



Keystone Blue Jay



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ON 13 Oct 71

REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 1st INF. DIV. AFTER ACTION REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

7 April 1970

SUBJECT: KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The attached after action report is the official of Operation KEYSTONE BLUEJAY: the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from the Republic of Vietnam during the first quarter of 1970,

2. (U) The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division marked the final phase of over four years of counter-insurgency warfare. The 1st Infantry Division has conducted intensive attrition operations characterized by frequent air assaults, cavalry sweeps, small unit patrols, ambushes and the constant use of some plows. The result of these operations was that the enemy's logistical and communications networks were largely destroyed, forcing him slowly extract the remnants of his regular units out of the division's area of operations and to widely fragment those units that remained. In July, 1969, South Vietnamese Army Forces, paced by the 5th ARVN Division, began to conduct operations with the 1st Infantry Division as a part of the Dung Tieng (Progress Together) Program. Combined US/ARVN operations against a common enemy in a common area of operation began to show dramatic combat results. The ground work for eventual redeployment had begun in the Big Red One area of operation and by February, 1970. the 5th ARVN Division was ready to hold its own. Thus, the ensuing withdrawal and redeployment of the Infantry Division was the next logical progression of our counter-insurgency program in South Vietnam.

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3. (U) KEYSTONE BLUEJAY was carried out in an atmosphere of optimism and mutual cooperation. In every case, early planning combined with both administrative and operational flexibility enabled the division to conduct a flawless operation. Since ours was the first unit of its size to completely redeploy, several new problem areas were encountered and many precedents were set. As the enclosed after action report documents both the problem areas and the precedents in great detail. I am certain it will provide much useful information and serve as a model for other major units planning future redeployment operations.

1 Incl

After Action Report



A, E. MILLOY
Major General, USA
Commanding

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDARD DATE</u>	<u>"R" DATE</u>
SEGMENT THREE (Cont'd)		
D/701st Maint (DS)	9 Mar	14 Mar
D/1st Med (DS)	13 Mar	16 Mar (changed to 19-21 Mar)
41st Inf Plat (SD)	9 Mar	11 Mar
1st MI	14 Mar	16 Mar
HHC, 1st Sde	15 Mar	22 Mar
HQB, Div Arty	15 Mar	21 Mar
8-6 Arty (GS)	4 Mar	22 Mar
SEGMENT FOUR		
HHC, (-) 1st Inf Div	30 Mar	6 Apr
HHC & Band, DISCOM	1 Apr	6 Apr
1st Avn Bn (-)	22 Mar	2 Apr
1st Engr Bn (-)	28 Mar	4 Apr
121st Sig Bn (-)	25 Mar	3 Apr
1st MP Co (-)	28 Mar	1 Apr
701st Maint Bn (-)	26 Mar	4 Apr
1st S&T Bn (-)	25 Mar	31 Mar
1st Med Bn (-)	29 Mar	2 Apr
1st Admin Co	31 Mar	7 Apr
43 PI Det	1 Apr	3 Apr
44 PI Det	1 Apr	3 Apr
MI Det USASSG/1 Div	3 Apr	6 Apr
MI Det USASSG/1 Div	3 Apr	6 Apr
Color Guard	4 Apr	7 Apr
337 AS CG SPT DIV	3 Apr	6 Apr (changed to 27-30 Mar)

HEADQUARTERS
1st Infantry Division
Di An, Vietnam

AVDB-MHD

7 April 1970

SUBJECT: KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. PURPOSE: The 1st Infantry Division was the first divisional size unit to redeploy all of its major elements from the Republic of Vietnam. The purpose of this report is to review and evaluate this redeployment in order to provide assistance to units making similar moves in the future. It is also the closing chronicle of a distinguished unit that has spent over four and one-half years in continuous combat.
2. MISSION: On 15 December 1969, Major General A. E. Milloy, Commanding, 1st Infantry Division, was notified that his division would return to CONUS by 15 April 1970 as part of President Nixon's Phase III Withdrawal. Later instructions specified that the division colors and a small honor guard would be sent to Fort Riley, Kansas, where the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) would be deactivated and replaced by the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). The majority of the division's personnel and equipment would revert to USARV control and be allocated throughout Vietnam.
3. BACKGROUND: a. Tactical Situation (see figures 1-2).
 - (1) Within the 1st Infantry Division's area of operation, the last six months of 1969 were characterized by a sharp decrease in enemy-initiated activity. From July 1969, the 1st Infantry Division conducted intensive operations in the Saigon and Song Be/Dong Nai River corridors, the traditional Communist/NVA infiltration routes into Saigon. By placing at least one infantry brigade astride each of these corridors, the division provided a shield, not only for Saigon,

but also for the heavily populated, rice-growing districts of southern Binh Duong Province. Here, the division's 2d Brigade pursued a vigorous pacification campaign in coordination with elements of the 3-8th Airborne Brigade and the 5th ARVN Division. One immediate benefit was rising HES (Hamlet Evaluation System) security ratings. While the percentage of the populace living in relatively secure (A, B and C) hamlets remained at a steady 98 percent, the number living in very secure (A and B) hamlets jumped from 40 percent in July to a high of 76 percent by the end of December 1969. Another significant step was Operation RICECAP, the 1st Brigade's highly successful rice denial campaign in the northern Saigon River hamlets of Tri Tam District. While 1st Brigade and 8th ARVN Regiment troops provided security, local GVN officials instituted comprehensive resource control measures around-the-clock. By 31 January 1970, 654 tons of rice had been harvested and secured with less than one percent of the total crop falling into enemy hands. While the enemy lost his grain local rice seed in the Iron Triangle and the Trapezoid, the government gained the respect of the people by protecting their economic livelihood.

(2) This enhanced security status allowed government forces -- including province and district officials, Regional and Provincial Forces (RF/PF), Popular Self Defence Force (PSDF) units, National Field Force Police, and Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre -- to function with minimal hindrance from the insurgents. In turn, regular army units of the 5th ARVN Division were generally able to turn over their local security responsibilities to RF/PF units, and devote more time to offensive operations against remote Communist/NVA base areas and infiltration routes. To assist and encourage ARVN commanders in this important shift from the defense to the offense, the 1st Infantry Division inaugurated a vigorous DONG TIEN or "Progress Together" program in July 1969, with the 5th ARVN Division and selected RF/PF units. Under this program, US and ARVN infantry battalions





Figure 21. Binh Duong Province

and artillery batteries shared advanced fire support bases in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone and the Trapezoid. In other cases, US and ARVN units were given a common area of operation (AO) and coordinated daily. One unit was not 'OPCON' to the other; instead two equal units were 'associated' in a common endeavor. US commanders, while retaining their full command responsibilities, became "advisors" to their ARVN opposites and, through cooperation and understanding, assisted them in remedying certain weaknesses while encouraging them to conduct offensive operations against a common enemy. Essentially the program was geared to upgrade ARVN small unit leaders and field staffs through prolonged exposure to field operations. ARVN commanders learned to delegate authority and to value individual initiative. US/ARVN dual company and cross attached platoon operations were used to foster these trends. Emphasis was also placed on giving ARVN leaders experience in employing sophisticated US support assets: especially helicopter support, artillery, gunship and USAF support. And almost all ARVN units, in turn, were able to assist Allied collection and exploitation of tactical intelligence, and provide more accurate terrain analyses of enemy activities. At the same time, the division cavalry squadron and several infantry battalions were conducting similar, but smaller-scale combined operations with the thirty or more Regional Force companies in the TAOL.

(3) While producing a steady rise in Vietnamese operational proficiency, this program also put more Allied troops in key enemy strongholds. Thus in the Trapezoid, the Michelin Rubber Plantation and the Song Be corridor. Units of the 1st Infantry Division, aided at any one time by four to five ARVN infantry battalions, steadily uprooted the enemy in Binh Duong Province, driving him away from population centers, north to the Cambodian border jungles. While the division's upper boundaries followed the enemy north (see figure 3), the division's southern AO was gradually absorbed by the expanding 3rd ARVN Division. The

Figure 3: Northernmost position of 1st Inf Div, 19 Dec 1969.



result was a mounting, intensive pressure on the enemy causing the dislocation of his communications and logistical networks, the attrition of his combat support units, and the withdrawal of his base and headquarters locations into more remote areas. In the last six months enemy offensive operations were limited to uncoordinated, harassing mortar and rocket attacks, several isolated terrorist incidents, and mine, booby trap and sniping activities. To avoid starvation he was forced to subordinate combat operations almost entirely to food resupply missions. This posture kept the enemy on the defensive and accelerated his organizational disintegration. In October 1969, after analyzing the enemy's predicament, 1st Infantry Division, ARVN and GVN leaders agreed that, barring a major enemy resurgence, the 5th ARVN Division could plan to assume control of the 1st Infantry Division's AO while the latter moved to areas of higher enemy activity. It was clear that the division was about to "work itself out of a job".

b. Planning.

(1) Based on USARV OPLAN 183-69 published 1 October 1969, the 1st Infantry Division staff began planning for possible redeployment from Vietnam. The main objective was to have a general contingency plan available for the displacement of the division before or after the cessation of hostilities. The plan would be revised and updated periodically. By 11 December 1969, initial drafts had been submitted. The time schedule called for a published document by 1 February 1970. However, the Commanding General's receipt of notification of the division's redeployment made a more urgent response necessary. Accordingly, the G3 promptly submitted a final draft to BG John Q. Henion, the Assistant Division Commander for Support, who was directing the division's redeployment activities. This draft contingency plan, with minimum changes, was published as 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 183-69 on 4 January 1970.

(2) The early start in redeployment preparations gave commanders and staffs

more time for detailed aspects of redeployment without detracting from combat operations. At division level, the perfection of all computerized personnel data cards was completed, enabling planners to establish a number of profiles for various possible personnel redeployment criteria. Reassignment preference statements were processed and key personnel were identified for retention. One of the objectives was to create a basis for a selective intra-divisional reassignment program to insure maximum strength of combat units during a phased redeployment. Early actions were also taken to select and prepare personnel and equipment processing locations, establish liaison with units supporting the redeployment and prepare transfer of facilities agreements.

(3) In subordinate units, more and early redeployment information insured an early and accurate inventory of all property and equipment, increased the amount of time and energy allotted to equipment preparation, and reduced personnel anxiety and confusion. Most important was the early turn-in program begun on 20 January 1970. Units were encouraged to turn in all equipment that was not absolutely essential for combat operations. From this successful program, the division derived two major benefits: first, the amount of equipment to be turned in during the limited standdown period was reduced to a minimum and, second, units became proficient in preparing equipment for turn-in (i.e., proper documentation and cleaning) in the early stages of redeployment.

(4) The above measures greatly assisted the execution of the redeployment plan, without committing the division to a narrow course of action before all critical decisions had been made by higher headquarters. For example, when the division was notified on 4 January 1970 that it would redeploy without equipment, the division C4 was ready to institute the early turn-in program (Saigon Support Command was not prepared to receive equipment until 20 January). In addition, extensive assistance from the USARV Planning and Operations Group




Figure 5: unit locations prior to redeployment, approximately 1 Feb 72.

(UPOC) was unnecessary, allowing it to devote more time to other redeploying units with smaller staffs. Finally no "crash" planning staff was needed; the Redeployment Control Center (RCC) established on 20 January 1970 served only to oversee and coordinate the ensuing operation.

(5) Planning and implementation of redeployment was also eased by the division's recently acquired flexibility. Within the last six months, each maneuver battalion and each artillery battery had made at least one major displacement. Equally important, from November 1969 through February 1970, the Division Headquarters and each of the brigades had made similar tactical displacements prior to their standdown date. In late December 1969 and early January 1970, the 3d Brigade moved its forward headquarters from Lai Khe (XT770380) to FSB IRCN I at Minh Thanh (XT628061). At the same time, the 2d Brigade moved from Di An (XT905058), first to Lai Khe, and then to Bear Cat (YS167994) where it maintained a forward CP to the southeast in Phuoc Tuy Province. Finally, during redeployment operations, the 1st Brigade moved from Dau Tieng (XT495473) to Lai Khe while the Division Headquarters displaced from Lai Khe to Di An. Because the division's TACI has remained relatively stable, headquarters units had become increasingly static. These moves gave the division's major units more mobility and, by renewing their proficiency in techniques of displacement, made later moves to stand-down locations more efficient.

4. CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT: a. Tactical Concept.

(1) Prior to redeployment, the Division Headquarters, based at Lai Khe Base Camp, was employing two brigades east and west of Lai Khe, and a third (outside the division's normal AO) in Phuoc Tuy Province about 50km to the southeast (see figures 4-5). In addition, the division had retained control of two major base camps south of Lai Khe - Phu Loi (XT858155) and Di An. Route 13 (QL 13), a secure, well-maintained macadam highway, connected the three bases. Similar

routes joined Di An with the larger complex at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Di An Base Camp, because of its large facilities and central location was the logical home for the division standdown center and final processing point. The Division Support Command was well established at Di An and the Division Headquarters could move into the old 2d Brigade headquarters area relatively easily.

(2) The 1st Infantry Division recommended and received higher headquarters approval for a standdown in four segments. Each phase of the division tactical plan for redeployment, OPLAN 1-70 "TRUY," corresponded to the standdown of one of these segments. The first three would generally consist of one brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. An appropriate percentage of combat support units would accompany each brigade-size segment. The final segment included the Division Headquarters, Division Support Command and subordinate headquarters, the aviation, engineer and signal battalions (-), and all remaining units (see Standdown Sequence, figure 7), Division Artillery headquarters and the divisional cavalry squadron. The 1st Cavalry would deploy with the third segment.

(3) Phase one called for five simultaneous moves in mid February 1970. See Sequence of Key Events, Appendix 1 to Annex C. First, Division Headquarters would move from Lai Khe and re-establish itself at Di An. Division Artillery Headquarters would make a similar move from Lai Khe to Phu Loi. During the same period, the 3rd Brigade and other elements of the first segment would move to Di An for standdown, while the 1st Brigade moved into Lai Khe from Dau Tieng. Simultaneously, the 25th Infantry Division would assume responsibility for the Dau Tieng-Michelin Plantation-Trapezoid AO, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) would absorb the division's northern areas around Minh Thanh and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade would take over eastern War Zone D (see figure 6). Finally, the 5th ARVN Division headquarters would move into Lai Khe, assume responsibility

Figure 7: Working Standdown Schedule

<u>Unit</u>	<u>STANDDOWN DATE</u>	<u>"R" DATE</u>
SECTION ONE		
2-28 Inf	15 Feb	28 Feb
1-28 Inf	16 Feb	1 Mar
1-18 Inf	18 Feb	3 Mar
1-5 Arty (DS)	15 Feb	3 Mar
A/1st Engr (DS)	23 Feb	27 Feb
1/B/121st Sig (DS)	16 Feb	19 Feb
Detach/1st MP (DS)	26 Mar	28 Mar
B/701st Maint (DS)	15 Feb	20 Feb (changed to 10-15 Feb)
B/1st Med (DS)	20 Feb	23 Feb
35th Inf Plat (SD)	15 Feb	18 Feb
1st Co, 3d Bde	15 Feb	23 Feb
242 Cml Det	15 Feb	18 Feb
266 Cml Det	15 Feb	19 Feb
SECTION TWO		
1-16 Inf (A)	3 Mar	20 Mar
2-16 Inf	3 Mar	14 Mar
2-18 Inf	2 Mar	15 Mar
1-7 Arty (DS)	1 Mar	19 Mar
B/1st Engr (DS)	2 Mar	6 Mar
2/B/121st Sig (DS)	4 Mar	7 Mar
Det/1st MP (DS)	28 Mar	30 Mar
C/701st Maint (DS)	25 Feb	3 Mar (changed to 16-27 Feb)
D/1st Med (DS)	6 Mar	9 Mar
61st Inf Plat (1D)	23 Feb	25 Feb
I Co, 75th Rangers	7 Mar	10 Mar
1st Co, 3d Bde	28 Feb	7 Mar
SECTION THREE		
2-2 Inf (A)	15 Mar	1 Apr
1-2 Inf	17 Mar	30 Mar
1-26 Inf	16 Mar	29 Mar
1-4 Cav (A)	19 Mar	5 Apr
2-33 Arty (DS)	15 Mar	2 Apr
C/1st Engr (DS)	24 Mar	28 Mar
3/B/121st Sig (DS)	21 Mar	24 Mar
Det/1st MP (DS)	29 Mar	31 Mar

NOTE: "Standdown Date" is the date on which the designated unit initiates its redeployment processing at the Processing Location. "R-Date" (Release date) is the date which all personnel and equipment of the designated unit, minus the color guard, have completed processing. Only minor changes were later made to this schedule.

for another portion of the division's southeastern AO, and, together with the 1st Brigade, continue to conduct DONG TIEN operations northwest of Lai Khe.

(4) Phase two involved the movement of the 2d Brigade and attached elements from Phong Tay Province to Di An for standdown. Responsibility for AO AJAX would be assumed by the 25th Infantry Division. Finally in phase three, the 1st Brigade would move from Lai Khe to Di An for standdown while the 5th ARVN Division, with assistance from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, would assume full responsibility for Lai Khe Base Camp. As the last division maneuver elements left Lai Khe, the final partition of the division's AO would be made between the 5th ARVN Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(5) The smooth tactical deployment would depend on detailed coordination with adjacent units in III Corps Tactical Zone. But the successful implementation of OPLAN TRCY meant that Allied pressure on enemy units within the division AO would continue uninterrupted, and insured a gradual transition of the 5th ARVN Division into the 1st Infantry Division's former AO. The plan also allowed 1st Infantry Division units to continue combat operations as long as possible since all major outprocessing could be accomplished within Di An Base Camp. Finally, because both base defense, territorial and overwatch responsibilities could be transferred to other units, the division headquarters and support units could remain relatively intact, and continue to give their full support to combat and redeployment operations before standing down themselves. As the last segment stood down, Di An base defense requirements could easily be met by other tenant units in coordination with tactical commands in Binh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces.

b. Administrative/Personnel Concept and Preparations.

(1) As each maneuver unit closed into Di An Base Camp ("D" day), it would become OPCON to Division Headquarters and be billeted in the standdown area surrounding the old 2d Brigade headquarters (see figure 8). Most support units




Figure 8: 31st Av. Headquarters/Standdown Area.

A-Element units.

B-1st Infantry Division Headquarters.

C-Brigade HQ standdown area.

D-Infantry battalion standdown area.

E-Artillery battalion standdown area.

F-Small unit standdown area.

would standdown at their Di An facilities. Depending on its size and equipment, each unit was allocated a certain number of days (D+1 to D+7) to turn in all major end items (track, artillery, engineer and communications-electronics equipment, wheel vehicles, and small arms). At the same time, all UCMJ and Awards and Decorations actions would be completed as soon as possible. The remaining time would be devoted to turning in all other equipment and supplies, and personnel outprocessing. Division Training Command (DTC) facilities at Di An were designated as the official outprocessing site for departing personnel. Since the division administrative rear was already established at Di An, experienced personnel were available to operate the outprocessing facilities and solve any unforeseen problems.

(2) While all "D" days remained tentative, total standdown time, including the completion day for major end item equipment turn-in, the release days of all personnel and the final release day ("R" date) for all units, was determined before 15 February 1970 by comparing estimates of unit commanders. Such data made it possible to determine release dates of all personnel once U-days were determined. In addition, a substantial number of personnel in segment one units would be released and reassigned within the division to segment three and four units. Chosen by MOS needs, these individuals would insure that all units remained combat effective until standdown. The release dates (to USARV) of such personnel would be determined by their new unit.

c. Logistical Concept and Preparations.

(1) Early notification (4 January 1970) that the 1st Infantry Division would redeploy without equipment insured the success of the early turn-in program. Turn-in points for Post, Camp and Station property were established at Dau Tieng and Lai Khe; a larger point at Di An handled all military items except track vehicles. These points were made available to units on a scheduled, rotating basis.

By 14 February 1970, one day prior to the arrival of the first segment, 25 percent of the division's major end items had been turned in to the Saigon Support Command representatives at the Di An Processing Location.

(2) Remaining equipment would be turned in at Di An and Phu Loi during stand-down. In preparation, one maintenance company stood down prior to 15 February 1970 and, under the direction of the Saigon Support Command, provided personnel to staff the processing points for the turn-in of supplies and equipment. In turn, the Saigon Support Command established its own office at Di An to direct turn-in operations and receive all processed material. Temporary storage areas were designated at Di An to house those items which could not be absorbed immediately by other units in Vietnam. Finally, special provisions were made for selected units with heavy equipment, such as the division's two mechanized infantry battalions, to deliver their material directly to Saigon Support Command facilities at Long Binh.

(3) The closeout or turnover of fire support bases was generally a tactical problem due to the temporary nature of these installations. However, the transfer of 1st Infantry Division base camps posed major administrative problems. Since all arrangements involved termination and transfer of facility and security responsibilities, any agreements had to consider both tactical and administrative aspects of redeployment. In addition, base turnover and standdown schedules had to mesh. This meant that, based on guidance from higher headquarters and our own perception of the situation, assumptions had to be made and contingency plans drawn up before preparations for base camp turnover could begin. A great deal of coordination was needed between US Army elements, representatives of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and, in one instance, representatives of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Based on this early coordination, detailed agreements were later prepared and signed. A small number of problems that could not be solved

in the allotted time (e.g., reduction in size of Dau Tieng Base Camp), were documented and transferred to the gaining unit. However, due to the timeliness of key decisions by higher headquarters, the cooperation of all involved units and agencies, and our own early preparations, such problems were kept to a minimum.

5. EXECUTION: The execution of Operation KEYSTONE BLUEJAY officially began on 15 February 1970 and by 7 April, 52 days later, all equipment and personnel processing was complete and the 1st Infantry Division was officially redeployed. During redeployment, approximately 17,000 personnel and 45,000 major end items were processed, 4 major base camps and 15 fire support bases were turned over or vacated, and a total of 3600 square kilometers of territorial responsibility was transferred to other combat units. The entire redeployment was carried out efficiently without enemy interference and with no lapse of combat operations within the TAOI. The implementation of each aspect of KEYSTONE BLUEJAY has been thoroughly documented in the attached annexes. These detailed accounts were prepared to assist official historians as well as major units tasked with similar missions in the future.

6. LESSONS LEARNED: Specific recommendations and solutions to problems are presented in each annex. The following are general recommendations based on the experience of the 1st Infantry Division.

a. Periodic guidance from higher headquarters concerning redeployment must be emphasized and given on a regular basis. This is especially useful to units selected for redeployment. The sooner critical decisions can be made, the easier it is for concerned units to complete thorough redeployment preparations. However, headquarters making such decisions must also realize that subordinate units benefit immensely from guidance which, however informal, gives them a basis upon which to organize and plan a number of contingencies before the actual decisions are made. The USARV CPLAN 183-69 which requires all major units in Vietnam to create and

periodically update redeployment plans is a good example of this type of assistance.

b. Upon notification of redeployment, an inventory of all major equipment and installation property should begin immediately. In the personnel field, this will take the form of preparing selected personnel data to provide input for later contingency profiles.

c. Early turn-in programs used by the 1st Infantry Division and other redeploying units have been extremely successful. Command emphasis at all levels should be placed on such programs once redeployment is announced. Whether a unit is to redeploy with or without equipment should not affect the initial preparations made for early turn-in.

d. More attention should be paid to personnel redeployment criteria. Actions of approving headquarters include not only making early decisions, but also informing concerned units of the status of those decisions. Redeploying units, in turn, must request and receive such non-official information in order to meet all contingencies, or to rule out certain others. Finally, troops must be informed on a regular basis, not only of all decisions made in these matters, but also of the fact that decisions have not been made. Rumor control is not a joke; a successful information program greatly reduces personnel hardships.

e. Major displacements made by 1st Infantry Division units, while not directly related to redeployment, did much to slim down these units and reduce fiscal standdown problems by increasing movement flexibility. When the tactical situation permits, redeploying units should incorporate such moves before stand-down as an integral part of their redeployment plan. This is especially valuable when substantial portions of major units have been stationed in one location for over one year.

ANNEXES


- A - Personnel and Administration
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operations
- D - Logistics
- E - CIVAC/PSYOP
- F - Signal
- G - Engineer
- H - Base Camp Transfer
- I - Information
- J - Redesignation



American flag descends final time at ceremony marking turnover of Lai Khe to Vietnamese.



The Lai Khe turnover ceremony is viewed by (from left) LTC De Cao Tri, CG, III CTE; MC Nguyen Van Thieu, CG, 5th ARVN Div; MG Milley, CG, 1st Inf Div and LTO Julian J Ewell, CG, IIFORCEV.



A farewell salute passes between MG Willey and the staff of the "Iron Brigade" at Lai Khe.



Bulldozer denies enemy use of FSPB "Dakota".




Reusable materiel is salvaged from PSPB "Dakota" aboard Army "flatbacks".



1st Bn, 7th Arty troops load unexpended ammunition into trucks as PSPB "Dakota" is closed out.



A queue of 1-7th Arty vehicles returns men and weapons to standdown at Di An.



Elements of Div Arty assemble for mass awards ceremony at Phu Loi.



Units from Army's oldest unit 2/1-5th Arty await transfer to new support missions.



Standdown at Di An marks another historic milestone for the Army's oldest unit—Alexander Hamilton's Cannoneers, 1-5th Arty.



iers of trucks turned in at Di An.



Heavy equipment awaits turn-in at 1st S & T Bn, Di An.



Tracks of 2-2nd Inf (Mech) trek south on QL 15 toward Di An standdown.



A/1-28th Inf sergeant awaits his unit's D-Day arrival.




2-28th Inf soldiers deplane at D-Day airfield.



1-28th Inf troops head for vehicles bringing them to standdown site.



1-28 Inf "Black Lions" scale DA An bound trucks.



Transportation from the fixed wing air pad, Di An, was provided by the 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion, 1st Inf Div.



Troops from 1-28th Inf disembark near standdown site.



2-28 Inf "Black Lions" standdown CP at Di An



Rifleman from 2-16th Inf (Mech) prepares weapon for turn-in.



1-25th Inf soldier carefully cleans his weapon.



Outprocessing included one final check of shot and medical records'



Required shots were given at this station during outprocessing.



Finance records were reviewed and updated at the Redeployment Center, H. An.



Pay accounts are updated prior to departure.



... there is need of ID cards and tags.



Ship out day — only duffle-bags and medicines now



1st Inf Div soldiers are briefed on impending movements at standdown center, Di An

Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUETAIL
After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: This annex covers all personnel aspects of the division's redeployment. In addition, the activities of the Provost Marshal, the disposition of funds and post exchanges, and the discharge of civilian laborers are also treated in detail.
2. PERSONNEL PLANNING:
 - a. Careful and perceptive planning was the key to the highly successful personnel redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. Preparation for redeployment actually began in September 1969 with a concentrated effort to purify the division's automated data bank. In December 1969, before any official or unofficial redeployment notification had been received, a special, one-time 100 percent verification of selected elements of automated data was made against hard copy records. These elements of data were the same elements used in all subsequent machine listings for redeployment. To maintain an automated data bank that was current and accurate, the Personnel Service Division kept its 24-hour processing rule in effect. Adopted on 1 October, 1969, this rule specified that any change affecting a personnel record will be posted to that record within 24 hours of receipt, and, if required, will be simultaneously processed into the automated data bank. These procedures established and maintained a highly accurate and current data bank which proved invaluable to the personnel redeployment effort.
 - b. Initial planning guidance (see Tab A to Appendix 1) established plans for the actual redeployment effort and outprocessing operations. At that time, it was expected that the division would return to COMUS at 100 percent authorized strength. Therefore, two or four month curtailments ("drops") and an infusion program were expected. Later, these assumptions would be radically altered.
 - c. Nonreceipt of a firm personnel redeployment criteria delayed efforts to complete plans for redeployment operations. However, this time was used for

requisitioning blank forms, medals, certificates and citations; eliminating backlogs in routine work areas; identifying personnel on TDY and in CONUS pending the outcome of requests for compassionate reassignment or hardship discharge; intensifying efforts to purify morning reports; making plans and preparations for personnel outprocessing facilities; and reviewing all other areas of operations to determine the impact of redeployment. Tab B to Appendix 1 covers other aspects of this period.

d. A typing pool of 15 personnel was formed. These soldiers were selected from the replacement stream and did not possess clerical MOS. An intensive training program in correspondence procedures was initiated. Within a few weeks, these soldiers had rudimentary clerical skills and at least average typing ability. The typing pool was invaluable to the redeployment effort. It was diverted from branch to branch to handle high volume typing assignments. This pool was especially useful in preparing requests for reassignment orders and stencils of general orders for awards.

e. On 3 February 1970, a GI/SI Conference was held to prepare SIs for all future redeployment activities in the personnel field. The subjects covered are listed at Appendix 2.

3. PERSONNEL SERVICE REDEPLOYMENT CONTROL GROUP: A Personnel Service Redeployment Control Group (RCG) was established in the Personnel Service Division. Its purpose was to provide overall control and guidance for the redeployment effort in the personnel area, coordinate the activities of all branches of the Personnel Service Division and the Replacement Detachment, schedule and coordinate all outprocessing activities, and serve as a central source of personnel redeployment information. It did not assume any of the functions or responsibilities of any element, but rather, served to coordinate the overall effort and accomplish tasks generated by redeployment. The RCG prepared and published the majority of

personnel redeployment letters and the various plans and documents generated by redeployment. Also, it scheduled and conducted all personnel briefings at unit level.

4. APPLICATION OF THE PERSONNEL CRITERIA: a. On 11 January 1970, Headquarters, USARV, announced what it expected would be the final personnel criteria (see Tab C to appendix 1). Essentially, there would be no curtailment of individual foreign service tours. Soon after, all redeployment plans were completed in anticipation of the official announcement of redeployment, which was expected to follow within a few days.

b. The personnel redeployment plans provided for normal attrition in all units throughout the redeployment period with intra-division assignments made from early deploying units to later deploying units only to fill critical duty positions. Except in critical skill areas, intra-division reassignments originally would not be made to second or third segment units, since the period of utilization would be minimal, or to fourth segment units (combat support and combat service support units), since these units would be able to retain all personnel (less DEROS losses) throughout redeployment. This plan resulted from careful analysis of the current and projected strength postures of all units. The following facts and considerations were examined in formulating this plan:

(1) Commanders are interested in obtaining personnel with critical skills rather than "bodies". In addition, projected strength estimates indicated that units would experience only a slight decline from current strength during redeployment. Thus, only critical needs would be filled from first segment resources and from USARV if necessary.

(2) In considering the provision of filler personnel to maintain effective combat strength, a utilization period of at least 30 days is highly desirable. No such utilization was possible. Personnel reassigned from the first segment

to the third segment would have a utilization period averaging only 26 days. Neither of these utilization periods included time necessary to administratively process and orient personnel to their new organization.

(3) Reassignments cause highly undesirable turbulence in the automated data bank. For successful redeployment, an accurate data bank, as noted in the Redeployment After Action Report of the 9th Infantry Division, is vital. The 9th Inf Div experience vividly points out why an accurate data bank is essential. Each reassignment creates additional possibilities for costly errors.

(4) Reassignments increase the possibility that deserving individuals will not be recognized for awards and promotions and have a detrimental effect on the R&R program. If a soldier is reassigned to a unit for less than 30 days, it is highly unlikely that his new commander will feel qualified to recommend him for either an award or a promotion. Since the entire utilization period could be only 26 days, second or third segment commanders could not allow personnel reassigned to them from a first segment unit to be absent on R&R for nearly 30 days. Yet, had the member proceeded to his new unit (non-division), he still would have been able to use the allocation and R&R program obtained from the 1st Inf Div.

(5) Each reassignment within the division added considerably to an already mammoth administrative task. Even with no intra-division reassignments, more than 17,000 special orders were issued, some 1300 officer efficiency reports were made, 15,000 general orders, awards citations and certificates were prepared, 5,000 promotion orders were cut, and approximately 17,000 soldiers were completely and accurately outprocessed and shipped to new stations. These actions, which normally are accomplished in 12 months, were completed in 65 days.

c. To execute this plan, the personnel criteria were programmed against the standdown schedule of each unit, resulting in machine listings of personnel by

category. Machine listings were then carried to each unit for the action required by the letter under Tab D to Appendix 1. At the same time, management specialists procured listings of critical MOS shortages to determine personnel needed by units to continue their tactical and redeployment missions. Resources to fill these shortages could be obtained from early standdown units or from USARV if necessary. While units were verifying the accuracy of the machine listings, a similar verification was conducted by the Personnel Records Branch using hard copy records. On return of the rosters from the field, the two rosters were reconciled and corrections were made. This procedure assured a near perfect data bank.

d. Everything seemed ready for the division's 1 February 1970 report to USARV on who would be eligible for in-country reassignment. Before that could happen, however, it was directed that certain personnel from first segment units be reassigned to maintain the strength of third segment maneuver elements at a minimum of 95 percent authorized strength until their standdown. This decision required the reassignment of approximately 900 personnel.

e. After these reassignments were made, new machine listings of personnel eligible for in-country reassignment were prepared. Officers and senior Non-commissioned Officers were allowed three assignment preferences. Junior enlisted personnel were not allowed any preferences. This last decision was made by the division since Headquarters, USARV, had indicated that although junior enlisted personnel could list their assignment preferences, it was not known whether the preferences could be honored. Therefore, it seemed impractical to try to obtain, in a very short period of time, three choices from each of more than 11,000 men if it was not certain that future assignments would be based on these preferences.

f. While USARV was preparing assignment instructions for first segment personnel, the decision was made within the division not to move the 900 personnel

scheduled for reassignment from the first to the third segment until two days after the first segment units had stood down (the original decision required the movement of these personnel prior to the first segment's standdown). The Personnel Service Division amended approximately 900 orders to show the new reporting date.

g. On receipt of annotated machine listings from USARV, the division found that assignment instructions were not provided for personnel who had 60 days or less remaining in their foreign service tour after their unit's release date. Obviously, 60-day curtailments were being considered by higher headquarters, but there was no official announcement or indication of how such a program would be administered. The official announcement came on 12 February 1970, three days prior to the standdown of the first segment.

h. Briefly, the curtailment policy authorized the curtailment of any individual who would have 60 days or less until normal DEROS as of the last day of his unit's standdown. This policy change generated other changes.

(1) With the 12-month redeployment criteria, problems obtaining CONUS assignment instructions were minimal. But with curtailments, the problem of obtaining CONUS assignment instructions became acute and required immediate action. Names of personnel requiring CONUS assignment instructions were expedited to HQ, USARV, and close coordination was maintained throughout redeployment. In most cases, assignment instructions were received, sometimes only a few days prior to the individual's scheduled departure. For individuals who did not have assignments eight days prior to DEROS, USARV furnished control and line numbers so that orders could be issued.

(2) More serious, however, was the effect of curtailments on personnel who had extended their foreign service tours in order to qualify for the 150 day early release program. Curtailments meant that these individuals would be

reassigned in CONUS rather than being separated. This headquarters believed that Department of the Army's commitment to these soldiers should be honored. Therefore, the division asked USARV to retain men in this category in Vietnam until their normal DEROS. The request was approved.

(3) Personnel who had not extended their foreign service tours but who were eligible for a 150 day early release were curtailed unless they specifically requested retention until normal DEROS. Such requests were approved by USARV

1. The curtailment program was the final major change in redeployment criteria, and all further reassignment actions flowed smoothly. Although redeployment plans had to be modified and outprocessing facilities for movement of personnel out of Vietnam had to be expanded, the basic redeployment plan remained in effect.

5. REDEPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS. a. Only 27 items of Congressional correspondence concerning redeployment were received by the division during operation KEPT THE BLUEJAY

b. The Personnel and Administration Letter of instruction, published on 24 January 1970, covered all personnel and administration aspects of redeployment (see Tab E to Appendix 1). Although later clarified by a second LOI (see Tab F to Appendix 1), it remained a basic reference throughout redeployment.

c. When the decision was made to reassign 900 personnel from the first to the third segment, the letter under Tab G to Appendix 1 was sent to each member involved. It explained the reasoning behind this action.

d. The Adjutant General Section also originated several other command letters to inform the division of personnel redeployment activities. These documents are under Tabs H through L to Appendix 1.

6. ORDERS: a. The issuance of approximately 15,000 reassignment orders presented significant organizational problems. To handle the volume, the Personnel

Management Branch used a central typing pool. Working from 2000 to 3800 hours, these typists prepared requests for orders. The Office Services Unit then prepared stencils assigning paragraph numbers of a special order to be issued on a date specified by the Personnel Management Officer. On the specified day, the special orders containing all reassignment instructions for a particular segment were released. This provided units and Personnel Management Branch with a handy and inclusive reference. One copy of the original request for orders was submitted to the Personnel Services RCG. These copies became the basis for all in-country outprocessing scheduling (see paragraph 7, p. A-10).

b. The typing pool also prepared requests for orders for personnel being reassigned from Vietnam. Although, in many cases, assignment instructions had not been received, a request for orders was still prepared for each man. The "assigned to" portion in these cases was left blank. As assignment instructions were received, they were added to the request for orders and orders were issued within a few hours. This procedure eliminated the need for using the individual's personnel file or DA Form 20 when assignment instructions were received.

c. As orders were received, the Personnel Records Branch divided personnel records into two groups: in-country reassigees and CONUS-bound personnel. Any personnel records "left-over" were carried to the Personnel Management Branch to determine the status of the concerned individual. This was a simple, but effective double-check to insure that orders were issued on all personnel.

7. IN-COUNTRY OUTPROCESSING SCHEDULING: a. Availability dates established in response to Tab A to Appendix 1 were also used to establish in-country outprocessing dates. To accomplish this, each unit was required to release a predetermined number of personnel on specified days during its standdown. This was done for several reasons:

(1) Planning for outprocessing provided that personnel would outprocess in

the morning and be shipped early in the afternoon.

(2) For a smooth, controlled operation, a steady, continuous flow of out-processing personnel was essential.

b. To establish outprocessing dates, the following procedures were used:

(1) Requests for orders for a given divisional unit were divided into stacks by availability dates.

(2) Outprocessing rosters, broken down by day and unit, were prepared using the stacks of requests for orders as source information. Rosters showed name, unit, gaining organization, and transportation pick-up point for each day.

(3) Outprocessing times were not entered on the rosters until rosters for all units of the segment had been prepared. When the number of personnel to out-process was firmly established, exact times were entered on the stencils.

(4) Normally, 75 personnel were scheduled to outprocess each hour at 0730, 0830, 0930, and 1030 hours. When the daily total exceeded 300 personnel, the hourly totals were increased; the outprocessing day was not lengthened.

c. Outprocessing schedules were prepared at least three days prior to the standdown of each segment. Distribution was made as follows:

(1) To the unit concerned, so it could have personnel prepared for pickup and outprocessing.

(2) To the Personnel Records Branch, Personnel Service Division, and to Finance Officer, so records could be prepared for outprocessing.

(3) To the Replacement Detachment, for use in picking personnel up at their units and arranging onward transportation.

(4) To the 90th Replacement Battalion, so it could plan for rations, billets and onward transportation.

(5) To the Division Training Command, so it could have sufficient rations to provide the noon meal for in-country reassignees at the outprocessing facility.

d. Changes to outprocessing schedules were announced as they occurred by numbered disposition forms. Every evening, all units were required to verify their outprocessing schedule for the following day.

e. Experience in processing the first segment showed that too much time had been allocated to unit standdown periods. Because redeploying units had made many preparations while operational, they had too many people and very little work for them to do after the first standdown days. Therefore, after preliminary conferences were held with each subsequent unit, standdown outprocessing was accelerated from two to seven days. The basic procedure, as outlined above, was still used.

f. Although nearly every availability date was changed by accelerated outprocessing, reassignment orders were not amended. The amendment of 9,000 orders would have been grossly impractical and would have resulted in unnecessary confusion for the individual, the losing unit and the gaining command.

8. OUTPROCESSING OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES: a. The Adjutant General Section was assigned overall responsibility for the coordination of all outprocessing activities. This included scheduling transportation to the outprocessing sites and onward transportation to the gaining units. Initial planning guidance is contained in the letter at Tab A to Appendix i; the disposition form under Tab M to Appendix i contains the final planning guidance.

b. To outprocess approximately 17,000 personnel in a period of 52 days required two high capacity outprocessing facilities, one for incountry reassignees and another for DEROS personnel.

(1) In-country Outprocessing Facility:

(a) In-country reassignees were expected to total nearly 11,000 personnel. Since existing facilities could not handle this volume, the Personnel Service Division created an outprocessing facility in the Division Training Command.

One structure was remodeled and transformed into a facility capable of accommodating over 500 personnel in a four hour period.

(b) This facility was colocated with Finance and Medical outprocessing stations and the Replacement Detachment Troop Movement facilities. Other facilities in the outprocessing complex included a mobile post exchange and mobile snack bar. A mess hall was located nearby and was available for use. Before personnel departed for their new units, a Big Red One shoulder patch (on the right) and the patch of their new organization was sewn on their uniforms free of charge.

(c) Despite a continual and comprehensive program to provide these items to personnel, a high number of identification cards and tags had to be made during outprocessing. Initially, 20 percent of all personnel needed ID cards and 33 percent needed ID tags. The majority were prepared for lower grade enlisted men who often indicate little concern for the safe-keeping and care of these items. Since this was the first Adjutant General outprocessing station, it slowed operations considerably. This situation was remedied by requiring units to submit requests for ID tags before or at standdown. Tags were then prepared prior to outprocessing and given to individuals as they outprocessed. Also, the ID tag facility was moved to the end of the processing line.

(d) The in-country outprocessing facility was staffed with 1 Warrant Officer and 31 enlisted men. Duty positions for enlisted personnel were:

- 1 NCOIC
- 3 ID Cards/Tags
- 2 Records Specialists, AG1
- 1 Postal Clerk
- 3 Personnel Management Specialists, AG2
- 3 Awards Specialists, AG3

12 Records Specialists, AG4

2 Records Specialists, AG5

1 IC Clerk

2 Records Specialists, Officer and Senior Enlisted Records

1 Driver

(e) Tabs N through P to Appendix 1 are checklists used in this operation.

(f) A total of 11,211 personnel (an average of 216 per day) processed through this facility as described at Inclosure 1 to Tab Q to Appendix 1. Generally, this plan was followed closely, with one exception. When five or more individuals were going to the same unit, their records were placed in a box and given to the 90th Replacement Battalion. All other records were placed in large manila envelopes bearing the member's name and the gaining unit. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers were allowed to hand-carry their records. There were no reports of anyone losing his records in transit to his new unit.

(2) Out-of-Country Outprocessing Facility:

(a) The existing Personnel/Finance Processing Facility was designated as the Out-of-Country Outprocessing Facility. It was expanded and operating procedures were modified (see Inclosure 2, Tab Q, Appendix 1).

(b) The out-of-country outprocessing facility was staffed with 1 Warrant Officer and 11 enlisted men.

1 NCOIC

1 Records Specialists, AG1

2 Personnel Management Specialists, AG2

2 Awards Specialists, AG3

4 Records Specialists, AG4

1 Records Specialist, AG5

(c) A total of 4,209 personnel (an average of 81 per day) processed through

this facility.

9. BRIEFINGS: A Personnel Service Division contact team met each unit within hours of its arrival at the standdown area. The purpose of these visits was to review all personnel and administrative activities. Specifically the contact team:

- a. Delivered outprocessing schedules and discussed outprocessing operations (see Tab R to Appendix 1).
- b. Pointed out transportation pickup points.
- c. Obtained the commander's clearance certificate referred to in paragraph 11, Tab E to Appendix 1.
- d. Discussed morning report preparation, the awards and decorations program, reassignment orders, and movement of DEMOS personnel.
- e. Offered any assistance needed.

10. FUNDS: See Appendix 13.

11. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: See Appendix 14.

12. CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES: See Appendix 15.

13. PROVOST MARSHAL: See Appendix 16.

14. REDEPLOYMENT CONTROL CENTER: See Appendix 17.

15. POST EXCHANGE: See Appendix 18.

16. FINANCE: See Appendix 19.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Personnel Management
- 2 - C-1/S-1 Conference
- 3 - Awards and Decorations
- 4 - Personnel Actions
- 5 - Administrative Machine Branch
- 6 - Personnel Records

- 7 - Administrative Services
- 8 - Special Services
- 9 - Reenlistment
- 10 - Replacement Detachment
- 11 - Postal Operation
- 12 - Band
- 13 - Nonappropriated Funds
- 14 - Civilian Personnel
- 15 - Chaplain Activities
- 16 - Provost Marshall
- 17 - Redeployment Control Center
- 18 - Post Exchange
- 19 - Finance

Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex 6 (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUE's After Action Report (U)

1. ORGANIZATION: In the Personnel Management Branch, redeployment proved the merits of a carefully nurtured cross-training program. Because of cross-training, the Chief, Personnel Management Branch, was able to shift manpower resources to various functional areas as necessary. During redeployment, the following organizational changes were made:

a. Initially, one additional man was added to the correspondence section in order to expedite all personnel actions and to follow-up outstanding actions later. As units began to stand down, correspondence decreased and the additional man and two others were moved from the section.

b. The Advance Overseas Returned (AOR) section was expanded by two personnel to handle additional requirements to verify AOR for March, April and May 1970.

c. The Personnel Information Roster (PIR) section was eliminated. Since the personnel from this section were experienced in making all business listings, they were put in charge of personnel telephone listings. These personnel verified and posted changes to the personnel rosters daily.

d. The Flight Control Section was expanded by one clerk typist.

2. SPECIAL PROCEDURES: a. Personnel who had extended their foreign service tours for six months with the division, but had not taken special leave, were allowed three assignment preferences in Vietnam.

b. Those personnel with CONUS assignment instructions who still had to be reassigned in Vietnam presented some special problems. If DESCE orders had already been issued, those orders were revoked and the letter under Tab T sent to the man explaining why this action was necessary. In all cases where assignment instructions had been received, the letter under Tab U was placed in the man's

field military personnel file. The letter under Tab V was used to notify the gaining command that the member had been reported on the AOR, but assignment instructions had not been received.

c. Initially, the last day of a unit's standdown was established as the DEROS for personnel in that unit who were to be curtailed. This procedure was changed when the division was required to insure personnel arrived at the 90th Replacement Battalion 48 to 72 hours prior to DEROS. Thus, DEROS personnel had to report to the division out-processing facility five days prior to their DEROS date. This meant that some individuals in units with short standdown periods had to depart their units prior to the unit's standdown. This created difficulties in transportation and control. Therefore, the adjusted DEROS for personnel curtailed in units with short standdown periods was made two days after the unit's release date.

d. Enlisted personnel redeployment statistics by segment are listed under Tab W (for officers, see Tab A to Appendix 6).

TABS

- A - Redeployment Planning Guidance #1
- B - Redeployment Planning Guidance #2
- C - Phase III Redeployment Criteria
- D - Proposed Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Roster
- E - LOI, 21 January 1970
- F - LOI, 3 February 1970
- G - Commanding General's Letter
- H - Request for Transfer
- I - Absent Personnel
- J - Personnel Strength Accounting
- K - Strength Accounting

- L - Morning Report Suggestions
- M - Redeployment Outprocessing Operations
- N - AG Outprocessing Checklist: Enlisted Personnel
- C - AG Outprocessing Checklist: Officer
- P - AG Outprocessing Checklist: Awards and Decorations
- Q - Outprocessing Procedures
- R - Outprocessing Schedules
- S - Foreign Service Tour Extension
- T - Rescission of PCS Orders
- J - DOA Assignment Instructions
- V - Non-receipt of Assignment Instructions
- W - Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Statistics

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 24-13)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDBLP

Redeployment Planning Guidance

TO

SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM

C, PSD

DATE

1 Jun 70

CMYI

CPT Behler/cm/2310

1. Time allowed for planning if and when redeployment is announced will be minimal. Therefore, it is imperative that contingency planning begin now. The purpose of this DF is to provide initial planning guidance.

2. Redeployment, in its simplest terms, is a two phase operation: Phase I is the redeployment of division personnel; Phase II is the redeployment of PSD personnel and equipment.

a. Phase I is dependent on two unknowns- who is going and when. Until these two factors are known, firm planning is difficult. Annex A outlines a plan for use if the Division redeploy in the manner the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne redeployed.

b. Certain other actions can be taken now. Therefore, branch chiefs will accomplish the following (a report is not required):

(1) Review all operations and prepare a list of functions which must be accomplished with redeployment. Also those whose volume will increase. Outline plans to accomplish these functions.

(2) Determine what reports, rosters, etc., must continue and which can be eliminated.

(3) Determine what functions would have to be performed on arrival in COMUS.

(4) Insure day-to-day operations are current. Don't allow any backlogs to develop.

(5) Don't procrastinate in writing any recommendations for awards for subordinates or finishing any involved projects.

(6) Do anything else now that will make your job easier in the future.

(7) Establish a file for redeployment correspondence and keep in mind that you will have to prepare an after-action report.

c. Phase II operations will probably be less difficult although time will be a major factor. Equipment disposition will probably be directed by a higher headquarters. However, it is imperative that all hand receipt holders insure tight control of property they are signed for. Although

Tab A (Redeployment Planning Guidance #1) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

there probably are some property averages in the PSD, there is the possibility that other elements of the command may "borrow" property to eliminate shortages.

3. With announcement of redeployment a Redeployment Control Center (RCC) will be established. The purpose of the RCC will be to provide centralized direction and control of all redeployment activities. It will operate similar to a TOC. On activation, the RCC will assume operational control of the PRB Typing Pool. Until otherwise directed, however, the C, PRB will continue to utilize these personnel.

4. Outprocessing is one activity that can be planned regardless of the mode of redeployment used. Annex B outlines an outprocessing plan. Request each branch review the plan and report the following to this office NLT 2 Jan 70:

a. Any suggestions for changes, additions, or deletions.


b. Recommended staffing for your element to outprocess ⁴⁵⁰ 300 soldiers per day.

Further, each branch will prepare detailed checklists to use in the actual outprocessing effort. Checklists will be submitted to this office NLT 5 Jan 70.

5. In the event of redeployment, no action will be taken to comply with plans contained herein unless specifically directed by the undersigned or the OIC, RCC.

6. This DF, although not classified as such, will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL in nature.

2 Incl
as


WILLIAM M. TOOHY
Major, AGC
Chief, PSD

DISTRIBUTION

5 - AG
5 - C, PAB
5 - C, A&DB
5 - C, DSU
5 - C, PMB
10- C, PRB/AMB
10- File

Annex A

Redeployment Operations

1. On notification of redeployment and personnel redeployment criteria, the AMB will prepare by-unit rosters (five part).

a. 2 copies will be furnished the PRB for verification against hard copy records.

b. 2 copies will be handcarried to each division basecamp for verification by the respective unit.

(1) The RCC will furnish letter of instructions which will require units to reconcile rosters with MR strength and actual on-board strength.

(2) Individuals will be given the option of returning with the ERO if they meet eligibility requirements or extending for a long enough period to meet reassignment within USARV criteria. Personnel pending USARV direct appointments may elect to remain in USARV to await final action on their applications.

(3) Units and individuals will have two to three days to return both copies of the verified rosters and options.

(4) A PSD representative will remain at the basecamp to offer assistance, clarify procedures, and insure compliance with suspense dates.

c. 1 copy will be furnished the RCC.

2. On return of the rosters, the following actions will be taken:

a. C, PRB will conduct a reconciliation between the PRB-verified rosters, unit-verified roster, personnel records and morning reports. Necessary changes will be submitted to the AMB within three days after information required is received from C, PNB.

b. C, PNB will simultaneously review options submitted to determine validity and process extensions. Further, the C, PNB will classify individuals according to the following categories:

Code 1: eligible for redeployment with the unit

Code 2: reassign within USARV

Code 3: reassign to unit redeploying in January

Code 4: reassign to unit redeploying in February

Code 5: reassign to unit redeploying in March

Code 6: reassign to unit redeploying in April

Code 7: pending direct appointment

Code 8: has assignment instructions

3. AMB will process changes and add codes to the redeployment data file. The roster will be re-run and carefully verified against the posted rosters by the C, FRB. Distribution of final roster will be as follows:

1 - G1

1 - RCC

1 - FRB

2 - FMB

4. AMB will further prepare a roster of code 2 personnel for the RCC. RCC will send the roster and letter of instruction to the unit. Code 2 personnel will list three choices of units for reassignment to in USARV.

5. AMB will prepare PIR's for each unit listing Code 1 personnel only. Distribution will be as follows:

1 - FRB

1 - RCC

1 - G1

2 - FM

a. The PIR's will be the basic document for use in assigning personnel to deploying units.

b. FMB will take immediate action to reassign Codes 3 through 6 personnel to units where they will be eligible to redeploy.

ANNEX B

OUTPROCESSING

Section I - General

1. Purpose: To provide a plan for the thorough and accurate outprocessing of each soldier. No soldier will depart this command unless his records are accurate and complete to include awards, decorations, promotions, etc.

2. Assumption: a. Outprocessing will be conducted at two locations:

(1) A standdown area for redeploying units

(2) Current ID# facility for personnel rotating prior to their unit's redeployment, ETS personnel, and soldiers being reassigned within USARV.

b. Redeployment outprocessing must be capable of outprocessing ⁴⁵⁰ ~~300~~ soldiers per day; 600 soldiers within a three to five day period.

Section II - Redeployment Outprocessing

1. Responsibilities: a. The G, PFB is assigned overall responsibility for operation of this facility.

b. Branch chiefs are responsible for operation of outprocessing points as listed below.

c. PSD, SEM is responsible for providing required transportation.

2. Procedures: See Inclosure 1

Section III - ETS, DEROS Outprocessing

Current procedures and facilities will be used.

STATION 6 - AG OUTPROCESSING

Initial Receiving/ Final Clearance Point (HRB)

- a. Initial records check for:
 - (1) health and dental records
 - (2) ID Cards and tags
- b. Determine if member is on manifest
- c. Staple AG Processing Checklist to 201 file of 36's and below and direct soldier to Point 2.
- d. Furnish AG Processing Checklist to officers and senior noncoms and direct them to Officer and Senior Enlisted Processing Points, respectively.
- e. Insure no member leaves the AG Area until checklist is properly completed.
- f. Provide other assistance as required.

AG2 Personnel Management Processing (PM)

- a. Verify correctness of PMOS, promotions, proficiency designation, duty assignment and orders.
- b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.
- c. Note corrective actions pending on the checklist and direct soldier to AG3.
- d. Provide assistance to Senior Enlisted Processing Point as required.
- e. Provide other assistance as required.

AG3 Awards and Decorations (A&DB)

- a. Verify awards, decorations, GCM's, and badges.
- b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.
- c. Note corrective action pending on the checklist and direct soldier to AG4.
- d. Provide assistance to Officer and Senior Enlisted Processing Points as required.
- e. Provide other assistance as required.

Incl 1 to Annex B

A-1. Records Check (PRB)

- a. Verify the accuracy of the following documents:
 - (1) DA Form 41
 - (2) DA Form 20
 - (3) Field 201 File
- b. Post orders or other changes as a result of discrepancies discovered at other points.
- c. Direct soldier to AG5.
- d. Provide other assistance as required.

AG5 Final Records Assembly (PRB)

- a. Check processed soldier off manifest .
- b. Insure all required actions have been taken
- c. Assemble all records
- d. File records with action outstanding in pending drawer
- e. File completed records in unit file drawer

Officer Processing Point (PRB)


- a. Verification of 66 and 201 with officer to insure all entries are correct and that all MOS's, awards, etc. have been posted.
- b. Review DA Form 41
- c. Provide other assistance as required.
- d. Direct officer with his records to AG5.

Senior Enlisted Processing Point (PRB)

- a. Verification of 20 and 201 with Sr. NCO to insure all entries are correct and that all awards, etc., have been posted.
- b. Review DA Form 41.
- c. Provide other assistance as required.
- d. Direct EM with his records to AG5.

ID Card/Tag Processing (PRB/GSL)

- Prepare ID Cards and Tags as required.



AG PROCESSING CHECKLIST

Initial Reception/Final Clearance Point _____

AG1 Initial Records Check _____

AG2 Personnel Management Check _____

AG3 Awards and Decorations Check _____

AG4 Records Check _____

AG5 Final Records Assembly _____

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 34-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDB-AG-P

Redeployment Planning Guidance

TO: S&A DISTRICT HQ

FROM: C, PSD

DATE: 13 Jan 70

CR/1

1. This DF summarizes the discussion held in this office on 11 and 12 Jan 70.
2. For all branch chiefs:
 - a. Duty hours will be 0730 to 2000 hours or until all required actions are completed.
 - b. Briefings will be held at 1900 hours each day in this office. The purpose of these briefings is to insure all members have current information, to determine the progress of various actions, and to share the combined talents and suggestions of the staff.
 - c. Continuous evaluation of all areas of responsibility and positive action to correct problems will be the key to a successful redeployment.
 - d. Insure that qualified personnel currently possessing other than clerical MOS's are, as a minimum, awarded secondary MOS's.
 - e. Insure files are complete and ready for forwarding.
 - f. Criteria remains classified until otherwise announced by this office. When the criteria becomes unclassified, insure all personnel in your branch are thoroughly familiar with the criteria.
 - g. Cease non-essential reports and rosters as soon as possible. Insure this action is coordinated with the report/roster recipient.
 - h. Be prepared to brief the AG and C, PSD on their return to duty.
3. For C, PRR/ADM:
 - a. Maintain and keep current a file of all personnel who are attached to COMUS-based units pending decisions on requests for hardship discharge, compassionate reassignments. Determine the specific status of each individual and insure all applicable directives have been followed. Coordinate action with C, PRR.
 - b. Coordinate with C, PRR and be prepared to provide machine runs which categorize personnel in accordance with criteria.

Tab B (Redeployment Planning Guidance #2) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

ATTN: AG-1

AG-100: 100-100

c. Coordinate outprocessing operations with Division Finance Officer. Prepare procedures, checklists and floor plan and determine equipment and personnel requirements for both outprocessing facilities.

d. Prepare forms for use in obtaining mailing addresses for each BRG soldier who departs after 1 Jan 70. These will be used in mailing the BRG yearbook.

4. For C, AIB:

a. Review all AIA actions. Insure DA Form 20 have been posted. Coordinate with USARV for procedures for termination of reporting requirements.

b. Analyze A7 Section personnel requirements and take immediate action to procure needed personnel.

c. Coordinate with USARV to obtain guidance on the establishment of a basic date for each unit.

d. Draft letter for use with machine runs referenced in paragraph 5b, above.

e. Insure all actions which effect an individual's DEROS or unit of assignment are processed as expeditiously as possible.

5. For C, PAB: Maintain a list of personnel who are on emergency or compassionate leave. Coordinate with C, PAB before authorized leaves in the future.

6. For C, AADR:

a. Insure sufficient awards, citations, etc., are on hand.

b. Prepare draft letter for announcing details for final awards program.

c. Coordinate transfer of GO issuance responsibility with C, CSU.

7. For C, OSJ: Procure sufficient card-board boxes and tape to ship all files for entire AG Rear.


8. For CO, Repl Det:

a. Be prepared to furnish approximately 30 field tables and 75 folding chairs on 1 Feb 70.

b. Do not commit your facilities without approval of the AG.

AVDB-AG-P
SUBJECT: Redeployment Planning Guidance

13 Jan 70


GENE R. BEBLER
CPT, AGC
Acting Chief, PSD

DISTRIBUTION:

C, PRB/AMB
C, PAB
C, A&DS
C, FMB
C, OSU
CO, Repl Det

CF:
AG
GT

Tab C (Phase III Redeployment Criteria) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

PHASE III REDEPLOYMENT CRITERIA
(Normal DEROS for all personnel)

1st Infantry Division
Standdown: 15-28 February 1970

DEROS

15 Feb - 6 Mar
7 Mar - 25 Mar
26 Mar and beyond

DISPOSITION

Reassign to replacement battalion
Reassign within the division
Report to USARV for reassignment*

Standdown 1-15 March 1970

DEROS

1-25 Mar
26 Mar - 7 Apr
8 Apr and beyond

DISPOSITION

Reassign to replacement battalion
Reassign within the division
Report to USARV for reassignment*

Standdown 16 March - 7 April 1970

DEROS

15 Mar - 12 Apr
13 Apr - 30 Apr
1 May and beyond

DISPOSITION

Reassign to replacement battalion
Reassign to residual Installation
Coordinator
Report to USARV for reassignment

3d Bde/4th Infantry Division

Normal DEROS

Reassign within division except USARV reserves option to reassign personnel with critical MOS to maintain equity among major units.

Other Units

DEROS

Standdown to R+5
R+6 to R+21

R+22 and beyond

DISPOSITION

Normal DEROS to replacement battalion
Reassign to commander/Installation
Coordinator (at same location) or as
directed by major commander
Report to USARV for reassignment

* Minimum 30 days in new unit

2a) Proposed Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Roster to Appendix C
(Personnel Management) to Annex A (Procedures and Administrative) to the
Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLOC/DA After Action Report. (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 1st Infantry Division
APO SF 95

3-100 10 January 70

ADA-ARMY

SUBJECT: Proposed Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Roster

Contracting Officer

1. Attached is a proposed enlisted personnel redeployment roster to be
verified by your command. The roster is separated in the following cate-
gories:

a. "LEPOS LOSS" - personnel in this category will rotate prior to
unit stand-down.

b. "60th Sep" - personnel in this category will rotate during the
stand-down period.

c. "Division Asset" - personnel in this category will be reassigned
within the division during the stand-down period and will remain with the
division until they rotate.

d. "OGAN Assignments" - personnel in this category will be either
reassigned in-country or reassigned within the division and then reassigned
in-country at a later date.

e. "Residual Assignments" - personnel in this category will be
reassigned to a unit at DMJ base camp after the redeployment of the
division has been completed.

2. The following instructions will be used in verifying the rosters:

a. Names of individuals, SEROC, and MOS appearing on rosters will be
verified against the unit DA Form 2475 (Personnel Data Card).

b. Names of individuals assigned to the unit who are not listed on
the roster will be added to the category containing personnel with a like
SEROC. Reason for the addition will be entered in the blank space follow-
ing the "Avail Date." (Example: Assigned on M/R 10 Jan 70)

AVDB-ACPM

SUBJECT: Proposed Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Roster

c. Names of individuals appearing on rosters who are no longer assigned to the unit will be deleted by drawing a single line through the entry, and the reason for the deletion will be entered under the "Avail Date" column. (Example: Rag to 90th Repl Bn, M/R 10 Jan 70)

d. The combined strength of the roster must be in agreement with the most recent DA Form 1 (Morning Report). The following information will be entered on the last page of the roster entitled "USARV Assignment".

(1) M/R date:

(2) M/R strength:

(3) Roster strength: (Note: Total of combined categories must be the same as M/R strength)

(4) Authentication by unit commander:

3. The column on the roster titled "Availability date" will be filled out in the following manner for category "Division Asset" and "USARV Assignment" only.

a. The approximate number of personnel who will be out-processed from the unit in a particular day during the unit stand-down is indicated below:

Stand-down day

b. The unit will be required to release the above number of personnel for reassignment on the date indicated. This day will be of primary concern in determining the availability date for reassignment of each enlisted man.

c. The unit will indicate the day each will be available to out-process by placing the day (example: +3) in the column "Availability date". If the unit is required to make available for out-processing 100 individuals on +3 day, there should be a total of 100 individuals that have +3 in "Division Asset" and/or "USARV Assignment" category.

4. All entries on the roster will be made by typing or neatly printing (with ball point pen). Care will be exercised to insure that information posted to the roster is legible on all copies.

5. A Personnel Service Division (PSD) representative will be available to answer specific questions for the determination of personnel availability date at the time this letter is distributed.

AVDB-AGPM

SUBJECT: Proposed Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Roster

6. The importance of accurate verification of the roster cannot be over-emphasized. Rosters must be verified within 48 hours after receipt. Rosters will be hand carried to the PSD representative located at each base camp.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

STEPHEN Z. KOVACS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Tab E (LOI, 21 January 1970) to Appendix i (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-AG

21 January 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI), Personnel and Administration

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Inclosed are instructions concerning personnel and administration for use during the 1st Infantry Division redeployment. These instructions are effective immediately and take precedence over all other 1st Infantry Division directives dealing with the same subjects.
2. The purpose of this LOI is to provide guidance to commanders, first sergeants, personnel staff noncommissioned officers, and company clerks during redeployment. Questions which are not resolved by the LOI should be directed to the appropriate office listed in Inclosure 2.
3. Maximum dissemination of information on redeployment to all Big Red One officers and men is essential. Upon receipt of this LOI, commanders have most of the available information on personnel and administrative matters. The unit orderly room, therefore, continues as the basic source of information for 1st Infantry Division soldiers. And, during this period, it is imperative that proper military channels are strictly observed.
4. Individuals who are uncertain about required actions must not attempt to resolve the uncertainty through assumptions. Neither should they hesitate to refer to the appropriate agency listed, through the proper channels, any matter of which they are in doubt. All such referrals are welcome at any time of the day or night and will receive prompt and decisive responses.
5. On arrival at the standdown area, units will be met by representatives of the Adjutant General Section. Final plans for personnel and administrative outprocessing will be coordinated at that time.

AMDE - AG


20 January 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI). Personnel and Administration

6. All facilities of the Adjutant General Section are staffed and prepared to provide any assistance or guidance required by unit commanders. Personnel of the Section are totally committed to the objectives of providing courteous, efficient, personal service to each member of the Division - service that will leave the soldier with the everlasting conviction that the Big Red One does, indeed, take care of its own. Unit commanders are requested to bring any apparent deviations from these objectives to the personal attention of the Adjutant General.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 incl
as


C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. SUSPENSE DATES: Meeting suspense dates during redeployment operations is especially important. Redeployment is a team effort requiring the efforts and cooperation of all organizations at all levels of command. If one element fails to meet its obligations, other corresponding actions by this and higher headquarters will be delayed. Such delays may adversely affect the speedy and accurate outprocessing of individuals and units.
2. R&R PROGRAM: The R&R program will be continued. However, personnel must complete R&R one day prior to the first day of their unit's standdown.
3. MOTION PICTURES: Units will notify the Special Service Division (DI An 2249/2227) by telephone one day prior to the date they wish to terminate their motion picture account. Movement to the Di An Base Camp will not interrupt service.
4. SPECIAL SERVICES PROPERTY: Separate instructions will be issued concerning disposition of special services property.
5. DIRECT COMMISSION; RETIREMENTS; APPLICATIONS FOR RA APPOINTMENT, OCS AND WOFT; AND MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS: For actions still pending in these areas, this headquarters will notify the appropriate agency of the member's change of assignment. All approved applications remain valid.
6. EARLY RELEASE FOR SEASONAL EMPLOYMENT AND SCHOOL: All approved applications remain valid, and new applications will continue to be accepted.
7. MORNING REPORTS:
 - a. GENERAL: Commanders of deploying units must insure that morning reports are prepared as required by current directives throughout all phases of redeployment, including the period of standdown. Final morning reports will be completed and forwarded to this headquarters three days prior to the last day of standdown. Unit morning report files will be turned in at the same time. This headquarters will forward morning report files to CONUS. The actions described in this letter must be completed at the time specified to insure proper accountability of personnel during redeployment and to permit the USARV Data Service Center to transfer accounting records of deploying units to the new servicing DPA within the time required by DA regulations.
 - b. REDUCTION OF STRENGTH: Due to normal losses, unit strength will be lowered gradually with a goal of zero strength as of the final day a unit is at standdown. The only exception will be personnel

Inclosure 1

in an AWOL status as of "Zero Day"; more specific instruction regarding these individuals appears below. Units which can attain a zero strength will run the appropriate entry under RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS on the morning report where a zero balance is attained. Temp depl of pers is entered in the action column with no entry in the status column, and the remark should read no pers ass or atch. (See Table 4-5, Rule 24, AR 680-1). Company clerks should be the last to leave a unit and will be responsible for submitting all morning reports during standdown and delivering them to the Morning Report (MR) Section, Records Branch, Personnel Service Division.

c. AWOL: As a unit stands down, it will forward the following documents to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-PR, regarding any men not previously reported as AWOL:

(1) Report for Suspense of Favorable Personnel Actions (DA Form 268).

(2) A copy of the inquiry into the probable causes or motives for this absence IAW Para 4a, AR 630-10. The original copy should be in the unit's files.

(3) A copy of the letter to the absentee's nearest relative IAW Para 5, AR 630-10.

(4) A copy of the inventory of the absentee's personal effects, recording all items on Inventory of Personal Property (DA Form 442). Dispose of personal effects IAW AR 755-20.

(5) Extract Copy of Morning Report (DA Form 188) (five copies) indicating the AWOL entries. Additional extract copies will be made if and when it becomes necessary to drop the individual from the rolls.

(6) An Installation Clearance Record (DA Form 137) including conduct and efficiency ratings as of the absentee's last duty day.

(7) Absentee's Health Record (DD Form 722) and Dental Record (DD Form 722-1).

Where any documents requested above are unavailable, submit a certificate to that effect signed by a commissioned or warrant officer. AWOL will be dropped from the rolls on the final day of standdown IAW Para 29g, AR 630-10 and units will make the appropriate entry under RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS.

d. GROUP ENTRIES: Units are encouraged to use group entries whenever possible and should refer to Para 3-8 and figures 3-2 and 3-3, AR 680-1. When orders are attached as inclosures, units are reminded

that any personnel not included in the group change should be deleted by drawing a line through the name. The officer's identification number should remain and initial each name lined out.

e. **ABSENT PERSONNEL:** Assigned personnel carried on the morning report in a status other than "present for duty" will be reported by name, grade, SSAN, DEROS, and duty status (hospital, leave, etc.), to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDR-AG-PR, not later than three days prior to standdown date of the unit.

f. **INQUIRIES:** While this redeployment creates additional work for everyone, if a degree of caution is maintained to preclude error, all should go smoothly. Any questions related to the Morning Report should be submitted to the Morning Report Section, Di An 2912.

g. **FOR HQ & HQ CO AND BAND, SUPCOM ONLY:** This is the only unit within the Division which will maintain personnel in the strength of its morning report throughout redeployment and it will have entries unique from those listed above. Because the unit will not attain a zero strength, close audit must be maintained as personnel are gained and lost. There are three entries required for PCS to CONUS, and Rules 11, 12, and 13, Table 4-5, AR 680-1 should be followed closely. Any AWOL will be dropped from the rolls on the day prior to departure for CONUS IAW Para 29h, AR 630-10, and the usual requirements for a DFR will be followed. Any questions should be directed to the Morning Report Section, Di An 2912.

