


Special Inspector General for



Afghanistan Reconstruction

DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY:

LESSONS FROM U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN



Executive Summary

The full report can be found on the SIGAR website at www.sigar.mil.



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Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan is the sixth lessons learned report to be issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This report follows and expands upon a previous lessons learned report, *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*. Specifically, *Divided Responsibility* examines the patchwork of security sector assistance programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001.

The report uses the Afghan experience to identify lessons that can inform U.S. policies and actions through each phase of a security sector assistance engagement in a foreign country. The report also provides recommendations for improving the impact of such efforts. These lessons are relevant for ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, where the United States may remain engaged for years to come, and for future efforts to rebuild security forces in states emerging from protracted conflict.

Our findings highlight the difficulty of conducting security sector assistance during active combat and the challenges of coordinating the efforts of an international coalition. In Afghanistan, no single person, agency, military service, or country had ultimate responsibility for all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. The mission also lacked an enduring and comprehensive plan to guide its efforts. For the United States, security sector assistance activities largely rested with the U.S. military; however, no Department of Defense (DOD) organization or military service was assigned ownership of key aspects of the mission. Responsibilities for developing the ANDSF's capabilities were divided among multiple agencies and services, each of which assigned these tasks to advisors usually deployed for a year or less.

Unlike traditional U.S. security sector assistance activities conducted bilaterally through the U.S. Embassy, the United States' efforts in Afghanistan were conducted multilaterally under a NATO mission. This has had benefits and drawbacks. While it distributed the burden of building Afghan security forces among several nations, it complicated coordination of the effort, both internationally and among U.S. agencies. Moreover, even within the military command, the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander did not have absolute authority over how the ANDSF was trained and advised in different parts of Afghanistan. This created asymmetries in ANDSF development and impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs.

This report also highlights positive steps taken by Congress, DOD, and the military services to improve security sector assistance in Afghanistan. For example, DOD's Ministry of Defense Advisors program has been largely effective in its development and deployment of

civilian experts to advise the Afghan MOD and MOI. In addition, the U.S. Army has taken initial steps with its Security Force Assistance Brigades by incorporating combat advisor teams into its military structure. Both of these initiatives addressed critical deficiencies in the U.S. approach to security sector assistance.

SIGAR began its lessons learned program in late 2014 at the urging of General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and other senior officials who had served in Afghanistan. Lessons learned reports such as this one comply with SIGAR's legislative mandate to provide independent and objective leadership and recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse; and inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense about reconstruction-related problems and the need for corrective action.

Congress created SIGAR as an independent agency. Unlike most inspectors general, SIGAR is not housed inside any single department. SIGAR is the only inspector general focused solely on the Afghanistan mission, and the only one devoted exclusively to reconstruction issues. While other inspectors general have jurisdiction over the programs and operations of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction over all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars, regardless of the agency involved. Because SIGAR has the authority to look across the entire reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address whole-of-government lessons.

Our lessons learned reports synthesize not only the body of work and expertise of SIGAR, but also that of other oversight agencies, government entities, current and former officials with on-the-ground experience, academic institutions, and independent scholars. The reports document what the U.S. government sought to accomplish, assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these efforts helped the United States reach its reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. They also provide recommendations to address the challenges stakeholders face in ensuring efficient, effective, and sustainable reconstruction efforts, not just in Afghanistan, but in future contingency operations.

SIGAR's Lessons Learned Program comprises subject matter experts with considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan, aided by a team of seasoned research analysts. I want to express my deepest appreciation to the team members who produced this report. I thank the report team: James Cunningham, *Divided Responsibility* project lead; Zachary Martin, senior analyst; Brittany Gates, Samantha Hay, and Ashley Schortz, research analysts; and Brian Tarpley, student trainee. I also thank Nikolai Condee-Padunov, program manager; Tracy Content, editor; Vong Lim, senior visual information specialist; and Joseph Windrem, Lesson Learned Program director. In producing its reports, the program also uses the significant skills and experience found in SIGAR's Audits, Investigations, and Research and Analysis directorates, and the Office of Special Projects. I thank all of the individuals who provided their time and effort to contribute to this report.

