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4 Signatures

BOOK DEPARTMENT

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

FORT RILEY, KANSAS



INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL

PACKET NUMBER I-25

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Army - TI&VA, Ft. Riley, Kansas S-1455

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I-6810

STUDENT SUMMARY

U.S. ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

USES OF BIOGRAPHY

1. SCOPE. Usefulness of biographical knowledge; persons about information is to be collected; information to be collected. Sources of biographical information.

2. INTRODUCTION. Biographical intelligence deals with individuals of present or potential importance, the leaders in the various fields of national and local activity. Information concerning these persons constitutes a background of knowledge essential to each of the various components of strategic intelligence and area study but its methodology is such that it is considered separately. In most countries internal politics and foreign policy are shaped by one or a few persons and even in the democracies the direction of governmental activity is determined by a relatively small group. From a knowledge of the lives and preferences of these persons' political action can often be predicted. There are also within each country subversive groups which are organized to combat the government in power, and whose members may be the governmental leaders of tomorrow.

The importance of the leader must not be minimized; even in the sciences and academic disciplines a handful of persons exercise considerable control over appointments to faculties and research organizations, membership in professional associations, and the allocation of funds to various forms of research. In fields like atomic energy, these persons determine what students and researchers shall be admitted to the field. In France, the director of atomic research until 1950 was Joliot-Curie, an admitted Communist. Knowledge of his background led to the suspicion that any findings made in French laboratories would soon become the property of Russia and was an important consideration in withholding American knowledge and techniques from France. It was also likely that non-Communists found positions in French atomic research difficult to attain, before Joliot-Curie was dismissed.

3. CLASSES OF PERSONS ABOUT WHOM INFORMATION IS NEEDED. Since it is unnecessary, and in fact, impossible, to maintain files on all persons within a given country, the strategic analyst must carefully select the persons about whom information is to be gathered. Certain persons, by virtue of their spheres of action, come under strategic surveillance. These categories include:

a. Military leaders. Information concerning military leaders is of vital concern to the strategic analyst not only because of their military importance but also because they often become political leaders. The attitudes and amount of respect which they command may serve as a clue to the general temper of the nation in respect to militarism.

b. Political and governmental leaders. These men not only make and shape a nation's policy but also exercise vast influence upon the attitudes and beliefs of the people.

c. Scientists. The role of scientists in modern warfare cannot be overestimated. They are the originators of new weapons and new defenses and are valuable sources of information in technical fields. It should be remembered that the term scientist applies to the social as well as the physical and natural scientist.

d. Educators. Educators wield great power in that they control the ideal propaganda medium, the schools. Dictators almost invariably seek to consolidate the positions of their parties by securing

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a firm hold on the nation's youth through the schools, and the heads of the educational system are likely to be of high standing within their political parties.

e. Industrial and commercial leaders. These men have extensive influence, not only upon the industrial activities of a nation, but upon the government itself since they play an important role in the countries political scene. This is true regardless of the form of economy or government.

f. Religious leaders. Religious leaders often have great political influence and in some instances--in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, for example--the head of the government is also the head of the church. In Europe religious leaders have also been leaders in the fight against Communism, but in other countries, as in pre-war Japan, they may be distinctly militaristic. Religious leaders are sometimes installed by the government rather than by the church.

g. Royalty. Although the power of royalty has greatly dimished throughout the world, their influence is still felt in some countries and they actually hold great political power in a few. Deposed royalty or pretenders to the throne sometimes serve as focal points in uprisings or revolutions.

4. THE DETERMINATION OF THOSE PERSONS ABOUT WHOM MATERIAL SHOULD BE COLLECTED.

Having decided upon the general classes of persons about whom information is to be collected, the next task of the strategic analyst is to decide which persons within each general class are of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in a biographical file. In the selection of these persons the following criteria should be considered:

a. Office or position. Certain offices or positions are in themselves of sufficient importance that their holders should automatically be included in the biographical file. Examples of this type of position are: cabinet members, bishops, or other heads of churches, political party leaders, and high ranking military officers.

b. Recognition in the field of activity. This criterion is especially important in connection with scientists. Recognition by other members of the field may be determined by consulting professional journals to see whose articles are included and by examining the membership lists of societies in which membership is contingent upon professional accomplishment. Some societies rank their members as "fellows", "members" and "associate members", the fellows being those who are recognized by the society as the leaders in the field.

c. Graduates of certain institutions. The function of some educational institutions is to prepare and train persons who will later hold positions of importance. Those graduating from universities or technical schools, especially those with doctoral degrees, who have been trained in fields important to strategic analysis, such as nuclear physics, should be observed to determine what duties they either are performing or will perform. Special attention should be paid to the graduates of advanced war colleges or to political training schools.

d. Membership lists of certain organizations. Certain organizations by the very nature of their activities bring their members under consideration. This is true of professional organizations as illustrated above and also of political action groups which may or may not be subversive.

e. Associations. Sometimes a person of relative obscurity should be considered not because of his personal achievements but because of the nature and position of those with whom he associates. Such a person

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may be of real importance but the nature of his work may demand obscurity, or he may be someone who is slated to play an important role at some future time.

f. University catalogues, army-navy listings, diplomatic registers, etc. Membership on the faculty of certain universities is in itself a guarantee of a modicum of status and proficiency in a scholarly field. Army-Navy listings and diplomatic registers give the names and rank of persons in these fields.

5. INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED. Having thus determined the persons about whom information is needed, the strategic analyst must turn his attention to the kind of information needed. This material must be such as will allow an observer to determine from it why the person is important, his affiliations, and if possible, where he may be located. Factors to be noted include:

a. Name and aliases or pseudonyms.

b. Location.

c. Identifying characteristics.

d. Unusual traits of personality; personal strengths and weaknesses.

e. Background and life history.

f. Special capabilities and achievements.

g. Political, social, and professional affiliations.

h. Relatives and close and important friends.

6. SOURCES OF BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION. While the sources of biographical information vary from country to country and from person to person, there are certain standard reference which can be consulted. It is impossible to list all the sources for all countries but the following list will serve as a general guide.

a. National Who' Who and like listings. These are published annually or biennially for many countries and contain brief biographical sketches together with the addresses of prominent living persons. Examples of national listings are:

(1) Who's Who in America

(2) Who's Who (English)

(3) Wer Ist's (German)

(4) Qui Etes-Vous (French)

(5) Who's Who in China (Printed in English)

(6) Who's Who in Turkey (Turkish and French in parallel columns)

b. Specialized listings. There are many specialized listings of scientists, religious leaders, educators, political leaders, and so on. Examples of American sources which are to some extent dupliqated in other countries are:

(1) Who's Who in American Jewry

(2) Who's Who in the Clergy

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(3) Italian-American Who's Who

(4) Who's Who among Labor Leaders

(5) American Men of Science

(6) Membership Lists of Professional Societies.

c. International listings. These listings, frequently for a given occupation, contain the names and some reference to the importance of the person. Their value lies in the fact that the names included are not confined to one country. Examples of this type of listing are:

(1) Pogendorff's Biographisch-Literarisches Handworterbuch zur Geschichte der Exacten Wissenschaften. This dictionary, first published in 1863 and still in progress, contains the names of scientists of all countries and times, together with a list of their major contributions. Included are mathematicians, geologists, astronomers, physicists, chemists, and mineralogists.

(2) Five Hundred Leading Communists. This was prepared by a Congressional Committee and lists leading Communists by country.

d. Membership lists of subversive organizations. Lists of subversive organizations, many of which are international in scope, have been prepared by our government and by the governments of various foreign countries. While the membership of such organizations is difficult to obtain, it is extremely valuable information.

e. Current biographical listings. The following, published quarterly or monthly, contain current material on many prominent persons.

(1) Biography Index: A Cumulative Index to Biographical Material in Books and Magazines. This publication, begun in September, 1946, indexes biographical material in current books in the English language, wherever published, and in over 1300 periodicals. In addition each issue contains an index to professions and occupations.

(2) Current Biography. This periodical, begun in 1940, contains informal, readable sketches of persons of many nationalities prominent in the news together with references to the sources from which the information is taken. Frequently, portraits are included. The cumulative indexing makes it necessary to consult only the index in the last bound volume and in the last paper bound copy.

(3) Who's Who in America Current Biographical Reference Service. This monthly, also begun in 1940, contains condensed factual data on persons of many nationalities and is useful in conjunction with Current Biography since there is comparatively little overlapping between the two.

f. Newspapers and periodicals. Daily perusal and clipping of newspapers and periodicals is one of the best ways to establish a biographical file. Among the most valuable publications are:

(1) The New York Times. This is important not only for its excellent coverage of the news but also because of its

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index. The index, published monthly with annual accumulations, contains brief synopses of articles. Back copies of the Times, either bound or on microfilm, are available at most large libraries.

(2) Foreign language or foreign sponsored American publications. These give the leaders of ethnic groups in this country as well as important foreignors.

(3) Foreign newspapers. These yield more complete biographical information on foreign personalities than do American papers and in addition present a different viewpoint.

(4) Newspapers "morgues" provide valuable and easily obtainable information about important people.

g. Author's own writings. In his writings a man reveals much of his own personality and opinions. In the case of scientific and political writings, they also reveal the scope of his work.

h. Governmental and private investigations, including criminal. These are sometimes difficult to obtain but are excellent source material.

i. Interviews. Interviews with persons acquainted with the subject are valuable, but care must be taken to determine the accuracy of the report.

7. SUMMARY. Biographical information is an important branch of strategic intelligence and area study for which there are many easily accessible sources. In establishing a file of personalities there are a number of national and international publications which give considerable information on prominent persons. Various indexes can be used to find biographical material in newspapers and magazines. Interviews and the reports of governmental and private investigations furnish valuable material. A valuable checklist of available biographical compilations in American libraries is Mudge, Isadore Gilbert: Guide to Reference Books. Chicago: American Library Association, 1936. Several supplements have been issued which bring this up to date.

SECTION II

CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 50 minutes.

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SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

   a. Required: None

   b. Supplemental:

      Mudge, Isadore Gilbert, Guide to Reference Books, Chicago: American Library Association, 1936 with supplements.

      Barton, Mary Neill. Reference Books. Baltimore: Enoch Pratt Free Library, 1951

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-6810

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

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ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL I-6812

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

STUDENT SUMMARY

HISTORY AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Use of history to strategic intelligence. Dangers of over-dependence on historical data.

