

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05/15/2020		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug 2019 - May 2020	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Centralized Joint Officer Management: A Model for Improving Joint Warfighting				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tribble, Stephen A.				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd. Norfolk, VA 23511-1702				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Not for Commercial Use without the express written permission of the author					
14. ABSTRACT This study recommends the development and implementation of a centralized joint officer management model (CJOMM) to build, maintain, and cultivate a professional corps of capable and competent career JQOs who are experts at planning and leading joint operations as well as leading joint formations in complex and uncertain operational and strategic environments through the application of globally integrated, multi-domain, and joint operational concepts. Under the direction of the Joint Staff J-1, CJOMM recommends the creation of a joint officer career field (JOCF) to consolidate the management of joint officer education, assignment, and promotion for a small corps of career JQOs.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS joint operations, joint warfighting, joint education, joint personnel management, centralized personnel management, personnel management, joint officer, joint officer management, global integration, multi-domain operations, joint operational concepts, planning and leading joint operations, leading joint formations					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
UNCLASS	UNCLASS	UNCLASS	Unclassified Unlimited	49	757-443-6301

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



Centralized Joint Officer Management: A Model for Improving Joint Warfighting

by

Stephen A. Tribble

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

Centralized Joint Officer Management: A Model for Improving Joint Warfighting

by

Stephen A. Tribble

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____



May 2019

Thesis Advisor:

Signature: _____


Keith D. Dickson, Ph.D.



Committee Member:

Signature: _____

James A. Fosbrink, Colonel, U.S. Army



Approved by:

Signature: _____

**Miguel L. Peko, Captain, US Navy
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting
School**



Abstract

The character of future of warfare continues to change with the introduction of space and cyber as warfighting domains, rapidly changing technological advances, individual and low cost access to weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the ability to induce fear among and inflict suffering upon the civilian population. History has exposed the dangers of single service solutions, service parochialism, ad hoc jointness, incompatible service specific equipment, and the overall lack of service interoperability. History has also proven the utility and value of conducting military operations as a joint force. United States military forces are structured and fight as a joint force based on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986. This joint force is employed through the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) concept capable of globally integrated, multi-domain operations. However, DoD has yet to codify how leaders are to be educated to employ joint forces effectively in future warfare. The fatal flaw in current U.S. thinking is the assumption that any commander or staff can operate in a complex joint environment or that any collection of commanders and staff officers can be effective in employing a joint force in the new complexity of the future battlespace. This future battlespace requires educated and experienced joint qualified officers (JQO) to provide the critical joint staff skills for the Combatant Commander to employ a joint warfighting capability effectively and decisively in a globally integrated, multi-domain operational-strategic battlespace. JQOs provide an essential set of skills and knowledge that make them experts in all joint matters; they will require a specialized personnel management system to cultivate a collective joint capability by managing officers who are proficient in high-paced, high-visibility staff work and can apply a joint mindset. This study recommends the development and implementation of a centralized joint officer management model (CJOMM) to build, maintain, and cultivate a professional corps of capable and competent career JQOs who are experts at planning and leading joint operations as well as leading joint formations in complex and uncertain operational and strategic environments through the application of globally integrated, multi-domain, and joint operational concepts. Under the direction of the Joint Staff J-1, CJOMM recommends the creation of a joint officer career field (JOCF) to consolidate the management of joint officer education, assignment, and promotion for a small corps of career JQOs. CJOMM implementation requires a committee of Joint Staff, service personnel exerts, and congressional representatives to work out structure and establish required Joint Staff institutions and changes in current laws. CJOMM improves JQO management effectiveness by directly connecting the management and development of a professional corps of JQOs to Combatant Command joint mission requirements, replacing the current fragmented system of JQO management by the services. Failing to implement CJOMM will result in continued joint operational and strategic inefficiencies that can lead to repeating the operational and strategic failures of the past.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Dr. Keith Dickson for his continual leadership and guidance. His expert contributions not only made this research project possible, it resulted in the overall improvement of my research and writing capabilities as well as significantly increased the quality of the final product.

I also want to thank Colonel James “Hall” Bain for his expert leadership throughout my time at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). His sharing of personal and professional experiences as well as his continual efforts to keep students grounded in reality improved my overall experience as a JAWS student and significantly improved my planning and leadership capabilities.

Thank you Colonel James Fosbrink for your support of and contributions to the development and improvement of this thesis.

Thank Dr. Charles Davis for your passion for and expertise in joint officer education and management. Your support, guidance, and input proved invaluable to the development and improvement of the this project.

Lastly but most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Marea T. Tribble. All of our success and accomplishments are a direct result of your support not only during this past year as a JAWS student but throughout our 28 year military career. I love you Sweets!

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Joint Staff Requirements for Future Warfigting	10
Barriers to Effective Joint Warfigting in the Future Battlesapce	14
Breaking the Barriers: Centralized Joint Officer Assignment Management	21
Conclusion	37
Bibliography	45
Vita.....	49

Chapter 1

Introduction

*Today, we face a complex and volatile global security environment with a wide range of challenges. We will meet those challenges and we stand ready to keep the peace and, if necessary, win the war on the land, at sea, in the air, in space and cyber space.*¹ - General Mark A. Milley

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the global security environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace.² The consequences of fragile and failing states, increased competition among peer and near-peer states, as well as increasingly powerful non-state actors, and increased power parity resulting from technological advances threaten the national interests of the United States (U.S.) as well as the existing U.S.-led liberal world order.³ Strategists have asserted that is imperative for the U.S. to not only keep pace with its competitors, it must also remain at the forefront of development and innovation, while maintaining a state of continual advantage.⁴ To maintain its global competitive edge and field a professional joint warfighting capability employed as an integrated joint force through the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) structure, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must centralize, under a single authority, the management of joint officer education, assignment, and promotion for a corps of career joint qualified officers (JQO) to lead a professional and joint force capable of meeting the challenges of future warfare.

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCS Milley’s Message to the Joint Force,” accessed January 12, 2020 from <https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1977200/cjcs-milleys-message-to-the-joint-force/>.

² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴ See, for example, Everett C. Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 6.

Historians track the concept of coordinating operations between distinct military capabilities back to the armies and navies of ancient Greece.⁵ Historian Williamson Murray suggests the origin of joint warfare dates back to the 17th century, marked by the rise of a professional military and nation-states.⁶ Throughout the following centuries, the character of warfare changed as the battlefield increased in size, speed of action, and overall complexity. By the end of World War I in 1918, tanks and radios were common place on the battlefield, and the invention of the airplane ushered in the warfighting domain in the air.⁷ Continued developments in technology, doctrine, and organization throughout the interwar period led to the employment of decisive combat power at the operational level during World War II. In the decades that followed, the United States began to understand and employ joint operational concepts, experiencing both failures and successes.

The United States experienced limited success and, at times, outright failure in employing joint operations during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in Operation Eagle Claw (Iran, 1980), and Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983). When the U.S. military fought as a joint force during the Korean War, it fought effectively. However, this was the exception rather than the rule. The Vietnam War provided a painful lesson of failure to employ joint operations. “Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others,” author David Jones observes, “considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself.”⁸ Indeed, each service fought its separate air war, and measured operational success through service specific body counts and

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), v.

⁶ Williamson Murray, “The Evolution of Joint Warfare,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 31 (Summer 2002): 31.

⁷ James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 28.

⁸ David C. Jones, “Past Organizational Problems,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 25.

tonnage of ordinance dropped. The lack of service interoperability persisted to the end of the Vietnam War.⁹

Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1980, was another setback for jointness. The lack of joint capability compounded the inherent complexity of an already challenging operation. DoD had not established joint doctrine or procedures, and did not have a joint organization with the organic capability to conduct such a complex operation.¹⁰ Furthermore, a joint staff element with the experience and expertise to plan and supervise execution did not exist.¹¹ The ad hoc team of inexperienced planners found cross service coordination and communication difficult at best.¹² Furthermore, information was not shared between elements of the planning team due to concerns over operational security allowing conceptual flaws and gaps in coordination to not be noticed until execution.¹³ The failure to establish clear command and control procedures across the joint task force created confusion as the multiservice force converged at Desert One, the final rally point prior to insertion into Iran. From the beginning, the lack of joint doctrine experience, expertise, and integration plagued Operation Eagle Claw at every level and ultimately resulted in its poignant failure. The lack of joint knowledge and joint acculturation doomed the mission.¹⁴

Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. military effort to liberate Grenada in 1983, was another example of limited success of a joint force. Operation Urgent Fury was hastily planned and

⁹ Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," 25.

¹⁰ James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 46.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

organized with the assignment of the U.S. Navy Second Fleet Headquarters as the lead element for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).¹⁵ The operation, however, required the coordination of land, sea, and air components, a capability that the navy headquarters was unable to provide.¹⁶ Each element of the task force employed incompatible communications equipment, used different modes of transportation, and employed different platforms and tactics for close air support.¹⁷ This ultimately led to confusion and a breakdown in the management of the battlespace.¹⁸ Operation Urgent Fury exposed significant interoperability and compatibility issues that prevented air, land, and sea forces to be employed effectively.

