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HELPFUL HINTS TO

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CG: C. P. L. A. V. L. W. O. R. K. I. N. G.

HOPEFUL HEROES

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TACTICS DEPARTMENT

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY GROUND FORCES
Washington 25, D. C.

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15 January 1946

SUBJECT: Helpful Hints to Hopeful Heroes

TO: Commanding General, Replacement and School Command

1. The Commanding General received the inclosed pamphlet, "Helpful Hints to Hopeful Heroes," from General Patton. He agrees in general with the ideas expressed and feels that there is much of value which can be used in the courses of instruction at the service schools.

2. It is desired that five (5) copies of this pamphlet and five (5) copies of this letter be distributed to each of the service schools.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

Major Lewis C. Taynton
G-1 Sect. Hq. USFA
APO 168 - c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

(signed)

S. R. KNIGHT

Lt Col, AGD

Asst Ground Adjutant General

1 Incl
Pamphlet, Helpful Hints
to Hopeful Heroes

CHAPTER IX

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

OR, IN A LIGHTER VEIN,

HELPFUL HINTS TO HOPEFUL HEROES

Probably there is nothing original in what I shall now put down, because war is an ancient subject, and I, an ancient man, have studied and practiced it for over forty years. So, what appears to me as original thought may be simply subconscious memories.

PART I

CONCERNING THE SOLDIER

The soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one's country. Hence it is a proud privilege to be a soldier -- a good soldier. Anyone in any walk of life who is content with mediocrity is untrue to himself and to American tradition. To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and in his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated ability.

There has been and is now a great deal of talk about discipline, but few people, in or out of the Army, know what it is or why it is necessary.

When a man enters the Army he leaves home, usually for the first time, and also he leaves behind him the inhibitions resulting from his respect for the opinion of his parents and his friends, which inhibitions, unknown to himself, have largely guided his existence. When he joins a unit and lacks this corrective influence he is apt to slip in morals, in neatness, and in energy. Administrative discipline must replace the absent inhibitions.

All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious. Where would an undisciplined football team get? The players react subconsciously to the signals. They must, because the split second required for thought would give the enemy the jump.

Battle is much more exigent than football. No sane man is not afraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline. The Army saying, "Who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?" is largely true. Pride, in turn, stems from self-respect and from the knowledge that the soldier is an American. The sense of duty and obligation

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to his comrades and superiors comes from a knowledge of reciprocal obligation and from the sharing of the same way of life. Self-confidence, the greatest military virtue, results from the demonstrated ability derived from the acquisition of all the preceding qualities and from exercise in the use of weapons.

It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that in our attempts to prevent war we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier. They do not realize that, as Shakespeare put it, the pursuit of "the bubble reputation even at the cannon's mouth" is not only a good military characteristic but also very helpful to the young man when bullets and shells are whistling and cracking around him. Much more could be done if the women of America would praise their heroes, if papers would publish the citations of soldiers in their home towns, and, further, if foolish ideas of security did not make the citations so unrealistic. Perhaps the returning soldiers of this war may correct this very unfortunate situation.

One of Kipling's poems starts as follows:

"When the young British soldier
Comes out to the East,
He acts like a babe
And drinks like a beast,
And wonders, because he is often deceased
Ere he learns how to act like a soldier."

All our soldiers do not drink like beasts. In fact, the lack of drinking in our Army is remarkable. However, many do act like babes. What follows is an attempt to make certain suggestions which have proved useful.

Do not dig slit trenches under trees if you can avoid it, because a shell passing overhead and striking the tree acts as an air-burst and the fragments come straight down so that your slit trench is useless to you, although it may be of some assistance to the graves registration people.

Slit trenches for gun crews must be in the close vicinity of the gun, else the men waste too much time getting from the trenches to the gun. Also they are just as apt to get killed while making the run as they would be if they stayed by the gun. Finally, a gun that is not firing is useless, and its crew are disloyal to the soldiers in front of them whom they are supposed to be supporting.

The trick expressing, "Dig or Die," is much overused and much misunderstood. Wars are not won by defensive tactics. Digging is primarily defensive. The only time it is proper for a soldier to dig is when he has reached his final objective in an attack or when he is bivouacking under circumstances where he thinks he may be strafed from the air or is within artillery range of the enemy. Personally, I am opposed to digging under such circumstances, as the chances of getting killed while sleeping normally on the ground are quite remote, and the fatigue from digging innumerable slit trenches is avoided. Also, the psychological effect on the soldier is bad, because if he thinks he has to dig he must think the enemy is dangerous, which he usually is not.

"Hit the dirt" is another expression which has done much to increase our casualties. Frequently in fighting Germans and probably other troops in the next war we will find that they have resorted to their knowledge of our custom of hitting the dirt. What they do is wait until we have arrived at a predetermined spot on which they have ranged rockets, mortars, or artillery, and then they put on a sudden and violent machine gun fire--frequently straight up in the air. The soldier, obsessed with the idea of hitting the dirt, lies down and waits supinely for the arrival of the mortars, rockets, etc. He usually doesn't have to wait long.

The only time it is proper for a soldier to drop is when he is caught at short range, under 300 yards, by concentrated small-arms fire. But even then he must not hit the dirt and stay supine. He must shoot fast at the enemy or in the direction of the enemy, because it is as true now as when Farragut stated it in the Civil War that "The best armor (and the best defense) is a rapid and well directed fire." It is a sad commentary on our troops that frequently we get the report that such and such a unit is pinned down under fire and later the same unit comes back.