2. INTRODUCTION. The study of History has had a three fold purpose:

a. To satisfy individual curiosity and interest in any period of history by researching intensively in that period to the exclusion of all others. No attempt is made to show the continuity of history. Study of this type is an end in itself, only occasionally producing material of value elsewhere.

b. To promote the interest of a particular nationalism. Here, if there is not outright falsification of fact, facts are at least "edited" and presented in such a way as to show a complete justification of actions taken by a nation. Its purpose is to create a patriotic and cohesive feeling in a national group.

c. A far more important function of history is to determine as accurately as possible just what has happened in the past and to construct a logical framework on which correct conclusions may be reached. Such a study will show an uninterrupted development of history and an interdependency of factors bringing about specific results. For convenience only, history in the past has been divided into eras or periods. Actually there is never a sharp dividing line which can set off one age from another. It is this last and practical purpose which qualifies history as a tool for Strategic Intelligence.

3. TYPES OF HISTORY USEFUL IN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

a. Until the middle of the last century historical writing consisted almost exclusively of describing military exploits of individuals or national groups. What occurred in periods of peace or within the political structure of a people was considered unimportant. Biblical writers, Greek and Roman historians, Chroniclers of the Crusades and of the Hundred Years' War concentrated on combat accounts. While descriptions of peaceful pursuits were made by contemporaries, these have only recently been used in giving a picture of the past.

b. For the past century, while not ignoring the military, historians have turned to political and diplomatic pursuits. Further expansion has since been made into the economic, social and cultural categories. For strategic intelligence purposes all such histories must be examined and understood before any analysis can be made.

c. Types of histories available to the strategic intelligence officer are:

(1) General histories covering all fields.

(2) Political and diplomatic histories.

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(3) Military histories.

(4) Economic histories.

(5) Social and cultural histories.

(6) Historical handbooks or encyclopedias.

4. USES OF HISTORICAL MATERIAL IN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

a. General Histories, either of the world or specific regions. These are designed to give an over-all picture of the development of man or of a people. Usually they are not detailed, but do offer to the strategic intelligence officer a quick review of the historical background if time does not permit extensive study. They also serve as guides to further research along lines of interest for intelligence personnel.

b. Political Histories are restricted to an area such as Europe or Latin America, or may even deal with only one national state. They are concerned in the latter instance with domestic problems, touching only lightly on foreign affairs. The more specialized diplomatic histories may likewise treat the foreign policy of one nation or several. Such histories are most useful in securing the political background of a nation, by means of which a more intelligent analysis of present-day conditions may be made. For example, much of German political behavior can be exemplified by the diplomatic, military, and internal policies of Frederick II, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, William II and Hitler. Intrigue, broken treaties, and a lurking threat of force are to be found in each instance. Thus, in analyzing current affairs, not much emphasis can be placed on officially stated policies or sanctity of existing treaties. Policy has been determined by an individual during Germany's peaks of strength. The United Kingdom, with a two party system has been more apt to steer a fairly consistent course within constitutional limits. While minor shifts of policy have been possible in the foreign field, over-all policy can be expected to change little.

c. Military Histories are still numerous and of varying value. These are particularly useful in examining habits of commanders of traditional basic tactics. Disposition of troops in the past and the action which followed can be a key to determining future actions. This would be particularly useful when disposition in border areas indicate a defensive or aggressive purpose. Such histories will be some guide as to ability and desire to properly train, equip, and maintain supply of troops and to discern the morale and effectiveness of the armed forces on past occasions.

d. Economic History deals with the means by which a nation has supported itself in the past. It shows the development of an area and its ability to adjust to changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Increased industrial output in the past 100 years is an indication of the area's potential economic and military power. Failure to adopt changes of a technological nature shows a refusal to break with past traditions and an inherent weakness in the area. Over-emphasis on industry, as in the United Kingdom after 1700, weakens a nation unless it can be assured of uninterrupted agricultural supplies at all times. British power has grown through its ability to shift from foodstuffs for domestic consumption, to wool for export and finally to textile manufacture and heavy industry. Through four world wars, the British Navy has been able to make industrial leadership effective by maintaining supply lines for import of agricultural products. If an area remains predominently agricultural, its relative power is dependent upon acceptance of new methods for securing increased crops.

e. Social and cultural histories are relatively new but no less important than other types. As in the economic field, knowledge of adapta-

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bility of a people to technological and the resultant social changes is essential in analyzing current problems facing that group. A constant rise in living standards is indicative of a healthy nation, but must not be confused with a trend toward degradation and softness in a people, which would have the opposite effect. Advancement made in combating diseases once or still prevalent in an area is of use in measuring future capabilities. Cultural histories are indicative of a national heritage. Lack of cultural pursuits in any region is a sign of backwardness. Over-emphasis on such matters, while showing a temporary spiritual advance, also may emphasize intellectual, moral; and physical regression. The contributions of the Italian Renaissance, while great in their importance, were not accompanied by progress in other fields; rather immorality and political anarchy ran rampant; while in England, France, and Germany, a no less impressive cultural growth brought moral and material strength with it.

f. Historical handbooks or encyclopedias should prove useful to strategic intelligence officers as they contain facts that are readily accessible, although they do not present them in the light of the complete picture.

5. THERE IS A DANGER IN BEING OVER DEPENDENT UPON HISTORY.

a. Bear in mind that "History teaches that history never repeats itself." Too often in evaluating a situation the easiest way out is to find an historical parallel and let the matter rest. Conditions today are never exactly the same as they have been before, thus because we can find some similarities in situations there is no reason to believe they will have parallel results. History at best prepares the analyst for what he can expect, but never for what will definitely happen.

b. Traditional bones of contention with neighboring areas, pervasive customs and prejudices, all discernible through history, can be used as factors in analyzing a region's present condition or state of mind. Some trends can be detected and prove of use in estimating the present, but current problems should be weighed to determine whether such trends will continue.

c. There is no such thing as an objective history. Historians, as everyone else, possess prejudices and theories which they are trying to prove. Every writer is at least unconsciously nationalist to some extent and will, therefore, tend to present his own country in a more favorable light than it should be. Political or economic theories may also obstruct clear presentation of factual material. Even today French historians are in violent disagreement in their interpretation of the French Revolution, although that event occurred over 150 years ago. Americans are no less uncertain, for the controversial Hamilton and Jefferson still have their adherents and opposition among historical writers. Charles Beard's economic interpretation of American History is unacceptable to the bulk of specialists in the American field. A strategic intelligence analyst must therefore be aware of an author's prejudices and theses before he can accept, reject, or modify a reporting of fact.

6. SUMMARY. a. Historical writing has had a variety of purposes, but the impartial, nearly objective type is the most useful for strategic intelligence.

b. All fields of history have a contribution to make to strategic intelligence in evaluating capabilities, weaknesses, and probable courses of action of a given area.

c. Great care should be exercised in finding out what a particular historian "has to sell" before accepting his facts.

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d. Do not use history exclusively to find the answer to a problem; other factors are equally important. History offers an effective method for gaining a background with which to understand and intelligently evaluate current events.

SECTION II

CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 50 minutes

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

   a. Required: None

   b. Supplemental:

   General History:
   Watts, Arthur P. A History of Western Civilization. 2 vols., New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940.

   Political History:
   Dallin, David J. Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1942.

   Military History:
   Miller, John, Jr. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. Washington, D.C., Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1949.

   Economic History:
   Bining, Arthur C. The Rise of American Economic Life. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943.

   Social and Cultural History:
   Sullivan, Mark. Our Times. 6 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927 et seq.

   Bibliography:
   Dutcher, George M., et al. A Guide to Historical Literature. New York: Peter Smith, 1949.

   Guide to Use of History:
   Gottschalk, Louis. Understanding History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-6812

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

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DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

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STUDENT SUMMARY

HISTORY OF NATIONALISM

SECTION I

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Rise of National States and development of national consciousness. Prejudices, traditions, patriotic observances.

2. INTRODUCTION. a. Nationalism is a product of the modern age. Prior to this development, personal loyalties were given to local political groups. In the ancient world one was an Athenian, a Spartan, a citizen of the city of Rome. There was no general nationality or citizenship. The medieval period indicated no improvement, Europe being divided into counties, provinces, duchies, small kingdoms, and cities. Local rivalries were apt to be so bitter that outside alliances were sometimes necessary to maintain existence. The feudal system at its height was a mass of confused loyalties that was impossible to unravel. Not until a king ceased to be one among equals, did a national state emerge. Not until sufficient machinery for central control was in operation could a ruler adequately subjugate his nobles.

b. As nations formed by the merger of once independent states, economic interdependence became more pronounced, political administration and policy formation became more intricate, and the makeup of the population ceased to be simple to understand. Here was a need for a comprehensive intelligence system to weigh the factors of power and probable actions. As we have already seen, some nations were able to secure information when it was needed. Others were not.

c. Every modern nation has developed a tradition which is part of its national consciousness. In some, this tradition is a strong driving force at all times; in others, it is a means used by leaders to bring about concentration of effort during a crisis. But national sentiment is ever present and must be weighed as a factor of strategic analysis The purpose of this hour is to illustrate how traditions have been established and how they have their present day use.

3. DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING NATION. a. The word nation is generally applied to a politically unified group within a geographic region. This group is assumed to have a common racial background, a single language, and a mutual cultural past.

b. Almost any modern example we can cite, however, indicates that all the factors of nationalism are not present in any given instance. The United States can claim only geography as a factor of its nationalism. The same is true of the Swiss. Modern France contains Bretons who are Celtic in origin, and Alsatians, who stem from Teutonic tribes. The most diversified, backgrounds are to be found in the U.S.S.R., which we regard as a single nation rather than a loose union of "autonomous" republics.

c. Actually nations are considered nations today, either by mutual consent of their members or by conquest. The former Baltic states may very well have their own national independence sentiments, but at present are considered parts of the Soviet Union.

d. As strategic intelligence must denote and study areas tied together by a single political system, it is useful to know what subordinated nationalities are an unwilling or dissatisfied part of the state.

