

TACTICAL
PRINCIPLES
AND
PROBLEMS

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**TACTICAL
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS**

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TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS

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(RECENTLY CAPTAIN GENERAL STAFF CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY)


FORMERLY INSTRUCTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART

ARMY STAFF COLLEGE AND ARMY SCHOOL OF THE LINE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

*Adopted by direction of the Secretary of War for use in the
Garrison Schools*

FOURTH EDITION



JUN 21 1988



PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

The fourth edition of *Tactical Principles and Problems* is the same as the preceding three editions. Such few changes as have been suggested are not essential to the fundamental treatment of the subject, and are not of sufficient importance to offset the annoyance and expense to owners of previous editions, which invariably follows the revision of a book that is widely used as a text book.

The author indulges in the hope that this edition may have the same cordial reception that has been extended to previous editions.

NEW YORK CITY,

THE AUTHOR.

June 10, 1913.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

The time has come for the publication of another edition of this book. The demand for it has steadily increased. It is being used with gratifying success in the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth and Fortress Monroe, and by the National Guard of a number of states. It has been adopted for use in the garrison schools of the regular army, and will receive its first trial therein during the coming school term. Orders from abroad, especially from Great Britain, indicate that it is of value to foreign services. The service journals and scores of officers of the regular army and militia have subscribed to its merit. Only a few changes in the text have been suggested, and they are unimportant. Accordingly, this edition is published without change in the preceding edition.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

THE AUTHOR.

July 31, 1911.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The first edition of *Tactical Principles and Problems* has been received with such universal favor that it is necessary to publish a second edition to meet the steadily increasing demand from the Regular Army and National Guard, as well as from the British Service and elsewhere.

The author is indebted to friendly critics for a few suggested changes in the text, but it has been decided not to make these changes at this time, mainly because they relate to minor points concerning which slight difference of opinion is to be expected.

Except that this edition is accompanied by much improved maps, it differs in no essential from the first edition.

THE AUTHOR.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

SEPTEMBER 9, 1910.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This book has been written in the hope that it may help junior officers of the regular service and militia who are beginning the study of tactics. In tactics, as in other sciences, the first steps are the most difficult to make, especially if the student has no instructor, as necessarily must frequently be the case. With this fact uppermost in his mind, the author has endeavored so to present the subjects herein treated that the book may be of special value to the student who is working without assistance.

The problems have been restricted to the simpler and more usual operations of small forces of infantry and of cavalry, and of these two arms united. Ar-

tillery has not been dealt with because it is believed that the student will make better progress if he becomes familiar with the tactics of infantry and cavalry before undertaking the much more difficult subject of the three arms combined. After the student has mastered this book, he may take up with advantage the study of the many excellent works on the applied tactics of the three arms, most noted of which is Griepenkerl's Letters on Applied Tactics.

The so called *applicatory method* followed in this text is so well understood as to need no explanation, and its superiority over all other methods of teaching tactics is well established; the method will give very poor results, however, unless the student pursue it properly. This means many hours of close application with map, dividers, pencil and paper. This book is not intended for casual reading, and the student will derive but little benefit from it unless he study it in some manner such as will now be outlined.

For each subject herein discussed, there are at least two chapters. In the first of these a problem and its solution are given, together with a discussion of the ordinary tactical principles involved in the particular kind of operation that is being illustrated. In the following chapter, a similar problem and its solution are given, together with comments on the solution. The first chapter of any particular subject should be studied in the most painstaking manner in connection with the map, and not until the student thinks he is familiar with the tactical principles illustrated in the *Solution and Discussion* of this chapter should he proceed to consider the problem given in the following chapter. *For this problem he should make his own*

solution, **PREFERABLY IN WRITING**, *before reading the solution and comments given in the text.* (*) This method will require work, but a method for learning tactics which does not involve labor has not yet been devised, and the student will find his reward in full measure in the progress he makes. If a single chapter is taken each week, the book furnishes the student with a course he can complete in six months and yet have much spare time for study along other lines.

A word concerning the solutions given in the text. They are by no means the only good solutions for the respective problems given, nor are they faultless, nor are they necessarily the best. They are merely the best that occurred to the author at the time they were written. The aim has been to give solutions that violate no sound tactical principle, that are simple of execution, and that will accomplish the desired end if the troops are well led throughout the operation. Any solution that observes these three essential ideas is good, no matter how much it may differ from the one given herein. This point is deemed of such importance that it is frequently reverted to in the text.

The advance sheets of the revision of the *Field Service Regulations*, to which the author has had access, have formed the tactical basis for the work, and it is believed that the solutions are in accord with the prin-

(*) Students who have had no previous experience in solving tactical problems should read a pamphlet entitled **Estimating, Tactical Situations and Composing Field Orders**, by Captain Roger S. Fitch, 2d Cavalry, which may be obtained on request made to the Secretary of The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also, students who find it difficult to read military maps, should study **Military Map Reading** by Captain C. O. Sherrill, Corps of Engineers, which may be purchased of the U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for 50 cents.

ciples therein laid down. Many books have been consulted in the preparation of this work, but most frequent reference has been made to the following, to all of which the author takes pleasure in acknowledging his obligation:

- ✓ Griepenkerl's *Letters on Applied Tactics*,
- ✓ Balck's *Modern European Tactics*,
- Von Alten's *Studies in Applied Tactics*,
- Von Bernhardt's *Cavalry in Future Wars*,
- Von Verdy's *Studies in the Leading of Troops*, and
- Clery's *Minor Tactics*.

The author finds it difficult adequately to express his gratitude to Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, Assistant Commandant and Senior Instructor, Department of Military Art at the Army Service Schools; to Captain T. O. Murphy, 19th Infantry; Captain G. F. Baltzell, 5th Infantry; Captain LeRoy Eltinge, 15th Cavalry; Captain Roger S. Fitch, 2d Cavalry, Instructors, Department of Military Art, Army Service Schools; and to Captain A. E. Saxton, 8th Cavalry, Secretary, Army Service Schools, for the valuable criticism, suggestions and other assistance they have given him during the months this book was being written.

M. E. H.

ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS,
MARCH 9, 1910.

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CHAPTER I.

LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL. SITUATION.

(See 4-inch map).

A small Blue infantry force in hostile country has just crossed the Missouri river at Fort Leavenworth, and is about to establish outposts for the night (September 29-30) on a general north and south line along Prison Lane.

A force of the enemy is reported advancing from the west, and is believed to be east of the Big Stranger (western edge of 2-inch map). Contact has not yet been established.

At 4 p. m., while the outposts are getting into position, Lieutenant A is given the following instructions by the outpost commander on Long Ridge: "I believe the enemy will camp near Salt creek to-night. Take a patrol from the support on Long Ridge, proceed to the vicinity of Frenchman and find out what you can about the enemy. A patrol will be sent out under Sergeant B to reconnoiter along Sheridan's Drive to the north, and another under Corporal C to reconnoiter along the Zimmerman road. It is especially important to determine the enemy's strength and locate his camp for the night. Send your reports to me here. Return when darkness prevents further reconnaissance."

Note—In addition to the requirements stated below, you

should write on the regular blank all reports that Lieutenant A would make during his reconnaissance.

Required:

1. (a) How many men will Lieutenant A take? Give reasons for the number selected.

(b) State the route and formation of the patrol for the first mile of its march, supposing nothing is seen of the enemy.

SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION.

(a) Lieutenant A will take a non-commissioned officer and three men with him. The patrol is meant to observe; it should accomplish its task by stealth, not by fighting, and consequently should be small. Every man added to the patrol makes it more difficult to conceal. With four men, two or three messages can be sent and still Lieutenant A will be left with at least one companion. It will not be necessary, in all probability, to send more messages than these, as the patrol will not be out very long, and the distance to be covered is not great.

Three, five, or six men would not be a wrong number to take, but should fewer than three or more than six be taken, the patrol would in one case be too small to send many messages, and in the other case it would be too large for easy concealment. Of course a patrol of ten or twelve men is quite unsuited to the mission given Lieutenant A.

(b) The patrol would move down the ravine on the southeast slope of Long Ridge in column of twos, and enter the bed of Corral creek about 150 yards west of XX. It would follow Corral creek, under cover of its banks and the timber along them, until

it entered the wooded ravine on the southern slope of Atchison hill. It would be in single file, with distances of about 20 yards; although other formations, easily concealed and furnishing protection against surprise, would do quite as well.

In this part of the march, the chief considerations are rapidly to gain the heights to the west, and to remain concealed during the march from any hostile patrols that may be in observation on those heights. The march of the patrol should not be delayed to reconnoiter the railroad cuts, ravines and high ground to the north and south of Corral creek. Such reconnaissance, in all probability, will secure no information of importance which cannot be obtained by the outposts, and may reveal the presence and route of the patrol. For similar reasons, the houses at 10 should be avoided, and the 14—16 road should be observed from the edge of the woods to the east of it.

The route along the north branch of Corral creek, via XXII and XXIII, is objectionable because of the 400 yards of open target range to be crossed; moreover, it infringes on the territory assigned to Sergeant B. However, were this route the better for reaching Atchison hill, time and invisibility considered, it would be perfectly proper to intrude on Sergeant B's territory for this purpose.

Continuation of the Situation.

At 4:40 p. m. Lieutenant A is on Atchison hill with his patrol, and observes a hostile cavalry patrol of five troopers turn north on the trail leading to Sheridan's Drive between F and E and disappear in the woods.

(c) What action does he take?

(d) . What route will he take from this point? Give reasons.

Continuation of the Solution.

(c) He remains concealed with the patrol and sends the following message, after assuring himself that the hostile patrol is not followed by other hostile troops:

No. 1

To

Outpost Commander.

Officer's Patrol,

Atchison Hill,

29 Sept.—, 4:50 P. M.

At 4:40 p. m. a hostile cavalry patrol of 5 troopers turned north on the trail leading from the F—E road, and disappeared in the woods about 600 yards northeast of here. So far as I can see, it is not followed by other hostile troops. I will advance immediately to SENTINEL hill and continue my reconnoissance from there.

A.

Lieut.

This is the first time the enemy has been seen in this operation of the Blue force. *For this reason the information is important.* It is an easy matter for Lieutenant A to send it to the outpost commander and doing so will not interfere with the further execution of his mission. Under these circumstances, for him to trust to Sergeant B to forward information of the presence of the hostile patrol would be a mistake.

(d) Through the woods on the northern slope of Atchison hill, crossing the railroad tracks and wagon road between Schmidt and McGuire, and entering the ravine that starts at F. Thence down this ravine 600 yards to the point where it makes a sharp bend to the north; thence due west in the small swale to the top of Sentinel hill. This route, as far as can be judged from the map, affords as good, or better cover

than any other direct route to Sentinel hill. Good cover from the inhabitants and the hostile patrol might be found on a shorter line through the woods on the northwest slope of Atchison hill and across the road between Moore and Schmidt, but it is preferable to get the patrol in the ravine at F as quickly as possible.

Of course, all the houses in this settlement should be most carefully avoided. Their occupants are hostile and would give no reliable information; but, on the other hand, they probably would report the presence of the patrol, should they get an opportunity to do so. To move directly along the 16—G road is to expose the patrol to view with few compensating advantages.

By way of 16, 18, 20, and the trail and ravine to the northward via Frenchman, and then *east* to Sentinel hill, the patrol might find good cover and avoid houses, but the greater length of this route and its other disadvantages far outweigh its advantages.

The patrol might go to Hund hill or Eleven Hundred Foot hill for further observation, were it not that the outpost commander evidently intended Corporal C to observe from those points and wished Lieutenant A to observe in the territory between Corporal C and Sergeant B.

Continuation of the Situation.

Nothing further was seen of the Red patrol after it disappeared in the woods north of E, and at 5:30 p. m. Lieutenant A is on Sentinel hill with his patrol observing Salt Creek valley, when a troop of hostile cavalry coming along Atchison pike from the west

halts and dismounts at the Mottin house, while a squad of about sixteen men from this troop continues the march to Frenchman and dismounts there.

(e) Further intentions of Lieutenant A.

Continuation of the Solution.

(e) To continue his observations from his present position. If he wishes to risk weakening his patrol, he might send a message containing information of the presence of the hostile troop. This message would add so little, *under the conditions of this problem*, to the information contained in the first message sent, that there is no great necessity for hastening to send it back. However, if Lieutenant A had reached Sentinel hill with four, five or more men, as would be the case if he had started with five or more men, he could well afford to spare one or two of them to carry this message.

Continuation of the Situation.

Lieutenant A remained in unmolested observation on Sentinel hill. By dusk two regiments of infantry and a baggage train had halted in the field 1,000 yards northwest of Mottin and had sent small detachments towards Mottin and Hill 900 about 1000 yards south of 19. Ten more troopers from the troop at the Mottin house had joined the cavalry at Frenchman, and two patrols from this detachment had moved by G and disappeared in the direction of E and 16. The road from Frenchman to G was being constantly patrolled by two troopers. A message was sent to the outpost commander by the two remaining privates soon after the head of the hostile infantry column came into sight on Atchison pike.

(f) Inferences drawn by Lieutenant A from his observations.

(g) Further intentions of Lieutenant A.

(h) His route on returning to his camp, on the supposition that he decides to return as soon as it grows dark. State reasons for selecting route chosen.

Continuation of the Solution.

(f) That the enemy's whole force in this vicinity consists of 1 troop of cavalry and 2 regiments of infantry, and that he is going into camp and placing outposts for the night. Were this the advance guard of a larger force, we would expect it to have more cavalry in its front and most probably we would have seen artillery. However, conclusive deductions as to the total strength of the hostile force can not be drawn from these facts, nor from the additional fact that the force has been joined by its baggage train.

