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THE ROLE OF SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE EUROPEAN WAR

Lecture delivered Friday, 20 October 1939


by

Professor Bruce C. Hopper

at the

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

20 Oct 39


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Role of Soviet Russia in the European War; Outline

By Bruce Hopper

U. S. Naval War College
October 20, 1939

Introduction. Confusion in diplomacy during years 1933-39

Clarification by Nazi-Soviet Pact (refer to
lectures of last few years)

I. Reorientation of Bolshevik Foreign Policy:

1. Predicate of Munich: Failure of Bolshevik Geneva Policy
2. Reversion to Rapallo Policy; Shift in Balance of Power
 - A. Motives
 - B. Trade Treaty, August 19
 - C. Pact of Mutual Assistance, August 23
 - D. Significance of Pact on Nazi Invasion of Poland

II. Why the Totalitarians Shifted Their Policies:

1. The Nazis
2. The Bolsheviks
3. The Demarcation Line between them in Poland

III. Strategical Shifts

1. Nazis and Bolsheviks become Immediate Neighbors
2. Advance West and Effect on Soviet Eastern Policy
3. End of Nazi Drang Nach Osten
4. Ukrainian Question
5. Contact of World's Two Most Youthful Regimes

IV. Economic Shifts:

1. Germany's War Stocks

2. Russia's Surplus in War Metals, etc.
3. Germany's Need for Oil.
4. Can Russia Restrict Consumption?
5. Can Russia Increase Production with aid of German Engineers?
6. The Transport Problem
7. How Can Germany Pay?
 - A. No Foreign Assets
 - B. How much gold?
 - C. How much gold, private, to be expropriated (jewels, etc)
 - D. Political Pressure on Balkans
 - E. Russia's Demands
 - F. A Possible Three-Cornered Arrangement

V. Political Shifts

1. Effect on Treaties
2. Racial Minorities
3. Integration of the Map

VI. Social Shifts

1. World Revolution
2. Christianity
3. Old Regime

VII. Effect of Pact on other States

1. Poland
2. Britain
3. France
4. Italy
5. Baltic States

6. Balkan States

VIII. America and the European War

1. The War

- A. Issues?
- B. The Kind of War?
- C. Will the War Spread?

2. America

- A. Repeal the Embargo
- B. America's Influence

IX. Conclusion

- 1. What Kind of Peace?
- 2. Contingencies
- 3. World Change

The Role of Soviet Russia in the European War

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In the last few years I have had occasion to bring before the College a bewildering account of the utter confusion and diplomatic chaos which characterized Europe since the advent of Hitler. It was as though rivers had left their customary beds, and were even flowing up hill. As we noted many times since 1934, the tremendous contradiction was the illogical opposition between Nazi and Bolshevik regimes, in the face of their common interest in opposing western democracies.

Whatever dismal view we may take of the picture today, the bewilderment, at least, is dissipated. The Nazi-Bolshevik pact allows the rivers to return to their normal channels. And we all begin to feel more normal as a result, although still baffled by the lightning shifts in diplomatic and military strategy.

I. Reorientation of Bolshevik Foreign Policy:

1. Predicate of Munich: Failure of Geneva Policy.

The Nazi-Bolshevik rapprochement was a direct predicate of Munich. The Bolsheviks, remember were blackballed at that esoteric club; they were to be shoved into Asia. Munich gave the final blow to Russia's Geneva policy, of reliance on collective security, which was feasible only so long as it enjoyed

the support of Britain and France. When these two powers abandoned Geneva, in practice, the Bolsheviks had to find other means to force Hitler to change his mind about going to Ukraina. Of course, Stalin, personally, had always favored a deal with Hitler, and actually said so in January, 1934. Munich forced the issue because with collective security dead, and Hitler threatening to march to the Urals, and the Japanese cutting big capers on the Mongolian frontiers, the Bolsheviks were confronted with a real danger of a return of the cordon sanitaire, 1919, when they were supposed "to stew in their own juice."

In the retrospect, we realize that between 1934 and 1938 Litvinov was pursuing a policy of stalwart support to collective security at Geneva, while Stalin was badgering the Nazis by tremendous purges in Russia, and the execution of Old Bolsheviks, Army Generals, and thousands of ordinary folk, on charges of conspiracy with the Nazis. And yet, we noted last year, the many contradictions in the relations between Moscow and Berlin, which suggested a colossal two-faced policy. It would not be too extravagant to say that the one conspiring with Germany was not the Army Generals, et al, but Stalin himself, who charged his victims with the very offenses he intended to commit himself. He used the political fanfare and radio war with Germany to liquidate the Old Bolsheviks, and all other likely opponents to his intended volte face.

Such deep political intrigues are beyond our powers to comprehend. The fact remains, Stalin did not move until he had cleared the decks of possible opposition. He emerges as the most absolute one-man dictator since the last of the powerful Roman emperors.

There were many steps in the build-up to the deal of August, 1939. Moscow was strangely silent after Munich. Litvinov gave a noble speech at Geneva, but he was already marked for the scrap pile. Munich spelled out the failure of Litvinov's policy. In January, 1939, Stalin made a friendly advance to Hitler in a speech, and again in March. True, Litvinov, in a note to Germany, March 19, 1939, refused to admit the validity of the Nazi suppression of the Czech state. Litvinov then retired from service in May.