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4. TRADITIONS ARE OLDER THAN THE NATION. a. While there is little evidence of modern nationalism before 1500, nations today trace their existence as far back as ancient times. Only a short time ago, the modern Italian state saw itself as the reincarnation of Ancient Rome. The glories of the Caesars became the glories of Fascism. Great strides made in cultural and scientific fields during the Italian Renaissance, while usually accomplished through the assistance of political units no larger than city states, were likewise adopted by Mussolini as part of the national heritage. Actually Italy did not become a national state until 1859.

b. German fascism could find no national heritage similar to the Italian. Instead of history, Hitler brought up Teutonic mythology to create a German tradition. Sound historical tradition, however, did exist from the time of Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg. Again, German political unity was not achieved until 1871.

c. The Soviet Union is faced with a problem of choosing which traditions it wishes to recognize. If it goes back to Russian history prior to 1917, it must recall at least some of the Czarist glories of the past. The intellectual struggles of Marxism can make little impression upon the mind of a peasant or a laborer. Recently the Soviet has found it necessary to bridge the gap to the past and make saints of past Czars such as Peter the Great and Alexander II. Tradition now extends to technological innovations, real or imagined, brought forward under the Czars.

d. Traditions which appeal to the ordinary citizen are those originated in time of war. No Fourth of July orator can afford to omit allusions to the heroism of the Revolution, the siege of Fort McHenry, the stand at the Alamo, or our more recent efforts to save democracy for the world. His speech would fall flat if he referred to great strides in plumbing, street lighting, preventive medicine, and fire protection. It is the same for other nations. Appeal is made to times of conflict. Frenchmen refer to the stand of Charles Martel at Tours, to Joan of Arc, the Revolutionists of 1789, 1848, and 1870, and to Napoleon. Today nationalism, for whatever purpose it is espoused, must rely on hero-worship. The more ancient the hero, the more venerable he appears to the national population. To strip a hero of the "glorious" myths which have grown up about him is considered treasonable.

5. NATIONALISM IN FRANCE. a. There was no need for a national state until commerce required the protection of a central authority. As medieval trade expanded, townspeople became more affluent than the nobility, who wasted their men and resources in petty wars. With an increase in wealth, townsmen were able to purchase privileges or to withhold loans from the needy nobility. Thus their demands for abolishing taxation when goods crossed from one baron's land to another's were heeded by the titular head of the state, the king. Both nobility, and the higher clergy fought such a move. The former fought for their very existence, the Church fought to maintain the unified ecclesiastical system which had prevailed since its inception.

b. For selfish reasons and in order to satisfy national sentiment on the part of the burghers and lower clergy, the king was able to secure in 1438 certain rights for the Gallican (French) Church. This made the Church in France more self-governing than it had been previously.

c. French kings were unable to control their nobles as well as they did the Church. Feudal wars ravaged France in the 16th century, after which a strong king emerged who had the support of townspeople, Cardinal Richelieu, while hated by nearly every Frenchman, a few years later was able, through his intelligence system and use of force, to subjugate the nobility. Louis XIV continued his policy by establishing the court at Versailles where he systematically brought about the degeneracy of the noble class.

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d. By 1789 France was far from unification as we know it today. However, the ground work of political unity and centralization of authority had become a part of French tradition. In the 25-year period of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the French almost overnight joined forces to bring democracy to their own country and to Europe. Volunteer and conscripted armies fought with religious fervor for "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." This brief but significant period saw the creation of a centralized system more effective than the kings had ever attempted. France expanded to a point where she was protected along her borders by geographical barriers. Cultural contributions made at the expense of the kings were hailed as national in character. A single language became universal throughout the country.

e. The French have never forgotten this period of their political and military greatness. The fall of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 is now celebrated as a national holiday. The Marseillaise, originated by volunteer militiamen, has become the national anthem.

f. With the industrial revolution of the last century, nationalism everywhere was stimulated. From factory towns stemmed a liberal democratic movement which is still in progress. Increased speed in transportation and communication has rendered central control more effective and more necessary. Economic specialization has made one part of the nation more dependent upon the others. As the level of literacy has risen, so has a desire to participate, either directly or indirectly, in the government. The trends of the last century are, then, cohesive in nature.

g. As traditions are born in conflict, so are national prejudices. Until 1914 a lively Anglo-French rivalry had existed for 1000 years. The prejudices stemming from this series of conflicts are not yet removed. German-French controversy over the Rhine Valley has been a source of ill feeling since 1814, having become more pronounced after the rise of a strong national German state. A traditional feeling of democratic kinship to the United States was, until 1918, very potent. It has since been tempered by economic rivalry and objection on the part of some Frenchmen to the presence of American troops over prolonged periods.

6. THE ROLE OF MODERN NATIONALISM. a. After the First World War national self-determination was considered the means by which permanent peace could be assured. This is to be seen in President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and the terms of the Versailles and related Treaties. Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century contributed to international order by bringing small political areas together in one sovereign state. The imperialism of the same century created empires of diverse groups and today nationalist or independence sentiments are reducing central control of these vast empires. Today nationalist movements within large states are divisive, not cohesive, factors.

b. Historical development indicates that large states are not outmoded, but on the contrary, are still growing. Imperialism, while once the chief expression of this trend, has showed itself unwieldy, oppressive, and costly. The modern state must have the support of the majority if it is to survive. In the Soviet Union such support is gained largely through the myth of a democratic federation, although some small portions of the Union are unwilling members. This is further supported by the widely advertised notion that the West, particularly the United States, advocates a return of the world to all the evils of absolute monarchies. The United States for 30 years tried "Dollar Diplomacy" as a means of exercising political and economic control over smaller nations, while not being tied up with the responsibilities of imperialism. This was found to turn the nations concerned against us and it was dropped as a national policy.

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c. Ideas are now becoming more important than nationalism. These can transcend national borders and receive the full support of several nations. They are the basis of the super-state. This could take the form of a world-state, which nationalist sentiments presently will not permit. It may take the form of a loose alliance system such as the Atlantic Pact, which is far more palatable, or it may even bring forth a Pax Romana with American or Russian overtones. Nationalist sentiments would also oppose the latter course.

d. Nationalism today is a convenient weapon both for the Cominform and for the West. The Soviet pattern has always been to emphasize national self-determination in backward or unstable countries, counting on seeing to it that only Moscow-trained Communists become the new leaders. After that, independent nationalism becomes a memory and the new nation becomes a satellite. North Koreans, Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Poles, Czechoslovakians, and a host of others are convinced that they are on the way to political and economic independence. The Soviets may also use national prejudices to drive wedges between Western nations and thereby weaken the military alliance structure.

e. On the other hand, nationalism is a weapon of the West. Jugoslav and other nationalisms can be used to weaken the Soviet armor. Appeals to the memory of centuries wherein "the holy national soil has been nurtured by the free-flowing blood of selfless heroes," as in a strongly nationalist people like the Poles, can conceivably be stronger than the attractions of Marxian-Leninist-Stalinist dialectics. Even within the boundaries of Russia itself there are scores of minority peoples, notably the Ukrainians, with whom the dream of an independent national existence is very much alive.

7. ILLUSTRATIONS INDICATING WHY DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IS USE-TO STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

a. The stronger the consciousness of a single national tradition, the stronger is national morale and a desire to fight a war to its end. The presence of a desire to revenge the defeat by Germany in 1870-1871 was a strong factor in preparing France in 1914 and prevented rapid collapse under the initial German offensive. In 1940 many Frenchmen had no desire to fight, no sense of national honor, and they were overrun.

b. The-existence of a Franco-Russian alliance from 1894-1914 and a Franco-Soviet alliance from 1936-1939 indicates a fear of German control of Central Europe. Today the French still look to Germany as a possible aggressor should the latter be permitted to rearm. The pervasiveness of a friendship with Russia should not be ignored by the strategic intelligence officer in evaluating a possible course of French action and its effectiveness.

8. SUMMARY. a. Nationalism is a relatively new political idea. Previous to modern times, when states were small and allegiances were to local rulers, there was no concept of nation.

b. Nationalism and the formation of national states has made the economic interdependence of regions more pronounced. Political administration of large national areas has become more intricate, and a cohesive spirit has cemented national groups socially.

c. Tradition, either real or manufactured, is an essential background to the growth of the influence of nationalism.

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d. Nations have generally been formed in the past through agreement of their individual members. However, more recently some nations have expanded through conquest.

e. Nationalist movements have been urban in origin. Until the rise of a strong urban middle class in Europe, nationalism was not possible.

f. The historical trend toward the formation of large states has apparently not abated. The world state or the super-state, both including many diverse nationalities, appears to be a future possibility. Ideas cross national borders and are cohesive, while national provincialism is now destructive of the modern state.

g. Nationalism, which is still strong in most parts of the world, is a weapon which both the Communists and the United Nations may use against each other with effect. National feelings, adroitly utilized, can effectively force the breakdown of a large state into smaller sovereign parts, or may break up military alliances by preying upon national honor or prejudices.

SECTION II

CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference.

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 50 minutes.

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATION DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

a. Required: None.

b. Supplemental:

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Earle, Edward Mead, ed., Nationalism and Internationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. Essays on Nationalism. New York: 192[illegible]

(2) Examples of Sources of Information on Nationalism.

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[redacted]

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-6814.

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the Day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

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ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION I-6813

STUDENT SUMMARY

HISTORY OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Uses and examples of Strategic Intelligence from ancient times to the present, giving attention to particularly well established Strategic Intelligence systems.

2. INTRODUCTION. While Strategic Intelligence is a new field, there have been occasions in the past where it has operated on an incomplete scale. Not only is it of academic interest to review these excursions, but we find a demonstration of strengths and weaknesses in strategic intelligence practice.

3. EARLY STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS. a. The Bible offers an example of Strategic Intelligence in the story of the twelve-man, forty-day mission dispatched by Moses into the land of Canaan. The instructions are still applicable today:

> And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and said unto them, Get you up this way southward, and go up into the mountains;
>
> And see the land, what it is, and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many;
>
> And what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad; and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether in tents, or in strong holds;
>
> And what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be wood therein, or not. And be ye of good courage, and bring of the fruit of the land. Now the time was the time of the first ripe grapes.
>
> So they went up, and searched the land from the wilderness of Zin unto Rehob, as men come to Hamath. (Numbers, XIII, 17-21.

b. Other examples of clandestine intelligence operations in Greece are to be found in Herodotus. Alexander the Great is usually supposed to have been the inventor, in 334 B.C., of postal censorship as a counterintelligence device. Intelligence doctrine was also laid down in China as early as 500 B.C.

c. The Crusades were singularly lacking in any conception of Strategic Intelligence. Often whole armies were entrusted to native guides of questionable loyalty. Only after the survivors of the first effort settled in the near East was there any indication that the westerners understood the Moslem mind. Soldiers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem after 1144 not only became fully aware of their precarious military situation, but also learned much about living in the East. Thus they were more disposed to make peaceful arrangements with their neighbors and to develop trade rather than to bring about disastrous wars. Only when new crusades arrived did old enmities flare up. Two crusades to Egypt were total losses simply because the crusaders were not aware that the Nile Delta flooded

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at certain seasons of the year. Cut off from supply, they were effectively dispatched by a better informed enemy.

d. In the 12th and 13th centuries Genghis Khan and his successors, while dependent upon the element of surprise and incredible mobility of cavalry for the bulk of their victories, also established a military spy system that was unequalled until 1870.

e. The most informative intelligence reports still extant from the Medieval period are from non-military sources. The Venetian Republic dispatched ambassadors throughout Europe for the purpose of maintaining commercial relations, protecting nationals, and securing information. Reports submitted by the ambassadors were essential to establish a "credit rating" for foreign monarchs who were generally dependent upon Venetian banking houses for funds to pay their expanding armies. Wars, threats of war, diplomatic encounters, and the personal life of a monarch all might serve to weaken a ruler's ability to repay a loan. While such reports had a narrow use, they would have provided invaluable strategic information to a militarized nation. The Fugger family of Augsburg required similar services of their representatives in investigating credit standings. A series of news letters provides not only reading of interest but also essential information.