When soldiers are caught in a barrage, either from mortars, rockets, or artillery, the surest way to get out of it is to go forward fast, because it is almost the invariable practice of the enemy to increase rather than decrease his range.

In the days when the chief small-arms fire on the battlefield was delivered by rifles, it may have been necessary to advance by rushing, in order to build up the firing line. Today, when the chief small-arms fire on the battlefield and the majority of the neutralizing fire are delivered by machine guns, mortars, and artillery, there is no advantage in advancing by rushing; because until you get within 300 yards small-arms fire has very little effect, whereas when you lie down between rushes you expose yourself to the effect of shrapnel. When you get to 300 yards your own small-arms fire, which is superior to anything now existing or which will probably ever exist, will neutralize the enemy small-arms fire so that you do not have to advance by rushing. I say this very feelingly because I have seen, on many occasions in maneuvers and in battle, troops advancing by rushes when they were defiladed behind hills and could have gone forward in limousines, had they been available, with perfect impunity.

Marching Fire. The proper way to advance, particularly for troops armed with that magnificent weapon, the M-1 rifle, is to utilize marching fire and keep moving. This fire can be delivered from the shoulder, but it is just as effective if delivered with the butt of the rifle halfway between the belt and the armpit. One round should be fired every two or three paces. The whistle of the bullets, the scream of the ricochet and the dust, and the twigs and branches which are knocked from the ground and the trees have such an effect on the enemy that his small-arms fire becomes negligible.

Meanwhile, our troops in rear, using high-angle fire, should put out the enemy's mortars and artillery. As I have stated, even if we fail to put out the mortars and artillery, the most foolish thing possible is to stop under

such fire. Keep walking forward. Furthermore, the fact that you are shooting adds to your self-confidence, because you feel that you are doing something and are not sitting like a duck in a bathtub being shot at.

In marching fire, all weapons must be used. The light machine guns can be used while walking -- one man carrying the belt, the other man carrying the gun. The same is true of the Browning Automatic Rifle and, of course, as previously stated, of the M-1. The 60-mm mortar, advanced by alternate sections, can do much in the same way. The 81 usually should support from one position.

I think if we would say that "Fire is the queen of battles" we would avoid arms arguments and come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and by movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank.

Every soldier should realize that casualties in battle are the result of two factors; first, effective enemy fire, and second, the time during which the soldier is exposed to that fire. The enemy's effectiveness in fire is reduced by your fire or by night attacks. The time you are exposed is reduced by the rapidity of your advance.

Bravery and Courage. If we take the generally accepted definition of bravery as a quality which knows not fear, I have never seen a brave man. All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory are attributes which will make a man courageous even if he is afraid.

The greatest weapon against the so-called "battle fatigue" is ridicule. If soldiers would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic. Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. If soldiers would make fun of those who begin to show battle fatigue, they would prevent its spread and also save the man who allows himself to malingering by this means from an after-life of humiliation and regret.

Trench Foot. Soldiers must look after themselves, particularly in wet or cold weather. This applies particularly to trench foot, which, with reasonable assistance by the higher command, can be largely prevented if the soldier will only take the trouble to massage his feet and put on dry socks. He is not responsible for the arrival of the dry socks, but, provided they do arrive, he is responsible for putting them on.

The same thing is true of venereal disease. Soldiers do not have to contract it if they will take the precautions which the military establishment provides. When they do contract it they are disloyal to their comrades, because while they are recovering somebody else is doing their work.

PART II

SMALL UNIT TACTICS

The best way for infantry to go through a woods is to advance in a skirmish line on a distant direct point, if such is available, or, more probably, on a compass bearing. The skirmish line should be at reduced intervals and should move straight forward through the woods using marching fire. If this is done, it will be surprising how little resistance will be encountered, because if the enemy attempts to fire through the woods his rifles, which are always less effective than ours, will not penetrate through the trees, while ours will penetrate and so get him.

In fighting through European woods, which are intersected at right angles every thousand meters by lanes, do not walk down the lanes, and be careful how you cross them -- that is, cross them fast -- because the enemy usually has them swept with machine guns.

Squads should seldom be split. However, if it is necessary to split a squad, be sure that the unit separated is at least capable of mutual support. This means that the unit separated from the squad should not be fewer than three men. The squad possesses in itself the weapons necessary for a base of fire and a maneuvering element. This should be its invariable method of attack; but the squad leader should not spend so much time thinking which way he is going to envelop that he suffers casualties which would have been avoided had he attacked at once.

In small operations as in large, speed is the essential element of success. If the difference between the two possible flanks for envelopment is so small that it requires thought, the time wasted in thought is not well used. Remember that the life of the infantry squad depends on its capacity of fire. It must fire.

When a small unit disposes both 60-mm and 81-mm mortars in an attack, the 60-mm mortars should fire on the front line of the resistance while the 81-mm fire for depth and to hit the supports and heavy weapons.

Tanks and Infantry. The question of whether infantry or tanks lead in attacking is determined by the character of the ground and of the enemy resistance. Whenever the ground permits tanks to advance rapidly, even with the certainty of a loss from mine fields, they should lead. Through dense woods or against prepared positions or unlocated antitank guns, infantry leads followed closely by the tanks, which act as close supporting artillery. But, irrespective of the foregoing, some tanks must accompany the infantry when they reach the objective. These tanks are for the purpose of removing enemy weapons which emerge after the passage of the leading tanks.

