hasten their flight. There were 2000 of these along the road, and I note that they were only Prussian hats. The 5th Chasseurs continued its charge to beyond the defile which consequently cut off the retreat on Auma of all those that fled into the woods; night prevented us from capturing these. However, as I left the field, Major Dery, who had just charged through the defile, informed me that 100 prisoners had been taken.

Tomorrow morning at 5:00 A.M. all the troops will be under arms; at daybreak the woods will be searched and reconnaissances pushed towards the enemy. * * * * *

Tomorrow morning the position will be rectified. I would not be astonished if we were attacked.

The following is the information which I have received from a Polish Prince. General Tauenzien who yesterday evening at first marched on Saalburg, then came here, and then marched this morning on Saalburg, then went back, finally decided to defend Schleitz pending reinforcements from Gera. The King is at Weimar and Prince Hohenlohe at Jena. It is reported that Prince Louis was still at Saalfeld tonight. The Count assured me that we would have a battle at Mittel near Triptis. He believes that Hohenlohe's army will proceed from Jena towards Neustadt, and from this point he has assured me they had taken the position of

Erfurt and Naumburg, as the King of Prussia believed that we would advance on Fulda and Cassel. According to him the enemy should attack us today or tomorrow, advancing via Cobourg to Meinungen, but he says they will have been much embarrassed by the prompt appearance of your Majesty's army.

Tomorrow morning General Lasalle with three regiments of light troops will be at Schleiz at 5:00 A.M. General Beaumont will, I hope, be there about 8:00 A.M.; General Milhaud will remain at Gross-Pausen, he will not leave his position. He will serve as my advance guard, if it turns out to be true that the enemy has assembled at Neustadt and Triptis; he has orders to reconnoiter all these points. Sire, I await your Majesty's orders as to directing movements for the Prince of Ponte-Corvo's troops. It seems that we have no one on our right, at Plauen there are only sick.

I enclose a report which I have just received from General Milhaud which confirms the information which I have given your Majesty. I also enclose several intercepted letters.

I am with greatest respect, etc.,

MURAT.

MEMORANDUM

CN—10974
(WD Files)

~~Kronach.~~

[NOTE:—This undated memorandum which appears to have been written October 10th is entirely in the hand-writing of Napoleon.

The Guard, 10:00 P.M., at Bamberg;—11th at Lichtenfels;—12th beyond Kronach;—13th at Lobenstein.

D'Hautpoul, on the 11th two leagues beyond Kronach;—14th Auma;—15th Jena.

Klein, the 11th two leagues beyond Kronach;—

13th Jena.

14th Jena.

15th Auma.

Klein ;—12th Lobenstein.	Guard the 15th at Jena.
Jena to Weimar, 4 leagues.	Park the 15th at Auma.
Naumburg to Weimar, 7 leagues.	Davout the 14th at Apolda.
Kahla to Weimar, 5 leagues.	Lannes the 15th at Weimar.
Neustadt to Jena, 5 leagues.	Augereau the 14th at Mellingen.
Gera to Jena, 7 leagues.	Bernadotte the 14th at Dornburg.
From Zeitz to Jena, 7 leagues.	Soult the 14th at Jena.
Reserve Cavalry ; 14th at Jena.	Ney the 14th at Kahla.

map p 312
 Soult p 288
 errata sheet
 p 302

TO MONSIEUR MARET

CN—10975
 (Imperial Archives)

Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

MONSIEUR MARET:

Send me a large number of copies of the proclamation to the Saxons;* this is very important to me. You may have it published in the newspapers of Bamberg, Nuremburg and Wurtzbourg, so that it will be known about everywhere.

Have inserted in the newspaper that on the 9th the Prussian General Tauenzien with 6000 Prussians and 3000 Saxons was attacked by the advance guard of the French army commanded by the Duke of Berg and overthrown; that Prussian hussars have been wiped out and that they were unable to stand the shock of French hussars; that the Saxon dragoons have suffered notable losses; that the guard regiment lost its colonel, a respectable old man, sixty years old; that the French have taken a large number of prisoners; that the conduct of the Prussians is poor; that they have incorporated a Saxon battalion in two Prussian battalions, to be sure of them; that certainly such a violation of the independence and such violence against a weaker power can only be revolting to all Europe.

NAPOLEON.

Write to the Empress that I am very well.

*See CN—10978.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG AT SCHLEITZ

IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CN—10976
(Imperial Archives)

Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

General Rapp has informed me of the good results of the evening. It seems to me that you have not assembled at hand sufficient cavalry; by scattering them everywhere, nothing will remain to you. You have six regiments; I recommend to you to keep at least four at hand; yesterday I noted only two. Today reconnaissances to the right will become much less important. Marshal Soult having arrived at Plauen, it is necessary to send strong reconnaissances to Poseneck and to Saalfeld to find out what is going on there. Marshal Lannes arrived at Grafenthal at 9:00 P.M. yesterday; he will attack Saalfeld tomorrow. You understand how important it is to me to know during the day the progress of the movement on Saalfeld in order that if the enemy has assembled there more than 25,000 men, I may send reinforcements there via Poseneck and take them in rear. I have given orders to the divisions of Dupont and Beaumont to proceed to Schleitz. In any case it is necessary to reconnoiter a good position beyond Schleitz which may serve as a field of battle for more than 80,000 men. This must not interfere with your sending a strong reconnaissance out at daybreak to Auma and Poseneck, supporting them if necessary by Drouet's division. The 1st Division of Marshal Davout will be at Saalburg. The two other divisions will be in front near Ebersdorf, and the light cavalry in advance. I am issuing orders to Marshal Ney to proceed to Tanna.

Your important affair should take place today, at first profiting by yesterday's action to seize as many prisoners as possible and obtain all information possible; 2d, to reconnoiter Auma and Saalfeld, in order to ascertain positively what are the enemy's movements.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—383

Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 6:00 A.M.

The Emperor, Marshal, approves of the disposition which you have taken; hasten the arrival of Marshal Augereau and immediately afterwards attack Saalfeld.

* * * * *

Our advance posts are near Poseneck, and if the hostile forces at Saalfeld become too large, we will march on them from the rear, but all information leads the Emperor to believe that there are not more than 12,000 to 15,000 men there.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10977
(WD Files)

Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

We overthrew yesterday the 8,000 men who were retreating from Hof to Schleitz, where they expected reinforcements during the night. Their cavalry has been cut in pieces; one colonel has been captured; more than 2000 muskets and helmets were found on the battle field. The Prussian infantry did not hold. Only two or three hundred prisoners were taken, as it was night and they scattered through the woods; I expect a good number this morning.

The following is what seems to me to be clear: it appears that the Prussians intended to attack; that their left was to advance by Jena, Saalfeld and Cobourg; that Prince Hohenlohe had his headquarters at Jena and Prince Louis at Saalfeld; the other column has advanced via Meinungen on Fulda; so that I am led to believe that you have no one in front of you, perhaps not 10,000 men as far away as Dresden. If you can crush some corps do so. My plans for today are: I cannot advance, I have too much to do in the rear areas; I will push forward my advance guard to Auma;

I have reconnoitered a good battle field beyond Schleitz for 80 or 100,000 men. I am having Marshal Ney march to Tanna; he will then be two leagues from Schleitz; you yourself at Plauen are not so far but you can go there within twenty-four hours.

The 5th, the Prussian army also made a movement on Thuringe, in such manner that I believe they are a considerable number of days late. My junction with my left has not yet been made, except by cavalry patrols which amounts to nothing.

Marshal Lannes will not arrive at Saalfeld until today, provided that the enemy is not there in considerable force. Thus the days of the 10th and 11th will be lost. If my junction is made, I will push forward to Neustadt and Triptis; after that according to what the enemy does, if he attacks me, I will be delighted; if he permits me to attack him I will not fail to do so; if he goes toward Magdeburg you will be at Dresden before him. I much desire a battle. If he has had a desire to attack me, he has great confidence in his forces; there is no impossibility then that he will attack me; this would be most agreeable to me. After this battle I will be at Dresden or at Berlin before him.

I am awaiting impatiently the mounted part of my Guard; it is today at Bamberg; 40 pieces of artillery and 3000 cavalymen like those are not to be disdained. These then are my plans for today and tomorrow; you are free to act as you understand them; but procure bread, so that if you join me, you will have several days' supply on hand.

If you find an opportunity to do something against the enemy, within one day's march, you may do so boldly. Establish small cavalry connecting posts in order to correspond rapidly between Schleitz and Plauen.

Up to the present it appears to me that the campaign is commencing under the most happy circumstances.

I presume that you are at Plauen; it would be very desirable that you take possession of this place. Let me know what you find in front of you. No part of the forces that were at Hof retired toward Dresden.

NAPOLEON.

I have just received your note of the 9th dated 6:00 P.M.; I approve of the dispositions which you have made. The information which you have given me, that 1000 men from Plauen retreated towards Jena, leaves no doubt that Gera is not an assembly point for the hostile army. I doubt that he could assemble there before I am there. However, during the day I will receive some news and I will have more precise ideas; you yourself at Plauen will have plenty of information. Letters taken from the postoffice will give it to you. While uncertainty exists do not fatigue your troops.

TO MARSHAL NEY

MN—274

GHQ, Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

We took Schleiz yesterday, Marshal, overthrowing an advance guard of 10,000 Prussians and Saxons, of whom we captured 700 to 800 men and 2 colonels.

The emperor's orders are to proceed to Tanna, two leagues from Schleitz. In this manner in case of battle you will be near Schleitz.

BERTHIER.

TO THE PEOPLE OF SAXONY

IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CN—10978
(WD Files)

Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806.

SAXONS:

The Prussians have invaded your territory. I am come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops, and have attached them to their army. They are to shed their blood not only for foreign interests, but also for interests contrary to your own. My armies were on the point of leaving Germany when your territory was violated; they will return to France when Prussia has recognized your independence and renounced the plan which it has formed against you.

Saxons, your prince had refused up to the present to form engagements so opposed to his duties; if he consented later, it was because he was forced by the invasion of the Prussians.

I have been deaf to the vain provocation which Prussia directed against my people; I was deaf as long as she confined her mobilization within her territory, and it was not until after she had violated your territory that my minister left Berlin. Saxons, your fate is now in your hands. Do you wish to remain uncertainly between those who wish to place you under the yoke and those who wish to protect you? My success will assure the existence and independence of your Prince and your nation. The success of the Prussians will result in eternal changes being placed on you. Tomorrow they will demand Lusace, and the day after the bank of the Elbe. For what do I say? Have they not asked for everything? Have they not for long periods attempted to force your sovereign to recognize a sovereignty, which were it immediately imposed upon you, would wipe you out from the rank of nations?

Your independence, your constitution, your liberty will no longer exist except in memory, and the shades of your ancestors, of brave Saxons, will arise indignant to see you reduced without resistance by your rivals, to a slavery prepared for long time since, and your country, so debased as to become a Prussian province.

NAPOLEON.

ORDERS

B—388

*Ebersdorf, 10 October, 1806, 11:00 A.M.**

It is ordered: Marshal Lefebvre will proceed as rapidly as possible with the advance guard from Ebersdorf to Schleitz.

General Klein, 1st Dragoon Division, to Bamberg;

General d'Hautpoul, 1st Cuirassier Division, to Kups;

*NOTE:—At the time this order was written, 11:00 A.M., Marshal Soult with the III Corps had proceeded to Saalburg and the artillery fire against that town could be clearly heard at Ebersdorf.—C.H.L.

General Nansouty, 2d Cuirassier Division, to Ebensfeld;

General Grouchy, 2d Dragoon Division, beyond Bamberg;

The artillery park to Kronach;

The engineer park to Kronach.

The Emperor directs that Prince Jerome instead of proceeding to Lobenstein, will proceed with the Bavarian corps in haste to Hof.

Orders for Marshal Augereau to proceed to rejoin by forced marches, Marshal Lannes, who has orders to attack Saalfeld with him.

Orders for Marshal Davout to proceed in haste to Schleitz where he will establish his headquarters and he will take position in front of this town with his three divisions.

Orders to Marshal Soult to proceed to Gera; he will occupy at first the town of Weyda where he will establish communications with the army advance guard which will be beyond Auma on the Saalfeld—Gera road. After having arrived at Hirschbach, he will also establish communications with Auma.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2573
(WD Files)

Allensdorf, 10 October, 1806, 12:30 Noon.

SIRE:

As I hear artillery fire, I am marching on Poseneck so as to be in position to carry out your Majesty's order, in reconnoitering Saalfeld, but I received the order to proceed to Gera, and all are moving out; our outposts were already this morning in front of Auma which the enemy evacuated about midnight. The enemy retreated towards Triptis. Our left flank guards are constantly meeting Prussian Hussars, which indicates that we are on the enemy's flank. It is continuously reported that the enemy is still about Naumburg; the Queen is with the army wearing the uniform of her regiment. We found two guns in the woods this morning.

I will have the honor after arrival at Auma, to report to your Majesty what I may learn from Neustadt, and Triptis. Beaumont's division is marching with me. I have the honor, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG, AT AUMA

CN—10979
(Imperial Archives)

Schleitz, 10 October, 1806, 5:30 P.M.

As I ceased to hear the artillery fire this evening, I am led to believe that the enemy did not defend Saalfeld for long. Marshal Soult is assembling at Weyda. It is possible that the head of his troops will be at Weinsbach tomorrow. I have directed him to send out patrols via Auma, to connect with you. Send out to meet them.

Marshal Ney will probably be at Schleitz tomorrow.

I believe that General Dupont will have arrived at Pose-neck.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10980
(WD Files)

Schleitz, 10 October, 1806, 6:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I believe that Marshal Lannes has attacked Saalfeld today. The artillery fire has been lively but only lasted for two hours; I am ignorant of the result. I have cut the road from Saalfeld to Gera by positions at the crossroads from Poseneck and from Neustadt. I have sent you the order to proceed to Gera. I will be glad to know when the head of your troops will be at Langen-Weitzendorf.

At Gera, matters are clearing up. I still believe that we can be at Dresden before then. But as soon as I am certain as to my left, there will be a lively turn in affairs. Marshal Bernadotte is at Auma, Prince Murat beyond that point, Marshal Davout is beyond Schleitz. I hope that Marshals

Lannes and Augereau are at Saalfeld. Let me know at Auma your information. After having arrived at Langen—Weitzendorf let me know if there is a road from there to Zwickau.

NAPOLEON.

I will be at Auma at 2:00 A.M.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—390

Schleitz, 10 October, 1806, 7:00 P.M.

The Emperor is waiting impatiently for you to proceed by forced marches to Neustadt. You are to form the left of the army which is going to march on Gera.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2574

(Prince Murat's Files)

Triptis, 10 October, 1806, Midnight.

SIRE:

I have received your Majesty's orders; I am at Triptis, with General Lasalle at Polnitz* on the road to Gera. General Wattier is on the Neustadt road with orders to connect with General Beaumont who is across the Auma road in rear of Triptis where is the 27th Light Infantry; Drouet's division is on the heights of Gutterlitz and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo at Auma. General Wattier should occupy Neustadt and reconnoiter the roads from Poseneck, Jena and Schleitz; and General Lasalle those from Weyda, Gera, Jena and Naumburg. The enemy who was defeated at Schleitz withdrew this morning to in rear of Polnitz, and left for Gera upon hearing the artillery fire; it is reported that they are concentrating. The Prince of Hohenlohe had his headquarters between Poseneck and Neustadt. It is not

*Polnitz=Mittel-Polnitz.—P.L.B.

yet positively known where he is now, but it is supposed that he is at Poseneck, and tomorrow morning if I am in liaison with General Dupont, and the enemy does not attack, I will proceed to Gera, at least unless your Majesty does not otherwise order. It is said that the Prussians are very much put out. I have no news from General Milhaud. Your Majesty's troops are living very well. The country is fine and rich.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

B-393

POSITIONS OF CORPS AND DIVISIONS OF THE GRAND
ARMY AT COMPLETION OF MARCHES OF
OCTOBER 10th

<i>Left Column</i>	<i>Center Column</i>	<i>Right Column</i>
V Corps at Saalfeld.	Lasalle's brigade at Mittel-Polnitz.	IV Corps at Plauen.
VII Corps enroute from Cobourg to Saalfeld.	Wathier's brigade at Triptis.	VI Corps at Tanna and Gefell.
	Milhaud's brigade at Poseneck.	Bavarians at Bayreuth.
	Beaumont's division at Tommelsdorf.	
	I Corps north of Auma.	
	Dupont's division at Poseneck.	
	III Corps near Schleitz.	
	Sahuc's division near Schleitz.	
	Guard at Schleitz.	
	GHQ at Schleitz.	
	1st Cuirassier Division at Nordhalben.	
	2d Cuirassier Division at Steinwiesen.	
	Mobile park at Kronach.	
	1st Dragoon Division at Kups.	
	2d Dragoon Division at Bamberg.	

See 292

TO MARSHAL NEY AT TANNA

B—394a

11 October, 1806, 6:00 A.M.

Proceed with your army corps to Schleitz and take position north of that town.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL SAHUC

B—394b

11 October, 1806, 6:00 A.M.

Proceed with your division [4th Dragoon Division] at 10:00 A.M. from Schleitz toward Auma.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2575

(Prince Murat's Files)

Triptis, 11 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to forward to your Majesty a report received from General Wattier, and I beg you to inform me if I should nevertheless proceed towards Gera, even if the enemy is in rear of Neustadt.

I am forwarding your Majesty letters seized yesterday along the Gera road, among these is one dated Naumburg, 2 October, which confirms the assembly of nearly all the Prussian generals in that town.

The Prince of Neufchatel has informed me of your disapproval of my having sent a regiment of dragoons to General Milhaud. Sire, your letter dated 5:00 A.M. yesterday morning directed me to send out a strong cavalry reconnaissance on Poseneck and Saalfeld and to support this with Drouet's division, which I would certainly have carried out except for the later orders from your Majesty to proceed to Auma and interrupt the road from Gera to Poseneck.

I have sent the order to General Milhaud to rejoin me this morning at Triptis, I fear very much that the officers may not be able to reach him, already the one who went to Neustadt has returned without having met him. It is still reported that Prince Hohenlohe is yet at Poseneck; if that is so, General Dupont and Marshal Lannes will not fail to attack him this morning, and if at the first cannon shot that I hear, I have not received orders from your Majesty, I will myself attack via Neustadt, which will force the enemy to abandon his position, I will then seek to harass him by sending out parties on his rear along the road from Jena to Orlamunda. I have the honor to be, etc.,

JOACHIM [MURAT].

P.S.—As I find myself too far distant from the heavy cavalry, I beg your Majesty to give them orders as well as to the dragoon division.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2576
(WD Files)

Ebersdorf, 11 October, 1806, 9:30 A.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to send your Majesty new information which has just arrived from Gera; it has been evacuated since midnight yesterday; it is very certain that the detachment which was defeated at Schleitz has gone to Roda and that other troops coming from Gera and Leipzig have also assembled at Roda. Neustadt has also been evacuated, and a reconnaissance should have been sent by General Wattier to communicate from Neustadt with Poseneck, and it is presumed that General Dupont has arrived there, the enemy will not have remained between Neustadt and Poseneck. *

* * * * But in order to carry out your Majesty's intentions, I am sending Adjutant General Girard, who will go to Poseneck as soon as he finds General Dupont's troops, and he will report directly to your Majesty the moment that this connection has been made; he will tell General Dupont

to throw detachments in rear of the Saale. I will be at Gera at 11:00 o'clock from where I will send your Majesty all the information which I can obtain.

MURAT.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—395a

Saalfeld, 11 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

I beg your Highness to believe that if I had received orders I would have executed them without delay, that my troops would not have made 20 leagues during the last night and during today.

AUGEREAU.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—395b

Saalfeld, 11 October, 1806.

From now on it is necessary that we arrange to act in concert; let us mutually exchange news as often and as promptly as possible. The needs of the service require this.

AUGEREAU.

REPORT OF A SAXON OFFICER TAKEN PRISONER
ON THE 10th NEAR SAALFELD ON THE MARCH
OF THE VIIth FRENCH CORPS ON THE 11th
OF OCTOBER THROUGH SAALFELD

B—396

During several hours' march I did not observe the least defect, nor did I see a single straggler.

When an obstacle was encountered, the ranks were opened and then closed again as if by enchantment without the least occurrence or disorder. Under these circumstances partial accelerations and retardations in march necessary for the command as a whole, were executed with precision and a prodigious dexterity.

This march past had the appearance of a majestic and powerful river.

TO MARSHAL NEY AT SCHLEIZ

B—397

11 October, 1806, Midnight.

The Emperor directs that you march towards Neustadt. It is expected that after your arrival at Neustadt you will receive orders to continue your march.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO PRINCE MURAT

B—398a

11 October, 1806, 8:00 P.M.

We have captured a Saxon convoy and made 100 prisoners. The prisoners state that the King is at Erfurt with 200,000 men.

LASALLE.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2577

(Prince Murat's Files)

*Gera, 11 October, 1806, 11:00 P.M.**

SIRE:


I have the honor to forward to your Majesty a report just received from General Lasalle;† I have sent you under charge of Monsieur Montjoie two merchants who have crossed the hostile army, they can give you very positive information, if they can be believed as sincere, but to tell the truth, I think they are hostile spies; the road which they have taken seems to prove this, for why from Gotha, proceed to Erfurt, and thence to Jena intending to go towards Saalfeld, in order to reach Leipzig.

The new information which I have been able to procure appears to confirm what your Majesty has already received on the assembly of the army at Erfurt. The Austrian sergeant whom you questioned has left for Naum-

*NOTE:—This report appears to have been received by Napoleon at 1:00 A.M., 12 October.—C.H.L.

†NOTE:—See B—398a, above.

12. BILLETTS ON EVENING, 11TH OCTOBER 1806, AND MOVEMENTS PROPOSED
FOR MORNING OF THE 12TH OCTOBER, 1806.



burg and for the headquarters of the Prussian army. He has promised to return during the morning; as soon as he arrives I will send him to your Majesty. As soon as my aide sent to Zeitz has returned I will hasten to forward you his report.

Two roads lead from Gera to Naumburg, one via Zeitz and the other via Crossen, the first is the better and is only $1\frac{1}{2}$ leagues longer than the other; in consequence your Majesty may continue to carry out your plan in proceeding towards Zeitz.

I have the honor, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL NEY

B—400

12 October, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

In consequence of new information which we have just received concerning the enemy, his Majesty directs that you proceed at once to Auma, and that you disregard the order dated midnight which directed you to proceed to Neustadt.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—10981
(Imperial Archives)

Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

Issue orders to Marshal Davout to proceed from his position towards Naumburg where he will arrive as soon as possible, whilst always keeping his troops in hand for combat. He will have his troops preceded by all his light cavalry, who will send out scouts as far as practicable, both to obtain information of the enemy, and to make prisoners, capture baggage and obtain precise news.

The dragoon division of General Sahuc will be under his orders. It will proceed to Mittel* where it will receive

*Mittel=Mittel-Poelnitz.—C.H.L.

orders from Marshal Davout. Prince Murat and Marshal Bernadotte have orders to proceed to Naumburg but by the road through Zeitz.*

Marshal Lannes from Neustadt will assemble on Jena.† Marshal Augereau will assemble at Kahla. Marshal Ney will be at Mittel.‡ GHQ will be at Gera at noon. Issue orders to have the heavy cavalry divisions and the dragoon divisions which have been in rear as well as the Park proceed to Gera.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE MURAT AT GERA

B—406

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

Proceed to Zeitz and send out messengers toward Leipzig and Naumburg.

If at Zeitz your information indicates that the enemy is still in the direction of Erfurt, the Emperor directs that you proceed to Naumburg where Marshal Davout will be.

* * * * *

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE AT GERA

B—407a

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

* * * * * The Emperor desires that you support the movement of the Grand Duke, Prince Murat; arrange directly with him as to your march.

MAL. BERTHIER.

*See B—406 and B—407a.

†See B—407b, page 310.

‡Mittel=Mittel-Poelnitz.—C.H.L.

TO MARSHAL LANNES
IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CN—10982
(Imperial Archives)

Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

I have received with great pleasure news of your affair of the 10th instant. I had heard the artillery fire and I had sent a division to support you. The death of Prince Louis of Prussia seems like a punishment from Heaven as he is the true author of the war. Repeat the orders which you have already given to have the guns captured from the enemy, evacuated to Kronach, and do not allow them to be stolen by the inhabitants as frequently happens. Yesterday I was at Gera. We have scattered the escort of the enemy's train and have captured 500 wagons, the cavalry is in charge of the money. You will receive orders as to your movements from the chief of staff. All captured letters indicate that the enemy has lost his head. They are holding counsels of war day and night, and do not know what to do. You will see that my army is united and that I will bar their road from Dresden to Berlin. The mission today is to attack everything met, in order to beat the enemy in detail and while he is assembling. When I say that it is necessary to attack everything met, I mean that one should attack anything in march and not in a position which gives them too great a superiority. The Prussians had already sent a column towards Francfort which they soon withdrew. Up to the present they showed great ignorance of the art of war. Do not fail to send plenty of scouts before your advance to intercept trunks, travelers, and gather all possible information. If the enemy makes a movement from Erfurt towards Saalfeld, which would be absurd, but in his position it is necessary to provide for all kinds of events, you will unite with Marshal Augereau and fall on the flank of the Prussians.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—10983

(Imperial Archives)

Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

I will be at Gera today before noon, you will see by the situation of the army that I will suddenly envelop the enemy. But it is necessary that I have information of what he desires to do. I hope that you will find something on this in the postoffice of Zeitz. You have seen what I did at Gera. Do the same. Attack boldly whatever is in march. They have columns attempting to assemble at a designated point and the rapidity of my movements prevents them from issuing counter orders in time. Two or three advantages of this kind will crush the Prussian army, perhaps without its being necessary to fight a general battle. Marshal Davout is sending all his cavalry straight to Naumburg; he is even taking Sahuc's division with his army corps. Cover the entire plain of Leipzig with your troops.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—10984

(WD Files)

Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

Assemble your command at Gera and at Ronneburg. It is possible that you will have no movements to make today. I will be later at Gera at noon, where is GHQ.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES AT NEUSTADT

B—407b

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:30 A.M.

Proceed to Jena via Kahla.

Marshal Augereau has orders to proceed to Kahla.

The intention of the Emperor, Marshal, is that as soon as you arrive at Jena you shall seek all possible information to determine what the enemy has been doing during the past three days (9-10-11). * * * * *

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL AUGEREAU AT POSENECK

B—407c

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 4:30 A.M.

Proceed to Kahla.

[Information concerning other corps. Omitted.]

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT AT MITTEL-POLNITZ

B—407d

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

Marshal Davout will proceed to Naumburg, where he will arrive as rapidly as possible preceded by all of his light cavalry. The 4th Dragoon Division (Sahuc) will be under your orders.

[Information concerning other corps furnished, here omitted.]

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT BAMBERG AND
WURTZBOURG

B—407e

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

March with your garrison, including allies, to Schleitz.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO COMMANDING GENERAL ELLWANGEN

B—407f

GHQ, Auma, 12 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

March with your garrison including allies to Bayreuth.

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—412a

Kahla, 12 October, 1806, Evening.

We have arrived beyond Kahla, without meeting the enemy.

The enemy was at Jena, but I am informed that he has left and has gone towards Weimar. The army corps is commanded by Prince Hohenlohe; it is reported that he is retreating from Weimar to Erfurt where the army of the King is.

Numerous deserters have come in. They state that both officers and soldiers are terror-stricken.

AUGEREAU.

NOTE:—This message appears to have been received after 7:00 A.M., 13 October.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—412b

Naumburg, 12 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

The cavalry entered Naumburg at 3:30 P.M. today, and the advance guard at 8:00 P.M. The 1st and 2d Divisions have bivouacked on a depth of twelve kilometers on this side of the town.

The cavalry have captured twelve leather pontons with teams.


All reports from deserters, prisoners and inhabitants unite in stating that the Prussian army is at Erfurt, Weimar and vicinity. It is certain that the King arrived yesterday, the 11th, at Weimar; it is stated that there are certainly no troops between Leipzig and Naumburg.

DAVOUT.

NOTE:—A summary of information received from prisoners, deserters, and wounded at Naumburg was inclosed to the above letter.

NOTE:—The above report appears to have been received by the Emperor at 8:00 A.M., October 13.

13. MOVEMENTS PROPOSED BETWEEN 1:00 AM and 3:00 AM, 12 OCTOBER 1806.



TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—10986
(Imperial Archives)

Auma, 12 October, 1806, 8:30 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

I am proceeding by riding for Gera. Advise me of the route which you are taking in order to reach Naumburg. It will be possible for the enemy to make a retreat behind the Ilm and the Saale; for it seems that he is evacuating Jena; it will be easy for you to find out about this as soon as you have arrived at Naumburg. Have the entire plain combed by all your light cavalry, and send as rapidly as possible news to Prince Murat, who will be in the direction of Zeitz, and to me who will be in the direction of Gera. Marshal Ney will be at Gera at an early hour. You should advise him of the results of information received by you.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 2

CN—10987
(WD Files)

Auma, 12 October, 1806.

The Emperor left Bamberg at 3:00 A.M. October 8th, and arrived at Kronach at 9:00 A.M. His Majesty crossed the forest of Franconia at daybreak on the 9th for Ebersdorf; from there he went to Schleitz, where he was present at the first battle of the campaign. He returned to Ebersdorf for the night, leaving again for Schleitz on the 10th. He arrived at Auma on the 11th, where he passed the night after having spent the day at Gera. At this moment GHQ is leaving for Gera.

All the orders of the emperor have been carried out perfectly.

Marshal Soult was at Bayreuth on the 7th, appeared at Hof on the 9th, captured all the enemy depots and a number of prisoners, and on the 10th proceeded to Plauen.

Marshal Ney followed his movement at one-half day's march.

On the 8th the Grand Duke of Berg proceeded with the light cavalry from Kronach to beyond Saalburg, together with the 27th Light Infantry. A Prussian regiment wished to defend the crossing of the Saale: after an artillery preparation of one-half hour, and threatened with being turned, it abandoned its position on the Saale.

On the 9th the Grand Duke of Berg proceeded to Schleitz; a Prussian general with 10,000 men was there. The emperor arrived there at noon and directed Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo to attack and capture the village, desiring to secure possession of it before the end of the day. The marshal made his preparations, placed himself at the head of his columns; the village was captured and the enemy pursued; during the night the greater part of this division was captured. General Wattier with the 4th Hussars and 5th Chasseurs made a fine cavalry charge against three Prussian regiments. Four companies of the 27th Light Infantry found themselves charged on the plain by Prussian hussars, but these latter saw how French infantry receives Prussian cavalry. More than 200 troopers remained on the battle field. General Maison commanded the light infantry. One enemy colonel was killed, 2 guns captured, 300 prisoners taken, and 400 men killed. Our loss has been a few men. The Prussian infantry threw down its arms and fled terror-stricken before the French bayonets. The Grand Duke of Berg was in the midst of the fighting, saber in hand.

On the 10th the Prince of Ponte-Corvo brought his headquarters to Auma. On the 11th the Grand Duke of Berg arrived at Gera. Brigadier General Lasalle of the cavalry reserve has broken up the escort of the enemy train; 500 caissons and baggage wagons were taken by the French hussars; our light cavalry is covered with money. The bridge trains and several important articles were a part of the convoy.

The left had equal successes. Marshal Lannes entered Cobourg on the 8th, proceeded to Grafenthal on the 9th; on the 10th he attacked at Saalfeld the advance guard of

Prince Hohenlohe commanded by Prince Louis of Prussia, one of the instigators of the war. The artillery fire lasted only two hours; only half the division of General Suchet was engaged; the Prussian cavalry was overthrown by the 9th and 10th Hussars; the Prussian infantry was unable to preserve any order in its retirement; part was overthrown in a swamp, another part dispersed through the woods. One thousand prisoners were taken; 600 men remained dead on the field; 30 guns fell into our hands. Seeing the rout of his people, Prince Louis of Prussia, a brave and loyal soldier, was brought to a hand to hand fight by a sergeant of the 10th Hussars, "Surrender, Colonel," said the Hussar, "or you are dead." The Prince replied with a saber cut; the sergeant replied by a thrust, and the Prince fell dead. If the last periods of his life have been those of a bad citizen, his death is glorious and worthy to be regretted; he died as every good soldier should wish to die. Two of his aides were killed at his side. On his body were found letters from Berlin announcing that the enemy's plan was to attack suddenly, and that the war party, at the head of which was the young prince and the queen, constantly feared that the pacific inclinations of the King, and the love which he had for his subjects, would not allow him to adopt their temperaments or throw down their cruel hopes. It can be said that the first strokes of war killed one of its authors.

Neither Berlin nor Dresden are covered by any army corps. Turned by their left, taken in the act and at the moment when they were proceeding with the most hazardous combinations, the Prussian army from the beginning found itself in a very critical position. It occupied Eisenach, Gotha, Weimar, Erfurt. On the 12th the French army occupied Saalfeld and Gera and marched on Naumburg and Jena. The scouts of the French army covered the plain of Leipzig.

All letters captured complain that the royal Council is torn by conflicting opinions; always discussing but never coming to a decision; uncertainty, alarm and fright appear to have already succeeded to arrogance, inconsideration and folly.

Yesterday the 11th, while passing at Gera the 27th Light Infantry, the emperor informed the colonel of his satisfaction as to the good conduct of this regiment.

In all these fights we have not to regret the loss of any officer of importance; the senior in grade is Captain Cam-pocasso, 27th Light Infantry, a brave and loyal officer; we have had only 40 killed and 60 wounded.

NAPOLEON.

MEMORANDUM

CN—10988
(WD Files)

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

Auma, 12 October, 1806.

His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, desiring that the evils of war shall be diminished as much as possible has decided that the exchange of prisoners of war will be made between the two powers through a cartel and under the conditions given below:

Prussian prisoners will receive in France a fixed pay and rations, under condition that French prisoners who may be captured by the Prussian army will receive the same treatment.

Therefore, there is allowed each Prussian prisoner a ration of 24 ounces of flour, of which three-quarters is to be wheat bread and one-quarter rye bread; one-half pound meat, one ounce of rice, three cents a day and a billet.

For non-commissioned officers, one third more than the above.

To 2d Lieutenants	50 francs a month.
1st Lieutenants	80 francs a month.
Captains	100 francs a month.
Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.....	150 francs a month.
Colonels	180 francs a month.
Major Generals	400 francs a month.
Lieutenant Generals	600 francs a month.

Women, children, doctors and all administrative personnel will be returned, as these are not considered as prisoners of war.

The chief of staff and the minister of war will issue the necessary orders for carrying out the above prescribed measures.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

UCN—734

12 October, 1806.

General arrangements for prisoners of war

All prisoners of war will be sent to Kronach, where they will be kept in the fort.

From Kronach they will be sent to the stronghold of Forchheim in convoys of five hundred. When there are a thousand prisoners at Forchheim these thousand prisoners will be sent to Wurtzbourg, where they will be consigned to the citadel. The commandant will notify Marshal Mortier, who is at Francfort, of this fact, and he will take charge of conducting the prisoners to France.

Staff officers will be placed in Kronach, Forchheim and Wourtzbourg, to take charge of each detail of prisoners and report daily to the Major-general, with very precise returns. These staff officers will be charge with all arrangements for the careful escort of the prisoners, that none escape. Adjutant-general Duveyrier will be charged with this duty at Wurtzbourg; at Kronach and Forchheim, such French adjutants as may be there.

The Major-General, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL DE TALLEYRAND

CN—10989
(Imperial Archives)

Auma, 12 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO:

I am sending you the decorations belonging to Prince Louis of Prussia. I add thereto some letters which were

found on his body; I have only glanced over them; read them carefully. Consult M. Laforest, if he understands anything about them. Send back M. De Knobelsdorf with M. Laforest.

Affairs here have gone exactly as I calculated two months ago at Paris, march by march, event by event; I was not wrong in anything.

I have not been duped by the neutrality of Hesse-Cassel. I am astonished that you have been, after what you have seen of my movements and the retreat of the Prussian army. Interesting things will occur here within the next two or three days; but everything confirms my opinion that the Prussians have hardly a single chance left them. Their generals are big idiots. I cannot understand that the Duke of Brunswick, whom all acknowledge has talents, directs the operations of this army in such a ridiculous manner.

Dresden is entirely uncovered.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA

CN—10990
(WD Files)

Imperial Camp of Gera, 12 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEAR BROTHER:

I only received the letter of your Majesty of September 25th on the 7th instant. I am sorry that you have seen fit to sign such a pamphlet.*

I only reply to you to state that I will never attribute to him the things contained in it; all is so contrary both to his character and to his honor. I object and disdain the editors of such a work. Immediately afterwards, I received the letter of his minister dated October 1st. He designated the 8th to me for a meeting. Like a good knight I have taken him at his word: I am in the middle of Saxony. Whatever he may think of me, I have such forces that all his forces will be unable to prevent a victory much longer. But

*This refers to the 20-page letter from the King of Prussia previously described as a rhapsody.

why shed so much blood? For what purpose? I am using the same language to your Majesty that I used to the Emperor Alexander two days before the battle of Austerlitz. May Heaven see that corrupt and fanatic men, more enemies of him and of his kingdom than there are of me and of my nation, do not give him the same advice as to cause him to arrive at the same result! Sire, I have been your friend for six years. I do not wish at all to take advantage of this kind of craziness which stirs up his counsels and causes him to commit political errors at which Europe is already completely astonished, and military errors of such grossness that Europe will soon resound with them. If he had asked me for anything possible in his note, I would have granted them; he has asked my dishonor, he should have been certain of my reply. War has then broken out between us, our alliance is broken forever. But why discuss such subjects? I will never take a victory which will be bought through the lives of a large number of my children. If I was at the commencement of my military career, and if I fear the hazards of war, this language would be entirely inappropriate. Sire, your Majesty will be vanquished; he will have compromised the rest of his days, with the existence of his subjects, without a shadow of reason. He is today intact and may treat with me in accordance with his rank; he will treat before a month is over in a different situation. He has allowed himself to be carried along by irritations which were carefully calculated and prepared. He has said to me that he had often rendered me services. Very good, I wish to give him the proof of my remembrance of them. He is able to save his subjects from the ravages and misfortunes of war. Scarcely commenced it can be stopped; and this should be something for which Europe would be proud of him. If he listens to enthusiasts who fourteen years ago wished to capture Paris, and who today have embarked in war, and immediately afterwards upon offensive plans absolutely inconceivable, he will do his people the wrong which the remainder of his life cannot cure. Sire, I have nothing to gain against your Majesty. I wish nothing and I have not wished anything from him. The present war is an impolitic war.

I understand that perhaps in this letter I may arouse a certain natural susceptibility of every sovereign, but circumstances require this. I say to him what I think. Besides if your Majesty will allow me to say so: it is not great news for Europe to learn that France has three times the population, as brave and warlike as the States of your Majesty. I am not giving him any real reason for war. Let him get orders to this aggregation of evil wishing and inconsiderate people to keep still, and maintain towards him the respect which is due him; and let him bring peace to himself and his states.

If he will never again find an ally in me, he will find a man who is desirous to avoid any war not indispensable to the aspirations of my people, and who does not wish to shed blood in a fight with sovereigns who have with me not a single cause of opposition in industry, commerce and politics. I beg your Majesty to see nothing in this letter than the desire which I have to spare the blood of men, and to avoid having a nation which geographically ought not to be the enemy of my country, the bitter repentance of having listened to ephemeral ideas which arise and disappear so easily among people.

Finally, I beg God, Monsieur, dear Brother, that you are in good health.

Your Majesty's good Brother,

NAPOLEON.


TO NAPOLEON

MN—275b

12 October, 1806.

It is certain that the King arrived yesterday at Weimar from Erfurt.

DAVOUT.



ORDER

CN—10991
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 12 October, 1806, Night.

Marshal Duroc will proceed at 5:00 A.M. to inform himself as to how many days' bread the Guard has, how much bread is being made here, whether there is any brandy on hand; finally how many rations of bread this town can furnish daily; how much it has furnished up to the present time.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE EMPRESS

CN—10992
(Letters of Napoleon to Josephine)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 2:00 A.M.

My good friend, I am today at Gera; my affairs are proceeding very well, and everything as I had hoped. With the help of God, within a few days this will have taken a very terrible character, I believe, for the poor King of Prussia to whom I have personally complained as he is a good man. The Queen is at Erfurt with the King. If she is to see a battle she will have that cruel pleasure. I am feeling marvelously; I have already been getting fat since my departure; although I have personally traveled twenty or twenty-five leagues a day on horseback, by carriage and all kinds of manner. I go to bed at 8:00 o'clock and I get up at midnight. I think sometimes that you have not yet retired at that time.

All to you.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 3

CN—10994
(WD Files)

Gera, 13 October, 1806.

The fight at Schleitz, which has opened the campaign, and which has been very unfortunate for the Prussian army,

and the fight of Saalfeld which followed the following day has brought consternation to the enemy. All letters captured state that there is consternation at Erfurt, where the King, Queen and Duke of Brunswick still are, and that they discuss as to what should be done, without being able to come to an agreement. But, while they are deliberating, the French army marches on. With this spirit of liveliness, with this excessive boasting, they commence to receive criticisms on the uselessness of this war, on the injustice of undertaking it against France, on the bad morale of the soldiers, on what has not yet been done, and a thousand and one other things which are always in the mouth of the multitude when princes are so feeble as to consult them on great political matters beyond their understanding.

Nevertheless on the evening of the 12th the scouts of the French army were at the gates of Leipzig; the headquarters of the Grand Duke of Berg between Zeitz and Leipzig, that of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo at Zeitz, Imperial GHQ at Gera, the Imperial Guard and the army corps of Marshal Soult at Gera, the army corps of Marshal Ney at Neustadt; in first line the army corps of Marshal Davout at Naumburg, that of Marshal Lannes at Jena, that of Marshal Augereau at Kahla. Prince Jerome to whom the emperor has confided the command of the allies and of a corps of Bavarian troops, has arrived at Schleitz after having blockaded the fort of Culmbach with a regiment.

The enemy, cut off from Dresden, was on the 11th still at Erfurt attempting to assemble his columns, which he had sent towards Cassel and Wurtzbourg under offensive plans, wishing to open the campaign by an invasion of Germany.

The Weser where he had constructed some batteries, the Saale which he also proposed to defend, and the other rivers have been turned in the same manner as was the Iller, a year ago; in such manner that the French army is on the Saale with its back to the Elbe marching on the Prussian army which on its side has its back to the Rhine; a very strange position from which events of a great importance should arise.

The weather since we entered on the campaign has been superb, the country bounds with provisions, the soldiers are

full of vigor and health. Marches of ten leagues are being made, without one straggler; never has the army been in such fine condition. At the same time the intention of the King of Prussia has been carried out; he desired that the French army should evacuate the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine by October 8th, and it has been evacuated; but instead of repassing the Rhine, it passed the Saale.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL NEY

MN—277a

GHQ, 13 October, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

The VI Corps will proceed from Auma to Roda.

BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—418a

13 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

As there is no doubt that the enemy is at Erfurt and Weimar, the I Corps will march to Naumburg covered on the north by the light cavalry brigade of Milhaud who will be at Weissenfels.

MURAT.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—10995
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

You have received the orders of the chief of staff to make no moves today in order to give a little rest to the troops. If the Prince of Wurtemberg comes to Leipzig, this will be a good opportunity to give him a licking. I have an exact copy of his return; he has not more than 10,000 men. I have no news from Jena nor from Naumburg. Undoubtedly I will receive these within an hour. Rest your dragoons in order that according to the order which I will give tonight,

they may arrive at Jena tomorrow. My intention is to march straight to the enemy. Send a commissary to Leipzig, with orders to have 30,000 rations of bread made and have these sent to Naumburg. I will leave here at 9:00 A.M. to be at noon or at 1:00 P.M. at Jena. If the enemy is at Erfurt, my plan is to move my army towards Weimar and to attack him the 16th. General Klein of the heavy cavalry has arrived at Auma, where I am having them billeted. I expect my Guard tomorrow.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL LEMAROIS

CN—10996
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

General Lemarois will proceed rapidly to Naumburg. He will there observe the situation of Marshal Davout. At Naumburg he will note the information concerning the enemy. He will note if the Unstrutt has been crossed and where the enemy is. Having done this he will return rapidly with the information which he has, to Jena, where I will be at noon.

NAPOLEON.

TO M. SCHERB

CN—10997
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

Orderly officer Scherb will proceed rapidly to Jena. He will observe what is going on. He will note information concerning the enemy and will return reporting to me on this. He will bring me information concerning Marshal Lannes and of the movements of the enemy.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—10998
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I will be at Jena at 1:00 P.M. I will go through the little town of Roda. Arrange matters so that I will find there news of you and information concerning the movements which the enemy may have made.

I am not having the army make any movements today, in order that they may take some rest, and to allow time for assembling. Only Marshal Ney will be during the day at Roda; he will then be three short leagues from you. Should the enemy attack you, do not fail to advance him on the ground.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—419a

13 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

The I Army Corps is about to leave from Meineweh for Naumburg.

BERNADOTTE.

TO MARSHAL DE TOURNON

CN—10999
(Imperial Archives)

Gera, 13 October, 1806, 7:30 A.M.

Monsieur de Tournon will proceed to the Grand Duke of Berg and will deliver to him the letter herewith.* He will inform himself as to all information which can be obtained concerning the enemy. He will obtain orders from the Prince to rejoin me at Jena, where I desire that he arrive before 3:00 A.M.

NAPOLEON.

*See CN—11000, page 327.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—418b

13 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

Information has been received that the strategical reserve of the Prince of Wurtemberg, has been seen between Dessau and Halle.

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2578
(WD Files)*Zeitz, 12 October, 1806.**

SIRE:

I hasten to forward to your Majesty an agent from General Savary† who left Leipzig this morning, and who was at Erfurt on the 7th and at Naumburg on the 8th; he has consequently crossed the entire hostile army; he met at Fulda the advance Prussian posts; he found others at Gotha, Erfurt, Weimar and Naumburg. The King and Queen were at Erfurt. On the 8th he saw a ponton train of 80 wagons near Weissenfels, proceeding towards Erfurt. I am not detaining him a single minute as I believe he can give most valuable information to your Majesty; it is sufficient for me to know that the enemy is at Erfurt. It is stated here that Naumburg was evacuated this morning. Messengers left here two hours ago for Weissenfels and Naumburg; I will know positively from them to what point the enemy retired to, and I will not lose an instant to inform your Majesty about it.

Sire, I received your Majesty's letter written at 4:00 A.M. today, also that of the Prince of Neufchatel written at the same hour. The chief of staff directs me to take care to send some patrols towards Leipzig, if I learn that the enemy has retired to Erfurt, and to march with all my corps towards Naumburg; while your Majesty has directed me to cover with all my cavalry the plain towards Leipzig, in-

*NOTE:—The above report appears to have been received by Napoleon before 9:00 A.M., October 13.

†NOTE:—General Savary was chief of Intelligence Section at GHQ.—C.H.L.

stead of by few patrols. In order to carry out this double mission, the following are the measures which I have believed best to take: one squadron of Hussars will stop to-night in the vicinity of Pegau and at daybreak tomorrow will have a patrol at the gates of Leipzig. I have sent General Lasalle with his two regiments of hussars to Molsen, who will have a squadron at Weissenfels, this squadron will reconnoiter Naumburg tomorrow morning and will send out patrols towards Merseburg and Leipzig. I with the dragoon divisions am at Teuchern and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo with all his infantry are at Meineweh, covered by his light cavalry which will have one regiment at Stossen, and will reconnoiter Naumburg tomorrow morning; in this manner we might be said to be in mass and ready to carry out any movements which your Majesty may wish to order, either towards Weissenfels or towards Naumburg while my cavalry being in hand is ready to carry out his Majesty's intentions. By my position at Teuchern I am perfectly connected with Marshal Bernadotte. With my light cavalry I find that I have intercepted the roads from Naumburg to Leipzig, Merseburg and Halle. General Milhaud will cover me with the 13th Chasseurs towards Weissenfels and Naumburg. The 27th Light Infantry which I have at Teuchern will support my cavalry in case of need.

I am sending your Majesty some letters taken from a messenger one league beyond Zeitz on the road from Leipzig. I inclose those which appear to be most interesting. I will remain at Zeitz until your Majesty advises me as to whether he approves of my dispositions, and whether I should proceed tomorrow to Weissenfels or to Naumburg. I am, etc.,

JOACHIM [MURAT].

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11000
(Imperial Archives)

Berg, 13 October, 1806, 9:00 A.M.

At last the veil is torn away; the enemy is commencing to retreat on Magdeburg. Proceed as rapidly as possible

with the corps of Bernadotte towards Dornburg, a large town situated between Jena and Naumburg. Go there above all with your dragoons and your cavalry.

All the heavy cavalry and General Klein's cavalry are marching on Jena. I believe that the enemy will attempt to attack Marshal Lannes at Jena, where he will be marching to. If he does attack Marshal Lannes, your position at Dornburg will allow you to support him. I will be at Jena at 2:00 P.M. You already know that the depots of the enemy which were at Naumburg have been captured, that the fine ponton trains, horsed, have also been taken. It appears that these trains were enroute to Halle. If there is anything new, come yourself tonight to Jena.

NAPOLEON.

TO M. DE LA MARCHE*

CN—11001

(Library of M. Lefebvre)

M. Lemarche will leave without delay to meet Generals Nansouty and d'Hautpoul of General Klein's command; he will give them orders to proceed as rapidly as possible to Roda, a small town half-way between Auma and Jena.

He will advise them that if they hear artillery fire in the direction of Jena, they will hasten their march and send some officers forward to give advice as to their arrival. Should he meet a division, he will send me an officer with a detailed report informing me as to the place where he met the division, its condition, and hour at which it will be at Roda.

NAPOLEON.

He will show this order to General officers as his authority.

The emperor will be at Jena at noon.

*This order does not bear any date; but the original has the following note written by M. de la Marche:

"I carried out this order on the 13th, a little before the battle of Jena."

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 4

CN—11002
(WD Files)*Gera, 13 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.*

Events succeed each other rapidly. The Prussian Army has been caught unexpectedly, its depots captured; its position turned. Marshal Davout arrived at Naumburg at 9:00 P.M. on the 12th. He captured there hostile depots, made prisoners and captured a superb train of 18 leather pontons, all horsed. It seems that the Prussian army is in march for Magdeburg; but the French army has gained three marches on them.

The anniversary of the affair of Ulm will be celebrated in the history of France.

The attached letter, written by a Prussian officer to one of his friends at Berlin, which has just been captured, shows the true condition of affairs; but this battle of which the Prussian officer speaks will take place within a very few days. Its result will decide the fate of the war. The French need not be disturbed about this.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEONM—2579
(WD Files)*Zeitz, 13 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.*

SIRE:

I have the honor to forward your Majesty a report received from General Lasalle, which confirms more and more the information that the enemy is at Erfurt and Weimar and toward Thuringia; I have not yet received the report of the detachment sent to Pegau and Leipzig.

I waited for your Majesty's orders at Zeitz in order to carry them out the more quickly; but receiving nothing and believing that something might occur, I am proceeding to Teuchern where I will obtain new information; and if at 8:00 A.M. I have received no orders from your Majesty, I will proceed, as directed in the instructions contained in the

message from the chief of staff, towards Naumburg, and will have Weissenfels occupied by General Milhaud, who will cover the road from Leipzig. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo will also proceed towards Naumburg. I will advise your Majesty as to later dispositions which I will make after my arrival at Naumburg.

There were rumors yesterday at Leipzig that the Prince of Wurtemberg was proceeding by forced marches towards Leipzig, and that the head of his column was expected there yesterday evening or today, and that he was reported as having 25,000 men; at the same time it was reported at Weissenfels that a body of troops was marching from Magdeburg to Halle and Weissenfels.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE EMPEROR NEAR JENA

B—415

13 October, 1806, Noon.

I arrived yesterday evening in front of Jena where I found a hostile corps of 12,000 to 15,000 men who retreated after exchanging a few artillery shots. Jena was occupied by us this morning and Sahuc's division has been sent 4 kilometers beyond in the direction of Weimar.

According to information received from the inhabitants the King was yesterday the 11th still at Erfurt. I do not know whether he wishes to give us battle or to retreat. There is a camp of about 20,000 to 25,000 men between Jena and Weimar. I am going to send out reconnaissances to ascertain exactly where the enemy is.

I would like to know whether your Majesty desires that I march with my army corps on Weimar. I do not dare to order this movement myself for fear that your Majesty might wish to assign me some other direction. * *

* * * * *

LANNES.

P.S.—I have just learned that the enemy has a camp of 30,000 men one league from here in the direction of

Weimar; it is very possible that he wishes to give battle to us.

NOTE:—The above document appears to have been received by Napoleon about 3:00 P.M., October 13, when he was enroute to Jena and about 6 kilometers from it. At this moment musketry firing was heard in the direction of Jena.—C.H.L.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—420a

13 October, 1806, Noon.

Reconnaissances sent last evening and this morning towards Jena via the bridge of Kosen, have developed hostile forces between Jena and Kosen.

The town of Freyburg, on the left bank and on the bridge over the Unstrutt, over which crosses the road from Weimar to Merseburg, has been occupied by a detachment of the III Corps.

DAVOUT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2580
(WD Files)

Teuchern, 13 October, 1806.

SIRE:

I hasten to forward to your Majesty the postmaster of Weissenfels, who appears to know well the strength and position of the enemy and who is very willing to tell all he knows.

The reserve army of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg is certainly in march. The head of his advance guard should have been yesterday between Dessau and Halle and was marching towards the Grand Army at Erfurt; but the occupation of Weissenfels and Naumburg must necessarily change the direction of his march and force him towards Querfurt, Nebra and Allstadt; still it is very doubtful whether he is bold enough to do this, especially after he

learns of the occupation of Naumburg. The same postmaster states that this same General has detached 6000 men towards Leipzig. Heavy artillery fire was heard yesterday in the direction of Erfurt, and it is supposed that the Prussians were repulsed, as the fire seemed to approach Naumburg and Weissenfels. Sire, if I did not fear to be too far away from the Grand Army and deprive you of our corps for a grand battle, I would not hesitate to march against this Prince; remaining at Naumburg, I will always be in a position to do this if agreeable to your Majesty.

I will have Freyburg occupied, and will guard the bridgehead. It is now 8:00 A.M., I have not yet received any order from your Majesty; I add to my letter several reports from Pegau, with the sack of letters found at Weissenfels in that town. The chasseurs whom I had sent to Naumburg entered there at 10:00 P.M., at the same time as the hussars of General Lasalle entered Pegau and Weissenfels.

Four messengers, two from Berlin, one from Vienna and the other from Dresden, passed through Weissenfels, yesterday between 3:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. for the headquarters of the King at Weimar. Numerous couriers also passed during the day. It is unfortunate that our hussars did not arrive a few hours earlier. I hope that some have been taken along the road from Leipzig. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL NEY, AT MOERSDORF

CN—11003
(WD Files)

Bivouac beyond Jena, 13 October, 1806 [3:00 PM.—C.H.L.].

The enemy with 40,000 men is between Weimar and Jena; push with your entire army corps as far as possible towards Jena, with a view of being at Jena at an early hour tomorrow. Assemble all your light cavalry, and return to the regiments all messengers. Send whatever is in rear with your light cavalry to the gates of Jena. Endeavor to be

personally this evening at Jena, to join the Emperor in the reconnaissance which he is going to make of the enemy.

By Command of the Emperor,

MAL. BERTHIER.*

TO NAPOLEON

M—2581
(WD Files)

Naumburg, 13 October, 1806, 4:00 P.M.

SIRE:

Some hussars from the 7th and 5th regiments entered Leipzig this morning, they captured the guard at the gate. General Lasalle advises me that he is sending some of the men who were captured consisting of officers, the gate guard and some baggage.

I have not yet received the report of the reconnaissance from Merseburg, but some wagoners coming from Magdeburg informed me that after leaving that town they did not see any troops other than those belonging to your Majesty, but that at Magdeburg an army of 80,000 men was being assembled. General Lasalle is sending a patrol in that direction tonight; there is still a main road available to the enemy which it may be necessary to cut.

I received the order from the chief of staff to have the troops rest today, but we were already in march and I do not believe it advisable to countermarch. In the position which we occupy, we can carry out all the movements which your Majesty may wish to order. Lasalle's brigade is at Weissenfels, in liaison with the detachments towards Leipzig, Merseburg, Halle and Mucheln. General Milhaud is at Schonburg in liaison with General Lasalle and at Naumburg General Beaumont with his division and the 27th Light Infantry is supporting the light cavalry. Ponte-Corvo's corps is on the heights in rear of Naumburg in liaison with the

*NOTE:—Orders were sent at same time to:

Marshal Lefebvre, to proceed with the Guard to Jena,

Marshal Soult, to follow the Guard to Jena,

Marshal Davout, to maneuver the same evening on the enemy's left if artillery fire was heard, otherwise to await orders.—C.H.L.

cavalry. I believed that Marshal Davout was on the left of that town reconnoitering towards Merseburg and Weimar.

Your Majesty's proclamation has been published at Leipzig, Halle and all neighboring points. The detachment which entered Weissenfels yesterday captured 150 horses; I am ordering that those suitable for cavalry be sent to the dragoons, I will assign the remainder to the artillery. Marshal Davout's cavalry has captured the 40 pontons, which I advised your Majesty left Weissenfels yesterday. We still hear some artillery fire, undoubtedly this is from Marshal Lannes. Marshal Davout has not yet received the report of the reconnaissance sent out towards Weimar.

It is reported that the enemy is in full retreat on Magdeburg; the rumor is general in Leipzig that your Majesty has completely defeated the Prussians, that the death of Prince Ferdinand has thrown into consternation and discouraged the hostile army, and that you have checkmated the King of Prussia at Erfurt, and captured all his artillery, pontons and trains.

It is 4:00 P.M. I was just going to send my report to your Majesty when I received at the same time two of his dispatches. I consider myself lucky in having approached Naumburg. Although it is already very late, I will proceed to Dornburg and tomorrow morning will be ready to carry out the orders which your Majesty may desire to give me. I will proceed in person to Jena during the night. I will certainly know before tomorrow morning whether the Prince of Wurtemberg is really marching to Halle.*

I am with profound respect, etc.,

MURAT.

*Murat went to Jena during the night of October 13-14, found the Emperor at that place and remained with him until the battle of the 14th commenced.—P.L.B.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

MN—277b

Morsdorf, 13 October, 1806, 4:00 P.M.

* * * * *

In consequence of your order,* I have issued the necessary orders to put them in execution, but the troops will arrive at Jena very late as it has been impossible to pass through Triptis; the column has been obliged to go almost up to Gera in order to change direction to the left.

NEY.

TO THE EMPEROR

B—419b

Naumburg, 13 October, 1806, 6:00 P.M.

In view of the fatigue of my troops they will leave at 6:30 P.M. for Camburg where they will be before midnight.

After sufficient rest the I Corps will be on the 14th before daylight at Dornburg, ready to proceed to Weimar or any other place.

BERNADOTTE.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—419c

Naumburg, 13 October, 1806, 8:00 P.M.

Marshal Davout has just informed me, Duke, as to your letter written at 3:00 P.M. and brought by M. Perigord, your aide; according to its contents I have believed it advisable to stop the movement which I reported to you in my letter today at 6:00 P.M. this evening, as you order Marshal Davout to maneuver on the left of the enemy, which is in case Marshal Lannes should be attacked this evening from the direction of Jena, and as you added that the attack had not taken place he will receive information as to the dispositions of the Emperor for tomorrow, as I believe that these dispositions are general, I am stopping my troops at the places where they are and I await new orders.

*See CN 11003, page 332.

I am yet with my entire corps in the vicinity of Naumburg, I am ready to carry out the movements which the enemy will order.

BERNADOTTE.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

B—417

13 October, 1806, Evening.

The Emperor has only given me orders to proceed to Kahla.

AUGEREAU.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—420b

13 October, 1806, Night.

Strong hostile forces have been seen a short distance from the bridge of Kosen, the village of which has been occupied by a battalion from the III Corps to secure the exits on the left bank of the Saale.

All dispositions have been taken for emergencies.

DAVOUT.

ORDERS

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS

MN—303b

13 October, 1806, Night.

The trains will remain at Roda, while the troops continue their march on Jena.

NEY.

NOTE:—The trains continue to remain at Roda until after October 25th, during which time the regimental papers, property, and officers' baggage were not available.—B.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT AT NAUMBURG

B—421a

13 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

The Emperor has determined that the Prussian army is in the high ground between Jena and Weimar. His intention is to move against them tomorrow. In consequence thereof, the III Corps will proceed to Apolda on the flank of this army.

If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which has been indicated to him at Dornburg.

MAL. BERTHIER.

NOTE:—This document appears to have been received by Marshal Davout at 3:00 A.M., October 14, and was immediately communicated by him in person to Marshal Bernadotte, who was also at Naumburg.—C.H.L.

GENERAL ORDERS

DISPOSITIONS FOR ORDER OF BATTLE

CN—11004
(WD Files)*Bivouac at Jena, 14 October, 1806.*

Marshal Augereau will command the left. He will place his 1st Division in column on the Weimar road, on a line so that General Gazan may place his artillery on the plateau. He will detail such forces as are necessary on the plateau on the left, on a line with the head of his column. He will have skirmishers along the entire hostile line at the different exits of the mountains. When General Gazan moves forward, he will advance on the plateau with his entire army corps and will then march according to circumstances to attack the left of the army.

Marshal Lannes will have, at daybreak, all his artillery in his intervals, and in the order of battle in which he has passed the night.

The artillery of the Imperial Guard will be placed on the high ground and the Guard will be in rear of the plateau, drawn up in five lines, the first line consisting of chasseurs on top of the plateau.

The village which is on our right will be bombarded by all the artillery of General Suchet and immediately attacked and captured.

The emperor will give the signal; everything is to be ready at daybreak.

Marshal Ney will be posted, at daybreak, at the edge of the plateau, to move up on it and advance on the right of Marshal Lannes, at the moment when the village is captured, by which space for deployment will be secured.

Marshal Soult will advance by the road which has been reconnoitered on the right and will constantly keep connected to support the retreat of the army.

The order of battle in general will be, for the Marshals to form in two lines exclusive of the light infantry; the distance between the two lines will be 100 fathoms.

The light cavalry of each army corps will be at the disposition of each general, to be used according to circumstances.

The heavy cavalry, as soon as it arrives, will be placed on the plateau in rear of the Guard, available as circumstances may require. What is today important, is to deploy in the plain; dispositions will then rapidly be made according to the maneuvers and forces of the enemy, in order to force him from the positions which he occupies and which are necessary for the deployment.

By Command of the Emperor.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—421b

14 October, 1806.

The I Corps will proceed to Dornburg.

DAVOUT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2582
(WD Files)

Weimar, 14 October, 1806.

SIRE:

I will not report to your Majesty on the conduct of the cavalry of which you have given me command; your Majesty has been a witness and has seen the results, but I owe great praise to the bravery of the dragoons of Klein's division, to the cuirassiers of D'Hautpoul's division, to the 10th Hussars and to the other light troops. Sire, nothing could resist the cavalry, all were overthrown, squares broken, the personal guard of the King, the light horsemen were all broken, all fled shamelessly and no one will longer state that your* cavalry is not the first of the world.

Generals Rapp and Gardanne never left me, the former having done very well, he charged with the cuirassiers; I owe the greatest praise to Generals Klein and D'Hautpoul and generally to all the generals. I have reason to be pleased with Generals Picard and Treillard, of whom I have complained before. Several cannon and caissons were captured together with several colors and several thousand prisoners. I am having watched the roads from Erfurt and Buttstedt by which the enemy retired. Early tomorrow morning I will rally my cavalry and will vigorously pursue the enemy but I would like to know by which road, as the enemy went by several.

Seven enemy Generals have been taken wounded, among whom Ruchel, Hohenlohe, the Duke of Brunswick, and Schmettau. The King and Queen left Weimar at 4:00 P.M. The Queen was crying like a child. I arrived there at 6:00 P.M.; the Dragoons charged a column of infantry and formed the rear guard; the streets were full of corpses and wagons, guns and baggage. The duchess is here. A billet for your Majesty has been designated.

I will have the honor to report to your Majesty on the important actions which took place today under your eyes.

I have the honor to remain, etc.,

JOACHIM.

*Word "Majesty" apparently omitted.

Your Majesty will pardon my hand writing, but I am alone and dead with fatigue.

M. de Segur has acted very well.

TO MURAT AT APOLDA

D—140.2

(Prince Murat's Files)

Apolda, 14 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

Sahuc's division and Lasalle's brigade arrived very late on account of the difficulty of a defile found near Dornburg before the entrance into the plain. This troublesome defile, which could not be worse, so delayed the march that notwithstanding the care taken by the Prince of Pontecorvo, that it was not until 2:00 P.M. that he could deploy into the plain and then only with a single division. *

* * * *

I have with me a Prussian officer, a prisoner, who says that the King was with the army and in command of it, and that he was on the right opposite your Majesty and personally ordered the charge of the infantry against our cavalry.

* * * *

The King who spoke to this officer after the retreat had a crest-fallen air.

BELLIARD.

TO MURAT

ULLA, ONE LEAGUE BEYOND WEIMAR SLIGHTLY TO
THE RIGHT OF THE ERFURT ROAD

D—132.1

(Prince Murat's Files)

14 October, 1806, 8:00 P.M.

I hasten to report that I have pursued the enemy as long as my horses could move. The enemy is in full retreat along the Erfurt road. The division has justified the opinion which you had the goodness to have of it, but it has many wounded and several officers killed. * * *

It has taken a large number of prisoners and many guns and caissons. * * * *

KLEIN.

TO THE EMPRESS

CN—11005

(Letters of Napoleon to Josephine)

Jena, 15 October, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

DEAR FRIEND:

I have made some fine maneuvers against the Prussians. Yesterday I won a great victory. They had 150,000 men; I have taken 20,000 prisoners, and captured 100 pieces of artillery and some flags. I was in sight and near to the King of Prussia; I failed to capture either him or the Queen. I have been bivouacking for two days. I am in magnificent health.

Goodbye, good friend, take care of yourself and love me.

If Hortense is at Mayence, give her a kiss from Napoleon and one to the baby.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2583

Weimar, 15 October, 1806.

SIRE:

Your Majesty's troops have been in march for Erfurt for an hour, I am just leaving and will have the honor to write to you from that town. In the meantime, Sire, everything leads to the belief that the enemy has retreated towards Merseburg, and what appears to me to confirm this movement is that the Queen of Prussia left Weimar the day before yesterday for Naumburg, but finding that this place was occupied she returned to Weimar, from where she left for Erfurt at 8:00 A.M. yesterday and not at 4:00 P.M. as I notified you. MM. d'Haugwitz and Lucchesini were still at Erfurt yesterday. The enemy had also yesterday a body of troops at Eisenach, I am forwarding to your Majesty four of the flags which were taken yesterday, with some thirty officers, among whom General Schmettau, one colonel and several majors. I have with me five divisions of cavalry and the division of light troops; from Erfurt I will follow the road which the enemy may have taken. I hope

that I will receive orders from your Majesty between now and this evening.

I am your Majesty's, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MONSIEUR CAMBACERES

CN—11006
(Imperial Archives)

Jena, 15 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I write you only one word; you will have the bulletin tomorrow. The battle of Jena fulfilled all my hopes. The Prussians have been crushed. They had 150,000. 25,000 prisoners, 200 cannon, flags, a large number of their generals killed, and among others the Duke of Brunswick.

NAPOLEON.

No important person on our side was killed.

TO MONSIEUR DE TALLEYRAND

CN—11007
(Property of Foreign Affairs)

Jena, 15 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO:

Herewith is a memorandum which you may have printed while awaiting the bulletin which I am sending you.

I am sending you the Prussian proclamation to which it is necessary to reply.

NAPOLEON.

MEMORANDUM:

The battle of Jena which took place on the 14th, will be one of the most celebrated in history. The Prussians numbered 150,000 men; they have lost 200 pieces of artillery, 30 flags, 20,000 prisoners. The Duke of Brunswick and General Ruchel were killed; Prince Henry of Prussia was severely wounded. A large number of generals and distinguished officers were wounded. Comparatively the loss

of the French army has been much less. However, at the field hospitals at Jena we have 1200 wounded, and at those at Naumburg 1500. No general has been killed except Brigadier General Debilly, an excellent soldier. Seven or eight colonels are dead on the field of battle. The French cavalry has covered itself with glory.

Marshal Davout, posted at the exits of Kosen beyond Naumburg, prevented the enemy from deploying. He fought all day and routed more than 60,000 men commanded by Moellendorf, Kalkreuth and the King in person. This army corps covered itself with glory. All the rest rivaled one another with zeal and with courage. The corps of Marshals Lannes, Soult, Ney and Augereau took part in the action with equal courage.

The Queen of Prussia was chased by a squadron of hussars; she was obliged to return to Weimar and left three hours before our patrols entered there. She has taken a road along which we have plenty of troops; it is possible that she has been captured.

The cuirasseur and dragoon divisions were unable to arrive until the end of the day. They broke several squares of the Prussian infantry battalions, whom they took prisoners.

Our troops entered Weimar during the evening; pursuing the hostile rear guard on the left. On the right Marshal Davout pursued the enemy as far as Neustadt. This morning his headquarters are at Eckartsberga.

It is believed that the enemy is seeking to rally towards Frankenhäusen to attempt to gain Magdeburg. The enemy must have suffered a frightful loss which will not be known until later. Six of their generals are prisoners with a large number of colonels.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11008
(Imperial Archives)

Jena, 15 October, 1806.

Marshal Berthier will send the attached memorandum by messenger to M. Otto, who will send it to M. la Roche-

foucauld, to General Sebastini and to Italy. He will have it printed throughout at Leipzig, at Jena, etc.

NAPOLEON.

MEMORANDUM:

The battle of Jena which took place on the 14th between the French army commanded by the Emperor Napoleon and the Prussian army commanded by the King of Prussia has been as glorious as could be desired for the French armies. The Prussian army has been crushed; it has suffered immense losses; it has been pursued for more than 6 leagues; it has left 100 pieces of artillery on the field of battle. Several thousand dead; 20,000 prisoners have been taken. The King and the Queen of Prussia escaped by only an hour. The greater part of the Prussian Generals have been wounded; their columns have been cut to pieces. We entered Weimar at the same time that they did. Our loss has not been very considerable.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 5

CN—11009
(WD Files)

Jena, 15 October, 1806.

The battle of Jena has wiped out the disgrace of Rossbach and has decided within seven days a campaign which has entirely calmed this warlike fanaticism which filled the heads of the Prussians.

The following is the position of the army on the 13th:

The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshal Davout with their army corps were at Naumburg with detachments towards Leipzig and Halle.

The corps of Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo was in march for Dornburg.

The corps of Marshal Lannes had arrived at Jena.

The corps of Marshal Augereau was in position at Kahla.

The corps of Marshal Ney was at Roda.

GHQ was at Gera. The emperor was enroute for Jena.

The corps of Marshal Soult was in march from Gera to take up a position closer to the road junction of Naumburg and Jena.

The following was the enemy's position:

The King of Prussia wishing to commence hostilities on October 9th, by advancing his right on Francfort, his center towards Wurtzbourg and his left towards Bamberg, had all his divisions arranged to carry out this plan; but the French army having advanced beyond his left, found itself within a few days at Saalburg, Lobenstein, Schleitz, Gera and Naumburg. The Prussian army being turned employed the days of the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th in recalling all of its detachments; and on the 13th appeared in order of battle between Kapellendorf and Auerstadt, about 150,000 strong.

On the 13th the Emperor arrived at Jena at 2:00 P.M., and from a small plateau held by our advance guard he observed the enemy's dispositions, who appeared to be maneuvering to attack the following day, and force the several crossings of the Saale. The enemy defended in force and by an impregnable position the high road from Jena to Weimar and seemed to believe that the French would be unable to deploy in the plain without having forced this position. In fact it did not appear possible to place his artillery in battery on the plateau, which besides was so small that hardly four battalions could deploy on it. Work was continued all night on a road up this rock, and it became possible to bring artillery up this height.

Marshal Davout received orders to deploy through Naumburg, to defend the defiles of Kosen, in case the enemy should march towards Naumburg, or to proceed to Apolda to take him in rear if he remained in his present position.

The corps of Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo was directed to deploy on Dornburg to follow in the enemy's rear, regardless whether he advanced in force on Naumburg or whether he advanced on Jena.


The heavy cavalry which had not yet joined the army could not do so until noon; the cavalry of the Imperial Guard was 36 hours' march away, it had made several forced marches since its departure from Paris. But there are times in war when no consideration should be allowed to

prevent the enemy from becoming informed and from attacking him first. The Emperor had formed on the plateau held by the advance guard, which the enemy seemed to have neglected and opposite to which it was in position, the entire corps of Marshal Lannes. This army corps was drawn up by General Victor; each division forming one wing. Marshal Lefebvre had the Imperial Guard formed in squares on top of the plateau. The emperor bivouacked in the midst of his brave soldiers. The night offered a sight worthy of note: two armies of which one was deployed on a front of 6 leagues and whose camp fires extended to the horizon, the other in which its camp fires appeared to be concentrated at one small point; in both armies was activity and movement. The camp fires of the two armies were at half cannon range; their sentinels almost touched one another, and no movement was made that was not heard by the other side.


