


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under

Brigadier General John J. Pershing

United States Army

1916 - 1917

Chapters I thru V

by

Robert S. Thomas

Inez V. Allen

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
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United States Army

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Preface

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Chapter II

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Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander
Mexican Punitive Expedition.

P R E F A C E

A survey of military histories published by the Department of the Army reveals the fact that there are many important incidents in early American military life not covered by official publications. Among them is the expedition of United States troops into Mexico in 1916, generally known as the Mexican Punitive Expedition, which was undertaken in an effort to put an end to the loss of American lives and property caused by Mexican bandit raids and depredations across and along the border. This monograph covers briefly the period of the expedition and the benefits gained from that experience.

The story is confined primarily to the military aspects of the campaign with only brief references to early American-Mexican relations and to border concentration of the Army, Militia, and National Guard. This was the first such mobilization of troops in the history of the United States Army and provided experience that proved of great value in the World War so soon to follow. Mobilization, the replacement system, and demobilization are treated at length in studies prepared in the Office of the Chief of Military History under the respective titles, History of Military Mobilization in the United States, History of the Personnel System, United States Army, and History of Demobilization, United States Army.

Official records of the expedition now stored in the National Archives, Washington, D.C., were used in the preparation of this narrative, supplemented by research into the

Wilson, Borah, and Daniels papers in the Library of Congress, and by interviews with participants of the expedition and students of that period of American history. Secondary sources were used to fill gaps when official records were not available and to highlight incidents not otherwise of record.

A series of typical photographs has been inserted at pertinent places to illustrate the equipment, uniforms, and means of transportation of the several branches of service and locale over which the troops operated.

For information furnished by interview, our sincere appreciation is extended to the following retired officers: Major General James L. Collins and Colonel Robert H. Fletcher, participants in the expedition; Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, Colonel Henry Hossfeld and Colonel Aristides Moreno, who served on the border during that period. We are also indebted to Lieutenant Colonel M. F. J. Brunow for his assistance with maps and charts prepared by engineers with the expedition; to Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. O'Donnell and Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff for preparation of maps used herein; to Major R. M. Paone for his painstaking research, and to the many others who have contributed cheerfully of their time and knowledge.

Robert S. Thomas

Inez V. Allen

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THE MEXICAN PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

CHAPTER I

EARLY CONDITIONS IN MEXICO AND ALONG THE BORDER

As a result of internal unrest and intrigue in Mexico, trouble had been brewing along that part of the country bordering on the United States for months before the bandit raid at Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March 1916. As early as 1910, the Commanding General, Department of Texas, was authorized by the War Department to send troops to the aid of civil authorities to help enforce the neutrality laws whenever, in his judgment, such an act became necessary.¹

¹ Dept of State, GPO, Washington, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 473.

Situation Within Mexico

Since achieving independence from Spain in the early part of the 19th Century, Mexico had been torn by civil strife and insurrections. The history of the country up to 1920 can be told, in the main, through the medium of such individuals as Porfirio Diaz, Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, Venustiano Carranza, and Francisco ("Pancho") Villa and may be divided roughly into three periods. During the first period, 1821-1855, the white aristocratic element was in control and the country was ruled by military chiefs. In the second, 1855-1910, some democratic teachings which were beginning to take root gave way to the Diaz dictatorship. The third period began with the outbreak of the Revolution of 1910 and continued

through the World War, a decade of chaos and anarchy, plunder and banditry, robbery and cold-blooded murder, with short intervals that promised peace as successive leaders came into power.

Except for a period between 1880 and 1884 when Manuel Gonzales functioned as president, the Mexican government was headed from 5 May 1877 to 25 May 1911 by Porfirio Diaz. He ruled with an iron hand and though his rule was despotic it was a benevolent despotism. The country became more financially sound and economically prosperous and occupied a position of prominence among nations. During the early days of the Diaz regime relations with the United States were somewhat strained because of border disturbances and the temporary refusal of the United States to recognize the Diaz government. These differences were adjusted satisfactorily and after 1888 disputes between the two countries were transient.

2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, Rev Ed (New York, 1942), pp. 539 - 551 (hereafter cited Bemis).

Many of the Diaz policies were beneficial and successful but some were prejudicial to the best interests of the country. Particularly disastrous were the land policies which resulted in the expropriation of communal lands. Opposition to these policies was a contributing cause to the 1910 Revolution and Diaz's resignation. Dissatisfaction with the land policies contributed also to the "election" of Francisco Madero.

3 Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York and London), pp. 92 - 94 (hereafter cited Gruening).

Through the medium of the press, the people of both Mexico and the United States were led to believe that Madero was a proponent of democracy but nothing could be farther from the truth. A weak character to begin with, the power conferred on him by his government brought to life all the dormant evil qualities in his nature. Surrounded by intrigues and jealousies, the Madero regime soon degenerated into a despotism of the worst sort. All Mexico was thrown into a state of confusion and revolution and, during the last few months, a virtual reign of terror existed, supported by espionage, bribery, and deception. New political factions and revolutionists in arms came into existence, including a movement initiated by the northern border states to form an independent republic, of which Venustiana Carranza, governor of Coahuila, was the originator. In February 1913, the garrison of Mexico City revolted. Troops to suppress the uprising were put under the command of General Victoriana Huerta, who secretly joined up with the rebels and seized President Madero and the vice president, forcing them to resign. Huerta was immediately recognized as president by the Mexican army, by twenty-five of the twenty-seven states of the Republic, and by all the nations of the world except five, one of which was the United States. Huerta

4 Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa (Harrisburg, Pa. 1934), pp. 4 - 6 (hereafter cited Tompkins); Bemis, p. 544.

remained in control until July 1914.

Early in the Huerta regime the anti-American feeling, aggravated by the presence of American warships in Mexican waters, led to the arrest of United States Naval personnel who went ashore at Tampico. The commander of the naval forces demanded an apology and a salute of the American flag by way of reparation. The apology was given but Huerta refused the salute without the guarantee of a gun-for-gun return salute which resulted in the occupation of Vera Cruz on 21 April 1914 by American naval forces. On 4 May, these forces were relieved by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston with a large force of Regulars from El Paso, Texas. General Funston functioned as military governor until after the collapse of the Huerta⁵ government.

5 Ibid., pp. 548 - 550.

From the time of Huerta's resignation until the early 1920's, there followed a period of confusion and strife. Rival armed factions under Emiliano Zapata in the southwest and Francisco Villa in the north ravaged the country. The government was carried on by decree, the edicts of the general commanding in each region becoming its law. The important decrees were those of the so-called Consti-

tationalists. The principal contenders for control of the government were Alvaro Obregon, Venustiano Carranza, Zapata and Villa; Carranza⁶ temporarily gained control.

6 Gruening, p. 98.

In an effort to hasten the establishment of order, a conference of diplomatic representatives from six Latin American countries, known as the ABC powers, was called in Washington in August 1915 to advise on which faction to support. Despite the fact that Carranza refused the invitation to attend the conference and denied the right of outsiders to intervene in Mexican internal affairs, the conferees decided that the Carranzista party was the only party qualified to act as the de facto government of Mexico. On 19 October 1915, the Carranza government was recognized by the United States; similar action⁷ by the ABC powers followed.

7 Bemis, p. 551.

Recognition of the Carranza Government, together with assistance given his forces in battles with the revolutionists at Agua Prieta and other towns along the Arizona border, so enraged the bandit, Villa, that he vowed vengeance on all things American. He immediately organized troops in the western part of his native state, Chihuahua, where he was virtual master, and began a campaign purported to provoke armed intervention by the United States. Knowing that the Mexican

populace was generally in sympathy with him, Villa's aim was to supplant Carranza in the estimation of the people and become their leader in a patriotic revolution against the hoped-for American⁸ invasion, and eventually, President of Mexico.

8 Ibid., pp. 550 - 551.

Another source of trouble in Mexico stemmed from the activities of the so-called de la Rosa Faction which was headed by Luis de la Rosa, one-time resident of Texas. He was the ringleader in a revolutionary movement originating in the state of Coahuila early in 1915 and referred to as the Plan of San Diego. One of the reported objects of this movement was the overthrow of the government of the United States. While this far-fetched plan never materialized, the majority of the raids preceding the climactic attack on Columbus, as well as many of those occurring while American forces were in⁹ Mexico, were attributed to the de la Rosa Faction.

9 Annual Reports of the Fiscal Year 1916 by Maj Gen Frederick Funston, pp. 3 - 15, AGO File 243231, Box 141 EN National Archives, Washington (hereafter referred to as Funston Rpt.).

Conditions Along The Border

Only the events resulting from the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March 1916, will be covered in detail in this narrative. However, General Funston was faced with the additional task of keeping

order along the Mexican border from the Gulf of Mexico to the California line, a distance of more than 1700 miles. During the early part of 1916 the border was divided into the following cavalry patrol districts: Brownsville, Fort McIntosh, Eagle Pass, Big Bend, Fabens, Columbus, and El Paso. In addition, there were camps and garrisons at Laredo and Eagle Pass, Texas; Douglas, Naco, Nogales and Yuma, Arizona. The patrols were practically all cavalry but as raids across the Mexican border became more serious, finally culminating in the attack on Columbus, it was decided to use infantry to a greater extent with small garrisons scattered at short intervals all along the border. To accomplish this purpose the former sub-divisions of cavalry patrol districts was discontinued on 17 May 1916 and the border was divided into ten districts. Troops of various arms were represented, depending on local needs and the troops available. The districts were: Brownsville, Laredo, Eagle Pass, Del Rio, Big Bend, El Paso, New Mexico, Arizona, Nogales, and Yuma.

10 Ibid., pp. 1 - 2.

Recognizing the inadequacy of the forces for this purpose, on 9 May 1916, President Wilson called the militia of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas into Federal service for duty with the Commanding General of the Southern Department. When war with Mexico appeared to be almost a certainty, the mobile portions of the national guard or organized militia of all other states, except those of Washington

and Oregon, were called into Federal service on 18 June. The National Defense Act, approved 2 June 1916, changed the state militia into the National Guard but when the call was issued on 18 June there had not been sufficient time to complete administrative details incident to that change. Therefore, the Commanding Generals of the Eastern, Central, and Western Departments were ordered, on 23 June, to transfer each unit to the Mexican Border as soon as it¹¹ was reasonably equipped for field service.

11 Ibid., p. 32, WD An Rpts. 1916, Vol. I, p.12.

When called out, the National Guard was more than 18,000 enlisted men below the minimum authorized peace strength and almost half of those reporting were without former service or training, commanded by officers of very limited experience. Concentration points were established at or near Douglas, El Paso, Fort Sam Houston, and Brownsville, where troops and officers received practical instruction and training with Regular Army officers under field conditions. This training greatly facilitated the training and building up of¹² the army in the World War.

12 WD An Rpts, 1916, Vol. I, pp. 190 - 191.

Throughout 1916 Funston's forces were kept constantly on the alert by raids and attacks at scattered points along the border. A partial list of forays include: Doyles Wells, near Hachita, New

Mexico, 18 January; Fort Hancock, Texas, 17 February; Edinburg, Texas, 7 March; Osborn, Arizona, 10 March; Alpine, Texas, 13 March; Glen Springs, Texas, 5 May; Deemer's Store, Texas, 6 May; New Hatchet Ranch, New Mexico, 10 June; Webb, Texas, 12 June; San Ygnacio, Texas, 15 June; San Pedro, Texas, 16 June; Old Fort Early, Texas, 1 July, and a few incidents subsequent to the withdrawal of the Punitive Expedition.¹³

¹³ Funston's Rpt, pp. 19 - 21.

Though most of the raids were nothing more than cattle-stealing incidents, some assumed more serious proportions. About sixty Mexicans crossed into the United States on the night of 5 May and rifled stores and homes at Glen Springs. A detachment of the 14th Cavalry drove the bandits out of town but about twenty outlaws broke away from the main body and, on 6 May, looted Deemer's Store. The entire body was finally driven about 135 miles into Mexico by troops of the 8th and 14th Cavalry regiments. At Glen Springs, one child, three United States soldiers, and two Mexicans were killed and two American soldiers were wounded. No lives were lost at Deemer's Store but the bandits took away seven Americans from a nearby mine in Mexico; also Mr. Deemer, the storekeeper. At Santa Anita, Troop B of the 8th Cavalry became engaged, capturing two Mexicans and ten rifles. In a raid at San Ygnacio during the following month, four United States troopers of the 14th Cavalry were killed. The Mexican leader and five of his men were killed; and

five men were taken prisoner.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 15, 20.

Accounts of the composition of these raiding parties vary. Some were definitely recognized as Villistas while others were branded as fanatical members of the de la Rosa faction. In the Glen Springs fight, some were identified as Carranzistas from their dress and manner of speech.

By the fall of 1916, the situation had cleared sufficiently to warrant the gradual withdrawal of the National Guard until, at the outbreak of the World War, practically all National Guard troops had been mustered out of Federal service. However, with the exception of one regiment, the cavalry remained in the Southern Department to keep watch on the ever-present danger from the south.¹⁵

¹⁵ WD An Rpts. 1917, Vol. I, p. 141.

The improvement in border conditions, due primarily to General Funston's punishment of border raiders and General Pershing's dispersal of Villa's forces in Mexico, was furthered by efforts of the Mexican people to establish a stronger constitutional government and extend civil order throughout the Mexican republic.¹⁶

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

Attitude Toward the Mexican Problem in the United States

After the Vera Cruz incident, the Government in Washington was fully aware of the danger of again becoming involved with our southern neighbor. While a policy of strict neutrality was maintained, a close check was kept on developments within Mexico as well as along the border. A wide divergence of opinion existed throughout the country in regard to the policy of the administration but there was a unanimous demand for greater protection of lives and property along the border. Opposition to the Administration's policy was led by Senator William A. Borah who took the stand that the United States was interfering in Mexican internal affairs.¹⁷

¹⁷ William E. Borah Papers, Library of Congress.

In response to a Resolution adopted by the United States Congress on 6 January 1916 in an effort to clear up the situation, President Wilson submitted reports from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, setting forth in detail precautionary measures which had been taken to protect American lives and property. Nevertheless, within a month, news came of the raid on Columbus. Indignation at this atrocity drew forth insistent demands that immediate steps be taken to punish the marauders and prevent the repetition of such a crime. This feeling throughout the country played a large part in the decision to send a punitive expedition into Mexico.¹⁸

¹⁸ Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 463 - 465; 469 - 478. Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited ^{Wilson} ~~Nelson~~ Papers.).

The Columbus Raid

After his defeat at Agua Prieta, Villa and his men drifted south across the desert and reorganized in the vicinity of Santa Ysabel and Rubio. Then he started a campaign of harrassment of both Carranzistas and Americans which culminated in the attack on Columbus, New Mexico.

Villa's first act toward provoking trouble with the United States was the deliberate murder of a group of young engineers on 10 January 1916 at Santa Ysabel, about twenty-five miles southwest of the city of Chihuahua. These engineers were sent out, on Carranza's invitation, by American mine owners to reopen their mines in that vicinity. President Wilson accepted, in good faith, the promise of the Mexican government that the perpetrators of the crime would be punished, and trouble was temporarily averted.¹⁹

¹⁹ Bemis, pp. 551 - 552.

As previously stated, the border between the United States and Mexico, in early 1916, was divided into patrol districts. The Columbus District was under the command of Colonel Herbert J. Slocum, with Headquarters at Columbus, New Mexico. He was required to patrol the border for a distance of approximately sixty-five air miles with a force consisting of Headquarters and Machine Gun Troops and seven Rifle Troops of the 13th Cavalry, aggregating 21 officers and 532 enlisted men. Early in March, rumors indicated that Villa planned to cross the border and move in the direction

of Columbus. To be on the safe side, Colonel Slocum decided to strengthen his forces at the two most vulnerable points - Gibson's Ranch, about fourteen miles west of Columbus, and the border gate, three miles south of the garrison. Accordingly, on 5 March, Major Elmer Lindsley, with two troops, was sent to Gibson's Ranch and Captain Jens E. Stedje, with one troop, was sent to the border gate. Both were instructed to send out patrols along the border at irregular intervals day and night. Regulations prohibited sending officer patrols into Mexico. Paid Mexicans, thought to be dependable, had to be used for that purpose. On 7 March, General Funston informed Slocum that the State Department was quoted as having received reliable information that Villa was planning to cross the border at Columbus and give himself up to be taken to Washington to confer with the President but unreliable sources reported that the bandit would attack Columbus.

20 Tompkins, p. 42; Funston Rpt., pp. 21 - 22.

On the evening of the same day, 7 March, a Mexican employee of an American land and cattle company reported to Colonel Slocum that Villa and about 500 men were about forty miles southwest of Columbus. The Mexican stated that he, together with the American foreman of the company and another American, had come upon the bandits in camp on the Casas Grandes River and that the Americans were captured. Upon the promise of pay, the Mexican agreed to get further information on the bandit's movements. Meanwhile, in an attempt to clear up

the conflicting reports, the district commander, himself, with two troops of cavalry, patrolled the border south of Columbus during the night of 7/8 March. The commanding officer of the Carranza forces at the border gate was interviewed about midnight but denied any knowledge of Villa or his followers. Late in the evening of 8 March, accompanied by Major Lindsley, the Mexican returned to Columbus and reported to Colonel Slocum that Villa's main body left camp on the Casas Grandes about 3:00 a. m. that day and moved eastward, while some one hundred of the men started toward Palomas but later turned to the south. The Mexican appeared to be telling the truth, but he was closely questioned by both Slocum and his adjutant, Captain George Williams, until about 11:00 p. m., Major Lindsley acting as interpreter. However, a few days after the attack on Columbus, the Mexican's story was contradicted by officials of the land and cattle company.²¹ The direction from which the attack

21 Tompkins, pp. 43 - 44.

was made also discredited the story.

Notwithstanding all precautions, about 4 o'clock on Thursday morning, 9 March 1916, with a force variously estimated at from 500 to 1,000 men, Villa crossed the international border entirely unobserved by patrols at a point about three miles west of the border gate, attacked the camp and looted the town of Columbus.²²

22 Funston, p. 22.



Machine Gun- the "Ben-A" (Benet Mercier) used in the Army in 1916

That Villa had spies in the town was proved beyond a doubt by the knowledge the enemy had of the officers' houses, which were immediately surrounded. Not until the Mexicans began to retreat were the officers able to leave their homes without endangering their lives; it was about dawn when Colonel Slocum joined his troops. ²³

23 Tompkins, p. 46.

The attack was well planned. Private papers belonging to Villa, found in Columbus after the raid, showed that he had planned the attack as early as 6 January. The first blow struck the west edge of the camp where a sentinel was shot and killed. Lieutenant James P. Castleman, on duty as officer of the day, turned out the guard and opened fire on the attackers. Assembling Troop F, he drove the bandits across the railroad and into the coal bins. Quickly other cavalymen joined in and the enemy was driven north through Columbus. Meanwhile, some of the marauders launched a second attack against the eastern edge of the camp. This group also was driven north through the town where they were fired on by the machine gun company. Two expert machine gunners were killed early in the action and it is reported that some of the guns jammed. The guns were Benet Merciers and so complicated as to require almost perfect conditions in order to function. After little more than an hour's fighting, the bandits were forced to flee, having set fire to many buildings and looting numerous stores. Unsuccessful in his efforts to reorganize his band for another attack, Villa retreated southward, pursued for about fifteen or twenty miles into Mexico by parts of



Cavalrymen who took part in pursuit of bandits after Columbus raid.

Troops H and F, under Captains Rudolph E. Smyser, Williams, and Lieutenant Castleman, with Major Frank Tompkins in charge. When ammunition was exhausted, Major Tompkins brought his²⁴ troopers back to Columbus.

²⁴ A full account of the Columbus attack is given in Tompkins' book, Chasing Villa, Ch. VIII.