Pillboxes. Pillboxes are best attacked by the use of prearranged groups. A satisfactory group consists of two BARs, a bazooka, a light machine gun, two to four riflemen, and two men with the demolition charge. Sixty pounds of

TNT is ample. Before initiating an attack on a pillbox area a reconnaissance should be made to determine which boxes are mutually supporting. Those in such a group must be attacked simultaneously. The best results are obtained by a silent night attack which places the assault groups in position close to their respective pillboxes at dawn. The apertures are immediately taken under fire and silenced. When this is achieved the demolition charge, covered by riflemen and light machine guns, is placed against the door at the rear of the pillbox; the fuse is lit, and the men withdraw around the corner of the building. As soon as the charge is exploded riflemen throw in grenades -- preferably phosphorus. Any enemy emerging are killed or captured according to the frame of mind of the enemy.

When circumstances prevent a night operation, similar but more expensive results are obtained by advancing close in the wake of an artillery concentration.

Another adjunct to the attack on pillboxes is a self-propelled 155-mm gun, where conditions permit its use. At short range the effects are very satisfactory.

Street Fighting. Street fighting is simply a variation of pillbox fighting. A similar group, but reinforced with more riflemen, is effective. The additional riflemen are split on opposite sides of the street so as to take under fire enemy personnel appearing in the upper stories on the side across from them. When a house offers resistance the windows are silenced by fire as in the case of pillboxes, and under cover of this immunity a bazooka crew fires one or two rounds at the corner of the house, about three feet from the ground. When a hole has been made by this means, phosphorus or HE grenades are thrown into the lower floor and cellar to discourage those operating there. The demolition essential in pillboxes is really not needed in street fighting.

In street fighting it is very essential to avoid hurrying. One group as above described can usually clear a city block in twelve hours. When tanks are available they replace the bazookas in blowing holes in the walls of the lower floor. However, they must be buttoned up to avoid grenades from the upper floors, and should be further protected by riflemen to keep the enemy from the windows. Self-propelled 155-mm guns are extremely useful in cities against moderate masonry construction. One round with delayed fuse will breach all the houses on one side of a city block, if fired at a very obtuse angle.

Two-way Attack. Wherever possible, beginning with the squad, use a base of fire and a maneuvering element. The maneuvering element should be the larger of the two forces and should start its attack well back from the point of contact of the base of fire. The maneuvering force must proceed sufficiently far beyond the hostile flank to attack from the rear. As soon as the enveloping attack or, better, the rear attack has progressed sufficiently to cause the enemy to react, the base of fire transforms itself into a direct attack along the original axis of advance.

River Crossings. In river crossings or assault landings there is a high probability that the boats containing a company or even a platoon will not all land at the same point. Therefore, each boat should be organized on a boat-team basis and contain means for producing a base of fire and an encirclement. These boat teams should practice as such before embarking, and each boat team in the assault wave must be informed of the geographical feature to which the assault wave is supposed to penetrate. This geographical feature, preferably a road or railway, should be far enough from the water's edge to prevent small-arms fire bearing on the beach. No beachhead can be considered at all sure until it has advanced to a perimeter at least 8000 yards from the beach and/or occupies the controlling terrain features. In a night landing desperate efforts must be made to gain this distance before daylight.

Hill Fighting. During fighting in hilly or rolling country, platoons get widely separated. The best practice is for the support and reserve squads of an attacking platoon to envelop on the uphill side. When you have once gained a ridge or a hogback, do not lose altitude.

Never attack along the bottom of a valley unless you have the heights on both sides in your possession. In all valleys there are geographical features which form obstacles to a direct advance and subject those on the valley floor to observe fire from the heights.

Fire on Infested Areas. Due to the pernicious traditions of our known distance rifle marksmanship we are prone to hold our fire until we see targets. In battle these are seldom visible. When any group of soldiers is under small-arms fire, it is evident that the enemy can see them; therefore, men should be able to see the enemy but seldom are. When this situation arises, they must fire at the portions of the hostile terrain which probably conceal enemy small-arms weapons. I know for a fact that such procedure invariably produces an effect and generally stops hostile fire. Always remember that it is much better to waste ammunition than lives. It takes at least eighteen years to produce a soldier and only a few months to produce ammunition.

Surrender. Any soldier who surrenders with arms in his hands is not doing his duty to his country and is selling himself short, because the living conditions of the prisoner of war are extremely bad. Also, the prisoner of war is apt to become the unintended victim of our own air and artillery bombardment.

If the enemy indicates a desire to surrender, make him come to you with his hands up. Don't advance toward him, and do not stop shooting until he does so surrender himself. When the enemy has surrendered, he must be treated in accordance with the rules of land warfare.

PART III

BATTLE TRICKS

Bridges. In river crossings all bridges must be one-way --- toward the enemy --- until the situation has steadied. Prior to that time, wounded and empty transportation come back in ferries.

In building an assault bridge over rapid water, put the anchor cable as high as possible --- at least ten feet above the water. This will prevent the floats from submerging.

Mines and Wire. Do not use mines or wire on the defensive except in the form of booby traps to give warning of enemy prowlers. Mining and wiring a position has a very bad effect on the morale of our troops. As a feint, however, mining and wiring may be useful. For example, we could put light wire in a dummy mine field across a section of the front over which we intend to attack and ostentatiously leave other sections of the front unwired; then when the attack starts we need not bother about the dummy mine field, and the wire can be got rid of rapidly.

