



REMARKS

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37-10V-  
10 DEC 50  
ACCESSION NO

~~N 172 58 5-A-2~~

# COMMAND REPORT

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on 7 June 65 DA Form 1575 dtd 23 Dec 64) DA Form inside  
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## HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

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<b>REQUEST FOR OR NOTIFICATION OF REGRADING ACTION</b> (AR 380-5)	FILE <b>ALLES-A-I-A</b>	DATE <b>28 Mar 60</b>
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**TO:**  
 The Adjutant General  
 Department of the Army  
 Washington 25, D. C.

**FROM:**  
 Commandant, USA Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (Attn: Archives)

DOCUMENTS (Type, Headquarters of Origin, Date, Subject or Short Title)	INCL	CONTROL NUMBER	CLASSIFICATION	REGRADED TO	CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT
Headquarters X Corps Command Report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10 Dec 50. NOTHING FOLLOWS - - - - -			S		

**AUTHORITY OR COMMAND LINE (When Applicable)**

**FOR THE COMMANDANT:**

**EDWIN A. DAYTON**  
 CAPT, AGC, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

*Edwin A. Dayton*  
 -SIGNATURE-

PRINTED OR TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICER

Archives

100-100000-1  
BASIS FOR REGRADING, OR JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUEST, WHERE FURTHER EXPLANATION WILL ASSIST IN RELATED ACTION(S)

A member of the staff and faculty is writing an article for publication in the MILITARY REVIEW and desires to use the contents of the command report.

REMARKS

AGAO-D 312.1 Security(0045)(28 Mar 6Q)st Indorsement

DA, TAGO, Washington 25, D. C., 23 June 1960

TO: Commandant, USA, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
Attention: Archives

1. Headquarters X Corps Command Report, Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950 has been reviewed and it has been determined that it can not be regraded at this time.
2. Accordingly, the SECRET classification will be retained for the protection of this document.

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

*W. Brucker*  
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

SPECIAL REPORT

ON

CHOSIN RESERVOIR

27 NOVEMBER TO 10 DECEMBER 1950

APPROVED:


COMMANDING GENERAL:



EDWARD M. ALMOND

Lieutenant General, United States Army

OFFICIAL:



JOHN S GUTHRIE

Brigadier General, General Staff  
Chief of Staff

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**I. FOREWORD**

1. Background:

The United Nations counter-offensive against the North Korean Army was launched in the middle of September 1950 with the X US Corps executing a successful amphibious envelopment at INCHON. In conjunction with the INCHON landing the Eighth Army attacked north from the FUSAN perimeter and after making a juncture with X Corps at the INCHON - SEOUL beachhead continued the exploitation north toward the YALU River.

During October, Eighth Army continued north to capture the North Korean Capital at PYONGYANG while the I ROK Corps made a rapid advance along the East Coast of Korea. Meanwhile, X Corps mounted a second amphibious envelopment, this time against the Northeast Korean Coast.

The capture of WONSAN and HUNGNAM, important east coast ports, by I ROK Corps obviated assault landings by X Corps and CG X Corps assumed command of all UN Forces in the Northeast Zone of Korea on 20 October 1950.

Following the debarkation of X Corps elements, beginning 26 October, the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division entered the exploitation phase against disintegrating North Korean resistance. The original mission of X Corps, to drive west after landing to assist Eighth Army in the capture of PYONGYANG, had been changed to an offensive to the North with the objective of reaching the Manchurian and USSR Borders as soon as possible. The sectors of advance were the 1st Marine Division on the West, 7th Infantry Division in the center, and I ROK Corps on the East.

By the end of the third week of November the completion of this mission was in sight. The 1st Marine Division had conducted vigorous anti-guerrilla operations in the WONSAN - HAMHUNG area and had defeated elements of the 124th and 126th CCF Divisions north of HAMHUNG. After this battle, the 7th Marine Regiment had advanced north reaching the southern tip of CHOSIN Reservoir on 14 November. On 6 November the 3d US Infantry Division, which was joining X Corps from Japan, initiated relief of 1st Marine Division elements in the WONSAN area. This released the bulk of the 1st Marine Division for its drive to the border. On 21 November, the

7th Infantry Division reached the YALU River (this was the only unit in X Corps to reach the border), while I ROK Corps advancing Northeast completed the capture of the port of CHONGJIN on 25 November against the only organized resistance in the Corps zone.

Civil Affairs was making steady progress in organizing local and provincial governments. UN Forces were enthusiastically received by the majority of the population. In order to protect these governments, it was necessary to employ a substantial number of troops. Likewise, the MSR's, railroads, and military installations required security against the depredations of many bands of by-passed NK Army troops and guerrillas. These guerrilla attacks, while a problem, were not considered critical and it was felt that as soon as the Corps Zone was cleared of organized resistance most of the guerrilla activity would cease.

The presence of CCF in front of the 1st Marine Division was the imponderable in the Intelligence picture. On 28 October the 26th ROK Regiment made the first contact with the CCF in the area north of HAMHUNG. The 7th Marine Regiment relieved the 26th ROK Regiment and by 14 November, succeeded in defeating this CCF covering force, but there were few indications of their intentions and future plans.

By the middle of November the plans of X Corps became dependent on the plans for Eighth Army in the West, and a change in the X Corps mission was indicated. This change was made necessary by the enemy buildup in front of Eighth Army and the halting by enemy action of the first attempt in the second week of November to advance Eighth Army to the border.

## 2. Eighth Army Situation:

An X Corps Staff Analysis covering the Eighth Army Situation and the steps which X Corps could adopt to assist the Eighth Army advance gives a picture of the problems facing the UN Army in North Korea just prior to the Chinese Counter-offensive in November:

### STAFF ANALYSIS: EIGHTH ARMY SITUATION

#### I. Mission:

1. The mission of Eighth Army is to drive to the border destroying enemy in zone.

#### II. The Situation and Courses of Action:

##### 2. Considerations affecting the possible courses of action:

- a. Terrain: Eighth Army is now deployed in the CHONGCHON-GANG Valley. Three main routes of advance are available to Eighth Army. The best route of advance to the border is on SINULJU. The most difficult route is through mountains to MANPOJIN. From present Eighth Army positions it is 80 miles to SINULJU and 140 miles to MANPOJIN.
- b. Roads: The principal axes are: Route 1, SINANJU - SINULJU and Route 7, KUJANG-DONG - MANPOJIN.
- c. Weather: November through March is the dry season in the Eighth Army sector. Temperatures in the lowlands, are less extreme than those in the X Corps zone.  $-20^{\circ}$  is the extreme temperature at SINULJU, while  $-30^{\circ}$  is experienced at MANPOJIN.
- d. Relative Combat Power: Facing Eighth Army are the elements of nine (9) NK Divisions (49,000 men) and six (6) CCF Divisions (40,000 men), (GHQ Intelligence Summary, 25 November 50). Opposing this force, Eighth Army has 4 US Divisions, 2 UN Brigades, and 4 ROK Divisions. Relative front line combat power is, therefore, approximately: 120,000 UN to 100,000 enemy. UN Forces have air supremacy and have superior artillery support. This is counter-balanced to some extent by enemy guerrilla activity and an extended supply line.

e. Logistics: Eighth Army estimates that approximately 3000 tons per day are required at the front. This amounts to 600 tons for a 20,000 division "slice", but includes necessary buildup tonnage and Class IV items required for the maintenance and repair of MSR's. Approximately 1500 tons per day can be cleared by rail from CHINNAMPO and a theoretical five trains a day will deliver 2500 tons per day to PYONGYANG. However, at PYONGYANG it is necessary to unload trains and shuttle by truck to the west side of the river and then to re-load trains for the move north to the CHONGCHON River. Advances north of this river must be supported for a considerable length of time by truck pending the rehabilitation of the rail line. Eighth Army has approximately 20 truck companies, but has only three (3) combat engineer battalions (exclusive of those organic to divisions).

3. Enemy Capabilities: (GHQ Intelligence Summary, 25 Nov 50):

a. Courses of Action:

- (1) Reinforce with Communist Forces outside Korea (An estimated 140,000 CCF Troops are now deployed north of the YALU River).
- (2) Conduct offensive operations.
- (3) Withdraw to the north.
- (4) Conduct defensive operations.
- (5) Conduct offensive air operations.
- (6) Conduct guerrilla operations.

b. Discussion: Any Eighth Army advance on SINUIJU is threatened by a CCF advance on the MANPOJIN - KANGGYE - HUICHON axis. Consequently the enemy's capability to attack Eighth Army on this axis is a determining factor in the general advance north.

4. Eighth Army Courses of Action: Eighth Army courses of action are

limited by terrain and lines of communication. The most favorable line of advance is on SINUIJU. However, the right flank must be defended against envelopment via the KANGGYE - HUICHON axis. Any course of action involving an Eighth Army advance is governed by two factors: (1) Logistic support and (2) enemy reaction. It is estimated that Eighth Army is now employing the maximum force which can be supported with the presently available service troop back-up. The courses of action are:

- a. To hold on the right flank and make a rapid advance on SINUIJU.
- b. To hold on the left flank and advance on the HUICHON - KANGGYE axis.
- c. To make limited advances all along the line reorienting the attack as the enemy's strength is developed.

### III. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action:

5. Enemy reinforcement VS any Eighth Army advance: Substantial CCF reinforcement and an organized defense in depth would indefinitely fix Eighth Army in its present position.
6. Enemy offensive operations VS Eighth Army attack: Eighth Army is now properly deployed with reserves in depth to contain any enemy attack. This course of action would probably hasten the enemy's destruction.
7. Enemy withdrawal to the north VS Eighth Army advance: In this event the UN mission would be accomplished. However, the political and economic reorientation of Eighth Army's northern zone would remain a time consuming task.
8. Enemy defensive operations VS Eighth Army advance: If this course is followed the enemy will probably organize the mountainous region of North-central Korea. Due to logistic difficulties Eighth Army's advance to the YALU, north of SINUIJU, might require from 1 to 4 months.