8. **ID CARDS/TAGS:** The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division will require that each man have a properly prepared ID card and a set of ID tags. Facilities will be available in the standdown area to prepare identification items.

9. **OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORTS.** The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division will require that the majority of the officers assigned to the Big Red One have an efficiency report prepared on their performance of duty in the next 75 days. Because of the volume of reports that must be prepared, raters and indorsers are requested to start preparing in draft form the reports they must complete so the reports can be completed expeditiously upon receipt from Officers' Records Branch. No officer will be permitted to clear the Division until he has completed all reports he is required to make.

10. **SENIOR ENLISTED RECORDS:** The planned deployment of the 1st Infantry Division will require the early initiation of Enlisted Efficiency Reports (EER) (DA Form 2166) to insure that all senior noncommissioned officers and personnel possessing controlled MOS have this form on file in their Military Personnel Records Jacket prior to deployment. DA Form 2166 will be forwarded in duplicate to battalion S1 for completion by appropriate rater, indorser and reviewer and both copies returned to this

headquarters by suspense date. The original copy of the EER will be forwarded to Department of the Army by this headquarters for inclusion in EM's official file. The second copy will be filed in the member's field military personnel file. Personnel in the above categories will not process out of the Division without a current copy of the Enlisted Efficiency Report in their records.

11. CLEARANCE PROCEDURES: a. Current clearance procedures will be followed for officers, senior enlisted personnel, and personnel in grades E1 through E6 returning to CONUS.

b. Commanders will provide a roster of all E1 through E6 enlisted personnel being reassigned in Vietnam certifying that the agencies listed below have or will be cleared prior to the individual's departure. This certificate will include conduct and efficiency ratings and must be personally signed by the commander. Certificate will be furnished this headquarters on the first day of standdown. Agencies to be cleared:

- (1) Orderly room
- (2) Classified documents
- (3) Unit supply
- (4) Unit reenlistment
- (5) Unit mail room
- (6) Library
- (7) Special Services

12. PERSONNEL PENDING ELIMINATION ACTION: a. Immediate and positive action will be taken to insure that all elimination cases are closed prior to a unit's redeployment from RVN.

b. Personnel for whom elimination cases cannot be closed prior to a unit's deployment will be reassigned (with flagging action maintained) by this headquarters.

13. BARs TO REENLISTMENT. Commanders will insure that all necessary bars to reenlistment are processed expeditiously and are completed prior to a unit's redeployment from RVN.

14. LEAVES AND PASSES: a. Seven day ordinary leave for personnel assigned to redeploying units must be completed one day prior to the unit's first day of standdown. Passes may be issued at the discretion

of the commander.

b. If it becomes necessary for a member of a unit scheduled for redeployment to take an emergency or ordinary leave (compassionate) and the member will not return prior to the date his unit is scheduled for redeployment standdown, he will be reassigned to the Division Replacement Detachment or another unit within USARV, depending upon DEROS. If reassignment is involved:

(1) Compassionate leave personnel will clear their organization and bring all personal property with them to Di An if possible. If there is not sufficient time to clear and bring personal property, commanders will follow procedures directed for personnel on emergency leave below.

(2) Unit commanders are responsible for inventorying the personal property of emergency leave personnel and forwarding such property and members' health and dental records to the gaining command. This will be accomplished within three days after receipt of reassignment orders. At the same time, commanders will insure that proper clearance procedures have been followed. If the member is assigned to the Division Replacement Detachment, personal property and health and dental records will be delivered to that unit. If the reassignment is to a unit outside the Division, property and health and dental records will be forwarded by registered mail. In any case, this headquarters (Di An 2058/2756) will be notified of shipping or delivery date and, if appropriate, registered mail number.

c. **SPECIAL LEAVE:** Special leave must be completed one day prior to the unit's first day of standdown. If this is not possible, members will be reassigned by this headquarters prior to the effective date of the leave or prior to the first day of unit standdown, whichever occurs first.

d. **REENLISTMENT LEAVE:** Reenlistment leave will be authorized for personnel who reenlist for other than Division units. Reenlistment leave for all other personnel will only be authorized if they can complete leave one day prior to their unit's first day of standdown.

15. **LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATION:** Prior to redeployment of units scheduled for standdown all outstanding LD determinations will be completed. It is imperative that commanders maintain close control on all suspense dates concerning LD determinations. Commanders will be required to furnish forwarding addresses of personnel involved in incidents when it is impossible to complete LD.

16. **REASSIGNMENTS:** Normal requests for reassignment out of the Division will be disapproved, effective immediately.

a. Effective immediately, reassignments within the Division will not be approved except under the most unusual circumstances. Requests for exceptions to this policy will be considered only if fully justified. Exceptions can only be approved by the ACofS, G1, for officers and the Adjutant General for enlisted personnel.

b. Reassignment instructions for individuals remaining in Vietnam will be furnished by HQ USARV. This headquarters will issue orders prior to the first day the member's unit stands down.

c. For individuals who will be reassigned in Vietnam prior to DEROS, the gaining command will issue PCS orders to CONUS or other oversea commands.

17. PROMOTIONS: a. The Division will continue to receive promotion allocations.

b. Order of merit lists for grades E5 and E6 for the months of February and March must arrive at this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-FM, by the first day of each month.

c. A list of individuals recommended for promotion to grade E4 must be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-FM, with the order of merit lists for each month. Units will not be required to submit requests for orders for promotion to grade E4.

d. The Division E7 promotion board will convene in February. There will be no board in March.

e. Promotions to grade E7 for the month of March will be made from the standing merit lists.

18. EXTENSION POLICY: a. All requests for extension of foreign service tour must be submitted at least 30 days prior to the first day of unit standdown. Requests for extension must also meet the normal time requirements.

b. Requests for six-month extensions for assignment within the 1st Infantry Division (See d below) will be returned without action.

c. Individuals who have approved six-month extensions for the 1st Infantry Division and have not taken special leave will be given the choice of terminating their extensions, or specifying three units of preference. Personnel in this category will be consulted individually by this headquarters for their choice of option.

d. Requests for six-month extension in conjunction with a request for reassignment within USARV must be submitted between six and three months prior to DEROS and will be submitted in sufficient time to reach HQ, USARV 30 days prior to standdown.

19. DEROS POLICY: Individuals with DEROS prior to or during the standdown of their unit will follow instructions contained in their special orders.

20. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: a. Achievement awards will no longer be submitted on machine listings; however, the listings previously submitted to the A&D Branch will be processed. Commanders and heads of staff sections will use a disposition form to submit recommendations for Army Commendation Medals and Bronze Star Medals. Sample format is at Inclosure 1. All deserving individuals should be recommended for an achievement award. The period of achievement will not extend past the date the award is recommended. Recommendations must be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-AD, 15 days prior to the initial date a unit is scheduled for standdown.

b. Service awards will no longer be submitted on machine listings; however, the listings previously submitted to the A&D Branch will be processed. Commanders and heads of staff sections will use a disposition form to submit recommendations for Army Commendation Medals and Bronze Star Medals. Sample format is at Inclosure 1. Service and achievement awards will not be submitted on the same DF. All personnel scheduled to depart Vietnam on or before 30 April 1970 may receive a service award from the 1st Infantry Division if recommended by their commanding officer. Those individuals departing Vietnam on 1 May 1970 or later who have at least six months in country when reassigned out of the Division may be recommended for a service award by submitting a completed USARV Form 157R. These recommendations will be placed in the individual's field military personnel file for consideration by the gaining commander. All recommendations for awards will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-AD, NLT 15 days prior to the initial date a unit is scheduled for standdown.

c. Recommendations for award of the Air Medal will be accompanied by USARV Form 131 for all personnel except those on flying status as crew or non-crew members. Recommendations should be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-AD, NLT 15 days prior to the initial date a unit is scheduled for standdown. All orders issued after this date will be processed as final awards and certificates will be prepared in accordance with Paragraph 4, Appendix IV, USARV Regulation 672-1. Excess hours should be reported on USARV Form 131. This form, when properly completed and verified by the commanding officer, will be inserted in the individual's field 201 file.

d. Recommendations for foreign awards may be submitted only for those individuals departing Vietnam on or before 30 June 1970. One copy of USARV Form 157R is required along with four copies of 1st

antry Division Form 368 when recommending an individual for a Vietnamese award. The Vietnamese headquarters must receive these recommendations at least 30 days prior to the date an individual departs Vietnam.

e. Recommendations for unit awards can be initiated only by the senior/parent headquarters to the unit recommended. Proposed citations should be limited to approximately 30 lines of type, exclusive of introduction, including naming of all participating units. The recommendation must be submitted in nine copies (reference: Letter AVHAG-FD, Headquarters USARV, 14 Dec 69, subject: Unit Awards). Recommendations must arrive at this headquarters prior to the first day of standdown but in no case later than 20 March 1970.

f. Awards ceremonies will be held prior to the initial date a unit is scheduled for standdown. All awards which have been completed and received by the unit will be presented to the individual. Individuals should also be informed what awards are still pending.

21. POSTAL. e. Individual units will not be required to prepare or monitor preparation of DD Form 1175 (locator card). This will be done by all members of each unit at outprocessing stations and will be handled by Division postal personnel. Individuals must have clearance forms signed by a member of the team giving assistance in completing locator cards. Individuals will not be allowed to complete outprocessing without this signature.

b. Postal facilities will be increased in Di An Base Camp to handle increased personnel moving in to staging areas. These areas are as follows:

- (1) Bldg No. 4402 in training command area.
- (2) Bldg No. 5092 in PX area.
- (3) Bldg No. (unknown) in 2d Bde area.

These locations will provide all types of postal service.

c. Individuals are encouraged to use hold baggage privileges. This is a free service provided by the Army. A hold baggage area will be set up in the training command. If individuals do not utilize hold baggage shipping authorization, customs free mailing may be obtained by placing one copy of orders in each parcel shipped through the post office. This service will be stamped by the postal clerk "Free entry claimed under public law. Movement orders enclosed". Parcels mailed require complete customs labels under other conditions.

d. **Packing, Preparing and Mailing:**

(1) Each article will be securely and substantially wrapped, consistent with the nature of the contents and climatic conditions, the length of the journey, and the numerous handlings necessary. The responsibility for proper packing rests with the sender.

(2) Mail which is not properly packed or wrapped to withstand normal handling will not be accepted for mailing.

(3) **Types of Containers.** Containers must be strong enough to retain and protect their contents during the course of normal mail handling. Boxes or cartons of the following materials are commonly used: Corrugated or solid fiberboard, kraftboard, chipboard (for small items), fiber mounting tubes with metal ends, metal, and wood. Heavy wrapping paper or burlap or similar cloth may be used for parcels containing unbreakable goods which would not be damaged by the weight of other mail. The strength of carton required will depend on the weight, size, and nature of the article shipped.

(4) **Size of Container.** Parcels will not exceed 100 inches in length and girth combined nor weigh more than 70 pounds. The outer shipping containers should be the proper size to hold goods shipped with enough space for cushioning material inside. If the container is too large, the contents are apt to shift while in transit. If it is too small, or too much is put into it, there will not be enough room for protective internal cushioning. An overstuffed carton may burst in transit.

(5) **Chipboard Boxes:** Small rigid telescoping chipboard boxes are usually used for small articles such as watches, jewelry, pens, etc. These boxes equipped with metal clasps which hold the two parts together ordinarily need no further reinforcement to effect a proper closure. Jewelry or watches having a value of more than \$10.00 must be mailed as registered mail.

e. **Nonmailable Matter:**

(1) Nonmailable matter includes all matter which by law, regulation, or treaty is prohibited from being sent in the mail. The mailer is responsible that items mailed do not violate provisions of the law. Additionally, mailers are required to declare the nature of the contents of all parcels to preclude acceptance of matter prohibited by Parts 124 and 127, Postal Manual, and to insure compliance with Part 125, Postal Manual. The latter governs the conditions under which certain matter may be mailed.

(2) Any article, composition, or material which may kill or injure another; or damage mail or other property; or is otherwise undesirable,

is not mailable. Included are the following:

- (a) Obscene and indecent matter.
- (b) Intoxicating liquors.
- (c) Matches of all kinds, lighter fluid, and lighters containing fluid, when addressed to or from overseas APO.
- (d) Magnetic material in air mail, MOM, SAM, or PAL having sufficient magnetic field to cause appreciable deviation of a compass sensing device of an aircraft.
- (e) All kinds of poisons or matter containing poison (acids and alkalies).
- (f) Oxidizing materials or highly flammable solids; or those which are likely under conditions incident to transportation to cause fire through friction.
- (g) Poisonous animals (except those authorized in Part 125, Postal Manual).
- (h) Disease germs or scabs.
- (i) All explosives and flammable material which may ignite or explode.
- (j) All firearms or major parts thereof addressed to, from, or between military post offices.
- (k) Radioactive matter, except that authorized in Part 125, Postal Manual.
- (l) Lottery, fraudulent, or libelous matter.
- (m) Contraband (AR 190-22) and war trophies (AR 643-20).
- (n) Narcotic drugs, except official mailings authorized by AR 40-61.
- (o) Threatening letters (876 USC 18).
- (p) Government property without an invoice or sales receipt.

22. RECORDS MANAGEMENT: a. All files created in 1969 and 1970 will be consolidated and transferred to CONUS. Files will be turned in by brigade and battalion S1 to the AG Publications Center, Bldg No. 4752, Ft An, during unit standdown at Ft An. 1969 files will be boxed separately

from 1970 files in unsealed cardboard boxes. Classified files will be boxed separately from unclassified files. Box(es) will be clearly marked with unit designation and contents (e.g., 2d Bn, 2d Inf, 1969 Files 2.01, 2.02, etc.). A list of file numbers will also be placed inside the box(es).

b. All reference publication files of regulations, circulars, and pamphlets from DA, MACV and USARV will be turned in by brigade and battalion S1 to AG Publications Center, Di An, during unit standdown. These reference publications should not be removed from their binders. This will facilitate redistribution to gaining units. 1st Infantry Division publications will be disposed of by units.

c. Publications Center Accounts:

(1) This headquarters will notify US Army Publications Center, Japan, of termination of all accounts for blank forms.

(2) Brigade and battalion S1 will dispatch letters to Publications Centers located at St. Louis, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland, requesting termination of their accounts. An information copy will be sent to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-ASD, NLT 15 Feb 70. A sample letter is at Inclosure 2.

23. OUTPROCESSING: a. As mentioned in the cover letter, as each unit stands down, it will be met by representatives of the Adjutant General Section. At that time, each unit will be furnished outprocessing rosters showing the exact time and date each member of the unit is scheduled to outprocess. Current planning requires that members outprocess and ship to their new units on the same day.

b. Personnel being reassigned within USARV will outprocess through facilities at the Training Command, Di An.

c. Personnel returning to CONUS prior to or during redeployment will outprocess through the current Personnel Service Division facilities at Di An. These individuals will follow reporting instructions in special orders.

2 Incl
as

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 20-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVD - AG - AD

Recommendation for Awards

TO Commanding General

FROM Commanding Officer

DATE

CMT

1st Infantry Division

(Unit)

ATTN: AVD - AG - AD

AFG 96345

1. The following named individuals are recommended for the award of the Bronze Star Medal for achievement for the period indicated:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>DAWN</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>OLC</u>
JOHNS, Charles W.	PFC	257 15 9876	1 Sep 69 to 1 Jan 70	
DCE, John E.	SMP	527 51 6709	1 Dec 69 to 1 Jan 70	1st

2. The following named individuals are recommended for the award of the Army Commendation Medal for achievement for the period indicated:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>DAWN</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>OLC</u>
SMITH, Tom W.	CPT	292 05 5525	5 Dec 69 to 5 Jan 70	2d
LEE, David A.	SF6	225 67 0532	3 Dec 69 to 3 Jan 70	

JOE : . CPT AG
CPT, INF
Commanding

- NOTE:
- Service award recommendations will be submitted in the same format but on a separate DF.
 - Unit commanders cannot recommend themselves for an award.
 - Periods of achievement cannot overlap.
 - Period of service should cover entire tour of duty.
 - Unit should try to verify oak leaf cluster to assist in Awards & Decorations Branch research.

Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

(File Symbol)

(date)

SUBJECT. Termination of Account Number (enter account number)

US Army AG Publications Center
1655 Woodson Road
St. Louis, Missouri 63144

Due to the redeployment of this organization, request termination of account number (enter account number). An organization has been selected to be redesignated the 1st Infantry Division, and should already have open accounts with your center.

D. G. LETTER
CPT, FA
Commanding

CF:
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAG-AP, APO SF 96375
CG, 1st Inf Div, ATTN: AVDB-AG-ASD, APO SF 96345

*A letter also to be sent to: US Army AG Publications Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21220

Inclosure 2 to Inclosure 1

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Adjutant General	LK 4206/DM 108-199
AG Executive Officer	LK 4206/DM 108-199
Administrative Services Division	LK 4521/DM 139
Personnel Service Division	
Chief	DA 2449/2310
Sergeant Major	DA 2449/2310
Personnel Management Branch	DA 2572/2575
Personnel Actions Branch	DA 2058/2756/2753
Awards and Decorations Branch	DA 2746/2646
Personnel Records Branch	
Officers	DA 2062/2362
EM (E1-E6)	DA 2749/2747
Flagged Records	DA 2913
Morning Reports	DA 2912
Administrative Machine Branch	DA 2558
Special Services Officer	DA 2249/2227
Postal Officer	
Main Office	MACV 2263
Di An	DA 2050

Inclosure 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-AG-AD

3 February 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Personnel and Administration

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: Paragraph 20, letter, AVDB-AG, this headquarters, subject as above, 21 Jan 70.

2. The following information is provided to clarify the awards and decorations procedures announced in the reference.

a. Only one achievement award per individual will be recommended by disposition form. Recommendations for additional achievement awards must be submitted on USARV Form 157R. The provisions of 1st Inf Div Reg 672-5-1 apply.

b. Recommendation for a service award will be submitted on USARV Form 157R and one copy will be placed in the individual's 201 file. This applies only to those individuals who have completed at least six months in RVN prior to their reassignment within USARV.

c. Personnel reassigned within the Division should receive all awards from their original unit. This will prevent any injustice to individuals because of the limited time their new commanders would have to submit recommendations for awards.

3. Disposition forms recommending awards will be submitted in four copies to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-AG-AD. Listing of names should be double-spaced. The award should be for a sustained period of performance. An appropriate period would be approximately three months.

AVDB-AG-AD

3 February 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Personnel and Administration

4. Priority for processing awards will be given to units in the order that they are scheduled to stand down.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Special

Tab C (Commanding General's Letter) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management)
to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE
FLORJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

Dear

You have been selected to remain in the 1st Infantry Division for a short period of time after many of the members of your present unit have departed for other assignments in Vietnam. My purpose in writing this letter is to explain the need for this action.

Although the Big Red One is redeploying to Fort Riley, our operational mission in Vietnam does not end until actual redeployment occurs in early April. Therefore, certain units must be maintained at close to full strength to ensure the accomplishment of this mission. With personnel in these particular units leaving on normal DEROS and no programed replacements available from outside the division to replace them, there is no alternative but for soldiers with the needed MOS and skills to be transferred within the division to maintain the required unit strength. You were selected to remain in the division because your MOS and skill are among those needed for this purpose.

I trust that the above explanation will answer any questions you may have concerning why you are being retained in the 1st Infantry Division.



A. E. MILLOY
Major General, USA
Commanding

For information for transfer: 1. Appendix 1 Personnel Actions effected by the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. 2. Appendix 2 Personnel Actions effected by the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 1st Infantry Division
APO SA. FRANCISCO 96345

AVDC-1


23 January 1970

SUBJECT: Request for transfer and other personnel actions

SIC DIS. RICH. IQ.

1. To ensure the smooth functioning of personnel actions effected by the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, individual requests for reassignment will not be considered except for extreme personal hardship.
2. Redeployment criteria will be announced as quickly as possible after it is received by this headquarters. Personnel to be reassigned within RVN and those returning to CONUS as individual replacements will be notified through their established chain of command. Individual telephonic inquiries for personal considerations will not be entertained by the AGofS, C. This office will continue to put the personal into personnel; however, the short time frame allowed for redeployment and the number of officers involved precludes the consideration of individual requests except as mentioned in paragraph 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J. F. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A(Mod-1)

Tab I (Absent Personnel) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDS-ASPB

20 Feb 1970

SUBJECT: Absent Personnel

1. Each unit will submit a list of all men who are in any operating category other than "present for duty" as of 21 Feb 70. The information listed below will be supplied on each individual. This list will be submitted NOT 1200 hours Sunday with the morning report for 21 Feb 70.

- a. Name.
- b. Rank and SSAN.
- c. Current morning report status (AWOL, Hosp, Conf, Emer Lv, R&R, TDY)
- d. Date departed.
- e. Date expected to return, if known.
- f. Where individual is, i.e. home address, LBJ, Hong Kong.
- g. Any other pertinent information you can provide concerning the man and his status or any correspondence you have regarding his status.

2. If a unit has no personnel absent as of 21 Feb 70, then they will submit a MR stating that all personnel are present for duty.

R.C. BUTLER, JR
CW2, USA
Chief, PRB

DISTRIBUTION:
A (MOD-1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

27 Jan 1970

AJUB-AGP

SUBJECT: Personnel Strength Accounting

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. A primary concern for unit commanders in preparation for redeployment is unit strength accountability as reflected on the morning report. The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention and provide instructions as to what steps must be taken to minimize and eliminate errors.
2. The Division's strength picture can be distorted due to late entries on the morning report. To insure closer attention to EUCSA dates, all units except those listed below will submit a morning report every day beginning 1 Feb 70 and will continue to do so through stand down. If no event occurs during a 24 hour period requiring a morning report entry, the unit will submit a "NO CHANGE" morning report with the heading, strength, and authentication sections completed in accordance with para 3-7, AR 680-1. All units are still required to submit a morning report on the last day of the month.

61st Inf Plat	35th SB	242nd Chem
43rd PI	41st SB	266th Chem
44th PI	17th MH	269th FA

3. Each battalion receives sets of consolidated orders through distribution. These orders must be screened to insure that units in that command make the proper entry on the EUCSA date. Proper use of consolidated orders will eliminate delayed entries.
4. Each unit is responsible for determining and reflecting the status of each individual on their morning report. One area where units fail to satisfy this obligation deals with those individuals who return to CONUS on either emergency or compassionate leave. When the individual fails to return within the prescribed time, the unit must pursue the matter and determine what his status is at that time. Often these individuals request compassionate reassignment and are attached to a nearby military facility pending the outcome of their request. When notified that a man has been attached in this manner, the unit must make the appropriate entry as shown in table 3-8, AR 680-1. Also the member must be listed as duty out of the division on the Fedcor Report, 1st Inf Div Form 710R. As units draw nearer to their stand down, necessary action will be taken by this headquarters to reassign these individuals so that unit strength can be zeroed during stand down.

Tab J (Personnel Strength Accounting) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AVDB-AGP


27 Jan 1970

SUBJECT: Personnel Strength Accounting

5. Units are responsible for auditing and verifying the strength figures on their morning reports. If discrepancies are discovered, units will go back to their last morning report inspection or audit and work forward in attempt to discover their error. When the error is located, the appropriate correction will be entered on the next morning report. If screening the morning report fails to reveal the mistake, the unit should contact the Morning Report Section, Di an 2912, for further instruction.

6. Now is the time to resolve the status of individuals and audit morning report strength figures. Units must eliminate late entries on morning reports to insure accuracy of strength accountability at the division level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WILLIAM M. TUCEY
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
A(MOB-1)

Tab K (Strength Accounting) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AGP

10 Feb 1970

SUBJECT: Strength Accounting

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. References:

- a. AR 600-1
- b. USARV Cir 600-1 dated 1 Jan 70

2. A review of Division morning reports shows that several areas need immediate clarification and emphasis. This letter identifies these areas and explains the correct procedures.

3. The EDCSA (Effective Date Change of Strength Accountability) is the primary administrative tool in maintaining a predictable strength picture. During redeployment of the Big Red One there is a critical need to have these entries appear on the morning report on the corresponding EDCSA date. Some units are not checking orders closely enough for the EDCSA and subsequently using an incorrect EDCSA. The EDCSA is located under the "For the Individual" portion of the order, should none appear in that section, look to the portion that contains the general instructions under the heading.

4. While some EDCSA's have been altered through carelessness, some units have arbitrarily altered an EDCSA to correspond with the individual's departure. Rule 3, Table 1, USARV Cir 600-1 includes the following note: "Note 2: Individual's will be reported 'RFA' (relieved from assigned) and 'Dprt' (departed) on their EDCSA notwithstanding whether they have physically departed the unit." An EDCSA can only be altered by amending or revoking orders.


5. When an individual receives a compassionate reassignment and is already in census, the orders may have "not used" in place of an EDCSA. This means that no EDCSA is required to USARV or to his ultimate unit of assignment since he is already there. For morning report purposes, the EDCSA for these individuals will be the date of the next morning report and the entry will appear on that morning report.

AVDB-AGP
SUBJECT: Strength Accounting

10 Feb 1970

6. The screening of consolidated orders and timely entries on the correct EDCSA will insure an accurate strength picture. Concern with accurate strength as reflected on the morning report will eliminate problems at standdown.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WILLIAM M. TONEY
MAJ, AGO
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
A(MOD-1)

Tab E (Morning Report Suggestions) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-107R

24 Feb 1970

SUBJECT: Morning Report Suggestions

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The first few days of stand down and processing have indicated several problems in obtaining a zero balance on the morning report. This letter will alert you as to the nature of these problems and suggest ways to minimize them. If there are any questions regarding the morning report, we encourage you to call Di An 2912.

2. As explained in the initial LOI, we had expected to have the final EDCSA's on reassignment orders coincide with the last day of processing so that the morning report would reach a zero balance on that day. Due to additional requirements this was impossible and the final EDCSA will be several days after the unit has completed processing. Units are still required to submit morning reports 3 days before their final day of processing for each day through their final zero balance morning report. Orders will be provided to facilitate this advance preparation.

3. As units move into stand down they will be contacted and a meeting with AG representatives will be arranged. At this meeting the morning report representative will request a list of men who do not have orders yet, and a list of those not in a present for duty status. Personnel Management will coordinate with the unit to insure that sufficient reassignment orders are provided to zero the morning report. Units are reminded that individuals in COMUS present a difficult problem and every effort should be made to contact these men and a definite determination of their status be made by the company commander.

4. Many orders have had to be amended due to a USARV directive and units should be careful that they note these changes. When quoting the authority, units must quote the original and all amending orders pertinent to that entry. One of the sample entries in the inclosure illustrates how this should be done.

5. The inclosure to this letter illustrates some of the entries common on the final series of morning reports. Company clerks will save themselves frustration and anxiety by contacting the morning report section before they complete entries they are not familiar with, Di An 2912. The following are errors which appeared in abundance recently:

ANDB-AGZR
SUBJECT: Morning Report Suggestions

24 Feb 1970

a. Most reenlistment orders now also have a reassignment order included as part of the order. While units are entering the reassignment correctly, they are failing to enter the reenlistment as required. The reenlistment is necessary and comes under the heading of "IMMEDIATE RE-ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY".


b. At no time will a zero (0) ever appear in the strength section of the morning report. Negative or zero entries in the strength section are indicated by leaving the section blank, i.e. the zero NR will have nothing entered in the "Today's Strength" column.

c. Entries will be run on their EDCSA without exception. No EDCSA will be altered without appropriate amending orders indicating that change.

6. Units will turn their morning report files for 1969 and 1970 into the Morning Report Section, Personnel Services Division (Building T-4906) with their final copies of the morning report. Any units with AWOLs will bring the information described in the initial LOI with the final morning reports to facilitate dropping these AWOL personnel from the rolls should that prove necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


R.C. BUTLER, JR
O/2, USA
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
A (MCD-1)

1. GROUP CHANGES (Reprinted from para 3-8, AR 680-1)

a. A group change consists of one MR entry that identically affects more than one individual. Separate entries will always be made for individuals going or returning from AWOL.

b. If the identical MR entry, other than initial accessions entries under rules 1, 2, and 3 of table 3-3, affects more than one and less than five, the SNL for each individual will be entered. The operational data will be entered on the first line following the last individual reported. This will be followed with the appropriate remark as usual.

c. If the identical MR entry affects five or more individuals, make entry in SNL area as indicated in rule 4, table 3-1. (Rule 4, Table 3-1 GROUP CHANGE Indiv-Incl #) On the same line enter the appropriate operational data and attach the substantiating orders or documents as instructed in d below.

d. In a group change, one copy of the order or an authenticated list with the heading of the order or list to the left side of the DA Form 1 will be stapled to each copy of the DA Form 1 in the lower left margin outside the border lines. The inclosure will be stapled so that it may be unfolded and read without removing the staple, but when folded will not extend beyond the edges of the form. The inclosure must provide the SNL data for individuals affected by the group change. Paragraphs of orders that are not pertinent to the group change will be lined out. Elements of authenticated lists may be lined out or corrected. Such corrections or deletions must be initialed by the officer authenticating the DA Form 1.

e. All individuals involved in a group change must have the same EDCSA. Sample entries appear below and additional samples may be found on page 3-8, AR 680-1, figures 3-2 and 3-3.

2. AMENDMENTS. Amendments will be quoted as shown in the second group change below. The original order and all amending orders must be quoted to have a complete entry.

3. The sample entries should help clarify how to enter group changes and quote amending orders. The entry under RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS will appear on the morning report when the strength reaches zero. The lists of individuals illustrate the two common and acceptable ways to delete or line out individuals on an order.

Incl 1

1	THOMAS, DAVID A	122-73-8674	SFC	71120
2	COOGLIN, GLENN R	327-83-9898	SSG	71130
3	BOSSON, DONALD G	559-29-2938	SP4	11810
4	BUTLER, THOMAS Z	666-98-3129	SGT	71120
5	WALSH, RICHARD	363-76-6666	SFC	91820
6	BRADY, RICHARD S	101-34-8976	SFC	1341018
7	STENFOLD, RICHARD	749-20-5394	SSG	11810
8	BRADY, FRANK	298-27-2385	SFC	1182018
9	WAGNER, THOMAS	322-26-5683	SP4	31180
10	MURRAY, DAVID A	334-25-8182	SFC	11820
11	MURPHY, CHARLES	849-33-6574	SFC	71130
12	WAGNER, DAVID	302-26-8888	SP4	11810

NAME	STATUS	CR	ACTION	STATUS	REPORT AT	EDCSA
GROUP CHANGE	20 Today-1001		REP	Part	21	
GROUP CHANGE	10 Today-1001 2		REP	Part	22	17 Feb 70
					23	20 Feb 70
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DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 200-1)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDB,AG-P

Redeployment Outprocessing Operations

TO SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM Dep AG for Opns

DATE 2 Feb 70

CMT1

1. Branches/sections listed below are assigned actions as follows:

a. For C, PRB:

(1) Prepare a chart (D7 Stencil) showing the number of personnel by unit scheduled to outprocess on each day of the 1st segment.

(2) Make plans and effect necessary coordination with all branches for the PSD Liaison Team which will meet each unit as it stands down. The purpose of this team is to brief commanders, first sergeants, S1 personnel, and company clerks on outprocessing procedures. Proposed plan and checklist of things to be accomplished will be furnished this office NLT 5 Feb 70. As a minimum, the following will be included:

(a) Delivery of the by-name outprocessing schedule (furnished by the RCC).

(b) Pick up the commander's clearance certificate which will include conduct and efficiency ratings.

(c) Point out transportation pick up points in unit's standdown area.

(d) Insure unit has orders necessary to zero morning report and fully understands final morning report procedures.

(e) Resolve all other problem areas.

(3) Prepare draft briefings for personnel to use at the following stations: AG1, AG4, AG5, Officer/Senior Enlisted Processing Point, OIC, and ID cards/tags.

b. For OIC, RCC: On receipt of firm assignment information, prepare outprocessing rosters. Rosters will list individuals, by unit, specific outprocessing time, transportation pick up point, and new organization.

c. For CO, Replacement Detachment:

(1) Obtain clearance for and clearly mark transportation pickup points in each standdown area.

Tab Y (Redeployment Outprocessing Operations) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEWAY After Action Report (U)

AVDB-AG-P (2 Feb 70)

SUBJECT: Redeployment Outprocessing Operations

(2) Obtain necessary transportation for use in transporting personnel and their personal gear to the Redeployment Outprocessing Facility.

(3) Coordinate with CO, Training Command to obtain area for use for onward shipping of personnel.

(4) Make provisions for personnel and buildings to use in securing personal gear.

(5) Prepare necessary signs for use at onward shipping area.

(6) Effect coordination with gaining commands for onward transportation of in-country reassignees.

(7) Prepare draft briefing for personnel to use at the following stations:

(a) Control Personnel in Dismount Point/Assembly area.

(b) Control Personnel in area between Finance and AG facilities.


d. For C, FMB: Prepare briefing for FM personnel to use at AG2.

e. For C, A&DE: Prepare briefing for A&DE personnel to use at AG3.

2. For all addressees: See inclosure 1 for sample of briefings. Briefings will be forwarded to this office NLT 4 Feb 70.

3. By 5 Feb 70 the final outprocessing plan will be published by this office.

1 Incl
as


WILLIAM M. TOOHEY
MAJ, AGC
Dep AG for Opns

DISTRIBUTION:
C, FAB
C, A&DE
C, FMB
C, CSU
CO, Repl Det

Proposed Briefing

Control NCC, Dismount Point/Assembly Area:

Sir, my duties are to insure baggage is properly secured prior to an individual departing for the outprocessing facility. Personnel are then directed to the bleacher area for the outprocessing orientation. I provide information and other assistance as required.

Incl 1

A-1-3-3

Tab N (AG Outprocessing Checklist: Enlisted) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AG OUTPROCESSING CHECKLIST
(Enlisted Records)

(Name)	(Grade)	(Organization)
<u>Section I - Personnel Management</u>		
_____	Grade (Items 2 & 33)	
_____	PMOS	
_____	SKOS	
_____	AMOS/VPKOS	
_____	SP, P-1, P-2, P-3	
_____	Rsg Orders	
_____	DEROS	
<u>Section II - Personnel Records</u>		
_____	Name	
_____	SSAN	
_____	Schooling and source indicator for PMCS	
_____	ETS	
_____	Last time, adjusted DEROS, BASD, SPED & ETS	
_____	Spouse (Items 10 & 20)	
_____	Security clearance and code	
_____	Item 43 against MPRJ	
_____	DD Form 98	
_____	DA Form 873	
_____	FCS Orders and clearance form	
_____	SGLI (VA Form 29-82-86)	
_____	Extraneous matter in 201 file	
_____	Comparison DA Form 20 (Parents, Wife, Children to DA Form 41)	
_____	Item 46 (Report of change submitted E-7-E-9; Spec categories A-1-N-1 and E-6 on Lineal List)	

Tab O (AG Outprocessing Checklist: Officers) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KORESTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AG OUTPROCESSING CHECKLIST
(Officers Records)

- | | | |
|---|-----------|----------|
| 1. Movement orders on file? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 2. Is DA Form 41 Current? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 3. Is DA Form 78 on file if due for promotion? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 4. Temporary documents removed? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 5. DA Form 66: | | |
| a. Audited? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| b. Item 17 closed? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| c. Item 18 closed? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| d. Item 21 - All awards posted? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 6. Has report of change been completed? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 7. Have all reports of change over one year old been removed? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 8. Identification tag? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 9. Is SGLI Form current? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 10. Identification Card? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 11. Is DA Form 873 on file? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 12. Is DD Form 98 current and on file? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 13. Immunization record? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| 14. Health and Dental records? | YES _____ | NO _____ |

Tab Q (Outprocessing Procedures) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

PERSONNEL SERVICE DIVISION
ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION REAR

OUTPROCESSING OPERATIONS

1. Purpose: To provide a plan for the thorough and accurate outprocessing of each 1st Infantry Division soldier. No soldier will depart this command unless he has all of his records and they are accurate and complete.
2. Facilities: Outprocessing will be conducted at two locations:
 - a. The Training Command for in-country reassignments and the Color Guard.
 - b. Current IOP facilities for out-of-country reassignments.
3. Responsibilities:
 - a. The C, FRB is responsible for all outprocessing activities.
 - b. Branch chiefs are responsible for providing personnel to accomplish outprocessing in their area of responsibility.
 - c. The CO, Replacement Detachment is responsible for control of personnel, transportation to and from the in-country outprocessing facility, security and police of the in-country outprocessing facility, and all onward transportation.

List of Annexes

- Annex A - In-Country Outprocessing
- Annex B - Out-of-Country Outprocessing

ANNEX A
OUTPROCESSING PROCEDURES
(In-Country)

Section I - Scheduling

1. Responsibilities: The RCC, PSD will be responsible for all out-processing scheduling.
2. Procedures:
 - a. The availability date provided by the losing command is the individual's outprocessing date.
 - b. 50 to 75 soldiers will be scheduled to outprocess each hour.
 - c. The RCC, PSD will provide appropriate commanders with out-processing schedules. Schedules will list individuals by name and include the specific hour and date of outprocessing. Schedules will also include the time and place of departure for outprocessing. Inclosure 1 is a sample outprocessing schedule.
 - d. Outprocessing will begin no earlier than 0730 hours, nor later than 1130 hours.

Section II - Transportation

1. The CO, Replacement Detachment is responsible for:
 - a. Transportation from Outprocessing Transportation Points to the Assembly Area/Dismount Point based on information provided by the RCC, PSD (see incl 1).
 - b. Coordination of onward transportation with the DIO and gaining units.
 - c. Preparation of signs denoting areas in inclosure 2 as "Out-processing Transportation Points."
 - d. Preparation of onward transportation area with signs clearly denoting gaining command.
2. Replacement Detachment Control Personnel will insure all personnel scheduled to be at the Outprocessing Transportation Point are present with all personal gear. The outprocessing scheduled will be compared with actual attendance. Any discrepancies will be reported to the appropriate CO and the RCC, PSD.

Section III - Outprocessing Procedures

1. On arrival at the Assembly Area/Dismount Point, Replacement Detachment Control Personnel will:

a. Require personnel to neatly line baggage up in the onward transportation area. In case of inclement weather, baggage will be secured in the former Training Command Museum. The CO, Replacement Detachment will provide security guards for the baggage area.

b. Assemble all newly arrived personnel in the bleacher area for the briefing at inclosure 3.

2. The group will then be lead to the Finance Initial Receiving Point where checklists (inclosure 4) will be furnished.

3. The group will outprocess through Finance, Medical and Personnel outprocessing following the plan at inclosure 5.

4. The CO, Replacement Detachment will insure control of personnel during outprocessing. No one will be allowed to leave the outprocessing area until all outprocessing is completed unless he has the permission of control personnel.

5. AG Outprocessing Checklist (inclosure 6), actions to be accomplished at each station (inclosure 7), diagram of scheduled activities (inclosure 8), and floor plan (inclosure 9) are attached.

Section III - Records

1. Personnel, finance and health and dental records will be given each departing soldier as he boards transportation to the gaining organization.

2. All records will be placed in a large envelope bearing the soldiers name and the gaining organization.

9 Inclosures
As stated

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 50-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

AVDB-IG-2

SUBJECT

Outprocessing Schedules

TO

FROM

CG, 1st Inf Div
(AVDB-IG-1)

DATE

CV 1

1. Attached are outprocessing schedules for your organization.
2. It is imperative that personnel report to the Outprocessing Transportation Point in your area at the time and date indicated.
3. Personnel reporting to the Outprocessing Transportation Point will have the following items in their possession:
 - a. All personal baggage
 - b. Health and Dental records
 - c. Identification Cards and Tags
 - d. Individual clothing record
 - e. Personnel Data Card
 - f. Immunization Record
4. Personnel will outprocess and then depart for their new assignment. They will not be allowed to return to your organization between outprocessing and final departure times.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Incl
as

GENE R. ESILER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Incl 1 to Annex A

OUTPROCESSING SCHEDULE

UNIT:

TRANSPORTATION POINT:

TIME:

DATE:

NAME

GAINING COMMAND

Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 1 (Annex A)

A-1-Q-5

Outprocessing
Transportation
Point

	<u>Area</u>	<u>Unit(s)</u>
A	HQ 2d Bde	HHC 1st Inf Div
B1	1/18 Inf	1/18 Inf 1/16 Inf 1/2 Inf
C1 & C2	2/18 Inf	2/28 Inf 2/18 Inf 2/2 Inf 1/26 Inf
C3	2/18 Inf	35th Sct Dog 61st Tracker 41st Sct Dog
D1 & D2	2/11 ACR	1/28 Inf 2/16 Inf 1/4 Cav
E	1/7 Arty	1/7 Arty 2/33 Arty 1/5 Arty 8/6 Arty
F	Standdown Ctr	3d Bde 2d Bde 1st Bde
I	701st Maint	701st Maint
J	1st S&T	1st S&T
K	Div Tng Cnd	Honor Guard
L	HHC & Band, SUPCOM	SUPCOM
M	1st MP Co	1st MP Co
N	1st Med Bn	1st Med Bn
O	1st Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn
P	1st MI	1st MI
Q	266th Chem	266th Chem 242d Chem I - 75th Rangers
V	409th AS	337th AS

OUTPROCESSING BRIEFING

IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS YOU WILL BE COMPLETING YOUR FINANCE AND PERSONNEL OUTPROCESSING.

THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO INSURE THAT YOUR RECORDS ARE CORRECT TO YOUR SATISFACTION AND OURS.

FIRST YOU WILL OUTPROCESS THROUGH THE FINANCE SECTION. YOUR FINANCE RECORDS WILL BE THOROUGHLY CHECKED EMPHASIZING PROMOTIONS AND COURT MUTILAL ORDERS; LEAVE RECORDS WILL BE CLOSED; AND ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO CORRECT DISCREPANCIES. ALL PAY INQUIRIES WILL BE ANSWERED AND OTHER ASSISTANCE PROVIDED AS NEEDED.

NEXT YOU WILL MOVE THROUGH THE MEDICAL FACILITIES WHERE YOU WILL RECEIVE NECESSARY IMMUNIZATIONS.

THEN YOU WILL MOVE THROUGH THE PERSONNEL SECTION. HERE YOUR IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND TAGS WILL BE CHECKED. YOUR RECORDS WILL BE REVIEWED TO INSURE YOU HAVE ALL AWARDS AND DECORATIONS, THAT YOUR RANK AND MOS ARE CORRECT, AND THAT EMERGENCY DATA IS CURRENT. IN SHORT, ANYTHING THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

IF YOU FOLLOW THESE SIMPLE RULES YOUR OUTPROCESSING SHOULD BE DONE WITHIN THE HOUR.

- A. MOVE QUICKLY AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS.
- B. YOU MAY SMOKE BUT BE SURE ALL ASHES AND BUTTS ARE PLACED IN BUTT CANS.
- C. KEEP YOUR VOICES DOWN.
- D. DON'T LEAVE THE OUTPROCESSING AREA UNLESS YOU HAVE PERMISSION FROM ONE OF THE SOLDIERS WEARING THE BLUE HELMET LINERS.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS ?

FOLLOW ME PLEASE.

OUTPROCESSING CHECKLIST
(IN COUNTRY)

NAME: _____

SSAN: _____ RANK: _____

CURRENT ORGANIZATION: _____


NEW ASSIGNMENT: _____

ACTIVITIES

	Time Completed	Initials
POSTAL LOCATOR CARDS	XXXXXXXX	/
FINANCE OUTPROCESSING	_____	/
MEDICAL OUTPROCESSING	_____	/
IG OUTPROCESSING	XXXXXX	/
PERSONNEL OUTPROCESSING	_____	/

Enclosure 4 to Annex A

A-1-Q-8



AG O.S. PROCESSING CHECKLIST

Initial Reception/Final Clearance Point _____

AG1 Initial Records Check: _____

AG2 Personnel Management Check _____

AG3 Awards and Decorations Check _____

AG4 Records Check _____

AG5 Final Records Assembly _____

AG OUTPROCESSING (IK_COUNTRY)

AG1 Initial Receiving/Final Clearance Point (FRB)

- a. Insure each soldier has ID Card and Tags, finance and health and dental records.
- b. Staple AG Outprocessing Checklist to 201 file of E6's and below and direct soldier to Point 2.
- c. Insure each soldier has completed postal locator cards.
- d. Furnish AG Outprocessing Checklist to officers and senior noncoms and direct them to Officer and Senior Enlisted Processing Points, respectively.
- e. Insure no member leaves the AG area until checklist is properly completed.
- f. Provide other assistance as required.

AG2 Personnel Management Processing (PM)

- a. Verify correctness of PMOS, promotions, proficiency designation, duty assignment and orders.
- b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.
- c. Note corrective actions pending on the checklist and direct soldier to AG3.
- d. Provide assistance to Senior Enlisted Processing Point as required.
- e. Provide other assistance as required.

AG3 Awards and Decorations (A&D)

- a. Verify awards, decorations, DCM's, and badges.
- b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.
- c. Note corrective action pending on the checklist and direct soldier to AG4.
- d. Provide assistance to Officer and Senior Enlisted Processing Points as required.
- e. Provide other assistance as required.

Inclosure 7 to Annex A

AG4 Records Check (PRB)

- a. Verify the accuracy of the following documents:
 - (1) DA Form 41
 - (2) DA Form 20
 - (3) Field 201 File
- b. Post orders or other changes as a result of discrepancies discovered at other points.
- c. Direct soldier to AG5.
- d. Provide other assistance as required.

AG5 Final Records Assembly (PRB)

- a. Insure all required actions have been taken
- b. Assemble all records
- c. File records with action outstanding in pending drawer
- d. Place completed records in envelope showing member's name and new organization

Officer Processing Point (PRB)

- a. Verification of 66 and 201 with officers to insure all entries are correct and that all MOS's, awards, etc. have been posted.
- b. Review DA Form 41
- c. Provide other assistance as required
- d. Direct officer with his records to AG5.

Senior Enlisted Processing Point (PRB)

- a. Verification of 20 and 201 with Sr. NCO to insure all entries are correct and that all awards, etc., have been posted.
- b. Review DA Form 41

c. Provide other assistance as required

d. Direct EM with his records to AGS



ID Card/Tag Processing (PRE/OSU)

Prepare ID cards and tags as required





IO Processing (IO) Prepare address labels for mailing the ERO Yearbook.

AG OUTPROCESSING

AG



Jr. Enl




Health & Dental Records →

← Finance Records



AG OUTPROCESSING (IN-COUNTRY)



ANNEX B

OUTPROCESSING PROCEDURES
(Out-of-Country)

Section I - Scheduling

1. Responsibilities: The CO, Replacement Detachment is responsible for enlisted outprocessing scheduling.

2. Procedures: a. All enlisted personnel will report to the Replacement Detachment in accordance with instructions contained in their special orders.

b. On arrival at the Replacement Detachment, enlisted personnel will be given the AG/Finance Outprocessing Checklist (inclosure 1). Checklist will show a specific outprocessing time and date. Outprocessing will be accomplished one day prior to shipping date to the 90th Replacement Battalion.

(1) 25 soldiers grade E1 thru E6 will be scheduled to outprocess at each of the following hours: 0730, 0830, 0930, 1030, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600.

(2) As an outprocessing hour is filled with the required 25 personnel, the CO, Replacement Detachment will deliver the outprocessing roster (in two copies) to the AG/Finance Outprocessing Facility and one copy to the Chief, PSD. Rosters will include full name and unit.

(3) Up to five soldiers grades E7 thru E9 will be scheduled to outprocess at the above hours in addition to 25 junior enlisted personnel.

c. Enlisted personnel normally will arrive one day prior to the outprocessing date. Replacement Detachment will provide the checklist indicating "Special" instead of time and date of outprocessing for personnel who arrive on the day of outprocessing.

Section II - Transportation

1. Responsibilities: The CO, Replacement Detachment is responsible for transporting personnel at Di An to the Replacement Detachment and for providing all transportation to the 90th Replacement Battalion.

2. The CO, Replacement Detachment will establish a once a day run stopping at each Di An-based unit to pick up personnel for out-of-country outprocessing. Exact time and route of the daily run will be announced in the daily bulletin.

3. Officers will not be scheduled for outprocessing nor need they report to the Replacement Detachment.

Section III - Outprocessing Procedures

1. On arrival at AG/Finance Outprocessing, personnel will be checked to insure they have the required AG/Finance Outprocessing Checklists (inclosure 1) and that they have reported as scheduled.

a. Those not having the checklist will be returned to the Replacement Detachment.

b. Personnel arriving late for outprocessing will be processed at the convenience of the AG/Finance Outprocessing section. In no case will their outprocessing delay the outprocessing of personnel who reported on time.

2. The senior members of the AG and Finance sections will coordinate to insure an equitable number of personnel process through their respective areas.

3. Personnel will completely process through either AG or Finance before processing through the other section.

4. Senior NCO's will process through Finance and then report to AG Outprocessing at Building T-4906.

5. Inclosure 2 is the AG Outprocessing functions.

6. Officers will report to Building T-4906 for outprocessing.

Section IV - Disposition of Records

1. Officers and senior enlisted personnel will be given their records on completion of outprocessing.

2. Records of enlisted personnel grades E6 and below will be placed in a large envelope and will show the member's name and gaining organization. At the end of each day, all record envelopes will be delivered to the Replacement Detachment where they will be given to the member as he boards transportation for the 90th Replacement Battalion.

3. Flagged records will be handled IAW AR 600-31.

2 Incl

as

AG1 - Initial Records Check (PRB)

a. Insure each member has the following:

- (1) Health and Dental Records
- (2) ID Cards/Tags
- (3) Clearance Papers
- (4) AG/Finance Outprocessing Checklist

b. Provide other assistance as required

AG2 - Personnel Management Processing (PRB)

a. Verify correctness of PMOS, promotions, proficiency designation and orders.

b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.

c. Issue MIA.

d. Provide other assistance as required.

AG3 - Awards and Decorations (ASDB)

a. Verify awards, decorations, GCM's, and badges.

b. Take necessary action to correct discrepancies.

c. Provide other assistance as required.

AG4 - Personnel Records (PRB)

a. Verify accuracy of the following documents:

- (1) DA Form 41
- (2) DA Form 20
- (3) Field 201 File

b. Post orders or other changes as a result of discrepancies discovered at other points.

Incl 1

AG5 - Final Records Assembly (PRB)

- a. Insure all required actions have been taken.
- b. Assemble all records.
- c. Place completed records in an envelope showing member's name and gaining organization.
- d. Deliver all records to the CO, Replacement Detachment for issuance to personnel on day of departure.

AG/Finance Outprocessing Checklist
(Out-of-Country)

NAME:

RANK:

UNIT:

DEROS:

INSTRUCTIONS

Grades E1 thru E6: Report to AG/Finance Outprocessing (Bldg T-4903)
at _____ hours, _____ 70.

Grades E7 thru E9: Report to Finance Outprocessing (Bldg T-4903)
at _____ hours, _____ 70.

THEN

Report to Personnel Outprocessing (Bldg T-4906)

<u>PERSONNEL OUTPROCESSING</u>	Cleared* by _____	*	<u>FINANCE OUTPROCESSING</u>	Cleared by _____
AG1 - Initial Records Check	_____	*	Fin 1 - Records Pickup	_____
AG2 - Personnel Management(MTA)	_____	*	Fin 2 - Records Check	_____
AG3 - Awards & Decorations	_____	*	Fin 3 - Travel Pay	_____
AG4 - Personnel Records	_____	*	Fin 4 - Computation	_____
AG5 - Final Records Check	_____	*	Fin 5 - Final Records Check	_____

IF YOU HAVE NOT PROCESSED THRU
FINANCE, MOVE TO FINANCE STATION 1.

IF YOU HAVE NOT PROCESSED THRU
PERSONNEL, MOVE TO AG STATION 1.

IF YOU HAVE PROCESSED THRU BOTH PERSONNEL AND FINANCE, RETURN TO AG STATION
5 FOR FINAL CLEARANCE.

ALL PERSONNEL - REPORT TO AG STATION 5 FOR FINAL CLEARANCE.

AG5 - FINAL CLEARANCE _____

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 40-11)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDB_AG_P

Outprocessing Schedules

TO

FROM

CG, 1st Inf Div
(AVDB_AG_P)

DATE

CMT

1. Attached are outprocessing schedules for your organization.
2. It is imperative that personnel report to the Outprocessing Transportation Point in your area at the time and date indicated.
3. Personnel reporting to the Outprocessing Transportation Point will have the following items in their possession:
 - a. All personal baggage
 - b. Health and Dental Records
 - c. Identification Cards and Tags
 - d. Individual Clothing Record
 - e. Personnel Data Card
 - f. Immunization Record
 - g. Reenlistment Data Card
4. Personnel will outprocess and then depart for their new assignment. They will not be allowed to return to your organization between outprocessing and final departure times.
5. Your organization will contact SP5 Murphy (D1 An 2449/2310/2422) NLT 2000 hours on the day prior to outprocessing to insure all information is current and accurate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Incl
as

GENE R. BENLER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF: Unit 10
C, PRB 5
CO, Repl Det 5
C, PSD 5
C, PFB 5

CO, 1st Med 5
Div Fin Off 5
RCC 5

Tab R (Outprocessing Schedule) to Annex A (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DA FORM 2496-1 REPLACES DA FORM 9 (EXACTLY), ISSUES SUPPLY OF WHICH WILL BE LIMITED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 42 UNLESS SOONER OBSOLETE.

A-1-R-1

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 20-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

INTD-AGPM

Foreign Service Tour Extension

BY THRU

FROM CG, 1st Inf Div

DATE

EXT

TO:

1. Records maintained at this Headquarters indicate that you have previously applied for and were granted a six (6) month extension of your foreign service tour with the 1st Infantry Division.

2. Records also indicate that, as of this date, you have not commenced travel in connection with your Special Leave.

3. Because of the imminent redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division you are being given the opportunity to take one of the following actions:

- a. Request revocation of your extension.
- b. Request your extension remain in effect with subsequent assignment to another unit in Vietnam.

In conjunction with this choice you may list, in order of preference, three (3) units you would desire to be assigned to. There can be no guarantee that any of your preferences can be honored.

4. You will submit the attached request indicating your choice of options and return it through channels to this headquarters, not later than _____.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

JAMES T. SHELTON
WO1, USA
Asst AG

Tab S (Foreign Service Tour Extension) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DISPOSITION FORM

(12-30-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

Foreign Service Tour Extension

TO THRU

FROM

DATE

SATI

TO: CG, 1st Inf Div
ATTN: AVDB-AGPM

1. Having been informed of my options in regards to my approved extension of foreign service tour, I desire to (have my extension cancelled) (have my extension remain in effect).
2. In conjunction with my request to have my foreign service tour remain in effect I request assignment to one of the following units:
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
3. I understand that there is no guarantee that I will be assigned to one of the above units.
4. I also understand that there will be no further opportunity to change my choice of options.

DA Form 2496-1 (Rev. 1-65) (Check for space, printing errors, etc. on back of form)

Tab 1 (Reaction of PCS Orders) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEWAY After Action Report (B)

JAMES L. SHELTON
COL, USA
Asst MG

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1. Attached are copies of para 30 _____, the Headquarters, which received previously published PCS orders.
2. The reason for this action is that you will be reassigned to another unit within USARV prior to your scheduled departure from Vietnam. Regulations preclude the Headquarters from issuing orders on personnel assigned to other commands. Your gaining command will be the leading authority for your PCS orders.
3. In the event this action should cause a hardship on you in regards to shipment of unaccompanied baggage, request you contact the Personnel Management Branch (DA M 2572/2575/2527), Personnel Services Division for proper authorization to allow you to ship your personal property.

TO:

THRU:

GMT

FROM: 1st INF DIV

DATE

Reaction of PCS Orders

AVDB-ACFM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

DISPOSITION FORM (Rev. 1-65)

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 40-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDB-AGPM

Department of the Army Assignment Instructions

TO

FROM CG, 1st Inf Div
APO 96345

DATE

CLASS

1. Department of the Army assignment instructions have been received for the following named individual:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>SSAN</u>	<u>PMOS</u>
-------------	--------------	-------------	-------------

Assigned to:

OPO Line & Control Number:

Authority:

2. Request reassignment orders be published by your headquarters as outlined in USARV Message, DTG 140306Z - Jan 70, subject: AOR/OCR Procedures for Key-stone Bluejay.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

STEPHEN Z. KOVACS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Tab U (DOA Assignment Instructions) to Appendix I (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEY-STONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 20-16)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDB-AGPM

Non-receipt of Assignment Instructions

TO

FROM CG, 1st Inf Div
APO 96345

DATE

GATI

1. The following named individual was reported on the AOR prepared by the 1st Infantry Division for the month of _____ 1970.


NAME

GRADE

SSAN

2. Individual departed this command prior to receipt of Department of the Army assignment instructions. In the event that assignment instructions are received by this headquarters, they will be forwarded immediately for publication of reassignment orders as outlined in USARV Message, DTG 140306Z - Jan 70, subject: AOR/ARR Procedures for Keystone Bluejay.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


STEPHEN Z. KOVACS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Tab V (Non-Receipt of Assignment Instructions) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Tab W (Enlisted Personnel Redeployment Statistics) to Appendix 1 (Personnel Management) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

<u>1st Segment</u>		<u>2d Segment</u>	
DEROS	423	DEROS	612
CURTAIL	218	CURTAIL	507
RSG-IN-COUNTRY	2318	RSG-IN-COUNTRY	2585
MEDEVAC	<u>43</u>	MEDEVAC	<u>21</u>
	3002		3725

<u>3d Segment</u>		<u>4th Segment</u>	
DEROS	598	DEROS	589
CURTAIL	455	CURTAIL	558
RSG-IN-COUNTRY	2706	RSG-IN-COUNTRY	2638
MEDEVAC	<u>10</u>	MEDEVAC	<u>0</u>
	3769		3785

<u>TOTAL</u>	
DEROS	2222
CURTAIL	1738
RSG-IN-COUNTRY	10247
MEDEVAC	<u>74</u>
	14281

Appendix 2 (G1/S1 Conference) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSICONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

On 3 February 1970, a comprehensive 1st Infantry Division G1/S1 Conference was held covering the following areas:

1. Adjutant General:
 - a. Morning Reports
 - b. OER and EER
 - c. Leaves and Passes
 - d. Extensions
 - e. R&R
 - f. Awards and Decorations
 - g. Postal Matters
 - h. Disposition of Records
 - i. Special Services
 - j. Outprocessing Overview
2. Finance Officer:
 - a. Intra-Battalion Transfers
 - b. Finance Outprocessing
3. Chaplain:
 - a. Reassignment of Chaplains and Chaplains Enlisted Assistants
 - b. Chaplain Coverage at Si An
 - c. Special Chapel Services during Unit Standdown
 - d. Field Chapel Services
 - e. Area and Unit Coverage during Standdown

4. Provost Marshal:
 - a. Privately Owned Weapons
 - b. War Trophy Firearms
 - c. Security of Private Property
5. Surgeon:
 - a. Medical Treatment at Processing Location
 - b. Standdown of Unit Aid Stations
 - c. Medical Outprocessing
 - d. Malaria Prevention during Standdown
 - e. Reassignment of AMEDS Officer Personnel
6. Education Officer:
 - a. Closeout of Facilities at Lai Khe and Dau Tieng
 - b. Facilities to be available at Di An
7. Red Cross Field Director:
 - a. Services Available
 - b. Problem Areas
8. Personnel Management Officer (CI):
 - a. Officer Efficiency Reports
 - b. Request for Orders & Assignment Changes
 - c. Release Dates
 - d. USARV Reassignment Policy for Officers of the 1st Inf Div
9. Safety Officer:
 - a. Safety Problem Areas
 - b. Administrative Problems
 - c. USARV Accidents

- d. 1st Inf Div Accidents
 - e. Cause of Accidents
 - f. Accident Reporting
 - g. Redeployment Activities
10. Funds Officer:
- a. Unit Funds
 - b. Other Sundry Funds
 - c. Domestic Hire Funds
 - d. One Mess
 - e. New Location of Funds Team
11. Civilian Personnel Officer:
- a. Direct Hire Employees
 - d. Daily Hires

Appendix 3 (Awards and Decorations) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (C)

1. CONCEPT: The final awards program (see paragraph 20, Tab B to Appendix 1) evolved from three basic concepts:

- a. All deserving personnel should be recognized.
- b. Paperwork requirements on field commanders must be minimal.
- c. All awards must be issued and presented to Big Red One officers and men before they leave the division.

2. EXECUTION: a. A large number of awards had to be processed and distributed in a short time period. To accomplish this mission, the Awards and Decorations (A&D) Branch was increased from 27 to 40 personnel and the Personnel Service Division typing pool was placed at its disposal. To streamline procedures, the A&D Branch assumed responsibility for preparation of general orders. This eliminated the need for preparing requests for orders, and, more important, it gave the Chief, A&D Branch, control of all facets of the awards program.

b. Close coordination with ARVN III Corps Headquarters insured that most Vietnamese awards for division personnel were issued by that headquarters before the division left Vietnam. A roster of outstanding recommendations was furnished to Headquarters, USARV, for necessary follow-up action.

c. Liaison visits by representatives of the A&D Branch to each unit as it stood down guaranteed that all aspects of the program were completed.

d. During outprocessing, A&D Branch awards specialists verified the accuracy of the awards portion of DA Forms 20 and 66 with the individual. Discrepancies

In most cases were corrected on the spot. When this could not be accomplished, discrepancies were noted on a checklist (see Tab P to Appendix 1). Action on these discrepancies was completed in 24 hours and appropriate documents were forwarded to the gaining unit.

3. RESULTS: Awards processed from 1 February through 7 April 1971, which are attributable to redeployment are noted below:

DF	50
DPC (A)	50
DSN (S)	700
EX (A)	5,000
AN (A)	3,200
ARCON (S)	450
ALCON (A)	<u>5,000</u>
TOTAL	14,450

Appendix 4 (Personnel Actions) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSICNE BLUEJAY After Action Report (L)

1. The personnel Actions Branch was not as actively involved in redeployment as other branches of the Personnel Service Division. However, the only noticeable decline in workload was in the Casualty Section; the Leaves, Retirements, and Special Skill and Combat Judges Sections all experienced a marked increase in activity. There was also a substantial increase in the number of 7-day ordinary leaves.
2. An increase was noted in the number of messages sent to DA. This was caused by the necessity of informing DA of reassignments of personnel pending retirement.
3. Daily bulletin notices were published notifying commanders to submit requests for awards of CIB, CMB and Combat Streamers to deserving personnel and units prior to standdown. Units responded and most of these awards were presented prior to or during standdown.
4. There was a sharp decline in the workload of the Casualty Section due to the withdrawal of combat troops from the field and their reassignment to other units. All other sections of the Personnel Actions Branch enjoyed a fairly stable workload through the entire redeployment period. There was no appreciable increase in Congressional correspondence during this period due to the timely Command Information Program (see Annex H, Information).

Appendix 5 (Administrative Machine Branch) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. Soon after the division's redeployment was announced, personnel rosters were made and sent to all units. Information vital to redeployment was verified by individual units, the Personnel Records Branch and the Personnel Management Branch. Data elements audited were Name, SSAN, Grade, POS, DEROS and unit of assignment. The division PEINACAP data base was thus made ready to support all requests for information rosters for redeployment planning.
2. Reports were provided to USARV giving a DEROS profile of the division. These reports gave the number of men departing the command by day for each unit during redeployment.
3. As the redeployment progressed, personnel assignment rosters were run separately for officers and enlisted men to obtain in-country reassignments. The late decision by USARV to curtail foreign service tours up to two months caused all rosters to be re-run.
4. The high number of amendments and revocations of orders caused considerable re-processing to keep the data base accurate during redeployment.
5. Timely machine processing is vital during redeployment. Many unexpected reports and rosters are required by higher headquarters. In some cases, manual processing was required to provide reports reflecting unit strength at stand-down, when EJCSA of unit gains and losses had not yet occurred.
6. The USARV Data Service Center produced a card deck from its personnel master file for the division's use to reconcile personnel differences between data files. However, early attention to the Roster of Exceptions had already reduced

these file differences to a minimum.

7. The data processing workload peaked early and decreased as redeployment progressed. Finance discontinued mechanized pay early; this released more machine time for redeployment activities.

Appendix 6 (Personnel Records) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. In addition to being responsible for outprocessing operations, the Personnel Records Branch handled all actions concerning officers and morning reports.
2. The volume of Officer Efficiency Reports presented a problem. One report for each officer in the division was expected. In anticipation of this massive effort, classes were given to raters and indorsers at each base camp prior to redeployment. Worksheets were sent to the field at least 30 days prior to each unit's standdown. Because of frequent changes in officer departure dates, the closing date, number of duty days, and date of signature were left blank and later completed by the Personnel Records Branch. As a further control measure, brigade and battalion S1's were not allowed to depart until all efficiency reports for their commands were completed. Similar restrictions were imposed on individual raters, indorsers and reviewers. As a result of these measures, there were few difficulties with efficiency reports. A total of 1333 reports were processed during the 52 days of the redeployment period.
3. A statistical breakdown of officer losses is under Tab A.

TABS

A - Officer Losses

Tab A (Officer Losses) to Appendix 6 (Personnel Records) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

<u>1st Segment</u>		<u>2d Segment</u>	
DEROS	8	DEROS	16
Curtail	5	Curtail	15
Reassigned In-Country	165	Reassigned In-Country	206
MEDEVAC	<u>4</u>	MEDEVAC	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	182	TOTAL	239

<u>3d Segment</u>		<u>4th Segment</u>	
DEROS	24	DEROS	52
Curtail	52	Curtail	77
Reassigned In-Country	302	Reassigned In-Country	291
MEDEVAC	<u>5</u>	MEDEVAC	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	383	TOTAL	421

Total Losses (15 Feb 70 - 7 Apr 70)

DEROS	100
Curtail	149
Reassigned In-Country	964
MEDEVAC	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	1225
HONOR GUARD	<u>37</u>
TOTAL	1262

Appendix 7 (Administrative Services) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. During redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, the Administrative Services Division was responsible for records management and reproduction of redeployment correspondence including OPLANs, Letters of Instruction and newsletters.
2. After an initial LOI on records management had been distributed, a records management team visited each unit and staff section to provide assistance in disposition of records, cancellation of publication accounts and guidance for records turn-in in January and February 1970.
3. Final records turn-in was conducted on a pre-scheduled date for each unit. All records were retired to the USARV Records Holding Area for further disposition with two exceptions - records of the Command Group and CA Reports of Survey were shipped to Ft. Riley, Kansas. DA, MACV and USARV regulations, circulars, etc., were collected in binders and re-distributed to non-divisional units. The records turn-in schedule allowed sufficient time for units to make corrections on file labels prior to the last few days of their standdown.
4. Blank forms accounts with Japan were cancelled via message. Publication Centers in COMUS received notification of cancellation via letters.
5. The Office Services Unit was responsible for typing, reproducing, filing, consolidating and distributing all general, special and letter orders. To keep up with the increased workload, the Unit was expanded and operated 24 hours a day during peak periods with night and day shifts. Shifts did not leave until every outstanding order had been processed (zero-out procedures) and

priorities were established to handle rush requests.

6. The General Order Section of the Office Services Unit was transferred to the Awards and Decorations Branch to permit assignment of priorities and close supervision by the A&D Chief.

7. The Personnel Management and Personnel Records Branches submitted requests for orders concurrent with their preparation. Individuals of the same units were placed on orders with consecutive paragraphs for easy reference.

8. Under Tab A is an outline of the functional role of the Administrative Services Division during redeployment.

TABS

A - Administrative Services Division

Tab A (Administrative Services Division) to Appendix 6 (Administrative Services) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. General Responsibilities.

a. Records Management:

- (1) Records disposition
- (2) Blank forms and publication accounts cancellation

b. Office Services Unit: Special Orders, ID Tags, MACV Currency Control Cards.

c. Reproduction:

- (1) OPLANS
- (2) Letters of Instruction
- (3) Newsletters

2. Planning.

a. Records Management.

- (1) Letter of Instruction:
 - (a) Distributed to units and staff sections.
 - (b) Informed units of records disposition procedures.
 - (c) Scheduled visit by Records Management Team.
- (2) Records Management Team:
 - (a) Visited units and staff sections.
 - (b) Provided assistance in records disposition.
 - (c) Provided instructions on disposition procedures.
 - (d) Assisted in final turn-in of:

- (1) Files (retired to USARV Records Holding Area),
- (2) Regulations, circulars, etc. (to other units within USARV).

b. Officer Services Unit: continued normal operations with:

- (1) Two shifts,
- (2) Zero-out system.

c. Reproductions: obtained additional supplies.

3. Actions Taken.

a. Records Management:

- (1) LCI distributed.
- (2) Post visited units and staff sections.
- (3) Records turned in on pre-scheduled dates.

b. Officer Services Unit:

- (1) Two shifts.
- (2) Zero-out system.
- (3) Priorities set by Personnel Management and Personnel Records Branches.

Appendix B (Special Services) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The Special Service Division (SSD) was responsible for establishing an overall program of morale and recreation support for units standing down during the redeployment period. The SSD was also responsible for the turn-in of all non-expendable special services property and the transfer of its facilities to units assuming base camp responsibilities.