4. MODERN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS. a. Sir Francis Walsingham (1530-1590) is credited with laying the basis of the present British intelligence system. Secret intelligence of the Elizabethan age attained a peak of efficiency never reached before. Not only were rebellious elements at home ferreted out and eliminated, but the spy network extended into ath courts of Europe, particularly in Spain. Thus the English were appraised in March 1587 of the exact number of ships, men and arms comprising the Armada which made its ill-fated appearance the following year. A century later Sir William Temple advanced the balance of power theory which has since been a cornerstone of British foreign policy. To effect a reasonably equal balance in Europe, the need for a permanent and accurate intelligence system became well recognized.

b. In France an internal intelligence system was devised by Cardinal Richelieu for the purpose of detecting dissident nobles and thereby effecting complete centralization of power in the hands of the crown. His foreign policy was aided by agents distributed throughout Europe. Many such agents were not Frenchmen, but foreigners in the pay of Richelieu. The framework was passed on to Mazarin, Louis XIV, and finally Louvois. Under the latter, intelligence activities were increased and the French Army reorganized along modern and effective lines. However intelligence activity did not reach its full bloom until the time of the French Revolution, when political and social control became highly centralized. The Convention sent out representatives-on-mission to check on morale, effectiveness, tactics and loyalty of troops and their commanders. So great was their power that in addition to serving a fact-finding function, they were also able at times to take over command from the area General. Out of the Revolution emerged an intelligence expert, Joseph Fouche. He had been among the most cruel and violent terrorists. Under Napoleon he effected a network of political espionage and counter-espionage throughout Europe for the purpose of discovering the intent of other rulers. Fouche reports were supplemented by estimates of total power of foreign nations compiled by an Alsatian, Karl Schulmeister. The effect of such intelligence operations may be seen in French victories of the Napoleonic Era.

5. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. a. The world's first international Congress, held at Vienna in 1814-1815 was the occasion for frenzied but ridiculously ineffective intelligence operations, particularly on the part of the Austrians. These activities nevertheless had a considerable influence in redrawing the map of Europe.

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Austrian agents trailed all foreign representatives, but secured only information of a personal nature. The British delegation led by Castlereagh, took effective security measures and none of its important documents fell into Austrian hands. In the aggressive phase of intelligence, Canning was able to secure, in 1807, the terms of the secret treaty of Tilsit between Russia and Napoleon, a coup of great strategic value.

b. Not until the middle of the century did strategic intelligence, still incomplete, come into its own. The dictatorship of Napoleon III was dependent upon accurate information in order to maintain its existence. While the press and other expressions of public opinion were effectively muzzled, it was still a necessity to gauge the temper of French public opinion. For this purpose the Departmental Intendants (Governors) and the Procurers-General (District Attornies) were required to submit to Paris detailed reports and evaluations of public opinion. While the system was, in theory, excellent, it proved ineffective due to the reluctance of the officials to report adverse information. The collapse of the intelligence system was a direct factor in steering France into a war for which she was wholly unprepared. Again, in the foreign field, a laudable framework existed, but was carried out by incompetents at foreign capitals. The result: misinformation and disastrous decisions.

c. Pitted against the intelligence network of Napoleon III, was the new and far superior one of Prince Bismarck in Prussia. Bismarck, realizing the inevitability of an Austro-Prussian war, dispatched Wilhelm Stieber to Austria under the cover of a peddler. Stieber for two years made a highly detailed terrain study of the route Prussian armies would soon follow. At the same time he made a careful study of the Austrian Army. The information obtained by this one agent, together with the employment of a breech-loading rifle were sufficient to overcome a well organized Austrian Army in three weeks, thereby upsetting completely French intelligence estimates and the European power balance. With Prussian leaders now convinced of the effectiveness of strategic information, Stieber headed a vast intelligence network, employing the services of 13,000 "Ausland" Germans in France, Belgium, and Switzerland. A command of such information together with political and military estimates of all German states enabled Bismarck not only to overwhelm France in six weeks but to effect final German unification as well.

d. Profiting by Prussian example, the Third French Republic established its "Deuxieme Bureau" or military intelligence office, which by 1914 surpassed the German intelligence service in organization and effectiveness.

6. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. a. As rapidly as the Second Continental Congress organized, it proceeded to set up a combined intelligence and diplomatic system. Arthur Lee, a colonial agent already in Europe, was instructed to find out how the colonial cause was received on the Continent. Lee was later joined by Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. This aggregation was responsible for the open French Alliance of 1778 and the later participation of Spain. By use of clandestine methods, Franklin, in 1783, was able to learn that the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, was quite willing to sell out the United States in order to secure more favorable concessions from the British. Only a complete knowledge of the intricate workings of the French Government made such a discovery possible. Acting hastily, Franklin was able to turn the tables on Vergennes and gain recognition of extensive American claims.

b. In order to formulate a wise policy toward the new states of Spanish America, President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, embarked for a few years on a strategic intelligence project. As official recognition of the rebelling colonies might possibly precipitate war with Spain and her continental Allies, both men had to be assured that the new nations would be able to maintain their independence. Acting as

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a field agent for the Department of State was Joel Roberts Poinsett, who proceeded to tour Latin America and made reports back to Washington. These reports gave an unusually accurate picture of the situation and were generally favorable. This operation led to outright recognition of the new republics and a few years later the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine.

c. For nearly 75 years strategic intelligence languished. With the development of a policy of isolation, the United States was not in need of comprehensive information regarding foreign areas. Not until the world was swept by a wave of imperialism after the Franco-Prussian war did the United States attempt to organize intelligence facilities. In 1882 the Office of Naval Intelligence organized, followed three years later by a Military Information Division of the Army AGO. However, not until 1903, when the General Staff plan was effected, was an Intelligence Section (G2) accorded full recognition.

d. Later developments of strategic intelligence in the present century will be covered in a discussion of current systems.

7. SUMMARY. a. Strategic intelligence is the product of many different intelligence systems.

b. Effective strategic intelligence has, in the past, been incomplete and short-lived. Only the British system can be said to have had a continuous existence.

c. The lack of an efficient strategic intelligence system may result in complete military defeat of a nation.

d. There has been a trend, increasing in pace, toward permanently established and comprehensive strategic intelligence systems.

SECTION II

CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 50 minutes.

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

a. Required. None.

b. Supplemental.

Pettee, George S. The Future of American Secret Intelligence. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. pp. 25-38.

Rowan, Richard W. The Story of Secret Service. New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1937.

Singer, Kurt. Three Thousand Years of Espionage. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948.

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2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-6813.

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

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ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL I-6815

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

STUDENT SUMMARY

MILITARY HISTORY

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

SECTION I

1. SCOPE. Methods of warfare in the past. Comparison to then-contemporary methods elsewhere; materiel, tactics, adaptability to technological change. Morale, leadership.

2. INTRODUCTION. a. The use of military history in strategic intelligence estimates of foreign nations should be obvious. While there is much to be learned from an examination of past campaigns from the tactical viewpoint, an overall evaluation of every phase, including national military strategy, is necessary in order to analyze current capabilities.

b. While armies in general have much in common, there are certain characteristics or habits which set off one from another. Emphasis on a given arm will be made by one nation, while the same arm will be subordinated or even discarded by another, with marked effect on national history. Thus the special interest shown by the Russians in guerrilla warfare has been an element of strength in the defense of that nation for over a century, while Polish over-reliance on horse-cavalry was a contributing cause to the Nazi military successes against that country in September 1939. Basic doctrine has not only varied between armies in the past, but such variations are still much in evidence today.

c. The sources of military history are legion, but reliable sources are few. Military historians, like others, are prone to advocate one doctrine over others, particularly when analyzing or relating it to current military problems. Memoirs of commanders, while valuable sources, cannot help but be apologia regarding the more controversial portions of their careers. An unconscious and understandable bias in many unit histories will gloss over errors and failures, exaggerate successes, blame other units or individuals for failure, or neglect to give credit to flanking and supporting units when such is deserved. The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, regards both unit histories and memoirs of commanders immediately suspect as completely reliable sources of information.

d. If military history is to prove profitable, however, it should be objective. Regarding this the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has stated:

> "If military history is to serve as a basis of education and training it must be factual and objective. Propagandistic history or censored history, on the other hand, is extremely dangerous and should not be used as the basis of instruction in military schools or in training. Such history is not history at all. It can provide no sound lessons or basis of intellectual and professional training. It leads to false conclusions. And it fosters one of the worst evils in professional military thinking--self deception.... History cannot, therefore, serve as an entirely satisfactory basis

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of instruction in leadership until it is written in such a manner that it portrays the acting men, their good and bad sides, their temperaments, doubts, and ambitions, their Janus faces, their tensions and contrasts, and their physical and mental conditions. The study of the initial phases of military operations—those periods of shifting scene in cast or setting—deserves special attention. These periods of operations that mark the introduction of new weapons, new tactics, or inexperienced troops, that involve a sudden shift in type of terrain, in defensive arrangements, in weather or in seasonal conditions. It is in these periods that inadequate or impractical training, inefficient weapons, failures of leadership and of communications, inadequate logistical support, faulty coordination of the various arms, the unforeseen effect of weather and terrain, and many other things, some almost intangible, create a state of confusion which should challenge every military student."