Marshals Ney and Soult passed the night in marching. At daybreak the entire army took up arms. Gazan's division was formed in three lines on the left of the plateau; Suchet's division formed the right; the Imperial Guard occupied the summit of the height and each of these corps had its artillery in the intervals. From the town and from neighboring ravines openings had been prepared to permit the easiest deployment of the troops who could not be placed on the plateau, for this was perhaps the first time that an army was to pass through such a small defile.

A thick fog obscured the day. The emperor passed in front of several of the lines; he recommended the soldiers to look out for that Prussian cavalry which was believed to be so redoubtable. He reminded them that a year before at the same time, they had taken Ulm; that the Prussian like the Austrian army, was then surrounded, had lost its line of operation and its depots; that at this moment it no longer fought for glory, but to secure its retreat; that seeking to make a penetration at different points, the army corps who had allowed themselves to advance had lost their honor and their reputation. To this lovely address, the soldiers responded by cries of: "Let's go!" The skirmishers entered into action; the musketry fire became lively. However good was the position which the enemy occupied, he was driven

BATTLE OF JENA Situation about 1.00 P.M., 14 October, 1806.



Scale 1 : 25.000



out of it, and the French army advancing into the plain, commenced to take up its order of battle.

On its side the main body of the hostile army, who had intended to attack only after the fog had lifted, took up arms. A body of 50,000 men on the left advanced to cover the defiles of Naumburg and to seize the exits from Kosen; but that had been already anticipated by Marshal Davout. The two other corps, consisting of about 80,000 men advanced in front of the French army, which was deploying on the plateau of Jena. The fog covered the two armies for two hours; but it was finally dissipated by a bright autumn sun. The two armies perceived each other in short cannon range. The left of the French army was supported by a village and some woods, was under the command of Marshal Augereau. The Imperial Guard separated it from the center, which was occupied by the corps of Marshal Lannes. The right was formed by the corps of Marshal Soult. Marshal Ney had only a small detachment of 3000 men, the only troops which had arrived of his army corps.

The hostile army was numerous and had fine cavalry; his maneuvers were executed with precision and rapidity. The emperor desired to delay the battle for two hours, in order to await in the position which he had just taken, after the morning attack, for the troops which were to join, and especially for the cavalry; but the French enthusiasm prevented this. Several battalions having become engaged at the village of Hohlstedt he saw the enemy gather to drive them out. Marshal Lannes received the order on the field to advance in echelon to support this village. Marshal Soult attacked a wood on the right. The enemy having made a movement on his right against our left, Marshal Augereau was directed to repulse it. In less than one hour the action became general: 250,000 or 300,000 men with 700 or 800 pieces of artillery everywhere dealt out death and presented one of those rare sights of history. From one part to another, there was constant maneuvering as on a parade; among our troops, there was never the least disorder, victory was never for a moment uncertain. The emperor had always near him, independently of the Imperial Guard, a considerable number of troops in reserve ready to meet any unforeseen event.

Marshal Soult having captured the wood which he had been attacking for two hours, advanced: at this moment the emperor was informed that the French reserve cavalry divisions were commencing to form, and that two fresh divisions of Marshal Ney's corps were forming on the field of battle towards the rear. All the troops that were in reserve were then ordered forward on the front line, which finding itself thus supported, overthrew the enemy in the twinkling of an eye and forced him to a complete retreat. During the first hour this was carried on in an orderly manner; but from the moment that our dragoons and cuirassiers divisions with the Grand Duke of Berg at the head were able to take part in the affair, it became a frightful disorder. These brave troopers, trembling at the sight of the victory being decided without them, threw themselves forward everywhere they met the enemy. The cavalry, the Prussian infantry, could not sustain their shock; in vain did the hostile infantry form by battalions in squares: 5 of these battalions were broken, artillery, cavalry, infantry, all were overthrown and captured. The French arrived at Weimar at the same time as the enemy who was thus pursued over six leagues.

On our right, the corps of Marshal Davout made wonders; not only did it contain but even defeated over more than three leagues, the main body of the hostile troops who wished to deploy toward Kosen. This Marshal has shown a distinguished bravery and that firmness of character, which is the first quality of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Daultanne, chief of staff, and by the rare bravery of his brave army corps.

The result of the battle are 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners, they are coming in every moment; 25 to 30 flags, 300 pieces of artillery, immense subsistence depots. Among the prisoners are more than 20 Generals, among which several Lieut. Generals, among them Lieutenant General Schmettau. The number of dead in the Prussian army is immense; it is estimated that there are more than 20,000 killed or wounded. Field Marshal Moellendorf was wounded; the Duke of Brunswick killed; General Ruchel killed; Prince Henry of Prussia severely wounded. From statements of deserters,

of prisoners and of parliamentaries, disorder and consternation are extreme in the remnants of the hostile army.

On our side we have only to regret among the Generals the loss of Brigadier General Debilly, an excellent soldier. Among the wounded, Brigadier General Conroux; among the colonels killed, Colonels Verges, 12th Infantry; Lamotte, 36th Infantry; Barbanegre, 9th Hussars; Marigny, 20th Chasseurs; Harispe, 16th Light Infantry; Doullembourg, 1st Dragoons; Nicholas, 61st Infantry; Viala, 85th Infantry; Higonet, 108th Infantry.

The hussars and chasseurs on this day showed an audacity worthy of highest praise. The Prussian cavalry never stood before them, and all the charges which they made against infantry had hopeless results.

We do not speak of the French infantry; it has been recognized for a long time that this is the best infantry in the world and the emperor has announced that French cavalry, as the experience of the two campaigns and this last battle have no equal.

The Prussian army in this last battle has lost all its lines of retreat and of operations. Its left, pursued by Marshal Davout, is conducting its retreat on Weimar, while at the same time its right and center are retreating from Weimar on Naumburg. Confusion is therefore extreme. The King had to withdraw across country at the head of his cavalry regiment.

Our loss is estimated at 1000 or 1100 killed and 3000 wounded.

The Grand Duke of Berg at this moment is investing Erfurt where there is a hostile corps commanded by Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange.

The General Staff is drawing up an official report which will give all details of this battle, and the services performed by the different army corps and regiments. If there can be added something to the effect that the army holds the esteem and consideration of the nation nothing could be added as to the feeling of tenderness which was felt by those who were witnesses to the enthusiasm and love which they showed to the emperor, at the height of the battle. If there was one moment's hesitation, one single cry of "Long live the Emperor," revived their courage and strengthened their

spirit. In the midst of the battle, the emperor, seeing his flanks threatened by cavalry, went in at a gallop to order maneuvers and changes of front into squares. He was interrupted at each instant by cries of "Long live the Emperor." The dismounted part of the Imperial Guard noticed with a disgust which it could not conceal everybody fighting and itself inactive. Many voices were heard to say: "Forward!" "What is the trouble," said the Emperor. "This must be some beardless youngster who wishes to pre-judge what I should do; let him wait until he receives orders from one who has participated in thirty great battles before pretending to give me advice." They were really old soldiers in whom young courage was impatient to show itself.

In such a warm fight, while the enemy lost nearly all its generals, we must thank Providence who watched over our army. No person of importance was killed or wounded. Marshal Lannes had a long barreled musket ball scrape his chest without wounding him. Marshal Davout had his hat shot away and a large number of balls in his clothes. The emperor was always surrounded, wherever he appeared by the Prince of Neuchatel; Marshal Bessieres; the Grand Marshal of the Palace, Duroc; the Chief Equerry Caulaincourt; and by his aides and equeries. A part of the army did not and has not yet fired a shot.

NAPOLEON.

EXTRACTS FROM MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON DICTATED AT ST. HELENA

B—422

The conduct of Bernadotte at Jena, was such that the Emperor had signed an order for him to be brought before a court-martial, where he would have been most certainly found guilty, so great was the indignation in the army. It was in consideration of the Princess of Ponte-Corvo that at the moment the order was being sent to the Prince of Neuchatel (Marshal Berthier), the emperor tore it up. *

* * * Without doubt the Prince of Eckmuhl (Marshal Davout) might not have been the victor; but he could not have lost the defile of Kosen.

With such good infantry as he commanded, he only needed 10,000 men to defend the defile for one day. But if he had lost, the Prussian army could not have passed the Saale in front of him; 6000 French and 24 pieces of artillery were sufficient to defend the crossing; thus should the Prince of Eckmuhl (Marshal Davout) been forced into the defile of Kosen and obliged to repass the Saale, such a fact would not have influenced the result of the battle of Jena. The loss of the Prussian army would only have been more certain.

TO NAPOLEON

MN—292a

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS, SOUTH OF AND NEAR WEIMAR

14 August, 1806, Evening.

I am unable to make any report on today's battle; your Majesty, during this glorious day did everything and saw everything.

NEY.

TO NAPOLEON

MN—282

HEADQUARTERS, VI CORPS

Nordhausen, 19 October, 1806.

SIRE:

In compliance with orders from your Majesty, I made my preparations to take part in the general attack which you intended to make on the Prussian army on the 14th of October. This army corps was posted at Roda; the advance guard towards Jena.

In this position in readiness it was difficult for this corps to come into line to attack and a thick fog which came up was an additional obstacle.

I therefore decided to march with my advance guard consisting of selected troops, in order to have at least some part in the glorious events in preparation. In spite of all obstacles, I succeeded in coming into line on the left of Marshal Lannes.

When I arrived at some distance from Krippendorf, I found a hostile line with its right at the Holzchen wood, the center covered by Vierzehnheiligen, and the left along the slopes which bounded the view of the field of battle.

Being informed that the VII Corps of Marshal Augereau was to deploy on my left, I thought that by establishing myself between the Holzchen wood and Vierzehnheiligen, the entire right of the enemy might be cut off, and the direction of the fire on my right proved that this result was inevitable.

In spite of the few troops at my disposal, I decided to have charged the artillery, whose fire was considerably damaging my infantry.

The 10th Chasseurs in column of squadrons, marched to the left under cover of some underbrush, changed suddenly to the right, threw itself on the artillery and carried off seven guns.*

I supported this movement with the 3d Hussars who prolonged the line to the left; which changed direction to the right and threw itself on the flank of Henckel's dragoons and cuirassiers, who were commencing to drive back the 10th Chasseurs.

I had also had formed two small squares by my two battalions of grenadiers and voltigeurs, jointly under the command of Major Lozivi, an old acquaintance, to support the cavalry if it was driven back.

The cuirassiers arrived within twenty paces of the squares without a single shot being fired by the latter. Their vigorous and steady appearance, together with the appearance of the 3d Hussars made them turn back and the Division of † Light Cavalry Division arriving at that moment, they took to flight. The hostile line of infantry was covered by too strong an artillery to enable it to be carried with only some hussars; at the same time it was of the greatest importance, while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements to make demonstrations which would prevent the enemy from making an offensive movement.

*Apparently only the caissons were carried off, not the guns.—B.

†This appears to have the Light Brigade of General Treillard from the V Corps, which was brought up by General Bertrand, aide to the Emperor.—B.

I caused my square of grenadiers to advance towards the clump of woods at the center (Holzchen), while the square of voltigeurs advanced toward the village of Vierzehnheiligen on the right, and the 25th Light Infantry on the Isserstedt on the left.

At this moment, about 11:00 A.M., the artillery and musketry fire was terrific along the whole line. Major Lamour, voltigeurs, my aide, maintained himself a long time in Viersehnheiligen, which was set on fire by the Prussian shells.

The Grenadier Battalion also courageously held the edge of the Holzchen wood.

As I had only three or four pieces of artillery* with the advance guard, and as I had nothing else at my disposition, the enemy's fire became too strong and I made a short movement to the rear, which was made with unexampled coolness.

The V Corps of Marshal Lannes continued its movement; the VII, Marshal Augereau, also commenced to arrive; and the advance was undertaken. Your Majesty personally ordered the necessary dispositions made to carry the enemy's right.

From this movement the 2d Division of my corps supported Prince Murat's Dragoons; the light cavalry did the same, and charged the column which was retiring on Weimar.

I am extremely sorry that an irresistible combination of circumstances have prevented me from reporting to your Majesty on the most important events, which the arrival of my divisions would not have rendered doubtful, but I can assure your Majesty that no corps was ever filled with greater enthusiasm than this weak advance guard.

NEY.

*There were really six pieces of artillery present.—B.

DECREE

CN—11110

(Imperial Archives)

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS

Jena, 15 October, 1806.

NAPOLEON, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, KING OF ITALY:

In view of the results of yesterday's battle and of the conquest of all the territories belonging to the King of Prussia, this side of the Vistula, we have decreed and we decree the following measures as a guide for our Quartermaster General, to the administrative General of Finances, and to our Receiver General:

ARTICLE 1.—The State of the Elector of Saxony will pay an extraordinary war contribution of	25,375,000
The Duchy of Weimar	2,200,000
The territories of the Duke of Brunswick and Wolfenbützel	5,625,000
The territories of the Prince of Nassau, Orange, and Fulda	1,300,000
The Elector of Hesse-Cassel	6,000,000
The town of Erfurt and the country of Blankenhain	400,000
The county of Eichsfeld	675,000
The town of Goslar	200,000
The principality of Halberstadt	525,000
Hildesheim	100,000
Paderborn	225,000
Münster	2,500,000
The territory of Tecklenburg and Lingen	100,000
The county of Marck	2,000,000
The principality of Minden and Ravensberg	600,000
The county of Baireuth	2,500,000
The territories of the King of Prussia, this side of the Vistula	100,000,000
The county of Berlin will be included in this requisition for ten millions.	
The country of Hanover	9,100,000
Total	159,425,000

ARTICLE 2.—East-Frise will be taken possession of by the King of Holland.

ARTICLE 3.—The territories of the Dukes of Saxe-Gotha, the princes of Anhalt, Waldeck, Lippe and Reuss, who have not taken part in the war, will not be disturbed in any manner and will not pay any of the contributions.

ARTICLE 4.—The Quartermaster General is authorized to seize properties of the Prince to insure payment of the contributions.

ARTICLE 5.—All British merchandise found in the towns of the North will belong to the army.

NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER VI

The Pursuit, 15 October, 1806, to 24 October, 1806

TO MARSHAL NEY

MN—292c

GHQ, 15 October, 1806, 5:30 A.M.

The Emperor directs that the VI Corps march towards Erfurt in support of Murat's cavalry.

BERTHIER.

THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11011
(Imperial Archives)

Jena, 15 October, 1806, 1:00 P.M.

It seems that the Prussian army is to assemble on Frankenhausen. Marshal Davout has had a superb fight; alone he defeated 60,000 Prussians. This morning his headquarters were at Eckartsberga; his light cavalry was at Buttstedt and Neustaedt.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 6

CN—11013
(WD Files)

Weimar, 15 October, 1806, Evening.

6000 Saxons and more than 300 officers have been taken prisoners. The Emperor has assembled the officers and has told them that he was sorry to see their army make war against him; that he had taken up arms only to insure the independence of the Saxon nation and to prevent its being

incorporated in the Prussian kingdom; that his intention was to send all of them home, on their parole, never to serve again against France; that their sovereign, whose good qualities he recognized had been extremely weak and thus given way to the threats of the Prussians in allowing them to enter his territory; that it was necessary that all this be stopped, that the Prussians should remain in Prussia and not mix up in any affairs of Germany; that the Saxons should unite with the Confederation of the Rhine under the protection of France, a protection which was nothing new as for 200 years past except for France it would have been invaded either by Austria or by Prussia; that the emperor had taken up arms only when Prussia had invaded Saxony; that it was time to place a limit on these violent acts; that the Continent needed rest, and that in spite of the intrigues and the base passions which agitated many hearts, it was necessary to have this rest, even if it required the fall of several thrones.

In fact all the Saxon prisoners have been sent home with the proclamation of the Emperor to the Saxons* and with assurance that nothing whatever was wanted of their nation.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER

UCN—735

Bamberg, 15 October, 1806.

IN THE NAME OF HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR AND KING:

His Majesty orders that post horses be at once returned to the posts to which they belong.

That wagons following the army be returned to their communes and restored to their owners.

Consequently, the postmasters should be prompt in assuring the service of mails and of His Majesty's couriers, under penalty of such provision being made at their expense. Regencies, bailiffs and burgomasters will insist that this very essential and urgent service be organized without the

*See CN—10978

slightest delay; the responsibility of it is laid upon them.

The use of horses will be paid for according to the tariff of the region.

Purveyors and war commissaries placed in each district will regulate the transportation service of each stage, and especially the formation of convoys necessary for the transportation of foodstuffs. They will instruct the administrative authorities that means of transportation are to be established and provided only for those to whom the laws and army regulations grant them.

French commandants and those of confederate States are asked to exert their authority to prevent all abuse and to establish and maintain good order.

For the Intendant-general,

The Inspector of Reviews of the 4th Corps,

LAMBERT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2584
(WD Files)

In front of Erfurt, 15 October, 1806, 4:30 P.M.

SIRE:

I hasten to advise your Majesty that I have found a rear guard of a corps consisting of cavalry and infantry in position on the high ground in rear of Erfurt; I had them charged. The hostile cavalry fled, the nearness of the city gave a refuge to the infantry and to some cavalry which retired there in the greatest disorder, abandoning a very large number of guns. We have taken much equipment, sixty wagons loaded with flour and 7 or 800 prisoners; the country is filled with scattered men who do not know where to go. It [is] 4:30 P.M. and Marshal Ney's corps has not yet appeared, and I am unable with the cavalry to seize the city which is held by 4 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry, who apparently [will seek] to escape during the night.

Seeing that infantry did not arrive, I summoned the town to surrender and threatened to burn it if it did not surrender. Colonel Preval was charged with this duty. I

am sending to your Majesty a first reply from the Commanding General, Lt. General De Larisch, who demands return to Prussia on parole of 40 officers present in the town, with their baggage, which terms I believe I can grant; the town has 40 guns mounted, 2000 infantry and a very good citadel. I will have the honor to advise your Majesty as to the capitulation as soon as it is drawn up and signed.

All the cavalry had already assembled at Erfurt when I received the order to leave half of it at Weimar. I am issuing orders to Sahuc's division to proceed toward Butteltstedt where your Majesty may send them orders for tomorrow's movements. The 1st Dragoon Division and the 1st Heavy Cavalry Division will be at Stetternheim tonight with detachments towards Weissensee; the 2d Cuirassier Division with the brigade is surrounding the town.

All the reports which I have received confirm the enemy's retreat toward Merseburg and Halle; from Erfurt I can proceed rapidly towards this point if your Majesty orders it. I would like to have your Majesty's orders before day in order that I may make a long march.

I have the honor to remain, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL NEY

MN—293a

GHQ, Night 15-16 October, 1806.

The Emperor directs that a guard be furnished as far as Francfort for the 6000 prisoners which have been taken at Erfurt.

Avoid any kind of disorder in that place, and take measures to see that all depots are kept intact.

BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL NEY

MN—293b

GHQ, Weimar, 16 October, 1806, 2:00 A.M.

The Grand Duke of Berg will advise you as to the intentions of the Emperor as to what your army corps is to do.

BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—10114
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 16 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I compliment you with my whole heart on your fine conduct. I regret the brave men you have lost; but they died on the field of honor. Express my satisfaction to your entire army corps and to your Generals. They have acquired forever rights to my esteem and my remembrance. Send me your news, and allow your army corps to rest for a few minutes at Naumburg.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11015
(WD Files)

Weimar, 16 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Issue orders to General Songis to assemble at Erfurt all the artillery captured from the enemy; direct the quartermaster general to assemble all the subsistence supplies at Erfurt which from now on will be the pivot of the operations of the army. General Songis will send to Erfurt the artillery company which is at Wurtzbourg; he will recall to the army the half company at Kronach, and the one at Forchheim.

He will issue orders to Marshal Mortier to come with the 1st Division of his army corps, place his headquarters at Fulda, and occupy the entire principality of Fulda as soon as possible. Direct some commissary to organize the army route from Francfort to Erfurt. The General commanding at Wurtzbourg, will proceed to Erfurt to command the citadel, town and province. The general at Kronach will similarly proceed toward Saxony.

The entire line of communications via Bamberg will be withdrawn and reestablished on the line Erfurt, Fulda and Mayence.

Give me a report on all the country not belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine and lying between the Elbe

and the Rhine; recommend an organization for it on the same basis as that which was established last year for the province of Swabia, both for military as well as for administrative purposes. Issue orders that all prisoners taken from now on shall be sent to Erfurt. It is desirable to have at that place a general staff officer for correspondence. Have a large military hospital established at Erfurt.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 7

CN—11016
(WD Files)

Weimar, 16 October, 1806.

The Grand Duke of Berg surrounded Erfurt on the morning of the 15th. On the 16th the place capitulated. In this manner, 14,000 men consisting of 800 wounded and 6000 well became prisoners of war, among which are the Prince of Orange, Field Marshal Moellendorf, Lieut. General Larisch, Lieutenant General Grawert, Major Generals Lossow and Zweifel. A park of 120 guns, equipped, also fell into our possession.

Prisoners are being gathered in every day.

The King of Prussia has sent an aide to the Emperor with a letter replying to the one which the Emperor wrote him before the battle; but the King of Prussia only replied after the battle. The letter from the Emperor Napoleon, was similar to the one which he had sent to the Emperor of Russia before the battle of Austerlitz. He said to the King of Prussia: "The success of my arms is in no way uncertain; your troops will be beaten; it will cost the blood of my children; but this could be spared through some arrangement compatible with the honor of my crown, there is nothing which I would not do to spare such precious blood. To my view there is nothing but honor more precious than the blood of my soldiers."*

*Compare with CN—10990, page 318.—C.H.L.

It seems that the debris of the Prussian army is retiring on Magdeburg. Of all that immense and fine army, there are assembled only remnants.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2585
(WD Files)

Under the walls of Erfurt, 16 October, 1806, 10:30 A.M.

SIRE:

In compliance with the capitulation which I have the honor to forward to your Majesty, the dragoons have taken possession of the gates of the city of Erfurt and immediately afterwards turned these over to the infantry of Marshal Ney's corps. This marshal has had orders to leave one of his regiments which has suffered the least in the city; he has appointed a commandant for the city and for the fort. General La Martiniere will receive the artillery; Quartermaster Faviers, the depots; and the engineer commander is to receive the plans of the fort and will make an inventory of everything.

Sire, according to all reports, the King should have been on the evening of the day before yesterday at Langensalza; all the trains should be withdrawn from there, also the troops from Aishenac;* everybody is sending dispatches for the King to this place. My dispositions are as follows: I am marching on Langensalza with Beaumont's division and with two heavy cavalry divisions, with Lasalle's brigade at the head and supported by Marshal Ney's corps. I am directing General Klein, covered by the 13th Chasseurs, on Tennstedt, in liaison with Langensalza and Weissensee and Colleda; tomorrow according to news which I will have of the enemy, I will follow them either towards Sondershausen, or toward Mulhausen, unless otherwise ordered by your Majesty.

In proceeding toward Langensalza, I may cut off the Duke of Weimar's corps which is retiring from Eisenach on

*Eisenach? These may be Hohenlohe's troops.—P.F.

that point, and I will be in position to go to wherever the enemy may retire to.

I am leaving the town. The Prince of Nassau came to see me at the gate. I have seen the venerable Mollendorf, I am sending my physician to him.

There are 6000 prisoners, large depots, plenty of guns and a part of the King's guard; the Prince of Orange would like to have this guard permitted to return to Berlin, stating to me that this would be an agreeable action to H. M. the King of Prussia; I reported to him that I would write your Majesty about it, as well as about the cadets and other persons whom he desires to retain; I turn them all over to your generosity.

I will suggest to the Prince of Nassau to go to see your Majesty.

We are going to receive the surrender of the city and in the meantime a detachment of * is in march. I will have the honor to write your Majesty as soon as I shall meet the enemy.

General Belliard will take possession of the city.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

MURAT.

THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11017

(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 16 October, 1806, 1:00 P.M.

I noted with pleasure the capitulation of Erfurt. I would have been very angry if the prisoners had not been sent to France. Have a reconnaissance of the town and citadel made for me, and send me a report to be drawn up by an engineer officer.

The latest news are that there are two hostile columns at midnight yesterday marching to Nordhausen and to Colleda. Marshals Soult and Bernadotte are in pursuit. It seems that matters are very much mixed and that something will happen from this. I presume that you will not lose a minute in pursuing the enemy, and that as soon as you

*"of the army corps"—words probably omitted.—P.F.

can, you will post yourself between the enemy and Naumburg, and that you will establish communications with all the army corps and particularly with Marshals Soult and Davout.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—736

Imperial Headquarters, 16 October, 1806.

In conformity with orders previously given, prisoners of war were to have been sent to Kronach. By a later arrangement the Emperor orders that all prisoners henceforth taken be sent to Erfurt, where orders will be given for their ulterior march to Francfort by way of Fulda.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MURAT

D—125.4

(Prince Murat's Files)

Gebesee, 16 October, 1806.

Leaving Lutzensonnern, I wished to take the road from Frankenhausen where it was said the enemy was retiring to, but as my outposts were leaving Greussen they saw a column of all arms of more than 3000 men; a stream and a narrow defile were in rear of me, I first crossed these and formed a line of battle in a good position, when I was informed that a *parlementaire* was coming. This was a Prussian officer who assured me on behalf of the Prussian General Blucher, who commanded the column, that an armistice had been made. Without putting too much faith in this, I took advantage of it to take position at Gebesee, in rear of a stream called the Unstrut, there I assembled my prisoners and the horses I had taken, and impatiently awaited your orders. It is hard for me to fear having done something which may not accord with your intentions, but sir, I thought

I was doing well in carrying out this movement, the result of which was quite satisfactory. * * * *

LASALLE.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2586
(WD Files)

Erfurt, 16 October, 1806, 3:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to report to your Majesty that the capitulation is completely executed; although I do not know the exact number of prisoners, I can state to your Majesty that there are at least 6000, and 5000 wounded; 60 guns mounted have been taken, and from 20 to 25 battalion guns which we have forced the enemy to abandon during the campaign. Several battalions, which were discovered by Your Majesty's cavalry about to billet in villages, has laid down their arms. At least 2000 prisoners were taken during yesterday. All the hostile army is scattered, and it seems that no points have been designated as rallying points, as all the generals have been wounded or killed. Sire, I owe the greatest praise to Your Majesty's cavalry; it yesterday attacked without infantry and alone, a detachment of nearly 10,000 infantry with 3 regiments of cavalry, and forcing it out of its position captured its artillery, and forced it to withdraw into this place. Only the cavalry with a detachment of 3000 men succeeded in saving themselves; thus without infantry, a body of 6000 or 7000 men commanded by old Generals has been obliged to assemble in a place sheltered from capture by surprise and having a good citadel. I will advise your Majesty as to the officers and men who have most distinguished themselves, and who have captured flags taken from battalion squares.

I have the honor to forward to your Majesty 9 guidons and 7 flags by my aide, Major Dery, who for the second time distinguished himself during the campaign; on the day of the battle, he was at the head of all the cavalry charges made against the battalion squares. * * * *

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

N—292h

Hq, VI Corps, 16 October, 1806.

I am forwarding to the Chief of Staff the return of killed and wounded; almost all commanding officers in my advance guard have been wounded.

The enemy is retreating on Erfurt in the greatest disorder. He is abandoning his trains and artillery; I have found more than 80 guns on the front of my attack. Several enemy generals are prisoners, and most of the remainder are killed or wounded; finally your Majesty may consider the Prussian army which was camped beyond Jena as completely destroyed.

Please accept, etc.,

NEY.

THE GRAND ARMY

CN—11018
(WD Files)

Weimar, 16 October, 1806, Evening.

The different army corps which are pursuing the enemy announce each moment the taking of prisoners, baggage, artillery, magazines, and munitions of every kind. Marshal Davout has just taken 30 pieces of artillery; Marshal Soult, a convoy of 3000 tons of flour; Marshal Bernadotte 1500 prisoners. The hostile army is so dispersed and mixed among our troops that one of his battalions tried to camp in one of our bivouacs believing it was one of his own.

The King of Prussia is seeking to reach Magdeburg. Marshal Moellendorf is very sick at Erfurt; the Grand Duke of Berg has sent him his own doctor.

The Queen of Prussia has been several times in view of our posts. She is in a trance, and under continuous alarms. Yesterday evening she reviewed her regiment; without cessation she incites the King and the generals; she wants blood. The most precious blood has flown. The most noteworthy generals are those which fell on the first blows.

Brigadier General Durosnel commanding the 7th and 20th Chasseurs has made a bold charge which had the best effect; the major of the 20th distinguished himself. Brigadier General Colbert commanding the 3d Hussars and the 10th Chasseurs has made several charges on the hostile infantry with the best of success.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2587
(WD Files)

Langensalza, 16 October, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

SIRE :

I had the honor to write to your Majesty from Erfurt at 4:00 P.M., and I now hasten to send to your Majesty the information I have gathered concerning the enemy during the 1½ hours that I have been here. Some men were still here at 4:00 P.M. today, and it is certain that more than 25,000 men of all arms and all corps passed through here, without order and almost all disarmed, proceeding to Mulhausen. Their officers recommended that they would throw down their arms and surrender if they met the French. The son of the Duke of Brunswick commands the rear guard, with a detachment of 14,000 men composed almost entirely of cavalry. I am informed that all the corps received orders yesterday and today to proceed towards Frankenhäusen in order to assemble the entire army, and from there to reach Magdeburg. If Marshals Soult and Bernadotte have vigorously pursued towards this point, I doubt if they will be able to assemble there. Never has such a rout been seen, never was there terror so general and so great. The officers openly state there they no longer desire to serve, all are deserting their colors and going to their homes; I am told that if I reach them, they will lay down their arms. Tomorrow if I have no other orders from your Majesty, I will proceed towards Sondershausen and I will attempt in compliance with your Majesty's letter, to be between Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, and the enemy. I found between Erfurt and here 12 guns and about 20 caissons of ammunition which the hussars caused the enemy to abandon yes-

terday. Yesterday General Klein, who charged cavalry and the train escort, proceeded towards Schlotheim, and since then has not sent any news. General Lasalle has done the same thing. I know that they are pursuing the enemy on my right. Tonight I am sending out patrols to all these points, and I hope to discover them. I am sending to Mulhausen and to Eisenach to ascertain if the enemy is there, and what route he has taken. Tomorrow I will have the honor to write to your Majesty. My dispositions are as follows: General Milhaud is at Langensalza with Beaumont's division, General Nansouty is at Grafen-Tonna; D'Hautpoul is at Dollstadt. Marshal Ney is at Fahner on the Erfurt road.

Instead of 6000 prisoners we have found at least 10,000; but they are deserting and going to their homes and it would therefore be desirable to take measures to prevent this. The Queen passed through here the day before yesterday with the Duchess of Weimar and took the road from Mulhausen to Gottingen. The army has no news of the King since the day of the battle.

I have the honor to remain, etc.,

MURAT.

The Prince of Hesse Hombourg and the Prince of Pleiss are among the prisoners.

TO GENERAL CLARKE

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF THE TERRITORY OF ERFURT

CN—11019
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806, 9:00 A.M.

I assume that during today you have gotten rid of your prisoners. It is important that you take measures and organize the services in such manner that if a detachment of light infantry appears at Erfurt, you may defend not only the citadel but also the town, and that if a considerable detachment appears and attacks the town you would at least be able to defend the citadel.

Place yourself in correspondence with Marshal Mortier who should be at Francfort and who has orders to proceed to Fulda with his army corps.

Place yourself in correspondence with the King of Holland who is at Wesel.

Write to M. Bignon at Cassel, that my desire is that he should proceed to join me.

Write often to Mayence, to Wesel, to Marshal Mortier in order to let them know what is happening and send me all important news.

Write to the commandant at Wurtzbourg.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

MN—294c

Erfurt, 17 October, 1806, 8:15 A.M.

I enclose herewith statement from General Dutaillis, and advise you as to complaint from the inhabitants, who estimate the total requisitions made on them at 400,000 livres.

CLARKE,
Governor of Erfurt.

TO GENERAL CLARKE, GOVERNOR OF ERFURT

MN—294b

Erfurt, 17 October, 1806.

Marshal Ney has demanded 300,000 francs from the city of Erfurt for pay due his troops.

He wishes in this manner to avoid all pretext for disorder, and prevent any complaint from those who have not been paid seeking means for their own living and for support of their family.

DUTAILLIS,
Chief of Staff, VI Corps.

TO GENERAL CLARKE

CN—11020
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806, 11:00 A.M.

I am in receipt of your letter. As a contribution has been made, there is nothing wrong in requiring it to be paid; but instead of having it turned in to the finance officer of Marshal Ney's army corps, it will be turned in to M. Boul-lerie, receiver general of contributions of the Grand Army. You will issue orders to Marshal Ney's finance officer not to receive this, and you will advise him that I have my eye on him and that I have expressly prohibited that he give any receipt without an order from Marshal Berthier, Chief of Staff.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—737

Imperial Headquarters, 17 October, 1806.

By the Emperor's desire the Prince of Neufchatel, Minister of War, Major-General, orders:

The masters of posts for horses through the entire extent of Germany, being in a position to render important services to the Army, are under His Majesty's special protection.

Whenever French troops occupy a post town, the commandant will at once detail a subaltern officer of infantry or cavalry to guard the house of the postmaster, that his house, his property and his horses be respected. He will be exempt from all military billeting.

The subaltern on guard in his house shall as soon as possible be relieved by a gendarme.

Should the number of post horses be insufficient for the service, others shall be provided by the local authorities, bringing the number up to 25 horses always ready for His Majesty's couriers, those of the staff, and officers charged with missions. Supplementary horses will be paid for, as well as those of the post house, according to local custom, by all persons authorized to make use of them.

When marshals, commanders in chief, are established in post towns, the postmasters may not furnish horses without their orders.

When the imperial headquarters are in such towns, horses may not be furnished except on the orders of the Major-General or the Grand Equerry.

All marshals are requested to cooperate in the execution of the present order.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL NEY

M—2589
(Rouen Library)

Merxleben, 17 October, 1806.

Marshal, I have learned that the enemy has evacuated Mulhausen and is marching on Nordhausen. It is therefore important to cut him off as soon as possible from all roads which lead to this point. Direct therefore your army corps to Sondershasen as soon as practicable, you will gain at least one and one-half hour's march, at that place I will decide as to the direction to be taken. I would like you to send out a chasseur regiment as soon as possible with my other light troops to my left. Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL NEY

M—2590
(WD Files)

Maxleben, 17 October, 1806.

Marshal: I have decided, Marshal, to march towards Ebeleben where I can, according to circumstances proceed either towards Sondershasen, Nordhausen or cut the road from Mulhausen to that point. Receive Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO GENERAL CLARKE

CN—11021
(WD Files)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

The enemy has spread a rumor that I have granted an armistice for six weeks. Deny this rumor, and write to the Prince of Berg and to Marshal Ney that this is false.

NAPOLEON.

TO MURAT

D.102 viz 1
(Prince Murat's Files)

Erfurt, 17 October, 1806.

The enemy is everywhere stating that the Emperor has granted a six weeks' armistice; this is false. It is to be noted that this untruth has originated with the Prussian General Blucher, who certified to this fact through one of his officers and on his word of honor.

CLARKE.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11022
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

The Prince of Benevento will have sent you the bulletins. In these you will see that fortune has favored the justice of my cause; 60 to 80 colors; 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners; 300 pieces of artillery, all the Prussian Generals killed or wounded, General Ruchel killed, the Duke of Brunswick killed, such is the result of the battle of Jena which I won on the 14th of this month.

It is today necessary that you shall take possession of the counties of Marck, Munster and Paderborn. Have everywhere Prussian eagles removed, and announce that these countries no longer belong to Prussia. Leave at Wesel the 3d Battalions of the 21st and 22d Infantry; have assembled there if necessary, two other 3d Battalions from those which are in the 25th Military Division, and form 6 battalions composed of two battalions of the 22d Infantry, two

battalions of the 72d Infantry, and two of the 65th Infantry. My plan is that you shall send these 10,000 men to Paderborn. Marshal Mortier with his army corps which is stronger than yours is proceeding to Fulda. My intention is that with these two army corps you shall enter into Cassel, that you will make prisoners of the Elector and disarm his troops; but before carrying out this plan, it is necessary that you shall have arrived at Paderborn and Marshal Mortier at Fulda. I presume that Marshal Mortier will have arrived at Fulda with his army corps on the 24th or 25th of October. If you arrive the same day, during the first days of November you will be able to enter Cassel and seize that territory.

I have occupied Erfurt, there I have designated General Clarke as Governor General. Send to him for information of the army. Keep constantly on good terms with the Elector, without however, compromising yourself. I believe the enemy has withdrawn his camp at Minden. Take possession of Frise, and drive out the Prussian arms. From now on Emden will be a part of your territory. You may also take possession of Osnabruck. I suppose that the garrison of Hameln is not strong. Thus as you receive news from here take possession of the country beyond the Weser. Have everywhere Prussian eagles removed, change the officials who are too much attached to Prussia, take all measures necessary so as to be able to carry out your second mission, that is to remove the Elector from Cassel.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—11023
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The two Italian regiments should be soon about to arrive at Mayence. With the three regiments which you have, this should give you 10,000 men or two divisions of 5000 men each. I have appointed General Lacombe-Saint-Michel to command your artillery; he will soon find means to provide 6 guns for each of your divisions.

You should have received the order to assemble these troops at Fulda and it is desirable that you establish your headquarters. You should remove the arms of the Prince of Orange; if there are any soldiers in the country make use of them; if these are the soldiers of the Prince discharge them; the Prince of Orange will no longer reign in Fulda.

You will take care to have posts at the exits of the mountains in the direction of Eisenach. Also have your advance guard at Eisenach. Enter into correspondence with General Clarke, Governor at Erfurt. If necessary you will proceed to the assistance of this General.

You need not bother about the materiel for your artillery. They are no longer 700 pieces at Erfurt; General Lacombe-Saint-Michel will send an officer there to procure the pieces of which you have need. It will be sufficient if you arrange for the personnel.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11024
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

Send by one of Prince Jerome's aides orders to the 2d Bavarian Brigade to hasten its march from Forchheim, or from Bayreuth where it ought to be, for Plauen, in order to join the 1st Brigade. Send orders to the division of General Grouchy, who should be at Auma, to proceed to Gera and from Gera to Leipzig:

Send orders to the Baden troops who should be at Bayreuth to proceed to Plauen. Same order for the Wurtembergers.

Repeat the order to the commandant of Bamberg to send forward all detachments without retaining any, and to hasten the march of the 28th Light Infantry; to the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt and of Usingen, who should not yet have passed Wurtzbourg, to proceed to Erfurt.

Same order to the 2d Baden Brigade, and write to Baden to hasten the departure of this 2d Brigade.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR PORTALIS

CN—11025
(Imperial Archives)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

I inclose herewith a letter to the bishops, which you will have sent to all of them. You will add to it a copy of Bulletin No. 5, so that they may know the extent of the success which we have had.

NAPOLEON.

CIRCULAR TO THE BISHOPS

Weimar, 15 October, 1806.

SIR BISHOP: the success which we have just had over our enemy by the aid of Divine Providence, require of us and our people to return to the God of armies solemn ceremonies of thanks. You have noted by the last letter from the King of Prussia the necessity in which we found ourselves to draw our sword in order to defend the most precious possession of our people, honor. Whatever repugnance we have had, we have been pushed to the limit by our enemies. They have been beaten and dispersed. On receipt of this circular please assemble the people in the churches, have the Te Deum celebrated, and order prayers to thank God for the prosperity which He has accorded our arms.

This letter having no other object, I beg God, Sir Bishop, that you are in good health.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 9

CN—11026
(WD Files)

Weimar, 17 October, 1806.

The garrison of Erfurt has surrendered. There are many more troops there than had been believed. There is there a great quantity of stores. The Emperor has appointed General Clarke as Governor of the town, of the

citadel and of the surrounding country. The citadel of Erfurt is a fine octagonal bastion with casemates and well armed. It is a valuable acquisition which will serve as a point of support in the midst of our operations.

In Bulletin No. 5 it was stated that 25 to 30 colors had been taken; up to now 45 have been brought to GHQ; it is probable that there will be more than 60 of them. There are flags given by the Great Frederick to the soldiers; that of the Guard regiment, that of the Queen's regiment, embroidered by the hands of this Princess, are among the number. It seems that the enemy is attempting to rally on Magdeburg. During this time we march from all directions. The different army corps are pursuing by different roads. Every moment messengers arrive announcing that entire battalions have been cut off, artillery pieces and baggage captured, etc.

The Emperor is billeted in the palace of Weimar where some days before the Queen of Prussia was staying. It seems that what has been said about her is true; she was here to encourage the war spirit; she is a woman with a pretty figure but little spirit, incapable of foreseeing the consequences of what she does. Today it is necessary instead of accusing her to defend her; for she must be very remorseful from the sad consequences she has brought on her country as the result of the influence which she has exercised on her husband, the King, whom everyone states is a perfectly honest man, who wished for peace and the good of his people.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2587
(WD Files)

Immenrode, 17 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I have just arrived at Immenrode, a village situated on the road from Langensalza to Nordhausen; the 13th Chasseurs are occupying Furra in front of my position and two leagues from Nordhausen. They reconnoitered this evening that town which the enemy had evacuated at noon today, and which I believe is now occupied by Marshal Soult's

troops. I am leaving on my left, along the Gottingen road, a hostile detachment which I believe can do nothing but retreat; as it has not sufficient time to arrive before us either at Magdeburg or at Brunswick. If such is the wish of your Majesty, tomorrow, in compliance with directions contained in your Majesty's letter, I will connect with Marshal Soult and attempt to place myself between the enemy and Naumburg, that is to say, I will maneuver by my right, so as to be within reach of the corps of Marshals Bernadotte and Davout.

The Prussian army is filled with terror, the approach of a single Hussar makes them all run.

It is now very difficult to correspond with your Majesty; I hope that I will be closer to you. It has been reported that you are proceeding to Naumburg; tomorrow I will go as far as I can and attempt to reach the enemy's tail. General Klein has made a bad error, and following his example General Lasalle has made another; yesterday the former passed General Blucher with 5000 men at Weissensee, and the latter another column at Tennstedt, because General Blucher assured them that there was a six weeks' armistice. General Klein was already at Weissensee the day before yesterday, and he could have done a great deal of harm to the enemy.

I am sire, your Majesty's, etc.,

MURAT.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

CN—11027
(WD Files)

Naumburg, 18 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR DEJEAN:

M. Lacuée notifies me that thirty young men from the Polytechnic School wish to enter into some corps. Send them straight out here. We need officers, we will assign them to corps. Send some also to Italy. The Viceroy writes me that he is receiving plenty of conscripts and that he has no officers except a force of sick officers who are asking to be retired.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 10

CN—11028
(WD Files)

Naumburg, 18 October, 1806.

Among the 60 colors which had been taken in the battle of Jena, there are several belonging to the King of Prussia's Guard and on one of these the inscription is written in French.

The King of Prussia has asked for an armistice of six weeks. The Emperor has replied that it was impossible after a victory to allow the enemy time to rally.

Nevertheless the Prussians have spread this rumor so thoroughly that several of our generals who met them were led to believe that this armistice had been concluded.

Marshal Soult arrived at Greussen on the 16th, pursuing the column with which was the King and which was estimated at from 10,000 to 12,000 men. General Kalkreuth reported to Marshal Soult that an armistice had been concluded. The Marshal replied that it was impossible for the Emperor to commit such a fault; that he would believe this armistice when he had been officially notified. General Kalkreuth asked to see Marshal Soult, who then proceeded to the outposts: "What do you wish of us?" said the Prussian General to him; "The Duke of Brunswick is dead; all our generals are killed, wounded or captured; the greater part of our army is in flight; your successes are great enough. The King has asked for a suspension of the armistice. It is impossible that your Emperor will not grant it." "General," replied Marshal Soult, "it is a long time since we have thus treated with you; our generosity is appealed to when we are the victors, and is forgotten one moment after the magnanimity which we have been accustomed to show. After the battle of Austerlitz, the Emperor granted an armistice to the Russian army; this armistice saved their army: see the ungenerous manner which the Russians show today. It is said that they wish to come back; we are burning with desire to see them. If there had been among them as much generosity as with us, we would have been left alone, after the moderation which we had shown in victory. We have done nothing whatever

to provoke the unjust war which you have made against us; you have declared it with gayety. The battle of Jena has decided the fate of the campaign. Our business is to do you as much harm as we can. Lay down your arms, and I will await, under the situation, the orders of the Emperor." The old General Kalkreuth clearly saw that there could be no answer. The two generals separated and the hostilities re-commenced a minute later. The village of Greussen was captured, the enemy overthrown and pursued closely.

The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshals Soult and Ney should, during the 17th and 18th, assemble by combined marches and crush the enemy. They will without doubt have surrounded a large number of stragglers. The country is full of them and the roads are filled with caissons and wagons of every kind.

Never was such a great victory followed by such great disasters.

The reserve commanded by Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg has arrived at Halle. We have only arrived at the 9th day of the campaign; and the enemy is already obliged to post his last resources. The Emperor is marching at them. They will be attacked tomorrow if they remain in the position of Halle.

Marshal Davout left today to take possession of Leipzig and throw a bridge over the Elbe. The mounted detachment of the Imperial Guard is at last about to join us.

Besides the large magazines found at Naumburg, another large number has been found at Wiessenfels,

General Ruchel has been found in the village mortally wounded. Marshal Soult has sent him his surgeon. It would seem that this is a stroke of Providence, all those who have instigated this war has been struck down by its first blows.

NAPOLEON.

ORDERS

MN—298

Hq VI Corps, Nordhausen, 18 October, 1806.

The 2d Division will proceed tomorrow the 19th to Hasselfeld; the 3d in echelon in its rear; and on the 20th both divisions to beyond Halberstadt.

No towns situated along the road will be occupied with a view of avoiding pillage.

The Marshal recalls to his French soldiers their honor and duty. Unheard of damages have been committed without advantage to their authors; some miserable individuals soil a name of which all soldiers should be proud.

The officers are informed that those among them who will distinguish themselves in maintaining good order and discipline will be cited in orders and rewarded; those who allow pillage and insubordination will be noted and recalled to their duty.

The Marshal, full of confidence in the honor of French grenadiers, recommends each company to watch for stragglers and pillagers; every grenadier who arrests one will be rewarded.

Measures will be taken so that the soldiers may receive necessary subsistence without destroying any surplus.

This order will be read to all companies, and captains will be responsible for the punishment of men who commit disorders.

NEY.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

MN—299

Hq VI Corps, 18 October, 1806.

The relaxing of discipline has reached such a point that the life of the officers is no longer safe.

NEY.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 11

CN—11029
(WD Files)

Merseburg, 19 October, 1806.

The number of prisoners at Erfurt is greater than was believed. The passports given to officers who are to return to their homes on parole in accordance with one of the articles of capitulation has increased to 600.

The corps of Marshal Davout took possession of Leipzig on the 18th.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo who was at Eisleben on the 17th to cut off some Prussian columns, having learned that the reserve of H. M. the King of Prussia commanded by Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg has arrived at Halle, proceeded there. After having made his dispositions, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo had Halle attacked by General Dupont, leaving Drouet's division in reserve on his left. The 32d Infantry and the 9th Light Infantry charged across the three bridges and entered the town supported by the 96th Infantry; in less than one hour everything was overthrown. The 2d and 4th Hussars and the entire division of General Rivaud crossed the town and threw the enemy out of Die-mitz, Plissen and Rabatz. The Prussian cavalry wished to charge the 8th and 96th Infantry; but they were received with vigor and repulsed. The reserve of the Prince of Wurtemberg was most completely routed and pursued for 4 leagues.

The results of this battle, which deserve particular and careful attention, are the capture of 5000 pieces among which two generals and two colonels, 4 colors and 34 guns.

General Dupont has acted with great distinction. Major General Rouyer had a horse killed under him.

Major General Drouet captured the Treskow regiment entire.

On our side the losses amounted to only 40 men killed and 200 wounded. The colonel of the 9th Light Infantry has been wounded.

General Leopold Berthier, Chief of Staff of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo has distinguished himself.

As the result of the battle of Halle, there are no longer any enemy troops which are not cut off.

The Prussian General Blucher with 5000 men, crossed the Dragoon Division of General Klein, who had cut him off. Having stated to General Klein that a six weeks' armistice had been made, this general was simple enough to believe it.

The Emperor's orderly officer, Montesquiou, who had been sent as a *parlementaire* to the King of Prussia the

evening before the battle, has returned; he had been carried along for several days with the enemy's stragglers; he stated that the disorder of the Prussian army is inexpressible. Nevertheless on the evening before the battle their boasting was unequalled; the only question was as to cutting off the French army and capturing their columns of 40,000 men. The Prussian generals as far as possible aped the manners of the great Frederick.

Although we were in their own country, their generals seemed to be in the most absolute ignorance as to our movements. They believed that on the little heights of Jena, there were only 4000 men, whilst the greater part of the army had deployed on this height. The hostile army has retired in force on Magdeburg. It is probable that several columns will be cut off before they arrive there. For several days no news has been received from Marshal Soult, who was detached with 40,000 men to pursue the hostile army.

The Emperor has crossed the battlefield of Rossbach. He has directed that the monument which has been erected there be sent to Paris.

The Emperor's headquarters was at Merseburg on the 18th and it will be at Halle on the 19th. In this latter town all kinds of stores have been found in great quantity.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—740

Imperial Headquarters at Merseburg, 19 October, 1806.

The Emperor expresses his displeasure with Major-General Klein and Brigadier General La Salle, for having given free passage to two intercepted columns of the enemy, both having been so extremely simple as to believe the statement of General Blucher of the enemy's forces that an armistice of six weeks had been arranged. His Majesty orders that this mark of his displeasure be spread upon Army Orders.

Since when has His Majesty made known his orders through the channel of the enemy?

The Emperor flatters himself that similar errors will not again be committed. Military law pronounces the most severe penalty against officers in such cases; but the severest penalty for an officer of the Grand Army is not to have cooperated in every way in the entire success of its operations.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 12

CN—11030
(WD Files)

Halle, 19 October, 1806.

Marshal Soult has pursued the enemy as far as the gates of Magdeburg. The Prussians several times wished to take up a position, but have always been overthrown.

Very considerable stores have been found at Nordhausen, among which a chest belonging to the King of Prussia and filled with money.

In the 5 days which Marshal Soult has pursued the enemy, he has taken 1200 prisoners, 30 guns, and 200 or 300 caissons.

The first mission of the campaign is finished. Saxony, Westphalia and all the countries on the left bank of the Elbe are freed of the presence of the Prussian army. This army, beaten and closely pursued for more than 50 leagues is today without artillery, without trains, without officers, reduced to less than one-third of what it was eight days ago, and what is still worse, it has lost its morale and all confidence in itself.

Two corps of the French army are on the Elbe, occupied in building bridges.

GHQ is at Halle.

The following letter* which has been captured, contains a very detailed statement of the situation of the Prussians after the battle of Jena.

*Letter omitted.

TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA

CN—11031
(Imperial Archives)

Imperial Camp, Halle, 19 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have received your Majesty's letter. I greatly regret that the letter which I sent to him by one of my orderly officers, and which arrived at his camp on the 13th was unable to prevent the battle of the 14th. A suspension of arms which would allow time for the Russian armies to arrive, and who seem to have called for the winter, would be too contrary to my interests, for however great may be my desire to spare evils and victims to humanity, I must look after these interests. I do not fear the Russian armies whatever, they are only a cloud; I have seen them in the past campaign. But your Majesty will have more to complain about them than I. Half of his territories will be the theater of operations and will therefore suffer all kinds of calamities; the other half will be ravaged by his allies and will suffer still more. It will always be a subject of regret to me that two nations who for so many reasons should be friends, have been led into a war having such little motives. The principal instigators of this war have been the first victims. Nevertheless I must repeat to your Majesty that I will note with satisfaction means for reestablishing, if possible, the old confidence which existed between us, and to coordinate the sentiment which I have for him with my duty and the safety of my people once more compromised after 15 years by a fourth coalition.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2591
(Murat's File)

Blankenburg, 19 October, 1806.

MY DEAR MARSHAL:

I beg you to send me General Sahuc's dragoon division as soon as possible. The enemy evacuated Blankenburg at 6:00 A.M. today, and is retiring in the greatest disorder

towards Magdeburg. As the country is extremely open, I have the greatest need for cavalry, my own will not deploy until 2:00 or 3:00 P.M. and may be later. My light troops are already in march to reconnoiter Halberstadt and Quedlinburg. I will have Aschersleben reconnoitered as soon as possible to obtain news of Marshals Bernadotte and Davout and of the Emperor's headquarters. I have directed the officer bearing this letter to guide Sahuc's division. I will leave you, if circumstances permit, Beaumont's division which is marching in the midst of your army corps. Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL LANNES AT DESSAU

CN—11032
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 19 October, 1806, 5:30 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

Your aide has arrived; you do not report to me whether the bridge over the Mulde has been cut, or whether you have passed the Mulde. There are boats on the Mulde; hasten to have them assembled. Have posts established along the Elbe, in order to select the places most favorable for crossing. There should be there a large quantity of lumber suitable for rafts; start work on them. I am sending at once a new company of pontoniers with the sailors from the guard to carry out this work. Send patrols up to Elbe; there must be boats there too; it is never possible to burn up everything. The Mulde forms islands where it enters the Elbe; it is among these islands that I would like to throw over a bridge. If the bank is high, I could make a good bridgehead there.

NAPOLEON.

TO MURAT

MN—294a

GHQ, Mersebourg, 19 October, 1806.

Five thousand prisoners coming from Erfurt for Francfort, under guard of too small an escort have been recaptured by a wandering party of 200 Prussian hussars.

The Emperor is displeased that you did not leave a garrison at Erfurt, he would have liked you to have left there 3000 men of Marshal Ney's corps.

BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2592
(WD Files)

Halberstadt, 19 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I advise your Majesty that my headquarters are at Immenroda; my position and my march are towards Magdeburg. Yesterday morning I directed Beaumont's division towards Elrich via Wolckramshausen, Gross-Werther, Hesserode and Wolfleben. I myself am marching with the 13th Chasseurs and all the rest of my cavalry on Blankenburg via Nordhausen, Birkenmoor, Steige and Hasselfeld; in this way I have in no way interfered with the march of Marshal Soult who is proceeding to the same point via Elrich. I arrived this morning at Blankenburg with the 13th Chasseurs and 25th Dragoons; I at once directed this regiment towards Halberstadt closely pursuing the enemy. General Beaumont who is in command of this brigade, in place of General Milhaud who is sick, arrived before this town about 1:00 P.M.; he fell on several parts of the guard's train which he captured together with 200 grenadiers of this guard. In the meanwhile three of four hussar squadrons coming from Derenburg marched for Halberstadt, not knowing that this town was occupied by your Majesty's troops. The colonel of the 25th Dragoons then received orders to charge these, which he did with great intrepidity and bravery. He captured 150 hussars mounted, and lost no one. The 13th Chasseurs in its charge against the grenadiers lost three or four men. Sire, tomorrow five divisions of cavalry will cover the plains of Magdeburg, and I hope by means of detachments to connect with Marshals Bernadotte and Davout and possibly have the Elbe reconnoitered around Kalbe. I would like to know where your Majesty is, and as I presume that you are probably at Halle or Naumburg, I am sending you my report to that point.

The following are the positions of the Reserve Cavalry Corps and of the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney: Beaumont's Brigade, across the road from Magdeburg to Emersleben and Neuendorf. Sahuc's division at Quenstadt; Beaumont's at Wegeleben; Nansouty at Westerhausen; D'Hautpoul's at Langenstein; Klein's at Blankenburg, Lassel the same. Of Marshal Soult's corps, one division is beyond Quedlinburg, of the two others, one is beyond and the other is in rear of Halberstadt. Marshal Ney is at Benneckenstein and at Hasselfeld, he will tomorrow take position about Halberstadt. Tomorrow Marshal Soult intends to take position at Oscherleben, Hadmesleben and Egelu.

I will advise your Majesty tomorrow evening as to my position; I will do everything possible to occupy Kalbe and surprise the Barby bridge.

I am forwarding to your Majesty the letters captured at the post-offices of Halberstadt and Blankenburg together with a letter captured from the courier sent by the King to the commanding general at Nienburg. We have just heard that your Majesty has also beaten the Prince of Wurtemberg. Sire, never was there seen such a rout, disorder and discouragement as at their height; the troops march without order and without any kind of organization; the sight of one of your hussars makes all those fleeing tremble, and now neither infantry or cavalry dare to defend themselves any longer.

Nevertheless it is said here that they wish to try a second battle at Magdeburg; it seems to me impossible, for the King will never have the time to reorganize the debris of his army. Sire, in any case more than 50,000 men will be assembled tomorrow and well disposed for fighting them. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11033
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 20 October, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

Yesterday I sent you orders. It is very important to have a bridge over the Elbe. I have tried through three

different army corps; but as yours is the only one that has any boats, I do not doubt but that this bridge will be thrown over during the day or during the night of the 20th-21st. The bridge once built, lay out a good bridge head and start work on it. Take possession of Wittenberg; if that place is as good as is reported to me, have it at once placed in good order for defense. We are before Magdeburg. Marshal Soult has followed during his pursuit, for five days a column with which was the King, and has captured the half of this force.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11034
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 20 October, 1806, 11:30 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshals Soult and Ney are blockading Magdeburg on the side of the left bank of the river. A regiment of guards has been captured, also guns, trains and a regiment of Hussars. It is believed that much will be taken in occupying Magdeburg. I am waiting impatiently your reports in order to know where we are at. Davout on his side is moving his headquarters today to Wittenberg, to try to throw a bridge across between Desseau and Bernburg.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—11035
(WD Files)

Halle, 20 October, 1806, 12:30 Noon.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am pleased with your conduct. The position which you have taken is a good one. See that your patrols do not allow the enemy any rest. Magdeburg is a mouse trap. On the other hand do not allow yourself to be blinded by good fortune but keep always on guard.

Remember that 8000 men are nothing; keep your army corps united. Take rest. I am trying to throw bridges over the Elbe; as soon as I have succeeded I will inform you as to what you should do.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11036
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 20 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Issue orders that the University of Halle shall be closed and that within twenty-four hours the students depart for their homes. If any of them are found in town tomorrow, they will be placed in jail to prevent a spread of the bad spirit which has been taught these young men.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11037
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 20 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I am sending you two aides by two different routes. I have already given you the same orders sent via Mayence. You will without doubt have learned about the battle of Jena. We are opposite Magdeburg and on the Elbe. Take possession of the city of Marck, of the territories of Munster and Osnabruck, of the bishopric of Paderborn, of East-Frise, without touching Danish territory.

According to the returns which you have sent me your advance guard has 9000 men. Add to them the 2000 men of the 22d Infantry; leave the 3d Battalion at Wesel. Add to this also the 1500 men of the Grand Duke of Berg. When I see all these forces at Goettingen and on the Weser, and when I have your report on Hanover, I will determine whether it is desirable to have you take possession of Hanover. I have given orders that the corps which is at Paris

shall proceed without delay to Nimegue, either to defend Holland if circumstances require it or to reinforce your corps. In your corps form two divisions. If you have not a Major General I will send you one. Assign 12 pieces of artillery to each division. Place an observation post before Hameln. You may boldly attack the Prussians; we are braver than they are. You will leave the 3d Battalions at Wesel and you will have several other 3d Battalions from the 25th Military Division sent there. The large number of conscripts arriving will sufficiently guarantee this place.

As soon as your corps have arrived at Goettingen and Alfeld, your cavalry will send detachments towards Magdeburg to connect yourself with the corps which I will leave in front of that place. You will also send detachments towards Erfurt and towards Hanover. The mission of these parties will be to gather stragglers and to police the towns. You will everywhere remove the arms of the King of Prussia, as these territories are no longer to belong to him. Be as rapid as possible in all these moves.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG

CN—11038
(Imperial Archives)

Imperial Camp, Halle, 20 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I am on the Elbe before Magdeburg. The Prussian army has existed; out of 160,000 men more than 100,000 men have been destroyed, artillery, trains, munitions, stores, all have been taken. I have more than 40,000 prisoners, 400 guns, 1200 caissons, 60 to 80 colors; $\frac{3}{4}$ of the generals have been taken or killed. The Duke of Brunswick has been dangerously wounded by a shrapnel shot in the body. Ruchel died in our lines; Schmettau died in our lines; several princes and brothers of the King have been dangerously wounded. Prince Louis-Ferdinand was the first one killed. The Queen has fled from post to post, pursued by our hussars; I am ignorant of the place to which she has retired. The Prus-

sian cavalry of which you said so much to me is detestable; it is well below the Austrian cavalry. The Prussian troops fought with only mediocre ability. The generals understand nothing about war. Moellendorf, the Prince of Orange and 18 other generals are prisoners on parole. Moellendorf wounded is sick at Erfurt which is in my possession. I have suffered no losses of importance; only one brigadier general has been killed. Give all this information to the Princess Catherine, as I consider her one of the family. I hope that she will take advantage of it. The reserve corps commanded by your brother, Prince Eugene has been beaten at Halle; has lost 5000 men, 4 flags and 30 guns. The Prince himself suffered no injury.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11039
(Imperial Archives)

Halle, 20 October, 1806.

Issue orders to Captain Lamarche to start out with 60 troopers from the 1st Hussars, to proceed independently wherever he thinks best in order to capture hostile individuals. He will send all the prisoners which he will take to Erfurt or Naumburg according to where he will find them. He will also send in all information which comes in his possession.

Send out two other detachments of 60 troopers from the 9th Hussars to scour by patrolling all the territory comprised between the Saale, Magdeburg and ducal Saxony. These patrols should capture a large number of prisoners. Select two intelligent men to command them and who have a desire to distinguish themselves.

After the commanders of these detachments have operated for eight days, and after they note that the roads are free from isolated men, they will approach your headquarters.

They will take care to keep you informed as to where they are, by keeping in correspondence with the commanders of the places who receive the orders of the day, or by means

of officers of other commands who are proceeding to your headquarters.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 13

CN—11040
(WD Files)

Halle, 20 October, 1806.

General Macon, commanding at Leipzig has issued the inclosed proclamation to the bankers, shop-keepers and merchants of that town.* As the oppressors of the seas do not respect any flag, the intention of the Emperor is to everywhere seize their merchandise and to actually blockade them in their island.

Fifteen thousand quintals of flour and many other subsistence stores have been found in the military depots of Leipzig.

The Grand Duke of Berg arrived at Halberstadt on the 19th. On the 20th he covered the entire plain of Magdeburg with his cavalry as far as the effective range of their artillery. The enemy's troops, isolated detachments, men lost, will be captured at the moment when they are about to enter this place.

A regiment of hostile hussars believed that Halberstadt was still occupied by the Prussians; it was charged by the 25th Dragoons and suffered a loss of 350 men.

General Beaumont has taken 600 men of the King's Guard and all the equipment of this corps. Two hours earlier two foot companies of the Guard had been captured by Marshal Soult.

Lieutenant General Count Schmettau, who has been taken prisoner has just died at Weimar.

Therefore of this fine and superb army which a few days past threatened to invade the Confederation of the Rhine and which inspired such confidence in their sovereign that he dared to order the Emperor Napoleon to get out of Germany before the 8th of October, if he did not wish to

*Omitted.

be put out by force; of this fine and superb army we say, nothing but remnants remain, an unformed chaos which merits more the name of a gathering than of an army. Of 160,000 men which the King of Prussia had, it would be difficult to unite more than 50,000; also they are without artillery and without trains, partly armed and partly disarmed.

All these events justified what the Emperor said in his first proclamation when he expressed himself thus: "Let them learn that if it is easy to acquire an increase of territory and of power by friendship with a great people, its enmity is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."*

Nothing more resembles, in fact, the actual conditions of the Prussian army than a shipwreck. It was a fine and numerous fleet which pretended nothing less than to subject the seas: the impetuous winds of the North have raised the ocean against them; nothing returns to port except a small part, which only found safety by using the wrecks.

The letters attached† indicates the true situation of things. Another letter also attached† shows to what points the Russian cabinet was duped by false appearances. It took the moderation of the Emperor Napoleon for weakness. As this monarch did not wish war and did everything possible to avoid it, they concluded that he was incapable of making war, and that he had need of 200,000 conscripts to recruit his army. However, the French army was no longer bound down to the camp of Boulogne; it was in Germany. M. Charles-Louis of Hesse and M. de Haugwitz might have counted on this. Let us recognize here the wish of that Providence who did not allow our enemies eyes to see, ears to hear, judgment or wisdom to reason.

It seems that M. Charles-Louis of Hesse only wished Mayence; why not Metz? why not the other eastern places of France? No longer state that the ambition of the French caused you to take up arms; acknowledge that it was unreasonable ambition which excited you to war. Because there was a French army at Naples, another in Dalmatia, you intended to fall upon the great people, but within seven days your plans were confounded. You wished to attack

*Compare CN—10948, page 246.—C.H.L.

†Omitted.

France without running any danger, and already you have ceased to exist!

It is stated that the Emperor Napoleon, before leaving Paris assembled his ministers, and said to them: "I am innocent of this war; I have not provoked it in any manner; it never entered into my calculation. Let me be beaten if it is my fault; one of the principal reasons for the confidence which I have that my enemies will be destroyed, is that I see the finger of Providence in their conduct, who wishing that traitors be punished, has so far removed wisdom from their counsels, that when in a moment of feebleness they think to attack me they will select the instant when I am strongest."

TO NAPOLEON

M—2594
(WD Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

SIRE:

For fear that my report of yesterday did not reach your Majesty, I hasten to forward a copy.

Five cavalry divisions are in the vicinity of Magdeburg; tomorrow if I have not received orders from your Majesty and if the Governor of Magdeburg whom I have summoned decides not to capitulate I will proceed with four divisions towards Dessau, one division will suffice to observe that place, with both the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney. I have just heard that Marshal Bernadotte has arrived at Aschersleben. I would uselessly lose here precious time without being able to pass, while by my movement I will approach the corps of Marshals Lannes, Augereau and Davout; as well as Berlin or Dresden; and as everything leads to the belief that the bridge at Desseau has not been destroyed, I will take advantage of this to proceed towards the enemy's flank, and I will also be nearer to your Majesty and in better position to carry out his orders. Everything leads to the belief that Magdeburg will capitulate; what is certain is that the army has not assembled there. I hope before tomorrow to have news from GHQ and orders from your Majesty.

In the meantime I have sent General Beaumont to Barby with the 13th Chasseurs and Major Adjutant Girard to seek to surprise the ferry; it would serve well for crossing the infantry. I am, your Majesty, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S.—A message which I have just received informs me that an aide of the Duke of Brunswick has carried off my funds at Werden and Essen.*

TO NAPOLEON

M—2593
(Prince Murat's Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806, 7:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I had the honor to advise your Majesty yesterday of my arrival at Halberstadt and of the position which I have just taken today. I inclose herewith a copy of my report in case your Majesty did not receive the original. If tomorrow I receive no orders, I will seek to assemble as many boats as I can, in order to attempt to cross the Elbe; I will establish my headquarters at † in order to be within reach of GHQ and Marshal Bernadotte. Our light troops appeared this evening under the walls of Magdeburg. It is reported that all the inhabitants begged the King not to expose them to the horrors of a siege and that the King appeared very displeased at this request. I have sent some one to Magdeburg to ascertain if the army actually wishes to attempt the folly of defending itself and of offering battle. The cavalry will this evening be entirely united at Egeln, the 13th Chasseurs at Kalbe and Barby, with an advance guard facing Magdeburg, one regiment at Borne and another at Schwaneberg in liaison with Marshal Soult's corps and Sahuc's division which is occupying Wanzleben. Marshal Soult has requested me to leave this division with him, his

*Werden and Essen are in the Grand Duchy of Berg. It is possible that Vinderderer and Ossen were meant.—F.

†Name not given in original.

request I have granted without hesitation as I have with me four divisions and three regiments of light troops. Tomorrow I will march on Dessau; Marshals Soult and Ney with Sahuc's Dragoon divisions are strong enough. The other army corps are short of cavalry. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

M—2595
(WD Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

The letter which I have just received from you troubles me considerably; I had directed Marshal Ney to receive the prisoners and escort them to France. You had yourself particularly directed him to do so by giving him a new line of communication which he was to reconnoiter, since he had received your special orders in this regard. But what I did not understand is as to not having left a garrison at Erfurt; however I am detaching some dragoon regiments to gather in the prisoners and mop up the territory of Erfurt. All the directions which his Majesty has prescribed will be complied with.

Your affectionate cousin,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2596
(WD Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

SIRE:

It is two hours since I sent two of my aides to your Majesty with my reports; I would be very much afflicted if you did not approve of my conduct. Leaving Erfurt I marched on Langensalza fully decided to vigorously pursue the enemy, which all reports indicated were retiring on Magdeburg. I then determined to march on Nordhausen to gain time and to close the passage of the Hartz. This movement was entirely in accordance with your Majesty's

orders, who had ordered me to maneuver as soon as possible, so as to place myself between Naumbourg and the enemy, and in communication with the corps of Marshals Soult and Davout, which I understood to be that your Majesty desired that I should maneuver so as to be able to place myself in the center of the army and in reach of supporting all its movements with my cavalry; this is what I have done, and today I am in a position to proceed wherever your Majesty desires.

The Duke of Weimar, noting my movement on Nordhausen and Elrich, has marched on Gottingen, and if your Majesty directs one of the corps of Marshals Soult, Ney or myself to proceed via Brunswick on Hanover, it would be impossible for this general to affect his junction with the rest of the army.

I have received a letter from the chief of staff notifying me of your displeasure that the prisoners from Erfurt were recaptured and that the road which they were to follow has not been reconnoitered and that no garrison had been left in that place. Sire, I was far from meriting these reproaches, which I would actually have deserved if the chief of staff had not expressly designated Marshal Ney for this operation. However, I am retaining a copy of the orders which I have given on this subject to Marshal Ney; I have directed him to appoint a commander for this place, to have a return of prisoners made, and to have them conducted to France under a good and strong escort. It was the chief of staff who directed Marshal Ney as to the road that they should follow, he has never written a single word to me about it. I ought however, to be satisfied as Marshal Ney had left the execution of my orders to his chief of staff, General Dutaillis; he had also directed him to provide a sufficient garrison.

As to Generals Klein and Lasalle, I will certainly not try to justify them; their conduct is unexampled; I have already notified them of my displeasure.

Tomorrow morning I will proceed personally to Darby and will ascertain if there is a possibility to assemble means for crossing the Elbe at this point.

I hope to receive during the day tomorrow orders from your Majesty.

Sire, I confess it, having received your Majesty's orders to approach Naumburg, I did not dare to march on Gottingen leaving the entire army without cavalry. During the night I will receive news from Magdeburg. I have sent General Belliard to summon this place and to obtain news of one of my aides who has been taken prisoner there. The object of this inquiry is to obtain certain news of the enemy.

It is generally stated that it is impossible for the Prussian army to reunite; all the regiments are marching mixed up and are not receiving orders from anybody; the soldiers are returning to their homes as we advance through their country. The bailiff here assured me positively that the King of Prussia will place himself at your discretion; already all his orders are disobeyed; the civil authorities are refusing to him all requisitions. I am, sire, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

M—2597
(Prince Murat's Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806.

MY DEAR MARSHAL:

General Belliard has arrived from Madgeburg; he has talked with General Hohenlohe, who he says yet wishes to hazzard a battle. He has plenty of troops outside the town, particularly plenty of cavalry, nevertheless, they are entering into the town which leads me to believe that they have no desire to remain on the left bank of the Elbe.

I have received orders to proceed to Kalbe with my cavalry, I leave you Sahuc's divisions, and Klein's division to Marshal Ney, who will attach three regiments to beat up the country about Nordhausen, Erfurt and Mulhausen.

I presume that you will receive in the message being sent you, instructions to prevent the Duke of Weimar's corps from entering Magdeburg and that you will support your left by your light troops on the Elbe. Please advise me this evening, of your position, I will notify you as to mine. It seems to be impossible that the enemy closes in as he has been can still risk a battle.

MURAT.

P.S.—The Emperor desires that Marshal Ney shall arrange with you to prevent Magdeburg from sending detachments to your rear or to your left, to cut off the retreat of the Duke of Weimar who is attempting to enter that place; finally it is necessary to drive the enemy against the Elbe. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL NEY

M—2598
(Prince Murat's Files)

Egeln, 20 October, 1806.

MARSHAL:

I am proceeding to Kalbe with my cavalry, however I am leaving one dragoon division with Marshal Soult, and with you General Klein's division, from which you will detach three regiments under command of a brigadier general; you will send them towards Nordhausen with directions to beat up the country about Erfurt, Mulhausen, Langensalza and gather in all prisoners who have escaped; this is ordered by the Emperor. I am advised by the chief of staff that you did not leave a garrison at Erfurt, and that the prisoners under escort were recaptured by a detachment of 200 hussars. As I had asked you to take all necessary measures for the safety of both that place and the prisoners, I am much displeased at this accident.