9. Enemy air offensive VS Eighth Army: Due to an extended line of communications and the limitations on Combat Force availability, Eighth Army's ability to advance is predicated on air supremacy. Failure to maintain at least air superiority would probably stall Eighth Army's attack.
10. Guerrilla operations: This is a continuing capability which will be exercised.

#### IV. Comparison of Courses of Action:

11. Eighth Army has adopted a conservative plan to make a general advance with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the enemy's MSR (HUICHON - KANGGYE). This course of action is designed to meet any course of action which might be exercised by the enemy.

#### V. Conclusions:

12. The X Corps plan of action to sever the enemy MSR at MUPYONG-NI will greatly assist Eighth Army's planned advance by isolating enemy elements south of a potentially strong defensive position.
13. Unless the CCF intends to withdraw from Korea, a strong enemy reaction can be expected to any X Corps thrust to MUPYONG-NI. Consequently it is essential that Eighth Army press forward its attack to contain and destroy enemy elements, particularly CCF units, in its zone. Otherwise these elements may organize strong defensive positions in the mountainous region comprising the MUPYONG-NI area.
14. When X Corps successfully carries out Operation Order Number 7, the II ROK Corps of Eighth Army will be pinched out. At that time consideration should be given to passing the II ROK Corps through the 1st Marine Division with a resulting re-orientation of the boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps to its former position. This would enable the ROK elements of Eighth Army to advance to the KANGGYE - MANPOJIN - HASONG region. This would free X Corps

US elements for employment in Northeast Korea.

In the following section on X Corps Plans and Orders, the steps taken by X Corps in the joint planning of the overall UN plan are outlined.

### 3. X Corps Plans and Orders:

1. By personal letter, 10 Nov 50, Brigadier General Wright, G-3, GHQ FEC, stated that C-in-C desired X Corps to do all possible to assist Eighth Army.

2. By personal letter, dated 15 Nov 50, General Almond replied that X Corps could best assist Eighth Army advance by continuing to attack north in zone and by attacking west, north of CHOSIN Reservoir if feasible.

3. On 16 November 50, CINCFE, by message CX 69009 (received 160725I; TOS 150701I) stated that X Corps would develop, as an alternative to Opn O 6, a plan for re-orienting the attack west on reaching CHANGJIN in order to cut the MANPOJIN - KANGGYE - HUICHON En MSR. The message requested that the plan be sent to CINCFE. This was the first indicated change in mission since CINCFE's message CX 67291 of 24 Oct 50. (Drive to the Border.)

4. Based upon the above, Opn Plan 8, Draft No. 1, dated 16 Nov 50, was prepared and presented to General Almond on 17 Nov 50. The concept of this plan was to seize KANGGYE by a drive from CHANGJIN. General Almond disapproved this plan on the basis that the MSR of the X Corps element making the main effort would be too extended. General Almond directed that a plan be prepared based on the concept of an advance on the HAGARU-RI - MUPYONG-NI axis. General Almond further directed: (1) That HAMHUNG-HAGARU-RI road be developed as a Corps MSR with intensive effort on the part of Corps troops including Corps Engineers; (2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of seizing CHANGJIN in order to protect the right flank of the 1st Mar Div. It was considered that the two objectives, CHANGJIN and MUPYONG-NI, were too widely separated by impassable terrain to be placed under control of one division. General Almond also directed that an additional assumption be listed in the plan, i.e. that the extreme minimum temperatures of from 30 to 40 degrees below zero Fahrenheit from December to March, inclusive, would severely restrict both friendly and enemy operations in the northern portion of the X Corps zone.

5. On 21 Nov 50, Opm Plan Number 8, Draft Number 2 was presented to General Almond. General Almond directed that the plan, with certain modifications be taken to TOKYO by G-3 (Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Chiles) for presentation at GHQ.

6. On 23 Nov 50, G-3, X Corps, departed for TOKYO with Opm Plan Number 8, Draft Number 3. This plan was presented at TOKYO on 24 Nov 50. By message CX 69661, dated 24 Nov 50, CINCFE directed that Opm Plan Number 8 be implemented. CINCFE directed one modification, i.e. a shift of the proposed boundary between X Corps and Eighth Army further West and South in the zone of the 1st Marine Division.

7. In compliance with CINCFE's directive cited above, X Corps issued Opm Order Number 7, dated 25 Nov 50. This order assigned the following missions to X Corps and its subordinate commands:

- a. X Corps: Attacks 270800I Nov to sever En LOC at MUPYONG-NI and destroys En in Z to the Northern Boundary of Korea, along the YALU River on the left to the mouth of the TUMEN River on the right.
- b. 1st Mar Div: Attacks at 270800I Nov to seize M. PYONG-NI, advance to YALU River, and destroy En in Z.
- c. 7th Inf Div: (1) Attacks N at 270800I Nov from CHOSIN Reservoir, advances to YALU River, and destroys En in Z. (2) Secures FUNGSAN area, after coordinating with I ROK Corps.
- d. I ROK Corps: Defends YALU River line in Z, advances from HAPSU and CHONGJIN areas, destroys En in Z to Northern Boundary of Korea.
- e. 3d Inf Div: (1) Gains and maintains contact with right flank Eighth Army along boundary in Z, (2) Protects X Corps W flank in Z, (3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O, (4) Protects airfield and harbor facilities in WONSAN area, and (5) destroys En guerrilla forces in Z.

**II. COMMAND**

COMMAND  
CHOSIN RESERVOIR  
27 Nov - 10 Dec

The period immediately preceding the formation of the HUNGNAM perimeter (27 Nov - 10 Dec 50) required unusually close supervision of, and careful coordination in the command by CG, X Corps.

Chinese Communist Forces had struck in force in Western Korea, while the 1st Marine Division, attacking north in the HAGARU-RI area, had, on 27 Nov 50, made strong contact with the CCF to the north, west and south.

This serious situation required daily trips by the CG, usually by air, to various CP's geographically separated by tortuous terrain and sub-Arctic weather. While enroute to various places, the Corps Commander conducted a constant check on convoy discipline, supply, casualty evacuation, condition of roads and rail lines, Combat Cargo Command activities, artillery fire, and the tactical situation in general, causing corrective action to be taken, as required.

The major problem of command facing the Corps Commander at this time, was the dispersion of his fighting forces over a 400 mile front. The rapidly-deteriorating tactical situation demanded a quick concentration of forces. For security of the Corps, the CG X Corps elected to form a perimeter defense, based on the HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area.

In addition to the many trips described above, the CG conducted seemingly endless conferences with his own and subordinate staff officers and commanders, members of the press, and visitors at the CP. During the period of 14 days, the Commanding General exchanged views and gave (or received) instructions during a total of 76 separate conferences, including one in TOKYO.

On 28 Nov 50, while visiting General Barr, at the 7th Division, word was relayed to General Almond that CINCPF had directed him to return immediately to TOKYO for a conference.

Returning from this conference to X Corps CP at 1700, 29 Nov 50, the CG directed his staff to draw up plans to implement a CINCFE directive to concentrate X Corps for the protection of HAMHUNG and action against the enemy wherever possible within good judgement.

At 2100, 29 Nov, Opn Order No. 8 was presented and approved by the CG, which provided for discontinuance of the X Corps attack to the northwest and subsequent withdrawal of forces into the HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM perimeter, for more cohesive action. It is interesting to note that this directed action closely paralleled previous plans for such a concentration.

At 1130, 30 Nov, CG X Corps conducted a press conference attended by the PIO and representatives of the major wire and photo services. During this conference, he gave complete "off-the-record" details of the operational developments since 26 November 50.

At 1410, 30 Nov, the CG conferred with Generals Smith, Barr and Hodes, and Colonels Williams and Forney, on the situation.

Subsequent conferences prior to the actual evacuation were largely concerned with implementation of the withdrawal order; for the safe outloading of all troops, with emphasis on minimum loss of supplies incident thereto.

EXTRACTS FROM  
THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S  
DIARY  
27 Nov - - 10 Dec

27 November 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 0900 - Conference with Nora Waln, Saturday Evening Post.
- 0920 - Conference with Lt. Col. Volkman, G-2, on anti-guerrilla activities.
- 0940 - Conference with Lt. Col. McCaffrey.
- 0950 - Conference with Transportation Officer.
- 1010 - Departed X Corps CP accompanied by Lt. Col. Waters, Marine Liaison Officer, and Maj. Ladd and drove to CP, 7th Marine Regt, 15 miles northwest of HAGARU-RI. The road was jammed with convoys of the Marine Division moving troops and supplies to the HAGARU-RI area. At the 7th Marine CP, the Executive Officer, Lt. Col. Dowsett, explained the dispositions of the Regiment and the enemy situation. The 7th Regiment had made strong contact with the enemy (Chinese) to the north, west and south. CG X Corps presented the Silver Star Medal to one officer and two EM of the 7th Regiment.
- 1650 - Departed CP 7th Marine Regt and returned to HAMHUNG, arriving at 2130. The traffic control stations along the MSR were not adequate and the convoy drivers were not practicing convoy discipline. The weather was bitterly cold throughout the day, particularly in the mountains and on the plateau surrounding CHOSIN Lake.
- 2230 - Dinner at guest house with Lt. Col. Waters, Maj. Ladd and Capt. Haig. General Ruffner, accompanied by G-2 and G-3 Executive, presented plan for augmenting forces in HAGARU-RI area and protecting the MSR.
- 2310 - Retired for the night sleeping at the guest house.