3. METHODS OF WARFARE IN THE PAST. a. Knowledge of a nation's military past is essential to a strategic evaluation of an area's capabilities. National military traits, or lack of them, may be noted by a study of the entire field. A concentration of attention on recent military developments and usages, however, is even more rewarding, for latest emphasis can be noted. At the present time, many of the leaders of the Second World War are still in positions of control and they are therefore worthy subjects of study.

b. Warfare in the West has been conducted by increasingly large numbers of troops. In earlier times, a force of a few thousand were all that a sovereign could command. Through growth in population and employment of mercenaries, these figures were somewhat increased, but until Carnot's Levee en masse during the wars of the French Revolution there was no universal conscription of all able-bodied men. Since that time, conscription has come into general use in most countries, both in peacetime and during war. Oriental warfare, on the other hand, has been marked by the employment of large numbers at almost all stages.

c. Infantry has been the basic unit in all armies. This was armed first by swords and close combat weapons, later by muskets and rifles. This arm has been essential in taking ground and holding it. Of necessity it is the most numerous of the arms and is marked by relatively slow mobility. Early armies consisted almost entirely of infantry. Later these were led and supported by cavalry, which became the main arm for some time. Maneuverability, speed, and capability to surprise marked the cavalry and it often proved to be decisive in both ancient, medieval, and early modern warfare. Cavalry capabilities were temporarily over-shadowed by the early use of artillery, which brought infantry back into importance as the key arm. The outstanding leaders of modern warfare did not place full emphasis on any one of these arms, however, but based their strategy and tactics on a combination of them. World War II saw the extensive use of infantry and artillery and the addition of armor and air. Motor and air transportability of ground troops again saw infantry receive a new emphasis and witnessed it use in novel surprise maneuvers. With the use of more arms than previously, World War II required the utmost in teamwork among the various military branches and among the armed services. All nations who enjoyed any degree of success used infantry, armor, and artillery in close support of each other. On occasion tactical air strikes were used in support of ground troops, while aerial reconnaissance was routine in all operations. Amphibious operations were used on a scale never previously contemplated, and with a large degree of success, these combining air, ground, and naval forces operating as a single unit.

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d. Tactics will vary from nation to nation and will be suited to specific situations. However, successful operations will fall into general paterns, which the analyst may determine by examination of past action. Some nations will base their success on almost purely infantry tactics. Others will show a marked ingenuity in the use of artillery or armor. At times, armies have been employed in mass, and on other occasions skillful maneuver has proved to be decisive. Fire power is another method, although this brings up problems of an adequate supply system. Some nations have traditionally traded space for time, while others have made a concerted effort to prevent a breach of their borders through the erection of strong fortifications. In addition to successes, which are often difficult to analyze, military failures should also be considered.

4. COMPARISON TO OTHER CONTEMPORARY METHODS. a. A true estimate of a nation's power in the past is often revealed by the way in which its military forces have measured up to alien forces which it has encountered. The most recent comparison that can be made is usually the most significant. Since many of the important nations of the world participated in the Second World War, studies based on this conflict are full of strategic intelligence material of current value. The First World War, being the first truly modern one, with highly improved weapons, is also worthy of intense analysis. Other conflicts become of less importance as they recede in time and should be studied only enough to show traditional tactics, soldierly qualities, and ability to innovate.

b. How may such a comparison be made? There are certain earmarks of what constitutes an effective army, and these criteria may be applied to both the past and present: particularly to the past to see if there has been a tradition of genuine military strength. Obviously the best times for consideration are when armed forces of a nation have been in actual operations against an enemy, although if there have been long periods of peace, a study of routine organization and training may be required. A good account of the German and Japanese armies in action can be obtained from our own records. The Soviet army is best seen through the eyes of German commanders, while the latter are also valuable critics of their own military system and its weaknesses. Specific criteria, other than general performance, would be in the fields of new weapons, quantity and quality of materiel, adaptability of the nation's military to change, and tactics. In connection with tactics the armed forces must have proper emphasis placed on each major arm, so that none is too weak for exploitation when needed. Thus infantry, armor, artillery, strategic and tactical air forces, naval craft and armament must be considered in their relationship to each other in addition to individual treatment as to specific uses and maneuvers. While size of the armed forces is a noteworthy item, the other factors will tend to qualify the real meaning of total numbers. Trained reserves and manpower resources are of immediate importance. All forces should be at such a stage of field training that they may be effectively used on short notice.

c. In respect to adaptability to change, it is not always the nation producing the innovation which profits from it. Thus the breech-loading rifle, a French invention, was used to great advantage by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. While the origins of artillery are obscure, it has been the exploiters of it which have gained. The Russian Army was a poor one until artillery became a chief arm. Russian soldiers proved readily adaptable to its efficient use at an early date. This capability was even more marked in the artillery emphasis displayed by the Soviets in the Second World War. The increasing necessity for team-

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work has complicated tactical doctrine in all modern armies. Artillery, armor, and infantry now need to be trained to work in perfect coordination with each other in even routine operations. When these arms are combined with air and seapower, the commander's task becomes formidable. The United States appears to have been outstanding in this respect, while the Soviet Union has had few opportunities to use all branches, being particularly weak on naval cooperation except in one instance along the Crimean coast. Adaptability to change is becoming increasingly more difficult for any army to accomplish. Such changes are often so expensive that they are prohibitive to most nations, even though there may be a willingness to effect them. The Soviets, Great Britain, and the United States have showed themselves to be capable of extensive change in World War II and are evidently still in a position to improve on their military, air, and naval establishments.

d. It must be remembered that all the above are worthless unless there is an adequate supply system in operation. Many of the world's most disastrous military defeats have been due to supply failure. The term "adequate", however, is difficult to describe, for both the Soviet system and the American system proved satisfactory in the Second World War, although they differed greatly as to personnel involved, types and quantities of equipment, means of transport, and total distance. German supply failure eventually was lack of raw materials for industry to process and the means of getting even what was produced to the troops who needed it.

e. Discipline is particularly important, as has been demonstrated in all major conflicts in the past. Yet discipline alone has not been enough, for over-emphasis on drill efficiency, ceremonials, and elaborate guard duty does not make troops prepared for field duty. Troops should know the general conduct of operations on their own level, the why and how of their mission insofar as it does not interfere with normal security measures. History, particularly that which is most recent, will assist the analyst in applying these criteria to national armies.

5. MORALE. a. Morale of troops is a highly important consideration in judging national armies. Here a grasp of tradition will be a good indication of present expectations. Discipline is to some extent a measure of morale. High discipline is usually indicative of good morale, while poor discipline invariably means poor morale. During the First World War, Russian morale was poor, eventually leading to revolution. German morale in 1870, 1914, and 1939 was high and almost approached religious fanaticism. This did not deteriorate in the latter two cases until a long line of defeats and a hopeless military situation intervened to cause a marked decline to continue. Soviet troops from 1941 to 1945 were sparked by both an ideology and love of country so that even great defeats in the early years of the war did not cause morale to break. Italian troops in both World Wars realized that their governments were playing politics, that there was no great cause or reason for their fighting under any conditions. Mass desertions, not only in the lower ranks, but also among highly placed commanders, made Italian contributions to the war effort negligible. Yet, when given sufficient motivation, Italian troops have proved to be most capable. This may be seen in the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century and the wars of liberation.

b. Military morale is further affected through the use of psychological warfare. Susceptibility (psychological vulnerability) to this weapon may also be determined, with emphasis on which types of propaganda lines have been particularly effective.

6. LEADERSHIP. a. Adequate leadership at the proper time does not always come to the fore during wartime. The United States has been

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partucularly fortunate in obtaining good leaders; so has Soviet Russia, and Great Britain. This has not consistently been the case, for example, in France, Italy, Spain, or China. Poor leadership brings about poor morale among troops and lowers the fighting potential of a nation.

b. At times political and military control have been combined in one man. While Louis XIV and Napoleon are exceptions to the rule, usually a statesman who assumes military command is apt to weaken his effort. Bismarck, while not unacquainted with the army, wisely delegated that province to Moltke. Most modern states, except where there is a dictatorship, leave military problems to military men. While not relinquishing political control of general policy, sufficient freedom of action is provided the professional soldier. In Hitler Germany and in the U.S.S.R. generals have not invariably been members of the single political party. When political hacks were given commands beyond their capabilities, or the government itself interfered in the formation of strategy and campaigns, friction was bound to result. This ended in the loss of qualified commanders or a rebellion in the ranks. The former situation has prevailed in both nations.

7. SUMMARY. a. Military history, regardless of the period covered, must be objective to be useful.

b. National strengths and weaknesses may be detected and emphasized by the use of military history.

c. Methods of warfare have become increasingly complex with the passage of time and the modern commander must be cognizant of the nature, use, and coordination of a diverse number of arms.

d. A study of a nation's armed forces is best conducted by comparing the performance of a national army against its opponents over a period of several years.

e. An historical study of morale among troops will indicate general behavior patterns under several possible conditions, enabling the analyst to approximate current morale and susceptibility to psychological warfare.

f. A nation which has consistently produced military leaders in past crises will probably be able to continue that tradition. Few nations have been able to have such a record, however.

SECTION II
CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference.

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 50 minutes.

SECTION III
ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

a. Required. None.

b. Supplemental.

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Boletin Historico. Montevideo: General Staff (Irregular).

Journal. London: Society for Army Historical Research (quarterly).

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Proceedings. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute (monthly; occasional articles on naval history).

Revista. Lima: Centro de estudios historico-militares (Irregular).

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary, I-6815.

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

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STUDENT SUMMARY I-6816

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL HISTORY

SECTION I

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Past forms of governments and the development of present forms. Political differences of long standing within area; foreign affairs. Relative economic positions at various times. Shifts in production emphasis. Standard of living, minorities, customs, intellectual pursuits.

2. INTRODUCTION. a. It is impossible to give more than the barest outline of an area history in the time which is available for the discussion of this subject. However, it will be possible to note some general trends which are to be found in most areas, particularly in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. It is not necessary that the strategic analyst know in detail the history of his area, but a sound background knowledge will afford him some basis for making an intelligent estimate of current capabilities and probable courses of action.

b. For convenience only, the framework of social, cultural, economic and political history is given as a method of approach. Actually many occurrences will be an interaction of forces found in all four major divisions. Rarely will a matter be simply economic or political in nature.

c. The strategic analyst is primarily interested in the present political, economic and social conditions in his area of interest. Yet even current information is not enough, for it must be weighed against the historical background of the area to see whether there has been improvement, stagnation, or retrogression. In the latter two instances, national morale would be poor and there would be some question as to whether such an area could effectively face its enemies.

d. Into the mixture of economic, social and political structures may be interjected the unpredictable quantity of personalities. Past events should be analyzed to determine, if possible, cause and effect relative to critical periods in national history, with the object in mind of finding some indication of probable reaction to future crises. Some nations, such as Great Britain, have a considerable political heritage and a traditional method of doing things. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has broken ties with the past and has established a new set of traditions which it is attempting to impose on its population. Great Britain, even with a democratic system, is far more predictable than the Soviet Union, although the latter has a far greater degree of centralization in both administration and formulation of national policy. Where there has been an absolute system of government it is difficult, if not impossible, to effect an immediate change to popular participation or even a liberal system. The French Revolution overthrew an absolute system of government, yet the French were unable to put into practice the democratic theories they had insisted upon, and a new dictatorship ensued.

e. In using historical material, the analyst should familiarize himself with the pattern of history. A general development is presented in this summary, but it should be noted that there are national variations in every instance; there is no definite iron-clad course which history must take Yet not all nations have become of political age and some can therefore be