2. ENTERTAINMENT: a. A comprehensive Special Service program was in effect throughout the redeployment period. Units standing down had use of a newly remodeled and expanded service club, two libraries, two swimming pools and a trailer photo lab. Two showmobiles were available for use by units having commercial entertainment. In addition, athletic programs were organized, crafts kits and paperback books distributed, and the following USO shows procured:

- (1) 17 Feb 70 - The Earl Nichols USO Show.
- (2) 2 Mar 70 - The Harrison and Tyler USO Show.
- (3) 7 Mar 70 - "All That Jazz" (a Command Military Touring Show).
- (4) 17 Mar 70 - Earl Colbert USO Show.
- (5) 31 Mar 70 - Edie and Scottie USO Show.

b. To supplement these shows, the Central Post Fund allocated \$5250.00 to the service club for the procurement of commercial entertainment during the redeployment period.

c. Motion picture service to all units continued throughout redeployment. Units were required to turn their projectors in five days prior to the last day of their standdown. Projectors and projectionists were then provided by

the Special Services Division on request.

3. R&R PROGRAM: a. An R&R Program was in effect throughout the redeployment period. All R&R's had to end at least one day prior to the day an individual's unit stood down. The R&R allocations for the month of March 1970 were distributed according to unit standdown dates in order to insure that individuals would either return from R&R prior to their unit's standdown or would begin R&R after they had reached their new unit assignment.

b. For the purposes of distributing R&R allocations, the redeploying units were divided into two groups. The first included all units with standdown dates beginning between 15 February and 9 March 1970; the second group included all units with standdown dates beginning between 12 March and 31 March 1970.

c. Because personnel in the first group eligible for R&R would be reassigned to other units prior to 1 March 1970, they were given allocations starting 7-10 days after their unit's release date. For example, personnel in a unit that stood down from 2-15 March 1970, received their R&R allocations for the dates 25-31 March.

d. Personnel in the second group were able to take R&R while still assigned to the division; therefore, these personnel were given R&R's that ended at least two days prior to the beginning date of their unit's standdown. For example, the personnel in a unit that began standdown on 15 March 1970 were given R&R's for the period beginning 1 March and ending 13 March. Units standing down on 30 March 1970 received allocations ending no later than 27 March. This insured that all R&R's ended at least two days prior to the beginning of each unit's standdown.

4. EQUIPMENT: Special Services non-expendable equipment was distributed to

special services activities as directed by the Adjutant General and 34, USARPV.
Redistribution of non-expendable equipment was accomplished by lateral transfer.

Appendix 9 (Reenlistment) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (O)

1. With the announcement of redeployment, reenlistments in the division fell sharply. It was assumed that most eligible personnel were putting off their decisions until their new assignments were known. Therefore, the reenlistment program concentrated on personnel who had received their assignment instructions, usually as their units stood down. Arrangements were made with HQ, USARV, to obtain assignment instructions for personnel desiring to reenlist for a different unit as rapidly as possible. However, only a slight increase in reenlistments was noted after assignment instructions were received. Apparently, eligible personnel were waiting until they actually began duties with their new units before making any reenlistment decisions.

2. Reenlistment Statistics:

	<u>OBJ</u>	<u>1st Term RA & AUS</u>	<u>PCT</u>	<u>Elig Career</u>	<u>Reenl</u>	<u>PCT</u>
Feb 70	60	35	41.2	27	27	100
Mar 70	None	22	N/A	19	19	100

Appendix 10 (Replacement Detachment) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. During redeployment, the Replacement Detachment was responsible for coordinating and scheduling the movement of nearly 17,000 personnel in a period of 65 days. To accomplish this, the detachment operated two troop movement activities:

a. In-Country Operations:

(1) The Replacement Detachment was responsible for transporting personnel from their units to the in-country outprocessing site. Four 2½-ton trucks were used for on-post transportation. A 5-ton tractor trailer was used exclusively to move baggage.

(2) The 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) provided transportation for personnel reassigned to their organizations. The Replacement Detachment moved all other personnel to the 90th Replacement Battalion by bus.

(3) In addition, the detachment was responsible for the control of personnel within the outprocessing complex.

(4) Nearly 12,000 persons were processed through this facility.

b. DEBDS Outprocessing Operations: The Replacement Detachment scheduled all outprocessing for personnel departing Vietnam, and provided transportation to the 90th Replacement Battalion.

2. No difficulties were encountered in these operations. One potential problem deserves mention. A replacement activity normally depends on replacements to supply physical labor. Consequently, there is only a small number of permanent

party personnel who work in specialized areas such as operations, supply and mess. Therefore, before the replacement flow was stopped, 35 additional personnel were assigned to the Replacement Detachment for housekeeping duties.

Appendix 11 (Postal Operations) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYS'ONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (L)

1. PLANNING: The basic planning for redeployment of the division Postal Division began on 15 January 1970; emphasis was placed on locator services and insuring locator cards were completed. To accommodate the increase of troops in the stand-down area, two additional units at the Di An Base Camp would be opened. In addition, the following decisions were made:

a. Postal teams would visit each unit standing down, give a class-room type briefing, and fill out the appropriate number of locator cards for distribution to all sections or facilities that required them.

b. Personnel returning to CONUS or transferring within the division would use normal mail routing procedures through their unit mail room or through personnel outprocessing.

c. A postal inspection team would be sent to each unit mail room to assist in closing out unit mail records and to aid the postal officer of the unit in any way possible.

2. EXECUTION: a. Mail distribution changes were prepared by each unit as it changed locations and submitted to the Postal Division. The Postal Division prepared distribution scheme changes to be submitted to the Postmaster, San Francisco. These were submitted in three increments to the USARV Staff Postal Officer in sufficient time to effect the changes on the dates requested.

b. Mail directory actions were monitored throughout redeployment. Locator cards were prepared on individuals and action was taken to locate all individuals who had left the command with no locator card or file. Several documents were used to locate these individuals:

- (1) 1st Infantry Division Personnel Roster

- (2) Outprocessing schedule and changes
- (3) DERSOS roster
- (4) Locator file

For each individual who was located in this manner, a set of locator cards was prepared and sent to all activities concerned.

c. Postal Claims and Inquiries: The processing of postal claims and inquiries was emphasized; all new claims were immediately processed and forwarded to individuals for completion. Claims involving individuals who had left the command were forwarded to the new unit of assignment or to the new serving postal facility.

d. No significant problems developed. However, even though considerable time was spent by the postal inspection team briefing unit postal officers and unit mail clerks on proper procedures for preparing and distributing locator cards, closing out mail records and handling mail, these activities required close supervision by the Division Postal Officer.

(1) Some units released their mail clerks early leaving no one to handle mail problems, locator service or mail call. This deficiency was detected during the processing of the first segment and was immediately corrected.

(2) Locator cards presented a minor problem due to the failure of some units to obtain completed cards on individuals who were reassigned from first segment to fourth segment units. The Division Locator was approximately 80-85 percent accurate during redeployment. Although considered good, this percentage would have been higher if units had properly controlled the completion of locator cards of personnel who were reassigned within the division. The overall locator processing system was a total success, however, and the outcome was extremely close to 100 percent completion of locator cards on every individual.

Appendix 12 (Big Red One Band) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The Commanding General directed that the division band would be maintained at full strength and remain completely operational until redeployment operations were terminated. The ceremonial band would be used at all official ceremonies, while the stage band, rock band and various ensemble groups, including two-hour stage shows for troop entertainment, would support units standing down. The use of buglers for Reveille, Retreat and memorial services would continue.

2. REQUIREMENTS: The division band was required to accomplish the following missions:

a. Meet and musically greet each unit or element thereof upon its arrival at Di An Base Camp for standdown.

b. Provide appropriate ceremonial music for individual units as required by Division Headquarters and as requested by individual units. These ceremonies consisted of brigade, battalion, squadron, company, battery and troop award ceremonies, memorial ceremonies, color ceremonies and farewell ceremonies.

c. Provide buglers for Reveille, Retreat and memorial ceremonies and services.

d. Provide entertainment in the form of stage band, rock combos, trios and stage shows for the troops as requested by units.

e. Provide entertainment at the Redeployment Processing Center for troops awaiting transportation.

3. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Personnel Strength.

(1) PROBLEM: It was necessary to maintain the band at full strength for maximum use during the division standdown period despite normal DEROS losses.

(2) SOLUTION: Close coordination between the division Personnel Service Division and the USARV Assignment Section insured that enough personnel were provided

prior to redeployment to replace normal DESROS losses.

b. Greeting Units.

(1) PROBLEM: It was difficult to establish accurate ETA for arriving units to insure that each unit received a musical greeting.

(2) SOLUTION: Close coordination between the band, arriving units, the Division Transportation Office, Support Command S3 and the Military Police by using land line and radio communication insured reasonably accurate ETA.

c. Division of Band.

(1) PROBLEM: Dividing the band into representative units to greet two or more units arriving simultaneously at different locations in Di An Base Camp presented organizational difficulties.

(2) SOLUTION: This problem was alleviated through an intensive crosstraining program initiated prior to the first unit's standdown so that two separate, but fairly complete band detachments were available if necessary.

Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. SITUATION: Prior to notification, 157 nonappropriated funds were operating within the division: 102 unit funds; 37 other Sundry Funds; 12 Domestic Hire Funds; 3 Open Messes; 1 Central Post Fund; 1 Chaplains Fund; and 1 Command Activities Fund.
2. PLANNING: The planning was based on existing regulations and directives. Letters of Instruction were prepared and forwarded to each nonappropriated custodian explaining procedures for the disposition of the fund. As soon as standdown dates were made available, funds were scheduled for terminal audits, usually on the second or third day of standdown. Form letters were prepared for terminal audits and the schedules were published. Letters of Instruction and examples of form letters are under Tabs A through C.
3. CONCEPT: The G1 Funds Officer and his assistants would perform terminal audits of all funds except the Central Post Fund and the three Open Messes; these would be audited by the USARV Comptroller.
4. EXECUTION:
 - a. Unit Funds: Two late changes required some modification of the original plans for terminating unit funds. First, disposition of residual assets was changed. Instead of transferring these to the gaining unit in CCNUS or USAREUR, they were retained by the USARV Central Welfare Fund. Second, some terminal audits had to be rescheduled because the audit date of the Central Post Fund was advanced eight days. These two changes presented no problems and resulted in only minor adjustments to original plans.
 - b. Central Post Fund: Residual assets were transferred to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment which accepted responsibility for providing service to units remaining after the departures of the division. The change of audit date caused

some unit fund audits to be rescheduled.

c. Clubs:

(1) Open Messes: The 1st Aviation Battalion Officers' Open Mess was terminated and residual assets were turned over to USARV. The Lai Khe Officers Open Mess was transferred to the 3-17th Cav. The 1st Infantry Division NCO/EM Open Mess was terminated and the residual assets were turned over to USARV with one exception - excess assets that were not disposed of were stored with the 11th ACR until USARV could make a final disposition.

(2) Other Sundry Funds: All Other Sundry Funds were terminated and residual assets turned over to USARV.

d. Domestic Hire Fund: These funds were terminated as provided for in each fund's constitution.

e. Chaplains Fund: Residual assets and property were transferred to the 11th ACR which also accepted responsibility for providing services to civilian organizations (i.e., orphanages, hospitals, etc.).

f. Command Activities Fund: Fund owned property was disposed of and the residual assets were transferred to II FFORCEV.

5. PROBLEM AREA: Due to cash and inventory shortages, a number of investigations were initiated at the Lai Khe PX. Investigating officers were given extensive technical advice by the SJA before beginning the investigations, and were thoroughly familiar with the requirements. Suspense dates were short, depending upon the type of investigations. This was extremely important because investigating officers were required to meet their reporting dates for their transfers out of the division. Investigations were closely monitored from one central location so that their status remained current.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. Meetings must be arranged with fund custodians to discuss in detail the termination of each type of fund. Although letters of instruction

were published, a small percentage were still unaware of correct procedures.

b. Increased command emphasis should be given to insure that all funds available in unit funds and Other Sundry Funds are expended for the benefit of the troops. The final bank balance for these funds should be as close to zero as possible.

TABS

A - LCI, Unit Funds #1

B - LCI, Unit Funds #2

C - Other Sundry Funds

D - Domestic Hire Funds

E - Terminal Audit, Unit Funds

F - Terminal Audit

Tab A (LOI, Unit Funds #1) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APC 96345

AVDI-P

27 January 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Unit Funds

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Nonredeploying units: Those units not redeploying will receive guidance from the CPF custodian on submission of future reports for Unit Funds.

2. Redeploying units:

a. Units to be deployed from RVN for retention in active status will retain possession of all unit fund cash assets and records thereof IAW AR 230-1. Fund owned property will be disposed of before departure from RVN, IAW USARV Regs 230-10 and 230-21.

(1) Cash assets: Prior to the unit standing down, all property will be disposed of and all obligations will be liquidated. At standdown the unit fund will receive an inspection by the C1 Funds Officer. At that time the custodian will write a check payable to the custodian of the fund. This check will be transported to CONUS and given to the custodian of the fund at the new location; i.e. the custodian, Co A, 1/28th Inf Unit Fund will write a check payable to Custodian, Co A, 1/28th Inf Unit Fund. This check will be carried to Ft. Riley by a Class A Agent and given to the custodian of the unit fund of the unit designated as Co A, 1/28th Inf.

(2) Unit fund records will be forwarded to CONUS, IAW para 22, LOI, Personnel and Administration, this headquarters, dated 21 January 1970.

b. Unit funds of units to be inactivated will be dissolved in RVN. All unit fund cash assets, liabilities and property will be transferred to CPF, IAW USARV Regs 230-10 and 230-21.

AVDB-P

27 January 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Unit Funds

3. Units will contact GI Funds Officer upon arrival at Di Ao for standdown for the actual time and place of inspection.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A(Kod-1) plus
T

Tab B (LOI, Unit Funds #2) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-P

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Unit Funds

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This letter supersedes LOI dated 27 Jan 70, subject as above, this headquarters.
2. Nonredeploying units: Those units not redeploying will receive guidance from the CPF custodian on submission of future reports for Unit Funds.
3. Redeploying units:
 - a. Units to be deployed from RVN (to include personnel) for retention on active status will retain possession of all unit fund assets and records thereof IAW AR 230-1.
 - b. Units to be deployed from RVN (less personnel) for retention on active status will dissolve unit funds in-country IAW USARV Regs 230-10 and 230-21.
 - c. Unit funds of units to be inactivated will be dissolved in RVN, IAW USARV Regs 230-10 and 230-21.
4. A schedule will be published by this headquarters giving the dates and location of each terminal audit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A(mod-1) plus T

Tab C (Other Sundry Funds) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDE-P

SUBJECT: Terminal Audit of Other Sundry Funds

Commanding Officer

1st Infantry Division
ATTN: Custodian OSF #
APO 96345

1. On _____ OSF # ____ will receive a terminal audit.
2. All procedures by the fund will cease 4 days prior to the date of audit.
3. All assets will be liquidated and reduced to cash. All cash will be deposited in the bank by _____. Stock and other physical assets may be liquidated by sale or donation.
4. All financial records pertaining to operation of the fund will be current and present at the time and place of the final audit.
5. Unit will notify G-1 Funds office upon arrival at Di An Base Camp to arrange time and place of audit on date specified.
6. Additional guidance can be obtained by calling the G-1 Funds office, LK4349.
7. Units will telephonically acknowledge receipt of this letter by contacting the G-1 Funds office at LK4349.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1st Inf Div FL 102-R (13 Jan 70)

Tab D (Domestic Hire Funds) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-P

27 January 1970

SUBJECT: Domestic Hire Funds

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. In accordance with paragraph 9, USARV Reg 230-2, the Domestic Hire Funds of the following units will be dissolved on the date indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1/7 Arty	28 Feb 70
HHC, 2d Bde	1 Mar 70
1/26th Inf	16 Mar 70
HHT, 1/4 Cav	19 Mar 70
B Trp, 1/4 Cav	19 Mar 70
Co C, 1st Eng Bn	24 Mar 70
HHC & Co A, 121 Sig Bn	25 Mar 70
Co B, 121st Sig Bn	26 Mar 70
Co C, 121st Sig Bn	26 Mar 70
1st MP Co	28 Mar 70
HHC, 1st Eng Bn	29 Mar 70
" , MISCOP	1 Apr 70
1st Admin Co	2 Apr 70

2. Prior to the date indicated, residual assets remaining after payment of all debts will be disposed of as provided for in the constitution and bylaws and approved by the responsible commander. All financial records pertaining to operation of the fund will be current and present on the date indicated.

3. Units will telephonically acknowledge receipt of this letter by contacting the GI Funds office LK 4349.

AVDB-P
SUBJECT: Domestic Hire Funds

27 January 1970

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SZLEY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 1/7 Arty
CO, HHC, 2d Bde
CO, 1/26th Inf
CO, HHT, 1/4 Cav
CO, B Trp, 1/4 Cav
CO, Co C, 1st Eng Bn
CO, PNC & Co A, 121st Sig Bn
CO, Co B, 121st Sig Bn
CO, Co C, 121st Sig Bn
CO, 1st KP Co
CO, HHC, 1st Eng Bn
CO, HHC, DISCOM
CO, 1st Admin Co
plus C: - 10 cys

Tab E (Terminal Audit, Unit Funds) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BEJEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1

AVIB-P

SUBJECT: Terminal Audit of Unit Fund

Commanding Officer

1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. On this date, your Unit Fund received a terminal audit in accordance with USARV Regulations 230-10 and 230-21. The fund had no outstanding liabilities, no fund owned property, and residual assets were determined to be _____ cash in bank.
2. Check #_____, payable to Custodian, D1 An Central Post Fund, was accepted for the above amount.

1st Inf Div FL 108 (14 Feb 70)

A-13-E-1

Tab F (Terminal Audit) to Appendix 13 (Nonappropriated Funds) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1
APO 96345

AVIB-F

SUBJECT: Terminal Audit

Commanding Officer

1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. On this date, Other Sundry Fund #_____ received a terminal audit in accordance with USARV Regulation 230-5. Residual assets were determined to be \$_____ cash in bank.
2. Check #_____, payable to Custodian, USARV Open Mess Fund, was accepted for the above amount.

1 Incl
Custodian's Statement
of Disposition

1st Inf Div FL 106 (26 Jan 70)

CUSTODIAN'S STATEMENT OF DISSOLUTION

I hereby certify as custodian of Other Sundry Fund #_____, that to the best of my knowledge I have no cash on hand, outstanding debts, fixed assets or inventoriable stock, and that I have closed the fund in accordance with existing regulations.

DATE

CUSTODIAN
OSF #_____

Appendix 14 (Civilian Personnel) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report

1. GENERAL: As of 1 February 1970, the division employed 541 direct hire employees. These employees were assigned to divisional units in accordance with the division's Table of Distribution and Allowances. There were also approximately 700 daily hires employed at the division's four base camps, Lai Khe, Di An, Dau Tieng and Phu Loi.

2. DISPOSITION: a. The disposition of the direct hire employees presented the greatest problem since they were paid by Long Binh Finance. It was essential that time and attendance sheets be turned in to Finance sufficiently in advance of each unit's standdown to permit the payroll to be made up and the employees paid prior to the unit's movement to the standdown area. It was initially decided that a unit's direct hires would be terminated four days prior to standdown. This had to be changed to seven days to allow Finance sufficient time to make up the payroll. Class A agents picked up the payroll two days prior to standdown (five days after employees' termination), paid the employees, and returned the signed payroll sheets on the day before standdown. This procedure proved effective and it is recommended that a minimum of seven days be allowed for the entire transaction.

b. On 15 January 1970, a Form 52 (Request for Personnel Action) was made up for each direct hire employee requesting his termination due to the redeployment of the unit. The effective date of termination was not included on the Form 52 at that time because the dates of the units' standdown were classified. The Form 52's were then taken to the Long Binh Civilian Personnel Office where they were held until needed. When the time came for the unit's Class A agent to carry the time and attendance sheets to Long Binh Finance, the effective date was entered on the employee's Form 52 and it was processed. It should also be noted that all direct hire employees were given severance pay in lieu of two weeks notice. Although it

appeared as a parting goodwill gesture, it was actually necessary due to the classification of unit standdown dates.

c. Daily hires were used until the day before units stood down. At that time, the unit's Class A agent returned his vouchers and money to the Division Civilian Personnel Officer and his account was closed.

Appendix 15 (Chaplain Activities) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE HILL/JAY After Action Report (U)

1. SITUATION: The full TOE of chaplains and chaplain enlisted assistants were assigned and present for duty when the division was alerted for redeployment. All known property had recently been inventoried. The Consolidated Chaplain's Fund had a balance adequate to cover all outstanding bills and contemplated expenses. An area coverage plan was in force. The Ben Cat Orphanage, the primary Civic Action project under Chaplain responsibility, had, through a combined G5/3d Brigade S5/Chaplain program, been freed of debt, repainted, and aided in establishing peanut-growing and rabbit-raising self-help projects.
2. PLANNING: Manning charts were analyzed to determine what shortages and imbalances would result from BERKOS losses, and from AO and mission changes for the division. The area coverage plan was studied to determine the effect of division redeployment.
3. CONCEPT: a. Religious services, memorial services and counseling would continue at field locations and base camps until each unit's standdown, and at the standdown area (DZ Ln) through closeout of the division on 7 April 1970. Transfer of chaplains and chaplain enlisted assistants within the division would be held to a minimum to avoid turbulence and insure adequate periods of service for U.S. Chaplains and chaplain enlisted assistants would be retained in the division until the release day of their unit of assignment to provide coverage as long as possible for subordinate battalions and companies; after departure of brigade or Division Artillery chaplains, coverage for infantry or artillery battalions still in standdown status would be given by Division Headquarters

and Division Support Command chaplains. Chaplain coverage at clearing companies (B/1st Medical Battalion at Dau Tieng and D/1st Medical Battalion at Lai Khe), 2d Surgical Hospital, the Stockade, the 12th, 24th and 93d Evacuation Hospitals, 3d Field Hospital, and 6th Convalescent would continue until redeployment was terminated or the facility was closed out. Necessary religious supplies and support would be available for the religious program throughout the standdown period.

b. It was assumed that the influx of standdown units at Di An would create turmoil and tension, and increase incidents. It was further assumed that chaplains could be effectively employed among their own troops, to answer questions, strengthen sagging morale, and reduce tension. Services at the standdown and processing areas were thus planned.

2. EXECUTION a. Standdown Service: During unit standdowns, personnel were kept busy turning in equipment and were entertained by a variety of well organized programs. Processing lines expedited the departure of men and there was virtually no time for incidents or, for that matter, for religious services. Chaplains waiting for their unit's release date found little to do. Three battalions conducted memorial services at Di An; other units held memorial services prior to leaving field locations.

b. Personnel: Early coordination was made with the USARV Chaplain to assure that replacements for known DEBPCS losses were sent prior to the cut-off date for replacements. Coordination was also made with the USARV Chaplain on projected dates for release of chaplains and chaplain enlisted assistants; USARV requests for reassignment orders thus supported the coverage plan. AGI was consulted on imbalances expected as a result of DEBPCS losses, cut-off of replacements, and

the make-up of standdown segments. To provide adequate coverage for the 2d Brigade, one chaplain was transferred from the 3d to the 2d Bde. Chaplain enlisted assistants were assigned to third and fourth segment standdown units, then placed temporarily with earlier departing units to give required support. On standdown of this unit, they reverted to their unit of assignment and replaced assistants who were DERCS losses.

c. Area Coverage: The 23d Artillery Group continued their coverage of MACV units. The II FFORCEV Chaplain was notified which MACV units would continue to be covered by the 23d Arty Gp and which could no longer be covered by 1st Infantry Division chaplains. Dates when responsibility for coverage would be terminated were also specified.

d. Hospital and Medical Evacuation Coverage: Due to AC changes, 2d Bde chaplains were relieved of responsibility for hospital coverage; Div Arty and 1st Engineer Battalion chaplains were tasked to cover the 12th Evac Hospital (Co Chi); and DISCOM chaplains were given sole responsibility for scheduled coverage of 27th Evac, 93d Evac and 3d Field Hospitals. Coverage of D/1st Med Bn and the 2d Surgical Hospital (Lai Zhe) was transferred from 3d Brigade chaplains, first to Division Headquarters, then to the 1st Brigade chaplains.

3. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND MEMORABILIA: a. The bell from the Division Memorial Chapel was taken to the Division Training Command for crating and shipment to the Cantigny War Museum at Wheaton, Illinois. Several chapel dedication plaques were also shipped there.

b. Instructions were received from the Saigon Support Command, the 1st Logistics Command, and the USARV Chaplain regarding the disposition of ecclesiastical property. Each chaplain holding ecclesiastical property from his

unit supply was instructed to have the property hand-carried to the Long Binh Army Depot, with the appropriate DA Forms 2765-1. All property would be turned in, including excess or unserviceable property; each DA Form 2765-1 would have a document number. Rather than laterally transfer organs to units taking over division chapels, the USARV Chaplain ruled that these items should be transported to the Depot to fill long-standing requisitions. The turn-in process was efficient, except for several Special Services items that were turned in to the Long Binh Depot by error. Recovery of these items required considerable extra work.

c. Special Services property had been hand-receipted to the Assistant Division Chaplain and further hand-receipted to using chaplains. As each chaplain finished using the property, he turned it in to the Assistant Division Chaplain, who immediately turned it in to Special Services. This operation went smoothly except for one factor. There were no records at the Division Chaplain's office of items on hand-receipt from the Central Post Fund. Late discovery by CPB of property chargeable to chaplains who had departed 6 to 12 months earlier caused a last minute rush to clear these accounts.

d. The disposition of awards and pens was delayed until it was known which chapels would be transferred to US units. This information was ultimately secured through Installation Coordinators as it became available.

4. TURNOVER : CIVIL AFFAIRS PROJECTS: a. During the last five months, the 3d Bde S5 had aided chaplains in coordinating an arrangement with the Ben Cat District Chief regarding support of the Ben Cat Orphanage. It was agreed that financial assistance from US units would be acceptable if processed through and supervised by Dr. Tom Stebbins, Chairman of the Vietnam Mission of the

Christian and Missionary Alliance, with offices in Saigon; Dr. Stebbins accepted the responsibility. An agricultural self-help program would also be acceptable under the supervision of CCRDS. Surplus food and material support could be given to the orphanage, providing adequate records were maintained by chaplains and SS's notified the District Chief of such gifts. The 11th ACR Chaplain was notified of these agreements and encouraged to have the Regiment continue financial, food and materiel support under this arrangement. A pictorial and news report to stateside sponsors of the Ben Cat or Andrew McNellon Memorial Orphanage was prepared to stimulate continued support.

b. In addition, the 11th ACR was notified of orphanages, schools and hospitals that had been aided by 1st Inf Div chaplains with particular emphasis on the Ben Son or St. Joseph's Leprosarium.

5. THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION CONSOLIDATED CHAPLAIN'S FUND: a. The Division SPMAG for redeployment specified that chaplain's funds would be handled in accordance with instructions given by the USAHV Chaplain. In consultation with the USARV Chaplain, it was decided that a \$3000.00 grant would be given to the USARV Consolidated Chaplains' Fund for Vietnam-wide special projects, a \$500.00 grant given to Fort Hiley, Kansas, Consolidated Chaplains' Fund, and the balance of the Assets and Liabilities transferred to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Consolidated Chaplains' Fund subject to 11th ACR concurrence. The 1st Inf Div Fund Council, at its January and February 1970 meetings, approved the grants and the proposed transfer of assets and liabilities. A check payable to the 11th ACR Fund was written to close out the 1st Inf Div Chaplains' Fund bank account. To handle the transfer of the balance remaining in the 1st Inf Div Fund account (because of checks written but not presented for payment), the 11th ACR Fund Custodian was authorized to sign checks drawn on the 1st Inf Div

account. Payment was stopped on checks which were determined to be in a lost status; the 11th ACR Custodian issued replacement checks from the 11th ACR Fund and transferred remaining 1st Inf Div Funds to the 11th ACR account.

b. Offerings received after closeout date were given to the 11th ACR Chaplain Fund Custodian, who paid authorized bills and disbursed designated offerings.

d. All fund owned property was inventoried prior to the transfer of the fund; a number of items were signed for by the 11th ACR Custodian who hand-receipted them back to the 1st Inf Div Asst Div Chaplain. An inventory was conducted on the arrival of the 11th ACR at Di An and the hand-receipts destroyed.

Appendix 16 (Provost Marshal) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. SITUATION: a. The division Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) were located at Lai Khe with the Division Headquarters. The PMO provided complete operational control over all military police operations in the division, maintained a physical security section for the division, collected, coordinated and distributed all military police reports, effected liaison with the VN National Police and VN Military Police operating within the 1st Inf Div TAOR, and coordinated with the division staff and unit commanders on military police functions affecting their respective areas.

b. The 1st Military Police Company consisted of four line platoons and one security platoon. Three platoons were deployed in basecamps within the division TAOR with the mission of providing military police support to these installations. One line platoon and the security platoon remained at Lai Khe to provide security for critical areas of the Division Headquarters. Each line platoon was capable of performing the full scope of military police functions to include convey control, weapons registration and PW collecting facilities.

2. PLANNING: a. Elements of information necessary for redeployment planning included the following items:

(1) The redeployment date of the division. This was made known by a formal announcement from the Commanding General on 12 January 1970.

(2) The standdown dates and locations of individual units of the division, including those of the 1st MP Co, were obtained from the division G3.

(3) The information necessary for the removal of individual line platoons from their respective basecamps and the designation of a replacement MP unit was coordinated between the division Chief of Staff, the division PM, the II PFCRCEV

PM, and the USARV PM/CO, 18th Military Police Brigade. This included the date of transfer of responsibilities, the arrival date of the new units, and the actual withdrawal date of 1st MP Co elements to the standdown area.

(4) The closing date of the division PMO was obtained from the Chief of Staff.

(5) The proper disposition of MP CID records, reports and open cases was coordinated between the division PM, the division G1, the CO, 8th Military Police Group (CI), and the Plans & Operations Section, USARV PMO. Subjects were identified to their respective unit commanders as early as possible to facilitate flagging action. In some cases the subject's new unit was obtained from AG and the gaining unit commander notified of the individual's status.

(6) The transfer of open CID cases and evidence held in connection with these cases was coordinated between the division PM and the CO, 8th MP Gp (CI).

b. The following factors influenced planning for redeployment.

(1) The chief factor influencing planning was the ability of the 18th MP Bde to assume responsibility for individual basecamps. Although transfer of responsibilities was not completed on the original schedule, these changes did not adversely affect the redeployment plan.

(2) Lateral transfer of property located in MP stations to the 18th MP Bde greatly eased the movement of the line platoons into the standdown area and reduced the amount of property to be turned in.

c. The base redeployment plan established by the PMO was flexible enough so that a series of alternate plans were not necessary. The after action reports submitted by the 9th Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, were extremely useful in planning. The final plan outlined the following redeployment goals:

(1) Continuing full military police support to the scheduled standdown date and beyond if necessary.

- (2) Maintaining sufficient flexibility to cope with any situation.
- (3) Establishing and maintaining a philosophy of "Service before Enforcement" in dealing with troops on standdown.
- (4) Effecting a smooth transition between MP units at individual basecamps to provide continuous military police support for each installation facility.
- (5) Establishing and maintaining close coordination with the commanders of units standing down.
- (6) Monitoring the various redeployment activities and being ready to provide support for them as needed.

3. EXECUTION: a. On 12 February 1970, the 1st MP Headquarters, the PMO and CID moved from Lai Khe to Di An and reestablished normal operations.

b. On 14 February 1970, the 4th platoon moved from Phu Loi to Di An, followed by the 1st platoon from Dau Tieng on 19 February, and the 3d platoon from Lai Khe on 15 March. At Di An, the company supported the division until 272400 March 1970 when its area responsibilities were turned over to the 300th Military Police Company. At that time, the 1st MP Co stood down and was "released" on 1 April 1970.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. Effect coordination for the transfer of area responsibilities with the gaining command as early as possible.

b. Plan for a possible customs inspections requirement in the event it should become necessary. The plan should be coordinated with the USARV PMO.

Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. The Redeployment Control Center (RCC) was established on 20 January 1970 with representatives from each of the G-staffs, Division Support Command, Adjutant General, Signal, Information Office, Transportation Office and the Provost Marshal. A charter was drawn up and the mission of the RCC assigned (see Tab A). It was established as the statistical data bank for all information pertaining to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Vietnam. Charts were maintained to indicate the up-to-date status of each representative's area of interest. Each representative was expected to be an "expert" in his area, was required to brief members of the Command Group and visitors from other units, and was tasked to handle any problems which occurred in his specific field.
2. All GI redeployment briefing charts were maintained at the RCC and are shown under Tabs E-R to this appendix.
3. The daily briefing given to the Commanding General covered the division strength and unit redeployment status. Approximately once a week, the status of awards and status of funds charts were shown. While the division was maintaining offensive operations, the status of maneuver battalions, artillery, combat support and combat service support battalions were also briefed.
4. In addition to the evening briefing for the Command Group, numerous update briefings were given to VIP's from other headquarters who visited the division to monitor redeployment activities. These briefings centered around an evaluation of methods used in redeployment operations.
5. The 17th Military History Detachment was located in the RCC and supervised the writing, editing and publishing of the redeployment after action report.

TABS

- A - RCC Charter
- B - RCC Organization
- C - Division Strength Status
- D - Unit Redeployment Status
- E - Personnel Outprocessing Status
- F - Strength vs Date
- G - Intra-Division Transfers
- H - US Awards Processing Statistics
- I - VN Awards Processing Statistics
- J - Strength Status: Maneuver Battalions
- K - Strength Status: Artillery and Support Units
- L - Officer Strength Status
- M - NCO Status
- N - Significant Shortages
- O - Audit, Officer Open Mess
- P - NCO/SM Open Mess
- Q - Other Sundry Funds
- R - Domestic Hire Funds

Tab A (RCC Charter) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 96345


AVDB-CS

22 January 1970

SUBJECT: Charter for 1st Infantry Division Redeployment Control Center

SEE DISTRIBUTION


1. The 1st Infantry Division Redeployment Control Center (RCC) is hereby established as the statistical data bank for all information pertaining to the redeployment of the Big Red One from the Republic of Vietnam. It will serve as the information center on the status of division redeployment activities. Charts will be maintained in the RCC to indicate this status, and each member of the RCC will be prepared to fully explain the situation within his particular area of interest.
2. Representatives of the following sections will comprise the RCC: G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, AG, DISCOM, ADE, DSO, IO, DTO and PM. In addition, the RCC will have an administrative section consisting of a Sergeant Major, an admin NCO and a clerk. The AG representative will be the RCC Coordinator in the absence of the ACofS, G1.
3. All members of the RCC will maintain a log of activities from 1800 hours to 1800 hours each day. These logs will be consolidated by the RCC SSM and submitted to the ACofS, G1 prior to 2100 hours each evening.
4. Members of the RCC will insure that their whereabouts are known 24 hours a day by utilizing the sign-out board posted in the RCC building.


A. G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

3

Tab B (RCC Organization) to Appendix C (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)



Tab C (Division Strength Status) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLJEAJ After Action Report (U)

DIVISION STRENGTH STATUS					
AS OF _____ HRS					
	STRENGTH YESTERDAY	DURCS LOSSES	STANDDOWN LOSSES	TODAY'S STRENGTH	TOMORROW'S LOSSES
OFF	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<u>AVIATION</u>					
OFF	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Tab D (Unit Redeployment Status) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)


UNIT REDEPLOYMENT STATUS			
UNIT	STANDDOWN STRENGTH	TODAY'S STRENGTH	TOMORROW'S STRENGTH
OFF	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____
OFF	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____
OFF	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____
OFF	_____	_____	_____
NO	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____

Tab E (Personnel Out-processing Status) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BICYCLE After Action Report (U)

PERSONNEL OUTPROCESSING STATUS

IN-COUNTRY REASSIGNMENTS	ENLISTED	OFFICERS	TOTAL
101st ABN			
1st CAV			
25th DIV			
4th DIV			
AMERICAL			
199th LIB			
173d ABN			
3/9 INF			
1/5 INF			
11th ACR			
MACV			
PTC			
TOTAL INCOUNTRY			
DERCS LOSSES			
TOTAL			

Tab F (Strength VS Date) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEWAY After Action Report (U)



Tab G (Intra-Division Transfers) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

INTRA - DIVISION TRANSFERS

INF:	FROM:	1/28 INF	
	TO:	1/2 INF	156
		2/2 INF	3
		1/26 INF	<u>75</u>
			234
	FROM:	1/18 INF	
	TO:	2/2 INF	2
		1/26 INF	87
		1/4 CAV	<u>149</u>
			238
	FROM:	2/28 INF	
	TO:	1/2 INF	40
		2/2 INF	<u>225</u>
			265
ARTY:	FROM:	1/5 ARTY	
	TO:	2/33 ARTY	78
		8/6 ARTY	<u>70</u>
			148
	TO DISCOM:		159
	GRAND TOTAL :		1044

Tab H (US Awards Processing Statistics) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

U.S.			
AWARDS PROCESSING STATISTICS			
FOR THE PERIOD _____ TO _____			
	PENDING	PROCESSED THIS WEEK	TOTAL APPROVED
ICM	_____	_____	_____
DEC	_____	_____	_____
DSM	_____	_____	_____
SS	_____	_____	_____
LM	_____	_____	_____
DFC-V	_____	_____	_____
DFC-A	_____	_____	_____
EM	_____	_____	_____
BSM-V	_____	_____	_____
BSM-S	_____	_____	_____
BSM-A	_____	_____	_____
AN-V	_____	_____	_____
AN-A	_____	_____	_____
ARCOM-V	_____	_____	_____
ARCOM-S	_____	_____	_____
ARCOM-A	_____	_____	_____
PH	_____	_____	_____

Tab 1 (VN Awards Processing Statistics) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division, KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

VIETNAMESE			
AWARDS PROCESSING STATISTICS			
FOR THE PERIOD _____ TO _____			
	PENDING	APPROVED BY USARV THIS WEEK	TOTAL APPROVED
NC 5th CLASS	_____	_____	_____
ADSO 2d CLASS	_____	_____	_____
GC w/PALM	_____	_____	_____
GC w/GS	_____	_____	_____
CC w/SS	_____	_____	_____
CC w/BS	_____	_____	_____
AFHM 1st CLASS	_____	_____	_____
AFHM 2d CLASS	_____	_____	_____
CAHM 1st CLASS	_____	_____	_____
CAHM 2d CLASS	_____	_____	_____
HER	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____

Tab J (Strength Status: Maneuver Battalions) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH STATUS							
AS OF _____							
GAINS & LOSSES FOR LAST WEEK							
UNIT	ALTH	ASC %	PFD %	GAINS	LOSSES	AVE CC PLD STR	PDT IN FLD %
1-2INF							
2-2MECH							
1-16INF							
2-16INF							
1-18INF							
2-18INF							
1-26INF							
1-23INF							
2-28LIF							
1-4 CAV (-)							
TOTALS							

NET _____

Tab K (Strength Status: Artillery and Support) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division
 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

STRENGTH STATUS					
AS OF _____					
ARTILLERY					
UNIT	AUTH	ASC %	PFD %	GAINS	LOSSES
1-5 ARTY					
8-6 ARTY					
1-7 ARTY					
2-33 ARTY					
TOTALS					
COMBAT SUPPORT & COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT				NET _____	
UNIT	AUTH	ASC %	PFD %	GAINS	LOSSES
1st ENGR (-)					
121st SIG (-)					
1st AVN					
C 4 CAV					
701st MAINT(-)					
1st S&T					
1st MED (-)					
TOTALS					

Tab L (Officer Strength Status) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUE JAY After Action Report: (U)

COMBAT ARMS							
OFFICER & WARRANT OFFICER STATUS							
AS OF _____							
UNIT	STRENGTH			% ASG		30 DAY LOSSES	
	AUTH	ASG	%	CPT	LT	CPT	LT
1-2 INF							
2-2 MECH							
1-16 MECH							
2-16 INF							
1-18 INF							
2-18 INF							
1-26 INF							
1-28 INF							
2-28 INF							
1-5 Arty							
1-7 ARTY							
2-33 ARTY							
8-6 ARTY EV MGR							
1-4 CAV (-)							
TOTAL							
AVIATORS							
UNIT	STRENGTH		WARRANT OFF		30 DAY LOSSES		
	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG			
1st AVN BN							
D/TRP 1-4 CAV							
OTHER UNITS							
TOTAL							

Tab 4 (NCO Status) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE DRUSAY After Action Report (U)

NCO STATUS						
AS OF _____						
UNIT	AUTH E-5/E-6 COMBAT NOS	E-5/E-6 % ASG	NCO'S GRADE	AUTH E-7	E-7 % ASG	TOTAL % NCO'S ASG
1-2 INF						
1-26 INF						
2-2 INF						
1-18 INF						
2-18 INF						
2-16 INF						
1-28 INF						
1-16 INF						
2-28 INF						
1-5 ARTY						
1-7 ARTY						
2- ARTY						
8-6 ARTY						
1-4 CAV						
I-75						
TOTALS						

Tab U (Audit: Officer Open Mess) to Appendix 17 (Redeployment Control Center, to Annex 4 (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

OFFICER OPEN MESS

ANNEX	LOCATION	DATE OF AUDIT	AUDIT COMPLETS	RESIDUAL ASSETS	REMARKS
MAIN CLUB	DI AN	3 APR			TO TRANSFER
1st Bde	LAI KHE				CLOSED
3/17 CAV	DI AN	26 MAR			TO TRANSFER
		25 MAR			

ANNEX	LOCATION	DATE OF AUDIT	AUDIT COMPLETE	RESIDUAL ASSETS	REMARKS
MAIN CLUB	PHU LOI				CLOSED
D TRP 4 CAV	PHU LOI				CLOSED
		14 MAR	18 MAR		

1. LAI KHE PX: a. Initial guidance specified that the Lai Khe PX should reduce and prepare to closeout HLT 15 March 1970. The PX was to sell out all luxury items and only stock necessity items. Since all troops would outprocess through Di An, the Di An PX would remain open, stock nice-to-have items and be transferred to a new unit.

b. Retail Sales: Sales during the phase down decreased sharply, primarily due to lack of merchandise to sell. The PX was reduced to necessity items only.

c. Items Purchased: There were increased demand for JAKCH and luxury merchandise during this phase down. All personnel were informed that this type of merchandise could be purchased at the Di An PX.

d. Services: All concession services (laundry, tailor, barber, ice cream, etc.) remained open until the PX closed. Concession sales paralleled troop strength.

e. Personnel:

(1) Attempts to place military personnel in other exchanges to utilize their experience were unsuccessful, and most were reassigned based on their PMOS.

(2) All local national employees who would agree to move were placed at other PX's. Those who did not wish to move were released.

2. DI AN PX: a. On 11 February 1970, the PX, Acct #1059, in Di An North was made an annex of the main PX, Acct #1066, in Di An South. This was done to increase the volume of available items at the Main PX and use its better storage and display facilities. The total volume of sales of the two stores remained equal.

b. Once the scheduled dates of the various unit standdowns and the number of

troops involved were determined, coordination with the Director of the Bien Hoa/Long Binh Area Exchange was made to insure that the normal quantity of items allocated for Di An would be proportionally augmented. However, normal business hours were not altered during standdown.

c. The volume of sales during operations Keystone Eagle (9th Infantry Division) and Keystone Cardinal (3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division) were used to determine stockage levels for Keystone Bluejay.

d. By establishing continuous direct liaison with the Bien Hoa/Long Binh Area Exchange Headquarters, a great amount of flexibility was given to the ensuing operation.

e. The goal of the PX during the standdown period was to provide the troops with as much merchandise as was available in the Exchange System. The Exchange Staff was increased by personnel from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion to handle the increased volume of sales. Transportation was also furnished by this unit to augment normal delivery operations. Total sales were more than double that of a normal period.

Appendix 19 (Finance) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: a. The goal of the division Finance Office during redeployment was to insure that every individual departing the division received prompt, courteous and accurate pay service.

b. Throughout redeployment, the Finance Office was involved in four separate, but coordinated operations:

(1) The Quality Assurance Section was initially assigned additional personnel from within the Finance Office and expanded into a 24-hour operation to insure that all 17,000 finance records of the division received a thorough and comprehensive audit before being released.

(2) An outprocessing facility was established in the Division Training Command for the outprocessing of in-country reassignees.

(3) DEROS personnel were outprocessed through the existing Division Finance outprocessing facility.

(4) Although actively engaged in the audit of 17,000 finance records and the operation of two outprocessing facilities, the division Finance Office also continued regular pay service, to include a normal February payday. The Pay Branch, which is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of payrolls, was operating at reduced strength, due to a loss of personnel to the auditing and outprocessing facilities. In addition, to achieve the flexibility needed to insure that all division personnel were paid on February payday, it was necessary to manually prepare all vouchers (instead of the mechanized vouchers previously used). Due to this workload, the preparation of the February payrolls became a 24-hour operation for the personnel remaining in the Pay Branch. Payday procedures during the withdrawal cycle are shown under Tab A.

2. PLANNING: When a unit reached the standdown area, the AG provided Finance with rosters of personnel to be reassigned in-country and DEROS personnel. Based on these rosters, finance records were pulled and completely audited by the Quality Assurance Section; any pay discrepancies detected were immediately corrected. Skeletonized vouchers, containing the soldier's name and all essential data except dollar amount, were prepared by the Pay Branch and placed in each man's finance folder. This was done to give the soldier the option of drawing all or any part of his pay accrued on the date he outprocessed. Allotment documents stopping Class S savings deposits were prepared for DEROS personnel by the Service Control Branch and placed in each finance record. The preparation and placement in the finance records of the above documents substantially reduced the outprocessing time for each individual.

3. EXECUTION: Personnel were normally outprocessed through finance in groups of approximately 75 per hour. The finance outprocessing was accomplished in three steps. Responsibilities of finance personnel at each outprocessing step are shown under Tab B. Outprocessing stations were as follows:

a. Station 1: Each group was assembled and given a short briefing by the Finance OIC on what was to be done at each step. Each soldier was also given a letter of instruction for finance outprocessing during this briefing (see Tab C). After each briefing, each individual's name was called, he was given his pay records and directed to Station 2.

b. Station 2: (1) Pay and allowances due to date were computed and amount individual desired to draw entered on pay voucher.

(2) Advance pay and/or advance travel pay, if desired, were computed and entered on appropriate voucher for DEROS personnel only.

(3) Leave record was balanced and acknowledged by individual.

(4) Each individual was queried about recent promotions for which he had

not been paid. Any needed orders were obtained.

(5) Locator cards were prepared on each individual showing his new unit of assignment. These cards, signed by the individual, also served as a receipt for his finance records.

(6) Any pay inquiry or complaint was discussed and necessary action taken.

c. Station 3: (1) Each individual's allotment status was discussed and any changes desired by the individual were initiated.

(2) At the end of each day, all allotment documents were forwarded to the Finance Center.

d. Station 4: Experienced Finance NCO's checked the accuracy of all pay documents and the leave record. At this step, each individual was asked if he was satisfied with the service rendered or had any questions that had not been answered. Personnel not completely satisfied were referred to the OIT. No individual was permitted to leave this area until all problems or inquiries were resolved to his satisfaction. Personnel were then directed to the Cashier for payment.

e. Station 5: Personnel so desiring were paid and also afforded the opportunity to purchase a Treasury Check for mailing to the United States.

f. Officers were processed in the same manner with the exception that one clerk completed all actions.

4. CLOSING OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION FINANCE OPERATIONS IN RVN: The redeployment of the division also necessitated the closing of 1st Inf Div Disbursing Station Symbol Number (DSSN) finance account in RVN. The Treasury Department decision to inactivate 1st Infantry Division DSSN 6414 and redesignate the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) DSSN 5454 as the 1st Infantry Division disbursing activity upon arrival of the Big Red One at Fort Riley somewhat minimized the problems normally inherent in the closing of a finance office. However, the inactivation

of a DSSN is a very complex process. The last day of disbursing operations for the 1st Inf Div in RVN was 6 April 1970. Although regulations allow a 10 day period subsequent to the last day of disbursing operations for closing the account, all actions were completed and final accounting reports submitted on 8 April 1970.

TABS

- A - Payday Procedures for February and March
- B - Finance Personnel Duties and Responsibilities
- C - Finance Outprocessing

Tab A (Payday Procedures for February and March) to Appendix 19 (Finance) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVES-FO

7 February 1970

SUBJECT: Payday Procedures for February and March

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Normal payday for the months of February and March will be extremely difficult due to the redeployment of, and transfers within, the Division.
2. To insure that every Big Red One soldier is paid accurately through date of DEROS or reassignment, the following procedures have been established:
 - a. Personnel out-processing during the period 15 February through 10 March 1970 will receive their last regular end-of-month pay on 31 January 1970.
 - (1) Personnel out-processing during the period 15 through 20 February will receive pay in the amount accrued since last regular pay through the date of out-processing.
 - (2) Personnel out-processing during the period 21 February through 10 March will receive pay representing their end-of-month pay for February.
 - b. Personnel out-processing during the period 11 March through 7 April 1970 will receive their last regular end-of-month pay on 28 February 1970.
 - (1) Personnel out-processing during the period 11 through 20 March will receive pay in the amount accrued since last regular pay through the date of out-processing.
 - (2) Personnel out-processing during the period 21 March through 7 April will receive pay representing their end-of-month pay for March.
3. Personnel on check payrolls will be paid as usual through the month preceding out-processing. Arrangements may be made during out-processing for the current month's payment by check.
4. Exceptions to the above procedures will be made on an individual basis. All

AVDB-FO

7 February 1970

SUBJECT: Payday Procedures for February and March

personnel will be thoroughly briefed and counseled on their pay status and options available during out-processing.

5. Request all unit commanders assist in this matter by providing rosters of assigned personnel as of 20 February, 10 March and 20 March. Rosters should arrive at Division Finance Office, ATTN: Pay Division, NLT 23 February, 13 March and 23 March respectively.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A(Moa-1) plus
100 - 30

Tab B (Finance Personnel Duties and Responsibilities) to Appendix 19 (Finance) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

STA #1 (Duties and Responsibilities)

1. You are responsible for taking out FDRFs from the filing cabinet to give to individual concerned.
2. Initiate a DD Form 141 for personnel, who do not have one in the FDRF.
3. Staple the Finance Check List to the outside of the FDRF and direct the service member to STA #2.
4. For Officer personnel, you will furnish the officer, the Finance Check list only and then direct him to the Officer's Pay, Leave, Inquiries Point.

STA #2 (Duties and Responsibilities)

1. Upon receipt of the FDRF from STA #1, you will perform a fast but thorough review of the record for missing documents, such as leave record, number two copies of MPV, promotion and Art 15 orders.
2. Prepare a Partial Pay voucher if individual requests pay.
3. Insure that an SGLI Form is in the FDRF if the service member is insured.
4. Up-date the DA Form 1996.
5. Place the processing out closing statement on the left side of the FDRF, and fill in all applicable items.
6. Audit and verify leave balance on the reverse side of leave record as of the date the service member departed this station. Inform him how many days leave he has accrued as of this date.
7. Have individual sign the DD Form 141 and place it in the FDRF.
8. Take action to correct all discrepancies.
9. Answer any pay inquiries. If you are not able to answer the service member's question, refer him to the NCOIC or OIC.
10. Complete your portion of the Finance Check List.
11. Give the service member his FDRF and direct him to STA #3.

STA #3 (Duties and Responsibilities)

1. Process all requests for start and stop and all other actions pertaining to allotments.
2. Advise individual as to the effective date of starts and stops on allotments (Example: When an allotment's last deduction is effective Feb 70, inform the service member that the allotment will be deducted from his pay for the last time).
3. Stamp the 1st Inf Div Brief Stamp on copies #2 and #4 of the 1341 and fasten them on the right side of the RDRF. Complete your portion of the Finance Check List.
4. At the close of business, you will prepare a letter of transmittal of the allotment. You will closely coordinate with SP4 Berg on this matter.
5. Give the member his FDRF and direct him to STA#4.

STA #4 (Duties and Responsibilities)

1. Insure that all required actions have been taken.
2. Check for any missing documents.
3. Verify the leave balance on the reverse side of the leave record and then sign it.
4. Pull the SD Form 141 from FDRF. Insure that it was signed by service member.
5. Give FDRF to service member and direct him to the cashier if any payment is to be made.
6. Advise service member to fill out MACV Form 385 for purchase of Treasury Check if desired.

STA #5 (Duties and Responsibilities)

1. Pay all properly certified vouchers for payment.
2. Insure that the service member properly signs the original copy of voucher and is properly identified before payment is made.
3. Have your weapon in the cage with you at all times.
4. Insure maximum security of all paid vouchers and funds.

(OFFICER PROCESSING)

1. Check FDRF with Officer to insure that all entries are correct.
2. Verify and close leave record on the reverse side.
3. Prepare SD Form 141, if he does not have one in the FDRF.
4. Prepare a Partial Pay Voucher if the Officer requests pay.
5. Process all requests to start and stop allotments. Insure that the 1st Inf Div Brief stamp is placed on copies #2 and #4 before releasing the FDRF.
6. Direct Officer to NSCIC or OIC for final Check.

TAB C (Finance Outprocessing) to Appendix 19 (Finance) to Annex A (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Division Finance Officer
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-FO

SUBJECT: Finance Out-Processing

Members of the Big Red One:

1. Today you start your finance out-processing. When your name is called pick up your Finance Records and proceed to Station 2. At this station, one of the Finance clerks will review your Finance Record with you, compute your pay due, correct any discrepancies, answer your questions, close Leave Record and provide any other assistance you request. If you think anything is wrong with your pay, bring it to the attention of the clerk here.

2. Those of you who desire to stop, start or change an allotment will move to Station 3. Service Members who do not desire allotment changes will proceed to Station 4 for a final Finance Records Check. At this station a check of your Finance Records will be made to see that everything is complete and up to date. If everything is straight and you are completely satisfied, move to the cashier for pay, if you want to be paid. This will complete your Finance out-processing and you will be directed to the Medics to continue processing.

3. We in the Division Finance Office work for you and I assure you that your interest is our primary concern. To protect your money there are four important points I would like to stress.

a. DO NOT CARRY LARGE SUMS OF MONEY WITH YOU. YOU MAY LOSE IT OR IT MAY BE STOLEN FROM YOU

b. YOUR EXPENSES WHILE ENROUTE TO YOUR NEXT STATION WILL BE VERY LITTLE IF ANY

c. YOUR MONEY IS SAFE IF LEFT ON THE BOOKS. YOU MAY DRAW AS LITTLE AS \$1. OR ANY AMOUNT UP TO THE AMOUNT DUE YOU.

d. IF YOU WANT TO SEND MONEY HOME TELL THE CASHIER AND WE WILL SEND A TREASURY CHECK FOR YOU.

4. After you finish your finance out-processing, if you have any questions

A-19-C-1

that were not answered to your satisfaction, or if you are not completely satisfied, please see me or one of my officers.

Good luck on your next assignment.

J. H. COOK
LTC, FC
Div Fin Off

A-19-C-2

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Annex F (Intelligence) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. (U) GENERAL: This annex covers disposition of agent nets, transfer of sensor fields, turn-in of radars, and other intelligence activities during the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division.

2. (C) SENSOR FIELD DISPOSITION: a. On 14 February 1970, the 1st Inf Div transferred to the 25th Infantry Division twenty-six (26) sensors in the Razorback field and thirteen (13) sensors in the Michelin field. To permit a smooth transition, teams from both divisions monitored these fields on 13 February 1970.

b. On 14 February 1970, three (3) sensors in the Razorback field were transferred to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

c. On 18 February 1970, twenty-two (22) sensors and associated monitoring equipment of the Binh My/Binh Co field were transferred to the 5th ARVN Division. Teams from both divisions worked together at PSB Normandy III for approximately one month following the transfer.

d. Between 12 and 22 March 1970, seventy-seven (77) sensors and associated monitoring equipment were transferred from the Binh My, Highway 301, Rocket Belt and Song Be fields to the 5th ARVN Div. Teams from both divisions monitored these sensors during the transfer period.

e. All remaining equipment, to include excess sensors, monitoring equipment and spare parts, was transferred to the 12th Signal Company at Cam Ranh Bay.

3. (U) DISPOSITION OF RADARS: All AN/FPQ-5 radars were turned in to the 701st Maintenance Battalion by artillery battalions as they stood down. The one AN/FPQ-24 radar was transferred to 11 PFORCEV Artillery on 16 March 1970.

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4. (C) AGENT NETS: The 1st Inf Div Counterintelligence (CI) Section maintained three agent nets for the collection of tactical intelligence. After a series of meetings with the 525th Military Intelligence (MI) Group and Office of the Special Assistant (OSA) representatives, it was determined that one net would be transferred to 525th MI Group and a second to the OSA. Both gaining agencies agreed to furnish pertinent intelligence reports until the termination of division combat operations. The third net was discontinued and all agent documentation turned over to the MACV J2 Source Control Register.

5. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: a. G2 personnel were transferred from the division on the same general schedule as combat operations were reduced. IPW (Interrogation Prisoner-of-War) and CI personnel were reassigned as brigades stood down. G2 CB (Order of Battle) personnel were reassigned as individual areas of responsibility were transferred. Administrative personnel were reassigned as the work load was reduced.

b. The data bank accumulated by the G2 Section during four and one half years in Vietnam was transferred to the following units:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATA TRANSFERRED</u>
15 Feb 70	25th Inf Div	OB material on 101st Regiment, 9th and 10th Artillery Battalions, Rear Service Groups (RS) 33 and 50, K35 Artillery Battalion, and the C61 and C64 Local Force (LF) Companies.
17 Feb 70	1st Cav Div (AM)	OB material on 69th Artillery Battalion, Main Force and NVA Divisions, the Long Nai Regiment and Sub-Region (SR)-5.
5 Mar 70	11th ACR	OB material on RSC-83 and RSC-80

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATA TRANSFERRED</u>
10 Mar 70	OSA	OB material on SR-1 and SR-5
16 Mar 70	5th ARVN Div	All remaining OB material

c. Unit Security Control Officers were responsible for debriefing all personnel with access to classified material, and for insuring that Security Termination Statement (DA Form 2962) was completed and placed in individual personnel records (DA Forms 2962 were requisitioned upon notification of redeployment to preclude shortages). The division Special Security Officer was responsible for debriefing personnel with Special Intelligence access.

d. Destruction and transfer of classified documents were conducted by unit Security Control Officers under supervision of brigade S2 sections and CI teams. CI teams conducted physical inspections of all areas and facilities vacated by division elements.

e. Although the Military Intelligence Company stood down on 14-16 March 1970, combat intelligence operations continued until 19 March. Two CI teams, one IPW team and selected OB personnel were retained for periods of three days to two weeks. Coordination was made with adjacent units and with higher headquarters for supplementary intelligence assistance as necessary.

6. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: a. Transfer of Agent Nets.

(1) OBSERVATION: Transfer of an entire agent net requires careful advance planning and close scrutiny by gaining intelligence agencies.

(2) EVALUATION: Planning for disposition for agent nets differs considerably from disposition of an individual agent per FM 30-18 (S). Sufficient time must be allotted to permit possible gaining agencies to evaluate each agent net for type, quality and credibility of intelligence produced. Such early coordination insured that 1st Inf Div nets were discontinued or transferred to other units as smoothly as possible.

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(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That advanced planning commence immediately upon notification of redeployment in order to provide sufficient time for possible gaining intelligence agencies to evaluate the overall net.

b. **Zeroing Intelligence Property Books.**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Intelligence Property Book Officers may be unaware of the requirement to conduct inventories prior to standdown.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Due to operational necessities, intelligence property is usually dispersed throughout the division. However, last-minute property inventories during standdown are inefficient and usually make it more difficult to zero property books.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That Intelligence Property Book Officers conduct inventory of intelligence property prior to standdown.

c. **Maintenance of ARVN Interpreter Support During Redeployment.**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** During phased standdown operations, close supervision of ARVN interpreters is difficult to maintain.

(2) **EVALUATION:** In order to meet their own legitimate redeployment needs (i.e., relocating families or securing new employment), ARVN interpreters are unable to fulfill mission requirements continuously.

(3) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** That close supervision be maintained over these personnel, while giving them sufficient time to satisfy personal needs.

d. **CI Inspection of Vacated Fire Support Bases.**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Even minor changes to standdown sequence schedules can hinder the implementation of CI security inspections.

(2) **EVALUATION:** The CI Section must make detailed inspections of areas being vacated by combat elements. To effectively accomplish this task, CI must be informed of all time changes to unit movement and standdown schedules.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: That CI Sections be given immediate notification of any deviations from published movement and standdown schedules for combat elements.

Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. SITUATION: a. On 31 December 1969, the 1st Infantry Division was officially notified of its redeployment. At that time three brigades were engaged in operations against the enemy in Binh Duong, western Bien Hoa and southern Binh Long Provinces (see figures 1-6 in basic report). This part of the division's TAOI was located within the 32d ARVN Division Tactical Area (DTA) and DONG TIEN ("Progress Together") operations with ARVN/GVN forces continued throughout the redeployment period. Located to the north and northeast of the TAOI was the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), to the west, the 25th Infantry Division, and to the south, the 5th ARVN Division. On 2 January 1970, one brigade began operations in AO Dagger located in western Phuoc Tuy Province (note: AO Dagger became AO AJAI on 15 February 1970). Royal Thai Forces and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade were operating to the north of this area and Australian forces were conducting operations to the east. The 1st Inf Div held a total of four permanent base camps and fifteen fire support bases (FSB). During redeployment eleven FSBs would be transferred to the adjacent divisions and four FSBs closed.

b. Redeployment activities were divided into three time periods. The first period, 1-31 December 1969, was the planning phase. Anticipated problem areas were identified, and coordination with higher and adjacent headquarters was begun. From 1 January to 14 February 1970 was the preparation phase. Priority tasks were established, the tactical DPLAN was promulgated, and the division standdown schedule was published. The actual redeployment processing phase began on 15 February and ended 7 April 1970. During this period, base

areas and AOs were transferred, units moved to standdown areas, and personnel and equipment were processed (see Sequence of Key Events, Appendix 1).

2. CONCEPT: a. During the redeployment, the 1st Inf Div established three priority tasks. First priority was given to combat operations, second to the maintenance of forces and material/facility security, and third to disengagement from combat and execution of redeployment. Each unit in the division continued combat operations until approximately 12-18 hours prior to their standdown, then moved to base areas and conducted local security operations until displacing to DI An. Units were also required to furnish personnel for DI An Base Camp security during their standdown period. The early move from field locations to base areas gave each maneuver element time for final cleaning and inspection of individual and unit equipment.

b. To execute redeployment, the division was divided into four segments. Each of the first three segments consisted of a brigade headquarters with associated maneuver battalions and the combat support/combat service support elements normally assigned to a brigade. The fourth segment was composed of the division headquarters elements and remaining administrative and support units which were involved in running the Processing Location and standdown facilities at DI An.

c. The initial redeployment plan had programmed Division Artillery Headquarters for redeployment in segment two, prior to the redeployment of two of its organic battalions. Since this arrangement would require the remaining battalions to operate without the administrative and operational support normally provided by Div Arty HQ (e.g., survey, metro and aerial observer support), the initial plan was changed so that Div Arty HQ redeployed in segment three. It would remain operational until the last artillery battalion (less one 4.2 inch mortar platoon) had redeployed. One move from Lai Khe to

Phu Loi, was made to position the headquarters in the vicinity of Division Headquarters at Di An. Standdown was conducted directly from Phu Loi.

3. EXECUTION: a. Redeployment of First Segment (15 Feb - 3 Mar 70).

(1) Transfer of TAOI/TAOR:

(a) The standdown of the 3d Brigade was accompanied by a major reduction in the division's TAOI/TAOR and the movement of the 1st Brigade from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe. On 15 February 1970, the 25th Inf Div assumed responsibility for Dau Tieng and the Michelin, Trapezoid and Razorback areas. The western TAOI/TAOR boundary was shifted from the Saigon River to a trace generally along the Thi Tinh River.

(b) Responsibility for the Minh Thach area in the northwestern part of the TAOI was assumed on 15 February 1970 by the 1st Cav Div (AM). The 199th LIE assumed responsibility for a portion of the Catcher's Mitt area on the same date. These transfers of TAOI/TAOR responsibilities to other US units presented no problems since II FFORCEV directed the change based on 1st Inf Div recommendations. Minor differences concerning the exact location of boundaries were resolved by direct coordination with II FFORCEV and adjacent divisions.

(2) Transfer of Base Camp Responsibility:

(a) Portions of two large base camps were transferred to US and ARVN units. Dau Tieng, location of the 1st Bde, was transferred to the 25th Inf Div on 141600 February 1970. Since only a part of the base was to be occupied by the 25th Inf Div, one company of 1st Inf Div engineers coordinated with the incoming brigade and constructed a new berm for the southern perimeter. Buildings and facilities outside the perimeter were transferred to ARVN or returned to the control of the Michelin Plantation. The 25th Inf Div assumed responsibility for base camp security of Dau Tieng also on 141600 February 1970. Direct

coordination between the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, and 2d Brigade, 25th Inf Div, was maintained during the turnover period and resulted in a smooth transfer.

(b) 1st Bde elements completed a phased move from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe on 14 February 1970, and assumed responsibility for Lai Khe base defense from the 3d Bde on 151000 February. The Division Headquarters conducted a phased move to Di An from 25 January to 19 February 1970. The DFOC became operational at Di An on 181700 February 1970. On 21 February 1970, the western half of Lai Khe Base Camp was turned over to the 5th ARVN Div. Advance parties from the 5th ARVN Div had begun moving into Lai Khe on 18 February 1970, and the transfer of base defense responsibility from the 1st Bde to the 5th ARVN Div for the western half of Lai Khe occurred on 211200 February. Decisions affecting the transfer of Lai Khe were made at the III CORPS/II FFORCEV level; however, detailed coordination between the 1st Inf Div and 5th ARVN Div provided the information that influenced many higher level decisions. The turnover of facilities from US to ARVN units required long range planning since both US and ARVN higher headquarters were involved. For example, 1st Inf Div recommendations which were passed to II FFORCEV had to be coordinated at the II FFORCEV/III CORPS level and then passed from III CORPS (ARVN) to the 5th ARVN Div. Many formal and informal US/ARVN staff planning conferences were held beginning 1 January 1970 and continued throughout the standdown period.

(3) Disposition of Fire Support Bases:

(a) Four FSBs were located in the Michelin, Trapezoid, Razorback and Minh Thanh areas. One base was closed, one was turned over to the 5th ARVN Div, and two were turned over to the 25th Inf Div (US). The transfer of four FSBs in the central TACR (Ben Cat, Chon Thanh and Phu Giao Districts) from the 3d Bde to 1st Bde was accomplished on 14-15 February 1970. Direct coordination between the two brigades facilitated the orderly transfer of responsibility. One FSB in the

western Catcher's Mitt area, which was outside the TAOI/TADR, was closed based on coordination with the incoming unit. The 5th ARVN Div assumed responsibility on 18 February 1970 for one US FSB which was located in their TADR but had been occupied by one battalion of the 1st Inf Div.

(b) Incoming units moved into FSBs three to five days prior to the departure of 1st Inf Div units. Each incoming unit received a detailed briefing on the area and the enemy situation; in addition, maps, charts and other records were transferred. Timely information concerning the disposition of FSBs was not always available, and assumptions had to be made for planning purposes. Close coordination with higher headquarters, and adjacent and subordinate units was essential in order to force decisions and surface problems that affected the movement of units and the transfer of these facilities.

(4) Artillery: The 1st Bde's DS artillery battalion (105) stood down with the first segment. The 3d Bde's DS artillery battalion (105) remained to support the 1st Bde and retained responsibility for control of DARMA (Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack) and all other artillery fires in defense of Lai Khe Base Camp. Little difficulty was experienced because the geographical area remained basically unchanged.

(5) Movement Security: Units used organic transportation as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft to move from field locations to FSBs and base areas. Truck convoys and fixed wing aircraft were used to move troops from the base areas to Di An. Convoy security and mine sweep teams for 3d Bde convoys were provided by the 1st Bde. Movement of the division headquarters from Lai Khe to Di An was accomplished using convoy elements of five vehicles or more. This security measure was used as an added precaution even though Highway QL 13 was a secure route (green), well traveled by US convoys. No mining or sniping incidents occurred during the move: from Lai Khe to Di An.

b. Redeployment of Second Segment (28 Feb - 20 Mar 70).

(1) Transfer of AO: Prior to standdown, the 2d Brigade was conducting operations in a temporary AO (AO Dagger/AJAX) in western Phuoc Tuy Province. The final decision as to which US or ARVN/GVN unit would assume responsibility for the AO was not made by II FFORCEV until 21 February 1970, nine days before the standdown of the first unit of the 2d Bde. Final plans for closing or turning over the FSBs could not be made until the incoming unit was designated. Standdown of the second segment began on 28 February 1970, and elements of the 25th Inf Div began a phased move into the AO on 1 March. These units were OPCON to the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, until 021200 March 1970. The 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, then assumed OPCON of the last battalion of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, until this battalion began the move to Di An on 3 March 1970.

(2) Transfer of Base Camp Security: The 2d Bde rear CP was located in Bear Cat, and the facilities occupied by the brigade were assigned to the incoming 25th Inf Div unit. There had been no requirement for the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, to furnish security for the base defense, so no transfer of responsibility was required.

(3) Disposition of Fire Support Bases: Four FSBs were located in AO Dagger/AJAX. Two were turned over to the 25th Inf Div and two were closed. The closing was accomplished by the brigade's direct support engineer company which also assisted the 25th Inf Div in constructing two new FSBs. Direct coordination between the two brigades as well as between the division staffs was maintained throughout the turnover period. All appropriate maps, charts and other files accumulated by the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, were turned over to the incoming unit. In many cases, antennas, tents and other items were left standing and direct exchange between brigades was effected.