28 November 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 1050 - Departed CP X Corps and flew by L-17 to HAGARU-RI. Proceeded by

- jeep to Advance CP, 1st Marine Division, arriving at 1130. Had conference with Gen. Smith on the local situation.
- 1255 - Departed by helicopter and flew to the Regimental Advance CP, 31st Regiment, and 1st Bn, 32d Inf. Had conference with regimental commander, Col. MacLean. Decorated Lt. Col. Faith, Lt. Smilley and SFC Stanley with Silver Star Medals. Returned to HAGARU-RI airstrip by helicopter. Flew to X Corps CP in L-17 and saw Gen. Barr at 1530 after being advised that CINCFE had directed my immediate return to Tokyo for conference.
- 1630 - Spoke briefly to Gen. Robertson, BCOF, before departing for YONPO.
- 1700 - Departed YONPO in C-54 for Tokyo accompanied by Lt. Col. McCaffrey, Lt. Col. Glass and Maj. Ladd. Gen. White, MATS, accompanied group.
- 2130 - Arrived Haneda and was met by Col. Clarke, Visitors' Bureau, who stated Gen. MacArthur desired me to proceed immediately to the Embassy where Gen. Walker was waiting.
- 2150 - 0130 - Conferred with CinC, CG Eighth Army, and General Hickey, General Willoughby, General Whitney and General Wright.
- 29 November 1950
- 1200 - Boarded C-54 accompanied by Lt. Colonels McCaffrey and Glass and Maj. Ladd and departed Haneda for YONPO. Discussed present situation and directed McCaffrey and Glass to begin preparation of new order to Corps to concentrate X Corps for the protection of HAMHUNG and action against enemy wherever possible within good judgment.
- 1710 - Arrived YONPO. Transferred to L-17 and flew to X Corps CP accompanied by Lt. Col. McCaffrey.
- 1830 - Conference with Chief of Staff, Deputies, and General Staff Officers.
- 2100 - Section Chiefs, X Corps Staff, presented plan for Op Order #8. Due to rapidity of enemy buildup and as a result of conference with CINCFE, the plans for the order provided for the discontinuance of the X Corps attack to the Northwest and the withdrawal of Corps forces to allow cohesiveness of action against the enemy.

30 November 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing. CG X Corps broadly explained the new concept of operations based on the Corps base of supply at HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM with operations against the enemy wherever possible and consistent with the concentration of the Corps.
- 0900 - Conference with Lt. Col. Campbell, FM.
- 0920 - Conference with Gen. Barr and telephone conversation with Gen. Smith. Gen. Barr left immediately for HAGARU-RI for conference with Gen. Smith.
- 1000 - Conference with Lt. Col. McCaffrey.
- 1030-- Conference with Gen. Soule and Col. Harris, CO 65th Inf, on the concentration of the 3d Div and the reconnaissance in force by one battalion of the 65th to the west toward Eighth Army's east flank. The reinforced battalion will probe and return with whatever information they can gather. ✓
- 1130 - Press conference. Lt. Col. Lay, Maj. Sieminski and the following members of the press attended: Bernard Kaplan, INS, Tom Stone, AP, Charles Moore, UP, Charles de Soria, CBS, Fred Sparks, Chicago Daily News, Bill Chapman, UP, Dick Ferguson, ACME Newspictures. CG and C/S X Corps were present and gave an "off the record" summary of CG's actions since the 26th of Nov and the developments of the situation which have come to pass within the last two weeks. The estimates on enemy strength confronting both X Corps and Eighth Army were explained. It was further explained that the action now in progress is an entirely new Chinese development and that the defeat of the North Koreans has virtually been accomplished. The UN must now decide what course of action will be taken. CG stated the X Corps will continue to operate against the enemy while readjusting to new developments. ↘
- 1230 - Press conference concluded.
- 1340 - Departed CP in L-17 accompanied by Maj. Ladd and flew to HAGARU-RI.

1410 - Conference with Generals Smith, Barr, and Hodes, Colonels Williams and Forney on the present situation. CG X Corps stressed the urgency of withdrawing the 5th and 7th Marine Regts to HAGARU-RI immediately and ordered Generals Barr and Smith to submit a plan for the withdrawal of the elements of the 31st and 32d Inf from the present position east of the lake to HAGARU-RI. Evacuation of the wounded in both the Marine and Army units presents the major difficulty in withdrawing these forces to HAGARU-RI. By telephone CG X Corps ordered C/S X Corps to send an immediate message to Lt. Col. Reidy, commanding the battalion enroute to KOTO-RI to join Col. Fuller immediately at KOTO-RI. Lt. Col. Carlton was ordered to proceed to HAGARU-RI for the purpose of providing airlift of supplies specifically desired by 1st Mar Div and arranging for their proper packing and delivery.

1530 - Departed HAGARU-RI and returned to CP, X Corps.

1615 - Conference with C/S and G-4 concerning supply of the forces at HAGARU-RI.

1715 - Corrected draft of message to Gen. MacArthur.

1 December 1950

0800 - Morning staff briefing.

0910 - Conference with G-4.

0930 - Conference with Gen. Barr.

0950 - Conference with Col. Prindle, Deputy to Gen. Turner, and Lt. Col. Carlton.

1015 - Conference with C/S and staff on defense plans for HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area.

1300 - Mr. DeSoria made recording for public release in the U.S.

1500 - 1700 - Administrative duties.

1700 - Conference with Transportation Officer on railroad facilities.

1710 - Conference with QM on winter clothing.

1715 - Conference with Gen. Sams GHQ PH&W Officer.

2 December 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 0900 - Conference with Gen. Barr.
- 0910 - Conference with Gen. Harris, 1st Marine Air Wing.
- 0930 - Conference with C/S.
- 0940 - Conference with Gen. Hodes. —
- 1030 - Conference with C/S.
- 1130 - Telephone call to Gen. Fox, GHQ FEC.
- 1230 - Conference with Col Quinn and Col Forney prior to their departure for Tokyo.
- 1250 - Conference with Gen. Meade during lunch.
- 1400 - Departed X Corps CP in L-17 accompanied by Capt. Haig and flew to HAGARU-RI.
- 1510 - Returned to CP X Corps, HAMHUNG.

3 December 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 0850 - Conference with Gen. Barr.
- 0930 - Conference with staff, C/S and Gen. Barr on defense of HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM.
- 1000 - Conference with G-3.
- 1030 - Conference with Lt. Col. Carlton, Combat Cargo Command.
- 1240 - Departed CP, X Corps, and drove by jeep to temporary CP 7th Div, 4 miles west of HUNGNAM. Attended conference with Gen. Barr, Gen. Hodes and Gen. Kiefer and discussed defense plans for HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area. Advised 7th Div that the 3d Div had been released to X Corps control and was responsible for the western (central) sector of the perimeter. CG 7th Div should coordinate his forces with arriving elements of the 3d Div.
- 1330 - Departed 7th Inf Div CP and drove to HUNGNAM. Was met by Col. McCaffrey and inspected new X Corps CP preparations.
- 1350 - Drove to airstrip south of HUNGNAM and flew to HAMHUNG by L-5.

Transferred to L-17 and flew to WONSAN for conference with Gen. Soule and his staff. The 3d Inf Div was ordered to move immediately to the HAMHUNG area. Col. Harris, CO 65th Inf was directed to re-establish guard posts along the RR to insure uninterrupted use of the RR, until the 3d Div had reached the HAMHUNG area. CG, 3d Inf Div Arty was ordered to confer and coordinate with Corps Arty Officer on fire plans and artillery defense of HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area. 3d Div requirements for trucks and LSTs were discussed and C/S, 3d Div, was ordered to contact C/S, X Corps, and tell him CG, X Corps directed all available LSTs be routed to WONSAN to lift 3d Div equipment.

1510 - Departed WONSAN and flew along RR to CHIGYONG to determine location of break reported by RPO. Break did not exist. Convoys of the 3d Inf Div headed south were stopped, apparently preparing to turn around and go north. Made reconnaissance flight up valley toward HUKSU-RI, thence north across the mountains to MAJON-DONG.

1710 - Returned to CP X Corps, HAMHUNG.

4 December 1950

0800 - Morning staff briefing.

0900 - Conference with Gen. Barr.

0910 - Conference with Colonel Ennis.

0930 - Conference with G-3.

1015 - Conference with C/S and staff on defense of HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area utilizing 3 American Divisions, I ROK Corps, and Korean Marine Regt.

1115 - Conference with C/S.

1145 - Conference with G-3 on operations summary.

1150 - Conference with Lt. St. Aubin on afternoon flight.

1300 - Departed CP in L-17 accompanied by Ladd and flew to HAGARU-RI observing road and enemy dispositions. Landed at HAGARU-RI and spoke briefly to evacuation officer at airstrip who stated 600 patients had been evacuated today. Proceeded to CP, 1st Mar Div,

and presented DSC medals to the following officers: Gen. Smith, Col. Litzenberg, Lt. Col. Murray and Lt. Col. Beal. Informed above officers that every effort within the power of X Corps and the Air Force was being put to the task of assisting the withdrawal of the Marine and attached Army units from the HAGARU-RI - KOTO-RI area to HAMHUNG.

1430 - Departed HAGARU-RI and flew to KOTO-RI. Proceeded to CP, 1st Mar Regt, and conferred with Col. Fuller and his Executive Officer, Lt. Col. Rickert. The plan of artillery and air support on withdrawal was explained by CG, X Corps, and 1st Mar Regt presented plan in which units moving from HAGARU-RI pass through 1st Mar Regt and continue down mountain while 1st Mar Regt holds top of hill and performs rear guard action. Decorated Col. Fuller and Col. Reidy with DSC and the following officers and EM with Silver Stars: Lt. Col. Rickert, USMC, Maj. Loxigan, USMC, Maj. J. I. Gurfain, USA, Capt. Crosby, USA, M/Sgt. Crowe, USA, S/Sgt Cornely, USMC, PFC Eaton, USMC, PFC Crenshaw, USMC, PFC Gates, USA.

1515 - Departed KOTO-RI and flew to HAMHUNG.