These inefficiencies in U.S. operations were finally addressed with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986, which implemented DoD structural and policy reforms and mandated jointness. Senator Sam Nunn, a proponent of the landmark legislation stated that “the act addressed a huge problem - the inability of the military services to operate effectively together as a joint team - and solved it.”¹⁹ GNA reform established the combatant command structure and streamlined the military chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders, who were now responsible for employing joint forces on the battlefield.²⁰ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the senior military advisor to the President.²¹ But most importantly for this study, the

¹⁵ Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 66.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Sam Nunn, forward to *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, by James R. Locher III (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), xii.

²⁰ U.S. Government, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, U.S. Code, vol. 10, sec. 161 (1986).

²¹ Ibid., sec. 151.

GNA sought to improve the quality, experience, and education of the joint force.²² It also mandated that the “number of officers with the joint specialty . . . shall be large enough to meet the requirements” of the joint force.²³

In accordance with the GNA, joint forces are employed through the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) concept.²⁴ The UCC structure provides a framework for the assignment of trained and ready forces to plan, execute, and support combatant command joint operations. Preparing these forces to fight as a joint force remains the responsibility of the services. The inherent strengths and benefits of fighting as a joint force include the mitigation of functional or geographic vulnerabilities, the availability of a broad range of options for military operations, and the employment of complementary and reinforcing capabilities of the services to enhance military capability.²⁵ A U.S. joint doctrine publication summarizes the essence of jointness; “Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts.”²⁶

Most recently, DoD, in response to perceptions that the conduct of warfare is undergoing rapid change, has developed the globally integrated operations (GIO) concept to increase the effectiveness of the joint force. GIO “requires a globally postured joint force to quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries,

²² Congressional Research Service, *Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)*, January 2016 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 2.

²³ *Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, sec. 661.

²⁴ Congressional Research Service, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress*, January 2013 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 1.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), i, ii & I-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I-2.

and organizational affiliations.”²⁷ On the battlefield, GIO translates into the requirement for rapid decision making within the battlespace, clear and smooth transitions between phases of the operation, an understanding of combat capabilities across the services, and battlefield knowledge and prowess in applying multi-domain forces in time and space for a decisive result. The GIO concept hints at the need for officers capable of planning and leading globally integrated, multi-domain, and especially, joint operations at the operational-strategic level but fails to address it explicitly.²⁸ “Joint force elements postured around the globe can combine quickly with each other and mission partners to harmonize capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. These networks will form, evolve, dissolve and reform in different arrangement in time and space as required with significantly grater fluidity and flexibility than do current Joint Forces.”²⁹ While not explicitly identified as part of GIO, it is reasonable to conclude that the success of the GIO concept requires planners, staff officers, and commanders who understand and know how to employ joint operational concepts. GNA reinforces this inference by mandating the identification, education, and management of officers “who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters” as well as the designation of “not fewer than 1,000 joint duty assignment positions as critical joint duty assignment positions.”³⁰ GNA also mandates that these position be only be held by JQOs.³¹

The education, professional development, and management of joint officers is the critical

²⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4.

²⁸ Francis J.H. Park, *Chairman’s Vision of Global Integration*, Presentation, May 24, 2018, retrieved October 11, 2019 from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdpc/11_global_integration15May.pptx.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁰ *Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, sec. 161.

³¹ *Ibid.*

issue for the advancement of the U.S. military as an effective and professional joint force prepared for a future, more complex battlespace. Joint officers are uniquely qualified and, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-7, should possess professional and “personal attributes conducive to staff work, joint service capabilities and knowledge, possessing and applying a joint mindset, high proficiency in ... professional skills, lifelong learning skills, and leadership and management skills for working in a joint, high-paced ... environment.”³² Properly educated and experienced joint officers possess executive writing skills, are comfortable interacting with senior leaders, and can critically assess, expertly research, and concisely communicate recommendations and courses of action.³³ Success in a complex, globally integrated, multi-domain battlespace requires educated and experienced JQOs possessing the ability to think critically, adapt quickly to the changing environment, interact professionally with a multitude of stakeholders across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational spectrum of partners and collaborators, and expertly plan, integrate, and lead joint operations.

Both DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the importance of joint operations and the contributions of JQOs, but do not seem to understand the basic problem: the future joint force capable of conducting GIO and MDO can only be built with JQOs in adequate numbers and with adequate education and management. The critical challenges for the current and future U.S. joint force are threefold and lie in producing qualified JQOs, managing existing JQOs, and developing Joint Staff policies related to JQO assignment. These force management inefficiencies have led to a critical shortage of available educated and experienced JQOs to fill the number of joint duty

³² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Staff Officer Project: Final Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 7.

³³ *Ibid.*

assignment list (JDAL) billets required for the effective employment of forces required by the UCC joint warfighting structure. If not reformed soon, the critical shortfall of JQOs will only continue to grow and the combatant commanders will receive forces incapable of operating as a joint force, let alone being capable of conducting the highly complex level of operations required for the future battlespace. The consequences of such a failure would be catastrophic.

The methodology for this thesis consists mainly of document research, but also includes interviews with subject matter experts, military practitioners, and commanders. The approach to this topic includes an examination of the future operational environment in relation to requisite joint officer competencies, obstacles associated with an insufficient number of JQOs, and the proposal of a model for a centralized joint officer management system to provide the necessary educated leaders capable of conducting globally integrated, multi-domain operations at the operational-strategic level. This thesis approaches the topic by examining the following research questions:

- Research Question #1: How is the operational environment changing that creates new requirements for joint officers and/or the joint officer force?
- Research Question #2: How is DoD developing of a professional joint officer corps in sufficient numbers that is properly educated, allocated, and managed to conduct globally integrated, multi-domain operations at the operational-strategic level.
- Research Question #3: What are the key attributes of a more professionally joint U.S warfighting officer corps?
- Research Question #4: What obstacles exist that have prevented the development of a more professionally joint U.S warfighting officer corps to date?

Professional joint officers are absolutely essential to future warfighting in a complex battlespace. The operational level of war is joint warfare. Critical to the conduct of joint operations is the availability and employment of expertly educated and experienced joint officers who provide the unique set of skills required to understand and effectively employ joint operational concepts in a complex operational and strategic environment. The U.S. military is currently falling short of producing and managing joint officers in both quantity and quality. It is imperative that the U.S. military cultivate a core of professional joint officers in sufficient number to conduct joint warfare.

The advantages of a more professional joint force and consideration of the institutional challenges lead to a conceptual outline for a centralized joint officer management system that enables the joint force to operate with greater efficacy. Scott Carpenter, in the *Joint Force Quarterly* argues that “because of its failure to designate career paths and implement a career management plan for joint officers, DoD is losing valuable expert knowledge.”³⁴ DoD must do a better job of managing joint officer talent and joint officer education to improve DoD’s overall joint warfighting capability. One model for improving joint officer management and education, as well as joint warfighting overall, is the implementation of a centralized joint officer management system that reduces service parochialism, improves joint officer education delivery, and oversees joint officer assignment management. Such a system would allow DoD to increase the overall number of JQOs available for assignment to JDAL billets as well as provide effective and efficient management of the JQOs corps.

³⁴ Scott A. Carpenter, "The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist," *Joint Force Quarterly* 63 (4th Quarter 2011): 125.

Chapter 2

Joint Staff Requirements for Future Warfigting

*The challenge now is to expand the 'jointness' achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan to the full range of operations and capabilities needed for the future security environment.*¹ - Martin E. Dempsey

The 2019 National Intelligence Strategy states that the United States must contend not only with traditional adversaries such as China, Russia, and North Korea across “traditional, non-traditional, hybrid, and asymmetric military, economic, and political spheres,” but also evolving threats from a wider range of actors “leveraging rapid advances in technology . . . in the realm of space, cyberspace, computing, and other emerging disruptive technologies.”² It is certain that the future battlefield will include an increasing number of interdependent variables and interrelated systems “where disparate, yet related elements of the Operational Environment (OE) are converging, creating a situation where fast moving trends across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spheres are rapidly transforming . . . warfare.”³ Elements such as the introduction of the space and cyber domains, rapidly changing technological advances, individual and low cost access to weapons, terrorism, and the ability of any number of actors to induce fear and inflict suffering compound the complexity of the environment. Whatever form future warfare takes, it is certain that it will be multi-domain, ambiguous, and exceptionally complex.

¹ Martin E. Dempsey, “The Future of Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for Real Threats,” *Foreign Affairs* (June 20, 2013), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-06-20/future-joint-operations> (accessed December 12, 2019).

² Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2019* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 4.

³ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2017), 4.

In 2012, General Martin E. Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the criticality of jointness to U.S. military success and the advancement of the profession of arms:

Jointness is derived from the integration of Service cultures and competencies, and requires teamwork amongst all Services and Military Departments to accomplish objectives in the best interest of National security unfettered by parochialism. It also demands teamwork with our interagency, intergovernmental, and coalition partners to achieve unity of effort to accomplish our shared objectives. Joint interdependence is integral to Jointness and is essential to provide the greatest number of military options for our Nation's leaders to preserve peace, and when necessary, respond to crisis to defend the American people and our national interests.⁴

Fighting as a joint force in such an environment requires “trust, cooperation, and interdependency.”⁵ This interdependence - true jointness - is the key to success on future battlefields and “demands truly joint warfighters who are capable, comfortable, and confident when operating across functions, domains, and cultures.”⁶ However, even as DoD has recognized that warfare continues to evolve, DoD has yet to codify how leaders are to be educated to employ joint forces in this new environment. The future battlefield requires educated and experienced JQOs to provide the critical joint staff skills necessary for the Combatant Commands to employ a joint warfighting capability effectively and decisively in a globally integrated, multi-domain operational-strategic battlespace.

In 2012, DoD introduced the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), providing a strategic vision for the development of, and the operational concepts for, the employment of the joint force to fight and win the nation's future wars.⁷ At its foundation is the concept that the U.S.

⁴ Martin E. Dempsey, *America's Military: A Profession of Arms White Paper*, 2012, accessed November 11, 2019 from <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/aprofessionofarms.pdf>.

⁵ Charles Davis and Frederick R. Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II," *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 23.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

military is a joint force. Specifically, the CCJO seeks to address the issue of how “future Joint Forces with constrained resources protect U.S. national interests against increasingly capable enemies in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and increasingly transparent world.”⁸ The CCJO identifies six persistent characteristics of the security environment: “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.”⁹ More broadly, the future security environment will be characterized by globalization, emerging space and cyber domains, social media, the diffusion of technology, and the difficulty in defining who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield.¹⁰

The CCJO introduced the concept of globally integrated operations that provides a context for the preparation of the joint force to succeed in the future security environment and leverages:

enable commanders to cope with uncertainty, complexity and rapid change. It will improve a commander’s ability to tailor the force to the situation. It will aid a commander’s ability to scale military force as required. It will help commanders down to the lowest echelons exercise initiative and coordinate locally while maintaining broader situational awareness.¹¹

The success of GIO relies on the ability of commanders and their staffs to understand and employ joint operational concepts and who can plan, execute, and lead joint operations. This will require educated JQOs who possess the unique set of skills and knowledge that make them experts in all joint matters.

⁸ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

In 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a CJCS directed review of joint education. The review identified six desired leader attributes (DLA) of JQOs:¹²

- Ability to understand the security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.
- Ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding.
- Ability to think critically and strategically and apply joint warfighting principles and concepts in joint operations spanning all levels of warfare.
- Ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty.
- Ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions.
- Ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms.

Producing, developing, and managing a corps of JQOs possessing these DLAs, but having mastered the top three, will foster joint acculturation throughout the joint force and improve joint warfighting capability, but as Scott A. Carpenter cautions, “without purposeful management and utilization of acquired joint expertise, there is no net gain in joint organizational performance.”¹³ DoD must address the first two problems outlined in this thesis: building a corps of JQOs and managing them as an essential component of U.S warfighting capability.

¹² Jeffery Ruth, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), xvi.

¹³ Scott A. Carpenter, "The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist," *Joint Force Quarterly* 63 (4th Quarter 2011): 127.

Chapter 3

Barriers to Effective Joint Warfighting in the Future Battlespace

While DoD has made significant strides toward improving jointness, more must be done to field a joint force capable of succeeding on the future battlefield. The days of assuming any military professional can step into a joint position and perform well without proper training and education are long gone. Success on the future battlefield demands a professionally educated and experienced joint officer corps. While DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the importance of joint operations and the contributions of JQOs and the requirement for JQOs is codified in law as part of GNA, this essential truth is not explicitly recognized in current DoD or Joint Staff documents nor is it supported by service-focused joint education and management systems and practices.

This chapter explores the bureaucratic elements inherent within DoD that limit the development of a professional joint officer corps. In particular, factors related to service parochialism, inadequate and ineffective joint officer education throughput, a shortage of JQOs, and existing CJCS policies that contribute to the conceptual breakdown of the current joint officer management system and serve as significant barriers to the development of a comprehensive strategic approach to future joint officer management.

DoD outlines a progressive system for the development and management of joint officers in the 2018 *DoD Instruction 1300.19: DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program* and the

2007 *Joint Officer Management: Joint Qualification System (JQS) Implementation Plan*.¹ Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) consists of three levels: primary joint education (Joint Officer Qualification (JOQ) Level II / JPME I), intermediate joint education (JOQ Level III / JPME II), and general and flag officer (GOFO) joint education (JOQ Level IV / Capstone).² Most officers receive JPME I as a junior field grade officer through a service specific program or institution. GOFOs complete Capstone upon appointment to O-7. Although DoD seems to execute and manage the JPME I and Capstone programs well, the execution and management of the JPME II program is deeply flawed. The problem relates to the inability to provide joint officer education at the right time in an officer's career to maximize the educational experience, as well as maximize the effectiveness of the joint staff officer's contribution to the joint force.³

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directs joint duty assignment (JDAL billet) immediately following preparatory joint education (JPME II).⁴ JPME II provides officers with a breadth of joint knowledge and instills joint acculturation to prepare them to be effective joint staff officers, serve in JDAL billets, and ultimately serve as the creators of an expert joint force.⁵ "The purpose of JPME II and its preparatory nature present considerable obstacles to improving the effectiveness of the joint force. Joint preparation necessitates joint acculturation, and the two must occur simultaneously to achieve the goal of

¹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *Department of Defense Instruction 1300.19: DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Officer Management: Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 3.

² *Joint Officer Management*, 11.

³ Charles Davis and Frederick R. Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II," *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 27.

⁴ U.S. Government, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, U.S. Code, vol. 10, sec. 161 (1986).

⁵ Davis and Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force," 27.

improving the joint force and fulfill the intent of Goldwater-Nichols.”⁶ Achieving joint officer qualification requires both joint education and joint experience. The JQO system approved as part of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, amended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, details waiver procedures and requirements for assigning non- JQOs to JDAL billets.⁷

Officers can receive credit for joint experience (experience joint duty assignment (E-JDA)) as opposed to a standard joint duty assignment (S-JDA). This allows junior field grade officers to achieve joint officer qualification by getting joint experience first, while delaying completion of JPME-II until attendance at a service joint school (SJS) or senior service school (SSS) as a senior O-5 or O-6.⁸ Because most JDAL billets are O-4/O-5 positions; this practice both robs the joint service of the required educated joint officers, while requiring officers without adequate joint education and training to fill JDAL positions.⁹ This loophole in the law “eased pressures on Service personnel systems and provided convenient options to personnel managers but shortchanged student academic and cultural experiences.”¹⁰ Scott A. Carpenter’s analysis of the current JOM program indicates that it falls woefully short of producing the intended outcome of the law:

While the JOM plan provides the mechanism for how officers acquire joint qualifications, it lacks a means by which DoD will develop and utilize these officers. Organizations do not exist for the purpose of providing officers joint experience, traditional or otherwise. ... Nonetheless, the failure is the result not of implementation but rather the DoD strategic approach to JOM. The concept breaks down at the point of developing the proficiency level of joint officers. Relatively

⁶ Davis and Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force," 27.

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1330.05A: Joint Officer Management Program Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), D-4.

⁸ Paul H. Mayberry, William H. Waggy II, and Anthony Lawrence, *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trend* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 51.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

speaking, current proficiencies never improve beyond a baseline level because there is no mechanism to retain joint expertise in the joint organization.¹¹

Carpenter's analysis clearly illustrates the breakdown of the current JOM system. By maintaining joint officer management at the service level, DoD has failed to implement a strategic approach to develop a joint organization through the development and retention of joint expertise. The services retain authority for all aspects of development and management of their service specific officers, to include selection for joint officer education programs, assignment to JDAL billets, and promotion of JQOs. The services manage all of their officers in accordance with service-specific priorities and protect service-specific equities to the detriment of the joint force.¹² Without the strategic management of JQOs, at a level above the services, joint education will continue to be mismanaged, while joint expertise, rather than existing as a centralized capability, will remain fragmented across the services. This situation ultimately prevents DoD from developing the level of organizational jointness dictated by law and required to support combatant commanders.