2. Failure of the Anglo-French negotiations.

Then came the Anglo-French effort to win back the Bolsheviks whom they blackballed at the time of Munich. That effort of four months failed because of mutual distrust; the British-French refusal to guarantee the Baltic states against their will; Poland's refusal to accept military assistance from Russia; and the sending of envoys of secondary importance, without mandates. The Bolsheviks claim they were asked to perform the impossible, to guarantee Poland without touching Polish soil. Above all, they claim, the British and French were afraid to do anything that might strengthen the Soviet Union.

3. Reversion to Rapallo Policy.

As a result, the Bolsheviks reverted to the Rapallo policy, 1922, of collaboration with Germany, which was bolstered by trade treaties, and especially by the Treaty of Friendship, 1926, which Hitler himself renewed, May 5, 1933.

If one feels friendly toward the Bolsheviks he would say that only in that way could Russia keep out of war, and at the same time prevent a return of the cordon sanitaire. If one is more critical, he could say that the Bolsheviks would never get any loot if lined up with Britain and France, and that Stalin is like Philip of Macedon setting the stage for the modern Greeks to destroy each other before moving into the whole camp himself.

There is no doubt that the Russians and Germans had been negotiating since last spring. What is astonishing is the secrecy; there were no leaks.

The opening gun was the trade treaty, August 19, by which Germany grants Russia seven years credit, and exchanges equipments for raw materials.

The Pact of Mutual Assistance, August 23, is what changes the course of history. The two totalitarian states pledge not to use force against each other, not to associate directly or indirectly, with groupings of powers aimed at one or the other, and to consult each other constantly. The pact is to run ten years, without a denunciation clause.

The timing of the announcement of the pact indicated agreement on the destruction of Poland. The German plans for smashing Poland were laid long in advance. But the German General Staff, remembering the folly of fighting on two fronts in the World War, told Hitler there could be no invasion of Poland unless Russia were neutralized. The price Hitler had to pay, therefore, was to forswear Mein Kampf, and his anti-Bolshevik utterances of as late as June. He was the corporal of the last war who wanted to see what it would be like to be Commander-in-Chief of the next war. Buying off Stalin with a share in the loot seemed a cheap price, when in such a mood. But Stalin may prove to be the Kiss of Death for the corporal become Commander-in-Chief.

The pact put the rest of the world into a fit of breathless amazement. And yet it is the logical outcome of the geography, of the international vacuum created by backward Eastern Europe in between two modernized, military machines. And it is the logical predicate of the carpet slipper diplomacy pursued by Britain and France since 1932.

II. Why the Totalitarians Shifted their Policies.

The two totalitarian powers shifted their policies toward each other, when they did, in order to divide Eastern Europe between them, instead of fighting for mastery. But just what the immediate propulsions were we don't know. My guess is: the Army

in Germany; and the Ukrainian question in Russia.

1. The German Army.

The German army never took part in the technique of making bogeymen of Communism and Semitism, which Hitler identified as one. The Army remembered that it had trained its officers and pilots on Soviet fields, in execution of the military protocol that went with the Treaty of Rapallo.

The Army had no interest in Nazi ideology, racialism, anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, etc. But the Army did, and does, embody the spirit of the German people, except that it does not subscribe to the anathema build-up of the Nazis against the Treaty of Versailles.

The first promise of the Army policy is: No more fighting on two fronts. Nevertheless, the two fronts are there. So the Army advocates a military way of life for all the people because Germany has two exposed frontiers, without defensible terrain. Germany, therefore, cannot afford the luxury of democracy, but must follow the Prussian system of security through discipline and order.

Secondly, the Army subscribes to the German assumption of master race, the Herren Volk, vastly superior to the conglomerate Slavs, Sklaven Volk, in the East. The Army feels itself the spear head of Germany's mission to bring order and security into Eastern Europe, by the sword.

In carrying out this mission there are only two alternatives: ersatz or conquest. Ersatz is too slow; therefore it must be conquest.

Because of Germany's lack of raw materials, because of the trade barriers, etc., the Army subscribes to the Lebensraum doctrine. But because of the old folly of fighting on two fronts, the Army insists that the Bolsheviks be appeased with loot, until the issue is decided in the West. In due course, the Army and German engineers can become dominant in Russia again by penetration.

The Army remembers bitterly that it conquered the East as far as the Caucasus in 1917-18, but was forced to disgorge through the Allied victory in the West. That must not happen again; better half a loaf in the East which need not be disgorged, and then proceed to the next step.

From this point of view, there is no contradiction whatever in the pact with the Bolshoviks. Our confusion comes from the fact that the Nazis do the talking. The Army is the power; the Army doesn't talk. So there wasn't any shift in Germany; the real power expressed its policy.

2. The Bolsheviks and Ukraina.

But in Russia there was actual shift in policy at the real source of power, Stalin. It was Stalin who said: We do not covet an inch of foreign soil; we will fight to the last man to

defend Soviet soil. That was before he had the unexpected loot held before his eyes; also before he faced the immediate prospect of fighting on two fronts himself. But the main propulsion, in his opportunism, was the chance offered to kill the Ukrainian separatist movement which had its headquarters in Lwow, Poland. Stalin keeps Mein Kampf on his table; he has studied Hitler's technique. He knew that if Hitler ever did move toward Russia it would be by way of Galicia, raising the hue and cry of Free Ukraina.

Could Britain and France arrest this danger? Probably not. Only in conjunction with the declared enemy, Nazi Germany, could Stalin smash the Ukrainian movement.

He undoubtedly knew that his deal with Hitler would uncork the Nazi drive to destroy Poland. He knew also that Britain and France might come in, but it was far from certain in August, 1939, with Munich less than a year old.