Methods of Attack. If, in a unit the size of a division, the attack is not going well four hours after it starts, it is necessary to make a careful personal reconnaissance and see if it may not be necessary to change the emphasis; because four hours of fighting should produce substantial effects. This does not mean that a man should be wobbly about continuing in the face of uncertain victory, but it does mean that after four hours one should know whether the thing is going to be a go or not; and, if it is not, he should slow up his attack on the old line while implementing it in a new direction.

Frontal Attacks. Do not try a sneak frontal attack at night or in the daytime against a dug-in enemy who has been facing you for some time. He will have ultimate bands of fire arranged. Therefore, he must be pounded by air and guns before you attack. This does not apply to a pillbox line. If the enemy is occupying the pillboxes and not the trenches outside them a sneak attack is quite all right with the purpose of getting the troops in the immediate vicinity of the pillboxes just at dawn. If the enemy is occupying trenches outside the pillboxes he must be pounded consistently to make him take shelter in the pillboxes, where he is much less dangerous than outside.

Night Attack in Woods. It is not necessary or advisable to attack through woods at night. In the first place the woods themselves give the cover which the darkness does in the open. In the second place it is almost impossible to move through a woods at night except in column on roads.

Open Country. In open country with isolated groups of trees, avoid occupying the trees, because they will invariably be attacked by the enemy artillery and air. In this type of country use dispersal in open fields. You may be able to use the woods as a decoy to draw enemy fire by the emplacement of bad camouflage along the edge, but do not get in the woods yourself.

By the same token do not occupy, as a command post, the only house on a hill, as I have seen done, and do not put your command post, as I have also seen done, in the immediate vicinity of a monument located on the map and which could be seen for several kilometers.

Large radio sets should not be in the immediate vicinity of a command post or of each other. They should be separated, camouflaged, and communicated with by telephone. Otherwise the enemy air will home on them and get the command post.

Use of Wire. In all attacks make the maximum use of wire lines, and use every effort to keep it up with the advancing units. Radio, while theoretically efficient, is not as good as wire and should be considered as a secondary means of communication. On one occasion we actually launched a tank attack, by quite a large number of tanks, at the end of 17 miles of wire.

Time Fire. Either proximity or normal time fire is very efficient as a means of covering a tank attack and will frequently prevent the enemy from manning his antitank guns. Tanks can move with perfect impunity under time fire provided by either 105-mm or 155-mm projectiles. Proximity fuses in woods are wasteful because the projectile explodes above the top of the tallest trees and the fragments are absorbed in the woods before they get down to where they will have much effect on the enemy.

In shelling woods to produce casualties, use slight-delay fuses so they will not burst until they hit a reasonable size limb or tree trunk.

Envelopments. Vertical or horizontal envelopment for tactical effect should not go too deep or be too large. The best results are attained when the envelopment arrives in or just back of the enemy's artillery positions. Here you disrupt his supply and signal communications and his guns and are close enough to the troops advancing along the axis to be sure of making contact in a reasonable time.

Cemeteries. Do not place military cemeteries where they can be seen by replacements marching to the front. This has a very bad effect on morale even if it adds to the pride of the graves registration service.

Haste and Speed. There is a great difference between these two words. Haste exists when troops are committed without proper reconnaissance, without the arrangement for proper supporting fire, and before every available man has been brought up. The result of such an attack will be to get the troops into action early but to complete the action very slowly.

Speed is acquired by making the necessary reconnaissance; providing the proper artillery and other tactical support, including air support; bringing up every man; and then launching the attack with a predetermined plan so that the time under fire will be reduced to the minimum. At the battalion level, four hours spent in preparation for an attack will probably insure the time under fire not exceeding thirty minutes. One hour spent in the preparation of an attack will almost certainly insure time under fire lasting many hours with bloody casualties.

Place to Attack. Never attack where the enemy expects you to come. It is much better to go over difficult ground where you are not expected than it is over good ground where you are expected. This remark applies to units to include the division. For corps and larger units an exception is necessary in that such units must take ground where roads and railways permit the establishment of lines of supply. These roads and railways will probably be defended. The point is that the division must secure them by attacking over hard ground and not by going up the railway or road.

Fire and Movement. The policy of holding the enemy by the nose with fire and kicking him in the pants with movement is just as true as when I wrote it some twenty years ago, and at that time it had been true since the beginning of war. Any operation, reduced to its primary characteristics, consists of moving down the road until you bump into the enemy. It may be one road or it may be several roads. When you have bumped, hold him at the point of contact with fire with about a third of your command. Move the rest in a wide envelopment so you can attack him from his rear flank. The enveloping attack should start first. The initial nose attack starts to move forward only when the enemy has properly reacted to the enveloping attack. Then the direct attack can go in easily and fast.

Covering Detachments. Make the maximum use of mechanized and armored reconnaissance and covering detachments. In actual war these merge into each other. In general, they should consist of a reconnaissance troop reinforced by at least a platoon of medium tanks with infantry riding on them.

Maximum Use of Vehicles. In a modern infantry division, if every available vehicle — tanks, armored cars, gun carriages, AA guns and trucks — is utilized, no soldier need or should walk until he actually enters battle. While the sight of a division moving under this system is abhorrent to the best instincts of a Frederickan soldier, it results in rapid advance with minimum fatigue. Units so mounted are dismounted by placing a sign or even a guidon on the side of the road indicating the dismounting point.

