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REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

LEARNED

CLASSIFIED BY 4th Infantry Division
SUBJECT TO GPO DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31/1973.

4TH
31 Oct. 67
Infantry Division

[REDACTED]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

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26 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS: CSFOR -65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

CLASSIFIED BY *Hq 4th Inf. Div.*
SEP 20 1971
SC 100 100 100
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 31/972

1. (U) The attached Operational Report - - Lessons Learned for the quarter ending 31 October 1967 summarizes the activities of the 4th Infantry Division from 1 August to 31 October, except those covered in the Combat After Action Reports for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY, which have been forwarded to all addressees.

2. (U) Since Operation FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY terminated on 11 October and the after action reports covered, in detail, operations, intelligence, fire support, logistics, civic actions and psywar, this report is an add-on and addresses only those items that were not directly associated with the two operations such as training and base camp development and all activities conducted between 12-31 October. The tactical lessons learned reported in the FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY After Action Reports provided a comprehensive and complete analysis for the reporting quarter, therefore, a great quantity of lessons learned are not included in this report.

3. (U) On 12 October a new operation, Operation MAC ARTHUR, was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division and continued at the end of the reporting period. The area of operations encompassed 8000 square miles of the Central Highlands and included all of PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces and portions of DARLAC and PHU BON Provinces. In this area the division was responsible to maintain surveillance of the 205 miles of VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN Border, which formed the western boundary, to prevent the incursion of enemy forces into the Republic of VIETNAM and to conduct operations in the remainder of the area to find and destroy NVA/VC forces operating in the area. In addition to the tactical mission, the division conducted civic actions in the TAOR and the area of operations and continued its support of the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENANG Refugee Resettlement Program.

4. (U) During the remainder of October the enemy continued to avoid contact with our units: never concentrating his forces, and moving only in small groups. To counter this tactic our units broke down into squads and sections to cover the maximum area, searching not only for enemy personnel, but their supply caches and base areas. There were no large contacts during this period but there were numerous small contacts each day.

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
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5. (U) It was also during this period that the division gained additional combat strength. The eight "straight" infantry battalions were reorganized adding a fourth rifle company and a combat support company which considerably increased our foxhole strength. The armored forces of the division were also increased by the attachment of the newly arrived 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry to the division.

6. (U) Operations during the past three months have been signified by a series of frequent, but light contacts. This has worked to our advantage for our units had nearly a 75 percent turnover of personnel during the months of July, August and September. The lack of heavy contacts gave our units the opportunity to assimilate the new personnel and mold themselves into effective fighting formations. This training and experience, gained during these months of relative quiet, was to hold our units in good stead in November at DAK TO and elsewhere in the MAC ARTHUR area of operations.

1 Inclosure
as



W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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OPERATIONAL REPORT -- LESSONS LEARNED

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
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SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by the report, the division terminated Operation FRANCIS MARION and Operation GREELEY. Operation MAC ARTHUR was initiated and continued at the end of the reporting period.

b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FRANCIS MARION contains the task organization in the FRANCIS MARION area of operations from 1 August to 11 October.

(2) Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY contains the task organization in the GREELEY area of operations from 1 August to 11 October.

(3) Task organization for Operation MAC ARTHUR for the period 12-31 October is at inclosure 1.

(4) The attached 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was redesignated 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on 1 August. The brigade was OPCON to the Americal Division for the entire reporting period and is not included in this report.

(5) The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was attached to the 25th Infantry Division until 1 August when the brigade was redesignated 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The activities of the brigade prior to 1 August are not included in this report because of the attachment to the 25th Infantry Division.

c. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry arrived in-country on 30 August and was attached to the division. The squadron moved to Camp Enari on 1 September and was operational on 15 September.

d. Company E, 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) was attached to the division on 15 October for all purposes less operational control which was retained by Commanding General, I Field Force, VIETNAM.

e. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

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f. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM'S EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

(f) Support the Revolutionary Development Program and the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program.

(g) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.

(h) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Regional and Popular Forces and of critical signal sites, sector and subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(i) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion-size reserve on order.

2. (1) Intelligence.

a. General. Enemy activities in PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces during the period were limited to small scale activities with attacks by fire by elements of the 174th NVA Regiment and 200th VC Artillery Battalion. In PLEIKU Province the enemy avoided any large concentration of troops, being content to conduct small reconnaissance missions while at the same time infiltrating supplies and personnel into and through the province. Mining activities and mortar attacks decreased significantly in PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces. The lack of contact and the enemy's emphasis on the movement of men and supplies were indicative of preparations being made by the NVA/VC for a dry season offensive campaign.

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(1) The division had a total of 132 contacts with enemy forces during the period. Of these, 21 involved enemy units of platoon-size or larger.

(2) During August, the 174th NVA Regiment was identified in a contact with ARVN forces west of DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp. This encounter plus previous attacks by fire on the DAK SEANG camp indicated that the NVA regiment was conducting extensive reconnaissance in the area for a possible future attack on DAK SEANG. During September and October, the 4th and 5th Battalions, 95B NVA Regiment were identified in contacts with division units. The 4th Battalion was engaged in the vicinity of PLEI MRONG, during several brief contacts, while the 5th Battalion was engaged on 11 October near the DAK PAYAU Valley. Also in October, the 200th VC Artillery Battalion was identified as the unit responsible for launching the 122mm rocket attack against PLEIKU City.

(3) A PW from the 174th NVA Regiment indicated that the 2d Battalion had the mission of attacking DAK SEANG during the monsoon season. Further indication of this intended attack was the discovery of a mock-up of the DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp found in the battalion's base camp west of DAK SEANG following their engagement with ARVN forces on 4-7 August. A PW revealed that the 2d Battalion was conducting indirect fire attacks on the DAK SEANG camp as an extensive reconnaissance effort to determine the reaction and reinforcement of the camp when attacked.

(4) Reconno patrols, red-haze operations and visual reconnaissance in early August indicated enemy activity in the CHU BA Mountains north of DUC CO. On 23 August a 122mm rocket attack was launched from this area at the forward headquarters of the division's 1st Brigade at LE THAN (Jackson Hole). This was the first time 122mm rockets were used in PLEIKU Province and the second time they had been employed by enemy forces in the II Corps area. The DUC CO Special Forces Camp received 8 to 10 rounds of 122mm rocket fire in early October and on 26 October a 122mm rocket attack was launched against PLEIKU City and nearby FVMAF installations. Although in both instances the damage was light, possession of this weapon poses an increased threat to friendly units in the western provinces of the II CTZ.

(5) During late August decreased enemy activity and the lack of significant contact along with special agent reports indicated that the major elements of the NVA B-3 front had withdrawn from PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces, marking the end of the enemy's monsoon season campaign. During August and September enemy forces generally avoided contact with US forces with the only contact of any significance being the rocket attack on Jackson Hole. In early October, enemy movement of men and supplies was becoming apparent; however, major contact with US and ARVN units was still avoided. The southern portion of PLEIKU Province consistently showed signs of enemy movement to the east and on 1 October an infiltrating company was attacked by US air and ground units southwest of the DAK PAYAU Valley. No other contact was made during the remainder of the month.

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b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition, and Strength as of 31 October.

UNIT	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	LAST REPORTED LOCATION	DATE	SOURCE
B-3 Front	12,765 ¹	YA657368	22 May	PW
1st NVA Div	5,743 ²	YA657366	21 May	PW
32nd Regt	1,050	YA7708	30 Jul	PW
66th Regt	1,577	YA841120	12 Jul	Document
95B Regt	1,328	AR971142	2 Oct	PW
K101D Bn	500	YB8614	10 Jul	PW
24th Regt	1,776	AS847313	5 Jul	PW
33rd Regt	1,160	AQ8418	17 Jun	PW
174th Regt	1,800	Western KONTUM	8 Aug	HOI CHANH
200th VC Arty Bn	200	ZA1253	27 Oct	PW
407th VC Bn	400	NE PLEIKU	17 Sep	HOI CHANH
304th VC Bn	400	ZA1377	25 Dec	Agent
H-15 VC Bn	375	VC Zone 6	4 Sep	HOI CHANH
E-301 VC Bn	470	BP1283	15 Apr	Agent

c. Counterintelligence.

(1) The emphasis of the VC infrastructure has been largely directed towards GVN's EDAP ENANG Resettlement Center. This center was formed from villages and hamlets in western PLEIKU Province and represents a significant loss of a source of food and forced labor for the VC/NVA operating in PLEIKU Province. To counter this the VC have attempted to persuade the villagers to return to their old village locations by claiming that the GVN will let them starve at EDAP ENANG and have encouraged the MONTAGNARDS not to concern themselves with the politics of the GVN. The VC/NVA have further reinforced their persuasion efforts by threats of harm and the inability of GVN to protect them: emphasized by the kidnappings of 11 village chiefs from EDAP ENANG.

d. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) General. NVA/VC activity showed a definite decrease for the quarter. The small scale VC activities of tax collections, ground-to-air fire, minings and kidnappings continued, but not to the degree that had been experienced in the past. The greater majority of these incidents were attempts by the NVA/VC to intimidate and influence the GVN election participants and results. The lack of contact with an enemy force can be attributed to the enemy preparations for a dry season offensive campaign.

¹The estimated total strength of all units subordinate to the B-3 Front.

²The estimated total strength of units currently listed as making up the 1st NVA Division.

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(2) Significant changes in enemy tactics.

(a) Attacks by indirect fire were employed both against friendly forces and fixed installations as an economy of force measure. The introduction of the 122mm rocket added significantly to the enemy's capability for this type of attack. The rocket has an effective range of 11,000 meters and is an effective casualty producing weapon. The enemy's infantry is deployed only to defend the rocket units positions instead of assaulting prepared US positions.

(b) There were no indications of new or increased enemy propaganda efforts directed against US personnel for this period.

(3) Recapitulation of enemy battle losses (quarter's totals)

	<u>FRANCIS MARION</u>	<u>GREELEY</u>	<u>MACARTHUR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) Personnel				
KIA (BC)	104	2	5	111
NVAC/VCC	27	0	3	30
TOTAL	131	2	8	141
(b) Weapons				
Small Arms	39	2	32	73
Crew Served	14	0	1	15
TOTAL	53	2	33	88
(c) Ammunition				
Small Arms (rds)	6,170	510	1,360	8,040
Crew Served (rds)	260	17	28	312
Grenades	72	19	7	98
Mines	22	5	9	36
(d) Selected items of captured equipment				
Explosives (lbs)	53	0	0	53
Documents (inches)	18.7	0	0	18.7
Rice (tons)	5.92	.25	.22	6.39
Salt (lbs)	25	0	0	25
(e) Material destroyed				
Structures	117	136	24	277
Fortifications	524	140	85	749

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e. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques. In the course of an average month the G2 Section received intelligence reports from numerous higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. These reports came from sources such as: VR, imagery, agent reports, captured documents, POW interrogations and from this intelligence, Intsums, Perintreps, and Intel Bulletins were prepared. During an operation the majority of information of immediate tactical value came from the division's own collection agencies: particularly the interrogation sections of the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment operating at division and brigade level.

f. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy capabilities.

(a) The NVA in the western Highlands are capable of launching attacks up to multi-regimental size in the CAMBODIAN and LAOTIAN Border areas. These attacks may be conducted in coordination with local VC elements. The enemy is capable of launching attacks further within RVN in battalion or regimental strength. It is believed however, that a concentration of strength greater than battalion size would be detected and the attack preempted by friendly actions.

(b) The enemy has a 122mm and 140mm rocket capability which can inflict damage to large targets such as air bases, base camps and other fixed military installations. Through the use of these rockets the enemy can place a considerable amount of firepower into an area in a relatively short period of time and withdraw from the launch site prior to the arrival of reaction forces. In a prolonged attack however he risks casualties through counter-battery fire. In addition to rockets the enemy is capable of employing mortars of various caliber up to 160mm in his attacks by indirect fire.

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities.

(a) The enemy's logistical system is vulnerable to disruption through friendly ground and air operations. Enemy units operating within RVN rely upon resupply of arms and ammunition from NVN. These supplies are carried over long distances through difficult terrain. They are subject to interdiction by friendly ground and air elements as they move through RVN.

(b) The enemy's need for extensive combat preparations and his inflexibility in the execution of his plans make him vulnerable to preemption by spoiling attacks.

(c) The locating of enemy forces prior to the initiation of their major offensives offer the opportunity to destroy these forces and disrupt enemy plans for major operations in an area.

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(d) Enemy forces, when massed, are especially vulnerable to combined air, artillery and ground attacks. This vulnerability increases as an enemy force penetrates deeper into RVN.

(e) The VC dependence on support by the indigenous population requires the establishment of a VC infrastructure which must remain in place to be effective. Individual members of this infrastructure are vulnerable to detection and apprehension. Sustained friendly operations in an area produces a sense of physical security and trust among the local inhabitants, and when augmented by intensive village sweeps, such operations achieve noticable successes in disrupting the VC infrastructure and detecting and apprehending VC cadre and officials.

(f) The enemy is also vulnerable to the use of chemical defoliants and crop destruction agents. The enemy's need for concealed base areas and the need to produce his own rice to augment foodstuffs procured from the local populace, renders him particularly vulnerable to these weapons.

(g) There are several psychological vulnerabilities which can either be exploited as separate targets or used in combination with specific enemy units. The enemy can be exploited psychologically because of suspected low morale in several units. Lack of proper medical attention and food has brought hardship on the individual soldier thereby weakening his determination to fight.

(3) Enemy probable courses of action.

(a) The enemy is expected to increase the number and intensity of his attacks by indirect fire. He will probably employ his increased rocket capability to a greater extent than he has in the past and will continue his use of mortar attacks. Probable targets are FWMF installations in and around the cities of PLEIKU and KONTUM City, the 4th Infantry Division base camp, brigade headquarters and special forces camps. The NVA can launch regimental-sized attacks into the interior of the border provinces; however, the enemy has been hurt in the past by concentrating his forces in these areas in large numbers. The large concentrations of forces are subject to early detection and once discovered become excellent targets for supporting air and artillery as evidenced in the contact south of DUC CO on 23 July. (See After Action Report, Operation FRANCIS MARION). It seems unlikely he will attempt these tactics unless favored by cover of monsoon weather or a thick dense jungle canopy. The enemy will continue to propagandize and terrorize. He will probably increase mining activity in order to combat the increased threat of armor deployment during the dry season.

(b) The NVA will continue to increase their reinforcement and integration of VC units and to provide them with leadership. This is a goal of NVA operational plans, as revealed in captured documents and

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confirmed by the testimony of prisoners of war. Their past losses and problems recruiting local South VIETNAMESE sympathetic to the VC cause have forced the VC to accept the NVA into their units. The Viet Cong main force and local force battalions are now heavily infused with NVA. Most of their cadre are NVA, as are fire support units, like the heavy weapons company of the VC H-15 Local Force Battalion. The VC 200th Artillery Battalion and the 407th VC Sapper Battalion contain such a high proportion of NVA that their identity as Viet Cong units is becoming only historic. There is increasing indication of coordinated action between the NVA B-3 Front forces and the Viet Cong Battalions in the Western Highlands, which suggests that the combat role of VC Military Region V and the province committees may be transferring to the NVA B-3 Front.

g. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization. To eliminate infrastructure cadre from villages, cordon and search operations must be put into effect properly. This involves positioning the cordon NLT 0330 hours in the morning, preventing villagers from leaving the village and detaining for interrogation those who do try to leave. Personnel participating in the cordon and search operation, whose presence is not needed for security and search within the village should be denied access to the village until the intelligence portion of the operation is completed. MEDCAP and civic action activities when conducted during the screening and interrogation phase of the operation distract the attention of the villagers and tends to ease their anxieties, limiting the initial psychological advantage and, as a result, the amount of information obtained.