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considered as having progressed as far as is currently possible, while others may lag behind. Still, political immaturity may not necessarily mean that a nation is weak in a military or economic sense. However, such inability of the people to govern themselves intelligently can very well be a potential weak point, either through government inefficiency or through popular dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

f. A nation which has consistently produced statesmen of unusual caliber may be expected to produce others in time of crisis. The same is true of those nations which have developed military leaders and administrators throughout their history.

g. A history of stability in government is no conclusive indication that it will remain so. However, it can partially be the basis for an estimate of present stability. Yet, with a history of political instability, it is fairly certain that the situation will continue unless strong corrective measures have been taken.

h. While the political question is an important one, and history can provide some criteria on which to base present judgments, the economic and social past will have some bearing on the over-all analysis of strength and intent. The ability of a nation in the past to meet its own requirements, both industrial and agricultural, is certain of experiencing very little change unless new territories are open for exploitation within the nation, outside areas drawn upon, or a concerted effort made to expand existing facilities. The Soviet Union is the best current example of a nation completely altering its economic potential in a relatively short period of time. Where changes have occurred recently, the analyst should concern himself with the nature of such changes and how they will affect the over-all capabilities of a nation and be a possible indication of intentions. Historical evidence can be used to show what the economic pace has been. Social conditions are most difficult to be changed rapidly. Government and economic life are subject to the most abrupt modifications. Thus social customs, traditions, and standard of living will be pretty much as they have been in the recent past. Where change has taken place over the centuries, the rate of change can be determined quite accurately. In several instances, there has not been even a slight change, although other factors have been radically reorganized.

i. History, then, can determine a traditional pattern for each nation. This will be the foundation of research and analysis of present conditions in any area under consideration.

j. For purposes of this study, reference is made only to western civilization, but parallels or differences should be noted in the history of the Middle East and the Far East, as well as in the territories now comprising the Soviet Union.

3. SOCIAL HISTORY. a. This type of history includes what might be called sociological history; that is, the study of group behavior. Of particular importance is the standard of living of a people: what elements raised, lowered, or maintained a socio-economic level. Minorities, whether national, political, social, or economic, create a long-range problem which is at times explosive and at all times a source of some disaffection. Over centuries customs have been nurtured to the point where today they have the force of law. While largely unwritten, they should nevertheless be considered as a vital part of the social background of a people.

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b. Modern living standards vary from nation to nation, even great contrast being evident within individual nations. Generally speaking, until the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th Centuries, there was no appreciable change in a mere subsistence level throughout the world. Some areas have now managed to take advantage of technological improvements, while others have lagged behind, and still others have remained at the lowest level to maintain life. The much advertised luxury of the Court at Versailles during the 17th and 18th centuries would be absolutely disagreeable to most Americans today. The wealth displayed at that Court was largely borrowed and was wasted on items of no practical value and in the most degenerate pursuits. Plumbing, which is common-place to us today, did not exist during the reign of the French kings, and even contemporaries found that the resultant filth, although surrounded by the best in architecture, painting, tapestries, and polite manners, was all but unendurable. Such conditions in the highest of civilized circles fostered disastrous epidemics with which medical science could not then cope. Historical literature abounds in descriptions of how the common people existed in cities and in the country. Seepage from the four main cemeteries in Paris, containing millions of bodies, poisoned wells and made cellars of nearby houses devoid of necessary oxygen. It is surprising that the population of cities could be maintained under such conditions. With a knowledge of sanitation and scientific medical practices, national and urban populations grew rapidly and out of all proportion to previous rates of increase. Aiding this increase, however, were advances made in scientific farming, which permitted greater returns for the same acreage cultivated, and industrial specialization which provided employment for larger numbers.

c. Naturally, living standards are not dictated by sanitation alone. The willingness of a people to improve itself is perhaps the most basic requirement. It was not until the liberal movement of the 19th century that there was manifested any widespread desire even in this respect. A raised standard of living could not be accomplished without some political participation on all levels and an economic freedom of the individual to advance according to his abilities. The best criteria for judging the advance of a people is to examine not those who may have been in positions of political or economic affluence, but those who may be said to represent "the Common Man." Thus how the ordinary farmer, industrial worker, or professional man lived a century or even twenty years ago is a clue as to how rapid advance has been. Types of homes, variety and quantity of food, amount and serviceability of clothing available to various economic levels will demonstrate not only the desire and ability to advance individually, but also be indicative of national morale. Collectively speaking, a living standard can also be judged by the amount and effectiveness of police and fire protection, street and house lighting. Nations which do not possess these facilities are apt to be backward. Those which do have them demonstrate a community consciousness and a desire to serve the individual by common effort.

d. With the development of the large modern nation there has come a problem of minorities, whether they be political, economic, social, or national in character. Great Britain for centuries has had Irish, Welsh, and Scottish problems, varying in intensity and seriousness. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was one of the most heterogeneous that has ever existed and even today, although several nations have been formed from its territories, each of those relatively small nations still has potentially explosive problems of national minorities. The Soviet Union is undoubtedly faced with a serious problem, for it has seen fit to force the migration of whole groups into more central areas. Quite often minorities will not be proportionally represented in the government, or they will be restricted in what economic activities they may pursue. There may be restrictive legislation of a social nature as well, preventing movement of groups or forcing it. History will provide the background for current treatment of minorities and to some extent explain why animosities have arisen.

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e. A society itself determines an ethical code, and eventually a legal code. These are largely based on customs which have been built up over many years. Current English law, and to a great extent American law, has been determined by customary usages and behavior. At present there exist many unwritten patterns of required behavior: prejudices, traditions, eating habits, adherence to taboos, treatment of superiors and inferiors, buying and selling, and class stratification. The analyst, by making use of historical material, will determine just how strong is the pressure of tradition on the populace.

4. CULTURAL HISTORY. a. The general decrease in working hours and the resulting creation of and increase in leisure time has permitted pursuit of culture in the form of science, philosophy, and the arts. If a nation has insufficient leisure time for such activities it has failed to keep up with technological change and is backward. On the other hand, if such time is wasted and not in part applied to arts and sciences, the nation in question is apt to be decadent.

b. Printing has now been used for 500 years. In some nations the people have rapidly grasped the ecuational implications of the art. Nearly all the population will be literate. This in turn permits them to think independently and arrive logically at their own conclusions. In the 20th century, the printed word has tended more to appeal to the emotions and to do the individual's thinking for him. Literacy in the Soviet Union has taken a decided rise since the Bolshevik Revolution; however, literacy for the bulk of the population is only high enough to permit the individual to absorb government propaganda. There is no widespread desire for the nation to express individual thoughts: only obedience is essential. Nevertheless, Soviet power has increased with the level of literacy, making unified action possible.

c. In line with dissemination of information, educational facilities and systems play an important part. Great strides did not appear until a departure from rote learning was effected by Pestalozzi in the 18th Century and expanded by the professional educators of the 20th. The history of educational systems and their improvement for effective training is again an indication of the cultural level of a nation and its power potential in event of war.

d. The Italian Renaissance in the fine arts was the result of leisure time at the command of noble patrons or wealthy commoners. The bulk of great masterpieces were performed by artists subsidized by others. While great understanding of the human being was expressed by such works, the same could not be said of the patrons, who were, as a whole, a degenerate lot who finally ceased to be of use, even as rulers. Italians who were not subsidized were foremost in other fields and their work still has a vigor and importance: Niccolo Machiavelli in political and military science, Galileo in astronomy, and Vesalius in medicine.

e. Each nation has found its own cultural pattern. Sometimes it has simply grown with a people; at other times such as Bismarck's "Kulturkampf", an attempt was made to manufacture a purely national culture. While the latter failed in its immediate objective, its influence is still marked throughout Germany and was further built upon by Hitler. France has been more experimental than other nations, showing much imagination in the development of new theories, some of which have proved to be fads, but the intellectual stimulus is still greater than elsewhere. This tendency on the part of the French has sometimes blinded them to material applications, which the Germans and Anglo-Saxons have readily developed.

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5. ECONOMIC HISTORY. a. The living standard of a nation and its cultural pursuits, as has been noted, are dependent upon economic life as well. The trend in democratic society has been to lessen the two extremes of economic classification of individuals. Perhaps the most outstanding current example is that of Great Britain, but there the Socialist experiment is by no means an accepted or definitely desirable fact. In the United States it has been realized that labor, whether agricultural, industrial, or professional, must have a high standard of living in order to keep up consumer demand for our products. Thus, the social, cultural, and economic pursuits of a nation are interdependent. History shows that this has been true in the past.

b. The chaos resulting from the breakdown of control in the Roman Empire gave birth to a new system of political protection and economic life. A host of local military nobility gradually set themselves up as protectors of the surrounding populace. Those to whom protection was given were required to deed their lands to the feudal lord and, in turn, to receive them back in terms of a contract, which required the serf to assume certain obligations. The lord, in effect furnished armed protection, land, common pasture, the local church, common facilities for milling, blacksmithing, repairing, and storage, as well as tools which each serf would be unable to make or afford. The serf, on the other hand, was required to furnish labor for a specified number of days, to turn over part of his crops to the lord (not unlike the share-cropping system), to pay taxes, and to render personal and military service when needed. In theory, the structure of such an economic system was quite simple. However, as the need for alliances grew, some lords placed themselves under the protection of others. In the end, feudal society was too complex to be described or even understood. In essence there were the upper nobility, lesser nobility, and the serfs. Economic and social classifications were quite definite: the nobility were reasonably well off, while the serfs found it difficult to even maintain existence.

c. The agricultural basis of the feudal system permitted that type of economic organization to continue from about the 4th century through the 15th. It undoubtedly would have continued longer, were not a new factor introduced into the economic picture. This was the growth of towns, and with it the expansion of commerce, specialization of labor skills, the use of money and banking, and the creation of a new socio-economic class, the bourgeoisie. A political and economic system based primarily on agriculture, such as was the feudal idea, could not adjust itself to the needs of townspeople, nor could the latter appreciate anything in a privileged agricultural society. Pursuits of the townspeople were mainly in commerce, one of the first really capitalist ventures, and in crafts, which were not unlike the modern labor union in their standards, except that no work was done for an employer. Feudal wars, often personal in nature, wasted much of the efforts of the nobility as well as their wealth. The townsmen, in the meantime, were able to build up fortunes far in excess of those of the nobility. The result was further privileges for the towns and a demand that some central authority curtail the nobility in order to permit a more orderly conduct of trade.

