The Failure and Success of the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Campaigns in the Philippines in 1902-1904 and 2002-2003
Abstract
In the years 1902-1904 the U.S Army was engaged in a conflict with insurgents in the Philippines. This insurgency arose, partly, in response to economic, political and cultural conditions that deprived the indigenous Philippine population of the means to exist in a manner that they perceived as appropriate for their way of life. In the years 2002-2003, the U.S. Army was once again engaged in a conflict with insurgents in the Philippines. Once again, this insurgency arose, partly, from the perceived belief of the indigenous population of the Philippines that the economic, political, and cultural conditions in the Philippines were not in accordance with their desired way of life. The Philippine insurgencies mentioned above illustrate the importance of the role of economics, politics, and culture in defeating insurgencies and quelling internal dissent. An indigenous population, content with its way of life, able to provide for itself by availing itself of an efficient economic system, able to express its political views in a workable political system, and able to define and adhere to a community culture in which its values are evident, is less-likely to mount and sustain an effective insurgency against the established government and the rue of law. Understanding this concept is an essential element in combating terrorism and insurgency. As the examples of the Philippine insurgency of 1902-1904 and 2002-2003 illustrate, in order to be successful at the strategic level, counterinsurgency campaigns must address and remedy, at the tactical level, the underlying economic, cultural, and political conditions that led to the insurgency.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 15, 2009
- Accession Number
- AD1137458
Entities
People
- Joseph P. Wilson
Organizations
- United States Army Sergeants Major Academy