According to the Fiscal Year 2018 Joint Officer Management Annual Report for the Secretary of Defense, DoD reported an inventory of 9,179 JQOs, 8,369 active component (AC) JQOs and 810 reserve component (RC) JQOs, to fill 3,543 JDAL billets.¹³ These numbers suggest that there are an adequate number of JQOs to fill all JDAL billets. However, AC JDAL fill rates decreased from 87.7 percent in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to 64.3 percent in FY18. The

¹¹ Scott A. Carpenter, "The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist," *Joint Force Quarterly* 63 (4th Quarter 2011): 127.

¹² Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, Roland J. Yardley, Marian Oshiro, Holly Ann Potter, Peter Schirmer, and Nelson Lim, *Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 8 & 111.

¹³ Sara A. Joyner, "Fiscal Year 2018 Joint Officer Management Annual Report for the Secretary of Defense" (unpublished Joint Staff report, May 6, 2019), Adobe PDF file.

FY18 fill rates for full-time RC JDAL billets were 59.5 percent and for part-time RC JDAL billets were 52.2 percent.¹⁴ These numbers are a stark illustration of the insufficient number of JQOs available to fill JDAL billets and indicates the service's failure to meet its responsibilities mandated by law.

In addition, the existing joint officer education system is not able to keep up with JQO demands. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) and Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), resident in the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), are the only programs specifically missioned and designed to achieve joint acculturation.¹⁵ The JCWS and JAWS programs deliver a curriculum focused solely on joint education designed to adequately prepare officers for assignment to a JDAL billet. JAWS produces 45 JQOs annually while JCWS produces approximately 750 JQOs annually, a total of 795 JFSC JQOs per annum. Based on a 36 month minimum JDAL tour length and an annual JDAL turnover rate of 33.33 percent, JFSC would need to produce 1,181 JQOs annually to fill 100 percent of the 3,543 JDAL billets. Even with these figures, that is a shortfall of 386 in available JQOs. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1330.05A reduced the minimum joint tour length from 36 months to 24 months.¹⁶ Based on a 24 month minimum JDAL tour length and an annual JDAL turnover rate of 50 percent, JFSC would need to produce 1,772 JQOs annually. This exponential spike in required JFSC throughput increases the JQO shortfall to 977.

Although DoD appears on the surface to be more joint today than it has ever been, the true level of jointness may actually be an artificially inflated perception as a result of the

¹⁴ Joyner, "Fiscal Year 2018 Joint Officer Management Annual Report for the Secretary of Defense."

¹⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E: Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), E-1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, E-3.

proliferation of JPME II–accredited institutions.¹⁷ As DoD increasingly continues to operate and organize as a joint force, there is a corresponding increasing pressure on the services to produce JQOs. The services wanted JPME II accreditation for their Senior Service School programs, so they could grant JPME II educational credit to their officers to generate a larger pool of JQOs for consideration for promotion to GOFO.¹⁸ This has led to no less than 13 different JPME-II accredited programs within DoD, many which include a student body dominated by a single service, the provision of a mostly service specific curriculum, and the teaching of joint concepts and instilling joint acculturation as a tertiary objective.¹⁹ A recent accreditation review of the remaining JPME-II accredited programs revealed an “insufficient emphasis and focus on jointness and, in some cases, a concerning lack of commitment to teaching the fundamentals of joint warfighting.”²⁰ Such practices lead to officers receiving JQO designation, but not acquiring the knowledge, skills, and attributes required to succeed when assigned to a JDAL billet.

The lack of effective joint officer assignment management also contributes to an insufficient number of JQOs relates. DoD does not have a central authority or entity to manage the assignment of officers to JDAL billets. DoD directs each service to identify and assign officers to fill specific JDAL billets but the services retain the authority to decide which officers fill these billets. The services frequently do not send officers identified to fill JDAL billets to preparatory JPME II education. The result is that these unprepared officers lack the joint education required to counter innate Service-centric biases. Forgoing joint acculturation and the

¹⁷ Sydney M. Savion and Terrance J. Mccaffrey "Burgeoning Courses, Lagging Standardization." *Joint Force Quarterly* 57 (2nd Quarter 2010): 74.

¹⁸ Davis and Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force," 25.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

inculcation of a joint mindset as a prerequisite to joint assignment unnecessarily disadvantages and burdens the officer assigned to the joint billet, their chain of command, and the command overall.²¹

Shortages in critical JQO numbers, as well inefficient institutional policies and practices, undermine DoD's ability to develop and field a professional joint officer corps. United States law mandates the employment of a joint force and DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the importance of joint operations and the contributions of JQOs. However, a multitude of bureaucratic elements related to service parochialism, inadequate and ineffective joint officer education throughput, a shortage of JQOs, and existing CJCS policies limit DoD's ability to build and manage a professional joint officer corps capable of planning, executing, and leading joint operations in a complex, globally integrated, multi-domain environment. Improving jointness requires a professional joint officer corps with the skills and experience required to conduct globally integrated, multi-domain operations (MDO) at the operational-strategic level. Therefore, it stands to reason that there is value in having a professional joint officer as opposed to a joint educated service officer. A professional joint officer provides improved effectiveness over years of service, negating the steep learning curve most officers experience upon arriving to their JDAL billet. A professional joint officer carries education and experience from one billet to the next, contributing to the education and experience of non-career JQOs in the command. The next chapter outlines a joint officer management model to for JQO selection, education, assignment management, monitoring, and promotion management.

²¹ Davis and Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force," 24.

Chapter 4

Breaking the Barriers: Centralized Joint Officer Assignment Management

A multitude of bureaucratic elements related to service parochialism, inadequate and ineffective joint officer education throughput, a shortage of JQOs, and existing CJCS policies limit DoD's ability to build and manage a professional joint officer corps capable of planning, executing, and leading joint operations in a complex, globally integrated, multi-domain environment. Centralized JQO management enables DoD to build, maintain, and cultivate a professional corps of capable and competent career JQOs who are experts at planning and leading joint operations and are able to lead joint forces in the future complex operational-strategic environment. To provide a broader contextual understanding of U.S. military officer management, this section begins with an overview of DoD officer management as well as a comparative analysis of officer management model employed by the U.S. special operations community. This section then describes a proposed centralized joint officer management model (CJOMM) in relation to the JQO management process, including JQO selection, education, assignment management, monitoring, and promotion management. This section also describes the adaptations to the organizational structure required to support the CJOMM. Finally, this section includes a discussion of the challenges and benefits of the CJOMM.

United States Department of Defense Officer Management

Understanding how DoD administers officer management overall provides context for a better understanding of the proposed CJOMM. U.S. Code Title 10 assigns the authority and

responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping DoD forces and organization to each individual military service.¹ Each service provides officer management through separate personnel management processes, structures, and policies to meet the operational needs of the service and in support of DoD missions. While each service provides its own officer management, several commonalities can be found.² First, each service manages its officers based on a system of military occupational specialties that are required to lead, manage, and execute service specific tasks in support of service specific missions. Second, officers in each service receive education and participate in training related to their military occupational specialty as well as participate in education and training related to broader leadership and professional military education (PME) opportunities. Third, each service retains the responsibility to assign officers to billets within their service as well as JDAL billets. Each service uses a progressive system of assignments to foster officer professional development, meet the operational needs of the service, and collectively strengthen the overall capability of the service.

Special Operations Officer Management

The special operations community employs a more collaborative form of officer management. All special operations officers begin with commissioning and initial training with their service.³ Following the completion of initial training, select highly qualified officers can

¹ U.S. Government, *Armed Forces*, Title 10 U.S. Code, vol. III, secs. 3013, 5013, 5042, & 8013 (2011).

² For a comprehensive description of how each service component manages their officer population, see: John S. Turner, 2013, *Special Operations Officer Talent Management*, National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, retrieved November 11, 2019, <http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat04199a&AN=ndu.557817&site=eds-live&scope=site>, 30-49.

³ *Ibid.*, 19.

then volunteer to undergo a selection process specific to their service.⁴ For example, U.S. Army officers can volunteer for evaluation for selection through the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), Navy officers volunteer for the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) school, Marine officers can volunteer for the U.S. Marine Special Operations Command assessment and selection (Marine Raiders) course, and U.S. Air Force (USAF) officers can volunteer for consideration for several specialized USAF special operations courses. Upon graduation, “USSOCOM monitors career-long education and training of SOF officers in direct coordination with the Services. Everything that USSOCOM does requires the approval and support of the Services with respect to duty assignments, education opportunities, promotions, and career development.”⁵ Although the services retain officer management authorities and responsibilities in accordance with U.S. Code Title 10, services often defer to, and closely coordinate with, USSOCOM for special operations officer management and particularly assignment management.⁶ In general, this system of collaborative officer management has worked for the special operations community.⁷ However, as John S. Turner suggests, it is not optimal, and that “due to the advanced knowledge, skills, and abilities of SOF officers, USSOCOM should execute personnel responsibilities for all SOF due to its unique understanding of SOF and Title 10 responsibilities: organize, train and equip functions for SOF-peculiar requirements.”⁸

⁴ Turner, *Special Operations Officer Talent Management*, 19.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 151.