3. (R) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans developed/executed during the quarter.

- (1) OPORD 28-67 (FIRE BASE), 23 August 1967.
- (2) OPORD 29-67 (PATCH), 23 August 1967. Established land clearing priorities along the LLOC within the division TAOR and area of operations. Rome plow teams will clear an area 100 meters wide on either side of designated roads and trails.
- (3) OPLAN 30-67 (SHORTTIMER), 27 August 1967. Provided for the security of the GVN's EDAP ENANG Resettlement Area during the dedication ceremony and for CG, I FFORCEV and CG, II CTZ attending the ceremony.
- (4) OPORD 31-67 (CIDG), 5 September 1967.
- (5) OPLAN 32-67 (NINE LIVES), 6 September 1967.
- (6) OPORD 33-67 (Task Org, 3d Bde), 9 September 1967, Specifies the task organization of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Task Force and designates units to be provided from division assets for brigade operations in the DUC PHO area.

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(7) OPORD 34-67 (BUSHMASTER), 17 September 1967. Established a night ambush program to complicate and harass the movement of VC/NVA forces in areas where heretofore they had been able to move with relative immunity. The program encompasses all portions of the division TAOR and area of operations.

(8) OPORD 35-67 (CHECKPOINTS), 23 September 1967. Established a standard checkpoint system for all units assigned, attached or OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division when operating in the division TAOR and area of operations.

(9) OPORD 36-67 (RICE HARVEST), 5 October 1967. Outlined plan for assisting EDAP ENANG villagers harvest rice in areas occupied prior to resettlement. The operation was conducted in cooperation and coordination with ARVN and CIDG units.

(10) OPORD 37-67 (MAC ARTHUR), 10 October 1967. Mission statement at paragraph 1d, this report.

(11) OPLAN 38-67 (HIPSHOOT), 13 October 1967. An element or elements of Division Artillery execute a change of mission to engage enemy targets outside the current range fan. Upon completion of the mission the artillery returns to its former location.

(12) OPLAN 39-67 (DECATUR), 16 October 1967. Provides for the relief/reinforcement of USSF/CIDG camps, RF/PF outposts, Province/District Headquarters and critical signal sites within KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC and TUYEN DUC Provinces by a force varying in size from a rifle company to a brigade. This plan superceded OPLAN 18-67 (AVENGER) and OPLAN 23-67 (DECATUR).

(13) OPORD 40-67 (Camp Enari and TAOR Defense), 25 October 1967. Specifies the organization, procedure and responsibilities of subordinate units in defending Camp Enari and securing the TAOR. A combination of extensive patrolling in the TAOR, comprehensive visual reconnaissance, fixed perimeter defense installations and employment of mobile reaction forces is used. This plan superceded OPLAN 10-67 (DMBC and TAOR defense).

b. Operations.

(1) Operation FRANCIS MARION, began on 6 April, terminated on 11 October. The detailed record of division operations is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, FRANCIS MARION, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division.

(2) Operation GREELEY, began on 17 June, terminated on 11 October. The detailed record of operations is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, GREELEY, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division.

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(3) The 4th Infantry Division began Operation MAC ARTHUR on 12 October 1967. The area of operations encompasses all of PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces, and with extensions the greater part of DARLAC and PHU BON Provinces also. (Inclosure 6). A chronological summary of significant activities from 12 October -- 31 October is at inclosure 3.

c. Training.

(1) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment.

(a) The detachment trained 5,979 replacements during the quarter. In addition, 702 personnel from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received the replacement training course upon their arrival in-country.

(b) The Combat NCO Leadership School provided instruction to 198 students. Of these 184 successfully completed the course.

(c) Thirty-five students successfully completed the Recondo Preparatory Course. The course was extended from two days to five days to better prepare students for the MACV Recondo School.

(d) A mine and booby trap confidence course was constructed and all replacements who arrived after 15 August have received this additional phase of training.

(2) RF/PF Training. Seven Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT) were deployed throughout the highland provinces during the month of October. These teams, consisting of one officer, three enlisted men and one ARVN officer or NCO, provide two weeks training for RF companies located in the II Corps area. In addition, six Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT), consisting of one officer, two NCO's and one ARVN officer or NCO were also deployed to provide one week's training for PF platoons. One CMTT and one CMIT are located in each of the following provinces: KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC, LAM DONG and TUYEN DUC. Additionally, one CMIT is conducting RF company training in PHU BON Province.

(3) New Equipment Training.

(a) Nine personnel received training on the multi-purpose Concealed Intrusion Detector (MCID), an anti-intrusion device. The personnel are a training cadre that will be used to instruct units when the equipment arrives in the command.

(b) The AN/TRT-26-XLW-1, a remote system for monitoring personnel activity (anti-intrusion device) was introduced in the command for evaluation. Personnel were trained on the operation and maintenance of this equipment.

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(4) Training Regulations.

(a) A new unit training regulation was published. This regulation prescribed mandatory training and emphasized battalion training at fire bases and the division base camp.

(b) To aid in reducing casualties caused by mines and booby traps, training guidance was outlined in a new training regulation. The regulation prescribed policies and procedures and provided guidance in the planning, conduct and supervision of mine and booby trap training.

(c) Policies, procedures and guidance for the planning, conduct and supervision of all M-16 rifle training were published in a new training regulation.

(d) A training regulation was published to establish procedures and responsibilities for inspection, maintenance and training pertaining to aerial delivery sling equipment.

(e) A new small arms range regulation was published.

(f) A program was established to train unit fire marshals in fire prevention and fire inspection techniques.

d. G-3 Air Operations.

(1) The 7th US Air Force provided close air support for the 4th Infantry Division while conducting Operation MAC ARTHUR during the period 12-31 October. For close air support provided from 1 August - 11 October see Combat After Action Reports for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY, both of which terminated on 11 October.

(2) The following tactical air support was flown in support of Operation MAC ARTHUR, 12-31 October.

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
FAC PP	118	69	251
FAC IMMED	49	30	113
CSS PP	31	28	34
CSS IMMED	12	6	11
SPOOKY	12	12	12
TOTAL	222	145	421

(3) Weather: Weather conditions improved following the abatement of the southwest monsoon in the Central Highlands. From 12-31 October weather was not an adverse factor affecting close air support.

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(4) Three B-52 strikes were flown in support of Operation MAC ARTHUR. Ground units exploiting these strikes discovered bunkers and gun emplacements in vicinity of the impact areas.

(5) An orientation flight was conducted by "Spooky 60" on 20 October. The flight was used as a test and demonstration flight of a new aircraft platform for Spooky missions. Spooky 60 is a C-130 aircraft that has been modified with the following equipment:

- (a) Four 20mm guns
- (b) Four 7.62mm mini guns
- (c) One Xenon searchlight with infrared
- (d) One counter fire radar
- (e) Multiple communications capability with ground forces

Based upon equipment aboard, Spooky 60 will have the capability of supporting troops to within 100 meters, regardless of weather. The aircraft also has the capability of staying on station up to six hours. Test results were not conclusive during this period.

e. Chemical.

(1) General. Chemical operations during the quarter consisted of defoliation, riot control agent (RCS) employment and airborne personnel detector (APD) employment. Chemical operations not conducted in direct support of Operations FRANCIS MARION or GREELEY are listed in detail at inclosure 4. Chemical operations conducted during Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY are discussed in the Combat After Action Reports for the two operations.

(2) Defoliation. The defoliation program continued with increased emphasis being placed on maximum utilization of defoliants during the rainy season when foliage is most susceptible to plant growth regulator type agents. Approval for defoliation of approximately 2320 square kilometers in PLEIKU Province is still pending. A new request was submitted for destruction of crops to the southwest of the DAK PAYOU Valley (VC Valley).

(a) Frequency of Traildust missions decreased during the period because of inclement weather. A total of 18 sorties were flown spraying 18,000 gallons of agent ORANGE.

(b) Ground based operations continued at a steady pace with 56 UH-1 sorties in 25 missions: 18 missions used the 500 gallon truck mounted tank, and seven missions were conducted using the hand spray methods

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(Mity Mite, spray cans, etc.). These operations consumed 11,575 gallons of ORANGE, 2,175 gallons WHITE, and 975 gallons of BLUE, for a total of 14,725 gallons of defoliant. This was an increase of 9,677 gallons over the previous reporting period.

(c) The most significant accomplishment in defoliation operations was the destruction of approximately 520 acres of enemy crops in the vicinity of the DAK PAYOU Valley including rice, beans, corn, bananas, pineapples and assorted garden vegetables. The operation resulted in an estimated 70 percent reduction of the enemy food supply in the area.

(d) A test was conducted on 30 October to determine the feasibility of ground troops using pressurized cans of agent BLUE to destroy enemy rice crops. The test was conducted on grass in the camp Enari perimeter. The grass showed systematic effects of BLUE poisoning within twenty four hours after application. The spray cans show promise as an efficient method of destroying rice during search and destroy operations.

(3) RCA employment. (Details at inclosure 4).

(a) 10,160 pounds of bulk CS-1 were dropped in six CH-47 sorties.

(b) Four E-158R2 munitions were dropped in two UH-1 sorties.

(4) Personnel Detector equipment.

(a) At the beginning of the quarter the division had four airborne personnel detectors (APD). On 23 September two of the APD's were transferred to III MAF. In addition to the four APD's, ten modified manpack personnel detectors (MMPD) were on hand, nine of which were being operated by divisional units and one by FOB #2 in KONTUM.

(b) Classes were conducted on theory, maintenance and operation of the MMPD's in their airborne role on 26 and 27 October by a manufacturer's technical representative.

(c) The APD's continued to be successful in locating enemy positions on the ground with several detections being confirmed by visual sightings, subsequent contact in the area or body count following artillery or air strikes on the site. A total of 100 APD missions were flown during the period, eight in support of the division, 54 for the 1st Brigade, and 38 for the 2d Brigade.

(d) All MMPD's have been modified with a read out dial that can be mounted directly in front of the helicopter pilot. This modification will allow the pilot or aircraft commander to take readings and mark detections on a map and will eliminate the need for an operator.

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f. Psywar.

(1) Psywar operations against enemy forces.

(a) Leaflet and airborne and ground loudspeaker operations were directed primarily at the NVA which were the predominant enemy forces facing the division. Airborne leaflet and loudspeaker operations that had been severely limited were intensified after the monsoon rains had abated. Another limiting factor was that night airborne psyops missions could not be flown by the USAF O-2B aircraft because of the lack of navigational equipment for night flying (TACAN for the aircraft is on requisition, but has not been received).

(b) Leaflets and taped messages were used placing emphasis on the CHIEU HOI program, US/ARVN power and might, ultimate victory by the GVN, lack of food and medical care available to NVA forces, hardships in the jungle and NVA losses and separation from family. These standard themes were supplemented by immediate reaction leaflets and tapes based on intelligence information on specific units and situations provided by POW's and HOI CHANH.

(c) All HOI CHANH and most of the POWs interrogated had heard of the CHIEU HOI program. Several indicated that other NVA/VC personnel were contemplating rallying but were afraid to do so because they were not sure where to rally and how they would be treated. Another problem to the potential HOI CHANH was successfully breaking away from his unit.

(2) PSYOPS in support of pacification.

(a) PSYOPS within the division TAOR continued to encourage support of the Civic Action Program through face-to-face activities by civic action team members. Bulletin boards were constructed in 22 of the 69 hamlets within the TAOR. An Audio/Visual (A/V) Team attached to the division was utilized for special missions within the TAOR including three meetings of hamlet chiefs at the Good Neighbor Council House, dedication of two community houses in the 2d Brigade sector and a community fair day in the DISCOM sector. Film showings were conducted throughout the TAOR. In addition, the A/V Team was utilized on several show-of-force operations in conjunction with the division Exploitation Platoon and remained in the hamlets overnight. One ARVN A/V team from the 20th ARVN Polwar Battalion was utilized on three occasions for operations in PHU NHON District, PLEIKU Province; in CHEO REO, PHU BON Province; and in the vicinity of PLEI MRONG. The Cultural Platoon of the 20th ARVN Polwar Battalion staged two productions for nearby hamlets.

(b) Airborne and ground loudspeakers were utilized extensively prior to the 3 September and 22 October VIETNAMESE National elections to encourage the people to participate in the elections. The enemy

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was unsuccessful in his attempt to disrupt elections in any of the three Western Highland Provinces. The most significant activity occurred several kilometers north of PHU NHOM where the VC entered a village on the night of 21 October warning the people not to vote on 22 October and burned one house in each of three hamlets to emphasize their point. Nevertheless, the villagers voted. The VC returned the next evening and burned the entire village.

(3) New equipment and techniques.

(a) During the period one US Audio/Visual Jeepster was attached to the division and four 1000 watt airborne loudspeakers were received as organic equipment. These assets greatly improved the PSYOPS capability of the division.

(b) A Model 85 quick-reaction press was received but, because of the lack of an initial issue of expendable supplies and various components not packed with the machine, the press could not be utilized in its primary role of printing quick-reaction leaflets.

(c) Films produced by JUSPAO are in English or VIETNAMESE and cannot be utilized in this predominately MONTAGNARD dialect area. To solve this problem, sound tracks of selected films have been translated into the JARAI MONTAGNARD dialect and placed on tapes for simultaneous and synchronized playback with film presentations.

(4) Statistical summary of psywar operations.

(a) Leaflets and posters:

44,695,000 air dropped.

42,000 ground distribution.

3,400 posters.

16 leaflets designed.

2 posters designed.

(b) Tapes and loudspeakers:

Daytime airborne broadcasts - 252 hours.

Nighttime airborne broadcasts - 43 hours.

Ground speaker and face-to-face - 84½ hours.

Tapes made (4 languages) - 22.

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(c) Cultural activities:

Cultural team - 4 hours.

Movies - 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) Training: All assigned aviators in the 4th Aviation Battalion continued training in pilot standardization training, area orientation flight, escape and team evasion techniques, and weapons familiarization prior to being assigned to operational missions. Initially, the newly assigned aviators were placed with more experienced aircraft commanders. Those aviators who demonstrated the requisite maturity of judgement, pilot proficiency, and who progressed rapidly in the required training, were selected for further training as aircraft commanders. Additionally, all aviators received periodic standardization rides to insure that continued high standards of aircraft operation and safety were maintained. Weapons firing for all weapons mounted on the aircraft was conducted either on assigned missions or in an approved test fire area.

(2) Operational totals for the 4th Aviation Battalion for the period 12-31 October:

	<u>Company A</u>	<u>Company B</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Hours flown:	1,596	603	2,199
Sorties:	4,792	4,419	9,211
Passengers carried:	8,615	250	8,865
Tons of cargo transported:	203		203
Average number of assigned missions per day:	9	4	13
Average number of aircraft utilized per day for assigned missions:	15	6	21

4. (N) Logistics.

a. General.