Miscellaneous Notes

During mobile operations it is better to use secondary roads for the axes of advance than primary roads. In the first place, the secondary roads are less apt to be thoroughly guarded, and, in the second place, there will be fewer demolitions on them. The primary roads must be repaired as promptly as possible behind the fighting front to secure efficient supply lines.

Obstacles and demolitions, unless defended, are of little value. It is not necessary to sit on a demolition or obstacle in order to defend it, because the enemy will place fire there. These points are best defended from a distance, of several hundred yards for small arms and from normal artillery range for that arm.

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline. An experienced officer can tell by a very cursory administrative inspection of any unit the calibre of its commanding officer.

The more senior the officer the more time he has. Therefore the senior should go forward to visit the junior rather than call the junior back to see him. The exception to this is when it is necessary to collect several commanders for the formulation of a coordinated plan. In that case the juniors should report to the superior headquarters.

There is very great danger in making retrograde movements at night, even when these movements are for a continuation of the tactical offensive, because troops not involved hear or see them and become worried to the extent of panic. If a unit must be withdrawn, see that all soldiers along the line of withdrawal are informed why it is taking place and when it will occur.

Hospital should be set up in the open so that the enemy has no excuse for thinking them other than what they are. They must not be placed in the vicinity of dumps or air strips.

Never halt on the near side of a river or mountain range. Secure a bridgehead in both cases, because, even if you do not intend to exploit the crossing, the possession of a bridgehead on the far side cramps the enemy's style.

In an infantry or armored division, relief of the division or immediate replacements are vitally necessary as soon as 75% of the riflemen have become casualties.

Always capture the highest terrain feature in your vicinity at once, and stay on it.

Prisoner of war guard companies, or an equivalent organization, should be as far forward as possible, in action, to take over prisoners of war, because troops heated with battle are not safe custodians. Any attempt to rob or loot prisoners of war by escorts must be strictly dealt with.

Whenever officers enter a prisoner of war cage, all prisoners of war must come to attention.

PART IV

COMMAND

Use of Codes. The decision as to whether to use clear or code radio or wire communications is very easily reached on the following basis. If the period of action is shorter than the period of reaction, use clear. Otherwise use code. By this I mean that if you can tell a combat team to attack at 1000, and your experience shows that the enemy cannot react to the information until 1100, use clear; and so on for higher units.

Judging Reports. When you receive reports of counterattacks, find out who sent them --- that is, the size of the unit which sent them. A squad occupying a position will report an enemy section approaching it as a counterattack, but such a counterattack has no material effect on a division or a corps.

Night Attacks. Soldiers must be taught to move and fight at night. This is becoming more and more imperative, and it does not mean to make an approach march at night. It means to conduct lethal operations in the dark. To do this, previous and very accurate daylight reconnaissance is desirable, and limited objective attacks are essential. In addition to the usual reserve following such an attack, a second reserve should be at hand to move up after daylight in case the enemy counterattacks.

Timely Thoughts on Supply. Reasonable study and a consultation of the almanac will avoid situations in which, through lack of forethought, heavy clothing, etc., has not been ordered in time.

Similarly, a knowledge of the tactical situation will insure that gasoline and ammunition are asked for in time. The combat service, and not the supply service, is responsible for failure to get such things.

In wet weather it is vital that dry socks come up for the soldiers daily with the rations. These socks should be wool or an analogous thick material fixed so it will not shrink.

With the advent of almost unlimited motor transport, it is foolish to load soldiers down with blankets, etc. This is particularly true in wet and cold weather. The answer is to see that light bedrolls go up to the ammunition distributing point prior to dark, where they are picked up by units and used during the night, rolled up by the men, and left to be picked up again by rear units. This sounds wasteful because the bedrolls cannot be accounted for, but it is much cheaper than pneumonia.

The fighting soldier should carry nothing into battle except what he wears, his ammunition, his rations, and his toilet articles. When he goes back he should get new uniform, new underclothes, new everything.

The two-bag system (A and B) with which we began this war is utterly foolish, because by the time the B bags get up many of their owners have become casualties.

In landing operations and river crossings where men lose their clothes or become very wet, assorted sizes of uniforms, complete with helmet, belt, shoes, underclothes, etc., should be provided for 20% of the command and should arrive with the second echelon of the landing. This insures that those who have lost their clothing are immediately reequipped with a minimum of cluttering of the supply lines.

The chief purpose of the general and special staffs is to insure that the troops get what they want in time. In battle, troops get temperamental and ask for things which they really do not need. However, where humanly possible, their requests, no matter how unreasonable, should be answered.

Supply and administrative units and installations are frequently neglected by combat commanders. It is very necessary to their morale and efficiency that each one be inspected by the senior general of the unit with which it is operating.

Length of Attack. Infantry troops can attack continuously for 60 hours. Frequently much time and suffering is saved if they will do so. Beyond 60 hours it is rather a waste of time, as the men become too fatigued from lack of sleep.

Marching at Night. Marching at night in the proximity of the enemy is not economical. It is better to halt two hours before dark and see that the men are fed, their socks dried if the weather is wet, and the vehicles serviced and made ready for the next day. Then start before dawn. Except under very favorable circumstances of terrain and where very thorough daylight reconnaissance has taken place, night attacks by armor are not economical.

Look Before Changing. In the old navy of sail there was a custom that the new officer of the deck did not call for any change in the setting of the sails for one half hour ---- that is, for one bell after he took over. The same thing might well apply to commanders and staff officers who take over new jobs in war. They should wait at least a week before they make any radical changes, unless and except they are put in to correct a situation which is in a bad way.