1630 - Conference with PIO.

1645 - Conference with Col. Forney and G-2, Lt. Col. Quinn, who had just returned from Tokyo.

1715 - Conference with G-1 and Col. Gavin who is to be assigned to the 31st Inf Regt.

5 December 1950

0800 - Morning staff briefing.

0840 - Conference with Gen. Soule.

0900 - Conference with G-3.

0910 - Conference with Col. Burkhardt and Col. Ennis concerning fire plan for artillery action today along MSR.

0925 - Conference with Engineer and G-3 on Engineer efforts and coordination of Engineer and Infantry on movement up pass to clear road for

withdrawal of 1st Mar Div and attached Army units to HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area.

1000 - 1020 - Administrative duties.

1020 - Departed CP and drove to 3d Inf Div CP in HAMHUNG. Discussed with Gen. Soule the coordinated movement of Engineers and Infantry up the pass from MAJON-DCNG and told him an order would be published today forming a Task Force of Engineer, Infantry and Artillery troops and that a General officer of the 3d Division would command the force. ✓

1045 - Departed CP X Corps, drove to airstrip and departed in L-17 accompanied by Maj. Ladd to observe artillery firing on enemy positions along the road south of KOTO-RI. The effect of the artillery fire could not be determined from the air. After the firing a reconnaissance was made of the CHOSIN area. Suspected enemy positions were observed on several ridges flanking the road south of KOTO-RI just before the road begins its descent. A group of 30 individuals deployed around two vehicles or large sleds were observed making their way across the ice of CHOSIN Lake from the eastern edge toward HAGARU-RI. This group appeared to have four fighters protecting its movement.

1230 - Returned to X Corps CP.

1330 - Conference with Baron Van Aduard.

1435 - Conference with Col. Champany.

1455 - Conference with Col. Neal Johnson.

1500 - Dr. Stearn, Maj. Gen. White, Col. Combs, Maj. Gen. Cabelle, Maj. Gen. Harris conferred with CG X Corps on subject of tactical air support and who should command supporting air. My statement was that the Ground Commander should have operational control of supporting air units.

6 December 1950

0800 - Morning staff briefing.

0840 - Conference with Gen. Soule and Gen. Harris. ✓

0900 - Conference with G-3.

0915 - Conference with Baron Van Aduard.

0930 - Conference with Col. McCaffrey and Maj. Ladd on schedule for Gen. Collins.

0950 - Conference with C/S on bomber effort on suspected enemy CP areas and on HAGARU-RI and KOTO-RI when UN forces have evacuated them.

1010 - Inspection of War Room and briefing preparations for Gen. Collins.

1040 - Departed CP and flew to YONPO to await Gen. Collins and party. While waiting inspected Cargo Command activities and the operations section of the airfield. Attended pilots briefing and ordered pilots to destroy the power plants along the MSR if there was any enemy activity around them.

✓ 1330 - Gen. Collins and party of Lt. Gen. Weckerling, Lt. Col. Walsh and Lt. Col. Larson arrived YONPO and were flown to X Corps CP.

1400 - Briefing by staff on current situation. Gen. Collins seemed entirely pleased with plans and operations of X Corps.

1435 - Lunch.

1530 - Departed CP X Corps and flew in L-17 accompanied by Gen. Collins on reconnaissance of the MSR as far as SUDONG. Weather precluded flying to KOTO-RI. Returned to 7th Inf Div airstrip between HAMHUNG and HUNGNAM and continued trip by jeep to 7th Div CP. CG 7th Div and his officers briefed Gen. Collins.

1715 - Departed CP 7th Inf Div and drove to CP 3d Inf Div where Gen. Collins was briefed by CG 3d Div and his staff. ✓

1800 - Departed X Corps CP and accompanied Gen. Collins to YONPO where he boarded his plane and returned to Tokyo.

1915 - Returned to X Corps CP.

General Comment: Gen. Collins seemed completely satisfied with the operation of X Corps and apparently was much relieved in finding the situation well in hand.

7 December 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 0900 - Conference with Aides re moving to HUNGNAM. Haig to arrange CG's house and Wilde to supervise movement of vans.
- 0915 - Conference with Gen. Ruffner.
- 0920 - Conference with G-1.
- 0950 - Conference with Lt. Col. McCaffrey.
- 1000 - Conference with Gen. Barr.
- 1020 - Conference with C/S.
- 1030 - Departed CP HAMHUNG accompanied by Maj. Ladd and flew in L-17 on reconnaissance of the MSR to HAGARU-RI. At 1100 the rear of the truck convoy of the 5th and 11th Marines was just south of the high ground south of HAGARU-RI. At that time the convoy was not moving but did not appear to be engaged with the enemy.
- 1200 - Landed at KOTO-RI and proceeded to CP, 1st Mar Div, for conference with Gen. Smith. Gen. Smith reported that the 7th Marines suffered about 200 casualties in their move from HAGARU-RI to KOTO-RI but that he felt the 5th and 11th Marines would fare better. Gen. Smith was assured by CG X Corps that the Marine Div would control the artillery fire of the units in the valley and that Gen. Soule's 3d Division would provide maximum protection for the movement of the Marines from CHINHUNG-NI down the valley to HAMHUNG. CG spoke briefly to Cols. Fuller and Litzenberg. Morale is high in the Marine Division and tomorrow they begin their movement from KOTO-RI to the HAMHUNG area. ✓
- 1245 - Departed KOTO-RI; flew again over the troops moving from HAGARU-RI, and flew to the 7th Div airstrip. Transferred to jeep and drove to 7th Div CP. G-3, 7th Div gave briefing of situation and explained 7th Div defense plan. CG directed that artillery plan be included showing artillery positions and limits of fire.
- 1330 - Departed 7th Div CP and drove to I ROK Corps CP. Held conference

with Col. Rogers and CG I ROK Corps, Gen. Kim Bak Il. CG was briefed on movement of elements of ROK Corps and their defense plan was explained and found satisfactory. ROK Corps has organized its agents well and they are now operating to the front of the ROK area of responsibility. 26th ROK Regt reported numerous supplies left at PUKCHON by the 7th Div. CG ordered that 26th Inf bring supplies with them and said he would send an X Corps staff officer to supervise movement.

1440 - Departed I ROK Corps CP and drove to new CP at HUNGNAM. Inspected progress of preparations which was proceeding satisfactorily.

1530 - Departed HUNGNAM and drove to 3d Div CP in HAMHUNG for conference with Gen. Soule. Gen. Soule reported the pressure in the MAJON-DONG area had let up and stated he felt the situation was well in hand along the MSR. CG X Corps explained Gen. Smith's concern over control of the artillery in the valley and Gen. Soule stated he fully understood the Marine Division was to control the firing in support of their movement. ✓

1630 - Returned to X Corps CP, HAMHUNG.

8 December 1950

0800 - Morning staff briefing.

0840 - Conference with G-2.

1000 - Conference with G-3.

1030 - Conference with staff on plan for evacuation. As staff had prepared only one plan, utilizing water lift, instructions were issued for all aspects to be considered.

1100 - CG went to van-quarters and spent remainder of day attending to administrative duties.

1830 - Orders issued to Maj. Ladd to arrange with PIO and G-1 for telecon with GHQ to determine reason for inaccuracies in Stars and Stripes Story on award of DSC's and Silver Stars to Army and Marine personnel.


9 December 1950

- 0800 - Morning staff briefing.
- 0845 - Conference with C/S.
- 0915 - Conference with Admiral Struble, Admiral Joy, Admiral Doyle, Gen. Shepherd, USMC, Gen. Harris, MAW, and members of their respective staffs on outloading and naval support.
- 1020 - Press conference. CG X Corps summarized the activities of the X Corps since 24 November and commented on the magnificent manner in which the Marines and 7th Inf Div elements with the Marines have conducted this operation. Admiral Joy, Admiral Struble, and Gen. Shepherd made brief statements. The Naval officers stated their job was to support the X Corps in every eventuality. Gen. Shepherd stated he was here to do all he could to assist Gen. Almond and praised the operations of the X Corps. Correspondents present: Tom Stone, AP, Bernard Kaplan, INS, Stan Swinton, AP, Charles Moore, UP, Bill Chapman, UP, Dick Ferguson, ACME, Gordon Yoder, PARAMOUNT, Dick Kallson, NBC, and James Pringle, AP PHOTO.
- 1115 - Conference with CG's 7th Inf Div and 3d Inf Div and staff of X Corps on current operations. ✓
- 1210 - Departed CP and flew in L-17 on reconnaissance of MSR and defensive positions northeast of HUNGNAM. Marine units appeared to have met at the power station near the crest of the hill and sections of treadway bridge were rapidly being moved to the breach in the platform bridge. 7th Inf Div and I ROK Corps troops were well disposed and digging in on the commanding high ground along the MLR.
- 1400 - Landed at HUNGNAM airstrip and proceeded to new Corps CP. Inspected office and living facilities.
- 1800 - Conference with C/S.

10 December 1950

- 0800 - Attended morning staff briefing.