(1) Detailed reports of the logistical support of tactical operations during Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY are contained in Combat Operations After Action Reports, FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY respectively.

(2) An air drop of supplies was conducted on 1 August and served as a training exercise in logistics resupply. No drop was conducted in September because of continuous relocation of units. No drop was conducted in October because of a shortage of USAF aircraft in RVN for training missions.

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(3) Action was completed on 88 Reports of Survey. Thirty Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 170 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

(4) Reception of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was completed on 15 September. Receipt of equipment for the reorganization of the infantry battalions continued. Planning action was initiated for the reception of the I Field Forces Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company and the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

b. Base camp improvements in logistical support facilities accomplished during the period were as follows:

- (1) Completion of two warehouses.
- (2) Construction of division ice cream plant.
- (3) Establishment of fruit and vegetable storage facilities within Class I area.
- (4) Construction of pads for additional Class I refrigeration storage units (In process).
- (5) Asphalt roads in II & IV warehouse area (In process).
- (6) Covering of receiving area for II & IV warehouse operations with M8A1 matting was completed.

c. Supply and Services:

The following figures represent total accumulative support data for support and service activities of the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion at all locations for the quarter:

(1) Division Supply Office

Requisitions received	23,832
Requisitions passed	6,961
Requisitions filled	14,346

(2) Class I

Average headcount issues: 14,113

(3) Class III (gallons issued)

JP-4	2,002,750
MOGAS	1,647,602
DIESEL	1,500,080
AVGAS	79,195

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(4) Baths

Individual processed 83,452

(5) Graves Registration

Human remains processed 33

Personal effects shipments processed 111

d. Transportation Service.

(1) Aerial support for the division was extensive. Thirty-one special missions of fixed wing aircraft were flown in support of tactical units. The C-7A division aerial courier lifted 2,302 passengers and 112,802 S/T's of cargo.

(2) The hold baggage section at Camp Enari processed the baggage of 2,141 personnel.

e. Material Readiness.

(1) The Command Maintenance Management Inspections continued with eleven initial inspections, thirteen reinspections and one courtesy inspection. The program is forty-one percent complete.

(2) Roadside spot check inspections were conducted by the 704th Maintenance Battalion on the average of one day per week. The large backlog of equipment in the maintenance battalion shops forced the inspections to be less frequent than desired.

f. Maintenance support. Maintenance support continued to be accomplished through the three Forward Support Companies, the Main Support Company and the Aircraft Maintenance Company of the 704th Maintenance Battalion.

g. Medical Service: Medical support was provided by the 4th Medical Battalion during the period. A summary of medical services is shown below:

	<u>HQ and A Company</u>	<u>B Company</u>	<u>C Company</u>
Patients seen	7,566	2,429	1,674
Patients admitted	1,833	803	554
Patients returned to duty	841	120	73

h. Operation MAC ARTHUR.

Operation MAC ARTHUR began on 12 October with the termination of Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY. On 4 October, an FSE was established

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at CHEO REO to support planned operations by the 3d Brigade who was then operating to the north in the DAK PAYOU Valley. This move was made prior to the brigade's deployment to deceive the enemy as to the exact time operations would begin in the area. It also enabled the logistic support to be prepositioned to support the 2d Brigade units that began operating to the south of CHEO REO on 12 October. The FSE at Oasis remained in operation and supported the 1st Brigade.

(2) Both BSE's supplied Class I, III, and barrier materials and provided bath and Graves Registration services. Additionally, the FSE at Oasis provided a laundry service. The Class V distribution points at both locations were operated by an ammunition team composed of personnel supplied by the using units. Primary means of resupply to both logistic bases was LLOC except Class IV was supplied to the CHEO REO FSE by ALOC through MACV channels.

(3) In addition to the logistics support provided by US army elements, the US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V from 12-31 October in support of Operation MAC ARTHUR.

Class III

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>QTY (GALS)</u>
Fighters	4,060,000
B-52's	8,100,000

Class V

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	1,444	401.0
CBU	167	29.5
Napalm	290	99.3
Rockets	66	1.8

Delivered by fighters & AC-47 (SPOOKY)

20mm	48,000	16.5
7.62mm	180,000	.50

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
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Delivered by B-52's

Bombs	UNK	553.5
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5. (U) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR (Good Neighbor Program).

(1) General. The Good Neighbor Program came of age during the reporting period and posted a number of solid achievements. The program was carried out by approximately 20 Civic Action teams of five to 10 men each from the battalions and separate companies of the division. Five times a week each team visited an assigned two to four of the 69 hamlets within the TAOR. This close and continuous contact between team members and villagers greatly increased mutual friendship, cooperation and confidence. The team members and villagers cooperated on self-help construction projects, mutual sports activities, and admired joint achievements. The teams conducted daily MEDCAPS, personal hygiene classes and provided advice on food/livestock production.

(2) Statistical summary of Civic Action Team achievements.

(a) Construction:

Fishponds	5
Spillways	7
Wells	1
Council Meeting House	2
Standardized MEDCAP Shelters	21
Bridges	1

(b) Health:

MEDCAPS	34,891
dustings	210
Immunizations	250

(c) Services:

Vehicles	221 (Transport to PLEIKU Market and return)
Air transport	10 (Highlands Junior Military Academy Students)
Food distribution	22,528 lbs
Sundry items and construction materials	46,173 lbs
Clothes	2,968 lbs

(3) Enemy contacts and intelligence.

(a) Early in September at AR875426 a 2d Brigade Civic Action team apprehended five VC sympathizers carrying rice for the VC.

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(b) On 4 September members of two CA teams from the 2d Brigade, observing peculiar behavior among the people of the village at AR842395, detected and identified three VC. Later in the day, a civic action team vehicle ran over a mine at AR835390 and two men were injured.

(c) On 18 October a 2d Brigade Civic Action team found a VC tunnel complete with booby traps at AR878418.

(d) On 25 October, Civil Affairs Team #8 learned that villagers at ZA167475 had received orders from VC not to go into their rice field on pain of decapitation. On the night of the 26 October an NVA unit used the field to bombard PLEIKU with 122mm rockets.

b. PLEIKU Province and Outlying Provinces.

(1) Civic Actions.

(a) In August and September, 1st and 2d Brigades conducted the Good Neighbor Program in hamlets around and near Jackson Hole, the Oasis and along Highway 19W to DUC CO. This program in the forward area included visitations and self-help construction projects as permitted by tactical requirements.

(b) During route security operations in October, the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry made initial civic action penetrations into the hamlets along Highway 14N. During August and September, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued its highly successful Good Neighbor Program along Highway 19E from PLEIKU City east to the MANG YANG Pass. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry assumed this civic action area during October.

(c) In October, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted high impact, short duration civic actions in the DAK TO area until their departure on 28 October.

(d) In early September the 2d Brigade conducted extensive civic actions in PLEI MRONG.

(e) The 2d Brigade, in late September, conducted a sweep of the DAK PAYOU Valley (VC Valley) and captured two water buffalo, six pigs, 900 lbs of corn and 3,000 lbs of rice. The brigade turned the commodities over to the EDAP ENANG Resettlement area. The water buffalo were successfully sling transported by CH-47 helicopter.

(f) In October the 2d Brigade conducted extensive civic actions from CHEO REO to PHU TUC to BAN BLECH in DARLAC Province.

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(2) Plans:

(a) The division plan for Revolutionary Development support in PLEIKU Province received final approval on 29 October. This plan provides for four civic action quadrants in which coherent, continuing civic action can be conducted under the staff supervision of G-5 project managers regardless of what units occupy the quadrants.

(b) The 2d Brigade completed plans in September for active pacification in the "Golden Triangle", and with the corners at the northern junction of Highways 14S and 6C, PHU NHON and PLEI ME. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor assumed responsibility for continuing these plans in October, with extensive civic action activity directed towards the populated areas along Highway 14S.

(c) 1st Brigade began pacification plans for the area between Highways 19W, 14B, 509 and the western edge of the TAOR.

(3) EDAP ENANG. One CA team supported the District officials and sub-sector advisors in conducting civic action activities in this refugee resettlement area. The pilot pig project progressed. Engineer land clearing operations were resumed on 25 October following the end of the monsoon season to complete the clearing of 1200 acres of farm land for the residents. Approximately 600 - 800 more acres remain to be cleared by this project.

c. Nation Building.

(1) Education.

(a) LE TRUNG Health Workers School. Two six week classes of 18 and 15 students graduated during the past quarter. This raised to 73 the number of graduates from this joint operation of the 4th Infantry Division and LE TRUNG District. The school was operated as part of a continuing effort to improve the health and sanitation habits of the villages through instruction and guidance from their own citizens.

(b) Highlands Junior Military Academy. A group of six cadets and one instructor began an eight week visit to three junior military academies in the western United States.

(c) MONTAGNARD Agricultural School. The MONTAGNARD Agricultural School's course in sewing has reserved all its vacancies for March, April and May for women from the EDAP ENANG Refugee Resettlement area.

(d) MONTAGNARD Elementary Schools in the TAOR. Initial studies were begun to evaluate the feasibility of constructing and staffing elementary schools in the 100% illiterate sections of the TAOR. Construction is in progress on one school in PLEI DO LIM that was destroyed previously by wind.

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(e) Civic Action teams taught conversational English to children in various hamlets. 500 hours of classes were given to an audience of 695 children. Teams conducted 450 hours of sports (volleyball and soccer) for 700 participants.

(f) English language classes taught by a member of the division were continued on a daily basis at the Highlands Junior Military Academy.

(2) Health.

(a) Standardized MEDCAP structures using cooperative construction efforts were completed in 21 hamlets. Construction of 32 more shelters was in various stages of progress.

(b) A comprehensive dispensary construction plan received approval. Construction was begun on one dispensary.

(3) Government.

(a) To build competence in the GVN leadership, the division by furnishing transportation, assisted district officials in visiting hamlets in the TAOR on a weekly basis.

(b) To make district chiefs aware of hamlet problems, the division sponsored each week in the Good Neighbor Council House a meeting of one fifth of the 69 hamlet chiefs within the TAOR. These sessions were valuable for the discussion and presentation of problems to the district chief and provided an opportunity for them to exchange views and seek solutions to their common problems.

(c) Publicity for GVN policies was an item of major concern to civic action teams. Renewed emphasis was placed on the self-help construction of bulletin boards. Posted on the boards were pictorial and written information on pacification projects and GVN officials. Team interpreters explained the posted written material.

(d) Night demonstrations. On three occasions the attached Audio/Visual Team together with sector civic action and reaction forces showed movies and slides and played tapes in villages at night. The team would remain overnight in the village.

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6. (1) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1)	Beginning of period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:					
	Organic	849	169	12,502	13,518
	Attached	<u>39</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>663</u>	<u>705</u>
	TOTAL:	888	172	13,165	14,223
Assigned:					
	Organic	774	134	12,178	13,086
	Attached	<u>27</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>586</u>	<u>616</u>
	TOTAL	801	137	12,764	13,762
(2) Close of period					
Authorized:					
	Organic	854	167	12,598	13,619
	Attached	<u>42</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,018</u>	<u>1,063</u>
	TOTAL	896	170	13,616	14,682
Assigned:					
	Organic	890	135	12,904	13,929
	Attached	<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,041</u>	<u>1,088</u>
	TOTAL	934	138	13,945	15,017

b. During this quarter the 1st Brigade experienced an extremely heavy rotation of personnel as September was the date the brigade left CONUS for South VIETNAM. The 1st Brigade received approximately 2,022 replacements and saw 1620 of its veteran officers and men depart for the states.

c. Replacements. A total of 629 officers and 7,542 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 482 officers and 8,485 enlisted personnel. A total of 264 emergency leaves were processed.

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d. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Decorations awarded:

Distinguished Service Cross	3
Silver Star	75
Distinguished Flying Cross	22
Legion of Merit	19
Soldiers Medal	17
Bronze Star w/"V" Device	307
Bronze Star (Service)	706
Air Medal w/"V" Device	80
Air Medal (Service)	557
ACM w/"V" Device	181
ACM (Service)	1,314
Purple Heart	464

(2) Combat Badges:

Combat Infantryman Badge	3,130
Combat Medical Badge	215
Aircraft Crewmen Badge	145

e. Promotions. A total of 6,770 enlisted personnel were promoted during the period.

f. Reenlistments. 171 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was:

(1) First term RA reenlistments	38
(2) AUS reenlistments	18
(3) RA extensions	9
(4) AUS extensions	3

g. Postal:

(1) Money order sales	\$3,957,925.10
(2) Postal and parcel post fees	\$ 79,607.09
(3) Incoming mail	12,518 sacks
	1,895 pouches
Daily average	136 sacks
	21 pouches
(4) Outgoing mail	5,061 sacks
	1,243 pouches
Daily average	55 sacks
	14 pouches
(5) Number of mail days	92

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h. Special Services.

(1) The division was visited by two Soldier Shows, three USO Shows, and one hand shake tour. A total of 12,700 personnel enjoyed this entertainment.

(2) R&R quotas received were 4,334 out-of-country and 722 in-country.

(3) A total of 504 movies and TV films were circulated within the division.

i. Chaplain Activities.

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Number of Services</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
Roman Catholic	623	22,097
Protestant	807	28,759
Jewish	6	66
Memorial	29	3,258
	1,465	54,180

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) A total of 461 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial	8
(b) Special Courts Martial	63
(c) Summary Courts Martial	35

7. (V) Artillery.

a. General. During the period the 4th Infantry Division Artillery participated in Operations FRANCIS MARION, GREELEY and MAC ARTHUR, and was responsible for the defense of Camp Enari, the division base camp.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Base camp defense.

(a) The perimeter of Camp Enari was extended eastward 420 meters to provide adequate space within the base camp for billets and a heliport for the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. The expansion added 18 bunkers and tower positions to the perimeter defenses. A total of 55 new positions were constructed as a result of the expansion: the 18 additional bunkers and towers and the re-location of existing bunkers and towers on the eastern side of the perimeter.

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(b) Visual reconnaissance of the TAOR was flown with one or more aircraft in the morning at first light and in the evening prior to darkness, weather permitting.

(c) Patrol activity was increased throughout the TAOR. Five to eight moving patrols and two stationary patrols were employed on a daily basis.

(d) The sector reaction platoons were committed weekly as a patrol in a show of force operation.

(e) An observation post was established on Dragon Mountain to provide for TAOR surveillance to assist in the location of mortar and rocket fire by detection of the flash.

(2) Metro.

(a) Three electronic meteorological sections were employed in the area of operations, one from 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (52d Artillery Group), one from 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (52d Artillery Group) and one from Division Artillery.

(b) The Division Artillery section operated a total of 234 hours and was down for six hours for parts. A total of 79 weather balloon flights were made producing 237 delivered messages.

(c) Due to widely separated areas of operations and the variance of weather conditions within a 60-72 KM radius, a Pilot Balloon Observation (PIBAL) met team was sent forward. This team made visual flights daily for a five line met.

(3) Radar.

(a) The Division Artillery AN/TRS-25 (GSR) is located in Base Camp. Numerous contacts were made with the radar, and it has also been used to provide surveillance of H&I fires. The AN/TPS-25 radar was operational with no down time during the reporting period.

(b) An AN/MPQ-10 Counterbattery Radar supplemented the Base Camp defense effort. This radar was operational during the entire reporting period. The AN/MPQ-10 was used to observe the majority of registrations fired from the Base Camp.