Don't Delay. The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good.

Reports. In war nothing is ever as bad or as good as it is reported to higher headquarters. Any reports which emanate from a unit after dark --- that is, where the knowledge has been obtained after dark --- should be viewed with skepticism by the next higher unit. Reports by wounded men are always exaggerated and favor the enemy.

Identification. Legible unit signs in the clear are more valuable than dangerous, and they should be placed where they can be seen.

Sand Table Exercises by staffs up to and including corps or army, even on the most rudimentary type of sand table, are extremely helpful prior to an attack.

General Officers.

There are more tired division commanders than there are tired divisions.

Tired officers are always pessimists. Remember this when evaluating reports.

Generals must never show doubt, discouragement, or fatigue.

Generals should adhere to one type of dress so that soldiers will recognize them. They must always be very neat.

In cold weather, general officers must be careful not to appear to dress more warmly than the men.

Commanders and their staffs should visit units two echelons below their own, and their maps should be so kept. In other words, corps commanders or their staffs should visit division and regimental command posts; the division commander should visit regimental and battalion command posts; the visits above referred to are for command purposes. What might be called inspirational visits should go further up. The more senior the officer who appears with a very small unit at the front, the better the effect on the troops. If some danger is involved in the visit, its value is enhanced.

When speaking to a junior about the enemy confronting him, always understate their strength. You do this because the person in contact with the enemy invariably overestimates their strength to himself, so if you understate it you probably hit the approximate fact, and also enhance your junior's self-confidence.

All officers, and particularly general officers, must be vitally interested in everything that interests the soldier. Usually you will gain a great deal of knowledge by being interested; but even if you do not, the fact that you appear interested has a very high morale influence on the soldier.

In my experience, all very successful commanders are prima donnas and must be so treated. Some officers require urging, others require suggestion, very few have to be restrained.

A general officer who will invariably assume the responsibility for failure whether he deserves it or not, and invariably give the credit for success to others whether they deserve it or not, will achieve outstanding success. In any case, letters of commendation and general orders presenting to the command the glory and magnitude of their achievements have great influence on morale.

Corps and army commanders must make it a point to be physically seen by as many individuals of their command as possible --- certainly by all combat soldiers. The best way to do this is to assemble the divisions, either as a whole or in separate pieces, and make a short talk.

When a unit leaves your command, if its performance at all justifies it, a letter of farewell and commendation to the unit should be sent.

During battle it is very important to frequently visit hospitals containing newly wounded men. Before starting such an inspection, the officer in charge of the hospital should inform the inspecting general which wards contain men whose conduct does not merit compliments.

Generals and their principal staff officers should keep diaries.

Avoid the vicious habit of naming the next superior as the author of any adverse criticism while claiming all complimentary remarks for yourself.

Inspections. When a unit has been alerted for inspection, do not fail to inspect it and inspect it thoroughly. Further, do not keep it waiting. When soldiers have gone to the trouble of getting ready to be inspected, they deserve the compliment of a visit. Be sure to tell the unit commander publicly that his unit was good if such is the case. If it is bad, tell him privately and in no uncertain terms. Be sure to speak to all enlisted men who have decorations or who have been wounded, and ask how they got the decoration or how they are wounded. (C)

Infantry and Armored Divisions. The chief difference between infantry divisions supplied with tanks and armored divisions is that in the infantry division the purpose of the tanks is to get the infantry forward. In the armored division the function of the infantry is to break the tanks loose. In the infantry division the tanks use their guns to facilitate the advance of the infantry. In the armored division the tank uses its gun to break through to a range where it can use its machine guns. It is therefore of vast importance that two, instead of one, coaxial machine guns be placed in the mantle of all tanks.

Air-Ground Cooperation. The effectiveness of air-ground cooperation is still in its infancy. Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise and use new methods of cooperation.

Fire Power. There can never be too many projectiles in a battle. Whether they are thrown by cannon, rockets, or recoilless devices is immaterial. The purpose of all these instruments is identical --- namely, to deluge the enemy with fire. Nor is it necessary that these projectiles be discharged on the ground.

Issuing Orders. The best way to issue orders is by word of mouth, from one general to the next. Failing this, telephone conversation, which should be recorded at each end. However, in order to have a confirmatory memorandum

of all oral orders given, a short written order should always be made out, not necessarily at the time of issuing the order, but it should reach the junior prior to his carrying the order out so that if he has forgotten anything he will be reminded of it; and, further, in order that he may be aware that his senior has taken definite responsibility for the operation ordered orally.

It is my opinion that army orders should not exceed a page and a half of typewritten text, and it was my practice not to issue orders longer than this. Usually they can be done on one page, and the back of the page used for a sketch map.

Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order or the devising of a plan is only about 5% of the responsibility of command. The other 95% is to insure, by personal observation or through the interposing of staff officers, that the order is carried out. Orders must be issued early enough to permit time to disseminate them.

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

Avoid, as you would perdition, issuing cover-up orders: orders for the record. This simply shows lack of intestinal fortitude on the part of the officer signing the orders, and everyone who reads them realizes it at once.

In planning any operation it is vital to remember and constantly repeat to oneself two things: "In war nothing is impossible provided you use audacity," and "Do not take counsel of your fears." If these two principles are adhered to, with American troops victory is certain.

Maps. In my opinion the use of large-scale maps by senior officers is distinctly detrimental, because by the use of such maps they get themselves enmeshed in terrain conditions.