You will arrange with Marshal Soult both in regard to Magdeburg and as to forming detachments to proceed to the rear and to your left, to seek to capture all those who are still attempting to reach that place. Finally it is absolutely necessary to drive the enemy across the Elbe. If you have positive news of the Duke of Weimar and if you are able to cut off his retreat and capture him, it must be done, unless you have contrary orders from the Emperor. Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.



Positions on the Evening of October 20th 1806
 PRUSSIANS □ FRENCH ■

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

CN—11041
(WD Files)*Halle, 21 October, 1806.*

The Emperor, Marshal, directs me to write to you that he is displeased that you have not carried out the order which you received to proceed yesterday to Kalbe to throw a bridge across at the mouth of the Saale or at Barby. His Majesty who is very angry that you have not carried out his orders, reminds you that you were not found present at the battle of Jena, that this might have compromised the fate of the army and prevented the important combinations of his Majesty, and rendered this battle more doubtful and more bloody than would otherwise have been the case. Although the Emperor was profoundly affected by this, he has not wished to speak to you about it, because remembering your former services, he feared to hurt your feelings; and these considerations led him to keep silent. But in this circumstances where you did not proceed to Kalbe, and where you have not attempted crossing the Elbe, either at Barby or at the mouth of the Saale, the Emperor has decided to state to you his opinion of this, because he is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed by vain ideas of command.

The Emperor, Marshal, also directs me to speak to you on a less grave matter: that is, that in spite of the order which you received yesterday, you have not yet sent here three companies for conveying your prisoners. There remain 3500 of these at Halle without any escort. The Emperor, Marshal, orders you to send at once a staff officer with three full companies, forming 300 men, to take charge of all the prisoners which are at Halle and conduct them to Erfurt. Only the Imperial Guard remains here, and the Emperor does not wish them to convoy prisoners belonging to your army corps.

It is 9:00 o'clock and there is no longer any question as to the three companies which I asked of you yesterday.

By command of the Emperor,

MAL. BERTHIER.

TO THE ELECTOR OF SAXONY

CN—11042

(Imperial Archives)

Imperial Camp at Halle, 21 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have received the letter of your Serene Electoral Highness. The esteem which I bear to him is equal to the desire which I have to see as soon as possible relations of peace reestablished and consolidated between us. Within two or three days, I will appoint a minister for this purpose to discuss the matter with a person which your Highness will have designated. In the meanwhile I have ordered hostilities to cease, and I therefore request him on his side to please direct that all his troops be withdrawn from the Prussian army. Your Highness cannot doubt the pleasure which I will have in seeing him and in making his acquaintance together with that of the Electrice.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11043

(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 21 October, 1806.

If you have not crossed at Barby, cross the Elbe at the bridge of Dessau; the bridge has been burned but it has been repaired. I go tonight to Wittenberg. The corps of Marshal Davout has crossed there; the bridge was in good condition; the corps of Marshal Lannes crossed at Dessau.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

D.122.1

(Prince Murat's Files)

Barby, 21 October, 1806.

DEAR PRINCE:

I have arrived at Barby, and am in the midst of the Saxon army, which is withdrawing from the Prussian army

and has refused to re-cross the Elbe. It has orders from its Court to treat the French as friends and to return to Saxony. I have the honor to forward to your Imperial Highness the letter which General Setschvitz wrote to General Beaumont in which is included a copy of one from his Highness the chief of staff. As Barby is occupied by Saxon troops, I have posted myself with the squadron in rear of the town, awaiting orders from your Imperial Highness. * * * * *

GIRARD.

TO GENERAL GIRARD*

M—2599

(Prince Murat's Files)

I am in receipt of your letter and of the copy of the one of the Saxon General; I would much like to believe that his majesty the Emperor and the King have agreed that the Electoral troops shall return to Saxony and certainly it is far from me to wish to object, but as I have no information as to such an arrangement, you will advise the Saxon General that I am ordering troops to Barby, which after they have arrived there, I wish that he would cross the Saale and occupy Gross-Rosenburg, which will always be along his road. Advise him of my intention and of the pleasure that I feel in seeing peace established between us. Prepare quarters for me at Barby; assemble boats, intercept communication along the Elbe, seize Schonebeck and try to send some one to the right bank of the Elbe towards Magdeburg in order to ascertain what the Prussians are doing and whether they are retiring.

MURAT.

*This letter is undated, it appears to have been written 21 October, 1806.—P.L.B.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

M—2600

(Prince Murat's Files)

Kalbe, 21 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I hasten to inform you that I have established my headquarters at Kalbe, and that I had Barby occupied yesterday by the 13th Chasseurs. I have at that point at my disposal a ferry boat with a capacity of 40 horses. Undoubtedly I will obtain another one at Schonebeck, I understand that from here we can go to Barby where I have sent a dragoon brigade with artillery to intercept the navigation of the Elbe, and assemble there as many boats as possible, with a view to crossing at that point, should such be the wish of the Emperor. Please advise me whether it is true that there is an armistice or any arrangement with the Saxons, and if you have received instructions as to this. Please let me know in order that I may decide what I should do with those Saxons which are at Barby with my troops.

It would be very kind of you to inform me as to the position of your troops and those of Marshal Lannes. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2601

(WD Files)

Kalbe, 21 October, 1806.

SIRE :

As I have already had the honor to advise your Majesty ; I have proceeded to Kalbe. My movement was fortunately in accordance with your intentions. The 13th Chasseurs arrived yesterday at Barby where I have a ferry boat capable of holding 40 horses, I have another one here which I will have sent on, and I am hoping to capture one at Schoenbeck.

The three cavalry divisions are located as follows: Beaumont at Muhlingen, two regiments at Barby with artillery to intercept navigation on the Elbe. Nansouty is at

Kalbe and D'Hautpoul at Glothe, with Lasalle at Atzendorf with detachments toward Magdeburg. The 13th Chasseurs at Schoenbeck is occupying Frohse.

I have ordered General Belliard to report to your Majesty; he will advise you as to his visit to Prince Hohenlohe. I have sent a sure person to the right bank of the Elbe towards Magdeburg to ascertain if the enemy is retiring, as it is impossible to think that he wishes to defend Magdeburg and offer you a second victory like Ulm.

I am proceeding immediately with the Prince of Pontecorvo for Barby, where we will make a reconnaissance to ascertain whether it is possible to throw across a bridge, and what material can be obtained at that town.

I have the honor to remain, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2602
(WD Files)

Kalbe, 21 October, 1806, 6:30 P.M.

SIRE:

I have arrived at Barby; already several boats have been obtained. The Saxons are assembled here; they are to proceed to Bernburg tomorrow; I have seen quite a fine regiment of Hussars.

Some Saxons which left Magdeburg at 10:00 A.M. today state that all of the remnants of the army are assembled under the artillery of that place on both banks and that they are re-organizing; this morning 2 loaded boats were captured in my presence which were going to Magdeburg; I have given orders to allow nothing to pass.

I have received the order to proceed as promptly as possible toward Dessau, I will be there tomorrow evening. But I have no need of an explanation as this order states "with all the cavalry" while this morning I received an order to leave two divisions with Marshals Soult and Ney. I beg your Majesty to advise me whether his order relates only to my three divisions or the five divisions; I have time

to receive your Majesty's order. In any case three divisions and three regiments of light troops will be tomorrow at an early hour at Dessau. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2603
(Prince Murat's Files)

Dessau, 21 October, 1806, 8:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I received the order which your Majesty sent me. I have just come from the bridge, I am assured it will be ready within four or five hours. I will cross as soon as it is finished. I hope to be tomorrow evening at your Headquarters with the greater part of my cavalry, the balance will be close by. The weather is frightful. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL CAMBACERES

CN—11044
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have crossed the Elbe. All affairs are going fine. The King of Prussia, his entire army and the Prussian nation cry loudly for peace.

I will probably be at Berlin within a few days. I have remarked that the same day when you made your statement to the Senate I won the great fight of Jena.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL TALLEYRAND

CN—11045
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

Monsieur the Prince of Benevento, I believe that as soon as you are sure that Marshal Mortier has arrived at

Fulda with his army corps, there will be no objection for you to proceed to Erfurt and from there to Wittenberg and Berlin.

Immediately after the battle, the King of Prussia sent me an aide with a letter. Today he sent me the Marquis of Lucchesini. I have had him stopped at the outposts and have sent Duroc to see what he wants. I am awaiting his return. The King seems to me to have decided to arrange everything; I will do so; but they will not prevent me from going to Berlin where I think I will be within four or five days.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11046
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

An assistant inspector will be sent into the territory of Brunswick with a patrol of dragoons to take possession of it. The arms of the Duke will be everywhere removed and his soldiers disarmed. Seals will be placed on his chests, and this country will be treated as a conquest. If the Duke is found there he will be made a prisoner, together with all his officers, and they will be sent to France, except the Duke if he is sick, who will be treated with all the respect due to a wounded general.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11047
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

At whatever place you cross the Elbe, advance as rapidly as possible on Treuenbrietzen to march on Berlin. I assume that today you will be at Dessau or in line with Dessau; that by evening of the 23d you will not be far from the point which I designated to you. Nevertheless do not wear out your horses. I have ordered that all the Prussian cavalry shall be dismounted. I have left 1000 men dismounted with Oudinot to take them; if there are more than

1000 horses, each man will take two or three. My intention is that these will march to Wittenberg where they will be organized.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11048
(Imperial Archives)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

I received your letter of the 14th; that was the day of the battle of Jena. The Prince of Wurtemberg is not in front of us; he was attacked and defeated at Halle; half of his command has been captured. I have sent you by an officer via Mayence, instructions for your advance on Goettingen and for occupying all the northern Prussian territories. Send me the tables of organization of your army corps, to which I add a detachment of nearly 12,000 men. I have advised you that it will be necessary to divide the corps into two divisions; let me know their organization and the day when they will arrive on the Weser. The Prussians have not 1500 men in the garrison of Nienburg on the Weser. I believe that at Hameln they have only what is necessary for the garrison.

The corps which is at Paris will not take 12 days in going to Holland; if it should be necessary they will take but four days and will proceed by truck. I have had proceed in this manner from Paris to Mayence, which is much further, a detachment of 8000 men in four days. Prussia asks for forced peace; its army is destroyed; I have crossed the Elbe; I will be at Berlin in three days.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—11049
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Your three regiments of light infantry and the two Italian regiments should have arrived by this time; you

should also have twelve or eighteen guns and be in position at Fulda. As soon as you will have arrived there, send me your return by one of the aides, in order that I may send you instructions as to your further operations.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL CLARKE AT ERFURT

CN—11052
(Imperial Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

I wish that you would send me a return of prisoners taken and of those who have been re-captured by hostile parties. Advise me of the exact moment when the corps of Marshal Mortier commences to arrive at Fulda. I have ordered him to move his advance guard to Eisenach. Issue all orders and take all measures necessary so that the artillery, arms, ammunition, of Weimar, and those which have been salvaged from the battle fields, be assembled at Erfurt. I have sent you the 14th Infantry to reinforce your garrison; but you ought to understand the need I have for this regiment. As soon as Marshal Mortier shall have arrived, and my rear areas are quiet, and as soon as this regiment is no longer necessary, return it quickly to Wittenberg. I have directed several chasseurs and hussar patrols to patrol your neighborhood. It is desirable that when these are no longer necessary you send them also to Wittenberg. Write me every day advising me of what is going on in the rear areas.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 14

CN—11053
(WD Files)

Dessau, 22 October, 1806.

Marshal Davout arrived on the 20th at Wittenberg, and surprised the bridge over the Elbe at the very moment when the enemy was setting fire to it.

Marshal Lannes has arrived at Dessau; the bridge was burned; he has started work to repair it with material found on the ground.

The Marquis of Lucchesini has arrived at the outposts with a letter from the King of Prussia. The Emperor has sent the Grand Marshal of his Palace, Duroc, to confer with him.

Magdeburg is blockaded. Major General Legrand during his march on Magdeburg has taken some prisoners. Marshal Soult has posts around the town. The Grand Duke of Berg has sent there his chief of staff, General Belliard. This general saw here Prince Hohenlohe. The tone of the Prussian officers has considerably changed; they are loudly demanding peace: "What does your Emperor want," they say to us, "constantly to pursue us with his bayonets at our heels? We have not had a moment's rest since the battle." These gentlemen have been undoubtedly accustomed to the maneuvers of the Seven Years' War. They wished to ask three days to bury the dead. "Think of the living," the Emperor replied, "and leave to us the interment of the dead; there is no necessity for a truce for this."

Great confusion exists in Berlin; all the good citizens trembling at the false direction given to the politics of their states rightly reproach the agitators excited by England as being responsible for the sad condition to which they have been reduced. There has been only one cry against the Queen in the whole country.

It seems that the enemy is seeking to rally in rear of the Oder.

The sovereign of Saxony has thanked the Emperor for the generosity with which he has been treated, and which seeks to withdraw him from Prussian influence. Nevertheless a considerable number of his soldiers have perished in this fighting.

GHQ was at Dessau on the 21st.

DECREE

CN—11054
(Imperial Archives)

Imperial GHQ, Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

PART I

ARTICLE 1.—All the Prussian territories situated between the Rhine and the Elbe will be taken possession of in our name.

ARTICLE 2.—The Prussian eagles will be everywhere removed; palaces, depots and public moneys will be sequestered, revenues taken in will be for our account.

ARTICLE 3.—The territories of the Duke of Brunswick and of the Prince of Orange will be taken possession of. The arms of these princes will be removed, seals placed on the palaces, moneys, depots, and revenues taken in will be for our account.

Guns, muskets and all arsenals will be placed at the disposition of the general commanding the French artillery. The Generals, officers, and soldiers of these princes will be made prisoners of war and sent to France.

A declaration will be made that these territories will not be returned to the possession of these princes.

ARTICLE 4.—The territories of Hanover, and Osnabruck will be taken possession of in the same manner as mentioned above.

ARTICLE 5.—The King of Holland will take possession on his own account, of the territory of East-Frise and of the territory belonging to Russia situated at the mouth of the river.

PART II

MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE 1.—*First Government.* Major General Loison is appointed Governor of the territories of Marck, Munster, Tecklenburg and Osnabruck. He will reside at Munster; he will attend to the execution of the requirements of this decree. He will have for these territories an inspector or sub-inspector, a quartermaster who will be designated by M. Daru, Quartermaster General of the Grand

Army, and who will have charge of all matters relating to finances. This inspector or sub-inspector will correspond with chief inspector Villemanzy, and will have a cashier appointed by M. de la Bouillerie, receiver general of contributions of the Grand Army.

ARTICLE 2.—*Second Government.* Major General Goibert is appointed governor of the territories of Minden, Ravensberg, Lippe, the bishopric of Paderborn; he will reside at Minden. He will have a quartermaster and a cashier, as prescribed above in Article 1.

ARTICLE 3.—*Third Government.* Major General Bisson is appointed governor of the territories of Brunswick, Hildesheim, the principality of Halberstadt, the towns of Goslar, Eichsfeld, Muhlhausen; he will be at Brunswick. This government will be organized as prescribed in Article 1.

ARTICLE 4.—*Fourth Government.* General Thiebault is appointed Governor of the territories of Fulda. This government will be organized as indicated above.

ARTICLE 5.—*Fifth Government.* Major General Clarke is appointed Governor of the territory of Erfurt and all other detached parts belonging to Prussia and located within the territory of Saxony. The government will have the same organization as the preceding ones. General Clarke will reside at Erfurt.

PART III

MILITARY FORCES

ARTICLE 1.—*First Government.* One company, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, brought up to the strength of 100 men will proceed to Munster as the governor's guard; one company 5th Chasseurs, 90 men dismounted, will also proceed to Munster. The General and the quartermaster will take measures to quickly mount and equip these 90 men; they will also procure trains and equipment for 2 8-pounder guns and their caissons which they will draw from the park at Erfurt.

ARTICLE 2.—*Second Government.* One company, 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 100 strong, and one company 12th

Chasseurs, 90 dismounted men, will proceed to Minden as the governor's guard.

ARTICLE 3.—*Third Government.* One company, 3d Battalion, 88th Infantry, 100 strong, and one company 1st Hussars, 90 dismounted men will proceed to Brunswick as the governor's guard.

ARTICLE 4.—*Fourth Government.* One company, 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, 100 strong, and one company 3d Hussars, will proceed to Fulda as the governor's guard.

ARTICLE 5.—*Fifth Government.* One company, 3d Battalion, 64th Infantry, 100 strong, and one company 2d Hussars, 90 strong, not mounted, will proceed to Erfurt as governor's guard.

ARTICLE 6.—The requirements given in Article 1 apply to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 above. They will be furnished from the troops of the Duke of Cleves, 200 men at Munster, 300 at Minden, and 500 at Brunswick, also for the governor's guard.

ARTICLE 7.—M. Moncey, Inspector General of Military Police will appoint five majors of the military police to take charge of the police in each of these five governments. He will have them accompanied: that of the first government by 4 squads of mounted military police; that of the second government, by 6; that of the 3d, by 8; that of the 4th, by 2; that of the 5th by 2 mounted squads, each consisting of six men taken from the reserve companies of the interior zone.

ARTICLE 8.—Governors will report daily to the chief of staff whatever concerns military conditions and the general police.

The quartermaster of each government will report daily to M. Villemanzy, Chief Inspector, everything relating to finances.

ARTICLE 9.—Our minister of war, chief of staff of the army, is charged with the execution of this decree.

NAPOLÉON.

DECREE

CN—11055
(WD Files)

Imperial GHQ, Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

ARTICLE 1.—The provinces conquered in the electorate of Saxony will be divided into four departments each of which will be turned over for administrative purposes to a French quartermaster under the orders of the Quartermaster General.

ARTICLE 2.—The first department will consist of the country of Thuringia, Schwarzburg, Stolberg and Mansfeld, the principality of Querfurt, the bishoprics of Merseburg and Zeitz-Naumburg, the townships of Voigtland and Neustadt, and the duchies of Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Saxe-Coburg, Hildburghausen, and Meinungen. The capital of this department will be Naumburg.

The second department will consist of the township of Leipzig; Leipzig will be its capital.

The third department will consist of the electoral township; the town of Wittenberg will be its capital.

The fourth department will consist of the township of Misnie and Erzgebirge and the mountains. Dresden will be its capital.

ARTICLE 3.—The following quartermasters are appointed for these departments:

for the 1st: M. Villain, sub-inspector;

for the 2d: M. Trielhard, auditor for the state counsel;

for the 3d: M. Coutelle, sub-inspector;

for the 4th: M. Dumolart, auditor for the state counsel.

ARTICLE 4.—The Quartermaster General is charged with the execution of this decree.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11056
(Imperial Files)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

Issue orders to M. de Thiard to assume command of Dresden. He will proceed by the left bank of the Elbe, join the head of the Bavarian Division and enter the town with it. He will take care to maintain good discipline in the city of Dresden. He will issue orders that the greatest respect will be given to the Elector and his family. He will take possession of the arsenal and of all the depots of powder and war materiel, announcing that all this is necessary as war measures. We are not at all at peace with the Elector; we have been at war, we are under armistice conditions. All stores of salt, shoes, cloth, harness, war munitions, remounts, will belong to the army as war materiel of which the Elector has no need. General Songis will send an artillery officer to take possession of the artillery and to assign it suitably to the interests of the army. General Chasseloup will send an engineer officer to reconnoiter the place.

My intention is to assemble all the Allied troops in Dresden. The 1st Division which will enter there tomorrow, consists only of 6000 men; the 2d consisting of 8000 men should not be late in arriving; the 3d consisting of 10,000 Wurtembergers will arrive within eight days. Quarters will be prepared for all of these troops. The guard of the palace will be left to the guard corps and the guards of the Elector. It is necessary that the Elector should not have at Dresden more than 400 mounted men and 1200 or 1500 infantry; if he has more there, the surplus should return to their ordinary garrisons.

If it appears that there is a spirit of resistance at Dresden, the arrival of the 2d column will be awaited in order to be more absolutely certain of being master. These instructions will be given to Prince Jerome and to the commandant of the place; both of them will correspond with the chief of staff.

There should be plenty of formality, plenty of regular proceedings, plenty of pleasant notes; but in reality seize

everything, especially means for war, under pretext that the Elector does not need them any more.

Prince Jerome will send out in advance of the 2d column to ascertain the day when it will arrive as well as the Wurtemberg column.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11057
(WD Files)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

General Chasseloup will tomorrow designate a suitable place within the city, where ten ovens can be constructed. This place should be near the subsistence depot, which should be able to contain one million rations of flour. The quartermaster general will have these ovens constructed from local material, and will appoint a depot quartermaster to organize the depot and his transportation.

General Chasseloup will designate a place for a forage depot which should be sufficient to contain 600,000 bushels. He will designate a place for the arsenal, within reach of a place where the caissons and other park wagons can be placed. The general of artillery will have his forges set up at this place, will stock his ammunition and park his wagons.

General Chasseloup will designate a place for a powder magazine and for a workshop; this place should be within the town. The general of artillery will have all his powder deposited at this place.

The general of artillery will have 30 to 40 siege guns, with carriages, platforms, etc., brought up from Dresden to arm the place. The Bavarians will be at Dresden the day after tomorrow.

The artillery will have made from local material fuses, gabions, for constructing the batteries, surrounding the town.

The space between the town and the river will be closed as soon as possible with palisades, in addition to such ditches, parapets and other works which the engineers con-

sider necessary. The general of engineers will take measures to procure a large quantity of pine palisades, which should be easy by utilizing all the trains on the Elbe and those which are further up. Barriers will be constructed in front of the gates with the least possible delay. In place of drawbridges which will take too long to make, bridges on trestles will be constructed, which in case of need can be promptly knocked down.

One hundred thousand francs will be locally placed at the disposal of the engineers; he will procure at least 5000 to 6000 laborers for these works, to allow water to enter the ditches, repair all the parapets, clear all the scarps, etc.

The topographical engineers will map the vicinity of the place to a distance of 1200 fathoms; and the terrain on the left bank of the Elbe to 1200 fathoms from the bridge.

General Chasseloup will designate a place for the park, for vehicles of the Breidt Company and another for the army trains, in such manner that the square shall be free for movements of troops. These two places may be within the space between the town and river.

He will designate a place suitable for containing 1200 to 1500 prisoners so that we may know where to put them as soon as they arrive.

Measures will be taken to place four lights on the bridge and street lights in the town so that it will be perfectly lighted during the night especially about the square; the lighting will be at the expense of the city.

General Chasseloup will designate two places; one for a hospital with a capacity for 500 or 600 wounded, another for the same number of sick.

He will designate six houses as depots for each of the six army corps. Each of these places must be able to contain 200 men.

The chief of staff will notify Paris, Mayence, Wurtzbourg, Kronach, and Erfurt that everything that is to be sent to the army, no matter for what corps, should be directed to Wittenberg, where men traveling individually, coming from hospital or detachments, will assemble to the depot of their army corps established in this town. There they will be inspected by the governor; furnished with arms if they have

none, provided with cartridges and sent to their corps under orders from the chief of staff, and in accordance with situation returns which will be furnished.

Orders will be immediately given to the six marshals commanding the six army corps and to the Duke of Berg, commanding the reserve; to send to Wittenberg exhausted men and those in need of rest. Each army corps will appoint a staff officer, who will be billeted with the depot of each corps and will look after the supply and discipline of his depot. All the slightly wounded of the army will be sent to Wittenberg, where they will remain for such necessary number of days as to perfectly reestablish their health. His Majesty expects in consequence that commencing tomorrow, there will be no more stragglers, and that all lame or exhausted men will be sent to the depot at Wittenberg for rest.

There will be a printing establishment at Wittenberg, and French proof-readers will remain there to print whatever may be necessary for the service of the army.

The chief of staff will send a copy of this order to the generals of the artillery and the engineers, to the Quartermaster general, to the governor of the city, and will place in orders such matter as is proper.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GHQ

MN—303a

Hq VI Corps, 23 October, 1806.

I have summoned Lt. General Kleist, the Governor of Magdeburg to surrender; he has replied negatively. General Wartensleben, sent to this Governor by the King of Prussia, privately told Colonel Lefol, the bearer of my summons, that he hoped to bring reason to bear on General Kleist, if a few shells were fired at his fort. M. Kleist has in addition given his word not to attempt to interfere with the operations of the French army, provided that movements are made beyond the range of his artillery.

NEY.

TO NAPOLEON

MN—295

Hq VI Corps, 26 October, 1806.

Marshal Ney and all of the VI Army Corps were indignant at finding incendiarism and pillage wherever they went; these disorders were caused by the Reserve Cavalry and the IV Corps, who preceded us.

I am telling you the truth and will say it again.

The soldiers and many of the officers complained, that having received no rations or pay, they have attempted to obtain these wherever they could; they still state that they will take the allowance promised by the Emperor. * * *

Marshal Ney wishes to make a reputation for his troops and avoid all pretext for disorders and excesses. * * *

Although this was not altogether possible, and in view of the fact that he had nothing but promises to give his troops, he has maintained order, and the city of Erfurt as well as that of Halberstadt owe their protection to the VI Corps.

DUTAILLIS,
Chief of Staff.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2604
(WD Files)

Bossdorf, 23 October, 1806, 3:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to report to your Majesty that I will stop tonight at Treuenbrietzen, together with Generals Lasalle, Beaumont and the 13th Mounted Chasseurs. General Nansouty will be tonight at Bossdorf and General D'Hautpoul at Verkau; and tomorrow in compliance with orders which I have received from the chief of staff, I hope to be at Potsdam, where I beg your Majesty to send me his orders.

The bridge will be finished this morning, but I should advise your Majesty that it is not yet sufficiently strong to remain as it is. I even fear but that some accident may oc-

cur during the artillery crossing. Tomorrow if the Marshals who have preceded me have not yet thrown troops on the Magdeburg road, I will have this road intercepted.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11058
(WD Files)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

If the detachments of light troops, Marshal, which you have not failed to send out along the road from Dresden and along the Spree assure you that you have no hostile force on your flanks, you will direct your march in such manner as to be able to enter Berlin at noon on the 25th of this month.

You will report on Brigadier General Hullin as a commandant for Berlin. You will leave one regiment to be selected by you for routine duties. You will send detachments of light cavalry along the roads to Custrin, Landsberg and Frankfurt-on-the-Oder.

You will place your army corps at the distance of a league or a league and a half from Berlin, with the right resting on the Spree and the left on the road to Landsberg. You will select for your headquarters a country house along the Custrin road, in rear of your command. As the Emperor intends to allow his troops several days' rest, you will have some shelter erected out of wood and straw. Generals, general staff officers, colonels and others will be billeted in villages in rear of the divisions; nobody in Berlin. The artillery will be posted in positions to protect the camp; the artillery horses on picket lines and everything in a most military manner. You will have cut, that is to say, intercept, as soon as possible, navigation of the Spree by a strong obstacle, so as to stop all boats coming from Berlin towards the Oder. GHQ will be at Potsdam tomorrow; send one of your aides to inform me where you will be on the night of the 23d-24th, and that of the 24th-25th.

If Prince Ferdinand is found in Berlin, have him complimented and grant him a guard with complete exemption from billeting.

Have published an order for disarmament, allowing only 600 militia for the police of the city. The arms of the people will be transported to a designated place to be at the disposition of the army.

Announce to your army corps that the Emperor in making them the first to enter Berlin is giving them a proof of his satisfaction for the fine conduct they exhibited at the battle of Jena.

Take care that all trains, and especially that disgraceful tail seen following divisions, stops two leagues from Berlin and rejoins the camp without going through the capital by using a road to the right. Finally, Marshal, make your entry in the greatest order by divisions, each division having its artillery and marching at one hour intervals from the others.

The soldiers once arrived in camp, take care that only one-third go to town, in such manner that there will always be two-thirds in camp. As his Majesty intends to make his entry in Berlin, you may provisionally receive the keys, informing the magistrates at the same time that they will nevertheless surrender them again to the Emperor when he makes his entry. But you must always require the magistrates and prominent people to come and receive you at the gate of the city with all the usual formalities. See that all your officers are in their best uniforms, as far as circumstances permit. The intention of the emperor is that you should make your entry by the Dresden high road.

The Emperor will probably billet at the Charlottenburg palace; issue orders that everything may be prepared there.

There is a small stream which flows into the Spree about one and one-half or two leagues from Berlin and which cuts the road at the villages of Marzahn and Biesdorf; see if that makes a good position which can be occupied.

If on the contrary, you have information concerning the enemy you will at once inform the Emperor and you will slow up your movements.

LE MAL. BERTHIER.

ORDERS

CN—11059
(Imperial Archives)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

Orderly officer Castille will proceed without delay to Marshal Davout. He will enter Berlin, proceed to the arsenal, to the drill halls, to the depots, take note of everything that may be there as to artillery and munitions, also as to the times when these have been evacuated. He will return to report to me along the Potsdam road.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

CN—11060
(Imperial Archives)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

I have received your letter. I am not in the habit of complaining about the past, since that is without remedy. Your army corps was not present on the field of battle, and for this reason I might have been very angry. Nevertheless, after a very precise order you should have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal exits of the Saale, on the same day that Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In view of your failure to have carried out these dispositions I caused you to be informed during the night that if you were still at Naumburg, you should march towards Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumburg when this order arrived; it was communicated to you* and nevertheless you preferred to make a false march to return to Dornburg, and in consequence you were not present at the battle and Marshal Davout supported the principal efforts of the hostile army. All this is certainly very unfortunate. Circumstances have since arisen which have given you an opportunity to show your zeal; there will be others also and you will be able to give proof of your talents and of your attachment to me.

NAPOLEON.

*See B—421a, page 337.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—11061
(Imperial Archives)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

You will find inclosed herewith a note which my minister or my charge d'affaires is to present. You will send it to him by one of your aides, with directions to present it when you are a short march away from Cassel.

After arriving at Cassel, you will have all arms and artillery sent to Mayence; you will disarm all the troops and you will seize the colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors and captains as hostages; whom you will send under a good and sure escort to the citadel of Luxemburg.

If the Prince of Hesse-Cassel and the Hereditary Prince remain, you will make both of them prisoners of war, and you will send them under a good and sure escort to Metz, where they will be billeted in the palace in that town. You will allow the wife and children to do as they please. The Prince of Hesse-Cassel and the Hereditary Prince will be arrested as Prussian Generals. Immediately afterwards you will have the arms of Hesse-Cassel removed. You will occupy Hanau. You will place seals on the funds and depots. You will appoint Major General Legrand, Governor of the territory. You will have the revenues taken in and justice administered in my name. Secrecy and rapidity, these are your greatest means of success. I leave you free to advance on Fulda or via Eisenach. Today is the 23d: calculating that you can arrive on the 28th, 29th or 30th, you should have under your orders two divisions of 4000 men each.

The advance guard of the Army of the North should be in march from Wesel to Goettingen, where it should be the 26th or 27th. This advance guard consists of 10,000 men. If you consider it necessary you will find herewith an order for its commanding general. It will enter via Paderborn or Goettingen according to the place where this order reaches it. After the troops are disarmed, if Hanau wishes to resist you will have some guns and mortars brought up from Mayence, and at once commence to besiege it.

My intention is that the House of Hesse-Cassel has ceased to reign, and is removed from the number of powers.

The 1st Italian infantry, 1000 men, arrives at Mayence

the 26th; it can therefore be at Fulda on the 29th. The 1st Italian Light Infantry arrives November 10th; it could be used for the siege of Hanau.

If there are still troops from the contingent of Darmstadt, and of the Prince of Nassau, you may ask for them to increase your forces. I think that Hesse-Cassel has not more than 500 or 600 men assembled; still if you think it necessary to have assistance from the advance guard of the army of the North, it will be sufficient, I believe, to have one division via Paderborn or via Goettingen. At Mayence are numerous dismounted cavalry detachments; organize a thousand chasseurs, hussars and dragoons dismounted with their guns; this will make a reinforcement for your forces, and you will issue to them the horses of the Hessian cavalry, which will mount all of these men.

I count on your activity and quickness in this operation. You will issue a proclamation demanding quiet from the entire country, and I much wish that before the 5th of November your corps, less those necessary for police of the country, be available to proceed to Hanover; I will issue you my orders from here at that time. As soon as you no longer have use for the division of the Army of the North, you will send it to Goettingen. I assume that the King of Holland has remained at Wesel, if he has marched with the advance guard, you will arrange all your movements by agreement with this Prince. The idea of your operations is not to allow any Hessian corps to be organized and to disorganize all of them, because if one or two regiments are formed and attack our lines of communications, it will always be a matter of embarrassment. In such a case you will pursue them until you have destroyed them. You will have the note of my minister printed in the country in French and in German.

You will also publish the inclosed proclamation.

You will recommend to General Legrand to correspond daily with the chief of staff. An inspector will be sent with the title and duties of a quartermaster. Announce that any who retain arms after the order for disarmament has been published will be shot.

NAPOLEON.

FIRST ENCLOSURE TO PRECEDING

CN—11062
(WD Files)

NOTE:—Delivered to the Court of Cassel, 31st October.

The undersigned, charge d'affairs of H.M. the Emperor and King of Italy, is ordered to announce to his Serene Highness the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, Marshal in the Prussian Service, that H.M. the Emperor is completely informed as to the adhesion of the court of Cassel with the coalition of Prussia; that in consequence of this adhesion men on six months' furlough have been called back, horses issued to the cavalry, Hanau provisioned and completely provided with a garrison;

That it is in vain that his Majesty informed M. de Malsburg, Minister of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel at Paris, that any mobilization on the part of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel would be regarded as an act of hostility; that in reply, the Court of Hesse-Cassel ordered M. de Malsburg to demand his passports at Paris and return to Cassel;

That afterwards Prussian troops entered Cassel; that they were there enthusiastically received by the Hereditary Prince, a general in the service of Prussia, who even marched across town at their head;

That these troops crossed all the territory of Hesse-Cassel to attack the French army at Francfort;

That immediately afterwards the plan of campaign of the French army developing, the Prussian generals felt the need to recall all their detachments in order to concentrate at Weimar and offer battle;

That therefore through military events, and not through the neutralization of Hesse, the Prussian troops retired to their places of assembly;

That during the entire time that the fate of the campaign was uncertain the court of Cassel continued its mobilization, constantly opposed to my declaration to the effect that all mobilization would be considered an act of hostility;

That the Prussian armies having been beaten and driven beyond the Oder, it would be as imprudent as without sense for the commander of the French army to allow this

Hessian army to form which would be ready to follow in the rear of French army should it suffer a check;

Therefore the undersigned has received the express order to announce that the safety of the French army requires that Hanau, and the entire territory of Hesse-Cassel be occupied; that the arms, artillery, arsenals, be turned over to the French army and that all measures be taken to assure the rear of the army against the constant hostility which has been shown against France by the House of Hesse-Cassel.

It remains to the Prince of Hesse-Cassel to decide under these circumstances if he wishes to meet force with force and bring upon his country disasters of war. At the same time as this would be incompatible with my political mission, the undersigned has received orders to demand his passports and withdraw immediately.

SECOND ENCLOSURE TO CN—11061

CN—11063
(WD Files)

PROCLAMATION

(To be published at Cassel, 1st November)

People of Hesse: I have just taken possession of your country. It is the only means to avoid bringing upon you the horrors of war.

You have been witnesses of the violation of your territory by the Prussian troops. You have been scandalized by the reception given to them by the Hereditary Prince. Besides your sovereign and his son being officers in the service of Prussia, were under the obligation of obeying the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army. His duty as sovereign, is incompatible with that of an officer in the service of a power depending on foreign tribunals.

Your religion, laws, habits and privileges, will be respected; order will be maintained. On your side remain quiet. Have confidence in the great sovereign on whom your fate depends. You cannot meet anything except an improvement of conditions.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 15

CN—11064
(WD Files)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

The following shows the information which has been obtained as to the causes of this strange war:

General Schmettau (who died a prisoner at Weimar) made a memorandum return with a great deal of force, in which he showed that the Prussian army ought to regard itself as dishonored, that it was in a condition to beat the French, and that it was necessary to make war. Generals Ruchel (killed) and Blucher (who only saved himself by subterfuge, by abusing the good faith of the French) subscribed this memorandum, which was in the form of a petition to the King. Prince Louis-Ferdinand of Prussia (killed) supported this by all kinds of sarcasms. Everyone went crazy. The Duke of Brunswick (very severely wounded) a man known as being spineless and without character, was enrolled in the war party. Finally the memorandum thus supported was presented to the King. The Queen undertook to fix the spirit of this Prince and to make him understand what people thought of him. She told him that people said he was not brave, and that if he did not make war, it was because he did not dare to put himself at the head of the army. The King, who was really as brave as any Prussian prince, allowed himself to be taken in, without ceasing to think privately that he was committing a serious fault.

We must note the men who did not take part in the illusions of the war party: these are the respectable Field Marshal Moellendorf and General Kalkreuth.

It is stated that after the fine charge of the 9th and 10th Hussars at Saalfeld, the King said: "You stated that the French cavalry did not amount to anything; now look what the light cavalry has done and consider what the cuirassiers will do. These troops have acquired their superiority by fifteen years of war; it will be necessary to have as many to equal them; but which of us would be such an enemy of Prussia as to desire this terrible experience?"

The Emperor, already master of all the communications of the depots of the enemy on the 12th of this month wrote the attached letter* which he sent to the King of Prussia by the orderly officer Montesquiou.

This officer arrived at 4:00 P.M. on the 13th at the headquarters of General Hohenlohe, who took the letter which he brought and kept him with him. The King of Prussia's camp was two leagues to the rear; that Prince should therefore have received the Emperor's letter by 6:00 P.M. at the latest; but it is reliably reported that he did not receive it until 9:00 A.M. on the 14th when the battle had already started.

It is reported that the King of Prussia then said: "If this letter had arrived earlier, perhaps it would not have been necessary to fight; but these young men are so hot-headed that if yesterday there had been a question of peace, I would have been unable to assemble a third of my army at Berlin." The King of Prussia had two horses shot from under him and was wounded in the thigh by a musket ball.

The Duke of Brunswick committed all kinds of errors in this war; his ideas were badly conceived and the movements of his army poorly directed; he believed that the Emperor was at Paris when he was really on his flanks. He believed that he had the initiative when he was already turned.

Finally on the eve of the battle consternation existed among its leaders. They realized that they were poorly posted and that they were staking the existence of the kingdom. All said: "Well, we will personally pay for this;" which is generally the idea of men who have little hope left.

The Queen was always at GHQ at Weimar; it had finally been necessary to tell her that circumstances were serious and that on the following day great events might occur for the Prussian monarchy. She wished that the King would tell her to go away, and in fact she made preparations to leave.

Lord Morpeth, envoy from the London Court to bolster up the Prussians, a mission truly unworthy of a man like

*See CN—10990, page 318.

him, arrived at Weimar on the 11th, charged with making seductive offerings and offering considerable subsidies, the horizon was already much obscured. The cabinet did not wish to see this envoy; had him notified that there was probably little safety for him personally, and suggested that he return to Hamburg to await events. What would the Duchess of Devonshire have said if she had seen her son-in-law charged with stirring up war spirits, offering poisoned bait, and obliged to return sadly and hastily? We can only be indignant at seeing England compromise itself by employing estimable agents and playing an odious role.

There is no news as to the conclusion of a treaty between Prussia and Russia and it is certain that no Russian has appeared up to today on Prussian territory. But the army would be very glad to see them; they will find an Austerlitz in Prussia.

Prince Louis-Ferdinand of Prussia and the other generals who fell under the first blows of the French are today designated as the principal instigators of this unbelievable madness. The King who ran all the chances and who supported all the misfortunes which resulted, is of all men surrounding him the one who had least to do with it.

There is such a large quantity of English goods at Leipzig that we have already been offered sixty millions for it.

Inquiry is made as to what England gains out of this. It might recover Hanover, keep the Cape of Good Hope, protect Malta, make an honorable peace and bring peace to the world. She has wished to excite Prussia against France, pushing the Emperor and France to the limit. Well, she has conducted Prussia to its ruin, brought still greater glory to the Emperor, still greater power to France, and the time is approaching when it will be possible to state that England is in a state of continental blockade. Is it then with blood that the English have hoped to feed their commerce and re-animate their industries? Great misfortunes may fall on England. Europe will attribute the loss to that Minister, an honest man, who wished to govern by great and liberal ideas for which the English people will one day weep with tears of blood.

French columns are already in march for Potsdam and Berlin. The Potsdam deputies have arrived asking for safeguard.

GHQ is today at Wittenberg.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 16

CN—11065
(WD Files)

Wittenberg, 23 October, 1806.

The Duke of Brunswick has sent the Marshal of his Palace to the Emperor. That officer brought a letter in which the Duke recommended his territories to his Majesty's care.

The Emperor said to him: "If I had demolished the city of Brunswick and had not left one stone on another, what would your Prince have said? Does the law of retaliation permit me to do at Brunswick that which he wished to do in my capital? To announce the intention to demolish towns is senseless; but to wish to take away honor from the entire army of a brave people, by proposing to it to leave Germany by daily marches, at the sole dictation of the Prussian army, is something which posterity will have difficulty in believing. The Duke of Brunswick could never have permitted himself such an outrage. When one has laid down his arms, military honor is to be respected; and besides it is not on the plains of Champagne that this general could acquire the right to treat French colors in such a fashion. Such a demand could only dishonor the soldier who made it. It is not the King of Prussia on whom dishonor will rest; it is on the chief of his military council, on that general to whom under difficult circumstances he had intrusted the care of his affairs; it is really the Duke of Brunswick whom France and Prussia can alone accuse of causing the war. The madness which the old general has given an example of, has caused mad ideas and led the King against his own opinion and his own private conviction. At the same time, sir, state to the inhabitants of Brunswick that they will find

generous enemies in the French; that I desire to reduce the rigors of war in their favor, and that the inconvenience which may be occasioned by the passage of troops is against my inclination. Tell General Brunswick that he will be treated with all the respect due a Prussian general, but that I cannot recognize a Prussian general as a sovereign. If it results that the House of Brunswick loses the possession of its ancestors, they can only consider itself the author of two wars, in the first wishing to strike down the great capital to its foundations, and in the other in attempting to dishonor 200,000 brave men, who possibly might be beaten but who could never be surprised on the road of honor and glory. Plenty of blood has flowed within a few days; great disaster weighs on Prussian monarchy. He is worthy to blame, who in a word could have forewarned, like Nestor raising his voice in the midst of the councils, saying: "Thoughtless youth, shut up; women, return to your homes and attend to your household; and you, sire, believe the most illustrious companion of your predecessors; as the Emperor Napoleon did not wish war do not place him between war and dishonor; do not engage in a dangerous fight with an army which has had fifteen years of glorious past, and which victory has accustomed to everything;" instead of using such language which would have been so suitable to the prudence of his age and to the experience of his long career, he was the first one to cry: "To arms!" He has misunderstood the ties of blood in arming a son against his father; he threatened to plant his flags on the palace of Stuttgart; and accompanying his denunciations against France, he announced himself the author of that senseless proclamation which for fourteen years he has disavowed, although he had not dared to deny that it held his signature."

It was remarked during this conversation that the Emperor with that enthusiasm which sometimes animated him, repeatedly said: "to knock down and destroy the homes of peaceful citizens is a crime which is prepared with time and money; but to dishonor an army, to wish it to fly out of Germany before the Prussian eagle, is a baseless wish which only he that advised it was capable of committing."

M. de Lucchesini is still at GHQ. The Emperor has refused to see him; but it is noted that he has frequent conferences with Duroc, the Grand Marshal of the Palace. The Emperor has given orders to issue out of the great quantity of English cloth which has been found at Leipzig one complete uniform to each officer, and one overcoat and one coat to each soldier.

GHQ is at Kropstaedt.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11067

(Furnished by the Princess of Eckmuhl)

Potsdam, 24 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

A column of considerable size has left Magdeburg for Stettin; we are now maneuvering to cut it off. All the light cavalry of Marshal Lannes and the reserve cavalry are marching on Oranienburg where it seems to me that it will be suitable for you to send your Dragoon division. Send small detachments to establish communication with General Milhaud, who will be during the morning at Hennigsdorf, and to General Lasalle who will be at Oranienburg; on the other hand send out parties to a distance of 8 or 10 leagues from Berlin to obtain information, and advise me as to all information which you may obtain in this great city. I will remain all of today at Potsdam. As the fort of Spandau is resisting, it will be bombarded today. Send there for information, but do not be disturbed about it.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL BERTRAND

CN—11068

(Furnished by Colonel Bertrand)

Potsdam, 24 October, 1806.

Proceed to the point where you have left the 10th Chasseurs. Arrive before daybreak at Spandau with this regiment; occupy the town and the bridge; surround the

fort but out of range, but so as to reconnoiter it perfectly; question the inhabitants of Spandau as to what news they had during the last three or four days. The regiment will send a small detachment to Wustermark to connect with General Savary, who will be by morning in this village with a hundred troopers. Send also a small detachment to Hennigsdorf to scout that road and to connect with Brigadier General Milhaud who should be there in the morning with his cavalry.

At 8:00 A.M. I will expect your first report from Spandau as to everything which has become known to you, in such manner that I may receive it before 10:00 A.M.

Prince Murat, with the Dragoons will arrive before 9:00 A.M., the infantry with 12-pounders before 10:00 A.M. You will have with you the engineer officers of Prince Murat, and of Marshal Lannes. If we can hope to seize this place by a bombardment of the fort, you will post the batteries and commence the bombardment. You will send me a report at noon, a second at 3:00 P.M., a third at 6:00 P.M. You will return after Spandau has been taken. You will send me a memorandum on it and its population.

NAPOLÉON.

CHAPTER VII

The Pursuit, 25 October, 1806, to 31 October, 1806

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 17

CN—11069
(WD Files)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

Marshal Lannes's corps arrived at Potsdam on the 24th.

Marshal Davout's corps entered Berlin at 10:00 A.M. on the 25th.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo's corps is at Brandenburg.

Marshal Augereau's corps will enter Berlin tomorrow the 26th.

The Emperor arrived at Potsdam yesterday and is staying at the palace; in the evening he visited the new palace, Sans-Souci and all places near Potsdam. He has found the situation and arrangement of the chateau of Sans-Souci a pleasant one. He remained some time in the room of Frederick the Great, which has the same furniture and is in the same condition as when he died.

Prince Ferdinand, brother of Frederick the Great, has been stopping at Berlin.

There has been found at the Berlin arsenal 500 cannon, several hundred thousand pounds of powder, and several thousand muskets.

General Hulin has been appointed commandant of Berlin.

General Bertrand, aide to the Emperor has gone to Spandau; that fortress is resisting; it is being invested by the dragoons of Dupont's division.

The Grand Duke of Berg has gone to Spandau to start a pursuit against a column going from Spandau to Stettin, which it is hoped to cut off.

Marshal Lefebvre, commanding the dismounted part of the Imperial Guard, and Marshal Bessieres, commanding the mounted part of the Imperial Guard arrived at Potsdam at 9:00 P.M. the 24th. The dismounted part of the guard marched fourteen leagues in one day.

The Emperor will remain at Potsdam during all of the 26th.

Marshal Ney's corps is blockading Magdeburg.

Marshal Soult's corps has crossed the Elbe one day's march beyond Magdeburg and is pursuing the enemy towards Stettin.

The weather continues superb; it is the finest autumn which has been seen.

The Emperor while proceeding on horseback from Wittenberg to Potsdam was surprised by the storm and took refuge in the house of the Chief Master of the Hounds of Saxony. His Majesty was very much surprised to be called by name by a pretty woman; she was an Egyptian, the widow of a French officer of the Egyptian army, and who had been in Saxony for three months; she had been staying with the Chief Master of the Hounds of Saxony, who received her and treated her honorably. The Emperor granted her a pension of 1200 francs and undertook to look after her son. "This is the first time," said the Emperor, "that I have dismounted for a storm; I had a presentiment that a good action was awaiting me."

It has been remarked as a peculiar coincidence that the Emperor Napoleon arrived at Potsdam and stopped at the same apartment, on the same day and at almost the same hour as the Emperor of Russia during his voyage a year past which has been such a sad one for Prussia. This was the moment that the Queen stopped looking after her interior affairs and the important occupation of her toilet, to mix herself up in affairs of state, to influence the King and to start up a disturbance everywhere she could.

The sane part of the Prussian nation look upon this voyage as one of the greatest misfortunes which has come

to Prussia. No one believed in the activity of the Prussian faction to bring the King to war in spite of himself. The result of the celebrated sermon made at the tomb of Frederick the Great, November 4, 1805, was the battle of Austerlitz and the evacuation of Germany by the Russian army by daily marches. Forty-eight hours later a picture of this subject was made which was exhibited in all the stores, and which excited the ridicule of even the farmers. In the picture was seen the handsome Emperor of Russia, near him the Queen, and on the other side the King with his hand raised on the tomb of Frederick the Great; the Queen, herself, draped with a shawl, somewhat like the London pictures of Lady Hamilton, held her hand to her heart while looking at the Emperor of Russia. It is inconceivable that the police of Berlin allowed such a pitiful satire to be distributed.

And the ghost of Frederick the Great could only be indignant at such a scandalous scene. His genius, his spirit and his wishes were with the nation which he so largely esteemed, and of which he said that if he were king of it, it would never fire a cannon shot in Europe without his permission.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—744

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, I have no other return from home than that of September 1. Send one to me up to October 15.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL KELLERMANN

CN—11072
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

You have not at all understood the idea in organizing a detachment of orderlies. This has nothing whatever to do with the detachment which has been asked for. My in-

tention has been that the officers should be selected among themselves. In organizing this detachment, I have been induced more by political than military reasons. I am sending you the list which the minister of the interior has sent me. When you have 100 of them, you will organize them and direct them towards Berlin, appointing officers taken from among them.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11075
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

You are wrong in asking me to levy national guards in the new departments. The large number of conscripts who are arriving in the 25th and 26th Military Divisions is such that it will be easy to place 10,000 men in Wesel, if necessary. You are also wrong in asking that the detachments which are at Paris should be directed on Wesel, as you have no need of them; these detachments are intended for Brittany, Cherbourg and Boulogne, according to circumstances. You make decisions too quickly and become alarmed at small matters; you must deliberate with more coolness and attend to your instructions. If the detachments were at Wesel, where they would be useless, and the English should debark at Brest, you can note how much my arrangements would be upset. I am giving orders that General Legrand, who is at Boulogne, be sent to your army. What the devil do you want with General Desfourneaux, who has never made war in Europe? He has seen active service only in Guadaloupe, where he was very much embarrassed in commanding a regiment of infantry.

No unforeseen event will cause you to submit the same requests to the ministers. Where they have after consideration refused you, it has been right. Your head is too quick. I had nothing to do then except to approve the conduct of the ministers, which is disagreeable. If you had on the contrary understood that the English might debark in Hanover or in Holland, they would have been beyond your

wishes, or better I would have provided for meeting them. A reserve at a central point guards the circumference; I have already explained this to you in my instructions. Up to now nothing has been changed since my departure from Mayence, which fact has not escaped the notice of the ministers. If I had ever thought it useful to station national guards at Wesel, I would not have failed to do so; but there national guards are worth nothing. As to your calculation that it required 15 days to send troops from Paris to Holland, I have already informed you that in view of arrangements which I have made, they can be sent there in four days, and these arrangements are understood by M. Dejean who will not fail to attend to them. I hope that today your advance guard is at Goettingen.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2605
(WD Files)

On the road near Liebenberg in rear of Falkenthal,

25 October, 1806, 2:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I am finally on the enemy. General Lasalle met them at Zehdenick on his approach, after retiring to the other side of the stream and cut the bridge. They appeared to be retreating towards Templin. Two regiments of hussars and several companies of foot chasseurs stopped last night at Liebenberg, they came from Ruppin. General Schimmelpenning stopped last night at Germandorf, the Prince of Philippstadt was with him. It appears that the enemy is entirely on our left from Fehrbellin as far as Zehdenick. The hussar regiments are the first troops that have been seen here. We have just captured some soldiers who came to arrange billets for a regiment of infantry and six companies of grenadiers at Klein-Mutz, in rear of Zehdenick. I am directing my reconnaissances on Lindow and Ruppin.

I am giving all this information to Marshal Lannes and am requesting him to arrive tonight if possible at Falken-

thal. As soon as I have new information, I will forward it to your Majesty.

I am, Sire, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11076
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

I inform you that Spandau has just surrendered. Twenty-four guns, lots of powder, plenty of commissary stores, and three hundred state prisoners have been found there. Twelve hundred prisoners have been taken.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11077
(WD Files)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Issue orders that all boats at Neubruck be sent to Spandau, and that all officers on board be turned in into the depots at this place. For this purpose send a staff officer to proceed along the river as far as the positions of our troops, to cause all the boats captured to descend the river towards Spandau.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR BIGNON

CN—11078
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

M. BIGNON:

My intention is that you will receive orders from the chief of staff to proceed to Spandau to carry out the following mission: there are 300 state prisoners at Spandau, you will inspect the records of their detention, question them

one after the other, and then report to me; in order that those who are only criminals against their government may be released, and those who have committed common crimes may be transferred to other prisons. My intention being not to have any prisoners at Spandau.

NAPOLEON.

TO M. MOLLIEN

CN—11080
(Imperial Files)

Potsdam, 25 October, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter of the 15th. I do not understand that there are only 1,500,000 francs in the reserve treasury at Mayence. 15,000,000 would be very good, but 1,500,000 francs seems to me a thoroughly insufficient sum, as there should be there funds for pay for the army for four months. Take necessary measures then to complete at Mayence a sum sufficient for these four months, which should always be there on hand.

By my orders the Prince of Neufchatel has had 2,000,000 francs sent here, in order not to be surprised by some unforeseen event, and to employ them according to circumstances.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL SAVARY, AT NAUEN

CN—11081
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

Remain all today in your position. Proceed wherever your horses can go. If you can proceed as far as Fehrbellin it may be possible that you will find something there. If you capture any horses send them to Spandau to mount the dragoons. Send me reports if you have any important information. You may send these direct to Prince Murat who is at Oranienburg.

NAPOLEON.

Positions on evening
of 25th October 1806.

FRENCH ■

PRUSSIANS □

English Miles



TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11082
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN :

Send detachments along the Frankfurt road and along the canal which empties into the Oder near Frankfurt, in order to capture all those boats which left Berlin during the last five or six days, loaded with articles belonging to the court or with artillery materiel. I presume that you have sent detachments towards Custrin. The two cuirassier divisions of Nansouty and D'Hautpoul are proceeding to Berlin. I am proceeding today to Charlottenburg. I am awaiting information as to the situation at Berlin.

NAPOLEON.

A detachment of cavalry proceeding to the second canal, will stop everything which left Berlin by that route.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—746

Charlottenburg, 26 October, 1806.

Erfurt and Wittenberg are two of the depots which I have already designated for the Army. Spandau is the third. Make known in the Order of the Day that everything in that place is to be in safety; that localities to serve as depots of each of the seven corps of the Grand Army have been designated; that a staff aide will command the depot of each army corps, that slightly wounded, footsore or weary men are to be sent to this fort; that regiments, instead of carrying with them their army-chests, baggage and heavy papers are to leave them at this depot, general officers to do the same; that all men joining the army, whether singly or in small detachments, will proceed to the depots at Spandau, never to Berlin; that they will sign with the aide in command of the depot of their army corps; the latter will report the same to the commandant of the place, who will send daily returns to the Major-General, that all clothing and

other goods which may come to the army be directed to these depots, from whence they shall be forwarded to their corps only upon orders of the Major-General; that there shall be an Adjutant-General in the town, under orders of the General in command of the place, charged to inspect all the depots and correspond in greater detail with the Major-General; that all stores whether of artillery or of the administration, whether of supplies, clothing or hospital supplies, shall be established at Spandau, it being my intention not to subordinate my manoeuvres to the protection of Berlin, but that Spandau shall be always secure.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2606
(WD Files)

Hennigsdorf, 26 October, 1806.

MARSHAL:

My hussars have finally reached the enemy, who is fighting in front of Zehdenick. It seems that this is the head of the column. Prince Hohenlohe should have been at Ruppín last night; according to appearances he is proceeding towards Falkenthal and Zehdenick. You will therefore understand that it is important that you hasten the march of your troops and close in on me as much as possible, that is, on Falkenthal, reconnoitering with all your light troops Gransee, Lindow, Ruppín, and Liebenwalde, the road which two regiments of hussars and some infantry have just taken.

The troops which have been driven out of Falkenthal and which last night were at Liebenberg came from Ruppín and Herzberg.

My light troops will occupy Zehdenick with one division of dragoons, a second dragoon division will occupy Liebenberg and Falkenthal. I am directing the 13th Mounted Chasseurs on Germensdorff and Herzberg. I beg you to advise me as to the position which you will occupy this evening and as to the dispositions which you have taken to observe the enemy on your left flank during tomorrow; ac-

cording to information which I will probably receive this evening, we may combine in order to attack. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2607
(WD Files)

Hennigsdorf, 22 October, 1806, 6:30 [A.M.].

SIRE:

I hasten to forward to your Majesty the report on the reconnaissances which you ordered on Fehrbellin. It seems according to all reports that Prince Hohenlohe is marching by this road on Stettin.

I have consequently ordered General Lasalle to proceed to Zehdenick, where he is to reconnoiter Templin and Tornow. I will have Liebenwalde reconnoitered by General Milhaud. I will myself proceed toward Falkenthal with two divisions of Dragoons in order to support and protect as necessary the light troops. As the enemy occupied Falkenthal and Fehrbellin yesterday, it can be inferred that the column has not yet entirely cleared Zehdenick and that by proceeding to this last point we can greatly damage the enemy. As the bridge at Hennigsdorf is very important, I have written to General Treillard who is at Neuendorf to have it guarded. I am sending to your Majesty Adjutant Major Girard to give you all the information which he has been able to obtain concerning Prince Hohenlohe's march. I hope that he will bring me at Falkenthal orders from your Majesty. I am, Sire, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11083
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

I am in receipt of your letter of 6:00 A.M. from Hennigsdorf.* The direction which you are taking is good.

*See M—2607, above.

Stop with your division for tonight at Zehdenick, with strong reconnaissances toward Gransee and Templin. Marshal Lannes's advance guard will stop tonight at Falkenthal, and his infantry as close to Falkenthal as possible.

Marshal Bernadotte will be at Falkenthal tomorrow.

I have not yet received the reports of your reconnaissances from Ruppin. The enemy is marching in rear of this road; I believe he is marching via Kyritz and Rheinsberg.

I have just this moment received a letter from Marshal Soult dated Hohenwarsleben at 8:00 P.M. the 24th. The column commanded by the Duke of Weimar, 5000 strong, has appeared at Magdeburg. Finding the crossing obstructed, it attempted to march on Tangermunde, where the enemy has a ponton bridge. Marshal Soult had cut the road, and was in full march to fall on this detachment, and he has seen their camp fires. Not one man from this column will escape. It seems that on the 23d, Blucher's rear guard passed Tangermunde; we captured from them 120 prisoners.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11084
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806, 11:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

There was only one column; all the enemy's troops are between Tangermunde and Stettin. They are marching in rear of Ruppin, supporting themselves towards Mecklenburg. You cannot arrive too quickly at Zehdenick. I wrote you an hour ago as to this.

NAPOLEON.

M. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD AT VIENNA

CN—11088
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter of the 20th. I have given orders to General Andreossy to proceed to Prague to the

headquarters of Prince Charles, if it is true that this Prince is at the head of an army of 60,000 to 80,000 men. If your information is correct, speak about this to the minister. State that it is ridiculous to keep such a large army on the frontier provinces under pretext of maintaining a neutrality which no one desires to violate, and which at the most would not require more than 10,000 to 12,000 men; that it is desirable that he discontinue these preparations which only result in causing distrust; that arming is going on everywhere in Austria, secretly; that the men on furlough are being re-called; that remounts are being assembled, etc. If all this is true, do not be satisfied with only speaking to the minister, speak to the Emperor. You will not fail to mention that this is the manner in which war is commenced and that they excite Powers who do not want to be drawn into it. I wish that your representations will lead him to discontinue this mobilization and to make them think particularly as to what this will result in.

I will be at Berlin within two days. The Prussian army is entirely destroyed; I have captured, dispersed, killed $\frac{2}{3}$ of them; those who remain are without guns, trains, etc. Notwithstanding this the greater part of my army has not suffered; so that I have more than 100,000 men who have not fired a shot.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11089
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806.

As soon as you will have passed Zehdenick, send detachments towards Prenzlau and Strelitz. You will have already received reports of your reconnaissances from Ruppín. I assume that today Marshal Lannes, if he has no further information will not be far from Zehdenick; it is necessary that you should be within $\frac{1}{2}$ day's march of him; but not so close as to embarrass him in obtaining subsistence supplies. Send detachments of light cavalry to secure information. I consider it impossible that you will

not be able to make several good strokes, especially as Marshal Bernadotte is following you at one day's march. According to all information which I have received, there are entire corps and columns, marching on Berlin, and which are partly wandering off in the direction of Custrin and partly on Stettin. I am assured that Stettin is provisioned. Your detachment should be under the walls of Stettin on the 28th; prisoners which you will take, some citizens which you will capture near Stettin, will give you information.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL SONGIS

CN—11090
(Imperial Archives)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806.

I wish to advise you of the importance which I attach to the fort of Wittenberg. It is therefore necessary to send there, without delay, some 30 guns, from those found at Berlin, and some mortars and howitzers. I much desire that within six or seven days, this place be armed.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL SONGIS

CN—11091
(Imperial Archives)

Charlottenburg, 26 October, 1806.

My intention is to arm the fort and town of Spandau; send there a brigadier general of artillery to organize matters, and see that before tomorrow, by 9:00 A.M., a complete company of artillery of 100 men, a detachment of mechanics, a colonel or major of artillery, a depot officer, an ordnance commander, an artificer. The brigadier general will remain there until matters are perfectly organized.

All powder found at Berlin and in the entire territory between the Spree and the Oder will be sent to Spandau without delay, together with all lead and all materials for manufacturing cartridges and bullets; also all materiel suitable for use at the arsenal. I repeat, I wish nothing at

Berlin. Transportation from Berlin to Spandau is very easy, as there is the Spree.

Under-ground places will be chosen at Spandau to contain one million pounds of powder, and storage places for four to five million cartridges; a machine shop will be established. I wish none except that one; a manufacturing arsenal; and there will be there organized everything which I have previously ordered for Erfurt and Wittenberg. Erfurt, Wittenberg and Spandau, those are my three depots. Whatever the places to which I may go, I must find powder, flints, muskets, cartridges, bullets, spare parts and ability to make necessary repairs after a battle, won or lost. The possible occupation of the rest of the country at any time by hostile cavalry or columns must be constantly kept in mind. For this reason artillery at Spandau must be determined from two points of view: the artillery necessary for the defense of that place, and artillery and war munitions of all kinds in storage for repairs or replacements. It is therefore necessary that within three days if this place should be cut off, the artillery should be able to defend it; for this purpose platforms should be established; that wood should be cut to make gabions and finally that the citadel and the town be armed. It is necessary that within six days, everything at Berlin which might be necessary, such as munitions, spare parts, light artillery, be stored within the fort of Spandau. I have already ordered you to assemble everything which you have to the rear, at Augsburg, Ulm, Wurtzbourg, Kronach, not in materiel, of which I believe you have here already more than you need, but in personnel; so that you will have everything necessary. Divide these between Erfurt, Wittenberg and Spandau.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR DARU

CN—11092
(Imperial Files)

Charlottenburg, 26 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR DARU:

I have advised you that Erfurt and Wittenberg were the depots of the army. Spandau is a place which the enemy

will never take; it is situated on the Spree, two leagues from Berlin. It is at this place that all the army depots are to be located, as it is not my intention to guard Berlin. The finance officer of the army will be recalled from Wittenberg to Spandau; on no pretext whatever will he be stationed at Berlin. At this moment there are two ovens at Spandau with a capacity of 10,000 rations per day. I have ordered the engineers to design emplacements for building ovens necessary to bake 60,000 rations per day. Have these ovens constructed, have made also as much hard bread as possible without interfering with the daily service. There are several very large depots at Spandau; when I visited there, I thought there must be at least 60,000 quintals of flour there and as much wheat and rye. My intention is that these depots be increased rather than diminished, that the rye and wheat be converted into flour and the flour into hard bread. It is therefore necessary that tomorrow before dawn, the commissary be within the fort of Spandau; and that he stay there and be not withdrawn on any pretext; that he have a storekeeper and an inspector of subsistence. Inventories will be made without delay, and you will appoint an auditor to assist in making these inventories. You will take measures to assemble within the citadel of Spandau, 1,500,000 bushels of oats; and vegetables, rice, and brandy or beer for two months' supply of the army. I have no need at Berlin of anything more than daily needs.

All clothing which may be at Berlin or elsewhere will be assembled at Spandau; if they cannot be stored within the citadel, they will be placed in the town. My facilities for hospitals will be assembled at Spandau. Whatever is necessary will be withdrawn from Berlin. There will be established in the citadel at a place to be designated by the engineers a hospital for 1200 wounded and in the town three hospitals for 200 or 300 sick. I authorize established at Berlin one hospital for 400 sick. I do not wish any wounded at Berlin.

NAPOLEON.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY

CN—11093
(WD Files)

Imperial Camp, Potsdam, 26 October, 1806.

Soldiers, you have justified my expectations and have worthily responded to the confidence of the French people.

You have supported privations and fatigue with as much courage, as you have shown intrepidity and coolness in battle. You are worthy of the honor of my crown and the glory of the great people. As long as you are animated with this spirit, nothing will be able to resist you. The cavalry has rivaled the infantry and artillery; I cannot state to which arm I can give a preference; you are all good soldiers.

Here is the result of our labors: one of the first military powers of Europe, which only a short time ago proposed a shameful capitulation to us, has been annihilated; the forests and defiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers were unable to cross in seven years, we crossed in seven days, and during this period had five combats and one big battle. We have been preceded at Potsdam and Berlin by the renown of our victories. We have made 60,000 prisoners, taken 65 flags, among which those of the King of Prussia's Guard, 600 guns, 3 fortresses, more than 20 generals. Nevertheless more than half of you have to regret not having yet fired a single shot. All the provinces of the Prussian monarchy as far as the Oder are in our power.

Soldiers! the Russians wish to come against us; we will march to meet them, we will spare them half their journey. They will find an Austerlitz within Prussia. A nation which has so far forgotten the generosity which we have shown towards them after that battle when its Emperor, its court, and the remnants of its army saved themselves only through the capitulation which we granted them, is a nation which cannot fight against us with success.

Nevertheless while we march against the Russians, new armies from the interior of the Empire will take our place and watch our conquests. My people have risen in mass, indignant at the shameful capitulation which the Prussian minister, in their dreams proposed.

The roads and our frontier towns are filled with conscripts who burn to march in our steps. We will no longer be the playthings of a treacherous peace, and we will not lay down our arms until we have compelled the English, those eternal enemies of our country, to renounce their project of disturbing Europe, and their tyranny of the seas.

Soldiers, I cannot better express to you the sentiment which I have for you than by stating that I have in my heart that love for you which you daily show me.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 18

CN—11094
(WD Files)

Potsdam, 26 October, 1806.

The Emperor reviewed the foot troops of the Guard at Potsdam, consisting of ten battalions and 60 pieces of artillery, furnished by the light artillery. These troops which have suffered so many fatigues appeared as if on parade at Paris.

At the battle of Jena, Major General Victor received a bruise from a long barreled musket; he has been obliged to keep to his bed for several days. Brigadier General Gardanne, aide to the Emperor, had a horse killed and was slightly wounded. Several superior officers have received wounds, others had horses killed, and all rivaled one another in courage and zeal.

* * * * The citadel of Spandau situated at three leagues from Berlin and four leagues from Potsdam, strong by reason of its situation between streams, and containing a garrison of 1200 men and a great quantity of war munitions and subsistence stores, was surrounded the night of the 24th. General Bertrand, aide to the Emperor, has already reconnoitered the place. Guns have been posted to fire shells to intimidate the garrison. Marshal Lannes has had the commandant sign the capitulation attached hereto.

Considerable depots were found at Berlin containing clothing and equipage. Inventories are being made.

Marshal Soult is following a column commanded by the Duke of Weimar; on the 23d it was before Magdeburg; our troops were already there since the 20th. It is probable that this column, 15,000 strong, will be cut off and taken. Magdeburg is the first assembly point for the Prussian troops. Many detachments are proceeding there. The French are preventing this.

A letter from Helmstaedt, recently captured, contains curious information. It is attached hereto.*

The Prince of Hatzfeld; Busching, Chief of Police; the President of Kircheisen; Formey, a confidential counselor; Polzig, municipal counselor; MM. Ruck, Sieger, Hermansdorf, deputy counselors of Berlin, turned over to the Emperor in Potsdam this morning the keys to Berlin. They were accompanied by MM. Grote, confidential financial advisor, Baron Weilnitz and Baron Eckartstein; these report that the rumors which had been circulated as to the morale of this city are false; that the *bourgeois* and the mass of the people saw a war arrive with sorrow; that a handful of women and some young officers were the sole cause of this; that there was not a single intelligent man who did not see that war was to be feared, or who could see that anything was to be hoped for. Like all the Prussians, they considered the visit of the Emperor Alexander as responsible for the misfortune of Prussia. A change has since appeared in the spirits of the Queen, who from being a timid and modest woman occupied with household matters, suddenly became turbulent and warlike. She all of a sudden had to have a regiment, attended councils, and so well led on the monarchy that within a few days she led it to the edge of a precipice.

GHQ is at Charlottenburg.

*Omitted.

TO MURAT

M—2608

(Prince Murat's File)

Storkow, 26 October, 1806.

SIRE:

I have the honor to report to your Imperial Highness that having effected a junction with General Lasalle at Zehdenick, a charge by the cavalry of this General, supported by the 1st Brigade of the Division, in the plain beyond this little town, overthrew the enemy into the defile at its edge. They were pursued by the 1st and 2d Brigades; the 1st under the orders of General Roget and at the head of which was Major General Becker, replacing General Lasalle whom the enemy had repulsed, made brilliant charges with the happiest result. Everywhere defeated, the Prussians were driven fighting for more than four leagues. The 2d Brigade under orders of General Millet rapidly following that of General Roget, seconded these operations with such zeal and determination that the enemy driven as far as the bridge in line with the village of Storkow, was unable to cross it. Two of his squadrons were surrounded and driven into a swamp, all who did not perish there were killed or taken. More than 200 horses were mired and drowned. Two other squadrons who were also cut off were captured complete, as well as a body of infantry which supported them. The General who commanded the hostile column was killed, one colonel, a crowd of dragoon officers and of Prussian hussars are in our power. The two regiments of Dragoons of the Queen and the regiment of the Schimmelpenning Hussars were entirely destroyed. Finally, sir, greater success was impossible.

* * * * I regret to report several men, killed and wounded.

I beg your Imperial Highness to accept the expression of my profound respect,

The Commanding General, 2d Dragoon Division,

EMM. GROUCHY.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2609
(WD Files)

Zehdenick, 26 October, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to inform your Majesty that General Lasalle's brigade was in contact with the enemy; it met four cavalry regiments, in rear of Zehdenick; General Lasalle was satisfied to have made a good appearance while awaiting the dragoons.

Grouchy's division appeared, and the hussars then charged with the rapidity of lightning, they overthrew everything, they chased this innumerable throng into the town, and drove it into a defile while cutting them to pieces. Meanwhile the Queen's dragoons rallied at the exit of the defile, and prepared to resist, the hussars formed in their turn on the right of the road to allow the dragoons to charge in their turn which they did with a horrible butchery, and drove them as far as Templin with horrible carnage. 600 prisoners, among which several noted officers, the colonel of the Queen's dragoons, one major, about 30 officers, the regimental guidon, is the result of the prettiest and most vigorous charge which has taken place. I have lost several men, but the enemy had at least 200 men killed. No officers of the Queen's dragoons are left, that regiment which still had 800 men, has now ceased to exist. This column almost all cavalry was commanded by General Shimmelpenning. I have sent Prince Philippstadt, and tomorrow will send all prisoners, to Spandau. 14,000 infantry soldiers are announced for this evening. The billeting parties have been taken, this detachment was a flank guard. It seems that Prince Hohenlohe is marching via Gransee on Dannenwald via Templin. I have sent to reconnoiter Ruppín and Gransee; tomorrow I will send out according to information which I receive concerning the enemy. I find myself here well placed. I will proceed at daybreak toward Templin; Marshal Lannes will maneuver against the enemy who I think is largely to our rear. I have this moment captured a message dated Stettin, the 25th instant, addressed to Mr. Jacobi, advising him that a corps is being formed at Genthin which

should move towards Custrin and directing him to send the funds to that town. The letter is addressed to Hewelsberg. I have also an intercepted letter addressed to the King, from one of his aides at Brunswick, it is being translated, I will send it to your Majesty.