- 0840 - Conference with Gen. Shepherd, Fleet Marine Force.
- 0935 - Conference with Capt. McCleary, Visitors' Bureau.
- 0950 - Conference with Capt. Jones.
- 1000 - Conference with Maj. Ladd.
- 1030 - Conference with Lt. Col. McGaffrey.
- 1050 - Departed CP for HUNGNAM airstrip accompanied by Capt. Haig.
- 1115 - Aerial reconnaissance of X Corps defensive front and detailed reconnaissance of KOTO-RI - HAMHUNG road and HAMHUNG-SINHUNG road. During reconnaissance of SINHUNG road groups of 10 or 15 individuals were observed on road south of SINHUNG. Gen. Soule stated that his unit had dispatched some equipment to the port for loading but that it was explained to him that it could not be loaded immediately. Gen. Almond left CP after emphasizing to Gen. Soule that he would coil and concentrate his units for effective action, particularly those units which the Marine Div would pass through enroute to HAMHUNG. Gen. Almond stated that we must maintain our strength intact to provide the capability of launching an effective attack in any direction. Gen. Soule agreed that this principle would be adhered to. ✓
- 1350 - Departed by Mobile CP for CP 7th Inf Div.
- 1405 - Arrived CP 7th Inf Div and discussed with Gen. Barr various phases of 7th Div defensive plan, emphasizing the necessity for effective concentration of strength. Gen. Barr's loading plans were also discussed.
- 1420 - Departed 7th Div CP for HUNGNAM port.
- 1435 - Visited Col. Forney, DC/S for Ship Movements, in his office at the port. Discussions were held on shipping required to transport X Corps. Col. Forney was instructed to make a detailed study and present an analysis of tonnage and shipping requirements in line with requirements for X Corps operations at INCHON. Col. Forney stated he felt turn around shipping would be necessary despite statement



**MAP B**  
**ENEMY SITUATION**  
012400 DEC 1950  
SHOWING FULL DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE ENEMY ATTACK IN THE  
**CHOSIN RESERVOIR**  
**AREA**  
**HQ X CORPS**

**LEGEND**

POPULATED PLACES: ○

ROADS:  
Principal: ————

Other: ————

RAILROADS:  
Single track (4'8 1/2"): —+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—

Narrow gauge (2'6"): —+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—

SPOT ELEVATION IN METERS: .370

5 0 5  
MILES

made by Admiral Doyle at previous conference.

- 1450 - Toured HUNGAM in Mobile CP accompanied by Col. Twitty, CO, 2d Engr Sp Brig. Unloading facilities and storage areas were inspected and discussions held to guarantee maximum use of all existing facilities and expansion where possible. Troop staging area at port was inspected in presence of Troop Commander, Lt. Col. Walsh.
- 1520 - Returned to X Corps CP.
- 1530 - Conference with G-3 and Chief of Staff.
- 1615 - Conference with Civil Affairs Officer.
- 1730 - Conference with Chief of Staff.
- 1900 - Conference with Gen. Shepherd.
- 1940 - Dinner in CG Mess with Gen. Shepherd, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Col. Twitty, CO, 2d Engineer Special Brigade.

### **III. INTELLIGENCE**

84  
6451

Enemy situation, Terrain, Weather

a. Climate and Weather:

Although the mountainous interior of Northern Korea is a region of relatively high precipitation, the period from October through March is the dry season. Much of the winter precipitation falls as snow, but the total amount is small. The accumulation of snow on the ground seldom exceeds one foot except in the northern mountain valleys where the depth is increased by local drifting. The best sky conditions for aerial operations prevail in winter when cloud cover averages .2 for 70% of the time in the interior. Days with cloudless skies are not uncommon in the north, and relatively clear skies may last for several days. Visibility is also affected by radiation fogs. These form in the protected localities of the interior during calms or very light winds usually late at night or in the early morning. Such fogs disappear by about 1000 hours. Winters in the North Korean Highlands are severe, with mean minimum temperatures generally below zero degrees Fahrenheit. Extreme minimum temperatures are 30 to 40 degrees below zero. In the north-central tip of Korea, at CHUNGGANGJIN on the YALU River, the minimum temperature may be expected to fall below zero on about 75 days between late November and early March.

b. Terrain:

The YANGNIM Range, between the CHOSIN Reservoir and the YALU River, is one of the highest and most inaccessible parts of the North Korean Ranges, with elevations of 7,000 to 8,000 feet. These rugged mountains are drained by fast flowing streams in steep-sided valleys or gorges. Valleys are generally forested and mountain sides are covered with grass or forests with the timberline extending up to 7,500 feet on some peaks. The region is sparsely settled; only two or three roads traverse it, and no railroad crosses it completely. Considering the Corps mission, critical terrain features in the area included the communications centers of CHANGJIN, KANGGYE, MUPYONG-NI, the YALU River crossings at MANPOJIN, CHASONG, LIN-CHIANG, HUCHANGGANGGU, SINGALPAJIN,

HYESANJIN, and the approaches to these areas. Avenues of approach from the line of contact to these critical terrain features were extremely limited due to the rugged terrain and the paucity of even "fair" roads. The virtual impossibility of cross-country movement required that the principal roads be augmented, as routes, by the use of all available trails and secondary roads.

For additional information see Terrain Study No. 6, GHQ, FEC, 9 October 1950.

c. Enemy Situation:

(1) The X Corps G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation on 24 November established five general areas in which the enemy forces opposing X Corps were located. These were: (a) The CHONGJIN Area on the east coast where an estimated 6000 NK troops were disposed; (b) the HYESANJIN Area where an estimated two infantry regiments and an artillery regiment (fighting as infantry) conducted a delaying action to the Manchurian Border; (c) the CHOSIN - FUSEN Reservoir area; (d) the HUKSU-RI - SACHANG-NI Area Northwest of HAMHUNG and; (e) the YONGHUNG area southwest of HAMHUNG in which remnants of North Korean forces which had withdrawn from the NAKTONG River front were located. Their total strength was estimated at 3000. In addition elements of the 124th CCF Division had been identified in the area. In the area south and southwest of WONSAN, 7000 to 10,000 additional remnants of NK forces were estimated to be reorganizing and conducting guerrilla warfare.

"In the area of the CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs, the 124th and 126th CCF Divisions, which had been contacted intermittently during the past three weeks have disengaged for employment in other areas. The 126th Division has been reported as having sideslipped to the southwest, but a new division, the 89th CCF Division, has replaced it in the CHOSIN Reservoir area. The exact whereabouts of the 124th Division is unknown at present but it is presumed to have either followed the 126th, or to have moved to the north of the reservoir for the purpose of establishing

defensive positions."

(2) Enemy reserves were reported in specific areas which were considered as assembly areas for the reorganization of North Korean units, the mobilization centers of newly activated units, or the march objectives of intervening Chinese Communist Units.

In northeastern Korea, MUSAN and HOENYONG had been reported as mobilization centers for newly activated North Korean units. In the CHAGANG-DO area, north and west of CHOSIN Reservoir the 124th CCF Division was considered a reserve capable of intervention. CHANGJIN and KANGGYE were reported as assembly areas for the reconstitution of North Korean forces as well as march objectives on the avenue of approach for CCF into the X Corps zone. It was pointed out that due to the location and importance of KANGGYE that enemy forces of unknown strength could appear from that area at any time. The identification of the 89th CCF Division in the CHOSIN Reservoir area indicated that the remainder of the 30th CCF Corps might be in the vicinity although there was no evidence of these additional forces at that time. It was later discovered that the 89th CCF Division was transferred from the 30th to the 20th Corps.

Consideration was also given to enemy forces last identified in the zone of Eighth Army which were considered as capable of intervention in the X Corps zone.

(3) The enemy capabilities in the CHAGANG-DO - HUICHON area as listed in the G-2 estimate of the enemy situation on 24 November were:

(a) The enemy can continue to delay with the estimated two CCF divisions presently available in the hope of creating a stalemate during the winter in the rugged terrain of the area.

(b) The enemy can reinforce these two divisions with the "possible" remaining divisions of the CCF Army, of which the 89th CCF Division is a part, for the purpose of improving his defensive capability.

(c) The enemy can launch limited objective attacks with forces of division size against the HUNGNAM - YUDAM-NI - MUPYONG-NI

logistics artery by employing the 126th CCF Division, and reorganized North Korean remnants, at SACHANG-NI, and by employing reserves of unknown strength now located in the vicinity of HUICHON.

The G-2 discussed these capabilities by stating "In the north-central part of Korea present indications point to an enhancement of the enemy's defensive capability. Not only is the extremely rugged terrain, with its narrow, winding roads a superior defensive advantage but also the enemy has readjusted his dispositions with a view of linking up these lines with his present position in the Eighth Army zone. The recently identified 89th CCF Division indicates the possibility of additional forces in the CHOSIN Reservoir area, and the newly established location of the 126th CCF Division at SACHANG-NI indicates that the gap in the enemy line is beginning to be plugged. The enemy reaction in this area to an envelopment of his left flank, with the imminent severing of his northern line of communication, is likely to be violent. Reserves capable of reacting to such a threat consist only, so far as is known, of the reorganized remnants of the 2d and 5th North Korean Divisions which have escaped north of SACHANG-NI and HUKSU-RI, plus the unlocated enemy reserves in rear of the enemy's position in the Eighth Army zone. The three most likely reactions are as follows, not in order of priority: a penetration in the direction HUICHON - HUKSU-RI - HAMHUNG, an attempt to escape to the north along the HUICHON - KANGGYE axis before being cut off, or a withdrawal to the west in the direction of SINUIJU and ANTUNG.

On the basis of indications then available it was concluded that the enemy would attempt to impede our advance into north central and northeastern Korea by whatever defensive or offensive measures were necessary. As the X Corps main effort approaches MUPYONG-NI and as the Eighth Army effort approached HUICHON it was pointed out the enemy could be expected to react violently by striking to the east and southwest. "The possibility of additional reinforcement of the enemy ground and air effort from across the (Manchurian) border cannot be overlooked".

#### IV. OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS REPORT  
CHOSIN RESERVOIR  
27 Nov - 10 Dec 50

By the third week in November 50, elements of the 1st Marine Division had reached HAGARU-RI at the southern tip of the CHOSIN Reservoir, and were preparing to continue the attack to drive to the Manchurian Border and end the Korean Conflict. (See Map A)

In their attack along the HAMHUNG - HAGARU-RI axis, the Marines had encountered resistance ranging from heavy during the first week in November, to light during the period 8-22 November. Between 4-8 November the 7th Marine Regiment had decisively defeated the 124th CCF Division in the vicinity of SUDONG, south of the CHOSIN Reservoir area. Throughout the period of the drive from HAMHUNG to HAGARU-RI, reports received from agents and civilians indicated a build-up of CCF forces in the CHANGJIN area north of the CHOSIN Reservoir, and the YUDAM-NI - SACHANG-NI area west of the HAMHUNG-HAGARU-RI axis. Air Reconnaissance during the same period tended to substantiate these reports.