(4) Artillery: One BS (105) and one GS (8"/155) artillery battalion

redeployed in segment two. The firing batteries of the DS battalion remained in position until the 2d Bde units they supported were withdrawn, and then they moved to Di An for standdown. When the CS battalion commenced its redeployment to Di An for standdown, general support artillery for the remaining brigade was provided by two 155 howitzer batteries and a platoon of 8 inch howitzers from II FFORCEV Artillery. The 1st Bde's DS battalion continued normal combat operations during this period.

(5) Movement Security: Normal convoy moves from the field to Di An were conducted by two infantry battalions and one battalion moved by fixed wing aircraft from an airstrip near Binh Gia (YS 5077) to Di An. Route security for the convoy moves along Highway QL 15 was provided by each unit and the overall movement to Di An was accomplished without incident.

c. Redeployment of Third Segment (15 Mar - 5 Apr 70).

(1) Transfer of TAOI/TAOR: Responsibility for the remaining portion of the 1st Inf Div TAOI/TAOR in Ban Cat, Chon Thanh and Phu Giao Districts was assumed by the 5th ARVN Div on 151200 March 1970. Elements of the 1st Bde continued to conduct combat operations in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone and Song Be Corridor until 17 March 1970. Temporary AO's in these areas were granted by the 5th ARVN Div and were terminated 16-17 March 1970 to coincide with the standdown dates of the remaining 1st Bde maneuver battalions. The success of the transfer of responsibility for the area was again based on timely and detailed coordination with the 5th ARVN Div and II FFORCEV/III CORPS. Movement from Lai Khe to Di An of 1st Bde elements began on 15 March and terminated on 19 March 1970. The division cavalry squadron was the last maneuver unit to depart.

(2) Transfer of Base Camp Security: The eastern half of Lai Khe Base Camp was transferred to US/ARVN units on 151200 March 1970. The 5th ARVN Div

moved into facilities located in the southeastern sector of Lai Khe and assumed responsibility for defense of this sector. One squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved into the facilities being vacated by the 1st Bde and assumed responsibility for the defense of the northeastern portion of the perimeter.

(3) Disposition of FSBs: Of the five fire support bases located in the 1st Bde area, two were turned over to the 5th ARVN Div, two were turned over to the 11th ACR and one base was turned over to the 34th Engineer Battalion (Construction) working on Highways LTL 1A and 2A. Every effort was made to turn over all facilities and material so that incoming ARVN and US units could continue operations rather than spend time constructing or improving these installations.

(4) Artillery: The remaining DS battalion (105) displaced to Di An for standdown in segment three. Again, firing batteries remained in position until the maneuver units they supported were withdrawn from the field. Units were echeloned to Di An to maintain continuous US artillery support for Lai Khe Base Camp until all elements of the 1st Bde had departed.

(5) Movement Security: The 5th ARVN Div assumed route security responsibility for all LOC (Lines of Communication) in the TAOI (Highways QL 13, 7B and 1A) on 151200 March 1970. Units of the 1st Bde, moving from Lai Khe to Di An for standdown during 15-19 March 1970, made normal tactical moves and provided their own convoy security. Mine sweep teams from the 1st, 31st and 34th Engineer Battalions cleared the roads prior to the movement of 1st Bde elements.

d. Redeployment of Fourth Segment (22 Mar - 7 Apr 70).

(1) General: The remaining 1st Inf Div personnel and equipment were located in two permanent base camps, Di An and Phu Loi, TAOI/TAOR

responsibility had already been transferred during standdown of the first three segments, and all STEs had been closed or turned over to US/ADVN units during the same period. The standdown of the fourth segment involved the transfer of security responsibilities at Di An and Phu Loi, the outprocessing of both troops and equipment and the turnover of facilities to incoming units.

(2) Transfer of Base Camp Security Responsibilities:

(a) All standdown units at Di An were required to furnish personnel for base defense. Division personnel were gradually phased out of the defense force and replaced by personnel from incoming units. The turnover of Di An Base Camp security responsibility to the 11th ACR took place on 011200 April 1970. Direct coordination between Support Command, 1st Inf Div, and the 11th ACR was conducted. A written agreement, approved by both incoming and outgoing units, was published by the Installation Coordinator at Di An to facilitate the transfer of responsibilities.

(b) The 1st Inf Div units located at Phu Loi were tenant units and were responsible for only a portion of the Phu Loi perimeter. During the period 10-22 March 1970, this responsibility was transferred to incoming units.

(3) Artillery: Throughout the entire redeployment, Di An Base Camp, the division's redeployment center, presented a lucrative target to the enemy. On any given date, approximately one-third of the division's personnel and equipment were located within the relatively small confines of this area. Although the base camp had not received an indirect fire attack or ground probe for over one year, it was felt that it could be attacked at any time chosen by the enemy. Special consideration was therefore given to providing adequate artillery support. The last DC artillery battalion to redeploy was assigned the mission of controlling fires in support of the defense of Di An Base Camp to include SAMBA. The principal support available throughout

redeployment were the 4.2 inch mortar platoons at Di An; in addition, one 105 Battery was ready to reinforce Di An within one to three hours. On completion of segment three redeployments, only one 4.2 inch mortar platoon remained positioned at Di An Base Camp. Since no additional US artillery was available from II SFORCEV Arty, which could actually range Di An, heavy reliance was placed on the use of ARVN artillery from the 5th ARVN Div and the Capital Military District (CMD) for the remainder of the redeployment period. ARVN liaison teams were provided by the 5th ARVN Div to facilitate obtaining rapid artillery support. Ready reaction tests were conducted, and periodic communications checks were made with the ARVN batteries. In addition, the operational period of the one remaining 4.2 mortar platoon, previously scheduled for standdown in the third segment, was extended to 1 April 1970 to insure continuous US artillery support.

(4) Movement Security: Buses were used to move troops from the Processing Location in Di An to the 90th Replacement Detachment in Long Binh. No special convoy security measures were used because of the security status (green) of the route. In many cases, units receiving 1st Inf Div personnel provided transportation and convoy security from Di An to their base camp areas. No sniping or mining incidents occurred during the redeployment of the fourth segment.

e. Special Redeployment Operations.

(1) Countermortar Radar: The three countermortar radar sections (AM/NEP-4) organic to Div Arty were phased out of operations individually; one section stood down with each of the three division standdown segments. First to stand down was the radar located at Dau Tieng on 15 February 1970, when the 23rd Inf Div assumed responsibility for counterbattery. The two remaining countermortar radars were located at Lai Khe, and had been providing coverage

for that base camp and the nearby district capital of Ben Cat. On 5 March 1970, one of the two ceased operations; coverage was continued by the remaining AN/MPQ-4 by adjustment of the scanning schedule. Finally, all counterair radar operations were terminated on 19 March 1970 when the last maneuver battalion stood down. To prevent equipment damage, all AN/MPQ-4 radars were moved by air to the turn-in point in Long Binh.

(2) Ground Surveillance Radars: Prior to standdown, Div Arty employed 14 ground surveillance radars, one AN/TPS-25 and 13 AN/PPS-5 radars. Four PPS-5 radars stood down with each DS artillery battalion. The remaining AN/PPS-5 and AN/TPS-25 radars stood down with the Div Arty Headquarters Battery. Adequate ground surveillance radar coverage was maintained throughout each phase by repositioning available assets and by increased use of mobile radar teams with mechanized units. Ground surveillance radar operations ceased on 19 March 1970.

(3) Field Artillery Survey:

(a) Survey operations continued until 15 March 1970. From 15 February to 15 March 1970, emphasis was placed on the review of all survey data and on training survey personnel of the 5th ARVN Div. All survey data was reviewed and disseminated to those agencies that would assume responsibility of the division's former AO. Data was passed to the 25th Inf Div, 5th ARVN Div, and the FATAB (Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battalion) of II PFCNCEV Arty.

(b) Training of 5th ARVN Div survey personnel was conducted over a three week period. Testing was conducted at the beginning of the training period to determine levels of proficiency and at the conclusion to determine the degree of improvement. Significant improvements in skill levels were noted in most cases.

(4) Organic Air Support: The 1st Aviation Battalion maintained a total of 83 rotary wing aircraft prior to redeployment. These were apportioned between four aviation detachments (one for each of the three brigades and a fourth for Div Arty), and three organic flying units. As maneuver units stood down, air support requirements diminished, allowing aircraft to be processed for turn-in and transfer on an individual basis (see appendices 3-4). Approximately five days were necessary to process each aircraft. When the 1st Avn Bn formally stood down at Phu Loi on 22 March 1970, a total of 12 aircraft were still operational.

4. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Reverse Sequence Planning.

(1) OBSERVATION: The use of reverse sequence planning insured that the redeployment operation was efficiently planned and executed.

(2) EVALUATION: The 1st Inf Div was given a date (7 April 1970) for the completion of redeployment activities; in addition, no combat unit was to stand down prior to the completion of the TET holiday. No intermediate dates were established by higher headquarters. The estimated processing time for each type unit, based on the experience of previous redeploying units, was tabulated and a standdown schedule was developed by planning in reverse from the 7 April completion date. The sequence in which the units would stand down and the designation of the specific units were modified as necessary so that maximum pressure could be maintained on the enemy during redeployment. The capacity of the standdown facilities at Di An and the requirement to keep a uniform flow of personnel and equipment through the Processing Location were also considerations. The result of this reverse sequence planning method was a final standdown schedule which was followed closely during the actual redeployment of the division.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the reverse sequence planning method be used by redeploying units to develop a realistic standdown schedule.

b. Turnover of Base/Territorial Security Responsibilities.

(1) OBSERVATION: Verbal agreements involving the transfer of responsibilities for base camps, fire support bases and TAGI/TAOR should be followed by formal written agreements.

(2) EVALUATION: To be effective, written proposals or agreements covering redeployment activities should be approved by both incoming and outgoing units. The use of a written document also prevents misunderstandings and surfaced problems that might otherwise be overlooked.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That letters of agreement, memoranda and messages be used to formalize verbal agreements involving the transfer of responsibilities from the redeploying unit to the relieving unit.

c. Weapons Turn-In During Standdown.

(1) OBSERVATION: During the standdown period some units turned in weapons and other equipment ahead of schedule and later had to have the items reissued.

(2) EVALUATION: Even though the possibility of an attack on the stand-down location may be remote, units should develop a contingency defense plan. To support this plan, provisions should be made to secure some weapons and ammunition in the unit standdown area. The turn-in of equipment must be carefully planned so that some weapons are retained for guard details and for a contingency defense force.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That G3/S3 Staff Sections closely monitor the turn-in of all equipment to insure that each unit is capable of defending itself during the standdown period.

d. Planning for Redeployment.

(1) OBSERVATION: Prior to redeployment, critical information needed by redeploying units for planning and preparations was often unavailable.

(2) EVALUATION: Upon notification of redeployment, formal and informal staff planning conferences were begun immediately within the 1st Inf Div Headquarters. Lacking critical information, assumptions were made, and plans or proposals developed on these assumptions. The submission of these plans and proposals to higher or adjacent headquarters often forced timely decisions to be made. Continued liaison with these headquarters insured that the division was aware of as many changes and modifications to these plans as possible. This information was evaluated by the division staff and the possible impact was disseminated to subordinate units.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That, if necessary, plans and proposals based on assumptions be submitted at the earliest possible date to higher and adjacent headquarters for approval.

e. Standdown Schedule.

(1) OBSERVATION: It was necessary to modify the unit standdown schedule based on recommendations from subordinate units.

(2) EVALUATION: The original unit standdown schedule called for supporting units to stand down with the first maneuver unit in each segment. Changes were made to the schedule to allow these units to provide field support until the last maneuver element in the segment stood down. A change to the stand-down dates for each brigade HHC was considered, but not made; the HHC of each brigade stood down with the first maneuver unit as originally scheduled and no command or control problems were encountered.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That brigade HHC and supporting artillery and medical units be scheduled to stand down when the last maneuver element in each segment ceases combat operations.

APPENDICES


- 1 - Sequence of Key Events
- 2 - Standdown Schedule
- 3 - UH-1C, Cobra and LCH Standdown
- 4 - UH-1E/H Standdown

Appendix 1 (Sequence of Key Events) to Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)


<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
31 Dec 69	1st Inf Div notified of redeployment.
4 Jan 70	OPLAN 163-69 published (Contingency Plan for Redeployment).
12 Jan 70	Official redeployment announcement released.
20 Jan 70	Processing Location open; early turn-in of equipment begins.
26 Jan 70	OPLAN TROY published (Tactical Plan for Redeployment).
14 Feb 70	1st Bde HQ moves from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe.
141600 Feb 70	25th Inf Div assumes responsibility for Dau Tieng Base Camp.
15 Feb 70	1st Bde assumes responsibility for Lai Khe Base Camp security.
151200 Feb 70	Boundary Changes: 1st Cav Div (AM) assumes responsibility for Minh Thanh area; 25th Inf Div assumes responsibility for Michelin, Trapezoid and Razorback area.
15 Feb 70	3d Bde begins standdown; HQ elements move from Lai Khe to . . .
18 Feb 70	Boundary Change: 5th ARVN Div assumes responsibility for a portion of the western Catcher's Mitt.
18 Feb 70	1st Inf Div HQ moves to Di An.
21 Feb 70	5th ARVN Div assumes responsibility for base defense of western Lai Khe.
28 Feb 70	2d Bde begins standdown; HQ elements move from Bear Cat to Di An.
1 Mar 70	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, moves into AC AJAX (Phuoc Tuy area).
2 Mar 70	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, assumes responsibility for AC AJAX.
15 Mar 70	5th ARVN Div assumes responsibility for Route Security, Hwy QL 13 and Route ZINC (Hwy 1A and 7B).
15 Mar 70	Critical Bridge Overwatch responsibility transferred from 1st Inf Div to ARVN/CVN.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
15 Mar 70	1st Ede begins standdown; HQ elements move from Lai Khe to Di An.
15 Mar 70	5th ARVN Div assumes responsibility for central TAOI/TAOR (portions of Ben Cat, Chon Thanh and Phu Giac Districts).
19 Mar 70	Last combat element (1 st Cav) in 1st Inf Div begins standdown.
7 Apr 70	1st Inf Div Honor Guard departs for Ft. Riley, Kansas.
7 Apr 70	Standdown facilities close; 1st Inf Div completes redeployment.

Appendix 2 (Standdown Schedule) to Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division
 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)




Appendix 2 (Standdown Schedule) to Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division
 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (')




Appendix 3 (UH-1C, Cobra and LOH Standdown) to Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

UH-1C, COBRA and LOH STANDDOWN



Appendix 4 (UH-1D/H Standdown) to Annex C (Operations) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)



Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: When redeployment was announced, the 1st Infantry Division was operating out of four base camps: Dau Tieng, Lai Khe, Phu Loi and Di An. On 2 January 1970, Bear Cat was added as the fifth base camp. The Division Support Command (DISCOM) maintained its headquarters at Di An, along with the headquarters and rear elements of all its combat service support units. A Logistics Coordination Center (LOCC) at Lai Khe represented DISCOM at the Division Headquarters.

2. PLANNING: a. After receiving official notification of its impending redeployment from Vietnam, the division immediately began preliminary logistical planning which included the following:

- (1) Continued logistical support to units committed to combat operations.
- (2) Procedures to transfer facilities.
- (3) Procedures to transfer and/or turn in all equipment and supplies.
- (4) Procedures to transfer Installation Coordinator functions.

b. Invaluable information pertaining to those points listed above was gained from USARV OPLAN 183-69 and the after action reports of the 9th Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. This available information plus the assistance of higher headquarters provided the division with sufficient planning factors and guidance to effect the timely and efficient turn-in/transfer of equipment and facilities.

c. Based upon the information available, logistical planning was formalized with the publication of 1st Inf Div OPLAN 183-69 on 4 January 1970.

d. On 9 January 1970, a conference was held at Division Support Command headquarters in Di An. Logistical planners from the division staff, DISCOM

and Saigon Support Command discussed the establishment of equipment processing locations in Di An, outlined the basic personnel requirements to staff the processing location, and discussed the basic guidelines to be followed in turning in equipment. At these and other meetings, the following decisions were made:

(1) Processing locations and turn-in points would be established at both Di An and Long Binh; since there was neither a sufficient source of water nor available hardstand at Di An, washing facilities would also be established at Long Binh. It was also agreed that these two locations should be operational at the earliest possible date, in order to reduce the density of equipment on hand and permit the Saigon Support Command to actually test their turn-in procedures.

(2) All equipment was to be turned in to the Saigon Support Command who would return the equipment to the USARV supply system. The Saigon Support Command was designated to process all equipment except medical, avionics, COMSEC and automatic data processing; these items would be processed through their own special channels of issue.

(3) Special Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material (SCRAM) would be used to determine equipment serviceability. These procedures are essentially designed to detect extensive damage, determine extent of repair required and ascertain over-age or over-mileage equipment.

(4) All equipment would be processed and turned in at Di An except for one brigade headquarters and headquarters company, two mechanized infantry battalions and one infantry battalion; these would process their equipment, except small arms, at Long Binh. All small arms would be processed at Di An. Arrangements were made to turn in the track vehicles of the cavalry squadron at Long Binh. The washing of all wheeled and tracked vehicles and trailers

was scheduled at Long Binh utilizing high pressure clearing equipment and facilities supplied by the Saigon Support Command.

(5) Facilities at Di An were designated that could accommodate an additional 4000 personnel (a "brigade slice") for outprocessing. Available billets and maintenance facilities were limiting factors in planning for the increased density of troops at Di An. Tents, general purpose and medium, were later erected in selected unit areas to provide billets for this overflow of personnel. Revetments had to be constructed to insure protection of troops living in tents.

(6) Rear areas of organic battalions at Di An would be used to provide facilities for incoming units. These facilities would be hand-receipted from one incoming unit to another. Organic water carrying capabilities would be laterally transferred from unit to unit to provide sufficient water for the increased number of troops at Di An.

(7) Initial plans were formulated to dissolve the division GMMI Team and to utilize the technical expertise of the members to assist in the processing of equipment.

(8) The division would stand down and turn in its equipment in four segments. The first three segments would be "brigade slices," consisting of a brigade headquarters and headquarters company, at least three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and supporting engineer, signal, medical military police and maintenance units. The fourth segment would be composed of the Division Headquarters, Support Command Headquarters, and support and administrative units not included in the brigade slices.

(9) The Saigon Support Command would provide personnel for operational control, supervision and technical assistance in both the Di An and Long Binh processing locations.

(10) The 1st Inf Div would provide personnel to supplement the staffing of the Di An Processing Location. Ultimately, 255 personnel were assigned to augment the processing lines. Personnel were to be supplied to the Long Binh Processing Location on an "as required" basis from units turning in equipment at those locations. In addition, the division would help man the Long Binh washing facility and aid in the movement of equipment from Di An to points in Long Binh or Newport. Of the 31 (1 Officer and 30 EM) personnel that were normally stationed at Long Binh, fifteen were at the wash rack and fifteen were assigned as a permanent "drive away" team with the mission of driving vehicles from the wash rack to the various staging areas.

(11) Post, camp and station (PCS) property located at Dau Tieng, Lai Khe and Tay Loi was to be processed on site by a small mobile team rather than being transported back to the processing locations. PCS property at Bear Ca. would be turned in at Long Binh; PCS property at Di An which was not transferred to new tenant units would be processed at Di An.

(12) Prepositioning and supply of PRP (packing, preservation and packaging) materials, lashing materials, crumage as well as the preservation, packing and packaging of material would be the responsibility of the Saigon Support Command.

(13) The division would continue to conduct combat operations until the last brigade headquarters stood down. DISCOM was given the following missions in order of priority of effort:

(a) Continue to support combat operations in accordance with current plans and directives.

(b) Continue to provide and coordinate security forces for Di An Base Camp.

(c) Augment the division Processing Location at Di An and Long Binh.

(d) Redeploy forces assigned or attached to DISCOM.

(e) Upon completion of the division redeployment, closeout the division's Processing Location and transfer remaining facilities to CG, USARV, as directed.

(14) Plans for the phase out of supply point functions and responsibilities were formulated.

(15) The Saigon Support Command agreed to provide personnel for operational control, supervision and technical assistance to both the Di An and Long Binh Processing Locations.

(16) The procedures for processing ENSURE, NESTOR, Special Services Property and War Dogs were different and required detailed specific instructions to insure disposition.

(a) ENSURE Items: Disposition instructions were received from the USARV G4 on these items. They would be either turned in to the Saigon Support Command, laterally transferred to other US units, or shipped back to CONUS.

(b) NESTOR Items: All NESTOR items on hand in units would be turned in to the Division Crypto Officer. Final disposition of these items was made through Crypto channels.

(c) Special Services Property Items: The majority of Special Services Property items were to be transferred to the USARV Special Service Property Officer. Later, some Special Services Property was laterally transferred in place to incoming units.

(d) War Dogs: Both Scout and Tracker Dogs would be turned over to the USARV Dog Training Detachment, Bien Hoa, RVN.

3. CONCEPT: a. Upon designation as a Phase III redeploying unit, subordinate elements were scheduled to begin turning in excess equipment, items not essential to combat operations and installation property that was no longer required.

b. Whenever possible, equipment and facilities were turned over in place to incoming units, after obtaining lateral transfer approval from USARV.

c. Existing requisitions that could not be filled from in-country assets were cancelled. RED BALL, G2 priority requisitions and requisitions for repair parts were submitted by each unit until seven days prior to standdown of the unit.

d. Field locations and base camps were closed and/or transferred, as directed by OPLAN TROY.

e. The redeployment segments, consisting of a "brigade slice," were scheduled to stand down and move to the Di An Processing Locations approximately 15 days prior to the "R" date in accordance with the division Sequential Standdown Schedule.

f. The Saigon Support Command was responsible for the following functions:

- (1) Determining facilities requirements and establishing processing areas for all TCE/MTCE and PC&S property except for medical, aviation and avionics.
- (2) Providing supervisory and technical assistance personnel.
- (3) Controlling the operation of the Processing Location.
- (4) Providing PP&P supplies and equipment.
- (5) Providing transportation and control movement of supplies and equipment received from base camps, to marshalling areas, depots or POE's.
- (6) Giving turn-in credit to units.

g. The 1st Inf Div was responsible for the following functions:

- (1) Preparing equipment for turn-in to include proper identification.
- (2) Providing both skilled and detail personnel to staff the processing line.
- (3) Providing Material Handling Equipment (MHE), electronic test equipment and such other equipment available from division assets.

(4) Controlling the movement of vehicles from Di An through the wash rack at Long Binh to staging areas at Long Binh.

h. Fire support bases and base camps were either turned over to other US users, ARVN or dismantled.

i. A break-out of the personnel required to staff the Di An Processing Location and the Long Binh washing facility is shown under Tab C to Appendix 3.

j. Material flow through the Processing Location is described under Tab D to Appendix 3.

4. EXECUTION: a. Unit Inventories.

(1) In order to provide accurate inventory data to support redeployment plans, each unit that maintained a property book was required to submit to the division G4, NLT 14 January 1970, an inventory of all on-hand FEMA items (reportable under AR 711-5) and PC&S property. These inventories were hand-carried to USARV G4 on 16 January 1970. In connection with this inventory, two representatives from USARV G4 visited the division from 6 to 8 January 1970 to reconcile 2d Quarter FY 70 Equipment Status Reports with property books.

(2) As a result of these inventories, Saigon Support Command was able to compute the number of major end items that the division would turn in. The amounts and those actually turned in were as follows:

<u>MAJOR END ITEMS</u>	<u>ANTICIPATED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Small Arms	27,405	25,870
COMEL	25,249	13,880
Engineer	1,168	1,431
Artillery/Track	502	452
Wheel Vehicles	4,430	3,645

They also prepared schedules for the turn-in of major end items for each unit. These schedules acted as a guide and reflected the turn-in of equipment from 15 February to 5 April 1970; they did not consider the turn-in of non-essential major end items prior to 15 February. For an example of a schedule, see Tab I to Appendix 9. Finally, the Saigon Support Command was able to graphically illustrate the progress the division was expected to make during the standdown period. For examples of these graphs, see Tabs F through J under Appendix 9.

(3) When units reached standdown status, it was necessary to have accurate information regarding the quantity of equipment remaining in the unit. Therefore, each property book officer submitted, NLT 1700 hours the day before standdown, a complete inventory of all equipment on hand as of that day. The following format was used:

	<u>LIN</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
A. TOE Equipment	_____	_____	_____
B. PC&S Equipment	_____	_____	_____
C. ENSURE Items	_____	_____	_____

Each day thereafter a report of what had been turned in on that day was submitted. These inventories and daily turn-in reports provided the data that depicted day by day progress. This data provided the basis for the daily briefing on the logistical aspects of redeployment given to the Commanding General.

e. Turn-in of Equipment.

(1) With the exception of avionics, all unit equipment on hand at the time of standdown was either transferred or turned in at the Long Binh or Di An Processing Locations. All aviation related equipment was turned in through the 34th General Support Group. In an effort to reduce the density of equipment to be turned in at standdown, Saigon Support Command consented

to open their Di An turn-in points on 18 January 1970 and the Long Binh turn-in point on 22 January 1970. The early opening of these turn-in points not only reduced the number of items on hand at standdown, but also permitted the Saigon Support Command to test processing and documentation procedures. The personnel of the CMHI Teams were detailed to assist in processing equipment.

(2) The supporting logistical activity, Saigon Support Command, made available "B" Teams to receive PC&S property at Dau Tieng, Lai Khe and Phu Loi Base Camps. The teams began accepting equipment at Dau Tieng on 26 January, at Lai Khe on 30 January and at Phu Loi on 4 March 1970. PC&S property at Di An was processed through the quartermaster turn-in lines beginning 23 January 1970 (the "B" Teams initially received only excess installation property). These procedures enabled units to turn in items conveniently since transportation requirements were minimized by stationing a team at each base camp.

(3) Installation tentage on frames was transferred, in place, to the Installation Manager (PA&E) thereby removing tentage from the unit property book.

(4) Prepositioning and supply of PP&P materials, washing materials and dunnage was provided by the Saigon Support Command.

(5) The standdown schedule was phased so that a proportionate share of combat, combat support and combat service support elements would be turning in equipment at any one time.

(6) During normal standdown, the equipment of 3HC, 2d Sde, the 1-16th Inf (Mech), 2-16th Inf, 2-2d Inf (Mech) and the tracked vehicles of 1-4th Cav were turned in at the Long Binh Processing Location. To familiarize those units with turn-in procedures at Long Binh, their pre-standdown turn-in was also processed through that location.

(7) All COE/MTOE equipment, EC&S property, and PLL/ASL was disposed of in-country. No equipment or supplies were shipped by the division except for museum items, unit memorabilia, organization colors, National Standards and guidons (see Appendix 4 to Annex J).

(8) The division was charged with the responsibility of transporting equipment turned in at the Di An Processing Location to designated locations at Long Binh and Newport. To accomplish this task, a pool of drivers was formed under the supervision of DISCOM noncommissioned officers. Convoys were formed and the MCCIC delivered the vehicles to appropriate destinations.

c. Special Disposition of Selected Items:

(1) No lateral transfer of equipment outside the division was allowed without USARV approval. The desiring unit had to initiate a request for specific items to USARV.

(2) No direct transfer of equipment from the division to ARVN was permitted. Transfers were accomplished through the 1st Logistical Command and III Corps Area Logistics Command channels.

(3) Weapons were not taken with personnel to their new in-country re-assignments, with one exception. On 23 February 1970, USARV directed that sniper personnel would be transferred with weapons. However, problems in obtaining disposition instructions on sniper personnel and accountability of the weapon in transit proved so difficult that this requirement was rescinded on 16 March 1970.

(4) National Match Grade or glass packed M14 rifles were processed separately from other equipment, and were identified so that Processing Location personnel could give special attention to these items.

(5) Generators at critical bridges were transferred to ARVN after extensive coordination with USARV and MACV. Requests for authority to transfer

generators were submitted on 31 December 1969 and 10 January 1970. On 16 February 1970, a joint US/ARVN team inspected the generators at the six bridge sites; the generators were found to be free of deficiencies and were formally accepted by ARVN on 18 February 1970.

(6) Chaplain's type property was turned in to the Chief of Chaplains at Long Binh Depot.

(7) The 1st Engineer Battalion's organic Home Plows were turned in at the Processing Location in the plow configuration. These items plus engineer bridging equipment were inspected by a Saigon Support Command representative at Di An and then transported to Long Binh for turn-in.

(8) The division's fourteen house trailers were disposed of in various ways. Two remained at Lai Khe for use by the 5th ARVN Division, three were transferred to II FORCEV in Long Binh, and the remaining nine were transferred to Long Binh Post Billeting Office. All transportation of the trailers to their new locations was provided by the division.

(9) The ASTA platoon (MOHAWK Aircraft) of the 1st Aviation Battalion, which had been detached from its parent unit since January 1969, was not redeployed. All of the ASTA platoon's equipment was laterally transferred to the 73d Aviation Company, based at Vung Tau, to which the platoon was attached.

(10) When incoming units identified based camp equipment they wished to retain, the units requested that USARV approve a lateral transfer for the desired items. In most cases, the requests were approved.

(11) Installed garrison mess equipment on unit property books was inspected and classified by the Installation Engineer (PA&E) prior to being disconnected.

(12) Commercial type air conditioners on unit property books were technically inspected by the Installation Engineer (PA&E) prior to turn-in. The

commercial air conditioners registered with USARV and picked up as installed property by PA&E were left installed.

(13) Forward support elements of the 701st Maintenance Battalion accepted PLL from units as early as 21 January 1970, providing that the unit submitted a DA Form 2765-1 for each stock numbered item. Quantity had to be shown, but no packing was necessary. PLL in depot pack configuration was transferred in place at Di An to the 29th General Support Group. Units which still had PLL/ASL items on hand during standdown, turned them in to the maintenance battalion at Di An with DA Form 2765-1.

(14) Fortification material at fire support bases due to be closed was given to the nearest US unit rather than back-haul the material.

(15) Medical equipment and supplies to include sets, kits and outfits, narcotics, atropine and expendable medical supplies were turned in to the Division Medical Supply Officer; the DMSO turned in these supplies to the 32d Medical Depot.

(16) Office machines were turned in at the COMMEQ equipment line at the Processing Location.

(17) Avionics items were turned in through aviation supply channels. On 14 March 1970, the 34th Group (GS, Avn) established facilities at Phu Loi to receive aviation items from divisional units.

d. Reports of Survey: It was anticipated that many reports of survey would be processed to cover shortages of equipment when units began to reduce property to a zero balance. Although all units prepared the basic report of survey for submission, units smaller than battalion required a headquarters to appoint officers to complete the reports of survey once their parent brigade ceased to exist. Originally, it was assumed that this would require an available pool of officers and enlisted men from which survey personnel could be

drawn. Four officers, one NCO and two typists were selected. However, the thirty-one surveys that were processed during the first standdown segment were routine. It was necessary to call upon the ready pool of survey officers only once during the first segment. Although there were large quantities of equipment being turned in or transferred, no increase report of survey load developed. One possible reason was the relative stability of supply personnel. Commanders and property book officers, who normally might have changed positions at this time, were retained through redeployment.

e. Documentation:

(1) DA Form 2765-1 was the only document used for turn-in at both Di An and Long Binh. Copy number four of DA Form 2765-1 was signed and returned to the unit as a receipt for the equipment turned in. This receipt was used to zero the property book.

(2) DA Form 2408-7 accompanied all items as required by TM 38-750. Units filled out blocks 1 through 17 and 21 as applicable. When used in conjunction with DA Form 2765-1 for turning in weapons, a maximum of 50 serial numbers were listed in block 21, "Remarks." Serial numbers were not required to be listed on the DA Form 2765-1. A single DA Form 2408-4 was used in conjunction with DA Form 2765-1 on each major item of equipment.

(3) Logbook forms required by TM 38-750 and pertinent TM's accompanied all equipment. A properly completed DA Form 2408-14 was used as a missing parts statement. Only non-expendable missing parts were required to be entered. Federal Stock Numbers were entered in column c, "Reason for Delay," of DA Form 2408-14 in lieu of requisition numbers for non-expendable missing parts.

(4) Basic Issue List Items (BILI) had to be as complete as possible, cleaned and preserved. A "Certificate of Missing Parts and Basic Issue List Items" was required for missing non-expendable items.

(5) A "Certificate of Absence of Ammo, Ammo Components and Human Remains" accompanied all items which could conceivably contain ammunition or human remains. This included but was not restricted to tool boxes, ammo pouches, packs, commo shelters and vehicles.

(6) A certificate, "Release From Survey Officer," accompanied all items damaged by anything other than fair wear and tear (FWT).

(7) Sets, kits and outfits contained a "Certificate of Missing Items" for all missing non-expendables. Credit was given if the set, kit or outfit was at least 85 percent complete, otherwise, credit was given for the container only.

f. Material Maintenance:

(1) Prior to standdown, units brought equipment to a high level of material readiness. Equipment was cleaned and organizational deficiencies repaired. During standdown, technical inspections (TI) were performed by Saigon Support Command personnel at the Processing Location. TI procedures were simplified in accordance with Selected Criteria for Retrograde of Army Materiel (SCRAM).

(2) The weekly and monthly material readiness reports were no longer required by USARV when the division began redeploying. The DA Form 2406 reports were deemed unnecessary because the on hand figures of equipment were reduced daily. The last monthly report was for January and the final weekly report was for the week ending 7 February 1970.

(3) On 15 January 1970, the division received an allocation of 122 Belly Armor Kits. Maintenance teams were sent to three different locations (Dau

Tieng, Lai Khe and Bear Cat) to install these kits. In order to have belly kits on all remaining rifle squad and cavalry section carriers, nine M113's were laterally transferred from a second segment mechanized unit (1-16th Inf) to third segment mechanized units (2-2d Inf and 1-4th Cav). In addition, five M113's were taken from the 1-16th Inf (Mech) and placed in the division supply float. Kits for combat essential vehicles of the M113 family continued to be installed by the maintenance battalion until 15 March 1970; on that date II FFORCEV directed that the three remaining kits in the division be transferred to the 11th ACR.

g. Turn-in/Transfer of Facilities: The transfer and turn-in of facilities necessitated close coordination between other US Army elements, representatives of a civilian owned enterprise, the Michelin Rubber Plantation (at Dau Tieng). Division units were stationed in Dau Tieng, Lai Khe, Di An, Phu Loi and Bear Cat. The transfer of facilities included the transfer of all real property, base camp functions and installation coordinator responsibilities. Facilities were transferred in the following manner: the outgoing units turned the facility over to the Installation Manager (PAMF), who in turn hand-receipted such facilities to the incoming US unit(s) or transferred them to ARVN units. The transfer of the Dau Tieng Base Camp required negotiations with the owners of the Michelin Rubber Plantation to obtain release of the masonry buildings, with the III Corps (ARVN) Engineer for the salvage of the excess section of the camp, and with incoming 25th Infantry Division (US) units. The transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp required the preparation of a combined agreement for the transfer and security of the base camp. The details of these facilities transfers are discussed in Annex I.

h. Phase Out of Supply Point Activities:

(1) The division was able to provide support from forward locations without difficulty until combat elements stood down. The transfer of supply points required extensive coordination with higher headquarters to transfer responsibilities and equipment to non-redeploying combat service support units.

(2) The 25th Inf Div assumed responsibility for providing logistical support at Dau Tieng except for the aviation rear/refuel supply point which was taken over by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). These responsibilities were transferred on 15 February 1970.

(3) The Lai Khe Class I Point was transferred to the 1st Cav Div (AM) on 15 March 1970 and the 554th Engineer took over the Class III points. The helicopter rear point at Lai Khe was taken over by the 173d Aviation Company on 1 March 1970 while helicopter refuel operations were assumed by 227th Aviation Battalion.

(4) The 29th General Support Group established a Di An Logistical Support Activity (LSA) by relocating units from Camp Davey to take over the facilities of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion and the 701st Maintenance Battalion. This transfer included the ASL/PLL, NCR 500 system, and Class I and III facilities. Support functions were assumed by the Di An LSA beginning 15 March 1970. The 12th Aviation Group assumed control of aviation fuel at Di An. These in place transfers saved the division and incoming units countless man-hours and transportation assets.

1. Clearance of Property Books and Records: The redeployment of the division without equipment necessitated the turn-in of all supplies and equipment and the serping of all division property records. The division Supply Logistics and Assistance Team (SLAT) of the G4 Section conducted a complete examination and audit of all supply records IAW Section IX, Appendix A, AR 340-2. All errors and discrepancies were corrected prior to the ACOF3, G4,

issuing a letter of property record clearance. All unit property records were collected by the C4 (SIAT) and destroyed after audit/examination revealed no errors or discrepancies, IAW AR 340-2. The units were issued a letter stating an examination of property records had been conducted and that such records had been destroyed. Accompanying the SIAT to selected units were two representatives from the General Audit Office (GAO). Their purpose was to verify that proper accounting procedures were being followed. These representatives monitored the final audits and were favorably impressed with the procedures. See Tab M to Appendix 8 for letter on examination of property books.

j. Shipment of Special Category Items: See Appendix 4 to Annex J.

k. Transportation Office: The Division Transportation Officer (DTO) was included as a representative to the Redeployment Control Center (RCC). The original plan called for all transportation requirements to be submitted to the RCC. In the early stages of redeployment this became impractical because placing the DTO in the RCC separated him from his staff and caused inefficiency in organizing transportation support. To regain efficiency the DTO moved back into the transportation office, but left a representative (senior NCO) in the RCC. Thereafter, all coordination for transportation requirements was accomplished in the Division Transportation Office. The senior NCO in the RCC was later replaced by a Movement Control Officer to fulfill briefcase requirements.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Establishment of Starsdown Area
- 2 - Reporting of Turn-In
- 3 - Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In
- 4 - Maintenance Support
- 5 - Medical Support
- 6 - Transportation
- 7 - Ammunition
- 8 - Lessons Learned
- 9 - Statistical Representation

Appendix 1 (Establishment of Standdown Area) to Annex D (Logistics) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESJAY After Action Report

1. GENERAL: The population of Di An Base prior to redeployment averaged 3500-4000 personnel. The anticipated influx of additional personnel meant increased demands on power generating equipment, water hauling and trash disposal, and emphasis on security of real and installed property. Scheduled redeploying units would be allocated real estate based on maximum billeting capacities, sufficient hardstand for unit maintenance, and adequate spaces for storage of supplies and equipment. In addition, redeployment necessitated that base development plans, to include real estate records, be verified for accuracy in the recording of building numbers, categories of buildings and condition of facilities. Initial planning thus included updating of real estate records in order to affix unit areas of responsibility and accountable hand-receipt holders.

2. STANDDOWN LOCATION: a. Base layout maps were used to plot areas for billeting. Existing 1st Infantry Division infantry and artillery battalion rear areas at Di An facilitated identifiable battalion areas to be used.

b. Redeploying infantry battalions were billeted in the 1-18th Inf and 2-18th Inf rear areas; a third area was provided by 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment facilities. Artillery battalions used the 1-7th Arty rear area and brigade headquarters companies were located in the standdown center. Other divisional units were scheduled to be billeted in their parent unit areas established in Di An prior to redeployment.

c. Plot plans were updated continuously to meet varying space requirements throughout the processing period.

3. BILLETING AND MESS: a. Maximum use of barracks space was anticipated. Initial plans called for double-bunking in billets as much as possible. Tents

were available for billets should the lack of bunk adapters necessitate this course of action. Approximately 75 GP Medium tents were erected in battalion standdown areas to provide 100 percent overhead cover for all personnel. Job order requests which directly affected redeployment (e.g., the upgrading of billets, electrical fixtures, lights, fans and interior wiring) were identified and priorities established to accomplish the work prior to standdown.

b. One consolidated mess hall was used per standdown battalion. Mess hall equipment was laterally transferred from the users to the next incoming stand-down unit. Responsibility for feeding of standdown personnel was assumed by the succeeding unit approximately two days prior to the "release" date of the preceding standdown unit. These procedures solved manpower problems inherent to the moving of mess hall property and the installation of mess equipment.

c. Host tenant units were tasked to establish billeting and messing arrangements for segment one standdown units. Additional PC&S property required was procured from divisional assets. Letters of Instruction were published to both the host and the incoming standdown unit pertaining to services and facilities available at each standdown location. Specific responsibilities were identified and delineated so that PC&S property was also transferred from the initial stand-down units to the next unit standing down in the same area.

d. Base Camp activities normally accrued by tenant units (e.g., water re-supply of mess halls and showers, daily garbage pickup, latrine burning, pumping out of urinals, and trash hauling) were accomplished by standdown units whenever possible. Towards the end of a unit's standdown period, responsibility for such activities normally reverted to the host unit or the next standdown unit.

Appendix 2 (Reporting of Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. The original projected figures of on hand quantities of major end items in the 1st Infantry Division were determined from the MACR-124 (711-5 Report) with overage factors added to the basic figures.

a. The overage factor was 20 percent in all areas, except COMCEL and machine guns which were given an overage factor of 100 percent. The following depicts the planned and actual amounts of items turned in:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ITEMS TURNED IN</u>	
	<u>PLANNED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Weapons	27,405	24,876
COMCEL	25,249	13,724
Engineer	1,168	1,429
Wheel/Trailer	4,430	3,517
Artillery/Track	502	451
Total Major End Items	58,754	43,998
PC&S		82,040
Secondary Items		95,129

b. The planned engineer equipment figure was approximately 25 percent low and the planned COMCEL figure was approximately 60 percent high. Based on projections made on 13 March 1970, planned figures for PC&S were approximately 70,000 items and for "secondary" approximately 100,000 items.

2. A schedule showing quantities to be turned in per day by unit, for each of the major five categories of equipment, was prepared by the Saigon Support Command and given to all units of the 1st Inf Div.

3. A turn-in period was used prior to standdown for units to process equipment that was excess to their operational requirements. This pre-standdown

period lasted for 27 days; by the end of this period, the division had turned in approximately 25 percent of its major end items. Obtaining copies of the document register (DA Form 2064) for each day's turn-in enabled the division to monitor the turn-in program. The turned-in quantities from each day's document registers were subtracted from each unit's on hand quantities; this yielded both the division's turned-in quantity each day and the new on hand quantity of each unit each day. This information was presented to the command group in order to monitor the progress of equipment turn-in.

4. As each unit stood down, equipment on hand totals were re-programmed to insure that all items were scheduled for turn-in. The schedules were updated by daily meetings with the unit S4 or P3C where an actual count of the quantities of equipment on hand in the five major categories was obtained. These meetings continued on a daily basis until the unit had turned in all equipment. Other items discussed at these meetings included special problem areas, quantities turned in each day and the following day's schedule.

Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics)
to 1st Infantry Division KSYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: a. Areas used for the division equipment processing location at Di An were made available by moving certain maintenance and supply activities out of shops and warehouses into open areas. This was possible without requirements for additional construction or erection of shelters since redeployment took place during the "dry" season.

b. In addition to the processing facilities at Di An, the 79th Maintenance Battalion operated processing facilities, including a seven line wash rack, at Long Binh. These facilities were used to turn in the equipment (except small arms) from one brigade headquarters and headquarters company, two mechanized infantry battalions and one infantry battalion, and the tracked vehicles of the divisional cavalry squadron.

c. PC&S property located at Dau Tieng, Lai Khe and Phu Loi was processed on site by a small mobile team rather than being transported back to the processing locations. PC&S property at Bear Cat was turned in at Long Binh; PC&S property at Di An which was not transferred to new tenant units was processed at Di An.

d. Aviation, medical, COMSEC and automatic data processing equipment were processed through their normal supply channels.

e. All vehicles, regardless of whether they were turned in at Di An or Long Binh, were washed at the wash facility at Long Binh.

2. ORGANIZATION: a. The Saigon Support Command Senior-Man-on-the-Ground (SMOG) headquarters was set up in a building, 40' X 50', formerly used as the HQ/A Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion, Tech Supply Office. It provided adequate office space for the headquarters.

b. A large warehouse in the same area, 70' X 140', was used for turn-in, storage and processing of COMHEL equipment and office machines. This structure was adequate as long as disposition instructions were issued to prevent equipment from stacking up in the storage and processing area.

c. The maintenance area of a former forward support company was used for processing wheel vehicles, artillery and engineer equipment, and track vehicles. Two buildings, 24' X 32', were used for office space; a work shop, 30' X 197', was used for storage of generators and other small engineer equipment.

d. After wheel vehicles, artillery and engineer equipment, and track vehicles were inspected and accepted, they were moved to one of two holding areas, 75m X 100m primary yard and a 100m overflow yard.

e. An area, 50m X 140m, containing two warehouses, 70' X 140', was used for processing Quartermaster items, chemical items and weapons. A maintenance tent, 15' X 32', was erected in this area to accommodate a carpenter shop.

f. All areas were completely fenced and guarded after dark to provide security.

g. In addition to the facilities required, it was necessary to install additional telephone and electrical service in the processing area.

h. The processing lines were organized to:

- (1) Perform a documentation check.
- (2) Inspect for cleanliness and serviceability.
- (3) Give turn-in credit at the location where the equipment was turned in.

i. A sketch of the processing area is under Tab E to this appendix. The flow of material through the processing lines and responsibilities is depicted on the chart under Tab D.

3. PERSONNEL: a. Supervisory and technical assistance personnel were provided by the Saigon Support Command (see Tab A). Additional personnel, both detail and skilled, were provided by the division to augment this supervisory staff.

b. Initial personnel requirements indicated that the 1st Infantry Division would have to provide 378 personnel for duty with the Saigon Support Command during KEYSTONE BLUEJAY. Of this total, 256 personnel were actually provided. The projected total was based upon operating a day and night shift on the processing lines. However, advanced scheduling permitted an even and continuous turn-in of equipment by the standdown units. The smooth and successful operation of the processing line eliminated the need for a night shift, except in critical areas such as carpentry and COMTEL. This reduced the total personnel requirement.

c. A list of personnel requirements is shown under Tabs B and C, and a breakdown of personnel provided is under Tab E.

4. EQUIPMENT PROCESSING: a. The following documentation was required for equipment turn-in:

(1) All maintenance records as outlined in TM 38-750 were required. An updated DA Form 2408-14 was used as a missing parts statement. Only missing non-expendable parts were required to be entered in column "C" of the form.

(2) DA Form 2765-1 was used as a turn-in receipt document.

(3) DA Form 2408-7 was used, when required by TM 38-750, in conjunction with DA Form 2765-1 to turn in multiple items.

(4) When appropriate, certificates of "Missing Basic Issue List Items," "Absence of Ammo or Ammo Components and Human Remains," and "Release from Survey Officer" were required. The technical inspection/classification was recorded on a locally reproduced form.

(5) Sample formats of all forms are included as inclosures under Tab F to this appendix.

9. Standards for equipment turn-in:

(1) Equipment was required to be as clean as possible. Since washing facilities were not available at Di An, equipment was turned in and then washed at Long Binh. However, it was still necessary to clean the under-carriages in order to check for cracked frazes, loose rivets, fluid seepages, etc.

(2) Basic Issue List Items (BILI) were required to be reconstituted as much as possible, and cleaned and preserved to the maximum extent possible. A shortage list was required for missing non-expendable items.

(3) Sets, parts and outfits were required to be as complete as possible. When sets were less than 85 percent complete, credit was given for the container only. Like BILI, a shortage list was required for missing non-expandable items.

(4) Equipment obviously damaged by other than wear and tear was required to be classified for serviceability by PA&E prior to being disconnected for turn-in.

(5) Ammunition, ammunition components and human remains were required to be removed from all conceivable items and the fact attested to on a certificate.

(6) A separate missing parts statement for major end items such as vehicles was not required. An updated 2408-14 was used for this purpose.

(7) ENSURE items for which disposition instructions had not been received through G3 channels were turned in at the Processing Location. They were required to be tagged conspicuously and the DA Form 2765-1 conspicuously marked "ENSURE."

(8) Safes were required to have combinations stenciled on the outside in order to receive credit.

(9) Atropine and narcotics were required to be removed from protective masks and medical kits, and turned in as separate items.

(10) All components/sets were required to be tagged to identify the end item to which they belonged. Components were required to be turned in as a complete set whenever possible.

(11) Items whose end application was obscure were required to be tagged with their noun nomenclature and federal stock number.

c. Maintenance:

(1) Organizational maintenance was required to be performed to the maximum extent possible prior to turning in equipment.

(2) Maintenance records were required to be prepared in accordance with TM 38-750. Except when time precluded units from querying the National Maintenance point, lost or illegible records were required to be reconstituted.

(3) Equipment was not required to be job ordered to supporting DSU's if direct support maintenance or above was required.

(4) As previously stated, SCRAM procedures were used for determining serviceability of equipment. COMFEL equipment was given a GO-NO-GO test to determine serviceability.

(5) Unauthorized modifications on equipment were required to be removed and equipment returned to its authorized configuration to the extent practical by the owning unit.

(6) Simplified checklists were developed to aid units in turning in equipment. They are attached as inclosures under Tab C to this appendix.

5. OTHER: a. Security and Storage.

(1) As equipment was turned in at the Processing Location, it was stored awaiting processing for shipment or disposition instructions. Although the division no longer had direct responsibility for the equipment, it was stored on M An Base Camp for which the division had overall security responsibility.

(2) A lack of disposition instructions and adequate transportation assets caused this equipment to backlog until it overflowed warehouses and marshaling yards making pilferage and theft harder to detect and control.

(3) It is essential that once turned in, equipment be removed from the Processing Location as quickly as possible.

b. Wash Facility Operation:

(1) After 20 February 1970, 15 personnel were assigned as a permanent detail to the Long Binh wash facility.

(2) The final wash facility consisted of seven lanes, five for wheel vehicles and two for track vehicles.

(3) Cleaning was accomplished with high pressure water hoses which use a low volume of water (approximately 12 gallons per minute) under extremely high pressure (as high as 5000 psi are developed).

(4) Water under such high pressure, if directed at the human body at close range, could inflict serious bodily harm and could even be fatal. Thus, a permanent crew was used so it could become familiar with the equipment and there would be a less likelihood of accidents.

(5) With this high pressure equipment, approximately 20-25 minutes were required to thoroughly clean a 2½ ton truck to meet Department of Agriculture standards for retrograde.

c. Delivery of Vehicles to Long Binh:

(1) During the pre-standdown period, 20 January through 15 February 1970, approximately 900 pieces of equipment including trucks, trailers, cranes, scoop loaders, etc., accumulated in the Di An holding area.

(2) On 6 February 1970, disposition instructions were received for 1/4, 3/4 and 1 1/2 ton trailers to be retrograded out of country. The division was required to place a ten man team at Long Binh to process these trailers for overseas shipment. Long Binh was chosen as the Processing Location since it was the only location with wash facilities available.

(3) On 14 February 1970, it was determined that equipment on hand in the Di An holding area and equipment to be turned in at the Di An Processing Location during normal standdown would be moved to Long Binh, washed and marshalled on Long Binh Post.

(4) On 16 February 1970, vehicles turned in through the Di An lines plus vehicles from the holding area formed the first convoy to Long Binh. The new wash facility was not yet open and a makeshift two-hose wash facility limited the number of vehicles which could be processed to approximately 50-60 per day.

(5) The operating plan used to move the vehicles to Long Binh was as follows:

(a) Various units within Division Support Command loaned drivers and NCO's to the Saigon Support Command's Senior-Man-on-the-Ground (SMOG). These personnel were used to form convoys and move equipment from the Di An holding area to Long Binh.

(b) Six NCO's were assigned to the SMOG for the purpose of marshalling and supervising convoys to Long Binh. The driver from the unit turning in the vehicle joined a convoy in the Di An marshalling yard based on his vehicle's maintenance category.

(c) Under the supervision of NCO's, the convoys proceeded to the Long Binh wash facility where the drivers were required to dismount and assist in washing the vehicles.

(d) After all convoy vehicles had been washed, the NCOIC reassembled the convoy and delivered the vehicles to various dropoff points, picking up the drivers as he went with a 2½ ton truck furnished to him for that purpose. After all vehicles were delivered to their proper destinations, the drivers were returned to Di An and the NCOIC prepared to lead another convoy to Long Binh.

(6) On 20 February 1970, the new seven lane wash facility at Long Binh opened, substantially increasing the number of vehicles which could be processed. Other improvements were:

(a) The ten-man crew which had been processing trailers was increased to fifteen and detailed to wash equipment as it came across the wash rack. This relieved the driver from having to wash vehicles with unfamiliar and potentially dangerous equipment.

(b) Later, on 25 February 1970, a driver pool of 15 men was placed in Long Binh OPCON to the 79th Maintenance Battalion for the purpose of moving the equipment from the wash facility to various locations on Long Binh Post. This allowed convoy drivers to be released and returned to their units earlier.

(c) A shuttle service using two trucks was established between the Long Binh wash facility and the Di An Processing Location. This reduced the amount of organic division transportation required for the purpose of returning personnel to Di An.

(7) It took approximately seven days before the washing and marshalling of vehicles at Long Binh became a smooth operation. It was unfortunate that

the new wash facility was not finished in time to support the pre-standdown turn-in.

TAB#:

- A - Saigon Support Command Personnel
- B - Personnel Assisting Saigon Support Command
- C - Personnel Requirements
- D - Material Flow and Responsibilities
- E - Di An Processing Location Strip Map
- F - Documentation
- G - Checklists

Tab A (Saigon Support Command Personnel) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-in) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

OIC	1
IG/OPR/SUP	1
Movement Control OFF	1
Transportation Off	1
Automotive Inspector WC	1
OIC ORD/CONTROL/QM	1
AMC CIV	4
STOCK CONTROL & ACCT OFF	1
STOCK CONTROL & ACCT EM	10
SMALL ARMS RPRMN	4
MOVEMENTS SPECIALIST	19
ENGINE & POWERTRAIN RPRMN	3
ENGINE EQUIPMENT RPRMN	4
FIELD RADIO RPRMN	3
GROUND CONTROL RADAR RPRMN	2
EQUIPMENT STORAGE SPECIALIST	8
CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT RPRMN	2
DETAIL PERSONNEL	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	70

Tab B (Personnel Assisting Saigon Support Command) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-in) to Annex E (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

The following is a listing by job description of the personnel programmed and the actual number provided to the Saigon Support Command by the division:

<u>PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>JOB DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
18	Small Arms RPRMN	13
2	Movements Specialist	0
58	Movements Specialist	22
16	Fork Lift Operator	5
165	Detail Personnel	141
6	Artillery RPRMN	3
21	Engine and Powertrain RPRMN	15
	Wrecker Operator	
5	Engineering Equipment RPRMN	4
1	Power Generator RPRMN	1
5	FLO Radio RPRMN	4
7	Ground Control Radar RPRMN	5
1	Field Radio Operator	0
1	Field Radio Operator	2
2	Teletype RPRMN	1
2	Field WRMN	1
2	Electronic Instrument RPRMN	1
2	Spec Elec Device RPRMN	1
2	Projector RPRMN	0
2	Field Radio Relay RPRMN	1
40	Equip Storage Spec	0

<u>PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>JOB DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
7	Chem Equip RPRMN	4
1	Refrigeration RPRMN	1
2	Auto WO	0
2	Engr WO	0
1	Arm WO	0
2	Commo-Elec WO	0
5	Detail Personnel	0
	Wash Rack Detail	15
	Drive Away Detail	<u>15</u>
<u>378</u>	TOTALS	255

Tab C (Personnel Requirements) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-in) to Annex B (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. Total personnel initially requested by the Saigon Support Command to operate the Processing Location, by MOS, is shown below.

2. Attached as inclosure are the listings for personnel for individual sections within the Processing Location.

<u>MILITARY BY MOS</u>	<u>AMOUNT REQUIRED</u>	
45B40	2	
45B20	16	
71N40	2	
71N20	56	
Fork Lift Operators	16	
Detail Personnel	165	
45O40	2	
45O20	4	
63M40	12	
63M20	9	
Wrecker Operators	4	
62B40	2	
62B20	3	
52D40	1	
31M40	1	
31F20	4	
26D20	3	
21J20	2	
36K40	2	
35B20	2	
35E20	2	
41F20	2	
31L20	2	
76V40	2	
76V20	40	
54D40	2	
54D20	3	
63V40	2	
63V20	6	
Armt WO	1	
Auto WO	2	
Engr WO	2	
COMMHEL WO	2	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	378
<u>CEVILIANS</u>		
Armt Civilian	1	
Auto Civilian	2	
Engr Civilian	2	
Commo-electric Civilian	2	
QM/Chem Civilian	2	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	9
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>387</u>

INCLOSURES

1 - Personnel by Section

Inclosure 1 (Personnel by Section) to Tab C (Personnel) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-in) to Annex E (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (J)

1. SMALL ARMS PROCESSING SECTION: a. Two (2) processing lines operating on two (2) shifts of nine (9) hours each.

b. Personnel required for the operation of one processing line:

- 2 - disassembly
- 1 - bore cleaner
- 2 - solvent tanks
- 1 - drain
- 2 - drying
- 1 - oil dip
- 2 - assembly
- 4 - wrapping
- 2 - sealing
- 1 - packing
- 1 - shipping

c. Inspectors required:

- 1 - Civilian
- 1 - Warrant Officer
- 2 - E6 - 45B40
- 20 - 45N20 + (604th) = 16 - 45B20

d. Equipment required:

- 1 - 10,000# R.T. forklift
- 4 - "hot air" compressors

e. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 1 - Civilian
- 1 - Warrant Officer
- 2 - E6 - 45B40
- 16 - 45B20
- 8 - 71N20
- 2 - forklift operators
- 76 - detail people

2. ARTILLERY PROCESSING SECTION: Personnel required:

- 1 - Civilian*
- 1 - Warrant Officer*
- 2 - E6 - 45C40
- 4 - 45C20

* same personnel as used in the Small Arms Section

3. AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT PROCESSING SECTION: a. Personnel required:

(1) Inspectors:

- 2 - Civilians (1 CRC-H qualified)
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 12 - E6 - 63H40
- 12 - 63H20 -3 (604th) - 9 - 63H20

(2) 8 - 71N20, documentation clerks,

(3) 8 laborers for loading, banding, piggybacking trailers, etc.

(4) Equipment operators:

- 2 - 5 ton wrecker operators
- 2 - 10,000# R.T. forklift operators

b. Equipment required:

- 1 - 5 ton wrecker
- 1 - 10,000# R.T. forklift

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 12 - 63H40
- 9 - 63H20
- 8 - 71N20
- 8 - detail people
- 2 - wrecker operators
- 2 - forklift operators

4. ENGINEER EQUIPMENT PROCESSING SECTION: a. Personnel required:

- 2 - Civilians (1 CRC-H qualified)
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 2 - E6 - 62B40
- 6 - 62B20 -3 (604th) - 3 - 62B20
- 2 - E6 - 52D40 -1 (604th) = 1 - 52D40
- 8 - 71N20, documentation clerks
- 2 - forklift operators

b. Equipment required:

- 1 - forklift (6,000# R.T. or towmotor depending on work area)

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 2 - 62B40
- 3 - 62B20
- 1 - 52D40
- 8 - 71N20
- 2 - forklift operators

5. COMTEL PROCESSING SECTION: a. Personnel required:

(1) Inspectors:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 2 - 31B40 -1 (604th) = 1 - 31B40
- 6 - 31B20 -2 (604th) = 4 - 31B20
- 4 - 26D20 -1 (604th) = 3 - 26D20
- 2 - 31J20
- 2 - 36E20
- 2 - 35B20
- 2 - 35E20
- 2 - 41F20
- 2 - 31L20

(2) Soft pack and other packaging:

- 2 - 76V40 -1 (604th) = 1 - 76V40
- 16 - 76V20 -2 (604th) = 14 -76V20

(3) 8 - 71N20 documentation clerks

(4) Equipment operators:

- 2 - 6,000# R.T. forklift operators

b. Equipment required:

- 1 - 6,000# R.T. forklift
- 2 - Cable power elect 50 ft
- 3 - Rod ground
- 1 - Truck 3/4 ton 4 M37B
- 2 - Signal generator SIG-12
- 2 - Signal generator AN/URM 25
- 2 - TS 352
- 2 - Meter ME30

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - Warrant Officers
- 1 - 31E40
- 4 - 31E20
- 3 - 26D20
- 2 - 31J20
- 2 - 36K20
- 2 - 35B20
- 2 - 35S20
- 2 - 41F20
- 2 - 31L20
- 1 - 76V40
- 14 - 76V20
- 8 - 71N20
- 2 - forklift operators

6. QM/CHEMICAL PROCESSING SECTION: a. Personnel required:

(1) Inspectors:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - 54D40
- 6 - 54D20 -1 (604th) - 5 - 54E20
- 2 - 63V40
- 6 - 63V20

(2) Packing chemical equipment (gas masks, etc.), taking inventories, preparation of QM equipment for shipment:

40 - detail people

(3) 8 - 71N20, documentation clerks

(4) 2 - forklift operators

b. Equipment required:

1 - 6,000# R.T. forklift

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 2 - Civilians
- 2 - 54D40
- 5 - 54D20
- 2 - 63V40
- 6 - 63V20
- 8 - 71N20
- 2 - forklift operators
- 40 - detail people

7. CARPENTER SHOP: a. Personnel required:

2 - 76V40 -1 (604th) = 1 - 76V40
28 - 76V20 -2 (604th) - 26 - 76V20
2 - forklift operators

The 76V20's will be used in the following number and capacity:

3 - sawing
5 - making boxes and pallets
2 - blocking and bracing
4 - banding

b. Equipment required:

1 - 6,000# R.T. forklift
1 - 12" DeWalt table saw
1 - 12" rip saw
2 - 9" Skill saws
12 - 12" saw blades
6 - 9" saw blades
24 - claw hammers
1 - 2" banding set
1 - 1 1/4" banding set
1 - 3/4" banding set

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

1 - 76V40
26 - 76V20
21 - forklift operators

8. VEHICLE PARK AND HOLDING AREA: a. Personnel required:

(1) Vehicle park and holding area:

1 - 2LT
4 - NCO's -1 (604th) = 3 - NCO's
28 - detail people -2 (604th) - 26 detail people (detail people will

be needed for the positioning and upkeep of equipment, loading and unloading of trucks, banding trailers and preparing vehicles for retrograde (fuel, batteries, etc.),

(2) Documentation:

2 - 71N40
16 - 71N20

(3) Equipment operators:

- 4 - forklift operators
- 2 - 5 ton wrecker operators

(4) Guards:

- 2 - S5
- 10 - guards

b. Equipment required:

- 2 - 10,000# R.T. forklifts
- 1 - 5 ton wrecker
- 1 - 1" stencil machine

c. Total personnel required from outside of the 604th:

- 1 - 2LT
- 3 - NCO's
- 26 - detail people
- 2 - 71N40
- 16 - 71N20
- 4 - forklift operators
- 2 - wrecker operators
- 12 - guards

9. PC&S TEAM PERSONNEL:

- 1 - NCO
- 4 - EM
- 71N40
- 76V40
- 71N20
- 76V20

10. "E" TEAM PERSONNEL:

- 1 - NCO
- 2 - EM

11. WASH RACK SECTION: Personnel to be furnished by the 567th in the operation of the 79th Maintenance Battalion wash rack (figures furnished represent a 24 hour operation).


a. Saigon Support Command (organic to the 79th Maintenance Battalion):

- 1 - CIC
- 2 - NCOIC
- 2 - NCO, holding area
- 6 - NCO, wash area and lubrication area
- 6 - Maintenance personnel


b. 1st Infantry Division:

- 1 - OIC
- 1 - NCCIC
- 15 - Wash area personnel
- 15 - Drivers

Tab D (Material Flow and Responsibilities) to Appendix J (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)



STRIP MAP DI AM PROCESSING LOCATIONS



Tab E (Di in Processing Strip Map) to Appendix J (Equipment Processing Location and Turn In), to Annex D (Logistics), to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BULLETIN After Action Report (U)

Tab F (Documentation) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Attached as inclosures are the various forms and documents used for the turn-in of all items of equipment. Additional forms required but not included are listed below:

- a. DA Form 2408-7, Equipment Transfer Report.
- b. DA Form 2765-1, Request for Issue or Turn-In.
- c. DA Form 2408-14, Uncorrected Fault Record.

INCLOSURES

- 1 - BILL Certificate
- 2 - Absence of Ammo, Ammo Components and Human Remains Certificate
- 3 - Release from Survey Officer Form
- 4 - Identification - Classification Data Sheet

Inclosure 1 (BILL Certificate) to Tab F (Documentation) to Appendix 3
(Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st
Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DATE

CERTIFICATE

The following listed parts and Basic Issue List Items (BILL) of: (List nomenclature, make, model, USA and Serial Number of the end item) have been requisitioned by this unit and are not available within a reasonable period of time. Requisitions will be cancelled in accordance with AR 735-35. The supporting cannibalization point has been contacted and the items are not available from it. Property responsibility and pecuniary liability for the missing items have been or are being determined in accordance with AR 735-11.

<u>FSN</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>MAKE/MODEL</u>	<u>USA/SN</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
------------	---------------------	-------------------	---------------	-----------------

NAME _____
RANK _____

Inclosure 2 (Absence of Ammo, Ammo Components and Human Remains Certificate) to Tab F (Documentation) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

CERTIFICATE OF ABSENCE OF AMMO, AMMO COMPONENTS
AND HUMAN REMAINS

DATE _____

CERTIFICATE

I have personally performed a physical inspection of the following items: (list nomenclature, make, model, USA and Serial Number) and verify that the item is free of ~~ammunition~~, ~~ammunition components~~, and human remains.

NAME _____
RANK _____
SSAN _____

Inclosure 3 (Release from Survey Officer Form) to Tab F (Documentation) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

RELEASE FROM SURVSY OFFICER

DATE _____

RELEASE

1. I have investigated the damages to the following item of equipment:

NOMENCLATURE:

TYPE:

MODEL:

MAKE:

USA #:

SN:

2. This item of equipment, described above, is no longer required for the conduct of this investigation and is hereby released for repair/turn-in or disposal in accordance with AR 735-11.

3. Actual cost of damage (is) (is not) required to be completed and forwarded to me at the above address.

Appointing Authority _____

or

Surveying Officer _____

Inclosure 4 (Identification - Classification Data Sheet) to Tab F (Documentation) to Appendix J (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLJ/EJAY After Action Report (U)

IDENTIFICATION - CLASSIFICATION
DATA SHEET

1. Unit and Present Location		2. Date of Inspection	
3. Federal Stock Number		4. Nomenclature or Description	
5. (a) Make	(b) Model	(c) Serial Number	(d) Registration Number
6. Age of End Item	7. Hours/Miles Operated/Rounds Fired (End Item)		8. Missing Major Components
9. (a) Engine Make	(b) Model	(c) Serial Number	
10. Frame Condition		(a) Frame Bends/Cracks	
		(b) No Apparent Damage	
11. Overall Condition		(a) Obviously Salvage due to Fire/Battle Damage	
		(b) Damaged/Parts Missing	
		(c) Minor Repair	
12. Level of Repair Required			
None/Org.	<input type="checkbox"/>	DS/GS	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Depot	<input type="checkbox"/>
		PDO	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Remarks: Use Reverse Side of Form			
14. Inspector:			
Rank/Name		Organization/APC	
		Signature	
15. Cost Comparison Data:		Recommended Disposition	
a. Total Overhaul & Trans Cost \$	_____	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
		Issue	DS/GS
b. Plus Additive (Cost to Replace Components)	\$ _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
		OVHL/PAC	OVHL/CONUS
c. Total Cost (a+b)	\$ _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
		PDO-Local	PDC-CONUS
d. Maintenance Expenditure Limit	\$ _____		
Rank, Name and Organization of Person Completing Block 15.			
6. Condition Code AR 725-50: (to be filled in by repair facility.)			

Tab G (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Attached as inclosures are the checklists used to assist personnel in preparing equipment for turn-in.

INCLOSURES:

- 1 - Wheel and Track
- 2 - Small Arms
- 3 - Artillery
- 4 - Engineer
- 5 - COMEL
- 6 - Sets, Kits, Outfits
- 7 - Miscellaneous Equipment
- 8 - Turn-In of Prescribed Load List

Inclosure 1 (Wheel and Track) to Tab C (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

WHEEL AND TRACK

	YES	NO
1. Is vehicle as clean as possible and all trash and debris removed from under seats, compartments, boxes, and bed.		
2. Is vehicle free of ammunition, explosives, and human remains, and certificates filled out.		
3. Has vehicle been lubricated in accordance with L. O.		
4. Are all logbook forms required by TM 38-750 present and properly filled out.		
5. Are FSM's entered in column C of DA Form 240E-14 for missing non-expendable parts.		
6. Has DA Form 2765-1 been prepared.		
7. Has BILI been cleaned and preserved and a certificate prepared for missing non-expendable items.		
8. Has certificate releasing equipment from survey been prepared on equipment damaged by other than fair wear and tear.		
9. Has delivery driver been briefed to remain with equipment until it is accepted by responsible processing site personnel.		
10. Has delivery driver been briefed to move the equipment from the processing site to a location, designated by processing site personnel, in Di An, Long Binh, or Newport.		
11. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.		

Inclosure 2 (Small Arms) to Tab G (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

SMALL ARMS

YES

NO

1. Is each weapon, magazine and container free of ammunition and explosives and certificate prepared.
2. Are component tools and equipment present with weapon.
3. Are all items as clean as possible with all rust removed.
4. Are logbook forms as required by TM 38-750 present and properly filled out.
5. Has DA Form 2765-1 been prepared.
6. Has DA Form 2408-7 been prepared.
7. Has certificate releasing equipment from report of survey been prepared for equipment damaged by other than fair, wear, and tear.
8. Have delivery personnel been briefed to remain with the equipment until accepted by responsible processing site personnel.
9. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.