In addition, I am grateful to the many U.S. government and military officials at the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State, and international partners at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who provided valuable

insights and feedback. This report is truly a collaborative effort meant to not only identify problems, but also to learn from them and propose reasonable solutions to improve future reconstruction efforts.

I believe lessons learned reports such as this will be a key legacy of SIGAR. Through these reports, we hope to reach a diverse audience in the legislative and executive branches, at the strategic and programmatic levels, both in Washington and in the field. By leveraging our unique interagency mandate, we intend to do everything we can to make sure the lessons from the most ambitious reconstruction effort in U.S. history are identified, acknowledged, and, most importantly, remembered and applied not just to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, but also to future conflicts and reconstruction efforts elsewhere in the world.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. F. Sopko', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After 17 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and security-related U.S. appropriations totaling \$83.3 billion (approximately 63 percent of the nearly \$133 billion of U.S. reconstruction funding), there is not one person, agency, country, or military service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance (SSA). Instead, the responsibility for security sector assistance was divided among multiple U.S. and international entities. This report examines how these divides had unintended consequences and created challenges to the effectiveness of the mission, as well as some benefits.

While the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander is largely responsible for reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the commander has no direct authority over civilian actors operating within embassies, the European Union, and other international organizations. Moreover, the commander does not have absolute authority to dictate the exact methods and activities NATO countries use to train and advise the ANDSF in different parts of Afghanistan. Rather the commander provides overarching guidance and coordinates the countries' various activities. This has created asymmetries in ANDSF development and has impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs.

This report also highlights how the unity of command and effort was strained because no U.S. executive branch department or military service had full ownership of key components of the mission, responsibility for assessing progress toward meeting U.S. strategic objectives, or accountability for vetting and deploying experts to accomplish mission tasks. Within the NATO-led coalition, the United States implemented a patchwork of SSA activities and programs involving dozens of U.S. government entities and international partner nations.

In addition, the lack of institutional focus on developing a cadre of SSA professionals and the short-term nature of deployments created serious staffing challenges. For most of the conflict, the United States and NATO have deployed individual advisors or pickup training teams and assigned them to frequently shifting and temporary military command structures in Afghanistan. Most of these advisors came from backgrounds unrelated to advising foreign security forces and were often underprepared for their tours of duty. In addition, since these advisors and ad hoc training teams typically deployed for only six to 12 months, they had little opportunity to establish long-term rapport with their Afghan counterparts or take ownership of multi-year SSA programs. Following their deployments, most returned to unrelated careers.

In 2017, SIGAR published a lessons learned report, *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, which focused on the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF. That report found:

- The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA programs of the size and scope required in Afghanistan. The lack of commonly understood terms, concepts, and models undermined interagency communication and coordination, damaged trust, intensified frictions, and contributed to under-resourcing of the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF.
- Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military operations and did not include the construction of an Afghan army, police, or supporting institutions.
- Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, and special forces, were not included in early U.S., Afghan, and NATO force design plans.
- The lag in developing Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity hindered planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF.
- Providing advanced weapons and management systems to a largely illiterate and undereducated force without also providing the appropriate training and institutional infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. financial support, and hampered efforts to make the ANDSF self-sustaining. *Divided Responsibility* is a follow-on report that builds on SIGAR's earlier work.

As retired Lt. Gen. David Barno observed:

Arguably, the greatest flaw in our 21st-century approach to [counterinsurgency] is our inability to marshal and fuse efforts from all the elements of national power into a unified whole. This failure has resulted in an approach akin to punching an adversary with five outstretched fingers rather than one powerful closed fist.

As this report shows, his concerns are just as applicable to SSA.

This report's five main chapters examine each of the core functions of the SSA mission in Afghanistan: field advising, ministerial advising, equipping the force, U.S.-based training, and coordination with NATO. In addition to identifying key stakeholders responsible for these efforts, each chapter examines how personnel were selected, trained, and organized to carry out each function. Where applicable, we identify coordination challenges and best practices. Each chapter ends with a list of key findings and recommendations specific to the core function being discussed. Essays between chapters provide a snapshot of specific coordination and synchronization issues. The conclusion, lessons, and recommendations comprise the final chapter. While each chapter can be read as a stand-alone product, taken together they illustrate the disjointed and complex matrix of activities the United States undertook to develop and support the ANDSF and the ministries that oversee it.