(c) Four AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radars were employed in the area of operations; two from the 52d Artillery Group and two from Division Artillery. On 16 October the DUC CO Special Forces Camp received 16 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. The radars of the 237th Radar detachment and 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery located the rockets. Grater analysis later

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verified these locations. The method used was the manual extrapolation method developed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The two radars from Division Artillery were operational during the reporting period with no down time.

(4) Aerial observers of Division Artillery flew 68 missions totaling 133 hours in the air.

(5) Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) had eleven 23-inch Xenon searchlights in the area of operations. The lights had 45 hours down time. Five of these lights supported the Base Camp defense effort following prepared searchlight schedules which were rotated on a nightly basis.

c. Operations, Training and Safety.

(1) A detailed report of Division Artillery and attached artillery unit operations for the period 1 August to 11 October is in Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FRANCIS MARION and Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY.

(2) Operation MAC ARTHUR, 12-31 October.

(a) Concept of operations. The concept of artillery employment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements: to use medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missions: and to provide artillery support for USSF/CIDG camps at DUC CO and New PLEI DJERENG.

(b) Execution.

1. To provide direct support to the maneuver elements, the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was placed in direct support of the 1st Brigade. The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery minus (-) was placed in direct support of the 2d Brigade and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, was placed in direct support of Task Force 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. Road security missions were supported, when possible, by placing self-propelled units in support, thereby complementing the armored force normally assigned this type mission. With the concurrence of the 52d Artillery Group Commander, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on Highway 14 South and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry on Highway 19 West and on "Road Runner" and "Hipshoot" type missions. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group units provided general support and reinforcing fires for the division.

2. The change in task organization on 29 October required a more complex task organizing of artillery support. It became necessary to place batteries of one battalion OPCON to another battalion to

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support the operation. Direct support for the 1st Brigade was provided by the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery minus (-) which was composed of Batteries B and C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery. Direct support for the 2d Brigade was provided by the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (-) composed of Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery. Direct support for Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was provided by the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery which was composed of Batteries B and C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group units provided general support and reinforcing fires for the division.

3. To provide the necessary medium and heavy artillery support over a large area of AO Wainwright in DARLAC Province, it became necessary to split both Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP) and Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (8"SP).

4. USSF/CIDG camps were supported by positioning 175/8" SP batteries of 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery within or adjacent to the USSF/CIDG camps at DUC CO and New PLEI DJERENG. DUC CO was covered by medium artillery fire throughout the period.

5. When possible and practicable, mutually supporting fire support bases were used regularly and continued to be highly successful.

6. The control of artillery ammunition expenditures continued to be closely supervised. Division Artillery operated within the assigned ASR during the entire period and was able to show a tactical savings in 105mm ammunition expenditures for each period during the quarter. The management of the artillery expenditures never deprived the maneuver elements of fire support. Expenditures on unobserved missions, however, were carefully controlled and fired on the basis of good intelligence and/or in preparation for operations by the maneuver elements.

7. The artillery has been able to make better use of intelligence targets this quarter as a result of more efficient dissemination of new intelligence information. The intelligence targets have been taken under fire rapidly and although unobserved, indications were that this method of H&I fires was effective and beneficial.

8. Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) and 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery were detached from the division, attached to 52d Artillery Group and continued to provide automatic weapons support to the division during the operation. During daylight hours, the M42 Dusters and M55 Quad 50's were used for convoy security and road security. During the hours of darkness they were positioned on the perimeters of fire bases and base camps for security and provided for an effective close-in H&I program for the fire bases.

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(3) Training. Division Artillery continued with scheduled training as required in 4th Infantry Division Regulation 350-6. In addition to this program a minimum of 15 hours per week was included to encompass MOS refresher training, safety during firing and rules of engagement. To further improve performance the Division Artillery Safety/Instruction Team visited and inspected each battery. The Division Artillery also provided support for the Noncommissioned Officer School shoots, and for division schools. Noteworthy in the field of training are the Forward Observer classes and training conducted for non-artillery personnel. During the quarter classes and practical exercises in observer procedures and techniques, the adjustment of artillery fire, safety rules and techniques, and the availability of artillery were conducted on 28 September for members of the 20th Engineer Battalion and on 29 thru 31 October for members of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. The direct support battalions also made this type training available to their supported units. Arrangements have been made for classes in adjustment of artillery fires to be held for nonartillerymen during the next quarter. The battalion and battery training programs concentrated on deficiencies noted during visits to the unit and on safety. Lessons learned during operations to include reviews of firing accidents were particularly emphasized.

(4) Safety: During the period, the organic units of Division Artillery had one firing accident which was caused by a failure of supervisory personnel to follow established procedures in that a friendly location was not plotted, a 600-meter error was made in plotting the target, and the corrections obtained from a valid registration were not applied to the raw data for firing. This was a violation of established safety procedures. Safety in firing continues to be an item of command emphasis at each echelon and is continuously stressed.

(5) Ammunition Expenditures:

(a) By caliber:

1. 1 August 1967 - 11 October 1967 (FRANCIS MARION)

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
115,701	42,799	10,100	3,886

2. 1 August 1967 - 11 October 1967 (GREETLEY)

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
24,718	5,627	2,497	2,257

3. 12 October 1967 - 31 October 1967 (MAC ARTHUR)

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
14,701	5,317	1,898	1,089

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4. Total for FRANCIS MARION:

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
232,345	117,012	33,868	15,018

5. Total for GREELEY

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
71,781	15,954	5,003	5,242

(b) By unit (12 October - 31 October 1967)

4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105T)	5,324
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105T)	6,143
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105T)	3,234
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (105T)	1,951
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP)	3,366
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (8"SP)	1,000
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (8"SP)	898
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175SP)	1,073
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175SP)	16

(6) Army Aviation.

(a) General.

1. The Aviation Section experienced a change in aviator assignments during the quarter. Four aviators were rotated to CONUS for reassignment while one aviator was reassigned in country. Two lieutenants and one major were assigned to the section as replacements. Transition training was conducted for the newly assigned aviators which included a thorough local area check out. Two aviators required 10 hours orientation and one aviator fifteen hours instruction prior to being assigned operational missions. This proved sufficient for a local checkout in the OH-23G helicopter.

2. Two additional aircraft were assigned to Division Artillery from the 610th General Support Company. This brought the section up to its authorized strength of nine OH-23G helicopters. One aircraft, on loan from the 4th Aviation Battalion since early July, was returned during the last month of the period.

3. During the reporting period the Aviation Section experienced engine changes and cooling fan drive changes on seven aircraft. After experiencing three forced landings caused by cooling fan drive failure within 25 hours after engine change, it is felt that the cooling fan drive should be changed at 900 hours when the engine is changed instead of 1000 hours as stipulated in current maintenance directives.

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(b) Disposition of aircraft during reporting period.

1. OH-23G.

- a. HHB, 4th Infantry Division Artillery: 7
- b. On loan from 4th Aviation Battalion: 1
- c. Assigned from 610th General Support Company: 2

2. UH-1C attached to 4th Aviation Battalion: 2

(c) Operations.

1. August: 522 combat support missions were flown and 909 passengers were transported requiring 970 sorties. A total of 408 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 43%.

2. September: 349 combat support missions were flown and 452 passengers were transported requiring 367 sorties. A total of 289 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 33%.

3. October: 780 combat support missions were flown and 1214 passengers were transported requiring 1129 sorties. A total of 546 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 46%.

4. The quarterly totals are as follows:

- a. Missions flown: 1651.
- b. Passengers transported: 2575
- c. Sorties required: 2466.
- d. Hours logged on aircraft: 1243.
- e. Average aircraft availability: 40.6%.

d. Logistics.

(1) Basic loads of artillery ammunition.

(a) For Operation MAC ARTHUR the basic loads of artillery ammunition were the same as those developed from the experience gained during Operation SAM HOUSTON and Operation FRANCIS MARION.

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WEAPON	TYPE OF AMMO	BTRY POSITION	BN TOTALS
105mm How	HE	1200	3600
(3 Btrys per Bn)	ILL	100	300
	WP	100	300
	SMK	50	150
155MM How	HE	800	2400
(3 Btrys per Bn)	ILL	50	150
	WP	50	150
	SMK	50	150
8-inch How	HE	600	600
(1 Btry)			

(b) These basic loads were originally developed to insure an adequate stock of ammunition at both the battery positions and the battalion ammunition trains area to meet the demands of continuous firing in support of infantry units during periods of heavy, prolonged contact. The battery position stockage levels represent the maximum to be stocked in the position. The amounts were reduced when the battery positions were too small to safely accommodate a large number of rounds, when a move was imminent, and when the number of rounds being expended daily did not justify stocking a large amount of ammunition. When the ammunition was not stocked in the battery positions, it was held at the battalion ammunition trains area and earmarked for the batteries so that the battalions were always in possession of their full basic load. The stockage at the battalion ammunition trains area insured that adequate ammunition was on hand and prepared for resupply of the batteries when required.

(c) The base camp defense ammunition stockage level remained unchanged during the period.

WEAPON	HE	ILL*	WP*	SMK*
81mm mortar	106	20		18
105mm howitzer	300	20	20	20
4.2" mortar	155	37		30
155m howitzer	150	10		10
8" howitzer	100			

* rounds per weapon.

(d) The basic loads of artillery ammunition proved to be satisfactory during Operation FRANCIS MARION and no problems were encountered with them.

(2) FSE Stockage Levels of Artillery Ammunition.

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(a) DISCOM continued operation of the FSE at LE THANH for Class I, II, and IV, and III supplies. Class V supplies were maintained in a battalion trains area of the FSE. On approximately 10 October this FSE was closed out and an FSE was opened at BAN BLECH on 26 October. The following were the stockage levels.

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>FSE TOTAL</u>
105mm Howitzer	3000 rds per battalion
155mm Howitzer	750 rds per battery
8-inch Howitzer	600 rds per battery

(b) DISCOM continued operation of the FSE at Oasis. The following were the stockage levels.

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>FSE TOTAL</u>
105mm Howitzer	3000 rds
155mm Howitzer	750 rds

(3) Available Supply Rate of Artillery Ammunition: The following ASR's were in effect during the period (105mm howitzer only)

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRED*</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
151800 - 241800 Aug	36	22.8	13.2
241800 - 091800 Sep	36	24.7	11.3
091800 - 241800 Sep	36	18.6	17.4
241800 Sep - 091800 Oct	36	16.1	19.9
091800 - 241800 Oct	36	15.0	21.0
241800 - 311800 Oct	36	9.7	26.3

(Period ends 081800 Nov) (*HE rounds per weapon per day)

(4) The average percentage of howitzers deadlined by month is shown below.

<u>Month</u>	<u>M101A1</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>M110</u>
August	0%	1%	0%
September	1%	20%	4%
October	2%	12%	3%

(5) The average percentage of vehicles deadlined by month were:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Average % Deadline</u>
August	12%
September	14%
October	12%

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8. (U) Engineer.

a. General. During the period, the 4th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of tactical operations in the area of operations and base development at Camp Enari. Companies A and B were in direct support of the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively and Company C was attached to the 3d Brigade Task Force at DUC PHO. Company D was in general support of the division at Camp Enari. Company E (Bridge Company) supported the division with tactical bridging. Headquarters and Headquarters Company supplied the necessary heavy equipment for base camp construction and support of forward areas. On 1 August concurrent with the exchange of 3d Brigades between the 4th and 25th Division, the previously attached Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion was redesignated Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion.

b. Operations. Support of the division's tactical operations is discussed fully in the Combat Operations After Action Reports for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY.

c. Base Development.

(1) Base camp construction. The construction of Camp Enari progressed steadily throughout the monsoon season. Engineer support consisted of Company D and Company E (-). General support was provided by the 20th Engineer Battalion. Major construction included 23 buildings for the newly arrived 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, perimeter expansion and construction of buildings to accommodate the newly arrived 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, an NCO Club, an EM Club, a PX storage shed and several vehicular maintenance sheds. Additionally the 20th Engineer Battalion constructed the Hensel AAF control tower and an aircraft maintenance hanger.

(2) Concrete operations: Prior to the monsoon all concrete production had been from a central batch plant and had been hauled to the sites by 5 ton dump trucks. This was done in order to provide a few billets, mess, orderly and supply rooms to each of the units in base camp. After meeting the minimum troop housing requirements it was decided to move each of the mixers to different areas and complete the remaining pads in that area before moving to the next location. This not only speeded up the operation but also freed the dump trucks for other missions. Sand was the most critical item of material and a daily convoy was sent to KONTUM more than 60 kilometers away, to haul sand. Both 5 ton dump and bridge trucks were used for this sand haul. At the height of the monsoon season the river on which the sand pit was located frequently overflowed and curtailed operations. The pouring of concrete pads continued in spite of intermittent monsoon rains. Wooden frames covered with canvas were useful to prevent monsoon rains from ruining freshly poured concrete.

(3) Roads and Drainage: In the Central Highlands there is not an abundance of natural rock suitable for placing on roads. Hence most of the roads in base camp are capped with a layer of laterite varying in quality

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according to the nature of deposits available. Though quite slick when wet, these laterite capped roads will hold up if the laterite is thoroughly compacted, adequate drainage provided, traffic controlled and a maintenance program carried out to catch problem areas as soon as they occur. Since these roads must be well crowned to shed water there is a continuing problem of vehicles sliding into the ditches of narrow roads. This problem can be partially solved by limiting traffic where feasible. Where two way traffic is necessary new roads should be constructed somewhat wider than normal (about 28 feet). Laterite capped roads will not withstand heavy tracked vehicle traffic, and in areas where tracked vehicles are concentrated, the roads suffered heavy damage. Ditches must be deep, since vehicles will invariably throw mud into the shallow ditches eventually filling them and allowing no place for the water to drain off the road. Steep grades should also be avoided since the slippery surface causes trucks to spin their wheels and slide from side to side thus tearing up the road surface. When the laterite cap breaks through it is essential that the hole be filled with rock, or else the hole will become larger, retain water and eventually become so bad that the hole can be traversed only by bridging it. A maintenance program to locate possible trouble spots and correct them before they become worse proved very effective during the past monsoon season. A daily reconnaissance was made to determine where the priority of effort should be made. The problem of slick road surface was alleviated by daily sanding of problem areas. Rock sometimes had to be hauled for several kilometers for repair of particularly bad areas.

(4) Dust Control: As the monsoon season ended plans were made for dust control operations during the forthcoming dry season. Asphalt distributors were requisitioned to replace the jerry-rig distributors which had been used for penneprime distribution during the last dry season. The former concrete plant was altered to provide for unloading, storage and loading of distributors with a penneprime and diesel fuel mix. This handling plant allowed for storage of 2000 barrels at one time, reduced the distributor loading time and eliminated the need for lifting and loading equipment.

d. Logistics. The 4th Engineer Battalion continued to support the division with Class II and IV engineer supplies. Although this function is in the process of being transferred to the Division Support Command, the battalion S-4 still provides sandbags, wire, pickets and lumber to the forward elements, and in many cases transports them to the user. Resupply of forward engineer platoons was effected whenever possible through the S-4 of the infantry battalion being supported. This procedure was found to be best since it allowed the request to follow the most direct line of communication and the material was delivered directly to the user. Once the brigades became familiar with this system, the most commonly used engineer items were stocked in the FSB and supply worked smoothly. The engineer battalion S-4 meanwhile filled emergency requests that could not be handled by the brigades. Water supply to the brigades was provided by two 1500 gpm units attached to the direct support engineer company. After the successful airlift of a 600 gpm water purification unit to a fire base, this technique was used for all available 600 gpm units to support the battalion sized operations. This program of placing water purification units with a forward battalion

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was most beneficial to the units involved and considerably reduced the number of hook sorties required for water resupply.