On 21 November, attempts by the 7th Marine Regiment to establish a blocking position west of HAGARU-RI were resisted with heavy small arms fire, and air reported considerable activity in the YUDAM-NI area. Up to this time there was no positive evidence that new CCF units had been committed to the CHOSIN area. Previously identified units consisted of elements of the 42nd CCF Corps, composed of the 124th, 125th, and 126th CCF Divisions.

On 23 November, the 7th Marine Regiment attacked North from HAGARU-RI toward YUDAM-NI, while elements of the 5th Marine Regiment took up positions on the east shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The 1st Marine Regiment was disposed with one (1) Battalion at HAGARU-RI, one (1) Battalion at KOTO-RI, and one (1) Battalion at CHINHUNG-NI.

The attack continued throughout 24-25 November against light resistance, though retarded by snow drifts and obstacles on the roadway.

Elements of the 7th Division led by the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved up the east shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir in order to relieve the 5th Marine Regiment. In addition this force, under command of CO, 31st Infantry, contained 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, 31st Tank Company, 57th FA Battalion (-) and elements of the 15th AAA AW Battalion. This force was located at three separate points. (See Sketch No. 1)

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, in the meantime moved to YUDAM-NI in order to continue the attack on the YUDAM-NI - MUPYONG-NI axis. The remainder of the 5th Marine Regiment was ordered to move to the vicinity of YUDAM-NI as soon as relieved.

The enemy situation was clarified somewhat when on 26 November, three PWs from the 60th CCF Division, 20th CCF Army were captured. These PWs indicated that 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Corps were in the area, having arrived at YUDAM-NI on 20 November. They stated they were to move south and southwest from YUDAM-NI and assume positions from which to launch an attack against the 1st Marine Division MSR after two Marine Regiments had passed beyond their positions. A civilian from the same area stated that on the night of 23/24 November he had been forced to act as a guide for an immense number of troops moving southeast from YUDAM-NI. To the north and east of CHOSIN Reservoir there was no contact although friendly air continued to report numerous signs of activity in that area.

On 26 November, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments consolidated positions in the YUDAM-NI area, and at 270800I November, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, attacked Northwest, in accordance with Opn Order No 7, Hq X Corps, dated 25 Nov 50, in the direction of MUPYONG-NI.

Only light resistance was encountered initially by the Marines as they advanced 1,500 yards westward from YUDAM-NI. Then at 1500 the 20th CCF Corps struck the positions of the 7th and 5th Marines around YUDAM-NI from the northwest, west and southwest while the garrison at KOTO-RI repulsed a CCF attack from the west. Attacks from the north and northwest were received by the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments throughout the night. Indications were that two divisions, possibly the 59th and 60th, of the 20th CCF Corps were involved, with two other divisions being in the general vicinity. Strong patrol contacts and fire on friendly convoys between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI indicated the beginning of a strong Chinese build-up along the MSR in that area. A PW reported two unidentified CCF Divisions in the vicinity of SAMDAEP-YONG.

A strong unidentified CCF force consisting of possibly 2 divisions, attacked elements of the 7th US Infantry Division on the eastern shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir from the north and northeast during the night 27-28 November. The force from the north was composed of tank and infantry units; the one from the northeast consisted of infantry units only. The enemy also cut the MSR between HAGARU-RI and friendly positions on the east shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir. (See Sketch No. 2)

About mid-morning 28 November air reported 37 obstacles and road blocks between YUDAM-NI and HAGARU-RI. In addition 5 road blocks were reported between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI, apparently covered by strong enemy forces, the bulk of which appeared to be on the hills east of the road. Toward the end of the day the 7th Marine Regiment moved back to deploy units along the MSR south of YUDAM-NI. At the same time the 5th Marine Regiment closed in positions around YUDAM-NI.

An emergency message from Commanding Officer 31st Infantry was relayed by the 1st Marine Division requesting that the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry come forward at once even if they had to fight their way up.

An estimated four enemy regiments continued to attack elements of the 7th US Division east of CHOSIN Reservoir throughout the night of 28-29 Nov and the following day. A series of heavily defended road blocks prevented a US armored task force from reaching the surrounded elements. Heavy losses were inflicted on the attackers by our forces. It is believed that at least two CCF Divisions, the 80th, subordinate to the 27th CCF Corps, and the 70th CCF Division were involved in this action, although the latter was never firmly identified.

On 29 November the enemy build-up continued. B Company, 31st Infantry and a Marine Tank Company moved up to KOTO-RI from CHINHUNG-NI. Action continued at HAGARU-RI though not as strong as during the night, while the 5th and 7th Marine Regimental areas continued relatively quiet. F Company, 7th Marine Regiment was cut off and isolated between HAGARU-RI and YUDAM-NI but other elements of the 7th Marine Regiment were enroute to relieve them.

A Task Force composed of the 41st Independent Royal Marine Commando (Strength 225) with G Company of the 1st Marine Regiment, B Company, 31st Infantry and B and D Companies of the 1st Marine Tank Battalion started from KOTO-RI to HAGARU-RI and were reported in contact with the enemy  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of KOTO-RI. B Company, 31st Infantry and B Company, 1st Marine Tank Battalion were cut off and forced to return to KOTO-RI.

The 7th Division elements on the east shore of the Reservoir were running seriously short of ammunition. At about mid-day 29 November 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, carrying 100 casualties, fought its way back and linked up with 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry. The Commanding Officer, 31st Infantry was reported wounded and missing in action. That afternoon two airdrops were made with partial recovery since some of the packages landed outside of the 31st Infantry perimeter.

Shortly after noon the Royal Marine Commando, accompanying elements included, was reported engaged about half way to HAGARU-RI and by late afternoon had fought its way north to the town. Casualties in personnel and equipment were heavy. The Commanding Officer of the Royal Marine Commando reported he had experienced the hardest fighting in his career.

At SACHANG-NI, elements of the 89th CCF Division, which apparently had side-slipped southward from the YUDAM-NI area, reappeared in front of the 7th Infantry during the night of 28-29 Nov and succeeded in establishing road blocks along its MSR. During the afternoon of 29 November, Chinese defending the road blocks were forced to withdraw. A breakthrough in this area could have seriously threatened the HAMHUNG Defense Area.

By evening KOTO-RI, which had been under attack from the northeast and west, had also come under attack from the south. A 31st Infantry convoy with elements of the 1st Marine Division Tank Battalion tried to advance north from KOTO-RI but was turned back and cut off. Commanding Officer 1st Marine Regiment assisted this force in returning to town.

At 292047I Nov 50, OI No. 19 was issued by Headquarters X Corps. "Part I: Effective at once all ELms 7th Inf Div in KOTO-RI (CV5560) - HAGARU-RI (CV5171) - CHOSIN Reservoir area are Atchd to 1st Mar Div. Part II: 1st Mar Div: Redeploy one RCT without delay from YUDAM-NI (CV4182) area to HAGARU-RI area, gain contact with ELms 7th Inf Div E of CHOSIN Reservoir; coordinate all forces in and N of HAGARU-RI in a perimeter defense based on HAGARU-RI; open and secure HAGARU-RI - KOTO-RI MSR. Part III: X Corps coordinates movement to KOTO-RI of ELms 7th Inf Div now S KOTO-RI."

During the night of 29-30 November the 1st Marine Division requested

that the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment holding the railhead at CHINHUNG-NI be relieved by Corps in order that this unit might be moved north to HAGARU-RI. This request could not be honored as protection for the railhead was vital.

At HAGARU-RI the Communists again struck during the night of 29-30 Nov and continued harassing tactics throughout the day. On the night of 30 Nov - 1 Dec the enemy lunged against our lines for the third consecutive night. Direction was primarily from the south, east and southwest in approximately Divisional strength. The 58th Division made an apparent all-out effort to destroy the base at the southern tip of the CHOSIN Reservoir before the outlying elements of the 1st Marine Division on the west side and the elements of the 7th Infantry Division on the east side could withdraw to it. Pressure on friendly forces eased at 0600 hours, 1 December.

5th and 7th Marine Regiments were pushing south with no report of contact for the night of 30 November - 1 December. The leading elements of the 7th Marine Regiment were approaching F Company, 7th Marine Regiment which had been isolated. By mid-morning 1 December it had become evident that the enemy was blocking the MSR in great force not only between YUDAM-NI and HAGARU-RI but also between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI. At this time the 1st Marine Division estimated that there were six enemy divisions opposing them.

Elements of the 7th Infantry Division initiated a move at 1245 hours, 1 December with a ten plane escort in an effort to consolidate with the 1st Marine Division at HAGARU-RI. The movement of the column was greatly hampered by the transporting of over 300 casualties. There were no medical officers left effective to care for these wounded. Initially the force, supported by fighter planes using napalm, attacked the high ground dominating the road just south of the perimeter. Then the movement progressed south along the lake shore, in the direction of HAGARU-RI

as the dominating terrain was taken. The force lost several daylight hours by-passing a blown bridge. About dark the force was stopped by a road block, but after the nearby high ground had been taken the obstacle was reduced and the few undamaged vehicles moved forward slowly. Progress continued until the road was found blocked by a burned out tank, which the force was unable to move. By this time all the field officers were either killed or wounded and only one was still able to exercise command. Part of the force was dispatched south to HAGARU-RI for assistance while the remainder stayed to guard the wounded. During the night some walking wounded escaped across the ice covered reservoir to HAGARU-RI.