Inclosure 3 (Artillery) to Tab C (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

ARTILLERY

YES

NO

1. Is weapon clean and free of ammo, explosives and human remains and certificate filled out.
2. Has weapon been lubricated and serviced in accordance with applicable TM's.
3. Has BILLI been cleaned and preserved and a certificate prepared for missing non-expendable items.
4. Are logbook forms required by TM 38-750 present and properly filled out.
5. Are FSN's entered in column c of DA Form 2408-14 for missing non-expendable parts.
6. Has DA Form 2765-1 been prepared.
7. Has certificate releasing equipment from report of survey been prepared for equipment damaged by other than fair wear and tear.
8. Have delivery personnel been briefed to move the equipment from the processing site to a location designated by processing site personnel in Di An, Long Binh, or Newport.
10. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.

Inclosure 4 (Engineer) to Tab G (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLOUJAY After Action Report (U)

ENGINEER

YES

NO

1. Is equipment as clean as possible and all trash and debris removed from under seats, compartments, and boxes.
2. Is equipment free of ammunition, explosives, and human remains and certificate filled out.
3. Has equipment been lubricated in accordance with L. O.
4. Has sufficient fuel been left in tanks to permit an operational check.
5. Are all logbook forms required by TM 38-750 present and properly filled out.
6. Are FSN's entered in column c of DA Form 2408-14 for missing non-expendable parts.
7. Has DA Form 2765-1 been prepared.
8. Has RILI been cleaned and preserved and a certificate prepared for missing non-expendable items.
9. Have delivery personnel been briefed to remain with the equipment until it is accepted by responsible processing site personnel.
10. Have delivery personnel been briefed to move the equipment from the processing site to a location designated by processing personnel in Di An, Long Binh, or Newport.
11. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.

Inclosure 5 (COMMEL) to Tab C (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

COMMEL

YES

NO

1. Is equipment as clean as possible and all debris and trash removed from all compartments and boxes.
2. Is equipment free from all ammo, explosives, and human remains and certificate prepared.
3. Is equipment tagged to indicate full nomenclature.
4. Are all components of an item tagged to identify them as part of the end item to which they belong.
5. Have batteries been removed and destroyed in accordance with existing regulations.
6. Has equipment been protected as much as possible against shock in transit.
7. Is BILI and running spares and TM's present with equipment and certificate prepared for missing non-expendable items.
8. Are all components of a set grouped together.
9. Are logbook forms required by TM 38-750 present and properly filled out.
10. Are PSN's entered in column C of 2408-14 for missing non-expendable parts.
11. Has DA Form 2765-1 been prepared.
12. Has a certificate releasing equipment from report of survey been prepared for equipment damaged by other than fair wear and tear.
13. Have delivery personnel been briefed to remain with the equipment until it is accepted by responsible processing site personnel.
14. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.

Inclosure 6 (Sets, Kits, Outfits) to Tab G (Check Lists) to Appendix 3
(Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st
Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

SETS, KITS, OUTFITS

YES

NO

1. Are all parts of set as clean as possible and preserved with a light coat of oil.
2. Is carrier free from all ammo, explosives, or human remains and is certificate prepared.
3. Is set as complete as possible and a certificate prepared for missing non-expendable items.
4. Is DA Form 2765-1 prepared.
5. Is set tagged to indicate complete nomenclature.
6. Have delivery personnel been briefed to remain with the equipment until accepted by responsible processing site personnel.
7. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.

Enclosure 7 (Miscellaneous Equipment) to Tab G (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

	YES	NO
1. Is equipment clean and preserved to the maximum extent possible.		
2. Is equipment free from all ammo, explosives, or human remains and certificate prepared.		
3. Is equipment complete and all components grouped together and tagged as part of a set.		
4. Are items whose identity is not obvious tagged to indicate complete nomenclature.		
5. Has equipment been lubricated in accordance with applicable TM's.		
6. Are logbook forms required by TM 38-750 and applicable TM's present and properly filled out, and FSN's entered in column c of 2408-14 for missing non-expendable parts for those items having this form.		
7. Are certificates prepared:		
a. Missing Parts and Basic Issue List Items (MILB).		
b. Ammo, Ammunition Components, and Human Remains.		
c. Release from Survey Officer.		
d. Missing Items, Sets, Kits, Outfits filled out where required.		
8. Have delivery personnel been briefed to remain with the equipment until accepted by responsible processing site personnel.		
9. Have delivery personnel been briefed to move the equipment from the processing site to a location designated by processing site personnel.		
10. Has copy #4 of DA Form 2765-1 been retained as a receipt.		

Inclosure 8 (Turn-In of Prescribed Load List) to Tab C (Check Lists) to Appendix 3 (Equipment Processing Location and Turn-In) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUFJAY After Action Report (U)

TURN-IN OF PRESCRIBED LOAD LIST (PLL)

1. Segregate like items together.
2. Prepare a DA Form 2765-1 for each Federal Stock Number. Include on the DA Form 2765-1:
 - a. Federal Stock Number.
 - b. Noun Nomenclature.
 - c. Quantity Turned In.
3. Tape or staple the 2765-1 to the item(s) or box. Small items should be placed in a paper bag and the 2765-1 stapled to the bag.
4. Turn in all items to Headquarters and A Company 701st Maintenance Battalion Tech Supply.

Appendix 4 (Maintenance Support) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Discussion of maintenance support has been divided into two interdependent areas, direct support maintenance and repair parts support.
2. DIRECT SUPPORT MAINTENANCE: Prior to standdown, the mission of each Forward Support Company was slightly altered. The companies were "tailored" to function as large, mobile "contact teams" providing normal support from shop vans and trucks. This permitted the Forward Support Companies to provide continuous support prior to the standdown of the supported unit, while simultaneously maintaining the capability of clearing their own unit areas within two days. During this period, there was a slight decrease in the workload of the Forward Support Companies. Backup support was available from Headquarters and A Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion, but the need for this support did not exceed normal requirements.
3. REPAIR PARTS SUPPORT:
 - a. Providing repair parts for the Forward Support Companies and the supported units required continual coordination and an increase in transportation. Although Forward Support Companies provided normal support until the supported units arrived at the Processing Location, they were also required to deplete repair parts stock. Reduction of repair parts stock was accomplished by turning in repair parts in mass and providing replacement parts as required. The replacement of parts in this manner did necessitate the use of additional transportation assets.
 - b. The ASL of HQ/A Company, 701st Maint Bn, was transferred in place. This in-place transfer eliminated most potential problems; in addition, it permitted the maintenance battalion to provide better support to its Forward Support Companies.

c. HQ/A Company stood down seven days after the last combat element. Since support required during those seven days was minimal, HQ/A Company used this time to prepare its organic equipment for processing and turn-in.

4. Units were encouraged to use as much of their PLL items as possible and turn in the remaining items to HQ/A, 701st Maint Bn. PLL stocks turned in to the battalion were returned to ASL stocks.

Appendix 5 (Medical Support) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (L)

1. GENERAL: Prior to redeployment, medical support for the 1st Infantry Division consisted of the following:

a. Unit Level: Battalion Aid Stations operated by organic medical platoons.

b. Division Level: The four organic medical companies of the 1st Medical Battalion were deployed in the following locations:

- (1) HQ and A Company: Di An.
- (2) B Company: Dau Tieng.
- (3) C and D Companies: Lai Khe.
- (4) Forward Clearing Platoon (Co C): vicinity Bear Cat.

2. CONCEPT: a. The general plan for medical support was based on the gradual reduction of support as the four segments stood down. Battalion Aid Stations would continue to provide medical support until the parent unit stood down. The 1st Medical Battalion would continue to provide division level medical support throughout redeployment, closing its facilities and processing its equipment as areas of support were vacated by divisional units.

b. Medical supplies and equipment would first be turned in to the Division Medical Supply Officer (DMSO) for final turn-in to the 32d Medical Depot, Long Binh.

3. MEDICAL TREATMENT DURING REDEPLOYMENT: a. Unit Level:

(1) Battalion Aid Stations continued normal operations until they stood down with their units; their treatment support mission was then assumed by HQ/A, 1st Med Bn.

(2) In order to expedite personnel outprocessing, battalion aid stations were tasked with insuring that all immunizations in their units were current prior to standdown.

(3) Aid stations continued to retain custody of individual health records during the standdown period to assure their accessibility to those requiring treatment. Health records were distributed to their owners just before they departed to the Personnel Outprocessing Center.

b. Division Level:

(1) Medical companies of the 1st Medical Battalion continued full operations until the supported units redeployed and responsibility for base camp coverage was assumed by non-divisional medical units.

(2) HQ/A Company, 1st Med Bn, continued operations until relieved by an MA dispensary detachment of the 68th Medical Group on 30 March 1970. Augmented with two Medical Corps Officers, one Medical Service Corps Officer and key enlisted personnel (primarily maintenance, communications and emergency room personnel) this detachment provided the following support throughout redeployment:

(a) Emergency dental treatment was provided by personnel from the 40th Medical Detachment (K), Cu Chi, operating in the facility vacated by the 257th Medical Detachment (K).

(b) At Di An Base Camp, in addition to the clearing station, an aid station was maintained in the vicinity of the standdown area to facilitate sick call.

c. Hospitalization:

(1) Medical battalion units continued to provide division level hospital care, with an average daily inpatient load of 30. Patients requiring hospitalization beyond 72 hours were transferred to the 24th or

93d Evacuation Hospitals. These hospitals continued to support the division throughout redeployment.

(2) The closing of the 2d Surgical Hospital at Lai Khe on 2 March 1970 had no adverse effect on divisional medical support. Due to a continuing decrease in enemy activity and tactical involvement of divisional units, patient loads remained well within the capabilities of the 1st Med Bn.

(3) Hospitalized members of redeploying units were reassigned to units not yet redeployed by the Division AG using the following procedures:

(a) All personnel hospitalized twelve or more days prior to their unit's release date, and expected to remain hospitalized on that date, were reassigned to nondivisional units. Personnel hospitalized after that date were immediately reassigned to other units if it was determined that they would still be hospitalized on the day their unit was released.

(b) The 1st Inf Div Hospital Liaison NCOIC furnished AG with a daily roster of hospitalized personnel which included name, rank, unit, diagnosis and anticipated length of hospitalization.

d. Evacuation: Aeromedical evacuation was provided by elements of the 45th Medical Company (HEL AMB), Long Binh. Aircraft of this unit remained on site at each major base camp until the supporting medical company withdrew to Di An for standdown.

e. Summary: Medical treatment remained adequate and responsive throughout redeployment. The continued lull in enemy activity resulted in patient loads that were well within the capabilities of the divisional medical facilities. The gradual reduction of medical support paralleled the redeployment of tactical units and closing of base camps.

4. MEDICAL OUTPROCESSING: a. Identical medical outprocessing stations were established at both Personnel Outprocessing Locations at Di An. Each

employed five enlisted personnel: two as medical records inspectors; two for immunizations, and one to dispense anti-malarial tablets.

b. Individual outprocessing consisted of:

(1) Medical records check: Medical records were checked for completeness and correct order of contents. Individuals reporting without a health record were provided with a temporary Health Record Jacket and DA Form 600.

(2) Immunizations check: Individual shot records were checked and any immunizations which were not current were administered.

(3) Anti-malarial tablets: Individuals received prepacked vials of 8 CP tablets each; prepacked vials of 28 Dapsone pills were dispensed to those individuals who had been required to take Dapsone because of their unit locations prior to standdown. All personnel receiving anti-malarial pills were briefed on the importance of continuing their anti-malarial prophylaxis until all pills were consumed.

5. REASSIGNMENT OF AMEDS OFFICER PERSONNEL: In-country reassignment of all Medical Corps, Dental Corps and Medical Service Corps Officers was effected by direct coordination between the Division Surgeon and Personnel Branch, USARV Surgeon's office. Reassignment rosters were submitted by officer branch (MC, DA and MSC) directly to the USARV Surgeon, listing the reassignment preference and availability date of each officer. Personnel Branch, USARV Surgeon's office, determined final reassignments and informed the USARV AG, who furnished appropriate reassignment instructions to the division AG for issuance of orders.

6. DISPOSITION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT: a. Non-expendable medical equipment: All medical elements of the division, except those of the 2d Brigade which processed at Long Binh, turned in their non-expendable

medical equipment to the DMSO, 1st Med Bn, Di An Base Camp, upon standdown. Units processing at Long Binh turned in their equipment directly to the 1st Advanced Platoon, 32d Medical Depot, Long Binh, where credit for turn-in was obtained. Units which turned in equipment to the 1st Med Bn's DMSO received credit on DA Form 2765-1, relieving their respective property book officers of accountability. The DMSO retrograded all items so collected to the 1st Advanced Platoon, 32d Medical Depot, Long Binh.

b. Expendable medical supplies: Items in this category were turned in to the DMSO for retrograde similar to those noted above, or, with the concurrence of the 32d Medical Depot, were laterally transferred to other US units. Due to programmed reduction of stocks prior to implementation of redeployment, relatively small quantities of expendable medical supplies were on hand when units stooddown. Supplies in quantities smaller than intermediate packages were given to other US medical units to eliminate the need to retrograde them to Long Binh and reissue them.

c. Code "R" Items: If the container seals were intact, narcotics and other Code "R" items were turned in to the DMSO, or, in the case of the 2d Sde. to the 32d Medical Depot. Partially used containers or containers whose seals were broken were transferred to US medical units or destroyed in accordance with AR 735-35 and AB 711-16.

d. Disposition of 1st Med Bn Equipment.

(1) Medical equipment was retrograded and turned in to the 1st Advanced Platoon, 32d Medical Depot at Long Binh, by the battalion S-4. Initial plans had specified that contact teams from the 32d Medical Depot would provide on site turn-in service to each of the medical companies at their respective base camp locations. But, because each medical company was required to remain operational in its location until the actual day

of departure, sufficient time was not available for proper packing of equipment; this situation was remedied by transporting equipment to Long Binh for turn-in and packing, rather than having turn-in take place at unit locations.

(2) Key items of medical equipment, such as X-Ray machines, sterilizers and audiometers, were laterally transferred to medical units which assumed responsibility for medical support of the area being vacated. The approving authority for these transfers was the Medical Material Division of the USARV Surgeon's office, which, in coordination with the USARV G4, determined which medical unit would receive what items of equipment. Written approval of the USARV G4 was necessary in every case.

Appendix 6 (Transportation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: a. When the division's redeployment was announced on 31 December 1969, the Division Transportation Office (DTO) was located with the Division Headquarters at Lai Khe. Hold Baggage Sections were operational at Di An, Lai Khe and Dau Tieng Base Camps.

b. The DTO continued to support the transportation requirements of the division in a normal manner. Unit S-4's submitted requirements to the DTO 24 hours in advance. DTO missioned either the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion or requested support from the Saigon Support Command.

c. The 3d Region Movements Control Office, Saigon Support Command, was the DTO's point of contact for coordinating line haul trucks. The Movement Control Field Offices at Di An, Dau Tieng and Lai Khe facilitated this coordination.

2. REDEPLOYMENT TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT: The division's OPLAN TRCY outlined the plan for continuing combat operations until 19 March 1970 and directed the phased movement of units into Di An for standdown and redeployment processing. This plan was issued in sufficient time to permit units to plan their transportation requirements in detail. The sequential stand-down schedule directed the movement of units into the Processing Location in three or four maneuver battalions, an artillery battalion, and a medical, maintenance and engineer company. Transportation assets used, in addition to organic transportation, are noted under Tab A.

3. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE STATUS: No major problems were encountered with the organic vehicles of the 1st S & T Bn, which continued to provide support throughout the processing period.

4. MATERIAL-HANDLING EQUIPMENT (MHE): a. Organic MHE of the 1st S & T Bn, 701st Maintenance Battalion and 1st Engineer Battalion provided all support. Fork lifts were used extensively in loading unit equipment for movement to the Processing Location, and in assisting the Saigon Support Command in the out-loading of the division's equipment. Several mobile house trailers had to be loaded on flatbed trailers and required the support of the 1st Engr Bn crane.

b. The DIO made necessary coordination between requesting units and the units which controlled the MHE, to insure efficient use of the equipment.

c. Mobile House Trailers: The division was required to transport 13 house trailers to Long Binh as the Lai Khe and Di An Base Camps were vacated. This required wheels to be installed and in some cases ball joint towing assemblies to be attached. The shortage of wheels and lug nuts required the back hauling of these items in order to move the remaining trailers.

5. SPECIAL REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS: a. Museum items and unit memorabilia: see Annex J.

b. Hold baggage operations increased considerably during redeployment. Prior to redeployment three hold baggage sections were in operation, one at Dau Tieng (2 men), one at Lai Khe (4 men), and the main office at Di An (9 men). When Dau Tieng and Lai Khe were turned over to other units, the hold baggage personnel moved into the main Di An Section. This transfer provided the necessary supplemental personnel to handle the increase in shipments and enabled the division to retain trained personnel. In anticipation of heavy shipments from Phu Loi, base camp location of the 1st Aviation Battalion and Division Artillery Headquarters, a hold baggage station was established there. Personnel to operate this station came from

the Di An and Long Sinh Personnel Property Sections; the 1st Avn Bn provided two clerks. This facility operated only during the peak shipping period of Phu Loi personnel (15-25 March 1970).

c. Customs inspection of hold baggage was performed by trained DTC personnel. It was necessary to operate two packing lines at the Di An facility during the peak of 15 March - 5 April 1970. No difficulties were experienced in hold baggage operations throughout KEYSTONE BLUEJAY.

Tabs

- A - Transportation Support
- B - DTC Organization
- C - Shipment of Unaccompanied Baggage

TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT PROVIDED BRIGADE AND DIVISION ELEMENTS TO MOVE FROM CAMP TO STANDDOWN.

UNIT	ORG/DEST	2 1/2 Ton	5 Ton S&C	LOWBOY	OTHER EQUIP ²	AIRLIFT SORTIES
HHC 1st Bde ¹	Dau Tieng-Lai Khe	8	25	2		4-C147/2-C7A
1st Segment:	14-18 Feb 70					
HHC 3d Bde	Lai Khe-Di An	8	4		1	
1-18th Inf	Normandy III-Di An	40				7-C123
1-28th Inf	Dau Tieng-Di An	10				11-C123
2-27th Inf	Dau Tieng-Di An	12				1-C123/4-C7A
Support Units	Dau Tieng-Di An	6	12			4-C147
Total 1st Segment:		62	65	2	1	19-C123 6-C7A
2d Segment:	28 Feb-4 Mar 70					
HHC 2d Bde	Bear Cat-Di An	4	8			
2-18th Inf	Vic Bear Cat-Di An	46	13			
1-16th Inf (Mech)	Vic Bear Cat-Di An	8	5			
2-16th Inf	Finh Gia-Di An	9	8			11-C123
Support Units	Bear Cat-Di An			1		
Total 2d Segment:		67	34	1		11-C123
3d Segment:	14-19 Mar 70					
HHC 1st Bde	Lai Khe-Di An	11	10	2	1	
1-26th Inf	Lai Khe-Di An	21	17			5-C130/3-C7A
1-2d Inf	Lai Khe-Di An	10	15			7-C130
2-2d Inf (Mech)	Lai Khe-Di An					
1-4th Cav	Lai Kho-Di An	5	3			
Support Units	Lai Khe-Di An	2	2			
Total 3d Segment:		49	47	2	1	12-C130 3-C7A
Div Hq ³	Lai Khe-Di An	43	35		2	

FOOTNOTE:

1. Includes rear elements of 1-2d Inf and 2-2d Inf (Mech). Move completed 8-14 Feb 70.
2. M52 truck, tractor with ball hitch to move house trailers.
3. Moved during the period 29 Jan-19 Feb 70.

D-6-A-1

Tab A (Transportation Support) to Appendix 6 (Transportation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE NUMBER after Action Report (R)

Tab B (DTC Organization) to Appendix 6 (Transportation) to Annex D (Logistics)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATION

DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

MAJOR - DIV. TRANS. OFFICER

CPT - NOV. OFFICER

E5 - NOV. SPECIALIST

E5 - CLERK

DI AN HOLD BAGGAGE

E7 - NCOIC

E7 - ASST NCOIC

E5 - CUSTOMS INSPECTOR

E5 - CUSTOMS INSPECTOR

E4 - CLERK

E4 - CLERK

E4 - CLERK

E3 - PACKER

E3 - PACKER

LAI KHE HOLD BAGGAGE

E7 - NCOIC

E5 - CUSTOMS INSPECTOR

E4 - CLERK

E4 - PACKER

DAU TIENG HOLD BAGGAGE

E6 - NCOIC

E4 - CLERK/PACKER

Tab C (Shipment of Unaccompanied Baggage) to Appendix 6 (Transportation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division: KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

The following chart depicts total shipment of unaccompanied baggage during the period 2 Feb - 4 Apr 70.

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>SHIPMENTS</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>PIECES</u>
2-7 Feb	125	18,711	191
9-14 Feb	255	39,841	417
15-21 Feb	235	34,277	352
22-28 Feb	235	33,108	346
1-7 Mar	319	40,582	461
8-14 Mar	317	41,213	480
15-21 Mar	303	38,941	441
22-28 Mar	474	65,280	716
29-4 Apr	296	42,052	570
TOTAL	<u>2,559</u>	<u>334,005</u>	<u>3,974</u>

Appendix 7 (Ammunition) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLOOMING After Action Report (I)

1. PLANNING: a. Normal ammunition resupply was planned for all units until the unit stood down. The amount of ammunition kept on hand by the unit as it approached standdown was left to the discretion of the unit commander. Commanders were encouraged to reduce their Class V supplies on hand.

b. Ammunition on hand was disposed of in the following ways:

(1) Transferred to another US unit,

(2) Turned in to a 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Supply Point or to the 3d Ordnance Battalion in Long Binh (see Tab A).

c. Detailed disposition instructions were issued by the Division Ammunition Officer (DAO) on 4 January 1970. A copy of these instructions is under Tab A.

2. CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Units were responsible for the reduction, removal and turn-in of ammunition on hand at time of standdown. The DAC provided assistance in preparing turn-in documents, arranging for inspections when requested, and coordinating transportation when needed. The prompt collection, segregation and turn-in of ammunition was essential in the prevention of accidents in the standdown area.

b. Close coordination among unit commanders, the DAC and the 3d Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh, helped alleviate the few problems that developed.

3. PROCEDURES: a. Collection of Unserviceable and Foreign Ammunition: As units prepared to close out base camps and fire support bases or turned them over to incoming units, detailed "house cleaning" usually revealed both unserviceable and foreign ammunitions. This collection included items returned by units coming in from the field, captured ammunitions and unserviceable ammunitions. Some items were deteriorated and had to be handled by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams. Each brigade and battalion S-4 was reinstructed on procedures for

obtaining U.S. assistance. In addition, the DAC alerted the EOD team that supported the division to expect an increase in missions. All EOD team requests were met with prompt and professional service; no incidents of improper munitions disposal were reported during the redeployment.

b. Closing the Lai Khe Ammunition Supply Point: On 19 February 1970, the 1st Log Cdn closed its Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) in Lai Khe because of the reduced US troop density in the area. Approximately five days prior to its announced closure date, the ASP was at a zero balance in many ammunition items. As a result, units located in the Lai Khe vicinity which normally used the Lai Khe ASP were suddenly faced with resupply problems. Convoy resupply normally required a five day notice. Rather than have units use their organic transportation to obtain ammunition supplies at the Long Binh Depot or the ASP at Cu Chi, a special arrangement was made. This arrangement permitted units that placed orders in by 1000 hours to receive the items by convoy the following day. By reducing supply response time from five to two days, better support was provided for units in the field. The shorter reaction time also enabled units to operate with smaller operational loads and allowed them to reduce their back-up stocks as they approached their standdown date.

c. Loose Ammunition On Hand at Standdown Area:

(1) When a unit reached standdown, it usually had large quantities of all types of loose ammunition. These items had lost their identity and units had no packing material to prepare them for turn-in. Thus, a free ammunition turn-in point was established and operated at Di An at the 1-7th Arty Ammunition Holding Area by the DAC for the convenience of these units. This free turn-in point accepted any loose or unserviceable ammunition. The items accepted had either lost lot integrity or, due to poor condition, could not be returned to the supply system for reissue. The turn-in point accepted all types of ammunition and did

not turn away any items which met the criteria for free turn-in.

(2) The variety of munitions turned in included the following:

A011	Ctg 12 gauge 00 Buck	AC71	Ctg 5.56mm ball
A068	Ctg 5.56mm tra er	A131	Ctg 7.62mm 4&1 linked
A475	Ctg cal .45 ball	A557	Ctg cal .50 4&1 linked
B534	Ctg 40mm MP	B568	Ctg 40mm HE
B569	Ctg 40mm CS	G890	Grenade Hand Frag
C940	Grenade, Hand Smk	X143	Nine AP M18A1
M023	Chg, Demo Comp C-4	M130	Cap Blasting elec
M131	Cap Blasting non-elec		Allocated (ASR) Items

(3) The items turned in were either picked up by other units, retrograded in bulk retrograde boxes, or disposed of by EOD. The free turn-in point processed and shipped over one hundred retrograde boxes of loose small arms, machine gun and tank ammunition.

d. Machine Gun Ammunition: Mechanized Infantry battalions and the cavalry squadron had large amounts of machine gun ammunition on board tracks when they arrived at the standdown area. This ammunition could not be turned in by lot to the depot in the allotted time. Coordination with the depot ammunition office solved this problem by allowing bulk turn-in. Units were required only to separate ammunition by type in cans, and note the total number of cans, rounds per can, and total rounds on a DA 581. This saved the mechanized units countless hours of extra work.

e. Packing Material for Main Gun Tank Ammunition: The basic load of main gun ammunition totaling about 1600 rounds, was carried by each 1-4th Cav tank upon standdown. The squadron had neither the packing material, the manpower, nor the equipment necessary to separate the main gun ammunition by lot number and repack it for regular turn-in to depot. Through coordination with the depot

ammunition officer, arrangements were made for a bulk turn-in of 90mm gun ammunition in retrograde boxes. Rounds were separated by type but not by lot. For safety, a separate turn in area was established away from the standdown area for processing main gun ammunition.

TASS

A - Ammunition Disposition Instructions

Tab A (Ammunition Disposition Instructions) to Appendix 7 (Ammunition) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The following specific guidance was given to units pertaining to the disposition of ammunition on hand.

2. PREPARATORY ACTION: a. Units will fire unpacked ammunition first upon notification of standdown date.

b. Units will maintain only minimum quantities of ammunition as an emergency stockage. These quantities should be low in types and numbers as determined by the unit commander. The DAC will be prepared to effect emergency resupply action from Long Binh ASD Depot.

c. Units will retain packing, packing materials, containers and boxes for future use during the turn-in phase.

d. Units will turn in excess items immediately.

e. Major unit S-4's and unit ammunition officers must locate and survey their ammunition stocks to insure no items are thrown away or abandoned. This survey is designed to segregate and classify ammunition into three groups.

(1) Packed and ready for turn-in.

(2) Serviceable, but not ready for turn-in (i.e., unpacked, damaged boxes).

(3) Unserviceable (i.e., requires EOD and/or surveillance inspections).

Ammunition which has lost its lot identity is considered to be unserviceable.

3. TURN-IN PHASE: a. Unit will prepare items for turn-in as usual (i.e., DA Form 581 in 5 copies), with a certification that surveillance personnel have inspected these items which are safe for turn-in.

b. Surveillance personnel are available through coordination with the DAC.

c. EOD personnel are available through coordination with the DAC.

d. The DAC should be notified 24 hours in advance of desired turn-in dates in order to effect coordination with 1st Logistical Command ASP's or Long Binh Depot. This is necessary to insure that the increased work load can be handled and unit transportation assets can be returned with minimum delays.

4. TRANSFER TO ARVN OR OTHER FREE WORLD MILITARY ARMED FORCES: a. None of the following will be transferred under any circumstances.

- (1) Allocated items (ASP).
- (2) Air munitions of all types.
- (3) Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) of all types.
 - (a) B574 Ctg 40mm HE, M386 (Firecracker).
 - (b) C462 Ctg 105mm HE, M2 (Firecracker).
 - (c) E561 Ctg 155mm HE (Firecracker).
 - (d) D684 Ctg 8 inch HE (Firecracker).
 - (e) C888 Grenade Hand Frag M33 (Firecracker).

The above items will be turned in to Long Binh ASD Depot or 1st Log Cnd ASP's.

b. The transfer of any other items is permissible and a billing document (DA Form 581) will be obtained from the unit commander or S-4 receiving the items.

- (1) Use DA Form 581 as inventory and receipt document.
- (2) Clearly identify recipient.
- (3) Obtain printed or typed signature block of recipient.
- (4) Furnish recipient copy no. 5.
- (5) Retain copy no. 4.
- (6) Hand-carry copies no. 1-3 to DAC.
- (7) DAC retains copy no. 3, furnishes copy no. 2 to 1st Log Cnd, ATTS;

ACofS, Ammunition, and copy no. 1 to MACVJ42AM for billing action.

5. PROCEDURES FOR LATERAL TRANSFER OF AMMUNITION WITHIN THE 1ST INFANTRY

DIVISION: a. DA Form 581 will be prepared in four copies.

b. Ammunition officers from both the gaining and losing units will sign DA Form 581.

c. Only serviceable ammunition will be transferred.

d. Appointments will be made through DAC 24 hours in advance for EOD/1st Log Cnd Surveillance inspections prior to turn-in of ammunition. DA Form 581 must bear certificate stating that ammunition has been inspected by surveillance personnel.

e. Ammunition declared hazardous and unsafe to handle will be disposed of by EOD personnel.

f. Units receiving ammunition through lateral transfers should program future ammunition requirements to comply with para 2a and 2b.

6. CLOSE OUT PHASE: Notify DAC one day prior to departure from area for final inspection and clearance.

Appendix B (Lessons Learned) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUETAIL After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: This appendix outlines logistical problem areas encountered during the planning and execution of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Vietnam. In each case, a problem is identified, discussed and a recommended solution given.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Turn-in Standards.

(1) OBSERVATION: The initial requirement to remove persprime from the undercarriages of vehicles was a problem because of the non-availability of high pressure cleaning equipment at Di An.

(2) EVALUATION: The advance information contained in the USARV Redeployment Guide and Saigon Support Command OPLAN 1-70, coupled with close liaison with personnel operating the turn-in points, enabled the division to avoid conflicts and confusion regarding equipment turn-in standards with few exceptions. In the above case, all vehicles were taken to Long Binh where suitable washing facilities were made available.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That measures be taken to provide high pressure cleaning equipment at turn-in points and/or the vehicle wash areas. Should shortage of such equipment preclude such a distribution, sufficient guidance must be furnished to processing point personnel so vehicles may be accepted and cleaned elsewhere at a later date.

b. Transfer of Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: The most noticeable problem with lateral transfer transactions was the slow response by USARV to these requests.

(2) EVALUATION: During redeployment, many formal and informal requests for lateral transfers of equipment were received from non-divisional units. In most

cases USAHV action was not taken until numerous inquiries were made concerning actions that had been pending for several weeks. Late receipt by divisional units of approved lateral transfers created confusion and last minute efforts to fulfill specified distribution instructions.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That redeploying units turn in all equipment to the appropriate supporting logistical command activity, as required by KEYSTONE BLUEJAY directives, and all transfers be effected between the logistical command and the gaining unit.

c. Turn-in of Temporary Loan Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: Present procedures for the turn-in of temporary loan equipment stipulate that such equipment will be turned in directly to the supporting logistical depot.

(2) EVALUATION: This procedure created an additional workload for the division since all such equipment had to be turned in to the Long Binh Depot. Since clearance of property records is the foremost factor in temporary loan equipment turn-in, the established processing points at Di An could have handled these transactions more expeditiously.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all equipment on hand per "temporary loan" authority be turned in to the SMOG (Senior Man on the Ground), the 1st Logistical Command representative at the Processing Location. The unit copy of the temporary loan authorization can be annotated by SMOG personnel to reflect the item(s) turned in.

d. Transfer of Facilities.

(1) OBSERVATION: A major problem experienced during the transfer of portions of the Lai Khe Base Camp to the 5th ARVN Division was the difficulty in obtaining approval of the ARVN request for FC&S property.

(2) EVALUATION: The request from the 5th ARVN Div for water trailers, dining tables, chairs, desks and office type chairs was never acted upon. The ARVN request for communications equipment was only approved after a great deal of difficulty.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a staff officer from MACV J4 be present during such negotiations to process the ARVN request for the transfer of equipment. This action officer would coordinate the request through ARVN and US channels to the JCS and MACV HQ for appropriate action.

e. Processing Location Procedures.

(1) OBSERVATION: Personnel of redeploying units as well as personnel staffing the Processing Location were initially unfamiliar with procedures and systems despite written instructions. Also, the exact number of personnel, documentation, and equipment needed at the Processing Location was difficult to determine.

(2) EVALUATION: The early turn-in program accomplished several things. It tested the system, allowed time for changes or adjustments where required, and enabled the inspection teams to establish realistic standards of serviceability and cleanliness. It also allowed the division to turn in non-mission essential and excess equipment and become familiar with the turn-in procedures and documentation required. Finally, it established the exact personnel requirements for both the division and Saigon Support Command.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That processing lines used for early turn-in items be opened at least 30 days prior to standdown of the first unit to maximize the benefits listed above.

f. Turn-in of Post, Camp and Station Property.

(1) OBSERVATION: PC&S property is difficult to move and often easily damaged during movement.

(2) EVALUATION: PC&S property has little structural strength. It is also bulky and requires an excessive amount of transportation. For example, it takes one 12 ton stake and platform trailer to transport 67 single wall lockers. In addition, moving such property usually causes heavy damage to a large number of pieces, rendering the items unserviceable.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That movement of PC&S property be kept to a minimum.

g. Washing Facilities.

(1) OBSERVATION: The lack of a sufficient amount of water to establish washing facilities at the Di An Processing Location precluded cleaning vehicles at Di An prior to turn-in.

(2) EVALUATION: When adequate washing facilities are not available to wash vehicles prior to standdown, it is difficult to clean the vehicles so they can be properly inspected. Thus, processing personnel are faced with the decision of turning the equipment back or relaxing standards.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That turn-in points be colocated with wash facilities whenever possible.

h. Inventory of Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: Units fear the loss of "nice to have" items and items in excess of authorization; as a result, these items are often held to the last minute.

(2) EVALUATION: Many excesses were not reported in the Equipment Status Report or considered in the equipment turn-in schedules developed by the 1st Logistical Command. A "fudge" factor was added to unit inventories to compensate for their inaccuracy.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the importance of accurate inventories be emphasized to commanders, SAs and PBOs, and that inventories be used rather than AR 711-5 reports with fudge factors.

1. Assumption of Support Functions for Non-Redeploying Units.

(1) OBSERVATION: It was extremely difficult to obtain timely information from higher headquarters concerning the assumption of combat service support for non-redeploying units.

(2) EVALUATION: Early identification of units who will assume these functions is necessary in order to provide continuous support to non-redeploying units, and coordinate the transfer of responsibilities and disposition of equipment.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That planning for assumption of the support role for non-redeploying units be undertaken and resolved as soon as possible after announcement of redeployment.

J. Disposition Instructions.

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to the lack of timely disposition instructions, early turn-in of equipment presented some serious problems.

(2) EVALUATION: COMMEQ equipment, for example, became backlogged in the storage areas to the point where it threatened turn-in procedures during stand-down. Vehicles and trailers backlogged, overflowing the established holding area and requiring the establishment of a second holding area. This equipment later had to be moved to Long Binh and required the establishment of driver pools.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That disposition instructions be supplied by higher headquarters as early as possible. If this cannot be done, pre-standdown turn-in should be held to a level sufficient only to test the system.

K. Vehicle Support for the Final Segment During Standdown.

(1) OBSERVATION: Vehicle support must be provided by non-divisional units during the last standdown phase.

(2) EVALUATION: In order to zero and audit property books, vehicle requirements for the final segment had to be determined early and satisfied by an

outside source. This problem was solved by having the division G4 obtain vehicles on a hand receipt through USARV G4 from the processing lines and forming a central vehicle pool from which the units could satisfy their requirements.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That vehicle requirements be identified early to enable the redeploying units to work out arrangements for outside support.

1. Closeout of Processing Lines.

(1) OBSERVATION: In order to process the equipment of the final segment, processing lines had to be kept open.

(2) EVALUATION: Arrangements were made to delay the transfer of detail personnel who were originally provided by the division to work in the processing lines. These personnel were attached to the Saigon Support Command on an "assigned but not joined" status for a period of approximately fifteen days after the final segment had outprocessed.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That personnel required to close out processing lines be identified early and attached to the supervising logistical command.

a. Shortage of Tie Down Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: Insufficient tie down equipment hampered the displacement of units moving to the Processing Location.

(2) RECOMMENDATION: That heavy type banding machines be made available to redeploying units. Two such machines are needed by each brigade size unit redeploying. These machines should be 1½ inch to 2 inch size.

n. Requisitions.

(1) OBSERVATION: The number of requisitions increased considerably during redeployment.

(2) EVALUATION: During the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, the number of requisitions permitted by the Long Binh Depot to be hand-carried through for action was totally insufficient. The division was permitted only

20 hand-carried requisitions daily.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Redeploying units must anticipate and program their needs early during the standdown phase to allow the Supply Officer sufficient time to obtain authorization for increased carrier.

Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Within this appendix are representative copies of the various charts, graphs and diagrams used during the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. These items were used throughout the redeployment phase by the Redeployment Control Center and the Division Staff to keep up with the daily and changing status of the processing of equipment.

TAES:

- A - Status of Property Books: 1st Segment.
- B - Status of Property Books: 2d Segment.
- C - Status of Property Books: 3d Segment.
- D - Status of Property Books: 4th Segment.
- E - Key Dates.
- F - Turn-In Progress Chart: Wheel Vehicles.
- G - Turn-In Schedule Engineer Equipment.
- H - Daily Turn-In Status: Major Items.
- I - Daily Turn-In Status: Vehicles and Trailers.
- J - Unit Programmed Turn-In.
- K - Status of Lateral Transfer.
- L - Examination of Property Records Letter.

Tab A (Status of Property Books: 1st Segment) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

STATUS OF PROPERTY BOOKS

FIRST SEGMENT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDBOWN DATE</u>	<u>TURNED IN AS OF STANDBOWN</u>	
		<u>COE %</u>	<u>PC&S %</u>
B/701st Maint	10 Feb 70	86	97
Hq, 3d Bde	15 Feb 70	71	47
1-28th Inf	15 Feb 70	73	79
2-28th Inf	15 Feb 70	72	94
1-5th Arty	15 Feb 70	61	37
35th Inf (SD)	15 Feb 70	93	91
242d Cml Det	15 Feb 70	92	100
266th Cml Plt	15 Feb 70	94	96
C/701st Maint	16 Feb 70	84	99
Plt/121st Sig	16 Feb 70	84	100
1-18th Inf	18 Feb 70	73	94
B/1st Med	20 Feb 70	96	99
61st Inf (TD)	23 Feb 70	92	98
A/1st Engr	25 Feb 70	91	100

Equipment items, by commodity, as of standdown date:

WEAPONS

3,180

VEHICLES

427

COMMO-ELECTRIC

496

NOTE: The number of items necessarily increases as one unit stands down; hence the figures shown represent the totals on hand for all elements in the first segment as of the standdown of the last unit.

Tab B (Status of Property Books: 2d Segment) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

STATUS OF PROPERTY BOOKS

SECOND SEGMENT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDDOWN DATE</u>	<u>TURND IN AS OF STANDDOWN</u>	
		<u>TUE %</u>	<u>PC&S %</u>
HHC, 2d Sde	28 Feb 70	75	25
2-16th Inf	1 Mar 70	77	77
1-7th Arty	1 Mar 70	64	00
2-18th Inf	2 Mar 70	81	31
B/1st Engr	2 Mar 70	88	100
1-16th Inf (Mech)	3 Mar 70	75	73
8-6th Arty	4 Mar 70	66	80
2d Plt/121st Sig	4 Mar 70	86	100
C/1st Med	6 Mar 70	100	94
Co I, 75th Inf	7 Mar 70	98	60
41st Inf (SD)	9 Mar 70	98	100

Equipment items, by commodity, as of standdown date:

<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>COMMO-ELECTRIC</u>
3,641	426	508

NOTE: The number of items necessarily increases as one unit stands down; hence the figures shown represent the totals on hand for elements of the second segment as of the standdown of the last unit.

Tab C (Status of Property Books: 3d Segment) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

STATUS OF PROPERTY BOOKS

THIRD SEGMENT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDDOWN DATE</u>	<u>TURND IN AS OF STANDDOWN</u>	
		<u>FCB %</u>	<u>PC&S %</u>
HHC, 1st Bde	15 Mar 70	71	99
HHC, Div Arty	15 Mar 70	74	75
2-2d Inf (Mech)	15 Mar 70	41	47
2-33d Arty	15 Mar 70	69	81
1-26th Inf	16 Mar 70	69	55
1-2d Inf	17 Mar 70	54	99
1-4th Cav	19 Mar 70	54	58
1st MI Det	15 Mar 70	70	75
D/701st Maint	19 Mar 70	78	100
D/1st Med	13 Mar 70	70	80
C/1st Engr	24 Mar 70	96	100
3 Plt/121st Sig	21 Mar 70	98	99

Equipment items, by commodity, as of standdown date:

<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>COMM-ELECTRIC</u>
4,770	598	776

NOTE: The number of items necessarily increases as one unit stands down; hence the figures shown represent the totals on hand for all elements in the third segment as of the standdown of the last unit.

Tab D (Status of Property Books: 4th Segment) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) & Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLJEFAY After Action Report (U)

STATUS OF PROPERTY BOOKS

FOURTH SEGMENT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDBOWN DATE</u>	<u>TURNE IN AS OF STANDBOWN</u>	
		<u>TOE %</u>	<u>PC&S %</u>
1st Avn Bn (-)	22 Mar 70	93	99
121st Sig Bn (-)	25 Mar 70	87	87
1st S & T Bn (-)	25 Mar 70	45	62
701st Maint Bn (-)	26 Mar 70	92	100
337th AS Co	27 Mar 70	86	86
1st X2 Co	28 Mar 70	94	94
1st Engr Bn (-)	28 Mar 70	97	99
1st Med Bn (-)	29 Mar 70	85	98
HHC, Div	30 Mar 70	92	99
1st Admn Co	31 Mar 70	96	92
HHC & Hd, DISCOM	1 Apr 70	46	03
43/44th PI Det	1 Apr 70	100	100
USASSG/MI	3 Apr 70	N/A	N/A
E/701st Maint Bn	23 Mar 70	86	55

Equipment items, by commodity, as of standdown date:

WEAPONS

2,497

VEHICLES

298

COMMO-ELECTRIC

49

NOTE: The number of items necessarily increases as one unit stands down; hence the figures shown represent the totals on hand for all elements in the fourth segment as of the standdown of the last unit.

KEY DATES - 1ST and 2D SEGMENTS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDBY DATE</u>	<u>"R" DATE</u>	<u>DATE 100% TURN-IN TOE</u>	<u>DATE 100% TURN-IN PC&G</u>	<u>DATE PROP REC. AUDITED</u>	<u>DATE PROP REC. BURNED</u>
B/701st Maint	10 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	18 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	21 Feb 70
HHC, 3d Bde	15 Feb 70	23 Feb 70	22 Feb 70	20 Feb 70	23 Feb 70	24 Feb 70
2-26th Inf	15 Feb 70	28 Feb 70	25 Feb 70	25 Feb 70	25 Feb 70	* 6 Mar 70
1-5th Arty	15 Feb 70	3 Mar 70	25 Feb 70	22 Feb 70	25 Feb 70	* 6 Mar 70
35th Inf (SO)	15 Feb 70	17 Feb 70	17 Feb 70	17 Feb 70	17 Feb 70	*21 Feb 70
256th Cal	15 Feb 70	18 Feb 70	16 Feb 70	16 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	21 Feb 70
242d Cal	15 Feb 70	18 Feb 70	16 Feb 70	16 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	21 Feb 70
C/701st Maint	16 Feb 70	20 Feb 70	20 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	21 Feb 70	21 Feb 70
1-28th Inf	16 Feb 70	1 Mar 70	24 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	27 Feb 70	28 Feb 70
1 Plt/121st Sig	16 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	20 Feb 70	18 Feb 70	N/A	N/A
1-18th Inf	18 Feb 70	3 Mar 70	22 Feb 70	22 Feb 70	1 Mar 70	6 Mar 70
B/1st Med	20 Feb 70	23 Feb 70	20 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	N/A	N/A
A/1st Sngr	23 Feb 70	27 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	19 Feb 70	N/A	N/A
61st Inf (TO)	23 Feb 70	25 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	28 Feb 70
HHC, 2d Bde	28 Feb 70	7 Mar 70	5 Mar 70	4 Mar 70	7 Mar 70	*10 Mar 70
2-16th Inf	1 Mar 70	14 Mar 70	7 Mar 70	7 Mar 70	8 Mar 70	8 Mar 70
1-7th Arty	1 Mar 70	19 Mar 70	11 Mar 70	12 Mar 70	13 Mar 70	*16 Mar 70
2-16th Inf	2 Mar 70	15 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	13 Mar 70	*13 Mar 70
H/1st Engr	2 Mar 70	6 Mar 70	4 Mar 70	4 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
1-16th Inf (M)	3 Mar 70	20 Mar 70	13 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	14 Mar 70	14 Mar 70
8-6th Arty	4 Mar 70	19 Mar 70	19 Mar 70	11 Mar 70	17 Mar 70	20 Mar 70
2 Plt/121st Sig	4 Mar 70	7 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	4 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
C/1st Med	6 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	6 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
I Co, 75th Inf	7 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	9 Mar 70
41st Inf (S.)	9 Mar 70	11 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	9 Mar 70	10 Mar 70	10 Mar 70

* CAO representatives audited/examined property records of this unit.

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Tab F (Key Dates) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex II (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division XEROXED FILED After Action Report (O)


KEY DATES - 3D and 4TH SEGMENTS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDDOWN DATE</u>	<u>"R" DATE</u>	<u>DATE 100% TURN-IN TOR</u>	<u>DATE 100% TURN-IN PC&S</u>	<u>DATE PROP RSC. AUDITED</u>	<u>DATE PROP RSC. BURNED</u>
1st MI Det	14 Mar 70	16 Mar 70	16 Mar 70	16 Mar 70	17 Mar 70	17 Mar 70
HHC, 1st Bde	15 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	22 Mar 70
HHC, Div Arty	15 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	20 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	22 Mar 70
2-2d Inf (M)	15 Mar 70	1 Apr 70	28 Mar 70	23 Mar 70	23 Mar 70	*
2-33d Arty	15 Mar 70	2 Apr 70	1 Apr 70	23 Mar 70	1 Apr 70	2 Apr 70
1-26th Inf	16 Mar 70	29 Mar 70	25 Mar 70	24 Mar 70	25 Mar 70	26 Mar 70
1-2d Inf	17 Mar 70	30 Mar 70	24 Mar 70	23 Mar 70	25 Mar 70	25 Mar 70
D/1st Med	19 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
D/701st Maint	19 Mar 70	25 Mar 70	27 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	23 Mar 70	23 Mar 70
1-4th Cav	19 Mar 70	5 Apr 70	26 Mar 70	24 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	*
3 Plt/121st Sig	21 Mar 70	24 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
C/1st Engr	24 Mar 70	28 Mar 70	22 Mar 70	21 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
1st Avn (-)	22 Mar 70	2 Apr 70	30 Mar 70	25 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	31 Mar 70
121st Sig (-)	25 Mar 70	3 Apr 70	2 Apr 70	29 Mar 70	3 Apr 70	3 Apr 70
1st S & T (-)	25 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	28 Mar 70	28 Mar 70	29 Mar 70	2 Apr 70
701st Maint	26 Mar 70	4 Apr 70	2 Apr 70	28 Mar 70	2 Apr 70	3 Apr 70
1st MP Co	28 Mar 70	1 Apr 70	30 Mar 70	30 Mar 70	1 Apr 70	1 Apr 70
1st Engr (-)	28 Mar 70	4 Apr 70	31 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	2 Apr 70	2 Apr 70
1st Med (-)	29 Mar 70	2 Apr 70	30 Mar 70	30 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	31 Mar 70
HHC, Div	30 Mar 70	6 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	4 Apr 70	4 Apr 70	4 Apr 70
1st Admin Co	31 Mar 70	7 Apr 70	2 Apr 70	2 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	3 Apr 70
RHC&Bd, DIV COM	1 Apr 70	6 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	4 Apr 70	4 Apr 70
43d FI Det	1 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	22 Feb 70	22 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	25 Mar 70
44th FI Det	1 Apr 70	3 Apr 70	22 Feb 70	22 Feb 70	24 Feb 70	25 Mar 70
MI Det USASSG	3 Apr 70	6 Apr 70	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
MI Det USASSG	3 Apr 70	6 Apr 70	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
337th AS Co	27 Mar 70	30 Mar 70	30 Mar 70	29 Mar 70	N/A	N/A
E/701st Maint	26 Mar 70	4 Apr 70	29 Mar 70	26 Mar 70	31 Mar 70	31 Mar 70

7-9-E-2

* Unit property records retained by GAO for audit/examination.

Tab F (Turn-In Progress Chart: Wheel Vehicles) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)



TOTAL TURN-IN — x — x —
 TURN-IN AT DI AS — o — o —
 PROJECTED —————

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

	FEBRUARY														MARCH				
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	
35th Inf (SD)	--	--	--	--															
242d Cml Det	--	--	--	--															
266th Cml Plt	--	0	--	--	--														
B/701st Maint Bn	--	0	--	--	--	--													
HQ, 3d Fde	--	--	2	0	--	--	--	--	--										
2-28th Inf	--	--	--	0	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--					
1-5th Arty	--	--	--	0	9	9	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Flt/121st Sig Bn		--	0	0	--														
1-28th Inf		--	--	0	--	--	--	--	9	--	--	--	--	--					
1-18th Inf			--	0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	5	--	--	--	--		
B/1st Med Bn						--	--	0	--										
A/1st Engr Bn									--	7	8	--							

D-9-G-1

FOR TURN-IN (Schedule Engineer Equipment) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE INFANTRY After Action Report (U)

Tab H (Daily Turn-In Status: Major Items) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

TURN-IN AS OF 15 MARCH 1970

	<u>BEGINNING INVENTORY</u>	<u>TURN-IN TODAY</u>	<u>TOTAL TURN-IN</u>
Major End Items	58,754	164	31,856
Small Arms	27,405	147	16,594
Commo-Electric	25,249	15	11,263
Arty/Track	502	0	199
Engineer	1,168	0	1,198
Wheel/Trailers	4,430	2	2,602
Secondary Items		59	82,295
PC&S		174	59,257

Tab I (Daily Turn-In Status: Vehicles and Trailers) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

TURN-IN AS OF 15 MARCH 1970

	<u>TURN-IN TODAY</u>	<u>TOTAL TURN-IN</u>
Vehicles	<u>2</u>	<u>2,740</u>
1/4 Ton	<u>0</u>	<u>295</u>
3/4 Ton	<u>1</u>	<u>371</u>
2 1/2 Ton	<u>0</u>	<u>435</u>
5 Ton and larger	<u>0</u>	<u>172</u>
Trailers	<u>1</u>	<u>1,329</u>
M113 Family	<u>0</u>	<u>123</u>
M48	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
VTR	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>
CSV	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Weapons	<u>147</u>	<u>16,594</u>
M79	<u>0</u>	<u>1,037</u>
Rifles	<u>86</u>	<u>9,445</u>
Pistols	<u>31</u>	<u>1,528</u>
MG	<u>27</u>	<u>1,048</u>
RR	<u>0</u>	<u>160</u>
Mortars	<u>0</u>	<u>120</u>
Other Weapons *	<u>3</u>	<u>3,256</u>

* Includes shotguns, aiming circles, rifle racks and other weaponry items.

Tab J (Unit Programmed Turn-In) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

UNIT PROGRAM

HEAD, Div Arty

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TURNED IN</u>	<u>REMAINING</u>	<u>MARCH</u>				
			<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>20</u>
<u>Wheel Vehicles</u>		38	13	9	2	4	7
<u>Small Arms</u>		285	165	35	35	30	0
<u>COMMEL</u>		18	3	2	0	1	5
<u>Engineer</u>		5	2	1	0	0	2
<u>Track</u>		0					
<u>Artillery</u>		0					

Tab K (Status of Lateral Transfers) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUJAY After Action Report (U)

1. The following compares the number of equipment items laterally transferred to units outside the division with the starting inventories. These transfers occurred during the period 15 February - 31 March 1970.

<u>TCE</u>		<u>PC&S</u>	
<u>INVENTORY</u>	<u>TRANSFERRED</u>	<u>INVENTORY</u>	<u>TRANSFERRED</u>
140,513	4,917	82,040	33,969

2. The following lists the number of equipment items laterally transferred within the division during the period 15 February - 31 March 1970.

<u>TCE TRANSFERS</u>	<u>PC&S TRANSFERS</u>
447	2,716

Tab L (Examination of Property Records Letter) to Appendix 9 (Statistical Representation) to Annex D (Logistics) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AVIB-L

SUBJECT: Examination of Property Records

Commanding Officer

1. Under the provisions of file number 14-01, Section IX, Appendix A, AR 340-2, dated 30 September 1969, an examination was made of all property records of your unit. This examination encompassed the installation and organization property books, document registers and document files. This examination revealed no discrepancies or irregularities in these records and a formal audit is not required. Further, it was determined that all property balances were reduced to a zero balance and all related property has been turned in to the supporting supply activity. All records referred to above will be immediately destroyed.

2. A copy of this correspondence will be maintained as prescribed in file number 2-05, Section II, Appendix A, AR 340-2 and disposition of that file will be as indicated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Annex 3 (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: This annex outlines operations in support of redeployment taken under the supervision of the ACoS, G5, 1st Infantry Division. Included in this material is the closeout or transfer of civic action (CIVAC) projects, psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of redeployment, and the termination of the division Kit Carson Scout Program.

2. PSYOP: a. Background and Planning.

(1) Prior to the official redeployment announcement, a division PSYOP campaign had been initiated to publicize the turnover of responsibility for the southern portion of Binh Duong Province to the 5th ARVN Division. In this campaign, the following themes were used:

- (a) Growing Strength of ARVN and their expanded operations.
- (b) Declining Strength of VC/NVA units.
- (c) The increased ability of local government units (Regional and Popular Forces, National Police, People's Self-Defense Forces) to provide security for hamlets of southern Binh Duong Province.

Since these topics provided an excellent background for the announcement of redeployment, redeployment themes were inserted into the existing campaign and presented as a natural progression of previous ones.

(2) The primary target audience for redeployment themes was the local population, a group that would be most concerned over its future security once US forces had departed. Enemy propagandists were expected to use this concern to persuade the population that the VC/NVA were actually winning the war. Thus, the need to reach the local populace as soon as possible was critical. The VC/NVA soldier was considered an important, but secondary target audience.

b. Execution:

(1) During redeployment, the phase out of PSYOP was accomplished concurrently with the standdown of maneuver elements. Operations ceased in each brigade AO on the same day that tactical operations ceased.

(2) The attached brigade HB (Broadcast) and HE (Audio-Visual) teams and PSYOP equipment were turned over to G5 for disposition.

(3) The redeployment PSYOP campaign was based on face to face communication, ground mobile missions employing tapes and leaflets (see Appendix 1), and dissemination of leaflets by aerial and ground means (see Appendix 2). Primarily, the campaign was conducted by ground teams from the 6th PSYOP Battalion, organic aircraft and 1st Inf Div MEDCAP Teams. In addition, Binh Duong Province Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) was furnished with leaflets and tapes for ground employment. Binh Duong VIS distributed these leaflets to the S5 of each Sub-sector and to Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre throughout Binh Duong Province. Of the six districts of Binh Duong Province, Ben Cat, Phu Giao and Tri Tan Districts received larger proportions because division troops were actually stationed there. Binh Duong VIS and 1st Inf Div G5 also conducted two highly successful rallies in Ben Cat area villages using redeployment themes and by distributing gift bags and raffling prizes.

(4) The division redeployment campaign lasted from approximately 12 January until 19 March 1970, the date the last unit stood down. As HB and HE teams reverted to division control, they were redeployed to lower Binh Duong Province and continued supporting redeployment.

(5) During redeployment, ten sets of leaflets were developed to support the campaign. Five sets were developed by 1st Inf Div G5, four by II FFGCEV G5 and one by 6th PSYOP Bn. A total of 961,950 leaflets were disseminated during the

redeployment campaign as follows:

(a) Leaflets Dropped by Air:	725,000
(b) Leaflets Distributed by Ground Teams:	116,950
(c) Leaflets Distributed by VIS Cadre:	88,000
(d) Leaflets Distributed by S-5, at Sub-sector:	16,000
(e) Leaflets Distributed by RB Cadre:	<u>16,000</u>
TOTAL	961,950

(5) A total of 15 tapes with redeployment themes were developed by the division G5. 35 hours were broadcast by ground teams using these redeployment themes.

(6) No incidents of enemy propaganda exploiting redeployment were reported.

a. Turn-in of Special Equipment: The turn-in of special PSYOP equipment was coordinated by II FFORCEV G5 to insure that this equipment remained in PSYOP channels and was redistributed to II FFORCEV units. As each brigade stood down, its PSYOP equipment reverted to division G5 control; G5 then notified II FFORCEV G5 that the equipment was ready for transfer. The II FFORCEV G5 coordinated with the gaining unit to arrange pick up of the equipment. A list of PSYOP equipment transferred is at Appendix 3.

3. CIVAC: a. When redeployment was announced, the division CIVAC activities consisted largely of providing material aid and technical assistance to a variety of local projects. Strengthening GVN channels to insure they could carry the burden of the Civic Action Program remained the main objective of the division Civil Affairs (CA) Section.

b. The CA Section coordinated with the 5th ARVN Div, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 25th Infantry Division to insure that these units could continue the MEDCAP and English Instruction programs, and provide assistance to the Ben Cat Orphanage and the Civic Action Program. However, the burden for the

Chan Long villagers constructed and are now operating the dispensary, eliminating the need for conducting MEDCAP operations in the village.

4. KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM: a. The ACoS, G5, recruited scouts from the Saigon, Phu Cuong and Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Centers. A total of 330 scouts were employed in December 1969 before recruiting and training was stopped due to the announced redeployment.

b. At the time of redeployment, 296 Scouts were employed by the division. HQ, II FFCRCEV announced that as many Scouts as possible should be retained within the program by transferring them from the 1st Inf Div to other USARV units in accordance with unit needs and authorizations.

c. Brigade standdown dates determined when the scouts would be available for recruiting sessions. This allowed maneuver units to retain their scouts until no longer needed and simplified recruiting sessions by decreasing the number of scouts outprocessed at each session.

d. The three dates established for interviewing and outprocessing were 20 February, 5 March and 20 March, 1970. II FFCRCEV notified all potential recruiting units in Vietnam of these dates and encouraged them to send representatives. On each date, the Scouts were assembled in the G5 warehouse at 0900 hours and KCS Coordinators and interpreters from recruiting units gave 5-10 minute presentations. After these talks and a short intermission, the Scouts selected their new units and handed their finance and personnel records over to the unit representative. Gaining units were responsible for transporting the Scouts to their new unit.

e. After each session, division KCS allocations were transferred to the gaining unit. The final result of the three recruiting sessions was the transfer of 242 Scouts to nondivisional units (see Appendix 4).

APPENDICES

- 1 - Redeployment Tape Broadcast
- 2 - Leaflets
- 3 - Turn-in of PSYOP Equipment
- 4 - Redistribution of Kit Carson Scouts

Tape Cut 16 Jan 70

DEAR COMPATRIOTS:

On November 3, 1969, Richard Nixon, President of the United States, said in a speech that the war in Vietnam "Anything is negotiable except the right of the people of SVN to determine their own future." In accordance with this support for the people of SVN, the United States is continuing the process of supplying the RVNAP with modern weapons including the M-16 Rifle, armored vehicles, and even jet aircraft. Nearly all ARVN Units have the M-16 Rifle with its great fire-power and many RF and PF Units are now being equipped with it.

The RVNAP are now as well trained as any fighting force anywhere and this is proven by their success in battle. Due to the dedication and sacrifice of thousands of proud, brave and well trained SVN Servicemen it is possible for refugees to return to their villages where they freely elect their own leaders, build new schools and improve their lives as they wish. More and more citizens of SVN are showing their determination to be free by joining RF, PF, and PSDF Units and protecting their villages and homes.

As more and more villages are being secured by RF, PF and PSDF Units the ARVN Forces are able to carry out the promise made by President Nguyen Van Thieu to replace U.S. Troops with ARVN Forces "as soon as possible." Based upon the growing strength of the ARVN and the proud determination of the people of SVN, Presidents Nixon and Thieu have agreed that 50,000 additional U.S. Troops will be replaced by ARVN Forces by April 15, 1970. As part of these 50,000 troops the U.S. 1st Inf. Division Troops in this area will be replaced by the soldiers of the 5th ARVN Division. The soldiers of the U.S. 1st Inf Division are proud that they were able to aid SVN, but realize that they are no longer needed. Everyday as the civilian and military strength grows, life becomes better for the citizens of RVN and they are assured a happy and productive future.

The ARVN and U.S. Forces have fought hard to give you the security you now enjoy! The well equipped and well trained ARVN 5th Division will now replace the U.S. Troops in this area. The soldiers of the U.S. 1st Inf Division are proud to have been able to help the people of this area but realize that they are no longer needed due to the increased capability of the ARVN Forces.

(Festive Music)

The ARVN Forces have been equipped with the most modern weapons and are ready in every respect to replace the U.S. 1st Inf. Div. Troops in this area. Even though the U.S. Troops are fewer in number, the U.S. will continue to aid RVN in its struggle with economic and military aid. The dedicated people of free Vietnam will soon enjoy a victorious peace.

(Festive Music)

The replacement of U.S. 1st Inf. Div. Troops in this area by the well trained ARVN Forces is one more example of the cooperation between U.S. and RVN Governments. Both agree that the will of the people of SVN to determine their own future is the most important aspect of the war.

(Festive Music)

The RVNAF are strong in number, well equipped with the most modern weapons and among the best trained soldiers in the world. As their strength grows they are replacing more and more U.S. Troops including the U.S. 1st Inf Div Troops in this area. We should take special pride in our brave and capable armed forces.

(Festive Music)

The ARVN receives support from many of the free nations of the world. This is evidence that the people of the free world believe in the just cause of the people of SVN.

(Festive Music)

The Communist Forces are in desperate condition. They control no major cities, they have achieved no major victories and are rallying to the SVN cause in large numbers. In the face of the increasing strength of the RVNAF the Communists will inevitably be defeated.

(Festive Music)

The people of SVN do not support the VC/NVA. They have repelled the Communists as the aggressors they really are. Due to the increasing strength of the ARVN Forces the U.S. 1st Inf Div Troops in this area are being replaced by the soldiers of the 5th ARVN Div. The growing strength of the ARVN Forces and the determination of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future will inevitably defeat the Communists.

Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Listed under Tabs A-J are examples of PSYOP leaflets texts in support of redeployment prepared by the 1st Infantry Division; 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Brigade; II FFORCEV; and the 6th PSYOP Battalion. These, target audience, method of dissemination and text are noted.

TABS

- A - 1st Inf Div Accomplishments
- B - US Redeployment
- C - Redeployment
- D - Redeployment of US Troops
- E - ARVN Strength/US Redeployment
- F - Divisive
- G - Troop Replacement
- H - Troop Withdrawal - I
- I - Troop Withdrawal - II
- J - ARVN Strength

Tab A (1st Inf Div Accomplishments) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

TITLE/LEAFLET: 1st Inf Div Accomplishments
THEME: Allied Operations
SIZE: 8 X 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
TARGET AUDIENCE: VC, NVA, Populace
PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: Allied Aid
METHOD OF DISSEMINATION: Air

DATE PROCESSED: 6 Mar 70
II FFV:
Log No: 1XX 65-1

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: FRONT:

The soldiers of the 5th ARVN Division are proud to replace the US 1st Infantry Division.

Since arriving on 12 July 1965, to aid the Vietnamese people in the struggle against Communist aggression, the 1st Infantry Division has won a remarkable string of victories over VC and NVA forces. Equally successful were the large Allied Operations where 1st Inf. Div. troops combined with ARVN and other Allied units to clear extensive areas occupied by the VC. These Allied Operations were the forerunners of today's highly successful ARVN-US joint operations. The success of the 1st Inf Div and its Allies can be seen in the security of the roads in the area. Everyone remembers when it was unsafe to travel in anything but huge convoys. Now it is possible to travel on them with little worry.

Since Tet, 1968, the VC/NVA situation has steadily deteriorated and the ARVN Forces have increased in strength to such an extent that it is now possible for the 1st Inf Div troops to be completely replaced by ARVN Forces. In the past year, ARVN and 1st Inf Div troops have operated together in preparation for the day the 1st Inf Div would go home and the results have been that many VC units such as the once mighty Dong Nai Regiment are reduced to small actions and Sub-Region units such as SR-1 are greatly reduced and much less effective than one year ago.

(Festive Music)

As the result of extensive training and experienced leadership, your ARVN Forces are well-qualified to assume the principal responsibilities in this area from the U.S. Forces. Besides having greatly superior numerical strength, the ARVN is now equipped with the world's most modern military equipment and support systems.

(Festive Music)

As the FVPAP Troops are withdrawn from this area and the ARVN assumes increasing responsibility for the protection of your freedom, the nations of the free world continue to demonstrate their dedication to the government and people of Vietnam by continued material and moral support.

(Festive Music)

Years of cooperation between the free world forces and the armed forces of Vietnam have repulsed the enemy and brought growing peace and prosperity to your village once again. Soon the ARVN will assume the principal responsibility in this area, as it is well-trained and dedicated to the maintenance of peace and order. The men of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division wish you well and hope that our work has been of lasting help to your village and to all of free Vietnam.

(Festive Music)

Now that the ARVN Forces are assuming the principal responsibility for the defense and development of your village, the U.S. will continue to assist your progress with all the means of support at our disposal according to its world treaty agreements. Free Vietnam is a valued friend of the United States, and we are dedicated to assisting you in every possible way.

(Festive Music)

Soon this area will become the responsibility of the ARVN Forces according to the U.S. Forces redeployment plans of the GVN and the U.S. This is another example of the cooperation of the United States with free Vietnam as plans to determine its own future.

(Festive Music)

As ARVN Forces now assume the major role in the military defense of your villages and countryside, the GVN will continue to promote its programs of village development and land reform. These programs demonstrate the genuine interest of the GVN in the welfare of the people.

(Festive Music)

The VC/NVA Forces are weak and vulnerable as never before due to the growing strength and victories of the ARVN in this area. The VC/NVA control no major cities, have achieved no major victories, and are rallying to the GVN cause in ever-increasing numbers. The people of free Vietnam have recognized the VC/NVA

as aggressors and destroyers of peace, and they have repelled them. As the ARVN grows daily stronger, the U.S. FVMAF Troops will be redeployed in accordance with the agreements between the GVN and the U.S. Government.



CHIẾN - SĨ SỬ - ĐOÀN 5 BỘ
BINH VIỆT - NAM HÃNH - DIỄN
THAY - THẾ LỰC - LƯƠNG SỬ
ĐOÀN 1 BỘ - BINH HOA - KỲ.



SỬ-ĐOÀN 1 BỘ-BÌNH HOA-KỲ ĐÃ SÁT CẢNH VỚI DÂN-CHUNG VIỆT-NAM TRONG VIỆC THẦU ĐẠT NHỮNG THẮNG LỢI TRONG NỖ-LỰC XÂY-DỤNG ĐẤT NƯỚC. XUYẾN QUA NHỮNG HOẠT-ĐỘNG DÂN-SỰ-VU PHỐI HỢP, HỌ ĐÃ THU PHỤC ĐƯỢC CẢM TÌNH VÀ LÒNG TIN CỦA DÂN VIỆT.

NHỮNG BÁC-SĨ, NHA-SĨ THUỘC SỬ-ĐOÀN 1 BỘ-BÌNH HOA-KỲ ĐÃ GIÚP-ĐỖ CÁC ĐỒNG-NGHIỆP VIỆT-NAM CHỮA TRỊ VÀ PHÁT THUỐC CHO HÀNG NGÀN ĐỒNG-BÀO QUANH VÙNG. CÁC KỸ-SƯ THUỘC SỬ-ĐOÀN NÀY CŨNG ĐÃ GIÚP CHÍNH PHỦ VÀ NHÂN-DÂN MIỀN NAM KHAI-THÔNG HÀNG TRĂM CÂY SỔ ĐƯƠNG LỘ, XÂY NHIỀU CẦU CÔNG, NHÀ CỬA, BỆNH-XÁ VÀ CƯ-XÁ ... HỌ CÒN GIÚP-ĐỖ ĐỒNG-BÀO XÂY-DỤNG HÀNG TRĂM LỚP HỌC, ĐỀN CHÙA, NHÀ THỜ CŨNG NHƯ ĐÃ PHÂN-PHÁT NHIỀU THỰC-PHẨM, QUẦN-ÁO, CHĂM-NOM VỀ SỨC-KHOẺ CHO ĐỒNG-BÀO TỊ NAN CÔNG-SẢN VÀ NHẤT LÀ GIÚP ĐỖ CHÍNH QUYỀN ĐỊA-PHƯƠNG CHĂM-SÓC CÁC TRẺ MỒ CÔI VÌ CHIẾN-TRANH.

VỚI NHỮNG TRỢ GIÚP ẤY CỦA QUÂN-LỰC ĐỒNG-MINH, DÂN-CHUNG VIỆT-NAM QUẢ-CẢM CÓ QUYỀN TIN-TUỞNG VÀ CHỨNG-TỎ CHO THẾ GIỚI BIẾT RẰNG CÔNG-SẢN KHÔNG THỂ NÀO THẮNG-LỢI TẠI VIỆT-NAM. VỚI NHỮNG KẾT QUẢ ẤY, NHÂN DÂN CỦA ĐƠN-VI "BIG RED ONE" RẤT HÃNH-DIỄN TRƯỚC SỰ PHÁT TRIỂN VỀ MỌI MẶT CỦA QUÂN ĐỘI VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HOÀ KHI RỜI KHỎI VIỆT-NAM. HƠN NỮA, VỚI NHỮNG THIÊN CẢM SẴN CÓ, CHẮC CHẮN HỌ SẼ KHÔNG QUÊN NỤ CƯỜI ĐỂ MẾN CÙNG MỖI CẢM-TÌNH MÀ DÂN VIỆT ĐÃ DÀNH CHO HỌ.