I hope that Marshal Lannes is at Falkenthal today. I hope that tomorrow I will do good work. Sire, your cavalry has truly covered itself with glory; General Lasalle has wiped out the day of Weissensee. I will advise your Majesty as to the names of those brave men who are the most distinguished.

I am your Majesty, etc.

I will know either at Templin or at Gransee if it is true as I have been told that this was the head of the column.

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2610
(WD Files)

Zehdenick, 27 October, 1806, 7:00 A.M.

SIRE:

Gransee was evacuated yesterday at 10:00 P.M.; the headquarters which were to stay there for that night on the first news of my march left for Furstenberg; and the 14,000 infantry who were to come here and the surrounding villages took this same direction. Prince Hohenlohe is to proceed from there towards Prenzlau, where I expect to arrive before him, or at least before the greater part of his command. I am marching on Templin and Prenzlau with all my cavalry; I have asked Marshal Lannes to follow the enemy with a detachment of cavalry and to send me the rest. I will write your Majesty from Templin.

The enemy is retiring in the greatest disorder and the butchery of yesterday by our cavalry will undoubtedly increase this. The cavalry detachment which passed yesterday was certainly the flank guard; all the rest of the army is retiring by its left and for Mecklenburg; I hope that all their trains, funds and artillery, if they have any left,

will be captured together with a large part of their troops. I hope that it will be a fine day.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2611
(WD Files)

27 October, 1806.

MY DEAR MARSHAL:

Gransee was evacuated yesterday at 10:00 P.M. Prince Hohenlohe who was to stay there for the night left quickly for Mecklenburg via Prenzlau, where I expect to head him off. The 14,000 infantry who were to occupy Zehdenick took the same route as the Prince; all should have stopped for the night at Furstenberg; the trains taking the same route. In sending your light cavalry in this direction, you will capture many; they are retiring in the greatest disorder. I leave now for Templin, from where I will advise you as to the enemy's movements. If you can send me regiments of your cavalry it would please me. There is much before me and they will be very useful.

MURAT.

TO MURAT

M—102.1 bis
(Prince Murat's File)

Oranienburg, 27 October, 1806.

* * * * *

"I received the order to proceed by long marches to Gransee. Although my troops are fatigued by the forced marches which they have made and are in want of everything, I will arrive today at Badingen and will push my cavalry as far as Gransee. My three cavalry regiments are reduced to 800 men, I will be very much obliged to you dear cousin, if you could return to me the detachment which I left at Achen, and which your Royal Highness has disposed of. * * *

BERNADOTTE.

ORDERS

CN—11095
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 27 October, 1806.

ARTICLE 1.—Reports, maps, plans and drawings relating to nautical and geographical details of the expedition which has been found and have been given to Naval Captain Baudin will be published.

ARTICLE 2.—The sum of 32,000 francs will be placed at the disposition of the ministers of the navy and colonies to cover the cost of the printing and engraving the above named work.

ARTICLE 3.—The ministers of the navy and of the colonies, and the minister of the public treasury are charged, each as concerns himself, as to the carrying out of this order.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL CHASSELOUP

CN—11096
(Imperial Files)

Charlottenburg, 27 October, 1806.

GENERAL CHASSELOUP:

Erfurt, Wittenberg and Spandau are the three places which are to be kept supplied and prepared for defense. I have already stated my intentions with regard to Wittenberg. The following is what I desire to be done at Spandau. It is necessary that within the next three days, drawbridges, or at least bridges on trestles be at all the gates of the town; that all houses located on the wall enclosing the city on the side of the river be torn down; that two or three points be selected along this river where there may be constructed three palisaded redans flanking the walls and provided with guns to oppose any surprise by use of boats; have all the demi-lunes palisaded, and have the ditches dug in such manner as to give a steeper slope to the counterscarp so as to make it more difficult to ascend it. The general plan which you will send me will show whether it is desirable to deepen all these ditches or to fill them with

water. My idea is to inclose the entire town with palisades, to palisade all the covered ways, and to construct a strong palisade in the middle of all ditches, as the water, during the season which we are approaching, may disappear into ice, and, as the Spree is not a rapid stream, the place would not be safe from a surprise attack, except by placing the wall facing toward the river in good condition and by constructing the above directed three redans. I am giving orders to the artillery to construct batteries on the ground. The earth which you will take from excavating the ditches will serve to heighten the parapets.

All houses which mask the citadel will be torn down within three days; only the mills will be allowed to remain, but these will be isolated.

There will be constructed a passage suitable for light artillery, or at least for men, extending from the citadel to the town, along the stockade now there; it is quite necessary that the passage to be thus constructed, either by use of sandbags or large pieces of wood, be safe against canister fire. This first defense is indispensable, but it will not be sufficient. Work will be continued on palisading across the demolition ordered, among which the trace for the palisade will be laid out. These two means appear to me to be sufficient, in connection with the fire of the citadel, in the case where the lake may disappear through severe freezing; for in this circumstance the first defense will be sufficient.

You will designate without delay, within the interior of the fort, sites for ovens sufficient to bake 60,000 rations of bread a day. You will designate under-ground places capable of containing a million pounds of powder and four million cartridges. Also a site for a hospital for 1200 wounded will be established. You will select within the town seven places for the depot for the seven corps of the Grand Army, each to be capable of containing 200 convalescents for its army corps. You will assist the artillery in heightening the parapet of bastions with strong epaulements made out of gabions or of any material.

My wish is that everything which I have prescribed shall be completed within eight to ten days.

I await the report which you will submit, to decide as to a more extended plan relative to the water system, and as to a system of redoubts surrounding the place, and which supposing the waters do not freeze, will enable 8 to 10,000 men to resist an entire army.

By all these redans and redoubts, I do not all mean simple field redoubts in which I have no confidence, but good redoubts revetted with wood, and with wood counterscarps; it has been proved that wooden beams 8" in diameter are not broken by a shell or a cannon shot. The method of placing these, considering saving of time with best solidity, is left entirely to the engineer officers. If their ideas are not fixed on this, it may be desirable that they try out different methods in the different redoubts. You will not fail to place within the citadel a great quantity of lumber, in such manner that the garrison, in case of attack, may be able to rapidly shelter itself along the interior slopes. It will even be possible under such shelters, to place the flour and other objects under cover, where they are not better sheltered in the magazines.

It is desirable that at least four engineer officers be detached to this place, of which one, charged with construction and one commanding the engineers, will be stationed there to defend Spandau. You will submit for my signature an order which will station them at Spandau, so drawn that under no pretext, not even that of sickness, they may leave the place. The chief engineer should have at least the grade of colonel.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 19

CN—11097
(WD Files)

Charlottenburg, 27 October, 1806.

The Emperor, left Potsdam at noon today and visited the fortress of Spandau. He has issued orders to Major General Chasseloup commanding the engineers of the army, as to the improvements to be made in the fortification of

this place. This is a superb work; the magazines are magnificent. Flour, grain, oats, sufficient to supply the army for two months has been found at Spandau with sufficient ammunition to double the supply of the artillery. This fortress, located on the Spree, two leagues from Berlin, is of inestimable worth. In our hands it will sustain two months of active siege operations. If the Prussians did not defend it, it was because the Commandant had not received any orders to do so, and because the French arrived there at the same time as the news of the lost battle. The batteries had not been constructed and the place was disarmed.

In order to give an idea of the extreme confusion which exists in this monarchy, it suffices to state that the Queen, on her return from her ridiculous and sad voyages to Erfurt and Weimar, passed the night at Berlin, without seeing any one; that for a long time there has been no news of the King; that no one attended to the safety of the capital, and that citizens were obliged to assemble and form a provisional government.

Indignation is complete against the authors of the war. The proclamation, which at Berlin is called an indecent libel, where no complaint has been specified, has raised the nation against its author, a miserable write-up, called Gentz, one of those men without honor who sell themselves for money.

Everybody agrees that the Queen is the author of the evils which the Prussian nation suffers. Everywhere is heard: "One year ago she was so good, so sweet; but after that fatal interview with the Emperor Alexander, how she has changed!"

There have been no orders given at the palace, so that the sword of the great Frederick was found at Potsdam together with the general's belt which he wore during the Seven Years' war, and his decoration of the Black Eagle. The Emperor took notice of these trophies and impressively said: "I would rather have these than twenty millions." Then, thinking for a minute as to whom he would give this precious capture, he said: "I will send them to my old soldiers of the Hanover war, I will make a present of them to the Governor of the Invalides; there they will remain."

In the Queen's apartments at Potsdam was found the portrait of the Emperor of Russia which he had given to her. At Charlottenburg was found her correspondence with the King during the last three years, and memoranda written by Englishmen to prove that no confidence could be placed in treaties concluded with the Emperor Napoleon, but to turn and join the side of Russia. These documents are historical documents; they will show, if proof is necessary, how unfortunate are those princes who allow their wives to influence them on political affairs. Notes, reports, state papers, were perfumed and found mixed up with pieces of chiffon and other toilet articles of the Queen. This princess had excited the heads of all the women in Berlin; but today they have completely changed. The first fugitives were badly received; they were ironically reminded of the day when they sharpened their sabers along the streets of Berlin wishing to kill and cut everybody in two.

General Savary, sent with a detachment of cavalry to seek the enemy, advises that Prince Hohenlohe, obliged to leave Magdeburg, was on the 25th between Rathenow and Ruppın, retreating towards Stettin.

Marshal Lannes was already at Zehdenick; it is probable that the remnants of this corps will not succeed in saving themselves without being again cut up.

A Bavarian corps should be this morning at Dresden; no news has yet been received from them. Prince Louis-Ferdinand, who was killed in the first fight of the campaign, was publicly called at Berlin the Little Duke of Orleans. This young man abused the kindness of the King to the point of insult. It is he who at the head of a body of young officers, went during the night to the house of M. de Haugwitz, when this minister returned from Paris, and broke his windows. It is impossible to say whether one should be astonished so much by the audacity as by the feebleness of the action.

A large detachment from those who went from Berlin to Magdeburg and to the Oder have been intercepted by the light cavalry. Already more than 60 boats loaded with clothing, flour and artillery have been stopped. Some regiments of hussars have more than 500,000 francs. It has been reported that they buy gold with silver at a 50% loss.

The chateau of Charlottenburg where the Emperor is residing is located one league from Berlin on the Spree.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—743

Potsdam, 27 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean: Despatch on November 6th, 120 men of the 14th line, 120 of the 12th light, 120 of the 2d light, 120 of the 4th light, 120 of the 25th light, 120 of the 64th, 120 of the 108th, 120 of the 48th, 120 of the 13th light, and 120 of the 32d, each detachment commanded by an officer, two sergeants, two corporals with two drummers. These detachments to be directed upon Mayence, Erfurt, Wittenberg and Berlin. Despatch 400 artillerymen, taking them from those regiments of foot artillery that have companies with the army, to repair their losses and complete them to 120 men.

Also despatch four companies of mounted artillery, taken from regiments which are with the Grand Army.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR DARU

UCN—747

Charlottenburg, 27 October, 1806, 11:00 A.M.

Mr. Intendant-General: the Emperor enters Berlin to-day at 2:30. Arrange that the citizens go out to meet His Majesty. General Hulín is to be at their head, to meet His Majesty at the gate.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL HULIN

UCN—748

Charlottenburg, 27 October, 1806.

General, the Emperor will make his entrance into Berlin between two o'clock and half past. I have bidden M.

Daru to inform the citizens that they may go to meet His Majesty outside of the city. It is the Emperor's desire that you be at their head to receive him.

The Chief of Staff,

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2612
(WD Files)

Templin, 27 October, 1806, 2:30 PM.

SIRE:

All information confirms the march of Prince Hohenlohe for Furstenberg. I will know before night whether from Furstenberg he has gone via Strelitz, Strasburg and Pasewalk, towards Stettin, or via Lychen and Boitzenburg, as I have just sent reconnaissances toward these two last places. He was to stop last night at Gransee and today at Templin, and the people were very much astonished to see us arrive in place of Prince Hohenlohe. The troops found food prepared and we are going to eat their general's dinner.

Through an intercepted courier, I have obtained the itinerary of the Stettin column for the 28th and 29th; I will certainly arrive before them and I hope that they will not reach Stettin. It would seem that the first had already passed and that Prince Hohenlohe commands the third, or else possible the first in which case I don't know where the third is. I will be this evening at the roadfork of the roads from Boitzenburg and Templin to Prenzlau, and General Lasalle has orders to try to reach Prenzlau. General Suchet is very close to me; I have recommended to Marshal Lannes to send his cavalry via Ruppin, Gransee and Furstenburg, that is to say to follow the enemy. Tomorrow I hope to be before Prenzlau, and I will take care to intercept the road from Stettin to Pasewalk and Uetkermunde, and certainly if Marshal Bernadotte and Soult are at the heels of the enemy, it is all up with them. General Milhaud has gone from here to Boitzenburg with the 13th Mounted Chasseurs and one squadron of dragoons and should cut the

bridge if the enemy does not occupy that town; from there they will join me towards Prenzlau while always covering my flank. It seems that the column commanded by Prince Hohenlohe is the right column and that the others are marching via Mecklenburg. Tomorrow we will have better information. I am, sire, your Majesty's, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2613
(WD Files)

Wichmansdorf, 27 October, 1806, 11:00 o'clock.

SIRE:

I have already had the honor to advise your Majesty that we have had a very good day. From Templin I directed General Milhaud with the 13th Chasseurs and one squadron of dragoons on Boitzenburg, to obtain information concerning the enemy, and to cut the bridge if the Prussian columns had not yet passed; I myself went with the rest of my cavalry towards Prenzlau. Arrived at Hasleben; where I was to stop for the night, I heard artillery fire in the direction of Boitzenburg; thinking that the enemy might be attempting to force a crossing, or that he was retiring by that route, I proceeded rapidly with one regiment of hussars and Grouchy's division towards Boitzenburg, leaving at Wichmansdorf two dragoon regiments to protect my right and support me. Beaumont's division remained in position on its side on the high ground of Hasleben, to observe Prenzlau until I myself could ascertain the enemy's strength and what might be his intentions. General Lasalle had orders to proceed towards Prenzlau with one regiment.

Scarcely had I formed line of battle before Boitzenburg, than the enemy, who had attempted to force the 13th Chasseurs and the squadron of dragoons to evacuate the village and clear the bridge which they had defended for three hours against all the troops of Prince Hohenlohe, beat the charge and formed to march against me. Several rounds from the artillery stopped them. * * * * During this time the regiment of Military Police, taking advantage of

the night, maneuvered on my left, and started to attack the village of Wichmansdorf which was in my rear; I proceeded against this regiment with three regiments of dragoons and arrived at the very moment when they started to force a crossing. To charge them, and to drive them into a swamp, was the affair of but a moment, and this corps seeing itself on the point of being driven into the lakes asked to surrender, which was granted to them. The officers are to retain their swords and their horses; the regiment is to be sent back to France. * * * *

I have the honor to forward to your Majesty four standards taken before the surrender, during the very fine charge which took place. * * * *

Sire, if the infantry [which was following me closely]* had arrived, the enemy would not have forced the crossing and Prince Hohenlohe would probably have been forced to surrender. * * * * I am waiting for the infantry, and if it arrives before midnight, I hope to retake the village. * * * * [and hold it.]* I am again asking Marshal Lannes to be close to me at a very early hour tomorrow, and we will attack the enemy if he has not completed his retreat, in which case I will march vigorously against his rear. However, I do not feel he is sufficiently strong to dare to cross, and I hope tomorrow to make a good march on Prince Hohenlohe. This fine little battle took place at moonlight; it was the advance guard of the army, no one has yet crossed. General Becker's conduct was perfect. I am, sire, etc.,

JOACHIM.

Marshal Lannes has only 3000 infantry at Templin, the remainder of his army corps is at Zehdenick, he informs me that he will march out at midnight, I fear that this may be too late. That Prince Hohenlohe may gain on him. Troops are in march to occupy Prenzlau. It is believed that the enemy is also marching on the same point.

*The words in brackets do not appear in the original.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 20

CN—11098
(WD Files)

Charlottenburg, 27 October, 1806.

If military events have no longer the interest of uncertainty, they always have interest as to combinations, marches, and maneuvers. The indefatigable Grand Duke of Berg was at Zehdenick at 3:00 P.M. on the 26th, with General Lasalle's light cavalry brigade, and the dragoon divisions of Generals Beaumont and Grouchy were in march for this point.

General Lasalle's brigade held the enemy, who appeared to him to have about 6000 cavalry. This was the entire cavalry of the Prussian army which have left Magdeburg, and formed the advance guard of Prince Hohenlohe's corps which was marching towards Stettin. At 4:00 P.M. the two dragoon divisions having arrived, General Lasalle's brigade charged the enemy with the singular intrepidity which has characterized the French hussars and chasseurs in this campaign. The enemy's line, although there were three of them, was broken, and the enemy pursued into the village of Zehdenick and overthrown in the streets. The Queen's dragoon regiment wished to reform; but the dragoons of Grouchy's division appeared, charged the enemy and made a horrible carnage among them. Of these 6000 cavalry, part have been overthrown into the swamps, 300 men were left on the field of battle, 700 were captured with their horses; the colonel of the Queen's regiment and a large number of officers are among these. The standard of this regiment has been captured. Marshal Lannes's Corps is in full march to support the cavalry. The cuirassiers are marching in column on the right, and another army corps is advancing on Gransee. We will arrive at Stettin before this army, which attacked in flank during its march, is already turned by its head. Demoralized as they are, we have reason to hope that none of them will escape, and that all that part of the Prussian army which uselessly stopped at Magdeburg for two days to reorganize will not reach the Oder.

The cavalry fight at Zehdenick has a military interest; nowhere was there any infantry, but the Prussian cavalry

is so inferior to ours that events of the campaign have proved that it is unable to meet forces less than half of its strength.

A staff officer, captured by a hostile detachment towards Thuringia, while carrying orders to Marshal Mortier, was taken to Custring, and there saw the King. He reports that so far very few fugitives have arrived beyond the Oder. Both at Stettin and the Custring he hardly saw any infantry.

THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11099
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806, Noon.

The chief of staff was to have written you informing you as to my intentions. Marshal Soult is between the Elbe and the column of the Duke of Weimar. His intentions are at first to prevent a crossing of the Elbe; if they succeed in doing this, he will pursue them and place himself between you and them. Follow Hohenlohe everywhere. If you can prevent him from crossing the Oder it will be very desirable. If he crosses, cross after him. To damage the enemy is the great object. If you should be obliged to pursue them towards Stralsund, return me the cuirassiers. It will suffice if you will send them half way from you to Berlin; I will send them orders according to circumstances. Yesterday I made my entry into Berlin; it was fine. You have the corps of Marshals Lannes and Bernadotte; these are all you need. Direct them on two parallel lines so that they will be at most but three or four leagues from each other. I am waiting with the greatest curiosity for news from you.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11100
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806, Noon.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have received your letter. I note with pleasure the activity which you put in your movements. Push after Prince Hohenlohe.

Marshal Soult has the column of the Duke of Weimar between the Elbe and himself. I am hoping that they will not be able to escape with their 10,000 or 12,000 men, and that they will fall into the hands of Soult. In forced marches, it is necessary to form a detachment each day from stragglers, for a rear guard of 400 men, with which you will leave a good staff officer charged with making them rejoin. In this way disorders will be prevented, and the soldiers will not fatigue themselves too much.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

CN—11101
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806, Noon.

DEAR COUSIN :

I am in receipt of your letter. Arrange with the Grand Duke of Berg as to the direction to take for your movements. What you are doing against Prince Hohenlohe, Marshal Soult is doing against the Duke of Weimar, beyond the Elbe. No rest until the last man of this army has been taken.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 21

CN—11102
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

Yesterday the 27th the Emperor made a solemn entry into Berlin. He was surrounded by the Prince of Neufchatel, Marshals Davout and Augereau, the Grand Marshal of his Palace, his Chief Equerry and his aide. Marshal Lefebvre opened the march with the infantry of the emperor's guard. The cuirassiers of Nansouty's division were in line along the road. The Emperor marched between the grenadiers and the mounted chasseurs of his guard. At 3:00 P.M. he entered the palace; here he was received by the Grand Marshal of the Palace, Duroc. An immense crowd

was gathered to see his arrival. The avenue of Charlottenburg of Berlin is very fine. The entry by this gate is magnificent. The day was superb. All the city officials presented by General Hulin, commander of the Palace, came to offer to the Emperor the keys of the city. These officials then proceeded to see his Majesty. General Prince Hatzfeld was at the head.

The Emperor ordered that the 2000 richest citizens assemble at the city hall, to appoint 60 from among themselves, to form a municipal corps. The 20 wards will each furnish a guard of 60 men, which will take 1200 of the richest citizens to guard the city and attend to police duties. The Emperor said to Prince Hatzfeld: "Do not come before me; I have no need for your services; go back to your own home." He received the Chancellor, and the Ministers to the King of the Prussians.

At 9:00 A.M. on the 28th, the Ministers of Bavaria, Spain, Portugal and the Porte, who were at Berlin, were admitted to an audience with the Emperor. He told the Minister from the Porte to send a messenger to Constantinople with news of what had happened, and to state that the Russians would not now invade Moldavia, and that they would attempt nothing against the Ottoman Empire. After this he received all the Protestant and Calvinist clergy. There have been more than 10,000 or 12,000 French refugees in Berlin as the result of the revocation of the edict of Nantes. The Emperor talked to the principal ones among them; he told them that they had just rights to his protection, and that their privileges and their religion would be protected. He recommended them to attend to their own business, to keep still, and to be obedient and respectful to Caesar.

The courts of justice were presented to him by the Chancellor. He talked with the members of the courts of appeal and of first instance; he informed himself of the manner in which justice was administered.

The count of Neale was presented in the Imperial office. His Majesty said to him: "Well sir, your women have wished for war; look at the result. You had better manage

your own family." Some letters from his daughter which had been captured stated: "Napoleon, does not wish to make war; we must make war on him"—his Majesty then said to M. Neale: "No, I do not wish war; not because I am distrustful of my power, as you think, but because the blood of my people is precious to me, and because my first duty is not to shed it except for its safety and honor. These good people of Berlin are the victims of war, while those against whom it was directed have been saved. I will see that these people of such small ideas will be obliged to beg for their own bread."

Stating his intentions to the municipal corps, the emperor said: "I understand that people's windows are not broken. My brother the King of Prussia ceased to be the King on the day when he did not seize Prince Louis-Ferdinand, when he dared to break the windows of ministers."

Today the 28th the Emperor rode out to review Marshal Davout's corps; tomorrow his Majesty will review Marshal Augereau's corps.

The Grand Duke of Berg, and Marshals Lannes and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo are pursuing Prince Hohenlohe. After the brilliant cavalry engagement at Zehdenick, the Grand Duke of Berg proceeded to Templin; there he found commissary supplies and a dinner prepared for the generals and the Prussian troops. At Gransee, Prince Hohenlohe changed the direction of his march and went towards Furstenberg. It is probable that he will be cut off from the Oder and that he will be surrounded and captured.

The Duke of Weimar is in a similar position in regard to Marshal Soult. This duke had shown an intention to cross the Elbe at Tangermunde in order to reach the Oder. On the 25th, Marshal Soult forestalled him. If he comes not a man will escape; if he succeeds in getting by, he will fall into the hands of the Grand Duke of Berg and Marshals Lannes and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo. A detachment of our troops is on the Oder. The King of Prussia has crossed the Vistula.

Count Zastrow reported to the Emperor on the 27th at Charlottenburg and delivered to him a letter from the King of Prussia.

At the same moment, the Emperor received an aide from Prince Eugene, notifying him of a victory over the Russians in Albania.

ORDERS

CN—11102
(WD Files)

Imperial Camp, 28 October, 1806.

ARTICLE 1.—The Prince of Hatzfeld, who reported at the head of the deputation from Berlin, as in charge of the civil government of that capital, and who, notwithstanding this position and the duties attached to it, took advantage of the information which his position brought to him as to the situation of the French army to advise the enemy of it, will be brought to trial before a military commission, as a traitor and a spy.

Marshal Davout is charged with carrying out this order.

ARTICLE 2.—The military commission will consist of seven colonels from Marshal Davout's corps, where he will be tried.

ARTICLE 3.—The chief of staff is charged with carrying out this order.

NAPOLEON.

TO MURAT

M—2614
(Prince Murat's File)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806, 12:30 Noon.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS:

His Majesty, Prince, has noted with the greatest pleasure, the brilliant manner by which you crushed the fifteen squadrons of hostile cavalry, but his Majesty would have liked that you had taken the remainder by pursuing them directly.

There is nothing in rear of Prince Hohenlohe except your Highness and the corps of Marshals Lannes and Ber-

nadotte. It is desirable, Prince, that in accordance with such information that you may have you designate a particular direction to Marshal Bernadotte, as he would be a useless force if he followed Marshal Lannes, the corps of which Marshal, together with your own being sufficiently strong for one line of advance.

As for Marshal Soult, he is not to pursue Prince Hohenlohe but on the contrary he should pursue the Duke of Weimar's troops; God knows where he will reach them. In any case, if the corps of the Duke of Weimar crosses the Elbe, it will fall into your hands. Finally, Prince, the intention of the Emperor is that you should pursue the enemy until you reach him, even as far as Stralsund if necessary, but in this case the Emperor directs that you return General D'Hautpoul's cuirassier division.

If in your captures you have surplus horses, send them to Potsdam where there are dismounted dragoons under command of General Bourcier, who will organize them.

The Chief of Staff,

MAL. ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GHQ

MN—304

Hq, VI Corps, 28 October, 1806.

The garrison of Magdeburg is keeping to the defensive; they consist of a garrison of seven battalions and the remnants of several regiments defeated at the battle of Jena. The cavalry consists of 300 to 400 men of various arms.

NEY.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GHQ

MN—302

Hq VI Corps, 28 October, 1806.

We are sorry to learn that Marshal Soult allowed M. de Weimar to escape.

I can assure you, without too much presumption that we would have taken him if we had been in Marshal Soult's place.

On account of the slowness of his marches, and his indecisive manner, Marshal Ney predicted what actually happened.

DUTAILLIS.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2615
(WD Files)

Prenzlau, 28 October, 1806, 6:00 P.M.

SIRE:

Your Majesty's orders have been carried out. Prince Hohenlohe is in my power together with his army corps. As I had foreseen, he maneuvered by his left and went towards Prenzlau after having marched all night. Being in doubt as to his movement I had ordered General Lasalle to proceed during the night to Prenzlau; the heads of both columns arrived at this town at the same time, the hussars rendered the honors and allowed the Prussian column to pass. At 6:00 A.M. I was in march with all the cavalry to support General Lasalle. General Milhaud followed the enemy with the 13th Chasseurs and the 9th Dragoons. I was two leagues from Prenzlau, when General Lasalle informed me of the enemy's movements and of his position; I hastened my march and after 9:00 A.M. I discovered the march of the Prussian army. I had ordered General Lasalle to approach the suburb and attack it, and I sustained him with six guns, Grouchy's division by three regiments of Beaumont's division. General Beaumont, my aide, had orders to pass the bridge at the village of Gollnitz, with a brigade of dragoons of Beaumont's division, to threaten an attack on the enemy's rear and flank. During this time a detachment reconnoitered to ascertain whether it was practicable to proceed by my right from Zolchow towards Seelitz in order to turn the town.

The attack commenced, the artillery fire became general and very active, your Majesty's artillery silenced the

hostile artillery and forced it to withdraw from position to position. We arrived at the suburb, noting that the column was on the point of escaping, I had General Bossard's brigade cross by a ford and ordered General Grouchy to charge the head of the enemy's column, which he did with inconceivable intrepidity; he overthrew infantry, the cavalry, took 18 guns and was about to enter the town pell-mell with the Prussians, when the gate was closed; all who were on the outside were captured. I brought up some artillery and sent General Belliard to summon Prince Hohenlohe. During this time the Dragoons broke in the Stettin gate and went for the enemy, when the Prince consented to lay down his arms. The officers are prisoners of war, retaining their swords and baggage and are permitted to return home subject to exchange; the troops have laid down their arms, are prisoners of war and are to be sent to France. 16,000 infantry and 6 regiments of cavalry surrendered before your Majesty's cavalry.

* * * * *

Sire, 16,000 infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, 60 guns, 60 flags, the Princes August, Ferdinand, Hohenlohe, Tauenzient, and several other generals, are the result of this fine day. * * * *

General Lasalle is marching on Lockenitz where he will stop tonight to cut the retreat of General Blucher; General Milhaud is proceeding to Pasewalk. Tomorrow I will be before Stettin. * * * *

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2616
(Prince Murat's File)

Prenzlau, 28 October, 1806.

MARSHAL:

Please issue orders that one regiment of infantry be detailed to escort prisoners; I am detailing one brigade of dragoons. The general officer who commands them will be charged with conducting the prisoners as far as Spandau.

Please also Marshal, order an artillery general from your army corps to take over the artillery captured from the hostile army, make a return of it and send it to me.

Please also, dear Marshal, appoint a commandant for the place to maintain order and see that there is no pillaging. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE PRINCESS FERDINAND OF PRUSSIA

CN—11104
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

I received the letter of your Royal Highness. I have been touched by the position of Madame Hatzfeld. I have convinced her that her husband was very wrong, and that the laws of war condemned him to capital punishment. Nevertheless, I have avoided the unpleasantness of a trial and have remitted his punishment and his conviction. It is true that the sweetness and deep pain of Madame Hatzfeld has forced me to do this; but I would be displeased if your Royal Highness did not also see in this action the intention of being agreeable to her.

NAPOLÉON.

TO M. DARU

CN—11105
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

MONSIEUR DARU:

It is necessary that you should have turned in to the chest of the finance officer money of the different offices of Berlin, in order that without using French money, the chief of staff may be able to provide for the expenses of the artillery, engineers, and other extraordinary expenses, until he has received the money which I have placed at his disposition. You will prohibit the finance officers from making payments with French money; they will pay with Berlin money; tomorrow one month's pay will be paid to the corps

of Marshals Davout, and Augereau, to the cavalry division of General Nansouty and to my Guard, and money will be kept in hand for all army corps to be paid as they pass Berlin.

My intention is that my army should have wine; you will have an inventory of cellars made, and will assemble the necessary quantity for a two months' issue to the army. You will have assembled, at first at Spandau, a quantity of brandy sufficient for a two months' issue for the army. Commencing tomorrow you will issue to the corps of Marshals Davout and Augereau, and to the cavalry division, a half bottle of wine per day for each soldier.

You will have taken from the houses of members of the Court who have left Berlin, mattresses and furniture necessary for the officers, and you will have these sent to Spandau. You will take necessary measures to secure cloth required to manufacture 100,000 overcoats and 100,000 trousers, and to procure 100,000 pairs of shoes, 100,000 hats and all articles needed to clothe the army. It is also necessary to designate as billets for the officers of the army corps the houses of the members of the Court who are absent from Berlin, in order to relieve the citizens as much as possible. My intention is that Berlin should furnish me in abundance with all that is required for my army, and to see that my soldiers are fully provided with everything.

NAPOLEON.

TO MONSIEUR DE THIARD, GOVERNOR OF DRESDEN

CN—11106
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter. I desire that the Bavarians be treated in the same manner as my troops; that shoes, and arms be furnished them as necessary, and that means be sought to satisfy the generals and officers while repressing everything of excess and pillage. I would much like to know in detail the situation of the city and of the Court.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL CLARKE

CN—11107
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

I am in receipt of your letter of October 24th. Give special attention to see that the slightly wounded are not evacuated from Erfurt towards France, as they would then return there; send these to Wittenberg and Spandau in detachments of 100 men. Marshal Mortier writes to me that he will be at Fulda on the 28th; so you should have news of him today. The artillery personnel and the dismounted men which were at Wurtzbourg should have arrived at Erfurt by now. This will give you needed assistance. One brigade from Hesse-Darmstadt, one battalion from the Grand Duke of Berg, one battalion from the Prince Primate, the 2d battalion from Nassau, some troops from Baden, should also arrive at Erfurt. Write to my ministers appointed to these princes to find out why these troops do not arrive. One battalion from the Grand Duke of Berg should also come to Erfurt to draw muskets. I have given orders that an engineer officer, medical officers and finance officers be sent you. While waiting for M. La Bouillerie to send you a finance officer, appoint some one provisionally. You will have seen the order which provides a government for Erfurt and in which a quartermaster is provided for you.

As soon as the 14th Infantry is no longer useful to you at Erfurt, or the dragoon regiment which I have sent to mop up the rear of the army, be careful to direct these troops to Berlin. I believe that as soon as the advance guard of the army of the North will have arrived at Goettingen, and Marshal Mortier at Fulda, the 14th Infantry and the dragoon regiment will be useless at Erfurt. You will then send them on to here as soon as possible.

NAPOLEON.

PRENZLAU TO LÜBECK

Positions on 28th October 1806, midday.
 PRUSSIANS - FRENCH
 Positions of French in pursuit of Blücher
 evening November 5th.

Scale of English Miles.



FRENCH TROOPS.

M - Murat. B - Beaumont.
 N - Nansouty. G - Guard.
 HPL - Hautpoul. GR - Grouchy.
 LAS - Lasalle. Others by Corps Nos

PRUSSIAN DETACHMENTS

W - Weimar (Winning)
 PL - Plötz.
 BL - Blücher.
 1 Hagen. 5 P. August.
 2 Bila II. 6 Baggage.
 3 Quitzow. 7 Bila I.
 4 Hopfner. 8 Wobeser

TO MARSHAL KELLERMANN

CN—11108
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 28 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

I approve of your appointing Monsieur Laval-Montmorency to command the 1st Company of Military Police. I also approve the choice which you have made of M. Bryas of Brussels. As soon as the 1st Company has 120 men, send them to Berlin. I do not approve at all that the Prince of Isembourg should command this corps; it is not desirable to have a foreigner in command of French. I permit you to select a commanding officer of the 2d Company.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 22

CN—11111
(WD Files)

Berlin, 29 October, 1806.

Events succeed one another rapidly. The Grand Duke of Berg arrived at Hasleben on the 27th with a division of dragoons. He had sent General Milhaud with the 13th Chasseurs to Boitzenburg, and General Lasalle's light cavalry brigade to Prenzlau. Informed that the enemy was in force at Boitzenburg, he proceeded to Wichmansdorf. He had scarcely arrived there, when he saw a brigade of hostile cavalry moving towards the left with a view to cutting off General Milhaud. To see them, to charge them, to drive this detachment of the Royal gendarmes into the lake was the affair of but a moment. This regiment, seeing itself lost, asked to surrender. The Prince, always generous, granted this: 500 men dismounted, and turned in their horses. The officers returned to their homes on parole. Four standards of the Guard, all in gold, were the trophies of the little engagement of Wichmansdorf, which was only the prelude to the fine affair of Prenzlau.

These celebrated gendarmes, which having found such sympathy after the defeat, are the same ones who for three months, provoked the city of Berlin with all kinds of

disorders. They appeared under the windows of M. Laforest, French Minister to sharpen their sabers; people of good sense shrugged their shoulders, but inexperienced youths and passionate women, such as the Queen, saw in this ridiculous performance a sure prophecy of the great destinies awaiting the Prussian army.

Prince Hohenlohe, with the remnants from the battle of Jena, sought to reach Stettin. He had been obliged to change his route, as the Grand Duke of Berg was at Templin ahead of him. He wished to deploy from Boitzenburg towards Hasleben. He was mistaken in this movement. The Grand Duke of Berg believed that the enemy sought to reach Prenzlau: this belief was well founded. The Prince marched all night with the dragoon divisions of Generals Beaumont and Grouchy, covered by the light cavalry of General Lasalle. The first patrols of our hussars arrived at Prenzlau at the same time as the enemy, but they were obliged to withdraw on the morning of the 28th, before superior forces which Prince Hohenlohe deployed. At 9:00 A.M. the Grand Duke of Berg arrived at Prenzlau and at 10:00 A.M. he saw the hostile army in full march. Without losing time in useless movements, the Prince ordered General Lasalle to charge the suburbs of Prenzlau and caused him to be supported by Generals Grouchy and Beaumont, and their six pieces of light artillery. He caused the little stream which passes through Prenzlau to be crossed at Golmitz by three regiments of dragoons, to attack the enemy in flank, and directed the remaining dragoon brigade to turn the town. Our brave light artillerymen placed their guns so well, and fired so accurately, that they brought disorder on the enemy's movements. At this moment, General Grouchy received orders to charge; his brave dragoons did this with intrepidity. Cavalry, infantry, artillery all were overthrown in the suburbs of Prenzlau. Our troops could enter pell-mell with the enemy into the town, but the Prince preferred to demand their surrender through General Belliard. The gates of the town were already broken; without hope, Prince Hohenlohe, one of the principal fire boxes of this unholy war, surrendered before the French army with 16,000 infantry, almost all of which were guards or grenadiers; 3 regiments

of cavalry, 45 flags, and 64 pieces of artillery, horsed. All of the Guards of the King of Prussia who escaped from the battle of Jena have fallen into our hands. We have captured all the flags of the foot guards and of the horse guards of the King. Prince Hohenlohe, commander-in-chief after the wounding of the Duke of Brunswick, one prince of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and several generals are our prisoners.

The Emperor wrote to the Grand Duke of Berg: "But more has to be done. You have turned a column of 8000 men commanded by General Blucher: see that I learn soon that these have met the same fate."

Another column of 10,000 men has crossed the Elbe; it is commanded by the Duke of Weimar; everything leads to the belief that he and his center column will be surrounded.

Prince August-Ferdinand, brother of the Prince Louis who was killed at Saalfeld, and son of the Prince Ferdinand, a brother of the Great Frederick, has been captured arms in hand by our dragoons.

This great and fine Prussian army has disappeared like an autumn fog before the rising sun. Commanding generals in chief, commanding generals of army corps, princes, infantry, cavalry, artillery, nothing remains of them. Our patrols have entered Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, the King of Prussia having gone further away. He has not 15,000 men left; and in obtaining such a result, we have lost on our side almost no one.

General Clarke, Governor of the territory of Erfurt, has caused a Saxon battalion which wandered in his direction to surrender.

* * * * *

All the dismounted dragoons which the Emperor had with the Grand Army are mounted; there is a large depot of 4000 horses, saddled and bridled at Spandau, which we do not know what to do with, as there are no more troopers needing remounts. We are awaiting with impatience the arrival of the depot establishment.

The last bulletin reported the manner in which the emperor received the Prince of Hatzfeld. A short time

thereafter this prince was arrested. He was to have been brought to trial before a military commission and would have inevitably been condemned to death; letters from this prince to Prince Hohenlohe, intercepted at the advance guards, showed that although he was charged with the civil government of the city, he was informing the enemy as to the movements of the French. His wife, daughter of the Minister Schulenburg, came and threw herself at the feet of the Emperor; she thought that her husband had been arrested on account of the hatred which Minister Schulenburg had shown to France. The Emperor soon explained matters, and made her understand that some papers had been intercepted which showed that her husband had been playing a double role, and that the laws of war were pitiless for such a crime. The princess attributed this charge, which she called a calumny, to misrepresentations by his enemies. The Emperor said: "You know the hand-writing of your husband; I will leave it to you." He had the intercepted letters produced and shown to her. This woman, pregnant for more than eight months, fainted at each word which showed how far her husband was compromised as she recognized his handwriting. The Emperor was touched at her sorrow, her confusion, and the anguish which she was experiencing. He said: "Very well, keep this letter, throw it in the fire; this piece of evidence is destroyed, I can no longer have him condemned." This touching scene took place near the fireplace. Mme. Hatzfeld did not wait for me to speak twice. Immediately after, the Prince of Neufchatel received orders to release her husband. The military commission had already assembled. The letter from M. de Hatzfeld alone would have condemned him; three hours later he would have been shot.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—750

Berlin, 29 October, 1806.

Cousin: Send orders by special courier to all the unmounted cavalymen at Mayence to proceed to Berlin to

be employed in caring for the large number of horses which we have taken from the enemy.

NAPOLEON.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER

UCN—751

Berlin, 29 October, 1806.

Cousin: Order Marshal Bessières to send to Spandau tomorrow 50 grenadiers, 50 chasseurs and 10 gunners, with a superior officer, to choose from the 4000 horses arriving at Spandau, 150 horses for grenadiers, 150 for chasseurs and 30 for the gunners. Order General Nansouty to send to Spandau an officer and 30 men from each of his six regiments. They are to arrive there tomorrow morning, going on foot, and will choose from among the 4000 horses arriving at Spandau tomorrow 540 horses, with saddles and bridles, those best fitted for their arm of the service. Inform General Bourcier by special courier that 4000 saddled horses which have been taken from the Prince of Hohenlohe are to reach Spandau tomorrow; that I have ordered that the best 330 be appropriated to the Guard, and for this purpose have sent detachments to receive them; that he is to send to Spandau all the unmounted dragoons that he has, and if there are more horses than men, he is to charge one man with 2 or 3 horses, and send to Spandau all the unmounted men that he can; that General Nansouty is to take 540 horses and send a third as many men; that General Bourcier must see to this distribution, and do his best that the horses do not lose flesh; that we have 3000 to 4000 unmounted men who are soon to join me, and then be mounted. The best way is to put them in stables in Potsdam. Despatch a courier to General Le Marois bidding him send to Spandau his unmounted cavalrymen and especially his unmounted dragoons. Write to Marshal LeFebvre that if he still has any unmounted dragoons he is to send them to Spandau. Finally, order that all cavalry depots enroute for Wittenberg hasten their march, as also the unmounted men coming from Wurtzbourg to Erfurt, and that all assemble at Potsdam to take care of these horses.

Write to all cavalry regiments, chasseurs and hussars, to direct their unmounted men to Spandau, bidding General Bourcier to deliver to them saddled horses for mounting these men. Write to General Songis that 60 pieces of cannon with their teams have been taken, and are to be sent to Spandau. He must have men there ready to take charge of the horses.

NAPOLÉON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2617
(WD Files)

Prenzlau, 29 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to report to your Majesty on yesterday's results, and on the movements of General Lasalle towards Lockenitz and of General Milhaud towards Pasewalk. General Lasalle arrived at Lockenitz about 4:00 o'clock, broke the bridge, but learning that there were troops in rear of him coming from Pasewalk, believed it best to withdraw towards Bergholz, a roadfork; learning of this I ordered him to retake Lockenitz; I went to that place with all of Grouchy's division and all of the infantry which Marshal Lannes could give me; I still hope to close the Stettin road to General Blucher, who was to stop last night in the vicinity of Pasewalk, unless he fails to escape me during the night; he commands a detachment of 10,000 to 12,000 men, remnants of the army of Wurtemberg. I will have the honor to report to your Majesty information which I may obtain at Lockenitz.

I have directed Major General Beaumont to escort prisoners with his troops, and to conduct the horses of the captured regiments. He is to divide the Prussian column into two detachments, in order to facilitate their subsistence. If I am as lucky today as yesterday, I hope to be able to report to your Majesty on a column nearly similar to that of yesterday. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S.—Marshal Lannes will march with his entire corps.

P.S.—I have just received a letter written by General Lasalle at Bergholz and a copy of which I hasten to forward to your Majesty.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2618
(WD Files)

Lockenitz, 29 October, 1806, 2:00 P.M.

SIRE:

General Belliard is sending to the Chief of Staff a copy of the capitulation of an army corps of about 6000 men, who laid down their arms at Pasewalk to General Milhaud's troops. I directed this general to escort this detachment to Spandau and to turn in the 1200 horses captured. I will relieve this general at Pasewalk by a brigade from Grouchy's division, who will be charged to observe Blucher along the route from Strasburg and from Ferdinandshof; I hope that this general will be forced to surrender, all his communication with Stettin and the Oder being cut. At this moment General Lasalle is very near to Stettin. The town is not provisioned, and I am informed that there are only a few fugitives as a garrison. Detachments have gone by my left toward Polnitz via Blanchensee and Falkenwald and by my right towards Krakow and Boblin. No troops have yet passed; consequently all will be captured. If Stettin does not wish to surrender I will have it observed and I will march on Blucher.

I will have the honor to write your Majesty this evening. General Milhaud will turn into the Chief of Staff 28 or 30 flags and guidons.

General Beaumont [my]* aide-de-camp has just made another detachment on my right surrender. I am your Majesty, etc.

Suchet's Division will be here [tonight].* General Grouchy at Bismarck, and Lasalle at Neunkirchen; D'Hautpoul at Prenzlau.

MURAT.

*Words in brackets do not appear in the original.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2620

(Prince Murat's File)

Opposite Prenzlau, 29 October, 1806.

I hasten to advise you, Marshal, that Stettin has surrendered, and I beg you therefore to send one division from your army corps to occupy that place. It will furnish the necessary detachment for escorting the garrison who will be sent to Berlin via Uetkermunde. The remainder of your army corps should be directed on Pasewalk, to press from there against General Blucher and pursue him in whatever direction he has taken. The division which you will leave at Stettin should occupy Schwedt and repair the bridge. The Elbe should be closed against English merchandise. Please designate a commandant to relieve General Lasalle and to take possession of the city. Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT AT FRIEDRICHSFELDE

CN—11109

(Files of the Princess of Eckmuhl)

Berlin, 29 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

You will have received from the chief of staff the orders for your movements for tomorrow; but I do not wish to lose a minute in sending you news of the fine cavalry engagement at Prenzlau. Prince Hohenlohe has laid down his arms with 16,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, 45 flags, 84 horsed guns; Prince August of Prussia and the Prince of Schwerin are prisoners, with other Prussian generals and all the King's Guards. The 4000 cavalry arrive at Spandau tomorrow, and as my dismounted dragoons have already been mounted send on all the dismounted men of your cavalry to receive horses; the horses are saddled and in good condition. Blucher's column will probably be captured tomorrow; I am waiting news from Soult, who may have captured the column of the Duke of Weimar. Communicate this information to the army corps.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG AT PRENZLAU

CN—11110
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 29 October, 1806.

I have received news of the engagement of Prenzlau. Notify the dragoons, and the light cavalry of Milhaud and Lasalle, of my satisfaction.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2621
(WD Files)

Lockenitz, 30 October, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

SIRE:

While General Milhaud was causing a detachment of 6000 men to lay down their arms at Pasewalk, General Lasalle was at the gates of Stettin summoning the governor to surrender. I have the honor to forward to your Majesty the capitulation. Your Majesty's hussars will take possession of the gates of the city at 6:00 A.M. today. I am directing General Lasalle to proceed rapidly to Damm and attempt to capture that place, which it is said is in very bad condition, unable to offer any resistance and which apparently is not occupied. * * * * Marshal Lannes will occupy Stettin with a regiment of his army corps. With the remainder of the command I will march to head off General Blucher.

Marshal Bernadotte whom I had directed on my left was at Lychen on the heels of General Blucher, yesterday morning. He should be tonight at Boitzenburg, I am directing him to proceed toward Strasburg and Woldeck. General D'Hautpoul leaves Prenzlau this morning for Pasewalk. General Becker is already there with a brigade of dragoons; I am going there myself with Grouchy and Marshal Lannes's corps; and I hope during the day to be able to inform your Majesty that there are no more Prussians left to fight on the left bank of the Oder. I will not return General D'Hautpoul as I have already returned Beaumont's division and Milhaud's brigade in escorting prisoners. In compliance with orders from your Majesty, I will pursue

Blucher as far as Stralsund, although it might be necessary to march by the right bank of the Oder on Custring, a movement which I will not however make without your orders. I will establish meanwhile communication with Berlin by means of my light troops, this route is much shorter and the post service better; I will especially occupy Schwedt and repair the bridge which it is said is cut.

As I presume that Blucher will be ours during the day I beg your Majesty to give me his orders for billeting the army corps which are with me and which have the greatest need for rest. I will send the garrison of Stettin via Uetker-münde to Berlin.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S. * * * * The Prince of Ponte-Corvo * * * * will be this evening at Strasburg and Woldeck. My headquarters will be at Passau where I am now going; instead of leaving one brigade, I will leave an entire division at Stettin; it will occupy Schwedt, Damm and Politz; it will furnish the necessary escort for the garrison. I could even leave the entire corps and march with Marshal Bernadotte, but as he is not at hand, I will send a division.

TO MARSHAL NEY*

MN—305

Magdeburg, 29 October, 1806.

I hasten to send you a return by name, of the French prisoners held here, and your Excellency may fix the moment when they shall be returned to you.

I am charmed to be able to find an occasion to show your Excellency the sentiment of esteem and most distinguished consideration which I have the honor to have for your Excellency.

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

DE KLEIST.

[*Lieut. General, Prussian Army.*]

*The following letter is a reply to one written by Marshal Ney requesting a list of about 200 French prisoners of war in Magdeburg.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2622
(Prince Murat's File)

Pasewalk, 30 October, 1806.

MARSHAL:

In all my dispatches to the Emperor, I have informed him every day of the rapidity of the marches of your army corps and of its position. Rest assured that I am giving full justice to the zeal and indefatigable activity which it has shown, for me not to have felt the liveliest regret in noting that this was not mentioned in the order of the day, and I am sending you a copy of what I had written to the Emperor before I received your letter. I hope that he will repair this oversight. As to the other paragraphs of your letter I cannot answer them: explanations will bring us nowhere. I only desire that you would remember that I informed you that it was possible that it was not the head of Prince Hohenlohe's column which appeared before Boitzenburg, and that this general wished to assemble all his corps to force a crossing. I caused General Lasalle's brigade to march for Prenzlau at midnight with orders to seize that place, and General Belliard was sent to Boitzenburg only to make sure that the enemy had evacuated it; you will also remember that I told you that I was going to report to his Majesty that apparently the enemy would seek to escape during the night, but that I had guessed his intention and had consequently taken proper measures. I am enclosing a copy of my report. Finally, I feel flattered to have had the same thought as you under these circumstances. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE KING OF BAVARIA

CN—11115
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

I thank your Majesty for the letter which you have sent me through your aide. I am master of the greater part of the territories of the King of Prussia, and of all his army. Yesterday the 29th, Prince Hohenlohe laid down his arms

at Prenzlau with 16,000 infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, 45 flags, and 64 guns. I am momentarily expecting news that the columns of the Duke of Weimar and of General Blucher have met the same fate. My troops are masters of Frankfurt and have crossed the Oder. The King of Prussia has crossed the Vistula. The 1st Division of your Majesty's troops, which entered Dresden, is proceeding to Frankfurt; the 2d Division is also proceeding to Frankfurt; the King of Wurtemberg's troops will cross at the same place; these will form an army corps at the head of which will be Prince Jerome. In assigning my brother in command of these troops, I have desired to give them proof of the interest which I bear them, and of the desire of not compromising them beyond the chances of war. Your Majesty can count under all circumstances, on the results of my friendship and on the care which I will constantly give to the interests of his House.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG

CN—11116
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I have received your Majesty's letter. You will have been advised of my entry in Berlin, and of the capture of Prince Hohenlohe with 16,000 infantry, consisting of the King's Guard and other elite troops, 6 regiments of cavalry, 45 flags and 64 guns. I am also informed that General Blucher with 5 regiments of cavalry, was taken and surrendered on the morning of the 29th near Lockenitz. My troops have crossed the Oder. Those of your Majesty have received orders to proceed to the Oder, together with the two Bavarian divisions. This corps, which will have about 25000 men, will be commanded by Prince Jerome. In assigning your troops to my brother's command, I have desired to indicate the interest which I will give them in all military combinations.

Up to this time I have heard nothing about the Russians. I assure your Majesty that I will be very glad to meet them, in order to give them a proper and severe lesson which will make them repent concerning the slight regard and remembrance which they have shown of the good proceedings which I granted them at Austerlitz. I should think that the success which we have obtained might suggest to your Majesty to order public prayers to thank God.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE PRINCE PRIMATE

CN—11117
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

The success which my arms and those of my Allies of the Confederation of the Rhine have obtained led me to order in my empire public prayers to thank the God of War for our signal victories. Perhaps your highness would judge it suitable to order the same throughout his territories, and would invite the sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine to follow this example.

My troops have crossed the Oder; the Prussian army exists no longer. The entire foot and horse Guards of the King, and all his grenadier battalions have been taken prisoners. This prince has crossed the Vistula.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF NAPLES

CN—11119
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

MY DEAR BROTHER:

I received the return of officers which you have sent me. I strongly approve of what you have done. These officers will be more useful to me elsewhere; perhaps you are retaining too many of them. However, I thoroughly understand that it is necessary to organize the army and the country, and that for this purpose a certain number of in-

dividuals are required. If General Mossel has not yet left Milan, direct him to join the Grand Army via the Tyrol. Issue the same order to General Debelle and to General Franceschi, if he is the one who was aide-de-camp to Soult.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 23

CN—11120
(WD Files)

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

The Duke of Weimar has succeeded in passing the Elbe at Havelberg. Marshal Soult arrived on the 29th at Rathenow, and on the 30th at Wusterhausen.

On the 29th the Duke of Weimar's column was at Rheinsberg, and Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo was at Furstenberg. There is no doubt but that these 14,000 men have already fallen, or about to fall into the hands of the French army. In another direction General Blucher with 7000 men left Rheinsberg on the morning of the 29th for Stettin. Marshal Lannes and the Grand Duke of Berg are three marches ahead of him. This column has fallen into our hands, or will so fall within 48 hours.

In our last bulletin we stated that the engagement of Prenzlau the Grand Duke of Berg had forced Prince Hohenlohe and his 7000 men to lay down their arms. On the 29th, a hostile column of 6000 men surrendered at Pasewalk to General Milhaud. This gives us another two thousand horses, with saddles, bridles and sabers. This makes more than 6000 horses which the Emperor has at Spandau after having mounted all his cavalry.

Marshal Soult having arrived at Rathenow, met five squadrons of Saxon cavalry, whom he summoned to surrender. He caused them to sign the capitulation attached hereto.* This makes 500 more horses for the army.

Marshal Davout has crossed the Oder at Frankfurt. The Bavarian and Wurtemberg allies, under the command

*Omitted.

of Prince Jerome, are marching from Dresden for Frankfurt.

The King of Prussia has left the Oder and has crossed the Vistula; he is at Graudenz. The forts of Silesia are without garrisons and without supplies. It is probable that Stettin will shortly fall into our hands. The King of Prussia is without an army, without artillery, without muskets. A liberal estimate of the force which he will be able to assemble on the Vistula would be 12000 or 15000 men. Nothing is more curious than his present movements. It is a sort of a hunt, where the light cavalry which goes as a look-out for the army is constantly turned by hostile columns which are cut off.

Up to this time we have taken 150 flags, among which are those embroidered by the hands of the beautiful Queen, whose beauty has been as unfortunate for the people of Prussia as was that of Helen to the Trojans.

The gendarmes of the Guard have passed Berlin to report as prisoners at Spandau. The people, who a few weeks ago saw them so arrogant, saw them in all their humiliation.

Today the Emperor has had a grand parade which lasted from 11:00 A.M. until 6:00 P.M. He saw in detail all the foot and horse troops of his Guard, and the fine carbinier and cuirassier regiments of Nansouty's division; he made several promotions and in doing so stated in the greatest detail everything relating thereto.

General Savary with two regiments of cavalry, has already reached the corps of the Duke of Weimar, and is able to serve in transmitting information to the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and Marshal Soult.

The territories of the Grand Duke of Brunswick have been taken possession of. It is believed that this duke has fled to England. All his troops have been disarmed. If this prince has properly deserved the dislike of the French people, he has also had that of the Prussian people and army: of the people, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war, of the army, who complain of his maneuvers and his military conduct. False calculations by young officers are pardonable; but the conduct of this old prince who was

72 years old, is an excess of folly and the failure of whom can only excite our pity. What is then respectable in age, if to the defects of age is joined the boasting and inconsideration of youth?

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—752

Berlin, 30 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean: Issue orders that from the 25th Military Division the following set out immediately: 150 men of the 3d battalion of the 21st Light Infantry, 150 of the 27th Light Infantry, 300 of the 21st Line, 200 of the 45th, 300 of the 54th, 250 of the 94th and 150 of the 95th; total 1500 men. These detachments to be directed without delay to Erfurt, whence they will be directed to Wittenberg and thence to Spandau. Despatch from Paris on November 4th, 200 men of the 2d regiment of Light Infantry, 400 of the 4th Light and 200 of the 12th Light. You will despatch all available men about 200 of the 1st, 3d, 5th, 9th and 15th Dragoons. For example, the 3d Dragoons has 347 men; send 140 of them. Also send 300 men of the 3d battalion of the 32d; despatch from Mezieres 250 men of the 10th line, 250 of the 14th line, 150 of the 25th Light Infantry and 150 of the 69th. Order Marshal Kellermann to send also on November 4th a company of 200 men from each of the twenty-four infantry regiments which are in the 5th Military Division. They are to assemble at Strasburg, and set out from thence under command of an Adjutant-General. Order him also to despatch 150 men from each of the eight infantry regiments of the 26th Military Division. They are to assemble at Mayence, whence they will set out in order for the army. Order 150 men of the 64th who are at Besançon to join their war battalions. As for the cavalry, write to Marshal Kellermann and to the commandant of the 25th Military Division, and issue a circular to the commanders of the fourth squadrons, that on November 5 they are to despatch by way of Erfurt, all men in condition to make part of the war squadrons. Are excepted from this disposition 200 mounted men each of the 4th regiment

of dragoons, of the 10th and the 1st, 3d 5th, 9th and 15th, whom I am leaving at Moulins, Amiens and Paris to form a reserve of 1400 to 1500 horse for my coast. All the rest should be sent to the army. Ask the Majors and commanders of the 4th squadrons and 3d battalions to present returns showing the number of horses and men that they despatch and their situation after their departure.

NAPOLEON.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2623

(Prince Murat's File)

Pasewalk, 31 October, 1806.

SIRE:

The garrison of Stettin consists of 550 men; 120 guns and all kinds of stores have been found at this place. General Becker was here at 8:00 P.M. yesterday under the walls of Anklam. He recognized enemy bivouac fires, a camp consisting of stragglers and remnants of different army corps and about 6000 strong; this morning he summoned them to surrender, and I have the more hope that they will surrender as the Swedes are willing to receive only their baggage and wounded, and have broken the bridge. Two regiments of cavalry marching from Uetkermunde on Stettin, on learning that this place had been taken, withdrew towards Anklam, and are now between Generals Lasalle and Becker; I have sent to summon them, and I hope they will surrender; one of these two regiments is from the King's Guard, the other is a cuirassier regiment.

Fifteen hundred artillerymen with thirty guns forgotten in a village have surrendered to one of Marshal Lannes's aides; their commander for twenty-four hours sought a French officer to surrender to.

In his letter of the 29th, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo notified me at 8:00 A.M. from Lychen that he would close in on me as much as possible; I therefore sent him at Boitzenburg the itinerary of my march and the information which we had concerning the enemy, and requested him to proceed towards Strasburg and Woldeck. My letter left at 11:00

P.M. and a duplicate at 5:00 A.M., both of them returned to me during the night, after having been through Strasburg, Boitzenburg and Woldeck without having met anything at those places. I presume that he must have gone toward Neu-Brandenburg where it seems General Blucher is marching.

The following are my movements for today; with D'Hautpoul and Grouchy's divisions I am proceeding towards Friedland; I am sending General Lasalle towards Stettin and Uetkermunde, he is to connect with General Becker who is to march against the enemy in accordance with such information as he may receive during his march, but only after having caused the camp in front of him to surrender. At Friedland, I will certainly obtain news of General Blucher, if he has not already surrendered to Marshal Bernadotte, and I will not leave him until after he has been forced to lay down his arms.

The chief of staff informs me that the Duke of Weimar crossed the Elbe on the 26th and that he should be at Paserow on the 30th or the 31st; as I have received no confirmation as to this, I must presume that he has taken another direction on learning of the defeat of Prince Hohenlohe. Finally I hope that during the day affairs will develop so that I can furnish your Majesty with positive news.

I have had the honor to report to your Majesty that one division of Marshal Lannes's corps remains at Stettin and that it should occupy Politz and Schwedt and repair the bridge. On request of Marshal Lannes, I have decided to leave here Suchet's division which he informs me is very exhausted. I hope to have sufficient forces with those of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and my own to settle with General Blucher and the Duke of Weimar, if contrary to all calculations he attempts to cross the Oder between Custrin and Stettin. Marshal Lannes is reconnoitering all this country with his light cavalry.

Sire, I should have commenced this letter by thanking your Majesty for his order of the day concerning the army corps which I command, how it acted differently when it had the honor of serving your Majesty. I would have liked that you had the kindness to render justice in the same order

of the day to the untiring zeal shown by Marshal Lannes's corps. I would be very much pleased if your Majesty would deign to mention this in the next order of the day, Marshal Lannes would be greatly affected.

P.S.—The officer who brought your Majesty's messages wishes me to state that he arrived at 8:00 P.M. yesterday. In the future all officers captured will be sent to France.

It is reported that the King is at Stargard, and the Queen at Swinemunde on the island of Rugen,* with the army's funds which left Stettin two days ago. I am, sire, your Majesty's, etc.,

MURAT.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11121
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.

DEAR BROTHER:

I compliment you on the capture of Stettin; if your light cavalry takes fortified towns in this manner, it will be necessary for me to furlough the engineers and have my heavy artillery melted. But there is still something more to do, you have still 25000 more men to capture. Major Adjutant Gerard, who left here yesterday, is to advise you on the condition of things. You have to capture General Blucher and the Duke of Weimar, which will make 25000 men more. Blucher must be taken. The Duke of Weimar has been pursued closely by Marshal Bernadotte; Marshal Soult is following him at a considerable distance. Follow down the Oder, have him pursued closely and as far as Stralsund if he goes there. No rest until these two columns have laid down their arms.

NAPOLEON.

*Swinemunde is on the island of Usedom, not Rugen.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT AT
FRANKFURT-ON-THE-ODERCN—11122
(Imperial Files)*Berlin, 31 October, 1806, 8:00 A.M.*

DEAR COUSIN:

A new column of 6000 men has laid down its arms to the 13th Chasseurs, commanded by General Milhaud. Stettin has been taken; 160 guns mounted in battery have been found there, with 6000 fine garrison troops and plenty of generals. All these have been taken by General Lasalle and his two regiments of Hussars. Depots of all kinds are in this town. After this the capture of Custrin becomes more probable. We still have before us 22000 men, the Duke of Weimar, with 14000 and Blucher with 7000 to 8000. They are so surrounded by Marshals Lannes and Bernadotte and by the Grand Duke of Berg that it is very probable that they will have been taken at the present hour. I have had verified at Stettin that not a single man of the Prussian army passed through this town. I am very curious to know what has occurred in the location of Custrin. There we will positively ascertain what number of troops remain at the King of Prussia.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

CN—11123
(Imperial Files)*Berlin, 31 October, 1806, 10:00 A.M.*

DEAR COUSIN:

Stettin was taken the day before yesterday; 6000 troops of the garrison, 160 guns, mounted on the ramparts, immense depots, several generals, all surrendered to the light cavalry of General Lasalle. General Milhaud's cavalry has caused 6000 men to lay down their arms near Pasewalk; this is all that remains of the Prince of Hohenlohe's corps.

I note with pleasure that you have started to pursue the Duke of Weimar; follow him to the Baltic.

Marshal Davout has crossed the Oder at Frankfurt. The King of Prussia has withdrawn in rear of the Vistula. Not one man of all those who remained after the battle of the 14th has crossed the Oder.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11124
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

Send at once a cavalry patrol to arrest Prince Hohenlohe. I do not wish him to go to Silesia. The aide of the Grand Duke of Berg will inform you as to where he will be found.

Issue orders to Marshal Davout that no Prussian officer is to be allowed to proceed to Silesia. My intention is that no Prussian officer who has been made a prisoner shall cross the Oder.

The 64th, 44th and 105th Infantry will be billeted during the day in the barracks of Berlin.

The 16th Light Infantry will be distributed among the villages along the road from Custring to Stettin.

No troops will bivouac around Berlin.

NAPOLEON.

ORDERS

CN—11127
(Count Daru's File)

*Berlin.**

A council of administration to consist of:

M. Villemanzy

M. Esteve

M. la Bouillerie

who will call if necessary, as witnesses, some of the King of Prussia's men who are acquainted with the country, will

*The copy of this order has no date, but it seems to have been issued on October 31, 1806.

recommend to me the tax to be imposed on the left bank of the Elbe.

The territories of the Duke of Brunswick, of the Duke of Weimar, will be included therein; Saxony also will be included.

Another recommendation will also be submitted as to the organization of the Prussian monarchy on this side of the Oder, in such manner as to cause money to come in at as early a date as possible.

A draft for an order will also be submitted to cover the issue of overcoats obtained at Leipzig and Berlin, on the principle that municipalities are not to buy anything; I much prefer their money.

At noon tomorrow Marshal Daru will bring me the result of their work.

There will also be submitted a draft of an order for an organization for the city of Berlin, national guard and municipality, and also for the remainder of the country, and providing for a military commander and an administrator.

Marshal Daru will also submit tomorrow a general report of the conditions of the depots of Wittenberg, Spandau and Berlin and on the Breidt Company; on the condition of such hospitals as exist; on the conditions of the funds of the army, both on hand and enroute.

But, not to mix what relates to the administration of the army with other matters, Marshal Daru will make this report at 6 o'clock.

If there are things which are not clear, he will send for the chiefs of services.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—11128

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I hope that before the 5th of November you will be master of Cassel, that your mission will have been completed by that time; and that as soon as the 1st Division of the King of Holland has arrived at Cassel, that you will return

it to the King of Holland, who has need of it in marching on Hanover. My intention is that on the 10th, at the latest, you will place yourself in march, leaving as I have ordered, General Legrange as Governor of Cassel, and that you direct your army corps on Hanover, less what you will consider necessary to leave to maintain order in the country. Some cavalry detachments and one regiment of infantry should be enough. Your arrival in Hanover to reinforce the King of Holland is very urgent. You are intended to carry out there a mission of the greatest importance.

NAPOLEON.

Stettin has just surrendered; 6000 men have been captured in the town, 160 guns in the ramparts. A column of 7000 men lay down their arms on the 29th.

Have this letter sent to the Prince Primate.*

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11129
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

From your letter I note that you will be at Paderborn on the 29th. In this case you ought to be at Goettingen on the 1st of November. Marshal Mortier will have asked you for a division of your army to assist him in taking possession of Cassel; but I hope that this division will be needed only for the time for it to reach Cassel, as the Prince once driven out and his militia disarmed, everything will be over. I assume then that by the 5th of November your division will have returned. As the mission against Hesse-Cassel is a little delicate, I imagine that you will not be charged with this personally. Leave as soon as possible for Hanover to take possession of the Electorate. I have told you to take the 22d Infantry in order to have three good French regiments. Marshal Mortier will join you in Hanover as soon as I ascertain the situation of things. Marshal Mortier has 10,000 men, and you have 12,000; thus together you will have 22,000 men; this is much more than you will need

*Cf CN—11117, page 487.

for the army of Hanover. Outside of this, I will not leave you alone. Hameln and Nienburg will not fail to surrender when they ascertain the disaster of their city. Send forward a small observation detachment, which without blockading the enemy will prevent them from running around the country. Make yourself master of all the Electorate. Correspond frequently with me and send me situation reports. If you have foot troops in Holland, have them come to Hanover, where you will mount them through requisitions.

As soon as you are in Hanover, enter into correspondence with Marshal Ney, who is blockading Magdeburg, and with the General whom I have appointed Governor of Brunswick; they are only two short marches from Hanover.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE EUGENE

CN—11132
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

DEAR SON:

The army of the King of Prussia no longer exists. All those who were at Jena, 160,000 men, have been killed, wounded or taken; not a man has crossed the Oder. * *

* * *

The four regiments of cuirassiers should have left by now; advise me when they will be on the Danube.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE EUGENE

CN—11133
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

DEAR SON:

Have all Prussian ships in Italian ports confiscated, and authorize our cruisers to pursue them.

Have issued a circular requesting public prayers in my Kingdom of Italy to thank God for the happy success of my arms.

At Milan have a *Te Deum* chanted on account of this occasion with great pomp and ceremony.

The two first Italian regiments are a part of the corps of Marshal Mortier and are towards Cassel. The third regiment is enroute.

NAPOLEON.

ORDERS

CN—11134
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

The Minister, Administrative Director of War, reports to the Emperor on the departure from Mayence of detachments of the Breidt Company organized at Brussels and at Paris.

M. Daru will give most precise orders to see that these four detachments are loaded at Mayence, with shoes, clothing and other articles which the troops wish sent to the army, and that these detachments proceed to Erfurt, from there to Wittenberg, and from there to Spandau, and that they march together under an escort which will be furnished by Marshal Kellermann. You will particularly prohibit the King of Holland and Marshal Mortier from interfering with them while enroute.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 24

CN—11135
(WD Files)

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

Stettin is in our power. While the left of the Grand Duke of Berg, commanded by General Milhaud, caused a column of 6000 men to lay down their arms at Pasewalk, the right commanded by General Lasalle, demanded the surrender of Stettin, and secured the capitulation, copy attached hereto.* Stettin is a fort in good condition, well

*Omitted.

armed and well palisaded. 160 guns; considerable depots; a garrison of 6000 fine troops, prisoners; among which many generals; such is the result of the capitulation of Stettin, which can only be explained by the extreme discouragement which can be produced along the Oder and along the territory on its right bank by the disappearance of the Grand Prussian Army.

Of all that fine army of 180,000 men, none have passed the Oder. All have been captured, killed, or are still wandering between the Elbe and the Oder and will be captured before four days. The number of prisoners will amount to nearly 100,000 men. It is useless to mention the importance of the capture of the city of Stettin, one of the greatest commercial towns of Prussia and which assures the army a good bridge across the Oder and a good line of operations.

As soon as the columns of the Duke of Weimar and of General Blucher, who are turned by the right and by the left and are pursued from the rear, have surrendered, the army will take several days' rest.

No news as yet of the Russians. We would much desire to have 100,000 of them come on but rumors as to their march is vain boasting. They do not dare to come to meet us. The day of Austerlitz appears before their eyes. What makes sensible people indignant is hearing the Emperor Alexander and his senate state that it was their Allies who have been beaten. All Europe well knows that there is not a family in Russia that is not in mourning; they are not crying for the loss of Allies. 195 battle guns have been taken, and these are at Strasbourg, and are not guns of the Allies. The 50 Russian flags which are hung in Notre-Dame at Paris are not flags of the Allies. The Russians who died in our hospitals or are prisoners in our towns are not the soldiers of the Allies. Emperor Alexander who commanded at Austerlitz and at Wischau with such a fine army corps, and who made so much noise, did not command Allies. The Prince who surrendered and agreed to evacuate Germany by daily marches, was undoubtedly not an Allied prince. We cannot do otherwise than shrug our shoulders at such bragging. Such is the result of the feebleness of princes and the venality of ministers. It would be much

more simple for the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of peace which his representative concluded, and to give a rest to Europe. The longer the war lasts, the more will the ideas of Russia disappear, and it will end by its being annihilated. As far as the wise policy of the Empress Catherine has succeeded in making of its power an enormous scarecrow, so will the extravagance and folly of the present ministers make it ridiculous in Europe.

The King of Holland, with the advance guard of the Army of the North, arrived at Goettingen on the 1st. Marshal Mortier with two divisions of the VIII Corps of the Grand Army commanded by Generals Legrange and Dupas, arrived at Fulda on the 26th.

The King of Holland found at Munster in the county of Marck and in other Prussian territories, supplies and artillery.

The arms of the Prince of Orange and those of the Duke have been removed at Fulda and Brunswick. These two princes will reign no more. They are the principal authors of this new coalition. The English have not wished to make peace; they will do so; but France will have more states and coast line in its confederated system.

Attached hereto is the report which Prince Hohenlohe made to the King of Prussia after the surrender of his army corps, and which has been captured.*

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2624

(Prince Murat's File)

Pasewalk, 31 October, 1806.

MARSHAL:

The Emperor advises me that the Duke of Weimar surprised Marshal Soult in crossing the Elbe, according to all information which he has received, this corps will be at Pasewalk on the 30th or 31st. Although it would seem that he knows of the defeat of Prince Hohenlohe and the direction taken by Blucher, this duke is maneuvering by his left,

*Omitted.

nevertheless he is sufficiently wise to protect his march, which it is possible to stop if you take measures to reconnoiter with all your light cavalry the country around Boitzenburg, Templin, Prenzlau and Schwedt, while I will cover Prussian Pomerania and Marshal Bernadotte Mecklenbourg. This evening my headquarters will be at Friedland with my right resting on the Peene, on the frontier of Swedish Pomerania, and my left connecting with Marshal Bernadotte, whom I will uncover during the day. A detachment of 6000 men and two regiments of cavalry are at Anklam; General Becker was to summon them this morning. I hope that they will lay down their arms as the Swedes have refused to receive them in their territory and have cut the bridge of Anklam. From Friedland I will be in a position to proceed in any direction which the enemy may have taken, and will have a point of support in Suchet's division if you desire to leave it at Pasewalk. In any case I beg you to let me know the position which you will take so that I can regulate my measures in accordance therewith. I would have liked that you had given me a regiment of light cavalry with six pieces light artillery now here; half of my artillery ammunition was expended in the affair at Prenzlau. Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MURAT

M—2625
(Prince Murat's File)

Prenzlau, 31 October, 1806, 3:00 P.M.