(g) To remain where he is until it is dark enough to conceal his movements and then to return to camp unless further developments in the meantime should warrant a different procedure.

(h) Due east until he enters the woods on Sheridan's Drive and then southeast by the roads to his outposts. He might return as far as McGuire's by the route over which he came, thence south of and along the railroads to the vicinity of 10, and thence east to Long Ridge. This route, however, is very dangerous and, if taken, great care should be exercised in crossing the road and railroads, and in moving along them; even then it is far less desirable than the route due east.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to follow compli-

cated routes in the darkness in an unknown country, and for this reason we prefer the simple route due east; it can be followed with ease and without the use of the compass, which usually can not be read at night without the risk that accompanies striking a match. Routes down Salt creek and up ravines to Wagner point or Bell point are unnecessarily complicated and roundabout. The same is true of routes to the south over Government or Southwest hills.

Before starting from Long Ridge Lieutenant A would inspect his patrol and give his orders and instructions. The inspection is mainly to determine whether the men are in fit condition, have serviceable arms and a proper supply of ammunition, and have taken the usual precautions to avoid the glitter of weapons and equipments. No regimental insignia or other devices that show the organization to which the patrol belongs should be worn, for an intelligent enemy well informed of our organization will get much valuable information from these should the patrol be captured.

The orders, which would be given to *all* the members of the patrol, would be about as follows: "A force of the enemy is reported advancing from the west (indicating the points of the compass) and Major A (the outpost commander) believes it will camp near Salt creek to-night. Here is Salt creek on the map; it is about a mile west of that ridge (pointing towards Atchison hill). We are to go to the vicinity of this bridge over Salt creek (indicating Frenchman bridge on the map) and find out what we can of the

enemy. Major A is specially anxious to know the enemy's strength and his camping place for the night. All messages are to be sent to Major A, here, and we are to stay out until it is too dark to reconnoiter. Sergeant B will reconnoiter on our right along that ridge (Sheridan's Drive ridge) to the north, and Corporal C is to reconnoiter on our left along this road (pointing out the Zimmerman road on the map). Atchison hill (indicating on both map and ground) will be our first objective, and we will reach it by following up that creek (Corral creek)."

If Lieutenant A's patrol is composed of experienced soldiers, the above orders will be sufficient, but, if he has one or more inexperienced men, he may have to add instructions regarding signals to be used, the necessity for concealment, firing pieces, and other matters depending on the training of the men. It is not necessary to designate a second in command, for that duty naturally falls to the non-commissioned officer, and it is too soon to prescribe a point where the patrol will assemble in case it is scattered.

The orders received by commanders of larger bodies of troops are not explained in such detail to the individual soldier, but in the case of small patrols it is important that each may be fully informed, for the reason that the duty requires the exercise of individual knowledge and judgment; moreover, in the event of the patrol leader being captured or killed, or of the patrol being scattered, each man should have a complete understanding of the situation so as to be able to act independently and intelligently under the circumstances.

We should not make the mistake of concluding that

the formation of the patrol in single file as it moved up Corral creek is the only suitable one, or one that will best fit all cases. In any case, we should seek a formation that favors rapid marching, facilitates concealment and observation, renders surprise difficult, and makes probable the escape of at least one man, in case the patrol is surprised. The marching formations of patrols are governed by this general principle and they will vary with the terrain and other conditions.

It may be asked, Why did not Lieutenant A go alone on this mission? In truth he might well have done so, had he thought there would be no occasion for sending a message back before he had completed his reconnaissance. Alone, his single pair of eyes could have seen everything that was to be observed, and there would have been less chance for his movements being discovered by the enemy. If a patrol has with it a single man unskilled in scouting, it is in constant danger of having its whereabouts disclosed by his stupid blunders. To this extent the efficiency of a patrol is measured by that of its least trained member. If this fact is fully appreciated, the wise patrol leader will select the men who are to accompany him with the greatest care allowable under the circumstances, and he will reduce the strength of his patrol rather than take along a man whose presence is a constant menace.

A patrol leader, as well as the commander of larger forces, should make his decisions and movements dovetail into what he considers the most probable intentions of his enemy. This the lieutenant did when he took careful precautions against discovery while approaching Atchison hill. An intelligent hostile patrol

on this or adjoining hills should be able to detect any movement not made under cover on the low ground to the east. Naturally, the lieutenant was eager to reach Atchison hill which promised a view to the west, but he realized that his patrol must be as well concealed during this part of the journey as later on, even though its march was somewhat delayed. As an additional precaution, it would have been well for the patrol, as soon as it entered the woods on the slope of Atchison hill, to move 300 or 400 yards to the right flank and then ascend the hill; if the enemy had observed the previous march of the patrol and set a trap for it, the trap might thus have been avoided; in general, it is well for a patrol thus to move to a flank, or otherwise to change the direction of its march on entering a woods.

It might have been better for the patrol to ascend Atchison hill along the spur which is about on the line connecting the words "Atchison hill" with the number "XXV", instead of following up the ravine. The latter is apt to be rocky or overgrown with dense underbrush; noises would *rise* from it to the enemy, were he on the hill above, and to be caught in it would be embarrassing. As a general rule, it is better to follow along spurs or near the ridge line *in traversing woods*, if such a route is available and open to the patrol.

Lieutenant A might have passed through these woods with his patrol extended in a line of skirmishers with wide intervals. Such a formation might be excellent if he wished to beat up the woods to determine whether small parties of the enemy were hiding in them; but such was not the lieutenant's purpose; on the contrary, his object was to reach the top of the hill

without being seen, and this he could best do by keeping the patrol in a more compact formation.

Having arrived near the western edge of the woods, the lieutenant approached the top of the hill with the greatest possible caution, making sure before leaving the woods that the enemy was not already in possession of the hill as an observation point. The patrol, except the man who was observing the 14—16 road, was left in the edge of the woods and the lieutenant alone crept to the top of the hill without exposing himself on the sky-line; there, lying flat, with only his head showing above the crest, he closely searched the visible country through his field-glass.

It is difficult at maneuvers to get men on reconnaissance to observe even such simple precautions as these, unless we in some way stimulate their interest in the game. There are many ways in which this can be done. One good method which can always be employed in the preliminary training of the company in patrolling is to have the patrols operate against each other from opposite directions along the same road. As many pairs of patrols as there are roads available can thus be trained at the same time. With three or four roads, it should be an easy matter to put the entire company through this exercise in a single morning. Later, the exercise may be varied in numerous ways that will readily suggest themselves to the mind of the enthusiastic officer. If our men are properly taught correct methods of scouting in time of peace, we may be sure that they will employ those methods when in the face of an enemy and constantly menaced by death or capture.

The message sent from Atchison hill, written on a field message blank, would be as follows:

U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE	No.	Sent by	Time	Signal Operators only		Time	Check	
				(Those spaces for)				
Communicated by BUZZER, PHONE, TELEGRAPH, WIRELESS, LANTERN, HELIO, FLAG, CYCLIST, FOOT MESSENGER, MOUNTED MESSENGER. (Underline means used)	From	<i>Officers</i>						
	At	<i>Watchman</i>						
	Date	<i>29 Sept.</i>	Hour	<i>4:50 P.M.</i>	No.	<i>1</i>		
	To	<i>Outpost Commander.</i>						
	<i>At 4:40 p.m. a hostile cavalry patrol of 5 troopers turned north on the trail leading from the F-E road, and disappeared in the woods about 600 yards north-east of here. So far as I can see it is not followed by other hostile troops I will advance immediately to SENTINEL hill and continue my reconnaissance from there</i>							
	<i>A.</i>							
	<i>Lieut.</i>							
Received								

If Lieutenant A had not been supplied with message blanks, as will often be the case, he would have written the message on a leaf from his note book, or on any other piece of ordinary paper; in that case the message would have been worded as in the solution, without any attempt to reproduce the ruled lines, etc. of the blank form. The object of the message blank, when it is furnished, is merely to prevent the sender from forgetting some important part of the message.

The lieutenant was careful not to state the location of the outpost commander, or the organization to which the outpost belonged. This would add nothing to the value of the message, but would give the enemy important information should the message fall into hostile hands. The messenger, however, is told where and to whom he is to take the message. The lieutenant intrusted the message to a single messenger,

and informed him of its contents before starting him off; the envelope (if one was used) was left unsealed so that the messenger might further study the message, if he saw fit. This was a wise precaution, for a messenger may have to destroy a message at any moment to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy; consequently, he should be familiar with its contents, when practicable. Information is sent by one, or by two or more messengers, depending on its importance, the dangers of the road, distance to be traveled, etc. A single messenger is not so confident and something may happen to him, or, if he is mounted, to his horse; but the lieutenant was so near his outpost line that he did not believe it necessary to weaken his patrol further by sending two messengers.

The lieutenant took his time in writing the message, without being unduly deliberate. Ten minutes elapsed from the moment he saw the hostile patrol to the moment he finished the message. A part of that time he was observing the country in every direction, but especially along the Atchison pike, to see whether the hostile patrol was followed by other hostile forces; at the same time, he was deliberating on what he would say in the message. Before he could complete the message he had also to decide what his further movements were to be, for his commander would want to know of them.

It is suggested that the message be carefully copied to see how long it takes to write it. It will take about 4 minutes to make a legible copy, unless one writes a legible hand with more than ordinary rapidity. But it is not the writing alone that takes time, although this is generally done under great difficulties in

the field. For every minute spent in writing, we probably will spend one or two minutes in considering what we will say, and in re-reading the message to see that we have omitted nothing. The message might be made shorter and say all that should be reported; even so, it does not follow that the shorter message can be more quickly written. Our Field Service Regulations say that a message should be brief and *clear*, resembling a telegram; but this does not mean that clearness shall be *sacrificed for brevity*. "Searching for the shortest form of expression might take longer than rapidly writing several longer sentences, and might result in ambiguities. It is most appropriate to say 'Please excuse this long letter; I haven't time to write a shorter one.' "

Yet this is time valuably spent. How frequently at maneuvers have we seen messages so carelessly composed that it was well nigh impossible to get any definite information from them, and so illegibly written that it was exceedingly difficult to read such incomplete information as they contained! We have seen a patrol leader work with great patience for hours in leading his patrol to a point from which he got a perfect view of the enemy, only to send in an incomplete and garbled account of his discovery, written in an illegible scrawl; whereas, had he spent five minutes more on the preparation of his message, he could have written a complete and easily understood report of inestimable value to his commander.

The lieutenant realized that he was running a risk, in taking his patrol to Sentinel hill, of having it cut off and captured. At the first glance, this lone high hill appealed to him strongly as an observation point,

but he reflected that the enemy's patrols might search its top and sides in the hope of discovering him. He thought of choosing some less conspicuous point, as Eleven Hundred Foot hill, but for the reasons given in the solution, and because there were many "back doors" through which he might escape from Sentinel hill, he finally chose the latter.

What should our lieutenant have done had he observed the glow of camp fires to the westward of the hostile force he had seen? This would be an indication that the force he had observed was but the advance guard of a larger column. We have seen that the patrol leader based his conclusion that he had seen the enemy's entire force on the rather scant facts that he had seen but one troop of cavalry, and no artillery, and that the infantry was followed by its field train. What appear to be the most convincing signs are at times deceptive. The lack of cavalry and artillery might be explained in many ways. In general, the field train of an advance guard does not follow immediately in its rear, but accompanies the rest of the baggage in rear of the main column; but this instance may be an exception, or the baggage may have been pushed ahead to join the advance guard for the night.

Under this supposition, should our lieutenant have continued his reconnaissance? His orders do not require him to return at dark and he has the whole night before him in which to work. By sending back the non-commissioned officer to report the result of the reconnaissance thus far made, and pushing on alone, he would, if successful, be able to return by morning with a more complete report of the enemy. Of course, in so doing, he would entrust the delivery of the im-

portant information already in his possession to the non-commissioned officer, whose skill is inferior to his own, but he could not be censured if his zeal should lead him to undertake the hazardous enterprise of a night reconnoissance within the hostile outposts.

No doubt it may be thought strange that we would approve, even in a guarded way, of the return journey being made in part over the route by which the patrol went out, apparently in violation of what our Field Service Regulations say on the subject. The regulations do not establish an absolute rule to be followed under all circumstances. It is the danger of ambuscade on the old route that makes it more dangerous than a new one, and for this reason the old route, generally, should be avoided. General Baden-Powell says that the only time he violated this rule he lost his hat and very nearly lost his life by the bullets of a hidden party of the enemy. But the route along the railroad from F is suggested as practicable, although lined with danger, for the following reasons: There is no hostile infantry east of Frenchman; the hostile cavalry patrols will probably confine their movements to the roads during the night, and in order to observe our camp, standing patrols probably will be on the high ground only at E and 16. Even so, our patrol would have to thread its way very carefully through the dangerous section between F and 10.

CHAPTER II.

LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL.

PROBLEM.

(See 4-inch map).

On September 1, a Blue regiment in hostile territory is advancing on Leavenworth via the Kickapoo—17—H—G road. Small detachments of hostile infantry are known to be in the vicinity of Leavenworth.

At 11 a. m., after 6 hours of forced marching, the column is halted for a rest of 45 minutes, when the advance party reaches the Taylor house (about one-half a mile south of 17). The advance guard commander had previously given Lieutenant A the following orders: "When the column halts to rest, take two squads from the advance party and determine whether the enemy occupies Sentinel hill and the ridge to the south and east of it. Leave your packs under guard at the Taylor house to be picked up by your company wagon when it passes. Send your messages to me with the advance guard."

Note—Salt creek is very low and can be crossed by infantry dry shod.

Required:

(a) What route will the patrol take for the first mile and a half of its journey? Give reasons.

SOLUTION.