During the engagement, eight American soldiers were killed and seven wounded while eight civilians were killed and three were wounded. Sixty-seven bodies of Mexican dead were found. In the running fight south of the border, seventy to a hundred Mexicans²⁵ were reported killed.

²⁵ Funston rpt, pp. 21 - 23; H. T. Toulmin, Jr., With Pershing in Mexico (Farrisburg, Pa., 1935) pp. 29 - 43 (hereafter cited Toulmin).

Since Slocum's action was a violation of War Department orders General Funston was directed to send his inspector general to Columbus to investigate all the circumstances connected with the raid. Based on the information obtained, Colonel Slocum was exonerated from all criticism in the matter by Funston. That decision was up-²⁶ held by the War Department.

²⁶ Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York, 1928), pp. 521 - 522; Report of Investigation, AG 2212358, filed in National Archives, Wash D. C.

Chapter II

The Mexican Punitive Expedition

The Columbus raid proved beyond a doubt that, as long as Villa and his band of outlaws were allowed to roam unmolested just south of the border, similar raids and depredations might be expected at any time. The Commander of the Southern Department decided that some positive action must be taken.

Southern Department Commander Requests Authority to Send Troops into

Mexico

On 9 March, 1910, General Funston sent a telegram to the War Department requesting authority to send troops into Mexico in pursuit of hostile bands. The next day he sent another message stressing the apathetic attitude of the Mexican Government towards suppressing Villa's activities and the need to move replacements to the Southern Department in order to tighten up border control if the War Department approved pursuit of the bandits.¹ The same day Funston

1 Funston Rpt, p. 25.

received authority for the pursuit as follows:

President has directed that an armed force be sent into Mexico with the sole object of capturing Villa and preventing any further raids by his band and with scrupulous regard to sovereignty of Mexico. Secretary War directs you telegraph exactly what you need in order to carry out foregoing general instructions but you will not take any overt steps until receipt orders from War Department.²

2 Ibid.

General Funston's Plan

In response, a plan was submitted on 10 March wherein Funston proposed that two columns enter Mexico from New Mexico, the first to start from Columbus, and the second to form at Hachita, travel by way of Culberson's Ranch and join the first column in the vicinity of Ascencion, Mexico, about sixty miles southwest of Columbus.

From Ascencion, available roads between the Sierra Madre and the Mexican Northwestern Railroad would be used in the movement southward. El Paso, Texas, was designated as the general supply depot with advance depots at Columbus and Hachita. These depots, using trucks and pack trains, were to furnish supplies until the converging columns reached Casas Grandes. At that point, Funston planned to have supplies forwarded by way of the Mexican Northwestern Railway from El Paso, keeping the railway open and operative with the aid of a force of infantry troops serving as guards. To constitute the invading force, Funston recommended the use of four regiments of cavalry organized into two brigades, with one battery of the 6th Field Artillery Regiment, together with necessary auxiliary troops, including aeroplanes, attached.

To insure the safe return of the cavalry, in the case of a mass rising on the part of the Mexican populace, Funston urged that a reinforced brigade follow the cavalry from Columbus. This brigade was to consist of three regiments of infantry and a battalion of field artillery, accompanied by necessary sanitary and signal troops. Additional infantry would be needed to establish and protect the lines of communication for the invading force. To patrol

the border after the units had been sent into Mexico, Funston's plan called for the shifting of troops from Douglas, Arizona, from El Paso, Texas, and from other southwestern areas. No immediate change in border patrols or dispositions east of El Paso or on the lower Rio Grande was contemplated. Naturally, all plans were predicated on Villa's most likely movements. Heretofore, when he had been occasionally pursued by Mexican government troops he had always run for the mountains of western Chihuahua. If he should now elect to cross the Sierra Madre into Sonora, all American plans would have to be changed and another expeditionary force organized and sent into Mexico from Douglas.³

³ Ibid., pp. 25 - 26.

Mexican Punitive Expedition Authorized

The following day, 10 March, orders were received approving the plan with the exception of the proposition to keep the Mexican Northwestern Railway open. Instead, it was emphasized that plans must not be based on the assumption that any railroad in Mexico would be kept open and guarded by United States troops but rather that use of the railroads and telegraph lines would always be contingent upon permission of the Mexican government. It was also made clear that no Mexican city or town should be occupied by American troops. An extract from the orders concerning details of the expedition follows:

You will promptly organize an adequate military force of troops under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus and the troops there on the morning of the ninth instant. These troops will be withdrawn to American territory as soon as the de facto government of Mexico is able to relieve them of this work. In any event the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa's band or bands are known to be broken up. In carrying out these instructions you are authorized to employ whatever guides and interpreters necessary and you are given general authority to employ such transportation, including motor transportation, with necessary civilian personnel as may be required. The President desires his following instructions to be carefully adhered to and to be kept strictly confidential. You will instruct the commanders of your troops on the border opposite the states of Chihuahua and Sonora or, roughly, within the field of possible operations by Villa and not under the control of the de facto government, that they are authorized to use the same tactics of defense and in the event of similar raids across the border and into the United States by a band or bands such as attacked Columbus, New Mexico yesterday. You are instructed to make all practicable use of the aeroplanes at San Antonio, Texas, for observation. Telegraph for whatever reinforcements or material you need. Notify this office as to force selected and expedite movement. McCain.⁴

⁴ Ibid., pp. 26 - 27.

General Pershing, then stationed at El Paso, Texas, was chosen to command the expedition on the recommendations of Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, Army Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss. Neither the Secretary of War nor the President had ever met him; his selection was based on his record as a successful field commander in the Moro campaigns of 1906-1912, in recognition of which he was promoted to brigadier general from captain of cavalry. No other officer then on active duty in the Army had had an opportunity prior to 1910 to demonstrate his ability to command a substantial body of troops

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in field operations.

5 James G. Harbord, The American Army in France (Boston, 1930), p. 33, (hereafter Harbord).

The War Department order of 10 March, quoted above, directs the "pursuit of the Mexican band" but the telegram received by General Funston on the 9th authorized the sending of an armed force into Mexico "with the sole object of capturing Villa." Considerable discussion arose later over the wording of the War Department instructions.

In a letter dated 12 March to President Wilson, summing up Funston's plans, Secretary Baker wrote:

I did not feel, during your absence, that any of the matters presented required my reaching you by wireless...

General Funston's dispatches to the Department have detailed with great particularity the troops, equipment and supplies needed by him. I directed that his requests be met promptly and as made, feeling that his judgment on the ground is better than any judgment which we could exercise at this distance and that the responsibility for the success of the expedition ought to rest on him. In this view General Scott and the officers of the General Staff here entirely concur.

6 Wilson Papers.

Reciprocal Agreement Between the Governments of the United States
and Mexico

On 10 March, the next day after the Columbus raid, the Mexican Government sent a note to the Government of the United States expressing regret for the "lamentable occurrence at Columbus" and

7 Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 485.

requested permission for Mexican forces to cross the border in an effort to "exterminate the horde led by Francisco Villa"⁸ and to

8 Ibid.

capture and punish him. In return the same privileges were promised American forces "if the raid effected at Columbus should ... be repeated...."⁹ In a reply dated 13 March, the United States

9 Ibid.

Government acceded to the request and stated that "... the Government of the United States understands that, in view of its agreement to this reciprocal arrangement proposed by the de facto Government, the arrangement is now complete and in force and the reciprocal privileges thereunder may accordingly be exercised¹⁰ by either Government without further interchange of views...."

10 Ibid., p. 488.

On the assumption that the matter was settled, the War Department sent a message to General Pershing, which he received before departure on the 15th, to the effect that entry of United States forces

would be tolerated by the Mexican Government. On 17 March, the Congress of the United States adopted a Resolution approving the reciprocal arrangement and the order sending forces into Mexico.¹¹

¹¹ Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 485 - 491; Teleg No. 32, 15 Mar 16, WD to Pershing (hereafter telegs Pershing to So Dept and vice versa).

Carranza consented to Pershing's expedition for good reason. For a long time Villa had been rising in power and had built up an emotional appeal throughout Mexico that was dangerous to the constitutional government. Control over federal forces in Chihuahua had become tenuous. Doubtless Carranza himself found it hard to determine whether the Carranzistas were really his men or were working with Villa. That quite a few were serving both Carranza and Villa was proven by the finding of bodies in uniforms of the constitutional government after bandit raids across the border.¹²

¹² Toulmin, pp. 7 - 10.

The Mexican Secretary of War and Navy, General Alvaro Obregon, issued a proclamation on 13 March based on the agreement between the two countries which was distributed to the governors of the states concerned and published in a number of towns. The proclamation read as follows;

Our Government having entered into an agreement with that of the United States to the North providing that the troops of either government may cross the border in pursuit of bandits who are committing depredations along our frontier, I advise you of same in order that you may in turn advise all commanders along the border in order that they may make judicious use of these powers, taking care in each case to act in accord with the military authorities of the American army in order that the pursuit of these bandits may give the best results....¹³

13 Rpt of Oper, Pun Exped by Gen John J Pershing, p. 10, AGO 2480591, Box 141 EN, Natl Archives (hereafter Pershing Rpt).

Notwithstanding this published proclamation, the Mexican Government took the stand on 18 March that "The consent ... in regard to the crossing of armed troops over our frontier line is being erroneously understood by taking it for granted that the crossing of a military expedition in pursuit of Villa has been permitted and furthermore, by the intent to have troops move over the line¹⁴ of the Northwest Railway of Mexico..."

14 Foreign Relations 1910, p. 493.

Terms of the agreement and the presence of American forces on Mexican soil were a continuing issue between the State Departments of the two governments. On 14 April, Robert Lansing, American Secretary of State, informed Carranza that the intention of the United States Government had not changed--that troops were sent into Mexico to capture the bandit chief, Villa, that the forces would be withdrawn only when the object of the expedition was

accomplished, and that the mission would be more speedily completed
by the cooperation of both governments.¹⁵ With that, the matter

15 Ibid., p. 518.

appears to have been temporarily eclipsed by the Parral encounter.

In the meantime, Pershing's forces had entered Mexico and his troops were carrying and displaying copies of the Obregon proclamation which should have been sufficient evidence of their right to be in Mexican territory. It probably did prevent open hostilities in the beginning but unfriendliness of the natives increased as the Americans advanced.

Preparations for Entering Mexico

General Pershing was informed of his selection to command the expedition by General Funston on 11 March 1916 and provided with plans and instructions approved by the War Department. As evidence of the responsibility placed on him, the following is quoted from the Departmental Commander's communication:

... As commander of the expeditionary force, the Department Commander leaves you free to make such assignments of the troops under your command as you think best in order to accomplish the purpose in hand. The instructions that have been given you and that are being given troops which will be placed under your immediate command are for the purpose of organizing the expedition. If you wish any changes in those instructions, telegraph these Headquarters at once, but from the time the troops report to you they will be subject to your orders.¹⁶

16 Pershing Rpt, pp. 1 - 2.

General Funston made provisions to maintain a line of communications from Columbus, the base of supply for the expedition, to the advance base when set up in Mexico. From that time on, supply and communication with the advancing troops became General Pershing's responsibility.

Immediate steps were taken by the Department Commander to collect at Columbus all necessary supplies, ammunition, means of transportation, and troops, the majority of which were to come from General Pershing's El Paso command. A superficial knowledge of the state of Chihuahua made it evident from the first that supply would be one of the most difficult problems to be encountered. If the use of Mexican railways was not permitted, motor transportation alone could make the expedition a success. General Funston in his 1916 report wrote: "Practically no motor trucks were available at this time but owing to the emergency the War Department authorized the hire of such trucks as might be available and of civilian chauffeurs to drive them."¹⁷ Of such a situation did the modern Army Transportation

¹⁷ Funston Rpt, p. 28.

Corps have its origin. To supply the replacement troops indicated as necessary, the War Department made the 1st and 11th Cavalry Regiments available as needed.

With reference to instructions to make use of aeroplanes, it should be noted that the Army at that time had only one air squadron of thirteen planes; eight of these were serviceable and available to General Pershing's forces. This air unit left for Columbus on

18

13 March, traveling by rail.

18 WD Annual Rpts 1916, Vol.1, p. 882.

The troops designated by the Department Commander to comprise the expedition were the 7th, 10th (Colored), 11th, and 13th Regiments of Cavalry; 6th and 16th Infantry Regiments; Batteries B and C, 6th Field Artillery; 1st Ambulance Company No. 7; Field Hospital No. 7; Signal Corps detachments; 1st Aero Squadron and Wagon Companies Nos. 1 and 2. These forces, numbering about 10,000 men, were organized as a provisional division called the Punitive Expedition of the United States Army (Appendix A).

Under orders from Headquarters, Southern Department, the command was to enter Mexico in two columns, the western column from Hachita and the eastern from Columbus. The following troops were directed to concentrate not later than 14 March:

<u>Hachita</u>	<u>Columbus</u>
7th Cavalry	13th Cavalry (less one troop)
10th Cavalry (less two troops)	11th Cavalry (from Ft. Oglethorpe)
Btry. B, 6th Field Artillery	Btry C, 6th Field Artillery
	One company engineers
	1st Aero Sqdn (eight aeroplanes)

Each column would be provided with full field transportation, two ambulances and a sanitary wagon. A reinforced brigade of the 6th and 16th Infantry, 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery and auxiliary troops would follow the Columbus troops, Signal Corps equipment, which included wagon radio sets and radio pack sets at Douglas, Arizona, Culberson's Ranch, Las Cienegas and Hachita, New Mexico,

and Mission, Texas, were made available to maintain communication.

The western column, designated Second Provisional Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Colonel George A. Dodd, would move by way of Culberson's Ranch. The eastern column, or First Provisional Cavalry Brigade, under Colonel James Lockett, would move directly south, both columns uniting at Ascencion. Just before time to start, it was learned that Villa's band had passed Casas Grandes and was moving south. An abrupt change in plans became necessary since the formerly-scheduled junction at Ascencion would cause delay and the use of Hachita as a base for the western column would be inexpedient. Consequently, this column was directed to make a forced march from Culberson's Ranch by the most direct route toward Casas Grandes and use Columbus as its base.

19 Pershing, pp. 5 - 6.

A further complication arose on the night of 13 March when it was learned that the Mexican de facto troops guarding the border gate at Las Palomas, south of Columbus, had taken the stand that they would resist American entry at that point. Whether they had been notified of Obregon's proclamation is not known. Every reasonable argument was used to convince the Palomas commander that the governments of the two countries had already come to terms in regard to crossing the border and that opposition at that point would be futile, but he maintained that his orders made it imperative for him to oppose entry of American troops. A clash at any point with the Mexican

hierarchy was to be avoided if possible but this local commander could not be allowed to upset the plans and he was notified that troops would enter Mexico at the appointed time regardless of opposition. Department Headquarters was advised of the situation but, when the command entered Palomas, no Mexican troops were in evidence.²⁰

20 Ibid., p. 7; Tompkins, p. 74.

Terrain and Climate of the State of Chihuahua

The geographical features, the climate, and weather conditions of northern Mexico to which the American forces were subjected played an important role throughout the operation. Topographically, the state of Chihuahua, about three times the size of New York State, consists of two parts, the plateau section in the east and the Sierra Madre or mountainous section in the west.

The plateau, with an elevation of from 3,000 to 6,000 feet, comprises about four-fifths of the state and is characterized by a series of plains lying between ranges of low, barren mountains, many with no outlet. The edges of the basins consist of long slopes of gravel cut through by ravines which make travel difficult but toward the center the gravel changes into fine sand or silt and forms level plains. Lake beds, covered with water only during floods, are often found in these plains. To pass from one basin to another it is necessary to go around the ends of the mountain ranges.

The Sierra Madre, or mountainous section, with an altitude of

from 6,000 to 10,000 feet, is almost inaccessible. The only means of penetration is through innumerable rocky canyons which are extremely hazardous. These fastnesses have always been a haunt for bandits, not only because of their inaccessibility but because water, forage, food and fuel are more plentiful than in the plateau region.

The climate is characterized by extreme dryness except during the so-called rainy season during the latter part of June and well into August; then frequent heavy thunderstorms and cloudbursts are common. In the southern part of Chihuahua the heat is intense in the middle of the day but the nights are cool -- often cold. In the winter, ice and snowstorms are severe but seldom last long.

Generally speaking, vegetation on the plains consists mainly of thorns or spines, ranging from tiny cactus to the giant pitahaya which rises to a height of fifty feet. Mesquite, agaves and yuccas also thrive. Thin grass springs up during the rainy season but soon dries up. Forage is scarce during most of the year and horses have to wander for long distances to find enough grass to keep them alive. The mountains rising from the plateau sections are generally bare or covered with scrub brush and small trees not large enough to be of commercial value. Mesquite is generally depended upon for fuel. Among the mountains farther west, vegetation is much more
21
abundant because of greater rainfall and lower temperatures.

Expedition Enters Mexico in Two Columns

Because of the general effect of further delay, the Commanding General, Southern Department, instructed General Pershing on 13 March that movement into Mexico would begin not later than 6 a. m., 15 March, even though progress for the first few days might not be rapid. The attitude of the Mexican government forces was not known but, taking into consideration the reaction of the small body of troops at Palomas, it was feared that opposition might be encountered. Pershing was again directed to warn his forces of the need for exercising caution and impress on them that the expedition was to be limited strictly to the accomplishment of the original mission so that "no color of any other possibility or intention be given."²²

22 Funston Rpt, pp. 28 - 29.

No accurate information could be obtained as to the strength of either the Mexican regular or bandit forces. It was known that the headquarters of the Mexican Army of the northwest was at Chihuahua City and that garrisons were maintained at Parral, Juarez, and Casas Grandes and at Torreon in Durango. The estimated strength was about 8,000; civilian organizations presumed to consist of about 1,000 men, called Home Guards, were maintained in towns along the Mexican Northwestern Railway for protection against bandits. At the time of the Columbus raid, Villa's forces were reported to number between 500 and 1,000 men.²³

23 Doc 904, Mexico, pp. 18 - 19, op. cit.; WD An Rpts 1916, Vol 1,

When the expedition entered Mexico, no adequate maps of the State of Chihuahua were available. A small detachment of engineers was detailed to prepare maps of the country to be traversed as the expedition advanced.²⁴

²⁴ Pershing, p. 40.


Since the western column would be moving rapidly, only pack trains were used for transporting supplies. All wagon transportation was sent to Columbus to follow the eastern column. The artillery was sent by a route more suitable for vehicles but at least twenty miles longer. However, it reached its destination at practically the same time as the cavalry, having traveled approximately 145²⁵ miles in about 46 hours.

²⁵ Pershing, p. 7; Tompkins, p. 77.

General Pershing decided to lead the swift-moving forces at Culberson's Ranch and Colonel Dodd was directed to await his arrival. Owing to an automobile accident, the General was delayed and it was after midnight, 15/16 March, when the troops got under²⁶ way.

²⁶ Pershing, p. 7.

The first leg of the trip was made in pitch darkness, bitter




Field Artillery Battery

cold, and over roads so choked with white alkali dust that the pack train got lost and did not rejoin the column until after daylight. The remainder of the trip was made without incident and the troops arrived in the vicinity of Colonia Dublan at 7:30 p.m., 17 March. In compliance with War Department orders concerning occupation of Mexican towns or cities, camp was set up about a mile north of Colonia Dublan. This camp became the temporary advance base of operations.

27 Ibid., Tompkins, p. 77.

The western or flying column covered 125 miles with only two major halts. Considering the distance the regiments had traveled to reach Culbersen's Ranch, the heavy loads, the rough country, and the fact that neither men nor animals had slept during the night of 15/16 March, this was indeed a great cavalry accomplishment.