9. (1) Signal.

a. Plans.

(1) Plans for a bunker complex for the VHF and FM radio equipment and a tower for antennas on Dragon Mountain were formulated.

(2) A request for 100-pair cable to run from Signal Hill to Dragon Mountain for demodulating of VHF systems on Dragon Mountain has been submitted to 1st Signal Brigade. This will release VHF radio relay equipment from Dragon Mountain to perform other missions.

(3) On 19 October a representative of the 1st Signal Brigade visited Camp Enari to review the underground cable system. As a result, additional underground cable is being programmed for 1st Brigade, 2d Brigade, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry areas and the new eastern perimeter. In addition several short cable runs will be added as extensions to the present system to improve service to various areas.

(4) A dial exchange for Camp Enari was reported ready for shipment to Camp Enari. Construction of the building to house the exchange was initiated.

b. Operations.

(1) VHF radio operations - VHF radio systems have been established and operated between Camp Enari and the following:

(a) One 12-channel VHF system to 2d Brigade Forward TOC from 12 to 25 October.

(b) One 12-channel VHF system to 2d Brigade Trains from 12 to 29 October and a second system established and operated from 21 to 29 October.

(c) Two 12-channel VHF systems to the 2d Brigade Forward TOC from 24 and 29 October until the end of the period.

(d) One 12-channel VHF system between 2d Brigade Trains and Brigade TOC from 26 to 29 October.

(e) One 12-channel VHF system to 1st Brigade Forward TOC at Jackson Hole from 12 to 27 October.

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(f) One 12-channel VHF system to 1st Brigade Trains at Oasis from 12 to 25 October and a second system from 26 to 28 October. Task Force 22 assumed control at Oasis on 28 October. The two systems previously supporting the 1st Brigade Trains remained in place for Task Force 22.

(g) One 12-channel VHF system between 1st Brigade Forward TOC and Brigade Trains from 12 to 27 October.

(h) One 12-channel VHF system to 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry from 12 October to present. A second system was established and operated in conjunction with the first system to support the new 1st Brigade Forward TOC from 28 October to present.

(i) One 12-channel VHF system to 1st Battalion, 69th Armor from 12 October to present.

(j) One 12-channel VHF system to 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry from 12 October to present.

(3) AM Radio Operation:

(a) 124th Signal Battalion continued to operate NCS for Division Command Net #3 (RATT) and maintained a station in the IFFV RATT and SSB Nets.

(b) VSC-2 SSB-RATT Communications with DAK TO were maintained during this period with satisfactory results.

(4) FM Operations:

(a) 124th Signal Battalion continued to operate Command Net #1 NCS, DTOC remotes and Dragon Mountain retransmission stations.

(b) An FM radio set was installed on Signal Hill and remoted to the G-4 in Division Headquarters. Also, an FM radio was installed at Dragon Mountain and remoted to DISCOM LOC for DISCOM operations.

(5) Communication Center Operations:

(a) At present there are seven teletype circuits terminated in the Communications Center:

- 2 circuits, Famous to Typhoon
- 1 circuit, Famous to Flexible Forward
- 1 circuit, Famous to PLEIKU
- 1 circuit, Famous to Fortify Forward
- 1 circuit, Famous to Formal Forward
- 1 circuit, Famous to Task Force 22

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(b) A secure teletype circuit is being installed from Typhoon to the Division DTOC. This circuit will be operated by 124th Signal Battalion personnel.

(c) An average of 2598 messages were processed per week during the reporting period.

	Sent	Received
Flash	13	8
Immediate	736	694
Priority	428	536
Routine	49	134
TOTAL	1226	1372

(6) Wire Operations:

(a) A line was installed from DISCOM LOC to the DISCOM Command defensive bunker on Dragon Mountain.

(b) Work on the original underground cable system is progressing as follows:

1. Cable laid - 96%
2. Trenches completed - 98%
3. Termination and junction pedestals installed - 98%
4. Famous MDF - completed
5. Favor MDF - completed
6. DTOC MDF - completed
7. Signal Hill MDF - 15%
8. Unit termination - 60%

d. Training:

(1) New personnel received during this quarter were trained on the job. This was necessitated by the high turnover rate in August and September coupled with the battalion being fully committed. Teams were sent to forward areas with one qualified man and two new men. Some difficulties were experienced with this type of operation, but the new men learned faster this way and were of more value for the next commitment.

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(2) The signal battalion is conducting an OJT program in the operation of carrier equipment to refresh MOS 31M personnel, who have been operating the VHF radio terminal on Signal Hill. A similar program is also being conducted with MOS 31N personnel on patch panels. This training is in preparation for the consolidation of the carrier and patch panel equipment with the radio terminals on Signal Hill. The operators are being trained by 278th Signal Company personnel, who are currently operating the VHF carrier and patch panel terminal facilities.

10. (U) Information Activities.

a. During the reporting period 13 issues of the division newspaper, the IVY LEAF, were printed at the Stars and Stripes Printing Plant, TOKYO, JAPAN. The paper was expanded from six to eight pages and 6000 copies of each issue were printed for a distribution ratio of one copy per every three men assigned to the division.

b. The Division Information Office had 372 news feature stories and 231 photographs cleared by MACV-IO and released to the various media in CONUS. Hometown News Releases numbered 693 and 76 pictorial releases were sent to the Hometown News Center.

c. During the period, 55 correspondents representing the civilian news media visited the division. Of these, 29 conducted formal interviews with the Commanding General or a member of the division's General Staff.

d. The Information Office produced a daily 55-minute radio program and a 15-20 minute weekly television show that featured the activities of the 4th Infantry Division. The radio program was transmitted through the rebroadcast facilities of the 124th Signal Battalion. The TV show was presented on AFRTS (PLEIKU) with transmitter located on Dragon Mountain.

e. By the end of the October the Division Chapter of the 4th Division Association had nearly 3000 members.

SECTION 2 (U) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) General. Many of the observations in the form of lessons learned for the quarterly period were submitted in the Combat After Action Reports for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY. Additional lessons learned are submitted herein.

2. (U) Personnel.

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Rotation of Personnel

Item: Administrative processing of large number of rotating personnel.

Discussion: The major personnel problem experienced during this period was the processing of an extremely large number of personnel rotating during August and September: for example, during 1-14 September over 3000 men departed and 1500 joined the division.

Observation: 1. The following procedures were found to be the most efficient and expeditious in outprocessing personnel:

- a. Rosters of rotatees were prepared and verified by units approximately 30 days before their DEROS date.
- b. Port calls were issued two to three weeks before DEROS and personnel were returned from the field for processing not earlier than five days before their port call.
- c. Close coordination was maintained with the G-4, USARV and CAM RANH Bay to insure an adequate number of seats on the proper days to preclude personnel from being held past their DEROS.
- d. A central clearance facility was organized to: close out records, insure all activities were cleared, control changes in flight manifests, obtain signatures on all required forms such as malaria pill receipt and to handle other matters incidental to clearance.
- e. All personnel picked up their records and were entered on final manifests the day before their scheduled departure from the division.
- f. Military transportation authorizations were typed the night before departure.
- g. Personnel reported to 4th Replacement Detachment on the morning of their departure for final processing. This included a farewell, speech, baggage check, issuance of malaria pills and military transportation authorizations. Personnel were processed by flight and manifest number.
- h. Several extra personnel were instructed to report along with personnel already manifested: they were available to fill spaces vacated by "no-shows".
- i. Prior coordination was made with the Tri-Service ATCO at PLEIKU Air Base to insure the availability of air transport to CAM RANH Bay.

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j. Personnel were shuttled to PLEIKU as convoy loads were accumulated. When aircraft were not available personnel were held over at the replacement detachment.

2. A similar procedure was required to coordinate and inprocess replacements. Daily contact with adjutants of brigades affected by the "hump" kept them apprised of the projected replacement situation and what they could expect to gain within the next few days. The normal five day replacement training cycle was reduced to three days, which required temporary augmentation of the division in-processing team and the AG reproduction section. Administrative procedures were streamlined and any bottlenecks that developed were eliminated immediately. Assignment of replacements as much as 14 days before heavy rotation commences would insure the maintenance of the units effective combat strength.

Religious Coverage

Item: Adequate religious coverage for assigned and attached units.

Discussion: Providing adequate religious coverage for the units assigned and attached to the 4th Infantry Division has become an increasingly difficult problem. The division is currently conducting operations in an area of operations that encompasses more than 8000 square miles of the Central Highlands. To cover this area the tactical units are employed by brigade and battalion task forces that remain in widely separated areas for weeks at a time. Additionally two cavalry squadrons, one separate company and a number of smaller units are attached to the division. None of these units have chaplains assigned.

Observation: To provide the best coverage possible under these conditions religious coverage has been changed to an area basis rather than a unit basis. The drawbacks to this system are obvious: foremost of which is that a chaplain is not readily available when needed. Also difficulties in obtaining transportation further reduces the time a chaplain may spend with a unit. To alleviate this situation the attachment of three additional chaplains is required (one Catholic and two Protestant).

3. ~~N~~ Operations.

SOP's

Item: Detailed battalion SOP's.

Discussion: Recent operations have demonstrated the need for battalions to have detailed field SOPs. The high rate of turnover of personnel in the various key staff jobs compounds the problems of establishing and maintaining a smooth routine during the many varied operations of a battalion in combat. For example the absence of an airlift SOP usually results in past lessons being relearned by trial and error, usually finding in the end

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that the best method or technique was one used by the "old" group but not passed on.

Observation: A detailed SOP based on past experiences and lessons learned will impart to new personnel the guidance on techniques and procedures that have been proven through experience. This will prevent unnecessary loss of time and effort and perpetuate smooth battalion operations regardless of the experience level of the key personnel.

Searchlights and Dusters Colocated

Item: Collocation of Searchlights and Dusters.

Discussion: A searchlight was colocated with an M-42 "Duster" to provide an excellent fire support system for use in perimeter defense. A "flash-bang" technique was used. The searchlight would flash white light on a target momentarily, shut off and the Duster would fire. This would be repeated until the target was hit. When the infra-red light was used, the effectiveness was increased as the target was in constant contact.

Observation: The effectiveness of perimeter defense was greatly increased by collocating a searchlight with a duster.

Flash Bases

Item: Use of Flash Bases.

Discussion: The battalion survey section set up flash bases in two different positions during this period. These flash bases were used with highly satisfactory results in conducting both high burst and center of impact registrations. Security was provided by the supported infantry battalions.

Observation: Use of flash bases permits the firing batteries to be registered accurately and regularly, without dependence on aircraft availability and ground observers. Flash bases continue to be an important means of locating enemy mortar and rocket positions.

M-18 FADAC

Item: Maintenance of the M-18 FADAC.

Discussion: Down-time for the FADAC has been excessive during the months of September and October because of a lack of spare parts. The highest incidence of failures occur with the contact boards which are in short supply in VIETNAM. Failures of the test equipment have greatly hampered troubleshooting of the FADAC's.

Observation: Emphasis must be placed on the procurement and stockage of running spares within the supply system so that timely repairs can be made.

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Metro Ballons

Item: Bottled Hydrogen for Meteorological Balloons.

Discussion: The cost of inflation of metro balloons could be reduced considerably and the operation could be simplified by using commercial bottled hydrogen. It now requires about 45 minutes to inflate a balloon using calcium hydride charges at a cost of \$26.52 per inflation. Many flights require a second or third release due to signal interference causing recorder traces which cannot be evaluated. If commercial hydrogen is used, cost to inflate one balloon is \$3.32. The time required is less than five minutes. By using commercial hydrogen, cost of a flight is reduced by \$23.20 or a quarterly savings for a quarter for one met section of \$6396.00.

Observation: There should be a continuous supply of bottled hydrogen to inflate meteorological balloons.

4. (U) Training.

Tracked Vehicle Mechanics

Item: CONUS training of tracked vehicle mechanics assigned to units possessing the M-48A3 tanks.

Discussion: The amount of maintenance required on the M-48A3 tanks of the armor and cavalry units is immense because of vehicular age, milage and frequent encounters with mines. This problem is further aggravate by the fact that tracked vehicle mechanics coming to these units from CONUS are not familiar with the M-48A3 tank.

Observation: The maintenance problem that exists could be reduced significantly by the assignment of mechanics who have been trained on and are familiar with the M-48A3 tank. This could readily be accomplished if an M-48A3 orientation course was added to, or included in, the tracked vehicle mechanics course at the service school.

5. (N) Intelligence.

Enemy Base Areas

Item: Neutralizing enemy base areas and safe-havens.

Discussion: A great amount of time and effort is expended in locating areas that have been or are being used as enemy base areas and safehavens. These finds should be plotted and placed under systematic observation and included in the Province defoliation plan to deny them natural concealment. Enemy base camps, bunker complexes and trails that are discovered should be recorded on an overly of the unit's area of operations and forwarded to G-2 for analysis and filing upon termination of operations in the specific geographical area. These overlays could be furnished to units conducting

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future operations in the area, during which the unit would up-date it and when they leave the area return the up-dated overlay to G-2.

Observation: All findings and data of enemy base areas, bunker complexes and trail networks should be recorded on an overlay during an unit's operation in a given area of operations. The division area of interest should be divided into intelligence sectors for collecting, cataloging and analyzing this information. The overlays should be forwarded to and analyzed by G2 for specific areas to be included in a systematic surveillance plan and the Province defoliation program. These overlays, placed on file in a central repository, would be readily available for future operations. The past detailed findings will not be lost to time and rotation of personnel under this or a similiar system.

Enemy Employment of Rockets

Item: Non-standard employment of 122mm rockets.

Discussion: In launching a 122mm rocket attack on the 1st Brigade forward CP at LE THANH on 23 August the enemy departed in several respects from the pattern established elsewhere in RVN. The attack began at 0500 hours and lasted for 40 minutes, during which time approximately 50 rounds were fired. The number of rounds and the period of time indicated that only one company with five launchers was employed. This contrasted with the pattern of employment elsewhere in RVN where rocket attacks have generally been made by full battalions, which began not later than 0300 hours and were completed in about 15 minutes.

Observation: The pattern indicates that the enemy feels free to employ rockets in smaller forces in close proximity to the CAMBODIAN safe-haven than elsewhere in RVN and to continue the attack during a longer period of time. Rocket attacks by small enemy forces requiring less preparation than standard battalion size rocket attacks can be expected in the Central Highlands near the LAOTIAN and CAMBODIAN Borders.

Surveillance

Item: Integration of surveillance/detection methods.

Discussion: The sequential use of airborne personnel detectors (APD), red haze (heat detectors) and ground reconnaissance has proved effective in locating enemy forces. The APD is used regularly over wide areas where enemy activity is suspected. A positive reading gives the general location of an enemy force. This is followed, during the hours when the NVA units are known to prepare meals (0400 to 0600 hours and 1800 to 2100 hours), by red haze reconnaissance to pinpoint the location of the cooking fires. Finally, ground reconnaissance by LRRP's or combat units is initiated to observe the enemy force and conduct appropriate operations.

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Observation: The sequential employment of reconnaissance methods conserves resources and ensures a high probability of detecting and locating enemy forces.

Compromise of Operations

Item: Compromise of planned operations by increased air activity.

Discussion: Interrogation of POW's has revealed that the enemy is able to anticipate planned US operations by the marked increase of aerial reconnaissance and liaison missions over areas selected for operations.

Observation: Reconnaissance and liaison flights should be conducted routinely throughout the division area of operations so that the presence of aircraft over the area of a planned operation will not arouse undue suspicion.

6. (N) Logistics.

Holding of Minor Casualties

Item: The holding of casualties with minor wounds and injuries in base camp.

Discussion: Minor wounds and injuries, which were treated at the medical battalion's base camp clearing station and when it was determined that complete recovery would require no more than four or five days, were held at the clearing station's infirmary. Although the prescribed procedures require that individuals having injuries requiring hospitalization be evacuated within 72 hours, the battalion's base camp clearing facilities are more than adequate for treatment of these minor wounds and injuries.

Observation: The holding and treating of minor wounds and injuries requiring only a few days to completely heal in the division's medical battalion clearing station results in a lessening of the burden on higher medical facilities and also facilitates the return of personnel to duty without the delay resulting from excessive transportation and administrative time involved in evacuating such personnel.

Class I Distribution

Item: Class I distribution system.

Discussion: During the quarter the division had approximately 39 Class I unit breaks each Monday, Wednesday and Friday. In the past, the method used in the Class I distribution was by item break. Upon receiving the Class I supplies from the Camp Holloway Class I Supply Point the supplies were brought into the Class I issue warehouse and put in stacks of like items.

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A roller conveyer was set up down the middle of the stacks. A unit would drive up to the side door of the Class I issue warehouse for pickup of its supplies. A Class I checker would call out the items and a stock picker at each respective item stack would pull the items from the stacks and send them down the conveyer to the unit representative who loaded them on his vehicle. This method was time consuming and required several Class I individuals to make the issue. Also, the supported units had to wait in line along the access road which at times created a road hazard and traffic jam.

Observation: To reduce some of the workload involved in the Class I break and reduce the vehicle congestion along the access road, the Class I distribution method was changed to a unit break. Class I supplies were brought in from Camp Holloway and off-loaded each Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday. The Class I was broken down by unit pile the evening prior to the Class I issue and the units were scheduled at specific time intervals to pickup their supplies. This method reduced the traffic jam around the Class I distribution point, provided for a more timely issue of supplies and reduced the workload and personnel requirements for the Class I break.

Storage of Class II & IV

Item: Storage and accountability of Class II and IV supplies.

Discussion: Each month the division receives, stores and issues on the approximately 2,000 to 4,000 line items of supplies. In the past, due largely to the obstacle created by the monsoon season and construction program in the Class II & IV area, these supplies have been poorly received and stored within the Class II & IV operation. In conjunction with this method of receiving and storing supplies, exact accountability of the supplies could not be adequately maintained.

Observation: A locator system was established in accordance with TM 743-200 for each respective commodity warehouse and bulk storage area. Supplies and equipment stored in the bulk storage areas between the respective commodity warehouses were moved and relocated in specific locations by like items. Depot packs were moved and placed in neatly formed rows and stacks. Multipacks were broken down and the supplies segregated by like commodity and moved to the respective commodity warehouse. This change in procedures resulted in more space being gained for the receipt and storage of supplies, a more accurate accountability of the supplies, and a more expedient means of receiving and issuing supplies to the supported units.

Graves Registration

Item: Graves registration search and recovery.

Discussion: On 5 September the Graves Registration Section was called upon to conduct a search and recovery mission for a U-6 aircraft which had crashed on a nearby mountain. It took the team one and one-half hours to

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assemble the necessary gear for this type mission. Later, while involved in the recovery operation at the site of the wreckage, another aircraft, an O-1E, crashed into the same mountain.

Observation: This operation pointed out the need for a search and recovery kit. The necessary items of equipment needed for search and recovery missions must be assembled in sufficient quantity and placed in an area where it is readily available. This will preclude needless delays on search and recovery missions where time is essential.

7. (U) Civic Action.

Hamlet Chief's Meetings

Item: Hamlet chief's meetings.

Discussion: The difficulties of transportation and the apathetic attitude of local GVN officials towards MONTAGNARD affairs limits provincial/district progress in gaining MONTAGNARD support for the GVN. By involving large groups of hamlet chiefs, inviting District officials and providing air transportation, the division has provided a sufficiently compelling attraction to bring District officials into contact with the MONTAGNARDS for whom they are responsible. At the meetings, GVN officials explain government policies and discuss hamlet problems and possible solutions with the village and hamlet representatives.

Observation: To achieve the goals of Revolutionary Development, local GVN leaders must meet with their hamlet chiefs. US Civic Action personnel should make extraordinary efforts to facilitate such contacts.

Transportation to Market

Item: Transportation of indigenous personnel to local markets.

Discussion: Civic action assistance to indigenous personnel in the form of providing vehicular transportation to and from local markets is an effective measure to counter VC propaganda directed at US exploitation of the local people. However, this also has an inherent danger because it could provide the VC with opportunities for local purchases and transportation of the supplies they themselves need.

Observation: The transportation of indigenous personnel to and from local markets must be closely monitored to prevent excessive purchases of food and other goods which could be of assistance to the VC. All purchases by villagers should correlate to the season of the year, size of families and status of existing food stores in the villages.

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8. (U) Psychological Warfare.

1000 Watt LoudspeakersItem: Water-proofing of the 1000 watt loudspeakers.

Discussion: Use of the 1000 watt speakers in the ground role during inclement weather resulted in some components being shorted out because of moisture. Speakers and components were kept under ponchos and tarps while in a static position but this proved to be unsatisfactory. The speakers are water-proofed and the cable connections to the speakers are water-tight, however the amplifiers and external power source, (BA 386 batteries) are susceptible to moisture when the system is employed in the dismounted ground role.

Observation: A water-proof box was fabricated that held all the cables, amplifiers and BA 386 batteries. This box was lined with waterproof shipping paper and the lid was hinged for easy access. The box provided an additional advantage by reducing the time required to install the speaker system in helicopters for airborne missions. By having the cables already connected to the amplifiers, when the box was placed on a helicopter it was only necessary to connect to the speakers and the 28V electrical system on the ship.

Motion PicturesItem: Motion Pictures with MONTAGNARD dialect sound tracks.

Discussion: No motion pictures exist within VIETNAM with sound tracks in MONTAGNARD dialects. JUSPAO and GVN films available for use throughout VIETNAM are in either English or VIETNAMESE. Except in a few areas, most of the JARAI in PLEIKU Province do not understand either of these two languages. Therefore, films in VIETNAMESE or English lose their effectiveness when shown to MONTAGNARD audiences.

Observation: To solve the above problem two systems have been employed. The first, as a temporary measure, is to have an interpreter preview the films and then narrate them in the appropriate MONTAGNARD dialect. The more effective method, now being employed, is to produce an audio tape from the sound track of the film. Music and sounds are retained; the spoken words are erased and replaced by dialect translation. When the film is projected the audio tape is run simultaneously and synchronized with the film. This method has proven to be extremely satisfactory and does not require the presence of an interpreter/narrator.

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9. (U) Chemical.

Bulk CS-1

Item: Bulk CS-1 Delivery.

Discussion: Bulk CS is now being received in a new type package. The agent is being issued in plastic jugs with a pouring spout. Each jug contains eight pounds of agent and five jugs are packed in a cardboard carton. The carton is wrapped in a metalized waterproof cloth bag and then packed in a wooden crate. The receipt of bulk CS-1 in this packaging requires a complete revision of procedures for aerial delivery of bulk CS.

Observation: It was necessary to determine how to rig the boxes for explosive dissemination when dropped from aircraft. In September tests were conducted employing 11 boxes rigged with explosives in 11 different ways and several sets of jugs rigged in various ways. The two methods that worked best were:

a. The cardboard carton and waterproof bags were removed. Four warps of primacord were made around the five jugs and one strand was run between the jugs. The jugs were placed back in the crates and the crate nailed shut with the end of the primacord running out the top. An M1A2, 15 second delay, detonator was used to explode the primacord which shattered the crate and jugs and disseminated the agent. A drop altitude of 2300 feet gave low airbursts. Problems associated with this method were the burning of some of the agent and the excessive amount of time required to rig the boxes.

b. The other method required that each plastic jug be cut on three sides and resealed with 2" masking tape. The jugs were dropped from 1500 feet or higher and broke open on contact spreading the agent. This method was tested in an open area (little vegetation) and worked successfully. It has not been determined whether the agent would reach the ground if the jug was dropped into a multi-canopied jungle.

CS Cannister Clusters

Item: E-158R2 CS Canister Clusters.

Discussion: The E-158R2 cluster is an excellent area coverage CS munition requiring little time to prepare for delivery.

Observation: Tests conducted using the E-158R2 munition indicate that the maximum safe load for UH-1 aircraft is eight munitions. This allows room for crew of three to handle the munitions (two as bombardiers and one to supervise) and one artillery observer to adjust fire onto the target. The best drop altitude, considering safety from ground fire and bombing accuracy, has been 2000 feet above the ground.

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Defoliation

Item: Contamination of aircraft.

Discussion: Difficulty has been experienced in decontaminating aircraft used in spraying agent ORANGE to prevent damage to paint and rubber fixtures.

Observation: Coating the tail section with wax or as an alternate, motor oil, reduces but does not entirely prevent damage to paint. Immediate decontamination with warm, soapy water minimizes damage but sufficient quantities of water are not always readily available. Dilution of the agent with diesel appears to reduce aircraft damage and also results in better dispersion on the target. However, operators as well as pilots are reluctant to fly with ORANGE/diesel mix because of the nauseating smell and fire hazard.

Precipitation of Salts

Item: Precipitation of sodium salts.

Discussion: It has been found that using BLUE in the defoliation apparatus after using WHITE will cause precipitation of sodium salts to such an extent as to completely plug the nozzles and valves of the apparatus.

Observation: Precipitation occurs even after the apparatus has been rinsed with water subsequent to use with WHITE. Rinsing with diesel followed by water appears to completely decontaminate the apparatus and results in minimum precipitation.

Defoliant Foaming

Item: Foaming of BLUE.

Discussion: The foaming of BLUE has become a problem in filling the defoliation apparatus. Only 60-70 gallons of agent can be pumped into the 110 gallon tank, the remaining space being filled by foam.

Observation: Pouring a quart of motor oil in the tank prior to filling with BLUE reduces the foaming, but does not entirely eliminate it.

Part II Recommendations.

1. Appropriate recommendations are contained in the lessons learned and the Combat Operations After Action Reports for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY.

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2. To eliminate duplication of effort, tactical units submitting a combat operations after action report for a major combat operation, which covered more than half of an ORLL quarterly reporting period, should be permitted to incorporate the material normally included in the ORLL into the combat after action report and not be required to submit an ORLL for that quarter. The portion of the quarter not covered would be included in the next combat operations after action report or ORLL, whichever would become due first.

6 Inclosures
as

W. R. Peers

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf	
1 - CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty	
1 - CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty	
1 - CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty	
2 - CO, 4th Avn Bn	
2 - CO, 4th Engr Bn	
2 - CO, 124th Sig Bn	
1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn	
1 - CO, 4th Med Bn	
1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn	
1 - ACofS, G1	
1 - ACofS, G2	

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

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1. (U) For organizational structure for the period 1 August to 11 October 1967, see Combat After Action Report, FRANCIS MARION and Combat After Action Report, GREELEY.

2. (U) Task organization for the remainder of the quarter, 12 October - 31 October 1967, is shown below.

a. Task organization for Operation MAC ARTHUR as set forth in OPORD 37-67 effective 22 October 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf (eff 11 Oct)
1-10 Cav (-) (OPCON)
C/3-6 Arty (DS)
6-29 Arty (DS)
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (DS)
Plat, 4th MP Co (DS)
TACP

1-69 Armor

A/3-6 Arty (DS)
TACP

2-1 Cav

Div Arty

5-16 Arty

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) (DS)
Co B (-), 4th Engr Bn (DS)
Plat, 4th MP Co (DS)
TACP

Div Troops

4th Avn Bn
4th Engr Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MI Det
4th Div TACP

TF 2-8

2-8 Mech Inf
B/1-69 Armor (-) (OPCON)
Plat, 2-1 Cav (OPCON)
A/4-42 Arty (DS)
Plat, 4th Engr Bn
TACP

DISCOM

b. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 2-37-67 effective 210600 October 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-10 Cav (-) (OPCON)

1-69 Armor

Co, 1-8 Inf

2-1 Cav

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2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf

TF 2-8

2-8 Mech Inf
Plat, 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Plat, 2-1 Cav (OPCON)

Div Arty

Div Troops

DISCOM

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c. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 4-37-67 effective 291200
October 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
Plat 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Plat 2-1 Cav (OPCON)
6-29 Arty (-) (DS)
Co A (-), 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

TF 1-22

1-22 Inf (-)
2-8 Mech Inf
1-10 Cav (-) OPCON)
3-6 Arty (-) (DS)
2 Plat, 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
2 Co, 1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) (DS)
TACP

1-69 Armor

A/3-6 Arty (DS)

2-1 Cav

Div Arty

5-16 Arty

Div Troops

DISCOM

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KEY PERSONNEL

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters.