The mission of the patrol is, in part, to determine

whether Sentinel hill is occupied by the enemy, and the only certain way of doing this is to reconnoiter the top and slopes of the hill. Consequently, Sentinel hill becomes the first objective of the patrol, and, if practicable, it should be reached under cover.

There are four available covered approaches to the hill. (1) South along the road as far as the stream between the Dolman house and the Burns house, thence along this stream to Salt creek, thence up the creek and through the woods bordering the northern spur of Sentinel hill to the top of the hill. (2) South along the road to the stream-crossing 350 yards north of Frenchman, thence down this stream to Salt creek, thence across the creek and through the same woods as before to the top of the hill. (3) South along the road to the bridge over Salt creek at Frenchman, thence along the right bank of the creek and through the woods to the top of the hill as before. (4) Directly east from Taylor's, keeping on the north side of the hedge until Salt creek is reached, thence along the creek and through the woods to the top of the hill.

There is not much choice among the first three of these routes. Route 4 is fairly well concealed, but is much more roundabout than any of the others, and is entirely across country; hence progress by this route will be slow. By routes 2 and 3, the patrol will remain longer on the road, and may reach its destination more quickly and with less fatigue. On the other hand, the first route has the advantage of better cover, for the low-cut hedge along the road forms but imperfect cover for so large a patrol. Consequently, Lieutenant A decides to take the first route.

Continuation of the Problem.

(b) On the supposition that the patrol takes the route first described above, and does not encounter the enemy, what will be its formation until it reaches the top of Sentinel hill?

Continuation of the Solution.

While on the road, a non-commissioned officer and three men will form a point; the non-commissioned officer will send one man 50 yards in advance of himself and the other two. The remaining twelve men will march in one body in single or double file, depending on the cover furnished by the hedge, and will follow the point at 200 yards. The files will follow each other at a distance of about 10 yards, thereby making it more difficult for an observing enemy to determine the full strength of the patrol. Two men will be sent to the Dolman house to examine the country to the east of there not visible from the road, and then to return to the patrol.

On leaving the road the point does not change its formation. Two of the twelve men fell back 100 yards and follow as a rear point. The remaining ten men keep the formation they had while on the road, half observing to the right and half to the left. This formation is preserved until the patrol enters the larger wood about the bends in Salt creek. From here to the top of Sentinel hill, the wood is thick and about 250 yards wide and dispositions should be made for observing from both its edges. Accordingly, two men are sent out to each flank to follow along the edges of the wood, and the six men in the main body of the patrol are closed up to the usual distances between files.

Lieutenant A has remained with or near the main body of the patrol throughout the march. The route of the patrol, after it reaches the top of the hill, will depend on the amount of cover furnished by minor features; it may be necessary for the patrol to continue along the east slope of the hill under cover of the narrow strip of wood.

Continuation of the Problem.

(c) On reaching the top of Sentinel hill at 11:40 a. m., Lieutenant A halts his patrol under cover, with two men observing each of the four slopes of the hill while he carefully scans the surrounding country, particularly the ridge to the south and east. His search reveals no indications of the enemy. His own column is not in sight and apparently has not yet resumed its march. What action should he now take? Give reasons.

Continuation of the Solution.

He should send a message giving the result of his reconnaissance up to this time, and then continue his advance along the best available route towards the ridge to the southeast. That Sentinel hill is not occupied by the enemy is important information for the advance guard commander and this information should be sent to him without delay. It tells him that he has nothing to fear from this commanding position on the flank of the Blue line of advance. But Lieutenant A's reconnaissance can not stop here, if he accomplishes his full mission. He must definitely determine, by a closer inspection than he can make from Sentinel hill, whether the ridge towards Leavenworth is occupied by the enemy.

His message is simple and reads as follows :

Officer's Patrol,
Sentinel Hill,

To

1 Sept.—, 11:50 A. M.

Advance Guard Commander.

SENTINEL hill is not occupied by the enemy, and there is no sign of the enemy on the ridge to the south and east. I will proceed at once to ATCHISON hill.

A.

Lieutenant.

Continuation of the Problem.

(d) The above message was sent by two messengers. Soon after their departure, as Lieutenant A is about to resume his advance, the non-commissioned officer, observing toward G, reports a hostile patrol of four men coming through the wood up the hill from the direction of G. What should be Lieutenant A's action in this situation? Give reasons.

Continuation of the Solution.

For several reasons, the lieutenant **should** attempt to capture the hostile patrol. His own patrol is so large and the east and west slopes of Sentinel hill are so open that he probably could not avoid being seen, unless he retraced his steps to the large wood on the north slope of the hill, and from there he could not reach the ridge to the east under cover without making a wide detour. His own reconnaissance would be blocked and the hostile patrol would be permitted to observe the Blue column. Lieutenant A was given a strong patrol in order that his reconnaissance might not be checked by small hostile patrols, and the important thing for him now is to push on to Atchison hill and discover the exact situation along that ridge and in the open country towards Leavenworth. This

he can hardly hope to do without colliding with the small hostile patrol, and it will be to his advantage to bring about the collision in such a way, if possible, that he may capture the entire patrol. This appears the more probable since the hostile patrol, apparently, is not aware of Lieutenant A's presence.

Continuation of the Problem.

(e) Lieutenant A hastily prepared an ambush and captured three of the hostile patrol, but the fourth man escaped towards G. There are no other signs of the enemy. It is now 12 o'clock and the head of the Blue column is passing the Burns house. What disposition will he make of the three prisoners?

Continuation of the Solution.

After disarming and searching the prisoners, each is questioned out of the hearing of the other two, and subsequently they are not allowed to communicate with each other. They are then placed under the guard of a non-commissioned officer and one man and are sent back to join the column. The bolts are removed from their rifles and they are required to carry their arms and ammunition. The non-commissioned officer was present when the prisoners were questioned, and he is directed to report their answers and the circumstances of their capture to the advance guard commander. Lieutenant A does not delay his reconnaissance in order to send a written message embracing the answers to the questions asked the prisoners.

Continuation of the Problem.

(f) From the prisoners, Lieutenant A learned that the enemy is attempting to concentrate his scat-

tered detachments at Leavenworth and that no hostile forces are along the ridge to the south and east of Sentinel hill. The Blue patrol (now reduced to 12 men) continued its advance at 12:12 p. m., as the advance party of the Blue column was crossing Salt creek bridge. At 12:30 p. m., the patrol is near 16 and the Blue advance party is approaching G. Lieutenant A observes about a battalion of Red infantry advancing in column on the 72—14 road, the point of its advance guard being at the railroad crossing just east of 14, while the tail of the column is concealed by the Penitentiary walls. What action should Lieutenant A take?

Continuation of the Solution.

He should deploy his patrol in the edge of the woods southeast of 16 and open a vigorous fire on the advancing column. The two hostile columns are about equally distant from the top of the ridge near 16, and the one that reaches it first will have a great advantage of position. There is no good reason why Lieutenant A should try longer to conceal his presence, and his fire may check the Red column sufficiently to permit the Blues to get easy possession of the ridge. Moreover, opening a rapid fire is the quickest way of informing the advance guard of the necessity for haste.

COMMENTS.

It should be observed that Lieutenant A allowed no member of his patrol, excepting those who carried the message and escorted the prisoners, to get more than 200 to 300 yards away from him at any time. During the reconnaissance, the patrol was under his

immediate control, and all its members that had not been sent to the rear could be assembled in less than a minute for any action he might wish to take.

Throughout this book, much will be said of the evil consequences of dispersion—of scattering a command on a front so broad that its full strength can not be opportunely united at the decisive point—for experience has shown this to be a very frequent, if not the most frequent, tactical mistake made by those beginning the application of tactical principles to practical problems. The principle *in concentration of forces there is strength, in dispersion there is weakness*, is simple enough. It requires no demonstration to convince one that eleven football players dispersed at equal intervals across the gridiron would make a sorry showing against the attack of the concentrated wedge of their opponents. The game of war, in this respect, is not unlike the game of football. The difficulty, however, lies not so much in learning the principle as in recognizing what constitutes dispersion with commands of various strengths, and this difficulty we hope to clear away, little by little, as we go through this book.

The principle applies, whatever the size of the command. Even a single man, fighting alone, must concentrate his efforts in the proper direction, if he is to secure the maximum benefits for the energy expended. We are liable to fall into the error of saying the principle does not apply to a very small command, certainly not to a command so small as a patrol. *From this very weakness of the patrol springs the greatest necessity for utilizing every particle of its strength.*

Now let us see what would constitute dispersion in

this particular case. As a general rule, every member of a patrol will accompany the patrol leader, and detachments should be sent no farther away than is necessary to protect the front, flanks, and rear of the patrol, while it is marching or halted, or to make observations from points *very* close by. Of course there are exceptions, but we will make fewer mistakes, if we adhere closely to the rule until we have mastered the difficulty; later, we will have but little trouble in recognizing the exceptions; whereas, if we search for them in the beginning, we are liable to consider every case an exception.

For example, Lieutenant A was told to reconnoiter "Sentinel hill and the ridge to the south and east of it." He might have tried to perform both these tasks at the same time, by sending a part of the patrol over Sentinel hill while the remainder followed along the road, or some other route, to the ridge. Had he done so, he would have dispersed the patrol. Or, he might have kept the patrol together as far as the top of Sentinel hill and scattered it after reaching that point. "The ridge to the south and east" measures two miles or more along its crest, and he might have tried to reconnoiter its whole length at one time by sending a few men to Wagner point, a few to Atchison hill, and a few more to Southwest hill. Had he done so, again he would have dispersed the patrol. *These tasks should be done one at a time in the order of their importance*, and, since the most direct route for his regiment is via 16, that is where he is most likely to find the enemy, and is the point on which he should direct his further march. It was not necessary to approach 16 along the road, and if he had tried to

get on the flank of any small force that might be near 16, by ascending the northern slope of Atchison hill, there could be no criticism of his action, *provided he kept the patrol together.*

Frequently, we will unwittingly disperse our command as a result of not having studied the map with sufficient care. It is advisable always to apply the scale of the map to the distances involved in the division of a command, before making a decision to divide it. More than that, we should read the map intelligently, and should remember that the terrain is very different from what we are likely to picture it, unless we have made a study of terrain from a military standpoint, and are able to use our imagination with intelligence when reading the map.

Lastly, we should not attempt on the map what we would not do on the ground. In solutions, such expressions as the following are not uncommon: "I will send 3 men to Wagner point to *signal me what they see there.*" Or, "I will march towards 16 with the remainder of the patrol and, if I encounter the enemy, will *signal the patrols on Wagner point and Southwest hill to rejoin.*" We have but to measure the distances on the map, and get a correct mental picture of the terrain, to realize that these signals probably would not be seen, and, even if they were, there is little chance of their being understood, for only the simplest messages can be sent in this manner, and the signals for these must be prearranged. Manifestly, we cannot foresee all the contingencies that may arise and devise a signal to meet each one of them.

CHAPTER III.

LEADING OF A CAVALRY PATROL.

SITUATION.

(See 2 and 4-inch maps).

The Missouri river is the boundary between hostile states. A Red force east of the river is known to be advancing on Leavenworth.

A Blue separate brigade with one squadron of cavalry has been pushed forward by rail to Winchester (19 miles west of Leavenworth) with orders to march on Leavenworth and seize the bridges over the Missouri at and near that point. The brigade was to camp at Winchester the night of September 20-21, covered by the cavalry which had been pushed forward toward Easton (11 miles west of Leavenworth). At 2 p. m., September 20, when the most advanced troop of the cavalry was approaching Easton, without having seen anything of the enemy, its commander gave Lieutenant A the following verbal order:

"The brigade commander has received information that the enemy is moving troops by rail to Beverley.

"Take a patrol of five privates from your platoon, proceed by way of Rock Island bridge to the vicinity of Beverley, and obtain information of any hostile forces that may be concentrating at that point.

"I will send another patrol under Sergeant A with similar instructions via Terminal bridge.

"The squadron will camp on the line of the Big Stranger (11

miles west of Leavenworth) to-night, with headquarters at Easton. You will go prepared to remain out over night." (*)

Lieutenant A selected five of the best men of his platoon and satisfied himself that they and their horses were in fit condition and that the latter were well shod and had no bad habits, such as neighing, which would render them unsuited for the work in hand. Rations, arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and equipment were carefully inspected and defects corrected. No cooked rations were available or they would have been taken. The inspection completed, Lieutenant A acquainted the men with the orders he received from the troop commander, taking great pains to insure their fully understanding the situation and what was expected of the patrol. The general principals governing the conduct of infantry patrols are, as a rule, equally applicable to cavalry patrols, and to avoid a repetition of the preceding chapters only such principles will be mentioned here as are peculiar to the conduct of cavalry patrols.

What route should Lieutenant A have taken for the first five miles of his march, supposing nothing was seen of the enemy?

During the march up to this point, Lieutenant A had been studying his map with the possibility of just such a mission as this in mind, and it took him but a moment to decide that his route at first would be along the Atchison pike via Frenchman. The Millwood road further to the north possibly might have been a less dangerous route, but the patrol would have been practically blindfolded the moment it entered the

* Fort Leavenworth is ungarrisoned.

woods east of Salt creek. If the enemy's cavalry had crossed the Missouri river it was more likely to be encountered in force on the Atchison pike than on the Millwood road, but Lieutenant A took this chance in order to get a view to the east from the hills south-east of Frenchman. A patrol should remain concealed from the enemy, yet it must see what is going on about it, and, if to do this it becomes necessary to expose itself, this additional risk must be taken without hesitation. Lieutenant A pointed out on his map to his patrol the route he proposed to take as far as the hills west of Leavenworth; he gave this information to Sergeant A also, and learned from him that he would enter Leavenworth via the Zimmerman road.

The formation and conduct of the patrol as far as Frenchman.