Putting it in general terms, army and corps commanders are not so much interested in how to beat the enemy from a tactical standpoint as in where to beat him. The where is learned from a careful study of road, railway, and river maps. The question of the tactical means to be used by divisions in securing these points is of necessity studied from larger scale maps. However, the size of the map used does not continue to increase as the size of the using unit diminishes. At the level of the regiment, a map should be sufficiently large and accurate to assist the commander in selecting his observation posts, his command post, and his general line. For the rest, he should rely on personal reconnaissance on the ground. From the battalion down, the use of maps is of no value and is frequently fraught with great danger. I have never seen a good battalion commander direct his units from a map. I have seen many bad battalion commanders indulge in this pusillanimous method of command.

Staff Organization. The headquarters of higher units, that is, corps and army, should be arranged by section as follows: The forward echelon consisting of the commanding general, chief of staff, secretary of the general staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, engineers, field artillery, antiaircraft, signal, and cooperating air; also, subsections of the provost marshal, special troops, headquarters commandant, and liaison representatives from G-4; ordnance, medical, quartermaster, and G-5 sections. Where circumstances require, this forward echelon can be divisible into an advance tactical headquarters consisting of the commanding general, forward echelon chief of staff, and a small operation section of G-2, G-3, engineers, field artillery, and signal. In this advance section it is desirable, but not necessary, to have a liaison group from G-4.

The rear echelon should be under the command of G-4 and contain G-5, chemical warfare, finance, medical, quartermaster, ordnance, signal, engineers adjutant general, inspector general, judge advocate, special services, and chaplain.

Wherever circumstances permit and accommodations warrant, all three echelons should be together. The rear echelon must be in one place and within easy driving distance, not to exceed three hours, of the forward echelon. Ample wire communications between the forward and rear echelons must exist.

Headquarters Arrangements. All headquarters from regiment up to army should be laid out on the same general plan, so any visitor who finds himself at the message center will know in which direction to go to find any section.

Trucks arranged for sleeping accommodations for general and senior staff officers save much time and promote efficiency. In addition, in the forward echelon there should be three large office trailers --- one for the commanding general and chief of staff, one for the Gs, and one for the secretary of the general staff and the clerks and stenographers, so that paper work and planning may be carried out during inclement weather.

A ruined building is better than a good tent for offices, dining room, and kitchen. In any staff office or trailer the telephone should be placed near the principal map, so that the officer consulting the map may talk over the telephone at the same time he scans the map. It is a strange commentary on human weaknesses that the Third Army in occupying its twenty-third Command Post placed the map and telephone on opposite sides of the room.

In my opinion, generals, or at least the commanding general, should answer their own telephones in the daytime. This is not particularly wise because few people call a general except in emergencies, and then they like to get him at once. At night the phone of the commanding general should be answered by an aide who should have means of buzzing either the commanding general or the chief of staff, depending on for whom the message is intended. It is very important that a stenographer or a stenographic reporting machine be constantly on duty, so that the chief of staff or the commanding general will have a written transcript of any telephone

messages. This is particularly important when they receive or issue orders by telephone. This record must show date, time, place, and the two speakers. Adherence to the foregoing will save many mistakes and prevent much acrimonious discussion.

In every type of headquarters there are, during each 24-hour period, two peak loads. During these peak hours all officers and enlisted men should be present. During the slow periods the maximum number of officers and enlisted men should be absent eating, sleeping, or exercising. Many officers have, to my knowledge, destroyed their future usefulness by being too conscientious at the beginning of a campaign and being always at their desks. This must not be done, and they must exercise.

A secretary for the general staff, with a competent deputy, is a vital necessity to see that the subsections and sections of the general and special staffs do not get too independent and issue contradictory orders. He is the bottleneck through which these orders must go.

At the army, corps, and division level, the forward echelon of each staff should have a staff meeting or briefing daily as early as the headquarters under consideration can obtain the information for the day. In my opinion, this time varies as follows: division - one hour after dawn; corps - two hours after dawn; army - three hours after dawn.

One officer from each staff section of corps and army should go to the front daily and visit corresponding officers of the next lower echelon. However, he should also collect general information not normally applicable to his branch or section. Anything of vital moment obtained during his visit he will report to the chief of staff immediately on his return. If it is not vital he will bring it up at the staff conference the next day. The commanding general or the chief of staff must visit part of the front daily after the briefing.

The commanding general or the chief of staff of the tactical air command operating with an army should be present at all staff conferences and planning meetings. If this is not done the maximum cooperation with this powerful arm will not be obtained. The A-3 must work with the G-3, and the A-2 with the G-2.

Staff officers of inharmonious disposition, irrespective of their ability, must be removed. A staff cannot function properly unless it is a united family.

Decorations. It is vital to good morale that decorations get out promptly and on an equitable basis. There should be in every army and corps staff one member of G-1 section whose duty it is to prod divisions and attached lower units to get citations out. He should further see that they are properly written. When time permits, there should be a citation writers' school, attended by officers from corps, army, and division G-1 sections.

Casualty Reports. Similarly, there should be an administrative school attended by officers from division, corps, and army, where special attention is given to casualty reports, etc. In order to know constantly the situation, two sets of casualty reports, both enemy and our own, must be kept. One is based on factual reports, the other on estimates. The one based on factual data usually lags from two to three weeks behind the estimated one. However, if properly made, the estimated report will be within two or three per cent of the factual report.

Equality of Punishments. The judge advocate and the inspector general should make checks and see that the schedule of punishments accorded for analogous crimes in each unit below them is generally the same, so that a general level and equality of punishment will exist throughout the Army.