6-23-70





CHIẾN - SĨ SƯ - ĐOÀN 5 BỘ - BINH VIỆT - NAM
HÀNH - DIỄN THAY - THẾ LỰC LƯỢNG
SƯ - ĐOÀN 1 BỘ - BINH HOA - KỸ.



KỂ TỪ NGÀY 12 THÁNG 7 NĂM 1965. NGÀY MỚI ĐẶT CHÂN TỚI VIỆT - NAM ĐỂ
NAY, SƯ - ĐOÀN 1 BỘ - BINH HOA - KỸ ĐÃ LIÊN - TIẾP ĐẠT ĐƯỢC NHIỀU CHIẾN - THẮNG VỀ
VANG TRONG KHI TRỢ GIÚP CHÍNH - PHỦ VÀ NHÂN - DÂN VIỆT - NAM DIỆT - TRỪ ĐƠN CỘNG
SẢN XÂM - LẤN. HỌ ĐÃ THÀNH - CÔNG LỚN - LAO KHI PHỐI - HỢP VỚI QUÂN - ĐỘI VIỆT
NAM CỘNG - HÒA VÀ CÁC ĐƠN - VỊ ĐỒNG - MINH KHÁC TRONG NHỮNG CUỘC HÀNH - QUÂN
KHAI - QUANG MỘT VÙNG ĐẤT RỘNG LỚN DO CÔNG - SẢN CHIÊM - NGU TUY - NHIÊN. ĐÓ
CHỈ LÀ NHỮNG ĐỢT HÀNH - QUÂN TIỀN - PHONG MỞ ĐẦU CHO NHIỀU ĐỢT HÀNH - QUÂN
BIỂU - HIỆU KHÁC CỦA QUÂN - ĐỘI VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA VÀ HOA - KỸ. NHỜ NHỮNG NỖ
LỰC ẤY MÀ AN - NINH ĐƯƠNG LỘ VÙNG NÀY ĐÃ ĐƯỢC ĐẢO - ĐẢM. NGÀY NAY ĐỒNG -
BÀO CÓ THỂ ĐI - CHUYẾN DỄ - DÀNG TRÊN NHỮNG HƯỚNG LỘ MÀ TRƯỚC KHI CHỈ NHỮNG
ĐOÀN QUÂN - XA HÙNG HẦU MỜI DÁM ĐI NGANG.

TỪ ĐIP TẾT NĂM 1965 TỚI NAY LỰC - LƯỢNG CỦA ĐƠN MẶT - TRẬN GIẢI - PHÓNG
MIỀN NAM VÀ QUÂN XÂM - LẤN BẮC - VIỆT ĐÃ SUY - YẾU RŨ - RỆT TRONG KHI QUÂN ĐỘI
VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA MỖI NGÀY MỘT HÙNG - MẠNH NÊN ĐÃ ĐỦ SỨC THAY - THẾ HOÀN -
TOÀN SƯ - ĐOÀN 1 BỘ - BINH HOA - KỸ TẠI VÙNG NÀY. TỪ TRƯỚC, TRONG KHI NỖ LỰC
CHIẾN ĐẤU HỖN - HỢP VỚI QUÂN - ĐỘI VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA, SƯ - ĐOÀN 1 BỘ - BINH HOA -
KỸ ĐÃ HY - VỌNG CHỒNG LÀM SUY GIẢM LỰC - LƯỢNG CÔNG - SẢN ĐỂ CÓ THỂ QUAY VỀ
QUÊ HƯƠNG CỦA HỌ. KẾT QUẢ CỦA NHỮNG CỐ - GẮNG ĐÓ THẬT KHẢ - QUAN VÌ NHỮNG
ĐƠN - VỊ CÔNG SẢN ĐANG KẼ NHƯ TRUNG - ĐOÀN ĐỒNG - NAI HIỆN ĐÃ BẮT BUỘC PHẢI
THU HEP TRONG MỘT VÀI HOẠT - ĐỘNG NHỎ. VÀ CẤP PHÂN - KHU CỦA CÔNG - SẢN NHƯ
PHÂN - KHU 1 CŨNG ĐÃ KIẾT QUÊ TRÔNG THẤY NẾU SO - SÁNH VỚI MỘT NĂM TRƯỚC ĐÂY.



Tab B (US Redeployment) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVCF-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-051-70 III

II FFV : 080

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

Unit Log Number : 0009-3

Theme: GVN/Allied Image

Title: US Redeployment

Target: Populace

Size: 3 x 6

Quantity: 200,000

Source of Requirement: 1st Inf Div

Date Required: 11 Jan 70

English Translation:

Front: Dear Citizens,

The ARVN forces are now stronger than ever as we continue to replace our Allies. Recent victories by the ARVN have demonstrated their ability to decisively defeat the Communists. The ability of the ARVN to stop the Communist offensives this year is a prime example of the growing strength and determination of the ARVN Army.

Due to this growing strength, President Thieu recommended to President Nixon that ARVN forces are ready to replace 50,000 more American troops by April 15, 1970. Part of the 50,000 to be redeployed is the American 1st Inf Div which has been working side by side with our own 5th ARVN Div. in securing Binh Duong Province.

Back: In recent months the 5th ARVN Div. has taken over the total responsibility for the security of lower Binh Duong Province and is now ready to take over the Northern portion. The US troops that are being replaced have completed their mission in SVN. The redeployment of troops is an encouraging sign of progress in the military situation in Vietnam and shows that the ARVN can handle the situation. We can be proud of our ARVN forces for their successful fight against Communist aggression.

Tab C (Redeployment) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (C)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGX-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-106-70

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

II FFV: 173

Log No. 0019-2

Theme: Redeployment

Title: Redeployment

Target: Civilians

Size: 8 x 10

Quantity: 1,000

Source of Requirement: 1st Div.

Date Required: 23 Jan 70

English Translation:

Poster:

Dear Compatriots:

The U.S. President, Mr. Richard Nixon, in his speech on 3 November, 1969, said, "We will discuss any problem except the right of the SVN people to determine their future". In support of this purpose, the U.S. government is giving assistance to the GVN in equipping the Army with modern weapons, including M-16's, armored vehicles and jet planes. Besides, the ARVN soldiers are well trained to cope with the Pacification and RD programs. Now, with the devotion and sacrifice of the ARVN soldiers of all service branches many refugees can return to their hamlets. They are living a peaceful life; their children go to new schools, their lives have improved in the political area; they freely elect their representatives to handle the affairs. In the military area, they have the right to join the RF, PF or PSDF to protect the hamlets.

Therefore, the RF, PF or PSDF are restoring security into many hamlets to help the regular forces to accomplish the task of replacing the Allied troops in accordance with President Thieu's promise. The redeployment of 50,000 American troops will be completed by 15 April 1970. The 1st U.S. Infantry Division is included in the withdrawal. The soldiers of the 1st Inf. Div. are very proud to help the SVN people and glad the military and Civil power is increasing; the future is bright and promising.

Tab D (Redeployment of US Troops) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

LEAFLET NO.: 6-185-70

DATE PROCESSED: 5 Feb. 70

TITLE/LEAFLET: Redeployment

II FFV: 290

Log No.: 0034-3

THEME: Redeployment of U.S. Troops

SIZE: 3 x 6

COLOR: Black on White

TARGET AUDIENCE: Populace

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

ORIGIN: 1st Inf. Div.

PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: Inform people of redeployment of American Troops

METHOD OF DISSEMINATION: Air and Ground Distribution

ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

FRONT: Attention Compatriots

BACK: Dear Compatriots

As you know the Armed Forces of Viet Nam have been highly successful in replacing over 60,000 American Troops in 1969. This has proven that the plan for redeployment of U.S. Troops is a sound one. Now the U.S. and RVN have decided that 50,000 more U.S. Troops can be replaced by RVNAF before 15 April, 1970. The U.S. 1st Inf. Div. Troops in this area are among these 50,000 troops to be redeployed. The men of the 1st Div. are proud to have been able to aid the Vietnamese people in their fight against Communism. The well-trained and well-equipped RVNAF will continue to pursue the Communist aggressors. Let us show our appreciation to our brave soldiers by giving them our whole-hearted support.

Tab F (Divisive) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGM-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-1134-69 II

II FFV : 069

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

Unit Log Number : 9XX 219

Theme: Divisive

Title: You will be defeated

Target: VC

Size: 3 x 6

Quantity: 100,000

Source of Requirement: 9th Inf Div

Date Required: 16 Jan 70

English Translation:

Front: Attention Communist Members!

One year ago, the President of the RVN announced, "The ARVN's will replace US troops soon." Today, the ARVN forces have become stronger and stronger and equipped with modern weapons. The Pacification and construction of the country is developing rapidly. Realizing the fruitful progress, the President of the United States has just announced another redeployment of 50,000 American troops to be completed by April 15, 1970.

BACK: This troop replacement again indicates the strength of the Army and people of SVN. It shows the pride and glory of the ARVN troops in their task protecting the nation and the fatherland.

However, the above good will to end the war should be answered equally by the Communists.

Tab G (Troop Replacement) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGM-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-1132-69 II

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

II FFV: 065

Log No. 9XX220

Theme: Troop Replacement

Title: Dear Citizens

Target: Population

Size: 3 x 6

Quantity: 100,000

Source of Requirement: 9th Div.

Date Required: 14 Jan 70

English Translation:

FRONT: Dear Compatriots:

The ARVN forces are growing stronger and stronger and getting more and more up-to-date weapons. The ARVN troops, consequently, have thwarted every attempt by the Communists in their Spring, Summer and Fall Campaigns. Realizing that the ARVN forces are fully capable of the burden of the war, the President of the United States has recently announced another 50,000 troop redeployment to be completed by April 15, 1970.

SACK: The decision above does not mean that the United States has made any concession to the Communist clique, but that it demonstrates the growth of the ARVN forces. At the same time it also indicates the goodwill for making peace by the GVN and the United States.

Nevertheless, the goodwill demands a reasonable response from the Communist clique, so that peace will return to the people of VN.

Tab E (Troop Withdrawal - T) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex 3 (CIVAC/PSYOP) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVCH-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-1133-69

Subject : PSYOP Material Data

II FFV : 881

Log No. : 881

Theme: Troop Withdrawal

Title: Dear Citizens

Target: Local Populace

Size: 3 x 6

Quantity: 150,000

Source of Requirement : II FFV

Date Required: 7 Jan 70

English Translation:

FRONT: Dear Compatriots:

Everyone knows the Armed Forces of the RVN has successfully fulfilled the task of replacing 60,000 American troops in the past months. The achieved result is due to careful training, up-to-date weapons, equipment and the constant victories by the ARVN troops all over the battlefield. The determination and the sense of self-sufficiency of our Army and people are also factors to the above achievement. Realizing that the ARVN forces are capable of safeguarding the country, the President of the United States has just announced another redeployment of 50,000 American troops to be completed by April 15, 1970.

RACK: This decision was made to demonstrate the determination of the people and Army of SVN to clear all hindrances to reach the goal of self-consolidation.

The decision, however, will be carried out provided the Communists show their goodwill to settle this ridiculous war.

We are looking forward to their good will with the hope that they know they not only have failed in the Summer-Fall Campaigns, but will be completely thwarted in their attempt to take over South Vietnam.

Tab I (Troop Withdrawal - II) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVQM-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-1135-69
II FFV: 872

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

Theme: Troop Withdrawal

Title: Vietnamese Capability

Target: Population

Size: 3 x 6

Quantity: 150,000

Source of Requirement: II FFV

Date Required: 7 Jan 70

English Translation:

Front: Dear Compatriots,

As a result of RVNAF continuous assumption of greater responsibilities in protecting the lives of the people of SVN against communist aggression, President Nixon has announced the redeployment of 50,000 more US Troops by April 15, 1970.

Back: The replacement of Allied troops shows the strength of SVN and encourages the peoples' pride in the country.

The RVNAF has the power to protect lives and prosperity from any communist aggression. The RVNAF replacement of US Troops shows the determination of the Vietnamese people to bring about peace and freedom.

Tab J (ARVN Strength) to Appendix 2 (Leaflets) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (3)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGM-6/PDC

Leaflet Number : 6-1141-69
Unit Log # 6PO
II FFV # 824

Subject: PSYOP Material Data

Theme: GVN instructions

Title: Troop Redeployment Slogan

Size: 5 x 14

Quantity: 135,000

Source of Requirement: 6PO

Date Required: 3 Jan. 70

English Translation:

Text:

1. The ARVN has grown stronger and is ready to replace the Allied Forces.
2. The ARVN soldier is well trained and equipped with modern weapons and is ready to replace the Allied Forces.
3. The ARVN soldier has the capability to protect the people and the country.
4. The ARVN is composed of elite and daring soldiers; a fortified stronghold capable of protecting the people and the nation.
5. Each ARVN soldier is dedicated to keep the enemy away.
6. Every redeployed Allied unit will be replaced by an elite ARVN unit.
7. The ARVN soldier is proud of his mission to protect the country from Communist aggression.
8. The ARVN soldier is always at the front to fight the enemy.
9. Replacing redeployed friendly forces means that we are self-supporting, self-strengthening and self-confident.

Appendix 3 (Turn-in of PSYOP Equipment) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

During redeployment the following equipment was turned-in and reissued to non-redeploying units:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ISSUED TO</u>
1000 Watt Aerial Loud-speaker system	1	199th LEB
500 Watt Aerial Loud-speaker for LOH	3	199th LEB 25th Inf Div 1st Cav Div (AM)
250 Watt Aerial Loud-speaker system	3	25th Inf Div
Polaroid Cameras	2	3/9th Inf Div (1) 1st Cav Div (AM) (1)
Cassette Type Tape-recorders	14	3/9th Inf Div (2) 11th ACR (1) 199th LEB (1) 1st Cav Div (AM) (6) 25th Inf Div (3) 6th PSYOP Bn (1)

Appendix 4 (Redistribution of Kit Carson Scouts) to Annex E (CIVAC/PSYOP) to 1st Infantry Division. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. The table below breaks down the number of KCS reassigned by unit.

<u>No.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
88	25th Inf Div
64	1st Cav Div (AM)
44	199th LIE
18	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
12	173d Abn Bde
8	3-17th Cav, 1st Avn Bde
3	MACV
3	4th Inf Div
<u>2</u>	11th ACP
242	TOTAL

2. In addition, eight scouts were terminated for medical reasons and two reassigned. The remaining 44 were terminated as AWOL.

1. GENERAL; Communications-electronics (COMMEL) tasks were grouped into three major areas. The division's 121st Signal Battalion gave first priority to maintaining effective command and control communications with diminishing personnel assets and equipment turn-in deadlines. Second, signal assistance required by the 5th ARVN Division for their expanded area of operations and assumption of responsibility for the eastern half of Lai Khe base camp had to be identified and acted upon. Finally, plans had to be made for processing and turning in COMMEL equipment.

2. COMMEL SUPPORT; a. Upon notification of redeployment, headquarters, 121st Sig Bn, was located at Lai Khe; A and C companies were situated at Lai Khe and Di An, while B Company provided support elements for each of the three infantry brigades. A diagram of the VHF (Very High Frequency) systems support is shown at Appendix A, Radio Teletype Net (RATT) at Appendix B and the telephone routing diagram at Appendix C.

b. To support the division with communications during all phases of redeployment, the 121st Sig Bn was required to commit all its personnel and equipment resources. This reached a high point 12-20 February 1970 when a number of headquarters were making major displacements. The following is a chronological summary of signal support operations during redeployment:

(1) On 12 February 1970, VHF support was installed at Lai Khe in preparation for the 1st Brigade's displacement from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe on 14 February.

(2) VHF support for the 1st Bde at Dau Tieng was terminated on 15 February 1970. In addition, all circuits to the 3d Brigade at Lai Khe were removed as that brigade displaced to the standdown area.

(3) On 16 February 1970, VHF systems were installed from the 1st Bde, 2d Brigade, Division Artillery and the 1st Aviation Battalion to the new division headquarters area at Di An in preparation for its activation on 18 February. A Danger Rear switchboard was also opened at Di An.

(4) On 18 February 1970, signal battalion headquarters displaced to Di An. The Danger Main switchboard and all VHF systems were closed at Lai Khe and opened at Di An. The division's new VHF network is shown at Appendix D.

c. After the Division Headquarters and DTCC (Division Tactical Operation Center) were settled in Di An, communications support was gradually reduced as units stood down.

(1) The Nui Ba Den relay was closed on 25 February 1970; equipment was air-lifted to Cu Chi and moved overland to Di An.

(2) On 3 March 1970, VHF systems to the 2d Bde at Bear Cat were closed out.

(3) The VHF system to the 1st Bde (Lai Khe) was terminated on 18 March 1970.

(4) VHF circuits to Div Arty (Phu Loi) were deactivated on 19 March 1970.

(5) On 22 March 1970, the VHF system to the 1st Avn Bn (Phu Loi) was discontinued.

(6) The 121st Sig Bn (-) began its standdown on 25 March 1970 when the Danger Main switchboard and communications center were deactivated.

d. The following special provisions were made during redeployment:

(1) At Lai Khe, Phu Loi and Di An, maximum utilization was made of the 1st Signal Brigade's central office dial telephone support.

(2) C Company, 121st Sig Bn, was tasked to support the division headquarters and DTCC at Di An, thereby allowing A Company to prepare for standdown as soon as the division headquarters displaced from Lai Khe.

(3) To insure that C Company had sufficient personnel, some men with critical MOS's were transferred to C Company as they became available in A and B companies. In addition, from approximately 20 February to 25 March 1970, personnel and equipment from A Company were placed under operational control of C Company supporting the division at Di An. On 25 March 1970, both companies stood down with the signal battalion headquarters.

(4) Public address and photographic support was required through the final ceremony on 3 April 1970. Arrangements were made to retain sufficient personnel and equipment to meet these requirements from signal battalion resources. Coordination was accomplished with II FFORCEV Signal Section to furnish support if needed.

3. TRANSFER OF SIGNAL ASSETS TO ARVN: a. Once MACV had determined that ARVN would occupy the division's former DTOC and that the ARVN signal complex would be installed in the 121st Sig Bn's Lai Khe site, close coordination was established with the 5th ARVN Div Signal Officer. The 5th ARVN Div requested that tactical cable, and perimeter defense telephones, switchboards and radios be left in place along with two AB 216 antenna towers. ARVN also desired to have the 1st Infantry Division's AN/MTC-1 switchboard left intact. Other items, including communications center air conditioners, were requested.

b. It was decided immediately to turn over tactical cables to ARVN and await approval from MACV of all other requests. An early decision was needed because 1st Inf Div signal personnel and equipment had to be cleared from the new ARVN area by 20 February 1970 to enable the 5th ARVN Div signal complex to be completely operational the following day. However, equipment could not be moved until control of the division shifted from Lai Khe to Di An at 191:00 February 1970. After joint meetings at MACV and JGS level, it was decided to transfer all major items of equipment requested except for the AN/MTC-1.

switchboard.. At the same time, control of the division was transferred to B1 An sooner than planned because adequate command and control communications had been installed there early. Consequently, no difficulty was encountered in meeting the 20 February deadline.

c. Every effort was made to assist ARVN signal personnel so that command and control communications were operational when the 5th ARVN Div commander and staff arrived at Lai Khe. Space was made available for the 5th ARVN Div signal company to install test VHF systems, a switchboard, and a high frequency radio station at the Danger Main signal site. Adequate precautions were taken to prevent mutual interference. ARVN personnel joined American installers at the division wirehead and all cable pairs were marked in Vietnamese. In addition, 1st Inf Div wire teams showed ARVN signal personnel existing cables and terminal boxes that were being left for their use so that accurate Vietnamese cable diagrams could be made.

d. The actual transfer of equipment was conducted on the ground with " and ARVN representatives present. The equipment was transferred from the 1st Inf Div to the Saigon Support Command on DA Form 2765 (Request for Issue and Turn-In) and then picked up by the 3d ARVN Logistical Command (3d LCC) from Saigon Support Command on DA Form 1584 (Transfer Control Movement Document).
4. SIGNAL EQUIPMENT TURN-IN: Most COMSEC items were turned in to Saigon Support Command and processed in the same manner as vehicles and other common items; exceptions are noted below.

a. Crypto Equipment.

(1) All crypto equipment was processed through the division Crypto Logistic Support Section (CLSS) and turned in to the Crypto Logistic Support Center Vietnam (CLSCV), by the division cryptocustodian. Turn-account custodians were encouraged to turn in early all equipment that was not mission essential so

that backlogs and delays could be avoided during unit standdowns. As units stood down, the remaining items were turned in and the unit custodian received a letter of audit and clearance which served as authority to deactivate the sub-account.

(2) All vehicle mounts, installation kits, associated cables and hardware were turned in with the equipment. Publications were page-checked by the CLSS and listed on SF Form 153, Transfer Report, along with the equipment. Key lists and codes were destroyed by sub-account custodians and accounted for on destruction reports.

(3) A few items of crypto equipment were required for a four day period after the division crypto account was scheduled to be closed and audited. USARV granted authority to laterally transfer crypto devices for general officer command and control helicopters and for the Special Security Detachment serving the 1st Inf Div. These items were transferred to other USARV units in the area and then hand-receipted back to the users for the short period required.

(4) The division's air cavalry troop was one of the few 1st Inf Div elements to be redesignated within Vietnam. Its crypto equipment was laterally transferred to its new parent organization to preclude a disruption of the unit's secure capability.

b. MARS Equipment: Disposition instructions for MARS equipment were passed down by the USARV MARS director. The Di An station was taken over intact by the 595th Signal Company, which provides area support to Di An and Lai Khe. Division MARS stations at Dau Tieng and Lai Khe were dismantled and the equipment was transferred to designated units. After a joint inventory, hand receipts were cleared by the USARV MARS director. Gaining units were responsible for picking up and transporting equipment.

c. Narrow Band Subscriber Terminal: The 1st Inf Div terminal was left in place for the 5th ARVN Div Advisory Team and was signed for by the 595th Signal Company. The advisory team terminal at Lam Son was turned in to the 1st Sig Bde in exchange for the 1st Inf Div van.

d. Radio Lai Khe: The signal battalion operated a low power AM/FM broadcast station at Lai Khe Base Camp. TCE equipment was turned in through normal channels; non-appropriated fund equipment was transferred to a non-divisional unit through the central post fund.

e. Antenna Towers: MTOE and 180-day loan AB 216 antenna towers were either dismantled and transported directly to the 1st Sig Bde's antenna storage yard in Long Binh or left in place for other units with USARV approval.

f. Command and Control Consoles: Initially, these items were turned in to Saigon Support Command representatives until USARV requested they be kept in avionics channels. The remaining avionics equipment was turned in to Avionics Central at Phu Loi except for two ASC-15's which were laterally transferred to the 11th Aviation Battalion. The 11th Avn Bn used these items in the aircraft provided for the Commanding General and the Assistant Division Commander for Support after the 1st Avn Bn had stood down.

g. TCE Lateral Transfers: A relatively small amount of TCE signal equipment was laterally transferred to other units at USARV direction. The only mix-up occurred when one unit failed to inform the division that it was requesting an in place transfer of the division's communications equipment at Nui Ba Den (the Black Virgin Mountain). By the time USARV had approved the request, the equipment had already been removed and turned in.

5. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Communications for Command Post Displacement.

1. OBSERVATION: Command Post displacements increase as standdown approaches.

(2) EVALUATION: The 2-3 week period immediately prior to the first stand-down was particularly demanding on the 121st Sig Bn. AO boundaries changed more frequently and major units made displacements in preparation for redeployment activities. Adequate communications had to be available at new command posts before the old locations were relinquished. When the division headquarters and division artillery headquarters both moved at the same time to Di An and Phu Loi, almost all divisional signal resources were committed to establish the required dual command posts.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That adequate jump capability be retained to operate dual command posts for limited periods. These requirements must be considered when scheduling signal elements for standdown.

b. Personnel Losses.

(1) OBSERVATION: Critical MCS shortages increased prior to completion of the 121st Sig Bn's redeployment missions.

(2) EVALUATION: Upon the unofficial notification of redeployment on 31 December 1969, there was a replacement slow-down followed by a termination of all replacements on 13 January 1970. This resulted in significant communications MCS shortages being projected. To remedy this situation, a survey of projected losses against known requirements was conducted prior to establishing release dates for critical personnel. Based on this survey, critical personnel were redistributed through inter-unit transfer.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the above measures be taken to insure that key signal personnel are retained until no longer needed. Additional personnel needs should be thoroughly documented and submitted to USARV as early as possible.

c. Phase-out of Area Communications Support.

(1) OBSERVATION: Simultaneous standdown of tactical and area communications systems could result in inadequate support.

(2) EVALUATION: The large reductions of US Forces at Lai Khe Base Camp enabled the 1st Sig Bde to scale down its area support. But the brigade provided a liaison officer to insure that full area communications were maintained until no longer required.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the phase-out of area and tactical communications service be carefully planned and coordinated.

d. Public Address (PA) and Photo Commitments.

(1) OBSERVATION: PA and photo commitments increase during standdown.

(2) EVALUATION: Each major unit and separate battalion conducted a ceremony during its first day of standdown. In addition, photographers covered withdrawals from base camps and the turnover of fire support bases. This type of support was required until 3 April 1970, the date of the division's departure ceremony.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That signal units retain their photographic and PA capability as long as possible and request outside support for commitments after signal elements standdown.

e. Telephone Directories.

(1) OBSERVATION: Telephone directories are difficult to keep current during redeployment.

(2) EVALUATION: Area telephone numbers change constantly as units begin moving immediately prior to and during redeployment. New directories become outdated before they can be published and distributed.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That listings be kept current by publishing short supplements to the telephone directory as required.

f. Turnover of Tactical Cable.

(1) OBSERVATION: Gaining units must be thoroughly familiar with tactical cable layout.

(2) EVALUATION: When authority was granted to transfer tactical cable in place at Lai Khe to the 5th ARVN Div, ARVN signal representatives worked side by side with US teams in cable heads and along cable routes. This made it possible for ARVN to make accurate cable diagrams in Vietnamese and complete their own telephone installations quickly.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That coordination prior to turnover of tactical cable systems include a combined inspection so that gaining units may use the system without delay.

g. Coordination of Requests for Transfer of Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION: In one case, the 1st Inf Div received word to transfer equipment to another unit after it had already turned in that equipment.


(2) EVALUATION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment wanted to take over 1st Inf Div signal equipment on Nui Ba Den and submitted its request to USAF without sending an information copy to the division. USARV approved the request, but the 121st Sig Bn had turned in the equipment unaware of the request.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That information copies of requests for transfer of equipment be sent to the redeploying unit.


APPENDICES

- 1 - Tactical VHF Systems Diagram, Nov 69 - Jan 70
- 2 - Radio Teletype Net Diagram
- 3 - Telephone Routing Diagram
- 4 - Tactical VHF Systems Diagram, Feb - Mar 70


Appendix 1 (Tactical V.F. Systems Diagram, Nov 69 - Jan 70) to Annex F (Signal) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)




Appendix 2 (Basic Network Diagram) to Annex 1 (Signal) to the National Security
Residual Classification Action Report (1)



Appendix 3 (Telephone Routing Diagram) to Annex F (Signal) to 1st Infantry Division
 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report '01



Appendix 4 (Tactical V.F. Systems Diagram, Feb - Mar 70) to Annex F (Signal) to 1st Infantry Division: KEYS/4/E BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)



1. GENERAL: Engineer support for the 1st Infantry Division prior to the announcement of redeployment consisted of area support by the 1st Engineer Battalion and isolated, non-divisional engineer support by various units of the 20th Engineer Brigade. Coordination with units most likely to assume the division's area of responsibility began in late December 1969. All information available concerning minefields, routes, bridges and Rome Plow cuts was prepared on overlays and given to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 25th Infantry Division.

2. DIVISIONAL ENGINEER SUPPORT: a. The following table indicates the support function of each engineer company before and during redeployment:

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>SUPPORT FUNCTION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
A	DS to 1st Bde	Prior to 16 Feb 70
	GS to Div	16 Feb 70
	Standdown	23 Feb 70
	Redeployed	27 Feb 70
B	DS to 2d Bde	Prior to 2 Mar 70
	Standdown	2 Mar 70
	Redeployed	6 Mar 70
C	DS to 3d Bde	Prior to 15 Feb 70
	GS to Div & Standdown	15 Feb 70
	Redeployed	25 Mar 70
D	GS to Div	Prior to 16 Feb 70
	DS to 1st Bde	16 Feb 70
	Standdown	28 Mar 70
	Redeployed	4 Apr 70

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>SUPPORT FUNCTION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
E and NHC	CS to Div	Prior to 28 Mar 70
	Standdown	28 Mar 70
	Redeployed	4 Apr 70

b. A Company, in direct support of the 1st Brigade, was selected to stand-down with the 3d Brigade in the first segment. This avoided relocating A Company from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe and placed engineer troops familiar with the 1st Bde's new area of operation in direct support of that brigade. While A Company stood down, C Company relocated to Di An and became the General Support Company for the division. This allowed the 5th ARVN Division to acquire C Company's area in Lai Khe Base Camp. D Company then furnished direct support to the 1st Bde in their same AO. This exchange of support elements was accomplished without interruption of normal engineer support and resulted in the final positioning of engineers to support redeployment.

c. The Division Engineer placed one platoon from C Company OPCON to D Company for the purpose of minesweeping Highway QL 13. This was done because of C Company's familiarity with the route. It also provided the 1st Bde with 25 percent increase in engineer support to assist in the operation and subsequent turnover of its temporary AO, including Lai Khe Base Camp.

d. The division headquarters was relocated from Lai Khe to Di An in mid-February, 1970. To support this move and the standdown areas, the following engineer projects were accomplished:

- (1) Relocation of "Danger Forward" sign to Di An.
- (2) Renovation of VIP Helipads.
- (3) Renovation and construction of command building, DTCC and Division Briefing Room.
- (4) Site preparation, movement and installation of VIP mobile homes.

(5) Construction of outprocessing center at Di An.

(6) Disassembly, site preparation, movement and reconstruction in Di An of the (Lai Khe) Education Center.

(7) Construction of 60 twenty-man bunkers in the Di An standdown areas.

(8) Construction of Saigon Support Command truck park.

e. The 1st Engr Bn was tasked with three unexpected projects requiring considerable engineer effort to support the turnover of Dau Tieng, Lai Khe and AO AJAX.

(1) At Dau Tieng, the 1st Engr Bn was tasked to decrease the size of the perimeter for 25th Inf Div occupancy.

(2) In AO AJAX, the battalion was tasked to construct a 400 meter diameter fire support base for elements of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(3) In Lai Khe, the battalion moved two 60 x 100 overhead sheds from the 1st Supply & Transport Battalion Yard to the east side of Highway QL 13.

3. DISPOSITION OF OUTSTANDING CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS: a. There were numerous projects within the division TAOI underway, or scheduled to begin, when redeployment was announced. The situation was alleviated by placing most projects in a hold status pending a II FFORCEV evaluation of priorities. Projects not yet started were evaluated by the Division Engineer's Office, in coordination with the user, and most directives were cancelled. Projects not cancelled were near completion and continued.

b. Coordination concerning operational support projects was effected between the 1st Engr Bn, units gaining installation/territorial responsibility, the II FFORCEV Engineer and the 20th Engr Bde. This coordination accomplished the following:

(1) Allowed the 1st Inf Div to terminate all projects.

(2) Allowed the new users to evaluate all projects and resubmit them to the II FFORCEV Engineer with any changes in requirements.

(3) Allowed the II FFORCEV Engineer to submit to the contractor (20th Engr Bde) the exact requirements of the new requesting units.

(4) Eliminated "hand-me-down" projects such as the Dau Tieng perimeter upgrade which was initiated originally by the 25th Inf Div, passed to the 1st Inf Div in July, 1969, and, due to numerous changes, not yet completed.

c. By 18 February 1970, all construction and operational support directives issued by the 20th Engr Bde in support of the 1st Inf Div were terminated. Construction materials remaining on site were transferred to new projects or returned to stock.

4. MISCELLANEOUS: a. Transfer of mine sweep responsibilities.

(1) In anticipation of division AO changes, the 1st Engr Bn began transferring its mine sweep responsibilities to non-divisional engineers in early January, 1970. On 2 January, Route 21nc (Highway 1A and 7B) was turned over to the 20th Engr Bde.

(2) All other sweeps were turned over as the TACR/TACI responsibility was transferred.

(3) During all mine sweep transfers, coordination was made between the old and new sweep teams to perform joint sweeps prior to the turnover day. This enabled the old team to show the relieving team hazardous sections of road and point out any unusual mining techniques used by the enemy.

b. Fire Support Base Closeout and Transfer.

(1) When redeployment was announced, the division occupied four main base camps and fifteen FSR/NDP's. The disposition of these bases was determined at division level and higher, and was implemented by the base commander. Engineer

support was used at all bases in closing out or transferring the base to another unit.

(2) The following schedule of base closeout/transfer was used by the 1st Engr Bn to program the availability of engineer support:

<u>BASE</u>	<u>CLOSE OUT</u>	<u>TRANSFERRAL</u>
Iron I	11 Feb 70	
Tennessee		12 Feb 70
Kien		13 Feb 70
Pine Ridge		13 Feb 70
Dau Tieng		14 Feb 70
Florida	17 Feb 70	
Normandy III		18 Feb 70
Lai Khe, West		25 Feb 70
Rhode Island		1 Mar 70
Colorado		2 Mar 70
Dakota	3 Mar 70	
Bear Cat		3 Mar 70
South Dakota	5 Mar 70	
Junction City (Apollo)		14 Mar 70
Thunder I		15 Mar 70
Thunder II		15 Mar 70
Attleboro (Lobo)		16 Mar 70
El Paso		18 Mar 70
Di An		7 Apr 70

c. Special Engineer Training.

(1) Anticipating the 25th Inf Div's interest in our Kennex Ski Barges, the Division Engineer arranged to send a 1st Engr Bn ski barge training team to

Co Dau Ha (XT 385247) to train members of the 65th Engineer Battalion in boat operations. Training on two boats was completed on 15 March 1970.

(2) A six week period devoted to training officers and NCO's of the 5th ARVN Engineer Battalion in nearly all combat engineering subjects was completed in early February 1970.

5. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Defective Ordnance.

(1) OBSERVATION: Units tend to retain excessive defective or dud ordnance at fire support base locations until final closeout day.

(2) EVALUATION: When FSB Dakota closed on 3 March 1970, engineers were tasked to destroy all defective ordnance on that day. Work associated with the closeout was stopped numerous times for safety of personnel.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That defective ordnance be turned in or destroyed frequently by redeploying units to prevent excessive amounts from accruing.

b. Lateral Transfers.

(1) OBSERVATION: Units outside the division wasted considerable effort in attempting to acquire critical engineer pieces of equipment.

(2) EVALUATION: Numerous nondivisions' units tried to coordinate with the 1st Engr Bn and USARV to have critical pieces of engineer equipment laterally transferred to them. Many man hours were wasted since USARV disapproved all such requests with the exception of the two ski barges required by the 25th Inf Div for training.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That USARV policy regarding lateral transfer of redeploying unit's equipment be published and distributed to all units in Vietnam. Periodic updates should be distributed as changes occur.

Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: a. Press speculation concerning the possible redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division appeared as early as 16 September 1969 and continued until the official MACV-CINCPAC announcement made on 12 January 1970 (for examples, see Appendix 1). Most notable was an Associated Press (AP) story to this effect (datelined Saigon) which appeared widely on 26 and 27 December 1969 and was carried in the Pacific Stars and Stripes. In addition, the division's Information Office (IO) began to receive an increasing number of press queries pertaining to the possible redeployment of the division following the President's speech 15 December 1969 announcing a Phase III redeployment. These rumors, while perhaps inevitable, caused a great deal of unnecessary speculation and anxiety among division personnel. However, they also provided the division IO with an early warning of future activities. Based on such unofficial stories and on the assumption that the 1st Inf Div would redeploy sometime in 1970, the IO took steps that went beyond the general requirements outlined in the USARV and 1st Inf Div OPLAN 183-69.

2. PLANNING AND PREPARATION: Prior to the official redeployment, the following measures were taken by the division IO:

a. Division IO personnel consulted USARV IO in early November 1969. This office identified the following information problem areas to be expected by redeploying units:

- (1) Press queries and requests for interviews prior to the official announcement of redeployment.
- (2) Control of the press following the announcement of redeployment.
- (3) Special ceremonies.

- (4) Dissemination of accurate command information to the individual soldier.
- (5) Requirement for comprehensive division and unit histories.

b. As a result of this guidance, an increased number of personnel (from two to five) were designated as escorts for correspondents and briefed on the importance of discussing only unclassified information that had been cleared for release by MACCI (Military Assistance Command Office of Information). In addition, the IO insured that information specialists at brigade and battalion headquarters were prepared to escort any newsman that by-passed the division office (this problem did not occur).

c. A comprehensive redeployment press kit was prepared to give reporters and other visitors background material on the Big Red One. The kit included a 16-page history of the division, names of all key personnel, recent division publications and other appropriate materials (see Appendix 2). Initially, these kits were mailed to 34 news agencies in Saigon and the United States on the day after the official redeployment announcement. Throughout redeployment, the kits were continuously updated and a total of 225 were made and distributed. The bulk of the kits were given out at the Lai Khe turnover ceremony on 25 February 1970 and the final departure ceremony on 3 April; the remainder were handed out piecemeal to visiting correspondents.

d. A comprehensive file on all information or press clippings relating to the division's redeployment was begun before the official announcement. This made it possible to keep abreast of all current news which had already been released to the press.

e. In expectation of a rising number of press personnel and other requirements as units began standing down, the IO prepared facilities for the press at Di An. The Di An office was already well established and had served as the distribution point for all MACV, USARV and 1st Inf Div publications throughout the

division, and the processing point for hometown news release forms. The main office at Lai Khe displaced to Di An in two echelons - one on 3 February 1970 consisting of all sections except administration and public information, and the second on 14 February. This insured that both the Di An and Lai Khe offices could assist visiting reporters. Telephones and typewriters were available for the press at both locations although little use was made of them.

3. COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM: a. On 11 January 1970, the IO was assigned to prepare a brief redeployment announcement to be pre-recorded by the Commanding General for broadcast over the division's AM-FM Radio Lai Khe station. The message (see Appendix 3) would officially announce the redeployment and assure division personnel that as soon as specific dates and redeployment criteria were available they would also be announced.

b. On 121615 January 1970, the official announcement of the division's redeployment was made jointly by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. The division IO had received no advance warning of the impending announcement and first learned of it through telephone calls from AP and CBS. The IO called MACOI's public information section, obtained the text of the announcement, and condensed and reproduced it for dissemination to the command group (see Appendix 4).

c. The Commanding General's Radio message was broadcast hourly over Radio Lai Khe from 122200 to 130300 January 1970. On 18 January 1970, Radio Lai Khe presented a 30-minute special on redeployment, including a brief history of the division's accomplishments.

d. In the weeks following these announcements, there was a major command information effort to inform division personnel of how the ensuing redeployment would affect them. Although several articles appeared in the American Traveler (see Appendix 5), the division's newspaper, they were not timely because of the delay between the newspaper's input and its publication (an explanation of this

time lag appears at Appendix 5). The command information effort thus centered around command-initiated letters distributed through AG channels (see Appendices 6, 7 and 8). In general the program sought to discourage speculation by advising troops not to expect any changes in their DEROS dates.

4. PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM: a. Visits by major media correspondents preceded the official announcement, and both NBC and ABC had made advance "canned" film stories for later public consumption. When the official word was received, an AP photographer, who was at Lai Khe because his bureau believed the announcement would be made that day, called reaction quotes to his Saigon office. A CBS film crew, which drove to Lai Khe after the announcement, interviewed the Commanding General and a film story on the division was completed the following day by NBC representatives. During the following week an increased number of other correspondents visited the division; most were seeking background information on the division and on the mechanics of redeployment.

b. Ceremonies offered major opportunities to tell the redeployment story.

(1) The special turnover ceremony at Lai Khe on 25 February 1970 was a joint effort between the 5th ARVN and 1st Infantry Division Information Offices. Guidance from the II FFORCEV IC requested that ARVN personnel be allowed to control the entire ceremony as much as possible. This necessitated careful coordination between the two offices as well as between the II FFORCEV and III Corps Tactical Zone (ARVN) Information Offices. Transportation to Lai Khe was provided by II FFORCEV, and transportation from the airfield to the ceremony was arranged by 1st Inf Div IC. Refreshments for the 40 correspondents present were jointly provided by the division's 1st Brigade stationed at Lai Khe and the newly arrived 5th ARVN Div. The press conference after the ceremony was supervised by III Corps, but the physical arrangements were made by the 5th ARVN Div.

(2) When the time came on 19 March 1970 for the Big Red One to fire its last

round of artillery in Vietnam, the division IO requested permission from MACGI to invite the press to the ceremony that was scheduled to accompany the shot. Permission was obtained (setting a precedent in MACGI redeployment policy) and a press callout was made by the IO the night before the ceremony. Unfortunately, a coup d'etat in Cambodia drew interest away from the ceremony and no civilian press attended.

(3) Because of the standdown of the 1st Administration Company, to which the IO staff is assigned, the IO requested USAFV support to cover the division's departure ceremony on 3 April 1970. The IO supplied press kits and the 121st Signal Battalion provided a PA system in the event of a press conference after the ceremony.

c. At Di An, a standard tour through the personnel outprocessing facilities allowed visiting correspondents to be escorted through in the same sequence as that followed by departing soldiers. Correspondents visiting standdown sites were cautioned that specific units could not be identified. In addition, reporters were referred to MACGI for all final decisions on what information could be released before the division's departure date.

d. There was a certain amount of confusion associated with the timely release of news concerning the division's redeployment.

(1) MACGI policy states that no news releases can be made concerning the redeployment of a unit until 24 hours before the unit departs Vietnam. Thus, despite the official division redeployment announcement on 12 January 1970, subordinate color bearing units could not be identified with the redeployment until 6 April 1970, the day before the departure of the Honor Guard. Strenuous efforts were made by the division IO to have this policy modified so that these individual units, rich in heritage and tradition, could receive separate recognition as they completed their standdowns.

(2) After many conferences and false starts, the USARV IO and MACOI agreed that such stories could be written stating that the unit was "redeploying with the Big Red One." However, after one story had been released (see Appendix 9), permission was withdrawn and the problem of giving these units special recognition remained unresolved.

5. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Release of Information.

(1) OBSERVATION: False rumors and misinformation regarding possible redeployment announcements resulted in many newsmen making unsuccessful trips to the division between 16 September 1969 and 11 January 1970.

(2) EVALUATION: Newsmen wasted much time and often became frustrated following false leads. This was especially disconcerting with news agencies which could not maintain large, in-country networks.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That, whenever possible, the press be given embargoed advance word on expected dates of major redeployment announcements in order to lower the dependence on rumor.

b. Official Notification of Redeployment.

(1) OBSERVATION: The 1st Inf Div IO had no advance warning of when the official redeployment announcement would be made.

(2) EVALUATION: As soon as the announcement was made, newsmen began to converge on Lai Khe. Since Lai Khe is only a 1.5 hour secure drive north of Saigon on Highway QL 13, news personnel were able to obtain their own transportation. Should the press have required air transportation to division headquarters, other arrangements would have had to have been made.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That advanced warning of all official announcements be given to the IO of concerned units so that contingency transportation plans and press accommodations may be established.

c. Clearance for Release of News Information.

(1) OBSERVATION: Current information policy regarding redeployment announcements is inequitable to battalions and brigades redeploying as part of a division as opposed to those redeploying as separate units.

(2) EVALUATION: One redeployment date was established for the 1st Inf Div even though its battalions and brigades withdrew from action over a six-week period. This meant that a single Marine battalion redeploying separately was likely to receive as much press attention as the 20 battalions of the 1st Infantry Division departing on the same date. Past publicity concerning battalions of the division emphasized that they were part of the Big Red One. Since the redeployment of the division had already been announced, there seemed to be little justification for not clearing feature stories on the accomplishments of individual battalions ahead of the division's final departure date.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That redeployment news release policies be reviewed and revised. Publicity concerning battalion size units redeploying as part of a division should be released ahead of the announcement of the departure of that division.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Redeployment News Accounts
- 2 - Redeployment Press Kit
- 3 - Redeployment Broadcast Text
- 4 - IO Condensation of the Official Redeployment Announcement
- 5 - American Traveler Articles
- 6 - CG Redeployment Letter of 13 Jan 70
- 7 - AG Redeployment Newsletter of 25 Jan 70
- 8 - AG Redeployment Newsletter of 22 Feb 70
- 9 - Feature-history on the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery

Appendix 1 (Redeployment News Accounts) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. Associated Press, 16 Sep 69, in the Lawrence (Mass.) Eagle-Tribune: "Among the troops expected to go are the 3rd Marine Division, now stationed along the demilitarized zone, and units of the 1st Infantry Division, the first Army division to arrive in Vietnam."
2. New York Times, 3 Nov 69: "The US 1st Infantry Division, the Big Red One, is nevertheless considered a prize candidate for early recall."
3. Baltimore Sun, 11 Dec 69 (datelined Washington): "The Army's 1st Infantry Division, which has fought in Vietnam since 1965, is considered in military quarters as the most likely outfit to be withdrawn in President Nixon's next round of troop cuts."
4. AP, 26 Dec 69, in the Memphis Press Scimitar (datelined Saigon): "The US 1st Infantry Division, the first Army unit to enter the war July 12, 1965, will be among those withdrawn by next April 15, informants said today."
5. AP, 26 Dec 69, in the 27 Dec 69 issue of the Baltimore Sun: "The Army's 1st Infantry Division will be included in the next US pullout and its duty of guarding the northern approaches to Saigon probably will be assumed by a South Vietnamese division, informed sources said tonight."
6. AP, 6 Jan 70, in the Washington Star (datelined Saigon): "Top American military officers will meet in Honolulu on Monday to work out final arrangements for the third-round withdrawal of 50,000 US troops that will include the 1st Infantry Division, informants said today."
7. AP, 12 Jan 70, in the Warren (Ohio) Tribune (datelined Saigon): "The US Command announced today the major units among the 50,000 American troops being withdrawn from Vietnam by April 15. They include the 1st Infantry Division, the 26th Marine Regiment and the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division."

8. Army Times, 21 Jan 70: "It'll be patch-switching time soon at Ft. Riley Kan, as a result of the latest Vietnam withdrawals." (probably the most accurate of the redeployment stories, this clearly implied that the move involved redesignation, rather than personnel and equipment redeployment).

Appendix 2 (Redeployment Press Kit) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (O)

The following items were included in the redeployment press kits:

1. History of the 1st Inf Div.
2. Photo and biographical sketch of the Commanding General.
3. List of past commanding generals of the 1st Inf Div.
4. List of commanders in the division.
5. List of command sergeants major in the division.
6. List of battalions and their nicknames.
7. Account of the origin of the Danger Forward CP marker.
8. Story of the origin of the Big Red One patch.
9. Division patch.
10. List of quotes made by famous personalities referring to the division.
11. News Release "Milloy on Redeployment," quoting the Commanding General on why the Big Red One was chosen for redeployment.
12. AG Redeployment newsletter date 25 Jan 70 (see Appendix 7).
13. Recent copies of the division's American Traveler newspaper containing redeployment articles.
14. The most recent issue of Danger Forward magazine.
15. Other materials as appropriate (e.g., lists of persons attending ceremonies including, in some cases, biographies and pictures; background of locations involved; and pertinent information on the 5th ARVN Div in English and Vietnamese when that division was involved in an event).

"Soldiers of the Big Red One:

"I wish to take this opportunity to officially announce that the 1st Infantry Division has been selected for redeployment to the United States.

"The dates concerning the beginning of our redeployment operation and the criteria for indicating who will leave with the division or be reassigned in-country will be announced shortly. As soon as these dates are available, I will see to it that you are immediately informed.

"In the meantime, we have a relatively short time left to put the Big Red One stamp on the Communists. Make every day count."

Appendix 4 (IO Condensation of the Official Redeployment Announcement) to Annex
H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Information Office
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345
January 12, 1970

Admiral John S. McCain, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, and General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, today identified the US 1st Infantry Division as the major element of the Phase III Redeployment.

Other units identified were the 3d Brigade, 4th US Infantry Division; three tactical fighter squadrons of the USAF 12th Tactical Fighter Wing; and the USMC 26th Regimental Landing Team. The Navy units, which were not identified, are characterized as service support units. The Phase III reduction in authorized strength of US Forces in Vietnam includes 29,500 US Army spaces, 12,900 Marine spaces, 5,600 US Air Force spaces, and 2,000 Navy spaces.

The US 1st Infantry Division will be reduced to two percent of its authorized strength and returned to Ft. Riley, Kan. The Division will be reorganized as the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), using the assets currently assigned to the US 24th Division (Mechanized). The 24th Division will concurrently be inactivated. The missions, assets, organizational structure, and unit stationing of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) will be the same as those of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) (it is still not clear whether this means the 1st Division (Mech) will have a brigade stationed in Europe).

Personnel policies for redeployment will be similar to those of previous phases of redeployment. For the most part, those with the longest service in country will be eligible for redeployment, while those with shorter service will be reassigned in Vietnam.

A number of smaller combat support and combat service support units of all services will be included in the redeployment of 50,000 authorized spaces. They will be identified 24 hours prior to their departure from Vietnam.

The first movement of personnel in connection with Phase III will not occur before early February.

Appendix J (American Traveler Articles) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BOMBAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The American Traveler, the 1st Infantry Division's weekly newspaper, had a lead time (from the day the input is sent to the printer in Tokyo to the publication date) of 14 days as a rule. This could be reduced by one or two days if necessary but no more. It was therefore impractical to rely solely on this medium to inform division personnel about redeployment. By coincidence, a general article on redeployment written by the Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army (OCINFO, DA), appeared one week after the official announcement on 12 January 1970. The first stories specifically about the Big Red One's redeployment appeared in the issue of 26 January 1970. Command-initiated letters distributed through AG channels were the most immediate practical means of disseminating accurate information to division soldiers.

2. SAMPLE STORIES: Examples of articles that appeared in the American Traveler between 12 January and 3 April 1970 are under Tabs A-J with the date of the issue in which they appeared.

TABS

- A - Withdrawal Policy Announced by DA (19 Jan 70)
- B - 'Make Every Day Count,' Says CG (26 Jan 70)
- C - CG explains why 1st Division was Chosen (26 Jan 70)
- D - AG tells Redeployment Policy (9 Feb 70)
- E - Redeploy Office Opens (9 Feb 70)
- F - Viet's Comment on ERC Move (16 Feb 70)
- G - Troop Redeployment Process Proceeding on Schedule (2 Mar 70)
- H - 5th ARVN Div Replaces the Big Red One in Lai Khe (9 Mar 70)
- I - Processing Center Opered (3 Apr 70)
- J - Color Guard Chosen to Return to Riley (3 Apr 70)

Withdrawal policy announced by DA

(OCINFO, DA)—The reduction of United States forces in the Republic of Vietnam is part of the continuing Vietnamization program and has been worked out in close coordination with the leaders of that country.

Troop reductions in Vietnam commence with a reduction in the authorized troop ceiling. That is, the total number of United States forces authorized to be in Vietnam is cut. For example, the authorized troop ceiling of 549,500 at the beginning of 1969 was reduced to 324,500 effective August 31, 1969. The second reduction lowered that ceiling to 484,000 personnel spaces as of December 15, 1969. And the third reduction made the ceiling 434,000 by April 15, 1970.

The reduction in personnel has been managed primarily on a unit basis, dealing essentially with authorized strengths. Once a new troop ceiling is determined, a reduction or redeployment of units is planned to meet the new space authorization figure. Certain units are selected for elimination from the force structure in Vietnam and then are inactivated or redeployed. However, the personnel in these units are not necessarily returned to the United States. The basic policy of a 12-month tour for individuals continues to apply.

In planning a reduction in personnel to meet the reduced troop ceiling figure, the overriding requirement is maintenance of the combat readiness of units remaining in Vietnam. Within that requirement, a policy of individual equity is followed. Therefore, personnel selected to be withdrawn from Vietnam are, in general, those within 90 days of their expected date of return. It would be unfair and uneconomical to return soldiers who had recently arrived in Vietnam ahead of those who served there several months longer. Because units in Vietnam regularly receive replacements for men completing the 12-month tour, most units have individuals who arrived in Vietnam only weeks before the announcement of troop reductions was made. Hence, many members of designated units do not return home immediately. Those personnel who have significant portions of their one-year tour remaining are reassigned to other units in Vietnam.

Units returned for inactivation are not redeployed as full strength units. Only a relatively small number of personnel are returned with the colors of each unit, and they are usually those who have completed or are nearing completion of their tour. An example of a unit being returned for inactivation with a small number of personnel is the 1st Brigade, 2nd Airborne Division.

Personnel serving in a unit which has been designated for redeployment or inactivation should not assume that they will return home immediately. Rather, they should wait until specific details have been determined and until they are notified, as individuals, that they are returning home or being reassigned to another unit in Vietnam.

It is the Army's desire to manage troop reductions in such a way that, insofar as possible, equitable tours are maintained for all personnel.

19 Jan 70

H-5-A-1

Tab B ('Make Every Day Count,' Says CG) to Appendix 5 (American Travler Articles) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

'Make every day count,' says CG

In the wake of the official announcement that the 1st Infantry Division is included in Phase III Redeployment, the commanding general urged the soldiers of the Big Red One to leave their mark on the enemy as a parting gesture.

Major General A.E. Milloy said the soldiers in a radio broadcast the night the announcement was made: "We have a relatively short time left to put the Big Red One stamp on the Communists. Make every day count."

General Milloy said the details of redeployment—including when the Division would start leaving and what would be the criteria for selecting the individuals to return home early—"will be announced shortly."

"As soon as these dates are available, I will see to it that you are immediately informed," he said.

The official announcement was made public at 4:15 p.m. Saigon time, on January 12, when it was handed to reporters at the daily news briefing in downtown Saigon. The announcement was made jointly by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., commander in chief, Pacific Command, and General Craghton W. Abratt, commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

The statement said a small contingent of the Big Red One soldiers (about two percent of the Division's strength) will return to Ft. Riley, Kan., to serve as the nucleus of a reorganized 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized).

The mechanized Big Red One will replace the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which will be inactivated. The 24th Division moved into Ft. Riley after the 1st Division was deployed to Vietnam. Ft. Riley had been the home of the Big Red One for 10 years—from 1893,

when the Division returned to the US from Europe, until 1903, when it deployed to Vietnam.

The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) will take over the assets of the 24th Division, and will assume the role the 24th had in the US defense structure.

"The mission, assignments, organization structure and unit stationing of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) will be the same as those of the 24th Division," the announcement said.

The announcement was not specific as to the criteria determining who will return to the United States, either with the Division or for reassignment, and who will be reassigned in Vietnam.

"As of this date the redeployment criteria have not been determined," General Milloy said the day after the announcement in a letter addressed to the officers and men of the Big Red One.

"I know that this matter is of great concern to each and everyone of you, and you can rest assured that as soon as any information is received, it will be passed on to you."

In the letter, the General cautioned against speculation as to anyone in the division returning home early.

"I urge you to suppress the many rumors which have been generated and concentrate on eliminating the Communist threat," he said.

26 Jan 70

Tab C (CG explains why 1st Division was Chosen) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles) to Annex E (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

CG explains why 1st Division was chosen

By SPS Charles W. Rubenstein (D1 VIO) — "We worked ourselves out of a job!"

As Major General A. E. Milloy sees it, that is the answer to the question, "Why the 1st Division?"

In an interview with a TV newsmen, General Milloy, the Division commander, discussed some of the reasons why the Big Red One was selected for redeployment.

Although the general emphasized that the war is not "over" in that part of Vietnam, he pointed out that the enemy in the Di-

vision's area of operation has been broken up into small units reluctant to get into battles. He pointed to the Big Red One's excellent record of pacification and the "remarkable progress" of the 5th ARVN Division as further reasons why the 1st Division is a logical choice to be redeployed.

"The Big Red One came to South Vietnam in 1965 and moved into this area," the general began. "Since that time we have fought many hard and vicious battles — in the Michelin, Thunder Road, War Zone C, and War Zone D — against the best the VC had to put up.

"Over this period of time we have been able to drive them out to the point that we are only opposed now by small local force units. The enemy is reluctant to fight. As a matter of fact, they do everything they can to avoid contact.

"We have done extremely well in the area of pacification," the general added. "A few years ago the roads were seldom traveled by civilians or military. Now you can look at any by-road and see a steady stream of traffic. Fields are under cultivation and all the people are busy. Acts of terrorism are almost non-ex-

istent. The people are able to travel at will."

The general said he has seen noticeable improvement not only in pacification and the economic life of the area, but also in the ability of the ARVN troops to protect the area.

"The ARVNs have made remarkable progress in the Hoa Tien (Progress Together) program," said General Milloy, who served as the senior advisor to the 5th ARVN Division during his previous Vietnam tour. "I think they are in good shape to take over this particular area, where the status of pacification is outstanding."

26 Jan 70

R-5-C-1

Tab D (AD tells Redeployment Policy) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles) to Annex E (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Adjutant General tells redeployment policy

"Don't believe the rumors that you will go home early."

That admonition contained in a recent newsletter published by the Division Adjutant General just about sums up the personnel policy to be followed as the Big Red One redeploy.

Most 1st Infantry Division soldiers have gotten the word that this phase of redeployment will not mean early DEROS. But the newsletter for the first time spelled out the policy clearly as it affects each man in the Division.

Here is the text of the newsletter:

TO: The Officers and Men of the Big Red One.

Within the next two months, the 1st Infantry Division will be returning to the United States. The question foremost in each soldier's mind is, "What is going to happen to me?" The purpose of this letter is to explain, in general terms, what is going to happen to the officers and men of the Big Red One.

Although the Division is going home, only a small number of soldiers will actually make the move with the Division to Fort Riley, Kansas. These soldiers will be members of a ceremonial unit carrying the Big Red One colors to the United States.

The question still remains, then, what will happen to the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division soldiers? The personnel redeployment criteria, as announced by United States Army Vietnam, provide that no one will return to the United States

until he has completed a normal tour in Vietnam. Therefore, many officers and enlisted men will have to be reassigned.

"When will I be reassigned and where will I be going?" are the next logical questions. "When" is easily answered — reassignments will be accomplished during your unit's stand-down period. "Where" is more complex. In fact, except for DEROS personnel, we don't even know right now. But one of the following things will happen:

a. If your DEROS is before or during your unit's stand-down period, you will rotate normally.

b. If your DEROS is shortly after your unit's stand-down, less than 30 days, you will receive a brief temporary assignment in-country. Don't believe the rumors that you will go home early.

c. If your DEROS is a month or longer after your unit's stand-down you will be either reassigned within the division and then later assigned to another USARV unit or assigned directly to another USARV unit.

d. As soon as we find out exactly where you are going, we will issue the necessary orders. You will have your orders prior to your unit's stand-down.

Personnel outprocessing procedures have been changed to accommodate the large numbers of personnel departing:

a. Personnel being reassigned to other USARV units will outprocess through a special facility established at the Division Training Command, Di An. But

don't try to get there on your own. Everyone will be scheduled by this headquarters to outprocess at a specific hour. This schedule will be given to your company commander, who will, in turn, notify you. Transportation will be provided. Current planning is that you outprocess in the morning and ship to your new unit in the afternoon. Specifics on your departure time and date will be fur-

nished when your unit stands down.

b. If your DEROS is before or during your unit's stand-down period, you will report to the Replacement Detachment at Di An. Out-processing will be handled at the Personnel Service Division, not at the Training Command. Just follow the instructions in your special orders and you will not have any trouble.

(Continued on Page 2)

AG on redeployment

(Continued From Page 1)

c. If you are being reassigned to another Big Red One unit, you don't have to process through Personnel, but must proceed directly to your new unit. Again, your reassignment orders will give you specific instructions. Make sure you arrive at your new unit on time. Reporting late can have serious consequences.

d. If you are not sure what to do, ask your first sergeant.

Regardless of when or where you outprocess, you may be sure you will receive the finest personnel service available. Before you leave the Big Red One, the Adjutant General Section is going to make sure your personnel records are accurate and complete. There is a long, long list of things we plan to check and things we want you personally to verify. Those you will be most interested in are promotions, MOS, ID cards and tags, awards and decorations, and emergency data. If you have any questions, bring them up at that time. The Adjutant General outprocessing philosophy is that all personnel records will be complete, current and accurate

to our satisfaction and yours. We will not accept anything but the best, and we don't expect you to either.

9 Feb 70

H-5-D-1

Tab E (Redeploy Office Opens) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles)
to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After
Action Report (U)

Redeploy office opens

(DIY 10) — The 1st Infantry Division recently opened an office to coordinate the redeployment activities of the Division.

Major General A.E. Milloy, Big Red One Commander, and the two staff officers chiefly responsible for redeployment were on hand to open the Redeploy-

ment Control Center.

The staff officers are Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Wereszynski of Alexandria, Va., the Division's assistant chief of staff G1, and Lieutenant Colonel Roger A. Culbertson, assistant chief of staff G4.

Colonel Wereszynski is on his second tour with the Division.

He helped pack and move the Big Red One to Vietnam in 1963 and, as a major, commanded a battalion for a short time in 1966.

As the Big Red One's top personnel and administration official, Colonel Wereszynski is now responsible for sending the soldiers of the Division to their new stations in Vietnam or in the US.

Colonel Culbertson's role in redeployment concerns equipment rather than men. He is responsible for transporting such things as field gear, weapons, fuel, vehicles, and machinery from Big Red One units now using them to their new users in Vietnam. Both Colonel Wereszynski and Colonel Culbertson received college degrees at the University of Omaha.

9 Feb 70

H-5-E-1

Viets comment on BRO move

By PFC Ike Sallert

(3rd Bde 10) — In the Hamlet of Lai Khe, which is completely surrounded by the Division base-camp, there live 2,000 people whose lives have been greatly influenced by the American unit.

When the Division first came to Lai Khe in October, 1965, only 1500 people lived there. The population has increased 100 percent and a higher standard of living has been attained — due mainly to the Big Red One. It is natural, therefore, that these people should have mixed feelings about the redeployment.

According to Tran Huu An, the hamlet chief, "When the 1st Division moved to Lai Khe and secured the area from the VC, more people moved into the hamlet to get the jobs that were

offered. The influence of the Big Red One on my people has been most good, especially in terms of medical aid and the teaching of good sanitation."

Asked about the redeployment Mr. Tran said "The Vietnamization program in this area has been and I feel will continue to be very successful in the future."

Mr. Nguyen Van Nhon, supervisor of Vietnamese workers at the Division's 3rd Brigade commented "The Division has given many people here jobs but when the Americans leave, jobs will become more scarce."

"A great concern about the Big Red One has effected most of the people here," says Miss Le Thi Bay, the village nurse and midwife. "I would like to see the Division remain because

we don't really have peace yet. I will be sorry to see them go."

Miss Bay, who also teaches Vietnamese classes for Big Red One soldiers, feels they have really tried to make friends and have. "I can tell this by the large turn out I have for classes," she continued.

Perhaps the feeling of the majority of Vietnamese about the Big Red One can best be summed up by a Red Cross secretary, Miss Tran Thi Binh. "In October, 1965 the Big Red One came to Lai Khe. The village was then controlled by the VC. The Americans drove out the VC and secured the area. I hate to see the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division leave and I hope my people remember the wonderful things they have done for us."

16 Feb 70

H-5-P-1

Tab G (Troop Redeployment Process Proceeding on Schedule) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles) to Annex B (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KRISTINE MURRAY After Action Report (U)

Troop redeployment process proceeding on schedule

By SP4 C. Wade Webster.
Redeployment. What does it all mean? Webster defines it as the movement, such as troops, from one front to another, or from Europe to the Pacific. In the case of the 1st Infantry Division the move will not be from Europe to the Pacific, but from the Republic of Vietnam to Ft. Riley, Kan.

What happens to all the equipment that is used by the Division and of course what happens to all the personnel are two questions that are foremost in everyone's mind.

Two of the key men in the redeployment of the Big Red One are Lieutenant Colonel Roger A. Culbertson, assistant chief of staff G4, and Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Wereszynski, assistant chief of staff G1. Both men wear "Big Red One sandwiches" — they have been with the 1st Division before.

Colonel Culbertson is responsible for the movement of all equipment now used by the Division back to its owners, so it can be redistributed to other units in Vietnam. The job of Colonel Wereszynski is to send the soldiers of the Big Red One to their new stations in Vietnam or in the US.

"There are four things involved in the redeployment as far as equipment and facilities are concerned," said Colonel Culbertson.

"These are, to redeploy to the US without supplies and equipment; close or transfer all base camps; solve defective problems and fire support bases; turn in all equipment; and turn in all property books," he explained.

There will be four phases of the redeployment. The first of these is pre-stand down. During this period all units are required

to inventory all their property and turn the results in to the Division G4. They are given 10 days to do this.

"The purpose of this is so that higher headquarters will be able to schedule the turn in of all equipment from the Division," said Colonel Culbertson.

"We have already started turning in some non-essential items such as beds, wall lockers, tents and some weapons," he stated.

Colonel Culbertson pointed out that there are four turn in points. These are Di An, Lai Khe, Da Nang and Long Binh.

Phase two of the redeployment is the transfer of facilities from 1st Division control to the control of other commands. Part of Da Nang will be turned over to the 3rd Infantry Division. Another portion of the base camp will be returned to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and the French buildings will be returned to their owners, the operators of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Lai Khe, the Big Red One's Headquarters base camp, will be inhabited by both US and ARVN units. Phu Loi and Di An will be taken over by other American units.

The actual stand-down comes under phase three. This period covers from four to 18 days for each unit. During this time all personnel will process, and all units will turn their property books.

"Each day of a unit's stand-down they will turn in so much equipment, so that by the last day their property books will be zeroed," explained Colonel Culbertson.

Who does all this equipment belong to and what will happen to it? "All property used by the

on schedule

Division is owned by the United States Army Vietnam," Colonel Culbertson said, "and will be turned over to their receiving agency, the Saigon Support Command."

"One of five things will happen to the equipment after this. It will be redistributed to other US units, given to Free World Forces, salvaged, sent out of Vietnam to be repaired then sent back here, or sent back to the States to be used," he added.

"During this stand-down period each man in the unit will clean equipment before it is turned in," said Colonel Culbertson.

The final stage of the redeployment is the processing of personnel, who will be either transferred to a new unit in

Vietnam or sent back to the States.

There are two categories for processing. There is an established schedule during which personnel will be either reassigned to another unit in Vietnam or sent back to the States. The second category is for people who will be sent to another unit in the 1st Division.

What will determine who will go home and who will be reassigned within the Division or in-country?

"The majority of people whose
(Continued on Page 3)

2 Mar 70

R-5-G-1

(CONTINUATION)

Redeployment underway now

(Continued From Page 1)

DEROS is 60 day or less from the last day of their unit's stand-down will be returned to the States," said Colonel Wereszynski. "When the person returns to the States under this program, and has less than 150 days remaining in the service, he will ETS. If he has more than 150 days remaining, he will be reassigned to another duty station," he added.

Everyone who has more than 60 days to DEROS will be reassigned in-country. The majority of the transfers within the Division will be picked from people who fall in this category, and will depend on the needs of the Division.

If a man's DEROS is before or during his unit's stand-down period, he will rotate normally, and will get the same attention as personnel being reassigned to other USARV units. People who will be given drops will go through normal DEROS procedures.

"When a man arrives at the stand-down center it will give him a chance to get cleaned up and have a good meal," Colonel Wereszynski stated.

Each man who goes through the special out-processing facility established at the Division Training Command in Di An will stop at three stations. The first of these is finance. Here the individual will be given all the pay

he has coming to him up until that day, and his financial records will be brought up to date.

The next station is medical. All medical records will be reviewed and shot records will be brought up to date. If new shot records are needed they will be issued.

The third and last stop, and probably the most important is personnel. Promotions, MOS data, ID cards and dog tags, awards and decorations, and emergency data will all be checked to make sure they are complete, current and accurate.

"The theme of this redeployment is the Big Red One takes care of its own," said Colonel Wereszynski.

"If a man has to go home on emergency leave during his unit's stand-down period he will

go," he said. "If he has enough time remaining on his Vietnam tour, he will receive his reassignment before he leaves country. When he returns to Vietnam he will not come back to the 1st Division, but will report directly to his new unit."

Normal DEROS personnel will ship their personal belongings under regular hold-baggage procedures. In-country transfers will not be allowed hold-baggage and will take their belongings with them to their new unit along with their field gear. The only thing they will not take is their weapon.

Soldiers who will be members of the ceremonial unit carrying the Big Red One colors back to Ft. Riley, must have no more than 60 days and no less than 30 days left on their tours as of April 7.

5th ARVN Div replaces the Big Red One in Lai Khe

By LT Mark F. Chapp (DIV 10) — In a colorful ceremony at Lai Khe, the 1st Infantry Division turned over its headquarters complex and base camp to the 5th ARVN Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The move precedes the transfer of a large tactical area of responsibility to the 5th ARVN Division when the Big Red One redeploys to the United States on April 15.

The US and Republic of Vietnam flags that had flown side by side for four years were lowered and replaced by a single Vietnamese flag to symbolize the

Vietnamization of the defense of Binh Duong Province. The event took place in front of the new 5th ARVN Division headquarters, a building which the Big Red One had vacated when it moved its headquarters to Di An.