The patrol then took up the march. Lieutenant A and one man were in the lead, two men were about 100 yards to the rear and the remaining two men were 100 yards still farther to the rear. All followed the road, taking advantage of such cover as was afforded by ditches, hedges, etc. A patrol must advance quickly. The peculiar value of a cavalry patrol lies in its great mobility. To cross country, following woods, ravines, and other cover, would wholly sacrifice this mobility for increased security; the horses would become a mere burden and the patrol would be less mobile and efficient than one composed of infantry. In this case, mobility was of special importance. Beverly, Lieutenant A's objective, was 15 miles away, and the afternoon was already partly gone. As he

drew nearer to Beverley his march would have to be conducted with greater caution; consequently Lieutenant A appreciated the necessity for making as much speed as possible in the early part of the journey, without taking undue chances; he did not lose sight of the fact that he might meet hostile forces at any time, especially cavalry. The enemy, apparently, was pursuing precisely the same tactics, in his efforts to secure possession of the Missouri river bridges, as was the Blue separate brigade, and, if he were detraining troops at Beverley, he would undoubtedly push his cavalry forward at the earliest possible moment.

For the first few miles the patrol was in comparative safety, since the road it followed had already been passed over by the most advanced scouts of the squadron, and Lieutenant A, without neglecting to observe, trotted out, walking on the hills only, until he came up with a patrol from his platoon about four miles east of Easton. From this point he proceeded with greater caution and more slowly, occasionally stopping on commanding points to reconnoiter the country to the front, orient his map and point out the location of the patrol to his men. Little time was lost in this part of the journey in reconnoitering side roads, since it was the duty of other patrols to warn the squadron of the near approach of hostile patrols and Lieutenant A's chief concern was to reach the vicinity of Beverley without being discovered by the enemy.

At 3:45 p. m., the patrol was about one mile west of Frenchman. Here it met a farmer returning home from Leavenworth, who told Lieutenant A that when

he left Leavenworth at a little before 2 p. m., it was rumored that Red troops were being detrained at Beverly and that some of their cavalry had been seen along the east bank of the Missouri river about noon. Lieutenant A did not delay to question him further, but hastened on in an effort to gain the hills in his front before they could be reached by the enemy's patrols, which he now felt sure would soon be across the river if they were not so already. At Frenchman, he delayed long enough to water the horses—the road from the north and that from the east being observed, in the meantime, by mounted sentinels; he also inquired if the country to the east was visible from the top of Sentinel hill, and was told that it was not, this information verifying the accuracy of his map. Before leaving here, the men were told to observe this point well as it would be the place of assembly in case the patrol were scattered.

How should the patrol have been led from Frenchman to the high ridge to the southeast?

With his patrol still in the same formation as at the start, he covered the dangerous stretch of road southeast of Frenchman at a swift trot, without delaying to question the inhabitants; he pulled down to a walk at the forks of the road at the Moore house and took the right hand fork as being the easiest and quickest way to the top of the hill. He proceeded along the road to the cut on the top of the hill and then turned sharply off to the left and followed along the ridge, under cover, to a point on Atchison hill from which the low ground to the east was open to his view. It was then 4:15 p. m. Lieutenant A sent four mounted

men with instructions so to post themselves, two on either flank of the patrol at a distance of about 200 yards, as to prevent the patrol from being surprised. Lieutenant A then carefully examined the country in his front through his field glass for the purpose of determining whether the enemy had yet crossed the Missouri river and what the subsequent movements of the patrol should be.

He remained here for some minutes without seeing any signs of the enemy and had about decided to move down the hill and strike Hancock avenue when five mounted men, evidently a hostile patrol, appeared on the road along the north side of the U. S. Penitentiary, and moved at a trot towards Atchison Cross.

What action should Lieutenant A have taken in this situation?

Lieutenant A immediately decided that he must move, and remained but a moment longer to make sure that the Red patrol was not closely followed by other hostile forces; he then assembled the patrol, gave it all the information he had obtained up to that time, explained his present intentions, and moved it through the woods towards the Schmidt house. As the patrol was about to emerge from the woods, four Red troopers were seen on the road just north of the railroads coming down the hill towards the McGuire house. Lieutenant A immediately dismounted one man and left him to observe the movements of this second patrol while he conducted the remainder of the patrol and the led horse to a place of concealment in the little watercourse on the north slope of Atchison hill where all dismounted. One man was then sent towards the

cut at E to overlook the country to the east, one was sent to the southern edge of the little woods, two were left with the horses, and Lieutenant A joined the man who had been left to watch the hostile patrol. He found that the hostile patrol had halted at the Schmidt house, but presently it moved on along the road to the west. Moving along the side of the hill under cover, Lieutenant A was able to keep the patrol in sight, and was much relieved to see it joined at G by five Red cavalrymen from the direction of Atchison Cross, evidently the first patrol seen. The two patrols remained here for some minutes, apparently conferring with each other, and then all nine men continued their march west along Atchison pike and were soon out of sight beyond Sentinel hill. This was at 4:50 p. m.

What should Lieutenant A have done at this time?

Leaving the man in observation, Lieutenant A hastened back to his horses, called in his two sentinels and learned from them that they had seen no further indications of the enemy. Since this was the first contact with the enemy in this operation, information of it should be sent at once to the cavalry commander at Easton. He and the brigade commander should know as soon as possible that the enemy had actually set foot on the western bank of the Missouri. Moreover, the message bearers could get through with less danger than later on when more hostile cavalry probably would be between Lieutenant A and his squadron. But Lieutenant A did not want to spare the messengers. Even if he sent the message by one man only, he would be able to send but one more message. The truth of the matter is the patrol was too small for

its mission. Lieutenant A should have had at least 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 men; then he could have sent three messages and still have been left with an escort of 2 men. Two non-commissioned officers and 8 men would have been a still more appropriate strength for the patrol, but commanders often will be compelled to make patrols much weaker than they would like, so many are the demands on the cavalry. Under the circumstances, Lieutenant A decided it was best to delay sending the message by a messenger until he had determined whether other hostile troops were following the patrol he had seen, and to attempt, in the meantime, to telephone the information he had already secured to Easton.

Once more the patrol was mounted and started through the woods towards the Schmidt house (which was found to be unoccupied), picking up the sentinel on the way. It regained the road, turned east and trotted up the hill beyond the McGuire house until Lieutenant A reached the trail leading north along the ridge to Sheridan's Drive. Here Lieutenant A signaled the patrol to halt, dismounted and deliberately scanned the country in his front without seeing any signs of the enemy. He then mounted and took one man with him to the McGuire house, where he found a telephone, but was told by the operator at Leavenworth that there had been no communication with Easton for more than half an hour. He ceased his efforts to telephone, rejoined the patrol, and signaled it to assemble. The rear men having come up, he pointed out the principal features of the country and stated that their further march would be along Hancock and Pope avenues to the river bridge and

the timber beyond. The march was then resumed at a walk.

As the patrol passed the target butts, one of the central men was directed to skirt the woods south of Hancock avenue. Sheridan's Drive was passed without halting. Just as Lieutenant A reached the western corner of the National cemetery the right flanker signaled the enemy in sight, and Lieutenant A, halting the patrol, hastened to his side. Two hostile troopers were seen on Engineer hill, and three on Merritt hill moving west along the road across the cavalry drill ground.

What was a correct course to follow in this situation?

Lieutenant A believed these to be the advanced scouts of a larger force, probably then crossing the river bridge, and it took him but a moment to decide that his patrol must be moved to a point where it would be more secure from discovery, yet from which it could observe the country about Fort Leavenworth. Sending the flanker back to his former place in the center, he turned the patrol into the woods and started up the hill north of the road. As the patrol entered the woods, the distances were reduced to about 50 yards. After a few moments, a faint trail was found on top of the ridge; this was followed for about 300 yards to the northeast until the top of the hill was reached, from which the surrounding country was plainly visible. The patrol was then dismounted under cover and two men with the led horses were hidden deep in the woods; two men were sent to post themselves as sentinels about 200 yards away on the trail, one in each direction, while Lieutenant A and one man watched the country below.

The hostile patrols had disappeared, but four Red troopers were seen moving west along Pope avenue, followed at about 200 yards by about 20 more; a third detachment, carrying a guidon, followed about 500 yards further to the rear, and, as it came nearer, it was seen to be the larger part of a troop. The head of the column soon disappeared under the hill, but appeared a few moments later on the north slope of Engineer hill, where nearly an entire troop was soon assembled. About the same time, the head of a column of cavalry appeared on Pope avenue and a few minutes later it turned off the road onto West End parade, formed column of troops, halted and dismounted. There were three troops in this column and apparently they were going into camp for the night. It was evident that there was at least a squadron of cavalry west of the river. In the meantime, the troop on Engineer hill had sent small detachments to Merritt hill and toward Long ridge, as though it were putting out outposts; the remainder of the troop had dismounted.

What would be your estimate of this situation and your decision?

From what he had seen, Lieutenant A believed that the enemy had sent a squadron of cavalry to seize the bridge at Fort Leavenworth and hold the ground west of it, and that it had gone into camp and put one troop on outposts for the night. He could scarcely hope to get across the bridge under the circumstances, for the enemy would certainly have it closely watched by a detached post. What then was he to do? He thought of making a wide detour and attempting to

cross at the Terminal bridge, but he knew that Sergeant A was on that road so he rejected the idea. He had secured valuable information of the enemy, but he had not yet completed his mission. To carry out his original order appeared impracticable, but he believed that by remaining in the vicinity over night and continuing his reconnoissance in the morning, he might discover what forces were in the rear of the squadron. This he decided to do. His position at that moment was exceedingly dangerous, yet to move was still more so. If the enemy's patrols were moving on the trails through the woods, the best way to avoid them was to remain concealed in one place. It was now a few minutes after six o'clock; by 7 p. m., it would be quite dark and the enemy's patrols would then probably confine themselves to the main roads; besides, he wished to continue his observations from his present good position as long as there was sufficient light. So he remained where he was until dark, but without seeing anything new, and then assembled the patrol.

While daylight lasted, he wrote a message giving the result of his reconnoissance up to that time, and shortly after dark two men were each given a copy and sent together to carry it to Easton. They were instructed to go by the road over which they came, Lieutenant A fearing that they might lose their way in the darkness if sent by a new route. The remainder of the patrol was then moved down the hill, and, after the horses had been watered in Quarry creek, they were concealed in a small watercourse south of the creek. One man was placed on duty as sentinel, and one to hold the horses. In this way, two reliefs

were formed, Lieutenant A taking his turn with the others. There was no talking nor smoking, nor were the cinchas loosened nor the bridles removed. Lieutenant A had no grain in his nose bags when he received his orders, and he had neglected to fill them at any of the farm houses in Salt creek valley. He now regretted this thoughtlessness; but the horses were allowed to browse and green branches were cut for them. The horseholder was instructed to watch the horses for indication of danger; the patrol was told to scatter in case of attack and to assemble at day-break the following morning at Kickapoo, the location of which was explained.

What plan would you have formed, as patrol commander, for the following day?

The night was passed without alarm. During the night Lieutenant A had deliberated on a course of action for the next day. He believed that the enemy's cavalry would resume its march the following morning and that it would be closely followed by such other hostile troops as were east of the river. He thought of moving through the woods to a point north of the river bridge from which the bridge could be seen, and of observing the crossing of the enemy from this new position. But doing so would have been more hazardous than leaving the patrol in its hiding place while reconnoitering from the top of the hill. Troops from the other side of the river would come into view soon after crossing the bridge. The woods were very thick and there was a dense undergrowth that made them difficult to get through, and it was not possible to see the horses fifty yards away. The trail leading to

the hiding place was so faint as to be scarcely discernible, and, as it evidently had not been used for some months, it was not probable that the point where it entered the woods would be noticed. So at day-break, Lieutenant A, leaving two men with the horses, took one man and ascended the hill to his observation point of the evening before; this man he posted to watch the trail towards the west while he himself watched the approach from the east as best he could, at the same time observing what was going on below him.

The cavalry was early astir and was in column of march towards the west by sunrise. Soon the cavalry had disappeared and for an hour nothing was seen except one or two mounted patrols; but about 6:30 a. m., infantry was seen approaching on Pope avenue in advance guard formation. The column moved west along the road until it disappeared under the hill. For an hour the successive parts of the advance guard and main body continued to march by in plain view of Lieutenant A. He had carefully observed the passing of the different portions of the column and found its strength to be three regiments of infantry and two batteries of field artillery. For half an hour longer, or until 8 a. m., Lieutenant A waited, thinking that other troops might follow, but nothing appeared.

What should Lieutenant A have done at this time?

Lieutenant A had finished the first part of his mission. He had complete information of the enemy's strength, but the task yet before him promised to be the most dangerous of all—to deliver this information

to his commanding officer. For the second time, he realized that his patrol was not made as strong as it should have been. The information he had was too important to take any risks in its delivery, yet he did not wish to cease his observations. He knew he might justly be censured, despite the brilliant success of his reconnaissance, if he ceased his observations before fatigue or reduced numbers compelled him to return, and his first inclination was to send his information back by two men while he continued to observe the hostile force from a position on its flank. Had he had a good non-commissioned officer to carry the message he would have done this, but he reflected that by attempting too much, he might fail to deliver the important information already in his possession, so he decided to return for at least a part of the way with the remaining three men.

Without delay, he assembled the patrol, mounted it, carefully explained to the three men all the information in his possession, and instructed them, in case the patrol were scattered, to make every effort to reach their command. Stopping a moment to water the horses, the patrol, in single file, with about 50 yards distance between files, then took a northerly direction through the woods, picking its way as best it could, and following the contour of the hills. Lieutenant A was in the lead and made all speed possible under the circumstances, stopping occasionally to listen, or when about to cross a trail through the woods. After about two miles of this hard marching, the patrol, at 9:05 a. m., reached a well defined road running east and west through the woods. Lieutenant A turned west on this road (which he believed to be

the 5—9—11 road marked on his map), signaled the leading man to join him and the others to increase their distances, and took the trot.