The eastern column left Columbus just before noon on 15 March under command of Colonel Lockett. As a token of appreciation for the part he had played in the pursuit of Villa and his band after the Columbus raid, Major Frank Tompkins was designated as commander of the advance guard. That night the column made its first camp on Mexican soil at Las Palamos. The command got off to an early start on the morning of the 16th and, following a route by way of Boca Grande, Ascension and Corralitos, arrived at Colonia Dublan soon after noon on 20 March, where the western column had



Las Palamos - Site of first camp in Mexico

already set up camp. Since all wagon transportation followed
the eastern column, only from 20 to 30 miles per day was covered. ²⁸

28 Tompkins, pp. 74 - 79.

At the time of entry into Mexico, the strength of the two
advance columns was as follows; ²⁹

29 Telegs, Pershing to So Dept, No. 21.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Animals</u>
Columbus Column (eastern)	133	3,175	2,288
Culberson Column (western)	<u>59</u>	<u>1,625</u>	<u>1,887</u>
Total -	192	4,800	4,175

CHAPTER III

PURSUIT OF THE VILLA FORCES

General Pershing's first step, after setting up camp at Colonia Dublan, was to try to find out where the bandits were hiding. According to local reports, they were somewhere in the vicinity of San Miguel de Babicora, forty or fifty miles to the south where Villa was building up his force and stealing horses and supplies from the people. Pershing decided to send south at once three separate cavalry columns with instructions to cooperate with each other to the fullest extent. It was believed that, by moving these detachments, generally parallel to each other, Villa would be prevented from moving toward Sonora on the west or farther east from the Mexican Northwestern Railway. In addition, there would be a chance of cutting his trail or getting ahead of him before he could move¹ into the mountains near Guerrero.

¹ Pershing, p. 7.

Three Pursuit Detachments Organized

One of the detachments, consisting of the 7th Cavalry under Colonel James B. Erwin with 29 officers and 647 enlisted men, left Colonia Dublan on the night of 17/18 March with orders to proceed by way of Galeana to the area southwest of El Valle and then toward the San Miguel plateau. The second detachment, composed of the 2nd Squadron, 10th Cavalry, under Colonel William C. Brown

with 14 officers and 258 enlisted men, was directed to advance to the San Miguel plateau, using the railroad as far as Rucio. The third detachment, consisting of the 1st Squadron of the 10th Cavalry under Major Ellwood W. Evans with 8 officers and 204 enlisted men, was ordered to proceed by rail to Las Varas, near Madera, to cover the area south of the Babicora plateau.² These

2 Ibid.

two detachments left late in the afternoon of the 19th.

The two 10th Cavalry detachments were sent by rail because the regiment had traveled more than 250 miles since 10 March and the animals had begun to show effects of the strain. Moreover, it was thought that time would be gained on Villa's forces, but unforeseen troubles caused delay. General Pershing's request for a train was immediately complied with and the train arrived at Colonia Dublan on the morning of the 19th. However, the cars were in such bad condition that several hours elapsed before repairs were made. During the journey, so many difficulties were encountered that Colonel Brown detrained at Rucio on the morning of the 20th and proceeded to the San Miguel plateau over a rocky mountain trail. Major Evans continued by rail for a short distance but after the train was involved in a wreck in which eleven of his men were injured, he too decided to proceed under his own power, reaching his destination on 22 March.³

3 Ibid.; The Tenth Cavalry in Mexico, by Capt G. C. Troxell, in the U.S. Cavalry Journal for October 1917, gives a very complete account of the activities of the regiment.

Unsatisfactory Attempts To Cooperate With Mexican Army

The American forces tried repeatedly to coordinate their efforts to capture Villa with those of the Carranza government but with little or no success. The first attempt in that direction was made by Colonel Brown at Namiquipa.

After detraining at Rucio on 20 March, Colonel Brown, with the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, reached the San Miguel area about noon the next day by traveling over an extremely difficult trail but one which afforded adequate forage for the animals. It was soon learned that Villa had not been within miles of the place. The rumor that he was in that vicinity was only one of the many that kept American forces following the will-o'-the-wisp for months. Continuing southward, Brown went into camp on 23 March between San Jose de Babicora and Namiquipa near the little town of El Toro.⁴

⁴ Tompkins, p. 91.

Brown's civilian guide, who was sent to San Jose de Babicora to communicate with the other detachments, heard that the Carranzistas under Colonel Cano had recently defeated Villa at Namiquipa. In a meeting with Cano at Namiquipa on 25 March, the report was confirmed and Brown was advised that the bandit was then probably in

the vicinity of El Oso or Santa Clara. Brown suggested that if the Mexicans could locate Villa that he, Brown, would make the attack. Cano agreed, and promised to send out scouting parties for that purpose providing that the American forces remain in camp until these parties returned. The next day Brown sent messages to General Pershing and Colonel Dodd informing them of the
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plan.

5 Ibid., p. 92.

Major Evans had joined Brown's command on 24 March. Upon learning of Villa's defeat by Cano at Namiquipa, General Pershing had ordered Evans, then at Madera, to report at once with his detachment, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, to Colonel Brown. Evans received the message late on 23 March and, by a night march,
6
reached Brown's camp about 2 p. m. the next day.

6 Ibid., p. 96.

The men of Evans' command who had been injured in the train wreck, were left in charge of a hospital corps sergeant and a guide, with the assurance that transportation would be provided immediately to return them to Colonia Dublan. However, the Mexican Government refused to allow rail transportation and an American cattleman took the men in on a handcar. The trip took
7
nearly two days.

7 Ibid., pp. 95, 106.

Colonel Brown held his troops in camp, with Cano's force of 200 in camp nearby, through the 26th waiting for Cano's scouting activities to materialize. When it became evident after another conference with Cano on the 27th that he had no intention of making the promised reconnaissance, Brown moved to Peloncillos, about eight miles southwest of Santa Catarina Ranch. There he heard that Villa was at the ranch, whereupon he surrounded it on the morning of 28 April and captured -- nothing. The next report was that the bandit had passed through La Quemada three days before. Sending Evans' force by way of Tepehuanes and Rubio to San Diego del Monte, Brown moved to La Quemada, where he remained throughout the 29th, trying to secure some reliable information on the enemy's whereabouts.⁸

8 Geo. F. Brimlow, Cavalryman Out of the West -- Life of General W. C. Brown (London and New York, 1934) pp. 352 - 353 (hereafter cited Brimlow).

Meanwhile, on 21 March, Colonel Dodd was ordered to join Erwin's detachment of the 7th Cavalry and take charge of operations. He was directed to establish communication with the other columns and try to secure the cooperation of the Mexican forces. Reaching El Valle on 22 March, Dodd got in touch with Salas,



Escort wagon pulling stalled truck across Santa Maria river.

Mexican commander at that place, who immediately asked by what authority United States forces were in Mexico. Obregon's proclamation, under which the troops were operating, was interpreted for him whereupon he [Salas] stated that no such paper had been furnished him by his government but he did have a copy in his possession. Though showing little inclination toward cooperation, Salas confirmed the report that he had fought a large detachment of Villistas on the 19th at Namiquipa and had been driven back through Las Cruces to El Valle. His command, in a demoralized condition, had taken up a defensive position south of El Valle in expectation of an attack. Salas detailed a staff officer to accompany the American troops through the canyon.

On the assumption that Villa was still in the Namiquipa vicinity, Colonel Dodd continued south, crossed the Santa Maria river about six miles north of Las Cruces and went into camp on the night of 23/24 March at a point about fifteen miles northeast of Namiquipa. Here he was informed that, on 20 March after Salas's defeat, the bandit had been attacked by Colonel Cano's forces and driven out of Namiquipa but reports as to the direction he had taken were indefinite and confusing. Later information indicated that Villa had passed through El Oso, headed south or southwest. Colonel Cano, at Namiquipa, was immediately informed and requested to guard all passes in that vicinity. In the hope of cutting ahead of the enemy, Colonel Dodd broke camp on the morning of 24⁹ March and moved in the direction of Santa Ana.

Dodd's forces headed into a cold gale along a route substantially south to Las Cruces, then through a canyon and over the heavily wooded Continental Divide. The trail was so steep and rocky that at times the men were forced to dismount and lead their horses. Upon arrival at Santa Ana on the 20th, information was received through Carranza messengers that Colonel Brown had found no trace of the enemy in the El Oso area. Dodd pushed on toward Providencia but found nothing to indicate that the band had been in that vicinity since the burning of Santa Ana in February. It became more and more apparent that the reports of Villa's movements after he was driven out of Namiquipa were false. Namiquipa, the home of Candalario Cervantes, one of Villa's chief lieutenants, was known to be one of the most pro-Villa towns in Mexico and decidedly anti-American. After leaving Providencia, the command met one of Cano's officers who claimed to have seen the bandit forces some twenty-five miles farther to the east. Little credence was attached to this report however for, in the meantime, a message had come from Colonel Brown to the effect that the bandit might be headed toward Bachiniva. Since this information coincided with his original conclusion that the enemy would strike for the Guerrero Valley, Dodd headed immediately for Bachiniva.

The command was practically without supplies. There was little forage and for days the only food available had been fresh beef,

frijoles and parched corn. The weather was intensely cold, even
10
the canteens of water froze solid.

10 Toulmin, pp. 94 - 97; Tompkins, pp. 80 - 82.

The Guerrero Fight, 29 March 1910

Reaching Bachiniva on the morning of the 28th, Colonel Dodd received information which appeared to be trustworthy to the effect that Villa, with a force ~~estimated~~ between 500 and 600 men, had been there a few days earlier. He had stolen supplies and animals, had impressed some inhabitants into his service, and was then at Guerrero. Dodd promptly decided to attack and started for Guerrero during the afternoon of the 28th. By marching all night, he hoped to reach Villa's camp by daylight but the native guide took a circuitous route which doubled the distance. Upon nearing the town, the guide refused to give any information as to the best roads and trails so that it was eight o'clock on the morning
11
of 29 March before the attack began.

11 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the Guerrero fight is based on Pershing's Report, pp. 14 - 17, and inclosures thereto.

Guerrero, headquarters of the Mexican ~~Guerrero~~ military district, is located in the lower plains of the Guerrero valley,

surrounded by high bluffs. In approaching from the east, the town is not visible until the edge of the bluffs is reached. In many places these bluffs are cut by nearly impassable arroyos running far back from the river. On the west, access to the town through the foothills is less difficult.¹²

12 Toulmin, p. 98.

Villa's forces at Guerrero on the morning of 29 March, commanded by Candalario Cervantes, were reported to consist of 230 men. Under orders from Villa to move south, Cervantes was making preparations to start that morning at nine o'clock. The presence of American forces in the vicinity was not suspected and when Dodd's column appeared on the bluffs to the east, the bandits hurriedly saddled their horses and fled in all directions.

To prevent escape to the mountains, Colonel Dodd placed the 2d Squadron, under Major Edward B. Winans, across the river west of the town to block exit from that side. The main body of the command approached from the east and, seeing the bandits making ready to escape, opened fire. Colonel Dodd's detailed report states in part:

...when it became evident that the bandits had become alarmed and parties were leaving town on both sides making it evident that attack must be inaugurated at long range, and at once if at all, fire was opened with machine guns and rifles. At this time the progress made by the 2d Squadron and its position was not all satisfactory (sic). Shortly after firing commenced on the east side, Winan's squadron reached arroyo F, E Troop under Captain Samuel F. Dallam, 7th Cavalry, being advanced to arroyo G, where excellent work was done in the killing of General Hernandez, the commanding officer, capturing two machine guns and other arms, and securing some

Carranza prisoners, who were being held by the bandits. No bandits escaped through the arroyo after Dallam had attained this position, while those who had already passed were pressed and driven westward. The balance of the squadron, arriving at arroyo F, encountered a large body of Villistas moving in an orderly manner, not firing and carrying a Mexican flag.... This is a matter of deep regret as not firing and carrying the national flag of Mexico was simply a ruse to escape punishment; a ruse (also) resorted to by the escaping bandits on the east side... but in this case fire was increased instead of being withheld, with satisfactory results. As a number of bandits were seen to escape at the north end of town and strike eastward, Lt. Col. Selah R. H. Tompkins, having but one troop, C, ...was sent north and east to intercept the escaping party. He was immediately reinforced by Major A. L. Bade, 7th Cavalry, with I, K, and L Troops and later, as the Villistas were moving toward the hills near Calera, B Troop under Capt. W. B. Cowin, and the Machine Gun Troop under 1st Lieut. A. C. Wimberly.... A running fight resulted and kept up until the Villistas entered the mountains broke into small detachments and scattered. Exhaustion of horses and other conditions prevented further pursuit.¹³

¹³ Pershing, pp. 15 - 16.

Villa was not present at the fight. It was reported that, with an escort of 150 men, he had left for the south, suffering from a gunshot wound in the hip and a broken leg received in an encounter with a force of Carranza troops a few days earlier.

The Guerrero encounter resulted in the dispersing of the greater part of Villa's band. Thirty of his men were known to have been killed, according to Dodd's first report, among them
^{13a}
the commander, Elicio Hernandez, one of the bandit's trusted

^{13a} Dodd makes this statement in his report though later testimony by some of Villa's followers and by American business men in Mexico indicates that one Hernandez, sometimes spelled Fernandez escaped to the south and was still active late in 1916. Rosalio C. Hernandez was Villa's Chief of Operations in Coahuila.

officers. Many dead and wounded were believed to have been carried away making it impossible to determine enemy casualties.

Dodd's command, consisting of 25 officers and 345 men, reassembled before noon and, after a brief rest, prepared to move north in the belief that the bandits were hiding out in the vicinity of Santa Ana. Men and horses were completely exhausted. Since leaving Bachiniva, the command had covered a distance of fifty-five miles, marching seventeen hours out of twenty-four and had kept up the Guerrero fight for five hours. Only four men were wounded and none killed. Two machine guns, a number of horses, saddles and arms were captured. Pershing reported: "Number Villa dead known to be 30, probably others carried away...."¹⁴

¹⁴ Teleg No. 77, Pershing to So Dept, 30 March 1916.

Report of the fight reached General Pershing at San Geronimo Ranch on 30 March. He immediately directed Dodd, who had by then arrived at Providencia, to scout the surrounding country and make every effort to locate Villa or any of his followers who might still be in that area.

Before receiving the report of the Guerrero fight, General Pershing had reached the conclusion that Villa would take to the mountains where only hand-picked cavalry detachments could follow. Consequently, on 26 March he requested additional pack trains and twenty selected Apache Indian Scouts, fully equipped and with two ponies for each scout, to be attached to the cavalry units.¹⁵

15 Ibid., Nos. 60 and 67.

Organization of Additional Columns

Foreseeing the need for additional pursuit columns soon after the departure of the 7th and 10th Cavalry troops from Colonia Dublan, General Pershing organized four new detachments, and established field headquarters at Namiquipa. From that point he would be in better position to keep in touch with the troops as they advanced southward. Majors Elmer Lindsley, Frank Tompkins, Robert L. Howze and Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Allen were put in¹⁶ command. Each was given special verbal instructions and all were

¹⁶ Pershing Rpt, p. 11.

told to be ready to move in any direction at any time.

The first detachment sent out was the 2d Squadron and Troop L, 13th Cavalry, under Major Elmer Lindsley. It consisted of 11 officers and 75 enlisted men, with five days rations for each man and horse and 150 rounds of ammunition. The detachment, with instructions to occupy Chuhuichupa, left Colonia Dublan on 20 March and reached its destination on the 22nd, a distance of over 100 miles. The men were in the saddle twenty hours out of the last twenty-four, traveling over a rough mountainous country. The purpose of this move was to guard the trails leading westward in the event that Villa should evade the pursuing columns and head in

that direction. As the bandits still appeared to be moving south, Lindsley was directed on 24 March to proceed to Babicora plateau and cover the territory vacated by the 10th Cavalry troops under Brown and Evans. Leaving Chuhuichupa in a heavy snowstorm, the command moved by way of San Miguel de Babicora and arrived at San Jose de Babicora on the 30th.

The next detachment to be sent out was composed of Troops K, M, and Machine Gun Platoon, 13th Cavalry, and Troops I and K of the 10th Cavalry, with 11 officers and 160 enlisted men under Major Frank Tompkins. This detachment, carrying two days rations, each man with a belt full of ammunition and a bandoleer over his shoulder, left Colonia Dublan on 21 March under orders to follow up the Santa Maria river and be on hand for pursuit of any portion of Villa's force. In accordance, Major Tompkins headed for Namiquipa where he arrived on the 29th.

From the 11th Cavalry, a provisional squadron was organized from all troops of the regiment and placed under command of Major Robert L. Howze. This command, consisting of 10 officers and 255 enlisted men, each carrying about 100 pounds of rations and other equipment, left Colonia Dublan on 24 March and proceeded south along the line of communication to Namiquipa, where it went into camp on the 29th. The horses of the 11th Cavalry were in very poor condition. They had arrived at Columbus from Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, after five days on the train and, in less than twenty-four hours, started for Colonia Dublan across the Chihuahua desert. Exposed to the heat and dust of the day and freezing temperatures at night, many of the horses died on the trip. With only three days'



Infantry used in protecting line of communications

rest at Colonia Dublan, an even harder march began.

Another provisional squadron of picked men, with two machine-gun detachments, was organized from the 11th Cavalry. It consisted of 10 officers and 282 men under command of Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Allen. This detachment was provided with pack mules carrying five days' field rations, two days reserve, and a supply of oats for Namiquipa. The command left Colonia Dublan on 29 March and arrived at Namiquipa on 2 April after a hard march over extremely rough terrain.¹⁷

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 11 - 12.

The movements of all detachments participating in the rapid advance to the south have not been followed in detail in this narrative, particularly those used to protect the line of communications. These units were strung out from the advanced positions gained up to 30 March 1916, all the way back to Columbus.¹⁸ The approximate

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 12 - 13; Return of units concerned.

location of organizations along the line of communications at the end of March 1916 is shown in Appendix B.

Parallel Columns Again Resorted To

After the Guerrero encounter, the detachments of Villa's command scattered to the four winds. Rumors, reports, and even positive assertions by natives indicated that Villa himself had been seen in

several different places simultaneously. Upon somewhat reliable information that he was hiding west of Bachiniva, Pershing ordered Tompkins, then at Namiquipa, to make a night march by way of Santa Ana and cover the western area, while Howze, who had reached San Geronimo, was directed to scout the mountains to the east. Pershing then moved to Bachiniva where both officers reported to him in person on 1 April that no trace of the bandits had been found. Since all passes to the north and west were carefully guarded, the use of parallel columns to the south was again indicated. Colonel Brown was directed to take the route farthest east, Tompkins and Howze to cover the center and western areas respectively, and all three columns converge at a point to be designated near the Chihuahua - Durango border. To Colonel Dodd's force went the mission of guarding the trails leading into the mountains on the west. Upon arrival of Colonel Allen's squadron at Namiquipa on 2 April, he was directed to move generally southeast by way of El Oso. By this maneuver it was hoped that the bandit forces could be intercepted before reaching the Durango line.

19 Pershing Rpt, pp. 17, 20.

Brown Moves Southeast From La Quemada; Agua Caliente Fight

Colonel Brown left La Quemada on 30 March and was joined at San Diego del Monte by Major Evans, who had come in from Tepehuanes. Because of a blizzard, communications with both General Pershing and Colonel Dodd were cut off. Hearing of Villa's fight with the

Carranzistas at San Ysidro, near Guerrero, on the 27th, Brown left Evans to guard the mountain passes and, early on 1 April, set out for Guerrero. Quite unexpectedly he encountered a band of Villistas at Agua Caliente, just over the Continental Divide, and forced them to abandon the town. After a six or seven mile pursuit through the main timbered range, the chase was given up at dark. There were no American casualties but two bandits were killed. This action is noted for the fact that, for the first time, the United States Army used overhead machine-gun fire to cover attacking troops.

20 Ibid., p. 17; Toulmin, p. 107.

Meanwhile, Evans was following the trail of another band headed north. Upon arrival at San Geronimo, General Pershing ordered him to cover the Santa Clara - El Oso country. This duty was performed by some of his detachments until the reorganization of commands on 9 May.