MG	Peers, William R	CG, 4th Inf Div
BG	Connor, Robert E	ADC-A
COL	Hickman, Don R	ADC-B
COL	Jackson, Charles A	Chief of Staff
LTC	Kunze, Melton H	AC of S, G1
LTC	Story, Robert	AC of S, G2
LTC	Livsey, William L	AC of S, G3
LTC	Tombaugh, William	AC of S, G4
LTC	Bentz, Harold F. Jr	AC of S, G5
LTC	Thomason, David A	AG
LTC	Singer, Lawrence	Div Surg
LTC	Seaman, Robert W	IG
LTC	Holeman, John S	PMO
LTC	LaBarbera, Albert	Fin Off
LTC	Sheehan, Joseph F	Chap
LTC	Young, Harold G	Cml Off
MAJ	Wingate, James A	Info Off

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

COL	Johnson, Richard H	CO
LTC	Edgerton, John D	XO
MAJ	Edmonds, Maurice	S3

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

COL	Sniffin, Charles R	CO
LTC	Taylor, William W	XO
MAJ	Bjorn, Edward D	S3

3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

COL	Wear, George E	CO
LTC	Weil, John D	XO
MAJ	Egeland, Edgar	S3

Division Artillery

COL	McAlister, Robert C	CO
LTC	Dewhirst, Sam T	XO
MAJ	Weall, Robert H	S3

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Division Support Command

COL	Blewett, Rex R	CO
LTC	Little, Roger M II	XO
MAJ	Risse, William	S3
	1st Battalion, 8th Infantry	
LTC	Madison, John H	CO
	2d Battalion, 8th Infantry	
LTC	Berres, John T	CO
	3d Battalion, 8th Infantry	
LTC	Belnap, Glen D	CO
	1st Battalion, 12th Infantry	
LTC	Birch, Harold B	CO
	3d Battalion, 12th Infantry	
LTC	Vollmer, John P	CO
	1st Battalion, 14th Infantry	
LTC	Petro, Peter P	CO
	1st Battalion, 22d Infantry	
LTC	Junk, William P	CO
	1st Battalion, 35th Infantry	
LTC	Kimmel, Robert G	CO
	2d Battalion, 35th Infantry	
LTC	Tiller, Norman L Sr	CO
	1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry	
LTC	Heiden, Charles K	CO
	2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry	
LTC	Gay, Joseph M Jr	CO
	1st Battalion, 69th Armor	
LTC	Grant, William D	CO

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	6th Battalion, 29th Artillery	
LTC	Kenney, Donald E	CO
	4th Battalion, 42d Artillery	
LTC	Dickerson, Roy L	CO
	2d Battalion, 9th Artillery	
LTC	Bobzien, Gerald B	CO
	5th Battalion, 16th Artillery	
LTC	Evans, Henry C	CO
	4th Aviation Battalion	
LTC	Holloman, Robert A	CO
	4th Engineer Battalion	
LTC	Lee, Emmett C Jr	CO
	124th Signal Battalion	
LTC	Spitz, William M	CO
	4th Medical Battalion	
MAJ	Anderson, Kirby V	CO
	4th Supply and Transportation Battalion	
LTC	DeVillie, David A	CO
	704th Maintenance Battalion	
LTC	Rice, Marvin E	CO
	Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division	
CPT	Batchelder, Michael J	CO
	4th Administration Company	
MAJ	Trussell, James M	CO
	4th Military Police Company	
CPT	Hazelwood, Robert R	CO

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION MAC ARTHUR

12 October. The 4th Infantry Division initiated Operation MAC ARTHUR. The 2nd Brigade with two battalions began deploying to PHU BON Province to conduct search and destroy operations south of CHEO REO; the 1st Brigade interdicted infiltration routes along the CAMBODIAN Border in western PLEIKU Province. A one battalion task force deployed by road to DAK TO to secure DAK TO and engineer work parties. Two cavalry squadrons and one tank battalion provided convoy and route security on the land lines of communication within the division's area of operations.

13 October. At 1805 hours at ZA043402 Hawkeye patrol 4C made contact with an unknown size NVA force. At 1815 hours the Aero Rifle Platoon, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducted a combat assault to reinforce the patrol. At 1945 hours the platoon and patrol were extracted: results, two NVA KIA and one weapon captured (by the Hawkeye patrol).

14 October.

15 October.

16 October.

17 October.

18 October.

19 October. At 1115 hours at BQ174511 Recondo Patrol 2B made contact with nine individuals. Contact was broken at 1145 hours. At 1721 hours vicinity BQ166515 Recondo Patrol 2B exchanged fire with three individuals. At 1915 hours patrol 2B linked up with elements of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, negative results from either contact.

20 October. At 2000 hours vicinity YA738331 Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms and weapons fire. Artillery and small arms returned fire: results, one US WIA (slight). At 1550 hours in at BQ305568 a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry took three NVA under fire, killing one NVA. At BQ326537 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found a large cache of medical supplies.

21 October.

22 October. At 2030 hours at YA740337 Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received five rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Again, at 2200 hours Companies A and B received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds resulting in three US WIA. Artillery, mortars and spooky returned fire.

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23 October. At 1845 vicinity of BQ232650 one platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry saw eight to 10 individuals dressed in khaki and black P.J.'s. The platoon took the individuals under fire as they fled into a cave. The platoon pursued and found 43 individuals in the cave: results one individual KIA, 20 individuals WIA. Individuals were evacuated, interrogated and found to be civilians. At AR776206 a tank from Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit an AP mine: results, two US WIA (slight).

24 October. At 2000 hours in the vicinity of YA7534 Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with two NVA: results, one US WIA (slight). At ZAI45586 a tank from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine damaging the tank's suspension and track.

25 25 October. At 0900 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry captured one NVA in a cave at BQ240612 with one AK-47. At 1800 hours at BQ326510 an element of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged six NVA: result, one NVA captured. At 2035 hours at ZAI20345 an APC from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was hit by B-40 rocket and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force: results, two US WIA.

26 October. At YA903270 a truck from the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry hit a vehicle causing moderate damage.

27 October. At 0645 hours two companies and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry conducted a combat assault northwest of PLEIKU in reaction to 122mm rocket attack on PLEIKU City. At 1400 hours at ZAI25530 the Reconnaissance Platoon captured one NVA and one 122mm rocket launcher.

28 October. The 1st Brigade terminated operations in western PLEIKU Province and initiated movement to DAK TO. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry terminated operations in the DAK TO area and the battalion (-) initiated a road movement to Camp Enari. At AQ864406 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found 18 Springfield, Model 1903, rifles and one sub-machine gun (type unknown) with collapsible stock.

29 October. 1st Brigade assumed responsibility of AO Spaatz effective at 1200 hours. Task Force 22 initiated operations in western PLEIKU Province with one infantry battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion and one cavalry squadron (-). At 1955 hours at ZA091171 Reconno Patrol 4C made contact with one VC: results, one VC KIA.

30 October.

31 October. At 1900 hours at AQ820429 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received automatic weapons fire: results, one US KIA, two US WIA (slight).

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

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1. (N) Defoliation Data

a. The following Traildust missions were flown during the period 11-31 October.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
24 Oct	4	4000	ORANGE	YA7521-YA8108
27 Oct	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7244-YA7227

b. The following crop destruction missions were flown during the period 11-31 October.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
18 Oct	5	375	WHITE	BQ3353-3359, 3454, 3458, 3459, 3256
19 Oct	3	150	WHITE	BQ3058-3060, 2263-2265 2362-2365
20 Oct	3	275	WHITE	BQ2752, 2852

c. The following perimeters were defoliated during the period 1 August - 31 October.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
1 Aug	Truck	2400	ORANGE/ Diesel	Camp Enari
10 Sep	Truck	1200	ORANGE	Camp Holloway
25 Sep	Truck	600	ORANGE/ Diesel	Camp Enari
26 Sep	Truck	100	ORANGE	DUC CO
26 Sep	Hand	100	ORANGE	2-1 Cav Fwd CP
26 Sep	Truck	50	ORANGE	PLEI DJERENG
26 Sep	Truck	50	ORANGE	1-69 Armor Fwd CP
27 Sep	Truck	600	ORANGE/ Diesel	Camp Enari
28 Sep	Truck	3550	ORANGE/ Diesel	Camp Enari
28 Sep	Truck	1000	WHITE	Dragon Mountain
5 Oct	Truck	75	WHITE	1-69 Armor Fwd CP
7 Oct	Hand	50	WHITE	Camp Enari
16 Oct	Truck	75	WHITE	1-69 Armor Fwd CP
16 Oct	Truck	225	WHITE	A/1-69 Armor Fwd CP
17 Oct	Hand	50	WHITE	Camp Enari
18 Oct	Hand	75	WHITE	PHU TUC
27 Oct	Hand	75	BLUE	Camp Holloway
29 Oct	Hand	75	BLUE	Artillery Hill
29 Oct	Hand	75	BLUE	DUC CO

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
29 Oct	Truck	75	BLUE	Camp Holloway (runway)
29 Oct	Truck	75	BLUE	1-69 Armor Fwd CP
30 Oct	Hand	12 cans	BLUE	Camp Enari

d. The following roadside defoliation was conducted during the period 1 August - 31 October.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
5-7 Oct	Truck	1800	WHITE	Hwy 19E Mang Yang Pass
14 Oct	UH-1	200	ORANGE	Hwy 7B AR9110
15 Oct	UH-1	200	ORANGE	Hwy 7B AR9110
16 Oct	UH-1	225	WHITE	Hwy 7B AR9110
21 Oct	UH-1	300	WHITE	Hwy 7B BRO002

2. (u) RCA Employment.

a. Forty pound boxes of CS-1 powder were delivered by CH-47 helicopter as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>POUNDS CS-1</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
19 Oct	1	2160	ZB093439 - ZB090442
21 Oct	1	1600	ZB005168 - ZB010166
24 Oct	1	1600	YB785210
24 Oct	1	1600	YB825160
28 Oct	1	1600	YB830051 - YB832047
28 Oct	1	1600	YB790117 - YB790118

b. CS-1 canister clusters (E-158's) were delivered by UH-1 helicopter as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>NO. OF MUNITIONS</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
16 Oct	1	2	YA968551
31 Oct	1	2	BRO03242

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ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (Local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AM	Air Mobile
AO	Area of Operations
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN	Army Republic of VIETNAM
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Available Supply Rate
A/V	Audio Visual
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
CA	Civic Action
CA	Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
C&C	Command and Control
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CP	Command Post
CS	Tear Gas
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DTO	Division Transportation Office
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center

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FAC	Forward Air Controller
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FO	Forward Observer
FRAGO	Frag Order
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GREGG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GSR	General Support Reinforcing
Gun, Gunship	Armed UH-1 Helicopters
GVN	Government of VIETNAM
Hawkeye Team	Four Man Hunter - Killer Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter	O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
Hook	CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
I FFORCEV	I Field Force, VIETNAM
INRHA	Injuries Not the Result of Hostile Action
IPW	Interrogation Prisoner of War Team
IRHA	Injuries the Result of Hostile Action
Jackson Hole	Brigade CP Area at LE THANH, YA898315
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Agency
KBA	Killed by Air
KIA	Killed in Action
LF	Local Force
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, Reconno Patrol

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LLOC	Land Line of Communications
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NVA	North VIETNAMESE Army
NVAC	North VIETNAMESE Army Captive
Oasis	Brigade CP Area at ZALLO275
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORD	Operation Order
PF	Popular Forces
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PW	Prisoner of War
PP	Preplanned
PZ	Pick-up Zone
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RD	Revolutionary Development
RF	Regional Forces
RL	Rocket Launcher
RVN	Republic of VIETNAM
S&D	Search and Destroy
Slick	UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift
SP	Self Propelled

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Spooky	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flareship
TAC	Tactical
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, VIETNAM
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong
VMCC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action

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HEADQUARTERS
2D SQUADRON, 1ST CAVALRY
(1ST REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS)
APO San Francisco 96262

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21 December 1967

SUBJECT: Deployment After Action Report

TO: Personnel Concerned

This report covers the activities of the 2d Squadron from 20 March to 28 August 1967. It is hoped that problems encountered by this Headquarters and the recommendations for their solution will provide assistance to units in similar circumstances.

Joseph M. Gay Jr.
JOSEPH M GAY JR
LTC Armor
Commanding

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SECTION I

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Roster of Officers and NCO's assigned as of 30 August 1967:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
<u>SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS:</u>			
GAY, JOSEPH M JR	LTC	062214	Sqdn CO
HOSMER, CALVIN III	MAJ	077459	Sqdn XO
OVERTON, STEPHEN M	CPT	OF101646	S1
SAWIN, PETER L	CPT	098923	S2
WOLFE, ROBERT A	MAJ	074605	S3
WEST, RONALD P	CPT	093262	S3 Air
MONTGOMERY, PATRICK	CPT	05320502	Comm Officer
HENNESSEY, DAVID A	2LT	05240766	L0
PLESKO, MICHAEL A	2LT	05240802	L0
LODER, WILLIAM V	1LT	05240713	L0
DUMAS, EDWIN H	CPT	02310694	S4
HIKSON, GARRY P	CPT	05531801	Sqdn Motor Officer
RONAY, JAMES C	1LT	OF108875	Support Plat Leader
JONES, RANDOLPH F	1LT	05233412	Trans Sect Cmdr
MATTSON, JAMES M	WO1	W32009998	PBO
PAYNE, CHARLES R	WO1	W3208976	Maint Tech
JONES, DONALD	2LT	05240775	S5
BARNWELL, WILLIAM L	CPT	05423466	Sqdn Surgeon
<u>HEADQUARTERS TROOP:</u>			
DEHART, WALLACE	CPT	099448	CO
CLARK, ALEXANDER J	1LT	OF1044671	XO
JENSEN, LLOYD	WO1	W34200090	Auto Maint Tech

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TROOP A:

SMITH, CHARLES T CPT 05415352 CO
WALLACH, MARSHALL 1LT 05022546 XO
GREENE, LAWRENCE 1LT 05233408 Plat Ldr
TAYLOR, DAVID G 1LT 0F109808 Plat Ldr
TERRY, DAVID B 1LT 05328459 Plat Ldr

TROOP B:

BEATTY, NORMAN E CPT 098593 CO
MOFFETT, DONALD L. 1LT 0F107856 XO
ABRAMS, JOHN N 2LT 05244565 Plat Ldr
HARTLINE, FRANKLIN Y 1LT 0F107730 Plat Ldr
RUSSELL, VAN B III 1LT 05421749 Plat Ldr

TROOP C:

HARTMAN, CLARENCE B CPT 0F101478 CO
SIMS, BILLY D 1LT 0F107963 XO
BRUBAKER, PAUL L 1LT 05233482 Plat Ldr
HARPER, RICHARD T 1LT 0F107723 Plat Ldr
STOCK, MICHAEL L 2LT 0F108743 Plat Ldr

SENIOR NCO'S:

BUSWELL, GEORGE T 1SG RA54063546 Sergeant Major
EMERICH, JAMES M MSG RA13337983 Intelligence Sergeant
EAKER, KENNETH R PSG RA17265865 Operations Sergeant
TYE, MARION F 1SG RA14338117 First SGT Hq Trp
HICKMAN, MARION L 1SG RA13277446 First SGT Trp A
BREWER, CHARLES E 1SG RA17297251 First SGT Trp B
BATTAZZO, FLOYD J 1SG RA12285269 First SGT Trp C

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DEPLOYMENT HIGHLIGHTS

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The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was reorganized under TOE 17-105 G per General Orders 26, HQ, III Corps and Fort Hood, dated 20 January 1967. Troop D (Air Cavalry) was attached to the 502d Aviation Battalion, 2d Armored Division per General Order Number 25, HQ, 2d Armored Division, dated 25 January 1967. Company F, 15th Armor was attached to the squadron per General Order Number 50, HQ, 2d Armored Division, dated 15 February 1967.

The squadron completed scout AIT on 3 March 1967. Infantry, mortar, and tank crew AIT were also completed on 3 March 1967 in the 1-41 Infantry, 1-50 Infantry, and 2-66 Armor respectively. At this time the squadron was configured as an "11th Armored Cavalry" type cavalry squadron per VCOG, 2d Armored Division with three line troops consisting of M113 APC's. The squadron was required to draw additional M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) from 2d Armored Division resources to complete the 11th Armored Cavalry configuration. However at the beginning of training, there were 12 APC's with the ACAV modification within the squadron. Company F, 15th Armor laterally drew its M60 tanks from squadron resources (9 tanks per line troop).

Regarding personnel, the troop commanders and principal staff arrived one week prior to the start of BUT. The S3 arrived during the first week of BUT. NCO's were transferred to the squadron from 2d Armored Division resources in order to continue training. Twelve of these original NCO's proved to be non-deployable approximately three weeks prior to deployment.

The squadron commenced BUT on 20 March 1967 and adopted a concept of spending four days per week in the field with the remaining three devoted to maintenance and classroom instruction in garrison. Squad and section training were stressed for the first four weeks, followed by two weeks of platoon level training. A final week of platoon ATT's was planned. The training was conducted by each troop commander as much as possible.