⁸ Ibid., 66.

The requirement for centralized officer management for the joint force and the special operations forces are similar. Both special operations and joint operations require officers who possess specialized education, training, and experience. Both require the services to provide initial officer commissioning and development. Once qualified, the services retain the authority and responsibility for officer management of both JQOs and special operations officers. Once qualified, the services retain assignment authority to support USSOCOM and Combatant Command joint operational requirements.

While USSOCOM works closely with each service for the management of the entire special operations officer population, a similar singular joint force entity for the collective monitoring or management of the JQO force does not exist. The Joint Staff provides directives, instructions, and policies related to JQO development and management but they do not actively or collaboratively monitor or manage joint officers. While special operations officers receive initial and advanced special operations training from their associated service, JQOs receive initial and advanced joint training in accordance with Joint Staff directives and policies. The need to centrally manage special operations officers above the service level is similarly applicable to JQO management. Due to the advanced knowledge, skills, and abilities of JQO officers, and the unique understanding of joint operational concepts and requirements, the Joint Staff should centralize JQO management to improve the effectiveness of U.S. joint warfighting.

The Centralized Joint Officer Management Model

The JQO management process consists of specialized joint officer education, immediate post-education JDAL assignment, and a joint officer career field for subsequent assignment and

promotion management. The requirement to commission and provide initial officer education remains with the services. Educationally, company grade officers are introduced to elementary joint concepts through service specific and service supplied primary military education (PME).⁹ Specific joint professional military education (JPME) begins at the field grade level. JAWS and JCWS are the only programs specifically designed to deliver a curriculum focused solely on joint education for JQOs to plan, lead, and execute joint operations. Meeting the increasing demand for JQOs and producing a truly professional joint officer force starts with increasing JPME-II throughput. There are three possible options for increasing JPME-II throughput.

The first option is to increase the numbers of seats available in the JFSC JAWS and JCWS programs to meet annual production requirements. Currently, JFSC produces approximately 750 JQOs annually to fill an annual JDAL assignment requirement of approximately 1,181 JQOs. Assuming some of the JDAL assignment requirements can be filled from the existing JQO population, and accounting for nominal JQO attrition, JFSC would need to increase throughput to between approximately 900 and 1,000 JQOs annually. This option requires significant increased expenditures by DoD to support facilities expansion, increased support requirements, and an increase in faculty members. This option results in the accreditation of JAWS and JCWS as the only JPME-II institutions in DoD specifically designed to achieve joint acculturation.¹⁰ JPME-II accreditation would be revoked for the existing SSC and other National Defense University (NDU) JPME-II granting programs. To assure the quality of the

⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E: Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), A-A-3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, E-1.

JPME-II programs and maintaining JQO competency standards across the joint force as well as the availability of JQOs to serve on a rotational basis as JPME-II faculty members.

The second option is to incorporate the 10-week JCWS course curriculum into the curriculum of the other JPME-II accredited schools. By incorporating the 10-week JCWS curriculum in the SSS and other NDU JPME-II programs, DoD can increase JQO production exponentially while the services continue to develop a large pool of JQOs for GOFO consideration. More importantly, by incorporating the 10-week JCWS curriculum in the SSS and other National Defense University JPME-II programs, graduates of those programs achieve the prescriptive joint learning objectives and achieve a higher level of joint acculturation. Incorporation of the JCWS curriculum can be done as a single 10-week phase prior to the start of the SSC/NDU program or incorporated into the overall program curricula.

Regardless of how DoD chooses to incorporate the JCWS curriculum, each SSC/NDU program will need to adjust their overall curriculum to maintain a 10-month program length. The advantages of this option include the ability to continue the education of a large number of JQOs annually as well as the retention of JPME-II accreditation for all the SSC/NDU programs. However, the disadvantages include a loss of centralized oversight of joint curriculum, the need to train and employ a large number of faculty to teach joint concepts all the different institutions, a requirement to change the culture of the institutions from service focuses to joint focuses, and, to keep a 10-month program length, the replacement of some service-related curriculum with joint curriculum.

A third possible option would be a hybrid of the first two options. Instead of incorporating the 10-week JCWS curriculum into the SSC/NDU programs, a hybrid method

would be to eliminate the JPME-II accreditation from the service schools and require select officers to attend the JFSC 10-week JCWS program as prerequisite to attending SSS/NDU, or as a post-SSS/NDU requirement for graduation. Students selected for SSS/NDU attendance would have to volunteer for the additional JCWS educational opportunity and be selected through a review process. Selection would make JCWS and JPME-II qualification highly competitive and would allow the services to identify highly qualified officers for JPME-II education, while keeping their current SSC curriculum. It would also increase JQO throughput at a rate higher than the current annual throughput requirement. A hybrid option does require a significant increase in faculty, support services, and facilities to accommodate the increase at JCWS.

Post-JPME-II Education JDAL Assignment

The purpose of JPME-II education is to prepare officers for their first joint officer assignment, therefore, JPME-II education must immediately precede JDAL assignment. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) outlined the requirement to complete JPME-I and JPME-II to achieve joint officer qualification, but removed the requirement for completion of JPME-II education as a prerequisite to JDAL assignment. Furthermore, it largely reduced JPME-II to an administrative block check requirement for GOFO promotion potential.¹¹ JPME-II qualification must be reinstated as a mandatory requirement prior to JDAL assignment, whether through JCWS as a standalone course, or through one of the SSS/NDU options listed in the previous section.

¹¹ Charles Davis and Frederick R. Kienle, "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II," *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 27.

The JQO Career Path and Subsequent Assignment Management

CJOMM includes the creation of a joint officer career field (JOCF) to provide personnel management for a small corps of career joint officers with the Joint Staff as the authoritative organization responsible for administer the JOCF personnel management program. With a JDAL billet inventory of 3,543, assignment to the JOCF should be restricted to approximately 2,000-2,500 JQOs. This allows for the creation of a sizable professional corps of JQOs, while leaving an ample amount of JDAL billets available for fill by JQOs from the services. By leaving some JDAL billets available for fill by service JQOs, DoD is able to maintain a level of jointness throughout the force. Bifurcating the JQO population may also require the identification of which JDAL billets can be filled only by JOCF JQOs and which JDAL billets can be filled by JOCF JQOs or service JQOs. Such identification could change on a rotational basis or stay static.

If JDAL billets are not identified by JOCF fill versus service JQO fill, the Joint Staff would need to assign JOCF JQOs first and the services would then be able to assign their JQOs to the remaining billets. This sequential method for assignment seems unwieldy as it lengthens the assignment process, shortens the officer assignment notification window, and potentially creates service animosity toward the Joint Staff as the services are left with what might be perceived as the less important JDAL billets. However, this method provides maximum flexibility and the ability to assign JOCF JQOs based on priority mission requirements.

Optimally, offices would transition to the JOCF as a field grade officer in the grades of O-4 or O-5. Officers would volunteer for transition to the JOCF through an application and screening process as a condition for attendance in the 10-week JCWS program, while attending a 10-month JPME-II accredited program, or at anytime after achieving joint officer qualification

(completion of JPME-I and JPME-II). The transition process necessitates the creation of a review board to receive, process, assess, and adjudicate JOCF applications. The Joint Staff would preside over the review board but the board would include representatives from all or a rotating membership from the Combatant Commands.

In addition, the Joint Staff J-1 would need to create a model or standard for use by the board to evaluate JOCF applications to identify the desired qualities and attributes for officers selected for acceptance into the JOCF. Officers selected for acceptance into the JOCF must have a record of exceptional, progressive performance and display the six desired leader attributes (DLA) identified by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO):¹²

- Ability to understand the security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.
- Ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding.
- Ability to think critically and strategically and apply joint warfighting principles and concepts in joint operations spanning all levels of warfare.
- Ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty.
- Ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions.
- Ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms.

The Joint Staff J-1 would also need to create model for the structure of the total JOCF force. The JOCF force would include representative authorizations for each service. Active component authorizations would make up 90% of the total JOCF and include the following service authorizations: Army (30%), Marine Corps (10%), Navy (24%), and Air Force (24%), the

¹² Jeffery Ruth, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), xvi.

Coast Guard (1%), and the Space Force (1%). Reserve component authorizations would make up 10% of the JOFC and include the following service authorizations: Army National Guard (3%), Army Reserve (2%), Marine Corps Reserve (1%), Naval Reserve (1%), Air National Guard (2%), and Air Force Reserve (1%). The Coast Guard Reserve would not receive any JOCF authorizations.