In a few minutes, he came to the edge of the woods and saw Salt creek valley, and the Millwood road leading straight to the west before him. He delayed here a moment to search the country but saw nothing. Soon after leaving the wood, the patrol was fired on from Hancock hill but it reached the ravine at the Schroeder house without casualty and followed the ravine under cover of the hill to Salt creek bridge which it crossed in safety and again took up the trot. When approaching the cross-road at Taylor school house, distant firing was heard to the southwest (*). About a mile further on, he met a patrol of five men from his squadron. The non-commissioned officer in charge told him of the whereabouts of the squadron and gave him a man to guide him to it, and at 10:30 a. m. Lieutenant A reported the result of his reconnaissance to his squadron commander.

* It was learned later that this was the termination of a cavalry combat in which the hostile cavalry was driven back, the successful termination of the combat being due largely to the definite information the Blue cavalry commander had received from the two messengers sent in by Lieutenant A the night of September 20-21.

CHAPTER IV. LEADING OF A CAVALRY PATROL.

PROBLEM.

(See 2 and 4-inch maps).

A Blue infantry brigade, with artillery and one squadron of cavalry attached, approaching Leavenworth through friendly territory, bivouacked for the night September 29-30, about six miles east of the Platte river. It is known that Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth are ungarrisoned, and that a Red force is approaching these points from the northwest. The Missouri river is the boundary between the Blue and Red states.

A Blue cavalry patrol of five men, under Lieutenant A, was sent out late in the afternoon of September 29 with orders to cross the Missouri at Fort Leavenworth, proceed via Kickapoo and obtain information of the enemy's strength, location, and movements. Another Blue patrol, under Lieutenant B, was sent at the same time through Leavenworth and to the west towards Easton on a similar mission. The Blue cavalry expects to cross the Missouri, at Leavenworth, at 8 a. m., September 30.

At 9 p. m., September 29, Lieutenant A's patrol reached the farm house on the edge of the U. S. Timber Reserve, about one mile east of the Rock Island bridge, and stopped for the night. Here he obtains complete information of the country about Fort Leavenworth that supplements that given on his map.

Note—All messages that would be sent by Lieutenant A should be written out in full on a regular message blank.

Required:

1. (a) Lieutenant A's hour of starting September 30. Give reasons.

Note—It is broad daylight at 6:00 a. m.

(b) Route or routes he intends to take for the first five miles of the march, if nothing is seen of the enemy.

SOLUTION.

(a) Lieutenant A will start at 4:30 a. m. Starting at this hour should enable him to get through or around Fort Leavenworth without being seen, and to be in observation on the heights west of Fort Leavenworth at the first break of day. If, contrary to the information he has of the enemy, a Red patrol, or other small hostile force, should be in Fort Leavenworth, his chances of getting across the Missouri river bridge will be very poor whatever he may do, but they will be best, if he makes the attempt before daylight. Moreover, due to the nearness of the opposing forces, it is important to get information of the enemy's main body as early as practicable.

(b) He will proceed via the direct route across the bridge to 4, thence via 6 to the south bank of One Mile creek, thence across country to Grant avenue near Merritt hill, and then via 8, D and Sheridan's Drive to Hancock hill.

Continuation of the Problem.

At 6:00 a. m the patrol is observing from Hancock hill, having just reached here without seeing anything of the enemy, and apparently without hav-

ing been seen by the inhabitants of the country. From here Lieutenant A observes a hostile cavalry patrol of eight men approaching 17 from the north. At 17 the hostile patrol divides, five men going towards Frenchman and three towards 15, all at a trot.

(c) Further intentions of Lieutenant A, with reasons.

Continuation of the Solution.

(c) Lieutenant A decides to conceal the patrol in the immediate vicinity until the hostile patrol has passed well beyond his hiding place, and then to continue his reconnaissance. The place of concealment is of secondary importance. We prefer moving to the vicinity of 13, observing from the edge of the woods while making the move, because at 13, observation can be continued from the edge of the woods, and the patrol would be in a good position to resume its march to the west. Moreover, the hostile patrol probably will move either via Sheridan's Drive, or via the 11—5 road towards Fort Leavenworth, and it probably will not move towards 13. However, a hiding place in the woods near Hancock hill probably would be quite as good. There is small danger of the hostile patrol "cutting Lieutenant A's trail" where he crosses the 11—15 road.

Continuation of the Problem.

Lieutenant A moved to the vicinity of 13 with his entire patrol and concealed it in the woods until some minutes after the hostile patrol had passed 11. Such observation as he can make from the edge of the woods near 13 reveals no further indications of the enemy. He decides to move to 17 (6:45 a. m).

(d) Route, formation and conduct of the patrol to 17, with reasons for the same.

(e) Route beyond 17 for two miles, supposing nothing is seen of the enemy and that a countryman met at 17 tells Lieutenant A that the enemy camped about six miles northwest of Kickapoo last night. Give reasons for the route selected.

Continuation of the Solution.

(d) The patrol will move down the water-course south of the Schafer house to Salt creek and up Salt creek to the bridge on the Millwood road; from this bridge the patrol will follow the road to 17. Although improbable, the hostile patrol may be observing *to the west* from Hancock hill, and consequently the patrol follows the less exposed route across country from 13 to Salt creek bridge. This route is a bit safer than that along the 11—15 road, but the patrol will be more mobile if it takes this road and to do so does not constitute a serious error, for the chances are that the hostile patrol has continued its march to Fort Leavenworth or along Sheridan's Drive.

To attempt to keep under cover from all points after crossing Salt creek bridge, by moving down the west bank of the creek and up the water-course to J. Aaron, is a useless waste of energy and time. It has been some time since the hostile patrol passed, and the Blue patrol is now in more danger of observation from the west than from the east.

Any formation of the patrol is correct that prevents surprise, favors reconnaissance in the direction of the enemy, and permits the escape of the greatest possible number of men in case the enemy is encoun-

tered. Lieutenant A and one man leading, followed by three men at 100 yards and one man 100 yards still further to the rear would be such a formation. From Salt creek bridge to 17 the patrol *will keep the road and move at a trot*. Near J. E. Daniels, Lieutenant A will go to the top of the hill to observe, or may send 2 men to observe and rejoin at an increased gait *on the road*. No flankers are sent out. It would be a mistake to reduce the gait of the patrol on the road to keep it level with a slowly moving flanker in the fields to the right or left of the road.

(e) If the enemy camped "about six miles northwest of Kickapoo last night," as stated by the countryman at 17, he should be approaching that village when the patrol is at 17. A look at the map, as well as at the ground, shows that the roads about Kickapoo can be observed from Crook point, and the patrol makes for this high ground by the quickest route, having due regard for cover. This route lies along the 17—19—21 road to that spur of Crook point which terminates in a small hill just north of 21; thence northwest across country, keeping under cover of this spur to the woods on Crook point. If it should appear that the patrol could follow the 21—83—81 road (see 2-inch map) and reach the cover of the woods more quickly, that route could be taken. The patrol might have proceeded west from 17 to 85, thence via 83 to Crook point; this route is longer, but it gives a view from Briedenbach and affords a look along the 85—87 road.

To go north on the 17—47 road to Plum creek and then west along the creek to Crook point, or to go west on the 17—19—85 road to the Duffin house and

then north along the 900 foot contour, or to take any other such difficult route across country, constitutes an objectionable sacrifice of mobility for concealment. The information obtained from the countryman at 17 is not from a sufficiently reliable source to justify sending a message.

Continuation of the Problem.

At 8 a. m., the patrol is on Crook point in observation, having seen nothing more of the enemy, but having been observed by numerous countrymen along the road, from whom no additional information was obtained. At 8:02 a. m., a troop of Red cavalry is seen emerging from Kickapoo on the 45—47—17 road with a patrol on the 23—19 road, and the dust of an infantry advance guard can be seen along the 51—49—43 road. Lieutenant A continues to observe until 8:40 a. m.; the tail of the column is then at 43, and the head of the advance guard is approaching 17. He has counted two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery. The troop of cavalry has disappeared—a small part towards 11 and the remainder beyond Frenchman. An advancing wagon train extends for nearly half a mile west of 49.

(f) Disposition of patrol while in observation on Crook point.

(g) Lieutenant A's intentions, together with the route he proposes to take, if he moves the patrol from its present position. Give reasons.

Continuation of the Solution.

(f) Any disposition is correct that conceals the horses and men, watches the 83—81 road and the 83—21 road, and keeps the roads into Kickapoo under

close observation. Such a disposition would be to conceal the horses among the trees on the east slope with one man holding them, while one man observes the 83—21 road, two men posted together observe the 83—81 road, and Lieutenant A and one man observe south and west of Kickapoo.

To leave the approach to Crook point from 81 unobserved would be a mistake, for the enemy certainly should send a cavalry patrol over this commanding ground; while it is not probable such a patrol would go far off the road, much less examine the half mile or more of woods on Crook point, still Lieutenant A should have timely warning of the approach of such a patrol and its movements should be watched from the moment it is first sighted until it is well beyond the Blue patrol's hiding place.

(g) Lieutenant A has the information he was sent out to secure. The presence of the wagon train indicates that the force seen is not the advance guard of a larger force. The information should be delivered to the squadron commander without delay. Lieutenant A may send it back by two messengers, or he may return with his entire patrol and make a report in person. The latter is the more certain plan, but it will compel Lieutenant A to interrupt his reconnaissance on the enemy's flank. However, the enemy is so near the Blue detachment, that there is slight probability of losing touch with him, and, consequently, there is no great necessity for Lieutenant A to hang on to the flank of the hostile column. It would be different, were the enemy still some miles from the Blue detachment; in that case, Lieutenant A should send his information by messengers, and should con-

tinue to observe the enemy's movements. Accordingly, he decides to return at once with his information.

To move the patrol *east* and south to Leavenworth, where the Blue cavalry was to cross at 8 a. m., is out of the question. Even should the patrol succeed in crossing in rear of the hostile column and gaining the woods along Sheridan's Drive, it certainly should not be able to get through the country about Fort Leavenworth, which probably is now occupied by hostile cavalry and soon will be by hostile infantry.

Lieutenant A must keep to the *west* and south of the Red force while returning with his patrol. He is in little danger of encountering hostile patrols in the first part of his march, since the hostile cavalry has passed beyond him, and he should take the road *at once* and make the best possible speed. He will move via 83 west and south to 85; here he might go across country to I if the terrain is such as will not greatly retard his patrol. Otherwise he will proceed via the 87—K—I—100—Zimmerman road and join the cavalry wherever found. The slight additional security gained by making a wider detour to the west and south will not compensate for the increased delay in delivering the information.

COMMENTS.

In solving this problem, the important thing to determine at the outset is what was expected of the patrol. Put yourself for a moment in the place of the squadron commander, or better still in the place of the brigade commander, and imagine what your state of mind will be when you reach Leavenworth to-morrow with your brigade, and find the surrounding hills oc-

cupied by the enemy, while your cavalry has given you no definite report as to its strength. Looking at the matter in this way is it not clear that our two officers' patrols are intended to find the hostile main body? Any less definite information from them than full reports of the enemy's strength and movements will be disappointing to the brigade commander, and if due to any fault in the leading of their patrols would justly entitle them to censure.

Viewing the situation thus broadly, Lieutenant A sent no message from Hancock hill. In the preceding chapters we found an opportunity to mention the general rule that first contact with the enemy should be at once reported, but here we have a situation in which there is doubt as to whether the rule should be observed. In his anxiety to clear up the situation in his front, a patrol leader is in danger of neglecting to give due importance to the situation in his rear. The squadron from which our patrol was detached is to cross the Missouri river at 8 a. m., and at this hour (6 a. m.) it is probably on the march, eight or ten miles east of the river, with local patrols four or five miles in its front. These patrols will probably come in contact near Leavenworth or Fort Leavenworth with the hostile cavalry patrol and get information of its presence back to the squadron commander about as early as it could be delivered to him by Lieutenant A's messenger. Information of the mere presence of a hostile patrol, from which no sound inference can be drawn except that the enemy is near—a fact already known to the squadron commander—is not sufficiently noteworthy to make a delay of a few minutes in its delivery a matter of importance; this is

especially true since the squadron has little choice of route while east of the Missouri, but must cross the river at one of the two bridges. Had the lieutenant been sent out to secure information of the hostile *cavalry*, it certainly would have been wrong for him to neglect to send a message of this first contact. But such is not the case; his mission is specific; it is to get information of the strength, location and movements of the enemy's *main body*. He has a right to hope that he will soon be able to report other and more important facts, and to believe that he may leave to other Blue patrols the task of reporting the presence of the hostile patrol he has just seen. However, the case is far from being clear, and if he had decided to spare at least one man and send a message he would not have committed a serious error. Before resuming his march from 13 the lieutenant made a note of his observations of the hostile patrol, thinking he might include it in a later message.

It would not have been strange had Lieutenant A divided the patrol as soon as it crossed the Missouri river bridge and sent its parts over two or more widely separated routes with orders to assemble at some point farther along. This is a mistake. The many contingencies that may arise to prevent one portion or another from being at the designated meeting point make this scattering of the patrol exceedingly objectionable. It is preferable to keep the patrol together along a single route, so chosen that observation frequently may be made from high points that afford a wide view of many roads in the direction of the enemy.