21 Pershing, p. 17.

Finding no further trace of the bandits, Colonel Brown moved by way of Cusiuhiriachic to San Antonia de los Arenales on 3 April. There he was coolly informed by Cavazos, the Carranzista officer in charge, that assistance in catching Villa was not desired and that further advance of American troops would be considered an act of hostility and treated accordingly. The real feelings of the Carranza

faction were now being openly revealed. Major Tompkins stopped briefly at Brown's camp the next day to compare notes and exchange information. At Cusiuhiriachic, about half way between San Antonio de los Arenales and Cieneguita, a message was received from General Pershing by aeroplane on 6 April. Brown was directed to secure guides from Cano, if necessary, and proceed to Parral by way of Satevo, Tres Hermanos and Valle de Zaragoza, known locally as Concha in order to protect the eastern border of the territory through which Tompkins and Howze were following a Villa trail. Brown left at once, stopping at Santa Rosalia where Tompkins was in camp, to inform him of Pershing's orders.

22 Ibid., pp. 17 - 19.

On 9 April, when within a short distance of Tres Hermanos, Brown was met by the Carranza commander, General Garza, and his staff with about 200 men. Garza appeared to be frank and straightforward and agreed to cooperate. Like Cano, he asked that the Americans remain in camp for a day until a detachment, which he had sent out to trail a suspicious band, could be heard from and, again, Brown conceded to the request. Upon being informed late on 10 April that the detachment had not returned, Brown started for Valle de Zaragoza with a Captain Trevino who was detached from Garza's command to serve as guide and liaison officer with the Americans. Trevino remained with Brown's command for nearly a month and rendered valuable service. During the afternoon of 12 April camp was made

about ten miles north of Parral and it was here that word was received of Tompkins' encounter with the Carranzistas earlier that day.²³

23 Ibid., p. 20; Tompkins, pp. 145 - 153.

Tompkins Follows Central Route Through Agua Caliente

While Colonel Brown's column was thus engaged, the other detachments were not inactive. Major Tompkins' route also led through Agua Caliente. The command arrived at San Antonio de los Arenales on 4 April and was told that Villa was reported to be moving toward San Francisco de Borja. Tompkins camped for the night at Cusiuhiriachio and started for San Francisco de Borja early the next day. Upon approaching that town, like Brown, he received a taste of Cavazos' displeasure in the following note:

On the 3d April I telegraphed you that I thought it prudent to suspend the advance of your troops until we both received orders on this subject from the Citizen Military Commander of the State. As I have just received knowledge that your forces are advancing in accordance with the itinerary which I have prepared for the troops under my own command, I would esteem it very much if you would suspend your advance until you receive the orders to which I refer, by which means there can be avoided a conflict which may occur by reason of your advance....²⁴

24 Pershing Rpt, p. 18.

The implication in the last sentence of the note could scarcely be misinterpreted.

In a meeting between Tompkins and Cavazos, information that Villa had recently passed through San Francisco de Borja was



A typical patrol in desert areas

confirmed but permission for the American forces to continue southward was refused, Cavazos stating that there was no point in chasing Villa since he was then dead and buried. It was rumored that this strategem was invented by Villa himself, upon the reported death of his henchman, Pablo Lopez,²⁵ as a good moment to have his

25 It was later learned that Lopez was wounded during the Columbus attack and sometime in April captured by Carranzistas and executed.

own death announced. Temporarily impeded by Cavazos and mindful of specific order to avoid a clash with troops of the Carranza government, Tompkins withdrew to Cieneguita and subsequently to Santa Rosalia on 7 April.²⁶

26 Ibid., p. 18.

Howze Heads Southwest from San Geronimo

In order to follow the course laid out for him, Major Howze returned to San Geronimo Ranch for supplies and headed southwest on 3 April. Pausing briefly at Colonel Dodd's camp near Providencia, where he had been ordered to remain after the Guerrero fight, Howze pushed his troops over a difficult trail southward to the vicinity of San Francisco de Borja by way of Cusiuhiriachic. This was the third column of United States Cavalry to pass by that town in as many days. At San Francisco de Borja, Howze received information

on the 8th that Villa was only slightly wounded and with an escort of about fifty men was moving down the mountains toward the State of Durango. Just a few days earlier in this same town Tompkins had been told that the bandit was dead and buried!

Howze continued southward by way of a rugged mountain pass and picked up Villa's six-day old trail near Casa, Colorada. This trail was followed through mountain fastnesses over a nearly impassable route, gaining three days on the bandit's lead. At El Aguaje, the Villistas went deeper into the mountains, using trails which the Americans could not follow. Howze scouted the base of the mountains by way of Los Estados as far as San Jose del Sitio, narrowly avoid-²⁷ing a clash with Cavazos' forces.

27 Ibid.; Tompkins, pp. 158 - 159.

On 9 April, Howze camped at San Jose del Sitio. The natives were generally unfriendly and there was little surprise when the camp was fired into during the night. Hoping to intercept Villa should he leave the mountains in search of food, the detachment started for Santa Cruz de Herrera the next morning. Several times during the day the troops were fired on and, about 5:30 p. m., they were viciously attacked near La Joya de Herrera. The bandit force was completely dispersed and the commander killed. According to a later report, Villa was at that time hiding about ten miles up stream at a distillery. Before daylight on 11 April, Howze surrounded Santa Cruz de Herrera in an effort to capture another party of bandits reported to be occupying the town. In attempting to

escape, a Mexican lieutenant and a soldier were killed but in the darkness it was impossible to tell whether they were Carranzistas or Villistas; Howze tried in vain to find someone in the town who would identify the force that escaped. A halt was made to give the weary men and animals a chance to rest and the next day the column moved on to Huejotitlan.

A detachment sent out to secure supplies discovered unusual activity around a ranch house about a mile from Santa Cruz de Herrera. It was later learned that Villa and his band were hiding there and came nearer being captured than at any other time during the entire expedition.

Gen

28 Pershing, p. 19; Tompkins, p. 160; Interview with Maj/Jas. L. Collins, Ret.

Allen Moves Southeast from Namiquipa

Colonel Allen's command arrived at Namiquipa on 2 April and a detachment was sent to scout the El Oso vicinity. Though fired on by snipers from time to time, no information of value was obtained. The detachment joined the remainder of the command at San Geronimo Ranch on 5 April and continued on to San Antonio de los Arenales, arriving on 8 April. Here General Pershing directed Allen to strip his command of everything that would slow him up and pick up the trail of Pablo Lopez, who had been seen at a nearby ranch. Allen left on the morning of 9 April and searched the country but found no trace of Lopez. On the 12th, the command reached Satevo, where

General Pershing, with a small staff and an aero squadron had set up temporary headquarters the day before. Allen was told to abandon his search for Lopez and go to the assistance of Colonel Brown who was reported to be in difficulty in the vicinity of Parral. It later developed that it was Tompkins' command instead of Brown's which was involved at Parral.

Colonel Allen's troops had been in the saddle sixteen days in succession without so much as a day's break. The shortage of forage and the long, gruelling marches were telling on both men and animals.
29

29 Pershing Rpt, pp. 20 - 21.

Dodd Guards Trails Leading West

Colonel Dodd, watching the passes leading generally west from Providencia, was also having difficulties. Part of his force was deployed on a line running through Providencia and Minaca, while another group was stationed at Bachiniva. Frequent clashes with bandits occurred. In one such encounter, five bandits were killed without American losses. Dodd moved his headquarters to Minaca on 8 April in order to protect the flank of Howze's column, hoping also to locate bands of outlaws reported to be in the vicinity of Guerrero. This move was immediately protested by General Luis Herrera, Mexican commander of the district, on the grounds that it would interfere with Carranzista plans. Upon intervention by General

Pershing, Herrera withdrew his objections and Dodd was allowed to continue with his plans.

The foregoing accounts show how Pershing's plan for supporting his columns worked. Major Tompkins command formed the spear-head of the advance; Colonel Brown covered Tompkins' left rear about a day's march behind; Major Howze covered the right rear at an equal distance and Colonel Allen was three days' march directly to the rear. In order to keep in close touch with his forces General Pershing covered the operations by moving quickly from place to place with only a small escort.

Communication and Transportation Difficulties

Equipment troubles were multiplying. On 18 March, Pershing telegraphed General Funston that wireless communications had not been successful and that it was necessary that he be furnished "two pack wireless sets ... and one wagon set, all in first-class condition. Greater part of signal equipment here is unserviceable and communication absolutely unsatisfactory."³⁰ Later the same day

30 Teleg No. 38, Pershing to So Dept.

another message stated that the only means of communication was by
31
courier.

31 Ibid., No. 39.

By the middle of March four aeroplanes were out of use and one

had not arrived. Communication with the detachments in the vicinity of San Miguel, an elevation of some 5200 feet, could not be maintained because of the inability of the planes to rise to that height. Recognizing the need for stronger planes, General Pershing urged on 20 March and again on 31 March that "... highest powered, highest climbing and best weighted aeroplanes that can be purchased in the United States be purchased for this service...."³² In reply he was

³² Ibid., Nos. 43 1/2 and 79.

informed on 20 April that four 90-horsepower Curtis aeroplanes were being shipped to him and that four 160-horsepower planes of the same make had been purchased and were undergoing tests.³³

³³ Telegs No. 110, So Dept to Pershing.

On 19 March the Department Commander was advised that only four of the trucks from Hachita were able to operate because of the poor conditions of the roads and that more of the four-wheel drive type were needed.³⁴ Realizing more fully the character of the terrain

³⁴ Telegs No. 40, Pershing to So Dept.

over which the troops would be forced to travel, the following telegram was sent to General Funston on 22 March:

Present indications are that the use of motor trucks and wagons may soon be impossible in this campaign and that pack mules alone can be used to supply troops. Request that pack trains from Douglas be sent at once and that at least one pack train be sent as soon as possible.³⁵

As the detachments moved south, food and forage became an ever-increasing problem. Meager government supplies were soon exhausted and until about the middle of April the troops practically lived on the country. At first, Quartermaster receipts were accepted as a means of exchange but the natives grew more and more reluctant to part with their products for mere "scraps of paper". The officers used what little currency they had with them; Colonel Brown alone contributed around \$1,500. But for these makeshift arrangements, it is doubtful if the advance could have been continued. In spite of transportation and other difficulties, a line of communication was established from Colonia Dublan by way of El Valle, Las Cruces, Namiquipa, and Bachiniva to San Antonio de los Arenales soon after the middle of April. Though inadequate in many respects, supplies were thereafter provided in reasonable quantities.

The following telegram sent by Pershing to Funston on 26 March 1916 on the general subject of supply is indicative of the logistical problems faced by the expedition:

Total capacity four motor truck companies over present roads 65,000 pounds daily. Total capacity of all available wagon transportation 27,000 pounds daily.... Unlimited beef procurable locally. Local supply wheat, flour, beans, for one week more. Corn and

alfalfa two days more. Grazing in immediate vicinity very poor.... Wagon parts, horseshoers, and supplies for motor trucks and aeroplanes constantly required. Wagon and pack train transportation being pushed to limit. One round trip, Casas Grandes to Columbus, for wagon trains requires 12 days hard marching.... Northwestern Railroad so far declines ship supplies to local merchants which might be used by this command. With lines of communication now about 250 miles from border and troops being supplied fifty miles beyond that with immediate further extension certain, increase of motor trucks is imperative. ³⁷

37 Teleg No. 63, Pershing to So Dept.

Mexican Reaction to Expeditionary Force

On March 18, the day after camp was established at Colonia Dublan, a complaint was received at Headquarters, Southern Department, from the Carranza Government claiming that American forces ³⁸ were occupying Casas Grandes. Upon being informed of the complaint,

38 Teleg No. 55, So Dept to Pershing.

Pershing replied: "...Am encamped one mile north of Colonia Dublan. No Mexican town has been or will be occupied by our troops. Mexican ³⁹ authorities were notified to that effect upon my arrival...."

39 Teleg No. 43 1/2, 20 Mar/10, Pershing to So Dept.

Again the attitude of the Mexican Government was demonstrated.

It became increasingly evident that the Mexican people, as well as the government, had no love for their northern neighbors

and that, in many instances, they were assisting Villa to evade American troops. The information furnished was generally misleading and it was plain from the start that the presence of United States forces on Mexican soil was thoroughly resented, General Obregon's proclamation as to the official character of the expedition notwithstanding. Pershing was convinced, and so informed Department Headquarters, that it would be next to impossible to get accurate information of Villa's movements from the local inhabitants. Those not in sympathy with the bandit were not friendly enough toward the Americans to give out information. Pershing was equally pessimistic concerning cooperation that might be afforded by the de facto government. He felt that if the campaign were eventually successful it would be without the real assistance of any natives south of the border.

40 Ibid., No. 56.

It later became known that, following a fight with the Carranza forces at Namiquipa, Villa moved by way of La Quemada and Rubio to San Diego de Monte, arriving there on the morning of 26 March. From there he headed southwest to Agua Caliente, then changed direction to the west, and arrived on the night of the 26th at San Ysidro, near Guerrero, where he defeated a force of Carranzistas the next day. Thus it will be seen that the

42 Pershing Report, pp. 8 - 10.

bandit was always days ahead of his pursuers.

CHAPTER IV

Carranza Forces Become Openly Hostile

Up to this time, General Pershing, regardless of his personal views, had proceeded on the premise that the Carranzistas were primarily concerned with putting an end to the bandit raids. But the hostility shown toward the American detachments as they moved southward brought the situation out in the open. Little doubt was now left in the mind of any member of the expedition that the sole purpose of Carranza and his followers was to force the withdrawal of American troops from Mexico.

The Parral Fight, 12 April 1916

From information gathered prior to his arrival at Santa Rosalia on 7 April, Major Tompkins believed the situation to be as follows: From 2,000 to 3,000 Carranzistas were on his flanks and between him and the United States, while more than 300 Villistas were scattered within easy striking distance, all the way from Santa Ana to San Jose del Sitio and east to Valle de Zaragoza. Based on this estimate, Tompkins decided to go to Parral, where he was told that rations and forage could be purchased, then move about 30 miles southwest of Parral and await orders. Knowing that Howze would cover the San Jose del Sitio area and that Brown was working his way toward Parral by way of Satevo, the detachment left Santa Rosalia early on 8 April and moved in a generally southern direction. The trail ran parallel to a range of mountains and crossed innumerable narrow and deep arroyos. The footing was so treacherous that at times the troopers were forced to dismount and lead their

horses. About 32 miles was covered that day. Soon after leaving camp on 9 April, the troops were fired on by eight Carranzistas but efforts to capture them failed. A herd of horses and mules which the enemy abandoned was captured, but they proved to be worthless. Tompkins believed this detachment to be a part of Garza's command which was known to be in the vicinity.¹

1 Unless otherwise indicated, Pershing's Report, pp. 21 - 23, and Tompkins Report inclosed therein, is authority for account of Parral fight.

Upon reaching Valle de Zaragoza on 10 April, about 25 bandits, in the act of looting a factory, were driven off and the stolen property in their possession returned to the owners. Hernandez,²

2 Elicio Hernandez was reported killed at Guerrero.

with approximately 100 Villistas, was reported to be moving southwest. This, and other information furnished by local inhabitants, confirmed the common belief that there was a general movement of Villa's forces toward the Durango line.³

3 Tompkins, p. 135.

Valle de Zaragoza was a thriving little town and the inhabitants were more intelligent and better dressed than the average.

Taking advantage of the local economy, Tompkins was able to purchase badly needed clothing for his troops, who were literally in rags. They presented such a savage, hardboiled appearance, when they lined up to get the clothing, that it was not surprising the natives thought they were another band of ruffians preparing to attack the town.

About 11 p. m., a Carranzista captain from the garrison at Parral came into camp, ostensibly to give information on both Carranza and Villista troops but probably for the purpose of spying on American strength and equipment. The officer was exceedingly friendly and promised that a message would be sent at once to General Lozano, commander of the Parral garrison, requesting that, upon arrival, the Americans be provided a guide to lead them to a camp site and arrange for provisions.⁴

⁴ Ibid.

When the troops reached the outskirts of Parral about noon on 12 April, no one met them. Taking the advance guard, Tompkins went directly to Lozano's headquarters. Denying all knowledge of the promised arrangement, Lozano finally agreed to provide supplies and after an hour's delay decided to lead Tompkins to a camp site in person. By that time a menacing civilian mob had gathered and when the outskirts of the town was reached Tompkins dropped to the rear in order to keep an eye on the situation. Lozano and his staff led the column to a camp site which would have been a veri-

table death trap; Tompkins recognized the danger and determined to avoid it. Upon being informed that the American rear guard was being fired on, Lozano attempted unsuccessfully to disperse the mob. Meanwhile, a large force of armed Carranza soldiers appeared on a hill to the south and raised a Mexican flag. Upon being asked for an explanation, Lozano denied all responsibility and returned to his headquarters. Soon thereafter a messenger arrived from Lozano with a request that American forces be withdrawn immediately. The reason given was that both soldiers and civilians were out of control. Tompkins replied that he would move out as soon as supplies previously arranged for were delivered but, instead of returning to Lozano's headquarters, the messenger went to the hill occupied by the soldiers who immediately opened fire, killing an American sergeant. In an effort to avoid a conflict, Tompkins called on the Mexicans to cease fire but no attention was paid to the request. Since the hill completely dominated the main body of American troops, a squad was sent out with orders to dislodge the enemy. About that time the Mexicans began closing in on both flanks and realizing that he had to contend with a civilian mob as well as with soldiers - a force far outnumbering his own - Tompkins decided to move out as rapidly as possible. The Carranza garrison at Parral consisted of about 500 or 600 men and the population of the town was about 20,000 many of whom were armed, while the American detachment numbered less than 100.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 137 - 139.

The retreat northward began about 1:30 p. m. and when favorable terrain was reached near Santa Cruz de Villegas about 4 p. m., a defensive position was constructed. The Carranza troops numbering about 300, who had followed the retreating Americans, scattered to the hills and kept up a desultory fire. Meanwhile, couriers sent out for support arrived with Colonel Brown and detachments of the 10th Cavalry about 7 p. m. After that, enemy fire ceased. Taking command, Colonel Brown spent the remainder of the night attempting to get information and in trying to get messages through to General Pershing, then at Satevo, more than 80 miles away. The next day Allen and Howze came in with the 11th Cavalry detachments, thus concentrating at Santa Cruz de Villegas a force of well over 600 men and nearly 900 animals, a situation which immediately created a serious supply problem.⁶

⁶ Ibid., pp. 139, 153, 156 - 157.

American casualties sustained during the Parral encounter were two killed, six wounded, one of whom was Major Tompkins, and one missing. More than forty Carranzistas were reported killed and an unknown number wounded.⁷

⁷ Ibid., p. 142.

While awaiting orders, Colonel Brown tried unsuccessfully to get to the bottom of the attack on Tompkins' force. In an exchange

of notes, the Mexicans were evasive but finally agreed to a conference on 21 April. At the meeting, a note was handed to General Herrera, Carranzista commander of the district and son of the Presidente of Parral, in which General Pershing demanded that a disavowal and apology be sent him for transmittal to the government in Washington. The reply, which was not received until after American forces had left Santa Cruz de Villegas on 22 April, denied all responsibility for the attack and stated that Lozano claimed to have taken no part in the affair; that he, as well as the civilian authorities, had tried to prevent such a catastrophe. On the other hand, General Pershing's report of the encounter stated his complete satisfaction with Tompkins' effort to avoid an open conflict and that Tompkins fired only after attacked.⁸

⁸ Ibid., pp. 168 - 171; Pershing Rpt. p. 21.