d. Out of the medieval conception of commerce, which did not admit that an area was not self-sufficient, grew a new theory of economic life. This was the Mercantile Theory of national self-sufficiency. When it became obvious that the new national states could not provide all their own needs, they looked elsewhere for exclusive sources of supply. These were to be found in colonies established throughout the world. The Spanish believed that by building up large stores of precious metals they would remain powerful. However, the introduction of gold and silver into trade channels was highly inflationary and eventually wrecked the Spanish economic system in a

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century. The French, while establishing colonies, did not follow up their advantage and remained principally an agricultural nation. Most resourceful were the English, who up to 1500 had held a very small position in the economic structure of the world. England had been far off the normal trade routes and except for territorial interests in France was quite content to be isolated from the rest of the world. By 1500 England considered herself overpopulated; peasants were being dispossessed of their feudal land-holdings and emphasis was placed by landlords on sheep raising, which required less expense and brought extensive profits. Soon a flourishing trade in unprocessed wool was moving to Flanders and the wealth of the English grew. However, it was soon discovered that considerably more profits could be had if the wool were made into cloth in England itself, therefore eventually the Flemish were by-passed in the trade picture. With an interest in selling to the rest of Europe, the English developed a large merchant fleet, which is still one of top rank today. Since the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and commerce, English power has accordingly increased. This development would have been less difficult had not the Mercantile system intervened and sent the English searching for new markets in the form of colonies.

c. It was in Great Britain's American colonies that opposition to the Mercantile system first developed. After several years of attempting to resolve the difficulties and inequities brought about by administration of the system, it became necessary for the Americans to revolt. In the same year as the Revolution got under way, a British economist, Adam Smith, published his Wealth of Nations, which within 75 years brought about the defeat of the system.

f. It will be seen that the Spanish attempted to gain power by monopoly on commerce in a large area, but failed to put importance on long-range advantages and therefore lost out. After holding American colonies for over 300 years, they were eventually lost, showing no marked economic improvement during that time. The French doubtlessly had the ability to take advantage of world trade, but preferred to confine their attentions to the continent. Only the English and Dutch really grasped the full significance of the economic revolution that was taking place.

g. The expansion of economic life from strictly an agricultural emphasis to include manufacturing by craftsmen and increased commercial activity was in process roughly from the time of the discovery of America until 1800. At about that time the British began to develop factories for mass production of manufactures. This Industrial Revolution continued throughout the 19th Century and is still progressing. The British were able, at an early date, to improve the quality of their manufactures as well as the quantity, all at less cost than previously. This placed them even further ahead of the rest of the world, particularly when economic power was concerned. From manufactures the Revolution spread to canal, rail, and steamship in the transportation field, and to improved methods of agriculture as well. Most nations caught up as rapidly as possible, but British predominance was not lost. After the First World War, American Manufactures began to compete most favorably with the British and other nations, eventually placing the United States in a high position.

h. The new economic system of the 19th and 20th centuries was based on two natural resources; coal and iron. The British had an abundant supply and were able to capitalize on their mineral wealth. Belgium, France, and parts of Germany also took advantage of their deposits of the two key materials. Italy and Spain were notably lacking in both and therefore never really achieved the power rating of the other nations. Czarist Russia had the necessary materials, but refused to develop them extensively. Refusal of a nation to exploit its natural resources in the face of world competition indicates

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an inherent weakness on the part of its people and its government. Germany, whether divided or not, is still potentially strong, while the fortunes of Italy and Spain cannot be viewed in the same light. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia brought about a change in economic exploitation which raised that nation's power potential far above the rest of Europe.

i. From this discussion of economic history, it can be seen that there has been a steady trend from the simple agricultural system to a more and more complex economy involving agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. No nation can be great today without being outstanding in all three respects, and few nations are equipped to do the job, being restricted largely by size. Only the United States and the Soviet Union have fully adapted themselves to the requisites of economic power.

6. POLITICAL HISTORY. a. Closely allied with the other forms of history is the political factor. Until quite recently, historians have been prone to emphasize this one aspect to the exclusion of the others, but more inquisitive minds have seen that there is a high degree of interaction which becomes so complex that it is often impossible to determine causation or result.

b. The Roman Empire at its peak was little different from the modern dictatorship. It disintegrated partly because of its own weight and degradation and partly due to the invasions of barbarian peoples from the north and east of Europe. This collapse did not take place immediately, nor were the Roman rulers quite aware of what was happening. However, central control gradually melted away until most of the Empire possessed only elements of local government and were furnished with no protection whatsoever from invasions from the outside or from neighboring localities.

c. Feudalism. It has already been noted in the study on economic history that there arose a need principally for protection from the outside and for law and order locally. This need was filled by the feudal lord, but at the expense of the former small landholder, who was required to give up all in return for protection. Legislation, executive decisions, and justice, were all performed on a local level, often by the lord of a manor comprising no more than a few hundred acres. There are usually one high authority at least recognized in theory, at various times termed Roman Emperor, or King of one of the western European areas. Actually, such a ruler had only very limited ability to control local rulers because of the difficulty in communications and a low scale of economic life. Feudalism was not, however, political chaos. It was a simple system designed to bring stability to a small agricultural area. Yet it was this very stability that brought about the downfall of the system. In the beginning, serfdom had been an honorable social status, but gradually was reduced to nothing more than slavery. Stability favored trade with other sections of Europe, and to meet this need, towns were founded.

d. Beginnings of Centralization. Early kings throughout Europe were at first considered as possessing a title, but actually having no more authority than other chief nobles. Several abortive attempts were made in all countries to secure more control, but none were lasting as the feudal nobility were too strong to permit one of their number to gain too much power. Until towns were sufficiently large and numerous the kings were powerless. Fortunately, for purposes of centralization at least, the kings and the townsmen found that they had common interests. Banking became necessary as trade expanded and the wealth of the new bourgeois class grew. With an accumulation of capital, loans were made, at high interest rates, to nobles and kings.

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Warfare became so large in scale that the feudal systems were unable to furnish sufficient troops, and kings, in dire need of military power, became more and more dependent upon the towns for funds to meet their expenses in the form of taxes and loans. Towns received their privileges by royal authority and were in need of a sufficiently strong central authority to protect domestic trade routes and to provide sufficient prestige to protect them abroad. Thus the towns threw their weight in favor of the kings and strong central control. This brought about a steady shift in political authority and the European nobility became quite definitely subordinate to a national ruler. The nobility found that it was more desirable to receive money payments from their serfs in lieu of produce and services. However, the sums to be payed were fixed by contract and could not be changed from generation to generation. Thus, as inflation became progressive, the real income of the landholding nobility decreased and they were forced to relieve serfs of all obligations in return for immediate cash payments. Thus noble capital assets diminished rapidly and landholders were forced to borrow heavily in the towns in order to remain solvent.

e. Absolutism. With the capitalist system taking over the economy, the nobility were rapidly losing economic and political power by the year 1600. However, complete control was not yet in the hands of the kings, although central power had increased. To tighten such controls, the governments of Europe developed the theory of the absolute, or Divine Right king. Such an individua would have complete sovereignty over the affairs of a nation. Such pretension now incurred the enmity of the middle class, who were willing to have central authority in the person of a king, but who also insisted upon having some participation in government. The attempts of James I and Charles I of England to govern without Parliament brought on civil war and a ten year "Protectorate". By 1700 the English monarch was definitely bound by a series of agreements, laws, and edicts to subject himself to the "Constitution." After 1707 no acts of Parliament were vetoed by the crown, and the executive power was largely transferred to a cabinet selected from Parliament. In Franc absolutism was more pronounced. Louis XIV subjected the nobility to degradation and degeneracy at Versailles, rendering them useless except as personal servants. Emphasis was placed on an executive of civil servants of marked ability by both Louis XIV and Richelieu before him. But even this iron clad system fell down during the 18th century when control went back to the hands of incompetent court favorites. Italy and Germany were not united during this period, being nominally part of the Holy Roman Empire. In both countries the local nobility remained strong and were provincial in outlook. Spain became little more than an appendage of France.

f. Limited Monarchies. The British were fortunate in being able to decide their political future somewhat in advance of other nations and to grant privileges to the middle class in the form of representation in the government. France, on the other hand, held on to absolutism in theory and attempted to effect the practice as far as possible. The economic failure of the French system brought about its downfall in the ten years following 1789. The French Revolution was instigated by the bourgeois businessmen of Paris in particular, but also to some extent in the provincial cities. The Revolution would have been a peaceful, constitutional process had not the French retarded the change too long and the movement became complicated by the demands of the peasants and industrial workers as well. When the Revolution left the hands of the bourgeoisie and came under radical control, it became violent, bloody and pointless. The influence of the American experiment in republicanism was profound in Europe, particularly France, but many of the national gains made by Europeans in personal liberties, rights and government practice were lost in the ensuing twenty five years of world war to effect a world revolution on the French model.

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g. France under the Revolution lost its kings, and when they did return after the Napoleonic Wars, it was as constitutional rulers, but France by no means lost central government control. Throughout the course of the Revolution there was a decided centralizing tendency in government that was never again lost. Under the republican systems with which experimentation was made, and in the dictatorship which followed, the central government received far more extensive powers over local affairs than had previously been the case under an absolute monarchy. Despite the defeat of France, all of Europe was slowly forced by nationalist and by liberal movements to consolidate authority in the capital cities. This was easier to do than ever before due to the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century and the resulting advances made in rapid transportation facilities and instantaneous transmittal of messages by wire. Where monarchy remained, it became, by 1850, constitutional in nature, while a growing liberal movement began to push the republican form of government, first abortively in 1848, then more gradually and successfully after 1870.

h. Within a half a century, middle class businessmen had made themselves heard, if they were not even dominant over the central governments. The nobility ceased to be of any practical value, although by courtesy their prestige was retained, some of them even entering into the political affairs of republican systems. If the reports made to the British Parliament on the occasion of the First Factory Act, or the political pamphlets issued in connection with attacks on the middle-class government of Louis Philippe in France, are examined it will be seen that the liberal movements of that period had sound basis in pressing for reform. Conditions in the crowded factory and mining towns throughout Europe brought a class consciousness to the worker that has persisted down to the present day. Several plans were almost simultaneously proposed to remedy the situation. In the political field, attempts were made successfully in Great Britain to legislate standards of labor and later housing in the mining and industrial regions, as well as to grant further extension of the suffrage to non-landholders. More theoretically minded men looked to the establishment of local "Utopias" which would be almost self-sufficient and government would humanely concern itself with the welfare of all. In Paris, where he would have starved had he not been supported by his friend, Engels, lay Karl Marx with few worries about his immediate existence and with considerable leisure time in which he could pursue great thoughts. The "Communist Manifesto" and "Capital", both growing out of the then intolerable conditions of labor, found adherents who were unable to understand all that Marx was proposing, but who were eager to expound their own interpretations.

i. Democratic Progress. Growing concurrently with Communism were the republican and socialist movements. By the time the First World War broke out, the major nations of the world all possessed governments which had introduced elective features into their systems. By the end of the war, this was not enough. Disillusioned Europeans wished to be more economically and socially secure and looked to government to meet their needs. Most were willing to give up gains made by liberalism in the field of politics and placed their future in the hands of new absolute types of government: fascism and communism. With these two movements came a greater degree of centralization in government than had heretofore been experienced.

j. The general trend in government, while it has had its variations from country to country, has been from supreme local autocracies through monarchies limited by noble power, absolute monarchy, monarchies limited by middle class economic power, and the republican system. Communism and Fascism while claiming to advance popular participation in government are actually

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a step backward by peoples who are unable, either by background or will, to intelligently govern themselves. Government has in general been dictated by economic and social trends. The agricultural economy is best suited to the local types of government to be found in the feudal system and the feudal monarchies. Commerce requires more centralization of authority, even though agriculture may still be the dominant economic pursuit, but such requirements are made for the benefit of a relatively few merchants and manufacturers. The form of government best suited to the dominant individuals in this situation would be a monarchy giving some representation as well as protection, or a republic limited in participation to large landholders and large taxpayers. Industrialization, the increase in individual skills and education, gives rise to demands for extensive popular control of government and often leads to the overthrow of hereditary rulers, whether on the local or national levels.