Since the letter which I wrote your Highness from Lychen the day before yesterday, I have not ceased to pursue the enemy. Arrived at Boitzenburg, I ascertained from my reconnaissances that General Blucher after first wishing to march towards Furstenwerder suddenly marched towards his left and went toward Neu-Strelitz. I then forced the march of my whole army corps, and yesterday evening took position between Teschendorf and Neu-Brandenburg, while one of my cavalry regiments harassed the enemy in the direction of the Neu-Strelitz road. This regiment passed

beyond this town, captured about 400 prisoners and determined that General Blucher's detachments were marching on Waren, with the view of effecting a junction with another column under the Prince of Weimar, which left Havelberg and retreated via Wittstock, Robel and Plau. This body thus united makes about 22,000 men, among which plenty of cavalry; it seems that they wish to march on Teterow or Schwerin, with the view of arranging as a last resort to embark at Rostock or Wismar or even if necessary to throw themselves on Hameln. I am continuing on Waren and will push forward my right as much as possible.

In order to hasten my march, I was obliged to form this morning at Neu-Brandenburg a depot for all lame and exhausted men. This indispensable measure reduces my corps to 12000 effective men, but this number of infantry will undoubtedly be sufficient. But I am short in cavalry. My three regiments are very weak on account of the forced marches and the many detachments which they have had to furnish. I have not today more than 600 horses available.

If I can obtain through your Highness' friendship a regiment of dragoons to be sent to Neu-Brandenburg, such a reinforcement would be a great help. I renew to your Highness my request to please return the orderlies of my three regiments which have been with his staff, if your Highness no longer needs them. The weakness of my cavalry has prevented me from pursuing the Royal stud which passed through Neu-Brandenburg the day before yesterday for Treptow and Anklam, to escape, undoubtedly via Usedom. I advise your Highness of this, as I am sure that it would be easy for you to gain on them and cut the Anklam road. I would be charmed if your Highness can manage to capture this fine prize.

Since we have been pursuing General Blucher's column, I have caused him to lose nearly 3000 men, either as prisoners, or stragglers, and we have captured an immense quantity of baggage.

Captain Larcher-Chaumont, engineers, whom I sent to your Highness from Gransee, has been taken prisoner. I have also since then sent you a sergeant major, carrying

three messages; I have not received any news of him. Through lack of officers, I have been obliged to send you non-commissioned officers.

Your affectionate cousin,

BERNADOTTE.

TO BERNADOTTE

M—2627

(Prince Murat's File)

Friedland, 31 October, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I hope that you have received my letter in which I informed you of the defeat of Prince Hohenlohe, of the capture of Stettin, of a detachment of 6000 men at Pasewalk and of my march on Pasewalk and Anklam; and I hereby request you to march on Strasburg and Woldeck. One of your staff officers on his way to the chief of staff has informed me of your position, and the letter which he carried furnished me information as to the movement which you intended to make tomorrow, and concerning the enemy. I will proceed tomorrow at 6:00 A.M. to Demmin and Jarmin and from there to Rostock or Stralsund according to the route which the enemy has taken. By this movement I will clean up both Prussian and Swedish Pomerania, whilst on your side you will drive the enemy out of Mecklenburg, and together we will thus within two days drive the enemy to the sea, without allowing any time to embark and thus forcing him to lay down his arms; I do not believe that he can escape towards your right; as he would then fall into the hands of Marshal Soult who is pursuing the Duke of Weimar, between those of Marshal Lannes who has remained in position with one division at Pasewalk, Prenzlau and Schwedt, and who should cover with all his light cavalry the entire country in our rear from Prenzlau as far as Oranienburg. I beg you to inform me as to your position tomorrow evening and to attempt to connect yourself with me by means of your light cavalry.

General Becker entered Anklam this morning where he took 500 prisoners among which 260 mounted cuirassiers,

he took an immense quantity of baggage, and the troops who left yesterday have embarked for Colberg I am told, which seems to confirm the statement that the Swedes do not wish to receive them.

A detachment of 1500 artillery, mounted, remained for two days in the vicinity of Friedland without orders, while an officer sought a French officer in order to surrender, the former begged an officer of Marshal Lannes whom he met on the street of Pasewalk, just as we arrived, to please accept their surrender. The detachment was escorting, 30 guns of large caliber and an immense quantity of ammunition. I am sending this convoy to Stettin. It is sufficient for us to meet the enemy in order to force him to surrender. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

M—2628
(Prince Murat's File)

Friedland, 31 October, 1806.

MARSHAL :

About 2000 men from all regiments of the Prussian army have passed through Friedland during the last three days to assemble at Anklam. General Becker entered this town this morning, he attacked the tail of the column of this detachment which was crossing the Peene and took about 500 prisoners, among which 250 mounted cuirassiers and an immense quantity of baggage. General Blucher is marching for Treptow and Demmin; I will march against him tomorrow morning, together with the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, whose headquarters this evening are at Waren. It seems that Blucher is maneuvering by his left and attempting to join the Duke of Weimar at Gustrow to go from there to embark at Rostock. I hope to prevent this. Being united with the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and convinced that we are strong enough, you may allow your army corps to rest in such billets as you think best to assign them to. I only ask that you let me know the place which you have selected.

Receive, Marshal, etc.,

MURAT.

TO NAPOLEON

M—2626
(WD Files)

Friedland, 31 October, 6:00 P.M.

SIRE :

I had the honor to inform you this morning that I was marching on Friedland and that I would summon through General Becker, the hostile detachment at Anklam, while General Lasalle would push in front of him everything on the Stettin-Anklam road by advancing on Strettensee. General Becker reports to me that he has carried out my orders, but that he has only captured the tail of this detachment, as the remainder crossed the Peene during the night and pulled up the drawbridge. 400 men were taken, among which 260 mounted cuirassiers. I am sending him one gun to knock down the drawbridge and drive off all who yet desire to defend the river crossing. This detachment is a grand mixture from all the corps of the army. Private letters captured at this town yesterday evening state that many regimental chests which were there were embarked during the night as well as all detachments, and that their destination is Colberg; this seems to confirm the statement that the King of Sweden does not wish to receive them. Not having any news from General Lasalle nor from the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, I have decided to open a letter from him addressed to the chief of staff, persuaded that I would find there information as to the enemy's movements and on that of the army corps of this prince. These dispatches confirm the retreat of Blucher on my left, but I do not think that he is as far away from me as he seems to think. I am certain that some troops of Blucher's corps were passing during all of yesterday via Schwanbeck and Treptow towards Demmin or Jarmin, which I will positively know about within a few hours, as I have sent eight detachments to all the points through which I believe the enemy is retiring. These reconnaissances are commanded by the most intelligent officers of their regiments. Tomorrow at 6:00 A.M. I will proceed towards Brest from which I will march towards Jarmin or Demmin according to reports from reconnaissances; this movement will connect me perfectly with the

Prince of Ponte-Corvo's corps, which tonight will be at Wären and which intends to follow in rear of the enemy; from there I will act according to circumstances. What is certain, is that I will clean up all Prussian Pomerania and Holstein, if the enemy decides to flee, through this duchy. I will even be in a position to enter Swedish Pomerania if they take refuge there. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo will on his side chase them out of all of Mecklenburg. I will constantly occupy Anklam with a detachment which will have its retreat assured via Stettin. If I decide to march on Demmin, I will direct General Lasalle on the bridge of Jarmin via Krien. I met this morning one league from Friedland the main artillery park which had surrendered to one of Marshal Lannes's officers; a detachment of a few men who reconnoitered on my left brought in 60 mounted artillerymen who were on their way to join the same park which was going to Stettin. Sire, I am counting that within two days we will have driven the enemy to the Baltic Sea.

I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO GENERAL HULIN*

UCN—754

31 October, 1806.

Detachment of 48 men from the 10th Mounted Chasseurs at the disposal of the commandant of the fortress at Berlin.

274 men of the 25th Light Infantry, 99 of the 69th, 103 of the 59th, 314 men of the 50th to form a battalion to keep garrison at Berlin until further orders; they will form a part of Marshal Ney's corps waiting for him at Berlin.

A new battalion commander: be careful to have the battalion given whatever is necessary and barracked in a place which shall be called Marshal Ney's barrack. The 270 men of the 55th, the 232 of the 75th will be joined with other detachments of Marshal Soult, designated this morning, and will form a battalion in barracks called Marshal Soult's bat-

*Memorandum in Marshal Berthier's hand.

talion, and will join that army corps which he passed through Berlin. The 300 men of the 25th Line to set out tomorrow to join Marshal Davout's corps at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN—755

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, all the colonels of heavy cavalry regiments report to me that they have not received orders for the formation of their 5th squadrons; this, however, is becoming very pressing. The train battalion which is at Douai need not buy horses; send me the men without horses. I have as many as I desire; I only need men to drive them. Send me as many unmounted cavalymen as you can, though leaving a few in the depots to receive the horses which have been contracted for. I have sent for the four regiments of cuirassiers that I have in Italy, by way of Inspruck, leaving their 4th squadrons in Italy; their fifth squadrons must also be formed up to 797 horses. The dragoon regiments should be carried to their full number of 828 horses. This will cost you nothing, for the unmounted dragoons whom I had here are already mounted and armed, with the horses, saddles and sabres of the Prussians. The chasseurs and husars should also be completed to 828 horses. Notwithstanding the great number of horses which I have, I desire that all the contracts which have been accepted up to now be carried into effect, since many die and a great many are used up.

NAPOLEON.

PART III

German Documents

CHAPTER VIII

The German Order of Battle

From The Jena Campaign

BY
COLONEL F. N. MAUDE,
British Army

THE ORDER OF BATTLE

I. Principal Prussian Army—Field Marshal, Duke of Brunswick (Quartermaster-General, Colonel von Scharnhorst).

Advance Guard—General of Cavalry, Duke Karl August of Saxe-Weimar. (Staff Officer—Captain von Muffling).

Light Troops: Major General von Rudorf.

Colonel von Yorck.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Rudorf Hussars.
Frussjager Battalion.

Colonel von Wedell.

Wedell Fusilier Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Rudorf Hussars.

Main Body: Duke of Brunswick-Oels.

1st Brigade: Colonel von Frankenberg (temp.).
Kunheim Regiment.
Borcke Regiment.

2nd Brigade: Colonel von Kaminsky (temp.).
Brunswick-Oels Regiment.
Owstien Regiment.
6-pr. Battery, Thadden.

Cavalry: Major-General von Pelet.

Bayern Dragoons.
Horse Artillery Battery, Wegener.
½ Pletz Hussars.

1st Division (right wing)—Lieut. General Prince of Orange.
(Staff Officer—Captain von Scholer).

1st Brigade: Colonel von Lutzon.

12-pr. Battery, Lehmann.
Knebel Grenadier Battalion.
Mollendorf Regiment.
Wartensleben Regiment.

2nd Brigade: Colonel von Schimonski.

Puttkammer Regiment.
Prince Ferdinand Regiment.
Rheinbaben Grenadier Battalion.
12-pr. Battery, Riemer.

Cavalry: H. R. H. Prince William.

Leib Cuirassiers.
Horse Artillery Battery, Willmann.
Leib Carabiniers.

Light Troops: Major-General von Oswald.

Half Wurttemberg Hussars.
Oswald Fusilier Battalion.

2nd Division (center)—Lieut. General Graf von Wartensleben.
(Staff Officer—Captain von Kyckpusch).

1st Brigade: Major General von Renouard.

12-pr. Battery, v. Heuser.
Alt-Braun Grenadier Battalion.
Brunswick Luneberg Regiment.
Louis Ferdinand Regiment.
12-pr. Battery, Lange.

2nd Brigade: Major-General von Wedell.

Renouard Regiment.
Kleist Regiment.
Haustein Grenadier Battalion.
12-pr. Battery, Wilkens.

Cavalry: Major-General von Quitzow.

Quitzow Cuirassiers.
Horse Artillery Battery, Merkatz.
Reitzenstein Cuirassiers.

Light Troops: Colonel von Klock.

Irwing Dragoons.
Klock Fusilier Battalion.

3rd Division (left wing)—Lieut. General Graf von Schmettau.
(Staff Officer—Captain von Liebhaber).

1st Brigade: Major-General von Alvensleben.

12-pr. Battery, Stankar.
Krafft Grenadier Battalion.
Malschitsky Regiment.
Schimonski Regiment.

2nd Brigade: Major General von Schimonski.

Prince Henry Regiment.
Alvensleben Regiment.
Schack Grenadier Battalion.
12-pr. Battery, Rohl.

Cavalry: Major-General von Bunting.

Heising Cuirassiers.
Horse Artillery Battery, Schorlemmer.
Bunting Cuirassiers.

Light Troops: Major-General von Greiffenberg.

Weimar Sharpshooters.
Greiffenberg Fusilier Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Wurttemberg Hussars.

Reserve—General of Cavalry, Graf von Kalckreuth. (Staff Officer—Major von Lossau.)

1st Reserve Division—Lieut. General Graf von Kuhnheim. (Staff Officer—Lieut. von Perbandt.)

1st Brigade: Major General von Hirschfeld.

12-pr. Battery, Faber.
Guards (three battalions).
Guard Grenadier Battalion.

2nd Brigade: Major General von Zastrow.

King's Regiment.
Rabiel Grenadier Battalion.
Prince August Grenadier Battalion.
7-pr. Howitzer Battery, Alkier.

Cavalry: Major General von Beeren.

Body Guard.
Gensdarmes.
Horse Artillery Battery, Scholten.
Beeren Cuirassiers.

2nd Reserve Division:—Lieut. General von Arnim. (Staff Officer Captain von Tiedemann.)

1st Brigade: Major General von Zenge.

11-pr. Battery, Heiden.
Gaudy Grenadier Battalion.
Osten Grenadier Battalion.
Arnim Regiment.
Pirch Regiment.

2nd Brigade: Major General von Malschitsky.

Zenge Regiment.
Schlieffen Grenadier Battalion.
Hulsen Grenadier Battalion.
12-pr. Battery, Bychelberg.

Cavalry: Major General von Irwing.

Half Queen's Dragoons.
Horse Artillery Battery Graumann.
Half Queen's Dragoons.

SUMMARY

	<i>Battalions</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>	<i>Batteries</i>	
Advance Guard -----	10	20	2	} or 58,300 men
1st Division -----	11	15	3	
2nd Division -----	11	15	4	
3rd Division -----	12	15	3	
1st Reserve Division ----	8	15	3	
2nd Reserve Division ----	10	10	3	
Total -----	62	90	18	

II, Hohenlohe's Army—General of Infantry—Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (Chief of Staff—Colonel von Massenbach).

Advance Guard—Lieut. General H. R. H. Prince Louis Ferdinand.
(General Staff Officer on Oct. 9-10, Captain von Valentini.)

Light Troops: Major General von Schimmelpfennig.

Horse Artillery Battery Gause.
Schimmelpfennig Hussars.
Two Jager Companies.
Pelet Fusilier Battalion.
Ruhle Fusilier Battalion.
Rebenau Fusilier Battalion.
Saxon Hussars.

Main Body:

6-pr. Battery, Riemann.
Muffling Regiment.
Clemens Regiment.
Kurfurst Regiment.
4-pr. Battery Hoyer.

1st Division (Right Wing)—Lieut. General von Grawert.

1st Brigade: Major General von Muffling.

12-pr. Battery, Glasenapp.
Hahn Grenadier Battalion.
Hohenlohe Regiment.
Sanitz Regiment.

2nd Brigade: Colonel von Schimonski.

Zastrow Regiment.
Grawert Regiment.
Sack Grenadier Battalion.
12-pr. Battery, Wolframsdorf.

Right Wing Cavalry: Lieut. General von Holzendorf.

Major General Graf Henckel.

Holtzendorff Cuirassiers.

Horse Artillery Battery, Steinwehr.

Henckel Cuirassiers.

Colonel von Heister.

Krafft Dragoons.

Light Troops: Colonel von Erichsen.

Gettkandt Hussars.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Battery Horse Artillery, Studnitz.

Erichsen Fusilier Battalion.

2nd Division (left wing)—General of Cavalry, von Zeszchwitz.
Infantry: Lieut. General von Niesemeuschel.

1st Brigade: Major General von Burisdorf.

8-pr. Battery, Haussmann.

Thummel Regiment.

Prince Xavier Regiment.

Prince Friedrich August Regiment.

8-pr. Battery, Ernst.

2nd Brigade: Major General Dyherrn.

2nd Battalion Bevilaqua Regiment.

Low Regiment.

Niesemeuschel Regiment.

12-pr. Battery, Bonriot.

Left Wing Cavalry: Major General von Kochtitsky.

Carabiniers.

Horse Artillery Battery, Grossmann.

Albrecht Light Cavalry.

Koschtitsky Cuirassiers.

Light Troops.

Boguslawski Fusilier Battalion.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Battery Horse Artillery, Studnitz.

Polenz Light Cavalry.

Reserve Division: Lieut. General von Prittwitz.

Major General von Sanitz.

12-pr. Battery, Schulenburg.

Losthin Grenadier Battalion.

Graf Dohna Grenadier Battalion.

Borcke Grenadier Battalion.

Half Kollin Grenadier Battalion.

Major General von Cerrini.

Thiollaz Grenadier Battalion.

Lecoq Grenadier Battalion.

Lichtenhayr Grenadier Battalion.

Metzsch Grenadier Battalion.

Hundt Grenadier Battalion.

Shell Gun Battery Tullmarr.

Cavalry: Major General von Krafft.

Prittwitz Dragoons.
Horse Artillery Battery, Hahn.
Clemens Light Cavalry.

Taumentzen's Corps—Major General Count Taumentzen.

Major General von Zweifel.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Herwarth Grenadier Battalion.
Zweifel Regiment.

Major General von Schonberg.

Rechten Regiment.
Prince Maximilian's Regiment.
Winckel Grenadier Battalion.
Shell Gun Battery, Kotsch.

Light Troops: Major General von Bila.

Bila Hussars (five Squadrons).
Two Jäger Companies.
Rosen Fusilier Battalion.
Prince Johann Light Cavalry.

	<i>Battalions</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>	<i>Batteries</i>	
Advance Guard -----	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	3	} or 46,500 men
1st Division -----	11	25	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
2nd Division -----	12	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Reserve Division -----	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	3	
Taumentzen -----	9	9	1	
Total -----	50	77	15	

CHAPTER IX
EXTRACTS FROM
Notes on Prussia During the Grand
Catastrophe of 1806

BY CLAUSEWITZ

TRANSLATED BY
COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA
Field Artillery

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR—THE PREPARATION

* * * * *

At the commencement of June (1806) M. de Talleyrand declared frankly to Lord Yarmouth that if Fox was employed as a negotiator, Hanover would never be a source of difficulty. The Prussian cabinet then commenced to mistrust the situation with regard to France; it felt a sort of anguish and saw that the honor of the state would again be in danger.

But little time had elapsed since Count Haugwitz had signed the Treaty of Vienna, and the following serious steps had been taken against Prussian interest preceding this last blow, which no one knew whether they were an outrage or a deceit:

1. The organization of the Confederation of the Rhine which followed immediately after the peace of Presbourg, when not a single word had been said about it during the negotiations, and without Austria or even Prussia having knowledge of it;

2. The factions which excited France to interfere in the formation by Prussia of a Confederation of the North of Germany, although it had itself proposed this as an equivalent;

3. Fulda had been offered to the Elector of Hesse if he would enter the Confederation of the Rhine: to the Elector of Hesse who was to be one of the principal members of the Confederation of the North, Fulda which belonged to the brother-in-law of the King, the Prince of Orange, to whom no proper satisfaction had been given for his just aspirations;

4. The Grand Duke of Berg had seized the convents of Verden and Essen, although these had never belonged to Cleves;

5. France itself occupied Wesel, although Prussia had ceded this town only to the Grand Duke of Berg.

* * * * *

The French had still in south Germany an army of 80,000 to 100,000 men, and another army assembling on the lower Rhine, and the Prussian court well foresaw that the bad feeling of the Emperor of the French would soon fall on them like a clap of thunder. It therefore decided, at the commencement of August to mobilize its army on a war footing and to assemble it in Saxony.

Prussia then was to mobilize again, at the very moment when Russia and England were negotiating at Paris for a separate peace. It was a real stroke of fortune for Prussia that these two powers had been unable to come to an understanding with France. The Emperor of Russia refused his ratification to the treaty which his Ambassador, Oubril, provided with full powers, had concluded at Paris in a hasty manner. There was in this treaty a particularly inappropriate requirement. M. d'Oubril, whose instructions were rather directed towards the idea of having a definite peace, learned during July, just after his arrival at Paris, of the organization of the Confederation of the Rhine, and of the signing on the 12th of July of the Act of Confederation. Instead of being disturbed at this and asking for new instructions from his court, he saw in this act an immediate danger for Austria, and thought to save this state by signing a definite peace with France on condition that the French troops should evacuate Germany as soon as possible. It is hard to understand that M. d'Oubril could believe that such conditions of peace would raise an obstacle, even if only a

diplomatic one, to a war against Austria or Prussia. There could not be a better analogy than that of children, who in order to capture birds try to place salt upon their tails.

The English negotiations at Paris were leading to no issue when the death of the illustrious Fox hastened this result.

Thus in September, or at least later, Prussia could again hope to appear not all alone on the field of battle.

In August, as has already been said, agreements had been come to with Sweden by abandoning Lauenbourg, and with England it was easy to abandon suddenly the hostile attitude in view of the fact that Gray, after the death of Fox, had crossed over to the opposition party in the government, and did not have the same zeal as his predecessor for peace with France. The arrangement for subsidies and assistance from England was not, however, established until later, but a few days before the battle of Auerstaedt.

With Russia there was still a sort of an alliance, and Colonel Krusemark was sent in September to Petersburg to reopen negotiations concerning supporting troops which Russia was to send.

With Saxony an alliance was concluded which added 25,000 men to the Prussian army, and negotiations were started with Hesse as the Elector did not wish to declare himself too soon.

* * * * *

* * * * * The Prussian army had a strength of about 200,000 men. It could be foreseen that hardly 150,000 of these would appear on the field of battle. With this force victory was not thoroughly assured, and if it was sufficient for this, it was only as against the army which France could bring up at the beginning of the operations. There was no doubt that another army would soon follow this into the theater of operations and it was necessary to foresee considerable losses which would have to be compensated for during the first weeks.

The Prussian army had made but two campaigns in 45 years and these were only partial wars. The principle of promotion by seniority had resulted in filling the high grades with old men. They carried along poorly in times of peace;

but in the field, in a war to the death against young and vigorous leaders, it was foolish to employ such means.

The political relation which Prussia had with the great powers was the result of the preceding politics, and these were not so particularly favorable as to be able to turn matters to its advantage. But the small princes scattered in the middle of Prussia made but one political system with it; they could and should be lead to the same degree in the extraordinary efforts which Prussia then itself made.

Electoral Saxony, the Dukes of Saxony, the two Mecklenburgs, Electoral Hesse, the Princes of Anhalt, Schwarzburg and Lippe, the Duke of Brunswick, etc., could mobilize a force of 60,000 to 70,000 men, while in October 1806, there were only 18,000 Saxons. But in a battle, 10,000 men may decide many things, and 50,000 men still more.

There was little hope of opening the campaign with success and of remaining in Saxony until the arrival of the Russians. The war should therefore have proceeded towards the Vistula and everything been arranged accordingly.

As a result the following extraordinary measures should have formed a part of the preparations for war:

1. The assembling of a considerable sum of money, either through a loan or through war contributions.

2. The raising of 100,000 men during the months of August as soon as the war was decided upon to organize the reserve battalions.

3. The organization of field batteries in numbers corresponding to the number of bronze guns withdrawn from forts and replaced by iron guns.

4. The purchase of 200,000 muskets in Austria and England.

5. The transfer of all military stores from undefended towns into fortresses.

6. The construction of bridgeheads over the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula.

7. The retirement of those generals, field officers and captains who were too old; the promotion of some young men to high grades; the assignment to command of forts, of some young men who would have had to determine their fate.

8. Finally, an amicable but powerful action on the little states.

From these eight measures, prescribed by sound reason, if one thought on the dangers of the time, not a single one was taken, because it was the custom to think of nothing else except mobilization.

The Court understood clearly, subject to possible minor errors, the strength of the forces which the Prussian army would regularly have in August 1806, viz:

INFANTRY

	<i>Soldiers</i>
1. 58 regiments of infantry, of 2 battalions of 5 companies each, a company containing 172 men not counting officers and musicians, making a total in soldiers-----	99,760
2. 29 battalions of grenadiers, at 4 companies each, of the same strength as above, making a total in grenadiers-----	19,952
3. 24 battalions of fusiliers, at 4 companies each, same strength as above, making a total in fusiliers-----	16,512
4. 1 regiment of chasseurs, of 3 battalions of 600 men each, giving a total of chasseurs-----	1,800
5. 5 battalions of guards at 4 companies each-----	3,440
Total infantry-----	141,464

CAVALRY

	<i>Troopers</i>
1. 12 regiments of cuirassiers, at 5 squadrons each, each squadron having 132 troopers, making in all 60 squadrons of cuirassiers-----	7,920
2. 14 regiments of dragoons, of which 12 regiments had 5 squadrons, and 2 regiments had 10 squadrons each; each squadron having 162 troopers, making a total of 80 squadrons, and of dragoons-----	10,560
3. 15 squadrons of Uhlans, at 162 troopers-----	2,430
4. 9½ regiments of Hussars, at 10 squadrons of 162 troopers, making a total of 92 squadrons and of Hussars-----	15,390
Total cavalry, 250 squadrons-----	36,300

ARTILLERY

	<i>Men</i>
1. 4 regiments of foot artillery at ---- companies, each company containing ---- men; 10 mounted companies each of ---- men, making a total in artillery-----	8,000

STRENGTH OF FIELD TROOPS:-----185,764

58 3d Battalions at 500 men each-----29,000

58 companies of convalescents at 50 men each-----2,900

Total for garrison troops-----31,900

TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARMY-----217,664

This total can be considered as 200,000 men in round numbers, taking into considerations that naturally all or-

ganizations would not have *their full authorized strength, allowing for a shortage of one-twelfth on an average.**

Of these 200,000 men, one could expect to find at least 150,000 in the theater of operations, by replacing 50,000 men by garrison troops, and allowing for leaving some field troops in certain fortresses. But the results were far from being so favorable.

For reasons difficult to understand, the troops of East Prussia were not at first mobilized, and consequently they were not brought to Saxony. Some people thought that this was accounted for by ideas of economy, and that it being intended to join these troops to the supporting Russian army, it was desirable to economize by not placing them on a war footing before they were needed. To this was also added the idea that it was impracticable to form a reserve army. This idea entirely confused and filled people's heads. While tactical reserves are to be recommended, on the other hand an idea to retain strategical reserves from forces all ready is contrary to good sense. The reason for this is that battles decide the fate of the war, and that the employment

*The above calculation varies in some details, from the correct return of the troops; however, the figures for the total are only slightly modified.

There was in 1806:

- 57 regiments of infantry at 19 companies each;
- 1 regiment of infantry of 2 companies (new organization);
- 29 battalions of grenadiers of 4 companies each;
- 1 battalion of guards of 4 companies;
- 1 regiment of foot chasseurs of 12 companies;
- 24 battalions of fusiliers at 4 companies each;
- 13 regiments of cuirassiers at 5 squadrons each;
- 12 regiments of dragoons at 5 squadrons each;
- 2 regiments of dragoons of 10 squadrons each;
- 1½ Towarcyn regiments at 10 squadrons each;
- 9½ regiments of hussars at 10 squadrons each;
- 4 regiments of foot artillery at 10 companies each;
- 1 regiment of mounted artillery at 10 companies each;
- 1 detachment pontoniers of 2½ companies;
- 1 detachment of mining troops of 4 companies;
- 58 3d battalions at 4 companies each;
- 52 companies of convalescents.

Total strength of the army then was in 1806, according to a report made in 1817 (K.A.—D.9), 239,800 combatants not counting the convalescents. On the other hand the subsistence returns for 1806 account only for 6,683 officers and 200,239 combatants, exclusive of the guard troops, who were not included in this return, and exclusive of the convalescents, but including all men absent on furlough. (*Note of German Editor.*)

of tactical reserves precedes the decision, while the employment of strategical reserves follows the decision. What would anyone say of the coachman who would detach one-half of his horses before an obstacle in order to have them in reserve if the others became exhausted? But this idea of the use of a strategical reserve, which is still constantly appearing at the present time, was certainly very plausible for people at the time we are considering; it is therefore very easy to believe that it was thought that it would be as practicable as economical to leave the troops in East Prussia quietly in their garrisons. These consisted ordinarily of 21,000 field troops. The reason why 10,000 field troops remained in the Duchy of Warsaw was a no better one, although it was more habitual. There was no confidence as to this country and it was not believed desirable to withdraw its garrison completely. As a matter of fact, it would have been worth while to protect Warsaw against a revolutionary movement by mean of a strong garrison, *had there been sufficient forces*, but under the circumstances, with a David going out to fight a Goliath, it was only by assembling all forces against the principal enemy that success could have been expected. If the French were beaten in Franconia, the Poles could not undertake anything; if our own troops were beaten, it would certainly be necessary to call up the troops in rear areas.

Six battalions of field troops also remained in Silesia, as it was believed that the garrison troops were not sufficient to guard the fortresses. As the forts in Silesia were in no way threatened while the fighting was in Saxony, and as it was possible in case of retreat to send from Saxony a detachment to Silesia, these 4,000 men could and should have marched against the enemy. It is therefore necessary to deduct from the 186,000 field troops the following:

	<i>Soldiers</i>
In East Prussia	21,424
In Silesia	4,300
In South Prussia	10,320
Artillery	2,000
Total	38,044*

*The numbers given by Clausewitz as to the strength of troops left in rear areas are in general too large. The prescribed strength of these troops in war, in round numbers was 33,000 men. (*Note by German Editor.*)

The remainder therefore is 148,000 for the theater of operations.

But a detachment of these troops, consisting of 11,700 men, was in Westphalia, partly on garrison duty at Hameln and Minden, and partly as a small observation detachment under General Le Coq. Therefore there remained in the principal theater of war in Saxony only 136,000 men.

But our army at Thuringia was at the end of September scarcely 110,000 strong. There was thus a deficiency in effective strength of more than 26,000 men, which can be easily explained by considering the system of recruiting and the desertions which followed; the prescribed strengths were rarely obtained, and still less so now that recruiting had been suspended for several years and that the last conscripts had been during spring, and that it had been necessary to leave in rear areas the many sick which the army had at the time of mobilization. The rapid and unaccustomed marches had slightly increased the number of sick; finally in view of the lack of practice in war and its strenuousness, the regiments had a great number of detached men who being on special duties were not present at the battle. Under these conditions the deficiency of 25,000 to 26,000 men, that is to say of one-fifth was not extraordinarily large; the Prussian ministry should have foreseen this condition and should have taken suitable measures in consequence.

Thus of the famous Prussian army of 220,000 men all to be ready for battle, only one-half was actually present and ready* for the most decisive battle which it was possible to undertake.

The political preparation for the war did not show any improvement over the military preparations.

As war was everywhere feared it was found impossible to abandon the last hope for peace. This hesitation at the

*The examination of the Archives as to the actual strength of the Prussian Army placed in march at the commencement of October, show numerous reports differing from one another. For example, Scharnhorst in his "Report to the Court of the Battles of Auerstaedt and Iena," states the total force was 96,840 combatants. But on the other hand Hoepfner states 141,911 men were present. The former statement is certainly too small, the latter too large. The number given by Clausewitz should be very close to the truth. A. Niessel.

last turn of the road, although it would have been for the most impracticable thing in the world, is the form under which feebleness of character is most often and most clearly shown. Nothing is more regrettable than not to show firm determination before an unavoidable danger. In order to ascertain if the danger is truly unavoidable princes should disassociate themselves from courtiers who only speak with their lips, and through good sense inquire from people who have proper intelligence. In August and in September, it was still believed possible to avoid war, that is to say it was hoped to meet Bonaparte on some middle ground, and in consequence it was not desired to become bound up too much in advance with England and Russia. It was not desired to make a decision before the report of General Knobelsdorff had arrived from Paris, from which it clearly appears that this poor diplomat had not been sent with the sole idea of deceiving the French, but that a last hope was expected from his personality. But what sad means! This report did not arrive until September 17th. If this intention had been in mind, a treaty should have been concluded at London during September, but this was not done until November, and then in East Prussia.* Instead of ardently seeking the assistance of England, especially in order to obtain arms and money, the arrival of Lord Morpeth at GHQ at Weimar, was awaited; and this person did not arrive until October 12, that is to say, two days before the battle.

Naturally a treaty cannot be concluded before a battle. However, a declaration of Marquis Lucchesini that negotiations depended on the result of the battle is an astonishing one. In ordinary cases, one could have expected such a declaration from Lord Morpeth. But while English politics and the entire system of government of this country are too strong, too powerful and too great to withdraw before a possible change, on the other hand Prussian politics had become too incoherent to attach itself under misfortunes under a stronger government with a view to re-

*The negotiations with England were renewed during November, but a treaty was not concluded until the end of January, 1807. (See Martens, the Report of the Principle Treaty of Alliances, suppl. IV. 411.)

newed assistance. In a word, no assistance for the campaign of 1806 was obtained from England.

The situation did not seem any better with regard to Russia. Colonel Krusemark, who could have been sent to Petersburg at the end of August, as the reply of the Emperor had then been already received, did not leave until the day after that on which General Knobelsdorff's report arrived, that is on the 18th of September. He was to arrange for what was necessary concerning the march of the supporting army; but the results showed that an immediate demand for rapid assistance was not made, as the Russian army, which was ready on the frontier, although only 50,000 strong, could have been available on the Oder by the middle of November, which would have made a considerable difference. It was certainly not necessary to wait on the good wishes of the Emperor for political difficulties and hesitations. If therefore the Russian army did not cross the frontier until November, the fault certainly lies in the erroneous opinion of the Russian Cabinet, who had left in their garrisons the troops of East and Central Prussia. At the end of October a long convention with the Prussian government concerning the subsistence of the Russian supporting troops was concluded at Grodno, and between all this red tape, all supporting action for the campaign of 1806 was thrust aside.

The selection of the man sent to Petersburg also shows that there was no important mission in sending him, and that the only thought was to arrange for carrying out the arrangements mentioned above. Colonel Krusemark was the aide or more exactly confidential messenger of Marshal Moellendorf, a man of wordly and agreeable manners, but absolutely ignorant, without a single distinguishing natural talent; he had not been up to now employed in any State affair except as a subordinate in two diplomatic missions. His position in the State was not such as to give him importance; it can therefore be easily believed that he was not sent to carry out any extraordinary thing, as it was impossible to count on his personal worth for any such tasks. It has also been said that it was necessary to arrange a plan of operations with the Russians. This subject would be to

him still more strange than any other, and besides it was not the time for this, as the Russian army was 150 miles in rear of the Prussian army.

With Saxony there had been difficulty in arranging for a treaty by which this country would send 18,000 men to the Prussian army, that is, nearly one-half of its own army.*

The treaty was completed so late, that the Saxon troops were the last to come into line and this caused several days' delay. As to the Mecklenburgers, the population of Anhalt and Schwartzburg, the Dukes of Saxony, the Houses of Lippe and the Duke of Brunswick, neutrality had been generously accorded these, as if the addition of their 10,000 or 20,000 men would have been of no use. The Duke of Brunswick alone sent one battalion of chasseurs.

The Elector of Hesse turned towards Prussian politics. He wished to wait for a victory of the Prussian arms in order to immediately declare himself, and in case this victory should not occur, he would be always protected by the sacred rites of neutrality, strong as a rock in a wild sea. This weakness and character was immediately punished by the most lamentable catastrophe; but in fact this was just and proper. It would have been unheard of that such a political course should be crowned with great success. But that the Prussian Cabinet tolerated this conduct of the Hessian Court was also very weak. Our troops crossed Hessian territory in order to march from Westphalia into Thuringia; this in itself was sufficient to prevent any choice of action to the Elector and 15,000 Hessians were not to be disdained.

For these reasons the Prussian army in Thuringia in front of the French, instead of having with it a detachment of 50,000 Allies, only had 18,000 Saxons.

Without these mistakes of the Cabinet and without those which were made in the preparations for the war, by employing only troops on hand and without any extraordinary effort, there could have been opposed to the enemy 200,000 men, whereas there were only assembled 130,000 men. If in spite of the superiority thus obtained, the first

*The North of Saxony troops which took part in the war can be estimated as about 20,000 men. The Saxon army then consisted of 30,548 men in all.—*A. Niessel.*

battles had been lost, they would not have been lost in the sense of being irremediable disasters.

At Paris also the affairs of the Prussian Cabinet were not remarkably carried out; M. de Lucchesini had been recalled because he had finally given the alarm. General Knobelsdorff was sent there, as it was known he would be agreeable to the French. He was very agreeable to them as he was the son-in-law of Count Dedem, Dutch ambassador at Constantinople, and during the time he was stationed at Constantinople, he was strongly impressed by French influences; but he was a diplomat without vigor and without spirit.

In the same spirit were the pretexts which M. de Knobelsdorff sought at Paris, before he was charged with delivering the ultimatum of our Court. During the month of September, he pretended: that the mobilizations made by Prussia were the result of appeals addressed to the King by the people, hostile and envious to France, and which the King would soon circumvent. In this language could be recognized the politics of Count Haugwitz, after the instructions which he gave to Knobelsdorff. Such imprudence should at least have been connected with great ability, if it was not to become dangerous and ridiculous.

On October 1, General de Knobelsdorff was finally forced to use other language and to deliver the Prussian ultimatum to the French ministry. This ultimatum required as a necessary condition for demobilization of Prussia:

(1) That the French troops, without exception should recross the line without delay.

(2) That no obstacles whatever should be presented to the formation of the Confederation of the North.

(3) That Wesel should be separated from the French Empire, and turned over to the Grand Duke of Berg.

(4) That the three monasteries unjustly occupied by the Grand Duke of Berg should be re-occupied by Prussian troops.

A reply was preemptorily required to be at the headquarters of the King by October 8.

Although this ultimatum did not in any way mention the principal questions, and although the French could conform to them, without the basic situation of Prussia being improved in any way, there was nevertheless a lack of tact and of non-attention in sending this ultimatum to Paris,

from which place Bonaparte had left six days before to join his army. If at the last moment it was desired to seek a way for negotiations this could only have been through imperial headquarters. It would have been much less presumptuous to have used such decisive language at Paris to M. de Talleyrand, as it would have been more impolite to say hurtful things to one through his subordinates than to say it to him personally. But the language which had been used was in no way suitable. Without losing anything in its dignity and its decisiveness, Napoleon could have been made to understand, through passive and negative phrases what the King of Prussia wanted. It would then have been possible to remain on the defensive, diplomatically as well as politically, and one would not have invited a double opposition by a dominating tone; on the one hand, with the politics of the Cabinet, without courage during several years and with the language previously used by de Knobelsdorff, while on the other hand with the insufficiency of our military and political forces.

But the Prussian Cabinet consisted of impossible elements and in such a case two things were always lacking: Unity and proportion in action. It fell heavily from one extreme to the other.

To wait any other reply to this ultimatum than that made by guns, to delay actual war for fourteen days, was truly the result of feebleness resting on last hope, and this was the result of a good quixotic nature.

CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1806

From what has already been stated, it follows that on account of the poor dispositions taken from the military organization of Prussia, that in September, not more than 110,000 men were assembled in the theater of operations in Thuringia. The Saxons were 18,000 strong; with them the army had 128,000 men. But 15,000 men under Duke Eugene of Wurtemberg, were not available at the beginning of the campaign, should it open in the first half of October. Consequently 113,000 men only remained.

The strength of the French had increased to about 130,000 men.* Their strength was not exactly known; but it was believed that a force of 80,000 or 100,000 men might be met, if a prompt advance was made into Franconia.†

Under these circumstances only two plans could promise success. The first was: to remain on the defensive and to retire slowly on the approach of the enemy, without fighting a decisive battle, to in rear of the Elbe, and the Oder, unite with the Russians and with the Prussians who were in back areas, and then offer battle either in Silesia or in Poland with all forces united. If the Saxons did not disappear, and if the Russians joined with 50,000 men, there should have been, allowing for losses in combat and for garrisons left in the forts of the Elbe and the Oder, a force of 150,000 men, while the French could have brought hardly 80,000 men to beyond the Oder. But the Saxons might, under these circumstances, quickly conclude peace and join their 18,000 men to the French. There might also well have been lost 10,000 men through desertion; the proportion then instead of being 150 against 80 might have been 120 against 100.

On account of these last limitations for a favorable result which might be expected by a withdrawal into the heart of a country and because it was not desired to abandon so many provinces in principle, as this was believed to be contrary to the honor of the Prussian name to make such a long retreat without a battle, and because finally this was entirely unusual and no one could be found who had such an idea, this plan was not discussed at all. This was, however, an abstraction due to moral factors and was quite natural.

The second plan was: to advance rapidly into Franconia and with the entire army assembled to fall into the midst of the French cantonments, to defeat their corps separately before they could unite, and thus force them to retreat to beyond the Rhine. It was believed that if this blow should

*The strength of the French troops in the theater of operation, exclusive of the Bavarians, according to most recent calculations was in October around 150,000 men. The strength of the Guard, given by Clausewitz in the next footnote, was only 6,000 men.—*A. Niessel*.

†As a matter of fact the 30,000 men of the Guard did not leave Paris until September 19th; they arrived at Mayence by forced marches on the 28th.—*Clausewitz*.

succeed, that a good moral base would have been acquired for an increase of force and of confidence in themselves, and also from a consideration as to the method of supply, although the circumstances as to this were only slightly favorable. It was hoped to acquire after such a blow: all of North Germany, to gain time, to call up the Russians and the troops in East Prussia, arrange for debarkation of the English and for new munitions from the Austrians. These advantages which it was hoped to obtain from such a happy blow were not exaggerated, but the blow itself was not a simple task. The expression "fall upon the cantonments and separately defeat the corps" has like many military expressions a very indefinite meaning, and when the expression is closely examined nothing more appears in it than a figure of rhetoric.

An entire army does not allow itself to be surprised in its billets in the same manner that an isolated battalion might; it is understood by this that an advance should be so rapid that the army has not time to assemble on a point within the area of its cantonments. It must therefore choose a point in rear, and the farther as the extent of its cantonments is the greater. If such a strategical surprise is vigorously exploited, it is possible that one or more corps may be prevented from reaching this point of assembly; but this could never be simultaneously the case for all the corps. If now isolated corps thus attacked may be forced to fight separately, a considerable advantage will be gained. We would be very superior in strength to them and we would thus be able to attack them from several directions at the same time and thus crush them. But corps take good care to present a proper front; they seek to gain the open, and the usual result is:

- (1) that a greater or lesser extent of terrain is gained;
- (2) if the surprise has been well carried out, and if there is a certain amount of disorder within the adversary's lines, some small fractions are strongly pressed, so that the total losses may finally be considerable. If account is taken of the war experience of the French army, it can hardly be believed that there was much chance for such a result from a surprise accompanied by improper conduct of the enemy.

It is from this point of view that the surprise was undertaken, and it was not possible to see any other point of view. It was hoped in case of success, to prevent the French by a rapid penetration within their cantonments, from finding in South Germany a general point of assembly; then they would be forced to make their concentration on the other side of the Rhine with a great number of minor losses. If one of the French marshals was bold enough to fight us with one or two corps, he would have been attacked with a superior force, and to the precedent advantages we would have added a battle won.

But many people will say: Bonaparte is not really a man to whom one can attribute such faults, and who can be surpassed in rapidity of action and indecisions. Bonaparte might have committed serious and even enormous errors; he was besides capable of complete neglect of foresight; experience later well showed this. But in fact this could not then have been known and proved by experience. But we state that in departing from the point of view of the commanding generals at the time, it was an absolute requirement for the conduct of the war, to believe in the possibility of the enemy committing faults and in succeeding in matters in which we were not accustomed. Whoever does not wish to conceive this, does not know thoroughly what is being discussed; he does not understand the question and does not understand himself. He places a pencil on the spring of a watch and wishes it to go by itself. If then it was not possible to state that such a success was impossible for local reasons, the question is only of knowing if the exterior reasons were such as to give it a general appearance of truth.

The King decided on war at the commencement of August. Eight days were spent in issuing instructions, fourteen for mobilization; the army was then mobilized by the end of August. The troops in West Prussia were in fact placed in march during the end of August. As the troops in East and Central Prussia were not called, and as those in West Prussia were to form a reserve corps, it then remained to unite rapidly the troops from Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania, Magdeburg, and Westphalia, the garrisons of which were within 60 miles of Erfurt. In three

weeks, that is to say by the middle of September, the army could have been united and made available at the edge of the forest of Thuringia without the French being able to take any other measures than those they did take; as the mobilization and troop movements of the Prussians really commenced on August 9th, and in the first half of September the Prussians commenced to assemble in Saxony.

The position of the French army in the last half of September was:

1. Bernadotte, at Anspach.
2. Davout, at Oettingen.
3. Soult, at Passau.
4. Lannes, at Bischofsheim.*
5. Ney, at Memmingen.
6. Augereau, at Francfort.

This large triangle, formed by these headquarters, Passau, Francfort, Memmingen; had two sides of about 40 miles long and one side about 60 miles long. Besides, the corps themselves had a depth of 15 to 20 miles.

The Prussian army concentrated in rear of the Thuringia forest, was not more than 25 miles from the line Passau; Francfort. It is impossible to deny that such an army did not have a great advantage. If in the first half of September, it had advanced across the forest of Thuringia, on Wurtzbourg and the Rhine, it might have met at most the four corps of Bernadotte, Davout, Lannes and Augereau, possibly 70,000 men. These could have been driven to beyond the Black Forest into the valley of the Rhine or towards the Kehl tarea, before the corps at Passau and Memmingen could have united with them. Undoubtedly this was a fine hope, and he who does not attack under such circumstances should never draw a saber from its scabbard.

Thus arose at first the idea of the Prussian offensive. But as always happens with ideas when they have to pass the gauntlet of strange opinions where many people had to discuss them, and especially where there was a lack of decision, this idea gradually waned and finally ceased to have any further resemblance to itself. Before proceeding with the history of the disease of this idea, we must consider the organization of the Prussian high command. The Duke of

*At this period Lefebvre was still in command of the V Corps.

See B-268, page 233.—C. H. L.

†Opposite Strasbourg.

Brunswick was to have the command of all the forces; the King wished to be with him, and to increase by his presence the rapidity and energy of all measures taken.

The King took Marshal Moellendorf with him, because no one knew what duty to assign him to, and the King thought that his advice might be useful. The King also took General Phull, of the General Staff, with him, because he was the senior general staff officer, and because the Duke did not like him, and had selected Colonel Scharnhorst as the chief of staff for GHQ. The King believed that he could also utilize the services of Phull in councils, on account of his very scientific spirit. Finally, the King detailed to his headquarters, General Zastrow, who commanded a brigade, because for a long time he had had particular confidence in him. In addition to these officers newly attached, Colonel Kleist was naturally found with the King as his Adjutant General, that is as the Secretary of State for the War Department. It is unnecessary to mention the two diplomats Haugwitz and Lucchesini, and General Koehritz.

The Duke of Brunswick instead of being frightened by this staff, on the contrary was probably secretly very well contented. He had become very old, and so discouraged that he did not have the heart to come to Berlin; he went only to Halle, because he wished in this manner to make it more evident, that he commanded the army only as a field marshal and that he did not wish to take part in the war as a prince. Thus this timid man held to a straw, and this straw was the principal reason for his interior discontent. Thus the Duke, discouraged we say, secretly rejoiced in the King's staff. The presence of the King was not so much the less agreeable to him, by giving greater weight to his orders, than because he could submit his decision to superior authority, and as he feared that the modesty of the King would prevent him from taking hold of affairs to the extent that the Duke himself wished, he considered the staff of the King almost as a lover's magnet.

The Quartermaster General of the Duke was Colonel Scharnhorst,* and besides this officer there was no one else

*In the German service, the quartermaster general was *ex officio* the chief of staff for the C-in-C.—C.H.L.

close to him. Captain von Muffling, General Staff, completely in agreement with Scharnhorst, had given the most precise idea to the plan of operations, as he knew best the Thuringian hills and especially Thuringia itself. He was therefore called in to a certain extent in different discussions, but on account of his rank he played only a subordinate role. The headquarters of the Duke were not therefore fully represented in November in councils. Besides Scharnhorst was not only junior in rank to Phull and Massenbach, but he also was too new to the army for them to have real confidence in him. All this resulted in diminishing his influence, and his position as the chief of General Staff to Generals with indecisive ideas was far from having the action and influence which he should have had. In addition, he became formerly at variance with the Duke during the later days.

Thus was composed the Board which was to direct the army; besides as we shall soon see, attention must be given to Prince Hohenlohe and to Colonel Massenbach. The King did not really desire war. He had therefore again had propositions and requests made at Paris through Knobelsdorff. The diplomats had calculated on October 8th as the day when the reply should be received, and as the date when the operations were to commence. All might have seen that the ultimatum was useless; it is still clearer that it was irreconcilable with plans for strategical surprise, and in fact, it seems that the French corps on September 25th, at the time when the Duke of Brunswick submitted his plan of operations, were still immobile, but with the decided declaration which the Prussian Cabinet had caused to be made at Paris, their immediate concentration should have been considered as certain. The plan of operations of the Duke should have been not only conceived and submitted on September 25th, but they should have been in addition carried out, and the Prussian army should have been in Franconia. The Duke of Brunswick should have protested against this manner of accomplishing things and he should have insisted on striking a rapid blow. But the Duke feared the war, perhaps more than the King did, and his apprehension caused him to still hope for a friendly issue, where his intel-

ligence should have shown him that there was nothing else in view than a desperate resistance.

If the campaign was not to commence until October 8th, we could not be on the Main before the middle of October and it was necessary to expect to find the enemy nearly concentrated, as within fourteen days it is easy to assemble over a distance of 30 to 40 miles. The idea of offensive was still persisted in as this gave the best chance to fall with the entire force on part of the hostile forces, but this offensive now entered into the class of ordinary offensives.

Before following further the plan of operations, we ought to discuss the organization of the army. Duke Eugene of Wurtemberg with the 16,000 troops of West Prussia, was a reserve called to Saxony later than the other troops, as it was thought possible that this force might be employed in Westphalia. But this was a double error, first because all strategic reserves are poor practice, and secondly, because it was evident that matters would be decided in Saxony, and not in Westphalia; but we should not be too much astonished at this, because this particular method of view was at that time quite general. The Duke of Wurtemberg should therefore be counted out. For the invasion of Franconia there then remained two armies and one corps; the principal army under the direct command of the Duke; the Saxon-Silesian army, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; and General Ruchel's corps.

On the recommendation of General Scharnhorst the army was organized into divisions of all arms as follows:

Principal Army	6 divisions.
Saxon-Silesian Army	5 divisions.
Ruchel's corps	3 divisions.
Total	14 divisions.

This division into two principal armies was without doubt contrary to all principles of good sense. Any new division in command weakened it. If the number of divisions were too many to be under the direct orders of the Duke, they should have been as has since always been done organized into corps of two or three divisions. This would have made five or six corps, which are exactly the best number for ordinary needs and operations. But Prince Hohen-

lohe had already commanded a corps in 1792-3-4; he commenced to be more highly considered in the Prussian army than the Duke was, as he was ten or twelve years younger and more energetic. It was not believed possible to deny him the command of a suitable army, under the supreme authority of the Duke, but an army almost as large as a principal army. The greater the force which the general second in command receives, the more he wishes to be independent, as the energy of the high command loses its strength. Prince Hohenlohe allowed himself to be led in this direction by his turbulent friend, Quartermaster General Massenbach; in a manner not unusual when an imperious master has faults, but which is doubly dangerous in a situation as critical as ours was.

Hohenlohe and Massenbach had in an open manner announced the intention* to proceed up to a certain point independently of the Duke, and to act according to a principle inadmissible for a general, acting in a theater of operations ten or twelve miles distant, but which in one and the same theater of operations was absolutely unheard of. In truth they did not carry out completely this foolish idea, but contented themselves by not responding, instead of complying from the beginning, to obedience, and with rude remarks. During the course of the campaign the Duke himself did not have the courage to speak to Prince Hohenlohe in the firm and clear tones of a commander; he always left more latitude than is suitable for the well-organized conduct of the war. From this point of view, however erroneous it was, there arose a divergence of opinion as to the plan which ought to be followed. These two reasons resulted in Hohenlohe and Massenbach never entering into the thoughts of the Duke and they always followed along in another direction; similar to a badly balanced ship, they were unable to navigate close to one another except with great difficulty.

They never came to open disobedience, but there was perpetual contradiction, their incessant complaints as to lack of information and their ignorance naturally rendered more feeble and more indecisive the command of an army so

*"*Report of an eye-witness in the Campaign of Prince Hohenlohe in 1806*," by R. de L., Volume 1, page 25.

poorly organized. The King in the end became mistrustful, the Duke from day to day more pusillanimous. As a result concerted action did not occur, but irresolution increased by gigantic strides.

After having spoken of the position of Prince Hohenlohe let us return to the plan of operations. The Duke submitted this to the King on September 25th. He had therefore already made the plan by this date, and must have looked at it from that point of view.

At that time the movements of the French army had not yet commenced, or else they were not known of; but as we have stated above, they might have been foreseen. It was intended to keep the idea of the offensive. It was expected to meet on the upper Main important fractions of the French army, but it was hoped to be superior to them, as the more distant troops would have difficulty in reaching this country at the time the Prussian army entered it (middle of October). The results have shown that in this assumption an error was committed: we would have fought on the upper Main with as many or more troops than we had effective against us on the Saale. However, this is not sufficient to condemn the idea of the offensive, because there is never certitude in war. As to such things, error was at least excusable. But this offensive could not have the results which might have been expected by an offensive. Made as a surprise fourteen days earlier, the sole advantage was to increase the morale of the army in leading it to believe it was the aggressor; too great a value was then attributed to this sentiment.

The only question was to ascertain by what roads we could march against the enemy. Which of the following methods should be followed:

1. Leave the Thuringia wood on our right and march via Hof, and Gegend towards Bamberg.
2. Leave the wood on our left and take the Francfort road.
3. March through the Thuringia wood straight on Wurtzbourg.
4. Divide the army and march on two or all three of these roads.

The principal factors in the choice of directions should have been:

- (a) Keep united as far as possible in order to be as strong as possible in the battle.

(b) Reach the superior forces and an important part of the hostile forces in order not to strike a blow into a void. We should have expected that, in fact, the enemy would soon be considerably superior to us. We could not therefore think of overcoming him by a turning movement. It was therefore necessary, if we did not meet an important part of his forces at which a decisive blow could be directed, to regard them as turned and consequently very much compromised.

(c) Maintain as far as possible a line of retreat to the rear.

A consideration of (a) should completely destroy the idea of moving with the principal mass in more than one direction. A consideration of (b) should lead to the rejection of the march on Francfort, as in that direction, there was only one hostile corps, that of Augereau, who could have retired towards the center; we would then have been in quite a bad position, because we could not turn to the left if we left the Francfort road, because this would have required crossing the Roehn Mountains by pathways.

There therefore remained as the only choice, marching straight through the Thuringia wood, or advancing through the territory of Bayreuth. If Magdeburg and Wittenberg were considered as the first points of the line of retreat, they would be best covered by marching through the Thuringia wood. Should we desire to retreat with our principal mass towards Dresden, a march towards Hof would be best. Undoubtedly a retreat towards Magdeburg and Wittenberg was the most natural, as this would cover the capital for the longest time, the Elbe could be more easily defended between Magdeburg and Wittenberg than at Dresden, and it was in consequence a better line of support; further, Silesia would be better covered than Brandenburg, thanks to its position in rear of Bohemia and its numerous fortresses. This reason should have decided us to march across the Thuringia wood, but in addition we remained in a central position by taking this direction; we could better quickly oppose an enveloping movement against the right wing than if we advanced via Hof, that is, towards our left wing. Finally, it was not a minor advantage to surprise the enemy by this movement straight across Thuringia wood which would have been somewhat unusual, as we would be crossing the main crest instead of following the valleys to the right and left. These advantages compensated well for the inconvenience of poor roads. These were the ideas which led to the conception of the plan of the Duke.

Ten divisions were to cross Thuringia wood in six columns following roads near to one another and were to reunite at Meinungen and at Hildburghausen and march from there to the attack.

One division was to remain in the territory of Bayreuth to cover the valleys in that direction. Three divisions were to advance on the Francfort road to contain Augereau's corps.

The only objection to this plan is that probably in consideration for General Ruchel, it was not desired to separate the three divisions of his corps, although it would have been better to have at this point but one or two divisions reinforcing the principal army with the balance. As however, these three divisions would never have had a greater strength than Augereau's corps which they would have most probably immobilized, this error was certainly not serious.

The movements were to commence on the 9th. By the 10th or at latest on the 11th, it was desired to be at Hildburghausen and Meinungen.*

It was to be feared that this plan of attack conceived on September 25th, was no longer practicable; this should have been known in advance, but would in no case be considered as a fault as to the conception of the plan. For it was possible, if the enemy came in front of us, to change to the defensive without taking up a disadvantageous position, and it is always possible in war to be troubled in the execution of plans leading to change in them.

The defensive to which we would then wish to pass, should have been foreseen, and with the plan of attack, form the plan of operations properly so-called. This defensive plan consisted in taking a concentrated position near Erfurt or Weimar. If the principal forces came via the Francfort road we would be square in front of them, and it would have been the same if they came across the Thuringia wood. If the French army came across the territory of Bayreuth we would be separated from them by the Saale, and we could, if the enemy continued his movement without bat-

*The movements were originally fixed to commence on October 10th, but on October 2d, this was changed to October 9th.—*W. D. Files, E-I 84.*

tle with us, follow by a flank march and be at Weisenfelds before them. But if the enemy changed direction to the left to cross the Saale and attack us, this would give us a possibility for the best offensive combination. For the valley of the Saale and the character of the steep hills bordering it, and the plain in rear of it permitted rapid movements. We could then hope, if we considered a battle still useful, to fall with superior forces on the hostile columns.

The correctness of this supposition was absolutely proved when the last case considered really occurred. The Prussian army in spite of the indecision and absurdities committed, still found itself in a position to hurl itself near Auerstaedt with 45,000 men on 27,000 men; who with their back against the closed in valley of the Saale, found themselves in the worst position possible in war. It was certainly possible to oppose an adversary physically and morally superior, when in a flank position where the front had been turned and where the natural line of retreat lay towards a flank. But through appropriate precautions we could have avoided these inconveniences, and under the most unfavorable case, we had always in rear of us a vast friendly country, while Bonaparte would have always had to fight with a reversed front and with his line of retreat towards his left wing, with only a narrow band of territory between him and the frontier of Bohemia.*

*Ordinarily the frightful catastrophe in Prussia in 1806 is attributed to this oblique position. This is altogether wrong, and this point of view lacks breadth of vision. It is true that if the Prussian army had had its line of retreat in its rear, the surrender of Hohenlohe at Prenzlau would not have finally occurred. But in the very poor condition of our army, and in saying this I am thinking particularly of the officers of high grade who were too old and lacking in experience, he would not have probably brought back to Prussia more than the skeletons of the different corps. That which caused our dissolution was not that we had been turned from the beginning, but that we did not know how to act in any situation nor under any circumstance. Whoever regards the oblique position in rear of the Saale as the necessary cause of the disaster is ignorant of military history. Frederick the Great often voluntarily chose positions with fronts half reversed, and he succeeded in retiring in many cases without losses, when necessity required it, from positions still more completely turned. It is true that he had a great superiority in morale while here conditions were reversed, but even here, there were a thousand ways to regain the line of retreat sacrificed at the beginning.—*Clausewitz*.

Against this plan of the Duke, which has never seemed to me but a simple, natural, understandable one, Prince Hohenlohe and Colonel Massenbach, arose with great anger; they had already submitted to the King their general ideas *with good intentions but without being called upon*. This fact indicates the spirit and the point of view of these two. The plan which they wished to see followed was to occupy with Hohenlohe's army, which was to be six divisions strong, the defiles of Saalfeld, Saalburg, Hof and Adorf, and to march with the principal armies by the Francfort road on Eisenach and Wach; then continuing the offensive with two principal masses, which like flank bastions would have turned the Thuringia wood, which was itself to be occupied by 10,000 men. At the same time, General Ruchel was to adopt an active defense towards the right flank (probably in Hesse and in Eichsfeld).^{*} These confused ideas of the excited Massenbach have been more or less chosen as a base for the judgments of all writers according as they understood matters better or worse. But it is true that soon afterwards conviction everywhere arose that the main movements and main combinations of war should always be very simple, not because those which are complicated are too difficult, but because they are generally useless detours and attempts not directly aimed at the mission. Further on we shall see fully that this false idea of the General Staff has taken hold after nearly a century of the government and the public. We can also be astounded at the hollow expressions, of all these sparkling metaphors, of these involved phrases, such as "flank bastions," and the "active defensive," when they relate to so important a matter, and where the greatest clearness and the greatest precision should be expressed in all propositions. But let this suffice as to our indignation. The author expresses his own, not in order to preserve it for the sake of posterity, but to prevent any idea that he allowed himself to be taken in by such errors.

As soon as Prince Hohenlohe and Colonel Massenbach learned of the plan of operation of the Duke, they were beside themselves, and decided to observe a most extreme

^{*}See page 107, "*Report of an eye-witness on the Campaign of Prince Hohenlohe*," C. I. T. Also 44 and following pages.—Clausewitz.

formality and the greatest discretion* in strictly preventing at their headquarters any facetious remarks on this matter. When they saw that their plan of operations had not been formally adopted, they desired to lead the Duke by numerous propositions, until he was drawn by force of circumstances towards the right bank of the Saale. A defensive position on the right bank of the Saale was itself more natural, more simple and less dangerous; there was much to be said in its favor. But as we shall see further on, there was also much against it. But the Duke's idea was altogether different. There was therefore the culpable and harmful tendency of Hohenlohe's headquarters to try to force their idea, and to thus increase indecision and disorder in the conduct of the army. The propositions and threatening notes did not stop and the efforts to induce the Duke by force to an offensive on the right bank of the Saale, absorbed the entire activity of Massenbach. On October 4, when the Duke was at Erfurt with his headquarters and the army marched forward to assemble, so much news as to the movements of the enemy arrived that it was possible to doubt whether the plan of attack conceived on September 15th was still practicable. It was certain that we would strike superior hostile forces united on the Main and already in march towards Saxony. It was ascertained that Bonaparte had already arrived at Aschaffembourg, in fact the French army, as was later known, was already at this moment on the line Nurnberg—Bamberg—Schweinfurt—Hamelburg.

Besides, the intimate moral character of the Duke showed up clearly. He formed the secret wish to have the commencement of the war still further postponed and had a secret intention to utilize the presence of the King to withdraw to the subordinate position. Instead then of taking a resolution appropriate to the circumstances, as he would not have done if he had been alone, he utilized the circumstances in which he found the army to convene on October 5th a council where it was to be decided what further movements were to be made.

*See page 57, op. cit.—*Clausewitz*.

On the 4th, General Ruchel not having yet arrived, a provisional meeting took place between the Duke, General Phull, Colonel Massenbach, Colonel Kleist the King's adjutant general, and Captain Muffling of the General Staff. The Duke had already abandoned the idea of the offensive in principle, but he did not express himself further. He stated he was persuaded that the French would take position in rear of the Bannach and the Franconian Saale, and that Bonaparte would assume the defensive in order not to appear to be the aggressor. Massenbach suggested a reconnaissance of the French positions in Franconia, with the secret intention of leading thereby to an offensive movement along the right bank of the Saale.*

The idea that we should cross to the right bank of the Saale had taken entire possession of Massenbach. He spoke about this without cessation and kept at it like a restive horse against a wall. But if there was little clearness in his recommendations, it was quite evident that he himself did not clearly understand his own ideas, which were colored with verbiage, which persuaded no one, but contributed in consequence to increased indecision. The conference took place on October 5th, at which besides his Majesty the King, the following persons were present:

The Duke of Brunswick,
Field Marshal Moellendorf,
Prince Hohenlohe,
General von Ruchel,
General von Phull,
General von Koechritz,
Colonel von Massenbach,
Colonel von Scharnhorst,
Colonel von Kleist, adjutant general of the King,
Marquis Lucchesini,
Count von Haugwitz.

Colonel Massenbach again brought up his idea of marching the two main armies towards the left to beyond the Saale with a view to attacking the hostile army during its march forward, and thereby prevent our being cut off from the upper Elbe and from Silesia. During this time General Ruchel was to reconnoiter and contain the enemy: where and how was not explained.

*"*Historical remarks on the History of the Fall of Prussia,*" by Colonel Massenbach, Part II, page 59.—*Clausewitz*.

Colonel Scharnhorst, tired of differences of opinion, and noting the dangers which we ran with such a command, rose and said: "What is done in war is less important than doing it with suitable force and liaison"; as the difference of opinions between the commanding general of the principal armies and their chiefs of staff is very great, to attempt to reconcile their opinions would be to lose time and besides would be useless. I therefore suggest that the principal army give up its idea. Let us carry out the march towards the left, suggested by the Prince and by Colonel Massenbach, but let us do it immediately and with maximum energy." But Colonel Massenbach had so little persuaded the council that even this did not move them. As it was not desired to adopt this plan, he proposed a grouping on three positions: General Ruchel, near Craula, on the road from Eisenach to Langensalza; the principal army near Erfurt; Prince Hohenlohe on the Etters hill, near Weimar. He considered this disposition as concentrated. This proposition sufficiently shows that Colonel Massenbach was not sure that the French would actually advance across Franconia. Under this idea, a position near Weimar, that is to say as near as possible to the Saale was the only one that could be advantageous. This plan did not either have the support of all those present. The conference was broken before any conclusion could be reached and was re-assembled on the afternoon at the Duke's headquarters.

Here the resolution was adopted to continue the movements up to the 8th, which was to be a day of general rest, but to cause each of the three armies to make a reconnaissance toward the enemy, and to attempt to locate him while remaining in three positions, General Ruchel near Craula; the principal army near Erfurt; Prince Hohenlohe's army near Hochdorf, not far from Blankenhain. But the King disapproved the reconnaissance and it was then decided to send only one general staff officer (Captain Muffling) towards the Franconian side. The news which this officer was to obtain could have been at GHQ ever since the 3d; consequently the march of the army across the Thuringia wood, if still considered suitable, could have been made on the 9th as already prescribed.

From and after this moment the Duke of Brunswick appeared in a very disadvantageous manner, that is to say, like a man who has not the importance of his position, who through sorrow and care no longer feels himself strong, and who attempts to save himself by seeking issues where there are none.

The idea of obtaining a decision through a Board of twelve persons on what one intelligent person could have decided alone, the hope to be able to avoid war, the idea that the French would take a defensive position in Franconia, and the measures taken to reconnoiter an enemy twelve miles away are proof of complete stupidity; the Duke of Brunswick was not himself absurd on this point and he would not have been had he been alone. But always accustomed to conceal his real opinion, and to submit it to his superior for decision, and surrounded by men who apparently were there to observe his conduct, he felt himself led half by duty and half by politics to withdraw on all points, in order not to increase his responsibility for a bad result, and with an air of considering himself as wiser than those who were called to the council.*

Thus what this seventy year old man had yet retained in clearness and understanding, and in force of decision, was lost in the frictions of a high command organized contrary to the laws of war.

The situation of the Prussian army of October 6th was a much entangled and dangerous one. If it was thought impossible to count on strategical surprise, a clear decision should have been taken to assume the defensive with all the advantages which it could offer. That is, the arrival of the enemy should have been awaited in Saxony, either to attack him, or to allow ourselves to be attacked in a well chosen position; or if we found the enemy too strong, we could withdraw step by step into the interior of the coun-

*Those who do not know of this campaign except through the *Memoirs of Massenbach* will believe that it is precisely the understanding of the Duke and the mistrust of all good counsels which led him to the catastrophe. This is only a partial opinion. If the ideas of Massenbach were not followed, it was not because the Duke alone rejected them but because a majority, or perhaps all of those present, disapproved of them. The King, General Phull and General Ruchel were decidedly opposed to them.—*Clausewitz*.

try, in order to reunite with new forces. To attack the enemy could not promise us success unless there was hope of finding them separated, as an attack in Saxony had no more chance of success than an attack in Franconia and should have been renounced in favor of the latter.

If we wished to be attacked in a good position, it could be understood by this that our forces should be placed on terrain favorable to us, which the enemy must cross to reach us, and to draw from the terrain all the advantages of circumstances to complete the defensive with an attack. Because it was impossible to think of an intrenched camp where the back areas were open, in any case our attitude should not have been a passive one, and it was not necessary to quietly await the enemy in the tactical radius of our position, because we being the weaker had to fear an enveloping attack by the enemy.

Finally, an intention to withdraw to within the interior of the country without a decisive battle was not admissible, except when circumstances showed that the chances of a decisive battle were too unfavorable. An offensive against the enemy, or a retreat to within the interior of the country must depend on circumstances, and it was for this reason that we should have provisionally posted our troops in the middle of the theater of operations. But the intention, by utilizing favorable terrain to place our forces as nearly as practicable on an equality with those of the enemy required that the terrain on which it was desired to fight should be more exactly prescribed.

There is here another alternative to examine. The Saale forms an inclosed valley and this fact connected with other circumstances divides the theater of operations into two completely dissimilar parts. If one is situated on the left bank of the Saale, he is squarely in front of an enemy coming from Eisenach, or straight across the Thuringia wood; in this case his retreat is toward Magdeburg and Wittenberg. On the other hand only a flank position can be opposed to an enemy coming from the direction of Bayreuth.

If one is located on the right bank of the Saale, he is directly opposed to an enemy coming from the territory of Bayreuth, and his retreat is directly on Leipzig or Dresden.

But in this case no flank position can be taken against an enemy coming via Eisenach or the Thuringia wood, as such a position would have its rear against Bohemia.

Besides in this case, on account of the nearness of Bohemia, a retreat is limited to a very narrow base, and if the enemy who is superior to us, finds it practicable to advance to beyond our right flank, or if he simply threatens to turn this flank, we cannot accept battle, as we would run the risk of being thrown back on Bohemia.

It would therefore rest with the enemy to force us back without fighting, as far as the Elbe and as rapidly as he was able to march.

It is not the same on the left bank of the Saale, where we have for a base all of North Germany and where we could in case of need retire in any direction. We say: "in case of need" as we do not overlook the great importance of keeping in liaison with the Oder and Prussia. As we would hardly wish to willingly cross the closed in valley of the Saale at the last moment and in the presence of the enemy, it was necessary to make a decision in time as to which bank of this river to fight on.

While we were still uncertain whether the enemy's principal forces would come via Eisenach, via the Thuringia wood, or via Hof, the position on the left bank of the Saale was the most central and was therefore more appropriate to the three forms of resistance, attack, defense, or withdrawal into the interior of the country. But as soon as we could be sure that the principal force of the enemy was coming via the territory of Bayreuth, this position was no longer useful except as a flank position. We could place ourselves in front of the enemy at the last moment, as it was necessary to fear arrival at the place where we wished to be at the same time as the enemy arrived there, and thereby be surprised while making a flank march, in a very cut up region which was from no point of view favorable to us.*

*During the campaign and after, Clausewitz was of the opinion that an offensive movement from the left bank of the Saale towards the right bank even at the latest possible moment was not without chance of success. (See Schwartz, *Life of General Charles von Clausewitz*, Volume I, page 45 and following, Volume II, page 461 and following.) The main point of view we have here in the "Notes" agrees with that given by Clausewitz in his: "On War, Book VI, Chapter 28.

If it was not desired at any price to expose an army to the danger of any flank position, it was necessary as soon as the offensive was abandoned, that is after October 5th, to march without delay and proceed to the Leipzig, Hof road, where Berlin would have been in our rear and where we could have best withdrawn if matters turned out badly. It is true that this did not present any prospect for any favorable battle, but the position behind the Saale was one flank position from among a few; it promised excellent conditions for a battle, consequently this should have decided us to turn in that direction.

The first condition for a flank position is that the enemy shall be unable to pass it, but shall be forced to attack it. This is a condition which is very difficult to fulfill, but it was here completely fulfilled. Because the French had for their lines of communication a very narrow corridor between the Saale and Bohemia, and for them these communications were so entirely towards the flank in connection with the Saale, that they would have been unable to have advanced without seeking the Prussian army in rear of the Saale.