U.S. Military End Strengths Authorized by the 2019 NDAA		
Active Duty		
Army	487,000	34.90%
USMC	186,100	13.33%
Navy	335,400	24.03%
USAF	329,100	23.58%
Space	16,000	1.15%
USCG	42,000	3.01%
TOTAL	1,395,600	100.00%
Reserve & National Guard		
Army Nat Guard	343,500	41.65%
Army Reserve	199,500	24.19%
USMC Reserve	38,500	4.67%
Navy Reserve	59,100	7.17%
Air Nat Guard	107,100	12.99%
Air Reserve	70,000	8.49%
USCG Reserve	7,000	0.85%
TOTAL	824,700	100.00%

Figure 1. United States Military Personnel Authorizations by Service and Component¹³

The JOCF force would also include the identification of and representation from critical career fields from each of the services. For example, the JOCF force would be made up of Army

¹³ U.S. Government, *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019*, Public Law 115-232, secs. 402 & 411 (2018).

officers from the infantry, logistics, engineers, psychological operations, civil affairs, aviation, intelligence, and artillery; Air Force officers from the fighter community, intelligence, logistics, engineers, etc.; Naval officers from surface warfare, aviation, submarine, intelligence, engineering, etc.; Marine officers from infantry, intelligence, engineers, aviation, military police, etc.

In the CJOMM, the Joint Staff would provide administrative oversight for the JOCF personnel management program, including serving as the approval authority for all JDAL billet assignments. The Joint Staff J-1 would directly manage JOCF JQO JDAL billet assignments and approve service recommendations for service JQO assignments to JDAL billets. By assigning JDAL billet assignment authority to a single entity, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commands, would be able to ensure the proper mix of JOCF and service JQOs across the JDAL billet system as well as validate the completion of JPME-II prior to the assignment of an officer to a JDAL billet.

Much like the Special Operations officer management model discussed previously, the services would retain their U.S. Code Title 10 authorities and responsibilities for their JQOs assigned to the JOCF. The Joint Staff would have to coordinate closely with the services to provide the full range of personnel management required. In particular, the Joint Staff, with service concurrence, would serve as the promotion authority for JOCF JQOs. This minimizes service influence related to JQO promotion and would allow JOCF JQOs to compete for promotion against their JOCF JQOs peers. To build a highly effective and experienced joint officer force, the career path for centrally managed joint officers would consist of mainly joint assignments. To remain competitive for promotion, JOCF JQOs would still be eligible to

complete for their service specific command opportunities. This again would assist the services with developing a large competitive pool of officers for selection to the grade of O-6 and the GOFO ranks. It would also allow JQOs to gain valuable command experience and share their joint experiences, joint perceptions, and joint culture with other members of their service, infusing joint culture throughout the force. However, non-joint assignments would be kept at a minimum so as to maintain the JQO's joint competency.

The CJOMM Structure

The CJOMM structure is contained within the Joint Staff organizational structure. The Joint Staff J-1 would serve as the single authority for administration of the JOCF program. As a personnel management program, the CJCS, while retaining ultimate responsibility for the program, should have the authority to delegate the authority to manage the JOCF program to the Joint Staff J-1. The CJOMM structure would require an increase in Joint Staff J-1 personnel to provide career management responsibilities related to the JOCF transition review board, the development and implementation of JOCF policies and procedures, and individual JOCF JQO career management services related to educational requirements, assignment management, promotion management, coordination and communication with the JOCF JQO's basic service personnel management organization, etc. Implementing the CJOMM would also require an increase in educational resources to support the increased JPME-II throughput requirement. DoD would retain the authority and responsibility for JPME-II accreditation while delegating JPME-II oversight and officer selection to the Joint Staff.




Figure 2. The Career Joint Officer Management Model

Benefits of CJOMM

The intent of CJOMM is to improve JQO management by making it more efficient and effective. CJOMM assures JQO management efficiency by consolidating JOCF JQO personnel management at the Joint Staff. Consolidating JOCF JQO personnel management at the Joint Staff reduces the overall personnel management requirements for the services. CJOMM improves JQO management effectiveness by directly connecting the management and development of a professional corps of JQOs to Combatant Command joint mission requirements while managing JQOs holistically as opposed to a fragmented system of JQO management by the services. Specific benefits of CJOMM include:

- Provides a program, develops processes, and provides a structure for maintaining expert joint knowledge across the force.

- Professionalizes joint concepts as a career field.
- Reestablishes JPME-II education as a prerequisite for JDAL assignment.
- Increases the quality of JQOs serving in JDAL billets, resulting in an improvement in Combatant Command capabilities as well as improving overall joint warfighting across the force.
- Centralizes the management and professionalizes a small corps of joint officers to meet the ever increasing demand for JQOs, enabling greater success on the future battlefield.
- Centralizes the management JDAL billets to ensure Combatant Commands receive educated and competent JQOs capable of quick assimilation within the organization, making an immediate impact, and meeting mission requirements by applying a joint mindset to planning and conducting joint operations at the operational-strategic level.
- Maintains the ability of the services to develop joint officers for continued promotion potential up to and through the GOFO ranks.
- Allows JOCF JQOs to remain eligible for command.
- Builds on the existing and successful Special Operations officer management model.

Challenges to CJOMM

While there are many benefits to CJOMM, there are a number of potential challenges to CJOMM:

- Services will most likely be resistant to permanently giving up a portion of their population to the joint force.

- Services will most likely be resistant to giving up control of the management of their officers. While the services currently coordinate with USSOCOM with regard to their Special Forces officer, the services retain full authority for personnel management. CJOMM would require the services to relinquish a great deal of personnel management authority to the Joint Staff.
- Depending on the JPME-II option (JAWS/JCWS only JPME-II granting programs, augment SSS/NDU programs with JCWS curriculum, or the hybrid JCWS plus SSS/NDU program), achieving JPME-II qualification may require longer educational programs, keeping officers away from the services for longer periods of time.
- CJOMM requires an increase in the size of the Joint Staff to provide personnel management services to the JOCF JQO population.
- CJOMM requires increases in fiscal expenditures, faculty and support personnel, and physical infrastructure to support the increased JPME-II throughput.
- Granting CJOMM authorities to the Joint Staff will most likely require changes to U.S. Code or statutes.
- Granting CJOMM authorities to the Joint Staff requires significant policy changes.

Summary

CJOMM provides a framework for the development of a professional, career focused, expert joint officer corps capable of meeting the demands of the future joint operational environment, as well as developing and employing a joint force that is globally integrated and capable of operating decisively on a multi-domain battlefield. CJOMM connects joint education,

joint qualification, JDAL assignment, and JQO promotion management into a JOCF program designed to develop and maintain expert knowledge within the JQO force as well as provide Combatant Commands with the joint experts required from mission success. By reestablishing JPME-II as a prerequisite to JDAL assignment, CJOMM assures the assignment of competent and capable JQOs to the Combatant Commands. CJOMM also accounts for the sharing of joint concepts, perceptions, and culture across the total force by allowing JOCF JQOs limited opportunities to serve in service specific billets. CJOMM implementation requires a committee of Joint Staff, service personnel experts, congressional representatives to work out structure and establish required Joint Staff institutions and changes in current laws.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

History has exposed the dangers of single service solutions, service parochialism, ad hoc jointness, incompatible service specific equipment, and the overall lack of service interoperability. History has also proven the utility and value of conducting military operations as a joint force. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 implemented structural and policy reforms mandating jointness. The Unified Combatant Command concept provides a synergistic combination of service capabilities to train for, plan, execute, and support joint operations. Globally integrated, multi-domain operational concepts provide a framework for the worldwide employment of the joint force through the “rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare” to understand, assess, and defeat the threats associated with the current and future security environment.¹

The success of globally integrated operations is predicated on an educated and experienced joint force capable of planning operations, organizing joint forces in time and space, for the employment of synergistic and complementary joint capabilities. The critical issue to building and improving U.S. military joint warfighting capability is the education and management of joint officers. Educated and experienced joint officers possess unique skills and knowledge that make them highly proficient in staff work, senior leader and executive level communication, and joint matters. However, the current system fails to educate the required numbers of JQOs to meet the demands of the Combatant Commands as well as fails to retain

¹ Stephen J. Townsend, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 2018), iii.

joint expertise at an enterprise level due to decentralized or fragmented management of JQOs and JDAL billets.

The U.S. military must contend with a complex future battlespace that not only contains elements of the traditional Clausewitzian conventional state on state armed conflict, but also emergent, new war concepts related to prolonged low intensity conflict, decentralized violence, the fusion of political and criminal activities, the use of violence for its own purposes, and the difficulty or inability to identify and define combatants and battlefield boundaries. The future battlespace will include an increasing number of interdependent variables and interrelated systems that quickly adapt across the all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) and all domains, to include the newer and very ambiguous cyber and space domains. Rapidly changing technology and individual and low cost access to weapons, terrorism, fear, and the ability of any number of actors to induce fear and inflict suffering compound the complexity of the environment.