The attack on Tompkins force proved beyond a doubt the animosity of the inhabitants throughout the state of Chihuahua. American troops from then on had to be ready to defend themselves not only against the Villistas and the Carranzistas but against civilian mobs as well. The record makes it clear that the attack at Parral was a culmination of a long series of petty acts of hostility which grew in number and viciousness as the columns moved south. General Herrera had threatened as early as mid-March to attack the first American troops he would meet. As previously stated, he tried to balk Dodd's movement on 8 April and it was common gossip among the

indigenous population that Herrera would see to it that the Americans were stopped at Parral.

State Department representatives concurred in the belief of members of the expedition that the actions of both civilian and military forces at Parral were planned in advance with the dual purpose of forcing withdrawal of American troops and facilitating the escape of Villa and his band.⁹

9 'Foreign Relations, 1910, pp. 520 - 527.

The Tomochic Fight, 22 April 1916

Colonel Dodd's detachment at Minaca was the next unit fired upon. A rumor reached Dodd on 17 April that a Villista force had looted Yoquivo, a small town southwest of Tomochic. Leaving Minaca on the 18th, accompanied by a detachment of some 40 Carranzistas under a Major Gonzales, who offered to go along, Dodd headed west through the mountains north of Tomochic and followed a circuitous route thereby hoping to effect a surprise. There was no roads, no sign posts, no guides - nothing but rocky trails and thick woods. The two detachments became separated and when Dodd reached Yoquivo on the morning of the 20th, he found that Gonzales had arrived the evening before and that the bandits were gone. From released prisoners and local inhabitants it was learned that the bandits, consisting of approximately 150 men under Cervantes, had gotten word of the approach of the combined forces the day before and had left the village, headed in the direction of Tomochic.

Dodd believed that the warning had come from his Carranza allies who, to him, had acted in a suspicious manner from the beginning. After gathering much needed supplies, Dodd set out at once for Tomochic, determined to follow the trail to the end.¹⁰

10 Pershing Rpt, p. 23; Tompkins, pp. 170 - 171.

Tomochic lies in a valley at an elevation of over 8,000 feet, surrounded by rugged mountains over 9,000 feet high. The only means of approach is by way of tortuous trails over which the command marched in single file, each man holding to the tail of the horse ahead. Suffering was intense; men and animals alike quickly wore out their shoes.¹¹ Only a limited supply of rations could be

11 Cavalry troops in Mexico wore the regulation shoe and canvas leggings, some of which were reinforced with leather on the inside.^{leather} All/leggings proved unsatisfactory. Service on the border during this campaign proved the regulation shoe too light and lacking in wearing quality for field duty. As a result, a heavier shoe was adopted. WD Rpts 1916, p. 195, Funston Rpt., 5th Ind, IMC 23 Jan 1917.

carried and the high altitude added to the discomfort. In his report to General Pershing, Dodd laid particular emphasis on the hardships endured in the forced march. The trail leading down to the valley was also difficult and it was late afternoon of 22 April

when the command reached Tomochic. The advancing troops were fired on from several directions but continued to the village, which they found the bandits evacuating. Their rear guard scattered, some mounted, some on foot, took up positions in the hills to the north and south of the village, and opened fire. Dodd sent out patrols which quickly silenced them but, in a short time, a heavy fusilade was received from the hills to the east of the village where, it was learned, the main body of the enemy was located. The bandits had a decided advantage in position and since there was no possible way of getting around them in the short time that remained before dark, Colonel Dodd decided on a frontal attack. Though under heavy fire from the semi-circular hills surrounding Tomochic, Dodd's forces drove the enemy from their positions as darkness fell. Completely demoralized, they fled, as usual,¹² into the hills.

12 Pershing Rpt. pp. 23 - 24; Tompkins, pp. 177 - 180.

The defeat led to a thorough disintegration of the force under Cervantes. According to reports, this force numbered between 150 and 200 men on 22 April, the date of the fight, but within a few¹³ days thereafter it had dwindled to scarcely a dozen men.

13 Tompkins, p. 181.

American casualties were two killed and three wounded; several

horses died of exhaustion. Twenty-five bandits were reported killed or wounded and it is quite probable that their casualties were considerably greater. A number of horses and mules and some arms were captured.¹⁴

14 Teleg No. 147, Pershing to So Dept.

After a brief rest, Dodd returned to his camp near Minaca where he remained inactive, except for patrolling, until early June when he assumed command of the camp at El Valle. While on that duty, he was promoted to Brigadier General and retired for age the following month.

Logistics Necessitate Withdrawal from Parral Area

The Parral encounter changed the entire character of the campaign. It marked the turning point of the southern advance of Pershing's forces and initiated the slow withdrawal to the north. Relations between the two governments had become so strained that the idea of keeping troops near Parral, where all four columns had converged, was abandoned. While tactically in a position to hold that area with the forces unified under the command of Colonel Brown at Santa Cruz de Villegas, the supply problem was such as to cause General Pershing serious concern. The rapidly moving columns had outrun their means of supply and since neither food or forage could be obtained locally, the line of communications would necessarily have to be extended 180 miles south from San Antonio to de los Arenales and would be subject to attack at any time. With the

transportation then available, it would be extremely difficult to supply such a large force.

Since no aeroplanes were fit for messenger duty, General Pershing, then at San Antonio de los Arenales, sent his chief of staff, Colonel De Rosy C. Cabell, to Brown's headquarters, with orders to investigate the situation and order the retirement of the forces if he considered it advisable. Cabell found Pershing's fears justified and, on 21 April, the command was ordered to move back to San Antonio de los Arenales by way of Satevo. Movement began that same night and the last unit left Santa Cruz de Villegas¹⁵ early on the morning of 22 April.

¹⁵ Pershing Rpt., p. 23.

By 3 May 1916, all or parts of the 5th, 10th, 11th, and 13th Regiments Cavalry and the 6th Infantry Regiment had assembled at San Antonio¹⁶ de los Arenales.

¹⁶ Tompkins, p. 188.

The operations of the Cavalry detachments from the time the first troop was sent out from Colonia Dublan on 17 March until withdrawal from Santa Cruz de Villegas were typical of campaigns against the Indians after the Civil War. Each campaign was conducted under the greatest difficulty and, for the most part, cut off from the commander of the expedition and the base of supplies. The

success or failure was dependent almost entirely on the resourcefulness of the regimental commander and the cooperation he received from his men. Special recognition should be given to the scouts assigned to the detachments; their services proved invaluable. The use of a detachment of Apache Indian scouts is discussed elsewhere.

Organization of Districts

Villa's forces, though scattered under different leaders, were still within the state of Chihuahua and Villa himself was hiding in the mountains near San Francisco de Borja, according to report. General Pershing, therefore, drew up a plan for patrolling the areas infested by the Villistas after his troops were withdrawn from the south. On 29 April, orders were issued dividing the territory into five districts, each to be patrolled by a regiment of cavalry, with the larger part of the supporting infantry and artillery well to the front in case their services should be required. In general, the plan called for the assignment of the cavalry to those districts wherein they had seen the most service. This, however, did not apply to the 5th Cavalry since that unit did not leave Columbus until the day the order was issued. The districts and assignments follow [For prescribed limits of districts see Appendix C]:

<u>District</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>District Commander</u>
Namiquipa	10th Cavalry	Major Ellwood W. Evans
Guerrero	7th Cavalry	Colonel George A. Dodd
Bustillos	13th Cavalry	Colonel Herbert J. Slocum
Satevo	5th Cavalry	Colonel Wilbur E. Wilder
San Francisco de Borja	11th Cavalry	Colonel James Lockett

With a view to assuring initiative and flexibility in carrying



Villista prisoners who participated in Columbus
attack, captured near Namiquipa

out the plan, General Pershing directed each district commander to organize his own agents and, as far as practicable, set up his own intelligence service. Further, as a result of any information obtained, each district commander was authorized to take such independent action as would most likely result in the capture of participants in the Columbus raid. Pershing took occasion again to remind his officers that United States were "operating within the boundaries of a friendly nation whose peaceful inhabitants were to be treated with every consideration"¹⁷ and that cooperation with

17 SO 28, Hq Pun Exped, Namiquipa, Mex, 29 Apr 16.

those forces should be effected whenever possible. At the same time, Pershing did not fail to caution all concerned that United States troops were always in danger of being attacked, not only by Villistas but by others who professed friendship. In case of an unprovoked attack, each district commander was directed to take the most vigorous measures at his disposal to administer severe punishment on the offenders, bearing in mind that any other course was likely to be construed as a confession of weakness. By early May the abandonment of advance stations left the command occupying the original line of communications, with Namiquipa as the principal southern camp.¹⁸


18 Pershing Rpt, pp. 24 - 28.

The Ojos Azules Fight, 5 May 1916

With a military plan thus clearly established and the district commanders directed to keep the Commanding General as well as the brigade commanders abreast of events in the field, cavalry troops embarked upon the new patrol and bandit-hunting missions. On 5 May, Major Howze, with six troops of cavalry and the machine gun platoon of the 11th Cavalry, completely surprised and routed a group of bandits at Ojos Azules. In a running fight lasting two hours three bands under Julio Acosta were driven into the hills, forty-two bandits killed and from fifty to seventy-five horses and mules captured with no American casualties. Howze's surprise attack maneuver saved the lives of a Carranzista lieutenant and four of his soldiers who were about to be executed by the bandits. Acosta's band was practically wiped out though he and his remaining henchmen were reported to be hiding in the mountains near Guerrero when
19
American troops left Mexico.

19 Ibid., pp. 25 - 27.

Howze force included some of the famous Apache Indian Scouts who had made history in early days with the American Army in the west. Among them were a hereditary chief, a tribal judge, and others of high standing in the tribe who understood the habits and language of the Mexicans. First Sergeant Chicken was unexcelled in trailing; he was finishing his seventh enlistment, spoke fair English and was a reliable citizen. Under his leadership, the Scouts proved of



Last organization of Indian Scouts used in the United States Army

great value and their capacity for scouting and trailing was demonstrated repeatedly. American insistence upon the fine, though often unfounded, distinction between hostile and friendly Mexicans did not appeal to Indian logic; neither did the white man's method of fighting under fire. When attacked, the Indians dismounted and returned the fire. No persuasion or force could induce them to charge as long as there was a chance of picking off a Mexican. Incidentally, use in the Punitive Expedition proved to be the last time the United States Army employed Indian Scouts as an organization in field operations.

20

20 Toulmin, pp. 85 - 88. For complete report, by Lt S. M. Williams, 11th Cav, see U.S. Cavalry Journal, 1917.

War Imminent: Efforts to Reach an Agreement

Relations between the two governments became daily more tense and de facto officials began to circulate rumors of war, announcing that all Americans were to be driven out of Mexico. The Secretary of State advised all American Consuls in Mexico and along the border to be prepared to advise all Americans in their districts to be in readiness to leave Mexico at a moment's notice. In a telegram dated 9 May, General Funston warned Pershing that war with Mexico seemed almost inevitable and that in the opinion of the War Department his line was too long and his troops too scattered. Pershing was urged to fall back along his entire line of communications

with a view to concentrating his forces near Colonia Dublan. Upon assurance that no hostile movement was in evidence and that the situation did not seem to warrant further withdrawal, the Department Commander directed that troops be held temporarily in the previously assigned positions and such tactical positions as might seem advisable to be made in the vicinity of Namiquipa.²¹

21 Pershing Rpt, pp. 27 - 28. Teleg, No. 145, So Dept to Pershing; Foreign Relations 1916, p. 689.

Meanwhile, General Scott was sent to the border for a conference with General Funston and to act as a direct link between him and the Secretary of War. On 28 April, Scott and Funston were ordered to El Paso to confer with General Obregon, the Mexican Secretary of War and Navy, with the hope of reaching an agreement satisfactory to both sides. Obregon's sole purpose was to secure the withdrawal of American forces from Mexico; General Scott's aim was to obtain Obregon's signature to an agreement permitting Pershing to remain in Mexico as long as necessary to protect American citizens and property. A series of conferences was held but Obregon would make no concession which was not conditioned on Pershing's withdrawal. Finally, the conferences were broken off without accomplishing anything.²²

22 Scott, pp. 525 - 528.

Secretary Baker's stand was expressed in a telegram to General Scott soon after his first meeting with Obregon, a stand which he maintained throughout the conferences:

This government cannot withdraw troops from the border until it is satisfied that danger to our people on the border is removed.... if our troops are attacked, or their operations for the protection of the people of the United States are obstructed, the consequences, however, will rest upon General Obregon. Safeguard your persons in retiring from the [next] interview; and if it terminates in such a break as above outlined concentrate American troops in a position thoroughly prepared for defense. On no account give excuse for attack. If attacked, take all necessary steps to make answer decisive and speedy.²³

23 Fredrick Palmer, Newton D. Baker (New York, 1931), Vol. I, p. 19, (hereafter cited Palmer); Scott, pp. 525 - 528.

General Pershing was informed of the results, or rather lack of results, of the conferences with Obregon and again warned of the possibility of a complete rupture with Mexico. In such an event, Pershing was directed to be ready to move swiftly and unite with Brigadier General George Bell's 5th Infantry Brigade then at El Paso,²⁴ Texas.

24 Telegs no. 168, 19 May 16; No. 192, 30 May 16, So Dept to Pershing.

Late in May, General Gavira, commanding Carranza troops at Juarez, indicated his desire to confer with General Pershing on a proposed change of plans in attempting to round up the outlaws. With General Funston's approval, Pershing left Namiquipa on 31 May

for Colonia Dublan where a meeting was held the next day. Contingent upon the approval of both governments, an agreement was formulated to limit the number of Mexican troops to be stationed along the railroad lines, specifying that none of those troops should occupy towns on the American line of communications.²⁵ On

25 Telegs No. 210, 25 May; No 231, 1 June, Pershing to So Dept.

9 June, General Trevino, commander in Chihuahua, informed General Pershing that the agreement was "valueless before the government [sic] because no chief of the constitutionalist army is authorized to enter into agreements with chiefs of other countries."²⁶ Thus

26 Ibid., No. 245, 10 June 16.

another attempt to reach an understanding failed.

Activities Prior to Carrizal Fight

As American troops withdrew from their advanced stations, the Carranzistas became more aggressive and patrols of both sides frequently came within sight of each other. Only by exercising the utmost forbearance and discretion, were the officers of the expedition able to avoid open clashes. Both Americans and Mexicans had two jobs--to pursue the bandits and, at the same time, keep close watch on each other.

By a series of depredations, Cardenas, one of Villa's trusted lieutenants, had stirred up the inhabitants of Rubio to such an

extent that the entire area was in turmoil. American patrols sent out to capture Cardenas had thus far had little success but a show-down was near. On 14 May, in order to procure much-needed corn, Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., with a small detachment, was sent to the vicinity of Rubio. When Patton approached San Miguel Ranch, near Rubio, several Villistas ran out from the ranch buildings, opening fire as they fled. In return fire, three of the bandits were killed, one of whom proved to be Cardenas. Another of Villa's right-hand men, Candelario Cervantes, had gathered a group of about twenty-five bandits and was making life miserable for the peaceful inhabitants of the Namiquipa vicinity. On 25 May, about six miles south of Las Cruces, a part of Cervantes' band ambushed an American detachment under Lance Corporal Davis Marsbury, killing him and wounding three others. Cervantes was killed in this encounter; thus within a brief span of time Villa lost two of his most reliable²⁷ henchmen.

²⁷ Pershing Rpt, p. 28. Interview with Gen Collins.

Early in June it was evident that the fears of the War Department regarding an all-out war with Mexico were well founded. Hundreds of Mexican troops were being assembled at points on the railroads both to the east and west of Pershing's positions and were threatening his line of communications. A force of about 10,000 men had gathered in the vicinity of Villa Alhumada and another large force estimated at approximately 22,000 had moved up from the south



A troop of Carranza cavalry

to the city of Chihuahua. Local Mexican commanders were reported to have issued standing orders for these troops to be ready at all times to assume the offensive. General Herrera is reported to have made the statement that he would attack if United States forces²⁸ were still in the country on 1 June.

28 Teleg No. 220, 28 May 16, Pershing to So Dept; Pershing Rpt, p. 29.

An extract from Carranza's report, covering this period of Mexican history read at the opening of the Mexican Congress, 15 April, 1917, confirms these rumors: ". . . my Government . . . was compelled to give orders to use force in repelling the invasion of our territory. The immediate result of this was the encounter at Carrizal . . ."²⁹

29 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1917, p. 996.

General Pershing had by this time lost the services of all the fragile aeroplanes assigned to him and in order to be prepared to concentrate at a threatened point, he was forced to rely on reconnaissances made by the cavalry detachments for information concerning hostile movements. Particular emphasis was placed on the activities of the Carranzista forces. The Mexican government objected to these reconnaissances. The following telegrams, quoted from General Pershing's Report, illustrate the feelings existing on both sides:

Chihuahua Headquarters, June 10, 1916

General Pershing,
Casas Grandes.

I have orders from my government to prevent, by the use of arms, new invasions of my country by American troops and also to prevent the American forces that are now in this state from moving to the south, east, or west of the places they now occupy. I communicate this to you for your knowledge for the reason that your forces will be attacked by the Mexican forces if these indications are not heeded.

Courteously,
J. B. Trevino, The General in Chief.

General Pershing replied the same day as follows:

I am in receipt of your telegram.... In reply, you are informed that my government has placed no restrictions upon the movement of American forces. I shall therefore use my own judgment as to when and in what direction I shall move my forces in pursuit of bandits or in seeking information regarding bandits. If, under these circumstances, the Mexican forces attack any of my columns, the responsibility for the consequences will lie with the Mexican government.

Respectfully yours,
John J. Pershing, General 30
Commanding American forces

30 Pershing Rpt, pp. 29 - 30.

The Carrizal Fight, 21 June 1916

The engagement at Carrizal brought the United States and Mexico so close to the brink of war that the encounter will be treated in considerable detail.

Among the reconnoitering detachments sent out by General Pershing were Troop C, 10th Cavalry, under Captain Charles T. Boyd and Troop K, 10th Cavalry, under Captain Lewis S. Morey, with

orders to scout the country thoroughly and secure information on Carranza troops reported to be massing near Villa Ahumada for attack on the American line of communications. Pershing's orders were definite;

Take your troops and reconnoiter in the direction of [Villa] Ahumada and obtain as much information as you can regarding the forces there. This is a reconnaissance only and you will not be expected to fight. In fact, I want you to avoid a fight if possible. Do not allow yourself to be surprised by superior numbers. But, if wantonly attacked, use your judgment as to what you should do, having due regard for the safety of your command.³¹

³¹ Rpt, Investigation of Encounter between American and de facto Govt Forces, AGO files 2377632, Pun Exped, Natl Archives, Wash, D. C. (hereafter cited, Rpt Investigation of Carrizal Fight).

Troop C, under Captain Boyd, left Colonia Dublan at 8:20 a. m., 18 June and moved generally eastward to Santo Domingo Ranch, which was about sixty miles from Colonia Dublan. On the same morning, Troop K, under Captain Morey left Ojo Federico and proceeded to Santo Domingo Ranch by way of Sabinal and Vado de Santa Maria. The combined strength of the two troops was less than one hundred. The detachments met at the ranch on the evening of 20 June and Boyd assumed command.³² The American foreman of the ranch warned

³² Pershing Rpt, p. 30; Investigation of Carrizal Fight.

Boyd against going through Carrizal. He believed that the Mexicans would oppose such a move and volunteered the information that

there were fairly good roads by-passing the town.³³

³³ Ranch foreman's statement in Tompkins, p. 211.

That night, Boyd discussed the situation at length with the other officers. The ranch foreman was called in for an accurate description of the town. Captain Morey argued against going through Carrizal for he felt that the Carranzistas were greatly superior in number and would offer strong resistance. Boyd, however, believed that the Mexicans would not risk provoking war by attacking United States troops. He interpreted his orders as requiring him to go through the town and stated that he intended to comply with the orders.³⁴

³⁴ Ibid., p. 210; Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 506, Morey's report.