“In time of peace, when fighting capacity does not count, where most persons have maps, where no one is

captured, and where individual messengers safely ride past hostile detachments, the subdivision of an officer's patrol into a number of small groups may sometimes achieve the desired end. In time of war it exposes the leader to the loss of his escort, which is necessary for his safety, for reliefs to messengers, and for fighting. Ferreting out, recognizing, and observing the enemy essentially is the function of the leader. He alone has a general view of the situation, and with his map and field glasses possesses superior facilities for the work. His men can perform only secondary duties for him; and small parties of them will be detached only for short distances and to accomplish some minor object—otherwise the reins will slip from the leader's hands and the thinnest hostile screen will become impenetrable." (*)

We may object to the route selected because of the difficulty of following it. From inquiries made at the farm house where Lieutenant A stopped for the night, he will learn of the practicability of this route and, if he has any doubt about his ability to follow it in the darkness, he can obtain a guide. He may have some trouble going through the woods south of the One Mile creek in the darkness, but his compass or his guide will keep him in the right direction and the roads and street car line near Merritt hill will serve to orient him.

There is little choice between this route and the route north from 4 via the trail through the gardens, and the wood road 5—11. The former gives the earlier view from the high ground west of Fort Leavenworth, but the latter is the more direct route to

* General von Alten in *Studies in Applied Tactics*.

Kickapoo and may be more easy to follow; but it leads past the railroad station and several houses, and concealment, which is of prime importance, would be difficult. In any case Fort Leavenworth should be carefully avoided. It is not probable that anything of importance can be learned by passing through the fort, but, on the other hand, the patrol might be discovered by an early riser. The fact that the patrol was able to cross the river bridge is sufficient indication that no large parties of the enemy are in the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth.

The route via the Frenchman—17 road has no advantages to offset the disadvantage of being about 200 feet lower than Sheridan's Drive. This drive is not only the best route for observation, but for concealment as well, the dense woods along the drive furnishing perfect cover.

We might have neglected to observe the teachings of our Field Service Regulations that "Patrols should avoid combat unless it is absolutely necessary to the execution of their orders," and have decided to attempt the capture of the hostile patrol. Little can be said in favor of this and much can be said against it. At least one of the hostile troopers should be able to escape and give warning of our presence to the main hostile cavalry force, and this might make the further execution of our mission more difficult. Whether we capture one or all three, will the advantages of the capture outweigh the disadvantages? Their regimental insignia may disclose something to our brigade commander, or even to us if we are well informed concerning the organization of the enemy's forces. We will question them, of course, if we can

speak their language, but, unless they are very stupid, the information extracted from them will not be reliable and we will have to continue our reconnaissance. We examine them separately; one says there is a regiment of hostile cavalry following, another says a squadron, and another says a troop. Which are we to believe? It takes time and skillful questioning to get information from prisoners. If we are wise, we will think of what disposition we are to make of them before being carried away by our zeal to capture them. If we take them with us, the further march of the patrol will be greatly handicapped by their presence. If we send them back across the river, we will have to weaken our patrol greatly and, with five hostile troopers moving toward Fort Leavenworth, it is doubtful whether we could send them across the bridge. That prisoners are of great value to a commander is well understood. The information extracted from them serves to check that obtained from other sources. But a small patrol, situated as was Lieutenant A's, probably will lessen the sum total of information it may gather, if it burdens itself with two or three prisoners.

While moving west from 13 the lieutenant accompanied the point. Ordinarily, in this position the patrol leader will be unnecessarily exposing himself to capture; this he should studiously avoid, for a patrol that has lost its leader, and with him field-glasses, map, etc., is reduced to a more or less helpless state. But, as the country was open to the west, thus precluding a surprise, the lieutenant thought it not only allowable, but advisable to go to the head of his patrol and guide the point across the country.

Was our lieutenant correct in not sending a message

from Crook point as soon as he reached there at 8 a. m. and saw the hostile column approaching? Again we call attention to the situation in his rear. Had he given the matter any thought, he might have been reasonably sure that there were but eight hostile troopers between him and his squadron, and the latter should have been just crossing into Leavenworth. Had he sent a message then (8 a. m.), the messengers probably would have been able to get through, whereas if he waited until he had seen the entire hostile column, the hostile troop would be between him and his squadron, thus interrupting the messenger service. Had he informed his major without delay that the enemy was approaching via Kickapoo, the major would have been able to direct the march of his squadron with absolute certainty; and, barring the enemy's strength, the situation would have been made clear to the brigade commander. Why then did our lieutenant not send a message. He probably was overanxious about reducing the strength of his patrol, which was made not strong enough in the beginning; there was every reason to believe that the entire patrol would soon return, and he may have thought it better to keep the patrol intact and preserve its full fighting power for the return journey. By doing so, however, he delayed the delivery of important information for forty minutes; and if he gets through the hostile cavalry after 8:40 a. m., the events, so far as his squadron at least is concerned, probably will overtake the message. As an additional exercise, we would suggest writing the message that *should have been sent from Crook point at 8 a. m.* The message should mention the patrol seen at 6 a. m. from Hancock hill, and the information obtained from the countryman at 17.

CHAPTER V.
AN ADVANCE.

SITUATION.

(See 2 and 4-inch maps).

A Blue detachment, in hostile country, is attempting to assemble at Leavenworth, by rail from the north. The 1st Infantry, and Troop A, 2d Cavalry (accompanied by their field and combat trains), commanded by Colonel A, are the first troops to be sent forward. On reaching Kickapoo during the afternoon of July 14, Colonel A learned that the important steel bridge at the mouth of Salt creek (on the M. P. R. R. between Kickapoo and Leavenworth) had been blown up by Red sympathizers. Accordingly, he detrained his command and took quarters in Kickapoo. His cavalry patrols were able to reconnoiter through Fort Leavenworth and Leavenworth before nightfall, and when they returned to Kickapoo they reported both places free of the enemy at 8 p. m. Companies A and B, and one platoon of Troop A are on outpost for the night on the line L. A. Aaron—Plum hill, with one company on the 23—21 road and one on the 45—47 road.

At 10 p. m., Colonel A receives the following telegraphic orders from General B, at superior headquarters: "It appears that the enemy contemplates moving a force to Leavenworth over the Missouri Pacific railroad from the south. It is important that he should not get possession of Leavenworth. Proceed

to the south to-morrow with your entire command, interrupt the railroads to the south of Leavenworth, especially the Missouri Pacific, and endeavor to locate any hostile forces advancing from the south. The 2d Infantry will reach Kickapoo some time July 16. Detachments from the 3d Infantry are now guarding the railroad in your rear."

Note—Missouri is a neutral state. The roads are free from mud or thick dust.

Required:

Colonel A's estimate of the situation, and his orders for the advance, on the supposition that no additional information of the enemy is received before the march begins.

SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION.

We find no difficulty in discovering Colonel A's mission from his orders. It is evident that General B wishes to complete his concentration at Kickapoo before the enemy can seize Leavenworth and vicinity, and that he fears he will not be able to do this unless the enemy's advance on Leavenworth is delayed. Accordingly, our colonel is ordered to interrupt the railroads as being the simplest and surest means of delaying the enemy with the force at his disposal. But we should not overlook the second part of his mission, which is to locate the advancing enemy.

It would not be strange, had we complained of the scantiness of Colonel A's information of the enemy, and wondered why the spy or other person who learned that the enemy contemplated moving a force to Leavenworth by rail, did not also learn when this movement was to begin. This ignorance of the enemy is

the rule in war, and if we find it annoying when solving a map problem, we may imagine how very disconcerting it must be when actually in command of troops in the face of the enemy. Precisely here lies the difficulty of troop leading—that we seldom know with any certainty the movements, strength, and intentions of the enemy, and that we must therefore fall back on *conjectures*, mostly based on very scant information. The more skillfully we learn to picture to ourselves the whole situation, based on more or less trustworthy information available, the better will be our arrangements. But, if the “fog of war” conceals the enemy’s movements, strength and intentions from us, it equally shields us from the view of the enemy, and we may find comfort, as did General Grant according to his own statement, in the thought that if we are mystified the enemy is no better off.

We cannot tell when the enemy will begin his movement on Leavenworth. It may be to-night, it may be to-morrow, and it may not be for some days. It is useless to speculate on this point before additional information is obtained from some source; and, unless this information is secured from superior headquarters, the enemy may be able to reach the vicinity of Leavenworth before our colonel becomes aware of his near presence. The Blue force is operating in a hostile country, and it can not hope to get much, if any, reliable information from the inhabitants. On the other hand, the Red force probably is much better supplied with information. The country is intersected with commercial telegraph and telephone lines, over which the inhabitants may communicate with the Red commanders. The destruction of the railway

bridge at the mouth of Salt creek, and Colonel A's arrival at Kickapoo doubtless have been reported to the enemy, and on this supposition we may fairly base the conclusion that he will lose no time in his effort to reach Leavenworth. We may safely count on an intelligent enemy doing those things which we least want him to do, and should make our plans accordingly. The fact that General B wishes to keep the hostile force out of Leavenworth is the very best of reasons for thinking that it will attempt to reach that town in superior strength before the Blue detachment can complete its concentration at Kickapoo. Consequently, Colonel A should base his arrangements for the march on the supposition that the enemy may be encountered at any time.

Communications on the railroads can be most easily interrupted by destroying bridges and culverts, of which there are many to the south of Leavenworth. First come those over Five Mile creek, and from the length of the creek and the area drained by it, we may assume the bridges are of some size, especially the one at its mouth. The map shows others farther to the south, and there probably are still others too small to be indicated on the map as well as those beyond the limits of the map. The wooden structures may be burnt, but those of steel should be demolished with explosives. (*) Although all three railroads may be used by the enemy, and consequently should be in-

* For a full description of how this is done, see **Engineer Field Manual**, page 417, or **Beach's Manual of Military Field Engineering**, Chapter XX. A command the size of Colonel A's should be supplied with explosives when sent on an independent mission, and we will assume it is so supplied, but were it not, explosives could be obtained in Leavenworth.

errupted, still Colonel A should give his first and principal attention to the Missouri Pacific, for this is the road over which the enemy is expected to advance.

Perhaps you are of the opinion that Colonel A should not delay his march at Five Mile creek, since that stream is so near Leavenworth, but should hasten on to bridges farther south. More delay to the enemy probably will be secured, however, by beginning the demolition at the earliest practicable hour, for we may be sure the news of it will speedily reach the enemy's trains, if they are approaching, and will make them very cautious in their advance, if in fact it does not make the troops detrain and follow the wagon roads. It is preferable to begin the demolition at Five Mile creek and make certain of stopping the trains south of Leavenworth; afterwards, it may be wise to continue the march, for the farther south the interruption eventually is made the greater the advantage to the Blue force. Five Mile creek, in the vicinity of its mouth, therefore becomes the first point on which Colonel A will direct his march.

Although we should be prepared to meet the enemy at any moment, still his near presence is so problematical that ease and rapidity of marching are the main things to be sought in the selection of a route; but this does not mean that the safety of the command is to be neglected. From Kickapoo, it matters little whether the regiment moves south on the 23—19—17, or the 47—17 road, although the latter is the more natural route and the more convenient on account of its location with respect to the outposts. At 17, the column may continue south, or it may turn east and go through Fort Leavenworth or along Sheridan's Drive.

The route south from 17 is the shortest, and on it the command will be in least danger, since it avoids the woods and always has its line of retreat directly in its rear. This road is also the best improved and most traveled (but the map does not show this), and consequently the infantry can march over it with least delay and fatigue. It is often important to keep marching troops on the best highways, even though they may be a trifle longer, for the extra distance is more than made up for by greater speed and less fatigue. From 17, then, Colonel A will follow the H—G—14—66a road, and thence along the outskirts of Leavenworth to the vicinity of 234.

We should not attempt at this time to choose Colonel A's route beyond Five Mile creek, for, not only may he never get so far, but even if he should, his further route will depend on many contingencies which cannot be foreseen.

Let us now consider what provisions Colonel A will make for the protection of his command while on the march. If troops were to move in the presence of the enemy in a continuous column with no small parties out to some distance to give warning of the near approach of the enemy, they would be in great danger of being suddenly attacked, thrown into confusion, and maybe defeated before they could deploy for efficient action. To avoid any such calamity, the larger part of a command, called the main body, is protected when on the march by smaller parts in front, on the flanks, or in rear, called advance, flank, and rear guards. In the situation before us the column is moving towards the enemy and the covering duties are performed mainly by an advance guard. In a

later situation (*) we will see how the duty of covering this same command falls to the lot of a rear guard.

No absolute rule can be given for determining the strength of an advance guard. Our Field Service Regulations state that, subject to variation according to the situation, one-ninth to one-third of the whole force may be assumed as a suitable detachment for this purpose; the ratio its size bears to the whole command will vary with the object of the march, the nature of the country, the character of the enemy, and the strength of the force it is covering. If too weak, it cannot do what is expected of it. If too strong, the commander unnecessarily loses immediate control of some of his troops, and the command is unnecessarily fatigued, for service with the advance guard is much more exhausting than with the main body. Very small commands are so quickly and easily put in fighting formation, that they need only a comparatively small advance guard. Thus a company might be amply protected with a single squad in its front, and a battalion with a platoon. But as commands increase in size, it takes longer and becomes more difficult to deploy and prepare them for action, and the ratio of the strength of the advance guard to that of the whole command must be increased in proportion.

As far as practicable, tactical unity should be preserved in detailing an advance guard. No officer likes to be deprived of a part of his command, nor is the splitting up of tactical units consistent with the most efficient employment of a command; for once a company, battalion, or regiment is divided, we cannot say when its parts will again be brought together. We

* See Chapter XII.

will often find this "preservation of tactical unity" exceedingly bothersome, for the situations are numerous in which other considerations are more important.