For much of the U.S. military, the work by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz serves as the foundation for understanding war. Clausewitz suggests that the nature of war is unchanging while the character of warfare is subject to the “spirit of the age.”² War’s nature is the violent interaction of states for the achievement of political aims.³ The character of war, the manner in which states fight the war, changes based on the politics and desires of the societies fighting the war.⁴ In 1942, Quincy Wright suggested that the character of war consists

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 594.

³ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 594.

of nation-states waging war to maintain a balance of power in their favor.⁵ War is defined as large scale, highly organized, legitimized by crossing a legal threshold, and involves expensive means.⁶

More recently, Herfried Münkler suggests that future wars do not conform to any classical understanding of war. Future wars will be a new type of war altogether. New wars are asymmetrical and consist of the politics of identify rather than the politics of the state, the decentralization of violence, the manifestation of low intensity conflict over longer periods of time, and the use of alternative techniques as an asymmetric advantage to overcome conventional force technology.⁷ New wars will be cheap, easy to execute and sustain, and involve combatants with minimal training and preparation.⁸ Individual fighters fuse political and criminal activities to form quasi-state entities using violence for its own purposes.⁹ Distinguishing between combatants and civilians becomes near impossible as the inherent vulnerability of civilian populations make terrorism, violence against women, and genocide acceptable weapons of war.¹⁰

As warfare changes and the future battlespace becomes more complex, the U.S. joint force must adapt to remain responsive and relevant. Key to success on future battlefields is true jointness and it cannot be achieved without cross-service trust, cooperation, and seamless interdependency. The service wide inculcation of trust, cooperation, and interdependency requires a corps of professionally educated and experienced joint qualified officers capable of

⁵ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 382.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷ Sylvia Walby, "Violence and Society: Introduction to an Emerging Field of Sociology," *Current Sociology* 61, no. 2 (March 2013): 99.

⁸ Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 74.

⁹ Walby, "Violence and Society: Introduction to an Emerging Field of Sociology," 99.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

synchronizing joint forces in time and space through a expert understanding of the capabilities of each service, service cultures, the application the different military domains, and their interrelationships and interdependence. The future battlefield demands the provision and development of educated and experienced JQOs to improve the U.S. joint warfighting capability. Joint qualified officers provide a unique set of skills and knowledge that make them experts in all joint matters and require specialized personnel management to cultivate a collective joint capability proficient in high-paced, high-visibility staff work while applying a joint mindset.

A variety of environmental elements inherent within DoD inhibit the development of a professional joint officer corps. First, services retain the responsibility and provide for the development and management of joint officers within their service and do so in a manner that protects service-specific interests at the detriment of the joint force. Second, the current JPME II educational system is ineffective. The two JPME II accredited institutions specifically designed to achieve joint acculturation, JAWS and JCWS, do not have the authorized throughput capacity to meet the demands of the joint force. Additionally, the constellation of no less than 13 different JPME-II accredited programs within DoD fall woefully short of producing properly educated joint officer due to an inadequate or absent emphasis on jointness, a student body dominated by a single service, a focus on service specific curriculum, and the failure to achieve joint acculturation. Third, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) decoupled JPME-II education as a preparatory requirement for JDAL assignment. The fallout of this egregious policy change is two-fold. Removing the requirement for completion of JPME II education immediately prior to JDAL assignment relegates JPME II to an administrative block check requirement for GOFO promotion potential. It also results in uneducated and ineffective officers being assigned

to JDAL positions, which increases the learning curve for the officer as well as reduces the overall effectiveness of the joint organization. Lastly, and most importantly, DoD has failed to employ a strategic approach to JQO management. Without the strategic management of JQOs, at a level above the services, joint education will continue to be mismanaged while joint expertise, rather than existing as a centralized capability, will remain fragmented across the services; preventing DoD from developing the level of organizational jointness dictated by law and required to support combatant commanders.

Staying the course or maintaining the status quo of a quasi joint force made up of service officers, trained by, managed by, and loyal to their service, severely hinders the development and employment of a truly joint force. Without an expertly trained and professional joint force, DoD will continue to manage and educate officers based on service biases and priorities at the detriment of the joint force. DoD will continue to fight as a fragmented service-oriented force as opposed to a joint force capable of planning and executing joint operations in a complex, globally integrated, multi-domain battlespace. DoD will maintain a force management structure that promotes service equities and continues the cycle of cross-service inoperability and incompatibility. Without change, DoD risks the erosion of its ability to compete, fight, and win on the future battlefield.

Changing the service oriented mindset and management system requires the services to relinquish authorities and authorizations to the Joint Staff to man and manage the JOCF JQOs. Personnel authorizations, as identified and authorized in law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, would need to be moved from each service to the JOCF. These changes to law combined with management by the Joint Staff J-1 would eliminate the barriers to effective joint

warfighting associated with service parochialism, the existing shortage of available JQOs, and the lack of a comprehensive strategic approach to future joint officer management. Additionally, personnel authorizations would need to be either reallocated from the services to the Joint Staff J-1 or the approval of new authorizations to increase the personnel in the Joint Staff J-1. The increase in Joint Staff J-1 personnel authorizations is critical to providing effective joint officer management. This again may require changes to existing law and would the challenges listed above.

Implementing the CJOMM would also require changes to the existing joint officer education system. Joint officer education must achieve joint acculturation and this can only be done if joint officer education programs change. As previously stated, JAWS and JCWS are the only programs specifically missioned and designed to achieve joint acculturation. The JCWS and JAWS programs deliver a curriculum focused solely on joint education designed to adequately prepare officers for assignment to a JDAL billet. Whether JAWS and JCWS are expanded to train more officers, the SSS/NDU programs are augmented with JCWS curriculum, or JCWS is added to the beginning or end of an SSS/NDU program, providing a true joint curriculum is critical to developing joint officers capable of conducting globally integrated, multi-domain operations at the operational-strategic level. Changing the joint education system will requires and increase in fiscal expenditures, faculty and support personnel, and physical infrastructure to support the increased JPME-II throughput.

While any change to such a large, bureaucratic organization such as the DoD can be challenging, these changes to authorities, authorizations, laws, budgets, and infrastructure are critical to developing and employing a truly joint force. If the DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

truly value the importance of the joint force and joint operations, and the contributions of JQOs to both, centralizing joint personnel management and improving joint officer education must be a priority. Failing to implement CJOMM will result in continued joint operational and strategic inefficiencies as well as expose the United States to the potential of repeating the operational and strategic failures of the past.

This study recommends the development and implementation of a centralized joint officer management model (CJOMM) to build, maintain, and cultivate a professional corps of capable and competent career JQOs able to expertly plan and lead joint operations and lead joint formations in complex and uncertain operational and strategic environments through the application of globally integrated, multi-domain, and joint operational concepts. Under the direction of the Joint Staff J-1, CJOMM proposes the creation of a joint officer career field (JOCF) to consolidate the management of joint officer education, assignment, and promotion for a small corps of career JQOs. Implementation of CJOMM requires significant investments in fiscal, personnel, and physical resources. However, CJOMM improves JQO management efficiency by consolidating JOCF JQO personnel management at the Joint Staff and improves JQO management effectiveness by directly connecting the management and development of a professional corps of JQOs to Combatant Command joint mission requirements while managing JQOs holistically as opposed to a fragmented system of JQO management by the services. CJOMM retains joint expertise across the force.

The services manage all of their officers in accordance with service-specific priorities and protect service-specific equities to the detriment of the joint force.¹¹ Without the strategic management of JQOs, at a level above the services, joint education will continue to be mismanaged, while joint expertise, rather than existing as a centralized capability, will remain fragmented across the services. This situation ultimately prevents DoD from developing the level of organizational jointness dictated by law and required to support combatant commanders. Provides a program, develops processes, and provides a structure for maintaining expert joint knowledge across the force.

Implementing the CJOMM postures the DoD to expertly plan, execute and lead joint operations in a complex, globally integrated, multi-domain battlespace. This is accomplished by professionalizing joint concepts as a career field, reestablishing JPME-II education as a prerequisite for JDAL assignment, centralizing the management of a small corps of JQOs, and centralizing the management of JDAL billets. The CJOMM increases the quality of JQOs serving in JDAL billets, resulting in an improvement in Combatant Command capabilities as well as improving overall joint warfighting capability and competency across the force. Overall, a professionally educated, centrally managed joint force exponentially increases the ability of DoD to complete, fight, and win in the complex future battlespace.

¹¹ Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, Roland J. Yardley, Marian Oshiro, Holly Ann Potter, Peter Schirmer, and Nelson Lim, *Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 8 & 111.