Carrizal is located less than ten miles east of the Santo Domingo Ranch on a plain bisected with irrigation ditches. The usually traveled road to Villa Ahumada runs through the town but other roads were available, so there were no geographical features making it necessary for the American troops to pass through Carrizal. Certainly there were no written orders to that effect. However, in testimony taken in General Pershing's investigation of the affair, many soldiers of the command quoted Boyd as telling them that he had verbal orders to go through the town. Others,

among them Captain Morey, considered it Boyd's own interpretation of the orders; the ranch foreman stated in his report that he overheard Boyd make a remark about making history. Be that as it may, after the investigation General Pershing stated that he was convinced the Mexican Government was entirely responsible for the opposition offered to Boyd's progress and "that the de facto military forces, in firing on our troops, committed a deliberate act of war."³⁵

³⁵ Pershing's Rpt, p. 31; Rpt, Investigation of Carrizal Fight.

About 4 a. m., on 21 June, Troops C and K left Santo Domingo Ranch, and, at 6:30, stopped at an irrigation ditch within a mile of Carrizal to water their horses. At Morey's suggestion, Boyd sent a messenger ahead to request permission to pass through the town peacefully. While waiting for the reply, a Mexican outpost was seen forming west of the town among some trees on the edge of the plain. In a short time, a member of the Carrizal garrison came out and informed Boyd that existing orders would not permit farther eastward movement of the American forces. Boyd returned to his troops and moved his line forward, sending the led horses of both troops to the rear center. General Felix Gomez, Commander of the Carranza forces at the Carrizal garrison, then sent a written message to Boyd giving him permission to enter the town for a conference. Sensing a trap, Boyd refused and again moved his troops nearer the town, whereupon Gomez himself came out,

accompanied by ten or twelve officers. Boyd, with an interpreter and an orderly, met them on the outskirts of the town. Gomez emphatically refused for the troops to advance, stating that Trevino's orders forbade the movement of American forces in any direction except north and that if Boyd persisted in his determination to go through Carrizal, he would have to walk over the³⁶ dead bodies of Mexican soldiers.

³⁶ Rpt, Invest Carrizal Fight; Toulmin, pp. 73 - 74.

While these conferences were in progress, Mexican troops were lining up in battle formation, both mounted and dismounted, at the edge of the town and along the irrigation ditches, indicating that Gomez's threat of opposition would be carried out. Notwithstanding,³⁷ Boyd made preparations to enter the town.

³⁷ Toulmin, p. 75.

Accounts of the fight vary. However, the message written by Captain Morey shortly after the battle and found in the hands of three men of Troop K returning from Carrizal, would seem to be an accurate version. The statement reads: "Carrizal, Mexico, June 21, 1916, 9:15 a. m. to C.O. Ojo Fererico. My troop reached Ojo Santa Domingo at 5:30 p.m. June 20, met Troop C under Captain Boyd. I came under Captain Boyd's command and marched my troop in rear for Carrizal at 4:15 a.m. Reached open field to southeast of town

at 6:30 a. m. Captain Boyd sent in a note requesting permission to pass through town. This was refused. Stated we could go to north but not east. Captain Boyd said he was going to [Villa] Ahumada at this time. He was talking with Carranza commander [sic]. General Gomez sent a written message that Captain Boyd could bring his force in town and have a conference. Captain Boyd feared an ambush. He was under the impression that the Mexicans would run as soon as we fired. We formed for attack, his intention being to move up to the line of about 120 Mexicans on edge of town. We formed mounted, C on left in line of foragers, one platoon on right line of foragers and other K Troop platoon on extreme right and echeloned a little to rear. When we were within 300 yards, Captain Boyd dismounted to fight on foot. I did likewise. The Mexicans opened fire and a strong one before we fired a shot; then we opened up. They did not run but, to make a long account short, after about an hour's fire in which both troops advanced, C Troop to position of Mexican machine gun and K Troop closing in slightly to the left. We were busy on the right keeping off flank attack. A group of Mexicans went around out rear and our led horses left at a gallop. At about nine o'clock, one platoon Troop K which was on right, fell back. Sergeant said he could not stay there. Both platoons fell back about 1,000 yards to the west and then together with some men of Troop C who were there these men scattered. I was slightly wounded. Captain Boyd, a man told me, was killed. Nothing was seen of Lieut. Adair after fight started, so man I saw stated. I am hiding

in a hole 2,000 yards from field and have one other wounded man and three men with me. Signed Morey, Captain."³⁸

³⁸ Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 596.

As soon as the Americans opened fire, Captain Boyd, with his troop of thirty rifles, crossed the open plain two hundred yards and dislodged the machine gun being operated by the outpost west of the town. Boyd was killed and Adair took command. It was about that time that Troop K fell back, leaving the right flank of Troop C exposed. Lieut. Adair advanced to the line of houses in the town, but finding his men short of ammunition, went back to get belts from the wounded and was killed. The men, left without a leader or support from Troop K, retreated. Twenty-three enlisted men and one civilian interpreter were captured.

Some of the men succeeded in capturing the stampeding horses while others started for the ranch on foot. When Captain Morey's message was received, Major Howze was sent out to bring in the remainder of the troops and the wounded.³⁹

³⁹ Toulmin, p. 76. WD Rpts 1916, p. 279.

Troop C went into action with two officers and 43 enlisted men; Troop K, with one officer and 36 enlisted men, an aggregate strength of 82. Two of the officers were killed immediately and the third was severely wounded. ~~Statements~~ as to the number of

casualties sustained differ but the report of the investigation of the Carrizal fight gives the number as 48.⁴⁰

40 The following is a breakdown of casualties as shown in the Report of Investigation, Chasing Villa, by Tompkins, p. 209, and WD An Rpts. 1916, pp. 279 - 280.


<u>Unit</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Rpt of Invest</u> - Tr C, 10th Cav -	4	4	4	9	21
Tr K, 10th Cav -	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>27</u>
	7	5	12	24	48
<u>Tompkins</u> - Tr C, 10th Cav -	8		4	8	20
Tr K, 10th Cav -	<u>4</u>		<u>7</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>26</u>
	12		11	23	46
<u>WD An Rpts</u> - Tenth Cav Rgt	9		10	24	43

Strength of enemy forces engaged was estimated at about 400. Between 39 and 45 were reported killed, among them, General Gomez.⁴¹ The number of wounded is not known.

41 WD Rpts 1916, p. 9.

General Pershing's summary of the action at Carrizal affords an insight into the responsibility of both sides. Concerning Captain Boyd, whose courage he commends, Pershing wrote:

I told him, among other things, that the Mexican situation was very tense and that a clash with Mexican troops would probably bring on war and for this reason was to be avoided. . . . After my conversation with him, I felt confident that Captain Boyd fully understood the importance and delicacy of his mission. No one could have been more surprised and chagrined than I was to learn that he had become so seriously involved.⁴²



81422

7 Cav. in Review. Dublan

The 7th Cavalry in review at Dublan. Mexico.

Concerning the Mexicans' part in the event, Pershing stated:

Attention should be first invited to the fact that this expedition having entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits through the courtesy of the Mexican government, the de facto forces, in firing on our troops under these circumstances, committed a deliberate act of war. Also, in declaring, through the military commander at Chihuahua, that the American forces were to be attacked under certain conditions, the Mexican government accentuated its own responsibility in the premises. In other words, the Mexican government itself was responsible for the opposition offered to Captain Boyd's progress and, finally, for the culminating act of open ⁴³ hostility to the United States which started the fight at Carrizal.

⁴³ Pershing, p. 31.

Precautionary Measures After Carrizal

When the fight at Carrizal was reported to the War Department, General Pershing was directed to begin preparations to assume the offensive with all available troops of the command. Further concentration of forces became imperative to meet what appeared to be an impending crisis. Accordingly, all troops south of El Valle were ordered to begin moving north, truck companies were assembled, and the command as a whole was placed and held in position of readiness in the vicinity of Colonia Dublan. On 22 June, the day following the Carrizal fight, the Secretary of War ordered Funston ⁴⁴ to protect all strategic positions along the border.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

In Washington, it began to look as if some overt step would be taken by the Mexican government that would involve the two countries in war. In anticipation of such an event, tentative plans were drawn up to enter Mexico in three columns under the over-all command of General Hugh L. Scott. General Funston would command the eastern column, General Pershing, the central, while General William H. Sage, then stationed at Nogales, would command the western column. However, proceedings of the Joint American-Mexican Conference, which convened early in July, ⁴⁵ obviated the necessity of putting the plan into effect.

⁴⁵ Scott, p. 524.

Controversy at the Diplomatic Level

In late May negotiations between the State Departments of the two countries assumed the form of a series of charges and counter-charges. On 22 May, the Department in Washington received an aggressive and recriminatory note from the Mexican Government imputing hidden motives and bad faith and demanding that American troops be withdrawn immediately. The reply on 20 June reviewed the whole situation, with particular emphasis on the preceding nine months. Attention was called to the following facts: that during that period the frontier along the Mexican border had been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory. Mexican bandits had taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens,

sometimes carrying them across the international boundary with the booty; American garrisons had been attacked at night; American soldiers killed and their equipment and horses stolen. The marauders engaged in the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March were driven back across the border by American cavalry and subsequently, as soon as a sufficient force to cope with the band could be collected, were pursued into Mexico. The communication continues:

Without cooperation or assistance in the field on the part of the de facto Government, despite repeated requests by the United States and without apparent recognition on its part of the desirability of putting an end to these systematic raids or punishing the chief perpetrators of the crimes committed, because they menaced the good relations of the two countries, American forces pursued the lawless bands as far as Parral, where the pursuit was halted by the hostility of Mexicans, presumed to be loyal to the de facto Government, who arrayed themselves on the side of outlawry and became in effect the protectors of Villa and his band.

In this manner and for these reasons have the American forces entered Mexican territory.... Obviously, as immediate action alone could avail, there was no opportunity to reach an agreement (other than that of March 10-13 now repudiated by General Carranza) prior to the entrance of such an expedition into Mexico if the expedition was to be effective. Subsequent events and correspondence have demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Government that General Carranza would not have entered into any agreement providing for an effective plan for the capture and destruction of the Villa bands....⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 581 - 592.

The communication ended by stating that the United States had not sought the duty forced upon it--a duty which, under principles of municipal and international law, was a function of the Mexican government; that its policy of continuing to ignore its obligation

and the threat to drive American forces out of the country by resorting to arms would "lead to grave consequences. While this Government would deeply regret such a result, it cannot recede from its settled determination to maintain its national rights and to perform its full duty in preventing further invasion of the territory of the United States and in removing the peril which Americans along the international boundary have borne so long with patience and forbearance."⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 591.

Report of the clash at Carrizal came in the midst of the controversy. Immediately, a formal request was made for a definite statement of intentions on the part of the Mexican government and for the release of all prisoners and property taken during the Carrizal encounter. On 29 June the prisoners, together with horses and equipment, were turned over to El Paso authorities but the important question, intentions of the Mexican government, was evaded in the following manner: "... the Government of Mexico is disposed to consider in a rapid, but at the same time practical form and in a spirit of concord, the remedies which may be applied to the present situation..."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 597 - 599; Funston Rpt, p. 44.

Joint American-Mexican Commission

The Carrizal incident caused the temper of public opinion in the United States to rise even higher. Protests against the methods being employed by the administration became louder and letters demanding immediate settlement of the tense situation poured into the White House from all parts of the country. President Wilson, determined to arrive at some solution of the problem, redoubled his efforts to set up a joint commission for the purpose of reaching an agreement satisfactory to both sides. ⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Wilson Papers, Letters June 1916.

Finally, early in July 1916, an American-Mexican joint commission was set up. The objective was the settlement of all questions arising out of the Mexican situation. The Commission, composed of three members from each government, first met in New London, Connecticut, 6 September 1916 and subsequently in Atlantic City, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, D. C. On 24 November, a protocol of agreement and referendum was signed at Atlantic City by all members of both delegations but Carranza refused to approve the protocol unless it was preceded by a recommendation for the withdrawal of American troops. Since such action could be accomplished only by order of the President of the United States, the Commission recommended, on 16 January 1917, as the only solution, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments and that Mexico be held responsible for further encroachment. ⁵⁰

50 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (Garden City, N.Y., 1937), Vol. 6, pp. 79 - 82; Foreign Relations 1916, pp. 604 - 605; Foreign Relations 1917, pp. 916 - 938.

A Period of Watchful Waiting -- Training

By the end of May 1916, the greater part of Pershing's forces had been withdrawn from outlying posts and concentrated in the vicinity of Colonia Dublan, the base of operations. Except for the Carrizal incident, no action of importance occurred during the remainder of the stay in Mexico. Villa had ceased to be a military factor though a close watch was kept over his activities. His best officers and a considerable number of his men were reported to have been killed and his remaining henchmen either dispersed or subdued. Be that as it may, as soon as Villa learned that withdrawal of American support was under consideration, he resumed activities against the Mexican Government. As late as November 1916 General Pershing reported that Villa's prestige was growing and his forces increasing and that the Carranza government appeared totally unable to cope with the situation. In fact, little or nothing was being done to save the country from this marauding bandit.

After withdrawal to the base of operations, the line of communications was considerably shortened, thus simplifying somewhat the problem of supply. Regular shelter for the troops being

scarce, improvisation was in order. The soldiers made themselves as comfortable as possible under the circumstances by constructing adobe huts and shelter tents. Facilities for recreation and amusement were practically nonexistent, even regular supplies were scant. Life would have been quite monotonous in a climate of extreme heat and intense cold, interspersed with dust storms and deep mud, had it not been for the initiation of systematic and intensive training by General Pershing throughout the command. Thorough courses were given in musketry and combat tactics for all units, beginning with the platoon and leading up to the brigade. The program was well received by officers and men and by the time the expedition returned to the United States, its personnel was undoubtedly more highly trained than any similar force in the annals of the United States Army.

51

51 Oliver L. Spaulding, The U.S. Army in War and Peace (New York, 1937) p. 405.

CHAPTER V

Withdrawal from Mexico

On the recommendation of the American members of the Joint American-Mexican Commission and in view of possible involvement with Germany, the President decided to order the withdrawal of American forces from Mexico. On 18 January 1917, the Commanding General of the Southern Department was directed to inform General Pershing of that intention. This was done and movement began at once, the last column leaving Colonia Dublan on 31 January. On 4 February, all troops of the expedition arrived at Las Palomas and at 3 p. m., 5 February 1917, the expeditionary forces¹ crossed the international border.

1 WD An Rpts. Vol. 1, 1917, p. 196.

The campaign was characterized by extreme peril and hardship but was conducted in keeping with the best traditions of the United States Army. It proved to be the last extensive campaign of the old cavalry in North America. In view of the hardships endured and the obstacles encountered, the troops of the expedition earned the following tribute from General Pershing:

The splendid services that the regular troops comprising this Expedition have performed under most adverse conditions again proves that for natural ability, physical endurance, unflinching persistence, general efficiency, and unquestioned loyalty and devotion to duty, the well-trained officers and men of the Regular Army are unexcelled by the troops of any other nation.²

2 Pershing Rpt, p. 44.

Relations between the two countries remained strained until the close of the World War and on numerous occasions American troops were forced to cross the border in pursuit of Mexican marauders. Carranza was elected President of Mexico on 11 March 1917 on a platform embodying reforms recommended by leaders of the Revolution and, on 31 August, President Wilson recognized the new government je jure though full diplomatic relations were not resumed until 1923.³

3 Bemis, p. 553.

The primary encounters of the Mexican Punitive Expedition may be summed up as follows:

With Villa Forces:

- Guerrero, 29 March 1916 - Col Geo. A. Dodd, with troops from the 7th and 10th Cav. Regts., dispersed a force under Cervantes.
- Agua Caliente, 1 Apr 1916 - Col. Wm. C. Brown, with troops from the 10th Cav., scattered another band, the leader reported to be a Lt. Beltran.
- Tomochic, 22 April 1916 - Col. Dodd defeated a force under Cervantes.
- Ojos Azules, 5 May 1916 - Maj. Robt. L. Howze, with troops from 11th Cav., practically wiped out a band under Julio Acosta.

With Carranza Forces:

- Parral, 12 April 1916 - Maj. Frank Tompkins, with troops from 10th and 13th Cav. Regts., was attacked by General Lozano. Tompkins withdrew to Santa Cruz de Villegas.
- Carrizal, 21 June 1916 - With Tps. C and K, 10th Cav., Capt. Chas. T. Boyd's attempt to enter Carrizal was opposed by Gen. Gomez. More than half of Boyd's force was killed, wounded, or captured.

Command Problems

This story would not be complete without emphasis on some of the major problems that confronted the Commander of the Expedition, ⁴

⁴ Recommendations based on experiences of the expedition, together with comments on the manner of performance of administrative functions, have been extracted from the Report of Operations of the Punitive Expedition and attached as Appendix D.

many of which could be solved only from day to day. The most serious were transportation and communications.

Upon request from the Commanding General of the Southern Department for adequate transportation facilities, the War Department immediately sent to the border two motor truck companies, each consisting of twenty-seven one and one-half ton trucks. However, the trucks arrived in every conceivable state of unreadiness, without adequate equipment for assembling, and no organization for their management. Escort wagon bodies in lieu of truck bodies were shipped from one point to be used on truck chasses from

another! The trucks were of various makes - Jeffrey, White, Mack, Packard, Locomobile, Peerless, Moreland, Velie, to mention a few. Those equipped with four-wheel drive proved most satisfactory. No provision was made for repairs nor for the installation of shops. To meet this emergency, the base quartermaster at Columbus organized a motor transportation division which consisted of a motor truck battalion, motor transport shops, and a motor transportation shipping office.

At the beginning, all repair work had to be done in the open, dust and sandstorms notwithstanding. The services of civilian drivers provided by the Jeffrey Truck Company were utilized in establishing the first repair shop and the Locomobile Company furnished its most competent station manager as an overseer for the first repair crew. The work load of the shop grew so rapidly that mechanical crews were supplemented by drivers.⁵ In this way,

⁵ Cost of maintenance per truck per 100 miles varied from \$0.33 1/2 for the Packard to \$1.40 for the Jeffrey. Approximate costs of operation per truck per ton-mile was \$0.70 including incidentals.

drivers gained mechanical skill which enabled them to make minor repairs on the road. It was seven months after entry into Mexico before shop buildings were constructed.⁶

⁶ WD An Rpts, 1916, Vol.1, p. 383. Pershing Rpt, p. 34 and Incl 18.

Unreliable communication systems - faulty aeroplanes, disrupted field telegraph, and poor radio - made it difficult, and at times impossible, to maintain contact with the advancing and widely scattered cavalry columns. Radio pack sets provided for the cavalry units proved of little value though the wagon sets worked fairly well. Communications were maintained between Colonia Dublan and the headquarters of the expedition by two-kilowatt tractor sets at each place and by aeroplane. Both the radio and aeroplane received their initial workout in field operations during this campaign into Mexico thereby marking a distinct step forward by the United States Army.