The ceremony represented "not only changing a US base to a Vietnamese base but the turning over of responsibility for the war effort from US to Vietnamese troops," said Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri in a press conference after the ceremony.

General Tri is commanding general of III Corps Tactical Zone

The Lai Khe ceremony and what it symbolizes was considered especially significant because the Big Red One, the first US division to be sent to Vietnam to bolster the defense of the Republic, was now handing the burden of the fighting back to the Vietnamese.

"In recent months, the 1st Division has progressively worked itself out of a job," General Ewell told newsmen. "It has reduced enemy strength so much that we had more troops in the central areas of III Corps than were needed."

But he went on to say that US accomplishments were not the only considerations in redeploying the Big Red One.

Although the 5th ARVN Division "for some years has defended Saigon by being in fairly close," he said, "the 5th is moving north and now will grind down and eliminate the enemy units farther and farther north of Saigon."

He explained that the 1st Division — "one of our traditional first line units" — had occupied "key positions" in the northern approaches to Saigon.

The Dong Tien (Progress Together) Program was accorded much of the credit for making the turnover possible.

"It is gratifying that the 5th ARVN Division is taking over," said General Milloy in brief remarks during the ceremony. "Our combined forces have reduced the enemy to a new level of ineffectiveness."

"We (US and ARVN forces) have learned much from each other," he added.

General Milloy, the last com-

mander of the Big Red One in Vietnam, speaks from experience when he assesses the capability of the 3rd and the Improvement it has demonstrated in 4½ years. As a colonel in 1965 and 1966, he was senior advisor to the 3rd ARVN Division and then commander of the 1st Division's 2nd Brigade.

While the 3rd Division will have responsibility for the defense of Lai Khe, ARVN troops will occupy only three-fourths of the base. US Army aviation, artillery, cavalry and engineer elements will remain in Lai Khe to

support forces such as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 5th ARVN Division. These are not 1st Infantry Division elements, however.

The turnover of Lai Khe marked the end of an era for the Big Red One. But even though there will soon be no more 1st Division troops stationed there, said General Milloy, "there will always be a special association between Lai Khe and the 1st Division."

The 1st Infantry Division headquarters moved to Lai Khe on October 27, 1967.

Tab I (Processing Center Opened) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEISTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Processing center opened

By SP4 Ray Hunt

(DIV 10) — A ribbon cutting ceremony was recently held to signify the opening of the First Division Redeployment Out Processing Complex.

The new complex, which will process 13,000 First Division soldiers, is set up with personnel, finance, and medical processing locations in the same area as a result of centralized location of the centers. It is estimated that 50 to 75 men will be processed each hour.

The new complex also has taken into consideration the many problems confronting soldiers in out processing. Common problems such as missing ID cards and ID tags, shots to be given, and earned but unawarded medals can all be routinely handled. In fact the complex even installed sewing machines to put

on the unit patches each man will receive for his next unit of assignment.

The processing center has also tried to avoid bottlenecks in the processing operation each man is scheduled to go through at a set time. On this basis, men picked up and processed in the morning starting at seven-thirty, will be finished processing and actually on their way to their next unit by early afternoon.

Present to start the new complex, was Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Werczynski, G-1, who commenced the opening by cutting the ribbon. Others present for the ceremony were Lieutenant Colonel James H. Cook, Division Finance Officer; Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hefner, Division Surgeon, and Lieutenant Colonel C.T. Selby, Adjutant General.

3 Apr 70

H-5-I-1

Tab J (Color Guard Chosen to Return to Riley) to Appendix 5 (American Traveler Articles) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Color guard chosen' to return to Riley

By SP4 David Sucas
(DIV IO) — For 340 1st Infantry Division soldiers the return home will be more than just going back after serving 10 or more months in Vietnam. These soldiers have been selected to escort the colors that have seen 1½ years of duty in Southeast Asia.

"The color guard will land at Forbes Air Force Base in Kansas and then depart to Ft. Riley where they will be met by the 24th Infantry Division," explained Lieutenant Colonel Henry Weresynski, USA, N.Y., Division G-1. The ceremonial honor unit will depart in April aboard special mission aircraft. A farewell ceremony will be held in Da Nang before the colors start their 12,000 mile journey and depart Vietnam.

The men selected for this mission were carefully picked.

"The standards were high. The criteria for all the men was that their DEROS had to fall between April 7 and June 7 except for 14 individuals who were outstanding soldiers, were serving on extensions, or were needed at Ft. Riley.

Colonel (A. G.) Hume (Chief of Staff) inspected the military records of the 340 men. The final list was then submitted to Major General (A. F.) Milloy, (Division Commander) who gave the final approval," said Second Lieutenant James F. Keegan of Houston project officer.

This will not be the first time the 1st Division's colors have been ceremoniously returned home. Following World War I the colors were paraded down New York's Fifth Avenue and were reviewed by President Woodrow Wilson. The colors returned to Ft. Riley, Kan., in the summer of 1955 after the Division's 11 years of continuous service overseas.

When the color guard departs Bien Hoa Air Force Base, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Stanton, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery will lead the honor guard aboard the special mission aircraft that will carry the men and the colors back home.

The Division Training Command will be responsible for the administrative, billeting and messing of the honor guard prior to its departure. "Each man will be fitted with new jungle uniforms," noted Master Sergeant Ralph L. Hoffman, Chester, W. V. "Our basic mission at the Training Command will handle the operations involved."

"Some of the men kid me about going home with the colors. But seriously, we all have to go home some time and I can't think of a better way to go," declared Master Sergeant James Thomas of Cleveland, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, intelligence air sergeant. "To me it is a real honor to have this opportunity," added the Sergeant who has served 18 years in the Army.

"I was quite happy," replied Sergeant David Evans of Houston, who operates a Military Affiliated Radio Station (MARS) at Big Red One fire support bases for Company B, 121st Signal Battalion.

"When I found out the first thing I did was to call my wife and let her know about the good news. She was very happy. Also it sure is nice to get back to the 'world' a month early."

Specialist 4 John Rafanski, Hibbing, Minn., Company A 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry has been on line for 9½ months.

"I feel great about returning home with the colors," he said "and I was sure surprised when I found out that I would go!"

3 Apr 70

H-5-J-1

Appendix 6 (CG Redeployment Letter of 13 Jan 70) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

13 January 1969

SUBJECT: Redeployment of the Big Red One

TO: The Officers and Men of the Big Red One

1. The redeployment of the Big Red One to the United States has been officially announced. As of this date the redeployment criteria have not been determined. I know that this matter is of great concern to each and every one of you, and you can rest assured that as soon as any information is received, it will be passed on to you.

2. Your best interests have and will always be uppermost not only in my mind, but also in the minds of my staff as well. We are presently making every effort to obtain all the information we can on the redeployment. While much of this data is now classified, as soon as we are allowed to disseminate what facts we know, we will do so with great dispatch. In the meantime, I urge you to suppress the many rumors which have been generated and concentrate on eliminating the communist threat.

A. E. MILROY
Major General, USA
Commanding

Appendix 7 (AG Redeployment Newsletter of 25 Jan 70) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
Office of the Adjutant General
APC 96345

AVUR-AG

25 January 1970

SUBJECT: AG Redeployment Newsletter

TO: The Officers and Men of the Big Red One

1. Within the next three months, the 1st Infantry Division will be returning to the United States. The question foremost in each soldier's mind is, "What is going to happen to me?" The purpose of this letter is to explain, in general terms, what is going to happen to the officers and men of the Big Red One.
2. Although the Division is going home, only a small number of soldiers will actually make the move with the Division to Fort Riley, Kansas. These soldiers will be members of a ceremonial unit carrying the Big Red One colors to the United States.
3. The question still remains, then, what will happen to the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division soldiers? The personnel redeployment criteria, as announced by United States Army Vietnam, provide that no one will return to the United States until he has completed a normal tour in Vietnam. Therefore, many officers and enlisted men will have to be reassigned.
4. "When will I be reassigned and where will I be going?" are the next logical questions. "When" is easily answered - reassignments will be accomplished during your unit's standdown period. "Where" is more complex. In fact, except for DEROS personnel, we don't even know right now. But one of the following things will happen:
 - a. If your DEROS is before or during your unit's standdown period, you will rotate normally.
 - b. If your DEROS is shortly after your unit's standdown, less than 30 days, you will receive a brief temporary assignment in-country. Don't believe the rumors that you will go home early.

25 January 1970

c. If your DEROS is a month or longer after your unit's standdown, you will be either reassigned within the division and then later assigned to another USARV unit or assigned directly to another USARV unit.

d. As soon as we find out exactly where you are going, we will issue the necessary orders. You will have your orders prior to your unit's standdown.

5. Personnel outprocessing procedures have been changed to accommodate the large numbers of personnel departing.

a. Personnel being reassigned to other USARV units will outprocess through a special facility established at the Division Training Command, Di An. But don't try to get there on your own. Everyone will be scheduled by this headquarters to outprocess at a specific hour. This schedule will be given to your company commander, who will, in turn, notify you. Transportation will be provided. Current planning is that you outprocess in the morning and ship to your new unit in the afternoon. Specifics on your departure time and date will be furnished when your unit stands down.

b. If your DEROS is before or during your unit's standdown period, you will report to the Replacement Detachment at Di An. Out-processing will be handled at the Personnel Service Division, not at the Training Command. Just follow the instructions in your special orders and you will not have any trouble.

c. If you are being reassigned to another Big Red One unit, you don't have to process through Personnel, but must proceed directly to your new unit. Again, your reassignment orders will give you specific instructions. Make sure you arrive at your new unit on time. Reporting late can have serious consequences.

d. If you are not sure what to do, ask your first sergeant.

6. Regardless of when or where you outprocess, you may be sure you will receive the finest personnel service available. Before you leave the Big Red One, the Adjutant General Section is going to make sure your personnel records are accurate and complete. There is a long, long list of things we plan to check and things we want you personally to verify. Those you will be most interested in are promotions, MOS, ID cards and tags, awards and decorations, and emergency data. If you have any questions, bring them up at that time. The Adjutant General outprocessing philosophy is that all personnel records will be complete, current and accurate to our satisfaction and yours. We will not accept anything but the best, and we don't expect you to, either.

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

Appendix B (AC Redeployment Newsletter of 22 Feb 70) to Annex H (Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEWAY After Action Report (L)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVIB-AC

22 February 1970

SUBJECT: AC Redeployment Newsletter

All Members of the Big Red One

1. The purpose of this letter is to explain a recent change in the personnel redeployment criteria.
2. The revised criteria provide that a soldier's foreign service tour may be curtailed if the soldier has sixty days or less until DEROS as of the last day of his unit's standdown and his services are no longer essential to the Division's mission. If a soldier has more than sixty days until DEROS he will be reassigned in Vietnam. Here are a few examples of how the criteria apply:
 - a. Your DEROS is 1 June and the last day of your unit's standdown is 1 April. This is sixty-one days; therefore, you will be reassigned in Vietnam. (The sixty-one days are computed as twenty-nine days for 2-30 April, thirty-one days for May, and one day for June.)
 - b. Your DEROS is 14 May and the last day of your unit's standdown is 15 March. This is sixty days; therefore, your foreign service tour may be curtailed. (The sixty days are computed as sixteen days for March, thirty days for April, and fourteen days for May.)
3. Although an individual may be eligible for curtailment, he will not necessarily be curtailed. Some soldiers eligible for curtailment may be retained in the Division to assist with redeployment operations. Where possible, of course, personnel eligible for curtailment will be curtailed.
4. If you have an approved extension of your foreign service tour for the purpose of obtaining early release from active duty when you return to the United States, this commitment will be honored. However, to be eligible for release from active duty when you return, you must have not more than one hundred fifty days remaining until your ETS on the date of your return. Therefore, even though you meet the new criteria explained in paragraph 2, above, your foreign

AVDB-AG
SUBJECT: AC Redeployment Newsletter

22 February 1970

service tour will not be curtailed. Instead, you will be reassigned within the Division or to another unit in Vietnam to serve the remainder of your foreign service tour extension. Thus, you will be returning on the DEROS established as a result of the approval of your voluntary extension, and you will be released from active duty immediately upon your arrival in the United States.

5. When will you know for sure whether or not your foreign service tour will be curtailed? Your orders, which you will receive soon, will provide that information. Of course, if you extended your tour to receive an early release from active duty, you know now that your tour will not be curtailed; and when you receive your orders, you will know the unit to which you will be reassigned for the short time before your DEROS.

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

Appendix 9 (Feature-history on the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery) to Annex H
(Information) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SLUG: 1/5 HISTORY

By SGT Fred Schuttenberg

Information Office
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345
Release No. 00330
March 13, 1970

DI AN, Republic of Vietnam (DIV ID)--The oldest continuously existing unit in the U.S. Army, an artillery battery which crossed the icy waters of the Delaware with George Washington in the Revolutionary War, is one of the units scheduled to return to the United States next month as part of the 1st Infantry Division.

The historic unit, D Battery, 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, also fought the British with Andrew Jackson in the Battle of New Orleans and is credited with firing the last shot of World War II in Europe. Organized in 1776 by Captain Alexander Hamilton, it was later expanded into the 5th Artillery Regiment. The 1st Battalion inspired the well-known "Caissons Go Rolling Along" song which has been adapted as the official song of the U.S. Army.

March 1, 1776, saw the birth of the unit which would in later years become D Battery, 5th Artillery. A 19-year-old youth, Alexander Hamilton, later to become the first Secretary of the Treasury, recruited and trained his New York Provincial Artillery Company. He was in command when it first fired on July 12, 1776.

Hamilton's battery, participated in a number of delaying actions before its first full-scale battle at White Plains, N.Y., on October 28, 1776. It crossed the Delaware River with Washington on that fateful Christmas night in 1776 and went on to fight in almost all the remaining battles of the war.

The story is told that at the battle of Princeton, Hamilton personally aimed one of his brass cannon and fired a 6-pound shot which "passed through the head of King George the Second's portrait in the chapel," now Princeton University's Nassau Hall.

D Battery participated in only one battle during the War of 1812, but it was a decisive one. A large British fleet was sailing up the Mississippi River to relieve the Redcoat soldiers at New Orleans. D Battery placed its cannon along the riverbank, and when the ships came into range, opened fire. The fleet was delayed, enabling General Andrew Jackson's army at New Orleans to crush the unsupported British troops.

The Battery fought in the Mexican War, Civil War, Indian Wars against the Sioux, and the Spanish-American War. In 1900 it received its initiation in the art of jungle fighting in the Philippines, first against the Insurrectionists under Aguinaldo, and later against the Moro headhunters.

In 1907 D Battery was reorganized as the 5th Artillery Regiment. The famous "Caisson Song," the Army's unofficial anthem in World Wars I and II, was written

SLUG: 1/5 HISTORY
ADD ONE

about this unit. Lieutenant (later Brigadier General) Edmond L. Gruber composed the words in March, 1908 at camp Stotsenburg, Parpanga, Philippines, to commemorate the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery to relieve the 2nd Battalion.

During World War I, the 5th was part of the 1st Expeditionary Force Division which sailed for France in June 1917. After being equipped with French 155mm howitzers, the 5th trained for two months near the Swiss border before being committed to combat for the first time on October 24, 1917, near Luneville. When the Germans launched their offensive against Amion in March 1918, the regiment was shifted to Picardy to help bolster crumbling Allied lines. The unit also saw action in the battles of Soissons and St. Mihiel, and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Although the first to land with U.S. forces in France in 1917, the 5th, with other units of the 1st Division, was among the last to leave. But its homecoming was a memorable one. General John "Black Jack" Pershing himself led the parade up Broadway in New York City, almost within sight of the place where D Battery had fired its first rounds 142 years before.

The 5th Artillery sailed with the 1st Infantry Division for Britain in August, 1942, and participated in the major campaigns of World War II. One of the fiercest actions came at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, where the fighting was so intense that the 5th was forced to abandon its weapons and equipment. The men were resupplied within 24 hours. Their return to action in the Battle of El Guet marked the beginning of the end for Rommel's Afrika Korps.

After landing at Normandy on D-Day and fighting across Europe with the 1st Infantry Division, a select crew from B Battery of the 5th Artillery fired the last artillery round of the war near Hoff, Germany, on May 8, 1945.

On September 25, 1965, the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery departed Oakland, Calif., aboard the USNS Blatchford for the long voyage to the Republic of Vietnam. The battalion arrived at Vung Tau on October 16 and completed unloading the next day.

The 5th's first big battle action came early in 1966 during Operation Rolling Stone. On February 24, 800 Viet Cong attacked the 1st Brigade forward base area near Tan Binh. When the VC attempted to overrun the 1st Brigade's position at first light, B and D Batteries fired at pointblank range, repulsing the attackers and inflicting heavy enemy losses. The 5th Artillery suffered 4 killed and 24 wounded in the clash, but 142 VC bodies were found surrounding the perimeter.

The artillery support of the 1st of the 5th played a decisive role during fierce fighting in August 1966, when the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry met the Viet Cong Phu Loi Battalion in its jungle base camp in the Battle of Bong Trang, 25 miles north of Saigon. At one point an infantry patrol located in a well-fortified VC base camp area reported that the enemy was in the trenchline with them. Artillery was called in and adjusted by a forward observer. When it was

SLUG: 1/5 HISTORY
ADD TWO

about to be overrun, the patrol called in artillery fire on its own position, and the bursting shells drove the Viet Cong back.

The battalion came under intense enemy mortar and rocket fire at Fire Support Base Rita, 35 miles northeast of Saigon, in November, 1968. The enemy then launched a human-wave assault which penetrated the northwest sector of the perimeter. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Rogers, Olympia, Wash., led a counterattack that forced the enemy back. At dawn the NVA launched a final attack on the northern defenses, but were forced back by a torrent of 105mm howitzer fire. For his role in the action, Colonel Rogers was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird at Da Nang.

Still, the battalion was not totally occupied by the "hot" war. Realizing that the friendship of the people was of utmost importance, the 5th Artillery inaugurated an active civic action program. One of its many projects was the restoration and repainting of the Phuoc Vinh Catholic Church.

The 5th joined in the Dong Tien (Progress Together) Program in July 1969. In this early Vietnamization project batteries from the 8th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division received a two-week training and orientation program explaining modern artillery techniques. The ARVNs were instructed in airlift and air mobile operations, radar, bore sightings, and direct support.

Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY
After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: In accordance with the division redeployment schedules for standdown and outprocessing, it was necessary to transfer facilities and Installation Coordinator responsibility at Dau Tieng, Lai Khe and Di An. Additional facilities were also released by division units located at Phu Loi and Bear Cat Base Camps.

2. DISPOSITION OF BASE CAMPS AND FACILITIES: a. Dau Tieng: The transfer of the Dau Tieng Base Camp involved constructing a new berm line to reduce the size of the camp and vacating the facilities in the southern sector. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, then transferred its facilities in the northern sector to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; all US facilities in the southern sector, except those designated to be relocated in the northern sector, were transferred to the 301st ARVN Engineer Battalion for salvage. The French masonry buildings were returned to the Michelin Corporation. The Commanding Officer, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, assumed Installation Coordinator responsibility, on 141600 February 1970, after most 1st Inf Div units had either displaced to Lai Khe to continue combat operation or to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing (see Appendix I for details of the transfer of facilities at Dau Tieng).

b. Lai Khe: The transfer of the Lai Khe Base Camp from the 1st Inf Div to the 5th ARVN Division and the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, was conducted in five phases during the period 15 February - 19 March 1970. The 5th ARVN Div took over facilities in the southeastern sector and all of those west of Highway QL 13, except the PA&E (Pacific

Architect and Engineers) water point and the Advisory Team 70 compound. The 3-11th ACR moved into the areas in the northeastern sector vacated by HQ, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, and 1-4th Cavalry Squadron, 1st Inf Div, as these units displaced to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing. The Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div, assumed Installation Coordinator responsibility from the Commanding Officer, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, 151200 March 1970 (see Appendix 2 for details of the transfer of facilities at Lai Khe).

c. Di An: The transfer of facilities at Di An from 1st Inf Div units to the Installation Manager for release to elements of the 11th ACR, 29th General Support Group, 409th Radio Research Unit, and 595th Signal Company began on 2 March 1970 when the advance party of the 223d Supply and Service Company arrived. The transfer of facilities was completed by 7 April 1970 (see Appendix 3 for details of the transfer of facilities at Di An).

d. Bear Cat: The transfer of facilities from the 2d Brigade, 1st Inf Div, at Bear Cat to the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, began on 28 February 1970 with the displacement of the brigade Headquarters Company (-) to Di An for standdown preparations, and was completed on 2 March 1970 when the brigade CP moved to Di An. The elements of the Division Support Command supporting the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, returned facilities to the Installation Engineer during the same period.

e. Phu Loi: The 1st Aviation Battalion and Company E, 701st Maintenance Battalion, transferred their facilities to 317th Avn Det and 388th BSL on 1 April 1970. The facilities of E Troop (air cav), 1-4th Cav, a non-redeploying unit, were scheduled for transfer to the Aviation Section, 11th ACR.

3. PROBLEM AREAS: a. Final disposition instructions for Post Exchange and Special Services activities at Dau Tieng were not received until

10 February 1970, only six days prior to the closure of the southern sector of the base camp. The delay in receiving these instructions caused numerous difficulties in vacating facilities and planning transportation for relocation of supplies and equipment. The fact that the southern sector was excess to US requirements should have caused the control headquarters to deliver more timely instructions.

b. Preparation of formal combined transfer agreements affecting ARVN, US units and PA&E were not prepared by the headquarters that could direct US forces or coordinate at the necessary ARVN command level, but by the 1st Inf Div itself. The 1st Inf Div was charged with preparing formal Combined Transfer Agreements affecting ARVN, 25th Inf Div (US) and PA&E. Many of the agreements' main points concerned operating procedures to be employed after the division's departure.

c. Timely decisions were often needed from MACV with respect to equipment and facilities. Routing inquiries through II FFORCEV, USARV, MACV and JCS action officers was time consuming and impractical. Immediate coordination could be effected if a MACV staff officer was in direct contact with units participating in the transfer of facilities.

d. The PA&E section did not have the staff capability to turn over large numbers of facilities in a short time period. The herculean task of providing current transfer documents (DA Form 1354) for release of US occupied buildings to PA&E, ARVN, or other US tenant units could not be accomplished with assigned real estate personnel.

e. The authorization to relocate buildings from the southern sector to the northern sector was delayed. As a result, ARVN salvage crews were on the ground before these facilities could be relocated. The area should have been free of all structures except those to be transferred for salvage to prevent

embarrassment to US and ARVN forces, and to minimize the possibility of an international incident.

f. PA&E was continually requested by higher headquarters to adjust the format of their transfer document (DA Form 1354) which required areas re surveyed and many forms retyped.

g. The absence of a liaison team that could coordinate at the highest US and ARVN levels made the response time for inquiries and guidance unacceptable.

h. The absence of disposition instructions for the release of buildings, mobile trailers, power generating equipment, communication towers, fortification materials, air conditioners and ceiling fans caused unnecessary delays in their transfer. Inefficient backhaul of equipment, repeated telephonic inquiries requesting guidance and policy, and retention of critical security elements at generator sites are cited as key problem areas caused by lack of disposition instructions.

i. Vacated facilities were secured by redeploying units until ARVN or other US units formally accepted for the structures. Except for buildings located adjacent to Lai Khe Village, vandalism was not a significant problem. However, the competent protection of large blocks of unoccupied buildings did result in a sizeable drain on US manpower located at Lai Khe Base Camp.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. The presence of a HQ, MACV, Liaison Team is needed to solve problems that may develop during the planning and execution of the transfer of facilities between US and GVN agencies.

b. A simple, standardized transfer document for facilities between US units, the Installation Manager and ARVN agencies should be prepared to meet the various needs of each headquarters.

c. Combined facilities transfer agreements should be initiated by MACV with input data supplied by redeploying units. Agreements must be coordinated

with participating units prior to execution.

d. When possible, transfer of key base personnel from the displacing unit to the incoming US unit is encouraged. The Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) and Base Defense Officer (BDO) are two such individuals that offer invaluable assistance to the new commander.

e. US or ARVN advance parties should never be located in areas until these areas have been formally accepted for by authorized representatives.

f. The Installation Coordinator should be the point of contact between US and ARVN units.

g. A facilities transfer schedule should be developed and published by the senior displacing unit (Installation Coordinator) in cooperation with PA&E and incoming units.

h. Authorization for relocation, destruction or abandonment of facilities should be given to the Installation Coordinator at the same time disposition for the base camp is determined.

i. It is essential that timely instruction be provided to the Installation Coordinator from competent authorities for the disposition of all fixed facilities, mobile house trailers and equipment.

j. Staff visitors to base camps at the height of transfer activities should be kept to the minimum and cleared through the Installation Coordinator.

k. Combined transfer agreements between US and ARVN must include PA&E.

l. PA&E must be prepared to furnish sufficient sign-over teams and clerical personnel to support the transfer of large blocks of facilities in a short time frame. Adequate facilities and equipment must be available to service the combined inventory teams.

m. Redeploying/displacing units must coordinate with PA&E to cancel all unnecessary job order requests.

n. Pre-inventory of real property by responsible commanders and PA&E representatives should be conducted to identify deficiencies prior to formal transfer.

o. Access rights of PA&E personnel into ARVN areas for the purpose of providing repair and utilities support must be defined as early as possible.

p. Tents mounted on tent frames should be carried on the installation property records as a structure and transferred in the same manner as buildings.

q. The legal status of US controlled base camps and assigned Land Use Concurrence (LUC) should be researched in advance. Where US forces occupy other than US owned facilities, such as the Lai Khe Rubber Research Institute and Dau Tieng Michelin buildings, the USA Engineer Command (Prov) Real Estate Division should be consulted for advice prior to displacement or redeployment.

r. Disposition of other than US facilities (i.e., Michelin buildings) must be established well in advance of actual transfer in order to survey buildings to determine damage and allow time for repairs, and to prepare the transfer agreement.

s. Inform local nationals employed at the base, by letter, of pending closure and/or transfer of the base to give them time to seek other employment.

t. When salvage operations are scheduled in areas occupied by US and ARVN forces, a formal agreement must be prepared and a daily coordination meeting held to insure harmonious relationships.

u. Authorized salvage and reclamation of US facilities should not begin until the entire work area is vacated by US forces. Detailed written agreements, approved by all parties concerned, must be prepared by the US unit that is best able to supervise the execution of the agreement.

v. When construction effort is required to alter base camp configuration, responsibility for design and supervision must be assumed by the unit requiring

construction,

w. Timely instructions must be provided for the disposition of PX stocks, Special Service equipment and facilities, and for Red Cross support for the residual sector.

x. Command guidance and enforcement, emphasizing physical security, property accountability, area maintenance and area police, is imperative. Military Police check points, manned by US and ARVN personnel, should be established to control movement of materials.

y. A Combined Base Defense Operations Center should be established to facilitate base defense coordination and security of buildings.

z. Controls must be established at the local sanitary fill to prevent discarding of unauthorized equipment and materials by displacing units.

APPENDICES:

- A - Lau Tieng Base Camp Transfer
- B - Lai Khe Base Camp Transfer
- C - Di An Base Camp Transfer

Appendix 1 (Dau Tieng Base Camp Transfer) to Annex 1 (Base Camp Turnover)
to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The transfer of facilities at Dau Tieng from the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 301st Engineer Battalion (ARVN), was initiated by the publication of CPLAN TRCY on 26 January 1970, which ordered the 1st Bde to displace to Lai Khe. This Appendix contains a summary of significant events, a chronology of activities and a copy of the combined agreements.
2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: This transfer of facilities included the following:
 - a. The reduction of the base camp to an area north of the most northern French masonry building. After a six day delay, the exact trace of the southern limits of the reduced camp was determined by the incoming forces.
 - b. The construction of a new perimeter berm and fighting positions.
 - c. The destruction of five buildings that were in the path of the new berm trace.
 - d. The transfer of facilities in the northern sector to incoming units and the turnover of excess US facilities in the southern sector to ARVN for salvage.
 - e. The removal of high dollar value and critically needed items from the excess area by PA&E.
 - f. The relocation of twenty-nine buildings required by the incoming units in the northern sector.
 - g. Relocation of the PA&E maintenance shop, administrative office and billets to the northern sector.
 - h. Security of the entire camp during the transfer period.
 - i. The development of a working agreement between US forces and ARVN Engineers.

- j. The return of the Michelin buildings to the owners.
- k. The closure of two water points in the excess area.
- i. The relocation of area signal communication facilities.
- m. Closure of Post Exchange.
- n. Relocation of Class I issue facility.
- o. Assumption of Installation Coordinator responsibilities by 25th

Inf Div.

TABS

A - Chronology of Events

B - Agreement for the Transfer of Dau Tieng

Tab A (Chronology of Events) to Appendix 1 (Dau Tieng Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Notification of the division redeployment was received on 31 December 1969. Action was immediately taken to begin planning for the orderly displacement of the 1st Infantry Division's 1st Brigade from Dau Tieng to Lai Khe, while continuing to conduct combat operations.

2. The following events occurred during the time frame indicated:

a. 31 Dec 69: The 1st Inf Div was formally alerted for redeployment as part of the Phase III troop withdrawal. This announcement was the basis for detailed planning and implementing directives concerning standdown dates, processing schedules and facility transfer procedures.

b. 4 Jan 70: The division contingency plan (OPLAN 183-69) for redeployment was published defining unit responsibilities, personnel and equipment processing procedures.

c. 9 Jan 70: A meeting was called by USARV G4 to discuss the implementation of USARV Regulation 700-26: "Disposal of Excess USARV Real Property and Related Property," scheduled for publication on 31 January 1970. The principle impact of this directive on the division was the requirement for submission of the MACDC-13, 14 and 15 transfer reports.

d. 11 Jan 70: Division representatives attended a meeting sponsored by II FFCRCEV G4 to discuss proposed stationing list and base camp configuration for Dau Tieng. The agenda also covered return of Michelin Corporation masonry buildings presently occupied by US forces.

e. 16 Jan 70: CO, 1st Bde initiated the following actions: Dau Tieng Installation Manager and Engineer were requested to update real property records (1354) and conduct pre-inventory of buildings to be vacated; PA&E was

requested to survey the Michelin buildings currently occupied by US forces in preparation for their return to the owners.

f. 19 Jan 70: Task organization, and standdown and processing schedules for redeployment were published as an annex to CPLAN 183-69; these schedules implied that Dau Tieng would be vacated by the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, by 15 February 1970.

g. 22 Jan 70: USARV, II FFORCEV, USAECAV, 1st Inf Div and 25th Inf Div representatives met at Dau Tieng for the first in a series of meetings to discuss the disposition and security of the US facilities and the Michelin buildings. In order to reduce the size of the base camp, the 25th Inf Div was tasked to trace the new perimeter berm and begin construction immediately.

h. 26 Jan 70: 1st Inf Div CPLAN 1-70 (TRCY), the implementing directive for the positioning of divisional forces prior to standdown, was issued. Representatives of III (ARVN) Corps and their US advisors traveled to Dau Tieng to inspect facilities and bunkers south of the airfield for possible salvage operations by III Corps Engineer. USARV directed PA&E to remove high dollar items (fans, light fixtures) from excess buildings south of the airfield. It was agreed that the Michelin buildings would be returned to the owners by 15 February 1970. The 1st Inf Div was directed to continue security for all US facilities until relieved by the 25th Inf Div.

i. 29 Jan 70: The 1st Bde developed a schedule for the phased transfer of buildings to PA&E during the period 2-14 February 1970. Engineer representatives from 25th and 1st Inf Div met to discuss construction of the berm line to separate northern and southern Dau Tieng. USAECAV Real Estate representatives continued to coordinate the return of the Michelin buildings.

j. 30 Jan 70: The 1st Inf Div received information copy of II FFORCEV message to USARV requesting approval of proposed transfer of excess facilities

at Dau Tieng to III Corps for salvage. At a meeting chaired by COL (F) Menion, ADG-S, LTC Nghia, CO, 3d ARVN Engineer Battalion and the Installation Coordinator confirmed that the 301st Engineer Battalion would employ two engineer companies to salvage all buildings and Class IV material from the southern sector of Dau Tieng. The ARVN advance party would arrive on 9 February 1970, followed by the main body on 11 or 12 February 1970. LTC Nghia agreed to clear all materials from the southern sector upon completion of his reclamation operation. A request was submitted to USARV by II FFORCEV to transfer the excess facilities in the southern sector to ARVN for salvage.

k. 1 Feb 70: Verbal approval was received from USARV authorizing ARVN to salvage facilities in the southern sector of Dau Tieng. Information made available confirmed that the 25th Inf Div would assume Installation Coordinator responsibility at Dau Tieng, effective 141630 February 1970. The term Dau Tieng Base Camp was redefined as that real estate north of the airfield bounded by the defensive berm to be established by the CO, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

l. 2 Feb 70: The 1st Bde began transferring buildings to FA&E for the removal of fixtures and subsequent turnover to ARVN for salvage.

m. 4 Feb 70: CO, 1st Bde, was directed to provide a detailed plan for turnover of facilities to 301st Engr Bn and 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

n. 7 Feb 70: Inventory of Michelin buildings by FA&E was completed. USA Engineer Command (Prov) Real Estate representative negotiated for the return of masonry buildings to the Michelin Corporation.

o. 9 Feb 70: A written agreement was signed by LTC Nghia, CO, III Corps Engineer Group, and COL Braun, CO, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div. The agreement covered ARVN billets, work area for salvage operations (30th Engr Gp), establishment of a coordination committee, controlling disposition of facilities, and security. An advance party of the 301st ARVN Engr Bn arrived Dau Tieng by air.

USARV approved the 25th Inf Div request to relocate 29 buildings from the southern sector to the northern sector.

p. 11 Feb 70: The 301st ARVN Engr Bn (-), under command of MAJ Anh, arrived at Dau Tieng and was quartered in vacated 1-27th Arty area. Salvage operations in the southern sector commenced.

q. 13 Feb 70: CO, 1st Sde, received a copy of the USARV proposed formal agreement for the transfer of facilities at Dau Tieng (southern sector). The agreement was scheduled to be signed by COL Brain as II FFORCEV representative and an ARVN representative, 141500 February 1970.

r. 14 Feb 70: The 1st Sde completed turn-in of all US facilities and Michelin buildings. USARV formal binding transfer agreement was not signed as scheduled because the ARVN Engineers required four additional days to complete their building by building survey.

s. 15 Feb 70: 2-28th Inf departed Dau Tieng by air and the 1-5th Arty moved by vehicle convoy to Di An for redeployment processing. Rear elements of 2-2d Inf (Mech) and 1-2d Inf moved to Lai Khe.

t. 17 Feb 70: Rear party, 1st Sde, 1st Inf Div, consisting of eight EM and one officer, departed Dau Tieng.

u. 19 Feb 70: The division received information copy of COMUSMACV message to USARV approving the transfer of the excess facilities at Dau Tieng to III Corps for salvage.

Tab B (Agreement for the Transfer of Dau Tieng) to Appendix 1 (Dau Tieng Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry Division KEY-STONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AVDS-L

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ACON: AVFED
APO 96266

1. PURPOSE: To provide terms of agreement for the transfer of facilities and Installation Coordinator functions at Dau Tieng Base Camp.
2. GENERAL: The Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, will be relieved of Dau Tieng Installation Coordinator responsibilities by the Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 141600 February 1970. The US facilities located in the southern sector (area south of new born line) will be returned to Installation Manager (PASE) control for disposal, and the Michelin buildings returned to the owners.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division:
 - (1) Maintain security for all US facilities and Michelin buildings until relieved by the 25th Infantry Division, 141600 February 1970.
 - (2) Vacate 1-27th Artillery area to provide living space for about 300 ARVN engineers and regional force guards, NLT 9 February 1970.
 - (3) Provide rations and ground transportation for a 15 man advance party of the 301st Engineer Battalion (ARVN) during the period 9-11 February 1970.
 - (4) Establish communication with the 301st ARVN Engineer Bn and the Forward CP, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, as early as possible.

AVDS-L

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

(5) Assist in the coordination to obtain 2 - 60KW generators for the purpose of providing power for security lights in the ARVN sector during salvage operations.

(6) Coordinate facilities transfer for tenant units through the Installation Manager (PA&F) to incoming 25th Infantry Division units or to the III Corps ARVN Engineers.

(7) Assure unit areas, buildings, bunkers, or other facilities are thoroughly policed.

(8) Coordinate the transfer of Class I, II & IV, III and Class V equipment and/or supplies to 25th Infantry Division. Transfer the rearm/ refuel points to the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(9) Insure buildings and bunkers are available for PA&E to remove high dollar cost items, ARVN Engineers to salvage, or to transfer to 25th Infantry Division in accordance with Inclosure 1 - "Facilities Transfer Schedule."

b. CO, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division:

(1) Assume Installation Coordinator responsibility for Dau Tieng Base Camp, 141600 February 1970, from 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

(2) Coordinate security of south sector with 301st ARVN Engineer Bn, beginning 141600 February 1970.

(3) Secure vacated facilities until they are transferred to ARVN for salvage or as otherwise directed by USARPV.

(4) Coordinate the disposition of buildings and bunkers as indicated in the Facilities Transfer Schedule, inclosure 1.

c. CO, USA Engineer Command (Prov):

(1) Prepare formal agreement with the Michelin Corporation for the return of masonry buildings located in the southern sector (IAW USAFV message, subject: Facilities at Lai Khe and Dau Tieng, DTG 261229Z January 1970).

(2) Take appropriate action to provide 2 each 60KW generators for the security lighting of the southern sector.

AVDB-1

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

d. CC, USARV: Prepare a legally binding transfer agreement for building materials salvaged from south sector (IAW USARV message, DTG 311253Z January 1970).

e. Dau Tieng Installation Manager (PA&E):

(1) Operate and maintain low voltage power generation system and equipment in the north sector only.

(2) Operate water supply point and provide water to both US and ARVN.

(3) Operate sanitary fill. ARVN may use this sanitary fill, subject to US restrictions, and with the approval of the Installation Coordinator.

(4) Provide vector control, repair and utilities service to US units located in north sector. Provide fire fighting support to US Forces in the north sector and to the south sector on emergency basis.

(5) Terminate septic tank pumping when the facilities being served by septic tanks are transferred to ARVN.

f. CO, 30th Engineer Group (ARVN) III Corps:

(1) Displace 301st Engineer Bn advance party to Dau Tieng by air on 9 February 1970 and main body overland on 11 February 1970; coordinate with CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division for billets.

(2) Coordinate with CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division on base security, control of personnel, and security of equipment and materials.

(3) Operate a radio in the Base Defense Net.

(4) Prepare to assume security of the south sector from the 1st Infantry Division, beginning 141600 February 1970.

(5) Provide internal security for billet area, work sites and salvage materials.

(6) Coordinate with Combined Committee to schedule salvage operations 24 hours in advance, during the period 9-14 February 1970.

(7) Dismantle approximately 223 SEA Huts, 11 mess halls, 9 oversize buildings, 41 tent frames with salvage tentage attached, and 75 living/ fighting bunkers. Remove all sand bags, ammunition containers and other fortification material. Clear the area of debris, fill all holes and level the area with a bull dozer.

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

4. DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES, NORTH SECTOR: a. Units located north of new berm line and scheduled for displacement will transfer facilities by joint inventory with P&E, documented on DD Form 1354 for release to incoming US units.

b. Schedule for disposition of units (1st Infantry Division), along with listing of proposed incoming US units (25th Infantry Division), north sector of Dau Tieng, is at Inclosure 2.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: a. A Combined Committee (CC) will be organized, consisting of one representative from Dau Tieng Installation Coordinator's Office, Installation Manager's Office, and 301st ARVN Engineer Battalion. The Combined Committee will be terminated when all US Forces and P&E personnel have relocated from the south sector.

b. Combined military police patrols will be organized to control access to and from Dau Tieng Post.

c. Installation Coordinator, in cooperation with the 301st ARVN Engineer Bn, will prepare combined plans for the establishment of communications, security of equipment and materials, identification of rules of engagement and the employment of a reaction force.

d. Installation Coordinator will secure vacated facilities until they are transferred to incoming units, or turned over to the ARVN for salvage.

e. All buildings and bunkers in the south sector will be transferred to 25th Infantry Division or turned over to 301st ARVN Engineer Bn for salvage.

f. Vehicles:

(1) Only 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division, P&E, and 30th Engineer Group (ARVN) vehicles will be allowed inside the perimeter. All traffic will use only the west gate to enter or leave the base camp.

(2) All vehicles entering and leaving will be checked by a combined MP patrol. To facilitate the rapid turn around of vehicle convoys and to eliminate congestion at the west gate, convoy vehicles should be checked in their assembly areas prior to departure.

(3) Vehicles departing Dau Tieng Base Camp with building materials must have authorization slips signed by a member of the Combined Committee.

g. Work Areas:

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

- (1) Initial priority is to salvage bunker material inside perimeter.
- (2) It is imperative that specific buildings and bunkers be designated each day for ARVN work parties. This will be done by the Combined Committee. Material salvaged will be brought to a central location in the ARVN Engineer area for sorting and storage. Detailed stripping will occur at this location.
- (3) All holes will be filled and ground leveled by a dozer.
 - b. All tenant units must maintain an effective interior guard. No individuals (ARVN or US) will be authorized outside their assigned unit area after 1800 hours. Unit commanders will strictly enforce this curfew.
 1. The policy that no dismounted US troops, except those involved in combat or combat support operations, will be permitted to leave the base, will be continued and is equally applicable to ARVN troops.
 5. Disposition of Facilities and Property:
 - (1) No buildings will be moved from the south sector to the north sector without USARV approval. CG, USARV has approved the relocation of 29 buildings from the south sector (USARV message, subject: Relocation of Buildings, DTG 090416Z February 1970).
 - (2) All bunkers and bunker material in the south sector will be available for salvage by ARVN work parties, as scheduled by the Combined Committee.
 - (3) All Michelin buildings will be returned to the owners. No Michelin buildings will be transferred to ARVN Forces.
 - k. Claymore mines, flares, Fougasse barrels, and other defensive weapons in the bunkers or forward of the perimeter in the south sector will be removed by ARVN Engineers.
 1. All chain link fence, aircraft revetments and base security lights in the south sector will be turned over in place to 25th Infantry Division.

AVIS-1

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

6. COORDINATION: The following organizations concur in this agreement:

1st Bde, 1st Inf Div _____
2d Bde, 25th Inf Div _____
301st Engineer Bn _____
Dau Tieng Installation Manager (PA&E) _____
Installation Engineer _____

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

1. Facilities Transfer Schedule
2. Disposition of Facilities

A. G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

CF:

CO, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
CO, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
CO, 30th Engr Gp (ARVN)

Inclosure 1 (Facilities Transfer Scheduled in Agreement for Transfer of Dow Dierig Base Camp)

UNIT	NUMBER OF BUILDINGS	NUMBER OF TROOPS BY AREA	DATE AVAIL BASE	DATE SALVAGE	DATE TRANSFER
2-2d Inf	46		10 Feb 70		10 Feb 70
MP		1		10 Feb 70	
337th PRU		2		10 Feb 70	
121 Sig		5		10 Feb 70	
B/701st Maint		4		10 Feb 70	
MMC 1st Bde		1		10 Feb 70	
D/1st Med		2		10 Feb 70	
S & T		6		10 Feb 70	
A/1st Engr	22		10 Feb 70		10 Feb 70
B/1st Med	9		10 Feb 70		
D/1st Med		4		11 Feb 70	
MP	1		10 Feb 70		
2-28th Inf	1		10 Feb 70		10 Feb 70
1-27th Arty	27		10 Feb 70		
1-27th Arty		10		11 Feb 70	
587 Sig	3		10 Feb 70		
35th LPSE	2		10 Feb 70		
MMC 1st Bde	6		10 Feb 70		
MC 1st Bde	1		10 Feb 70		10 Feb 70
S & T	2		10 Feb 70		
1-5th Arty	4		10 Feb 70		
1-5th Arty	5		10 Feb 70		10 Feb 70
1/1st Med	6		11 Feb 70		
B/1st Med		3		12 Feb 70	
MP	2		11 Feb 70		
1-2d Inf	37		11 Feb 70		
1-2d Inf	2		11 Feb 70		11 Feb 70
MMC 1st Bde	3		11 Feb 70		
B/1st Med	11		12 Feb 70		
B/1st Med		5		13 Feb 70	
MP	2		12 Feb 70		
2-28th Inf	1		12 Feb 70		
587 Sig	5		12 Feb 70		
35th LPSE	1		12 Feb 70		
S & T	3		12 Feb 70		
1-2d Inf		22		13 Feb 70	

1-1-P-7

UNIT	NUMBER OF BUILDINGS	NUMBER OF BUNKERS BY AREA	DATE AVAIL PAGE	DATE SALVAGE	DATE TRANSFER
S & T	1		12 Feb 70		12 Feb 70
HHC 1st Bde	8		12 Feb 70	13 Feb 70	
B/701st Maint	5		12 Feb 70	13 Feb 70	
1-5th Arty	7		12 Feb 70	13 Feb 70	
19th TASS	1		12 Feb 70	13 Feb 70	
B/1st Med	6		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
B/1st Med		5		14 Feb 70	
MP	1		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
2-28th Inf	1		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
2-28th Inf	4		13 Feb 70		13 Feb 70
1-2d Inf	9		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
1-2d Inf	1		13 Feb 70		13 Feb 70
587 Sig	5		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
35th IPSD	5		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
S & T	3		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
HHC 1st Bde	6		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
337th RRU	2		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
B/701st Maint	5		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
B/701st Maint	2		13 Feb 70		13 Feb 70
1-5th Arty	2		13 Feb 70	14 Feb 70	
1-5th Arty	4		13 Feb 70		13 Feb 70
B/701st Maint		6		15 Feb 70	
337th RRU		1		15 Feb 70	
35th IPSD		7		15 Feb 70	
121 Sig		2		15 Feb 70	
B/1st Med	9		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
B/1st Med		8		15 Feb 70	
MP	2		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
MP		5		15 Feb 70	
2-28th Inf	1		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
1-2d Inf	4		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
587 Sig	13		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
587 Sig		5		15 Feb 70	

I-1-B-8

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BUILDINGS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BUNKERS BY AREA</u>	<u>DATE AVAIL. PAGE</u>	<u>DATE SALVAGE</u>	<u>DATE TRANSFER</u>
S & T	8		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
S & T	1		14 Feb 70		14 Feb 70
S & T		3		15 Feb 70	
MHC 1st Bde	8		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
MHC 1st Bde		23		15 Feb 70	
1-5th Arty	24		14 Feb 70	15 Feb 70	
1-5th Arty	7		14 Feb 70		14 Feb 70
1-5th Arty		8		15 Feb 70	

NOTE: The right hand column is the date facilities will be available for transfer to 25th Infantry Division units.

6-8-1-1

Inclsoure 2 (Disposition of Facilities) to Agreement for Transfer of Dau Theng Base Camp

1. Disposition of units located in north sector:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF DEPARTURE</u>	<u>INCOMING UNIT *</u>
2-2d Inf (K)	10 Feb 70	1-5th Inf (K) (Rear) 2-12th Inf (Rear)
B/2-34th Armor 1-5th Arty	N/A 10-14 Feb 70	None 1-8th Arty (-) FSE, S & T (west area)
C/127th Arty B/D/229th Avn Bn A/168th Engr	N/A N/A 4 Feb 70	None None HHC, 2d Bde
A/1st Engr Bn	10 Feb 70	C/65th Engr Bn

*Incoming units not currently positioned:

94th Maint Det
RRU Det
Co ____ (-), 725th Maint Bn

2. Disposition of logistics facilities by 1st Infantry Division:

a. Class I:

- (1) Storage building for ice cream returned to Michelin, NLT 9 Feb 70.
- (2) Reefers not desired by 25th Infantry Division will be TI'd by PA&E and turned in to "B" Team, Dau Theng, NLT 11 Feb 70.

b. Class II & IV: Laterally transferred to 25th Infantry Division.

c. Class III:

- (1) Transfer bulkhead facility to 25th Infantry Division on 13 Feb 70.
- (2) Mini-port transferred to 1st Air Cavalry Division, NLT 14 Feb 70.

Inclosure 2 (Disposition of Facilities) to Agreement for Transfer of Dau Tieng Base Camp

d. Class V: The following 1st Infantry Division units will transfer their Class V to the 25th Infantry Division units as indicated below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>1ST INF DIV</u>	<u>25TH INF DIV</u>
8 Feb 70	1-2d Inf	2-12th Inf
11 Feb 70	2-2d Inf (M) 2-28th Inf	1-5th Inf (M) 2-12th Inf
14 Feb 70	1-5th Arty	1-8th Arty

Appendix 2 (Lai Khe Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover)
to 1st Infantry Division: KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Planning for the transfer of the Lai Khe Base Camp from the 1st Infantry Division to the 5th ARVN Division began on 31 December 1969 when the division was ordered to redeploy from Vietnam; the transfer was completed on 19 March 1970 when the last facilities were vacated.

2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: The transfer of facilities took place in the following five phases:

a. Phase I (15-24 February 1970):

(1) Input data was submitted to HQ, II FFORCEV for the preparation of the (RCS) MACDC-13 and 14 reports (Proposed Property Transfer Report and Property Transfer Plan IAW USARV Reg 700-26).

(2) Facilities became available with the displacement of HQ, 1st Inf Div; HQ, 3d Brigade; I Company, 75th Inf; 337th Radio Research Unit; 121st Signal Battalion; C Company, 1st Engineer Battalion; C Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion; 1st Medical Battalion; and 2-16th Inf.

(3) PA&E relocated their maintenance and fire station operations from the western sector to the northeastern sector in order not to be co-located with ARVN units.

(4) A III Corps Combined Planning Committee was established.

(5) A combined agreement for the transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp was prepared.

(6) A total of 472 facilities were transferred to ARVN representatives on DD Form 1354 (Transfer and Acceptance of Military Real Property) citing the approved Property Transfer Plan (RCS-MACDC-14) as authority. The Installation Manager received the facilities from 1st Inf Div units and transferred them to MAJ Jayet, Commanding Officer, Military Property

Construction Office, Binh Duong Area Logistics Command, for occupancy by the 5th ARVN Div.

(7) A combined security plan for the entire base camp was developed during the transfer period.

(8) The formal announcement was made that the Commanding Officer, Advisory Team 70, would assume Installation Coordinator responsibility for Lai Khe.

(9) Area signal communication facilities were relocated.

(10) USARV issued guidance on the operation and maintenance of existing high voltage power generating system and water point by PA&E.

(11) CG, USARV, approved the transfer of designated facilities to Advisory Team 70.

(12) A Combined Base Defense Operation Center (CRDOC) was developed.

(13) Operation of the helicopter rear point was assumed by the 173d Assault Helicopter Company.

(14) 1st Logistical Command Lai Khe ASP operations terminated.

(15) Disposition instruction was received from USARV for 13 mobile house trailers.

(16) USARV formally approved the transfers of the excess portion of Lai Khe to ARVN.

b. Phase II (1 March 1970):

(1) A total of 15 facilities were declared excess following the displacement of B Company, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion (Forward Support Element), from the western sector.

(2) Operation of the Class I point was assumed by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

c. Phase III (4 March 1970): A total of 80 additional facilities in the western sector were transferred following the displacement of the 8-6th Arty to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

d. Phase IV (15-16 March 1970):

(1) A total of 257 facilities in the southeastern sector were transferred when D Company, 1st Engr Bn, and the 2-2d Inf (Mech) displaced to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

(2) Operation of the ground refueling point was assumed by the 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction).

(3) Operation of the aviation refueling point was assumed by the 227th Aviation Battalion.

(4) Commanding Officer, Advisory Team 70, assumed duties as Installation Coordinator.

e. Phase V (18-19 March 1970):

(1) A total of 87 facilities were transferred on 18 March 1970 with the displacement of the 2-33d Arty (the scheduled date of this transfer had been 19 March).

(2) Final displacement of US forces from Lai Khe.

TABS

A - Chronology of Events

B - Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

C - Installation Engineer, Facilities Transfer Agreement

Tab A (Chronology of Events) to Appendix 2 (Lai Khe Base Camp Transfer)
to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY
After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Notification of the division's redeployment was received on 31 December 1969. Action was immediately taken to begin planning for the orderly displacement of the 1st Infantry Division units from Lai Khe to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.
2. The following events occurred during the time frame indicated:
 - a. 31 Dec 69: The 1st Inf Div was formally alerted for redeployment as part of Phase III troop withdrawal. This announcement was the basis for detailed planning and issuance of implementing directive concerning standdown dates, processing schedules and facilities transfer procedures.
 - b. 1 Jan 70: Representatives of Advisory Team 70 visited Headquarters, 1st Inf Div and were briefed on Lai Khe Base Camp station plan, troop list, facilities and perimeter defenses.
 - c. 4 Jan 70: The division's contingency plan (OPLAN 153-69) for redeployment was published defining unit responsibilities, personnel and equipment processing procedures.
 - d. 8 Jan 70: The first in a series of meetings was called by G4, USARV, to discuss disposition of excess facilities at Lai Khe.
 - e. 9 Jan 70: A meeting was called by USARV G4 to discuss the implementation of USARV Regulation 200-26, "Disposal of Excess USARV Real Property and Related Property", scheduled for publication on 31 January 1970. The principle impact of this directive on the division was the requirement for submission of the MACDC-13, 14 and 15 reports.
 - f. 13 Jan 70: The II FFORCEV DC/S and ACoFS, G4, toured Lai Khe Base Camp observing unit cantonment areas. A proposed base camp

configuration and stationing list for Lai Khe, once the division has displaced, was discussed.

g. 14 Jan 70: Installation Coordinator initiated the following actions: Lai Khe Installation Manager and Engineer were requested to update real property records (DD Form 1354) and conduct pre-inventory of buildings to be vacated; in addition, PA&E was required to survey the Lai Khe Rubber Research Institute French buildings occupied by US forces

h. 15 Jan 70: The III Corps (ARVN) Combined Planning Committee was established with representatives from III Corps, III Corps Area Logistics Command, JGS, 5th ARVN Div, USARV, II PFCRCEV and 1st Inf Div. The purpose of the committee is to plan and coordinate the transfer of the Lai Khe Base Camp from the 1st Inf Div to the 5th ARVN Div.

i. 16 Jan 70: ARVN members of the III Corps Planning Committee visited Lai Khe. They were escorted by the II PFCRCEV G4 and briefed in detail on base camp facilities. The ARVN III Corps G4 proposed to locate an eight to nine man team at Lai Khe by 19 January 1970 to enhance 5th ARVN Div planning for displacement of their division headquarters from Lam Son.

j. 19 Jan 70: Task organization and standdown and processing schedules for redeployment were published as an annex to CPLAN 183-69. These schedules implied that Lai Khe would be vacated by the 1st Inf Div in phases during the period 15 February - 19 February 1970.

k. 24 Jan 70: A letter of instructions, "Headquarters Displacement", was published to assign responsibilities and provide coordinating instructions for the displacement of the Division Headquarters to Di An.

l. 26 January 70.

(1) CPLAN 1-70 (TRCY), the implementing directive for the positioning of divisional forces prior to standdown and the movement of the first

redeploying segment to Di An, was issued.

(2) Input data for Lai Khe (RCS) MACDC-13 Report was forwarded to Headquarters, II FFORCEV. The purpose of this report was to request disposition instructions for excess facilities resulting from the displacement of the 1st Inf Div from Lai Khe Base Camp.

a. 27 Jan 70: A proposed transfer plan for Lai Khe Base Camp was published by the G4, 1st Inf Div. The purpose of the plan was to outline the transfer of facilities and base camp security responsibilities for the 5th ARVN Div.

n. 29 Jan 70: Representatives of USARV G3, G4, Engineer and Signal sections, and staff members of II FFORCEV G3 and G4 visited Lai Khe. The group was briefed by the division G4 and the Commanding Officers of the 1st Aviation, 121st Signal, and 1st Engineer Battalions. Several problem areas were identified for USARV/II FFORCEV to resolve

(1) Authority to transfer 12 generators located at 6 critical bridge sites to ARVN security forces.

(2) Disposition instructions on signal towers, 1st Log Comd Ammunition Supply Point, mobile house trailers, and division headquarters office furniture.

(3) Disposition of B Troop (air cav), 1-4th Cav, a non-redeploying unit.

(4) Disposition of facilities occupied by the 1st Avn Bn at Phu Loi.

o. 31 Jan 70

(1) The division received an information copy of a II FFORCEV message to USARV requesting approval for transferring excess facilities at Lai Khe to 5th ARVN Div.

(2) USARV Regulation 700-26 was published prescribing policy and procedures for disposal of excess USARV real property and related property.

This regulation also prescribes procedures for the submission of MACDC-13, 14 and 15 Reports.

p. 1-8 Feb 70: This period featured several meetings of the III (ARVN) Corps Combined Committee, 5th ARVN Div Liaison Teams, 70th Advisory Team, and 1st Inf Div representatives to discuss plans for 5th ARVN Div's move to Lai Khe.

q. 5 Feb 70: The division received an information copy of USARV message to II FFORCEV: "MARRY SENDS", requesting that the turnover date of Lai Khe be changed from 21 to 28 February because of the possibility of not having the communication tower relocated by 21 February.

r. 9 Feb 70: Division data input for the MACDC-14 Report was hand-carried to II FFORCEV. This input provided a summary of actions concerning transfer of facilities from 1st Inf Div elements to the 5th ARVN Div.

s. 10 Feb 70: The division received an information copy of II FFORCEV reply to "MARRY SENDS" message, dated 5 February 1970, requesting the transfer date not be changed from the coordinated 21 February 1970 date.

t. 13 Feb 70: The Combined Agreement for the Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp was distributed to: CO, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div; Headquarters, 5th ARVN Div; Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; Lai Khe Installation Coordinator; and Lai Khe Installation Engineer, for concurrence and/or comment. The purpose of the document was to provide terms of agreement for the transfer of facilities and Installation Coordinator functions at Lai Khe Base Camp.

u. 14 Feb 70: A Letter of Instructions, "1st Infantry Division Displacement from Lai Khe", was published to establish procedures, assign responsibilities and provide coordinating instructions for the orderly transfer of facilities and security responsibilities.

v. 17 Feb 70: The Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div, called a meeting of all tenant units at Lai Khe to discuss operation of the base camp upon departure of the 1st Inf Div.

w. 18 Feb 70:

(1) An agreement prepared by the Lai Khe Installation Coordinator, "Agreements for Facilities Transfer between US and ARVN, 20 February - 19 March 1970", was signed by MAJ Duyet, Commanding Officer, Military Property Construction Office, Binh Duong Area Logistics Command; LTC Buchman, Lai Khe Installation Coordinator; and MAJ Lewis, Installation Engineer. The agreement defined sectors of the base camp and dates that the facilities in each sector will be transferred to ARVN control.

(2) Facilities were transferred to the 8th Regiment, 5th ARVN Div and served as a cantonment area for their advance party.

x. 19 - 22 Feb 70

(1) A total of 405 facilities were accepted by the III Corps Area Logistics Command during this period.

(2) Received USARV message, subject: Property Transfer - Lai Khe, DTG 190342Z February 1970. The message approved II FFORCEV request to transfer excess portion of Lai Khe Base Camp to RVNAF.

(3) Division Headquarters displaced to Di An from Lai Khe.

(4) Signal towers were relocated to vicinity of the Advisor Team 70, 5th ARVN Div.

y. 21 Feb 70 PA&E relocated their maintenance and fire station operations from the western to the northeastern sector.

z. 28 Feb 70: A Combined Facilities Planning Group meeting was held at Headquarters, III Corps, Bien Hoa, to discuss the transfer of the facilities in the southeastern sector and those remaining in the western

sector during the period 1-19 March.

aa. 1 Mar 70:

(1) A total of 15 facilities were transferred to the 5th ARVN Div following the displacement of Company B, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion (Forward Support Element), from the western sector.

(2) Class 1 point was relocated in the US residual area (northeastern sector).

ab. 4 Mar 70: A total of 90 additional facilities in the western sector were transferred following the displacement of the 2-6th Arty to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

ac. 8 Mar 70:

(1) Addendum to Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp was concurred on by CO, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div; Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div; Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division (AM); CO, 3-11th ACR; Lai Khe Installation Coordinator, Lai Khe Installation Engineer, CO, 554th Engineer Battalion, and approved by Chief of Staff, 1st Inf Div.

(2) Lateral transfer of selected Lai Khe installation property from the 1st Inf Div to the 11th ACR was approved by USARV G4.

ad. 15 Mar 70:

(1) A total of 257 facilities in the southeastern sector were transferred when Company D, 1st Engr Bn, and the 2-2d Inf (Mech) moved to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

(2) Commanding Officer, Advisory Team 70 (SA, 5th ARVN Div), assumed duties as Lai Khe Installation Coordinator.

(3) Headquarters Company, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, displaced to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

(4) Operation of the aviation refueling point assumed by the 227th Aviation Battalion and the 554th Engr Bn began operation of the ground refueling point.

ae. 16 Mar 70: 1-26th Inf displaced from Lai Khe to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing; their facilities were returned to the Installation Manager.

af. 17 Mar 70: 1-2d Inf displaced from Lai Khe to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing; their facilities were returned to the Installation Manager.

ag. 19 Mar 70:

(1) Forward Command Post, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, displaced to Di An for standdown and redeployment processing.

(2) A total of 87 facilities were transferred on 18 March with the displacement of the 2-33d Arty.

(3) 1-4th Cav began standdown at Di An.

(4) E/1st Medical Battalion moved from Lai Khe to Di An.

(5) D/701st Maintenance Battalion moved from Lai Khe to Di An.

Tab B (Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp) to Appendix 2
(Lai Khe Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry
Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

AVTB-L

24 February 1970

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVFED
APO 96266

1. Reference IIFV message, AVFED-P&O 010471, subject: Proposed Base Camp Change.
2. The results of numerous staff conferences, messages and other directives on the transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp are consolidated in the enclosed agreement. All of the organizations listed in paragraph 5 of the agreement have concurred, except 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. As of this date the 11th ACR has not replied to inclosure 1.
3. Request your headquarters coordinate formal approval of this agreement with Headquarters, III ARVN Corps and Binh Duong Area Logistical Command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

- 2 Incl
1. Ltr of Transmittal
dtd 13 Feb 70
 2. Combined Agreement for Transfer
of Lai Khe Base Camp

A. G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division, Lam Son, RVN
 Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, APC 96345
 Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division, Lam Son, RVN
 Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, APC 96257

1. The inclosed Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp is being submitted for your approval and/or comment.
2. Request comments be forwarded to this headquarters NLT 12 February 1970. In order to expedite the submission of this agreement to HQ, IIPFV, for coordination with HQ, III Corps, it is requested that addressees contact ACoFS, 24 (this headquarters, Lai Khe 4204/Danger Main 104) and a representative will pick up your comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl	A. G. HUME
1. Combined Agreement for	Colonel, GS
Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp	Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

1. PURPOSE: To provide terms of agreement for the transfer of facilities and Installation Coordinator functions at Lai Khe Base Camp.
2. GENERAL: 1st Infantry Division units at Lai Khe will transfer facilities located in the west and southeast sectors, and responsibility for security for these sectors to the 5th ARVN Division during the period 20 February - 15 March 1970. 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment will assume responsibility for the northeast sector on 15 March 1970.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division:
 - (1) Transfer base defense of western sector to 5th ARVN Div, 211200 February 1970.
 - (2) Transfer base defense of southeast sector to 5th ARVN Div, and northeast sector to 3d Squadron, 11th ACR, 151200 March 1970.
 - (3) Secure all US real property scheduled for transfer to 5th ARVN Div until transferred to 3d Area Logistics Command, and secure other unoccupied facilities until 15 March 1970.
 - (4) As Installation Coordinator, provide support for installation administrative and logistical activities.
 - (5) In coordination with CG, 5th ARVN Div, establish and operate a Combined Base Defense Operation Center (CBDCC), commencing 211200 February 1970, until relieved by the Installation Coordinator.
 - (6) Provide personnel to man combined military police check points at north and south gates and at the sanitary fill.
 - (7) Be prepared to provide a ready reaction force to support CBDCC's contingency plans in the defense of Lai Khe.
- b. Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division:
 - (1) Receipt for facilities in the Advisory Team 20 compound, as indicated in Inclosure 1, from Installation Manager o/a 20 February 1970.

12 February 1970

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

(2) Maintain liaison with the Installation Coordinator and CO, 1st Brigade, and act as the point of contact between these agencies and the 5th ARVN Division.

(3) Assume Installation Coordinator responsibilities for those areas under US Force control from 1st Infantry Division on 15 March 1970.

(4) Provide billet and mess support to 595th Signal and 327th Microwave personnel.

c. Deputy Chief of Staff, for Installation Coordination, will remain at Lai Khe to support the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, until 15 March 1970.

d. CO, 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

(1) Displace advance party to Lai Khe o/a 10 March 1970, and coordinate billet space with Installation Coordinator.

(2) Assume responsibility for base defense of northeast portion of Lai Khe from 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, to include participating in the operation of the CPDOC, effective 151200 March 1970.

(3) Assume responsibility for the operation of the Class V distribution point to support Lai Khe Base Camp

(4) Receipt for facilities in the northeast sector as indicated in Inclosure 3.

e. 1st Air Cavalry Division:

(1) Assume responsibility for operation of the rear point on 15 February 1970 and the aircraft refuel point on 1 March 1970.

(2) Sign a lateral transfer for all equipment required to operate refuel/rear point.

(3) Assume responsibility for operation of the Class I supply point on or before 14 March 1970.

(4) Sign a lateral transfer agreement for all equipment required to operate Class I supply point.

f. Installation Manager (PA&E):

(1) Operate the water supply point and provide water to both US and ARVN units.

(2) Transfer old French nonpotable water distribution system to ARVN when the buildings it serves are transferred.

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

(3) Operate and maintain high voltage power generating equipment and complete primary high voltage distribution systems in both US and ARVN areas.

(4) Operate and maintain low voltage power generating equipment and distribution system in areas occupied by US units only.

(5) Operate the sanitary fill. ARVN may use the sanitary fill subject to US restrictions and regulations and with the approval of the Installation Coordinator.

(6) Provide fire protection for both US and ARVN sectors of the base. Fire Chief will retain authority for determination of priority of response capability.

(7) Provide vector control and repair utilities services to US units only.

(8) Provide septic tank pumping service to only US occupied facilities.

g. CG, 5th ARVN Division:

(1) Receipt for facilities, on the dates indicated in Enclosure 2, from Installation Manager (PA&E) through Binh Duong Area Logistical Command (ALC).

(2) Assume responsibility for defense of the Lai Khe perimeter west of Route 13, effective 211200 February 1970, and the southeast sector perimeter, 151200 March 1970.

(3) In coordination with CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, establish and operate a CBDOC, commencing 211200 February 1970.

(4) Provide personnel to man combined military police check points at north and south gates and at the sanitary fill.

(5) Be prepared to provide a ready reaction force to support CBDOC's contingency plans in the defense of Lai Khe.

(6) Permit US Forces and PA&E employee access to the water point.

(7) Permit PA&E employee to service high voltage electrical distribution system.

h. CO, 554th Engineer Battalion:

(1) Assume responsibility for operation of Class III (less air) supply point on or before 14 March 1970.

12 February 1970

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

(2) Sign lateral transfer agreement for all equipment required to operate Class III (less Air) supply point.

(3) Assume responsibility of area damage control.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: a. The CBDOC will be established to provide a center for coordinated operations and planning for Lai Khe Base Camp defense. CBDOC staff will prepare contingency plans for base defense to include the employment of the US or the ARVN reaction force in any sector of Lai Khe Base Camp.

b. Combined Courtesy Patrols and Interior Traffic Control points will be established as required.

c. Installation Manager personnel (PAAE) will be permitted access as required to maintain the power distribution system and to operate the water supply point.

d. US and ARVN tenant units will not make additions to, or modifications of, the electrical distribution system without Installation Manager approval.

5. COORDINATION: The following organizations concur in this agreement:

1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	<u>17 Feb 70</u>
SA, 5th ARVN Div	<u>19 Feb 70</u>
HQ, 5th ARVN Div	<u>21 Feb 70</u>
*HQ, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR	<u>9 Mar 70</u>
Lai Khe Installation Coordinator	<u>15 Feb 70</u>
Installation Engineer	<u>15 Feb 70</u>

Inclosures: 1 - Advisory Team 70
 2 - 5th ARVN Division
 3 - 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR
 4 - Comments of CO, 1st Bde
 5 - Comments, Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div

*NOTE: 11th ACR concurred in the agreement on 9 March 1970 when it was decided that the 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR would be stationed at Lai Khe.

Inclosure 1 (Advisory Team 70) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of
Lai Khe Base Camp

1. REFERENCES: General Site Plan, Lai Khe.
2. PURPOSE: To list the facilities located in the west sector of Lai Khe that will be transferred to MACV Advisory Team 70, NLT 20 February 1970.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Senior Advisor, Advisory Team 70, will receipt for facilities vacated by 1st Military Police Company; Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion; and 121st Signal Battalion.

b. The 595th Signal Platoon and 327th Microwave Signal Team will locate in the Advisory Team 70 area.
4. FACILITIES TO BE TRANSFERRED: Area: QL 13 west to Cocoa Beach Road; Pattle Creek Road south to Cedar Falls Road.
5. COORDINATION AND PROCEDURES: a. Vacated facilities will be transferred to Advisory Team 70 through Installation Manager and documented on DD Form 1354 and DD Form 337.

b. Vacated facilities will be left in the best condition possible and the area will be thoroughly policed.