PART V

GENERAL

One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrative rather than legal. As the French say, sentences are for the purpose of encouraging the others. I am convinced that, in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for a reasonable time during combat, or who shirk in battle should be executed, and that army commanders or corps commanders should have the authority to approve the death sentence. It is utterly stupid to say that general officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon.

Uniforms. The purpose of the uniform is to provide the soldier with something he can wear which makes him look like other soldiers and which is warm or cool according to circumstances. In my opinion the proper uniform for the American soldier is the helmet with liner; an olive drab wool shirt and trousers, the trousers cut reasonably narrow at the bottom; and combat boots. When weather becomes cool in the fall the weight of the shirt and trousers can be increased up to 26- or 30-ounce cloth. At the same time the soldier should be issued heavy underwear and socks (all wool) and a 48-inch woolen muffler which he can wear around his neck, around his head at night, or around his stomach.

In zero or sub-zero weather the soldier should in addition be issued an overcoat of the trench coat variety with a liner but without a belt, and provided in front with a muff in which he can thrust his hands so that he can use his gun trigger without the necessity of removing his gloves.

Use of Sight. The peep sight is not adapted to warfare, since it is inefficient in the dark or in a bad light. I have met only three or four officers, out of hundreds questioned, who have ever seen a soldier set a sight in battle. Therefore, our rifles should be equipped with two open sights --- one for a range of 100 yards and one for a range of 300 yards. This will insure that the soldier shoots low and will correct for the fact that in the excitement of battle he always takes too much front sight.

Gun Slings. The same officers whom I questioned on the sight informed me that they had never seen a gun sling used, except on two occasions by snipers, as an aid to firing. Therefore, the heavy and expensive leather gun sling should be dispensed with and a cloth sling, used solely for the purpose of carrying the piece, should be substituted.

Mortars. Infantry mortars should be provided with an illuminating device for night firing.

Red Cross Marking. Ambulances should be painted white all over except for a large red cross on top, sides, back, and front.

Attached medical personnel with front line units should have a tabard covering the whole chest and back, as far as the belt. For combat this should be white with a large red cross back and front. When approaching combat, and white would be too easily seen from the air, the reverse side of the tabard, OD with a small red cross, is worn.

Air Attacks. We know the effect of our attacks on the enemy's means of signal, rail, and road communication. We must therefore contemplate similar attacks upon our means of communication and think how we can get on with those means limited or destroyed.

Where possible it is best to request the air to cut railways far from cities and to cut them at three points, because this entails great delay in getting to the center point from either direction. It also makes it necessary to move the repair crews over considerable distances and forces them to work at points from which they can more easily be attacked from the air, because out in the country there are, as a general thing, no anti-aircraft guns.

After Action Reports. As soon as an operation starts, a group composed of officers from G-2 and G-3 should start the compilation of the after action report, which should be organized on a calendar month basis so that each month is a complete entity. At the termination of hostilities the data thus secured can be re-edited on a campaign basis. This report must contain copies of orders, letters of instruction, maps, etc.

Guards on Trains. Railroad trains carrying rations or fuel or other articles with a sales value on the black market must be guarded, and any persons attempting pillage must be shot, and the fact published.

Dead and Wounded Casualties. In order to properly evaluate the effectiveness of enemy fire, more information than that now obtainable on the subject of casualties is necessary. At the present time we know only the number of casualties and the type of wounds of those reaching the hospitals, but even in their case we do not know on what part of the battlefield they were wounded. We have no knowledge of how or where battle deaths occurred. In collecting wounded a method should be prescribed which would show that a man was hit in the vicinity of such and such a point. The graves registration personnel should state what type of missile caused death. No medical experience is necessary. Anybody who has seen a few wounds can tell a small arms wound from a fragmentation wound. This information should be made of record. The location of both types of casualties could be secured through the issue of sketch maps to medical and graves registration personnel. The purpose in collecting the foregoing information is that if we know what causes our casualties and where they occur we can take steps to avoid them.

Overhead Cover. Owing to the certainty that in the next war the enemy will have proximity fuses, we must contemplate the necessity of providing all mechanized combat weapons, including artillery pieces, with overhead cover.

Replacements. When the current infantry division has lost 4000 men its offensive value is zero, because 92% of these 4000 men are riflemen, and there are less than 4000 riflemen in a division. The same fact applies, with slightly less emphasis, to armored divisions. Therefore, every division must have a replacement battalion organic in the division. In an infantry division this replacement battalion should contain 15% of the rifle strength of the division and 5% of all others, including company officers. There should be a company for each infantry regiment and a company for all others.

A similar unit in an armored division should contain 10% of the rifle strength of the armored infantry, 10% of the personnel strength of the armored battalions, and 5% of all others, including company officers.

During a campaign the returned wounded will occasionally produce a state where the strength of the replacement battalion is over the percentages recommended, but one or two days of battle will invariably correct this situation. It is vital to morale that men return to their old units without loss of rank.

American Ingenuity. The Americans as a race are the greatest mechanics in the world. America as a nation has the greatest ability for mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground and in the air to the maximum of our ability, particularly in view of the fact that the two races left which we will have to fight are both poor mechanics but have ample man power. While we have ample man power, it is too valuable to be thrown away.

There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent.

In terminating these remarks it is sad to remember that when anyone has fairly mastered the art of command the necessity for that art usually expires -- either through the termination of the war or through the advanced age of the commander.