The second condition for a flank position is that it should promise an advantage in the combat itself, sufficient to compensate for the trouble of occupying the position. Now the valley of the Saale is a deep defile of a mountainous character which the enemy could not cross except by separated columns; there was also on the left bank a continuous and fertile plateau which permitted the most precise movements for our army. While minor detachments could occupy the valley of the Saale itself, where they could make a prolonged resistance out of proportion to their strength, the army from a central position could fall on that part of the enemy which promised the greatest results. The enemy would be fighting with his back to the steep depressions of the Saale, with scarcely enough terrain to deploy in; he would be fighting with the Kingdom of Bohemia at his back and towards his flank a retreat across Voigtland, which he would have to cross in withdrawing.

This was the relation of the position in rear of the Saale to the march of the enemy via the territory of Bayreuth. But, in a general way, the little theater of operations, where

it was, was separated from the enemy, on one side by the Thuringia wood and Eichsfeld, and the other side by the deep defile of the Saale as far as Merseburg. The interior of this region was a fertile plain where it would be impossible to suffer hunger, and which permitted the most rapid and precise movements. As a matter of fact, there has perhaps never been in history such an advantageous position for an army adopting a defense. If we took a central position near Erfurt, we could oppose everything coming via Eisenach and the Thuringia wood, and crush with a superior force one of the divided enemy columns. If the enemy came via the territory of Bayreuth we could go to Weimar and occupy the crossings of the Saale. If the enemy tried to completely pass in front of us, which was scarcely imaginable, we could be covered by the valley of the Saale, and using the main highway of Merseburg, be in front of him and again regain what had at first been abandoned to his advance guard. For this, certain preliminary arrangements would be sufficient, particularly by constructing two ponton bridges at Freiburg and occupying Kosen and Merseburg. This would have been a solution in accordance with the most prudent customs. But we could also, if we had the courage, cross the Saale in rear of the enemy, and attack him towards his flank or from his rear, in such manner that his only line of retreat would have been into Bohemia. The happy circumstances as to lines of retreat justified this bold step: the enemy would have had no line open, and we would have all the crossing of the Saale in our possession. Bonaparte in such a position, would not have hesitated one moment to carry out the most decisive blow imaginable in war. But in view of the material and moral superiority of the enemy and the feebleness of our high command, it would have been impossible to carry this out. Colonel Scharnhorst had proposed this plan should the occasion arise, but in the council the Duke rejected the plan.

Should the enemy not pass in front of us, but turn to the left to attack us, the battle would for us proceed under the advantageous conditions which we will discuss. This last case is what actually happened, and it proves the correctness of our conclusions. On October 14th, the Duke with 45,000 men marched against Davout with 27,000 men. At

the same time, if the Duke had not marched on the 13th towards Auerstaedt, and if the troops at Saalfeld and on the expedition in Franconia had not been there, 80,000 men could on October 14th, have met Napoleon at Jena, while there were actually only 60,000 there; and this would still have left 25,000 men to occupy Kosen, Camburg and Dornburg. These last detachments would not have allowed Murat, Davout and Bernadotte to pass, or at least they would have passed too late to be at Jena.

The resolution to have taken on October 6th, if the offensive was to be given out, was then very simple. It was: leave General Tauenzien near Hof in observation, with orders to withdraw without serious fighting in the direction of Naumburg; occupy the crossing of the Saale from Saalburg to Jena; post Prince Hohenlohe in rear of Jena and the principal army of Ruchel near Erfurt, with outposts in the Thuringia wood and on the Eisenach road.

The measures which were actually taken were not much different from what we have here indicated. We should then have been able on October 14th to fight without disaster and without great inconvenience, if:

1. General Tauenzien had not suffered too much in his retreat, because he had made an unnecessary resistance.*

The march of this General towards Jena had the disadvantage that we no longer knew how far the enemy had advanced on the road to Leipzig, and the enemy found Naumburg and Kosen unoccupied.

2. If Prince Louis had not been crushed, which was the result of his unfortunate timidity.

3. If Hohenlohe's army had not been in a condition of disorder and panic, as it was not assembled; we will speak about this later.

4. If the Duke had not allowed himself to be led to the foolish enterprise in Franconia, directed by the Duke of Weimar.

These four circumstances resulted in the army having 20,000 men less at the battle than they should have had, and in its courage and confidence being much shaken. These circumstances were not the consequence either of the prior plan of attack nor of the position selected. Excepting the position of Taunzien and the expedition into Franconia, these were not the result of false measures of the Duke,

*For the considerable losses which resulted from the retreat from Hof towards Schleitz, General von Tauenzien is less responsible than General von Villa, who started a serious combat in spite of instructions which he had received.—W.D. Files, E III, Vol. I, E 117, Vol. II.

but of his subordinates. But in truth this favorable result from our strategical position supposes an army seeking a battle and generals determined on utilizing a momentary superiority, and sufficiently prudent not to neglect the most essential measures. It was believed possible to obtain this from the Prussian army, the Duke of Brunswick and Prince von Hohenlohe. If it had been possible to foresee the poor conduct which we showed in battle, the irresolution and folly of our generals up to the last moment, the mass of orders disobeyed, the contradictions and disorders which occurred and resulted, we could not have given any better advice than to post ourselves on the direct road from Leipzig in order to march off more easily.

Now let us turn back to the consideration of events.

On the 7th, the Prussian army was still in its billets extending from Creuzburg and Wach as far as the Saale; the Prince of Hohenlohe had even, contrary to orders, allowed the Saxons to be a good march away on the other side of the Saale near Neustadt;* General Tauenzien was still at Hof from where he marched on the evening of the 7th. The reserve under the Duke of Wurtemberg was assembling in Brandenburg. The French army had started its march in three main columns. *The right wing*, consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, marched via Bayreuth and Hof which they reached on October 8th. *The center*, with which was Bonaparte, and consisting of the corps of Bernadotte and Davout, of the Guard and the reserve cavalry under Murat, advanced via Bamberg and Kronach and reached Saalburg on the 8th. *The left wing*, consisting of the corps of Lannes and Augereau came from Schweinfurt towards Cobourg, where it was on the 8th. On the 8th Bonaparte had his headquarters at Steinwiesen.†

The Prussian army was, as we have already said, organized into fourteen divisions of all arms. The defective

*The Prince had on October 4th, suspended the movements of the Saxons, because he still hoped to induce the Duke of Brunswick to adopt his plan to march in front of the enemy on the right bank of the Saale. It was for this reason that the Saxons on October 7th, were still near Roda. Only some cavalry had been pushed beyond Neustadt, and some hussars to Schimmelpfennig.

†Augereau came via Wurtzburg, Burgebrach, Bamberg; Napoleon's GHQ was at Kronach on the 8th.

organization of dividing the cavalry between the divisions at the rate of 10 to 15 squadrons each, and without having any reserve cavalry, was in force.

General Ruchel's corps consisted of the divisions of:

Larisch;
Winning;
Tschammer.

The principal army had the following divisions:

Duke of Weimar, advance guard;
Prince of Orange;
Count Wartensleben;
Count Schmettau;
Count Kunheim } Reserve under Count Kalkreuth.
General Arnim }

Hohenlohe's army consisted of the following divisions:

Count Tauenzien, advance guard;
Prince Louis;
General Grawert;
General Zezschwitz (Saxons);
General Prittwitz.

Some Saxon regiments were assigned to General Tauenzien and to Prince Louis.

We may assume that the divisions of the principal army	
were 9,000 strong -----	54,000
Those of Hohenlohe, 8,000 strong -----	40,000
Those of Ruchel, 6,000 strong -----	18,000
Total -----	112,000

On the 8th we had a day of complete rest; except General Tauenzien who continued his retreat as far as Schleitz.

On the 9th, General Tauenzien was attacked by the French under Bernadotte near Schleitz; he made a poor and unsuitable resistance, suffered many losses, and was repulsed almost in a rout to in rear of the Orta, near Neustadt, where General Zezschwitz received him.*

According to the orders for the 9th, General Tauenzien was to join Prince Hohenlohe; the latter was to hold the Saale near Kahla, Orlamunda and Rudolstadt, and even occupy the Hochdorf position near Blankenhain; the principal army was also to move in that direction; and finally Gen-

*General Tauenzien retired to Mittel-Poelnitz one and one-half miles east of Neustadt, as Clausewitz more exactly explains a little further on.

eral Ruchel was to march on Erfurt. At the same time, in accordance with a recommendation from Captain von Muffling, to follow in the heels of the French from Franconia with some cavalry, a mission of this nature was prescribed for General Rudorf. Unfortunately the Duke of Weimar was also directed to cross the Thuringia wood with the entire advance guard to sustain him. General Ruchel was also directed to send several thousand men toward Hamelburg. By these insignificant enterprises, which might be called out of season, the army was weakened on the field of battle by 12,000 men. On the 9th the positions of the army were as follows:

General Tauenzien was retiring on Mittel-Poelnitz.
General Zezschwitz near Mittel-Poelnitz.
General Grawert near Orlamunda.
Prince Louis near Rudolstadt.
General Prittwitz near Jena.

The Duke of Weimar was in march to cross the Thuringia wood.

The principal army was leaving its billets to concentrate near Hochdorf. General Ruchel was enroute to Erfurt.*

On this day the right wing of the French advanced against Plauen, the center turned towards Schleitz where General Bernadotte attacked and repulsed General Tauenzien. The left wing advanced as far as Grafenthal. Bonaparte's headquarters was at Ebersdorf near Saalburg.

Early on the 10th, Prince Louis on learning that the enemy was marching in force on Saalfeld, proceeded in that direction with his division, with the hope of a brilliant affair in his favor, as he believed that only one hostile corps was in front of him; he there accepted battle against Marshal Lannes. The Prussians had twelve battalions and eighteen squadrons; he then had a force of about 10,000 men.†

*The principal army assembled from the 9th on near Erfurt. Ruchel only reached this place on October 10th, the day on which the principal army arrived at Hochdorf.—W.D. Files, E.I. 55, Vol. I.

†The Prince had at Saalfeld 10 battalions, 1 company chasseurs, 10 squadrons, and 2½ batteries. One battalion, 1 company chasseurs, 8 squadrons and half a battery had been sent towards Blankenburg and Possneck.

He could have foreseen that he would have to fight a French corps of 15,000 to 20,000 men, and possibly even 25,000 men. The terrain was extremely unfavorable: it was a small enlargement in the valley of the Saale, on the other side of the town, closed in by the wooded edge of the Thuringia wood, where the enemy already held the heights. All these circumstances counted nothing to the Prince. The opinion that with Prussian tactics, and with the courage and resolution which he felt in his breast, he could defeat an enemy as strong again as himself, led him forward beyond all considerations. He later felt the crushing weight of the facts. The Prussian tactics proved to be entirely insufficient; the courage of the troops was quickly shattered. Only that of the Prince was grand and dignified in his resolution. Thus he did not abandon the field of battle.*

The division of the Prince retired in a state of complete dissolution on Rudolstadt where General Grawert came to meet it.† The losses might reach 4000 to 5000 men.

The two divisions of Hohenlohe's army had now been checked. But it could not be said that the precise orders of the Prince were responsible for this. On the one hand, the independent spirit in which he thought and spoke continued to react on his subordinates who conducted themselves as pleased them best, when they should have acted as

*The attempt of the Prince to oppose the enemy by an obstinate resistance at the defile of Saalfeld appears to be justified. The Prince understood his mission in admitting that he had to make it possible for the entire army to cross to the right bank of the Saale; and this opinion was the natural consequence of all the orders which he had received. In this sense, the battle was accepted not with an offensive intent but with a defensive one.—W. D. Files, E.I. 84—*Report of Captain von Valentini*.

†In accordance with the orders which Prince Hohenlohe had sent him, General Grawert was in readiness on the morning of October 10th near Orlamunda prepared to cross to the right bank of the Saale. Some contrary orders having reached him from GHQ, he then marched toward Vorwerk-Spahl, 1½ miles NW of Oramunda. He there received the Prince's order to advance to Rudolstadt to support the defeated advance guard, but so late that he did not believe it possible to accomplish this. He therefore contented himself with sending Major von Massow with a patrol to Rudolstadt, which found the town already occupied by the enemy.—W.D. Files E.I.—67, 84, 91; E.III, 17, Vol. II.

a single staff.* On the other hand, General Tauenzien and Prince Louis were so obsessed with the idea that the entire army would cross the Saale, that he gave too high a value to the terrain on the right bank, and to clear crossings. Another unfortunate fact was that the Prince left General Zeischwitz too long near Neustadt, especially as he had not assembled his army in a camp and occupied the crossings of the Saale with small detachments as had been the intention of the Duke of Brunswick. Now the troops who were on the other side of the Saale hastened by forced marches towards Roda and Jena, where they only arrived on the 11th, in great disorder.

This disorder, the losses of Tauenzien's division, the dispersion of Prince Louis's division, led to such confusion in Hohenlohe's army during the 10th and 11th, that on the 11th, near Jena, there arose, on the cry that the enemy was in the town, a shameful panic, whence it was difficult to re-establish calm and order. On the 10th the Prince had sent Colonel Massenbach to the King's headquarters, with new suggestions, and this constant and erroneous method of conduct was a cause in Hohenlohe's army of neglecting necessary matters.

At times when there occurred, as happened in this case, hasty and complicated movements, and where a crowd of tactical dispositions were necessary, the chief of the general staff was not too strong. We cannot consider the unfortunate condition in the army of Silesia on the 10th and 11th, except as due to the incapacity of Colonel Massenbach, and at the false advice which he gave to Prince Hohenlohe. It is easy to understand that all this was a bad preparation for a decisive battle.

The positions of the army on the 10th were:

Principal army, near Hochdorf, but not yet completely assembled.

General Ruchel near Gotha.

*General Tauenzien had about the same idea as Prince Louis. He wrote to Prince Hohenlohe during the battle "that he hoped to obtain a complete victory."—*Clausewitz*.

Let us note while on this subject that Tauenzien did not write that he hoped to obtain a complete victory, but that he had repulsed the French and hoped to successfully rejoin the army of the Prince on the next day.—W. D. Fries, E.I. 79.

See M 2572, page 290; and CN 10977, page 295, for French accounts of the battle at Schleitz.—C. H. L.

In Prince Hohenlohe's army, General Grawert was near Orlamunda, and marched from there towards Rudolstadt; General Pritt-witz was near Jena; Generals Zezschwitz and Tauenzien were in march from Mittel-Poellnitz to Roda.

The French left wing under Lannes attacked Prince Louis in Saalfeld on the 10th. Augereau was one-half march in rear of Lannes. The center advanced as far as Auma and Gera. The right wing was marching from the Plauen road to the Schleitz road. Bonaparte was at Schleitz.

On the 11th, a part of the French center advanced by a long march towards Leipzig and Naumburg, and thus became the right wing, since the former right wing would be in rear of it by one march to the flank on the Schleitz road, and thus became the center. On this day the positions were:

Murat, between Zeitz and Leipzig;
Bernadotte at Zeitz;
Davout in the vicinity of Naumburg;
Soult and the Guard at Gera;
Ney at Neustadt;
Lannes at Jena;
Augereau at Kahla.*

The positions on the evening of October 11th, were:

Soult at Weyda.
Ney at Schleitz.
Murat at Gera.
Davout Mittel-Poellnitz.
Bernadotte at Gera.
Lannes at Neustadt-sur-l'Orla.
Augereau at Saalfeld, head on the Neustadt road.
Napoleo at Auma.

As the enemy, at Saalfeld had not advanced further along the left bank of the Saale, it followed that either he was marching completely across our front, or that he had selected his point of attack and consequently a place of crossing the Saale further on.† It was therefore decided to

*Augereau only reached Neustadt, 2 miles N. of Cobourg with the head of his force on October 10th. He was therefore a good day's march in rear of Lannes. The center reached Triptis. Of the right of the column, only Ney reached the Schleitz road in rear of the center, while Soult remained on the Plauen road with his headquarters in that vicinity.—C. See map opposite page 306.

†According to his own statement (Correspondence of Napoleon, No. CN 10950 and following) the Emperor remained on the right bank of the Saale, as he expected to find there the principal force of the enemy.—C.

CN 10950 is a private letter from Napoleon to Josephine, not reproduced in this volume. But compare CN 10980, page 300; and CN 10982, page 309.—C. H. L.

have the principal army march on the 11th to Weimar, and to post Prince Hohenlohe between Weimar and Jena (Generals Zezschwitz and Tauenzien reached Jena on this day), to recall in haste the Duke of Weimar,* and to direct him also to Weimar as well as General Ruchel. On the 12th the positions of our armies were as follows:

Principal Army, near Weimar;
General Ruchel, between Erfurt and Weimar;
Prince Hohenlohe, near Kapellendorf and Jena;
Duke of Weimar, marching on Ilmenau.

It was learned on this day that the enemy had sent some troops to Naumburg and had occupied that place.

The situation of the army was in general such as had been expected under the case for taking necessary measures for the defensive and its position was neither bad nor unfavorable; it would be even difficult to imagine a better position. However, affairs had become worse by the losses which had occurred, by the departure of the Duke of Weimar from the principal army, and of General Winning of Ruchel's corps; the troops also lacked confidence and their courage was reduced.

Thanks to the clamors of Hohenlohe's party and to the checks already received, the opinion that the army was being led up to a disaster commenced to spread and to establish itself. The news as to the occupation of Naumburg, where we had a depot, increased the distrust and the disorder. Wherever the stupid imagination of ignorant officers and uneducated soldiers had resulted in creating fabulous stories, the charge of treason was discussed. This was the sign of a burning fever, which existed in our army at this time, and the morale of the entire force was thereby reduced, although each one individually remained available and in vigorous condition. But the army was 20,000 men less strong than it might have been, it lacked confidence in its leaders and was half defeated by a preconceived idea of the enemy.

*The order for the Duke of Weimar to withdraw via Oberdorf or Ilmenau was issued on the morning of the 10th, and was received the same day. After hearing the news of the battle at Saalfeld, the order was amended in the evening, and the Duke was directed to make his retreat via Gotha on Weimar.

It was already difficult, from the beginning to promise ourselves hope for victory over the French army; under the present circumstances, this hope could be regarded as only a very feeble one. It was now therefore necessary either to still follow this feeble ray and to attempt to acquire a superiority by a very concentrated and decided employment of our troops; or else to march away by our left, if it was desired to interpose before the enemy and to join with the Duke of Wurtemberg with a view to acting according to circumstances.

It was impossible to foresee if the enemy would march in front of us or would simply turn our left and afterwards attack us. It was therefore necessary to decide to accept battle and at the same time, in case the enemy did not cross the Saale to attack us, but continued his march in front of us, to decide to follow him up and attack him from his rear. The Duke believed that the enemy would continue his march in front of us. Colonel Scharnhorst thought he would attack. The Duke believed it too hazardous to allow the enemy to continue on and to follow him up from his rear; Colonel Scharnhorst considered this as a necessary measure, it must be taken if we did not decide to march away at once. General Phull wrote a memorandum in which he said that we should move towards our depots. General Kalkreuth predicted that we would lose all of Saxony. Both of these two, as well as Hohenlohe and Massenbach, were of the opinion that the enemy would march on Leipzig or that he would send a detachment there.*

We can hardly believe that the old and unsuitable plans of operations could yet be discussed at a time when even sentiment should have led directly to the mission. It was not necessary to know whether we were further or nearer to the depots, nor whether we might lose one or two of them, nor whether we did or did not cover Saxony but where and how we might accept and win a battle, whether that place was here, or after being reinforced by the Prince of Wurtemberg behind the Elbe, or after being reinforced by the Russians in rear of the Oder. It was as clear as day that Bona-

*See Volume II, Clausewitz, by Schwartz, "*Remarks on the Journey to Marienbad in July, 1825*," page 276.

parte would not be satisfied to capture a few depots and a strip of territory by maneuvering, but that he would seek a decisive victory wherever he could find us, and that it was therefore necessary to prepare for this battle. There was only the following alternatives:

1st. If it was decided to risk a battle here, it was only necessary to keep all the forces ready to concentrate and to properly select the moment to fall upon the separated detachments of the enemy. For such a mission, the position of the principal army near Weimar, and that of Hohenlohe between Weimar and Jena was entirely appropriate. It was necessary to detail one division to hold the defile of Jena for as long a time as possible, and to send another division towards Kosen as soon as the enemy's march on Naumburg was known of, while the crossings of Dornburg and Camburg should have been held by minor detachments. We would then have been in condition to fight in front of the Saale, to determine whither the principal force of the enemy was marching, and to march towards that point which would have been the most decisive one; or if we desired to be prudent, towards that force intended to turn our left flank and which would consequently have been the most dangerous one. In the latter case, an important part of the army should have marched to meet the principal mass of the enemy and hold him on the Saale, as far as possible without a decisive combat.

2nd. If it was believed impossible to utilize this simple situation for a battle, and considering the proposition of forces, also very advantageous, it was necessary to march without delay towards the Unstrutt in order to reach Leipzig before the enemy.

If now we consider the resolutions which should have been provisionally taken, and of the dispositions of the enemy, as they were later ascertained, the combat of the 13th on the Saale, near Jena, should have taken place as it actually occurred with General Tauenzien, except that this General did not have his division in order and committed the fault of evacuating Jena too soon and retiring too far towards the Dornberg. General Tauenzien sought, with a true Prussian instinct, to reach the plain and thought it

impossible to do anything better than to abandon to the French the difficult slopes of the valley of the Saale, and to retire to the open terrain of the plateau as far as necessary, with a view to again attacking the enemy in echelon as most suitable,* as it had been one hundred thousand times taught, recommended and preached that in war the offensive was always preferable and gave the most advantages, and that this form of battle was particularly suitable to Prussian troops. Besides an attack by echelon was very nearly the height of Prussian tactics, the means by which Frederick the Second had beaten the Austrians at Leuthen; it was necessary to employ a similar maneuver in the most dangerous moments. Such a moment had arrived. Therefore, General Tauenzien abandoned the Saale and withdrew on the evening of the 13th with a view to advancing in echelon on the 14th, in a thick fog, after having, as was customary in the good old times, allowed the enemy space to establish his line of battle.

In face of this erroneous conduct on the 13th, which arose from drill ground routine, and lack of common sense, the division posted at Jena should have defended this extremely difficult terrain foot by foot; here was the place, properly speaking, for passively defending the steep slopes and ravines. Such obstacles defended by 8000 men cannot be taken by frontal attacks; the French would have been forced to turn General Tauenzien. But for such a movement time was required, and under the circumstances, in view of the nearness of Hohenlohe's army, nothing was easier than to remain on the 13th, master of the crest of the valley of the Saale, and to absolutely ascertain that Bonapare was facing them with the main part of his forces. This infor-

*In place of Prince Louis who had been killed, General Tauenzien had been charged on October 11th, with the command of the Advance Guard, and on October 12th, he occupied Jena and the crossing of the Saale beyond and in front of that town. On the morning of October 13th, he saw himself forced, on news that Dornburg had been evacuated before the enemy, to also abandon Jena. The enemy followed him closely and thus reached the Landgrafenberg. According to the report of Major von Marwitz, Prince Hohenlohe might have understood the importance of this place; but when he was inclined to drive back the enemy from Landgrafenberg with some reinforcements which the Duke himself led, Colonel Massenbach brought him formal orders from GHQ forbidding an attack.—W. D. Files, E.I. 72, 84. E. III—117.

mation would have been ascertained with certitude by the battle itself; but it did not take place, because General Tauenzien withdrew without fighting. There was, therefore, a very unfortunate and dangerous lack of information, which still existed with Prince Hohenlohe on the morning of the 14th. As the distance from Weimar to Jena is only two miles the principal army could have been at daybreak of the 14th near Jena, that is, ten divisions making about 80,000 men in all could have been assembled there, and offered battle to the enemy in a situation where he would have had the steep slopes of the Saale valley in rear of him. Bonaparte would not have acted, under these conditions, otherwise than he did act, as he could not have known, when he passed through Jena, that the Duke was in march. But Bonaparte did not have more than 60,000 men altogether near Jena; 50,000 men had been detached under Davout, Bernadotte and Murat and 20,000 men had not yet arrived.* It would have been the same if we had decided to offer battle on the Saale against the enemy's principal force; and these circumstances could not have been other than favorably influenced.

If it was desired to offer battle on the Saale, not against the principal force of the enemy, but against that part of this army which was turning us, that is coming from Naumburg, we could, as actually occurred, march during the night and attack this part of the enemy at daybreak. In this case, it would have been necessary to detail an important fraction of an army, 3 or 4 divisions, as a sort of rear guard, to hold the main force of the French in the valley of the Saale, until the enemy, by capturing some points less strongly occupied, had turned the Jena position, but however, before he was in condition to *force the troops there to a battle on the plain*. With the remaining troops, that is, 8 or 9 divisions, we could have fallen on Marshal Davout. Before the principal force of the enemy could have been in

*Napoleon had near Jena, during the morning more than 78,000 men. To these should be added the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of Soult's corps which arrived on the field of battle about noon. Murat took part personally in the battle, but he only had about one-half of his cavalry present. The cavalry of the Guard, and Grouchy's 2d Dragoon Division were unable to arrive for the battle. They arrived on the evening of the 14th only as far as in line with Kronach.

The detached troops (Davout, Bernadotte and half of the reserve cavalry) amounted to 56,000 men in all.

condition to chase our rear guard from the valley of the Saale, and drive it as far as the field of battle, 3 miles away, evening would have arrived and our fight against Davout would have been decided. If we had been able to completely defeat this Marshal, we would, with our entire army have turned the enemy's main force. If the success against this Marshal, was less decisive, we could still retreat towards the Unstrutt. If it was desired to absolutely avoid a battle on the Saale, the army should have been put in march from the 12th, towards Freyburg and cross the Unstrutt at that place without hesitation on the 13th, while 3 or 4 divisions, left at Jena as a rear guard should have followed on the 13th, Kosen remaining constantly occupied during this time by one or two divisions. In this manner, the mixed up lines of the skeins of strategy which had become mixed on the 12th, would have been separated. Excepting the unfortunate battles of Schleitz and Saalfeld, and the detachment of 12,000 men to Franconia, the Prussian army would once again have been strategically in a position as advantageous as possible for its moral and physical strength.*

The Duke considered that Bonaparte would really march across his front rather than attack him. Perhaps this was only a preconceived idea, because it can be well understood that few would blame him under the circumstances for marching by his left to place himself in front of the enemy. But by such a march, the battle on the Saale would become impossible, while this was exactly what the Duke desired. He might have openly shown an intention of avoiding a battle at this time in order to offer a battle later; but everybody was so obsessed with the idea of a decisive battle that the Duke did not think it possible to abandon this idea without some new, impelling motive. Whatever his reasons may have been, on the 12th the Duke resolved to

*All the writers of the time, especially Massenbach and R. von L., who follow this campaign, have spoken of the deplorable situation of the Prussian army, and completely without foundation. It is a mere dream, to turn to the right and to the left, by changing in arbitrary directions, with no fixed point of departure and consequently with arbitrary results. It is really difficult to see why one wishes to discuss things he does not understand, to believe that he can determine in talking casually without a plan a subject which he cannot even consider. The army of writers who have followed have naturally still less understood what the original writers did not understand. In this manner there has arisen a veritable comedy of words, full of eloquence, but absolutely without sense.—*Clausewitz*.

march away by his left on the 13th. Schmettau's division which formed the left wing, was to start several hours earlier as advance guard; the four other divisions were to follow. General Ruchel was to go to the Weimar position; Prince Hohenlohe was to remain at Jena to cover the march. The first march was to be to the vicinity of Auerstaedt, the second to or near Freyburg on the Unstrutt. This resolution of the Duke is not to be absolutely disapproved of; it would have enabled him to place himself in front of the enemy and at the same time, during the first march, which was made not on the 12th but on the 13th, afford a possibility to attack with superior force the enemy who might have crossed the Saale near Kosen.

But in carrying out this plan, several serious errors took place:

1. Why should General Ruchel go to Weimar? Why not have him follow immediately in rear of Prince Hohenlohe, or in the vicinity of Apolda, in order to unite the two armies, if it was not desired as we should have thought was best, to have him march with the principal army? If he had been there, in spite of the best wish, we would hardly have been able to lose the battle of Auerstaedt.

If he had been with Hohenlohe, or near Apolda, this would not have changed events, but it would have been much more natural than to have him remain at Weimar. Apparently the Duke wished to put a brake on Prince Hohenlohe, to prevent him from engaging in a serious battle.

2. Schmettau's division should have occupied Kosen on the evening of the 13th. It had a four mile march to do this.

If it was not desired to engage with the enemy, it was much the more necessary to close this opening. If it was desired to allow the enemy to pass, this could always be done; Schmettau's division would then have served to determine his force and his intentions. It would also have been possible, by having this division withdraw in its natural direction, that is, parallel to the river in front of the enemy seeking to cross, and occupy a line of battle better traced than that which was taken on the morning of the 14th under the influence of the enemy's position. We will see later on what influence this had.

3. To Prince Hohenlohe, it was not only necessary to precisely direct him as was done, not to attack or to cross the Saale, which would have been veritable nonsense, but in addition to exactly indicate his destination.

His mission was to prevent the crossing of the enemy via Jena and Dornburg for as long a time as possible, and in consequence to vigorously fight for the crest of the valley of the Saale. But as soon as it would be impossible to hold this longer, and the enemy had obtained another crossing, or Jena itself, it was necessary to start the retreat, and avoid all serious fighting on the plain. Prince Hohenlohe should neither have lost nor offered a battle, for it was ridiculous to engage with 40,000 men in a battle against the principal forces of the French who might have had 80,000 men.

It was in no way difficult to avoid a decision on the plain, a battle may always be avoided when there is space to break away, except when the force consists only of a handful of men who might be stopped by cavalry alone. But as an army, even without fighting does not march more than three miles* in one day, it was not probable that Prince Hohenlohe would have been forced back in a single day more than three miles. There was not, under the actual circumstances, any difficulty in offering to a certain extent an obstinate resistance, while at the same time avoiding a defeat. In ordinary terrain, this task would have been difficult, and perhaps impossible against a superior enemy. But it is altogether different when there is in front of the position a deep valley which the enemy must cross on bridges. A position like that of the valley of the Saale is not readily found. It would require hours of time to drive out hostile well posted infantry and artillery, and this could only be done by obtaining fire superiority for a long time, and by small turning movements against each detachment, etc. In this way the French would have required several hours in order to reach the

*German miles are of the following length:

Geographical -----	7420 yards, ab't 4½	English mi.
Prussian -----	7532 yards ab't 4½	English mi.
Brunswick and Hanover --	7419 yards ab't 4½	English mi.
Saxony -----	9062 yards ab't 5½	English mi.

crest, and there would always have been time to withdraw, as the enemy would need time to deploy on leaving a defile; a movement which cannot be done in a few minutes.

There is no doubt that in this manner, Prince Hohenlohe could have gained more time than he could gain by the battle which he fought. If the Duke did not give orders to this effect with clearness and precision it was certainly an error; but the real orders of the Duke are not known. As the prattling writers of the other party have always been against the Duke, and consequently have had no interest in examining the truth on this point, we cannot allow them to condemn absolutely the Duke. The idea of the Duke for Hohenlohe's army was undoubtedly of this general nature. Whatever it may have been, without other indication, Prince Hohenlohe should, if he merited the name of General, so have judged the situation, and he should have acted in this spirit. What he did is below all criticism, and was one of the principal causes of the catastrophe. We will speak of that in connection with the battle of Jena.*

4. The principal error of the Duke was that he failed to consider dispositions necessary for a retreat. When circumstances required him to form a front towards his flank his line of retreat was no longer straight to his rear; it was more or less to one side. If only one or two neighboring routes exist, battle cannot be accepted under such circumstances. But if there is a large base to retreat to, and if in case of need it is possible to withdraw in one of several directions, battle may be accepted with the front half reversed; this was our case on the Saale. Our retreat should actually have been made towards Wittenberg and Magdeburg, or towards Leipzig and Halle, but we could in case of a check have retired on the Elbe, beyond Magdeburg, or at the worst to Westphalia. But to be separated from the true base is always very disagreeable; it is therefore very important, when a battle is accepted, to think of a position which would suffice with relation to our base for a natural situation.

It would have been easy for the Duke to have done this at Auerstaedt. It was sufficient while the divisions of

*The Duke's order to the Prince spoken of above and given on the evening of October 13th, is found in WD Files, and a copy in Hoepfner's "*The War of 1806-1807*," I. page 353.

Schmettau and Wartensleben fought with the enemy, to continue the march in rear of them with the remaining three divisions and to take position with them with their backs against Freyburg.* But this did not concern only the Duke's army, and it was more difficult to direct Prince Hohenlohe in this direction. He could not withdraw from Jena towards Freyburg as this would have led him to Auerstaedt, and consequently if the battle of Auerstaedt was not a victory, he would have run into the enemy. It was therefore natural in case we should be beaten, which was really supposable, for the left wing to select a central line of retreat, crossing the Unstrutt, not at Freyburg but at Nebra, Rossleben and Artern, and to direct Prince Hohenlohe, towards Buttstedt. The principal army in case it was forced to retreat could have received the Prince at Buttstedt, as his reserve had not gone further than Buttstedt.

But it appears that no clear resolution had been taken before the battle concerning a retreat, which was a serious and double error for an oblique position and before a brave and superior adversary. The principal army fought near Auerstaedt as if it was necessary to retreat on Weimar, and in fact, it wished to go there on the evening of the 14th with the intention of joining Prince Hohenlohe. But the road from Weimar to Erfurt led rather towards the enemy than towards our base. From this circumstance, there resulted, as we shall soon see, the great and astonishing series of victories by the French.

Let us return here to consider events.

The three roads by which Bonaparte had advanced into Saxony between Bohemia and the Thuringia wood, had been taken because he supposed he would find the Prussian army in position on the right bank of the Saale. When he saw that this hypothesis was not correct, he turned to the left, sent his center on in advance towards Zeitz and Naumburg and decided to cross the Saale between Jena and Naumburg to give battle to the Prussians on the other bank. Perhaps he thought them committed to a defensive position along

*See the orders for October 14th, 1806, in the second part of "*Monographs of Military History*," page 95.—*German Editor*.

the Saale. The left wing and the center of the French army consequently made no movement on the 12th, and only Davout continued his march on Naumburg where he arrived in the evening.

The positions of the corps are not given in the French Bulletins, but it was probably the same as on the 11th, because they were all more than one march away from the Saale, which they reached only on the 13th. The 12th was probably employed in concentrating the corps and other interior preparations. On the 13th positions were as follows:

Davout and the reserve cavalry under Murat near Naumbourg.
Bernadotte at Dornburg.
Soult between Dornburg and Roda.
Ney at Roda.
Lannes at Jena, from which he drove out General Tauenzien; and where he took position on the Landgrafenberg.
The Guard was also at Jena in rear of Lannes.
Augereau at Kahla.

No information can be found as to the reason why Soult and Ney did not march on the same day towards the Saale. It almost appears as if Bonaparte feared that some force might still fall on his right flank and crush Davout.

On the 14th, Soult and Augereau and the Guard concentrated at Jena; Davout passed through Kosen; Murat with the cavalry returned from Naumburg towards Jena, but did not arrive until after the battle. Ney and Soult were not put in march until the evening; they marched all night and as a result arrived a little late on the battlefield. Ney only had 3000 men present at the battle; the remainder had not arrived. No one explains where they were; but it is probable that they were already in the theater of operations. On the other hand the cavalry of the Guard was still absent; according to French Bulletins, they were 36 leagues to the rear. Bernadotte was to pass Dornburg on the 13th, but he was already at Naumburg on the 13th, and he took no part on the 14th, which according to the Bulletin was due to his being misled into false movements. As a result Bonaparte only had 60,000 men near him; Davout had only 28,000 men opposite the Duke. 40,000 men had not arrived, as certain divisions of Ney's corps were either away from the field of battle due to false movements, as

was all of Bernadotte's corps and the greater part of the reserve cavalry of Murat.*

We will now proceed to consider the battles of Jena and Auerstaedt.

We have already discussed what Prince Hohenlohe should have done with his army near Jena. If he had made his dispositions from our point of view, he would have completely abandoned his position between Kapellendorf and Jena on the 13th. He, however, acted in an entirely different way. His force was still 33,000 strong, he could have placed 10,000 men and 60 guns near Jena, and occupied Dornburg with 3,000 men and 20 guns, he would have had 20,000 men and 70 guns in reserve, and General Ruchel had another 15,000 men to support the whole.†

If the General who commanded at Jena, and it was desirable that this should have been the Prince himself, had destroyed the bridges at Jena, occupied the town with several thousand men, and posted the remainder on the Landgrafenberg taking full advantage of the terrain, it would have been almost impossible to penetrate at this point with-

*During the morning of October 13th, Napoleon had not yet sufficient information either as to the position or as to the intentions of his adversary. But later, more precise information came in and consequently the 13th of October, which had been designated as a day of rest, saw tiresome marches for the French troops, but thanks to which the concentration towards the left on the Saale was carried out.

Ney and Soult with their divisions were at Jena at noon on the 14th. Bernadotte, marched on the morning of the 14th from Naumburg to Dornburg and reached Apolda on the morning of the 14th. He has not given satisfactory reasons why he did not appear on the battlefield either at Jena or at Auerstaedt.

As a result of the marches on the 12th and 13th (certain organizations also marched during the night of the 13th-14th) the positions of the troops were:

	12th	13th
IIIrd Corps,	Davout -----Naumburg	Naumburg
Ist Corps,	Bernadotte -----Meineweh	Naumburg
	Murat -----Zeitz	Naumburg
IV Corps,	Soult -----Gera	Jena, Kloster, Lausnitz
	Guard -----Gera	Jena
Vth Corps.	Ney -----Auma	Stadt Roda
Vth Corps,	Lannes -----Winzerla	Jena
VIth Corps,	Augereau -----Kahla	Jena
	Napoleon -----Gera	Jena

†The Prince himself estimated forces on this day as 28,000 men and those of Ruchel's as 12,000. W. D. E.III, 117, Volume II.

out a great loss of men and time. The enemy would not have gained his objective before noon of the 14th, as it would have taken the 13th to construct a bridge. Similar measures should have been taken near Dornburg. If the enemy as a result of Jena being too strongly held, had directed his main effort against Dornburg, the Prince should have sent one-half of his reserve there, which would have been all the easier as such a movement would have been along the line of his retreat.

With such dispositions, we state that the Prince should have been on the 13th in a position to be exactly informed as to the intentions of the enemy, and to resist one-half of the day of the 14th, and then retire without great losses on the principal army. On the contrary the Prince held to his reversed position, with more of his rear than his front turned towards the enemy; his left division did not defend the Saale at all, except as an ordinary outpost line capable of ascertaining more correctly the movements of the enemy. Thus on the 14th, he understood nothing of the intentions of his adversary; the bridges of the Saale were not interrupted, the edge of the valley was abandoned to the enemy without a shot, together with sufficient space for him to establish himself on the plateau. The Prince might have supposed that he was likely to meet Bonaparte with 100,000 French, he knew the condition of his own troops and that General Ruchel was not under his orders, and in spite of all this, disobeying the orders of the Duke, he took it upon himself to accept a decisive battle at this point.

Now what was the nature of the battle itself? General Tauenzien during the night of the 13-14th, withdrew into the plan with a view to again attacking the enemy by echelons in the morning during a most dense fog. He was naturally beaten and half dispersed. Then General Grawert arrived; he changed fronts and also advanced in echelon against the enemy and was beaten. Now Ruchel came, advanced in echelons and was beaten. During this time the Saxons remained in their useless flank position on the Floh Berg acting as if nothing was happening; they were surrounded and taken prisoners.* In this manner the separ-

*The Saxons remained at Schneck, with the mission of holding this point as long as possible to cover the right flank.

ate fractions of 6,000, 10,000 and 15,000 men each sought an individual battle against a mass of 60,000 men, without it being possible to find in these movements the slightest sign of connection.

Successive employment of the troops in battle had been only recently taught, particularly under Bonaparte; this method is so strong that almost always it gives victory against a mixed up employment of troops. But here evidently an entirely different thing was done. In the first place this method is more suitable for the defense than for the attack, as it is not a matter of inserting the troops little by little into the battle, but to hold and exhaust the enemy for a long time with a few men in order to retain the remainder in reserve, and thus have the best position at the end. This is the easier where, as in the defense, assistance can be obtained from the terrain and intrenchments. But if such successive employment of troops occurs during an attack, this attack must have such characteristics. By a slow and continued advance forward, by a battle with a fire fight of several hours, by attack with small bodies of cavalry, the enemy will be led to prematurely deploy his forces, and thus enable a decision to be obtained with fresh masses and at a moment when the enemy no longer expects it. The essential point is that this final maneuver must be in liaison with the first, that is, it is necessary not to allow the troops which are employed in the initial attack to be beaten, crushed and chased off the battlefield before the second act is started. But nothing was less appropriate to the successive employment of troops than the Prussian tactics of this period, where the advance was made with the entire mass, and where it was believed that the mission could be accomplished with some fire by battalions, followed up with the bayonet, and where consequently in a single blow and in a few minutes everything was thrown into the abyss of the battle. When the second attack commenced, hardly anything was left of the first. Using these tactics, if Prince Hohenlohe absolutely wished to deliver battle, he had only one plan: assemble the four divisions in the usual order of battle, and fall with these on the enemy, with the mission of throwing them back into the valley of the Saale.

I do not believe that the Prince would have gained the battle, but it can be believed that this would give a possibility of gaining.

Prince Hohenlohe did not lose only the battle. He was, in what was almost an unheard of case, so crushed on the field of battle that of the 48,000 men, including Ruchel's corps, which were defeated there, not more than 10,000 could be assembled afterwards.* Prince Hohenlohe would have had better reason to retreat towards Apolda, and from there towards Buttstedt, in order to unite more easily with the principal army. But he went towards Weimar, from where part of the defeated army fled towards Erfurt, while the remainder went in the direction of Frankenhhausen, Sondershausen and Nordhausen. If the Prince had kept this line of retreat, the remnants of his force would have met the defeated army of the Duke, and the dispersion would not have been so great.

During the whole course of these military events, the only thing you can praise the Prince for is his courage and his good intentions.

THE BATTLE OF AUERSTAEDT

Schmettau's division which had bivouacked a little less than a mile from the bridge of Kosen, on the morning of the 14th, encountered the head of the enemy's column. The Duke then decided to march forward with this division, to have the remaining divisions follow, and to overthrow the enemy who must be between him and the defile of Kosen, and if this enemy was in strength, to undertake the necessary battle. There was one hundred chances to one that only one or two hostile corps would be met; we would therefore be superior to them and must not lose this advantage. The decision to fight was then entirely proper.

Schmettau's division advanced in great haste into the fog and suffered cruelly from canister fire at short range

*The dispersion of Prince Hohenlohe's army did not occur until during the retreat. On the field of battle itself, it was disorganized by the great losses, but it was not, as stated above, "completely crushed."

which forced it to retire slightly. This took place between the villages of Taugwitz and Hassenhausen. It was ascertained that the enemy was more than 30,000 strong, of which 8,000 were near Hassenhausen and the remainder were in march coming from Kosen. A halt was then made until Wartensleben's division arrived, and his march was pushed through aides. General Blucher who in the absence of the Duke of Weimar's division, was to form a new advance guard, then received from the King 25 squadrons of cavalry attached to the divisions; he disposed of these on the left of Schmettau's division and turned the right wing of the enemy's first line, on the flank and on the rear of which he soon found himself. Blucher with 25 attack squadrons of Prussian cavalry in rear of the French!—not a single Prussian could doubt as to success. But the attacks were everywhere repulsed and this cavalry disappeared to a good distance from the field of battle.*

The result was entirely natural. In rear of the front hostile line were reserves in good order, a sufficient reason for repulsing the best cavalry and a better one against cavalry which had not yet smelled powder.

But here again, it was the fault of our pre-judgments and the tactics of our drill ground. The first regarded the Prussian saber carried by a Blucher as invincible; the second taught no other rule than to form, then to advance. The result was that this cavalry did not re-appear, and that the weak enemy cavalry, nine squadrons, was in a position to overthrow the left wing of Schmettau's division which had already suffered a great deal, and thus carry out an important blow. At first the Duke of Brunswick did not wish to advance with Schmettau and Wartensleben's divisions, but wished to wait for the arrival of Orange's division and of the reserves. Field Marshal Moellendorf spoke to the King with the words which Frederick the

*Scharnhorst (WD File, posthumous works, 41) says that General Blucher had 20 squadrons under his orders. From the WD records, it is impossible to positively identify more than 11 squadrons as having taken part in the attack. The attack was made in a dense fog; Blucher, on the strength of communications made to him by the Duke of Brunswick, at first believed that he only had hostile cavalry to meet; and during the charge he was fired upon by his own artillery. These are circumstances which must be considered in judging of events.—*Note by German Editor.*

Great had used at the battle of Prague to Schwerin: "Fresh fish are good fish." The attack then commenced with two divisions without even waiting for the artillery of Wartensleben's division which had been unable to follow along fast enough. The advance was in one line, volleys were fired by battalions and the result was that at first they advanced and repulsed the troops which the enemy had brought into the fight. But we suffered beyond all proportion from the fire of the skirmishers and from the French artillery, and after we had advanced against the thick masses and the reinforcements brought up by the enemy, we were stopped.

Two Prussian divisions now fought against the two French divisions of Gudin and Friant. The Prussian divisions had been led without a real plan of battle. They deployed nearly perpendicular to the road they had been following, and immediately marched forward. On their left flank they found the village of Hassenhausen from which the enemy offered a vigorous resistance. On the other hand the right Prussian wing had greater success, and a change occurred by which the Prussians had more of their backs to the Ilm, when they should have had them towards Eckartsberga.

Schmettau's division had suffered most because it had commenced to fight earlier and had attacked the villages. It was much exhausted when the hostile cavalry appeared. These attacked its left wing and repulsed the whole division in such manner that it formed a crook with General Wartensleben's division.* At this moment before Orange's division had arrived, the Duke received a mortal wound.

As the march of Wartensleben's division had been much accelerated there was a corresponding increase in time before the arrival of Orange's division. When the latter did

*Clausewitz here apparently follows Muffling's report (Ch de W. *Plan of Operations of the Saxon Army in 1806*) on the Battle of Auerstaedt, which contains many errors as to events which occurred on the left Prussian wing. The line of battle of Schmettau's, up to the last moment, did not form a crook with Wartensleben, but an obtuse salient angle. From the beginning of the battle, Schmettau's division was charged by the hostile cavalry, however, it did not change its position. Only on the extreme left, Malschitzki's cavalry was posted by Scharnhorst refused to the flank, with regard to the division, when the first enveloping columns of the enemy were seen.—W. D. Files, E III, 3, 166.

arrive, the two preceding divisions were already much exhausted and shaken. In any case, Orange's division should have been employed exclusively to reinforce the left in order to again acquire a position corresponding to the line of retreat, but this idea does not seem to have occurred to any one during the entire battle. They contented themselves by sending one brigade of this division to the left, which according to the order of battle belonged to the right wing; this brigade was unable to re-establish matters.*

Marshal Davout had then called up his third division, Morand, and had employed it to still more turn the already refused Prussian wing; he caused it to take the direction from Taugwitz via Spielberg and even directed a part on Lisdorf.† Davout had orders to come up on the flank of the Prussian army to separate them still more from their line of retreat. He maneuvered with this mission. He believed he could avoid the danger to which he was exposed, by assistance to be given him by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps, who were between him and the principal army, and who should by their march forward have fallen on the rear of the principal army.

But these corps did not arrive, because Soult was called to Jena and Bernadotte made false movements. On the other hand, the Prussian reserve under Kalkreuth was only one-quarter of a mile from the field of battle. Marshal Davout's situation was consequently extremely dangerous. Up to now, three Prussian divisions had fought against three French divisions; the two sides had nearly equal forces, around 27,000 men, and there was, therefore, an equilibrium of power. But the French, more accustomed to

*On arrival of the King, the Prince of Orange personally received orders to reinforce the left wing of the line of battle with his entire division. There was thus a return to the intention expressed in the march order to have the troops which followed Schmettau's division on the left (see *Monographs of Military History*, Vol. II, page 95). But under the circumstances, Wartensleben's division commenced to bend, and the order was again changed, and only Prince Henry's brigade was sent to the left, while Lutzow's brigade was intended to reinforce the right wing.—W.D. Files, E III—3.

†Here again, Clausewitz must have followed the incorrect report of Muffling. Morand's division was actually engaged against the right Prussian wing, while the columns which turned against the left Prussian wing, belonged to Friant's division and had taken this direction from the beginning of the battle.

war, confident in the advantage of their tactics, had little by little gained the upper hand. They had fewer losses than their adversaries and pushed the latter into a disadvantageous oblique position. This result was altogether simple and natural. If at this moment (it must have been about 10 A.M.)* the reserve under Kalkreuth had received orders to throw itself against the right wing of the French, which Marshal Davout had caused to converge towards Lisdorf in front of Eckartsberga, a miracle would have been necessary to prevent Marshal Davout from being overthrown and crushed with the greater part of his army corps before he again reached the Kosen bridge.

But Bernadotte did not fall on the rear of the Prussians, and neither did Kalkreuth fall on the rear of the French. He left his bivouac near Rannstedt so late that when he arrived at Auerstaedt, the three divisions were already in such disorder that the King, who had himself assumed command, did not believe it possible to re-establish the battle with the reserve.† If the King had known the situation of his adversary as we now know it, he would not have hesitated for a minute to use his reserves against him, and it would have been a miracle if he had not won a brilliant victory. But it was estimated that the troops which had fought against our three divisions were much superior in strength, because we had seen our troops crushed while the enemy always had reserves. We did not understand sufficiently the effects of the new tactics which greatly economizes force during the battle, and no account was taken of the difference of result in the two methods of fighting. Everywhere everyone in war has believed the enemy to be stronger than he was, and still more so when all our designs everywhere fail by a better employment of the enemy's forces. But, besides, it was not known what was following Marshal Davout across the bridge of Kosen; and the three Prussian divisions which had been fought were almost crushed. If an attack had been made with the reserve, and this failed to succeed, the reserve would fall into the same condition

*The moment spoken of here, should have been fixed as noon. At this time the reserve was already deployed in rear of Gernstedt.

†See *Monographs of Military History*, Volume II, page 12.

and a complete disaster would result in a lost battle. It was therefore decided not to attempt this useless task but to withdraw with a weakened army towards Prince Hohenlohe, who was believed to be intact, with a view to undertaking either a new battle with all forces united, or else to continue to retreat. This was the point of view taken and at first sight it appears very proper, but considering correct principles, we arrive at the following considerations:

In war there is always uncertainty as to the mutual situation of the two parties. We must therefore become accustomed to always act according to general appearances, and it is an error to wait for the moment when all ignorance has disappeared, and where it becomes possible to proceed without hypotheses. He who considers lightly the requirement to act according to general appearances, will not know what he wants, and will not understand what he is doing. It is therefore difficult to examine the decision taken at Auerstaedt, by placing ourselves in the situation at the time, and of inquiring what would be the result of reasoning, if we admit as a premise the more reasonable assumptions, and if we follow this up by strict logic.

The first assumption which was made, was that other corps were following Marshal Davout via Kosen; this was altogether arbitrary. The terrain between Hassenhausen and the Saale was as flat as a table and was not very much covered and nothing could be seen of corps who might be following; there was therefore no reason to believe in their existence from any observations. In addition, it could be quite clearly seen that Kosen was at the extreme right of the enemy, for he had appeared at Saalfeld on the 10th in great force. Now it was difficult to admit that the principal mass of the French would be found exactly at the head of their march order. It was more natural to suppose that strong forces would come from Camburg and Dornburg. If these should arrive near Auerstaedt in time, it would be impossible to win; but the entire effort of the battle should have had as a mission to wait and defeat one of the columns crossing the Saale before the others could arrive, and naturally these other columns had not yet arrived. It was therefore necessary not to hold back through fear of its

being impossible to carry out what had been regarded as possible in the directing idea, that is, that we would strike an enemy considerably weaker.

. We will not besides conceal the fact that it was possible to see the reserve crushed without a penetration. But such dangers arise in all battles, and we must not consider every possibility, but only probabilities. The latter promised a brilliant victory over one hostile corps; if this would not be sufficient to decide the war, it was at least a compensation to the evils which must be expected, and particularly it was what was desired and very nearly what could have been obtained from the situation. The battle of Auerstaedt was not continued and consequently was not won: this is an excellent example of the results of indecision in war. As there was no absolute certainty of success, it was believed more prudent, and providing more for the future, not to continue, while prudence and foresight urged exactly the opposite, that is, not to allow the single advantage on which we could count in this war to escape.

The error which was committed in breaking off the battle, was entirely the result of indecision. But there was also here a false reasoning.

The second assumption which was made, was that Prince Hohenlohe would be intact. This assumption was also against all probability, for even if the Prince did not fight a battle, it was not probable that he could retire without being pressed and without a serious rear guard action. Here commences the false reasoning. What did they wish to do with Prince Hohenlohe? To fight a battle after joining? Then it would have been better not to have become separated from him. As long as the enemy had to cross the Saale in order to get at us, there was the hope of being able to fall with our assembled forces on his separated forces; if we fought away from this side of the Saale, the concentration of our forces could no longer assure us any advantage, as we would have probably encountered the hostile forces also concentrated. Finally, if it was desired to unite with Hohenlohe, in order to continue the retreat and go towards the Russians, it was also unimportant whether the two divisions of Kalkreuth were intact, or were weak-

ened by a battle. The reasoning at Auerstaedt belongs to the class of superficial conversations which occur so frequently in war between those who are near to the Commanding General and are questioned by him at a critical moment. Ordinarily, men are always frightened at the danger of taking an important resolution, and are therefore very much inclined to withdraw behind a superficial reasoning because they do not take into consideration their lack of courage. He who at such times has not by distinguished natural courage maintained a level head, should have at least strong logic, understand exactly what he wants, see clearly what is occurring, and keep straight at his mission. Both of these qualities are much more to be expected in a commanding general than in his staff, or at least from those who have not from the beginning had absolute confidence, it is for this reason why advice and conversations at moments when great decisions are required are always very undesirable.

We now come to a third point. The retreat which it was desired to continue in concert with Hohenlohe's army, should at first in principle have been obtained by a victory at Auerstaedt. The entire plan of defense in rear of the Saale was based on the following idea: if the enemy wished to turn our army by the left, and reach our natural line of retreat with the head of his column, we would strike this head, and if we did not succeed, we would select another line of retreat, as near as possible to the true one. Now, not only had we struck the head of the hostile forces near Auerstaedt, but we had also so disarranged our front that in withdrawing straight to the rear, we returned from whence we came, and where the enemy would now be, that is, at Weimar.

To carry out a retreat together with Prince Hohenlohe, which would again place the army in a better situation, it was necessary to be possible to occupy a position in the vicinity of Eckhartsberga until the Prince had reached Auerstaedt, and then together march towards the Unstrutt. To do this, it was necessary to defeat the enemy at Auerstaedt; without such a victory, there would always be a bad retreat, a retreat where it would be necessary to hasten and to make

detours in face of the enemy. From this point of view, it was another serious error to discontinue the battle of Auerstaedt so early.

The Prussians were at that battle 45,000 men strong, against 27,000 French, who had in their rear, a difficult closed valley with only one bridge. The Prussians were defeated because they did not understand the new method of conducting battle and because they lacked resolution. We can well say that from the moment when it was known we could not win here, an admissible result of the war was impossible. Evidently it was the fault of tactics, and not of strategy that the campaign took such a bad turn.

We now come to the general retreat. Before considering the details we wish to point out the principal facts of this retreat, that is, essential events.


14 October—Hohenlohe's army and General Ruchel's corps were in such a state of dissolution, that it was impossible to say where they were. A part had gone towards Erfurt, another to Buttstedt; another had gone towards the Unstrutt, between the other two parts. Prince Hohenlohe himself arrived in the night with a cavalry detachment at the Vippach Chateau, which he however soon left.

The situation of the principal army was not much better. About 35,000 men left during the evening in good order from the vicinity of Auerstaedt via Buttstedt, for Weimar.* But when news of the loss of the battle by Prince Hohenlohe was received, the march was changed and directed towards Buttstedt via the Sommerda road. All the troops did not receive the new order, and consequently part went to Buttstedt, and part towards Buttstedt.

Among the former, some left immediately, and under the direction of Field Marshal von Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange, took the road to Erfurt; they no longer knew the place of assembly of the army and they became invested in Erfurt. His Majesty, the King, and General Count von Kalkreuth, were ordered to Sommerda where the Duke's army was to be assembled.

*See "*Monographs of Military History*," Volume II, page 16.

BATTLE OF AUERSTÄDT 14TH OCTOBER, 1806.



On the 14th, the French did not follow very much beyond the fields of battle. Particularly Davout remained at Auerstaedt and Eckartsberga, and the main body near Weimar, where was the Headquarters of the Emperor.*

15 October—Prince Hohenlohe went to Sondershausen where he commenced to assemble some remnants of his army, while other parts were moving on Frankenhäusen.

His Majesty, the King, remained at Sommerda until evening, and then went towards Sondershausen to there assemble the troops who were entirely dispersed as the result of the night march, and to place them in billets in rear of the Unstrutt. Although Sommerda was not much more than four miles from Auerstaedt, many battalions did not arrive there until after night; all the troops which were assembled at this point might amount to about 14,000 men.

In the French army, Murat and Soult turned towards Erfurt; Ney leaving Weimar, followed the defeated army in the direction of Frankenhäusen. Lannes and Augereau turned to the right, towards Naumburg. Bernadotte and Davout did the same.†

16 October—Prince Hohenlohe reached Nordhausen where he continued to assemble the remnants of his army which by now might amount to 8,000 or 10,000 men. The command of the army, less Kalkreuth's two divisions, was confided to Prince Hohenlohe at Sondershausen by his Majesty, who thereupon left the army. General Kalkreuth left Sommerda to proceed via Weissensee and Greussen to Sondershausen. He found already at Weissensee several regiments of hostile cavalry under General Klein who belonged to Prince Murat's corps. This General was very pleased to learn that negotiations had already been started, and that consequently an armistice had been concluded. He could not have stopped Kalkreuth's column, and the latter might have greatly endangered him. He therefore allowed General

*The Chasseur brigade of Marshal Davout arrived as far as Buttstedt.

†On October 15, Murat and Ney appeared in front of Erfurt. Soult went towards Buttstedt, and only patrols from his corps reached Erfurt. On the other hand Augereau marched towards this city. Bernadotte turned from Apolda towards the north and reached Bibra; his patrols came as far as Querfurt. Only Lannes and Davout were on the Naumburg road or in that city.

Kalkreuth to proceed peacefully from Weissensee towards Greussen. Scarcely had he arrived at this place, when Marshal Soult arrived, coming from Erfurt via Tennstedt, with Lasalle's cavalry division leading. General Kalkreuth wished to pass the night quietly near Greussen. But Marshal Soult did not wish to know anything about the armistice; the march was therefore continued on to Sondershausen where they arrived in the morning.*

In the French army Murat was still in front of Erfurt where Marshal Moellendorf surrendered on the morning of the 16th with about 14,000 men.† Murat left there for Langensalza. Soult was near Greussen, Ney in rear of Soult, Lannes and Augereau were at Naumburg; Davout at Weissenfels. Bernadotte had taken the direct road to Magdeburg; he was at Querfurt. Napoleon and the Guard were at Weimar.‡

17 October—Prince Hohenlohe waited near Nordhausen for General Kalkreuth. The latter general left Sondershausen without stopping for rest; he reached Nordhausen during the afternoon. The two armies left during the evening and crossed the Harz, marching as follows: Hohenlohe via Stolberg and Guntersberg, towards Quedlimburg; General Kalkreuth via Ilfeld and Stiege, towards Blankenburg. The heavy artillery under an escort of a battalion of 600 troopers, under General Blucher, made a detour via Osterode, Seesen and Brunswick, around the extreme west of the Harz, and later across the Elbe near Sandau.

In the French army, Murat also made a detour around the extreme west of the Harz. On this day he was between Langensalza and Sondershausen. Soult and Ney arrived at Sondershausen, which they reached towards evening. Lannes and Augereau went towards Merseburg. Bonaparte

*Soult did not come from Erfurt but from Butteltstedt and he marched via Sommerda. Lasalle's hussar brigade belonged to the reserve cavalry. Coming from Walschleben, it reached this day Tennstedt.

†The formal conclusion of the capitulation took place during the night 15-16th. Prince Orange replaced Marshal Von Moellendorf, who was sick. About 10,000 men, not 14,000, surrendered.—W. D. Files, E III, 64.

‡Ney, coming from Erfurt, followed Prince Murat on October 16th; he reached Grafen-Tonna, in the evening. Augereau was at Weimar on October 16th.

with the Guard to Naumburg. Bernadotte turned against the Duke of Wurtemberg, who stayed at Halle and was defeated. Davout remained at Weissenfels.*

In this manner, it followed that the direct road from Auerstaedt to Magdeburg was not taken by any of our corps, nor by a hostile corps.

18 October—Hohenlohe's army was near Quedlimburg. That of Kalkreuth assembled near Blankenburg and reorganized from the disorder into which it had fallen during the night march. The Duke of Wurtemberg had withdrawn during the 17th from Halle to Dessau and was consequently marching from Dessau to Magdeburg.

In the French army, the cavalry under Murat was in the vicinity of Bleicherode. Soult and Ney crossed the Harz. Lannes and Augereau arrived at Halle, Bonaparte at Merseburg, Davout at Leipzig. Bernadotte had again abandoned the Dessau road and turned towards Magdeburg, he arrived nearly as far as Commern.

October 19—Hohenlohe marched via Egelu, just opposite Magdeburg; Kalkreuth to near Oschersleben; the Duke of Wurtemberg to near Magdeburg; Murat, Soult and Ney reached the vicinity of Halberstadt; Bernadotte, Bernburg; Lannes and Augereau, Radegast; Bonaparte, Halle.†

October 20—Prince Hohenlohe was near Magdeburg. Kalkreuth went beyond Magdeburg as far as Jerichow and crossed the Elbe by ferry. The remainder of the Prussian army, about 45,000 men strong, were to be assembled this day near Magdeburg. Prince Hohenlohe assumed command. General Kalkreuth left for Prussia.‡

The French, under Murat, Soult, Ney and Bernadotte, advanced as far as the vicinity of Egelu and Aslesben, some

*Ney reached Nordhausen only on the morning of October 18th, by means of a night march. Lannes on the evening of the 17th was near Naumburg, on the Leipzig road.

†Let us remark that Murat's cavalry was on the 18th spread between Sondershausen and Steige. Lannes marched towards Merseburg on the 19th, Bernadotte reached Alsleben and Ney Benneckenstein. Augereau followed Lannes. He arrived just beyond Halle.

‡See "*Monographs of Military History*," Volume II, page 24.

even as far as under the guns of Magdeburg. Lannes and Augereau at Dessau and Davout at Wittenberg.*

In this part of the retreat, the Prussian army had made a detour of 8 miles, in order to march to Magdeburg, 18 miles away, while the direct road was, we may say, entirely free. It made, on the 16th and 18th, a continuous march of 14 miles from Sommerda to Blankenburg, crossed the Harz in the night by a miserable crossroad, which completely disorganized it, so thoroughly that it required three days to cover the following 8 miles. General Blucher arrived several days later, on the 24th, without having fought, by the road which we have indicated, near Saudau, where he crossed the Elbe; the Duke of Weimar recalled with his division too late from Franconia, arrived on October 15th in front of Erfurt where he wished to attempt to rescue the garrison; he did not succeed in this, and marched via Langensalza, Mulhausen, Heiligenstadt, Duderstedt, Osterode, Seesen Wolfenbittel, Koenigslutter, Gardelegen and Sandau, where he luckily crossed the Elbe almost in sight of Soult. The French were divided into two principal masses. Their left wing, Murat, Soult and Ney, followed the defeated army toward Magdeburg, making the detour which they took without pressing them too strongly; the right wing sought to cut off the main Prussian army by occupying Dessau and Wittenberg.

Bernadotte, in the middle between these two masses, had desired to take the direct road, but had been turned away by the Duke of Wurtemberg. The Guard had followed the right wing.

Prince Hohenlohe near Magdeburg reorganized the remnants of his army. He left on the 21st with about 24,000 men. He should not have left more than 12,000 men at Magdeburg but the disorder and the haste did not allow of exact supervision, and events showed that about 20,000 men remained there.†

The Prince did not believe it possible to reach Berlin in advance of the enemy. He therefore decided to proceed to-

*On October 20th, Ney arrived as far as Halberstadt. Bernadotte as far as Bernburg.

†The total effective strength at the capitulation amounted to 24,118 men.—W.D. Files, E III, 163, Volume VII.

wards Stettin, making the detour via Rathenow and Ruppín. For this purpose he divided his force into two columns. One consisted of infantry with one brigade of cavalry; the other of cavalry. The infantry was to march to Stettin, via Rathenow, Friesach, Ruppín, Gransee, Templín, Prenzlau; the cavalry column via Havelberg, Kyritz, Wittstok, Wesenberg, Woldegk, and Pasewalk.

The third column, consisting of 35 squadrons of light cavalry and a few light infantry, under General Schimmelpfennig, was to cover this long flank march on a road nearer to the enemy, via Ziesar, Plaue, Fehrbellín and Zehdenik.*

On the French side, Ney, and at the beginning Soult also remained in front of Magdeburg. Lannes, Augereau and Davout, continued on towards Berlin, from where Lannes alone kept on. Murat and Bernadotte converged towards Dessau as they were unable to cross Dessau near Magdeburg. From Dessau, Murat marched via Plaue, towards Fehrbellín, where he joined Lannes; Bernadotte marched via Rathenow and Wusterhausen. There is no exact information as to their position during these days.†

21 October—Prince Hohenlohe marched towards Burg, with the infantry column.

The cavalry column assembled on the Elbe; Schimmelpfennig near Ziesar.‡

22 October—Infantry column at Genthin; cavalry column at Jerichow; Schimmelpfennig at Plaue.

23 October—Infantry column at Rathenow; cavalry at Sandau; Schimmelpfennig opposite Ranen.

As the bridge near Fehrbellín had been destroyed, General Schimmelpfennig was directed for the morrow to proceed towards Friesach, and this was the reason for the infantry column making a new detour towards Rhinow.¶ An

*See "*Monographs of Military History*," Volume II, page 26.

†Murat marched from Dessau via Potsdam via Oranienbourg, and reconnoitered towards Fehrbellín on October 25; Bernadotte took the road from Oranienburg via Boernicke.

‡Schimmelpfennig's column did not unite until October 22. On October 21, Schimmelpfennig's hussar regiment was at Gladau, and at Dretzel between Ziesar and Genthin, while the other regiments assigned to this general were in rear.

¶See "*Monographs of Military History*," Volume II, page 26.

infantry brigade under Colonel Hagen had been attached to the cavalry.

24 October—The infantry column was near Neustadt. The cavalry column was near Kyritz.

General Schimmelpfennig was near Protzen.

General Blucher on this day crossed the Elbe at Sandau.

Natzmer's division formed from the Wurtemberg corps, remained near Rhinow as a rear guard, and was then placed under the orders of General Blucher, who was to remain with it at a short march in the rear of the army.

25 October—Infantry column at Ruppın.

Cavalry column at Wittstock.

General Blucher at Neustadt.

Schimmelpfennig at Zehdenick.

On this day Spandau surrendered.

26 October—Infantry column at Furstenberg.

Cavalry column at Wesenberg.

General Blucher at Alt and Ruppın.

General Schimmelpfennig was struck at Zehdenick on this day by the head of Murat's forces; he was completely dispersed and his detachment in great part taken prisoner. Only two squadrons of his regiment, under the Prince of Pless, reached the Oder. Marshal Lannes was in rear of Murat's cavalry, but he did not reach Zehdenick until the evening.

Prince Hohenlohe made a new detour by marching from Gransee not on Templin but on Furstenberg, in order to close in on his cavalry column; this movement deprived the troops of the rations prepared at Templin.*

27 October—Prince Hohenlohe had marched from Lychen on Boitzenburg. But as a hostile cavalry patrol had arrived there a half hour earlier, he again abandoned the expected rations, made a new detour via Krewitz and Schoernermark, where he did not arrive until nearly morning.

The cavalry column was to join the infantry near Prenzlau. In consequence, near the infantry column were the following troops:

*See "*Monographs of Military History*," Volume II, page 27.

Beeren's brigade, with 5 squadrons of gendarmes and 5 squadrons of Beeren's regiment;
Leib regiment of Schwerin's brigade;
Wobeser's brigade, consisting of 5 squadrons of the Prittwitz regiment, 5 from the Kraft, 5 from the Quitzow, and 5 from the Wobeser regiments—Total, 35 squadrons.

Fifteen squadrons under General Bila were to follow, but never joined the infantry column. The gendarme regiment was to join General Bila, and the latter was to replace General Schimmelpfennig to cover the right flank of the infantry column. The gendarme regiment then marched from Lychen on the right of the lake near Boitzenburg towards Prenzlau. Near Wichmansdorf, it was stopped by a superior cavalry force, and forced to surrender. Only Major Furgas escaped with one squadron which later reached Anklam.

The positions of the Prussian troops, on the 27th, or more correctly on the 28th before daybreak, were as follows:

Infantry column near Schoenermark;
35 squadrons of cavalry near Schoenermark; the remaining regiments of cavalry column (45 squadrons) near Furstenberg;
General Bila with 15 squadrons between Lychen and Schoenermark;*
General Blucher at Lycken and Furstenberg.

28 October—Prince Hohenlohe left Schoenermark at daybreak and left for Prenzlau, which he reached at about the same time as the enemy's cavalry.

Murat came with his leading cavalry from Templin via Hassleben. Lannes followed him. Bernadotte was further to the rear and following General Blucher via Ruppín and Lychen. Soult on this day crossed the Elbe,† near

*On leaving Schoenermark, only the following regiments were there, Leib cuirassiers, Prittwitz, Kraft and Wobeser regiments, 20 squadrons in all. Quitzow's regiment did not reach the infantry until shortly before Prenzlau. Near Furstenberg were 25 squadrons from the Leib carbiniers, and from the Heising, Holtzendorf, Bunting and Count Henckel regiments, and in addition from the remnants of the Katte and Balliodz regiments.

General Bila left Jacobshagen on the morning of the 28th for Schoenermark. He had five squadrons from his own regiment and 10 from Gettkandt.—W.D. Files, EIII, 13, Vol. VII; 117, Vol. II; 189, Vol. III, IV.

†Bernadotte left Oranienburg via Gransee, and reached Furstenberg on the evening of October 28th, and then alone continued the pursuit of Blucher. Soult crossed the Elbe near Tangermunde.

Sandau. The other French corps in part marched on Frankfurt and Custrin and in part on Berlin and beyond.

Prittwitz's dragoon regiment deployed against the leading hostile cavalry, and was repulsed; as the result the King's regiment was thrown back into disorder into Prenzlau. Prince August's battalion and Quitzow's regiment were cut up. The battalion was captured several hours after noon, on the Pasewalk road, after a long resistance. Prittzow's regiment fled toward General Bila.

Prince Hohenlohe considered his troops too exhausted to continue his march; he surrendered to General Murat with about 10,000 men who still remained with him.

Blucher arrived at Boitzenburg late on the 28th and here learned of Prince Hohenlohe's surrender. Blucher remained at Boitzenburg.*

General Bila learned near Prenzlau from Prittzow's regiment that he was cut off. He therefore made a false march via Strasburg and Uetkermunde towards Falkenwalde, 3 leagues from Stettin, in order to reach Stettin by this detour, as he thought it no longer possible to proceed via Lockenitz. He arrived there at noon on the 29th, sent some one ahead to Stettin and was informed that the enemy was at the gates, and that he could no longer pass by. In consequence, he withdrew towards Anklam, where he joined on the 30th his brother, General Bila, senior, with the 1st Battalion of Grevenitz's regiment which had escorted the royal chests which had been luckily sent to Usedom. There was no longer time to do much for the troops, and General Bila, senior, concluded on the 31st a capitulation with Becker's French cavalry brigade.

The cavalry column with Hagen's infantry brigade marched on the 28th towards Pasewalk, which it reached on the morning of the 29th and there surrendered to a brigade of French cavalry, as the defile to Lockenitz was already occupied.†

*Blucher received the news only on the morning of October 29th. His advance guard had already started from Boitzenburg for Prenzlau. He therefore immediately changed his direction of march towards Strelitz.—W. D. Files, E III 5.

†Hagen's brigade reached Pasewalk after noon on October 28th, at a time when the defile of Lockenitz was not yet in the hands of the enemy.—W.D. Files, E III, 189, Volume IV.