Such is the case in the situation before us. Taking everything into consideration, two companies appear to be ample infantry for the advance guard. The enemy may not be near, the country is fairly open so that surprise is difficult, and the far reaching reconnaissance of the cavalry will give timely warning of the approach of the enemy. Under these conditions, two companies should be able to insure the uninterrupted progress of the main body, in case the enemy *is not* encountered in strength, and to protect the main body against serious attacks without due warning, in case the enemy *is* encountered in strength. But this arrangement will require Colonel A to split a battalion and the question he now has to answer is—Shall I place twice as many men as are necessary in the advance guard in order to preserve the tactical unity of a battalion? Should he do so, he would pay too great a price for tactical unity, and would show an unreasoning adherence to a principle that is subject to frequent exceptions.

You may have decided to detail the present outpost infantry (Companies A and B) for the advance guard. This arrangement is objectionable, for the outposts should be shown every possible consideration after their night of arduous duty, whereas placing them in the advance guard would give them the position of greatest danger and fatigue. Moreover, if the advance guard duties are to be performed in the most efficient manner, fresh troops should be assigned to this task when practicable. In exceptional situa-

tions, it may be wise to form the advance guard from troops on outpost, but in the ordinary case, fresh troops will perform this duty and the outposts will be assigned a place in the main body. So Colonel A fixes on two companies from the 2d Battalion for his advance guard infantry.

For several reasons, it would be well to have the battalion commander go with these two companies. In the first place, the advance guard should be commanded, where practicable, by an experienced officer. Two companies are not a command appropriate for the lieutenant-colonel, but it may be given to a major. Then these will be the first companies to become engaged in case the enemy is encountered, and the major will not want to be separated from them at such a time; when the remaining two companies of the battalion come up, he will have to take command of the reunited battalion, and he will be better prepared to lead it if he has been on the ground from the moment the enemy was first encountered. So, also, the two companies not in the advance guard should be at the head of the main body, that they may be the first reinforcements sent to the advance guard.

It is Colonel A's duty to prescribe the distance that should be preserved between the rear of the advance guard and the head of the main body. This distance will vary with the situation. On the one hand, it must be great enough to protect the main body against delay, and to afford it time to deploy in case the enemy is encountered; on the other hand, it must not be so great that timely support of the advance guard becomes impracticable. Almost any distance between 500 and 700 yards will meet these require-

ments fairly well so we will select the mean of these and call it 600 yards. No one distance can be declared better than any and all others. After reading Chapter VII, we will see that the leading element of the advance guard infantry is about 1500 yards from the head of the main body, and that the cavalry point is still farther away. Consequently, it is not at all probable the main body will get within effective rifle range of the enemy before he has been discovered by the advance guard; and if the main body wishes to go to the assistance of the advance guard, its leading companies can deploy and cover the intervening 600 yards in about 10 minutes.

The distance between main body and advance guard may be preserved either by requiring the advance guard to regulate its march on that of the main body, or vice versa. In a command as small as this there is little difficulty in keeping touch with the main body, and the advance guard may be required to regulate its march on that of the main body. However, when the commanding officer rides with the advance guard, as generally will be the case when near the enemy, it probably is simpler to have it establish the rate of march for the whole column whatever may be the size of the command. The commanding officer will arrange for the halts to rest as he sees fit, and his method of doing this may vary from day to day to suit the conditions of the march.

We are now ready to consider what use Colonel A shall make of his cavalry, and it is assumed that we are acquainted with the essential characteristics of this arm and what it can accomplish by way of assisting the other arms. However, it may be well to recall

that its mobility enables it to cover much more ground than infantry, and to get to a point more quickly, while its ability to fight dismounted as well as mounted enables it to combat the enemy without the assistance of the other arms. It is therefore a very independent and self-reliant arm, with a very wide radius of action. It is the arm *par excellence* for reconnaissance, and to it we naturally would entrust those missions calling for both fighting power and great mobility.

As a general rule we should avoid scattering the cavalry, and exceptions should not be made to this rule without very good reasons. The amount of cavalry with a small infantry command generally will be so small, and the tasks we would like to give it so numerous, that we will find it difficult to avoid scattering it to such an extent that it will not have strength enough at any point to accomplish anything of importance. By attempting to do too much, we end in doing nothing. In most situations, cavalry can only get results really worth while in the same way as infantry—by fighting; and if it is to fight advantageously, the bulk of it must be held together.

Of all the tasks we would like to give the cavalry in any particular situation, we generally will find some one more important than the others; *the bulk of the cavalry should be assigned this task, and duties of less importance should be performed by smaller detachments, such as patrols.* Still, it will not always be easy to decide how best to employ the bulk of the cavalry, but in general we will not go far wrong if we utilize its mobility and fighting power in the execution of that task for which the remainder of our com-

mand is not so well fitted, and yet is most essential to the accomplishment of our mission.

Were Colonel A's cavalry stronger, it might be sent ahead of the infantry to begin the destruction of the bridges. Alternating the trot and walk, it can make 5 miles per hour, and so small a command might do better than this for two or three hours without over-fatigue, if all the conditions are favorable. In three hours from the time it leaves Kickapoo, it can be five or six miles south of Leavenworth ready to begin the interruption of the railways. This is about three hours earlier than the infantry can reach the same point. But it is unwise to send so small a force of cavalry so far ahead of its infantry support in a situation as uncertain as this. Trains bearing superior hostile cavalry may enter Leavenworth at any time, and Colonel A cannot afford to take the chance of having his cavalry cut off and destroyed or scattered. Weak cavalry, in the face of strong opposing cavalry, is compelled to remain near its infantry support. This was amply illustrated on the Japanese side in the recent Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese cavalry was very weak in numbers, and small parties of it were seldom or never sent so far in advance of their infantry support that they were liable to become a sacrifice to the superior numbers of the Russian cavalry. (*)

So long as it is unknown whether the enemy reached Leavenworth during the night, Colonel A's troop had better act with caution and not get too far from its infantry, but it may proceed much more boldly

* To those of our readers who are interested in this subject, we recommend reading *Reconnaissance in the Russo-Japanese War*, by an anonymous German writer.

should it discover Leavenworth unoccupied by hostile forces, and Colonel A should then have no great hesitancy about hurrying the troop ahead to begin the demolition of the bridges. Of course the cavalry will be depended upon for far reaching reconnaissance, and at the beginning of its march this duty, together with adding to the security of the column, will constitute its principal task. Its employment later in the day will depend on the manner in which the situation develops.

Colonel A may keep the cavalry under his own control, or he may place it in the advance guard under the immediate control of the advance guard commander. In the former case it is called "*independent cavalry*" and in the latter "*advance guard cavalry.*" At the beginning of the march the cavalry and the advance guard will have the same mission; consequently tactical unity of action will be best secured by having both under the same commander. For example, suppose the enemy's infantry and cavalry are met in force in the vicinity of Leavenworth (and we have seen that this is quite probable), the march of our single troop probably would be stopped, and the advance guard would have to come to its assistance; in which event each will cooperate with the other to best advantage if both are under the control of one mind from the beginning. It would be different, if the situation permitted of sending the cavalry far ahead of the advance guard, to the south of Leavenworth, to begin the destruction of the bridges. Its mission would then be quite separate and distinct from that of the advance guard, and there would be no good reason why it should be under the advance guard command-

er. On the contrary, he might so tie it down to the advance guard that it would not have the independence essential for the execution of a mission at so great a distance. Every advance guard commander is naturally prone to use cavalry in the restricted field providing for the security of the march; whereas, the commander of the whole force from his higher viewpoint can give it much more freedom of action; and can judge when it is necessary by his intervention to prevent the cavalry getting out of hand. At any time the situation appears to warrant it, as for example should Leavenworth be found free of the enemy, Colonel A may resume immediate control of his cavalry and send it off to the south on an independent mission.

This question, when to employ our cavalry independently and when not, will often place us in a quandary. *In general, it will be so employed when the task to be assigned to it is outside the sphere of activity of the remainder of the force, be it with reference to time or place; provided its strength is equal to the task and such as to warrant so detaching it from its infantry support.* By "strength" is meant not only absolute numbers, but relative fighting power when compared with the opposing cavalry. A force of cavalry, say a squadron, amply strong to act independently under one set of conditions, might be ridiculously un-independent under a different situation. And, although it is unusual to send so small a force as a troop on an independent mission, still situations will arise in which it will be perfectly proper to do so. For example, in the situation before us, were Colonel A perfectly sure the enemy would not reach Leavenworth for a day or

two, the infantry might remain in Kickapoo and the cavalry be sent out, unsupported, to interrupt the railroads.

In any problem involving a mixed command, we will find no difficulty in deciding upon the proper employment of our cavalry, if we are able to answer the following questions correctly:

1. What are the tasks for which cavalry is specially fitted by its mobility and fighting power?

2. Of these tasks, which ones are present in the problem before us?

3. Of the tasks thus found for the cavalry, after a careful examination of the problem, which one is most essential to the accomplishment of our mission?

4. In order that the strength of the cavalry assigned this most essential task may be as great as possible, what is the *least* cavalry we can get along with for the secondary tasks?

5. Are the conditions such that the cavalry assigned this most essential task should be made independent?

We may now consider the *time* when the regiment will begin its march. If it is so important to keep the enemy out of Leavenworth, why did not General B order our colonel to march to the south to-night? The objections to this are that the command is in a hostile country, it is not familiar with the roads and other features of the terrain, the enemy may be encountered in the darkness, and, most serious of all, the disastrous effects of forced night marches on the fighting efficiency of troops. The occasions when men and animals must be pushed ahead day and night regardless of the limits of physical endurance are exceptional;

yet, in solving map problems, we are in danger of estimating every situation as one demanding unusual exertions if not a forced march. This is because we fail to think ourselves completely into the spirit of the problem—to appreciate that the single day's operations in which we are interested was preceded by many other days of hard work, and is yet to be followed by many more which demand a rational conservation of the energies of the fighting force. If accurate statistics could be obtained, we probably would discover that the losses in war from diseases that are due to injudicious marching and sheltering of troops exceed those caused by bullets.

Accordingly, for the command to start for the south at a late hour to-night is objectionable in the extreme, but Colonel A should begin his march at an early hour to-morrow morning, for, as already seen, the railroad should be interrupted at Five Mile creek at the earliest practicable hour. General Griepenkerl has the following to say (*) on the subject: "This desire to reach some place or other as quickly as possible is an element in most tactical exercises. But I must warn you not to fix too early an hour for departure in your orders, as otherwise you might encounter various difficulties. Especially out of consideration for the mounted troops, avoid starting until an hour after daybreak. But to give the troops as much as possible of the absolutely necessary night's rest, the march should begin even later, unless it is desired to avoid marching in the heat of the day. * * * If you intend starting at an exceptionally early hour, you will be expected fully to explain your reasons."

* In **Letters on Applied Tactics.**

This advice agrees in its main points with the principles laid down in our Field Service Regulations.

As already pointed out, the situation furnishes Colonel A with ample reasons for not observing the general rule as to the hour of starting, but the uncertainty of the situation, the difficulty of marching in the dark, and the annoyance to the troops, make it undesirable to begin the march while it is still dark. Even if the troops start at daybreak they must be astir an hour earlier, and disturbing the rest of troops in the early morning hours is specially objectionable. At this season of the year, in this latitude, the sun rises at 4:30 a. m., and daybreak is about an hour earlier. Consequently we will fix 3:30 a. m., as the starting hour for the advance guard.

Our final *decision* is as follows: To start from Kickapoo at 3:30 a. m., to-morrow and march via the 47—17—H—G—14—60—66a—224—226 road towards the railroad bridges over Five Mile creek, with two companies of the troop of cavalry in the advance group.

In some of the situations presented in subsequent problems, the detachment commander will have to reach his decision in a very few minutes, but that is not true of the situation we are now considering. Colonel A has abundant time for deliberation, but he probably will reach his decision and be ready to issue his orders by 10:30 p. m. At that hour most of the officers will be resting for the night and, excepting the advance guard commander, they need not be disturbed to receive orders; the advance guard commander, however, should be given his orders at 10:30 p. m., in order that he may have ample time to deliberate on

the situation and decide on his arrangements for the march. When he (Major B, commanding the 2d Battalion) has reported, Colonel A has him read the telegram from General B (*) and then adds:

"In compliance with this telegram, we will advance to the south early to-morrow morning.

"Two companies of your battalion, and the cavalry (†), will constitute the advance guard under your command. Have your infantry start from 29 at 3:30 a. m. and follow the 45—17—H—G—14—66a road. Your cavalry will start at the same hour and will reconnoiter through Fort Leavenworth and Leavenworth, and to the south; it will carefully watch the woods west of Fort Leavenworth, and will patrol the hills along the line of march west of Leavenworth. I will specially desire to know if Leavenworth is still unoccupied by the enemy and you may send out a cavalry patrol before 3:30 a. m., to obtain that information. The platoon of cavalry now on outpost will be ordered to join your column as it passes the line of outposts.

"The main body will follow at a distance of 600 yards, with the remaining two companies of your battalion in the lead.

"The field train will remain provisionally in Kickapoo.

"I will accompany the advance guard."

The surest method of imparting orders consists of the verbal instructions given by a senior officer directly to those concerned—especially so, as it affords opportunity for explanation and prevention of misunderstandings. But the verbal order should follow the same general form as a written order. The officer giving the order is then less liable to omit something

* See Situation, page 57.