The introductory chapter examines the importance of security sector assistance to the success of all reconstruction activities, including economic development, building government capacity, and stabilization. However, understanding the United States' approach to security sector assistance faces definitional challenges. While the term "security sector assistance" encompasses all U.S. government activities to develop a partner nation's security forces and supporting ministries, many U.S. executive branch agencies use alternative terms to describe similar programs and activities. The introduction also covers the history of U.S. security sector assistance from the Revolutionary War to the post-9/11 era and the Global War on Terror.

Chapter 2 examines how the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps deployed military advisors to train, advise, and accompany Afghan National Army (ANA) units at the tactical and operational level. The U.S. military's approach to field advising underwent four iterations, each designed to improve on prior efforts. Despite these efforts, the U.S. military continues to struggle with staffing units, providing tailored predeployment training, and retaining personnel long enough to maintain expertise and long-term relationships with ANDSF partners. This chapter also discusses the selection and training of U.S. air advisors to the Afghan Air Force. Since most U.S. advisors were deployed individually or to temporary units, consistent historical data was often difficult or impossible to obtain. This chapter's findings rely heavily on interviews conducted by SIGAR, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Government Accountability Office, and other government organizations. The essay following this chapter highlights the lack of coordination between the field advising and air advising missions, which at times resulted in advisors providing contradictory guidance.

Chapter 3 focuses on the U.S. advisory mission at the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. While ground-based forces focused on improving Afghan war-fighting capabilities, U.S. advisors at the ministerial level were focused on developing systems and policies to govern the force. In Afghanistan, where literacy rates are low and education is limited, it was nearly impossible to recruit the necessary staff. Instead, U.S. advisors often performed critical functions themselves, such as developing policy, budgets, and human resources, and managing the design of the forces—rather than actually advising Afghans on how to do it. Moreover, the U.S. military had limited to no capability to train its own military officers on how to advise at the ministerial level, which resulted in untrained and underprepared U.S. military officers advising the highest echelons of both ministries. To address this issue, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) created the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program (MODA) in 2010. MODA deployed civilian experts who received extensive predeployment training and served longer tours. However, MODA advisors never accounted for more than 15 percent of the advisory mission. The essay following this chapter discusses the evolution of command-and-control responsibilities for the SSA mission and the lack of a command structure linking advisors at the ministries and in the field.

Chapter 4 describes how the United States equipped the ANDSF and examines the effectiveness of equipping decisions. Specifically, the chapter considers the benefits and drawbacks of the equipping process used in Afghanistan and whether the right people and organizations were tasked with making equipping decisions. While the foreign military sales process used in Afghanistan allowed the United States to rapidly equip the ANDSF, the United States often provided equipment without adequate training and sustainment, and provided equipment that did not meet ANDSF-identified needs. The essay that follows identifies the challenges associated with an equipping process that did not consistently integrate ministerial and operational advisory efforts.

Chapter 5 examines efforts to bring ANDSF personnel to the United States to receive advanced professional training. Since 2003, more than 3,000 ANDSF students have attended training in the United States, at a cost of approximately \$112.6 million. While the U.S. Department of State traditionally authorized the training of foreign military personnel at U.S.

military schools, in the 1980s Congress began to give DOD that authority, in coordination with State. But because DOD and State face challenges tracking alumni of U.S. training programs, they struggle to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S.-based training programs. While one of the primary goals of such programs is to build professional relationships with foreign military officers that will last as former students rise through the ranks, only 13 of the thousands of ANDSF students trained in the United States have risen to “positions of prominence” (loosely defined as senior ministerial officials or general officers), a key metric used to evaluate the impact of U.S.-based training. While U.S.-based training programs were successful in professionalizing the ANDSF, Afghan military students absconded from training at a higher rate than students from any other country, putting the sustainability of U.S.-based training programs at risk. The essay that follows identifies best practices gleaned from the U.S. Air Force’s A-29 aviation program in choosing and developing advisors, making equipment and sustainment decisions, and linking U.S.-based aviation training with U.S. aviation training programs in Afghanistan.

