



Spotlight On: Insider Threats in the Supply Chain

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Prevalence of the Problem



For the finance and insurance sector, **38%** of insider incidents were known to be perpetrated by trusted business partners


<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/patterns-and-trends-in-insider-threats-across-industry-sectors-part-9-of-9-insider-threats-across-industry-sectors/>

Scope of the Challenge

<i>How extensive is the challenge of achieving each of the following for insider risk programs?</i>						
Challenge	Respondent Count	Low	Medium Low	Medium	Medium High	High
Coordinating and communicating across business / operational units	50				✓	
Establishing the insider threat program scope and organizational structure	50			✓		
Ensuring compliance with all applicable legal requirements	50			✓		
Developing policy and formalizing the program	50			✓		
Incorporating insider threat controls for trusted business partners	49				✓	
Obtaining adequate funding for program operation	50					✓
Developing and administering insider threat awareness training	50			✓		
Hiring and retaining qualified insider threat program personnel	48				✓	
Sharing information across the organization's departments / units, including Human Resources (HR)	50				✓	


https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/_files/documents/irm-survey-results-20210331.7.pdf

Insider Incident Progression



Adapted from Shaw, Eric, and Laura Sellers. "Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider Risks." *Studies in Intelligence* 59.2 (Extracts, June 2015)

A Case Study



A contractor was unofficially working for the company's TBP, a document imaging company.

The victim organization was a high technology company. The TBP was hired to copy trade secrets in preparation for litigation. The insider was hired informally by a family member, to assist with the high workload.

The insider stole and posted trade secrets, design notes, and correspondence between the victim organization and a collaborator. The incident related loss was approximately \$25 million.

Best Practices for Supply Chain Insider Risk Management


Policies, practices, and procedures – yours and your trusted business partners

- Non-disclosure and intellectual property agreements
- Background screening
- Concerning behavior reporting

Contractual agreements that “raise the bar” for technical controls and information sharing

Goal: apply security controls and risk management activities based on levels of access, not employment status

Components of a Successful Insider Risk Management Program



Q&A



For More Information

- [CERT Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats](#)
- [Spotlight On: Insider Threat From Trusted Business Partners](#)
- [Insider Threats in the Finance and Insurance Sector](#)
- Additional Inquiries: insider-threat-feedback@cert.org