As previously stated, there was only one tactical air unit in the service at this time, the First Aero Squadron. Though equipped with as good material as could be obtained, it consisted of only eight low-powered planes which had already been in use beyond the ordinary period of serviceability. Because of distances to be covered, altitudes encountered, limited range of the planes, and inadequate maintenance, the aircraft soon became unserviceable. Valuable experience was gained, however, which led to more intensive training for aviators, the development of better planes, and the eventual reorganization of the aviation section of the Signal Corps.⁷

7 Toulmin, pp. 47 - 49; The Signal Corps and Air Service, Monograph No. 16, by Hist Sect, AWC, GPO, 1922.

General Pershing crossed the border on horseback but the rapid movement of his forces made it necessary to switch to the automobile. He was immediately faced with the necessity of breaking off with his headquarters and communication with the War Department or of losing touch with his troops. He chose the former and for days was out of contact with his nearest base and at times with his troops, without tentage or other equipment and exposed to all hardships endured by his men. Accompanied by a small staff, with his automobile serving as headquarters, Pershing moved rapidly from Colonia Dublan, to El Valle, to Pamiquipa, then toward Bachiniva and to San Geronimo Ranch, where he remained about ten days. It was here that he received Dodd's report of the Guerrero fight on 29 March and reports from the detachments following Villa's trail to the south. From San Geronimo Ranch Pershing went by way of San Antonio de los Arenales to Satevo where, with the use of an aero section, he was able to keep in touch with his troops and send dispatches for relay to Headquarters, Southern Department.⁸ After the Parral encounter, Pershing

⁸ Toulmin, pp. 50 - 55.

returned to San Antonio de los Arenales, the advance supply base, where provisions were made to withdraw the troops from the south.

Throughout the expedition, the Commanding General covered the whole field of operations, turning up at unexpected places and unexpected hours.

Casualties

Reports on American casualties sustained during the expedition differ considerably but no evidence has been found of a War Department determination as to the actual number. Consolidated regimental returns show 66 casualties. However, there are no returns for 9 March or 21 June, the dates of the Columbus and Carrizal attacks. War Department Annual Reports give 76 casualties, which includes those sustained at Columbus but does not include 2 killed and 7 wounded in subsequent encounters with Villa's forces. The Southern Department surgeon reports 43 men died of wounds received in action during the fiscal year 1916⁹, which undoubtedly may be interpreted

9 Funston's Report, p. 67. There follows a breakdown of conflicting reports on casualties:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wound- ed</u>	<u>Mis- sing</u>	<u>Cap- tured</u>	<u>Died Of Accidents And Other Causes</u>	<u>Died of Disease</u>	<u>Total</u>
Consolidated regimental returns, Mar - June 1916 (9 Mar and 21 June missing).	9			11	24	33	66
WD An Rpts, 1916, Vol 1, pp. 278 - 280.	26	25	1	24			76

to mean that these men were casualties of the campaign into Mexico. All reports agree that only two officers were killed.

On the Mexican side, no reliable figures are available. Based

on reports of encounters with the Villistas, it is estimated that well over 200 were killed or wounded. Prisoners were taken from time to time but for lack of adequate means to guard them or inability to distinguish between Villistas and Carranzistas, they were often released, but if evidence seemed justifiable, they were held. When Pershing was preparing to return to the United States he sent twenty-one Mexicans to Columbus to be held pending decision by the State Department. These prisoners were alleged to have been connected with the Columbus raid. Losses among the Carranzista forces are variously estimated as from 50 to 100 killed, but no figures are found showing the number

10 WD An Rpts 1916, Vol. 1; pp. 278 - 280. Foreign Rel 1917, p. 908, AG 0052129, Case 1.

wounded.

Summary and Conclusions

There have been numerous comments as to the success of the expedition. On that score, the opinions of prominent men of that period may be significant. Secretary of War Baker stated that "... Its objective, of course, was the capture of Villa, if that could be accomplished, but its real purpose was an extension of the power of the United States into a country disturbed beyond control of the constituted authorities of the Republic of Mexico, as a means of controlling lawless aggregations of bandits and preventing attacks by them across the international frontier.

This purpose is fully and finally accomplished."¹¹

¹¹ WD An Rpts 1917, Vol. 1, p. 10.

The Chief of Staff, General Scott said: "Pershing made a complete success in the accomplishment of his orders from the War Department point of view but the State Department, by putting out erroneous information, spoiled the effect in the minds of the public. Neither the State Department nor the Press, moreover, has ever corrected this unfortunate impression; in fact, this is, in all probability, the first correction that has ever been publicly made...."¹² General Harbord wrote: "Pershing accomplished the

¹² Scott, p. 521.

purpose for which he was sent, did it without bringing on a clash of arms and with the loss of only two officers and a few men in a small detached command...."¹³

¹³ Harbord, p. 34.

When American forces entered Mexico, only a limited number of army officers on active duty were conversant with the art of handling large bodies of troops for the reason that there had been no recent occasion for such a concentration. During the period that followed, it was the privilege of but two men to

command the greater part of our limited, active military strength -- General Funston, commanding the Southern Department with a force varying from about 20,000 to over 150,000 was charged with border defense and General Pershing, in Mexico, headed the punitive force numbering approximately 15,000 at its peak. ¹⁴ However, all

¹⁴ Funston Rpt, p. 33.

officers involved had an opportunity to develop practical leadership in handling units appropriate to their grade.

Upon the death of General Funston in February 1917, General Pershing assumed command of the Southern Department. Until called to command the American Army in the World War, he continued the open-warfare training he had instituted in Mexico, concentrating on the most modern methods. Concerning this training, Pershing wrote:

The contingents of the Regular Army and about 150,000 National Guard troops that served on the border during this period learned much that was beneficial to them in the World War. Most commands were given some tactical training and the officers had the chance to learn something of camp life and to develop practical leadership in handling units up to the regiment. The training and experience the National Guard received during this service raised their relative efficiency considerably above that attained under ordinary circumstances. Thus the only training, except ordinary routine, any of our forces received during the year prior to 1917 was given to the troops then in Mexico and to those stationed along the border.

. . . While my command in Mexico was taught the technique of trench fighting, it was more particularly trained in the war of movement. Without the application of open warfare methods, there could have been only stalemate on the Western Front. ¹⁵

15 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (New York, 1931), Vol. 1, pp. 10 - 11.

The Mexican incident proved of inestimable value to the United States Army. First, it demonstrated the determination of the Government that a menace to lives and property of American citizens would not be tolerated along the southern frontier. Second, by the mobilization of the Regular Army and National Guard, it provided an opportunity for training officers and men for the development of administrative procedures incident to the operations of considerable forces. The need for drastic improvements was demonstrated especially in the systems of supply, transportation, and communication. Third, it afforded a serviceable foundation upon which to proceed when the expansion of the military establishment became necessary on declaration of war against Germany a few months later.

16

16 WD An Rpts 1917, Vol. 1, p. 10.

APPENDIX A

Organization of Troops Designated to Comprise the Mexican Punitive Expedition

[Extract from Report of Operations, Mexican Punitive Expedition to
30 June 1916, by John J. Pershing, Cmdg]

HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION,
U.S. ARMY, Columbus, N.M.,
March 14, 1916.

General Orders)

No. 1.)

I. 1. The forces of this command are organized into a provisional division to be called "Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army."

2. The following Staff is announced:

Chief of Staff:	Lt. Col. DeK. C. Cabell, 10th Cav.
Asst. to Chief of S.:	Capt. Wilson R. Burt, 20th Inf.
Adjutant:	Maj. John L. Hines, Adj. Gen. Dept.
Intelligence Officer:	Maj. James A. Ryan, 13th Cav.
Inspector:	Col. Lucien G. Berry, 4th F.A.
Judge Advocate:	Capt. Allen J. Greer, 16th Inf.
Quartermaster:	Maj. John F. Madden, Q.M. Corps
Surgeon:	Maj. Jere B. Clayton, Medical Corps
Engr. Officer:	Maj. Lytle Brown, Corps of Engrs.
Signal Officer:	Capt. Hanson B. Black, Sig. Corps.
Commander of the Base:	Maj. Wm. R. Sample, 20th Inf.
Aides:	1st Lt. James L. Collins, 11th Cav. 2d Lt. Martin C. Shallenberger, 10th Inf.

3. The Provisional Division will consist of:

(a) First Provisional Cavalry Brigade, Colonel James Lockett, Commanding.

-Troops-

11th Cavalry	13th Cavalry
Battery C, 6th Field Artillery (attached)	

(b) Second Cavalry Brigade, Col. Geo. A. Dodd,
Commanding.

-Troops-

7th Cavalry 10th Cavalry
Battery B, 6th Field Artillery (attached)

- (c) First Provisional Infantry Brigade, Colonel John H. Beacom, Commanding.

-Troops-

6th Infantry	16th Infantry
Cos. E, and H, 2d Batt. of Engrs. (attached)	

- (d) Ambulance Company, No. 7, Field Hospital No. 7.
- (e) Signal Corps Detachments, First Aero Squadron Detachment Signal Corps.
- (f) Wagon Companies, Numbers 1 and 2.

APPENDIX B

Location of Organizations of the Expedition, 29 March 1916

[Extract from Report of Operations, Mexican Punitive Expedition to 30 June 1916 by Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, Cmdg]

ORGANIZATIONS	COMMANDING OFFICER	LOCATIONS
Division Headquarters	:	: Colonia Dublan
HdQRS, 1st Prov. Cav. Brigade	: Col. Lockett	: Colonia Dublan
Detachments:	:	:
1st Sq., 13th Cavalry	: Maj. Lindsley	: San Jose de Babicora*
2 Tps. 13th Cavalry	: Maj. Tompkins	: Namiquipa
1st Prov. Sq. 11th Cav.	: Maj. Howze	: Namiquipa
HdQRS 2d Prov. Cav. Brigade	: Col. Dodd	: Guerrero*
Detachments:	:	:
7th Cavalry	: Colonel Erwin	: Guerrero (near
Troop A, 7th Cav.	: Capt. Nissen	: Portrillo Pass-(Santa
Troop D, 7th Cav.	: Capt. Boice	: Santa Ana* (Ana
2d Sq 10th Cav.	: Col. Brown	: La Quemada
1st Sq. 10th Cav.	: Maj. Evans	: Rubio
2 Troops, 10th Cav.	: Maj Tompkins	: Namiquipa
HdQRS, 2d Prov. Inf. Brigade	: Col. Beacom	: Colonia Dublan
Detachments:	:	:
Co. C, 16th Inf. with Wagon Cos. Nos. 1 & 2	: Capt. Ball	: En route Dublan
Co. M, 16th Inf.	: Capt. Creary	: Corralitas.
Det. Cos. 16th Inf.	: Maj. Moore	: Colonia Juarez*
Co. B, 16th Inf.	: Capt. Smith	: Boca Grande
3d Bn. 6th Inf. (less 2 cos.)	: Capt. Shaeffer	: El Valle
Co. D and one half	:	:
M.G. Co. 6th Inf.	: Capt. Johnson	: Galeana
1 Co. and one half	:	:
M.G. Co. 6th Inf.	: Lt. Monroe	: Las Cruces
2 Cos. 6th Inf.	: Capt. Roach	: Chocolate Pass
Co. G, Engrs.	: Lt. Fox	: Boca Grande
Co. H, Engrs.	: Capt. Garvis	: Namiquipa
Co. E, Engrs.	: Capt. Grant	: Ascencion
Pack train ost Bn.,	:	: San Jose de
6th F.A. (with Lindsley)	:	: Babicora*
1st Bn., 6th F. A.	: Capt. Merrill	: Colonia Dublan

Station of Troops -- Continued

ORGANIZATIONS	COMMANDING OFFICER	LOCATION
Ambulance Company No. 7	Capt. Jones	Colonia Dublan
Field Hospital, No. 7	Maj. Clayton	Colonia Dublan
Signal Corps:	Capt. Black	
Hq. 1st Aero Sqdn.	Capt. Foullois	Colonia Dublan
Det. 1st Aero Sqdn.		El Valle
Hq. Signal Det.	Capt. Black	All stations
Wagon Wireless sets		Colonia Dublan and Namiquipa
Wagon Co., No. 3,	Capt. Bryson	Colonia Dublan
Pack Train, No. 10		Colonia Dublan
Pack Trains, Nos. 2 & 7		Namiquipa
Pack Train, No. 11		La Quemada*
Hq. 1st & 3d Sqds.	Col. Wilder	Gibson's Ranch
5th Cavalry		
Hq. & 5 Cos. 24th Inf.	Col Penrose	Colonia Dublan and way stations
3 Cos., 24th Inf.,	Capt. Gilmore	Columbus
1st Bn., 20th Inf.	Maj. Sample	Columbus
2d Sqdn., 5th Cav.	Maj. Fleming	Columbus

*Not on Line of communications

APPENDIX C

[Extract from Report of Operations, Mexican Punitive Expedition, to 30 June 1916, by Brig. Gen John J. Pershing, Cmdg].

District Boundaries

Namiquipa District:

Commencing at a point north of Alamo on the thirteenth parallel, thence east to the Mexican Central Railroad inclusive, south to Sauz, generally west through Tepehuanes, San Miguel, Madera to Tio Chico, north to the thirteenth parallel, thence east to Alamo.

Bustillos District:

Commencing at San Miguel, thence along southern boundary, of Namiquipa district to Sauz, south to near Salas, west to San Andres, and San Antonio de los Arenales, and excluding both towns, thence southwest to Mal Paso, thence northward to Bachiniva and San Miguel, including both towns.

Satevo District:

Commencing at San Antonio de los Arenales, thence east through and including San Andres to Mapula, thence along the Mexican Central Railroad to Jimenez, Parral to Santa Barbara, thence northwesterly to San Lorenzo and to San Antonio de los Arenales.

San Borja District:

Commencing at San Antonio de los Arenales, southwest to San Lorenzo and Santa Barbara, west to Guachochic, north to Carichic, northwest to Rancho de Santiago, northwest to San Antonio de los Arenales.

Guerrero District:

Commencing at San Miguel, thence south through Bachiniva to Mal Paso, southwest to Rancho de Santiago, southeast to Carichic, south to Guachochic, west to the third meridian west of Chihuahua, north to a point west of Madera, thence east to Madera, thence southeast to San Miguel.

APPENDIX D

Comments and Recommendations

[Extract from Report of Operations, Mexican Punitive Expedition, to June 30, 1916, by Brigadier General John J. Pershing, Commanding].

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

General Staff in the Field

1. The importance and the necessity of a well organized general staff for an army in the field has been decidedly emphasized by the experiences of this Expedition. A chief of staff with a large practical knowledge of handling troops, considerable field service and an abundance of common sense is a valuable asset for a commanding general to have. An energetic chief of staff possessing these qualifications is indispensable, even in a command of this size, and much more so with a large force. Assisted by the junior members of the general staff, the specific duties of whom are well prescribed in our service regulations, the chief of staff is in a position to coordinate the work of the various departments and to relieve his commander of many minor details of administration, thus leaving the Commanding General free to occupy his mind with the military and possibly political questions that present themselves for solution. In the preparation of orders for the movement of troops, and for governing and controlling the supply departments and in handling many other matters, such an officer is essential to maintain all parts of an army in the field in smooth working order. During this Expedition the above features have been exemplified in actual accomplishment by the Chief of Staff and his assistants. There have been many times when it was necessary for me to be far to the front in touch with advance columns, and during such times the entire control of the Expedition has been left to the Chief of Staff, who issued the necessary orders and followed out general lines of policy laid down for his guidance. A brief report by the Chief of Staff will be found among the appendices to this report.

Adjutant General's Department

2. Fortunately when this Expedition was ordered there was available a well organized and fully equipped office with capable personnel on duty with the 8th Brigade at El Paso and ready to take the field; consequently the duties of the office have been efficiently performed from the start and the Adjutant General has been able to handle most of the Administrative details without specific instruction.

In order to meet just such an emergency as confronted this command at the beginning, it is suggested that all brigades and

divisions be provided with a well instructed personnel, furnished with full field equipment, all under a competent adjutant general of experience. Such an organization would always be available for use in a larger command or elsewhere as its services might be needed.

Based upon actual experience in the field, there might be prepared in the office of the Adjutant General a memorandum covering the various duties of such an office in the field and prescribing the features that the adjutant should anticipate and provide for. Such a memorandum is now being prepared by the adjutant of this command. The recommendations contained in his report herewith are approved.

Inspector General's Department

3. The Inspector General's Department was not represented with this Expedition until recently, so that nothing pertaining to that Department will be found among the Staff reports, but in order to keep constantly informed regarding the condition of troops, camps, transportation and the work of the staff and supply departments, a member of the command was appointed Inspector. These duties were performed by Colonel L. G. Berry, Fourth Field Artillery, from March 14th to April 30th, 1916. Colonel Berry inspected the troops and camps along the line of communication and the Base at Columbus, correcting errors and defects on the spot and reporting his action later, together with the general results of the inspection. On April 30, Colonel Berry was relieved and Colonel H. T. Allen, Eleventh Cavalry, with Colonel D. L. Tate, Fifth Cavalry, as assistant, performed these duties in like manner up to June 21st, when Colonel G. O. Cress, the present Inspector, reported for duty from Department Headquarters.

Judge Advocate's Department

4. Soon after entering Mexico it became evident that it would be impracticable for the Department Commander to detail general courts as the officers and troops were constantly on the move and the probability of their remaining at any one place, even temporarily, could not be foreseen. To meet this situation request was made, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved March 2d, 1913, that authority be given the commander of the expedition to detail general courts, which request was approved May 6th, 1916. In this connection, the question was presented as to cases arising within the provisions of Article 58 of the Articles of War upon which the Judge Advocate General gave the following opinion:

"I am therefore of the opinion that, while war is not recognized as existing between the United States and Mexico, the actual conditions under which the field operations in Mexico are being conducted are those of actual war; that within the field of operations of the expeditionary force in Mexico, it is 'time of war' within the meaning of the 58th Article of War, and that the crimes mentioned in that article should therefore be tried by general court-martial in accordance with its provisions. The opposite ruling would give immunity for the capital crimes specified in the 58th Article of War, since it could not have been intended that, under such conditions, United States soldiers would be turned over to the authorities of Mexico for trial."

Courts martial have been detailed as circumstances made it possible to assemble the requisite number of officers without interference with field duties. Between May 7th and June 30th, 19 cases were tried as follows:

- 5 trials for sleeping on post, in violation of the 39th Art. of War.
- 1 trial for leaving post, in violation of the 39th Article of War.
- 3 trials for disobedience of orders, in violation of the 21st Article of War.
- 2 trials for quitting guard, in violation of the 40th Art. of War.
- 2 trials for desertion, in violation of the 47th Art. of War.
- 1 trial for larceny of govt. property, in violation of the 60th Art. of War.
- 2 trials for larceny of private property in violation of the 62d Art. of War.
- 1 trial for assault with intent to kill, in violation of the 62d Art. of War.
- 1 trial for insubordination, in violation of the 62d Art. of War.
- 1 trial for murder, in violation of the 58th Article of War.

The Quartermaster Corps

5. When this Expedition was ordered it was found that the Quartermaster's Department had not anticipated the immense amount of preparation and organization necessary to establish promptly a base of supplies for an army in the field. Officers, clerks and other personnel had to be ordered from all points of the compass. Office supplies were lacking and there was a dearth of trained personnel necessary to receive, classify and forward supplies with intelligence. It would seem entirely feasible to have the personnel for such an organization prescribed and designated

beforehand, ready to move upon receipt of telegraphic orders, with the material and office equipment necessary to begin business, all prepared and packed for shipment by express to any point. However, all sorts of material soon began to arrive and loaded cars whose contents were unknown filled all available sides of tracks. Trucks of various makes were hurriedly sent to Columbus in every conceivable state of unreadiness, with no adequate equipment for assembling them and no organization for their management. Escort wagon bodies, in lieu of properly constructed truck bodies, were shipped from one point to be used on truck chassis from other points. There was no provision for needed repairs, and there was none for the installation of shops to meet the emergency. The hasty detail of officers, most of whom were entirely unfamiliar with such work, had to be made to handle the perplexing problems presented. Notwithstanding all this confusion and congestion, it was not long before supplies were moving to the front, and, in the end, of course, these difficulties were overcome, but under other and more pressing circumstances, it might not have been possible.