General Blücher seeing that he could no longer reach Stettin went on the 29th towards Strelitz with the intention of joining the Duke of Weimar. The latter had on orders written by the King turned over the command of his corps to General Winning, who had marched via Kyritz and Wittstock towards Mirow, where he arrived on the 30th and received information as to the surrender at Prenzlau. He then decided to take the Rostock road in order to embark on ships if possible. Near Waren, he joined General Blücher who assumed command of the two corps, which were about 20,000 men strong and had 100 guns with them. General Blücher decided to draw the enemy as far away from the Oder as possible, in order to offer battle to one hostile corps. He hoped in this way to give the King time to reach the Oder with the Russian and Prussian troops. He therefore abandoned the march on Rostock, and took the road via Alt-Schwerin and Lewitz-Bruch between Neu-Schwerin and Neustadt. But the French Marshals Murat, Bernadotte and Soult* the first on the right, the second on the center and the third on the left, were so close on his heels that he could not maintain his march on the Elbe, as he would not have had the time to cross it; he could on the other hand not halt to give his troops a moment's rest or to reorganize. With numerous rear guard actions, he went via Raggendorf towards Lubeck, where he arrived November 5th with the hope of there finding an opportunity for an advantageous battle in view of his position in rear of the Trave and thanks to the neutrality of Denmark.

The unexpected loss of the gate of the city of Lubeck, and in consequence of the town, with a large part of the troops that were in there, caused his hopes to vanish. During the night, his troops were again surprised in rear of Lubeck. He was thus forced on November 7th, to lay down his arms with 9000 men.

*March Table November 1st to 5th:

<i>November</i>	<i>Soult</i>	<i>Bernadotte</i>	<i>Murat</i>
1	Waren	Alt-Schwerin	Demmin
2	Plau	Lubz	Malchin
3	Crivitz	Rabensteinfeld	Gustrow
4	G-Welzin	Lankow	Schwerin
5	Ratzeburg	Schoenberg	Ratzeburg

Let us consider the general circumstances of this retreat.

The King and his staff had so little understood the necessity of winning at Auerstaedt in order to protect their retreat, that they no longer thought of selecting the road nearest to the natural lines of retreat; but they wished, of their own accord, to march on Weimar to unite there with Prince Hohenlohe. Only news that hostile cavalry, were already on the main Weimar highway caused them to march towards Buttstedt, that is towards the Harz.

Even with the defective front which we had at the battle of Auerstaedt, even when at the end of the battle, we were in rear of the Auerstaedt creek, that is, with our backs towards Weimar, it was still possible to march directly via Eckhartsberga toward Nebra or Rossleben, on the Unstrut; they would have been there on the 15th, with a position in a deep valley in which to reorganize the troops. In fact we had been constantly turned during the battle by our left; a flank march after a lost battle is an unusual thing, but we must not lose sight of the general circumstances. It was not with the hostile center that we were fighting, which might have led us to suppose that other corps were being sent around our flank to turn us; it was the extreme edge of the turning movement which we had in front of us, this was known with the greatest probability. The turning movement which Davout carried out with several battalions was a sort of child-like movement. If we had marched squarely away with the 35,000 men which we had in rear of Auerstaedt, this small force could not have stopped our march. It is impossible to consider the situation of the Prussian army at Auerstaedt as so desperate, that if we had acted in the same manner as the Russians had near Custring, we could have charged two or three times from the front, and at the end reoccupied our true line of retreat in spite of the victor and marched off to the left flank. How much more difficult was the similar task of Frederick the Great after the battle of Hochkirch, where his first retreat toward Klein-Bautzen, on the morning of the battle, was a flank tactical march in sight of the enemy, between two hostile corps, the right and left Austrian wings, and where in consequence the retreat from Klein-Bautzen to Goerlitz was a strategi-

cal flank march to regain the strategic line of retreat which he had thus so completely lost!

But even conceiving that we had at first complied with the natural sentiment by retreating directly and proceeding as far as Buttstedt, we should however have arrived near Buttstedt 35,000 strong, and not as actually occurred with 10,000 men. From Buttstedt it was still possible to march toward Rossleben. If on the 15th we had been near Rossleben we could easily have been on the 16th near Halle, which is only $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Rossleben. Even on the 17th we would not have arrived at Halle too late, as only Bernadotte's corps advanced against the Duke of Wurtemberg and it would not have dared to attack under these circumstances.* From Halle, on the 18th the road to Wittenberg and Dessau would have been open, but on the 15th we did not march towards Rossleben:

(1) Because the army was completely dispersed since the night of the 14th-15th. One part had gone to Buttstedt and had even wandered towards Erfurt; it was therefore necessary to make its assembly practicable by choosing a nearer point. Like the loss of the battle of Auerstaedt; this dispersion was the result of inexperience in war and to the improper tactical conduct of our army. No precise orders, no decisions, uninstructed division staffs, very old men as Generals, regimental and battalion commanders, such were the causes which in one night march resulted in only 10,000 men remaining in ranks out of 35,000 men.

(2) We did not march towards Rossleben as we had constantly the idea of uniting with Hohenlohe, and because we hoped to arrive there earlier by taking the Sondershausen road. But it was not a question of joining Hohenlohe. All our interests lay in gaining and covering the nearest places for crossing the Elbe. Prince Hohenlohe was always assured of reaching Magdeburg and there crossing the Elbe. The two forces had nothing more to do together.

Of the nearest points of crossing the Elbe, Dessau and Wittenberg, nobody thought of. An important object is recognized so seldom, that the Duke of Wurtemberg who re-

*The distance from Buttstedt to Halle is about 165 kilometers. Clausewitz probably considers too slightly the difficulties of a march on Halle.

mained near Halle, and should preferably have been detailed for the covering force, had to be notified by the Governor of Magdeburg, and received his instructions through him.

From Sommerda, from where Colonel Kleist wrote to the above effect to the Governor of Magdeburg, to Halle, is only 10 miles; via Magdeburg it is 27 miles. There is nothing astonishing in the fact that the Duke did not receive instructions. Also a bad interior arrangement led us wrongly to the Sommerda road. On October 15th, General Kalkreuth had about 15,000 men there. Let us consider now the point of view at this time. General Kalkreuth could have on the morning of the 16th marched on Frankenhäusen, and have reached without difficulty on the 17th or 18th the direct Magdeburg road and arrived at this town one day sooner. But several regiments of hostile cavalry were at Weissensee. Although General Kalkreuth had a superior force of cavalry, and although these regiments in the situation in which they were, ran a greater risk of being captured than of taking us prisoners, General Kalkreuth preferred to offer them a sort of armistice and to continue on to Sondershausen.

From Sommerda to Blankenburg is 14 miles, of which five miles are through the Harz. General Kalkreuth covered this distance between the morning of the 16th and the morning of the 18th, that is, in 48 hours; 5 miles were covered in the Harz over most abominable roads and during a dark night. We can imagine the condition in which the troops arrived near Blankenburg, besides Prince Hohenlohe had waited half a day; without having so waited he could have also reached the Elbe on the 19th. All this was the result of the small cavalry detachment which had been met near Weissensee, and which should have been overthrown.

But the march across the Harz itself via Steige, instead of going via Hasselfeld, was with the intent of better deceiving the enemy. It was in fact feared that on the main road we might be attacked from both flanks, even if only by hostile patrols which were seen everywhere.* The contin-

*The main road from Hasselfeld still passed in 1806 via Steige, but was in such condition that it might well have been taken as a crossroad. Clausewitz probably used a more modern map, on which the new road is shown from Nordhausen to Hasselfeld.—*German Editor.*

uous fire of our stragglers was the cause of this terror inspiring idea. For this reason we abandoned the greater part of our artillery in the Harz from which we marched in a disorder which could not be surpassed.

The following are the losses which had occurred up to this time: Prince Hohenlohe left Magdeburg with about 24,000 men; 21,000 men surrendered in this fortress; General Blucher left with about 20,000 men. This makes 65,000 men. If we estimate the strength of the army, less the Saxons, but including the garrisons of Erfurt and Magdeburg, as 115,000 men, the losses were 50,000 men. Of the 45,000 men which Hohenlohe had near Magdeburg, about 25,000 men belonged to the principal army, 8,000 men to Hohenlohe's army, 8,000 men to the reserve army, and the remainder to the Magdeburg garrison.

The principal army had at Auerstaedt 45,000 men; it had therefore lost 20,000 men. Immediately after the battle, it might have been 35,000 men strong. Its losses during the retreat in stragglers, deserters, etc., was 10,000 men.

Prince Hohenlohe and General Ruchel had about 30,000 Prussian troops on the battlefield; at Magdeburg they had 8,000 men of this army. The losses then were 22,000 men, of which 8,000 men surrendered at Erfurt. This leaves a balance of 14,000 men, of which probably half were deserters and stragglers.

With an orderly and regular retreat, the surrender of Erfurt should not have taken place. The loss of 18,000 men in stragglers and deserters, could have been reduced to 10,000 men. We could then have had at Magdeburg 20,000 men more, and our losses would not have exceeded 30,000 men. Besides, we may consider the fact that as a result of the disorderly retreat, we left 11,000 men in rear more than was necessary for the garrison of Magdeburg. Prince Hohenlohe should then have been able to leave with 55,000 men instead of 24,000 men and Blucher to follow him with 20,000 men. But due to the bad conduct of the retreat, and the lack of experience in war, the army was led to Magdeburg instead of to Dessau and Wittenberg and caused it to leave 30,000 men less strong.

But another serious error which was committed west of the Elbe, was the conduct of the Duke Eugene of Wurtemberg. Without having any real intention of fighting a battle, he took away 4,000 or 5,000 men; this was another fault of our method of war. These troops taken off to one side were along the natural line of retreat of our army. To stay there, covering as best as was possible the bridges of Dessau and Wittenberg, should a good occasion arise, was their sole mission. Instead of doing this, they completely neglected Wittenberg, abandoned Dessau, and voluntarily left the direct road for another, with the sole idea of undertaking a concentration which had no object whatever. Did they receive this order via Magdeburg? This is not certainly known. After having thus neglected on the left bank of the Elbe everything which was natural, they finally found themselves on the 20th near Magdeburg, it is true in a critical position. It became doubtful whether they could reach the Oder, in any case all could not do this, except by the greatest efforts.

Let us again place ourselves on the point of view of Prince Hohenlohe, let us inquire the measures which he ought to have taken on the 20th.

Magdeburg is 18 miles from Berlin; Wittenberg 14 miles from Berlin, that is, Magdeburg is 4 miles further. Berlin lies on the shortest road to Stettin, the last point of crossing of the Oder, whether coming from Wittenberg or from Magdeburg. If we reached Berlin before the enemy the problem was solved.

The road which Prince Hohenlohe with the infantry column chose, via Rathenow and Ruppin, only makes a very small detour; the road taken by the cavalry column makes a detour of 4 miles. The latter might overtake the infantry, but it was not the less serious fault to take these roads, as in any case, *the direct road was left completely open to the enemy*. Although it was impossible to longer offer any considerable resistance west of the Oder, it would have been much different if the enemy had in front of him an important force which he would have been required to drive back each day, instead of making a simple road march. Here and always in similar cases the first rule is certainly to be as

soon as possible in front of the enemy. It could be assumed with the greatest probability that the enemy could not have yet crossed the Elbe on the 20th. It would then have been possible by leaving the Elbe at the same time, to make up 4 miles on the 21st by forced marches.* In any case, it was as easy if we arrived too late, to support the left on leaving Brandenburg or Potsdam as from Magdeburg. Brandenburg and Potsdam, two important stream crossings, were besides very suitable for safe billets at night. Prince Hohenlohe should then, after we had decided to leave Magdeburg on the 20th, having decided that he would cover the 18 miles to Berlin in 3 days, and arrive there on the 23d. In this retreat, infantry had to cover 14 miles in 48 hours, in two separate marches from Sommerda and Blankenburg and from Ruppín to Prenzlau, without having rations prepared. It would have been much preferable to make a similar march via Brandenburg and Potsdam where rations could have been ready and where he would not have been followed by any enemy, and where we could have marched with considerable order.

For such a mission the following dispositions should have been taken. On the 21st, the cavalry which was at Magdeburg should have marched to Ziesar, grazed the animals for some hours, and then continued the march to Gottzow where it should have arrived in the evening. All the infantry should have marched to Ziesar, rested there for several hours and then continued the march to Brandenburg. Brandenburg should have been reached about the morning of the 22d. The cavalry, which had already passed to beyond Magdeburg, should have marched via Genthin and Plaue on Brandenburg, where it should have arrived on the morning of the 22d.

If at Brandenburg information was received that the enemy had not yet been seen at Potsdam, the march on this point should have been resumed at noon on the 22d; the cavalry should have preceded the movement, should have reached Potsdam during the night and should have occupied

*Davout crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg on the morning of October 20th. He had crossed the river with his entire corps by 3:00 P.M. On October 24th, he reached Schoenberg near Berlin.

the crossings of the Havel with the horse artillery. The infantry could have reached Potsdam on the morning of the 23d and have left in the evening for Berlin.

The leading French corps, those of Lannes and Davout, did not reach Potsdam until the 24th, and Berlin not until the 25th. That is 36 hours later than we could have arrived there; from Berlin we could have retired on Neustadt—Eberswalde, and from there have crossed the Oder near Schwedt, which could have been on October 29th or 30th.

Under these circumstances, it was doubtful whether Weimar's corps would be able to reach Stettin. But this would always be more possible than by its own march drawing in the enemy in the direction of Stettin.

As far as the Elbe, the Duke had nowhere attracted the attention of the French. There only its appearance scared Soult's corps which invested Magdeburg on the side of Neu-haldensleben. But Soult was no longer able to prevent the Duke from crossing the river at Sandau; he found himself there in his rear with regard to Stettin. If the Duke had marched as rapidly as possible he might have covered the 30 miles to Stettin in six days, that is by October 31st; perhaps the enemy would not have been there on that day. In any case, the safety of this corps was no longer the mission of Prince Hohenlohe, because he could scarcely save himself.

On the other hand, the march of General Blucher with the heavy artillery and the small detachment escorting it (for General Natzmer's division, consisting of the remnants of Wurtemberg's corps was to remain near Prince Hohenlohe) was not in doubt. This General on the 24th was near Rhinow, and he arrived on the 28th near Boitzenburg, from where he could reach Loeckenitz on the 29th, that is to say on the day at the earliest on which Prince Hohenlohe could have crossed the Oder at Schwedt.

Even by the road which the Prince took, he reached Prenzlau before the enemy. He should have also had the foresight to have some cavalry on the Loeckenitz road, but this resulted from the fact that the Prince did not have any cavalry at hand. It cannot then be really said that he was cut off. He arrived at the same time as the enemy, but without time

to deploy, and his troops after 48 hours, marching over fourteen miles arrived in the most lamentable state of hunger and fatigue. Finally, even holding to the road which the Duke chose, three faults can be found. First, the absurd separation of the cavalry from the infantry, as it should have been foreseen that hostile cavalry and not the hostile infantry would be the force to cut him off. Secondly, the march was not as rapid as necessary during the first five days, as from October 21st to 25th, they only covered 17 miles; it was consequently necessary to accelerate beyond measure the rate of march during the last period which was the decisive one. Thirdly, several useless detours were made, one going via Rhinow instead of Friesach, then via Furstenberg and again via Schönermark instead of Boitzenburg.

He should have required all his cavalry to march on the road prescribed for General Schimmelpfennig. This cavalry was 10,000 strong; Murat would have found it near Zehdenick and probably would not have dispersed it, as he himself had only 4,000 to 5,000 troopers, so that the infantry could have proceeded without danger to Templin.

The surrender of Prenzlau was not excusable, in view of the fact that we were in rear of the defile and had not yet been effectively turned. In truth, the idea of proceeding with these troops four miles to Lockenitz in sight of the hostile cavalry had an unusual appearance, but I know from experience that in executing such a movement, it really is less difficult than it seems. The troops were extremely fatigued, but danger gives an impulse to morale greater than can be imagined. Prince August's battalion, which formed the rear guard and was more fatigued than any of the others, and which I would not have believed could have marched a quarter of a mile further, after it had been cut off and surrounded by the cavalry reorganized and formed in order. It formed in a square, and for three hours continued the march along the left bank of the Uecker, notwithstanding the constant charges from Beaumont's dragoon division; it had already reached the suburbs of Brandelow, when deep ditches full of water threw it into such disorder that not more than 150 men remained, who were taken in a confused

mass.* I am sure that if instead of a single battalion, there had been twenty, one alongside the other with the artillery in the intervals, they could have covered the four miles which separated us from Lockenitz without being broken by the hostile cavalry.

It was Colonel Massenbach who was principally responsible for causing the Prince to decide to surrender. In his own *Memoirs*, we can see in what condition of lack of strength he was in. Sent as an envoy by the Prince, he thought he would find Marshal Lannes on our side of the defile, while he was in fact on the enemy's side.

What Colonel Massenbach says in his *Memoirs* against General Blucher, is one of those tearful complaints of which his *Memoirs* and all of his writings are full, and without precise statements of facts, or clear indications of times and places; and it is this which has caught the public attention and some writers.

On the morning of the 26th, Prince Hohenlohe left the vicinity of Ruppın. Up to the morning of the 28th, when he reached Prenzlau, via Gransee, Fursternberg, Lycken, Krewitz and Schonermark, he marched fourteen miles, during which time the troops had no billets, no regular bivouacs and received neither bread nor forage. On the 25th, General Blucher was about 3 miles in rear of Hohenlohe; he should have made a straight march of 17 miles if he wished to arrive at Prenzlau at the same time as Prince Hohenlohe. We can judge by this all the circumstances, and we know what should be thought as to the two or three hours lost by the Prince in waiting for General Blucher near Gransee and Schonermark.

The *Memoirs* of Colonel Massenbach on the remainder of the campaign of 1806 have the same character of insufficient, superficial and almost childish talk. Nowhere are there sufficient facts; nowhere any clear idea; nowhere any definite object. Everywhere there is a mixture of poor sensibility and of ideas confused between themselves. Such

*The description of the glorious combat made by Prince August with his battalion, given hereafter, has been placed in the appendix on account of its length. This description * * * * * with some slight differences in style, has been literally reprinted from Schwartz's "*Life of Clausewitz*." See Chapter X, page 604.

a man was above all not made for practical life, and still less for war; and Colonel Massenbach showed this, and also during the following years. At Weissensee where the question of passing General Klein's corps arose, and where the attitude of Field Marshal Kalkreuth showed this intention so slightly that Prince August who was in the column, fearing a capitulation, called up the old Blucher from the rear guard, Colonel Massenbach made pathetic speeches on the duty of obedience, so that it was difficult to avoid hitting him on the head. He seeks in vain for an excuse to march the night of the 27th-28th, via Krewitz to Schonermark, instead of taking the Boitzenburg road, by stating that this march should have been towards Nechlin. At this time no mention had been made of Nechlin, and there was no bridge whatever near Nechlin.

In the same way the complaints of General Bila and Schimmelpfennig are useless. The former was on an entirely different road; it was then at first necessary to have him come and the same was true with General Blucher; it is not easy to draw in an organization which marches continuously. It is true that General Schimmelpfennig at Zehdenick did not acquire any particular glory; he allowed himself to be so completely dispersed that out of 35 squadrons he only saved two. But he had hardly 2,000 troopers to oppose to the enemy's 4,000; it could hardly be required of him to cover the march on Prenzlau. It would seem that Colonel Massenbach would not be justified unless out of the 10,000 troopers which we still had, 8,000 had been on the road which General Schimmelpfennig took. But this is enough on Colonel Massenbach.

In addition to the numerous errors committed during the retreat by the leaders of the Prussian army, one circumstance greatly contributed by its deplorable results and led the leaders to commit errors; this was the constant habit of camping the troops. The Prussian army had at that time a complete camp outfit, tents, large cooking utensils and bread wagons. This made an immense baggage train which had to be separated from the troops at times of danger. But its presence on the road during this rapid retreat, caused a hundred halts without it being able to obtain the slightest use from them. The troops were then without

cooking utensils. They were also without overcoats, and the bedding with which they were to protect themselves from cold nights in the tents was naturally with the tents. In addition the troops were without means for individual cooking. All this was considered by the Prussian Generals as a primary reason for putting the troops in billets each day even at the most dangerous times, and these quarters were not concentrated, as it was necessary that the soldiers be subsisted by their hosts. The inconveniences which resulted from this are easy to realize:

1. The marches were greatly shortened. If the army advanced but three miles, this amounted for the soldier on an average to four or five miles. If then it is desired to advance four or five miles with the army, the soldier can no longer leave the main road, but nevertheless this rate of march is quite customary in modern wars and indispensable in difficult situations such as ours was.

2. To this was joined the imminent danger, that during the night, evening and morning the troops were never assembled. Had the French known our methods they could have dispersed us during the first days.

3. Some errors of all kinds are inevitable. All sudden modifications of the march and of dispositions, occasions them. The troops are not all informed, they no longer take the best roads, they are cut off and captured. This frequently happened during our retreat.

4. We were rarely ready to fight; consequently we allowed ourselves to turn away from our march direction or have our plans disarranged, by the smallest regiment of hostile cavalry.

5. The losses through desertion are much larger and this must in such circumstances be given great consideration, even when the army is not composed from the local inhabitants.

If our generals had avoided acting in this manner, the troops could have been assembled in camps, as we will show. The lack of overcoats could have been made up by large bonfires; besides, the season was not far advanced and the weather was very favorable. If kitchen utensils had been on hand, the subsistence of the troops would not have been

too difficult; everywhere some cattle could be found; in general a rich country was crossed, and a column of 10,000 to 15,000 men as ours were, is still one of the smallest elements of armies. But without pots nothing can be done with meat. What would have been principally required was bread and brandy; this would have presented great difficulties under the conditions which we now have, but our lack of skill in such matters was a real obstacle.*

Some resolute young men at the head of the army would have obtained some counsel from their good sense; but some old men, shriveled in spirit during a long peace, with some ideas bound up with red tape, could find no solution. If then the Prussian army was completely dispersed before it reached the Oder, if it could not reach the Oder with even 10,000 men, allowing for the capitulations of Prenzlau, Pasewalk and Anklam which had taken place, the fault was the lack of consideration for judicious measures for the retreat, the lack of coordination, and to an exaggerated fear of meeting on the main road the head of some hostile column. On the evening of the 14th, all these misfortunes were not unavoidable.

The enemy had not actually gone beyond our principal army, it had not stolen any march on it; the heads of its column and our own were at the same place, near Eckhartsberga and Buttstedt; they were then the same distance

*The spirit of the troops was however, not changed by this. While we had been without rations on the 14th and the 15th, after the battle of Auerstaedt, and while our troops had arrived near Greussen on the 16th, dying with hunger, Prince August sent a detachment towards a neighboring village to obtain rations. The peasants were astonished when the soldiers arrived for this purpose. When rations were taken by force they raised cries of distress. Old Major Rabel, who commanded the battalion of grenadiers of the Guard, and who was in the Prince's brigade, sent for me; he was very indignant at these proceedings, and begged me to immediately represent to the Prince that such pillage was unusual within the Prussian army, and contrary to its spirit, that the Prince was a young man who did not yet understand such matters. The preceding evening when the troops arrived near Sommerda in considerable disorder and very tired, General Kalkreuth appeared to try, by a long general order, to wish to reestablish order. Among other things, he said: "Some bread should be issued to the troops, and if there is no bread, suitable commutation will be given to them." It was not necessary then to think about the bread wagons and still less as to money. Prince August very properly said that the above amounted to saying: "Issue to the soldiers funds which you do not have, in order that they may purchase bread when there is none to purchase."—*Clausewitz*.

from Berlin and Stettin. The enemy had gained little during the battle, but as this was with their most advanced troops, this was not very important. But let us suppose that it was considered impracticable to reach Wittenberg and it was desired to proceed via Magdeburg; from Buttsedt to Berlin via Magdeburg was only 36 miles, and via Wittenberg only 33. The enemy covered these 33 miles in 11 days; it would not then have been difficult to make the 36 in ten days.

This is nothing except saying that purely geometrical considerations indicated that it was not impossible to reach Berlin before the enemy. If then it was believed no longer practicable to march via Halle, it was necessary to direct the Duke to march on Wittenberg, send a detachment to Dessau, break the two bridges and defend the Elbe for as long a time as possible, which would necessarily have delayed the enemy several days.

There is no doubt that an army physically and morally feeble from the beginning should after a complete defeat be conducted with ability, courage, and special intelligence where it is not to receive considerable support in the vicinity. The retreat of the Prussian army was rendered slightly more difficult by reason of its reverse position. This can not be denied. If the Prussian army had been directly in front of the enemy, quite close to Leipzig, it would have covered the shortest road to Berlin and towards the lower Oder, it might have been strongly pressed, but it could not have been cut off. No one can deny the disadvantage of its oblique position. But it voluntarily exposed itself to this disadvantage in order to fight under the best conditions. Being the weaker it was up to a certain point necessary for it to discount the future in order to be stronger at the present moment. Where could it have obtained the possibility of a lucky battle, had it been unwilling to run any risks; with nothing, nothing is done.

When Bonaparte, in October, 1813, found himself forced to assemble his forces at the same point against the enemy who was everywhere advancing, and when he could see that he would be able to oppose his adversary with a strength less than half of his, he selected for his

battlefield the vicinity of Leipzig, where the Plesse, the Partha, and the Elster unite and divide the terrain into well defined sectors. He did not place himself in rear of these streams in order to strengthen his front; this advantage did not appear sufficient to him. He posted his troops in front of these obstacles, exposing his retreat to the greatest dangers, in order to have during the battle itself the advantage of having the enemy's army separated by stream lines, in order that he could fight for a long time in one of the sectors of the battlefield without being endangered by what was going on in the others. On the 16th Blucher was victorious near Moeckern, in rear of Leipzig on the Partha, while Bonaparte was about to fight the principal allied army, near Leipzig. It was not until the 18th when the entire terrain was on fire that the victory of Blucher began to make its effects felt.

We will not decide whether Bonaparte did best in acting in this manner, but we can note that a similar idea can be conceived by a great captain; and consequently must not be considered as silliness. If Bonaparte at Leipzig was not as completely crushed as we were in 1806, it was due to the fact that his troops were better.

It is the same here as in mechanics. What is gained at one point must temporarily be economized in another. The question is not to know whether we could have made a better retreat by placing ourselves squarely in front of the enemy, in order to immediately deduce therefrom that a serious error was committed in not doing this. But the question is to know whether from this position we could not actually have moved more towards the Oder, and whether in consequence the sacrifice which we made to obtain a momentary advantage, was not too great a one? We believe that we have shown that this was not the case.

The torrent of victory led the French army not only to the Oder but as far as the Vistula, where the strength of this victory was to a certain extent exhausted; there was a cessation of maneuvers, and the first new resistance commenced. It is from this point that the campaign of 1807 commences. And without the rapid fall of all the fortresses located in the theater of operations, this would

hardly have occurred. The first halt would have been made on the Oder and the Russian army with our troops from Prussia would probably have advanced as far as the Oder.

The series of capitulations of fortresses is as follows :

October 15th, Erfurt fell into the hands of Murat and Soult.
October 25th, Spandau fell into the hands of Lannes.
October 29th, Stettin fell into the hands of Lasalle.
November 1st, Custrin fell into the hands of Davout.
November 8th, Magdeburg fell into the hands of Ney.
November 19th, Czenstochau was captured by a Polish detachment and some French cavalry.
November 20th, Hameln surrendered to Savary with a detachment of the VIII Corps.
November 25th, Fort Plassenberg, near Culmbach, surrendered to one of Prince Jerome's detachments.
December 2d, Glogau fell into the hands of Vandamme.
January 5th, Breslau fell into the hands of Vandamme.

In the French army, Davout and Augereau marched via Frankfurt and Posen towards the Vistula; Lannes followed towards Stettin.

Murat, Bernadotte, Soult and Ney returned from this pursuit to Berlin in the middle of November. They marched also towards the Vistula. Augereau, Davout and Lannes with Murat entered Warsaw on November 28th.

The Wurtemberg brigade, and the Bavarian troops, under Jerome Bonaparte, formed a corps which had closely followed the principal army from Franconia. It went via Dresden to Silesia, where this corps captured Glogau and Breslau.

The VIII Corps, under Marshal Mortier, went from Francfort to the territory of Hesse-Cassel, where it disarmed that army. From there it went via Hanover to Hamburg, and then towards Swedish Pomerania.

If Erfurt, Magdeburg, Spandau, Custrin and Stettin had not fallen without regular sieges, the enemy would have been under the necessity of investing them, and this would have required from four to five or six corps of his principal army. He would not then have had sufficient force remaining to advance without them towards the Vistula. On all of these places, except Erfurt, we would have been able to count on a two months' resistance counting from the first moment of investment; this would have brought us to the month of January.

The reason for these rapid surrenders are evidently found in three facts:

1. These places lacked for their defense many things which the bad direction of our military affairs had prevented from being attended to in advance.

2. The Governors and commanding officers were decrepit, old individuals.

3. Defeats, and the universal discouragement, had destroyed every idea of resistance.

When forts which are not provided with everything are to be defended, they require resolute far-sighted leaders, who will not be contented with doing the same thing every day, but will act wisely and intelligently. In order that fortresses may resist bravely after a catastrophe such as that of our army in 1806, vigorous action is required from the high command, fear and hope must be excited, and enthusiasm aroused. But this was not our kind, the contrary even occurred in several instances. We must not therefore be astonished at the result, when with several governors their natural feebleness extended to a real shameful behavior, such as was the case at Custrin, Stettin and Spandau.

CHAPTER X

EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1806

Prince August's Battalion at the Battle of Prenzlau

BY VON CLAUSEWITZ

TRANSLATED BY
COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA,
Field Artillery

PRINCE AUGUST'S BATTALION AT PRENZLAU

Prince August's grenadier battalion, several hundred men strong had been organized at Magdeburg from the remnants of the Rheinbaben grenadier battalion, and on October 26th, it left Neu-Ruppin, 600 strong. By a continuous march to Schonermark, on October 28th, during which the troops had been led from one assembly place to another, and had not received the least sign of any rations, the battalion had been reduced to 240 men. The balance had been left in rear, exhausted with hunger and fatigue. We formed the rear guard in the march towards Prenzlau. When at break of day we wished to pass through the village of Gustow, half a mile from Prenzlau, we were informed from the front that the rear guard should close up; at the same time, several hundred wagons which during the night had gotten into the interval between us and the main body without our having noted it, suddenly left the road, so that there was a

large empty space in front of us. We continued to march towards Prenzlau as rapidly as possible. General Hersfeld, our division commander, sent Count Stolberg of the King's regiment once again to the rear, to hasten our march. Prince August directed me to proceed forward towards Prenzlau with Count Stolberg, to see how things were. When we had arrived at several thousand paces from Prenzlau we saw alongside of the road three or four hostile cavalry regiments who seemed to be about to throw themselves on the King's regiment, which was just reaching the gates of Prenzlau. Count Stolberg said to me: "We have no time to lose, come with me. The others are all cut off." I replied that our duty here separated us, that he could regain his regiment in time by galloping, but that I would wait for Prince August at this place. I waited a moment longer, watching a fight which a company of the Dohna Grenadier Battalion and the Prittwitz Dragoon regiment were having with the hostile cavalry. The regiment was repulsed by the enemy across the road on which we were, and then into Prenzlau. I saw the disorder which took place at the entrance of Prenzlau where cavalry, infantry, friends and enemies were mixed up. I returned to the Prince who arrived on the ground with his battalion and I reported to him as to what I had seen. We discussed what there was to be done and we decided that the best thing to do was to march away towards the left, it being believed that we could not count much upon our men, and particularly because we had not learned by experience that a battalion of infantry can hold its own in the midst of hostile cavalry; we hoped that thanks to everybody being busy around Prenzlau we would not soon be noticed. We now noticed for the first time that in rear of us was a cavalry regiment, the Quitzow cuirassiers. While we were still on the road, we received some artillery fire from hostile batteries who had taken position on our right flank, on the other side of a small stream coming from Boitzenburg. The few rounds fired dispersed the Quitzow regiment like a handful of chaff thrown on the ground. We turned the head of the column to the left, crossed a small stream and a vegetable garden. As soon as we were across, we formed a square and continued the march in this manner following down the Uecker, having this stream a thousand

paces to our flank, and moving in the general direction of Ellingen. Prince August strongly reproached Colonel Cospoth, commanding the Quitzow regiment on the conduct of his regiment. But the latter himself was very indignant and took all possible pains to reassemble his command by use of bugle calls. He succeeded in again uniting about one hundred troopers, one squadron, and we soon lost sight of the remainder. They assembled some distance away, and joined General Bila, who with 15 squadrons was still in rear. Prince August sought to require Colonel Cospoth to remain near him, which he promised to do, but naturally he did nothing of the kind.

The battalion continued its march for half an hour, when we saw appear on our left, behind a line of very flat heights, three or four squadrons of cavalry, marching in the same direction as we were. At first we supposed that these were troops of the Quitzow regiment, who had fled in that direction, but noticing immediately afterwards that a still larger number were following in rear of us, we soon recognized them as the enemy, and that it was necessary to defend ourselves. The battalion had only 7 officers, and as we have already said, 240 men. The Prince exhorted them to make an honorable resistance, to be calm, not to lose their heads and particularly not to fire before receiving orders to do so. Some minutes later, the hostile cavalry advanced. The battalion executed "halt—ready," and the men were then cautioned: "Do not fire." I thought for a moment to myself of the battle of Minden where the French cavalry charged two Hanover battalions; and when these failed to fire at the usual distance, they came gradually from a gallop to a trot and finally from a trot to a walk. Exactly the same thing happened here. The French dragoons advanced at a gallop, and we could see with what anxiety they awaited the moment when they would receive our fire; when at a range of 100 paces they had received no fire, they more and more drew in on their horses, and finally were approaching us only at a slow trot. Fire was ordered at 30 paces; many fell, the rest lay down in rear of their horses' necks, wheeled about and fled. Now all our men were well in hand. They seemed thoroughly astonished at the great success of the maneuver which they had often practiced on the drill ground

and which they had usually considered as a sort of play. Even when a hostile dragoon, who had been dismounted immediately in front of the battalion, and disengaging himself from his dead horse ran away as fast as possible, the contrast between this anxious flight and the savage appearance of this dragoon with helmet and horse hair plume, made such an impression on the men that everybody laughed. We continued then on our march, not much time elapsed before a second charge was repulsed in the same manner. When we took up the march again, we found ourselves barred by several squadrons and the rest followed us so closely that we were never sure but that they were not going to charge. We stopped again, sent out some of the skirmishers which we still had, and fired several musket shots at these squadrons. Results were immediate; they gave way in all directions, the road became free, and we were able to continue the march. After this, at intervals there were five attacks; during this time, we observed 14 hostile squadrons consisting in part of Beaumont's division, as we afterwards ascertained, but they were without artillery.

After having continued our retreat in this manner for about half an hour, we ascertained from a messenger, captured in a village (Schoenwerder) that we would find no crossing over the Uecker until we reached Pasewalk, and that the banks of this stream were not practicable on account of marshes and ditches. We saw that we would have to fight over a distance of four miles; it was necessary to consider lack of ammunition and the possibility of exhausting the strength and morale of the troops. The Prince therefore decided to march with his battalion preferably through the marshes of the Uecker, satisfied that it would be generally possible for the infantry to obtain an advantage in such terrain, however bad it might appear. The hostile cavalry could not reach us there, and the only question was to reach Pasewalk at the cost of great physical efforts. Consequently, in spite of the advice of the peasant, we changed our direction of march, and we were glad we did so, when we advanced without interference about one league, although with great difficulty, while the hostile cavalry, which followed along the high ground on our flank, could only look at us, a part of them dismounted, and they appeared to have

abandoned us. But the terrain became more and more difficult; frequently we met large ditches full of water and so deep that the water came up under the arms. About 100 of our men fell out in this bad ground, lacking strength to proceed through the marsh. We had had to leave all our saddle horses behind; only the Prince had been able to keep a fine English horse of remarkable strength. This was the horse on which his brother, Prince Louis, had been killed at Saalfeld, and the blood stains from this brave Prince were still visible on the saddle. But during the violent exertions which this animal made to get out of the marsh, he escaped and jumped into the Uecker, where it swam alongside of us. We sought in vain to rescue it with the use of long halberts which some of our noncommissioned officers still carried. This was the more cruel as the Prince with the pride of his race, had decided in case of misfortune to fight saber in hand. The hostile artillery now arrived and for some time fired shells at us, as the marsh was too wide for shrapnel fire; the fire did not have any serious effect. We would have continued to advance in this manner individually, and we would probably have thus saved ourselves, if after crossing a large ditch full of water which we had the greatest difficulty in getting over, the ground had not become more solid. This allowed the hostile cavalry to approach us in considerable numbers, although only at a walk. When we arrived on this solid ground, the men were called upon to reform the square, and I wish to particularly mention Captain Schwerin. This officer like a service watch, had been noted in time of peace for regulated activity, very methodical and generally considered pedantic; I say that I wish to think of this man because, a rare thing, he maintained the same calm, methodical manner under most extreme danger. He could not console himself, because the square was not reformed. But the men had used their muskets to assist themselves in crossing the ditches; the greater number had been in the water up to their arms, their cartridge boxes had become wet as well as the ammunition within them. They foresaw the impossibility of defending themselves; they threw down their arms and voluntarily permitted the hostile cavalry to take them. The Prince had nothing else to do, and he accepted the fate of his men. At first, his sword, his star of

the Black Eagle, and his watch were taken from the Prince. But Major General Beaumont soon arrived and these articles were returned to him. On the request of the Prince, orders were given to look for his horse which was soon brought up.

The number of prisoners which the enemy took here might have amounted to a hundred. The others were still in the swamp, and when they saw what had happened to us, a part turned around and returned towards Prenzlau. We had only had a few wounded, among which one officer, caused by the hostile dragoons firing with their carbines after their charges, while following our retreat. We were unable to determine the effect of the artillery fire, and particularly as to the last rounds, which were shrapnel fire. The enemy acknowledge the loss of about 80 killed and wounded. When one knows that cavalry under such circumstances has but slight losses, this number does not appear unreasonable.

During the fight, the Prince had sent one of Schimmelpfennig's hussars who happened to be near us, and also my orderly, along the Uecker, in hopes that they might meet some detachment which might rescue us. Neither of these returned. We were surprised not to see our troops leave Prenzlau on the other side of the Uecker. We therefore supposed that they had so departed very rapidly while we were having our violent fight. The Prince learned with astonishment and with the greatest chagrin that Prince Hohenlohe had surrendered.

We found ourselves between the villages of Bandelow and Nechlin, at a full mile and a half from Prenzlau, to which we were led back, because the Grand Duke of Berg had to decide what to do with the Prince; we arrived there at 4:00 P.M. While we were leaving the ground where we had been captured, we saw French cavalry making useless efforts to capture some men who had remained in the swamp, who repulsed them with musket shots. General Beaumont then suggested to the Prince to order these men not to fire any more, as they were included in the capture of their chief. The Prince made this noble reply: "These men are more lucky than I am. They are no longer under my orders, and I can only rejoice that they defend themselves like brave

soldiers." A part of these men did in fact have the good fortune of crossing the Uecker at a narrow place on a plank which a swimmer obtained from the other side, and they thus escaped towards Stettin.

At Prenzlau the Prince was conducted to the Grand Duke of Berg who was in an embroidered marshal's uniform, and who was making up a report to the Emperor on a sheet of open paper with very large oblique letters and a miserable hand writing. He said some flattering things to the Prince, and gave him to understand that he would leave that night for Berlin under guard of a high officer.

During this journey they arrived in the morning at Oranienburg where the postmistress, who did not know the Prince, asked whether it were true that all the Guards had been captured. The Prince only replied with a sad look: "Ah! Good God," she said, "let us hope that they have been captured and everything is over!"

I mention this matter as it illustrates the spirit and the ideas of the people. We arrived at Berlin about noon, where in the midst of the most contrary sentiments, we were the object of the people's curiosity. We were soon taken to the chateau where we found the Imperial Headquarters assembled in the King's chambers. The Prince was immediately brought before the Emperor; as to me, I was allowed to remain with my much worn uniform in the midst of the brilliant uniforms of the Emperor's aides, who seemed slightly to dislike me. The Emperor sent back the Prince after about 5 minutes, and after having told him that he could remain at Berlin with his parents. However, two months later, he was sent to Nancy by orders of General Clarke, Governor of Berlin.

I acquired the conviction during this little cavalry fight, that infantry is very strong against cavalry. The square which we formed, was according to the old method, a 3-rank square. The men were so weak physically and morally by the lost battle, by a constant retreat of 14 days, by frightful marches, and lack of rations; the French cavalry were so excited by continuous successes; and the odds of 240 infantry to 1500 cavalry were so unfavorable, that the situation in which this infantry found itself, can certainly be considered

as very bad. The calmness maintained by its chief and his officers, and their continuous caution not to fire, and consequently retaining the fire until late, caused the success.

I am persuaded that it is not in the nature of a cavalryman to wish to have himself killed in such cases by a musket shot. It is usually believed that the hostile cavalry, at the moment when they actually turned about could have charged without danger. But this is a false idea. Infantry fire under any form used (with us we have thought of battalion volleys, that fronts attacked should fire at the same time, and that in serious cases, this is the only possible manner), does not strike down the cavalry so suddenly, but that they by continuing to advance do not always receive many shots at very short range, in the last case as is said, *à bout pour-tant*,* and it is these shots at point blank ranges which everybody fears. In other cases, in which we have formed infantry squares, we could certainly count upon the fact that the infantry was no longer in order, and had already commenced to weaken before the brave cavalry had had the time to turn around, or that it had fired too soon at between 200 and 100 paces, and that at the moment where the cavalry was very close to the square none or little fire came from it. If horse artillery prepares a charge the effect will be almost always decisive against troops with slight military spirit, but in fact it amounts to little against French troops as the author knows from experience. I therefore say: Consideration being given to the effects of artillery, the best and most effective formations for attacking infantry, will always be to charge in echelon in several lines, in such manner that the first charge will be immediately followed by a second. This cannot be done unless the squadrons are divided into platoons and this is so much disliked by captains that this method of attack is not general.

*French in text.

PART IV

The End of the French Pursuit

CHAPTER XI

End of the Pursuit, 1 November, 1806, to 10 November, 1806

FOREWORD

In this Chapter, documents and parts of documents relating to administrative features which had no effect on the military operations during the period covered by this Chapter, and documents and parts of documents which were issued in this period but relate to operations to take place after November 10th, have been omitted. The abbreviations, relating to source of documents used, are the same as shown on page 54, Part II.—C.H.L.

TO GENERAL DEJEAN

UCN 755

Berlin, 31 October, 1806.

Monsieur Dejean, all the colonels of heavy cavalry regiments report to me that they have not received orders for the formation of their 5th squadrons; this, however, is becoming very pressing. The train battalion which is at Douai need not buy horses; send me the men without horses. I have as many as I desire; I only need men to drive them. Send me as many unmounted cavalrymen as you can, though leaving a few in the depots to receive the horses which have been contracted for. I have sent for the four regiments of cuirassiers that I have in Italy, by way of Inspruck, leaving their 4th squadrons in Italy; their fifth squadrons must also be formed up to 797 horses. The dragoon regiments should be carried to their full number of 828 horses. This will cost you nothing, for the unmounted dragoons whom I had here are already mounted and armed with the horses,

saddles and sabres of the Prussians. The chasseurs and hussars should also be completed to 828 horses. Notwithstanding the great number of horses which I have, I desire that all the contracts which have been accepted up to now be carried into effect, since many die and a great many are used up.

NAPOLEON.

MARSHAL LANNES TO MURAT

M—2629
(Murat's File)

Stettin, 1 November, 1806.

I have received your letter at Stettin, to which place I have proceeded with my headquarters and my entire army corps. I note with pleasure that Blucher and the Duke of Weimar will not escape you. Be quite certain that you will never have as much glory as I wish for you, and that I care for you a thousand times more than you do for me. I will never cease to take advantage of all circumstances to give you new proof of this.

A thousand times your friend.

LANNES.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2630
(WD Files)

Friedland, 1 November, 1806, 4:30 A.M.

SIRE:

I hasten to inform Your Majesty that the entire corps, which I had been told embarked at Anklam, is within the power of your troops. General Bila who commands them has surrendered to General Becker, whom I am directing to conduct this detachment to Spandau, using the dragoon brigade of General Boussard. I owe the greatest praise to General Becker, who himself charged at the head of his dragoons at the battle of Zehdenick, and also at that of Vichmansdorf which gave us the King's gendarmes, and who finally has just caused General Bila to surrender at Anklam after the very vigorous charge which he made yesterday morning in the town. He much praises General Boussard. We only lost in this charge one sergeant major and several dra-

goons. The hussar regiment of the King's Guard, which on account of its brilliant conduct during the Seven Years' War received from Catherine herself tiger skin capes form a part of the detachment which laid down their arms. Can not Your Majesty give these capes to his own hussars? The Lasalle brigade has covered itself with glory in this campaign.

General Becker informs me that the funds are several leagues from Anklam within Pomerania. I have directed this general to demand them from the local authorities informing them that if they refuse, I will cross the Peene with my entire army corps and will levy a contribution on their country. I hope that Your Majesty will permit me to distribute this to the cavalry reserve; I have dared to tell them of this as a favor in your name.

As I informed Your Majesty in my letter of yesterday evening, dated 9:00 P.M. I will be at Demmin this evening and I hope that tomorrow we will have the remainder of the detachment of Weimar and Blucher; who are now driven against the Baltic Sea. We are very tired; the cavalry absolutely needs rest; it will be desirable if not unsuitable with your plans to leave in Mecklenburg, which is a cavalry country, the divisions of Grouchy and d'Hautpoul; there they will soon be rested, and this country has all the horses which will be needed for remounts. I ask Your Majesty for orders for myself, from the time when everything will be over.

The detachment which surrendered is 3,000 or 4,000 men strong; it has some artillery and two generals; two regiments cavalry and a considerable part of a third. In order to preserve 1400 or 1500 horses which we are receiving, I have ordered General Becker to proceed to disarm the cavalry and to conduct these regiments mounted as far as Potsdam where they will turn in their horses to General Bourcier.

Cannot Your Majesty order that all the stallions in different stables of Mecklenburg be seized. I will await your orders. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11136
(Imperial Files)*Berlin, 1 November, 1806, 8:00 A.M.*

DEAR COUSIN:

Do you really believe that I have not noticed that your army corps has made forced marches, and that you have commanded it with all possible intelligence? You are a big child. From time to time, I will give proofs to you and to your army corps of my entire satisfaction as to your conduct. I am awaiting with impatience your capturing this Duke of Weimar. The Grand Duke of Berg has undoubtedly sent me much information; but I only received one page of his letter, the other page remained on his desk. I have sent General Bertrand with General Chasseloup, one artillery general and a commissary to Stettin to find out about the situation at that place.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG

CN—11137
(Imperial Files)*Berlin, 1 November, 1806.*

Your wrote me a letter dated 8:00 A.M., October 31st. It appears that the letter must have been long, since it consisted of two pages; but you only sent the second sheet and forgot to forward the first.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—756

Imperial Headquarters at Berlin, 1 November, 1806.

His Majesty grants a gratuity of cloaks to the various army corps in the following proportion:

12,000 to the III^d Corps, of which 6000 will be requisitioned at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder; 2000 are to be taken from those now in the magazine in Berlin; 2000 from those which

the municipality of Berlin is to put into the magazines and 2000 from those which are in Leipzig.

6000 to the VIIth Corps, 2000 of which from those now in magazine in Berlin; 2000 from those to be provided by the municipality of Berlin and 2000 from those now in Leipzig.

12,000 to the IVth Corps, of which 2000 now in the magazines in Berlin, 2000 from those to be furnished by the municipality of Berlin, and 8000 from those now in Leipzig.

10,000 to the Vth Corps, of which 4000 will be requisitioned at Stettin, 2000 will be taken from those now in magazine in Berlin, 2000 from those to be furnished by the municipality of Berlin, and 2000 from those now in Leipzig.

9000 to the Ist Corps, of which 2000 of those now in Berlin, 2000 from those to be furnished by the municipality of Berlin, and 5000 from those now in Leipzig.

8000 to the VIth Corps from those now in Leipzig; 1200 to the 28th regiment of light artillery from those which are in Berlin.

Marshals commanding the various army corps will attend to the distribution of these cloaks among the various regiments and the regiments will apply for them to the Intendant-general and the army.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY*

UCN—757

Imperial Headquarters at Berlin, 1 November, 1806.

Marshal Lannes's corps has caused 1500 artillerymen and 200 dragoons to lay down their arms, has captured 30 pieces of cannon, 60 caissons and wagons full of munitions with good teams.

His Majesty expresses his satisfaction to Marshal Lannes and the brave men composing his army corps upon their activity in following the cavalry by forced marches after the fatigues which they had already undergone.

*Printed.

General Gazan's division is keeping garrison in Stettin; that of General Suchet is on the march to complete the investment of the Duke of Weimar's column.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11138
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

It seems that the Oder is bordered by swamps; have these reconnoitered from Krossen as far as Custrin, by an engineer officer. Have a similar reconnaissance made of the Warta, and of the country from Custrin to Landsberg. What kind of swamps are these? Are there any roads there? How can you go from Sonnenburg to Custrin?

I have issued orders to the corps of the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, consisting of 18,000 men, to proceed to Krossen, which will be your right. Keep your army corps resting as much as possible at Frankfurt and vicinity. Obtain there some pairs of shoes and overcoats. Operate with a few detachments towards Custrin. Send cavalry pickets towards Landsberg and Posen. Have 120,000 rations of hard bread prepared at Frankfurt, in order that when leaving you may be able to refill your train with four days' rations, exclusive of four days' bread which you have distributed to the troops. I believe if you have no enemy within reach, your troops should be billeted.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11139
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I congratulate you on the capture of Custrin, I wait with impatience information concerning the depots which

you have found there. On a map in my possession I note a small fort on the left bank of the Oder forming a bridgehead. Have this put in order; make there a good bridgehead which will make us masters of the Oder and the Warta. Let me know whether there are ovens there and whether bread can be baked. There is a good point of support for the army.

NAPOLEON.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2631
(WD Files)

Demmin, 2 November, 1806, 10:00 A.M.

SIRE:

I arrived yesterday evening at Demmin, as I have already informed Your Majesty, after having traveled a dozen leagues and consequently am much tired. I have been informed that the Prince of Ponte-Corvo marched yesterday morning to Waren, where he expected to find the enemy. The artillery fire which I heard about 5:00 P.M. yesterday in the direction of this place, confirmed to me the presence of the enemy, and I decided to proceed either to cut off his retreat towards Rostock or to attack towards his rear via Teterow, where I will be in position towards Gustrow with the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, should he desire to defend the Nebel. I am directing General Lasalle with the 7th Hussars on Rostock, where he will probably arrive during the night and where he has orders to destroy all means of embarkation which the enemy will have been able to prepare there. The remainder of the 1st Hussars will take station at Demmin to observe the exit from Malchin and to receive all the trains which arrive for us from this time on by this route, to support the squadron of dragoons which is pursuing trains on the left bank of Peene in Swedish Pomerania, and finally to escort prisoners. I hope that I will be in liaison with Marshal Bernadotte.

Some spies report to me that the enemy is intrenched in rear of the Peene between the two lakes; if this is cor-

rect my movement of today will place me absolutely on their rear.

Yesterday there passed through this town during the entire day all the trains of the army, escorted by about 1000 men; I have sent on their heels my aide Dery, with a squadron of dragoons, via the Demmin bridge, and a squadron of hussars via Jarmen on Gustrow, to take them in flank, while a squadron of dragoons will stop their head at Ank-lam; the first convoy having surrendered tonight at Ank-lam I am thinking that all who have crossed the Peene will likewise surrender.

I have just now received Your Majesty's letter of October 31st, you will see that through my movements I have quite happily carried out your intentions. I have not been at Stettin, I was satisfied to send General Lasalle there and while I directed General Becker on Ank-lam I marched to Pasewalk and Friedland on Demmin, in order to constantly turn the enemy and to cut off his retreat on Stralsund and Rostock. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11140
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Have 1200 pairs of shoes issued to the 28th Light Infantry. Have 3000 hats issued to Marshal Davout's corps, 1000 to Marshal Lannes's corps, 1000 to Marshal Soult's corps, and 1000 to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo's corps.

Advise the army in orders that at the arsenal of Berlin there are a great quantity of drums, and that troops having need for any should send in requisitions.

Direct Marshal Bessieres to inspect 5000 saddles which are there in the depots, to ascertain whether they are in good condition, and let me know what is necessary to complete these saddles. Give to Marshal Lannes 6000 pairs of shoes, to be issued at Stettin, and to Marshal Davout's corps 6000 to be taken at Frankfort.

Advise the army that at Berlin there are 80,000 cartridge boxes which may be had by troops if they need any.

Have issued to the dragoons, in so far as they are mounted, the 2,103 leather trousers which are at Berlin. Give them also if they need them some of the sabers and shoulder belts. Advise the chasseur, dragoon and hussar troops that there are plenty of shoulder belts at Berlin.

Give orders that 5000 pairs of woolen socks be issued gratuitously to the wounded as they are discharged from the hospitals to rejoin their commands.

Have the cavalry regiments informed that there is a large quantity of horse equipments at Berlin and that they will submit requisitions for them as they need them.

There are also cooking pots and pans. Have issued 800 pots and 800 platters, 800 hatchets to Marshal Davout's corps who has asked for these.

NAPOLEON.

DECISION

UCN—759

Schönebeck, 30 October, 1806.

Marshal Ney, in a report to Marshal Berthier, shows the difficulties which he encounters in insuring the investment of Magdeburg, and also the dispositions which he has made for bombarding the town.

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

Reply to Marshal Ney that I warmly approve the dispositions which he makes for bombarding Magdeburg, but that he needs more than 4 mortars.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY*

UCN—760

Imperial Headquarters at Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

The army is informed that Cüstrin has surrendered to Marshal Davout. Major General Gudin entered it last ev-

*Printed.

ening at seven o'clock. His Majesty has seen with pleasure the corps of this division which distinguished itself so greatly at the battle of Jena gaining the noblest reward by being the first to enter this fine and magnificent stronghold.

There were in the fortress 4000 men who were taken prisoners on the ramparts, ninety pieces of artillery, thoroughly provided, and considerable stores of provisions.

The column of the Prussian General von Bila was taken prisoner on October 31st on the frontier of Swedish Pomerania, after the battle of Anklam. Major-General Becker, at the head of Boussard's brigade of dragoons, vigorously charged the enemy, made him prisoner and obliged him to capitulate. His Majesty expresses his satisfaction with Major-General Becker and with Boussard's brigade of dragoons. He has already noted with pleasure General Becker's conduct at the battles of Zehdenick and Vichmannsdorf.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11141
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

Send orders to General Sanson to make a reconnaissance on the Oder, from Frankfurt as far as the Baltic Sea, to a distance of three leagues on both sides of the river. It is desired to ascertain the number of villages, their population, the nature of the terrain, and whether there are any swamps, the exits and the dikes where passages exist; also the small hills and the features of the terrain which might be favorable for an army. General Sanson will detail four topographical engineers for this reconnaissance and will give them the same program. This reconnaissance may be made from the point of view, that it is desired to defend the crossing of the Oder, with Custring and Stettin as points of supports.

NAPOLEON.

It is necessary that this reconnaissance be submitted to me within eight days.

TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG AT DEMMIN

CN—11143
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

The King of Sweden is an enemy. If you meet any Swedish troops they must be disarmed, and you will inflict as much harm on them as possible.

I authorize you to take all the standards from Mecklenburg and send them to Spandau under escort of some cavalry patrols. Seize also all the Mecklenburg treasure, all these princes are our enemies.

I am hoping that by the present hour you will have captured the Duke of Weimar and that the destiny of this army will thus be completely ended.

Custrin surrendered yesterday. We found there 80 guns and considerable depots of subsistence supplies. We took there 4000 prisoners. Thus Marshal Davout and Prince Jerome with the auxiliary army, which is about 30,000 strong are on the frontiers of Poland.

I have inspected in great detail General Nansouty's division. It is still at Berlin where his troops are resting and are getting into good shape. I am waiting to prescribe new movements for you, until I know where are the different army corps of Marshals Soult, Bernadotte and Lannes, at the moment that the Duke of Weimar and the rest of his troops are captured. As soon as these operations are completed, it will be desirable that Marshal Lannes return to Stettin to assemble there his entire army corps.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 25

CN—11144
(WD Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

Major General Beaumont presented 50 new flags and standards taken from the enemy to the Emperor today. He marched across the city with his dragoons and carrying these trophies. The number of colors taken since the battle of Jena, amounts to more than 200.

Marshal Davout surrounded and summoned Custringen to surrender and this fort has surrendered. Four thousand prisoners of war have been taken there. The officers are to return to their homes under parole and the soldiers are being sent to France. 90 guns have been found on the ramparts. The place which is in very good condition is located in the middle of marshes; it contains considerable depots. It is one of the most important conquests of the army; it has succeeded in making us masters of all forts on the Oder.

Marshal Ney is about to make a regular attack on Magdeburg, and it is probable that this fortress will make but slight resistance.

On the 31st, the Duke of Berg had his headquarters at Friedland. Having made his dispositions, he ordered an attack on the column of the Prussian General Bila, which General Becker charged in the plain in front of the little village of Anklam, with General Boussard's dragoon brigade. All were driven in, cavalry and infantry, and General Becker entered the town with the enemy whom he forced to capitulate. The result of this capitulation has been 4000 prisoners of war. The officers are returning home under parole, and the soldiers are being sent to France. Among these prisoners are the hussar regiment of the King's Guard, who after the Seven Years' War, received from the Empress Catherine, as a testimony of their good conduct, tiger skin coats.

The funds of General Bila's troops and a part of their trains have crossed the Peene, and are now in Swedish Pomerania. The Grand Duke of Berg has demanded them.

On the evening of November 1st, the Grand Duke had his headquarters at Demmin.

General Blucher and the Duke of Weimar finding the road to Stettin closed, marched away to their left as if to return to the Elbe, but Marshal Soult had foreseen this movement and there is little doubt but that these two corps will soon fall into our hands.

Marshal Lannes has assembled his army corps at Stettin where each day new depots and guns are being found.

Our patrols have already entered Poland. Prince Jerome with an army corps, formed from the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, is proceeding to Silesia.

His Majesty has appointed General Clarke as Governor General of Berlin and Prussia, and has already issued orders for the entire interior organization of the country.

The King of Holland is marching on Hanover and Marshal Mortier on Cassel.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11147
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 2 November, 1806.

As it is possible that Marshal Soult did not receive the order to come to Dessau, send an aide to have carried out the same order which I gave this Marshal with regard to the 450 Saxon horses. Let them come to Potsdam if there are men to ride them, and if of the 4000 or 5000 horses which should arrive at Spandau, there are not more than 500.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT, FRANKFURT ON THE ODER

CN—11150
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 3 November, 1806, 5:00 A.M.

DEAR COUSIN:

Do not use up the siege commissary supplies of Custrin, these stores are very difficult to replace and Custrin is a fort of first importance; on the contrary give every possible care to preserve these; continue to draw your rations

from Frankfurt and from Landsberg. I am issuing orders that everything that belongs to your army corps and which are at the depots at Erfurt, Wittenberg, Spandau and other places in rear shall be sent to Custrin.

If you consider it desirable, you can send a good infantry division to Landsberg. Beaumont's division arrived to-day; I will allow it two days' rest, immediately afterwards I will send it to you. Prince Jerome's corps will be assembled at Krossen on the 4th and will thus support your right; it will be directed to cover you against anything which may come from Silesia. He has more than 3000 cavalry, Bavarian, Baden and Wurtemberg.

NAPOLEON.

MURAT TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

M—2632
(Murat's File)

TO THE PRINCE OF PONTE-CORVO

Headquarters, Malchin, 3 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I advise you that having arrived at Demmin on November 1st, I intended to proceed to Rostock on the 2d in order to cut off the enemy's retreat on Stralsund, but as all the news that I received of your engagement at Waren was not altogether favorable, I decided yesterday to march via Malchin on Gustrow in order to connect with you. Finally to-night through officers and patrols sent out in your direction, I have learned of the retreat of the enemy on Gustrow and of your junction with Marshal Soult. I have just been told that General Blucher, who yesterday evening occupied Goldberg and Krakow has evacuated them this night; I therefore do not hesitate to march on Gustrow where I will stay for tonight and where I beg you to advise me of your position and of that of Marshal Soult.

MURAT.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2633
(WD Files)

Malchin, 3 November, 1806, 9:30 A.M.

SIRE:

I had the honor to advise you yesterday morning at Demmin of my march on Gustrow via Tetterow. I proceeded on this point, not having received any news of the engagement of Marshal Bernadotte, or those which I did receive not being favorable, I believed it my duty to proceed toward Waren where he had fought. Later through messengers and general staff officers sent out, I learned of the junction of Marshals Bernadotte and Soult, of their march against the enemy and of the retreat of the enemy from Gustrow, where I will arrive this evening. From this point I will pursue them either towards Rostock or towards Wismar and I hope to be in liaison with Marshals Bernadotte and Soult.

We are very much embarrassed for escorts for prisoners. The escorts considerably weaken our forces. I was going to send an order to Marshal Lannes to proceed toward Neu Brandeburg to support us because I knew of the junction of Blucher and the Duke of Weimar, while ignorant of that of Marshals Bernadotte and Soult, but as things have changed and we are sufficiently strong without him, I will not send him any order.

I hasten to forward to Your Majesty the courier from Hamburg who was arrested at Anklam. He has most important dispatches addressed to the King and the Queen. Your Majesty will learn from these that the ex-General Moreau passed through Paris on October 12th and was at Hamburg on the 28th, and immediately afterwards left for Russia. If the events of the war lead me promptly towards Hamburg, or as soon as communication with it will be opened, I will hasten to inform Bourrienne of the presence of Fauche-Borel at Hamburg and I will undertake to have him arrested. Besides the dispatches of the King, I am forwarding to Y. M. all the other letters which the courier had.

I beg you, sire, to return me my aides; I am now without officers. I hope that within two or three days the round up which you have ordered will be finished. I am, Your Majesty, etc.,

MURAT.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11151
(WD Files)

Berlin, 3 November, 1806.

Issue orders to General Montbrun to leave tonight for Custrin. He will proceed to Prince Jerome and will carry out his orders. Have Prince Jerome advised that he is an excellent light cavalry officer to whom he can confide one of the columns which are to invest Glogau.

Issue the following orders to Prince Jerome:

Send by an aide, an order to the cavalry of the 2d Division and of Wurtemberg, to force their march to rejoin him during the day of the 6th, at Krossen; form without delay three detachments, giving the command to the first to General Lefebvre, the second to General Mortier, and the third to a Bavarian, each detachment will consist of 800 men. He will send one along the left bank of the Oder, another along the right bank and the third towards Posen. The two detachments on the left bank and the right bank will proceed to Glogau to invest that place and ascertain whether it is willing to surrender like Custrin. They will send patrols as far as Breslau, to intercept couriers and convoys which might give us information on the situation of things.

Have Marshal Davout informed as to those dispositions; advise him not to scatter his cavalry but to bring all of it along the line which his army corps will soon take. Instruct him that General Durosnel, who is at Oderberg, has orders to cross the Oder and to push patrols towards the left; that in case need for this cavalry become pressing he may order him to come and join him.

NAPOLEON.

TO PRINCE JEROME

CN—11152
(Imperial Files)

3 November, 1806.

DEAR BROTHER:

I am sending you one of my orderly officers, an engineer officer. You will send to the right bank of the Oder to reconnoiter Glogau. The General Staff should issue orders to accelerate the march of the Wurtemberg column and of the 2d Bavarian Division, so that they can be united at Krossen on the 6th. I am sending you Brigadier General Montbrun, an excellent light cavalry officer whom I had sent here from Naples. I have ordered the formation of three strong detachments of your cavalry; you will give the command of one of these to General Lefebvre, and the command of the second to General Montbrun. These two detachments are intended to operate on the two banks of the Oder. The third, which will proceed towards Posen to connect with detachments of Marshal Davout will be commanded by Bavarians. You will retain near you the remainder of the cavalry and will send them to the support of such of these three reconnaissances as necessary.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL KELLERMANN

CN—11157
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 3 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am in receipt of your letter of October 30th. I make known to you my desire to have you send me as many men as possible. The 28th Light Infantry has only 1600 men; send them at least 400 more. I have several fortified places where I can have them drilled if they are not instructed, and where they will at the same time form the garrison.

I have sent you orders to send forward the 1st Company of Military Police. As soon as this detachment has 1200 men and becomes a suitable command for you, I will ask you to volunteer for the command. Do not leave any troops in the rear. I am occupying a large extent of territory.

Our patrols are already on the frontiers of Poland. I am therefore in need of troops; but it is necessary that reinforcements reach me early rather than that they arrive too late. The Russians are far away; but it is possible that we may meet them and be engaged with them inside of a month; there is no time to lose. Whatever arrives after the battle will not amount to much, proceed on this principle.

I am sorry to note that you have sent a regiment of cuirassiers to escort prisoners to the interior of France. It is up to the national guard to perform that duty.

I am here in a cavalry country. Consequently when there are fifteen cavalymen at depots ready to leave, send them to me at once.

NAPOLEON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 26

CN—11154
(WD Files)

Berlin, 3 November, 1806.

No news has yet been received of the capture of the columns of General Blucher and of the Duke of Weimar.

The following is the situation of these two hostile divisions and that of our own troops. General Blucher with his column, had been marching towards Stettin; having learned that we were already in this city, and that we had gained two marches on him, he withdrew from Gransee, where we arrived at the same time as he did, towards Neu-Strelitz where he arrived October 30th, not stopping there but proceeding towards Waren, where it is supposed that he arrived on the 31st with the idea of attempting to retire in the direction of Rostock to embark on ships.

On the 31st, six hours after his departure, General Savary with a column of 600 troopers, arrived at Strelitz, where he captured the brother of the Queen of Prussia, who is a General in the service of the King.

On November 1st, the Grand Duke of Berg was at Demmin, proceeding towards Rostock, so as to arrive in time to cut off General Blucher from the sea.

Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo has turned General Blucher. This Marshal with his army corps was on the 31st at Neu-Brandeburg, and was proceeding to Waren, which should have brought him into contact with General Blucher during the 1st.

The column commanded by the Duke of Weimar arrived on October 29th at Neu-Strelitz, but informed that the Stettin road was cut, and having met French outposts, he marched back on the 29th towards Wittstock. On the 30th, Marshal Soult learned of this through his hussars and then proceeded towards Wustershausen. He will undoubtedly have met him on the 31st or 1st. These two columns have then been captured yesterday, or today at the latest. The following is their strength. General Blucher has 30 guns, 7 battalions of infantry, and 1500 cavalry; it is difficult to state the strength of this detachment; his trains, wagons, munitions have been captured; he is in the most pitiable condition. The Duke of Weimar has 12 battalions and 35 squadrons in good condition, but he has not a single piece of artillery. These are the feeble remnants of the entire Prussian army. Nothing else remains of them. These two columns captured, the power of Prussia is annihilated, and she has practically no more soldiers. To state that 10,000 men have withdrawn with the King towards the Vistula would be an exaggeration.

Marshal Schoenberg reported at Strelitz to ask for passports to Berlin. He said to General Savary: "Eight hours ago I saw the remains of the Prussian monarchy pass by. You will capture them today or tomorrow. What an inconceivable and unexpected result! The lightning has struck us." It is a fact, that since the Emperor started the campaign, he has not taken one moment's rest, always in forced marches, constantly foreseeing the enemy's movements. The results are such, that no similar example can be found in history. Of more than 150,000 men who were present at the battle of Jena, not one escaped to carry the news beyond the Oder. Certainly, no aggression was ever more un-

just; never was a war carried on so tempestuously. Let this example serve as a lesson to feeble princes, to whom the intrigues, the demands and the money of England are always exciting them to stupid enterprises!

The Bavarian division commanded by General Wrede left Dresden on October 31st. That commanded by General Deroy left November 1st. The Wurtemberg column left the 30th. All these columns are proceeding to the Oder. They form Prince Jerome's army corps.

General Durosnel was sent to Oderberg with a detachment of cavalry, immediately after our arrival at Berlin, in order to intercept everything proceeding via the canal to the Oder. He has captured more than 80 boats filled with all kinds of munitions, which he sent to Spandau.

Subsistence depots have been found at Custrin sufficient to support the army for two months.

Brigadier General Macon whom the Emperor appointed commandant at Leipzig, has died in that town from typhus fever. He was a brave soldier and a perfectly honest man. The Emperor thought highly of him, and is much afflicted with his death.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 27

CN—11167
(WD Files)

Berlin, 4 November, 1806.

A great quantity of English merchandise has been found at Stettin in the Oder warehouses; 500 cannon have been found there and considerable commissary supplies.

On November 1st, the Grand Duke of Berg was at Demmin, on the 2d he was at Teterow, with his right at Rostock. General Savary on the 1st November was at Kratzeburg and on the 2d at an early hour he was at Waren and at Jabel. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo attacked at Jabel, on the evening of the 1st, the enemy rear guard. The fight was well sustained; the hostile forces were several times put to flight; they would have been entirely captured if the lakes and the difficulty of crossing the territory of Meck-

lenburg had not served them on this date. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo, while charging with his cavalry, was thrown from his horse but without receiving any injury. Marshal Soult arrived at Plau on the 2d.

The enemy consequently has given up the idea of marching to the Oder. He changes his plans every day: note that when the road to the Oder was closed to him, he wished to retire to Swedish Pomerania; noting that he would also be intercepted here, he desired to withdraw to the Elbe; but Marshal Soult having foreseen this, he proceeded to march on the point nearest to the heights. They should come together on November 4th or 5th. However, every day, one or two battalions, and even squadrons from this column fall into our hands. The enemy has no longer either wagons or trains.

Marshal Lannes is at Stettin;

Marshal Davout is at Frankfurt;

Prince Jerome is in Silesia.

The Duke of Weimar has left his command to return home, and has left in his place a general who is but little known.

The Emperor today reviewed the dragoon division of General Beaumont at the Palace Square in Berlin; he made several promotions.

All the cavalymen who are dismounted have been assembled at Potsdam, where captured horses have been sent to them. Major General Bourcier has been placed in charge of this large depot. Two thousand dismounted dragoons, who were following the army, have already been mounted.

Work is progressing actively on arming the fortress of Spandau and in repairing the fortifications of Wittenberg, Erfurt, Custrin and Stettin.

Marshal Mortier, commanding the VIIIth Corps of the Grand Army started to march to Cassel, on the 30th of October. He arrived there on the 31st. Following is the letter which the charge d'affaires of France presented to the Prince twenty-four hours earlier.* The following is a proclamation which Marshal Mortier issued.† The Prince

*See CN—11062, page 423.

†See CN—11063, page 424.

of Hesse-Cassel, a marshal in the Prussian army, and his son, a general in the same army had left. The Prince of Hesse-Cassel, as a reply to the note which had been remitted to him, requested authority to march at the head of his troops with the French army against our enemy; Marshal Mortier replied that he had no instructions as to this request, that this Prince having taken up arms after the declaration which had been made by his minister M. de Malsburg, the least mobilization would be considered as an act of hostility, his territory having been not only violated by the Prussians, but they had been later received with ceremony by the hereditary prince, that subsequently they had evacuated Cassel as a result of military combinations and that it was only upon receipt of news of the battle of Jena that mobilizations were discontinued in Cassel; that in fact the hereditary prince had had the great luck of marching at the head of Prussian troops and insulting the French by all kinds of provocations.

He will pay for this madness by the loss of his States. There is not in Germany a House which has been more constantly the enemy of France. For many years, they have sold the blood of their subjects to England in order to carry on war against us in the two hemispheres; and it is to this business of his troops that the Prince owes the treasures which he has gathered; of which it is said a part is shut up in Magdeburg and another part has been sent abroad. This sordid avarice has led to the catastrophe of his House, the existence of which on our frontiers is incompatible with the safety of France. It is finally time to stop playing with forty million people, and to stir up among them trouble and disorder. The English can yet corrupt some sovereigns with money; but the loss of their thrones by those who receive this money will be the infallible consequence of their corruption. The Allies of France will prosper and will gather strength; their enemies will be confounded and dethroned.

The people of Hesse-Cassel will be happier, unburdened from these enormous military duties, they can peaceably carry on the cultivation of their farms; free from a part of their taxes, they will also be governed by generous and liberal principles; the principles which direct the adminis-

tration of France and its Allies. If the French had been beaten, they would have invaded and annexed among themselves our provinces; it is just that the war have also serious results for those sovereigns who make it, so that they may reflect more maturely in their councils before starting a war. In this terrible game, chances must be equal. The Emperor has directed that the fortresses of Hanau and Marburg be destroyed, that all depots and arsenals be sent to Mayence, and that all troops be disarmed, and that the arms of Hesse-Cassel be everywhere removed.