† It is not necessary for Colonel A to weaken his already small cavalry force by detaching from it a number of troopers to do messenger service for him. The mounted orderlies and the regimental detachment of mounted scouts are intended for this purpose, and they are ample. Some of these scouts may be assigned to the main body and advance guard, but it is not necessary to mention this distribution in the orders.

of importance, and it will gain in clearness and conciseness for the officer receiving it. The form is the result of much careful thought and study, and has been thoroughly tested by experience. The different paragraphs of the order follow each other in logical sequence, and an officer trained in this system gives his orders in the fewest possible words and clearest possible manner, and receives them with a clear understanding of what is intended. Without some form for a guide, all orders and especially verbal orders will be rambling and confusing. Information of the enemy and of supporting troops will be scattered throughout its paragraphs; what the one issuing the order proposes to accomplish may have to be surmised; the commander of any particular fraction of the command may have to piece together disjointed sentences scattered throughout the order, and still get only a more or less imperfect idea of what he is expected to do. This leads to questions, always annoying when unnecessary and frequently impossible to answer because of lack of time. It is in critical situations where seconds are counted, that the full value of system in issuing orders becomes apparent, for no time is wasted in useless talk, yet every officer has a clear understanding of what is to be done. We may have an opportunity to illustrate this in the solution for a problem farther along in this book.

By reading the telegram received from superior headquarters, Major B obtains a clear understanding of the situation and General B's wishes. A detachment commander ordinarily should fully explain his plans and intentions to his advance guard commander. In general there should be few secrets between them.

The reason for this will be explained in a later chapter. Since the telegram contained all fresh information of the enemy and the Blue supporting troops, (*) the order begins with a statement of Colonel A's intentions. It is unnecessary to state the object of the march to the south, as that may be clearly inferred from the telegram; there is no serious objection, however, to telling Major B that the railroads will be first interrupted at the bridges over Five Mile creek, although this might divert his attention from his main mission which is to cover the march of the main body. It is too early to decide with absolute certainty when, where, and with what troops the railroad will be interrupted, and the less said on this point the better.

In telling Major B the part he is to play in the march, Colonel A confines himself to a statement of the troops that will constitute the advance guard, the place and time of starting, the road to be followed, and the most important points to be reconnoitered. No mention is made of the way in which the advance guard will be subdivided, the distance separating its parts, the *local* reconnaissance it is to make, or the manner in which it will perform its duties in general. With a properly trained officer in command of the advance guard (and in all of the problems contained in this book it is assumed that we are dealing with well instructed officers, unless the contrary is stated), this would be not only unnecessary, but an unwarranted interference with a subordinate. Under our regulations, an advance guard commander has certain well established duties to perform, whatever the situation,

* It is assumed that the situation up to the receipt of the telegram was known to the command.

and it is taken for granted he will perform them to the best of his ability without making mention of them in his orders, which should be confined to directing those things which vary with the situation.

It may be said that the rather detailed instructions covering the reconnoissance to be made by the advance guard cavalry do not accord with the above principle, and constitute interference with the advance guard commander. Doubtless it is interference but it is not *unwarranted*. We have seen that Colonel A thought seriously of keeping the cavalry under his own command, and only decided to surrender his complete control of it because there is not, at the outset, a mission for it separate and distinct from that of the advance guard. He may be pardoned for any misgivings he may have as to its being properly employed, for its operations probably will have much to do with the success or failure of the mission of the detachment. The chief mission of an advance guard is to provide for the security of the march, and, if given absolute freedom, it would not be strange if the advance guard commander should employ the cavalry in a very restricted field, and not give it that freedom of action and direct it along those lines so plainly desirable when the situation is examined from the broader view point of the detachment commander.

For example, we know from Colonel A's estimate of the situation that if he hears, when on the march to-morrow morning, that Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth are not occupied by the enemy, he probably will hurry his cavalry ahead to Five Mile creek to begin the demolition. Consequently, it is important that patrols should be sent through those places

and to the south and, rather than take chances on Major B doing this of his own accord, Colonel A makes certain of this reconnaissance by ordering it. There is less necessity for ordering a reconnaissance of the woods and hills west of Fort Leavenworth and Leavenworth, for the advance guard commander probably would examine these localities, but the order makes a *certainty* of a *probability*, and leaves no doubt in Colonel A's mind. After all, this is not strictly interference with the advance guard commander, for when the order is carefully analyzed it will be seen that our colonel has stated *what he wants done* and has left the *manner of doing it* to his subordinate. And, in general, any commander of a force of which cavalry forms a part, whatever may be the mission of the command, will specify in his orders the important directions in which his cavalry is to reconnoiter, but will leave to the cavalry commander the determination of how this reconnaissance is to be made.

By directing Major B to start his cavalry at the same hour as his infantry, Major B is prevented from disturbing the cavalry at an unnecessarily early hour. It can gain the desired distance in advance of the infantry by trotting out, for, if unopposed, it can easily march three miles farther than the infantry in the first hour after starting. However, to make sure of early information of the situation in Leavenworth, Major B is authorized to start a patrol in that direction before 3:30 a. m. Colonel A might have sent out this patrol, merely informing Major B of that fact. Frequently the detachment commander will thus send out his own patrols when he is anxious to secure information of special importance, but this procedure

is open to objection when the advance guard commander can make this arrangement equally well, for it divides responsibility for proper reconnaissance and may lead the subordinate to depend on his superior to do this work for him.

From the closing paragraphs of the order, Major B learns that the main body is to follow him at 600 yards, and, consequently, that it is to guide its march on that of the advance guard; and that the remaining two companies of his battalion are placed at the head of the main body, that the battalion may be the more easily united in case the detachment has to fight.

In giving an order, a commander should attempt to state, in clear, concise and definite language, everything his subordinates should know and nothing more. He may not always succeed in doing this, and even if he does, there may be some one among those receiving the orders who does not immediately grasp their full import. Such a one should not hesitate to ask for further explanation, and, as a general rule, his questions when proper should be fully and graciously answered. The subordinate that in war time does not ask a question when in doubt is as culpable as the superior that shows intolerance of being questioned. Manifestly it is not practicable to state in these solutions the conversation that takes place between commander and subordinate to clear up doubtful points in the order. We can but give the order as it actually is issued, and must leave the remainder to the imagination.

There are other arrangements that Colonel A has yet to make to-night. The outposts must be notified of the proposed march and given their orders, and

provision should be made for rousing the command in the morning.

The outposts should remain in position and cover the rest of the command until the advance guard is stretched out on the road and ready to take over the duties of security. They will then move by the most convenient line and take their proper place in the column as it passes. This method of withdrawal is understood by the outpost commander, and in the order sent him it need be referred to only in the most general way. The following is the order in the form of a message, and we will observe that Major A is told what he should know at this time and nothing more; the object of the march, and information of the 2d and 3d Infantry will be told him when he joins the column to-morrow morning.

1st Infantry,
Kickapoo, Kansas,
14 July—, 10:40 P. M.

To
Major A,
Commanding Outpost.

Telgram just received from superior headquarters states that the enemy apparently contemplates moving a force to LEAVENWORTH over the MISSOURI PACIFIC railroad. We will move south with all our command in the morning. The advance guard, under Major B, will start from 29 at 3:30 a. m. and follow the 47—17—H—G road. The outpost cavalry will join the advance guard, and the outpost infantry will join the tail of the main body, as the column passes the line of outposts. The wagons of the outpost companies will join the field train at KICKAPOO after the column is on the march.

By order of Colonel A:

X,

Capt. & Adjt. 1st Inf., Adjutant.

At 2:30 a. m., the command is astir; and at 3 a. m. Colonel A assembles the lieutenant colonel, Major C (commanding 3d Battalion), all the captains of the main body (excepting those on outpost), and his staff, and issues the following verbal orders:

"A telegram received from General B last night states that the enemy contemplates moving a force to Leavenworth over the Missouri Pacific railroad from the south, and directs this command to prevent this movement by interrupting the railroads south of Leavenworth. We are also to endeavor to locate any hostile forces advancing from the south. The railroad in our rear is now guarded by parts of the 3d Infantry, and the 2d Infantry will reach here some time to-morrow.

"We will march to the south this morning to carry out General B's orders.

"Companies E and F, and Troop A, under command of Major B, will constitute the advance guard. It will start from 29 at 3:30 a. m. and follow the 47—17—H—G—14—60—66a road.

"The main body will follow the advance guard at 600 yards, and march in the following order: Regimental headquarters, Companies G and H, 3d Battalion, 1st Battalion.

"The outposts will join the column as it passes the outpost position.

"The field train will remain here until further orders; it will assemble ready to march at 4:30 a. m.

"I will be with the advance guard."

It is quite proper for Colonel A to inform his officers that the proposed movement is being made in compliance with orders from higher authority. The command is small and may have a feeling of isolation in its advanced position, and there will be greater confidence in the wisdom of the movement if the officers know it constitutes part of a general plan worked out at superior headquarters. But the colonel must carefully avoid giving the impression that he is crit-

icising the judgment of his superior, or is attempting to shift responsibility to other shoulders than his own, else he may spread a sentiment throughout his command that might result in the failure of the expedition. This is mentioned only to point out that indiscretion in issuing orders may have serious consequences. The morale of the command will be greatly improved by the knowledge that the line of communications is safe, and that reinforcements will arrive tomorrow, so these facts are mentioned. The most should always be made of every scrap of favorable information.

Colonel A might have told his officers a little less of his own plans. As a rule it is not well for a commander to state what he intends doing far in advance of the event, for he cannot tell at what moment the enemy may compel him to change his plans, and such changes are liable to decrease the confidence troops have in their leaders. But this rule applies with more force the larger the command, and in a command as small as this, it may be a positive advantage for every officer to know the *object of the movement*, unless there is a reason for secrecy. Accordingly, Colonel A probably was right in saying what he did of interrupting the railroads, and locating the enemy, thereby insuring a keener interest in the movement and more intelligent cooperation among all parts of the command.

It is not necessary to inform the officers that the advance guard will so conduct its reconnaissance as to insure the safety of the march, for that is what an advance guard is for; but the hour and place of starting and the road to be followed are all mentioned, in or-

der that commanders in the main body may regulate their times of starting. It devolves upon the senior captain of Companies G and H to time his start so that he will follow the advance guard at 600 yards. No harm is done if he does not get this exact distance at the start, provided he so regulates his march as to secure it in the first few minutes of the advance. In small commands, it is simpler for all concerned to give the distance at which the main body will follow the advance guard (or the advance guard will precede the main body), than to prescribe the hour when the main body should start in order to have its proper distance. The commanding officer should always prescribe the order of march of the troops in the main body, for this is often a matter of great tactical importance (especially in large commands with artillery). In this situation, for example, the two companies at the head of the main body are from the same battalion as the advance guard, and the battalion to which the outposts belong is put at the rear of the column.

Our Field Service Regulations prescribe that the field train (*) will be guarded as far as practicable by a picked up guard consisting of teamsters and other men always with the train, assisted by convalescents and others who are non-effective in the ranks but accompany the command; but, if the situation de-

* For the composition of the field train see F. S. R. In addition to its field train every body of troops is accompanied by its combat train, which comprises the led horses of the officers, the battalion ammunition wagons and ambulances temporarily attached to the various regiments. It generally marches directly in rear of the unit to which it belongs, so that it will be immediately available in case the command goes into a fight. Thus each battalion ordinarily is followed by its ammunition wagons, but the six wagons of the regiment may be assembled and marched immediately in rear of the regiment.

mands, additional guards will be provided. We have assumed that the train has such a picked up guard with it. It would be unwise to have the train follow the command before the situation is somewhat cleared up. Should the enemy be encountered near Leavenworth and the command have to retreat, the train would be in the way and might seriously interfere with the movements of the troops. After Colonel A knows he can continue his march beyond Leavenworth, there will be ample time to send word to the train and have it join the command at its camp for the night.

A commander should always state his proposed position in the column in order that his subordinates can easily find him at any time. In case he is in doubt as to where he will be, he should state where messages should be sent, and then leave a staff officer at that point to forward messages. Colonel A says he will be with the advance guard, but he will assure himself that his entire column is on the march in accordance with his intentions before riding to the front. Unless a commander thus supervises the formation of his command, irregularities of all sorts are liable to creep in, but he cannot constantly remain with the main body; when contact with the enemy seems probable, he generally should join the advance guard where he can make his own observations of the situation as regards the enemy and the terrain, for he must not then depend on messages and maps. But he must scrupulously guard against unwarranted interference with the advance guard commander.

Had Colonel A issued his orders in writing the

night of July 14-15 they would have appeared as follows:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Field Orders
No.—
Troops | 1st Infantry,
Kickapoo, Kansas,
14 July —, 10:45 P. M. |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
- (a) Advance Guard:
Major B.
2d Bn. 1st Inf. (less
2 companies)
Troop A, 2d Cav.
- (b) Main Body—in order
of march:
Hq. & Cos. G & H,
1st Inf.
3d Bn. 1st Inf.
1st Bn. 1st Inf.
1. It is reported that the enemy contemplates moving a force to LEAVENWORTH over the MISSOURI PACIFIC railroad from the south. Detachments from the 3d Infantry are now guarding the railroad in our rear and the 2d Infantry will reach here some time July 16.
2. In compliance with telegraphic orders from General B, we will advance to-morrow to interrupt the railroads entering LEAVENWORTH from the south, and locate any hostile forces that may be advancing.
3. (a) The advance guard infantry will start from 29 at 3:30 a. m., and follow the 45—17—H—G—14—60—66a road. The cavalry will start at the same hour, and, in addition to examining the woods and hills west of FORT LEAVENWORTH and LEAVENWORTH, will reconnoiter through FORT LEAVENWORTH and LEAVENWORTH and to the south.
- (b) The main body will follow the advance guard at 600 yards.
- (c) The outpost will assemble and join the column as it passes the outpost position.
4. The field train will assemble ready to march at 4:30 a. m., and then remain here awaiting further orders.
5. The commanding officer will be with the advance guard.
- By order of Colonel A:
X,
Capt. & Adjt., 1st Inf. Adjutant.
- Copies to Lt. Col. A, Majors A, B and C, Captains C and G, and Staff; brief message to General B by wire.