Incloasure 2 (5th ARVN Division) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of
Lai Khe Base Camp

1. REFERENCE: General Site Plan, Lai Khe.
2. PURPOSE: To list facilities located at Lai Khe Base Camp that will be transferred to the 5th ARVN Division through Binh Duong Area Logistics Command on 20 February; 1, 4, 15 and 19 March 1970.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES:
 - a. All US units (except 2-33d Artillery; 8-6th Artillery; Company B, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion; 595th Signal Platoon; 327th Microwave Team; and Camp Sentinel Radar post) will vacate the west sector of Lai Khe prior to 20 February 1970.
 - b. 595th Signal Platoon will not move, but will remain in the Advisory Team 70 area.
 - c. 327th Microwave Team displaces to Advisory Team 70 area.
 - d. Company B, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion vacates west sector and transfers refueling equipment to 1st Air Cavalry units, prior to 1 March 1970.
 - e. 8-6th Artillery vacates west sector on 6 March 1970.
 - f. 1st Engineer Battalion (-) vacates southeast sector by 15 March 1970.
 - g. 2-2d Infantry (Mech) vacates southeast sector by 15 March 1970.
 - h. 2-33d Artillery vacates west sector by 19 March 1970.
 - i. Camp Sentinel Radar post vacates west sector by 19 March 1970.
 - j. Binh Duong Area Logistics Command receipt for facilities in the west and southeast sectors from the Installation Manager as they are vacated on 20 February; 1, 4, 15 and 19 March 1970.
4. PROCEDURES: US units vacating Lai Khe during the period 20 February - 19 March 1970, along with designation of unit areas, are indicated below:
 - a. Transfer Date: 20 February 1970.
 - (1) Units: 337th Radio Research Unit; 121st Signal Battalion (-); Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion; 1st Medical Battalion and 2-16th Infantry.

Inclosure 2 (5th ARVN Division) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of
Lai Khe Base Camp

(2) Areas: West sector of QL 13, except for Advisory Team 70 and
sectors to be transferred on 1, 4, 15 and 19 March 1970.

b. Transfer Date: 1 March 1970.

(1) Unit: Company B, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion.

(2) Area: West side of QL 13 to fence line, rear of buildings 34119,
34120 and 34125; south from Cedar Falls to first primary road, vicinity of
building 230.

c. Transfer Date: 4 March 1970.

(1) Unit: 8-6th Artillery.

(2) Area: West side of QL 13, north of water point and west of Wallace
Road, with an east to west trace of buildings, 33464, 33460, 33457, 33707,
33704, 22620, 22009 and 22041.

d. Transfer Date: 15 March 1970.

(1) Units: 1st Engineer Battalion (-) and 2-2d Infantry

(2) Areas: East of QL 13 to perimeter road; north from Lexington Road
(extended) to Birmingham Road, except PA&E compound.

e. Transfer Date: 19 March 1970.

(1) Units: 2-33d Artillery and Camp Sentinal Radar post.

(2) Areas: West of QL 13 to Wallace Road (extended); north from
primary road (parallel to building 32432) to access road beyond building
33000; and the radar site south of ASP.

5. COORDINATION AND PROCEDURES: a. Vacated facilities will be transferred
to Binh Duong Area Logistics Command through Installation Manager and
documented on DD Form 1354 and DD Form 337.

b. Vacated facilities will be left in the best condition possible and
the area will be thoroughly policed.

Inclosure 3 (3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

1. REFERENCE: General Site Plan, Lai Khe.
2. PURPOSE: To list facilities at Lai Khe Base Camp that will be transferred to the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, o/a 151200 March 1970.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. 1st Infantry Division units in northeast sector will vacate facilities prior to 15 March 1970 (except 1-4th Cavalry which displaces on 19 March 1970).
 - b. 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment locates in northeast sector, 10 March 1970, with advance party and prepares to replace 1st Brigade and 1-4th Cavalry, NLT 19 March 1970.
 - c. Operate ground refuel point to support Lai Khe Base Camp and base defense radar tower.
4. US units vacating southeast sector of Lai Khe, along with designation of unit areas are indicated below:

Transfer Date NLT 19 March 1970.

 - (1) Units: 1st Brigade and 1-4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division.
 - (2) Areas: Billings Road west to Manhattan Road; Battle Creek Road north to Shenandoah Road.
5. COORDINATION AND PROCEDURES: a. Vacated facilities will be transferred to 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment through Installation Manager and documented on DD Form 1354 and DD Form 337.
 - b. Vacated facilities will be left in the best condition possible and the area will be thoroughly policed.

Inclosure 4 (Comments of CO, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

I concur with the Agreement, as written. However, I believe it could be tightened in the following areas:

1. Spell out the identity and specific authority of the Installation Coordinator.
2. Spell out in para 3a(3) what is meant by security responsibility for "all" real property.

PAUL F. BRAIM
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Inclosure 5 (Comments of Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division) to Combined Agreement for Transfer of Lai Khe Base Camp

I concur with the agreement as written with exception of par 3.b (3). This Advisory Team does not have the personnel to accept Installation Coordinator responsibilities as outlined in MACV Directive 10-4. Correspondingly, relief from this responsibility or the assignment of additional officer and personnel to expedite these functions have been requested through Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps Advisory Team to Commanding General II Field Force Vietnam.

JOHN G. HAYES
COL, ARMC
Senior Advisor

Tab C (Installation Engineer Facilities Transfer Agreement) to Appendix 2 (Lai Khe Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (J)

AVCD-P-LX

18 February 1970

SUBJECT: Agreements for Facilities Transfer Between US and ARVN, 20 February 1970 - 19 March 1970

MAJ DUYET

Commanding Officer, Military Property Construction Office
Binh Duong (Phu Cuong)
ARVN

1. The following terms of agreements between MAJ Duyet, CO Military Property Construction Office, Binh Duong (Phu Cuong), the Installation Coordinator, Lai Khe Installation and the Installation Engineer, Lai Khe Installation are satisfactory as pertains to transfer of designated real property facilities from US control to ARVN control between 20 February 1970 and 19 March 1970.

a. Transfer on 20 February 1970 of approximately 556 facilities located on the Western side of Highway QL-13. These facilities have been divided into five (5) packets and will require five (5) ARVN teams and five (5) US teams with interpreters in order to effect a complete and orderly transfer in one (1) day.

b. Transfer on 1 March 1970 of approximately 15 facilities located on the west side of QL-13; requiring one (1) team of ARVN personnel and one (1) team of US personnel with interpreter.

c. Transfer on 4 March 1970 of approximately 80 facilities located on the west side of QL-13; requiring two (2) teams of ARVN personnel and two (2) teams of US personnel with interpreters.

d. Transfer on 15 March 1970 of approximately 257 facilities located on the east side of QL-13; requiring three (3) teams of ARVN personnel and three (3) teams of US personnel with interpreters.

AVCD-B-LK

SUBJECT: Agreements for Facilities Transfer Between US and ARVN, 20 February
1970 - 19 March 1970

1. Transfer on 19 March 1970 of approximately 87 facilities located on the west side of QL-13; requiring two (2) teams of ARVN personnel and two (2) teams of US personnel with interpreters.

2. Transfer of facilities will be accomplished by joint inventory utilizing DD Form 1354 and DD Form 337. Each team will be provided a packet of these prepared forms for the buildings for which they will be inventorying and inspecting. Deficiencies noted by ARVN personnel will be noted on the reverse side of DD Form 1354 but will be in English since these forms must be maintained by PA&E. The US furnished interpreter will verify that deficiencies noted and recorded during inventories correspond to annotations made on the forms by PA&E personnel.

3. Upon completion of inventory by each team, the ARVN and US (PA&E) representatives will co-sign each DD Form 1354.

4. ARVN logistical personnel have agreed to meet with the Installation Coordinator, Installation Engineer and PA&E personnel in the Installation Coordinator's office at 0730 hours on the morning of each incremental transfer day.

NORMAN BUCHMAN
LTC, CE
Deputy Chief of Staff, IC

HARRY C. LEWIS JR.
MAJ, CE
Installation Engineer

PHAM HUU TUYET, Major
Commander, Military
Property Const. Off.

Appendix 3 (Di An Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division called for the orderly transfer of Installation Coordinator responsibilities of Di An Base Camp to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and clearance of divisional units from the base. This transfer involved determining those facilities to be vacated by redeploying units and the dates that the facilities would be available to new units moving into Di An.
2. CONCEPT: 1st Inf Div units at Di An would transfer facilities to the 11th ACR through joint FA&E inventory upon completion of redeployment processing. Tenant units remaining after the division's redeployment would retain, relocate, or expand present facilities. Other units programmed for Di An would move in on a time-phase basis.
3. PLANNING: a. As Di An Installation Coordinator, the Commanding Officer, Division Support Command, had direct responsibility for preparing transfer agreements. Upon notification that the Commanding Officer, 11th ACR, would assume Installation Coordinator responsibility for Di An effective 1 April 1973, concurrent planning between the current and the designated Installation Coordinators was initiated. One of the first priorities established was the need for a complete stationing list of units that were scheduled to move into Di An upon redeployment of the division. This stationing list was designed to identify maximum capacities, preclude piecemealing of areas, and minimize relocation of units once the initial move to the base had been accomplished.

b. Preliminary steps in the transfer plan required the development of scheduled dates for departing units to clear facilities. This schedule was coordinated with the Installation Engineer to insure a joint inventory of property was accomplished by the using unit, the Real Estate Section of FA&E and.

if possible, the incoming unit. The plan was flexible to allow for changes in unit release dates. In addition to a departure dates schedule, stationing dates for incoming units had to be established. This required detailed coordination concerning the assumption of facility, function and service responsibilities. The assignment of two officers from the 11th ACR 30 days prior to the transfer to understudy Installation Coordinator functions and base camp defense responsibilities at D1 An greatly assisted transfer coordination of the base camp.

c. The early arrival of elements of the 29th General Support Group to establish the D1 An Logistical Support Activity enabled division combat support units to phase out their operations without an interruption of logistical support to tenant units.

4. TRANSFER OF BASE CAMP: The phased standdown of 1st Inf Div support elements required the publication of an agreement (see Tab A) to insure that vacated areas were secure, logistical support was continuous and incoming units were stationed with minimum difficulty.

TABS

A - Agreement for Transfer of D1 An Base Camp

Tab A (Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp) to Appendix 3
(Di An Base Camp Transfer) to Annex I (Base Camp Turnover) to 1st Infantry
Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report

AVDB-WW-IC

1 March 1970

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Commanding Officer, 29th General Support Group
Commanding Officer, 3/17 Air Cavalry Squadron
Commanding Officer, JSARV Advisory School
Commanding Officer, 409th Radio Research Unit
Commanding Officer, 595th Signal Company
Installation Manager, PA&E, Di An
Area Provost Marshal Designee, Di An

1. The inclosed Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp is submitted for your approval and/or comment.
2. Request comments and/or concurrence be forwarded to this headquarters.
ATTN: AVDB-WW-IC, MLT 7 Mar 70.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Combined Agreement for Transfer
of Di An Base Camp

DOUGLAS MATHIS
MAJ, INF
Adjutant

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

1. PURPOSE: To provide terms of agreement for the transfer of facilities and Installation Coordinator functions at Di An Base Camp.

2. GENERAL: 1st Infantry Division units at Di An will transfer facilities located in North Post to Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR o/a 1 April 70. Tenant units remaining after 1st Infantry Division's redeployment will retain, relocate, and/or expand present facilities subject to approval of Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Installation Coordinator, 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron:

- (1) Assume Installation Coordinator functions effective 1 April 70.
- (2) Assume responsibility for perimeter defense of sectors presently manned by 1/18th Inf, 2/18th Inf, 1/7th Arty, 701st Maint Bn, 121 Sig Co, and 1st Engr Bn on 01 1200 April 70.
- (3) Assume perimeter defense of sectors manned by 1st Admin Co and Division Training Command on 03 1200 April 70.
- (4) Receipt for real property on North Post, Di An o/a 1 April 70 and/or as areas vacated by 1st Infantry Division standdown units.
- (5) Provide repairs and utilities support for buildings, roads, and other real property to maintain the facility in a usable condition will be performed by PA&E.
- (6) Assign necessary living space to PA&E personnel in the vicinity of 1st Med Battalion.
- (7) Receipt for all installed garrison mess equipment located in North Post, Di An.
- (8) Maintain discipline, law, and order, for Di An Base.
- (9) Assume responsibility for the operation of exchange activities, Special Services, service clubs, and Civilian Personnel Activities on 1 April 70.
- (10) Provide equipment presently required to man the Di An Base perimeter as indicated at Inclosure 1.

b. CD, 29th General Support Group:

- (1) Displace Advance Party from the 223d S&S Co to Di An on 2 Mar 70.
- (2) Displace Inventory Team for Class IX to Di An on 12 Mar 70.

AVDB-LW-10

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of DI An Base Camp

- (3) Assume Class III responsibility on 15 Mar 70.
- (4) Assume responsibility for RCR 500 and ASL on 19 March 1970.
- (5) Assume Graves Registration Mission on 20 March 1970.
- (6) Assume Class I responsibility on 23 March 1970.
- (7) Assume Class II & VII responsibility on 25 March 1970.
- (8) Assume responsibility for 1st S & T base defense sector 26 1200H March 1970.
- (9) Program moves of maintenance companies into 701st Maint area on 25 March 1970, and assume responsibility for shop facilities. Direct coordination with 701st Maint Bn is recommended.
- (10) Receipt for all real property and installed garrison mess equipment vacated by 1st S&T and 701st Maint Bn o/a 1 April 1970.
- (11) Provide Installation Manager, P&E a requirement for power generating equipment NLT 5 March 1970.

c. CO, 3/17th Air Cavalry Squadron:

- (1) Coordinate with Installation Coordinator for the relocation of C and D Troops from North Post into South Post, DI An after 1 April 70.
- (2) Receipt for and secure facilities presently occupied by 1st Military Intelligence Detachment NLT 16 March 1970.
- (3) Receipt for and secure facilities presently occupied by I/75th Rangers NLT 10 March 1970.
- (4) Receipt for and secure facilities presently occupied by 121 Sig Bn (-) o/a 1 April 70.
- (5) Receipt for and secure facilities presently occupied by Div Tng Cnd o/a 1 April 70.
- (6) Receipt for the 1st Inf Div Memorial Chapel on 1 April 1970.
- (7) Continue present defense of perimeter sector until otherwise directed by Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR.
- (8) Provide messing for Med detachment referenced in para 5e.

d. CO, USARV Advisory School:

- (1) Receipt for and secure facilities vacated by 1st Engr Bn (-) o/a 1 April 1970.

AVDR-NW-IC

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

(2) Be prepared to assume defense of a designated perimeter sector as directed by Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR.

e. CC, 409th RFU:

Receipt for and secure all facilities vacated by 337th Radio Research Unit o/a 1 April 1970.

f. CC, 595th Sig Company:

(1) Continue present defense of perimeter sector until otherwise directed by Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR.

(2) Assume responsibility for MARS station NEE 1 Apr 70.

(3) Assume technical and operational supervision and maintenance of the Di An Dial Telephone Exchange NLT 1 Apr 70.

g. Installation Manager, PA&E, Di An:

(1) Continue present B&U activities through coordination with Installation Coordinator.

(2) Effect transfer of installed garrison mess equipment to incoming units.

(3) Receipt for all facilities not assigned to incoming units.

(4) Coordinate with Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR for assignment of real estate for the billeting of PA&E personnel on 1 April 1970.

(5) Coordinate with Installation Coordinator for messing PA&E Third Country Nationals.

(6) Operate the Sanitary Fill. Coordinate with Installation Coordinator for the security of the fill effective 1 April 1970.

(7) Provide vector control.

(8) Operate and maintain power generating equipment and distribution system in all occupied areas.

(9) Operate water supply points.

(10) Provide fire fighting support to Di An Base.

(11) Continue septic tank pumping for all occupied areas.

AVDP-NW-10

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

h. Area Provost Marshall Designee, Di An:

(1) Relocate to Di An on 23 March 1970 and assume Military Police responsibility for the base camp.

(2) Coordinate with Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR for billeting and messing facilities contingent on the designated MP unit, strength, etc. MET 15 March 1970.

(3) Initiate action immediately to effect lateral transfer of station property from the 1st MP Co.

4. DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES:

a. Units located in Di An North and scheduled for redeployment will transfer facilities by joint inventory with PA&E. Facilities will then be receipted for by 11th ACR. (Incl 2).

b. Schedule for disposition of units (1st Infantry Division) along with listing of proposed/programmed incoming units is at Inclosure 3.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR will establish a Tactical Operations Center for a coordinated base defense by 1 April 1970. (Incl 1).

b. Effective 1 April 1970, assignment or termination of real estate will be subject to the approval of the Installation Coordinator, 11th ACR.

c. Installation Manager will insure that Reports of Survey generated by loss, damage, or destruction to real or installed property are initiated and processed through the user's command channels, not PA&E's.

d. Installation Coordinator will secure vacated facilities until they are transferred to incoming units.

e. Medical Support: The 68th Medical Group, Long Binh will have medical area responsibility for Di An Base Camp. On 27 Mar an MA Dispensary Team will displace to Di An. The team will consist of 2 Doctors and 15 Medical Technicians. They will be located in the 1st Med Bn dispensary. Major items of medical equipment will be laterally transferred from the 1st Med Bn to the MA Dispensary Group. The Medical Staff as of 30 Mar will consist of 4 Doctors (1 Flight Surgeon presently in Di An), 1 Flight Surgeon to be assigned by the 12th Aviation Group, and 2 Medical Doctors. Area Dental Service will be provided by the 40th KJ Team presently billeted in the 1st Med Bn area.

AVDE-4W-10

SUBJECT: Combined Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

6. RECOMMENDATION:

That 11th ACR initiate action for equipment at Incl 1 through lateral transfer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls

DOUGLAS MATHIS
MAJ, INF
Adjutant

1. Base Defense
2. Facilities Transfer Schedule
3. Schedule for disposition of Units

CURRENT PERIMETER STATISTICS

I. POSITIONS

a. Bunkers	70
b. Towers	17
c. Gates	4

II. PERSONNEL

a. 3 per bunker	210
b. 3 per tower	51
c. 3 per gate	12
TOTAL	273

III. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT


a. Machine gun M-60	76
b. M-79 Grenade Launcher	61
c. M-16 Rifle	270
d. 90mm BR	4
e. Cal 45 Pistol	(As determined by Sector Commander)
f. Starlight Scope	20
g. AN/PRC 25	17
h. CA 312 Field Telephone	91
i. Binoculars	17
j. Flashlight w/red filter	91
k. Protective Mask	(One per individual)
l. Other normal field equipment	

IV. MINIMUM AMMUNITION AND PYROTECHNICS

a. M-16 Rifle	360 Rds (20 Mag of 18 Rds)
b. Cal 45 Pistol	21 Rds
c. M-79 Grenade Launcher	36 HE Rds
d. M-60 Machine Gun	2000 Rds
e. 50 Cal Machine Gun	500 Rds
f. Hand Grenade, Fragmentation	12 per position
g. 90mm BR	5 Canister Rds 5 HE Rds
h. Hand Held Flares	10 per Tower (2 Red) 6 per Bunker (1 Red)

Incl 1

I-3-A-7



8-V-C-1

(Facilities Transfer Schedule) to
 Agreement for Transfer of D1 An Base Camp

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BUILDINGS</u>	<u>DATE AVAILABLE</u>	<u>PA&E</u>
I/75 Rangers	6	10 March	1970
1st XI Det	5	16 March	1970
HQ 1st Bde (SDC)	22	22 March	1970
1-26th Inf	27	29 March	1970
1-2d Inf	30	30 March	1970
1st S&T Bn	89	31 March	1970
2-2d Inf (M)	*7	1 April	1970
1/4 Cav	38	1 April	1970
1st MF Co	14	1 April	1970
2-33 Arty	60	2 April	1970
1st Med Bn	48	2 April	1970
701st Maint Bn	80	4 April	1970
121st Sig Bn	57	4 April	1970
1st Engr Bn	40	4 April	1970
HQ 1st Inf Div	52	6 April	1970
HPC&Pand	46	6 April	1970
1st Admin Co	78	7 April	1970
1st Repl Det	30	7 April	1970

* Other Facilities used by 2-2 Inf (M) will be returned to 2/11 ACD.

Incl 2

(Schedule for Disposition of Units) to
 Agreement for Transfer of Di An Base Camp

1. Disposition of units located in North Post, Di An.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF DEPARTURE</u>	<u>INCOMING UNIT</u>
8/6 Arty	22 March 1970	11th ACR
1-26 Inf	29 March 1970	"
1-2 Inf	30 March 1970	"
2-2 Inf (M)	1 April 1970	"
1/4 Cav (-)	1 April 1970	"
G, D Troop 3/17	After 1 Apr	"
2-33 Arty	2 April 1970	"
B/121 Sig (-)	3 April 1970	"
SDC	5 April 1970	"
HHC Div	6 April 1970	"

2. Disposition of units located in South Post, Di An

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF DEPARTURE</u>	<u>INCOMING UNIT</u>
1st MI Det	16 March 1970	3/17 Air Cav
S&T Bn	31 March 1970	29th GS Group
1st MP's	1 April 1970	720th MP Det* or 300th MP Co.
1st Med Bn (-)	2 April 1970	None
121 Sig Bn (-)	3 April 1970	3/17 Air Cav
701st Maint Bn	4 April 1970	29th GS Group*
1st Engr Bn (-)	4 April 1970	USAIN Adv Ech
HHC&Band	6 April 1970	None
337 RRU	6 April 1970	409 RRU
DTC	7 April 1970	B, C Troop 3/17
1st Admin Co	7 April 1970	29th GS Group (292 Finance)
1st Repl Det	7 April 1970	None
3d Maint	10 April 1970	None

* Incoming units not currently positioned.

Incl 3

Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: On 12 January 1970, the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Vietnam was officially announced. The division was tasked to return to Fort Riley, Kansas, at two percent strength and redeploy its 3rd Brigade to Augsburg Germany. At these locations, units of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) would be deactivated and their personnel and equipment redesignated as the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). While fulfilling this mission, the Commanding General, 1st Inf Div, strove to preserve the traditions, esprit and professionalism of the "Big Red One". Formation of a representative Honor Guard, careful shipment of unit memorabilia and mementos, and retention of viable division institutions, programs and societies were given great attention to insure continuity of division heritage and standards.

2. HONOR GUARD: a. The Honor Guard consisted of approximately 340 carefully selected members of the 1st Inf Div, representing 26 color bearing units. From the Guard, ceremonial formations were formed for use in Vietnam and CCNIS. However, the main redesignation ceremony would take place at Fort Riley on 15 April 1970. No Honor Guard was sent to Augsburg Germany for the redesignation of the 3rd Brigade, 24th Inf Div (Mech). After the final Ft. Riley ceremony, the Honor Guard would be dispersed.

b. The Honor Guard was organized on 25 March 1970, departed Vietnam on 7 April and arrived at Forbes Air Force Base the following day. During its short lifetime, it conducted three ceremonies in Vietnam and two at Ft. Riley. All training, equipment, movement and personnel arrangements were planned in advance to facilitate the successful completion of the Guard's mission. In addition, the Guard escorted the division colors and records to Ft. Riley to insure their safe passage and proper disposition.

c. A detailed summary of all activities related to the Honor Guard is at Appendix 1.

3. UNIT MEMORABILIA, TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS: The division's redeployment created the problem of imparting the "Big Red One's" distinguished heritage to those units being redesignated as the 1st Infantry Division. By itself, the 340 man Honor Guard was too slim a base to insure such continuity. Thus, extensive measures were taken to transfer division memorabilia and mementos to successor units or museums, and to acquaint newly designated 1st Inf Div troops with the traditions and customs they would inherit.

a. Maintenance of Traditions and Customs: The division carried out an information/publicity campaign to familiarize Big Red One redesignees with its traditions and customs. Significant aspects of that program are noted below:

(1) Initially, the 1st Inf Div capitalized on the high visibility of its Honor Guard to acquaint Ft. Riley soldiers with the emblems they would soon bear. Rather than depend on normal logistics channels, sufficient quantities of patches and crests for new divisional personnel were brought by the Honor Guard.

(2) Liaison was inaugurated between present unit commanders and their designated CONUS or European successors. Commanders were urged to employ unit newspapers, albums, yearbooks and other appropriate vehicles to convey unit pride and tradition (see Appendix 2).

(3) Upon request of the 24th Inf Div (Mech), 10 personnel were returned with the Honor Guard to Ft. Riley. These personnel were prepared to relate divisional history through lectures and slide shows.

c. Return of Unit Memorabilia and War Trophies.

(1) All units were instructed to transfer mementos to their successors, or as appropriate, to the 1st Inf Div Cantigny War Museum at Wheaton, Ill. Individual donations were also solicited (see Appendix 3).

(2) In order to effect transfer, the following measures were taken:

(a) The Division Support Command established and manned a turn-in center to collect and ship all unit memorabilia.

(b) This depot was tasked to document, package and protect collected items. All unit shipments were consolidated to minimize Conex containers shipped.

(c) An early turn-in deadline gave DISCOM adequate time to prepare and ship all items. Final deadline was approximately five weeks prior to the Honor Guard's departure.

(d) Elaborate registration procedures precluded loss of irreplaceable unit mementos, allowed units to clear these from property books and provided a record of accountability for such property (see Appendix 4).

(3) Final shipping destinations were Ft. Riley, Kansas; Augsburg, Germany; Cantigny War Museum, Wheaton, Ill.; and the US Army Depot, New Cumberland, Penn.

4. RETENTION OF VIABLE DIVISIONAL INSTITUTIONS, PROJECTS AND SOCIETIES.

Upon redeployment, the division retained those institutions and projects which were integral parts of its legacy. The Society of the First Division and the Division Scholarship Fund were not returned and reinstated concurrent with redeployment.

a. Scholarship Fund:

(1) During its four year tenure in Vietnam, the 1st Inf Div inaugurated a scholarship fund to provide an education for the children of Big Red One war dead. The Fund's aim was to present \$1500.00 scholarships to each of the sons and daughters of these fallen comrades. The entire program was funded by contributions of active members serving with the division in Vietnam.

(2) By April 1970, well over \$500,000.00 had been contributed. Upon redeployment, fund collection ceased, and a final sum was forwarded to the appropriate CONUS trust fund.

(3) One officer was appointed to monitor the return of all Scholarship funds. The G1, 24th Inf Div (Mech), became the new representative to the fund at Ft. Riley.

(4) The Fund was closed out on 7 April 1970, and remaining monies forwarded to the 1st National Bank of Washington, ATTN: Trust Dept. Checks were payable to the Sons of the 1st Division Scholarship Fund.

(5) A controlling committee from Headquarters, Society of the First Division, actually administered and operated the fund. Since this body is autonomous from the active division, redeployment did not effect committee activities or daily operation of the Fund. Thus, with redeployment, only fiscal input terminated. However, investment of contributed capital insured necessary dividends to fulfill the goals of the Fund.

b. Society of the First Division:

(1) Founded in 1919, the Society of the First Division was organized to perpetuate the traditions and spirit of the division, provide a vehicle for continuance of friendships developed during divisional service, and aid members of the Society and of the division. Its affiliations with the 1st Infantry Division Scholarship Fund exemplifies the Society's work and aims.

(2) Each separate brigade and battalion had its own Society Branch controlled by the central chapter at Division Headquarters.

(3) Under the Commanding General's directive, a representative of the ACoFS, G1, 1st Inf Div, initiated liaison and concluded arrangements with 24th Inf Div (Mech) representatives to move these branches to CONUS. Individual brigade and battalion commanders were instructed to send their separate branch by-laws and constitutions to successor units in both CONUS and Germany.

(4) Society related material returned to CONUS included a summary of the Society's background and purpose, a list of Society responsibilities and a

container with the Society's records, files and material.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Honor Guard
- 2 - Unit Traditions and Heritage Letter
- 3 - Disposition of Unit Memorabilia
- 4 - Shipment of Special Category Items

Appendix : (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Because the Honor Guard was scheduled to represent the division at a series of departure and reorganization ceremonies conducted in the Republic of Vietnam and the United States, the division strove to select its finest soldiers to fill its ranks.
2. HONOR GUARD SELECTION: a. To insure representation of the highest quality, a series of demanding criteria were used to select potential guard members. The two percent redeployment figure permitted a total guard strength of approximately 340 members. As soon as possible, interview procedures were established and guard members carefully nominated and chosen (see Tabs A-B).
 - b. A late USAFV directive stipulated that all Guard personnel must have a DEROS between 7 April and 7 June 1970. This eliminated several members from the Honor Guard who had been chosen prior to the directive's publication.
3. ORGANIZATION: The Honor Guard, organized at Di An during March 1970, included 37 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 301 enlisted personnel with color bearing units represented on a proportional basis (see Inclosure 1 to Tab B). While conducting activities and traveling, the Guard used the three basic organizations noted below:
 - a. The Division Honor Guard Organization was the basic administrative structure. Directed by the Honor Guard Commander, the organization included an organic staff and permitted centralized control of all Guard personnel and operations (see Tab C).
 - b. The 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony Organization outlined command and formation assignments for all Vietnam departure ceremonies (see Tab D).
 - c. The Movement and Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony Organization facilitated

control in movement and an orderly regrouping upon arrival at Forbes AFB. Pre-arranged aircraft assignments insured that all Guard personnel disembarked in designated groups for the airport ceremony which immediately followed (see Tab 2).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: Despite its small size, training and supporting the Guard was a complex task; thus responsibilities were clearly delineated and assigned to preclude confusion.

a. Honor Guard Command and Staff:

(1) Commanding Officer (LTC): Exercised overall command of the division Honor Guard.

(2) Executive Officer (MAJ): Commanded the 1st Honor Guard Brigade, secured and accounted for two M-14 rifles for the color guard, and provided a five man division color guard and three general officer's flags.

(3) Honor Guard Staff: Insured necessary coordination in each staff area of responsibility.

(4) The Commanding Officer, Division Honor Guard, and commanding officers of Honor Guard brigades and aircraft commanders were responsible for establishing internal SOP for the command and control of the Honor Guard and its respective sections.

b. ACofS, G4: Provided two M-14 rifles to the division color guard and monitored logistic support requirements.

c. ACofS, G1: Prepared operational letters of instruction and necessary movement orders.

d. ACofS, G1: Coordinated all AC, Finance and Surgeon outprocessing for Honor Guard personnel.

e. CO, Division Support Command:

(1) Provided mess, billeting, transportation, band and administrative support, as required. This support continued through 5 April 1970.

Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. GENERAL: Because the Honor Guard was scheduled to represent the division at a series of departure and reorganization ceremonies conducted in the Republic of Vietnam and the United States, the division strove to select its finest soldiers to fill its ranks.
2. HONOR GUARD SELECTION: a. To insure representation of the highest quality, a series of demanding criteria were used to select potential guard members. The two percent redeployment figure permitted a total guard strength of approximately 340 members. As soon as possible, interview procedures were established and guard members carefully nominated and chosen (see Tabs A-B).
 - b. A late USARV directive stipulated that all Guard personnel must have a DEPOS between 7 April and 7 June 1970. This eliminated several members from the Honor Guard who had been chosen prior to the directive's publication.
3. ORGANIZATION: The Honor Guard, organized at Di An during March 1970, included 37 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 301 enlisted personnel with color bearing units represented on a proportional basis (see Inclosure 1 to Tab B). While conducting activities and traveling, the Guard used the three basic organizations noted below:
 - a. The Division Honor Guard Organization was the basic administrative structure. Directed by the Honor Guard Commander, the organization included an organic staff and permitted centralized control of all Guard personnel and operations (see Tab C).
 - b. The 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony Organization outlined command and formation assignments for all Vietnam departure ceremonies (see Tab D)
 - c. The Movement and Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony Organization facilitated

control in movement and an orderly regrouping upon arrival at Forbes AFB. Pre-arranged aircraft assignments insured that all Guard personnel disembarked in designated groups for the airport ceremony which immediately followed (see Tab E).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: Despite its small size, training and supporting the Guard was a complex task; thus responsibilities were clearly delineated and assigned to preclude confusion.

a. Honor Guard Command and Staff:

(1) Commanding Officer (LTC): Exercised overall command of the division Honor Guard.

(2) Executive Officer (MAJ): Commanded the 1st Honor Guard Brigade, secured and accounted for two M-14 rifles for the color guard, and provided a five man division color guard and three general officer's flags.

(3) Honor Guard Staff: Insured necessary coordination in each staff area of responsibility.

(4) The Commanding Officer, Division Honor Guard, and commanding officers of Honor Guard brigades and aircraft commanders were responsible for establishing internal SOP for the command and control of the Honor Guard and its respective sections.

b. ACofS, G4: Provided two M-14 rifles to the division color guard and monitored logistic support requirements.

c. ACofS, G5: Prepared operational letters of instruction and necessary movement orders.

d. ACofS, G1: Coordinated all AG, Finance and Surgeon outprocessing for Honor Guard personnel.

e. CO, Division Support Command:

(1) Provided mess, billeting, transportation, band and administrative support, as required. This support continued through 5 April 1970.

(2) Issued uniforms and accessories as noted under Tab F.

f. Division Transportation Office, 1st Inf Div: Provided transportation to 90th Replacement Battalion, Long Binh.

g. DTC, 90th Repl Bn: Provided transportation to Siem Reap AFB where special USAF aircraft completed the return to Ft. Riley.

h. DTC, 24th Inf Div (Mech): Satisfied all transportation requirements of the Guard at Forbes AFB and Ft. Riley.

i. Unit commanders: Released all Honor Guard personnel as soon as possible and NLT 251700 March 1970.

3. PREPARATION: a. The Honor Guard Advance Party departed Vietnam on 28 March 1970. Composed of three officers and one EM (from the division Information Office), the Advance Party was required to facilitate the Honor Guard's arrival by coordinating all future activities with the CG, 24th Inf Div (Mech), at Ft. Riley.

b. From 25 March to 5 April 1970, the Honor Guard was trained under the direction of the ACoS, G3 (see Tab G).

c. Guard members satisfied all normal DEPOS outprocessing procedures to include:

(1) The packing of all personnel records for shipment on the aircraft returning the Honor Guard to CONUS. The Honor Guard's organic S1 worked closely with the G1 on this project.

(2) Completion of all standard outprocessing actions, supervised by division G1 and Guard S1.

d. The following special measures were taken in conjunction with flight to Ft. Riley:

(1) Each passenger was allowed 66 lbs of baggage plus 134 lbs of excess baggage.

(2) In anticipation of long stop-overs and colder climates, field jackets, shaving gear and clean changes of uniform were required to be available in each individual's hand baggage.

(3) Guard personnel were provided unaccompanied baggage facilities at Di An Airfield prior to their Vietnam departure.

6. EXECUTION: a. The 1st Inf Div Honor Guard traveled thousands of miles and passed under jurisdiction of several different commands. On 6 April 1970, the Guard moved from Di An to Long Binh and from there to Bien Hoa AFB. After a brief ceremony, the Guard then continued on to the division's new home at Ft. Riley, Kansas.

b. During its existence the division Honor Guard participated in the following five ceremonies:

- (1) LTC Tri Awards Ceremony at Di An on 301130 Mar 70.
- (2) LTC Swell Honor Guard Ceremony at Di An on 011130 Apr 70.
- (3) Division Departure Ceremony, Di An on 031000 Apr 70 (Tab I).
- (4) Division Arrival Ceremony at Forbes AFB, Kan. on 6 Apr 70 (Tab J).
- (5) Division Reorganization Ceremony at Ft. Riley, Kan. on 15 Apr 70 (Tab K).

7. CONCLUSION: Major administrative, logistical and operational difficulties associated with moving the division Honor Guard to CONUS were avoided by careful planning and clear division of responsibilities. In a series of farflung ceremonies . . . stretching from the Annamese to the Kansas plains, the Division Honor Guard admirably fulfilled its mission by proudly heralding the return of the 1st Infantry Division to the United States.

TABS

A - Honor Guard Interview Procedures

B - Honor Guard Criteria and Selection Requirements (LOI)

- C - Honor Guard Organization
- D - Departure Ceremony Organization
- E - Movement and Forbes AFB Ceremony Organization
- F - Honor Guard Uniform Requirements
- G - Honor Guard Training Schedule
- H - Honor Guard Outprocessing Actions
- I - 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony
- J - Movement and Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony
- K - Fort Riley Reorganization Ceremony

Tab A (Honor Guard Interview Procedures) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLJEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-CS

4 February 1970

SUBJECT: Procedures for Color Guard Interviews

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference, letter, this headquarters, subject: Letter of Instruction, Color Guard Ceremonial Unit, dated 27 January 1970.
2. The purpose of this letter is to establish the procedure for the interview and final selection of the 1st Infantry Division Color Guard Ceremonial Unit.
3. The commander of each major subordinate unit will be responsible for interviewing the nominees for the color guard from within their respective headquarters and from the battalions assigned to their respective unit. Interviews will be completed NLT 9 February 1970.
4. A division team, consisting of the G5 and the Division Command Sergeant Major, will interview nominees from the following battalions: 1st Avn Bn, 1/4 Cav Sqdn, 121st Sig Bn, and 1st Ingr Bn. The G5 will coordinate directly with commanders concerned to establish specific dates to insure completion of the interviews NLT 9 February 1970.
5. The nominees from EHC, Division, and the general and special staff sections will be interviewed by a special interviewing team consisting of the Chief of Staff and the G1 in accordance with a schedule to be published under separate cover.
6. Each interviewer will select those individuals that he determines will best represent the 1st Infantry Division. The names of nominees will be submitted to this headquarters using the following criteria:
 - a. The total number of personnel each major unit commander will submit must equal the total number of nominees allotted to their unit by the inclosure to the referenced letter. The total number is to include the number of nominees of each assigned unit and also will include the names of two alternates allotted each color bearing unit.

AVDB-P

4 February 1970

SUBJECT: Procedures for Color Guard Interviews

b. A roster of those individuals selected for the Color Guard will be hand carried to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-P, NLT 9 February 1970. Interview cards supplied with this letter will be completed for each individual selected and will be submitted to this headquarters with the aforementioned roster.

c. From the nominees of each color bearing unit, two will be designated color bearers and two color guards.

7. The special interviewing team will use the procedures described in paragraph 6 above to select personnel from HEC, Division, and the general and special staff sections.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 In:1
as

A. C. HOME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION
A (Mod-1) plus
30 - C1

LAST NAME _____ FIRST _____ MI _____ SSAN _____ MOS _____

UNIT _____ RA _____ DEROS _____ ETS _____ POS HELD _____

NUMBER OF TOURS IN VIETNAM (check one) 1

2

3

NUMBERS OF TOURS W/BRC (EITHER AT FT RILEY
OR VIETNAM) 1

2

3

AFTER RETURN OF COLOR GUARD TO CONUS, DO YOU DESIRE TO REMAIN AT FT RILEY? YES

NO

WHY DO YOU DESIRE TO BE A MEMBER OF THE COLOR GUARD?

(For use of interviewer)

APPEARANCE: EXC GOOD FAIR POOR

MILITARY BEARING: EXC GOOD FAIR POOR

IF, AS OF 7 APRIL 1970, NOMINEE HAS MORE THAN 60 DAYS UNTIL DEROS, DO YOU THINK HE SHOULD BE ON COLOR GUARD? YES

NO

IF, AS OF 7 APRIL 1970, NOMINEE HAS LESS THAN 60 DAYS UNTIL ETS, DO YOU THINK HE SHOULD BE ON COLOR GUARD? YES

NO

REMARKS:

OVERALL RATING:

ACCEPTABLE

UNACCEPTABLE

QUESTIONABLE

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

SHOULD NOMINEE BE DESIGNATED A COLOR BEARER OR COLOR GUARD IN CEREMONY? YES NO

Tab B (Honor Guard Criteria and Selection Requirements /LOI/) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APC 96345

AVIB-CS

27 January 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LCI), Color Guard Ceremonial Unit

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The purpose of this LCI is to establish the criteria and requirements for the selection of the 1st Infantry Division color guard to return to Fort Riley, Kansas, to participate in redesignation ceremonies.
2. The commanders of each color bearing unit and each general and special staff section will nominate personnel of their unit/section as indicated in inclosure. Additionally, commanders and general and special staff sections will nominate two additional personnel as alternates to the primary list.
3. The following criteria apply:
 - a. Nominees must have at least 90 days of service remaining after arrival in CONUS.
 - b. Personnel who have served previous tours with the division either in Vietnam or at Fort Riley and meet the criteria for selection will be placed on the list without regard to the USARV DEROS limitation.
 - c. Nomination lists will indicate current DEROS and basis for selecting each nominee. eg., awarded DSC, serving with the Big Red One on second tour, or outstanding Soldier.
 - d. At least one company grade officer will be nominated by each color bearing unit.
 - e. Enlisted nominees should be equally distributed by grade structure commensurate with a above.
4. Nominees will be personally screened by respective commanders and general and special staff sections to insure that personnel selected represent the high standards associated with the Sig Red One.

AVDB-GS

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI), Color Guard Ceremonial Unit

5. The 1st Infantry Division color guard is scheduled to depart Vietnam via special mission aircraft on 7 April 1970.

6. List of nominees will be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDB-P, not later than 1 February 1970. The Commanding General will make final determination on the composition of the color guard. Nominees will be interviewed at this headquarters in accordance with a schedule to be published under separate cover.

FOR TSS COMMANDER:

1 Incl
List of color bearing units

A. G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
A(Mod-1)

COLOR-BEARING UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>No of Nominees</u>
1st Avn Bn	8
HHC & Band	6
1st S&T Bn	13
701st Maint Bn	16
1/4 Cav	16
1st Engr Bn	16
HHC, Div Arty	6
1/5th Arty	11
8/6th Arty	11
1/7th Arty	11
2/33d Arty	11
HHC, Div	6
HHC, 1st Bde	6
HHC, 2d Bde	6
HHC, 3d Bde	6
1/2d Inf	16
2/16th Inf	16
1/18th Inf	16
2/18th Inf	16
1/26th Inf	16
1/28th Inf	16
2/28th Inf	16
2/2d Inf	16
1/16th Inf	16
1st Med	7
121st Sig Bn	13

STAFF SECTIONS

<u>Section</u>	<u>No of Nominees</u>
G1	2
G2	2
G3	2
G4	2
G5	2
G6	2
G7	2
G8	2
G9	2
G10	2
G11	2
G12	2
G13	2
G14	2
G15	2
G16	2
G17	2
G18	2
G19	2
G20	2
G21	2
G22	2
G23	2
G24	2
G25	2
G26	2
G27	2
G28	2
G29	2
G30	2
G31	2
G32	2
G33	2
G34	2
G35	2
G36	2
G37	2
G38	2
G39	2
G40	2
G41	2
G42	2
G43	2
G44	2
G45	2
G46	2
G47	2
G48	2
G49	2
G50	2
G51	2
G52	2
G53	2
G54	2
G55	2
G56	2
G57	2
G58	2
G59	2
G60	2
G61	2
G62	2
G63	2
G64	2
G65	2
G66	2
G67	2
G68	2
G69	2
G70	2
G71	2
G72	2
G73	2
G74	2
G75	2
G76	2
G77	2
G78	2
G79	2
G80	2
G81	2
G82	2
G83	2
G84	2
G85	2
G86	2
G87	2
G88	2
G89	2
G90	2
G91	2
G92	2
G93	2
G94	2
G95	2
G96	2
G97	2
G98	2
G99	2
G100	2

Incl 1

Tab C (Honor Guard Organization) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Division Honor Guard Organization

<u>Div HQ</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>
CO	LTC	Div Arty
CSM	CSM	1-16
S-1	CPT	1-7
S-3	CPT	1st Bde
AS-3	CPT	8-6
S-3 NCOIC	MSG	3d Bde
S-4	CPT	G3
AS-4	1LT	2-28
S-4 NCOIC	MSG	G4

1st Bde

CO	MAJ	1-7	Sqd Members from:
XO	CPT	1st Bde	
CSM	1SG	1st Engr	1st Bde HHC
1st Sqd	1LT	1-2	1-2 Inf
2d Sqd	1LT	1-2	2-2 Inf
3d Sqd	1LT	2-2	2-28 Inf
4th Sqd	1LT	1-28	1-28 Inf
5th Sqd	1LT	1st Engr	1st Engr
6th Sqd	1SG	1-2	

2d Bde

CO	MAJ	121 Sig	Sqd Members from:
XO	CPT	2-16	2d Bde HHC
CSM	SFC	2-18	2-18 Inf
1st Sqd	CPT	2d Bde	2-16 Inf
2d Sqd	SFC	2-18	1-16 Inf
3d Sqd	SFC	2-16	Cmd Co
4th Sqd	SFC	1-16	PX
5th Sqd	SFC	2-18	IO
6th Sqd	SFC	1-16	337 BRU
			HHC, 1st Inf Div

3d Bde

CO	MAJ	1-4 Cav	Sqd Members from:
XO	CPT	1-26	3d Bde HHC
CSM	CSM	1-26	1-18 Inf
1st Sqd	CPT	1-4 Cav	1-26 Inf
2d Sqd	MSG	G2	1-4 Cav
3d Sqd	1LT	G1	G-staff
4th Sqd	1SG	1-18	AG
5th Sqd	1LT	1-18	
6th Sqd	SFC	1-18	

<u>Div Arty</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>	
CO	MAJ	Div Arty	Sqd Members from:
XO	CPT	1-7	HHS Div Arty
CSM	CSM	8-6	1-5 Arty
1st Sqd	1LT	Div Arty	8-6 Arty
2d Sqd	2LT	8-6	1-7 Arty
3d Sqd	CPT	2-33	2-33 Arty
4th Sqd	1SG	8-6	
5th Sqd	1SG	8-6	
6th Sqd	SFC	1-5	

DISCOM

CO	MAJ	DISCOM	
XO	CPT	701	Sqd Members from:
CSM	1SG	DISCOM	HPC DISCOM
1st Sqd	CPT	1st Med	1st Med
2d Sqd	1LT	1st S&T	1st S&T
3d Sqd	CPT	1st Avn	701 Maint
4th Sqd	1SG	701	121 Sig
5th Sqd	MSG	1st S&T	1st Avn
6th Sqd	SFC	DISCOM	

Tab D (Departure Ceremony Organization) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Departure Ceremony Organization (DI An)

<u>Div HQ</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>
COI	LTC	Div Arty
Staff	Division General and Special Staff	
Five color guards and three flagbearers from 1st Bde.		

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>	
CO	MAJ	1-7	Sqd Members from:
1st Sqd	1LT	1-2	1st Bde HHC
2d Sqd	1LT	1-2	1-2 Inf
3d Sqd	1LT	2-2	2-2 Inf
4th Sqd	1LT	1-28	1-28 Inf
5th Sqd	1LT	1st Engr	2-28 Inf
6th Sqd	1SG	1-2	1st Engr

<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>	
CO	MAJ	121 Sig	Sqd Members from:
1st Sqd	CPT	2d Bde	2d Bde HHC
2d Sqd	SFC	2-18	2-18 Inf
3d Sqd	SFC	2-16	2-16 Inf
4th Sqd	SFC	1-16	1-16 Inf
5th Sqd	SFC	2-18	Cnd Gp
6th Sqd	SFC	1-16	HHC 1st Inf Div
			337 RRU
			IO
			PM

<u>3d Bde</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>	
CO	MAJ	1-4 Cav	Sqd Members from:
1st Sqd	CPT	1-4 Cav	HHC Div Arty
2d Sqd	MSG	C-2	1-5 Arty
3d Sqd	1LT	C-1	B-6 Arty
4th Sqd	1SG	1-18	1-7 Arty
5th Sqd	1LT	1-18	2-33 Arty
6th Sqd	SFC	1-18	

<u>DISCOM</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>	
CO	MAJ	DISCOM	Sqd Members from:
1st Sqd	CPT	1st Med	HSC DISCOM
2d Sqd	1LT	1st S&T	1st Med
3d Sqd	CPT	1st Avn	1st S&T
4th Sqd	1SG	701 Maint	701 Maint
5th Sqd	MSG	1st S&T	121 Sig
6th Sqd	SFC	DISCOM	1st Avn

Tab E (Movement and Forbes AFB Ceremony Organization) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Movement and Forbes AFB Ceremony Organization

<u>HQ</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PARENT UNIT</u>
CO	LTC	Div C-3
XO	MAJ	1-4 Cav
S-1	CPT	1-7
S-3	CPT	1st Bde
S-4	CPT	C-3

Aircraft Assignments:

<u>#1 Aircraft</u>	<u>#2 Aircraft</u>	<u>#3 Aircraft</u>	<u>#4 Aircraft</u>
MAJ—CO	MAJ—CO	MAJ—CO	MAJ—CO
1st Bde HHC	2d Bde HHC	HHC Div Arty	HHC DISCOM
1-2 Inf	2-18 Inf	1-5 Arty	1st Med
2-2 Inf	2-16 Inf	8-6 Arty	1st S&T
2-28 Inf	1-16 Inf	1-7 Arty	701 Maint
1-28 Inf	1-26 Inf	2-33 Arty	121 Sig
1st Engr	Cmd Gp	1-18 Inf	1st Avn
G-staff	PM	AC	3d Bde HHC
	IO		1-4 Cav
	337 RRC		
	HHC, 1st Inf Div		

Note: A five-man color guard from 1st Bde and HQ flew on #1 aircraft. Four seats were available for the contingency use of the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, a G4 representative (MAJ) and the division CSX on aircraft #1.

Tab F (Honor Guard Uniform Requirements) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Each member of the Honor Guard was required to have the following items:

1. Six sets tropical fatigues, patches on each shoulder, printed name tapes, authorized qualification badges, and printed US Army tapes. Three sets of new fatigues were reserved exclusively for ceremonial use.
2. One pair of tropical combat boots
3. One field jacket
4. One hot weather cap (baseball type)
5. Steel Helmet w/new camouflage and band
6. Load bearing equipment composed of:
 - a. Individual equipment belt
 - b. Canteen, canteen cover
 - c. First aid packet
 - d. First aid Pouch
 - e. Adjustable suspenders

Tab G (Honor Guard Training Schedule) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Schedule of Events

1. 251700 Mar 70 - All Honor Guard personnel will report to the bleachers in BTC area for briefing by LTC Holt.
2. 260800 - 0900 Mar 70 - Close order drill in stand down area.
3. 270800 - 0900 Mar 70 - Close order drill in stand down area.
4. Personnel from 701st Maint, 1st Engr and 1st Med Battalions will report to their units at appropriate times to participate in awards ceremonies on 27, 29 and 30 Mar 70.
5. 280900 - 0900 Mar 70 - Close order drill in stand down area.
6. 290800 - 1000 Mar 70 - Close order drill in stand down area and rehearsal for LTC Tri Award Ceremony in front of division headquarters.
7. 300900 - 1200 Mar 70 - Rehearsal and LTC Tri Award Ceremony in front of division headquarters.
8. 310800 - 0900 Mar 70 - Close order drill in stand down area.
9. 010900 - 1200 Apr 70 - Rehearsal and Honor Guard Ceremony for LTC Ewell in front of division headquarters.
10. 020800 - 1000 Apr 70 - Rehearsal for departure ceremony in front of division headquarters.
11. 030800 - 1030 Apr 70 - Rehearsal and departure ceremony.
12. 031500 - 1630 Apr 70 - Rehearsal for Forbes AFB arrival ceremony in stand down area.
13. 040800 - 1. Apr 70 - Outprocessing.
14. 050900 Apr 70 - Move to Long Binh.

Tab H (Honor Guard Outprocessing Actions) to Appendix I (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

1. Outprocessing Actions to be Completed at Di An:

- a. Immunization check and Medical Records check: See Tab A for required shots and renewal dates.
- b. Finance outprocessing.
- c. AG outprocessing.
- d. War Trophy, War Trophy Firearms and Privately Owned Firearms Registration: See Tab B for procedures.
- e. Organizational clothing turn-in: All field equipment, extra uniforms and bedding will be turned-in at the supply room at Division Training Command.
- f. Preliminary Shakedown Inspection: See Tab C for restricted items. Provision will be made for "no questions asked turn-in points" immediately prior to the inspection.

2. Outprocessing Actions to be Completed at Long Binh:

- a. Malaria Debriefing.
- b. Ration Card turn-in.
- c. Currency Conversion: A maximum of \$1000.00 may be taken out of country. A Commander's Certificate is required if the amount is in excess of \$200.00.
- d. Shakedown Inspection.

Tab I (1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEWAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APC 96345

AVDS-T-T

13 March 1970

SUBJECT. 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. PURPOSE: To assign responsibilities and tasks for the conduct of the 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony at Di An.
2. DATE-TIME-PLACE: The ceremony will be held in front of Division Headquarters at Di An on 031000 Apr 70.
3. REHEARSAL: Rehearsal of ceremony for all personnel will be conducted at the ceremony site 48 hours and 24 hours prior to ceremony. Participating personnel are:
 - a. Commander of troops, etc.
 - b. General and Special Staff.
 - c. 1st Infantry Division Band.
 - d. Color guard.
 - e. Honor guard of approximately 320 troops.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Commander of Honor Guard (COG)
 - (1) Insure that all personnel are present for rehearsal and ceremony.
 - (2) Provide necessary color bearers and color guards.
 - (3) Provide VN National Color, US National Color, Division Color and General Officers' Flags. Bn and Bde colors will also be present.
 - (4) Provide VIP seating.

13 March 1970

SUBJECT: 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony

(This letter supersedes Ltr. HQ, 1st Inf Div, AVDB-T-T, 9 Feb 70, subject: 1st Infantry Division Departure Ceremony).

b. Provost Marshal: Block traffic in vicinity of ceremony from 030945 Apr 70 until end of ceremony.

c. AG: Read movement order (during ceremony).

d. ACoS, G3: Coordination and execution of ceremony

e. DSO: Make provisions for:

(1) Public address system with back up for rehearsals and ceremony.

(2) Photographic coverage of ceremony.

5. UNIFORM a. Jungle fatigues, jungle boots, stripped pistol belts, steel helmets with green camouflage covers and camouflage bands.

b. COT, general staff, special staff and honor detachment commanders will be armed with .45 cal. pistols. Troops unit personnel and color bearers will be unarmed. Color guards will be armed with M14 rifles.

6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS All personnel will be briefed and inspected before departure for the ceremony. Appearance of personnel will be in accordance with 1st Infantry Division standards.

7. SCHEDULE a. Rehearsals:

(1) 011500 Apr 70 - COT, staff, det commanders, color bearers and color guards.

(2) 020800 Apr 70 - All participants

b. Ceremony - 031000 Apr 70.

8. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS See Inclosure 1.

9. FORMATION See inclosure 2.

FOR THE COF: SDR.

2 Incl

1. Sequence of Events

2. Formation

C. T. SELBY

LTC, AGC

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

10 Provost Marshal

10-OO-HHC, 1st Inf Div

10-10

20-CofS

40-G3 Tng

10-1st Inf Div Band

5-AG

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS


1. 030945 Apr 70: Troops and colors are in position under control of troop unit leaders as band plays appropriate music.
2. Troop unit leaders align troop units.
3. 030950 Apr 70: COI assumes position 36 paces in front of, centered on and facing the colors. Staff (minus Adjutant) assumes positions two paces to rear of COI.
4. Adjutant assumes position 27 paces in front of, centered on and facing the colors.
5. Band plays Attention.
6. On the last note of Attention, troop unit leaders face their units, command "Attention" and remain facing their units.
7. Band plays Adjutant's Call.
8. At last note of Adjutant's Call, troop unit leaders command "Present Arms," then face about and salute Adjutant, holding their salute.
9. Adjutant, without returning salute, faces about, salutes COI and reports "Sir, the Honor Guard is formed."
10. COI returns Adjutant's salute and directs "Take Your Post." Adjutant drops his salute and marches by most direct route to his position on left of staff.
11. COI commands "Order Arms" and "Parade Rest."
12. COI faces reviewing stand.
13. As COI faces reviewing stand, staff executes right face and two successive turns left halting two paces behind and centered on COI facing reviewing stand.
14. When staff is in position, COI and staff execute parade rest in unison.
15. As reviewing party starts toward reviewing stand, COI brings staff to attention, faces troops and commands "Honor Guard Attention" and "Present Arms." COI then faces reviewing stand and COI and staff come to present arms.
16. Band plays Ruffles and Flourishes and General's March.
17. At last note of General's March, COI and staff order arms, COI faces troops and commands "Order Arms" and "Parade Rest." COI faces reviewing officer, salutes and reports, "Sir, the Honor Guard is formed."
18. Reviewing party discounts reviewing stand and approaches COI.

Inclosure 1


19. As reviewing party approaches, COT salutes reviewing officer. Reviewing officer marches to left of COT. Host marches behind COT with second member of reviewing party on his left, behind senior reviewing officer. If there is only a two-man reviewing party, the host marches to the right of COT and reviewing officer to the left of COT.
20. As COT and reviewing party approach band, bandmaster salutes. Reviewing party salutes only when passing colors.
21. As reviewing party approaches troop units, unit commanders, in turn, command "Battalion Attention" and "Eyes Right." Troop unit leader salutes. Troop unit personnel track reviewing party with eyes until reviewing party is directly ahead. When reviewing party passes, troop unit leader commands "Order Arms."
22. When reviewing party reaches end of inspection COT halts and salutes reviewing officer. Host then leads reviewing party back to reviewing stand.
23. When reviewing party has returned to reviewing stand COT commands "Staff Right Face, Forward March." Staff executes right face and marches to right a sufficient distance to provide clearance for colors, halts and faces left.
24. COT takes his post five steps in front of colors.
25. COT commands (over shoulder) "Colors, Forward March." Band plays appropriate music. COT marches within six paces of reviewing stand and commands "Colors, Halt."
26. COT salutes reviewing officer and reports, "Sir, the colors are present."
27. Reviewing officer returns salute and directs "Present the Command."
28. COT moves around right of colors and assumes position in front of and centered on staff.
29. COT commands "Present Arms," faces reviewing stand and presents arms with staff.
30. Band plays WVN and US National Anthem.
31. COT and staff "Order Arms." COT faces troops and commands "Order Arms."
32. Reviewing party moves forward to a position in front of colors.
33. Div CC moves to the left of the reviewing officer. Reviewing officer stands three paces in front of and facing the 1st Infantry Division Color. CSM takes position one step in front of and faces the 1st Infantry Division Color.
34. The movement order is read by the Adjutant General charging Div CC with responsibility for return of color to CONUS.
35. CSM receives Div Color from color bearer, gives it to reviewing officer, who gives it to Div CC. Div CC hands color to CSM, who returns it to color bearer.

36. Reviewing party returns to reviewing stand.
37. COT commands "Colors Post" and "Forward March." Colors move to their position.
38. COT and staff execute left face and return to original position.
39. When colors are in position COT commands "Parade Rest." COT faces reviewing stand and comes to parade rest with his staff.
40. Members of reviewing party address the honor guard. On completion of remarks, COT brings staff to attention, faces troops and commands "Honor Guard Attention," and "Case the Colors." Color guards assist in furling and casing the colors.
41. COT faces reviewing stand, salutes and reports "Sir, this concludes the ceremony."
42. Band plays The Spirit of the 1st Division.
43. Reviewing party departs reviewing stand.
44. Adjutant returns to original position 18 paces in front of troops and facing COT.
45. COT directs Adjutant to take charge of honor guard, Adjutant salutes and COT and staff depart.
46. Adjutant directs troop unit leaders to take charge of their units and to march from field to a release point to be determined by the COT. Band plays Sambre et Meuse.

FORMATION



- 1 - Reviewing Officer
- 2 - Reviewing Officer
- 3 - MC Milloy



Tab J (Movement and Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony) to Appendix 1 (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUESAY After Action Report (U)

1. Movement and Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony.

a. Loading Aircraft (Bier Hoa, Japan and Elmendorf AFB):

(1) Personnel will be formed into four aircraft loads on line adjacent to the aircraft, using the Forbes AFB arrival ceremony formation.

(2) The rear ranks of each formation will file into the aircraft first.

b. Unloading aircraft (Japan and Elmendorf AFB):

(1) When aircraft have halted and formation area is determined, personnel will file from aircraft into the Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony Formation (See Tab A).

(2) When formation is complete, instructions will be issued and formation will march to terminal buildings.

c. Sequence of Events - Forbes AFB Arrival Ceremony:

(1) Aircraft land and hold in holding area until all aircraft are on the ground.

(2) MG Milloy will deplane and proceed with MG Linvill to a press conference.

(3) Aircraft will move to assembly area and park on an aircraft parking line facing the ceremony (Tab A, bottom sketch).

(4) Honor Guard deplanes and files into formation as described above. Color guard uncases 1st Infantry Division colors.

(5) COT calls staff to attention, faces troops, commands "Honor Guard Attention" and faces forward.

(6) 24th Infantry Division Band plays The Spirit of the 1st Division.

(7) At the end of music COT faces troops, commands "Present Arms," faces forward and salutes with staff.

(8) Band plays Ruffles and Flourishes and General's March.

(9) COT and staff order arms, COT faces troops, commands "Order Arms," "Parade Rest" and faces forward. COT and staff remain at attention.

(10) MG Linvill, the guest, and MG Milloy, the host, move forward to COT. COT reports to MG Linvill and inspection begins. MG Linvill marches on left, COT in center and MG Milloy on right.

(11) As the inspecting party approaches formation Aircraft Commanders command (over the shoulder) "Detachment Attention," "Eyes Right" and salute. Troops

track reviewing party with their heads until directly ahead. Aircraft Commanders order arms after inspecting party has passed.

(12) Color guard comes to present arms as inspecting party approaches. Inspecting party salutes only when it passes in front of the colors.

(13) Inspecting party moves around rear of formation and halts at right front of the band. Salutes are exchanged and inspecting party and COT return directly to their posts.

(14) COT faces troops, commands "Present Arms," faces forward and comes to present arms with his staff.

(15) Band plays US National Anthem.

(16) COT and staff order arms. COT faces troops, commands "Order Arms," "Parade Rest," faces forward and comes to parade rest with his staff.

(17) Remarks are made by MG Linvill and MG Milloy.

(18) COT and staff come to attention, COT faces troops, commands "Honor Guard Attention" and faces forward.

(19) COT salutes and reports "Sir, that concludes the ceremony."

(20) Reviewing officer, MG Linvill, returns the salute and reviewing party departs.


(21) COT faces troops, commands "Present Arms," directs "Colors Dismissed" and comes to present arms with staff.

(22) Colors reverse march, move several steps to rear, halt and case colors.


(23) COT and staff order arms, COT commands "Order Arms" "Take charge of your detachments."

(24) Honor Guard personnel are marched back into aircraft to secure baggage. Personnel will load onto buses for movement to Ft. Riley.

2. Formations at Various Airbases



3. Forbes AFB Formation



Tab K (Ft. Riley Reorganization Ceremony) to Appendix I (Honor Guard) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

Sequence of Events - Ft. Riley Reorganization Ceremony

1. Formation of Troops.
 - a. Troops formed on ready line.
 - b. Adjutant's call.
 - c. Units march forward to final line.
2. Presentation and honors.
3. Inspection.
4. Inactivation of all 24th Infantry Division (Mech) battalions and three 1st Infantry Division battalions.
5. Activation of three battalions of 63d Armor.
6. Colors forward.
7. National Anthem.
8. Inactivation of 24th Infantry Division - Case colors.
9. Change of Command.
10. Post Colors.
11. Remarks.
12. Benediction.
13. Parade in review.
14. Smoke ship fly-by.

Appendix 2 (Unit Tradition and Heritage Letter) to Annex J (Redesignation) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APC 96345

AVDB-AG

4 February 1970

SUBJECT: Unit Traditions and Heritage

SEE DISTRIBUTION

As soon as possible after it is determined which unit in the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is to receive the colors of his unit, each battalion and separate company commander of this Division will write to his counterpart commander in the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The purpose of the letter will be to establish informal unit-to-unit communication, with the primary objective of facilitating continuity of the unit's traditions and preserving its heritage. A guide letter for this purpose, which addresses may modify as they desire, is inclosed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A

(Unit Letterhead)

Commanding Officer
____ Battalion, ____ Infantry
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Fort Riley, Kansas 66442

Dear Sir:

As commander of (Unit), I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you as my successor and to convey to you some of the background, history, and traditions of this distinguished unit. I know you share my dedication to the preservation of the proud traditions and exemplary record of (Unit) in accordance with the indomitable Spirit of the 1st Division. My purpose, therefore, is to provide information and material which will facilitate the accomplishment of that objective.

Probably, you already know a great deal of the unit's history. There may be details in recent chapters of that history that have not been made available to you, however. I think you will find the brief historical sketch at Inclosure 1 useful in bringing you up to date.

We are proud of the unit newspaper, "The _____", which we hope you will continue to publish. A copy (copies) of "The _____" is (are) at Inclosure 2.

Sketches of the unit crest and shoulder patch are at Inclosure 3. An explanation of their symbolism is included.

(If books are available) Inclosures 4 and 5 are copies of the unit and division year books, which will add to the historical information at Inclosure 1.

(In succeeding paragraphs, refer to any other material being sent: e.g., biographies of former commanders, lists of winners of high awards and/or legendary heroes, photographs, albums, etc.)

Memorabilia of the unit are being shipped by separate action.

I am happy to share with you the common purpose of perpetuating the customs, traditions, and distinguished record of (Unit). I hope you will find the inclosed material helpful in that regard. If you think of additional material or information that will be useful, please write to me.

Please convey to the officers and men into whose keeping we pass the colors of the (Unit), the warm regards and best wishes of the officers and men of the

Inclosure 1

Appendix 3 (Disposition of Unit Memorabilia) to Annex J (Redesignation) to 1st
Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUEJAY After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

S-2 March 1970

AVDB-L

22 February 1970

SUBJECT: Turn In of Unit Mementoes, Memorabilia and Impedimenta

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Unit commanders are hereby directed to turn-in all mementoes, memorabilia and impedimenta by not later than 022000 March 1970. It is advised that turn-in commences immediately to avoid congestion on the final day of turn-in.
2. Unit project officers for these items are requested to consult MSG May, Division Project NCO, telephone DA 2732, in order to coordinate time of turn-in. All mementoes, legal trophies, awards and impedimenta will be turned-in at Bldg #4262, vicinity of Headquarters, 1st S & T Battalion, DI An.
3. These items will be flown by special aircraft from Vietnam to Fort Riley, Kansas and it is emphasized that they will remain with the unit at Fort Riley. They will not be absorbed by the museum.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A plus
15 - C4

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-T-T

5 February 1970

SUBJECT: Contribution of War Trophies to the Division Museum

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The Division Training Command is packing the educational display of captured weapons and war material for shipment back to the First Infantry Division Museum at Wheaton, Illinois.
2. Many units of the Division have fine war trophies which are not authorized for shipment out of country by individuals or units which do not have an authorized museum. USARV regulations authorize museums no lower than Brigade.
3. Units having war trophies which are not authorized to be taken out of the country by individuals (ref 1st Inf Div Reg 643-1), are encouraged to turn them in to the Division Training Command not later than 15 February 1970, as donations to the official Division Museum. All significant trophies will be marked as having been captured by the donating unit.
4. Due to the packing schedule, war trophies to be donated must arrive at the Training Command not later than 15 February. Items on hand in units after that time must be turned in through normal USARV channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A(Mod-1)

Appendix 4 (Shipment of Special Category Items) to Annex J (Redesignation) to
1st Infantry Division KEYSTONE BLUJAY After Action Report (U)

1. UNIT MEMORABILIA: a. Unit memorabilia, such as awards, plaques, unit crests, trophies, photographs, sample stationery, authorized war trophies and other mementoes, were turned in to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion by 2 March 1970 for packing, crating and subsequent shipment.

b. Unit Memorabilia were packed into three CONEX containers and shipped by Special Mission Aircraft on 7 March 1970 to Fort Riley, Kansas. The shipment was escorted by one officer and one NCO. J1, MACV, arranged the Special Mission Aircraft.

2. MUSEUM ARTICLES: a. Items contributed to the 1st Infantry Division Museum were turned in for shipment at Di An.

b. These items were identified, documented and processed by special detail personnel under the supervision of Division Support Command. Two CONEX containers of museum articles were also flown by Special Mission Aircraft to the Cantigny War Museum at Wheaton, Ill.

3. DOCUMENTATION: Unit Memorabilia and museum articles required the following documentation:

a. Certificate of Inventory (3 copies) of all items turned in to the 1st S&T Bn.

(1) One copy was retained in the unit files.

(2) One copy was sent to the receiving unit.

(3) One copy was retained by ACoS, G4

b. Transportation Control and Movement Document DD Form 1384.

c. Certification Tag, DA Form 9-1.

d. Military Shipping Tag, DD Form 1387.

e. Military Shipping Tag, DD Form 1387-1.

f. Military Shipping Tag, DD Form 1387-2.

4. ORGANIZATION COLORS, GUIDONS AND NATIONAL STANDARDS: Redeploying units turned in organizational colors, National Standards, guidons, web slings and staffs for shipment to Ft Riley and Augsburg, Germany. Procedures for this turn-in were as follows:

a. Preparation of DA Form 444 in four (4) copies with the following statement: "This inventory adjustment report is prepared in order to drop accountability of above items from property book of _____ Bn _____ Inf, APO SF 96345, and to establish accountability on new property book of _____ Bn _____ Inf, Fort Riley, Kansas or APO 09112." A separate DA Form 444 was made for each company of a battalion that was being reassigned to Germany when the parent unit was going to Ft Riley. The form was verified for completeness by the ACoFS, G4.

b. Disposition of DA Form 444 was made as follows:

(1) One copy was retained in property document file.

(2) One copy was given to individual selected to turn the colors over to the new unit.

(3) One copy was furnished to the ACoFS, G4. This copy was then forwarded by letter to the ACoFS, G4, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kan., or to HQ, 3d Brigade, 24th Inf Div (Mech), Germany.

(4) One copy accompanied the colors, guidons, flags, staffs and slings to COMUS or Germany.

c. The Honor Guard Detachment received and receipted for all colors, guidons and slings, and coordinated the packing for air movement.

d. Inactivating units shipped organizational colors and/or guidons to the Storage Division US Army Depot, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, 17070. Colors

and/or guidons were tailed along with a letter of transmittal. Copies of the letter of transmittal were given a voucher number and used as authority to drop these items from the property book. The letter was placed in the document file.