Events will prove that it is neither an insatiable ambition nor a thirst for conquest which has led the cabinet of the Tuilleries to take this step, but rather the necessity for finally terminating this fight and for having a long peace succeed this senseless war, which was proposed by the miserable intrigues and the underhand maneuvers of agents such as Lords Paget and Morpeth.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

CN—11168
(WD Files)

Berlin, 4 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

My intention is that the army corps of Marshal Lannes be divided into three divisions; the third division will be under the orders of Major General Victor, and will consist of the 28th Light Infantry, and the 64th and 88th Infantry; these two regiments will be taken from Suchet's division, a division with five regiments is too large to enable it to be maneuvered on the field of battle. General Victor's division will have 12 guns. For this purpose I am issuing orders, that a battery of six guns now attached to the Guard and belonging to the foot artillery be assigned to Marshal Lannes's corps. General Songis will add to these two 12-pounders from the park, this will make eight in all, and he will add to these as soon as possible four 3-pounders, which will make up the twelve pieces. You will therefore issue orders to Marshal Lefebvre to send tomorrow, at 5:00

A.M., under charge of the colonel of the 28th Light Infantry, the artillery battery of the Guard which has been organized at Mayence, and which I understand is served entirely by the foot artillery.

The 28th Light Infantry leaves tomorrow at 5:00 A.M., you will issue orders to General Songis to have arrive this evening two 12-pounder guns from the park at Spandau and if possible four 3-pounders; and to assign these to the artillery battery which has been formed at Mayence, in order that this battery may leave, under the escort of the 28th Light Infantry for Stettin, where it will arrive at the latest during the day of the 7th. The artillery and the troops leaving for Stettin will take with them four days' bread. You will advise Marshal Lannes of these orders, and you will order the 28th Light Infantry to march in military order.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY*

UCN—768

Imperial Headquarters, Berlin, 4 November, 1806.

His Majesty repeats the order that all the small depots of all arms of the cavalry be united at Potsdam under the inspection of Major-General Bourcier. All wounded horses, all unmounted men of the various cavalry arms, chasseurs, hussars and dragoons will also go to Potsdam. Regimental shops will there be formed, for everything relating to the reintegration of the cavalry. Generals, colonels, post commanders, will send all wounded horses and all unmounted cavalymen to Potsdam. All the small cavalry depots at Wurtzbourg, Forchheim, Kronach, Bayreuth, Erfurt, Wittenberg and elsewhere are suppressed.

Henceforth, all infantry depots remaining at Kronach, Erfurt, Wurtzbourg, Wittenberg and Forchheim will move in the following directions:

*Printed.

All belonging to the Ist and Vth Corps will be directed upon Stettin. All belonging to the IIIrd and VIIth upon Cüstrin. All belonging to the IVth and VIth upon Spandau.

Generals in command of army corps and commandants of strongholds will give orders in accordance.

The general depot of artillery will be at Spandau.

Commandants who, after receiving the present order, continue to keep depots in their strongholds will be named in Army Orders.

Stragglers and scattered detachments will be directed to the depot of their army corps.

The Emperor orders that the army be given a month's pay.

Paymasters of the Ist and Vth Corps and the reserve cavalry divisions of d'Hautpoul, Klein, Sahuc and Grouchy will present themselves at Stettin where they will receive funds.

Those of the IIIrd Corps will receive funds at Cüstrin.

Those of the IVth and VIIth Corps and Nansouty's and Beaumont's divisions will receive them at Berlin.

The paymaster of the VIth Corps, at Erfurt.

Many officers, subalterns and soldiers have money which embarrasses them; the paymaster informs them that he has drafts of the Comptroller of the Treasury upon himself; they are payable at sight and to bearer. Those who wish to make use of this method of sending money home may present themselves to the paymaster of their army corps.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—770

Berlin, 4 November, 1806.

Cousin, order Marshal Augereau to recall to Berlin the 7th Light Infantry which is detached upon the Havel.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—771

Berlin, 4 November, 1806.

Cousin, order the detachments of the 34th, 64th, 40th and 88th and of the 21st, 100th and 103d Light Infantry, which are at Spandau to set out tomorrow with all their baggage and other effects, to join their corps at Stettin. Also issue orders to the two battalions of the 21st Light Infantry which are at Spandau, having escorted prisoners thither, to return at once to Stettin.

NAPOLEON.

MURAT TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

M—2634
(WD Files)

TO THE PRINCE OF PONTE-CORVO

Headquarters, Schwerin, 4 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN :

Your letter was handed to me one league from here, I compliment you on your successes, I hope they will be complete.

I have just arrived with a hussar brigade; one division of cuirassiers and one of dragoons are two leagues from here. They have orders to be assembled tomorrow at 8:00 A.M., when I will proceed to march to join you, and we may hope that General Blucher will not escape us much longer. I will recall the dragoon division which is with Marshal Soult, as soon as I know where he is at; I will send after him tonight. What does Blucher want to do, and what is his idea in proceeding towards Lubeck? I do not understand this. Have you troops at Wismar; would it not be possible that he would seek to reach Rostock and from there Stralsund for still one more blow, what does he intend to do in reaching Holstein which has no exit? As for the Elbe, I do not think that he will wish to recross it, he would risk being thrown into it and drowned. It is now up to us to arrange to crush him at the first opportunity, you should

deal the first blow and I promise you to give the second. If I had received information concerning you, I could have been present at your engagement of yesterday. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2635
(WD Files)

Schwerin, 4 November, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I hasten to advise Your Majesty of my arrival at Schwerin from where the Prince of Ponte-Corvo left at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon for Lubeck, where it appears the enemy wishes to retire to; I will join the Prince very early tomorrow morning and I hope that we will have a good account of Mr. Blucher; who up to now seems to have retired in good order, and as he has at least 25,000 men, of whom 5,000 are cavalry, and as the Prince has only 12,000 men, of which 600 are cavalry, I believe it prudent to join him, and to arrange our maneuvers together, if we wish to crush him in the first battle. His troops have not yet been defeated, they have confidence in Blucher, it is therefore necessary to unite and to fall upon this detachment in mass. I do not know where Marshal Soult is, but he is however very near here; I will find out during the night, and we will act accordingly.

It is reported that Blucher is retiring to Lubeck. As a matter of fact, I do not understand this maneuver; is it in order to embark? Or is it to proceed to Holstein? Under the first supposition, I doubt that he will have the necessary time; under the second supposition he is hopelessly lost. Holstein is a closed in country from where it will be difficult to leave. Does he wish to regain Stralsund; he would be lost, we would succeed in turning him and driving him into the sea. Sire, I will announce my arrival to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo; I will have the honor to advise Your Majesty tomorrow what will have been arranged.

The fight at Waren which I have been assured was unlucky for us, has cost me a half day, except for this I would

have been here for the battle of yesterday and I could have done a great deal of harm to the enemy. I am, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S.—I am inclosing with my letter one from the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and one from the Duke of Mecklenburg. Please let me know your intentions with regard to the latter.

MURAT TO BOURRIENNE

M—2636
(Murat's File)

*Headquarters, Schwerin, 5 November, 1806,**

TO MONSIEUR BOURRIENNE, MINISTER OF FRANCE AT HAMBURG:

I hasten to advise you of my arrival here, with the corps of Marshals Bernadotte and Soult, and a part of the reserve cavalry. Tomorrow I will be at Lubeck where I am counting on giving a mortal blow to General Blucher if he wishes to try the fate of battle; I am told that he plans to embark there, but I do not believe that he will have the necessary time, and I hope that if he does succeed in effecting an embarkation the protecting God of His Majesty's seas will give him contrary winds. If any Prussians should present themselves to enter in Hamburg, recommend plainly to the Magistrate to deny them entrance into the town, which would bring us upon them.

General Moreau passed through Paris on October 12th, and on the 28th was at Hamburg from where he left for Russia; Fauche-Borel is there now; try to find him and have him arrested, this traitor although a Frenchman can serve England.

I beg you to send me at Lubeck all the information which you may have as to General Blucher's plans. I inform you of the defeat of Prince von Hohenlohe, I made his

*This letter is also given in Bourrienne's *Memoirs* Volume 7, page 189. It differs from the copy given here in the text, in that it is dated at Ratzeburg, 8:30 PM, November 5th.—P.L.B.

entire corps prisoners at Prenzlau on the 28th; my hussars forced Stettin to surrender at 11:00 P.M. on the 29th, while General Milhaud whom I had sent to Pasewalk there caused a detachment of 4,000 men to lay down their arms, and General Becker caused a detachment of the same strength to surrender at Anklam. Custrin surrendered the day before yesterday, so that all that remains of the entire Prussian army is about 20,000 to 25,000 men who certainly will not escape us. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

P.S.*—I desire, my dear Bourrienne, that circumstances will allow me the pleasure of seeing you.

TO GENERAL LAGRANGE
AT CASSEL

CN—11174
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 5 November, 1806, 4:00 A.M.

I am sending you my orders directly, as I suppose that General Mortier has left for Hanover. I assume that he has left with you one French and one Italian regiment. One other Italian regiment will arrive at Mayence on November 6th, call it up to you so that you will have a strong force. Marshal Kellermann will send you all the dismounted cavalrymen who are at Mayence; mount as many of them as possible. Remove the arms of Hesse everywhere. Have destroyed the fortifications of Marburg from top to bottom. Have the fortifications of Hanau blown up, so that the fort will be as flat as a hand. Have all the artillery, all the stores, all the furniture, statues and effects of the palace of the court sent to Mayence.

Announce that this Prince can no longer reign; that I will no longer allow on my frontiers a hostile Prince, more than a Prussian, but English and selling his subjects to make war on me in both hemispheres.

*This P.S. appears only in the copy given in Bourrienne's Memoirs.—P.L.B.

Ask for all that the Princes of Nassau-Usingen are to furnish, and give them some muskets, ask also for 2000 men from Hesse-Darmstadt. Disarm this country thoroughly; so that they will not have a single cannon or musket. Carry out the measures which I have ordered, to arrest and send to France the colonels and officers. Send a quartermaster and finance officer to look into the revenues of the Prince. For the rest the country may be treated with kindness but if there is the slightest movement on any part, make a terrible example of them. Have the first village which objects pillaged and burnt; see that the first assembly is dispersed and its leaders brought before a military commission. No Prince of the House of Hesse, not even the women, must be allowed to remain in the country, give them passports to leave. Furlough all the servants. Do all this with exactness and firmness, but with entire French honesty and with the fullest regard for sexes.

Your rule of conduct must be in my projects, which are to entirely dethrone this House of which the existence on the Rhine is incompatible with the safety of France.

You understand that by leaving you the two Italian regiments and the three or four thousand men of my Allies, that this makes five to six thousand men which I may need later on. It is therefore necessary to take measures, that these troops may soon be no longer necessary-there, so that you may be able to get along with about a thousand men.

If there is anything to be done which may be useful for this people, and to make them contented, such as the suppression of some onerous duty, take care to inform me about it.

Advise me of the exact date when the artillery and the stores will have arrived at Mayence and the forts destroyed. I wish that this be before the 16th of November, and that by this date three-quarters of the troops which you have under your orders may be sent to the Elbe.

I suppose that the Elector will not have had the time to carry off the archives on foreign affairs; try and find his correspondence with Prussia.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL MORTIER

CN—11175
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 5 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have noted with pleasure your entry into Cassel on November 1st. I am giving my instructions directly to General Lagrange as I presume you are no longer at Cassel and that you have gone direct towards Hanover. You will find there with the King of Holland, under whose orders you will be, orders to proceed to take possession of Hamburg, with the necessary instructions. If the health of this Prince obliges him to return to his own kingdom, you will assume command of all my troops in Hanover and in the Hanseatic towns. Take care that there is no pillaging and that everything you do shall be with the greatest order; I do not wish to tolerate any disturbance; all resources should be for the use of the army.

Send me frequently your returns, and send me an officer every other day.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11176
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 5 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am in receipt of your letter. I permit you to advance your troops towards Driesen and Meseritz, on the Posen road. I will even soon probably send you an order to proceed with your entire corps towards Posen; but, before allowing you to leave, I wish to give you a division of 2500 dragoons under General Beaumont, which I reviewed yesterday and which will rest here today. I wish also to be free from that column of the Duke of Weimar, which is keeping busy the corps of Marshals Soult, Bernadotte and the Grand Duke of Berg. Those miserable fugitives were yesterday around the vicinity of Rostock. I hope that they will have been taken during the day of the 4th. As soon as

I have news of this, these three corps will become available to me. Marshal Lannes is at Stettin with strong patrols pushing towards Colberg, Posen and Graudenz. I have sent 2000 Baden troops to form the garrison of Custrin. Prince Jerome should have more than 24,000 men to flank your right. If I take Glogau, I will send him to that place; otherwise I will send him towards Posen to support you, you would then have a corps of more than 50,000 men. Marshal Augereau's corps, which is at Berlin, well rested, as well as the cuirassiers of Nansouty's division and my Guard, can very easily raise this number to 80,000 men; but, by this order, I inform you that my intention is that your infantry, under no pretext whatever is to go beyond Meseritz. Perhaps, before you have completed these 15 leagues I may give you the order to continue on. It is desirable that before withdrawing your troops from Landsberg you be sure that the Baden troops have arrived at Custrin. The depots which you have at Landsberg will be very useful, as they are located along the river, in order to supply the entire army.

According to my letters from Moldavia, dated October 9th, the entire Russian army is still on the Dniester, near Kaminetz. They speak of going on to Moldavia or else of marching against us; but they have not made any movements; I do not believe that they can be at Warsaw before November 20th. Marshal Ney is about to bombard Magdeburg; it is time that this place be taken now. The King of Holland will occupy Hanover. Marshal Mortier entered Cassel on the 1st: he has dismounted all the Hessian cavalry and has disarmed the country. This enemy being now beyond the possibility of injuring us, all will advance towards you.

The dismounted men which you sent to Spandau are in a great hurry to leave; however they have not had good horses, the regiments have changed them enroute, replacing them with poor horses.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—773

Berlin, 5 November, 1806.

Order the 737 men of Marshal Ney's corps arrived at Berlin from France to proceed to Spandau for garrison duty.

Order the 1008 men belonging to Marshal Soult's corps, arrived at Berlin from France, to proceed to Cüstrin where they will do garrison duty until the arrival of Marshal Soult.

Order the detachment of the 10th Chasseurs, now in Berlin, to join its corps at Magdeburg.

Order Marshal Ney's elite battalions which are now at Erfurt, to proceed with all diligence to Cüstrin where it (*sic*) will join the army.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11182
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 5 November, 1806, Evening.

DEAR COUSIN:

I am in receipt of your letter of November 4th. I see no objection to you having Stargard occupied, provided that the troops will be well off there and can rest. They should be some depots at Stargard. Send patrols on the side of Colberg, towards the sea. Twelve pieces of artillery together with the 28th Infantry left this morning, one hour before daybreak, for Stettin. I much desire that you organize your three divisions. As soon as I have another regiment I will give it to Victor. Select another chief of staff.

You will soon receive orders to march to the Vistula; but I am waiting in order to see brought to a close the pursuit of the column of the Duke of Weimar which has united with that of Blücher and keeps the army corps of Marshals Soult, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, and the Grand Duke of Berg occupied. This column should have arrived yesterday on the Baltic Sea toward Rostock. I believe that they will succeed in capturing them.

I am assured that there is much movement in Poland.

My intention is to fortify Stettin. Have provisioned the forts of Prussia, Damm, William and Leopold. I have issued orders to General Chasseloup. With an army like this, so many depots, so many auxiliary troops; it is very lucky to have places where two to three thousand men can be placed in safety.

I do not know the number of bakeries which are at Stettin; if you have not sufficient means to make 50,000 rations a day, have some additional ovens constructed.

A detachment of Bavarian troops is marching towards Glogau; that place is strong; but Stettin and Kustrin soon surrendered; I do not see why the former would do otherwise. This place would be very useful to us.

I have appointed to the command of Custrin a major adjutant, but I will give the command to General Thouvenot, of whose conduct at Wurtzbourg I was pleased and who well understands matters about forts.

I have learned with pleasure that you have 20,000 rations of brandy; but am displeased that you have no more shoes. Two pairs of shoes only to a man are very few in the season upon which we are about to enter. I believe that the corps are bringing some up from France; 500 pairs are being made here daily. If possible, have some made at Stettin; we have passed the best season and from now on a pair of shoes will not last longer than ten days.

NAPOLEON.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2637
(WD Files)

Ratzeburg, 5 November, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I have the honor to advise Your Majesty of my arrival at Schwerin and of my junction with Marshals Soult and Bernadotte. I started out this morning at 7:00 A.M.; the two army corps of the Marshals arrived at Ratzeburg at the same time. Marshal Soult took the road from Ratzeburg and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo that from Rehna, both

proceeding towards Lubeck where all reports indicated the retreat of Blucher, by the two points of Rehna and Ratzeburg. General Lasalle has received orders to follow the Ratzeburg road; Generals d'Hautpoul and Grouchy will be tonight in line with Rehna; tomorrow all will march at 5:00 A.M. for Lubeck, where the entire detachment of Blucher is, and where it is believed that he intends to embark. We have met his rear guard here; it has been charged. We captured eight guns which were cut off, and approximately 300 cavalry surrendered. Only one battalion of infantry passed through the town, who on our approach interrupted the bridge, but I caused the lake to be turned by General Lasalle, via the village of Schmilau, and his hussars entered the town from the direction of Lubeck, whilst in the meantime the bridge towards the Schwerin gate was repaired; his main guard is within pistol range of the enemy. I hope that tomorrow will be a desirable day, as I do not believe that General Blucher has either the means or the time to embark; the Swedes, who left here yesterday have embarked at Lubeck on Russian ships, and I do not think that there are sufficient vessels to embark the Prussian army; besides the wind just now is contrary, and God, who protects Your Majesty's arms will not change it.

All Your Majesty's orders contained in your dispatches of the 2nd, which reached me this morning, will be carried out. All the troops are well tired; I will take the responsibility of leaving the cuirassiers and Grouchy's dragoons at Lubeck; if the enemy continues to flee I will follow on his heels with Sahuc's division and all the light cavalry of Marshals Soult and Bernadotte; I have left them at Schwerin certain that Blucher wished to give battle near Lubeck. I have just written to Minister Bourienne. I am, Your Majesty, etc.,

MURAT.

MARSHAL BERTHIER TO NAPOLEON

N—307

5 November, 1806.

I hereby advise you that the bombardment should constantly increase in severity. Fire red hot shells, in order to set the city on fire. . . .

Do not delay in notifying me that Magdeburg has either surrendered or is on fire. You will not hesitate to have the governor informed that the siege train has arrived from Dresden,* with 100 guns† and that with the artillery and engineer officers which you have, the place should soon be taken, that within one week you will have crossed the ditch and opened a breach, that the city will be burnt and sacked, that if this comes to pass there will be no surrender for the officers; that the present resistance has no mission, as my armies are on the Vistula, and Cüstrin and Stettin have been taken.

. . . . You will find at Magdeburg part of the funds of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and many regimental funds. See that nothing escapes you. . . .

BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL CHASSELOUP

CN—11189
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 6 November, 1806, Evening.

The chief of staff will give you orders to have the engineer park leave tomorrow in order that it may be at Kustrin on the 9th. Have made a return of materiel, personnel, and transportation of this park. I wish that they pass tomorrow, between 11:00 A.M. and 12:00 noon, through the Palace Square where I will observe them march by. I hope that this park will have some 20,000 tools, as finally it becomes very important that I have the necessary material to construct in one night several redoubts and intrenchments.

*This was an incorrect statement.—B.

†This was a greatly exaggerated statement.—B.

In requiring 20,000 portable tools for your park, I wish that you will assemble as many more at Custrin, which will hereafter be the base for military operations.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL BERTHIER

UCN—777

Berlin, 6 November, 1806, 7:00 o'clock evening.*

Cousin, despatch a captain to act as commander-at-arms half way between Berlin and Cüstrin, and at Frankfurt. Order that everything at Spandau belonging to Marshal Soult's corps leave that place for Cüstrin. Send orders by special courier to the 28th regiment of light infantry on garrison duty in Leipzig to leave that place and proceed to Cüstrin. A picket of 100 men, among whom the footsore and slightly wounded are to be included, will remain at Leipzig to guard the magazines.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY†

UCN—781

Imperial Headquarters at Berlin, 7 November, 1806.

His Majesty is displeased to see that disorders are committed in the rear of the army, notably in the environs of Leipzig and Wittenberg. French commanders are all the less pardonable because, independently of the French forces under their command, they have also Saxon infantry and cavalry. They should establish patrols to arrest stragglers, being careful to put them under French officers or subalterns. The same dispositions should be made for Weimar, Erfurt, Gotha, Brunswick, etc. French commanders should employ the local forces to see that property in the country

*The copy in the National Archives has 10 o'clock in the evening.

†Printed.

is respected, and strenuously to repress all disorders which dishonor the army.

The Major-general, Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin.

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

TO THE EMPRESS

CN—11191

(Letters of Napoleon to Josephine)

Berlin, 6 November, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

I have received your letter in which you appear to be angry as to what I said about women. It is true that I hate intriguing women above everything else. I am accustomed to women who are good, sweet and conciliating; those are the kind which I like. If they have spoilt me, it is not my fault, but yours. Besides you will see that I have been very good to one who has shown herself to be sensible and good, Mme. de Hatzfeld. When I showed her her husband's letter she said to me, while crying, with profound feeling and frankness: "Ah! that is really his writing." When she read it, her voice came from her soul. She made me sorry; I said to her: "Very well, Madame, throw this letter into the fire. I will no longer be able to punish your husband." She burned the letter and seemed to me to be very happy. Her husband has since been very quiet. Two hours later he would have been lost. You see then that I like good, frank and sweet women; but these are the only ones that are like you.

Goodbye, dear friend. I am very well.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11192

(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 6 November, 1806.

Your kingdom does not render me any service, today less than ever. You should furnish at least 20,000 men, and you govern your kingdom with too much softness. This

makes it necessary that I alone support all the expenses of the war. You only furnish me one-half the number of troops which the King of Wurtemberg furnishes. You have only organized your military position so as to oppose the King of Sweden. All this is not well done. A kingdom is not well administered except when it is done with vigor and energy. You explain this by the pretense of the poorness of the Dutch, who have all the money of Europe. All your measures show evidence of this extreme good nature. You have only 6,000 infantry, four weak squadrons and 12 guns; you should have 40 guns, 3,000 troopers, and 12,000 or 15,000 infantry; who joined to my 6,000 French would make an army of 25,000 men, with which you could have done honor to yourself. The war will continue; try for next spring to have 25,000 foot troops, in order to reinforce the army of Hanover and to defend your own States.

NAPOLEON.

TO THE KING OF HOLLAND

CN—11193
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 6 November, 1806, 10:00 P.M.

I hope that on the 5th or the latest the 6th, you will have entered Hanover. On the 6th or the 8th you will be joined by Marshal Mortier. The fortress of Rinteln seems to me very good for observing Hameln. Have it occupied and keep it in good condition. Send me the plan with a report from the engineer officers, so that I can see what I can do. It seems to me to be well situated between Magdeburg and Wesel to serve for a point of support to my line of communication, but it is necessary that it should be susceptible of holding out against a raid. As to the fortresses of Hanau, Marburg and Ziegenhain, I am giving orders to General Lagrange to have them demolished. I hope that Marshal Mortier will be at Hamburg with his army corps on the 10th or 11th. If a column of 12,000 men, which is being pursued by the Prince of Berg and by Marshals Soult, Lannes and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, and which was at Kriwitz on the 3d, apparently retiring towards Wismar, has passed the

left of Marshal Soult in order to withdraw towards Hamburg, you will proceed to its pursuit. Marshal Mortier, before entering Hamburg, may go through Lauenberg to strike whatever belongs to the Swedes. I am leaving him in charge of this movement; but he will proceed to the pursuit of General Blucher's column if this has not yet been captured. Marshal Davout has entered Posen, the capital of the great Poland. The Poles appear to wish to rebel. In a few days I am myself going to march towards the Vistula. Send me daily an officer with your reports.

NAPOLEON.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2639
(WD Files)

Lubeck, 6 November, 1806, 9:00 P.M.

SIRE:

I hasten to announce to Your Majesty the most brilliant success, of which I hope the result will be the capture of the entire forces of General Blucher and the Duke of Weimar. General Blucher, who commands all that remains assembled of the Prussian army, awaited the troops of Your Majesty at Lubeck. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo and Marshal Soult advanced on this town practically at the same time. The divisions of Grouchy and d'Hautpoul appeared there at the same hour; the Prince of Ponte-Corvo by the Rehna road, Marshal Soult by that of Ratzeburg, and the heavy cavalry on a road between the two army corps. I marched personally with Marshal Soult and General Lasalle's brigade. Marches from all directions commenced at 5:00 A.M.; the light troops of Marshal Soult, and Lasalle's brigade met the enemy one league in front of the town, they charged, overthrew the enemy, captured one guidon and two hundred mounted men. General Lasalle in carrying out his charge, arrived under the walls of the town, where he was received by six rounds of shrapnel; he lost several men; he maintained his position; in the meantime Sahuc's division and the entire corps of Marshal Soult followed; the different roads were intercepted, and the streams of Wakenitz and

Steckenitz were reconnoitered and observed; General Le-grand then received the order from Marshal Soult to attack the advanced works and the Mülhen gate. The Corsican and Po riflemen, supported by the 18th Infantry, marched in front, and with shouts repeated a thousand times of "Long live the Emperor," advanced on the enemy. To attack and capture the advance works was the affair of only a moment, 1200 men and three generals who defended them were made prisoners. The first success led to a second; the gate of the town was blown in by artillery fire, the ramparts were scaled and we entered the town. General Leval, on his side, marched to attack the Huxter gate and General Saint-Hilaire remained in reserve. While Marshal Soult in this manner chased the enemy through the Mühlen gate and penetrated into the interior of the town; the Prince of Ponte-Corvo obtained the same success at the Burgen gate. The heads of the columns of the two army corps met in the middle of the city; everything was overthrown. Never was there a more savage fight. The streets are strewn with corpses. Then I ordered the cavalry to be allowed to pursue the enemy, sabers at their heels, on the Travemunde road by which General Blücher retired.

Sire, 5000 men, three or four enemy generals, at least 50 cannon are the results of this day. A column consisting of six squadrons and several battalions, which retreated by the Hamburg road, has surrendered to Marshal Soult's light cavalry. Night brought an end to the battle and prevented the capture of all the enemy troops. Tomorrow at break of day, all the cavalry will march against General Blücher, who situated between the sea and the line of Danish troops, who, arms in hand, will make their neutrality respected, will certainly be forced to surrender. It is impossible to make better dispositions than those which the Marshals have made. They will undoubtedly inform Your Majesty of those of all grades who most distinguished themselves in this affair; as for me I must state to you that everybody did their duty. The city suffered much, but it was beyond our power to prevent this. Tomorrow I will have the honor to write Your Majesty more in detail. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo has taken a thousand to twelve hundred Swedes who

had already embarked. The Danes, who appear to be thoroughly decided to defend their neutrality, have fired on my troops whom they took for Prussians.

I will return all the prisoners of this nation.

I remain with profound respect.

JOACHIM.

P.S.—I enclose with my letter a copy of the capitulation of Wolgast, sent to me by my aide, Dery, whom as I announced to Your Majesty I had sent to Swedish Pomerania to seize all the trains which had retreated there. I have the honor to send to Your Majesty a copy of all the reports which I have received from Major Boyer who commands at Anklam, and from my aide, Dery.

TO MARSHAL DAVOUT

CN—11196
(Imperial Archives)

Berlin, 7 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

I have read your letter of the 5th to the Prince of Neuchâtel. You will receive the order to proceed towards Posen with your army corps. Have follow you as practicable, your 3000 muskets, in order that you may distribute these to the Poles at Posen. Captured letters indicate that the Russians are not yet at Warsaw. I presume that you will be at Posen on the 9th or 10th. At the same time my idea is that you will not engage in any serious affair, particularly with the Russians if they have arrived on the Vistula. Marshal Augereau will be on the 9th at Driesen. On the same day, Marshal Lannes will be at Schneidemühl. Prince Jerome will be the master of Gross-Glogau, if this place wishes to surrender, and in case it does not wish to surrender, my intention is to have Prince Jerome's corps cross the Oder, and proceed in the direction of Schmiegel, to intercept the Breslau and Posen road. When you are at Posen, you will send patrols to intercept the roads from Posen to Breslau, Graudenz and Thorn. It is impossible that this will not furnish

you some important information. Send to reconnoiter the bridges over the Warta between Custrin and Posen, in order that if by reason of movements by the enemy you should move by your left, I may know where you can cross this stream. Send orders to General Beaumont's division, which left here at daybreak this morning to join you; it will be on the Oder on the 7th, and can be at Posen on the 10th; if the enemy is still far away, do not uselessly fatigue it and do not have it arrive until the 11th. Advise General Beaumont to maintain a severe discipline and do the same in your army corps; it would be unfortunate to make the Poles discontented. I presume that you have some Poles with you. You can easily find spies and agents so as to be advised of the march of the Russians. Do not be too confident, this is what I recommend to you today. It is important for me to have frequently news from you. Send an adjutant along the Stettin road, so that he can give you news of Marshal Lannes. Do not in any way fatigue your troops and arrive at Posen without making forced marches.

Select at Posen a good military position which covers the road from Thorn and that from Warsaw. As it is possible that I may leave you there for three or four days, not being able to advance further without having closed in the corps which are towards the rear, have barracks constructed and establish yourself in a very military manner. Have engineers make sketches of this entire position, and see that from the position which you will take, you will be able to retreat either along the left or the right bank of the Warta. You will consequently reconnoiter the second retreat position, which it seems to me should be in rear of a small stream which crosses the Posen, Schneidemuhl road at the village of Rogasen.

Have ovens constructed at Posen as the entire army will assemble there, but have them actually constructed in three days. Send orders to your cavalry. Let me know how many days are required for a boat to ascend the Warta from Custrin to Posen.

In taking up a military position, have your cavalry a short distance out in order that they may not eat up that which is in the vicinity of your camp in order to reserve these for moments of difficult operations. On your entry

into Posen, take measures to establish depots of flour, forage, brandy and meat, if you did not find them there, not only for your own corps but for the entire army.

NAPOLÉON.

TO MARSHAL LANNES

CN—11200
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 7 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The chief of staff is sending you an order to push your light cavalry out on reconnaissance on the 9th instant as far as Schneidemühl. If you can be there on the 9th or 10th, be there, maintain strict discipline in Poland. Colonel Exelmans entered Posen on the 4th; he was received there with an enthusiasm difficult to describe. Marshal Davout will be at Posen on the 9th; reconnoiter the road from Neu-Stettin. Have four days' bread taken which you will distribute among the soldiers, and you will place four days' supply in your wagons.

I have no need to tell you that I do not see any probability of a serious engagement; but if you learn that the Russians have entered Graudenz, you will so advise Marshal Davout, and according to circumstances you will maneuver so as not to become involved in any serious engagement.

A company of artillery should have arrived at Stettin; it will not lose a minute in arming the place. The 1200 men which you left there will be stationed in the following manner: 200 at Damm, 200 at Fort Prussia, 100 at Fort William, 100 at Fort Leopold, and 600 at Stettin, these men will be quartered by companies in the bastions. In this way their service will not be difficult and they will always be at hand. These 1200 men should be promptly reenforced by the 600 men of your army corps who are leaving Wittenberg and by the detachments which are coming in from all directions.

Issue orders that all of your corps who arrive will stop at Stettin until further orders, in order to reenforce the garrison. This detachment will ultimately form the rear

guard of your division. It will have around 2,000 men, and it will rejoin you when the head of the Prince of Pontecorvo's army corps is at Stettin, and in accordance with orders which I will give. I will in addition send an auxiliary detachment of 1500 German troops.

Direct that the fort be armed with the greatest energy, and that within two days guns be mounted in each bastion. See that there is a complete artillery company of 100 men. According to the returns submitted to me by the chief of artillery, this company would be the 18th of the 5th Foot Artillery, which is 100 men strong. See that there is a senior artillery officer and several engineer officers present. I have given my orders to General Chasseloup, I wish to defend all of Stettin. Stettin, with 1200 men, and guns on all the bastions, should be safe against all surprise, if, as the Turks do, and according to the custom which we have practiced with success, instead of mounting a guard every day the guarding of each gun be intrusted to one company, the troops be quartered in each bastion, and it is required that everybody be in the work during the night and up till 10:00 A.M.; when if it is certain that the enemy has not appeared, only one-half of the troops need remain near their guns, and the rest may be allowed to go to town.

Issue your orders in consequence to the commandant of the town. I have given the general staff orders to send on officers to command the Fort of Damm and the Fort of Prussia.

NAPOLEON.

TO MARSHAL NEY

CN—11202
(Imperial Files)

Berlin, 7 November, 1806.

I have given orders to General Lemarois who is at Wittenberg, to send you six 2-pounders and two mortars with implements and munitions. We have a large quantity of powder and shells at Dresden. You have canoneers who can serve this material. Bombard Magdeburg. All letters from Stettin state that that place is not supplied and lacks

the most important articles. I have informed you that the bombardment should constantly increase in severity. Fire red hot shells, in order to set the city on fire. I presume that you have constructed some small redoubts in front of the town, so that if the besieged, discontented with seeing themselves so mistreated, make counter attacks, you will be able to receive them. Send officers frequently to the King of Holland at Hanover, and to Marshal Mortier who will arrive at Hamburg on the 10th, and send me regularly the information which you have concerning these two corps. I suggest that you send me frequently officers and reports of the bombardment. At Wittenberg there are 500,000 [pounds of] powder, at Dresden as many shells as anybody could want. Send some officers to Wittenberg, to Dresden, to M. de Thiard, whom I have appointed commandant of that town and who has orders to furnish you everything which you may need. Do not fail to notify me that Magdeburg has surrendered or is on fire. You will not fail to have the governor notified that a siege train has reached you from Dresden; that with 100 guns and the engineer and artillery officers which you have, the place will soon be taken; that within 8 days you will have crossed the ditch and opened a breach; that the city will be burned and sacked; that at this point there will be no surrender for the officers; that this resistance has no mission as my armies are on the Vistula, and Custrin and Stettin have been taken. If they at all doubt the news of this capture, I see no objection in allowing one of their officers to proceed via Berlin to Custrin and Stettin and return to Magdeburg, to assure them of the condition of things. I imagine that before November 15th you will have Magdeburg.

My troops have entered in Poland; they have been received at Posen with an enthusiasm difficult to picture. The people of Poland asked loudly for arms; I have sent them some. The Russians had not yet come there on November 1st. It is probable that we will meet them during the first days of December. You understand how much I desire that you be rid of Magdeburg in order to be about that time on the Vistula. You will find at Magdeburg a part of the treasure of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and many regimental

funds. See that nothing escapes you; in order to do this search all wagons and baggage, and do not allow the officers to keep anything which does not really belong to them.

NAPOLÉON.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 28

CN—11206
(WD Files)

Berlin, 7 November, 1806.

His Majesty today reviewed, in the Palace Square of Berlin between 11:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M., the dragoon division of General Klein. He made several promotions. This division distinguished itself at the battle of Jena and broke several squares of Prussian infantry. The Emperor then watched the army park, the bridge train and the engineer park pass by; the army park is commanded by General Saint-Laurent of the artillery, the bridge train by Colonel Bouchu, and the engineer park by General Cazal of the engineers.

His Majesty has expressed to General Songis, Inspector General, his satisfaction with the activity which he has shown in the organization of the different branches of the artillery of this Grand Army.

General Savary, at the head of 500 troopers of the 1st Hussars and 7th Chasseurs has turned near Wismar on the Baltic, the Prussian General Usedom, and has made him prisoner with two brigades of hussars and two battalions of grenadiers. He also captured several guns. This column belongs to the corps which is being pursued by the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and Marshal Soult, which corps cut off on the side of the Oder and from Pomerania, appears to have gone in the direction of Lubeck.

Colonel Exelmans, commanding the 1st Chasseurs of Marshal Davout's command, has entered Posen, the capital of the great Poland. He was received there with an enthusiasm difficult to describe; the city was filled with people. The windows were decorated as for a holiday; the cavalry could scarcely move through the streets.

General Bertrand of the engineers, aide to the Emperor, has embarked on the lake of Stettin in order to reconnoiter all crossings.

A siege battalion has been organized at Dresden and at Wittenberg, for use against Magdeburg. The Elbe is covered. It is to be hoped that this place will not hold out much longer. Marshal Ney is charged with its siege.

NAPOLÉON.

MURAT TO BOURRIENNE*

M—2640
(Nantes Library)

Lubeck, 7 November, 1806.

DEAR SIR:

I have just received, and at the moment of mounting, your letter and that addressed by you to the Emperor. I thank you for the information which you have so kindly given me.

The corps under the orders of the Duke of Brunswick and of General Blücher, about 25,000 men strong, awaited His Majesty's troops at Lubeck. This city was taken by assault; 6000 prisoners, three generals, 50 guns, some standards and guidons are the brilliant results of this day. The remainder of these troops are fleeing dispersed, and if as it is said and as appears to be the fact, the Danes have determined to make their neutrality respected, it is probable that General Blücher will be forced to lay down his arms today. Thus will end the reputations of this army which performed such marvels under Frederick the Great.

Receive, sir, the assurance of my considerations.

JOACHIM.

P.S.—Your letter does not formally acknowledge the receipt of the letter which I wrote you on the evening of the

*In Murat's Correspondence, Volume CCCLXIX, by Lombroso, the date of this letter is given as October, 1806, and no address appears. But the letter is given by Bourrienne in his Memoirs, Volume VII, page 191, as shown above.—*P.L.B.*

There appears to be no doubt that the date of October must be wrong. The information contained in the letter indicates that the date shown in this text, November 7th, is correct.—*C.H.L.*

5th from Ratzeburg, in which I advised you of the brilliant results of the campaign, and among other things of the defeat and surrender of the Army of Prince von Hohenlohe, the capture of Stettin and of Custrin, and the march of a large part of the army towards the frontiers of Poland.

As you did not speak to me of ex-General Moreau, I must presume that my letter did not actually reach you. This traitor passed through Paris on October 12th, he arrived at Hamburg on the 28th, from where he left for Russia. Fauche-Borel is yet, so it seems, at Hamburg. I have captured a letter from him dated Hamburg, October 28th. If he is still there, you must have him arrested.

I hope that by now the communications between Hamburg and Berlin have been re-established.

MURAT TO NAPOLEON

M—2641
(WD Files)

TO HIS MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR AND KING

In rear of Schwartau, 7 November, 1806, 10:30 A.M.

SIRE:

The battle is over on account of lack of combatants. I hasten to advise Your Majesty that General Blucher's detachment surrendered this morning to the three army corps at Lubeck. He will lay down his arms before them in one hour. I will send sometime today the capitulation which has been made, as well as the billeting reports of the corps of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, Marshal Soult and the Reserve Cavalry.

I await Your Majesty's orders for future movements.

I am, sire, etc.,

MURAT.

MURAT TO THE MINISTER OF WAR

M—2642

(Neufchatel Library)

Lubeck, 7 November, 1806, 4:00 P.M.

I advised you yesterday of the victory which we obtained over the Prussian troops under the walls of the city of Lubeck. I have the pleasure of advising you today that the entire forces of General Blucher which had been thrown into the swamps of Trawemunde have just laid down their arms. This force consists of 10,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry; plenty of guns and flags are in our possession. Thus ends the destinies of this army.

Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

BERNADOTTE TO MURAT

M—D. 102.6

(Murat's File)

Lubeck, 8 November, 1806.

As to the police of the town [of Lubeck], as I was the first to enter there, I believe it necessary to appoint at once a commandant. In spite of the precautions which have been taken, the town has suffered. I have complained of this, but it has been impossible to entirely prevent it. The presence of three different army corps in this town, which was captured by assault, made disorder almost inevitable, you yourself must be convinced of this. I am giving orders that the stallions which have been carried off be turned in at once.

BERNADOTTE.

MURAT TO MARSHAL BERNADOTTE

M—2643

(Murat's File)

TO THE PRINCE OF PONTE-CORVO

Headquarters, Lubeck, 8 November, 1806.

DEAR COUSIN:

The refusal which General Berthier, chief of your staff, has just made to my chief of staff to submit a return of

prisoners taken by your army corps, states that I have not the right to ask for this. As there must be no doubt on this subject, and as I must believe that this refusal was given without your knowledge, I beg you to give orders to have this return sent to me immediately. I need it to make my report to the Emperor.

I advise you that I will leave tomorrow to establish my headquarters at Schwerin, where please send me the report of billets which you have assigned to your army corps, in order that I may report this to the Emperor, and may not send other troops to those places.

I beg you to have made a report of the different funds which are to be turned in in accordance with the capitulation, of the different depots, and of the loading of the various ships which have been stopped on the Trave. You like good order too much, not to have already taken the necessary measures to prevent the pillaging which might have taken place. For my part I have prescribed the same measures to my executive. Apparently Marshal Soult has not gone into these details, since it is you who have appointed a commandant and taken over the police of the town.

The Emperor attaches importance that the stallions of the stables of the King of Prussia be sent to Spandau. As all the cavalry which I have brought with me and that of Marshal Soult's corps are no longer here, I beg you to have an escort formed to conduct those stallions which have been assembled during the day; and as many of those horses which are at the tail of the column which surrendered, have been taken off by the troops of the different army corps, I beg you to issue orders that those which may be in your corps be returned and assembled with those which are here. I will write with the same idea to Marshal Soult; the same orders have been given to the general of the cavalry division. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

MARSHAL NEY TO NAPOLEON

N—306

7 November, 1806.

The citizens of Magdeburg assembled on the night of the 4th and 5th November, after the bombardment, under

the windows of the governor, and threatened to revolt if he refused to surrender, as they had no intention whatever of allowing themselves to be burnt out.

NEY.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—782

Berlin, 8 November, 1806.

The Emperor expresses his satisfaction to General Savary, as also the 1st regiment of Hussars and the 7th of Chasseurs under his orders, who captured at Wismar General Usedom with two régiments of hussars, 1000 horses strong, two battalions of grenadiers and two pieces of cannon.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Valengin, Major General of the Grand Army,

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

MARSHAL NEY TO NAPOLEON

N—306a

8 November, 1806.

The fortress of Magdeburg surrenders to Your Majesty's armies. The capitulation was signed this evening. . . . it has been confirmed that the garrison is 20,000 men strong, sick and wounded included; they will march out on the 11th. I am informed that there are 800 guns in the fort. . . .

NEY.

TO THE EMPRESS

CN—11215

(Letters of Napoleon to Josephine)

Berlin, 9 November, 1806.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

I have good news for you: Magdeburg has surrendered, and on November 7th, I captured at Lubeck 20,000 men who have escaped me during the last eight days. So

here you see the entire army has been taken; Prussia has not beyond the Vistula 20,000 men left. Several of my army corps are in Poland. I still remain at Berlin. I am in quite good health.

Goodbye, dear friend; a thousand regards to Hortense, Stephanie and the little Napoleon.

NAPOLEON.

ORDER OF THE DAY

UCN—787

Berlin, 9 November, 1806.

The Emperor expresses to the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, Marshal Soult, and to the infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer corps under their orders, his satisfaction with their brilliant conduct at Lübeck, and the activity of their pursuit of the enemy.

Closely pressed, constantly outflanked at all points by which they sought to retreat, overwhelmed in every way, General Blücher's corps, including 16,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry and 80 pieces of cannon, was obliged to capitulate and surrender as prisoner of war with all its baggage and stores, to be taken to France.

No other hostile troop remains on this side of the Vistula.

The Prince of Neufchatel, Minister of War, Major-General,

MARSHAL ALEX. BERTHIER.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 29

CN—11223
(WD Files)

Berlin, 9 November, 1806.

The dragoon brigade of General Becker appeared today on parade.

His Majesty wishing to reward the good conduct of the regiments composing this command, has made several promotions.

One thousand dragoons who had followed the army on foot and which had been mounted at the Potsdam depot, were reviewed yesterday by Marshal Bessieres; they have been furnished with several articles of equipage which they lacked, and they leave today to rejoin their respective commands provided with good saddles and mounted on good horses, the result of victory.

His Majesty has ordered that a contribution of 150,000,-000* be levied on the Prussian states and on the allies of Prussia.

After the capitulation of the Prince of Hohenlohe, General Blucher, who was following him, changed direction and succeeding in uniting with the column of the Duke of Weimar, to which was joined that of Prince Frederick William Brunswick-Oels, son of the Duke of Brunswick. These three divisions thus found themselves under the orders of General Blucher. Several small columns also joined this corps.

For several days these troops attempted to penetrate along roads which the French might leave open; but the combined marches of the Grand Duke of Berg, of Marshal Soult, and of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo has closed all lines of march.

At first the enemy tried to go towards Anklam and then towards Rostock: headed off in carrying out this plan, he attempted to go back to the Elbe; but finding himself again headed off, he marched to his front towards Lubeck.

On November 4th, he took position at Greivismuhlen; the Prince of Ponte-Corvo overthrew his rear guard; but he could not capture this detachment as he only had 600 troopers and those of the enemy were much superior in strength. General Wattier made some fine charges in this fight, in which he was sustained by Generals Pacthod and Maison, with the 27th Light Infantry and the 8th Infantry.

It is to be noted during the different circumstances of this fight, that a company of scouts of the 94th Infantry commanded by Captain Razout, was surrounded by several hostile squadrons; but the French voltigeurs did not fear at all the shock of the Prussian cuirassiers; they received them

*Francs probably intended.—C.H.L.

firmly and with such well sustained and well directed fire, that the enemy gave up the idea of overthrowing them. The foot voltigeurs then pursued the cavalry with great haste. The Prussians lost seven guns and 1000 men. But on the evening of the 4th, the Grand Duke of Berg, who had proceeded to the right, with his cavalry, struck the enemy whose plan was yet uncertain. Marshal Soult marched for Ratzeburg. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo marched for Rehna; he stopped at Schoenberg for the night of the 5th to the 6th, and left two hours after midnight. Arrived at Schlutup on the Trave, he surrounded a detachment of 1600 Swedes who had at last decided it was desirable to retreat from Lauenburg in order to embark on the Trave. Artillery shells sank the boats which had been prepared for the embarkation. The Swedes after having made a defense lay down their arms.

A convoy of 300 wagons that General Savary had pursued from Wismar was surrounded and captured by the column of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo.

In the meantime the enemy fortified himself at Lubeck. Marshal Soult had not lost time in his march from Ratzeburg; so that he arrived at the Mullen gate at the same time that the Prince of Ponte-Corvo arrived at the Trave gate. The Grand Duke of Berg, with his cavalry, was between the two.

The enemy had hastily fortified the old fortifications of Lubeck; he had placed some batteries in the bastions; he did not doubt but that he would gain one day's time; but to see, to reconnoiter and to attack was the affair of but an instant.

General Drouet, at the head of the 27th Light Infantry and the 94th and 95th Infantry, assaulted these batteries with the coolness and intrepidity natural to French troops. The gates were immediately broken in, the bastions scaled, the enemy put to flight, and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo's corps entered by the Trave gate.

The Corsican chasseurs, the Po riflemen, and the 26th Light Infantry, composing the advance guard of General Legrand's division, which had not yet fought in this campaign, and which was impatient to come into contact with

the enemy, marched with the rapidity of lightning; redoubts, bastions, ditches, all were crossed; and Marshal Soult's corps entered by the Mullen gate. It was in vain that the enemy attempted to defend himself in the streets, he was everywhere pursued. All the streets, all the fortifications, were filled with corpses. The two army corps, coming opposite directions, united at the middle of the city. As soon as the Grand Duke of Berg could pass, he proceeded to the pursuit of the fugitives. 4000 prisoners, 60 guns, several Generals, a large number of officers, killed or captured, such is the result of this fine day.

Before daybreak on the 7th everybody mounted, and the Grand Duke of Berg with Lasalle's brigade and D'Hautpoul's cuirassier division surrounded the enemy near Schwartzau. General Blucher, Prince Frederick William of Brunswick-Oels and all the Generals came to the conquerors, in order to sign a capitulation and surrender before the French army.

These two days have destroyed the last corps which remained of the Prussian army, and have brought into our hands the remainder of this army, many colors and 16,000 prisoners, among which are 4,000 cavalry.

Thus the Prussian generals, who in the delirium of their vanity, allowed themselves many sarcastic remarks against Austrian generals, have four times repeated the catastrophe of Ulm: 1st, by the capitulation of Erfurt; 2d, by that of the Prince of Hohenlohe; 3d, by the surrender of Stettin; and 4th, by the capitulation of Schwartzau.

The city of Lubeck has suffered considerably; taken by assault, its fortifications and streets have been the scene of carnage. This would not have occurred except for those who have brought war to within its walls.

Mecklenburg has also been ravaged by Prussian and French armies. A large number of troops, marching in all directions and by forced marches over this territory, have been unable to find subsistence except at the expense of this country. This state is intimately connected with Russia. Its fate will serve as an example to German princes who seek distant relations with a power, for support against evils which they bring upon themselves, and who do nothing

to support those who are attached to them by the closest bonds of blood and by the most intimate relations. Dery, the aide of the Grand Duke of Berg, has caused to surrender the detachment which escorted the trains which had withdrawn to in rear of the Peene; the Swedes have taken the fugitives and the caissons. This capitulation has produced 1500 prisoners and a great quantity of baggage and wagons. There are today several regiments of cavalry who have several hundred thousand crowns.*

Marshal Ney, in charge of the siege of Magdeburg has bombarded this place. Several houses having been set on fire, the inhabitants expressed their dissatisfaction, and the Commandant asked to surrender. In this fortress there are plenty of artillery, considerable stores, 16,000 men belonging to more than seventy battalions, and many chests of funds.

During these important events, several corps of our army have arrived on the Vistula.

The mail from Warsaw has brought many letters from Russia which have been captured. It is noted that in that country, the fables of the English newspapers find considerable belief: for example, in Russia it seems to be understood that Marshal Massena has been killed, that the city of Naples has risen in insurrection, that it has been occupied by the Calabrians, that the King has fled to Rome, and that the English with 5000 or 6000 men are masters of Italy. It needs only a little sense to reject such rumors. Has not France any longer an army in Italy? The King of Naples is in his capital. He has 80,000 French; he is master of both the Calabrias; while at Petersburg, it is believed that the Calabrians are at Rome; if some galley slaves armed and instructed by the infamous Sidney Smith, the shame of the brave British army, do kill isolated men, cut the throats of rich and peaceful proprietors, the military police and the gallows will do justice to them. The English navy will never disavow the title of infamy given to Sidney Smith. General Stuart, and Fox, all the army officers, are indignant to see the English name associated with that of brigands. The brave General Stuart has even publicly raised his voice

*A crown was worth about 3 francs.—*C.H.L.*

against such acts, as powerless as they are atrocious, and which tend to make of the noble profession of war, a series of assassinations, of crimes. But when Sidney Smith was selected to second the madness of the Queen, he has appeared only as one of the instruments which governments too often employ, and which they abandon in spite of the fact that they are the first to utilize them. Some day the Neopolitans will publish in detail the letters of Sidney Smith, the missions which he has given, the money which he has disbursed to carry out the atrocities of which he is the chief agent.

It is also noted in the letters from Petersburg and even in official dispatches, that it is believed that there are no longer any French in upper Italy. It should be known, however, that independent of the army of Naples, there are still in Italy 100,000 men ready to punish those who wish to bring on war there. At Petersburg, there is also expectation for the success of the Corfu division; but they will soon learn that this division, almost immediately after debarking at the entrance of Cattaro, was defeated by General Marmont*; that a part were captured, and the balance driven back to their ships. It is quite another matter to have a contest with the French, or with the Turks, who are kept under fear and oppression, while stirring up discord in their provinces.

But, however this may be, the Russians will not be embarrassed in order to explain the disgrace of these results. An order from the Directing Senate announces that at Austerlitz it was not the Russians but the allies who were defeated. If there shall be a new battle of Austerlitz on the Vistula, there will again be others who will be beaten, although today, as before, the allies have no troops to join theirs, and their army must necessarily consist only of Russians.

The march returns and tables of organization of the Russian army have fallen into the hands of the French General Staff. There is nothing more ridiculous than the Russian plan of operations, except that their vain hopes are still more ridiculous.

General Legrand has been appointed Governor General of Cassel and of the states of Hesse.

*Commanding the II Corps.—C.H.L.

Marshal Mortier has started for Hanover and Hamburg with his army.

The King of Holland has blockaded Hameln.

It is necessary that this war shall be the last one, and that its author be so severely punished that whoever hereafter desires to take up arms against the French people will thoroughly understand, before starting such an enterprise, what the consequences may be.

MURAT TO BOURRIENNE

M—2644
(Murat's File)

Headquarters, Lubeck, 9 November, 1806.

TO M. BOURRIENNE, MINISTER OF FRANCE AT HAMBURG

DEAR SIR:

I am in receipt of your letter dated 1:00 A.M. on the 8th of this month. The reply which you state you sent me by courier to my letter from Ratzeburg has not reached me. I hope that you received the two letters which I sent you yesterday; the first advised you of the capture by assault of the city of Lubeck and the second of the surrender of all of Blucher's corps; in this manner the last of the Prussian army has disappeared.

I will now reply to the questions which Your Excellency sends me. What did I say? The defeat of Blucher has already answered in advance and should entirely dissipate the fears of the Senate of Hamburg. A detachment had actually been sent towards Hamburg to observe Blucher's movement on this point, but the commander of this detachment never had orders to enter the territory of this city, he has never been authorized to demand contributions from this city. I am issuing orders that the sums obtained be returned. This detachment has orders to rejoin the army.

We are on the tracks of the Westphalian money which should still be at Lubeck. I thank you for the information which you have given me on this subject.

The letter from Fauche-Borel* dated Hamburg, advises of the passage of ex-General Moreau through that town,† this is the only information I can give you.

I leave tomorrow for Schwerin where I am counting on finding orders from the Emperor and from where I will return to Berlin.

The city of Lubeck has greatly suffered, but I dared hope that the Senate and the unfortunate inhabitants of this city will do justice to the efforts which I have just made to prevent the inevitable damage suffered by a town taken by assault. I can only complain concerning the disorders which have taken place and I have done everything possible to stop these. Receive, etc.,

MURAT.

MAJOR AMEIL TO MURAT

Bourrienne's Memoirs
Vol. VII, p. 163.

Bivouac near Hamburg, 9 November, 1806.

Detached by Marshal Soult to cover the left of the IVth Corps with 60 troopers * * * I have interrupted all the crossings of the Elbe in Mecklenburg and in Lauenburg. 500 of Kother's and Rudorf's hussars, not finding safety except by violating the territory of Hamburg, forced its neutrality, and captured the crossing of Zollenspicker from the Hamburg militia. I had not dared to guard this point. I had believed it sufficiently defended by the laws of war. Sir, I remember the former example which Your Imperial Highness gave to the army when it pursued the Austrian cavalry and Prince Ferdinand. I took courage from this event, and attacked and captured the 500 hussars at Zollenspicker and Burgsdorf, on Hamburg territory.

*Fauche-Borel was the printer of almost all the libels which appeared at Berlin concerning France. "I had the most formal orders to insist that the Senate have him arrested in case he should come to Hamburg." *Memoirs of Bourrienne*, Vol. VII, page 117.

†Bourrienne states in his Memoirs that General Moreau did not come to Hamburg but that the person taken for him was in fact M. Billaud, the French consul at Stettin.—*P.L.B.*

Embarrassed with trains, prisoners, horses, wounded, I have successively sent all beyond Hamburg territory. I only permitted myself to come up to the walls of the city to sell the captured horses. I found everything well armed and guarded, I respected everything and only asked to live as in a friendly country.

* * * * * * *

AMEIL.

EXTRACT FROM BOURRIENNE'S MEMOIRS

VOL. VII, PAGE 163

* * * * * * *

This terrible Major Ameil who said he wished to send his command (consisting of only 40 men) against Hamburg, spoke of the bank, pillage, etc. * * * *

The service which under these circumstances I gave to the inhabitants of Hamburg, was not I may say, without great importance.

BOURRIENNE TO MURAT

M—2645
(Murat's File)

Hamburg, 9 November, 1806.

DEAR PRINCE:

I received just at this moment the two letters which Your Imperial Highness has had the honor to write me under date of November 7th and 8th. You are the child of Victory; but that which in the midst of your astonishing successes fills my heart with joy, is the love which everyone everywhere has for you; this is how they speak of you. It is a real pleasure to hear the praises of the Prince sung, especially by your particular friend, who maintains this feeling in the midst of glory and greatness. I am not a flatterer, dear Prince, but I cannot refrain at this moment from involuntarily telling you what I feel and think.

My courier of November 6th has been captured by the Prussians. I did not reply to your letter of the 5th, but this reply was less important than the second letter which you received, I regret [its loss] as it contained spontaneous expression of the sentiments which were inspired in me by the news of your successes and by the kind manner with which you informed me of this.

I persist in believing that Moreau has not been through Hamburg. I will spare you the details which confirm this idea, I am informing the Minister of the general police of them. Fauche is at Altona, I will do whatever is possible to have him arrested, I will have him brought to Hamburg and he will not leave there.

Everyone here is so convinced of your humanity, of your magnanimity, that the inhabitants of Hamburg are blessing you, and their greatest wish is to see you within their walls, as they are persuaded that your presence alone would have guaranteed them, in case of a siege, of all trouble and disorder.

May I dare request, dear Prince, to have this letter transmitted to His Majesty. The commanding officer of the detachment sent to observe Blucher's movements has asked only for what was necessary for the subsistence of his small command, he has assured me that he would not enter on Hamburg territory except when in pursuit of the Prussians, and in this case he did well. The commanding officer also assured me that he knows nothing about a contribution required from Geesthacht. He yesterday pursued some Prussians up to and under the walls of Hamburg; he did not enter into the city, he leaves today, and as his presence is no longer necessary in this country he will rejoin the army. I must do him the justice to say that there is no complaint whatever of any disorder committed by his command in the country traversed by him; there are some damages unavoidable in war, but this officer deserves praise for having reduced these as much as possible.

Goodbye, dear Prince, continue to be as happy as you deserve, my wishes will everywhere accompany you. Retain your friendship for me which is so dear to me, and believe in the sincerity of a devotion which is without limit,

and of the unbreakable attachment which has been vowed to you.

BOURRIENNE.

THE GRAND ARMY

BULLETIN No. 30

CN—11230
(WD Files)

Berlin, 10 November, 1806.

Magdeburg surrendered on the 8th. On the 9th the gates were occupied by the French troops.

16,000 men, nearly 800 canon, depots of all kinds, come into our hands.

Prince Jerome has had Glogau, the capital of Upper Silesia blockaded by Brigadier General Lefebvre at the head of 2000 Bavarian horse. The fort was bombarded on the 8th by 10 howitzers from the light artillery, the Prince has praised the conduct of the Bavarian cavalry. General Derooy with his division, invested Glogau on the 9th, preliminary arrangements for its surrender have been started.

Marshal Davout with his army corps entered Posen on the 10th. He is extremely pleased with the spirit which animates the Poles. A Prussian policeman would have been massacred if the French army had not taken them under its protection.

The heads of four Russian columns, each 15,000 men strong, entered Prussian territory by Georgenburg, Olita, Grodno and Jalowka. On October 25th the heads of these columns had made two marches, when they received news of the battle of the 14th and of events which followed; they immediately retreated.

So much success, such highly important events, must not cause the French to slow up their military preparations; on the contrary they should be continued with new energy, not only to satisfy an insatiable ambition, but to put an end to that of our enemy.

The French army will not leave Poland or Berlin until the Porte has been reestablished with complete independence, and until Walachia and Moldavia are declared as absolute territory of the Porte.

The French army will never leave Berlin until the possessions of the Spanish, Dutch and French colonies are returned, and general peace is made.

Attached hereto, is the capitulation of General Blucher [omitted].

A trunk from Danzig has been captured in which have been found many letters from Petersburg and Vienna. There is being employed at Vienna a quite simple ruse to disseminate false rumors. With each copy of newspapers, which are very conservative in nature, there is inclosed under the same cover, a bulletin written by hand which contains the most absurd news. We find in these that France no longer has an army in Italy, that all that country is on fire; that the state of Venice is most severely discontented and has taken up arms; that the Russians have attacked the French army in Dalmatia and have completely defeated it. However false and ridiculous these news are they arrive from so many sides at the same time, that it obscures the truth. We are authorized to state that the Emperor has 200,000 men in Italy, of which 80,000 are at Naples, and 25,000 in Dalmatia; that the kingdom of Naples has never been troubled except by bandits and assassins; that the King of Naples is master of all of Calabria; that if the English wish to debark there with regular troops they will find people to meet them; that Marshal Massena has never had anything except success, and that the King is tranquil in his capital occupied with the care of his army and the administration of his kingdom; that General Marmont, commanding the French army in Dalmatia, has completely defeated the Russians and the Montenegrins, between whom discord exists; that the Montenegrins accuse the Russians of fighting badly, and the Russians reproach the Montenegrins with having run away; that of all troops in Europe, those least appropriate to carry on war in Dalmatia are certainly the Russian troops; so in consequence they generally appear very poorly.

In the meantime the diplomatic corps, led by the false directions given to the popular opinion at Vienna, mislead their cabinets with these stories. As a result false calculations are made, and like everybody who depends on lies and

errors promptly falls into trouble, such badly calculated ideas lead to the confusion of their officers. Certainly during the present war, the Emperor does not wish to weaken his Army of Italy; he has not withdrawn a single man from it; he has satisfied himself with taking eight squadrons of cuirassiers, as troops of this arm are useless in Italy. These squadrons have not yet arrived at Inspruck. Since the last campaign, the Emperor has on the contrary increased his army of Italy by fifteen regiments who are in the interior and nine regiments of General Marmont's corps. 40,000 conscripts, almost all of the 1806 levy, have been sent to Italy; and according to the returns of this army of November 1st 25,000 have already arrived there. As to the people of Venetian States, the Emperor can only be very satisfied with the spirit which they show. For this reason His Majesty is looking after the dearest interests of the Venetians, he has thus ordered works to repair and improve the harbor, and to make the Malamocco passage suitable for vessels of all draft.

For the rest, all these manufacturers of news wish many things to happen to our marshals and our generals; they have killed Marshal Massena at Naples; they have killed the Grand Duke of Berg and Marshal Soult in Germany. Happily this prevents nobody from being in the best of health.

Appendix I

The following information concerning prominent people frequently mentioned in the text is furnished to enable them to be more readily identified:

- Augereau*—French Marshal commanding the VII Corps.
Beauharnais, Eugene—Son of Empress Josephine by her first marriage; Prince of Eichstedt, viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy.
Bernadotte—Prince of Ponte-Corvo, a small principality in the Kingdom of Naples; also commanded French I Corps.
Berthier, Alexander—Prince of Neufchatel; French Marshal; and Chief of Staff at French GHQ.
Bertrand, General—Aide to the Emperor Napoleon.
Bessieres—French Marshal, commanding the Guard.
Bignon—French Minister at Cassel.
Bonaparte, Joseph—Brother of Napoleon and King of Naples.
Bonaparte, Louis—Brother of Napoleon, and King of Holland.
Bourrienne—A French representative at Hamburg; writer of memoirs.
Brunswick, Duke of—Commander-in-Chief Prussian Army; commanding principal army.
Cambacérès—French arch-chancellor.
Caulaincourt—Chief equerry of the French Emperor.
Davout—French Marshal, commanding the III Corps.
Dejean—French Minister of War.
Fouchè—French Chief of Police, and in charge of secret service.
Haugwitz, Count—A Prussian Minister without portfolio; prominent member of the court.
Hohenlohe, Prince von—Commanding Prussian Saxon-Silesian Army.
King of Holland—Napoleon's brother, Louis.
King of Naples—Napoleon's brother, Joseph.
Kleist, Colonel—Adjutant to the King of Prussia.
Knoblesdorf—Prussian Minister to France.
Krusemark, Colonel—Special agent from Prussia to Russia.
Lannes, Jean—French Marshal commanding the V Corps after October 5, 1806.
Lefebvre—French Marshal commanding the V Corps before October 5, 1806; after this date on duty with the Guard.
Lucchessini—Prussian Minister to France.
Louis, Prince—Nephew to the King of Prussia.
Laforest—French Minister at Berlin.
Marmont, Auguste—French General, Chief of Artillery, and Duke of Ragusa.
Massenbach—Chief of Staff to Prince Hohenlohe.

Mortier—French Marshal, commanding the VIII Corps.

Murat, Joachim—Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves, a small independent territory created by Napoleon just east of the Rhine, opposite Belgium; French Marshal and commanding the French Reserve Cavalry.

Ney—French Marshal, commanding the VI Corps.

Orange, Prince of—Brother-in-law to the King of Prussia.

Otto—French Minister at Munich, Bavaria.

Oubril—Ambassador of Russia to France.

Ruchel—Prussian general commanding an independent corps.

Scharnhorst—Chief of Staff at Prussian GHQ.

Soult—French Marshal, commanding the IV Corps.

Talleyrand—French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Tauenzien—Prussian Corps Commander.

Appendix II

DOCUMENTS LOCATED TOO LATE TO INCLUDE IN THE BODY OF THE TEXT

TO NAPOLEON

GHQ, Munich, 24 September, 1806.

(This letter appears to have been received by Napoleon on September 29th.)

One of our spies has been hung at Magdeburg.

* * * * *

I do not believe that the officers whom I have sent to Saxony will succeed in carrying out the reconnaissance which I ordered them to make. There are spies following them.

BERTHIER.

TO NAPOLEON

Wurtzburg, 28 September, 1806, 5:00 P.M.

(This letter appears to have been received by Napoleon on September 29th.)

The greatest activity appears to exist in the Prussian dispositions. Troops are leaving on trucks.

BERTHIER.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—125

Schweinfurth, 28 September, 1806.

(This document was forwarded by the Chief of Staff to Napoleon and received by him about 9:00 P.M., September 29th.)

I have examined Cobourg, Hildburghausen, Meinungen, Eisenach * * * ; none of these towns is surrounded by a wall * * * .

A cavalry detachment could enter them at any time from any direction.

The Prussians were, and still are, at Eisenach, Meiningen, Hildburghausen; it appears to me necessary to have some cheek to enter as far as Eisenach, which is the headquarters of their outposts, and bear the shame of being chased out and sent back under strong escort to the frontiers of Saxony.

MAJOR HUBART.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—126

Wurtzbourg, 28 September, 1806.

(This report was forwarded by the Chief of Staff to Napoleon and received by him about 9:00 P.M. on September 29th, 1806.)

According to the least exaggerated reports, the enemy's forces are divided into three detachments:

The left wing, 62,000 men, under Prince von Hohenlohe, with whom is Prince Louis.
The center, 75,000 men, under the immediate orders of the King; the Duke of Brunswick is His Majesty's Lieutenant; Generals Moellendorf and Kalkreuth each command one wing of this army.
The right wing, 50,000 men, under von Ruchel.
Total, 187,000 men.

The left wing, consisting of troops from Silesia and Poland, entered Saxony on September 6th.

The Saxon army is under the orders of von Hohenlohe.

The King's army has advanced very slowly toward Magdeburg, via Merseburg and Leipzig.

On September 23d, Prince von Hohenlohe was still at Dresden but was prepared to move his headquarters to Freyburg.

Several Saxon battalions are echeloned between Plauen and Chemitz.

The right wing is in Hanover, and according to reports is to operate against the lower Rhine.

General Tauenzien is at Hof with 2,000 men.

Nothing is known positively about the Russians.

The morale of the Prussian army, especially among the officers, has been increased very appreciably; all imaginable

means have been employed to produce this effect. The Saxon army is not so well off in this direction.

The Duke of Brunswick does not desire war; he fears to compromise his reputation; he is timid, slow, irresolute, in one word, he is the drone of the Prussians.

Von Moellendorf also fears to expose his reputation. He, together with von Kalkreuth, have been given a fictitious command in the King's army, in order not to upset the tables of organization by giving preference to assignment to command of corps to Generals Hohenlohe and Ruchel who are junior to them.

The latter two wish for war; talents and knowledge are attributed by some to von Ruchel, while a larger number of others dispute this.

Prince von Hohenlohe is very hostile to the French; he has some reputation.

Prince Louis is a great drunkard; he is brought home drunk every night; he has a swelled head; he is reported to be energetic.

Prince von Kalkreuth has all kinds of sicknesses; he is considered as incapable.

MAJOR GUILLEMINOT.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—167

V Corps, Schweinfurth, 29 September, 1806.

I only arrived at Schweinfurth the day before yesterday, but several days earlier I had placed a brigade of cavalry at Hammelburg to cover Wurtzbourg, to observe Bruckenaue, and in general everything that might appear over the territory of Fulda; later some infantry were attached to them but I consider that these forces would be insufficient to defend this point against a strong force.

According to your instructions and those from the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, I have given my principal attention to Schweinfurth on which I am going to concentrate our troops, a part of which will commence to camp today, with a view of proceeding on October 3d to the Neustadt position, across the main highway from Meinungen, in order to observe

everything which may appear in this direction from Saxony, where it appears that the enemy has concentrated his principal forces.

LEFEBVRE.

Note.—This letter was received by the Chief of Staff on September 30th.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—197

III Corps, Bamberg, October 1, 1806, Evening.

I have just arrived at Bamberg and have had an interview with Marshal Bernadotte.

The latter has informed me that he is proceeding with his corps to Kronach. I do not understand the order as to detaching the cavalry to Kronach and as to preparing this place for defense. I request, consequently, new instructions, but I will nevertheless proceed to carry out the orders received.

The 7th Hussars, which is to form part of Lasalle's brigade, will march without delay to Kronach.

The 1st Division, and the cavalry, leave on October 1st and take station between Bamberg and Forchheim with its head one league from the former town on which it will, tomorrow, rest its left, with its right extending in the direction of Staffelstein.

Tomorrow, October 2d, the remainder of the III Corps will be between Bamberg and Forchheim.

DAVOUT.

ORDERS

B—384

At 6:00 A.M., October 10th, Marshal Berthier issued orders as follows:

3d Dragoon Division, General Beaumont, to proceed from Roppisch to Schleitz.

III Corps (cavalry and 1st Division) from Lobenstein and Ebersdorf to Saalburg.

Early orders had been issued for Dupont's division to immediately join the I Corps at Schleitz.

TO THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

B—409A

GHQ, October 13, 1806, 1:00 A.M.

Have the commissary trains continue towards Auma from Kronach, and establish a hospital at the former place.

BERTHIER.

TO GENERAL WREDE

B—409B

GHQ, October 13, 1806, 1:00 A.M.

Proceed with the Bavarian Division to Schleitz.

BERTHIER.

ORDERS

B—409C

GHQ, October 13, 1806, 1:00 A.M.

SUMMARY

The 1st Cuirassier Division, General Nansouty; the 2d Cuirassier Division, General d'Hautpoul; the 1st Dragoon Division, General Klein, with the mobile army parks of the artillery and engineers, will not proceed beyond Auma, but will be billeted in the vicinity of that town.

BERTHIER.

TO THE BADEN DIVISION

B—409D

GHQ, October 13, 1806, 3:00 A.M.

Proceed from Bamberg to Bayreuth.

BERTHIER.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN

TO GENERAL DEROY

Commanding Bavarian Division

B—409E

GHQ, October 13, 1806.

Proceed from Ingolstadt to Bayreuth and invest the small Fort of Culmbach.

BERTHIER.

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

B—412A

Kahla, October 12, 1806, —P.M.

I have arrived beyond Kahla without meeting the enemy.

The enemy was at Jena but I am informed that he left and went towards Weimar. The army corps is commanded by Prince von Hohenlohe; I am told that he is supposed to have retired from Weimar to Erfurt, where the King's army is.

Many deserters have been received by me. They report that both officers and soldiers are terror stricken.

AUGERAU.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

IV Corps, at Gera

B—414

GHQ, Gera, October 13, 1806, 9:00 A.M.

Proceed immediately at the head of your cavalry and one division to Roda, and warn the other two divisions to hold themselves in readiness to march during the night.

BERTHIER.

TO MARSHAL SOULT

Kostritz, October 13, 1806, 11:30 A.M.

Send the two divisions of the IV Corps at Gera to this point, ready to proceed tomorrow either to Jena or to Naumburg.

BERTHIER.

M 94405-J5-D3-C.73
COMMAND & GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
The Jena Campaign (Source Book)


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SOUTH GERMANY



This is a highly detailed historical map of Central Europe, likely from a 19th-century travel guide or atlas. The map covers a vast area, including Germany, Poland, and parts of Russia and France. It is characterized by a dense network of place names, including cities, towns, and villages. Major rivers like the Rhine, Danube, and Vistula are clearly depicted. The map uses a color palette of sepia, brown, and green to represent different geographical features and political boundaries. A scale bar at the bottom left indicates distances in kilometers (0 to 100). The map is oriented with North at the top.

BATTLE OF JENA Engagement of the 5th Corps and Tauenzien. 14th Oct. 6 a. m.—10. a. m.




Scale 1 : 25.000

0 1/4 1/2 3/4 1 1 1/2 2 Miles

BATTLE OF JENA

Bivouac of Tauenzien, and of the 5th Corps and Imperial Guard, Night of 13th — 14th Oct, 1806



BATTLE OF JENA

Scale 1 : 25,000

Note: The highest point (375^m) of the ridge between Lützen & Rodigen is known as the "Dornberg".
The height of the Napoleonstein is 263^m.
The zigzags on the Weimar-Jena Road are locally called "die Schnecke".
All heights in metres.