Chapter 6 focuses on how the United States worked with NATO and the challenges related to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, such as strained unity of command and effort, varying restrictions placed by coalition nations on the use of their forces, and the lack of standardized predeployment training. This chapter also describes the various ways the United States enabled NATO’s involvement by providing coalition nations with financial support and, on occasion, providing intelligence and close air support for their advisors. Finally, this chapter examines the ways the United States could have better leveraged the support of other NATO countries. The essay following discusses the fractures in the U.S. and international effort to develop the ANDSF. Since 2001, there has been no command-and-control relationship between the most senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan and the U.S. ambassador, nor is there an enduring mechanism in place to ensure effective coordination between the United States and other countries and international organizations.

While each chapter concludes with a list of key findings for each topic, below is a list of the major findings from this report:

1. No single person, agency, military service, or country has ultimate responsibility for or oversight of all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Instead, the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission relies on command directives and orders to provide overarching guidance and less formal mechanisms, such as weekly operations and intelligence briefings between Resolute Support and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), to coordinate military activities.
2. SSA efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-and-control relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as between ministerial and tactical advising efforts. This has resulted in disjointed efforts to develop ANDSF capabilities.
3. There is no formal mechanism to resolve conflicts between SSA activities led by the United States through the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and those conducted by other national embassies, international governmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations working directly with the

Afghan government. While international working groups and coordination boards have been created to resolve conflicts, they are often temporary and lack authority.

4. The SSA mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring, comprehensive, expert-designed plan that guided its efforts. As a result, critical aspects of the advisory mission were not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to guide equipping decisions over time.
5. DOD organizations and military services were often not assigned ownership of key aspects of the SSA mission. Responsibilities for developing ANDSF capabilities were divided among multiple agencies and services, each of which provided advisors who were usually deployed for no longer than one year.
6. Most predeployment training did not adequately prepare advisors for their work in Afghanistan. Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, weapons, culture, and doctrine. It also did not expose advisors to other parts of the advisory efforts, nor did it link advisors who operated at different tactical, operational, and ministerial levels.
7. The U.S. government has taken incremental steps to improve SSA activities, such as creating the MODA program, implementing core aspects of defense institution building, and deploying advisor units like the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). However, these capabilities have not been fully realized.
8. The United States has not adequately involved the Afghans in key decisions and processes. As a result, the United States has implemented systems that the Afghans will not be able to maintain without U.S. support.
9. The NATO command structure had benefits and drawbacks. While NATO's command structure broadened international military SSA coordination, it complicated U.S. interagency coordination.

LESSONS

This report identifies 10 lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions to improve the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and to better prepare for future SSA operations. These lessons are derived from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan but can be applied to any current SSA operation or at the start of any future SSA activities.

1. The lack of a comprehensive and consistent long-term plan to train, advise, assist, and equip a partner nation's military and security forces results in misalignment of advisors and ad hoc decision-making.
2. Conducting SSA activities while the United States is engaged in major combat operations fractures the traditional way the United States develops partner forces and creates a disjointed command-and-control relationship between the U.S. military and civilian leadership. A long-term vision is required in order to transfer responsibility from the senior military commander back to the embassy and ambassador.
3. SSA missions that involve NATO require a plan to improve coordination among all international stakeholders involved in the development of the host nation's defense and security forces.

4. Unless there is a plan to transition responsibilities to a partner nation, the foreign military sales process used in Afghanistan will likely limit the institutional development of a partner nation as well as that nation's ownership of and responsibility for its own resources.
5. U.S. financing of partner nation security forces may be a continued requirement even as their capabilities improve.
6. Creating professional military advisors requires long-term assignments, proper incentives, and the ability to refine advisor skills through multiple deployments and training cycles.
7. Advisors are best prepared when they are selected based on technical expertise, are trained and vetted for their ability to advise, and when they receive predeployment training focused on the partner nation's military structures, processes, culture, and equipment.
8. Filling advisor requirements strains the U.S. military and civilian agencies, as advisors are typically in high demand, yet there are very few trained and readily available. Special hiring authority allows the United States to recruit and retain civilian specialists and fill advisor requirements.
9. Equipping partner forces requires determining the capabilities the United States will train and advise on for the long term, versus those capabilities the United States will assist with in the short term to help the host nation reduce or remove a particular threat. Failure to determine this will result in equipping a partner nation with capabilities it may not need or be able to sustain.
10. Failure to establish lead organizations with unified command over SSA from the ministerial to tactical levels results in an inability to identify needs, fragmented command and control, and limited accountability and oversight.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Because SSA in Afghanistan has evolved from a secondary mission supporting counterinsurgency operations to serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan today, SIGAR provides actions that can be undertaken by Congress and executive branch agencies to improve the effectiveness of SSA activities. This report provides recommendations in each of its major chapters on ways to improve actions related to a specific core function. At the conclusion of this report, SIGAR provides overarching recommendations to improve coordination among U.S. agencies and other coalition nations.