In any case, the constellation of the powers was favorable for Stalin to scotch the one, real separatist danger in the Soviet Union, and so he cast the die.

Now, of course, he is called a double-crosser, and many other odorous names. But, the Bolsheviks say, what about the French treaty with Czechoslovakia, what about this, what about that? In the business of the double cross no large state has a clean record; some are just worse than others.

Here's what the Bolsheviks say by way of apologia, in the note to the Polish Ambassador, Moscow, September 17: "The Polish-German war has revealed the internal insolvency of the Polish state... the Polish state and government have in fact ceased to exist. Treaties between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to function. Poland has become fertile ground for any chance and unexpected events which might become a menace to the Soviet Union. Having been neutral heretofore, the Soviet therefore can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward these facts, nor remain indifferent to the fact that consanguine Ukrainians and White Russians in Poland have been abandoned to their fate and left defenseless...

"In view of these circumstances the Red Army has crossed the border to protect the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraina and White Russia. At the same time the Soviet government intends to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from a disastrous war... and make it possible for them to lead a peaceful life."

That's the story. Of course, the Bolsheviks blame what they call the corrupt and unwise ruling classes of Poland for the disaster.

Now, you can accept that motivation, or not. There can be no doubt that Russians are concerned for Russians over the

border. The fact remains that by occupying Eastern Poland, Stalin settles the Ukrainian irredenta problem, and gains a much better position in European politics.

Further, although it may be called Bolshevik imperialism, it is quite in line with revolutionary principles, "to liberate" oppressed brothers, who will form or join a Soviet republic, and become part of the Union.

3. Demarcation line.

Then note the division of the loot between Germany and Russia by the second pact, signed September 28.

The location of that line between Russia and German-occupied Poland is interesting. It begins at the southern point of Lithuania, follows the course of the Bug River, thence to the Hungarian border (old Ruthenia).

Evidently, Stalin refused to take on any large section of Poles; let Hitler have the headache, -- a Polish headache to add to his Czech headache.

But what Russia has, Russia will hold, no matter what the shake-down in Western Europe. Never in history has Russia had such a defensible frontier toward Europe.

All in all, one may say this has been extraordinary good fortune for Stalin. He should be grateful to Hitler. It is a historical paradox of tremendous magnitude. The one man, Hitler, who for six years, smashed treaties and peoples on the justifica-

tion that he was keeping the Bolsheviks out of Europe, turns around and gives the Bolsheviks a territorial set-up they never even dreamed of in their wildest moments.

One may ask: why study world politics at all when the real forces are so bewildering? Of course, in this instance, we should not have listened to Hitler, but studied the German army.

III. Strategic Shifts.

The strategical shifts resulting from the fourth partition of Poland include:

1. Nazis and Bolsheviks Become Immediate Neighbors.

The Versailles system established these small states in Eastern Europe as buffer states between Teuton Germany and Slavic Russia. The buffers are wiped out, except for Hungary and Rumania.

How long these powerful neighbors can maintain friendly relations is uncertain. There is no fundamental quarrel between totalitarian states except over loot and direction of expansion.

2. Effect on Soviet Eastern Policy?

Advance westward of the Soviet national system (let us not call it communism) may again split the Soviet main interest, which in recent years has been focussed on Asia. The new Soviet frontier in the West is much easier to defend (now being fortified). The Bolsheviks seem to be in European politics for good.

Hitler has arranged it so that no important European decision will be taken in the future without the Bolsheviks being present at the conference. There can be no more blackball, that is, until the Nazis and Bolsheviks fall out.

3. End of the German Drang Nach Osten.

Stalin will not allow Hitler to go down the Danube through Hungary. Hitler's mistake was to tackle the Czechs first. Had he charged into Poland last year it is doubtful if he would have been opposed by Britain and France, who had then even less means to protect Poland.

As it is, Hitler Drangs as far as Warsaw, and there he stops, which is not the German dream at all. His withdrawal from the Baltic states of Germans, who have been rooted there for three or four hundred years, indicates he has been forced to give up the dream.

4. Russia's New Position

In the momentum of "liberating" Ukrainians and White Russians, Stalin (in the well known fit of absence of mind) gets ice-free ports on the Baltic, and actually becomes master of the Baltic with submarines. He also gets the northern border of Rumania and Hungary, thus a whip over the Danube and even the Bosphorous and Dardanelles. He is able to squeeze the Balkans.

5. Contact of the Two Most Youthful Regimes.

Most important, the two most youthful regimes in the

world, the Bolsheviki and the Nazi, are thrown together by sharing in what may be called a criminal act. There is a certain extenuation in the Russian case. But as Pertinax points out, the language of the Russian note to Poland bears a striking similarity to that of Catherine the Great when she took the original slice of Poland, 1772.

What is highly problematical is the interplay of Soviet youth and Nazi youth, with their powerful military systems. Youth is unpredictable; youth is in power in each.

IV. Economic Shifts.

The important question is: How much can Russia supply Germany from behind the blockade?

1. Germany's War Stocks.

We know that Germany has a ten months reserve of grain, over and above this year's harvest. In the last two years Germany imported 10 million tons of grain, which is stored in some 8,000 makeshift granaries. But there is a lack of fodder, especially oil cake. It is possible, of course, for Russia to ship soya beans from the Far East to the Black Sea, thence to Germany.

There is also some war stock of rubber and copper. The experts tell us there cannot be much storage of oil as oil cannot be concealed.

2. Russia's Surplus.

Russia, of course, is the second gold producer in the

world. But Russia's exportable surplus for war needs is limited to manganese, 27% surplus over consumption needs in 1937; oil and natural gas, 8%; phosphates, 30%; asbestos, 30%; as shown by the following table:

In 1937, Russia produced:

Copper	59% of her needs
Tin	a tiny fraction
Lead	57%
Zinc	96%
Nickel	40%
Aluminum	96%
Mercury	94%
Iron Ore	101%
Manganese	127%
Chromium	101%
Wolfram	1%
Molybdenum	10%
Coal	101%
Oil & Natural Gas	108%
Phosphates	130%
Asbestos	130%

In all other war metals, Russia produces less than is needed for the Third Five Year Plan.

There is an increasing consumption of oil, with more than half a million automobiles now operating in Russia. Oil wells have been going at full capacity. New wells are being opened, notably a promising field south of the Urals, called a second Baku (and a new field in the Romny and Poltava region which may make possible a motorized Ukrainian border army without the long haul of oil from the Caucasus).

Russia's production of oil last year was 28 million tons, of which less than one million tons were exported.

3. Germany's need for Oil.

In 1938, Germany produced, synthetically; 2.5 million tons of oil. In peacetime, Germany consumes 7 million tons; and in wartime, Germany needs 15-20 million tons of oil.

Germany's imports of oil have been about 2/3 from U.S., and the other third from Mexico and South America.

So with the blockade on, where is Germany to get her minimum of 10 million tons of oil a year?

4. By Restricted Russian Consumption?

That would mean transfer of much Soviet equipment to wood fuel, which would require six months, at least. It could not be done where wood is scarce, as in Ukraina.

5. By Reorganizing Russian Industry?

That is, could German engineers step up the output from new wells, etc.? Possibly, but again, only after six to twelve months. An optimistic estimate of increased production would be 4-5 million tons of oil, which still would not meet Germany's need.

6. Transport Problem.

But even granting increased Russian production, there remains the transport difficulty.

A. Russia's Railroads.

The railroad system is the weak link in Soviet economy. Russia has built up her iron and steel industry in the last ten

years, -- an enormous increase in production, -- through the technical assistance of German and American engineers.

The new steel industry enabled the Bolsheviks to concentrate on developing their system of defense in the Far East, vis a vis Japan, involving a railway to the Pacific parallel to the Trans-Sib. The steel industry has been geared to making steel rails for railway construction. But, in order to run steel plants at capacity, it was necessary also to increase the transport capacity of the trunk lines linking the various coal fields (Donets, Kuznets, Karaganda, etc.) with the main iron mines and steel plants in the Urals. That is, lay a third and even a fourth track on existing railroads. How far has that work progressed? We don't know.

To that end, between 1930 and 1932, Russia obtained from Germany fifty-four months credit for roughly 800 million dollars, much of which was to be spent in rolling stock for railroads. That was all paid off by 1937, including 200 million dollars in gold.

The real question is: Have the Russians finished double tracking, etc. the feeder lines between their coal and iron? If they have, they can divert the steel industry to strictly war needs. If not, then they must continue railway building. They are working feverishly on railroads.

B. Russian Plants (Industry)

German engineers were shifted out of Russia in 1934. They began to shift back in 1937. In the interim there had been an enormous breakdown of machinery, and waste. That was a strong reason for Stalin wanting close relations with Germany: to get back the German engineers, and to get replacements for German-built plants. (It would seem the Germans and Americans get along best with the Russians, White or Red. The English and French haven't the patience to cope with the Slavic temperament.)

Now, how long will it take to repair broken down plants with the Germans back? We must remember that German industry has been working at top speed for war needs. How much machinery can it spare to repair the Russian plants? These are questions for experts, inspecting plants on the spot.

C. Transport of Oil

Again, even granting Germany's capacity to reorganize Soviet industry, the transport of oil remains an insuperable problem in any quick solution.

Baku oil has always been shipped through the Mediterranean. Barges can go up the Danube, but in a limited way. The mouth of the Danube is shallow (sand bars). And the Iron Gate has bad rapids; large tankers cannot get through.

Some transport could be via the Russian canal system to the Baltic in the summer season; not in winter when the canals are frozen.

So, the key to the oil story is the Soviet railway system. It's a long haul, say 2,000 miles. Germany's war needs from Russia would be, to be very conservative, a minimum of 10 million tons a year. (We have noted that such oil will not be available, short of a miracle in Russian production, restricted consumption, etc.)

But if the oil is there, to transport to Germany 10 million tons in one year would require the delivery into Germany of about 28,000 tons a day. The big tank cars carry 20 tons. That would mean 1,400 tanks arriving every day in Germany from the distant Russian oil fields. Divide the 1,400 tank cars, required to arrive every day, by the number of trains required to compose 1,400 cars, and you get the picture of the daily arrival. Then, multiply that number by the numbering of trains enroute, (noting the distance travelled by a freight train in one day) get the number of days from the oil fields, the number of sidings necessary, and you would arrive at some fantastic figure as to the number of tank cars necessary to deliver 28,000 tons of oil every day into Germany.

So what's the answer? Simply, that it cannot be done, even with ten thousand German engineers working in Russia. From that point of view the British blockade begins to look effective (unless, of course, the captial ship is to be blitzed out of the water by submarines and airplanes!)

D. Rumania.

There remains the question of Rumania, with six million tons of production. But Rumanian oil has hitherto gone to Italy and the Balkans. It is largely owned by British, American, and Dutch companies.

With Russia's permission, Germany might increase the pressure on Rumania to get that oil, but only at the cost of throwing Italy heart and soul into the lap of Great Britain.

Another possibility; the Germans and Russians might force Rumania to install harbor equipment, permitting the transfer of Russian oil from sea tankers to railway tank cars, for land shipment through Hungary and Poland to Germany. That would shorten the haul.

Undoubtedly all three routes will be used: Russian railways; the Danube by barge; and through Rumania by rail.

But the sum total of possibilities would seem to spell failure for Germany to get oil for a protracted war in the West.

Of course, it depends on the kind of war. Major battles use up oil very fast; attrition would mean slower consumption.

E. Uncertain Factors.

But in noting the impossibility, on paper, for Germany to get enough oil over Russia's railway system, there remain factors of uncertainty within Germany.

For instance, private consumption of gasoline has practically ceased. Private motor cars and taxis do not operate. Also,

Germany has greatly favored the Diesel engine which uses the heavy oils from the German coal industry.

Another factor of decreased consumption for normal needs is the requirement, by law of 1932, to mix gasoline with 30% potato alcohol. Therefore, the potato harvest enters the calculation.

Also we must remember the German strategic railway system has been improved even over its excellent condition in 1914 when the whole German army in the West (except for two army corps) disembarked from the railroads at points exactly covered by the present Siegfried Line. The annual Nazi Party rallies in Nurnburg have been mainly to test that quick transport system, which fact was apparent to most students. The excellence of railway transport in Germany (burning coal) means less need for motor transport (using oil).

As for the quality of the synthetic gasoline, the Germans claim it has certain advantages for high speed planes. Our experts, of course, say the reverse; it attains only 85 octanes instead of the normal of 100 or more.

Besides these factors, we don't know yet what kind of war this is going to be. If it is to be a Blitz war, within the next month, then Germany will be badly handicapped by lack of oil. If it is to be attrition, then the oil famine may be postponed until spring.

In any case, there is no possibility for Germany to send, say, 200 planes over Britain and France day after day for any protracted period. The limit of Elitz war is two months for Germany.

For these reasons we must qualify our estimates of Germany's oil needs in war.

7. How can Germany Pay?

Granted Germany is going to get something from Russia, manganese, timber, and some oil, how is Germany going to pay? These facts leap to the eye:

A. Germany has no foreign assets whatever.

B. There may be gold reserves, up to 500 million marks. It is impossible to know how much gold was expended in the three months prior to the march into Poland.

C. An expropriation of all the private gold in Germany, in the form of watches, jewelry, sacred Church vessels, etc., would not yield more than 500 million marks.

So what other means?

D. Political Pressure on Balkans.

The Nazis might force the Balkan states to supply raw materials on credit. In the barter system to southeast, Germany's main means of payment has been coal, e.g., to Italy, the export of which has dropped away. Italy may have to turn to Britain for coal as well as oil.

Meanwhile, Germany has lost use of the Saar coal mines, under the French guns, but gained the more important coal mines of Upper Silesia.

Even so, the production of coal cannot be much increased. The loss of the Saar iron and steel, of course, quite outweighs the less important acquisition of Upper Silesian iron and steel.

Then, the increasing need of coal for synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber means vastly decreased means of payment in the barter system.

What Balkan states want from Germany in the barter trade are guns, munitions, airplanes. But with the war in swing, Germany needs all the arms she can make herself.

It's hard to see how German industry can pay for imports of raw materials by exports of arms during the war.

E. Russia's Demands

Russia, on the other hand, has for several years demanded the latest types of machinery, and the latest optical instruments for airplanes. The Nazis have consistently refused to part with the latest and best. But now that Stalin seems to have Hitler where Hitler usually has other people, it seems ^{un-}likely that the Bolsheviki will slacken their demands for high grade machinery, and optical instruments for airplanes.

For German industry to work to that extent for Russia would mean a corresponding decrease in capacity to work for Germany's own war needs. Whatever Germany gets from Russia she will pay for in labor hours.

F. Three-cornered Arrangement.

There remains the possibility of paying by a three-cornered arrangement. For instance, Hitler could decree: Henceforth, let there be no more smoking of tobacco in the Reich.

Germany could then supply Bulgaria with needed goods, and tell Bulgaria to send her tobacco to Russia. Germany would thus establish credit in Russia via Bulgaria, and Russian raw materials could be shipped directly to Germany. Such a system is very complicated and would take time to work out. It never could be on a large scale because of the size of Bulgaria. Numerous stunts of that kind are possible, based on the inescapable acceptance of a lowered standard of living by the German people. And on that score we must not underestimate the strength of the Nazi position. The Nazis have the power to distribute sacrifice equally through the whole population. The bitterness in 1917 was due not so much to the famine in Germany as to the fact that some people had plenty amidst others in utter want. The Nazis have changed that. There is no telling how much suffering the German people can endure, provided it is spread equally. As we noted, Germany has a wheat supply for at least a year. But the fat supply is worse than at any time since the period 1916-1924.

This whole economic exchange between Russia and Germany, of raw materials exchanged for equipment and technical assistance, is complicated by the labor shortage in Germany. Then, too, during World War, Germany had monopoly in chemistry, dyes, etc. The Blue Ribbon for industrial chemistry is now in U.S. (e.g., super-gas).

V. Political Shifts.

1. Effect on Treaties

The partition of Poland is another push toward chaos in international relations through the violation of treaties, pledges, covenants, contracts, debts, -- all the obligations which once had significance in a nation's honor, now have become trivia in power politics. The Nazi-Bolshevik deal is the climax of a long chain.

2. Racial minorities.

Undoubtedly Poland had a bad record in the treatment of minorities. Russia comes in with a working formula, already in operation in the Soviet Union, of cultural autonomy for racial minorities, to retain their identities and racial customs, so long as they subscribe to the central economic and political modes.

3. Integration of the Map.

The partition of Poland operates to further the process of integration of the map, thus to kill, perhaps for a long time, that type of self-determination, and parcellation of the map, on which collective security and the Versailles treaty were founded, e.g., the aggregate strength of small states. The small states everywhere face loss of independence because of the competition in building war industries.

VI. Social Shifts.

1. World Revolution.

This may be the launching of the world revolution in a big way, not as Lenin planned it, but along the course of power politics. It might even be that Hitler will prove to be the spearhead for Stalin in leading the world revolution, - by shifting the German revolution to the Bolshevik rails. True, Stalin has sacrificed leadership of the left wing intelligentsia by his deal with the Nazis. The United Front against Fascism and war, created by resolution of the Third International in 1938, is destroyed. But he gains new terrain. The Red Army is trained to ferment revolution in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. These regimes may vote to gain the crown as Soviet Republics.

2. Christianity.

One school believes it is world revolution against Christianity, and the prevailing ethic of western civilization for the last 2,000 years. The anti-Christian bloc extends from Vladivostok to Aix-la-Chapelle.

3. Old Regime.

Another school holds that it is world revolution only against the old regime, - the bankers, the income from interest, the coupon clipping, etc.

In either case, it might be called the dictate of machinery, the streamlined totalitarian state against the old form of

state, the consent of the governed, etc.

In a way, it is a revolution of modernization. For instance, the Soviet system is smack up to the Hungarian border. What will that do to the Hungarian feudal system, still operating, large estates and lowly peasant labor?

Defense of democracy is not so enthusiastic as in 1914. The front is broken. And modern youth is not fascinated by the democratic system which has allowed war to come twenty years after the war to make the world safe for democracy.

VII. Effect of the Pact on other States.

The Nazi-Bolshevik pact will be known historically as the document which precipitated the partition of Poland and war on the western front. We might run over a few items in the resulting disequilibrium of power, and the present scramble of both sides for allies.

1. Poland.

There is still much obscure about the Polish defeat in the field. We now know that in the middle of August a feeling of relief ran through the German General Staff because it learned that Poland intended to defend the whole Western frontier -- instead of falling back to a defensible line just east of the Vistula. Nor had the Poles worked very hard to fortify the frontier toward Slovakia, which became dangerous after Hitler took over that section. The Polish air fields were bombed to smithereens the first two days, putting Polish aircraft out of commission.

And there is the long story of Poland's unfortunate diplomacy, of the Polish jealousy of Czechoslovakia at Geneva, of the flirting with the Nazis in 1934, and of joining in the grab in 1938 instead of standing by the Czechs. All these are past.

Will Poland rise again? Polonia Restituta? I believe so, because I have faith in an Allied victory. But Poland will be reduced. What Russia has, Russia will keep. Meanwhile, the Polish government in France is operating with a large gold supply and plenty of credit.

2. Britain.

Aside from the recent untoward happenings in the British navy, the outstanding factor is the way the British and the Germans can hate each other once they take up arms. There is no hatred like it in the world. One reason is the utter incapacity of the Germans to understand the British character.

At the Stresa Conference, Mussolini asked Sir John Simon three times if Britain would object to Italy making a little colonial expedition in Ethiopia to round out the frontier. Sir John exchanged shrugs with Ramsay MacDonald as much as to say it was Mussolini's own business what he did in Africa. Then followed the sanctions, and Mussolini was so furious that he broke the Stresa front, made the Axis with Hitler, and allowed Austria to disappear, bringing the Prussians to Brenner Pass, beyond which lie the alluring vineyards and warm beaches of Italy. Mussolini blames Sir John for bringing the tiger to his door. And at that he knows he

would lose Ehtiopia if he went to war in Europe.

Sometimes, it is the other way around, as in the case of Sir Neville Henderson who has just published the last sections of his White Paper. That White Paper is Sir Nenille's apologia for the failure of his policy of four years in Berlin -- his policy of using Goering to promote British interests. Now, Goering can behave like a gentleman, which manner cloaks the most brutal character of all the Nazi leaders. Sir Neville bet on a tough horse, and lost more than his shirt. Only Hitler can say No; all others say Yes, including Goering.

But more typical than Sir Neville Henderson is Lloyd George, the same prime minister who promoted the "Knock-Out" psychosis in the last war, and won the Khaki election with the slogan of "Hang the Kaiser". Recently, Lloyd George began to coo for thorough consideration of Hitler's so-called peace offer. But even the Nazis could not be taken in by that, knowing that if Lloyd George were made prime minister tomorrow he would most likely revive the "War to the Knock-Out" idea.

As I said, it's small wonder the Germans do not understand the British statesmen; they are the most enigmatic people of the earth. They do seem to blow hot and cold. But Hitler is now up against the British Admiralty which has been blowing only hot since last May when Hitler, in resentment over the British pledge to Poland, abrogated the Naval Treaty. It was the Admiralty that took the decision for war on September 3.

The Admiralty is devising means to rush the Baltic, to cut off the supply of iron ore from Sweden to Germany. The Admirals seem to believe they can sweep the mines in the Sound and block the Kiel Canal. The danger, of course, is that in sweeping the mines a ship might be sunk and thus block the channel.

Fortunately, Britain is not all Sir Johns. There are the Churchills, the Edens, and the solid British mass. Britain never needed our sympathy more than now. Old England, controlled by landlords and farmers has passed; England is now urban, and consequently less stable. There is danger that England might change in character, even to the point of rushing into Fascism. If that happens America will need a colossal navy to protect our isolationists.

3. France.

There is not much to note about France except that the country has recovered from the danger of Civil war at the time of Munich, and is now united as never before since 1918. The French army is evidently a superlative fighting force, entrenched in an impregnable fortress. France may have another Verdun, at the Elbow in the Maginot Line.

4. Italy.

Mussolini is on a hot seat. He may have to rely on Britain for coal and oil. His northern industries are easy and luring targets for Nazi bombers. He is damned if he does; damned if he doesn't. Of course, defeat and fall of Hitler might make

the position of Fascist leaders precarious in Italy, if not that of Mussolini himself. Britain rather expects the Vatican to have some influence in preventing Italy from siding with Germany despite the alliance of May 22, 1939.

To my mind, Italy should be set apart as the treasure trove of the race, guarding the monuments of classical times and the Renaissance. It should be agreed that no matter what capers are cut by Italian Fascists, Rome, Florence, Venice, etc., should never be bombed, no matter what the provocation.

Certainly the Italian people don't want to fight anybody about anything. But they are fearful for loss of position in the Danube and of the arrival of Bolshevism in the Balkans.

There is the story that last Easter morning Mussolini telephoned Hitler at Berchtesgaden, saying: "Well, I have just taken Albania!" There was a pause, then the answer: "Idiot, I said Rumania!"

5. Baltic States.

In the Baltic, Stalin has been raking in the chips in a way that must excite the envy of Hitler who began the bloodless conquest technique.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are all destined to fall back into the body of Russia as Soviet Republics. The military occupation, the various islands as naval bases, and the ice-free port of Libau, give the Bolsheviks command of the Eastern Baltic, to control which they already have sufficient submarines. Finland

will fight harder for independence. (It is extraordinary that Finland gets credit in our public mind for paying her war debt to us. But Finland never had a war debt; the debt was for surplus supplies of foodstuffs delivered after the war.) With or without Finland's sanction the Bolsheviks have acquired a much more favorable position in the North Atlantic, which endangers both Norway and Sweden.

6. Balkan States.

In the Balkans the picture is obscure. Turkey has signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France, thus denying the Bolshevik demand for closure of the Straits. Somehow, I cannot believe Turkey will work against Russia; but the era of surprises is not over. The key to Turkish policy is Mussolini's desire for Turkish territory. It may be that the Turks, in the final analysis, have to rely more on the British navy than on the Soviet Red Army.

It is likely that Russia will recover Bessarabia. As for the Balkans in general, the Russians seem to have taken the master control away from Germany in the south as well as in the Baltic. There is the possibility of the revival of Pan-Slavism. If Stalin gives the Baltic peoples a fair deal, and stops oppressing the Greek Orthodox church, he might even win the peasantry of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the Soviet cause. The war in the West, however, obstructs our view of potentials in the Southeast.

VIII. America and the European War.

Now for one quick glance at the present war:

1. The War.

A. The Issues.

What are the issues, for the record? We don't yet know. The war aims have not been stated. We know, in fact, that Britain is fighting for her very existence. Britain could not have weathered another appeasement such as Munich. The British say they are fighting to exterminate Hitlerism. The French say they are fighting Germanism, as they did before. I am inclined to believe that Hitler is much more representative of the German people than we have hitherto been prepared to admit. Further, it is the Army which now seems to have master control, and the Army may refuse to attempt the impossible.

B. The Kind of War.

Another factor, still to be determined is the kind of war this is going to be, Blitz or Attrition.

1. Blitz War.

It is possible that Hitler, with that madness known as the Niebelung psychosis (dying to the last warrior in the field) may order an all-or-nothing assault, to stake everything on a single, long drawn-out battle.

If so, his only chance against the Maginot Line seems to be between the Saar and the Rhine.

It is already too late to attack through Holland, as the north is already under water; the south is moorland, leaving only the middle. If the Germans struck through the middle of Holland they could only get as far as the Zuyder See, and then would be stuck.

Farther south, of course, attack is still feasible through Belgium. But the Maginot Line extends halfway across the Belgian frontier and would force the German advance to the narrow strip along the coast, and thus within range of the British naval guns. Of course, the Blitz attack along that route would probably be accompanied by all the available submarines and even the pocket battleships in one grand Armageddon. That would be the Niebelung. That would be the corporal acting as Commander-in-Chief which would require another Wagner to describe for posterity.

As for a Blitz advance through Switzerland, that seems to be the least likely of all; the Swiss are prepared, and would delay the machine until the French reorganized to meet the oncoming army whether through the Belfort Gap or elsewhere.

If it is to be Blitz, then it must be within the next four weeks.

2. Attrition.

The other method is the attrition, sniping at the British navy with submarines and airplanes. In any long attrition the Germans are beaten in advance, unless, of course, they really can sink the British navy. If that is the course adopted, the sinking

of H.M.S. Royal Oak will be recorded as the signal for Hitler's hope to win, even by attrition.

It may be useful to recall what happened in 1918 when Ludendorff broke up the trench warfare and attrition.

The two factors were: Russia dropped out of the war, and America came in. The first item allowed a rest period for the sixty first class Divisions which had been taking the brunt on the Western front, their places being taken by the second class divisions from the East. That military advantage could last only until America arrived in full strength.

Ludendorff, therefore, planned to decide the war before that point was reached, hence the big offensive beginning March, 1918. His plan was to find the soft spots, and conduct a series of offensives through the length of the line. That plan was opposed by General Gröner, and the younger staff officers, who held that everything must be staked on a single, long battle to break through.

The Gröner school was proved right by Ludendorff's failure. He lost the element of surprise with the first advance. And then the German army became so exhausted by the repeated lunges, moving up and down the line, that when the Allies' counter-offensive began in July the German army was already tired. And the Divisions from the East were put into the front line. They were unaccustomed to tough fighting. The British tanks rolled over them, on the celebrated August 8, which was the turning point in the war.

But even then, Ludendorff could have repeated his successful manoeuvre of January, 1917, of falling back to a previously fortified position. Ludendorff at that time was already a defeated man. Hindenburg distrusted him. And a goitre, which first appeared in the opening days of the war, troubled him badly, affecting his eyes. It was Ludendorff, after all, who told Berlin to ask for an armistice, before the German army knew that it was beaten. I mention this only because the ultimate decision as to the kind of war rests with political and military leaders of vastly different temperaments. The German General Staff has probably been split over the question ever since the first objective was reached in the conquest of Poland.

C. Will the War Spread?

I am beginning to believe that this war may not spread, unless Britain should be so foolish as to make war on Russia. Britain's obvious tactic is to play Japan against Russia, and vice versa. For that the Japanese seem to be prepared. My own view is that the Japanese will never be really happy until they are back under the wing and prestige of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The spread danger largely centers on Italy. If the record is any help as a guide, Mussolini will wait, in terrific nervous tension, as long as he can, and then do his best to pick the winner.

It is extremely unlikely that Russia will fight anywhere in Europe, certainly not on the Western front. Rather is Russia

crashing through to a commanding position as a "neutral" to be in on the peace settlement.

2. America.

A. Repeal the Embargo.

I am one of those who say: Repeal the embargo as the best way to keep out of this war. Build up our own war industries, especially in air planes, build up our arsenals, but be as careful as we can not to be saddled with useless plants when the let-down comes after the war.

If we don't do it, Canada will, with both British and American capital, making a situation of unfortunate competition later. Also, if Britain is forced to build a tremendous plant in Canada, that would transfer to Canada a measure of British home power which we may not like, eventually.

This whole Neutrality mess can be laid at the door of Congress for failing to repeal last July. That failure undoubtedly influenced Hitler in his determination to strike; and it influenced the Bolsheviks in throwing in with Hitler. (After thirteen years study of the Bolsheviks I am convinced they want, most of all, to avoid being opposed to America's industrial power).

Undoubtedly America's supply of shells to France in 1915-16 had much to do with Germany's decision to go in for unrestricted submarine war. But that has already started in this war, without reference to America. If the German Navy had not given the Reichstag such over-estimates of the number of submarines in

1917, Germany would have delayed unrestricted submarine warfare for six months, and then not had to use it (e.g., Russia out; United States not in).

B. America's Influence.

I say let America keep out of the war, but also keep quiet; keep the President quiet on any premature appeal from Hitler for mediation (he has kept quiet), and above all keep the Lindberghs quiet and tending their air motors away from the dizzy atmosphere of world politics.

Our economic weight can dictate the peace in Europe if wisely used, if we don't let our President put his idealistic head into the lion's den, as did Wilson in 1918-19. Rather must we stay at home entirely, sell fast pursuit planes to Britain and France, and then mediate when the time is ripe, but mediate in Washington.

IX. Conclusion.

1. What Kind of Peace?

There is a general fear that this war will end in a peace similar to Versailles or Brest-Litovsk. The longer the war, the more likely does that become.

We are reminded that in 1916 Lord Landsdown wrote a memo suggesting that the war to the knock-out would be bad for Britain, that France would thereby gain hegemony in Europe in a way harmful to British interests.

And that is exactly what happened, as the British realized when the French drove them off gold in 1931. As Landsdown said, it would have been better to have preserved the balance of power, even if the war ended in a stalemate. Incidentally, Landsdown was labelled a traitor at the time.

Peace at the end of this war will depend somewhat on the constellation of power within Germany, on the relations between the Army and Hitler, if he is still extant. It may also depend on the advance of Bolshevik ideas from the East; there is such a possibility that the Western powers may frame a hasty peace in common fear of the Bolsheviks.

2. Contingencies.

We might even phrase that as a contingency:

If the Nazis win, then Germany may be the spearhead of the world revolution, more dependent on Russia, and together they would smash the West.

If the Germans lose in the field, and the Nazis are thrown out of power, then the Allies may restore the German monarchy, and unite with a new Germany to drive back the Bolsheviks.

A sensible solution of the old problem of Eastern Europe would be to give the Germans control of economic organization as far as the Eastern Estonian frontier, but put political control into other hands. (The Germans succeed in economics, and make a mess of politics.) Such a sensible solution is beyond the reach of man in his present stage of moral development. (One thing we

may expect when the boot tightens in Germany is that Hitler will offer to abdicate, even from the position as Commander-in-Chief. If he were to abdicate he should have to leave Germany, in order to make it real. There is no Sabine Farm big enough inside the country. But where could he go? No nation is equipped to give refuge to a man-made god, unless it be America; there is always Hollywood).

3. World Change.

Above all, we must expect a changed world to emerge from this war. A civilization that spends up to fifty percent of its income for war is doomed to disaster. We are in transition to those changes, in transition from the first to the second revolution. This war is only one violent aspect of that change which is nothing less than the rebirth of all human society, comparable in historical significance, and greatly exceeding in magnitude, the previous rebirth of western society beginning four hundred years ago -- the Renaissance.
