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Abstract

History, why is it important? It has some practical value that is relevant generation after generation. Our understanding of urban warfare history is valuable to the United States military's current battlefield operations. The knowledge we seize about past "Combat in Cities" will give us a strategic advantage when projecting current and future missions. The tactics we employ must be compatible to our mission while engaged in an asymmetric environment. Commanders will play a critical role in developing tactical plans to counter the enemy on the battlefield. The implementation of an urbanization plan is more of a challenge today than any other time in modern history. The many challenges encountered during asymmetric warfare conducted on an urban battlefield require numerous changes in our institutional instruction and operational training requirements.

Combat in Cities

Team Delta's broad topic was Combat in Cities. After determining the team's strengths we developed the above thesis statement. Our Haines paper focuses on urban combat definition and history, types of combat operation in an urban environment, challenges in conducting urban operations and changes necessary to training and doctrine to maintain a force ready for engagements in an urban environment. I was assigned the section on challenges, which were further broken down into winning the hearts and minds, intelligence preparation of the battlefield and medical considerations. In my portion below you will see the first two aspects of challenges as the medical considerations was written by MSG Gilbert due to his medical expertise.

Winning the hearts and minds

The United States will not win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) on a conventional battlefield. The United States military's actions will be in public site and scrutinized every step of the way. The GWOT will occur globally and the US Army will not have the luxury of fighting within our borders or the Western hemisphere for that matter. Therefore, our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) must take this into account and focus on positive interaction with the population where the GWOT will be fought.

How do we do this and why is it important? There have been numerous articles, books and research into this topic. During World War II the allies knew they were winning when they controlled more land on the way to Berlin or more islands on the way to Japan. However, in today's asymmetric battlefield metrics like these do not exist to measure our progress.

Our involvement in Vietnam has several parallels to what is going on in Iraq today.

Sure, military might -- or intimidation -- may provide a momentary triumph, but such events are mere glimpses in the passage of human history. How warriors touch the hearts

and minds of the civilians will be as telling generations into the future. Today, Americans are the most admired foreign nation by the Vietnamese people. Could that be winning?

(Kinney, 2006)

The above quote is very significant to the future of GWOT. The actions of US Soldiers on the ground in Iraq every day will outlive anything else that occurs. If the opening of one school or digging of one well prevents one Iraqi child from becoming a member of Al-Qaida, we are accomplishing our mission.

This is not a new concept to the United States military. Our training as US military members emphasizes the importance of interacting positively in every situation. Our joint doctrine talks about military operations other than war (MOOTW), which for all intents and purposes is interchangeable with contemporary operational environment or asymmetric battlefield. The publication emphasizes that MOOTW operations will often occur in urban areas and the commander must take appropriate measures to minimize impact on the local population. These measures include mitigating resentment or anxiety, disruption of normal lines of communication, displacement of port or airfield workers, or overburdening utilities. (Joint, 2002)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

The GWOT is changing the face of intelligence preparation. Some politicians and government officials initially thought that fighting an enemy like Al-Qaida would be easier than symmetric battles due to their size, funding and equipment. Unfortunately, this is not the case. An enemy that effectively utilizes their terrain whether it be a hill top or a populated area can prove very difficult to combat.

FM 34-130 (1994), defines IPB as a four-step, systematic and continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment of a particular geographic area. The four steps are define the battlefield environment, define the battlefield effects, evaluate the threat and determine threat courses of action. Intelligence professionals used these steps even prior to 34-130 being printed on 8 July 1994. The IPB process is still valid; however, intelligence analysts must look at urban areas differently than a symmetric battlefield.

Historically defining the battlefield environment may have involved expanding the unit's area of interest to include an air base with bombers that could reach US positions. On an asymmetric battlefield the intelligence analyst is still concerned with geography, terrain and weather; however, the average terrorist cell will not have access to bomber aircraft anywhere in the world. Now the analyst must focus on characteristics such as demographics, financial networks and electronics/communications.

Understanding demographics can have a significant impact on understanding cultural values and preventing behavior that can display US Soldier in a negative manner. These include ethnicity, religion, languages, mannerisms and media. Financial networks include bank accounts, automated teller machines, money transfer methods and banking laws. As with all operation, disrupting the funding of an asymmetric foe can pay huge dividends. Understanding and defeating electronics and communications can provide a crucial advantage in urban warfare and shorten the conflict. Possible electronic and communications systems that can be exploited include telephones (landline, satellite and cell), microwave backbone, coax cable systems, fiber optic networks, Internet chat rooms and group web sites and multimedia (CD-ROMs, tapes, posters etc...) JP 3-06 tells us that we must also adhere to international law, rules of

engagement, treaties and targeting constraints regarding the battle space environment. (Joint, 2002)

Historically describing the battlefield effects analyzed the environment and determined primarily how weather and terrain impacted both friendly and enemy forces. The process is still the same; however, the intelligence analyst now needs to focus on infrastructure in urban areas, political goals of the insurgents/terrorists and security environment in the urban area. The urban area infrastructure needs to be analyzed to determine if the enemy or US forces have an advantage. Infrastructure includes airports, ports, public transportation, police, fire and housing areas. For example, if the enemy is familiar with a housing area it may make the area easier for them to defend. The political objectives of the enemy are significant because it may tell the US how far the enemy is willing to go to harm US forces. The ability to monitor the security environment is significant in the sense that it can help the US forces detect the presence and activities of the enemy.

During a symmetric fight the third step of IPB, evaluate the threat, may have included how a tank division aligns on the battlefield. To evaluate the threat on an asymmetric battlefield an analyst needs to examine small groups/cells or even individuals. First, threat models can be built to examine known operating procedures, and current capabilities. JP 3-06 emphasizes that human intelligence (HUMINT) is essential in understanding local behavior, psychology, pinpointing locations, identifying targets and developing situational awareness. (Joint, 2002) For lack of a better term, “man hunting” is going to be the key to winning the GWOT. Here evaluating the threat may include name, physical description, address, family members, communication methods, operational history, associates, aliases, etc...

The final step of IPB, determine threat course of action, in reality is the same concept for any situation. The analyst takes all that one has learned from the previous steps and tries to make an educated decision. However, in an urban environment the analyst must consider collateral damage the enemy may cause, location of possible US targets and if they are “soft” enough for the enemy to attack and the enemies desired end state. This can get extremely complicated as the enemy may cause physical destruction, inflict terror, act for financial gain, retaliate for a previous act or act with political implications. Here the enemy has tools that are not as powerful when considering symmetric warfare. For example, effective use of media may get the enemy to gain a sympathetic following for their cause. This can lead to international pressure or propaganda tools effective in recruiting the next generation.

Conclusion

My section scratches the surface on challenges faced by US Soldiers on an asymmetric battlefield dealing with local population and use of intelligence. Traditional force-on-force operations are not effective when dealing with an urban area. Here the local population becomes key terrain and we must handle each situation on separately. I tried to highlight paradigms and historic methods that one needs to consider when updating training and doctrine. The US military has made tremendous strides in developing new doctrine especially in the joint environment. We must continue to learn from the Iraqi battlefield so that the next generation is not making the same mistakes.

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