Overarching Recommendations

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-Policy), in coordination with the U.S. Central Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), State, and the National Security Council, should lead an interagency review to determine the long-term SSA posture for Afghanistan based on current and long-term programming. This review should determine if the United States will continue to engage in SSA activities as part of a NATO-led coalition, or if it will transition to a more conventional model led by the U.S. Embassy.
2. USFOR-A, in coordination with NATO, should conduct a review to determine which SSA activities are dependent on the current size of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and which activities can continue to be carried out with fewer U.S. security personnel.

3. OSD-Policy, in partnership with DSCA, Resolute Support Mission, and the NATO Joint Force Command, should conduct an assessment to determine where U.S. and other international advisors are currently located, how missions are organized, and the requirements to keep advisor positions filled. Based on the results of this assessment, Resolute Support should create a common advisory picture outlining U.S. and NATO efforts with the aim of standardizing the mission among all of the military services and NATO coalition countries. This will lower the risk of advisors working at cross purposes.
4. The Resolute Support Mission should create a command-and-control relationship among all elements of the advisory mission. This includes aligning the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands, regional task forces, and SFABs under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance.
5. OSD-Policy should organize a group of U.S. military and civilian force management experts to partner with the Afghan government and NATO to develop an ANDSF force design plan based on expected long-term military, police, and ministerial capabilities. Based on this plan, the United States should validate advisor requirements and ensure the pipeline for equipment matches the current and future needs of the force.
6. The Joint Staff should create a DOD-led and Pentagon-based Security Cooperation Coordination Cell for Afghanistan with the mission of improving coordination of all SSA activities. The staff assigned to this organization should be required to serve at least a three-year tour with regular deployments into Afghanistan.
7. Resolute Support should host a quarterly SSA conference in Kabul for all civilian and military stakeholders with the intent of resolving conflicts that have a direct or indirect impact on the ANA, Afghan National Police, MOD, or MOI.
8. Predeployment training should expose attendees to all U.S. and international advisory efforts in Afghanistan and should be tailored to the Afghan context.

Field Advising

9. The U.S. Army should create a clear career path for combat advisors and continue to provide incentives to improve recruitment. Part of this career path should include postdeployment assignments at SSA commands and U.S. military training centers.
10. Congress should request that the military services conduct an internal human capacity assessment of combat advisor requirements around the globe. This assessment should also consider U.S. military force readiness requirements to maintain combat capabilities, a top priority of the U.S. National Security Strategy. The assessment should pay specific attention to those positions in high demand, such as military officers with a specialty in intelligence, medical, and logistics.
11. In addition to training and building the SFABs, Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) should also certify outgoing teams to ensure they are properly staffed, trained, and equipped; institutionalize a formal feedback mechanism to collect the SFABs' observations and formulate lessons learned; and create an assessment tool that SFAC can use to evaluate the effectiveness of SFAB units.
12. The military services should comply with DOD policies to track advisor experience, training, and deployments.
13. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize Theater-Specific Advisor Training (TSAT) for all advisors and should address country-specific command-and-

control relationships, procedures, and military culture. All advisors should complete TSAT in order to properly advise their Afghan counterparts in the processes and systems the Afghans employ.

14. Resolute Support should create an independent assessment, monitoring, and evaluation division and create mobile assessment teams responsible for tracking ANDSF capabilities. The mobile teams should track the frequency in which tactical and operational training and advisory teams visit and engage with ANDSF units, as well as the core tasks advisors perform.
15. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should create a Joint Security Force Assistance Command to monitor advisor requirements among the different military services and provide a level of standardization in unit organization and predeployment training.