Bibliography

- Allen, Charles D., and Edward J. Filiberti. "The Future of Senior Service College Education: Heed the Clarion Call." *Joint Force Quarterly* 81 (2nd Quarter 2016): 48-53.
- Augier, Mie, and Sean F. X. Barrett. "Cultivating Critical and Strategic Thinkers." *Marine Corps Gazette* 103, no. 7 (July 2019): 72-77.
- Bowhens, Vincent C. "Manage Or Educate: Fulfilling the Purpose of Joint Professional Military Education." *Joint Force Quarterly* 67 (1st Quarter 2012): 26-29.
- Carpenter, Scott A. "The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist." *Joint Force Quarterly* 63 (4th Quarter 2011): 125-131.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (September 2012). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2012.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1330.05A: Joint Officer Management Program Procedures* (December 2015). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2015.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E: Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (May 2015). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2015.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01F: Officer Joint Professional Military Education Policy* (May 2015). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2015.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman's Vision of Global Integration*. Presentation by Francis J.H. Park, May 24, 2018. Retrieved October 11, 2019 from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdpc/11_global_integration15May.pptx.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*. Government Printing Office. Washington, 2005.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (July 1997). Government Printing Office. Washington, 1997.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Officer Handbook: Staffing and Action Guide* (August 2012). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2012.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Officer Management: Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan* (March 2007). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2007.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (July 2016). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2016.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada* (July 1997). Government Printing Office. Washington, 1997.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Staff Officer Project: Final Report* (April 2008). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2008.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

- Congressional Research Service. *Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)*, United States Congress, by the Congressional Research Service, January 2016. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.
- Congressional Research Service. *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress*, United States Congress, by the Congressional Research Service, January 2013. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.
- Crosbie, Thomas. Getting the Joint Functions Right. *Joint Force Quarterly* 94 (3rd Quarter 2019): 108-112.
- Cunningham, Case, Patrick Donahoe, Mike Jernigan, and Michael Riggins. "Sustaining the "New Norm" of Jointness." *Joint Force Quarterly* 81 (3rd Quarter 2016): 43-47.
- Davis, Charles, and Frederick R. Kienle. "Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II." *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 23-29.
- Dempsey, Martin E. "The Future of Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for Real Threats." *Foreign Affairs*, June 20, 2013. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-06-20/future-joint-operations> (accessed December 12, 2019).
- Dempsey, Martin E. *America's Military: A Profession of Arms White Paper*, 2012. Retrieved November 11, 2019 from <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/aprofessionofarms.pdf>.
- Dohrenwend, Bruce P., and Robert J. Smith. "Toward a Theory of Acculturation." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 18, no. 1 (Spring 1962): 30-39.
- Dolman, Everett C. *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*. New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Dörner, Dietrich. *The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996.
- Driscoll, John B. "Developing Joint Education for the Total Force." *Joint Force Quarterly* 24 (Spring 2000): 87-91.
- Eliason, William T. "Executive Summary." *Joint Force Quarterly* 72 (1st Quarter 2014): 8-9.
- Field, Chris. "Reinvigorating Education in the Australian Army." *Australian Army Journal* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 76-93.
- Fitzsimonds, James R. and Jan M. Van Tol. "Revolutions in Military Affairs." *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994), 24-31.
- French, Brent. "Building Joint Capacity within the Reserve Component." *Joint Force Quarterly* 80 (1st Quarter 2016): 67-77.
- Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. Secs. 151, 161, & 661 (1986).
- Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Hayes, Christopher D. "Developing the Navy's Operational Leaders." *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 77-108.
- Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Kevin P. Kelley. "Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military Education." *Joint Force Quarterly* 84 (1st Quarter 2017): 65-71.
- Jones, David. "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 23-28.

Joyner, Sara A. "Fiscal Year 2018 Joint Officer Management Annual Report for the Secretary of Defense." Unpublished Joint Staff report, May 6, 2019. Adobe PDF file.

Kirby, Sheila N., Al Crego, Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, Kimberly Curry, and Michael S. Tseng. *Who is Joint: New Evidence from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Survey*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

Lamb, Christopher J., and Brittany Porro. "Next Steps for Transforming Education at National Defense University." *Joint Force Quarterly* 76 (1st Quarter 2015): 40-47.

Locher, James R. *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002.

Martin, Gregg F., and John W. Yaeger. "Break Out: A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation's Future Strategic Leaders." *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (2nd Quarter 2014): 39-43.

Mayberry, Paul W., William H. Waggy II, and Anthony Lawrence. *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trends*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2019.

McKenna, Tim, and Tim McKay. *Australia's Joint Approach: Past, Present and Future*, 2017, accessed November 11, 2019 from https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/documents/joint_studies/JSPTS_1_Australias_Joint_Approach.pdf.

McInerney, Michael E., Conway Lin, Brandon D. Smith, and Joseph S. Lupa. "The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform." *Joint Force Quarterly* 90 (3rd Quarter 2018): 36-40.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. "CJCS Milley's Message to the Joint Force." Accessed November 11, 2019. <https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1977200/cjcs-milleys-message-to-the-joint-force/>.

Münkler, Herfried. *The New Wars*. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005.

Murray, Williamson. "The Evolution of Joint Warfare." *Joint Force Quarterly* 31 (Summer 2002): 30-37.

Nunn, Sam. Forward to *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, by James R. Locher III, xi-xii. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002.

Pisel, Kenneth. "JPME II Available at Satellite Sites." *Joint Force Quarterly* 82 (3rd Quarter 2016): 128-131.

Richardson, David K. "The Case for JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy." *Joint Force Quarterly* 50 (3ed Quarter 2008): 121-126.

Savion, Sydney M., and Terrance J. Mccaffrey. "Burgeoning Courses, Lagging Standardization." *Joint Force Quarterly* 57 (2nd Quarter 2010): 72-77.

Shelton, Henry H. "Remembering the Forgotten War" *Joint Force Quarterly* 28 (Spring/Summer 2001): 23-30.

Thie, Harry J., Margaret C. Harrell, Roland J. Yardley, Marian Oshiro, Holly Ann Potter, Peter Schirmer, and Nelson Lim. *Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2019* (January 2019). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2019.

Office of the President of the United States. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (December 2017), by Donald J. Trump. Government Printing Office. Washington, 2017.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. *Department of Defense Instruction 1300.19: DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program* (April 2018). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2018.

Ruth, Jeffery. *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*. Government Printing Office. Washington, 2018.

Turner, John S. *Special Operations Officer Talent Management*, National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2013. Retrieved November 11, 2019 from <http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat04199a&AN=ndu.557817&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare*. TRADOC. Fort Eustis, 2017.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (December 2018). TRADOC. Fort Eustis, 2018.

U.S. Army War College. *Strategic Leadership Primer 3rd Edition* (2010). United States Army War College Press. Carlisle, PA, 2010.

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (July 2017). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2017.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (2018). Government Printing Office. Washington, 2018.

U.S. Government. *Armed Forces*, Title 10 U.S. Code, vol. III, secs. 3013, 5013, 5042, & 8013 (2011).

U.S. Government. *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019*, Public Law 115-232, secs. 402 & 411 (2018).

Waggener, Anna T. "Joint Professional Military Education: A Retrospective of the Skelton Panel." *Joint Force Quarterly* 77 (3rd Quarter 2015): 55-59.

Walby, Sylvia. "Violence and Society: Introduction to an Emerging Field of Sociology." *Current Sociology* 61, no. 2 (March 2013): 95–111.

Water, Douglas E., and Craig R Bullis. "Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain." *Joint Force Quarterly* 93 (3rd Quarter 2019): 38-46.

Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Vita

LTC Stephen A. Tribble first enlisted in the United States Army Reserve as a Construction Equipment Repairer in 1992, was commissioned through the Missouri Army National Guard Officer Candidate School in 1997, and branched as an engineer officer in 1998. After several years of service in both the Army National Guard and Army Reserves, he accessed into the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program in 2007.

LTC Tribble served his company command as Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 15th Psychological Operations Battalion. His staff assignments include Deputy Section Chief, CJ5 Contingency Force Plans, Headquarters, Resolute Support (HQRS); Executive Officer, USCENTCOM Deputy J5; Joint Strategic Planner, USCENTCOM J5 Plans; Colonel Development Officer, G-1, Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR); and several years as operations or plans officer at the battalion level, the 416th Theater Engineer Command, in recruiting, and with the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. His operational deployments include Operation Iraqi Freedom II, Operation Freedom Sentinel (Iraq), Operation New Dawn (Iraq), Operation Inherent Resolve (Qatar), and Operation Resolute Support (Afghanistan).

LTC Tribble is a graduate of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Canadian Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP), the Defense Strategy Course (DSC), the Reserve Component National Security Course (RCNSC), Joint Engineer Operations Course (JEOC), the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the Engineer Captain's Career Course (ECCC), and Engineer Officer Basic Course (EOBC). He holds a Bachelors Degree in Psychology from Western Illinois University, a Masters Degree in Sport Management from Western Illinois University, a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy from the National Defense University, a Master Degree in Military Affairs and Science from the US Army Command and General Staff College, and a Doctorate Degree in Higher Education Leadership from Indiana State University.