A trial landing at the HAGARU-RI C-47 air strip at 1450 hours 1 December proved successful and the air evacuation of wounded started. During the night of 1-2 December the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments continued to push south and by 0100 had contacted the isolated F Company which had held out for four days. By early morning of 2 December the Commanding Officer 7th Marine Regiment reported that he considered his situation very grave, and was making an all out effort to break out during the day. A reconnaissance in force, which went up to make contact with elements of the 7th Infantry Division, was almost surrounded and ordered back. They brought more 7th Division men with them. On the morning of 3 December the 7th Marine Regiment resumed its attack against defended road blocks. They continued the movement throughout the day and leading elements of the regiment entered HAGARU-RI during the evening. There was no indication of heavy enemy pressure on the rear guard but artillery concentrations were fired to cover their movement. By mid-afternoon on 4 December the 5th and 7th Marine column closed in HAGARU-RI. The next day was spent in preparation for the

the attack south toward KOTO-RI and the completion of the air evacuation of casualties.

At 0445 6 December 50, the combined Marine and Army Force, with the 7th Marine Regiment in the lead, attacked south from HAGARU-RI. The attack progressed against strong enemy resistance and by midnight the head of the column had reached a point approximately two miles north of KOTO-RI. The following day the column closed in KOTO-RI and began making preparation for the final leg of its breakout from the attempted Chinese encirclement. (See Sketch No. 3)

Meanwhile the X Corps Commander was formulating a coordinated plan whereby maximum assistance could be given to the entrapped forces and at the same time the integrity of the HAMHUNG Defense Area would be safeguarded. The latter consideration precluded the use of an extensive number of troops in the maneuver, consequently the employment of a compact task force was decided upon. The plan envisioned the advance of this task force north along the HAMHUNG - KOTO-RI MSR to CHINHUNG-NI where contact would be made with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. Service elements of the task force would then proceed north with the Marine Battalion to effect a juncture with the Marine and Army elements fighting south from KOTO-RI. In this manner transportation and engineer support would be provided to the withdrawing force, and the MSR north from CHINHUNG-NI to the point of contact would be cleared in advance thus permitting a more rapid entry of the entire Marine and Army force into the HAMHUNG Defense Area. The combat element of the task force would be responsible to keep the MSR from HAMHUNG to CHINHUNG-NI open and to provide rear-guard and flank security for the withdrawing force.

Accordingly the Commanding General, 3d US Infantry Division was directed to form a task force, designated TASK FORCE DOG, consisting

of Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Transportation, etc. The Task Force under the command of the Asst Div Comdr, 3d US Inf Division moved north at 070700I Dec and by late evening the same day had made contact with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at CHINHUNG-NI. Meanwhile friendly forces at KOTO-RI prepared for the attack south to link-up with the other Corps elements. (See Map C)


At 0800 8 December, the attack moved out south from KOTO-RI with the 7th Infantry Division elements on the left (east) side of the road and the 7th Marine Regiment on the right (west) side. Concurrently the relief force moved north from CHINHUNG-NI. Both forces advanced in the face of heavy enemy resistance from all sides.

By afternoon of 9 December the two attacking forces had advanced until only a destroyed bridge separated them. Treadway bridging had previously been air-dropped to the force at KOTO-RI to replace the demolished span, and as soon as the crossing site was secured, members of the 58th Treadway Bridge Company and the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion began repairing the bridge. By 1651 9 December, the work was completed, the two forces joined, and transportation was released to move southward. The CCF attempt to encircle and annihilate the UN Forces in the CHOSIN Reservoir area had failed.

As Task Force Dog proceeded to secure the flanks and rear of the column, the combined Marine and 7th Division force proceeded to the safety of the HAMHUNG Defense Perimeter. There was no further major enemy attack against the movement, although there were several minor attacks and ambushes against the MSR. By 11 December, all elements of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th US Infantry Division fighting in the CHOSIN Reservoir area had closed in the HAMHUNG Defense Perimeter.

The successful withdrawal from the CHOSIN Reservoir area in the



face of CCF forces which were vastly superior in numbers was made possible only through the fighting determination of the encircled Marines and Soldiers, the coordinated X Corps Plan to effect the withdrawal, and the magnificent air support received from units of the 1st Marine Air Wing, the US Naval Air Arm, and the US Air Force. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy by the constant air attacks, over 1500 tons of supplies were air-dropped to the embattled forces, and over 5000 casualties were evacuated by air. Losses were almost 7,000 Marines and Army casualties, the most severe fighting encountered since the entry of X Corps into the Korean fighting. The enemy, on the other hand, saw the fighting effectiveness of from six to eight of his front line divisions destroyed.



MAP OF NORTH KOREA

MANCHURIA


MAP A  
GENERAL SITUATION  
27 NOVEMBER 1950



38

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# CHOSIN RESERVOIR




**No. 2 CONCENTRATION OF FORCES  
CHOSIN RESERVOIR AREA  
28 NOV. to 5 DEC. 1950  
( PANORAMIC SKETCH NOT TO SCALE )**

PREPARED BY G-3 HISTORICAL SECTION, X CORPS HQ, APO 809 KOREA

REPRO BY 628TH ENGR TOPO DET

# CHOSIN RESERVOIR

YUDAM-NI




## No. 3 THE BREAKOUT

6 to 10 DEC 1950

( PANORAMIC SKETCH NOT TO SCALE )

# CHOSIN RESERVOIR



**No.1 MOVEMENT INTO CHOSIN  
RESERVOIR AREA  
22-27 NOV. 1950  
(PANORAMIC SKETCH NOT TO SCALE)**

**V. LOGISTICS**

REPORT ON LOGISTICS  
CHOSIN RESERVOIR  
27 Nov -- 10 Dec

1. Operations - Logistical Aspects

On 25 November, 1950, the X Corps G-4 held a conference to discuss logistical support for the forthcoming operation which was designed to end the Korean campaign. Conferees included the chiefs of the Supply and Operations sections and all Technical Service representatives.

At this time, elements of the 7th Infantry Division had reached the YALU River in the HYESANJIN area; the 1st Marine Division was centered in the CHOSIN Reservoir area; the 3d Infantry Division with the 1st KMC Regiment in the WONSAN area and the I ROK Corps in the HAPSU - CHONGJIN - KILCHU area. X Corps Operations Order No 7 ordered the 1st Marine Division and elements of the 7th Infantry Division, to attack West-Northwest from the CHOSIN Reservoir area, the I ROK Corps to advance to the northern boundary of KOREA, and the 3d Infantry Division to protect the Corps rear installations and supply points in the WONSAN area. Logistic support for elements of the 7th Infantry Division on the YALU River was accomplished by dispatching daily supply trains on the standard gauge rail line from HAMHUNG to the Division railhead at PUKCHONG. Organic truck transportation augmented by one Transportation Truck Company in direct support of the Division, transported the supplies from the railhead over the hazardous supply route to the YALU River. ✓

Supply of the I ROK Corps was accomplished primarily by water transport between PUSAN and SONGJIN augmented by some rail shipments from HAMHUNG. HAGARU-RI was chosen as the forward supply point for all classes of supplies in support of the attack from the CHOSIN Reservoir area.

The estimate of supplies delivered at HAGARU-RI to support the 1st Marine Division and elements of the 7th Division called for 1000

tons, all classes, per day This estimate included requirements for building a { 10 day level of rations, POL and ammunition at HAGARU-RI. This tonnage had to be moved over one narrow mountainous road approximately 48 miles long and one narrow gauge railroad, with an estimated capacity of 300 - 400 tons per day, extending from HAMHUNG to POHU-JANG, a distance of 33 miles. During the period prior to 27 November, the 1st Marine Division established their Supply Point at HAGARU-RI, using their 1st Motor Transport Battalion and 7th Motor Transport Battalion (-), two companies of which were utilized by the Combat Service Group, FMF, on port clearance at HUNGNAM. Within a few days after implementation of Operation Order No 7, these two companies were released to 1st Marine Division control, but the tactical situation had changed prior to movement of these units to HAGARU-RI and they remained on port clearance operations. Prior to movement of the 1st Marine Division northward from its Base at HAGARU-RI, X Corps assumed responsibility for operation of the transfer point at POHU-JANG and for the establishment of a Corps Supply Point at HAGARU-RI. To provide close logistic support to the Marine Division and elements of the 7th Division, the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, composed of the 513th, 515th, and 377th Transportation Truck Companies, was assigned the mission of transporting all supplies forward from the end of the rail line to the new Corps Supply Point at HAGARU-RI. Originally, the narrow gauge railroad rolling stock and motive power consisted of 50 cars and 8 serviceable locomotives which were later augmented by 63 cars and 2 locomotives through the repair and reclamation efforts of the 301st Railway Operating Battalion (ROK). On 26 November, 1950 a radio requisition was placed on Eighth Army for an additional 63 cars and 10 locomotives which were available in JAPAN; however, due to the change in the tactical situation, these cars were not shipped. Railway operating and maintenance personnel were provided by the 301st ROB (ROK)

and Korean National Railway personnel with the 3d TMRS supervising the operation. The usable portion of the railroad extended from HAMHUNG, to PCHU-JANG a distance of 33 miles, where a transfer point was established. Due to the limited capacity of the narrow gauge railroad, maintenance and improvement of the vehicle route to HAGARU-RI assumed primary importance toward success of the planned operation.

Plans developed prior to the operation ordered for 27 November also included the construction of a C-47 airstrip by the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion at HAGARU-RI with a target date for completion on 1 December 1950.

In the event conditions became such that overland transportation of supplies could not completely support all units, an emergency air support plan was devised. The plan contemplated the air drop of supplies and equipment to isolated units and to the 1st Marine Division supply point at HAGARU-RI if necessary. C-119 aircraft were to be used to lift supplies from ASHIYA airbase in JAPAN for drop to units in zones designated by X Corps. The air support plan also included the employment of C-47 aircraft stationed at YONPO airfield to airdrop supplies to units and to airland them at HAGARU-RI when the field became operational. Planes returning from the field at HAGARU-RI were to evacuate casualties. X Corps supply agencies furnished the supplies from local stocks and delivered them to YONPO airfield for packaging by the 1st Air Delivery Platoon, FMF and subsequent lift by the C-47 aircraft. Control of air delivery and evacuation was under the supervision of G-4, X Corps with a liaison officer from the FEAF Combat Cargo Command attached to assist in the coordination and execution of the plan.

Established air heads for C-47 aircraft were located at WONSAN, YONPO, HOAMUN-DONG and KIILCHU. In addition to the field at HAGARU-RI airheads for C-47's were to be established at PUNGSAN and in the vicinity

of the CHOSIN Reservoir.

Technical Service installations supporting the operation were located at HUNGNAM, HAMHUNG, WONSAN, and PUKCHONG. The 2d Engineer Special Brigade was made responsible for port operations at HUNGNAM with the 1st Marine Combat Service Group, FMF, providing personnel and transportation for port clearance, operation of intransit depots and depots for items peculiar to Marine Corps. Following relief of the Combat Service Group, FMF, responsibility for port operations at WONSAN was delegated to the 3d Infantry Division assisted by the Marine 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Amphibious Truck Battalion and a detachment from the 2d ESB. Responsibility for airhead operation at YONPO was assigned to the 1st Marine Combat Service Group and WONSAN airhead to the 3d Infantry Division. Supervision of railhead operations was accomplished as follows:

HAMHUNG - 142d Quartermaster Battalion

HUNGNAM - 1st Marine Combat Service Group

POHU-JANG (Transfer Point) - Hq & Hq Detachment, 4th Chemical Smoke Generator Battalion and 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company attached.

I ROK Corps and 7th Division (-) were made responsible for railhead activities in their zones. Ordnance support for maintenance and supply of units involved in the operation was to be furnished by the 1st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company at HAGARU-RI and the 58th Ordnance Ammunition Company establishing an ASP in the CHOSIN Reservoir area with an initial stockage of 3000 tons and a daily resupply of 350 tons.

All of the above responsibilities and locations were outlined in detail in X Corps Administrative Order 8-50, dated 25 November 1950.

On 28 November 1950, a traffic regulation and control plan was established on the MSR between HAMHUNG and HAGARU-RI with the X Corps

Transportation Officer, in coordination with the Provost Marshal, charged with the responsibility for its implementation.

Plans for medical service and evacuation included the formation of an ambulance pool made up of vehicles from all separate Corps medical detachments to augment rail and air evacuation. Six (6) Korean railway cars, 3 standard gauge and 3 narrow gauge, were converted into hospital cars utilizing labor furnished by the 163d Medical Battalion and the 1st Marine Medical Battalion. Initially, the 1st Marine Medical Battalion furnished the medical personnel for operating the narrow gauge hospital coaches and the 163d handled the standard gauge cars. The 163d subsequently took over operation of both types.

## 2. Discussion:

At the outset of the operation, the major portion of the Corps Engineer effort was directed toward improvement of the MSR between HAMHUNG and HAGARU-RI. The 8224th Engineer Construction Group was given this mission in addition to constructing a winterized Corps advanced CP in the vicinity of HAGARU-RI, repairing the narrow gauge railroad between POHU-JANG and SUDONG-NI, and reconstructing the narrow gauge cableway beyond SUDONG-NI. In order to accomplish these tasks, the 73d Engineer Combat Battalion was stationed along the road south of SUDONG-NI, the 185th Engineer Combat Battalion was removed from direct support of the 7th Infantry Division and ordered to HAGARU-RI along with Company "D" of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion detached from the 3d Infantry Division for the mission.

Enemy action commencing on 29 November prevented all but Company "D" 10th Engineers, from arriving at their destination and consequently altered plans for Engineer Support. Enemy attacks hampered the performance of normal Engineer duties and much time was spent maintaining defensive perimeters. Between 3 December and 5 December the 185th

Engineers constructed a C-47 airstrip at KOTO-RI while under enemy fire. The 1st Marine Engineer Battalion was also subjected to frequent small arms fire during the construction of C-47 airstrip at HAGARU-RI. In spite of the enemy fire and the difficulty of leveling and surfacing the frozen ground, the first C-47 landed on the airstrip the afternoon of 1 December, the original target date for completion. Thereafter, this strip was used to airland supplies and to evacuate casualties.

Many bridges destroyed by enemy action were repaired or reconstructed. One of these was the replacing of a complete M-2 steel treadway bridge near the Reservoir area in order to allow the 1st Marine Division to continue their withdrawal. The position of the bridge made it impossible to construct a bypass and there was no material immediately available to span the gap. This obstacle was surmounted by a successful airdrop of 8 sections of an M-2 steel treadway bridge and its installation by personnel of the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion and the 58th Treadway Bridge Company.

Truck transportation along the HAMHUNG-HAGARU-RI MSR was augmented on 28 November by the formation of two provisional truck pools, thirty-four trucks in each, under the control of the CO, 52d Transportation Truck Battalion. Vehicles for these pools were furnished by the 121st Evacuation Hospital, 163d Medical Bn, 4th Signal Bn, 772d MP Bn, 50th AAA AW Bn, 581st Signal Radio Relay Co, X Corps Artillery and Hq & Hq Co, X Corps.

The traffic regulating plan established on 28 November successfully controlled the heavy traffic throughout the period. Fifteen officers from the 96th Field Artillery Battalion and enlisted personnel of the 5th Field Artillery Group operated the traffic control communication net using both radio and wire. Personnel were also drawn from the 8224th Engineer Construction Group to augment Corps Military Police

in manning traffic regulating points.

The Marines were relieved of responsibility for operating the transfer point at POHU-JANG on 27 November but elements of their service units remained in the area throughout the operation and assisted in rail - truck transfer operations.

As the quantity of supplies increased at POHU-JANG, the limited space made it necessary to unload POL at MAJON-DONG, 8 miles south, thus splitting the operating units and making it necessary to augment the personnel with 150 indigenous laborers in order to keep supplies moving. Due to enemy action, all northward movement of supplies on the narrow gauge railroad was stopped on 3 December. On 4 December supplies stockpiled at POHU-JANG for subsequent movement to HAGARU-RI were reloaded and evacuated to HAMHUNG. During this evacuation of supplies, 2 officers and 66 enlisted men from the Chemical units operating the transfer point were released to assist in loading and unloading aircraft at YONPO airfield. On 6 December this personnel returned to MAJON-DONG to assist in the final evacuation of excess supplies and casualties until all personnel had withdrawn from the area.

On 8 December an 8 car hospital train and 60 additional cars were positioned at SONTANG to assist in evacuating the Marine Division and elements of the 7th Division. The hospital train departed the night of 9 December and approximately 4000 men were evacuated on the remaining trains until rail movement ceased on 9 December.

When the MSR was cut between HAMHUNG and HAGARU-RI on 28 November the problem of logistical support of approximately 25,000 troops became critical. The only means of evacuating casualties from units north of HAGARU-RI was by Marine helicopter into the airstrip under construction at HAGARU-RI and transfer to liaison aircraft for the remainder of the flight to the airstrip at HAMHUNG. From there, patients were moved by

ambulance either to the 121st Evacuation Hospital or to the Hospital Ship CONSOLATION located in HUNGNAM Harbor. This situation was alleviated by the opening of the airstrip to C-47 planes on 1 December.

The tactical situation required the emergency air support plan to be placed in effect at the outset of the operation. On 28 November ammunition was dropped to elements of the 31st and 32d Infantry Regiments, and the 7th Marine Regiment. The total amount dropped was 24.6 tons in 10 C-47 sorties. From then until the end of the period, air supply and evacuation proved a major factor in the successful withdrawal operations. Maximum airlift was attained on 5 December. On this date a total of 1580 casualties was evacuated from HAGARU-RI to YONPO air field in 38 C-47 sorties. 101.4 tons of supplies were airlanded at HAGARU-RI and 14 C-119's dropped 75 tons of ammunition and supplies to isolated units of both divisions. Total C-47 and C-119 air supply and evacuation figures for the period November 27th to December 10th are as follows:

Casualties evacuated by air from HAGARU-RI	4526
" " " " " KOTO-RI	<u>312</u>
Total	4838
Supplies & equipment, all classes airlanded at HAGARU-RI	190.8
Supplies & equipment, all classes airlanded at KOTO-RI	<u>11.4</u>
Total	202.2
Supplies and equipment, all classes, airdropped	565 tons

### 3. Summary:

Summary of logistical operation during the period 27 November - 10 December is as follows:

During the time the narrow gauge railroad was in use, 25 November - 2 December, 1350 tons of supplies were shipped to the railhead at POHU-JANG in support of this operation. This amounted to a daily average of 169 tons. Some 4000 personnel were evacuated by rail

from SONTANG to HAMHUNG. A total of 1,580 casualties were evacuated by air including those by helicopter, liaison aircraft and C-47 cargo planes. 565 tons of supplies of all classes were airdropped and a total of 202.2 tons were airlanded. Prior to commencing the withdrawal from the CHOSIN Reservoir area maximum utilization of C-47 cargo planes was made to evacuate battle casualties, excess supplies and equipment.

The execution of the logistical plan in support of Operations Order No 7 progressed generally according to schedule. While ice covered rails and roads and locomotive mechanical failures temporarily delayed establishment of the planned 10 day stock level of supplies at HAGARU-RI, all levels were attained prior to the beginning of the attack northward. The implementation of the emergency air support plan, following the encirclement of the friendly forces, was highly successful and contributed materially to the success of the withdrawal. The logistical accomplishments of this operation can be attributed to the careful detailed planning of the operation and to coordinated and energetic execution.