Ministerial Advising

16. The Office of Personnel Management, in coordination with the U.S. military, should request that Congress reinstate special hiring authority allowing DSCA to hire individuals outside of DOD. This would allow them to capitalize on internal and external civilian expertise and fulfill its civilian requirements through the MODA program.
17. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize Senior Leader Advisor Training. This training should be conducted in close partnership with the MODA training center and take advantage of core aspects of the MODA program of instruction. USFOR-A should make this training a requirement for all military personnel deployed to serve as advisors at the ministerial level.
18. As with MODA, training academies conducting predeployment training should be empowered to vet and remove candidates who do not meet training qualifications.
19. DSCA should take ownership of the ministerial development mission in Afghanistan and establish a cadre of civilian professionals for this task. The director of DSCA, in close coordination with the senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, should approve all U.S. candidates serving in senior leadership roles at CSTC-A, including the CSTC-A commander.

Equipping the Force

20. OSD-Policy, DSCA, and the services should conduct a thorough analysis of U.S.-procured equipment for the ANDSF to determine short- and long-term security assistance. The analysis should consider how best to balance long-term sustainability against near-term threats.
21. Resolute Support, in coordination with the appropriate organizations in the ANDSF, should conduct an analysis of how ANDSF casualties occur and then work with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to make equipping decisions aimed at reducing casualties.
22. When the U.S. government empowers a temporary organization like CSTC-A to transfer equipment to a partner nation, DSCA must establish a formal process that ensures all relevant U.S.-based stakeholders approve of and provide input on equipping decisions.
23. DSCA should create a course that familiarizes U.S. personnel with the pseudo FMS process. To ensure that U.S. efforts are geared toward increasing partner nation

capabilities, this course should educate U.S. personnel on how best to involve a partner nation in the equipping process over time.

24. CSTC-A should formalize Afghan involvement in the pseudo FMS process.
25. Congress should evaluate the benefits and challenges associated with using the pseudo FMS process and its impact on overall U.S. foreign policy objectives.

U.S.-Based Training

26. DOD and State should develop new metrics of effectiveness for foreign military training. Current metrics of effectiveness are misleading, as they are often based on the future career prospects of students. This “position of prominence” criterion reflects a statistically insignificant number of Afghans who have trained in the United States.
27. DOD and State should track the performance of Afghan students trained in the United States by implementing a system to consolidate information and inform advisors of its availability. This can be done through enhancing the existing Security Cooperation Training Management System.
28. State, in coordination with DOD, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and state and local governments, should strengthen efforts aimed at preventing foreign military students from going AWOL. This can include changing the visa status of AWOL students to make obtaining U.S. identity documents more difficult, and working with local authorities to ensure students only have access to limited or restricted documents.

By, With, and Through NATO

29. DOD should establish a close working relationship with NATO security sector assistance-related centers of excellence and schools to share best practices and lessons learned. DOD should also provide staff to security sector assistance-related centers of excellence to leverage capabilities for future operations.
30. In planning the drawdown of U.S. forces, DOD should analyze NATO partner dependency on U.S. support of their operations in Afghanistan to determine how to maintain NATO support while the United States reduces its military forces.
31. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should update U.S. doctrine to clarify how the U.S. military conducts SSA efforts as part of a multinational coalition. The doctrine should provide clear guidance for establishing and maintaining coordination between U.S. departments and agencies operating at the embassy in the host country.
32. The United States, in coordination with NATO, should conduct an assessment of NATO’s core functions and capabilities related to SSA efforts. This effort should determine which activities should be military-led and therefore under the purview of NATO and which are civilian-led and may be conducted outside of a NATO command. Based on this analysis, NATO should consider updating its doctrine on conducting SSA efforts in the future.



The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Source: P.L. 110-181, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008," 1/28/2008.

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By phone: Afghanistan

Cell: 0700107300

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By phone: United States

Toll-free: 866-329-8893

DSN: 312-664-0378

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By fax: 703-601-4065

By email: sigar.hotline@mail.mil

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**SIGAR
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION**

2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil