

THE LANDING OF THE BRITISH FORCES

IN GALLIPOLI, 1915


By

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THE LANDING OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN GALLIPOLI, 1915

THE DARDANELLES

The Gallipoli peninsula, once called Hellespont, forms the European bank of the Dardanelles. Opposite it begins Asia Minor. Separating the two continents and taking the shape of a broad and mighty river, the Dardanelles lead up into the Sea of Marmara and, through the Bosphorus, into the Black Sea.

Thus linking the two continents and at the same time constituting the only passage to the Black Sea, this water route has an eventful history, probably antedating even the Trojan War.

The Dardanelles have been in Turkish hands since 1453. To them Turkey owes largely the respect and position she commands in the council of nations, for their possession permits Turkey to close the passage and convert the Black Sea into a lake. And yet, the Turks have derived more grief than joy from the possession of the Dardanelles, which have been a constant source of envy among other nations.

Naturally, the nations bordering on the Black Sea were the principal claimants to the guardianship of the only gate to their sea. Among them, it was above all the gigantic and mighty Russian Empire which had to find an icefree outlet to the open seas for its abundance of agricultural products. On the other side, the Mediterranean nations pressed for free access of their merchant vessels - and navies as well - to the Black Sea. At the head of all stood proud Albion who wished to guard all of the three passages that lead into the Mediterranean.

The old Russo-British controversy clearly came to the fore once more in October, 1939, when Turkey, contrary to Russia's desire, failed

to close the Dardanelles to naval vessels - other than those of Black Sea nations - but preferred to join the war policy of the Western Powers.

Thus England succeeded this time by diplomatic means in gaining access to the Dardanelles, a passage for which she had fought in vain in 1915. Yet Churchill's further plan, that of marching from the Black Sea on Vienna, by following the course of the Danube - or, rather, of shedding the blood of the Balkan states for the cause of England - will fail in 1940, as it did in 1915. Perhaps the plan was this time to march on Baku and seize the oil wells in that region. Turkey, by her action, has placed herself in a precarious position.

This mere glance at the political factors of recent times shows clearly enough the geo-political importance of the Dardanelles. One wise man realized this as early as 1453, namely, Sultan Muhamed II, a determined and far-seeing ruler, who closed the Dardanelles by a double gate, as if foreseeing the many diplomatic conflicts and wars in which the possession of the Dardanelles would involve Turkey. The plan for the double gate was given by nature. One was the entrance to the Dardanelles from the Aegean Sea; and the other the narrowest part of the passage at Chanak Kale. The castles of Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale, at the outer gate, and Kilid Bahr and Kale Sultanie, at the inner gate, which were built in those days were replaced later by forts.

Between those two gates, the Dardanelles widen into the Bay of Brenkoi. Here foundered the great Franco-British naval attack of March 18, 1915, after shattering the outer gate. The loss of a number of British and French naval vessels was offset by the realization that the fleet alone could not force the passage of the Dardanelles, but that land forces were required.

GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

Thus the focus of the World War was thrown clearly on Gallipoli, that 50-mile long tip of land which Thrace pushes into the Aegean Sea, between the Gulf of Saros and the Dardanelles. This small peninsula, which bore the name of Chersones in ancient times, might have played a cultural role in the olden days. Today it is barren and without any cultivation, outside of a few olive groves and poor fields in the plains. In the main, the peninsula consists of bare and rocky mountain terrain which, in some places, reaches an elevation of over 10,000 feet and whose steep slopes are covered with rocks and low, thorny brush. The population, most of which consisted of politically highly unreliable Greeks, was expelled at the time; its houses demolished by the guns of British naval vessels.

It is important not only what a man is, but where he is. That fact makes barren Gallipoli a small piece of the earth which is of great political and military importance, a political delicacy which, in the following, we shall examine from the military point of view.

There are two narrow, yet quite favorable, places which may be used for landing troops in Gallipoli and pushing on from there to the Dardanelles. One, in the north, is the narrow gap at Bulair, where the straits are less than three miles wide; the other, located farther south, are the narrows which extend for a little over four miles from Gaba Tepe to Maidos. The conformation of the shore line further favors a debarkation, especially on both sides of Gaba Tepe.

For the remainder, the northern part of the peninsula - with the exception of Suvla Bay and the beach south of that bay - is unsuitable for landing operations on a large scale, the steep and abrupt mountains extending directly to the shore. Southern Gallipoli offers far more

numerous and favorable landing places, especially south of the mouth of the Sigin Dere and around the southern tip of the peninsula.

The interior of the peninsula is dominated by barren and steep ridges with deep ravines. The absence of trees has caused the top soil to be carried into the plains and to the mouths of the rivers, where the accumulation of soil offered the British forces ready landing places. Toward the south, the peninsula grows gradually flatter, finally to rise into another line of ridges bordering the southern tip which, in the west, ends in the sharp edge of the Tekke Durmu and, in the east, in the old fort atop a mountain and the village of Sedd el Bahr. Features of military importance south of the straits of Maidos are the high and expansive Kilid Bahr plateau which, forming a square, protects the forts of Kilid Bahr; and, northwest of the village of Krithia, Mt. Achi Baba, which proudly lifts its head 780 feet above the plain.

From there, the rivulets and creeks cease to flow in a westerly or easterly direction seaward; on the contrary, the Sigin Dere, Krithia Dere, Kereves Dere and Domus Dere flow, almost parallel to each other, toward the south. From the month of May on, the rocky beds of these streams are dry; together with Achi Baba and the village of Krithia, they are characteristic of the southern part of Gallipoli. Such was the scene of the most obstinate and sanguinary fighting of the year 1915. From there, the route led by way of Achi Baba to the Kilid Bahr Plateau, whence one could reach the forts around Chanak Kale which had blocked the passage of the British fleet.

Yet there was another road by which to reach Chanak Kale, namely, on the Asiatic side. The coast, from Kum Kale down to the two Besika Bays offers good landing places. Leading first through level terrain, the road then moves by way of Erenkoi and heads directly for Chanak Kale, and thus leads into the rear of the strong Turkish forts located between those

two towns.

We can see, therefore, that General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, did not lack a choice of places at which to land and attack.

On the other hand, these advantages were, to say the least, equally disadvantageous to him whose mission it was to prevent the landing. This mission devolved upon the Commander of the Turkish Fifth Army, Marshal Liman von Sanders-Pasha, Prussian General of Cavalry. In addition, he was faced by the great mobility of the British troops which, thanks to a large transport fleet that was protected by naval vessels, were in a position to effect a surprise landing any time and at any place. The defender had to rely on foot marches; and it was certain that his main forces invariably would arrive too late, especially since there existed no road net whatsoever in Gallipoli. One solitary road led across the peninsula; and part of it was in the zone of fire of the British naval guns. Finally, the front of the Turkish Fifth Army was separated into two parts by the Dardanelles. However, this separating water route and its defenses were not included in the zone of the Fifth Army, but belonged to the zone of command of Admiral von Usedom, Commander in Chief of the Straits.

There was no doubt, therefore, that all advantages, with respect to the incipient battle, were on the side of the British. And yet, the justified enthusiasm of Sir Ian Hamilton received a great blow when, the day after arriving off Gallipoli, March 18, 1915, he sailed up the hostile coast as far as Bulair and so gained his first impression of those inhospitable, steep and broken shores, where he could observe Turkish fortifications and barb wire entanglements strung out along the most favorable landing places. He wrote to his superior in London, War Minister

Lord Kitchener: "Here, Gallipoli looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your office."

THE LANDING PLAN

Sir Ian Hamilton now had to decide on his plan of attack. He had at his disposal 75,000 men, some of whom were still en route. His intention was to land simultaneously at several points and execute either a wide or narrow pincer operation. The narrows at Bulair and Besika Bay offered suitable places for the launching of a wide pincer operation.

With Bulair in British hands, the Turks in Gallipoli would be cut off from their lines of communication; the Dardanelles would be blocked by the fire of the heavy ship's artillery; and the British submarines would have a highly desired base. However, there was the possibility of the Allied forces being exposed to fire from two flanks, if Turkish troops should rush up from Thrace. Besides, Sir Ian Hamilton had convinced himself, in person, of the fortification of the old and historic Bulair line, whose wall had protected Miltiades against the invasions of the Thracians as long ago as five and a-half centuries B.C. Now there were three old Turkish forts located along that line. Sir Ian Hamilton ruled out a landing at Bulair. Likewise, he decided not to land at Besika Bay, despite its highly favorable conditions for a landing and the urgent insistence of the French who wanted the main offensive as a whole to be placed in that region, on the Asiatic side.

However, Lord Kitchener, whose word was decisive, did not want British troops to be employed in the vast expanse of Asia Minor. He feared that such a move might make it necessary to bring up reinforcements, which were needed urgently at home and on the Western Front. As a matter of fact, he had agreed to the entire Dardanelles operation only on the constant insistence of Winston Churchill, and against his

own better judgment. He preferred the employment of his troops to be restricted to the small peninsula. There was no space for strategic plans and far-reaching tactical maneuvers.

Therefore, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to confine himself to diversions at those two flanking points, while executing the smaller of the two pincer operations. This he contemplated to launch in the southern part of Gallipoli, after ruling out further a landing in Suvla Bay where there was no immediate objective of attack. He adhered closely to his mission, which called for the neutralization of the forts guarding the Narrows at Chanak Kale, in order to clear the path for the naval forces. That presupposed the occupation of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. The safest, though not the nearest, route to that objective, he believed, lay across the southern tip of the peninsula and Achi Baba, which point he hoped to reach the first day. In any case, he could count on the superior fire support of the fleet from three flanks during the landing. A similar support was out of the question at any other place.

He had in mind also to exploit the narrows at Maidos. However, instead of landing at Gaba Tepe, which point he believed too strongly guarded and fortified, he selected a landing place farther north where it seemed possible to gain surprise effect.

The Disposition of the British Forces

Located in highly favorable positions at the entrance to the Dardanelles, the islands of Imbros, Lemnos and Tenedos presented a natural concentration area for the forces under the command of Sir Ian Hamilton. The fact that these islands were under Greek sovereignty did not disturb England. As early as the middle of March, a part of the troops had arrived in the wide harbor of Mudros, on Lemnos. It was found, however, that - unbelievable as it may seem - the future tactical

employment of the troops had been left entirely out of consideration in loading the troops on the transports at home. Units had been broken up; guns, wagons and horses, trains and their supplies, even ammunition and fuzes - as stated in the official "History of the Great War" - had been separated and loaded in different ships. These amateurish preparations for the action of certain units made it necessary completely to unload, rearrange and reload the transports. The harbor facilities at Mudros, which were the only ones available on the island, proved to be entirely too small and primitive for such a tedious and difficult task, not considering the shortage of drinking water which was sufficient only for 10,000 men.

In order to straighten out the confusion, General Hamilton was forced to shift the base of his Dardanelles enterprise, that is, all of his divisions, temporarily to Alexandria and Port Said. That meant a considerable loss of time and, for the opponent, a wonderful, entirely unexpected present. It was March 27, the day on which Sir Ian Hamilton reached Alexandria - of which we, in Gallipoli, had no idea, of course - that Marshal Liman-Pasha, who had been appointed Commander of the Turkish Fifth Army a few days before, told me at Erenkoi: "If the English will give me only eight days." The delay lasted four weeks, thanks to the gross mistake in organizing the embarkation of the troops in England.

The mistake was corrected in Egypt. In the course of the last week of March, the following units reached Egypt, where they were placed at the disposal of Sir Ian Hamilton: The English 29th Division, under the command of General Hunter-Weston; the English Royal Naval Division (R.N.D.), with General Paris in command; the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), under General Birdwood; and the French Orient Corps, commanded by General d'Amade. Nineteen valuable days were taken up with the tiresome task of reloading.

The Disposition of the Turkish Forces

In order to understand the subsequent landings of the British forces in their details, one must first cast a glance at the measures taken by the Turks at the Dardanelles. While the Commander of the Straits made feverish efforts to block the water route, the Turkish High Command directed its attention, with regard to the defense on land, first of all to the operations in the Caucasus and along the Suez Canal. It was not until the ever increasing activity of the Anglo-French naval forces was felt at the Dardanelles that the Turkish High Command reinforced its land troops in that region. The attempt of hostile naval units to penetrate the Dardanelles, on March 18, finally caused the High Command to charge Marshal Liman von Sanders, March 24, 1915, with the defense of the Dardanelles - exclusive of the water route - and place at his disposal the newly organized Fifth Army.

In Liman von Sanders, the British faced a man who, with clear military vision and ruthless determination firmly bode halt to the opponent, despite the latter's vast material superiority, thus guiding the history of the world into channels which differed from those contemplated by the Entente. Upon his arrival in Gallipoli, Liman-Pasha - by which name he was known, for short - discarded immediately the old method of defense, a cordon system which extended all along the long line of the coast, endeavoring to secure with inadequate forces all points along the coast and so leaving no concentrated and strong reserves with which to drive out an invader. "He, who covers everything, covers nothing."

Liman-Pasha had at his disposal six divisions; of these, he placed two each at the threatened strategic flanks at Bulair and on the Asiatic coast, and disposed the rest in the southern part of the Gallipoli peninsula. Of the last two divisions, the entire 19th Division remained

as a general reserve at Midos; and the 9th Division was charged with the mission of covering the entire southern part of the peninsula. The divisions were instructed to maintain a maximum of concentration and push forward only security elements to the threatened points; however, these were to be fortified with available auxiliary means and armed with artillery and machine guns for enfilade fire. A defensive organization of that kind calls for well-trained troops, an efficient communication system, and an ever-ready, highly mobile reserve which may go into action at a moment's notice.

All units immediately launched a program of corresponding exercises; and labor battalions went to work on the construction of badly needed roads. New life came into the troops which previously had lain idle in monotonous coast defense routine. We know already that the British granted the Turks a respite of four weeks. No harm was done by the fire of the British fleet which lay off the coast and kept interfering with the exercises of the Turkish troops. On the contrary, the fire served to accustom the troops to warfare conditions and gave them an opportunity to make the acquaintance of hostile airplanes and captive balloons. Besides, much of the work was accomplished under cover of night.

The 9th Division, under the command of Colonel Sami Bey, had a very difficult assignment, namely, to cover the long stretch of coast line from a point south of Suvla Bay, past Gaba Tepe - Tekke Burmu - Sedd el Bahr, to Morte Bay. Its geographical position and great number of favorable landing places made this southern part of the peninsula a most threatened zone.

While the northern part of this sector up to, and inclusive, Semerli Tepe was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, reinforced by a mountain battery, the other two battalions and a mountain battery took

up a position in concentration in the region west of Maidos, near the vital valley that led to Gaba Tepe. Adjoining that position and guarding the coast as far as Sari Tepe, lay the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, and a battery of field guns. The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry covered the coast line to the mouth of the Sigin Dere as well as the east coast of Gallipoli, from Sedd el Bahr to, and including, Merto Bay. Two companies of this battalion were located in regimental reserve at the Kanli Dere, south of Krithia. This disposition made it possible to entrust the entire southern tip, from the line; mouth of the Sigin Dere - Sedd el Bahr, to the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, reinforced by a company of engineers. The Battalion had advanced a company each to Tekke Burnu and Sedd el Bahr; the remainder was located in battalion reserve in the area northwest of Sedd el Bahr. Finally, the Division Commander had retained the 25th Infantry and two field batteries and placed them in position on the Kilid Bahr Plateau, near Serafin Chiflik. Thus we can see that, although the general principles laid down for the defense of Gallipoli called for a maximum of concentration, the length of the coast had made it necessary widely to separate two regiments of the Division.

An estimate of the Turkish situation requires further to point out that the Fifth Army included neither heavy artillery nor aviation nor motor transport, and had at its disposal only the poorest material with which to erect field fortifications and was lacking badly in means of communication. Nor could the Army Commander count on major reinforcements, in view of the fact that the Russians, in the early part of April, began to concentrate a large expeditionary force at Odessa, with the intention of attacking the Bosphorus. In other words, the conditions were most favorable for the Allies. They faced the poorly equipped Turks with abundant materiel of all kinds, backed up by the resources of practically

the whole world, and with the freedom of strategic and tactical action which every soldier aspires.

The Jump-Off from Mudros

Sir Ian Hamilton returned from Alexandria to Mudros as early as April 10, for time was now pressing for a mutual agreement with Admiral de Robeck, the Chief of the Naval Forces, on the details of the joint military and naval action. Perfect cooperation, based on the directives issued by the two high commands, was essential to assure the simultaneous and well-directed movement of around 200 vessels and their unloading under hostile fire at well-defined places - in short, the success of the greatest landing operation ever planned. The organization of this enterprise, indeed, was an extremely difficult task, a program whose development the entire world would follow with tense eyes.

The delay which the reloading at Alexandria had forced upon the course of the operations had been exploited by the naval units that had remained off the Dardanelles to determine all technical conditions for the debarkations. This was all the more difficult, since reliable charts were not available and the demand for absolute secrecy required that all reconnaissances be conducted unobtrusively from the sea. These reconnaissances extended primarily to the sounding of the varying depth of the water - which was an important factor - the location of shoals, reefs, currents as well as suitable anchorages for the many transports and their naval convoys. It was necessary also to examine the suitability of the beaches for landing troops, especially with regard to the danger of hostile fire delivered from the beaches. In order to be able to conduct the landings simultaneously at several places and with a maximum initial strength, it was necessary to procure a large number of tows, lighters,

motor boats and other suitable vessels. Furthermore, the difference in the capacity of the vessels and width of the various landing places called for the preparation of special time schedules covering the debarkation and landing. Finally, specially organized and experienced naval commands had to be placed in charge of the landing maneuvers, to permit adherence to these schedules.

On these and many other bases, General Sir Ian Hamilton and Admiral de Robeck met aboard the Queen Elizabeth at Mudros, on April 10, for their first conference.

The crisis of the entire undertaking consisted in the moment at which the "amphibian" - a name which England likes to apply to herself, conscious of her versatile strength - was to emerge from the water and move onto land. All transitions involve a moment of weakness at which one is no longer one thing, nor is as yet the other.

Therefore, Sir Ian Hamilton was anxious that the transports should sail as near the coast as possible, in order to reduce the time required by the tows in plying between the transports and the beach. The objection to this plan was that it would require the men, who were heavily loaded with ammunition (200 rounds), rations for three days, entrenching tools and machine guns, to climb down shaky rope ladders from the high transports into small boats, in darkness and possibly also under hostile fire. Moreover, one did not know what effect that fire might have on the merchant marine sailors on the transports. Therefore, it was decided to carry the first waves of the landing forces close to the shore on men-of-war. The naval vessels would be certain to reach their designated positions even in darkness.

However, in order to eliminate entirely the perilous transfer of troops to shore by small boats, the daring plan was adopted to load 2,000 men on the collier River Clyde and to beach the vessel with full force at

Sedd el Bahr. Lighters carried in tow were to serve as a floating bridge and connect the collier with the beach. Sally-ports had been cut in the sides of the ship to permit ready access to the floating bridge. Besides, machine guns were placed in the bow of the River Clyde, which, as we shall see later, was a very good idea.

Another important question to be decided was, whether the troops should debark by daylight, covered by the ships' guns, or do so quietly and with surprise effect at night. No general rule was laid down; and the problem was handled differently, according to the situation and local conditions.

It was decided that, on the whole, the combat units should land first; while the horses, vehicles, baggage, ammunition and ration reserves were to follow their respective units later.

Both headquarters had to work in closest collaboration to arrange these and many other details and to amend them in accordance with the development of the events. It was a wise decision on the part of Sir Ian Hamilton with a part of his staff to board the Queen Elizabeth, the flag ship of Admiral de Robeck, at the outset of the fighting, thus assuring uniformity of command during the operations.

The conferences between the two commanders in chief resulted in a mass of orders and directives. In substance, these were directed at the execution of the following operations on April 23, the day on which fighting was to begin:

- (1) 29th Division: Landing on the southern tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, under cover of the naval artillery which was to open fire at sunrise.

Objective: Achi Baba, on the same day; next Kilid Bahr Plateau.

- (2) ANZAC: Surprise landing on the beach north of Gaba Tepe before daybreak; no noise; no fire support.

Objective: Mal Tepe, on the same day; followed by advance in the direction of Maidos.

- (3) One regiment of the French Orient Corps: Demonstration in the form of a surprise landing at Kum Kale.

- (4) Royal Naval Division: Diversion at Bulair; no actual landing.

- (5) French Orient Corps: Diversion at Besika Bay, no actual landing.

The most difficult attack mission was assigned to the battle-tried 29th Division. It was to debark simultaneously at five points along the southern tip, namely: At V Beach, near Sedd el Bahr; at W Beach, south of Tekke Burnu; at X Beach, north of Tekke Burnu; at Y Beach, north of the mouth of the Sigin Dere; and at S Beach, at the east corner of Morte Bay. For the sake of brevity, I shall adhere to the English use of letters in designating the beaches. The landing place for Anzac originally was called Z Beach; however, Anzac shortly became also a geographical term.

The plan to land at Y Beach was based on the special request of Sir Ian Hamilton. While the place as such was wholly unsuitable for a landing and difficult to approach, it was, for that reason, unguarded. Thus the Commander in Chief not only exploited all possible means of landing, in order to gather experience, but he hoped that the line S-Y would indicate the direction in which the small tactical pincers would close effectively.

Even before leaving Alexandria, the transports had been marked by large letters indicating their destination, as, for instance, A for the ANZAC, D for the 29th Division and so forth.

Sailing under the bright, clear moon of the night of April 23-24, 96 transports, inclusive of the attached men-of-war almost 200 ships, headed in orderly formation for their final assembly places: The R. N. D. for the upper part of the Gulf of Saros; the ANZAC for a point east of Imbros; the 29th Division for the waters near Tenedos; and the French Orient Corps for a point south of that island.

There is no argument that the entire gigantic enterprise, including the final concentration against the Dardanelles, was planned on a large scale, was carefully prepared and well organized.

To be sure, the British - contrary to their opponent - had at their disposal vast resources and, besides, were undisputed masters in the Aegean Sea, which, even in the case of a successful landing, was extremely important for the lines of communication of the landed forces. Such unlimited control of the waters is the exception in landings on hostile shores. It was not long before the first German submarine appeared off the Dardanelles. However, there were only few of such vessels in those parts. The ball kept rolling without obstruction. Sir Ian Hamilton halted its course once more when he postponed the day of landing from April 23 to 25. That was a wise decision, for the weather, which up to then had been continually bad and stormy, changed now to the opposite.

All considered, the jump-off from Mudros was promising.

The Fighting at the Southern Tip of Gallipoli

This fighting comprised the nucleus of the entire offensive. It must be conceived as a closely coherent tactical operation. While the landings at V, W and X Beaches constitute a frontal attack, the two landings at S and Y Beaches are an envelopment of both hostile flanks which may lead to a complete encirclement of the opponent, a maneuver which has been found highly successful on numerous occasions in the recent past. What the motor accomplished in Poland and France, in 1939 and 1940, here was entrusted to the ship's screw. However, both require the guidance of the will (command) and hand (troops) of man.

In addition, Sir Ian Hamilton had at his disposal heavy artillery ranging in caliber up to 15-in. - 345 pieces, all told - which he could commit to action with surprising rapidity at any point. On the other hand, the naval guns were all flat-trajectory guns and, therefore, were not as effective against entrenched land targets as howitzers or mortars.

On the opposing side, Liman-Pasha had no heavy artillery whatsoever. While the range of the fixed batteries, which were designed to defend the Dardanelles and belonged to the command of the Commander in Chief of the Straits, was limited to the Straits themselves, the forts at Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale had been put out of action in February. A 120-mm battery, commanded by Colonel Wehrle and located on the Asiatic side, was the only battery in a position to reach Sedd el Bahr and Morte Bay. This battery made itself quite unpleasant to the British in the ensuing operations.

Judging from reports on hand, Sir Ian Hamilton estimated the strength of the Turkish forces located in the region south of Achi Baba at a

full division. However, in reality there were only the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 26th Infantry and a company of engineers. These forces were faced by the reinforced 86th Brigade, under the command of General Hare. After storming the banks along the beach, the 86th Brigade was to advance to the line X - Sedd el Bahr, in order to clear the path for the debarkment of the 87th and 88th Brigades, each comprising four battalions. Thereafter, General Hunter-Weston, the Division Commander, intended to take over the command and lead the Division to Achi Baba.

During the night of April 24-25, with the weather and sea perfectly calm, the individual groups of transports, led and covered by men-of-war, reached their appointed positions opposite the coast of Gallipoli while it was still completely dark.

The Landing at V Beach

As the vessels assigned to V Beach approached the coast shortly before 5:00 AM, the outlines of the land which the troops had orders to invade emerged more and more clearly from the fog of the dawn.

On the right hand, one could recognize the entrance to the Dardanelles and, rising beyond, the imposing ruins of the wall of the old fort of Sedd el Bahr. On the left, the picture is framed by the protruding corner of Cape Helles and the ruins of a light house on top of the high ground. In the center, a ridge forms an open semi-circle and rises up to a 100-foot elevation, its right half covered with sod and brush, and its left passing into a yellowish-white wall. The spectator believes himself to be riding into an amphitheater. In front, one can see a

white band. It is the actual beach, a sandy strip some ten yards wide and bordered in most places by a low bank about five feet high. This strip of land gained vast importance during the ensuing operation. Complete calmness lay over the entire scene. Two rows of inter-connected wire entanglements were the only signs of war. Atop the high ground, one could see a number of destroyed buildings and the ruins of Fort Entregul.

Suddenly, at 5:00 AM, life came into the picture. The British warships opened fire with one stroke; in a short while, the entire scene was shrouded in geysers of impenetrable smoke and dust. The British were justified in expecting a successful landing; it seemed impossible that anybody could survive in this cauldron. Besides, the barrage continued longer than contemplated, for the now approaching five tows, loaded with Dublin Fusiliers, had been delayed by strong currents. Likewise, the River Clyde, which was assigned to this place, had to check its speed repeatedly, in order not to get ahead of the tows.

It was around 6:25 AM, when they finally reached the beach together. It seemed that the Turks had abandoned their defenses. The ships' guns shifted their fire to the interior, in order not to endanger the friendly troops. As planned, the River Clyde ran aground with its screw still turning.

At that moment, "Hell burst loose," to quote from the official British account. A murderous infantry fire met the incoming British from the upper tiers of the amphitheater. Heaviest casualties were suffered in the first few seconds. Only a small part of the Dublin Fusiliers succeeded in wading ashore. Some of the boats drifted helplessly northward; their occupants were either killed or had jumped into the water

and drowned. This demoralizing situation was aggravated further when the battery of Colonel Wehrle opened fire on the mass of confusion from its position at In Tepe. It was now up to the 2,000 men that were still hiding in the River Clyde to save the situation. They comprised a battalion of Royal Munster Fusiliers, a company of Dublin Fusiliers, and two companies of the Hampshire Regiment.

The first thing to do was to build a floating bridge of the lighters ahead of the bow of the River Clyde. However, the tugboat was not in place. Without hesitation, Commander Unwin reached for the line to which the lighters were fastened, jumped into the water and swam ashore under the hail of bullets. He saw his work in danger, for it was he who, during the conferences at Mudros, had proposed the daring scheme of using the River Clyde, in order to set ashore at one time more men than small boats could do in many trips. Commander Unwin, who had been in command of H.M.S. Hussar, further had volunteered to take command of the River Clyde. Standing in the water, he was now pulling the lighters into position to form a bridge.

Immediately, a company of Munster Fusiliers streamed down the gangway and across the bridge, but fell in heaps; the Company Commander was mortally wounded. Only a few remnants succeeded in gaining the cover of the sand bank at the beach. Bravely, the next company followed; the first 48 men who followed their captain were killed immediately. As the remainder reached the bridge, the latter was torn away by the strong current. Those whom the bullets had spared jumped overboard, but many were drowned by the weight of their equipment.

The result of the landing up to then was that but three officers and 30 percent of the men were left to continue fighting. Only a handful

of men had gathered behind the protective sand bank. Farther up the slope, one could see a few gallant men who had paid with their lives in the attempt to cut the wire entanglement.

Meanwhile, equally brave sailors had reconstructed the bridge with heavy losses. It was now 9:00 AM. Again, a company of Munster Fusiliers rushed down the bridge. It, too, met its death. This could not go on. The attempt to enter the village of Sedd el Bahr from the east, by landing troops at a point within the Dardanelles, also had failed. Therefore, the senior officer aboard the River Clyde issued orders not to resume the debarkation until dark. That decision was logical, for it was impossible to proceed with the landing in the previous manner.

The Division Commander, who was stationed in the Euryalus, off W Beach, was misinformed about the events at V Beach. At 8:30 AM, he directed the second echelon, consisting of the 87th and 88th Brigades, to land. Shortly after 9:00 AM, a tow, carrying General Napier, Commanding 88th Brigade, his staff and some troops, entered the bay at V Beach. Disregarding a warning sent from the River Clyde, General Napier and his adjutant were killed shortly. Other attempts to land were made in the course of the afternoon at the insistence of the Division Commander, but failed likewise in the face of a well-aimed and devastating fire which the Turks loosed at any suspicious motion. Even the repeated and protracted barrages fired by the naval guns, including the 15-inch guns of the Queen Elizabeth, did not succeed in silencing the defensive fire. The only visible result was that the village of Sedd el Bahr went up in flames. It was dusk before additional troops could be landed and the wounded finally could be collected. An assault, preceded by a thorough artillery preparation, was postponed until the next morning.

Let us turn now to the opponent who was so successful in his defensive action. We know that, at first, there was only one company of the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry. However, these men were well distributed and deployed in expertly constructed trenches, behind old walls, the ruins of barracks and destroyed fortifications. From this 100-foot high, upper gallery of the amphitheater, the Turks could look down into the arena about 200 yards away. This arena was the beach, where not the slightest motion could escape the eyes of the defenders. The effect of the cross fire of the machine guns, which the Turks had emplaced on the flanks and forward, was devastating. The fact that the British officers on the bridge of the River Clyde, notwithstanding constant observation with powerful binoculars, were unable to make out the trenches until the afternoon, when the sun was in their rear, goes to show how perfectly the entire defensive organization conformed to the ground.

The tremendous effort put forth by the British naval guns, which included the largest calibers, in no wise corresponded to the effect upon the opponent. The latter sat crouched in his holes. The howling burst of an armor-piercing, 14-inch or 15-inch shell, at first, affected the Turkish soldier like some catastrophic occurrence in nature; a direct hit would blow an entire section into the air. However, the Turkish soldier noticed before long that the cone of burst of such a monster, which buried itself deep into the soil, would be directed upward into the air and the explosion followed only by a dull rain of fragments without any grazing effect. He dubbed them "fountains" when he saw himself getting off with a scare. That sensation was reflected by the morale of the troops. Similar was the morale at Headquarters, 9th Division,

despite the fact that the British were landing at all points. Colonel Sami Bey wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Kadri Bey, Commanding Officer of the 26th Infantry and a splendid soldier: "I am sending you a battalion. It is evident that the enemy is weak. Drive him into the sea; I don't want to find a single Englishman in the south, when I arrive." The "History of the Great War" writes - and justly so - that this one company at Sedd el Bahr rendered a service to the defense which it would be difficult to exaggerate. "The failure to capture V Beach was the main cause of the collapse of the British plan." The gallant company of the 26th, at Sedd el Bahr, was reinforced in the course of the day by two companies. I have purposely described the landing operation at V Beach in such great detail, for it reveals most clearly how difficult it is to land troops by open boats, while under hostile fire. Even the use of the 8,000-ton steamer River Clyde could not alter the situation, though it saved the landing operation from complete collapse, especially since the Turks, whose armament in general was poor, lacked even a single battery of artillery with which to destroy the River Clyde. Around 1,000 men remained safely hidden within the steel body of the collier, waiting for nightfall; meanwhile, the machine guns in the bow were the only weapons with which to return the infantry fire of the Turks, for not one of the 200 men crouching behind the sand bank on the beach could as much as lift his head, without getting shot.

Here the question arises, whether it would have been better if Sir Ian Hamilton, in his capacity of Commander in Chief, had insisted on the execution of his original plan, namely, of landing with surprise effect, under cover of darkness and without artillery support. Admiral de Robeck,

at the Mudros conference, had pointed out the strong currents at the exit of the Dardanelles and spoken of reefs below the water line that were suspected to be at V Beach. The Commanding General, 29th Division, had believed it to be extremely difficult to assemble and establish order among the troops upon landing and to guide them on the foreign shore. Thus, Sir Ian Hamilton had decided in favor of an open landing at the southern tip, with the support of the naval guns. From this landing operation we can draw the lesson that the defensive must open fire on the landing forces, while they are still closely crowded and helpless in their boats and rowing for the shore. On the other hand, the offensive must not extend the defensive the favor of landing at a point where an invasion is expected. In the following, we shall see several examples which demonstrate this. In the operation at V Beach a small garrison, well concealed on the ground and adequately supplied with ammunition, showed what infantry fire, by itself, can accomplish, no matter how daring the opponent and how self-sacrificing his officers may be.

The Landing at W Beach

The conditions were similar at W Beach, south of Tekke Burnu, although the conformation of the shore line there was different.

In the course of the ages, the waters flowing down from the ridges near the coast have broken a gap of about 350 yards' width into the steep cliffs that line the shore between Cape Helles and Tekke Burnu. Located south of, and near, Tekke Burnu, this gap is especially suitable for a landing, inasmuch as the soil which has been carried down through the years has formed a basin uphill and widened the beach below. The

basin leads to a plateau which rises toward the southeast, that is, in the direction of Sedd el Bahr, to Hill 138 and northward to Hill 114.

In this nature-created passage, the Turks had erected a carefully organized system of defenses. Called a "death-trap" in the official British account, these defenses were built on the instructions of Major Effenert, a German engineer officer. Along the beach, a deep wire entanglement blocked the entrance to the bay. Land mines, torpedo heads and trip wires had been placed into the water, a few yards from the shore. The entire beach was covered by rifle fire in front and machine gun fire from the flanks. An Englishman who took part in the operation related to me personally that the enfilading machine gun fire, in particular, was unbearable. Finally, he said, he discovered a protruding rock behind which he took cover and from which a machine gun, held in the lap of a British soldier, could open fire. The slope of the basin was flanked on the right and left by trenches; the ridges likewise were protected by troops. The entire scene of action was a perfect example of a natural defensive position; unfortunately, the Turkish garrison there consisted of a solitary company of the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry.

Here, as in the case of the adjoining company at Sedd el Bahr (V Beach), British naval guns opened heavy fire at 5:00 AM, April 25. The effect was the same. At 6:00 AM, six tows, crowded with Lancashire Fusiliers, shoved off from the Euryalus which was lying off W Bay and headed for shore, where everything seemed dead. Fifty yards from the shore the two ropes were slipped; and 32 cutters rowed by sailors glided toward the beach. As at V Beach, Hell broke loose shortly

before the first boat grounded. The Fusiliers immediately jumped into the waist-deep water; suffering heavy casualties, they reached the wire entanglement at the beach, but found that the artillery preparation had not destroyed it. Nevertheless, some minor elements tore their way through and took a trench where the Turks had maintained only a weak garrison.

Following closely behind the first echelon, a tow carrying General Hare, Commanding 86th Brigade, his staff and some troops approached the shore. They succeeded in reaching a covered landing just below Tekke Burnu, whence the General, accompanied by a handful of men, proceeded immediately to make a frontal attack on Hill 114. Before the attack had advanced 200 yards, it collapsed when General Hare was seriously wounded. Simultaneously, two companies of Lancashire Fusiliers on the right flank had gained ground in the direction of Hill 138.

Thus, contrary to the landing at V Beach, that at W Beach forthwith suggested tactical maneuvers, namely, an attack on Hills 114 and 138, the two points on the flanks. Besides, space and safety was provided at the beach for the tows which were now headed for the beach with fresh loads. Disregarding the gallantry with which the landing forces executed the operation, the early success (7:15 AM) of the landing at W Beach was due to the fact that the Turkish garrison occupying the trenches in that sector was entirely too weak in numbers.

A comparison of the actions at V Beach and W Beach even up to that early hour shows that, in order to prevent a landing, it is better for the defensive to concentrate its infantry into one well-concealed line, like that at V Beach - if but for the sake of fire control - than to organize a deep system of defenses and occupy it too weakly, that is,

defend too many points simultaneously by small garrisons, as was the case at W Beach. The former method must be chosen, in order to be able to deliver concentric and destructive fire, with surprise effect, on the enemy as his boats are nearing the beach. A test of the artillery effect could not be made in this case, since the Turks had no field guns at all at the southern tip of the peninsula. Thus, while one single company of Turkish infantry at V Beach frustrated the attempted landing of two British battalions, the Turkish company at W Beach was unable to prevent the landing of but one battalion.

Meanwhile, troops had continued to land in W Bay. Two additional battalions (Essex and Worcestershire) arrived by noon. Their employment was somewhat delayed, however, by the absence of necessary instructions upon reaching shore, which was due to the fact that the Brigade Commander and nearly all battalion commanders had fallen out. At times, there was no command at all. When the Division Commander, who was stationed in the Euryalus, received word of the state of affairs through a captain, he sent his chief of staff ashore, with instructions to carry on the operations in his name. It would have been better if the Division Commander, himself, had taken the trouble of going on land, especially since practically all of his infantry was ashore. By so doing, he could have avoided the issue of duplicate and, in some instances, contrasting division orders. As already demonstrated and confirmed repeatedly in the subsequent operations, it is extremely difficult to conduct land operations from the deck of a ship. It is impossible to gain a true estimate of the situation in that manner; the personal influence of the commander and - especially in this particular case - the smooth

flow of communications and orders are lacking. Nevertheless, the considerable reinforcements that had been carried ashore succeeded in taking Hill 114. However, this attack was made from the direction of X Beach, as we shall see later. On the right flank, Hill 138 and, finally, the terrain as far as the ruins of Fort Etrogul fell into the hands of the British troops. Efforts to continue the drive eastward and to establish contact with the two Fusilier battalions at V Beach foundered on the expertly constructed wire entanglements which, running parallel to the coast, were successfully enfiladed from the north.

The British official accounts states that the fighting urge in general waned in the course of the afternoon. This inertia was due to the loss of many officers, the absence of a uniform, strong and determined command, and the confusion of the units. Inasmuch as the three brigade commanders personally went ashore at V, W and X Beaches, shortly after the first troops had landed, it would have been better if their respective brigades also had commenced landing operations at those three points; in other words, a simultaneous employment of the units side by side would have been preferable to their successive employment at one point. That would have prevented also the inevitable confusion of the units.

The Landing at X Beach

The troops which landed at X Beach, north of Telke Burnu, went into action in the immediate zone of W Beach.

Located along the very steep coast, as it turns north at Telke Burnu, X Beach forms a small bay north of Hill 114 with which it is

connected by way of a small basin. Although situated in a highly favorable tactical location, the Turks had attached no great importance to X Beach and had placed there a covering force of only 12 men.

Shortly before 6:00 AM, April 5, the Implacable, firing with all her guns and with four tows abeam, approached the bay. Overcome by a feeling of helplessness, in the face of the "fire-spitting monster," the 12 Turkish soldiers retreated from their position at the bay. By 6:30 AM, Battalion Headquarters, two companies and a machine gun section of the Royal Fusiliers had reached the top of the cliff without a casualty. The remainder of the Battalion followed shortly. As the Battalion ascended toward Hill 114, it drew heavy fire suddenly from the left flank. This fire came from a company of the 2d Battalion of the Turkish 26th Infantry which was on its way to support the company at W Beach. The Commanding Officer of the Royal Fusiliers detailed a company to face that opponent, but continued to march on Hill 114 with the remainder of his force. By 11:00 AM, he had gained the summit of the hill, thus establishing the vital contact with the troops at W Beach. However, the British command failed to exploit these welcome gains, despite the most favorable opportunity of gaining additional, wholly unexpected successes. To the surprise of the British, the high ground just above X Bay offered a sweeping view of the entire terrain in rear of the Turkish front line as far as Hill 141; one could see clear across the peninsula to Morte Bay and S Beach.

The situation clearly called for an attack against the rear of the Turkish lines between Hills 114 and 138, provided there were enough troops on hand. They arrived. As early as 9:00 AM, two battalions of the 87th Brigade, under the command of General Marshall, debarked at X Bay without interference. These battalions constituted the Division Reserve which had been directed to that locality by a turn of good

fortune. I do not know whether General Marshall appreciated the unusual advantage of the tactical situation which the God of War had bestowed upon him. At any rate, he did not feel justified to dispose of the Division Reserve and did not believe he should leave the cover of X Bay. He made no proposal of this kind to his division commander with whom he was in communication. On the contrary, throughout the day and the following night he remained inactive on the cliff above X Bay; his sole action consisted in driving back a surprise attack which Turkish elements launched at noon from an easterly direction. That attack goes to show that the Commanding Officer of the Turkish 26th Infantry felt keenly the threat in his right flank and rear and endeavored to anticipate it by a counterassault.

Having just studied the bitter and costly fighting at V and W Beaches, we cannot comprehend the reason for the failure to take action in that direction from X Beach. A simple advance of the two battalions in developed formation, from the flank and rear, probably would have been sufficient to lift the entire Turkish front out of its hinges. Any German lance corporal would have taken the initiative in those circumstances. The recent campaigns in the East, North and West offer any number of examples to bear out the truth of this assertion.

The Landing at Y Beach

The landing at Y Beach, which lies north of the mouth of the Sigin Dere, constitutes another lost opportunity, with even more tragic consequences. The landing at this point was executed at the express request of Sir Ian Hamilton who assumed the place to be unoccupied because of its unsuitability for a landing on a large scale. The beach actually

was unoccupied.

The strip of beach along the coast north of the mouth of the Sigin Dere is very narrow. In places, there is no beach at all, but the steep cliff, spotted with brush and rock, drops 150 feet directly into the sea. The cliff can be ascended only in extended formation. Yet the rains had dug two small gullies at Y Beach, which made it easier to climb the wall.

Here, a battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, followed by the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Naval Division and a company of the South Wales Borderers, landed completely unopposed at 5:15 AM, April 25. Lieutenant Colonel Matthews was in command.

Some 70 feet from the top of the cliff, one reaches a sheer drop into the deeply cut valley of the Sigin Dere, which is between 35 and 50 feet wide. The ridge on which one stands grows narrower toward the south and, after about 2,000 yards, reaches the mouth of the Sigin Dere. Toward the north, the ridge grows steadily wider.

Coming from the north, one enters this ravine of the Sigin Dere, as it is called best (the British named it "Gully Ravine" - Tr.), at a point a little over half a mile north of the village of Krithia. In the course of May 1915, I did so practically every day; I rode my horse under full cover all the way to the trenches of the Turkish 9th Division whose right flank extended to the Aegean Sea approximately at Y Beach. Naturally, this ravine was the logical approach to be used by anybody wanting to join the 9th Division. Yet it was also the logical approach route for the British, who could enter the ravine readily through the mouth of the Sigin Dere. A rare natural phenomenon, the ravine offered full cover to the very foot of Achi Baba, the objective.

Although Sir Ian Hamilton could not know it, with the poor maps at

his disposal, Lieutenant Colonel Matthews should have recognized this to be the ideal approach to the objective of the day, when he climbed down into the ravine in the morning hours of the 25th. It did not call for a special military eye for terrain. Even if he did not want to act on his own initiative, he should at least have sent an immediate report to his division commander about the location of the ideal approach. He failed to do even that. How completely Lieutenant Colonel Matthews was master of the situation, is revealed by the fact that he had at his disposal at Y Beach two battalions, without facing any enemy; in other words, the strength of his command was equal to that of the Turkish elements in the entire southern part of the peninsula, south of Achi Baba. According to the mission which he had received from the Commander of the 29th Division, Colonel Matthews was to occupy the terrain at Y Beach; attract Turkish forces that were rushing southward; establish contact with the elements at X Beach; and, finally, join the advance of the 29th Division on Achi Baba. Outside of a few inconsequential reconnaissances, Matthews remained entirely inactive at Y Beach. The only man who thought of using him was Sir Ian Hamilton himself. The latter had convinced himself of the success of the landing at Y Beach, while sailing early that morning in the Queen Elizabeth from Anzac to the southern tip of the peninsula. Seeing his troops at V and W Beaches engaged in bitter fighting, he contemplated the employment of the elements at Y Beach, but believed that they would have to be reinforced first. Sir Ian Hamilton, himself, had retained no reserves at his disposal. Therefore, he recommended to the Commander of the 29th Division a reinforcement of the troops at Y Beach. However, meeting with the disapproval of the Division Commander and "unwilling to interfere with the command of a subordinate," Sir Ian Hamilton dropped

the happy idea. Considering that, in the final analysis, the vital interest of his nation were at stake, this concern for the feelings of a subordinate is incomprehensible.

Lieutenant Colonel Matthews meanwhile had waited in vain for the advance of the 29th Division. And so he issued orders to the two battalions at 3:00 PM, to entrench. At least, here was a decision after eleven hours of waiting. It would have been better to commence entrenching a little earlier, for the Turks meanwhile had assumed the initiative and taken steps to drive the invaders at Y Beach into the sea.

Lieutenant Colonel Nail Bey, a splendid officer and Commander of the Turkish 25th Infantry, leading a battalion of infantry, a machine gun detachment and a field battery, clashed with the British troops at Y Beach at 5:00 PM. The first assault collapsed under the fire of the naval guns (a battleship and three cruisers). Colonel Nail Bey had to wait for darkness and made several strong attacks in the course of the night. Both sides suffered heavy losses and called for reinforcements. While Nail Bey received two additional companies, Matthews failed to receive as much as a reply to his calls. The final Turkish assault took place at 7:00 AM of the 26th - again without avail. However, on the side of the British, the obstinacy of the Turkish troops, the heavy losses, lack of ammunition, and a feeling of being cut off gave rise to an undercurrent bordering on panic, which drew the men toward their ships. It occurred now one of those peculiar cases that are mentioned sometimes in history, in which both opponents cleared the battlefield because neither of them could muster enough energy to hold on. The Turks had reached their objective; but they did not know it. The last rear guard elements of the British troops were back on

board ship at 11:00 AM.

Thus England withdrew voluntarily the most promising, though not the strongest, card which she was playing that particular day. Regardless of whether Lieutenant Colonel Matthews, on the 25th, attacked in a southerly, easterly or northerly direction, he had an opportunity to help his country to gain a splendid victory. However, he clung to his ships.

The Landing at S Beach

In the southern part of Gallipoli, there enters into consideration, finally, the landing at S Beach, on the east corner of Morto Bay. Located well within the Dardanelles, the Turkish defenses at S Beach were weak. The terrain near that locality offered no major obstacles.

Three companies of the South Wales Borderers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Casson and covered by the Cornwallis, successfully landed after minor fighting and occupied the high ground of Eski Hissarlik around 8:00 AM. From this point of vantage, Colonel Casson had a sweeping view of the entire southern part of the peninsula. To his regret, he noted that the 86th Brigade at V Beach was making no headway. It was the hour at which the Fusiliers were attempting to debark from the River Clyde and were suffering heavy casualties. His instructions were to wait for that brigade at S Beach and to join its advance on Achi Baba. From his point of vantage at Eski Hissarlik, Colonel Casson could look into the rear of the Turkish position. About two miles in front of him, he saw Hill 141, north of Sedd el Bahr. "But" - we quote from the British history, the "History of the Great War" - "Colonel Casson's orders had conveyed no hint of what he was to do in such an emergency."

In order to appreciate fully this most interesting situation of Lieutenant Colonel Casson, it should be mentioned that he was facing no enemy at any point, but had heard from a Turkish prisoner that there were 2,000 Turks in the "neighborhood." Now and then his three companies drew fire from the Turkish battery on the Asiatic side; this artillery fire was quite ineffective, however.

Lieutenant Colonel Casson decided that it would be an "unjustifiable departure" from orders to go to the support of his comrades who were engaged in bitter fighting at Sedd el Bahr. His orders were to wait for them at S Beach - and so he remained at S Beach and waited. A German officer would have been placed before a court martial in the circumstances. Yet General Hunter-Weston, the Division Commander, gave his full approval to the action of Colonel Casson. Moreover, Sir Ian Hamilton, the Commander in Chief, noted in his diary that the South Wales Borderers themselves had been too weak to attack Sedd el Bahr; furthermore, cooperation with the troops at Y Beach against the hostile rear had been impossible because of the artillery fire from the Asiatic side and the difficult terrain. This shows that both, Sir Ian Hamilton and General Hunter-Weston, approved of the conduct of Colonel Casson.

The Landing at Ari Burnu

There is a counterpiece to the landing of the 29th Division at the southern tip of Gallipoli, namely, the landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps at Ari Burnu, north of Gaba Tepe. Commanded by General Birdwood, the ANZAC comprised two divisions of 12 and eight battalions, respectively. The mission of General Birdwood was to land

at a point north of Gaba Tepe, advance in the direction of Maidos, and thus separate northern from southern Gallipoli.

There and to the north, at Bulair, are the two narrows of the peninsula which naturally attract any attacker. The narrows of Maidos had been intended to play a role once before, at the beginning of the War, when Greece suddenly declared herself ready for an immediate attack on the Dardanelles and submitted a carefully prepared plan which called for a landing at a point south of Gaba Tepe. England was to furnish only transport and war vessels. Of course, England was delighted with this offer, typical as it was of her aim to have other peoples fight for her interests. However, the execution of the plan foundered on the firm opposition of Russia who was to receive the Bosphorus and Constantinople as her reward for entering the War and did not wish to see the realization of Greek dreams concerning the restoration of ancient Byzantium.

Sir Ian Hamilton decided not to attack Gaba Tepe as proposed by the Greeks, having convinced himself of the strong fortification of that point. A mighty range, crowned by a number of summits, extends from the northeast, from Anafarta, in the direction of Gaba Tepe. At Dus Tepe, the range splits into two ridges which reach the sea at Ari Burnu and a point on the half-way mark to Gaba Tepe. A third ridge forks off near Chunuk Bair and extends to a point just east of Gaba Tepe. The small elevation at the beach, where Gaba Tepe is located, constitutes the final elevation of that ridge. The remainder of the terrain is typical dune land. At Gaba Tepe, one wades through sand and lyme grass. Toward the north, the three ridges grow more and more abrupt and reveal

wellnigh Alpine characteristics, though they do not rise above 1,000 feet. Steep rocks, deep gullies, rolling stone and knee-high, tough and thorny scrub obstruct one's passage and, especially, orientation in this confusion of ridges, knolls, gullies and valleys.

The plan of attack prepared by General Birdwood provided for a night landing, at the beach about a mile north of Gaba Tepe. Though the beach there is quite narrow for a landing of several divisions, it is nevertheless wider than at the southern tip. As far as I recall, it is between 35 and 50 feet wide. An invasion of the interior and a crossing of the three ridges from that landing place are easier than from the beach farther north - at Ari Burnu, for instance - where rocky slopes must be climbed that lead to the long ridge of Sari Bair.

Aside from the conformation of the ground, the plan of General Birdwood was influenced naturally by the strength of the Turkish forces that were assumed to be in that region. Again, the British overestimated the strength of their opponent. There were no "two complete divisions, or, roughly 20,000 men," in that region.

Here we encounter once more elements of the Turkish 9th Division guarding the beach itself. A company of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, was located between Ari Burnu and Gaba Tepe; one company each was posted along the shore north of Ari Burnu and south of Gaba Tepe, at which point there was also the 4th Company in reserve. A mountain battery was placed southeast of Ari Burnu, on the central of the three ridges. Two 120-mm guns guarded the coast at Gaba Tepe; and two 150-mm guns were stationed east of that point. Thus we see that, in contrast to the defenses at the southern tip of the peninsula, the garrison here

was relatively well armed with artillery - which was bound to impede greatly the landing of boats by day. The Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, had placed two battalions of his regiment and a mountain battery in an olive grove west of Maidos, as a local reserve of the elements along the shore. Finally, there was the 19th Division which, constituting the general reserve, was located in the immediate vicinity of the critical narrows at Maidos, between Boghali and Mal Tepe.

General Birdwood's mission now was to launch an attack from the sea against these Turkish forces which, considering the conditions in Gallipoli, were heavily concentrated and stood ready behind a most difficult mountain terrain. He had decided to outflank strongly fortified and occupied Gaba Tepe and avoid steep Sari Bair for the time being. Appropriately, he had selected the ridge extending from Sari Bair for the initial assault and directed the landing to be made at the beach a mile north of Gaba Tepe, where a mile of sandy beach seemed to offer no difficulties to landing parties. From the outset, General Birdwood had been in favor of executing the landing at night, without the support of naval artillery fire, while exploiting fully the momentum of surprise. Upon landing, the first wave was to drive on immediately into the interior and occupy the third ridge even before daybreak. However, the moon interfered with that plan. On April 25, the moon set in the west at 2:57 AM. This would have caused all ships to show themselves against the bright sky like silhouettes and reveal to the Turks the intention to land. Inasmuch as the landing was to be executed in the manner of a raid, surprise effect was essential. Therefore, the transfer of the troops to the boats had to be postponed until dawn,

i.e., around 4:30 AM. There was no other choice. Thus the time and initial objective of the attack were determined. We shall now examine the execution.

The rendezvous for the naval vessels assigned to Anzac lay northeast of Imbros, about five miles west of Gaba Tepe. A light showing at the stern of the Triumph designated the place. Around 1:00 AM of April 25, 1,500 men of the 3d Australian Brigade commenced transferring to the lowered boats, that is 500 men each from the battleships Queen, Prince of Wales, and London. Heavily loaded with ammunition and three days' rations, the troops had a difficult time climbing down the sides of the ships; however, the moon was still shining bright, and the sea was as smooth as a millpond.

As the moon disappeared beyond Imbros, the mass began to move. The three battleships took an easterly course toward Gallipoli, followed by the twelve tows of boats and, behind them, the seven destroyers which carried the remainder of the 3d Brigade, some 2,500 men. It was now entirely dark, except that now and again the searchlights in the Dardanelles would sweep across the eastern horizon and throw into black relief the outlines of Gallipoli and the rugged summits of Sari Bair. At 3:30 AM, the battleships dropped anchor two and a-half miles off shore. The twelve tows, with the troops tightly wedged and silent in the boats, made their way through the ships. In order to avoid friction upon landing and permit immediate tactical employment, each battalion was moved in a group of four tows.

The naval officer responsible for guiding the line of tows - there were still two and a-half miles of water to cross - was Lieutenant

Waterlow. He was stationed in No. 1 steamboat on the extreme right, with orders to steer on the landing place a mile north of Gaba Tepe. The other eleven steamboats had instructions to keep a lateral interval of 150 yards on starboard; however, not all boats were able to maintain that interval in the darkness.

Steamboat No. 12, on the extreme left, carried the naval officer in charge of the flotilla, Commander Dix. Shortly after 4:00 AM, the dawn of the morning revealed the outlines of a cape; while Lieutenant Waterlow thought it was Gaba Tepe, Commander Dix felt certain it was Ari Burnu. Both endeavored to correct the obvious mistake in steering by putting their helm hard over - Lieutenant Waterlow to port, and Commander Dix to starboard. The outcome was utter confusion among the tows. Commander Dix was right; the place was Ari Burnu.

This confusion was caused by the northerly current that sets along the Gallipoli coast; its effect was greater than the sailors had realized in the darkness. During the Mudros conferences, the Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces had warned against night landings on an unknown shore and recommended that the landing forces rely on the artillery preparations of the naval guns and land by day.

The confusion was aggravated further by the fact that the tows now were within 50 yards of the shore and it was time to cast off the lines and row the 48 boats ashore by five sailors each. Suddenly - it was 4:25 AM and day was breaking - scattered fire rang out from Ari Burnu. Naturally, each boat did its best to reach shore as quickly as possible. As a result, the boats landed on both sides of Ari Burnu, at the very

point where the first ridge drops abruptly into the sea and which was to have been avoided by landing at a place farther to the south. One must admit that the Australians adjusted themselves quickly to the unfortunate change in the situation. In a few minutes, all were on land. Once ashore, the troops immediately climbed the first ridge in front of them. Some 30 or 40 Turkish soldiers could be seen disappearing in a ravine towards the interior. The surprise was complete, despite the error made in the course.

Upon a hasty collection of the units, the individual groups at 5:00 PM took up the advance in the direction of the second ridge, while securing their flank against Gaba Tepe. The remainder of the Brigade, under the command of Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan, landed without delay and likewise pushed on toward the second ridge. Simultaneously, other elements of the 3d Brigade on the left flank tried to gain the dominating Dus Tepe, by heading directly east from Ari Burnu, but were brought to a halt by hostile fire in front and left flank.

Wholly contrary to schedule as the course of events had been, it had caused the 3d Brigade to become widely dispersed and intermixed. The Commander had lost firm control of his units; and he justly feared at that moment that the enemy might launch a counterblow from the direction of Gaba Tepe. The moment was opportune, both from a tactical and psychological point of view. However, the Turks were not ready; the landing had taken them by surprise. At Gaba Tepe, the Turks brought into action only machine guns and long-range cannon. The mountain battery on the second ridge had fallen into the hands of the Australian troops, but was retaken later by the Turks.

The danger point of the situation passed at 6:00 AM, when the 2d

Australian Brigade landed without interference. The change in the situation made it necessary, however, to place the 2d Brigade on the right of the 3d Brigade, with orders to march on Sari Bair, instead of employing it on the left flank. In other words, the carefully devised plan of employing the 1st Australian Division collapsed and created confusion among command and troops. The 1st Brigade, whose debarkation extended into the noon hours, also became involved in this unforeseen development of events.

At the front, the Commander of the 3d Brigade, that is, the brigade which had landed first, decided as early as 7:00 AM to entrench on the second ridge, despite the fact that the hostile fire was weak. This decision had far-reaching consequences. The Brigade Commander gave the enemy time to take countermeasures; he voluntarily relinquished the initiative; above all, he abandoned his objective, the third ridge, whence he could have pushed on at will in the direction of Maidos.

Naturally, the Turks took advantage of the opportunity. Around 9:00 AM, the reserve in the sector west of Maidos ascended the important third ridge without opposition, while the Australian troops were digging in on the second ridge. Mustapha Kemal Bey, the Commander of the 19th Division (later Ataturk and President of Turkey), forthwith placed himself at the head of the 57th Infantry and rushed for the dominating terrain feature of Chunuk Bair, without regard to the fact that his general reserve had been placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief. The two opponents clashed at Shain Tepe (Battleship Hill).

The Turks succeeded in regaining Dus Tepe (Baby 700), which was a vital point. Meanwhile Essad-Pasha, Commanding General III Corps, whom Liman-Pasha had sent to the south of the peninsula, had placed Lieutenant

Colonel Mustapha Kemal Bey in command of the operations against Ari Burnu. Mustapha Kemal Bey had already given the operations the decisive turn, for -surprising as it may seem - the line which the Australians had reached in their initial assault of the early morning hours of April 25 remained the front line. Even the heaviest and bloodiest battles of the next eight months failed to cause any change in that line. Despite the greatest efforts, the Australians and New Zealanders reached neither Gaba Tepe, nor the third ridge, nor, farther north, Dus Tepe (Baby 700), nor the dominating ridge of Sari Bair.

This goes to show how much depends upon initial determined, yet intelligent, action.

Diversions

Besides the two major landing operations at the southern tip of Gallipoli and at Ari Burnu, which it had been hoped would bring about the decision, Sir Ian Hamilton directed the execution of several feint landings designed to divert the attention and reserves of the opponent. In this he was successful, basically because of the difference in the estimates which the two opposing commanders in chief formed of the situation developing from the ensuing fighting.

Liman-Pasha was of the opinion that the Entente intended to land troops in Gallipoli for the purpose of defeating the opponent, that is, primarily Turkey, first in a military way and next in a political way. Consequently, he expected the invader to execute an envelopment of both flanks, that is to land at Bulair and Besika Bay. The geographical conformation of the terrain favored that decision; and it conformed also to the strategic requirements.

On the other hand, Sir Ian Hamilton gave no thought to such a sweeping conception of his mission. His train of thought confined itself to tactical plans and was directed solely at the aim of gaining Kilid Bahr Plateau and neutralizing the forts at Chanak Kale, in order to permit the naval units to enter the Sea of Marmara. That was the mission assigned to him by his superior, War Minister Lord Kitchener; and he would adhere to it, even though Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, should entertain farther reaching strategic and political ideas. Therefore, Hamilton's plan covered only the occupation of Kilid Bahr Plateau. He believed at the time that he would require but a few days to accomplish his mission in Gallipoli. As early as the morning of the 25th, the mine sweepers went to work clearing the Dardanelles for the fleet which expected to enter the Straits on the 26th.

Liman-Pasha saw his opinion verified early in the morning of April 25, when 11 large transports - carrying the Royal Naval Division - steamed up the Gulf of Saros and dropped anchor off Bulair, while the convoying naval vessels loosed a devastating fire on the narrows at Bulair. Liman-Pasha, himself, rushed to that point and, for the time being, refused all calls for reinforcements that reached him from the southern tip of the peninsula and Ari Burnu. As we have learned in the foregoing, he merely sent the Commanding General of the III Corps, with orders to assume command of the entire south of the peninsula. In the afternoon, there were signs of an attempted landing; however, the boats apparently returned to their transports at dusk. Movements were simulated again during the night. Seeing the following morning that no landing actually had been executed at any place, Liman-Pasha

realized that the enemy had intended to deceive him. The five battalions that had been sent to the southern tip during the night were followed gradually by the 5th and 7th Divisions; because of the threat of British submarines, these reinforcements could be transported through the Dardanelles only at night. Committed to action piece-meal, and then too late, the defenders were unable to drive the British and Australian troops back into the sea, for they had already gained a foothold on the soil of Gallipoli. Sir Ian Hamilton could be content with the success of his diversion.

Simultaneously, diversions took place on the Asiatic coast; their execution was assigned to the French Orient Corps which was about a division strong. The British report refers to the actual, though temporary, landing at Kum Kale more appropriately as a demonstration. The landing operation, as such, reveals a picture which differs widely from that of all of the other landings.

In this case, two villages - Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr - about two miles apart are located at the edge of the shore, on a ridge which is 900 yards wide, drops toward the north and, on the inland side, is bounded by a river, the Menderes. On the far side of the river extends the Trojan Plain, a level stretch of land which is traversed by a number of streams. Naturally, the Turks had occupied the ridge and, especially, the two villages. These proved to be splendid targets to the long-range guns of the French naval units, among them the Russian cruiser Askold, as compared with the trenches concealed in the terrain over on the European side. The two villages burned down, forcing the Turks to evacuate them and retire to the far bank of the Menderes.

Under those conditions, the landing of the French 6th Colonial Regiment and a field battery met with no untoward incident, except a considerable delay due to the strong current coming from the direction of the Dardanelles. Torpedo boats had to be sent to the assistance of the tows. Bitter fighting ensued when the French forces attempted also to take Yeni Shehr. The invaders, finally, had to content themselves with the occupation of Kum Kale and vicinity; there they entrenched. Nor were they successful in their endeavor to take Yeni Shehr the next day. Since the purpose of the undertaking, namely, the contention of Turkish forces on the Asiatic side, had been accomplished, and it became necessary to send the French troops to Sedd el Bahr, in support of the British 29th Division, the French troops were returned to their ships during the night of April 26-27. The casualties suffered in the course of this demonstration were not inconsiderable, the French losing 778 men, and the Turks 1,730 men, inclusive of 500 prisoners.

In comparison, the demonstration at near-by Besika Bay was harmless. The two destroyers and one torpedo boat, convoying a flotilla of six French transports, merely bombarded the coast and simulated a landing, but withdrew to Tenedos as early as 10:00 AM. The Turks had recognized early that the opponent intended nothing serious.

Conclusions

We have seen how the gallant soldier of the Entente, led by his officers, landed and established a foothold in Gallipoli, in the execution of a well prepared plan. Yet at no point did he get beyond the edge of the peninsula. Having failed to strike a vital blow the first

day, the invader was unable to gain the objectives of April 25, Achi Baba and Mal Tepe, in eight months of bitter fighting. It is interesting to note the reasons which the British report gives for the failure of the operations of April 25. These reasons are as follows:

- The large number of casualties suffered among brigade and battalion commanders in the course of landing;
- The lack of flexibility in the orders for the operation;
- The absence of reserves in the hands of the Commander in Chief;
- Poor arrangements for communication with the troops on land;
- The difficulty encountered in conducting land operations from the deck of a man of war, as in the case of the 29th Division.

However much the English might rack their wits in the endeavor to eliminate these and other faults in the structure of their army, they will not find it easy, for these faults consist in the evolution which the British Army has experienced in the course of time. Like the individual, so the multitude, the nation, is the product of inherited characteristics, environments and education. The resulting character of the nation finds expression most clearly in his national defense. In other words, it is necessary to steer an organic development onto new paths. That requires the work of many generations.

Germany, for instance, lacking natural, protecting boundaries and situated in the heart of Europe, for many centuries has had to fight for her bare existence and has to do so again today. Thus, her evolution has forced her throughout untold generations to create a national defense which - ever ready to strike - constitutes the acme of military strength and expresses the military spirit of the entire nation.

The military tradition of England, whose insular position imposed limitations even upon as great a man as Napoleon, has followed a wholly different trend. England sees in the soldier, on and beyond the seas, the protector and pathfinder of her commercial-colonial activities who permits her to bring in unmolested the resources of the world. Consequently, the British Army bases itself on the lessons and traditions of colonial campaigns. There is no question that England has been sole master in that sphere of action and has had a decided advantage over all other nations in power, resources and intelligence. Invariably England has been in a position to take her time, to deliberate and prepare everything in perfect calm, as well as to await the effect of other means - both legal and illegal - before deciding to sacrifice her own dear blood. There should have been enough food for thought in the Boer War, which lasted two years and in which women and children were locked behind barb wire, in order to strike at the men. Unquestionably, England would like to see also our women and children behind her barb wire. However, Germany is no Negro tribe; and the accustomed and so convenient methods of colonial warfare cannot be applied against her any more than the "divide et impera," which the English like so well and at times have employed successfully in dealing with strifes between Hindus and Mohammedans, or between Jews and Arabs. Greater Germany is only too well aware of the fact that the "divide" is followed invariably by the "impera." Nor can warfare conducted from the bookkeeping department, with pencil and telephone in hand, prove successful forever against an opponent who is resourceful in a military way.

The foregoing remarks are no deviation from the strictly military

subject of our discussion, for they introduce us to the English conception of warfare. This conception is expressed even in situations of a purely tactical nature, based as it is on colonial experience. It casts a light on the odd similarity in the conduct of the three commanders at S, X and Y Beaches; all three failed to take action on their own responsibility, for they looked upon themselves as being solely in an executive capacity. Troops placed at one's disposal, they reasoned, may not be committed to action without special authority any more than bonds placed in one's keeping may be sold on the stock market on one's own responsibility. The owner must first give his consent. Such seemed to be the logic of the commanders at the beaches. That was the reason why the General in command of the 29th Division signalled to the commander at S Beach: "Well done, South Wales Borderers. Can you maintain your position for another 48 hours?" In colonial warfare, one does not employ troops of one's own race hastily. There is no cause to hurry, for the opponent must wait, the same as the weak must wait for the decision of the strong. That is the lesson taught by colonial experience. Hence the detailed instructions issued by Sir Ian Hamilton - who had attended the same school. Having received orders to join the "advance" of the 29th Division, one simply waited for new orders, if the Division "did not advance." To be sure, the British report censures this and refers to it as a "lack of flexibility in the orders for the operation." Yet the mere issue of new orders is not enough; situations of this kind call for subordinate commanders that will appreciate the change in the situation with lightning rapidity and possess that fine sense of knowing what decision to make in order to conform to the new situation. That

cannot be accomplished by issuing orders; on the contrary, it is the result of many years of carefully planned training and involves also many other factors. True military glory lies in wait at the door of death. There one must achieve it with a quick and determined grasp. I believe that the splendid campaigns of 1939 and 1940 will reveal many examples of the kind of military spirit which takes action swiftly and at the right time and place. The many directives issued by Headquarters of the Expeditionary Force for April 25 include one which I would like to mention as being "typically" English. The instructions read that, in the event of failure to gain a foothold in Gallipoli on the 25th, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force should make a landing at Enos on the 26th. "Political as well as military considerations will demand," so it is stated in the General Headquarters communication, "that the Gallipoli landings should be made to appear a feint, and it will be of the utmost importance to give the impression that our main effort was intended from the first to be made in another quarter." The purpose of this pre-arranged denial was to assure the illusion of British infallibility from the outset. That method might be applicable to Negro tribes. Yet the method of making it a matter of principle to deny unpleasant facts must have been found excellent, for it is still being used without limitation. Of interest is merely the fact that Headquarters directed it with foresight.

Returning to our immediate subject, the landings, we have seen that, on April 26, 1915, troops landed at ten different places. The variety of these operations represents a true pattern, with the added advantage that it is derived from practical experience. Some landings

were made by day and some by night; some were aimed at surprise effect, others were launched in the open; some had artillery support and some had none; some landings met with counteraction, others encountered no opposition; some were feints, and the purpose of others was to bring about a decision. The vast amount of details which must be taken care of preparatory to a landing operation present an especially difficult problem, as most of them call for careful joint deliberations by the Army and Navy, in the course of which one party frequently makes demands which the other party cannot meet. While our discussion has been confined to the tactical execution of the landings, and the administrative measures have not been taken into consideration, they are of utmost importance. For instance, labor details must be set ashore without delay to prepare the beach for the unloading of guns, vehicles and horses; the wounded must be evacuated; ammunition and rations must be supplied, especially drinking water; material must be brought up for the construction of field fortifications, shelters etc. Briefly, the coupling of the sea and land echelons, with its many complications, is a highly involved problem.

Nevertheless, a study confined to the tactical events reveals a wealth of interesting details:

First of all, the initial, critical phase of the landings, which was carried out in open and unprotected boats, while feared was overcome with surprising success, except at V Beach. Yet a new and unexpected crisis developed immediately, due to the entirely new conditions encountered on unfamiliar ground, especially where the assembly of the units and initial orientation was impeded by hostile fire.

Still more crises developed in the course of the landing operations,

when both sides began to doubt the success of the fighting. The British report fittingly states: "The side with the more resolute leader, who insists on one further effort, will generally prove the victor."

In making preparations for a landing, it is highly important further to possess a thorough knowledge of the conformation of the ground, in order to avoid walking blindly into disaster and running into cliffs, deep water and strong currents. The fact that that happened several times on April 25 was no fault of the naval command, for it had issued repeated warnings, but was due to the poor maps available; unobtrusive reconnaissances conducted along the coast served little to furnish additional information. The Admiralty in London had made better provisions for a landing on German soil; as early as 1914, it possessed most accurate models of the mouths of German rivers and the islands facing them.

The weather plays a great role. Sir Ian Hamilton was richly rewarded for his decision to postpone the operation from the stormy 23d to the clear and beautiful day of the 25th. On the 23d, his crowded boats would have been crushed by the surf along the shore. Though high and low tides did not enter into consideration in the Aegean Sea, the moon was of vital importance in connection with the landing at Anzac.

Diversions have been found to be of considerable help. However, they must not assume the harmless appearance of the one which was staged at Besika Bay. At least, the feint must be accompanied by much activity and extend throughout the following night, as in the case of the diversion at Bulair, unless one intends actually to land, as at Kum Kale.

The conduct of the command and the system of communication must be studied jointly. Of what avail are the most splendid gains of a

subordinate commander, unless the high command can exploit them immediately in a strategic manner? Of what benefit are even the best orders, if they do not reach the troops? Communication during and after the landing at Gallipoli failed on a number of occasions, generally in the case of communication between land and ship. That was all the more dangerous, since all communication between the units on land and Headquarters passed through the battleships. Here, again, we observe the amphibious character of such an undertaking. To be sure, it was a good idea to station General Headquarters, the naval command as well as the two command posts of W and Anzac Beaches in the respective flag ships. It permitted immediate verbal discussion at Headquarters which was bilateral in this case. Yet signal communication between ship and shore failed repeatedly, despite the evident fact that the sailors aboard the battleships did their best to support the soldiers on land. In many instances, the naval personnel did not know what went on ashore or where to direct their fire; and inquiries remained without replies. Frequently, the signal station on land would be entirely out of touch with its own respective unit.

However, the joint location of the land and naval commands aboard the battleships also had its disadvantages, for one cannot serve two masters. When the artillery of the Queen Elizabeth had to assist the heavy fighting at V Beach in the afternoon of the 25th, General Hamilton was chained to that locality, instead of being free to visit by ship several landing places where his supervision was urgently needed. The British consider it best, therefore, to accommodate the land and naval commands together on a specially equipped vessel. Another disadvantage consisted in the fact that the general in command of the forces on land

went ashore too late, for - and that has been demonstrated - land operations cannot be conducted from the deck of a vessel.

From these lessons in the offensive, we may draw conclusions also with regard to the defense of a coast line.

As in the offensive, secrecy is of primary importance in the preparations for the defensive. Liman-Pasha had given orders to work only at night, one reason for which was that the British battleships by day would open fire on even the smallest targets, including individual horsemen. Significant are the words with which Admiral de Robeck oriented Sir Ian Hamilton upon his arrival at the Dardanelles, March 17, 1915: "The peninsula itself is being fortified; and many Turks work every night on trenches, redoubts and entanglements. Not one single living soul has been seen, since the engagement of our Marines at the end of February, although each morning brings forth fresh evidence of nocturnal activity, x x x."

The smaller the number of troops, as compared with the length of the threatened coast line, the better signal communication and the roads must be; otherwise one will be too late at the decisive moment. And that is - as we know - the moment at which the invader approaches the coast in boats - defenseless and facing twofold death: that of drowning or the bullet of the enemy. What great efforts the British made to avoid that moment is demonstrated by the landing at Suvla Bay, in August, where the landing forces employed specially constructed motor boats with steel sides that offered protection against rifle and shrapnel fire. These motor boats had a capacity of 500 men or 40 horses and a speed of from five to seven knots. On the bow, a ramp was fitted which was lowered for landing and established contact with the beach.


It goes without saying that all devices at the disposal of a superior defense must be put to work, in order to impede the hostile landing operations. Tread mines, trip wires laid below the water surface, and barb wire entanglements, especially when covered by machine gun fire from the flanks, proved excellent means of defense at V and W Beaches.

Wherever possible, the Turkish forces conducted their defensive by offensive methods and, in general, did all one could expect of them, considering the primitive means at their disposal.

The tremendous increase in all technical means since the World War will benefit coastal defense in particular. Though the methods of warfare change with the progress of the evolution, the fundamental requirements that must be made upon the command and the manly qualifications of the individual soldier remain the same. Therefore, our study of the British conduct of war in Gallipoli is not without importance.

Sketch 51

DISPOSITIONS OF THE TURKISH 9TH DIVISION

Dawn, 25th April.

Col. Burrows:

The Gallipoli,
1915, story is told
in detail to P. 46. —

However, the significant
part of this article would
seem to be in the

"Conclusions" — (P. 46 to
end) and ^{worthwhile} any digest
would probably center
largely on the "conclusions,"
it seems to me.

In view of the date of this
article (Dec. 1940) and German interests
apparently in the Burdinellas, (over)


now, a brief
digest seems timely.

M

(The maps may be
of some direct value
to us, if the Dartnell
picture develops)

Y BEACH

(Reduced from the Turkish 1:5,000 Survey)



Y BEACH


Attack by
Bn 25th Regt.

Ravine

Gully

Krithia

Achi Baba
1 mile



Heights in feet.


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Prepared in the Historical Section (Military Branch).

HELLES

The Beaches & the Turkish Defences

25th April 1915.




Prepared in the Historical Section (Military Branch).

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
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Ordnance Survey 1925

THE THREE ANZAC RIDGES




ANZAC



KUM KALE & YENI SHEHR

SCALE OF YARDS.
1000 500 0 1000
Heights in metres.



MOUTH OF THE DARDANELLES

Kum Burnu

Pier

Small Jetty

Kum Kale

Cemetery

Orkanie Mound

Yeni Shehr

Tuzla Asmak

In Tepe Battery
2000 yds

Ruins of Tepe
2 miles

Prepared in the Historical Section (Military Branch).