At the beginning of the sixth week the squadron was notified that the TOE changes that had been instituted in March were being rescinded and that the squadron would revert to the conventional tank - APC mix in each of the line platoons; ie, three tanks, six APC's and the mortar track. However the ACAV configuration would be retained on all APC's, and APC's would be substituted for M114 Command and Reconnaissance vehicles. Company F, 15th Armor was detached and its tanks were returned to the squadron. Company F was at this time redesignated Troop H, 17th Cavalry and assigned to the newly formed 198th Light Infantry Brigade. Concurrently with the tank replacement came authority from Fort Hood (Post G4) to obtain the M88 medium track recovery vehicle in lieu of the lighter M578 recovery vehicle.

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Particularly noteworthy during this phase of training was the field environment for the whole squadron, excluding Squadron Maintenance and the S4 Section. The squadron command post was established in the field with training supervised from there.

Another feature was the integration of RVN-oriented training. Where the field manual was felt to apply, it was followed. Such accepted practices as dispersion to avoid the effect of nuclear weapons, use of overhead camouflage to avoid detection from the air and the use of scouts in a widely separated, fast moving role were not taught. Points stressed were the use of small unit patrols; the use of platoon laagers in open areas to present the best defense against ground attack; and the technique of convoy security, route security and detailed search operations. A modified mechanized infantry live fire course was set up for the scouts, infantry and mortar crews to stress firing techniques in the use of the ACAV vehicle as an assault vehicle. The Mechanized Infantry Course as originally established made use mainly of long and intermediate range targets. However the ACAV course made extensive use of close-in targets (10 meters or less) to train gunners on both the side mounted M60 machine guns and the caliber .50 machine gun to react to ambush situations.

From 8 May to 12 May 1967 all platoons were tested by squadron headquarters. The main points stressed included a search and destroy mission, route security mission, night security, both setting and reacting to an ambush, and patrolling. The usual pre and post-combat checks were conducted with a live fire exercise conducted as the final phase.

Troop level training (15 May to 3 June 1967) involved squadron headquarters giving missions to the respective troops; ie, route security, search and destroy, and cordon and search of villages. This method of training proved quite effective in exercising the squadron staff as well as the line troops.

The squadron received its annual AGI/CMMI on 18 May 1967. The short time spent in preparation for the inspection did not gain the desired results, and a re-inspection of maintenance and administration was directed.

Training on the troop level was resumed following the AGI. The troop ATT's were conducted by 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division. The test included route security, zone reconnaissance, cordon and search of a village, convoy security and night security operations. The new series (AN/VRC 12) radios were completely issued in time for the troop tests. There previously had been a mixture of new and old series radios. The squadron also began to draw new vehicles, and the equipment it had been using for training was prepared for turn-in.

Following the troop ATT's, the squadron spent two weeks in preparation for the AGI re-inspection on 26 June 1967. The re-inspection was passed successfully. On the following day the squadron took its ATT which was administered by the 2d Armored Division.

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The three-day exercise involved route clearance and security, zone reconnaissance, patrolling, attack, and night defensive operations. The test terminated on 29 June 1967.

The next two and one half weeks were spent conducting make-up training, POR qualification training (including zeroing and familiarization firing with the newly issued M16 rifle), issue and continued turn-in of equipment, and packing of equipment for shipment. On 15 July most of the squadron departed on pre-embarkation leave. A small force stayed behind to load the vehicles and equipment on flat cars for shipment to port. The squadron returned to Fort Hood, on 4 August and deployed by air and rail on 7-8 August from Oakland, California, arriving at Qui Nhon on 29 August 1967. The squadron advance party left by air from Bergstrum AFB, Austin, Texas, on 10 August and arrived in Pleiku on 14 August 1967.

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SECTION II
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1. Personnel:

a. Item: Personnel augmentation for ACAV vehicles.

Discussion: DA Message 811440 (SECRET), dated 212230 April 1967, authorized an additional 72 personnel spaces to provide an extra 2 men on each of 36 M113A1 ACAV vehicles from the nine (9) scout sections of the squadron. However, the additional personnel (42 spaces) to man the command vehicles (platoon leaders, troop commander, S3 and the squadron commander) which are ACAV equipped were requested and denied. The authorization to draw 50 ACAV vehicles and convert the remaining M113's already in the squadron was not accompanied by a complete augmentation to the squadron strength, listing grade and MOS requirements. On 12 July 1967, a DA Readiness team headed by Colonel Frank B Davis visited the squadron. They stated that the squadron would deploy with an aggregate strength of 833, but could not give information as to MOS or grade. The DA final movement directive (message number 819151 and 820097) stated that the unit would deploy with an aggregate strength of 829 personnel.

Observation: Augmentation of deploying unit should include MOS and grade authorization. Equipment modification should be accompanied by personnel augmentation where applicable.

b. Item: Personnel replacements and shortages.

Discussion: Troop commanders and key staff members joined the squadron from 15 March 1967 to 15 April 1967. All troop commanders had less than fourteen (14) days with their units prior to beginning the first week of BUT (20 March - 24 March 1967). Key NCO's; ie, platoon sergeants, section leaders, squad leaders, supply sergeants and motor sergeants continued to arrive in May and June. This constant gaining of personnel created much turbulence and confusion. A particular area of concern was the lack of support squad leaders (11C40); each troop had one of the required three. While the majority of replacements came from within the 2d Armored Division; their resources were soon exhausted.

Observation: When a unit is alerted for deployment, Officers and NCO's should be assigned at least thirty (30) days prior to commencement of BUT. Ironically, a similar problem was encountered by the 11th ACR (see page 3, Personnel Actions or ORILL, 11th ACR, dtd 31 October 1966 published by DA on 21 April 1967).

c. Item: Non-deployable personnel.

Discussion: The assignment of personnel who were non-deployable created organization problems throughout the squadron. Also, the criteria for non-deployable status changed during the month of June.

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As the shipping date approached, the number of personnel who had ship discharges or who had members of their family in Vietnam in a similar situation existed in the 11th ACR (see Page of ORIL dtd 31 October 1967).

Observation: Deploying units can figure on a 5% loss rate prior to deployment. Fillers should be assigned based on the deployable status and each unit should be 105% to 110% of strength to make-up for losses immediately prior to shipment.

d. Item: POM-qualification program.

Discussion: Late arrival (after 20 June 1967) of filler personnel created confusion and extreme difficulty meeting prescribed POR training. These personnel arrived after training had been completed. Therefore training programs had to be re-initiated at the expense of the packing and crating program which was in progress.

Observation: A team from CONARC/STRIKCOM should visit the unit thirty (30) days after it has commenced training. This team could provide invaluable top level assistance to the deploying unit regarding training, personnel and logistical problems.

e. Item: TOE

Discussion: As of this writing the TOE of the 2-1 Cavalry is still not clarified. This has been a problem since the initial readiness report was submitted on 31 March 1967. While some questions have been clarified, other still remain unresolved. The following list of TOE changes are understood to be part of a modified TOE being studied:

- (1) Elimination of the squadron air defense section.
- (2) Elimination of line troop ground surveillance sections.
- (3) Elimination of squadron air liaison team.
- (4) Addition of an S5 section (S5, 03/02; S5 NCO E6/E5, Driver/clerk E5/E4; medic/clinical specialist E6).
- (5) Addition of an assistant S2 officer.
- (6) Addition of two (2) clerks for S1.
- (7) Addition of flame thrower squad (13 men, 3 M132A1).
- (8) Addition of 3 ammunition handlers per troop (for mortar squads).
- (9) Addition of 42 machine gunners for command ACAV vehicles.
- (10) Enlargement of HHT ground surveillance section.

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Observation: Clarification and official determination of TCE is needed by this squadron as soon as possible. The TO for units organizing for deployment should be firm prior to the start of training.

2. Training and Operations:

a. Item: Planning and organization of training.

Discussion: The 2-1 Cav was unable to send representatives to Vietnam prior to commencing training. The use of Lessons Learned Reports and lectures by Vietnam returnees created a slight "Over Orientation". Contradictions existed which were due to the different locales in RVN in which lecturers had served, and the different SOP's and missions of the unit making the reports.

Observation:

- (1) CO, S3, & troop commanders should visit Vietnam prior to BUT.
- (2) The appropriate ATP should be followed until commencing AUT.
- (3) During AUT, RVN type operations and their peculiarities (route security, cordon and search, search and destroy, and S5 and civic actions) should be stressed.

b. Item: Interpreters.

Discussion: During training at Fort Hood, a Vietnamese language school was run by the post for members of the unit. The Montagnard language was not taught (instructors were not available), and yet the present mission of the squadron requires it to deal with Montagnards. The Vietnamese language training facilities were also limited for space so that only six men could be sent. A requirement exists for one interpreter for each platoon, due to the extended nature of cavalry operations in Vietnam.

Observation: Each troop should have an interpreter per platoon and one at troop level. These personnel should be excused from all except POR type training and should be sent to an Army Language School prior to deployment.

c. Item: Recovery operations.

Discussion: Recovery operations were taught during pre-deployment training, but not enough time was allowed for this subject. The area of the Fort Hood Reservation does not readily lend itself to the creation of recovery problems during training. A stuck vehicle was a rarity during this unit's training, thus the practical work in recovery usually experienced during field training was missing. Extra-long tow cables were fabricated and issued to each platoon prior to deployment.

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Observation: Recovery training must have added emphasis and practical exercises should be conducted at platoon level.

d. Artillery training.

Discussion: Training in the adjustment of Artillery cannot be over-emphasized during BUT and AUT. While a great deal of time was spent at Fort Hood on this subject, additional time should be spent. Adjusting fire is a very frequent requirement in this unit. Concurrently with adjustment of fire, rules of engagement are extremely important. This squadron had no experience at Fort Hood in this subject. Finally, fire and maneuver exercises while in CONUS would be beneficial in providing training in the adjustment of defensive contrations; and the use of artillery to block routes of withdrawal while forces move in.

Observation: CONUS training should include:

- a. Actual adjustment of artillery fire by all personnel.
- b. Familiarization with RVN "Rules of Engagement".
- c. Live fire exercises with forces maneuvering with artillery support.
- e. Item: Civil affairs and civic action training.

Discussion: The squadron did not have an S5 section or a realistic Civil Affairs/Civic Action training program during CONUS training. The platoon leader conducting a cordon and search operation in-country had to learn as he went in dealing with Vietnamese, Montagnard, captured food stuffs, suspected VC and the part that an S5 team plays in these situations.

Observation: CONUS training for RVN should include a realistic orientation and practical exercise in Civic Action/Civil Affairs.

f. Item: ACAV orientation and training.

Discussion: During CONUS training, this squadron had 12 non-ballistic ACAV armor kits for training. This permitted live fire training of each ACAV crew three times before deployment. This training is quite important as it instills confidence in the weapon system and is the most effective method of crew/ACAV training. The ACAV course was a moving vehicle range which included targets from 10 meters to 200 meters with three targets for the M79 grenade launcher. However, due to safety procedures, throwing of grenades from the vehicle was prohibited. This feature warrants consideration for inclusion in future courses. In addition, as an improvement, the course should have many targets (12 to 13) within its negotiated length. Also the vehicle commander should be required to engage targets with both left and right machine guns simultaneously.

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Observation: All Army crews should negotiate the moving vehicle live fire course as often as possible, (at least four to five times). Hand grenades and simultaneous firing of vehicle weapons should be integrated into the course.

g. Item: Dismounted operations:

Discussion: Although dismounted patrolling and ambushes were practiced at Fort Hood, recondo/ranger training should be emphasized during CONUS training. Each line platoon can form four, four-man long range reconnaissance patrols. Desirably, these soldiers would receive extensive recondo training in CONUS. After the patrols receive training, joint mounted/dismounted operations should be conducted. Emphasis should be placed on dismounted elements covering area where mounted elements can reach them if contact is established with the enemy.

Observation: Armored units should consider training specialized long range reconnaissance teams for their own use in RVN operations.

h. Item: Shipboard training.

Discussion: A great deal of planning was made for shipboard training, but conditions aboard the ship did not permit more than platoon sized classes.

Observation: Deploying units should not plan to cover large unit aspects of training while on ship but rather should concentrate on small unit tactics, weapons training, and platoon SOP's.

i. Item: Late arrival of equipment.

Discussion: Late arrival of M-16 rifles (two weeks prior to conclusion of all training) and starlite scopes (after arrival in-country) precluded CONUS training with this equipment other than familiarization with M-16. A trainfire qualification program and strong maintenance training program would help to curb the loss of faith in the weapon caused by adverse national publicity. Introductory information was given on the starlite scope at Fort Hood but the equipment was not given to the troops until arrival in Vietnam.

Observation: New equipment should be in the hands of the troops in sufficient time to insure training before deployment.

3. Logistics:

a. Item: Communications.

Discussion: The squadron did not receive the complete issue of new series (AN/VRC-12) radios until June. From March until June, the squadron trained with a mix of new and old series radios. The procedure for requisitioning the new series radios was confused and consequently

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caused late arrival of the sets. Also, the squadron lost all of its AN/GRC 19 radios and that it would receive the AN/GRC 106 upon arrival in RVN. When the unit arrived in RVN, it was told that the AN/GRC 106 was not available and AN/GRC 19 radios were issued.

Observation: Closer liaison with USARV as to availability of equipment in-country and timely delivery of equipment in CONUS should be made in order to provide proper training.

b. Item: AGI

Discussion: The squadron stood the Annual General Inspection during its BUT phase (18-19 May). Training precluded having sufficient time to prepare and the Squadron had to stand a reinspection which was passed. The inspection achieved the results desired, but cost the squadron three weeks of training.

Observation: An AGI conducted after completion of training would have greatly assisted the squadron in its final preparatory phases.

c. Item: Useful equipment.

Discussion: Each troop was issued an extra four hundred gallon water trailer prior to deployment. This has been a welcomed addition. With mess hall, drinking and washing requirements, the demand is heavy, even for two water trailers. Due to extended operations and separation from squadron support base, the special tool set B should be a mandatory set of equipment in each troop for the M48A3 tank and the M113A1 APC.

Observation:

a. An armored cavalry troop needs an extra water trailer for RVN operations.

b. The special tool set B for both M48A3 and M113A1 at troop level would greatly expedite maintenance operations.

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SECTION III
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1. Personnel:

a. Officers and NCO's should be assigned to deploying units thirty days prior to commencement of BUT.

b. Deploying units should be filled with 5% to 10% over strength.

c. TOE of deploying units should be firm prior to BUT.

d. Deploying unit should be frequently inspected by COMARC in personnel, logistics and training areas.

2. Training:

a. Key officers should visit area to which unit will be assigned

b. Interpreters should be school trained, with each troop having four.

c. Greater stress should be placed on recovery operations in training armor units for deployment to RVN.

d. Adjustment of artillery fire should be particularly stressed in training a unit for deployment to RVN. Live fire maneuvers are recommended as training aids.

e. Practical, realistic work in Civic Action/Civil Affairs aspects of the war in RVN should be stressed during training.

3. Logistics:

a. The issue of equipment to be used in RVN should be made in time to allow training on the equipment.

b. AGI should be conducted at the end of the training phase.

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AREA OF OPERATIONS

MAP 1:250,000 SERIES JOG (6) 1501
SHEETS ND 48-4, 48-8, 48-12,
49-1, 49-5, 49-9