6. Motor Trucks:- The truck trains during the progress of the campaign have been put to the most severe tests. Some of them operated at a distance of four hundred (400) miles from Columbus having reached Satevo southwest of the city of Chihuahua. The deplorable character of the Mexican roads that run at random over the dry alkaline flats and sandy plains of the desert, or wind their way over the roughest mountain passes, materially increased the difficulties of truck trains. Contemplation of the supply of an army under such adverse conditions might dishearten the most courageous, hence actual accomplishments under the circumstances is all the more creditable to the officers concerned. The successful handling of supplies by truck trains for an expedition operating over a long line of communication has been steadily and gradually developed to a degree never before attained in our service. The greatest praise is due to the officers charged with these tasks, and the results again prove the well known resourcefulness of officers of the regular army. No doubt these experiences will be made the basis of energetic efforts in anticipation of possibly greater emergencies.

7. Rations:- Lack of transportation facilities during the early days of the campaign necessarily limited the supply of rations to the barest necessities. The continual change in the situation and the number of troops at different points along the line of communications made it difficult to anticipate necessities. There was as often too much as too little. Troops stationed along the line of communications were fairly well supplied, but troops operating at the extreme front for the first month literally lived off the country. When the advance columns left [Colonia] Dublan they had only what remained of the five days' rations carried by pack trains with which they started from Culberson's Ranch.

Fortunately plenty of cattle were to be found in the country and a limited amount of corn and Mexican beans could usually be procured. Colonel Brown's squadron of the 10th Cavalry received no rations from the time it left Dublan on March 19th until rations were sent south by pack train to Santa Cruz near Parral about the middle of April. While supplying the current needs of the command in general, it was also imperative to provide against extraordinary field service as well as against the probability of impassable roads during the rainy season. In addition to providing regular rations, one hundred thousand rations were accumulated at convenient points and held for emergency. Later a greater variety was furnished, while at present the most liberal supply is being provided.

8. Forage:- Northern Chihuahua is essentially a grazing country yet, at the time of year during which the campaign was at its height, the grass was extremely dry and without substance, as there had been no rain since the preceding July. Certain sections of the theater of operations were absolutely barren and devoid of any forage whatever. An uncertain quantity of corn has been obtainable in some sections, and oats have been sent forward as far as transportation facilities warranted. Through private arrangement with the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, oats and hay were now received in abundance by rail from El Paso through Juarez.

9. Other Supplies:- In general, other supplies have also necessarily been restricted to the barest needs, and shipment from the Base has been authorized for only material that has been actually required to keep the Command in readiness for field service. Few replenishments have been possible during the period covered by this report, and troops have been compelled to make repairs themselves as far as possible. It has been impracticable to provide the widely separated columns according to regulations laid down for supply in garrison, and, in cases where delay was probable on this account simpler methods have prevailed. In order to avoid the necessity of formal requisitions, a plan that would meet the requirements was covered by instructions published to the command as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY
In the Field, Namiquipa, Mexico,
April 20, 1916.

General Orders)

No. 25.)

1. The following instructions are published for the information and guidance of all concerned: x x x x x

2. When clothing is needed, organization commanders should submit simple lists of kinds and sizes to the station or organization Supply Officer, who will abstract the lists received. The

Supply Officer will then request the clothing required from the Depot that regularly supplies his station or organization. Upon its receipt he will issue the clothing to organization commanders. Commanders of organizations will certify to the original lists that the clothing has been issued and charged or will be charged as required by Regulations, and return the lists to the Supply Officer, who will return them so certified, to the Depot. Station Supply Officers will be held to a strict compliance with these instructions.

x x x x x x x x x x x x x

4. Each Depot Quartermaster will tabulate the detailed information (regarding strength of men, animals and supplies on hand) received from the commands supplied by him and keep his statement up to date at all times, so that a change in personnel will not interrupt the regular flow of supplies and in order that constant and rapid changes of station of troops may not cause either lack, or congestion of supplies at remote points.

5. Until further directed, San Antonio [de los Arenales] is assigned as an Advance Depot from the Depot at Namiquipa. Colonia Dublan and Namiquipa are designated as Depots on the line of communications to be supplied from the Base at Columbus.

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

By Command of Brigadier General Pershing:

DeR. C. Cabell,
Lieut. Colonel, 10th Cavalry,
Chief of Staff

10. Accountability:- Considerable difficulty has arisen in accounting for certain Quartermaster property, which, according to Regulations, is carried on memorandum receipt from post quartermasters, a system not feasible as applied to troops ordered on extended field service. Several quartermasters of ability and experience agree that the following suggestions by Captain Leon B. Kromer, Acting Chief Quartermaster of the Expedition, would meet this problem:

1. "Quartermaster property necessary for equipment of troops should be divided into two classes, viz:

(a) Required for field service.

(b) Additions to (a) required for garrison service. At present both (a) and (b)

are held on the property account of the post quartermasters when troops are in garrison. When the command is ordered into the field transfer of (a) has been made by the post quartermasters to the regimental supply officer, and this can be done properly when troops leave in a hurry.

2. It is recommended that property under the heading (a) be held at all times on the property account of the regimental supply officer, and that Army regulations be amended accordingly. This will permit the captain of the supply company of the regiment to be responsible, for example, for the wagons and mules pertaining to the regiment as well as to the teamsters, who are now by law enlisted men of the regiment and under his command. Property of this class in the hands of organizations will in this case be held on memo receipt given to the regimental supply officer."

11. Recommendations:- Attention is invited to the excellent report of Major John F. Madden, Chief Quartermaster of the Expedition, and to the following recommendations contained therein which are unhesitatingly approved:

"1. That truck and wagon companies be organized, trained and maintained in peace for use in time of need; that this training be administered to selected officers and enlisted men at a school or schools of Transportation, and that sufficient trained units be maintained to furnish all tactical units, each with its prescribed quota.

2. That the practice of giving increased pay to certain enlisted artisans of the Quartermaster Corps by issuing warrants to such men be discontinued; that in occupations which carry with them a normal wage over that of laborers on account of increased intelligence demanded, enlisted men rated in these occupations be given increased compensation but remain in the grade of 'private first class.'

x x x x x x x x x x

4. That a system of unit accountability be devised so accounting for individual items of storage of all kinds shall cease at the last Depot; that the system of issue of clothing be changed so all shall be issued on memorandum receipt and the 'clothing allowance' be done away with."

Medical Department

12. Beside the regimental contingents that accompanied their organizations into Mexico, there were two field hospitals and two Ambulance companies with approximately their full complement of officers and men. One field hospital and one ambulance company have been located at the camp at Colonia Dublan, and one of each has been at various places with the changing sub-base farther to the front. A cantonment hospital was established at Columbus after the organization started and all cases that could not be handled by the field hospitals have been sent there for treatment. This cantonment hospital has also performed the functions of a

supply depot for the field hospitals with troops. In turn, severe cases, especially those for which an operation is indicated, are transferred to the Base Hospital at Fort Bliss, Texas, for treatment.

During the early days of the campaign, it was often impossible to provide the rapidly moving columns with all the medical supplies generally thought necessary, but constant activity on the part of the troops, coupled with the natural healthfulness of the climate at this season of the year, kept the number of sick at a minimum.

There have been but few venereal cases, some fever and some intestinal trouble. Only since the rainy season began, finding troops stationary in the various camps along the occupied line, has there been any sickness worth mentioning. Diarrhea and dysentery became prevalent at a few stations about the end of the period covered by this report, no doubt due to water pollution, and it was necessary to drive a sufficient number of wells to provide pure water. After this was done intestinal troubles cleared up, and the percentage of sick was reduced to its usual low rate.

13. The number of sick in the command, present and absent, had been about three per cent, although often much below that figure. Colonel George S. Bratton, Medical Department, writing in the absence of any Medical Officer familiar with the medical history of the Command up to June 30th, says of the water in Mexico:

"One would be safe in saying that all surface water, and shallow well water in Mexico is dangerous, for the Mexican peon is most careless as to the disposition of his excreta."

"All organizations brought their Lyster bags with them, and where these bags and the chlorinization of the water was used very little sickness of intestinal type occurred. Unfortunately the chlorinated water is very objectionable to many persons, and after a few weeks use it was hard to keep the men on this water. Many of the men drank water from the streams and irrigation ditches and this infected water was undoubtedly the cause and starting point of later cases of diarrhoea and dysentery."

Medical officers as a rule have been very strict in their inspections and criticisms, and the camps all along the line are in excellent sanitary condition. Line officers, and men as well, have come to realize fully the importance of enforcing modern sanitary rules as a means of maintaining their organizations at the highest state of efficiency.

Although the detachments of the Medical Department serving with regiments, have been short of the personnel prescribed for war service, there has been no lack of medical attention and the efficiency of the officers and men of this Department serving with this Command has been marked.

Corps of Engineers.

14. The Engineer troops assigned to the Expedition, consisting of Companies E and H, 2d Battalion, under Major Lytle Brown, Corps of Engineers, reached Columbus, New Mexico, from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, March 14th. The early duties that fell to the Engineers were a small amount of pioneer work with a maximum amount of work on roads. This road work made it obligatory to distribute detachments at convenient places both for actual labor and to supervise the work of troops and of native employees. It early became evident that to meet the demand of the heavy traction of truck trains considerable rebuilding would be necessary. The approaching rainy season was also given consideration, all information pointing to heavy and probably impassible roads during that period. While the roads all along the line of communication were kept in repair, work was begun at putting metal on several sections, especially the flats of the river bottom in anticipation of early rains. At the same time it was deemed advisable to survey routes around the worst parts, locating these new stretches on higher ground that would be easily drained and therefore less difficult to maintain during the height of the wet season.

When it became clear that the Expedition would require the use of a good road indefinitely, the requisite funds were provided, road machinery and bridge material were purchased, native teams and labor secured and construction work was begun in earnest over the new routes selected. This work has been carried on and, at the same time, the main road has been maintained in serviceable condition. Wooden bridges have been constructed at the important crossings of both the Casas Grandes River at Vado Fusiles and the Santa Maria River at El Valle, and culverts and causeways put in where necessary.

15. The difficulties of the situation at the beginning can hardly be imagined. The wheels of heavily loaded trucks sank deep into the friable alkali soil and cut great furrows that filled to the level with dust ground as fine as powder. New tracks were laid out only to have the operation repeated, requiring these ruts to be filled with gravel whenever possible as the only resource left. The rainy season brought about the opposite condition and truck trains were often delayed by torrential rains, stuck to the hubs for days and compelled to remain so until the roads dried sufficiently for them to proceed. It soon became

necessary to abandon the old road, but the rains had improved the sand stretches of the new sections, making them in turn passable during the wet season. Thus the question of utilizing available truck and wagon transportation at any season, has been solved. All that is needed from now on is maintenance and this can be reduced to a nominal expenditure.

The personnel of the Engineer battalion entered Mexico with no knowledge of road construction of this nature, as nothing exactly like it had ever come under the experience of any of its officers. Moreover, during the early part of the campaign, the official personnel included several very young officers without practical field experience of any sort. Thus the battalion commander was seriously handicapped in securing the progress that should have been his right to expect from his organization. This condition improved with time, and in the end a commendable state of efficiency has been reached throughout the battalion.

16. The actual expenditures on road work up to August 31, 1916, are shown below:

Direct Expenditures:

Disbursed by Quartermaster for labor	\$99,000.00
Disbursed by Engineer Department	34,000.00
Machinery and spare parts	80,000.00
Lumber	14,000.00
Culvert Material	<u>5,800.00</u>
Total cash expenditure	\$232,800.00

Cost of truck maintenance, depreciation and upkeep of trucks engaged on road work for three months, estimated	\$97,200.00
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Supplies furnished by Quartermaster, gasoline, oil, tentage, and the use of wagons and mules and their forage, estimated	<u>50,000.00</u>
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Total	\$380,000.00
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Work Done:

Road built	157 miles
Road repaired	224 miles

The proportionate cost of repairing and building is about as one to three. On this basis the roads built have cost \$1,635 per mile and repairs have cost \$545 per mile. This estimate takes no account of the soldier labor used. That is estimated as valued at \$240,000.00 which would bring the total cost up to \$827 per mile for roads repaired and \$2,481 for roads built.

17. Topographical work has not covered as much territory nor has it been as efficiently done as might have been expected,

but the urgent demand of road work has made it imperative to employ the Engineers mainly on that duty. A mapping department has been in existence since the Expedition began, and the maps produced of the country actually traversed are excellent considering the time devoted to that class of work. A list of these maps is appended to Major Brown's report, and copies are forwarded herewith.

Attention is invited to the following from Major Brown's report:

"18. The necessary staff organization for engineer operations along the line of communications was entirely lacking. This made it necessary to place pioneer troops on the line of communications, out of their proper place, and impose upon their officers staff duty to such an extent as to prevent them giving proper attention to their troop duties. While such arrangement was probably unavoidable considering the nature of the Expedition, its hurried organization and its extraordinary mission, it should not occur in any future movement as extensive as this has been.

"There were no engineer funds available for the conduct of engineer operations along the line of communications; while the cooperation of the Quartermaster Corps produced the necessary funds, such arrangement is highly unsatisfactory as may be seen without mention of reasons."

Upon completion of the new organizations recently provided by law for Engineer troops there should be no lack of field equipment and funds to meet the exigencies of active service anywhere.

Ordnance Department

19. It was some time after the troops entered Mexico before an Ordnance Officer was sent to the Base to take charge of the supply. A continuous flow of ordnance from the Base of the troops, hundreds of miles to the front, seems not to have been anticipated and provided for. At an early date the wear and tear upon ordnance of all sorts became noticeable, as was to have been expected under such conditions as were encountered by the Expedition. There was inadequate provision for quick replacement of ordnance and none for its repair. Adherence to regulations applicable to garrison service made it difficult for troops to procure supplies needed or to keep those on hand in serviceable condition. To meet the difficulty, orders were issued that ordnance should be shipped to the front, as needed, using slips of paper as requisitions, if necessary, instead of following the impracticable method that prolonged peace imposes upon us.

A decided revision of ordnance regulations along practical lines is needed if efficiency in providing equipment for troops

in active service is expected. In their efforts to maintain unit accountability of equipment in accordance with regulations, officers have been put to great inconvenience. They have been held responsible for ordnance they could neither keep on hand in the field nor transfer to any other responsible party, and have been unable under the regulations to obtain equipment for any excess in the present peace strength of their commands. In order to get much needed ordnance equipment in the hands of the troops promptly when fleeting opportunity existed and without the formalities of deliberate requisitions on the Base or other Ordnance officer, a short-cut had to be taken, and the orders issued met the situation for the time being.

It is recommended that the Regulations regarding unit accountability be revised and that a rational system of supplying ordnance in the field, based on business methods, be adopted. The following order served its purpose for the time being:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, US. ARMY,
In the Field, Namiquipa, Mexico, Apr. 20, '16.

General Orders)

No. 25)
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

II. The following information and instructions will govern in obtaining ordnance stores for this command:

(a) The Ordnance Depot is located at the Base.

(b) Ordnance officers have been designated at Dublan and Namiquipa. These officers will act as the agents of the Ordnance Officer at Base, and make no return for Ordnance stores. Stations north of Dublan will be supplied from the Base at Columbus direct; stations north of Namiquipa from Dublan, Namiquipa and stations south from Namiquipa, until further orders.

(c) Organization commanders requiring ordnance stores will submit to proper supply points, simple lists of number and kind of articles desired.

(d) The Ordnance Officer at the Base will furnish his agents, on memorandum receipt, such supplies as he may request, from time to time.

(e) Ordnance agents will issue the supplies called for on lists, taking a simple receipt therefor. They will also be furnished by organization commanders with certificates of loss, destruction or damage, setting forth the facts in the case, when practicable, approved by the Commanding Officer, or verified by a disinterested officer.

(f) The Ordnance agent will return to the Ordnance Officer at the Base, all receipts and certificates received by him for credit on his memorandum receipt and for use as vouchers to the accountable officer at the Base.

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By Command of Brigadier General Pershing:

DeR. C. Cabell,
Lieut. Colonel, 10th Cavalry,
Chief of Staff.

Signal Corps.

21. The Signal detachments for this Expedition had to be assembled from several different field stations along the Border, so that organization was lacking and equipment was deficient. There was no field wire on hand and number 14 galvanized iron wire had to be submitted in laying the first ground telegraph lines. This wire was unsuited for such conditions, as it would not lie flat on the ground and was therefore easily disturbed and broken by animals and wheeled vehicles passing up and down the line. A supply of field wire was at last obtained and being carefully laid at considerable distance from the road, the above difficulties were eliminated. Some trouble was experienced at first in maintaining the line in tact on account of interference by natives, and very drastic measures had to be taken before the practice could be stopped.

Eventually the line was extended from Columbus connecting up all stations as far as San Antonio [de los Arenales], Mexico, with a branch from there to Ojos Azules which was used as long as that point was occupied. The total distance over which this ground wire worked is 325 miles, which exceeds anything previously known in our service in the use of such a wire.

On account of the heavy rainfall during the summer months, and the unreliability of the ground wire during the wet weather, a permanent telegraph line on iron poles has been built from Columbus to Colonia Dublan. The number of words per day transmitted over the telegraph line wire at present reaches an average of 10,000. The radio sets often transmit as high as 2,000 words. The pack sets provided to accompany moving columns are of little value for use by Cavalry. In lieu of these small pack sets, there should be a larger type capable of reaching from 50 to 75 miles that could be carried on packs and accompany the cavalry.

The atmospheric conditions in the high altitudes of the mountainous districts through which wireless communication is maintained are very difficult and uncertain, but our wagon sets although often out of repair have kept up communication with the Base almost constantly. The radio sets were able to work very

to Columbus efficiently from San Antonio [de los Arenales], Mexico, direct, a distance of 303 miles. The main difficulty experienced with these radio sets has been the impossibility of obtaining spare parts as much of the machinery is of foreign manufacture. The fact that spare parts are unobtainable in our country is pointed out as a very serious defect. As wireless communication is indispensable in operations under modern war conditions, the shortage of wireless machines should also be given consideration.

The work of the Signal Corps has required a high state of efficiency among its personnel, and with very few exceptions among some of the enlisted force, they have maintained a high standard and performed their duties faithfully and well.

Aeroplane Service

Aeroplanes were used by this Expedition in active service for the first time in the history of our army. Eight aeroplanes only were available and they were old, having been in use beyond the ordinary period of serviceability. Their carrying capacity was small and their ability to combat adverse conditions was very limited. The organization of the squadron was very imperfect and incomplete, the equipment for repairs was deficient and there were few supplies on hand for replacement. Conditions in Mexico are different from any which our aviators had hitherto experienced. The great altitudes with treacherous air currents, and the prevailing high winds and dust storms, and an occasional snow storm made the work of the aviators hazardous indeed. Missions were not always accomplished, yet this was due to the inferior class of machines and equipment, and not from lack of willingness. Many important reconnaissances have been made, and communication has often been maintained with distant columns when no other means existed. The original eight machines have all been wrecked or become unserviceable through use.

Under the difficulties of aviation experienced, the service rendered must be considered as most exceptional. The personnel has displayed the most commendable spirit, and personal efficiency is of the highest order. Officers have literally taken their lives in their hands without hesitation, although several aviators have had narrow escapes. Unstinted praise for the aviators who have served with this Expedition is universal throughout the Command. Attention is invited to the report of Major Foullois to be found among the appendices, the last paragraph of which is quoted as being especially pertinent.

"The experience gained by the commissioned and enlisted personnel of this command while on active duty with the Punitive Expedition, has been of the greatest value, and it is believed

that the knowledge gained by all concerned should result in more rapid and efficient development of the aviation service in the United States Army."

CONCLUSION

The splendid services that the regular troops comprising the Expedition have performed under most adverse conditions again proves that the natural ability, physical endurance, unflinching persistence, general efficiency, and unquestioned loyalty and devotion to duty, the well trained officers and men of the regular army are unexcelled by the troops of any other nation.

(Signed) JOHN J. PERSHING
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

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