7. POLITICAL DIFFERENCES OF LONG STANDING. a. The citizens of any nation are prone to have differences of opinion on almost any subject. Where political control, and therefore, to some extent, economic and social control as well, is at stake the divisions become quite marked and on occasion are the source of violence. It is essential that the strategic analyst be acquainted with long-term political differences within a nation so that he may be aware of whether or not the problems have been sufficiently alleviated to permit national unity in time of crisis. When considerable pressure is applied to a nation, however, it is entirely possible that cohesiveness may break down completely and political minorities will look to the outside for help. Political division in a nation usually stems from one of three sources: national minorities, economic differences, and regionalism. Religious differences are sometimes set forth as a basis of political disagreement. While religion is definitely used as a rallying cry, it is at best a subsidiary cause of division, being used by political leaders to support their own action in meeting nationalist, regional or economic differences. While the United States has had elections involving a multitude of issues, basically political division centers around a conflict between an agrarian economy and an industrial economy. In connection with this is the ever present question of the extent to which government should centralize its powers. Yet political differences in the Anglo-Saxon countries vary greatly from other nations. The British Empire and the United States are unique in that they are essentially two party systems. No one party has ever had a monopoly on power and is further subject to popular control at specified intervals. This is not true in European countries or in other parts of the world. These nations have a series of small parties, each adopting an inflexible political or economic theory. This has tended to make such nations politically unstable as changes in government bring about considerable changes in domestic and, at times, foreign policies. It is the roots of such differences that the analyst must determine by examining historical materials.

b. Differences in nationality. The trend toward larger nations has invariably raised the problem of national minorities within the state. Usually these minorities are dissatisfied with the existing situation for they can never fully control the government. Often such national minorities, particularly when there has been cause for bitterness in the past, will be restricted in their political rights, in their freedom of economic pursuits, and in their social life. Where such conditions prevail, the minority group is apt to express only luke-warm loyalty to the government and will cause serious trouble if it can. Several modern nations, the Soviet Union for example, are made up of numerous nationalities which have been swallowed up

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in a larger state. Quite often there remains a strong nucleus advocating independence and may cause serious trouble in the future. In judging the current conditions in such nations, the analyst must see where they originated Such items as recency of incorporation into the larger country, bitterness of past experiences, and attempts to solve the problem, should be covered. Europe, being an unusual mixture of races and nationalities, has many problems of this nature. Arab unity in the Middle East is retarded by religious and national differences that cannot be resolved. The Jugoslavs, while considered a nation, are actually three nationalities, each bitterly opposed to control by either of the others. A history of oppression of minorities does not indicate strength on the part of a government. Actually, by stirring up past hatreds, a nation can considerably weaken itself.

c. Economic Differences. The Civil War in the United States vividly demonstrates the power of economic conditions in dividing otherwise homogeneous populations. Rarely, however, do matters reach such a degree of seriousness, for usually the spirit of compromise will prevail. Even today the United States is almost equally divided on the question of government controls over private business and the growing tendency for government to enter utility fields. Elsewhere the agricultural element of a nation will be opposed to the growth of industry and will fight any legislation which is designed to encourage the latter. Equally divisive is the fact that in some nations tradition has developed an economic stratification which prevents the movement of an individual from one economic level to another, regardless of ability. Early United States history clearly demonstrates how economic systems have been in conflict. From the time of the first settlements on the continent New England was unable to extensively farm its land area. Effort was directed at industries such as fishing and ship-building, later textiles. In the Middle Atlantic States there was a mixture of industry, particularly iron, but at the same time excellent farm land was available and used to the extent that there was always an exportable surplus. The Southern States were well adapted to farming, and for purposes of building up credit abroad, concentrated on "money crops": at first tobacco and later cotton. After Independence, the New England and Middle states required high protective tariffs on competing imports from Europe in order to stay in business. On the other hand, the South found that tariffs raised the cost of living and that retaliation by Europe for high rates reduced cotton and tobacco sales abroad. This condition was further complicated by the opening of Western farmlands and resulted in concerted political action between the Civil War and the First World War. At least two, if not three economic systems were operating at the same time and each was seeking political control of the government in order to push its own interests. A more modern aspect of economic divisions is the basic one of capital and labor, which is at present more important than economic sectionalism of the past. The strategic analyst must familiarize himself with the roots of such economic divisions in order to determine the cause of present conditions and to note whether improvement has taken place.

d. Regionalism. Conflicting economic interests and geographic regions of a nation sometimes combine to create long range differences of opinion. There are instances, however, of where sections or provinces of a nation are apt to consider themselves unequally represented in government. This has been true in the past history of the United States, although such a feeling is no longer as strong as it was a century ago. The French Revolution provides an outstanding example of regionalism, for the bulk of revolu-

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tionary activities took place in the vicinity of Paris. In general, the provinces were not as far advanced politically as the capital and only wanted minor changes made in the order of things. So great was resentment throughout most of France toward the various revolutionary governments, that for almost the entire period half of France was in armed rebellion against the new authorities. Again, with centralization of power and with rapid transportation and communications, extreme regionalism is ceasing to be a strong factor in political divisions, although it is by no means dead. The analyst should be able to state just how strong such feeling is within his area and whether it has a marked effect on national weaknesses. History will demonstrate the strength of the problem in the past and give some indication of its pervasiveness.

8. CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. a. The purpose of history in an examination of foreign relations must be limited to national attitudes toward other nations and how dependable the conduct of relations has been. Until as recently as 300 years ago, ambassadors were sent to foreign nations only when a special mission was involved. Upon the accomplishment of a mission, the embassy would return home and be dissolved. It was discovered, however, as travel for couriers became more dependable, that it was wise to have a permanent embassy at important foreign courts in order to keep the home government aware of any policy changes that might occur. Embassies also became fact-finding agencies to determine the strength of foreign governments and armies and their immediate intentions. Today, with instantaneous communications, an ambassador or minister makes few decisions for his nation, but is a go-between for his own government to the one to which he is accredited. The fact-finding function has, however, increased to a great extent.

b. Every nation has what is known as a "large policy". This is more or less a traditional policy toward a nation or toward the world in general. It is not apt to change rapidly or even with a complete change in governments. Large policy is based somewhat on world position and the power picture at any one time. The United States, for example, has the Monroe Doctrine as part of its traditional policy in respect to Latin America and Europe; until recently there was a policy of no foreign alliances. Also, since the War of 1812 there has been a long period of friendship toward Great Britain and France, which, while at times strained, has prevailed during the important crisis. France has had a hard and fast policy as well, but it is somewhat different from that of the United States, due to the peculiar position which that nation occupies in Europe. There has been a traditional demand for extending French frontiers to the Rhine and even as far as to include Belgium. This has in part been modified, but France is still looking to a natural barrier against future German military action. Since Germany has risen as a dominant power in Europe, the French on two occasions have built up a system of mutual defense alliances with which she entered both World Wars. The backbone of such a plan was first a Franco-Russian Alliance and later a Franco-Soviet agreement. Great Britain has been prone to let Europe build up power alliances and base her foreign policy on maintaining a nearly equal balance. In the event of trouble, the British have always been able to throw their weight on the favored side at the moment. The strategic analyst will know, therefore, the large policy of the nation which he is studying and discover how much influence that policy has in current affairs.

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c. Of particular importance to the strategic analyst is the method by which foreign relations are conducted by a nation. Great Britain and France traditionally have been legalistic in their formal relations, and quite coy on occasion in interpretation of agreements. German policy has been dictated by a desire for self-sufficiency, and as she possesses no colonies for provision of some essential items, there has been a combined assertion of self-pity and threat of force. The latter course has been consistently followed, successfully under Prince Bismarck, but disastrously under William II and Hitler. Unlike the British and French, German conduct of foreign policy has consistently been heavy handed. The United States is quite new in the field of international relations and therefore has demonstrated a straight-forwardness that is unknown elsewhere. This characteristic has on occasion seriously embarrassed the nation and has been the basis for the remark that we "have never lost a war nor won a peace." With the traditional background of a nation in mind, the strategic analyst must weigh current policies and official pronouncements so that they may be evaluated in their true light. This is a difficult feat to perform and a thorough knowledge of diplomatic history is essential.

9. SUMMARY. a. Historical material and historical judgment are prerequisites for an intelligent analysis of present capabilities and intentions of a nation.

b. No historical event can be seen only as purely political, economic, or social in nature. It is usually an inextricable mixture of all three, plus the factor of individual personalities involved.

c. History is a universal phenomenon which has demonstrated a pattern of individual and group behavior, against which national histories may be judged. Such a pattern, however, is invariably affected by factors peculiar to the nation involved.

d. Nations which have developed individual leaders of high caliber in the past and have demonstrated stability in government are apt to produce competent leaders and show stability in future crisis.

e. A national economy is not subject to rapid change. A study of economic history will show how progressive a nation has been and at what pace it is effecting changes.

f. The rate of social change may in part be determined by historical evidence. Social conditions are less subject to change than political and economic institutions.

SECTION II

CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference.

2. TIME ALLOTTED: 110 minutes.

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SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

   a. Required: None.

   b. Supplemental:

   Hayes, Carlton J. H. A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe, 2 vols., The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939.

   Watts, Arthur P. A History of Western Civilization, 2 vols, Prentice-Hall Inc., New York, 1940.

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-6816.

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.