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SECURITY INFORMATION

See p.1 of 1043
letter dated 31 December
1952 for title.

**OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA**

ATTNG-42 319.1/294(C)(~~U.S. Army~~ 53) 2 January 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of United States Forces,
Trieste, November 1952.

TO: Chief of Staff
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of the Inspection Team from this Office which visited the United States Forces, Trieste during the period 7-8 November 1952 for the purpose of determining the status of training and operational readiness of units in that command.

2. The report shows that, in general, the status of training and operational readiness of units has increased materially over that which was found by the Inspection Team from this Office which visited the United States Forces, Trieste in October 1951.

3. The important observations and conclusions as I see them are as follows:

a. Status of Training

The status of training of United States Forces, Trieste is excellent, with the exception of CBR defense which is estimated to be not more than satisfactory. Training in mine warfare was not being given sufficient emphasis. Air-ground training is hampered by the lack of a definite service responsibility for the provision of tactical air support and of a suitable control agency. The status of training may be expected to be reduced considerably with the large personnel losses in the next few months.

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4. Operational Readiness

**ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.**

a. Combat units of TRUST are in an excellent condition of operational readiness to perform normal type missions.

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ATTNG-42 319.1/294(C)(2 Jan 53)

2 January 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of United States Forces,
Trieste, November 1952.

b. Detriments to operational effectiveness may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The absence of an air defense plan.
- (2) The lack of a definite service responsibility for the provision of tactical air support and of a suitable control agency.
- (3) The lack of adequate number of NCOs due in part to Department of the Army's restriction on promotion of enlisted men.

5. Corrective Action

I have initiated action on all deficiencies which fall within the purview of my Office.

6. Recommendations

a. I recommend that the Department of the Army:

- (1) Consider the advisability of increasing to twelve months or more the time-remaining requirement for overseas shipment as soon as the recent larger inputs into the Army become available for assignment.
- (2) Consider the advisability of reducing the "service in higher position in recommending unit" requirement, as imposed by DA Circular 73, 1952, in order to permit the promotion of personnel otherwise qualified, and of increasing the promotion quota to the command.
- (3) Give special consideration, in view of the relatively small authorized strength of the command, to maintaining TRUST at its authorized strength.
- (4) Reexamine the present basic education policy with a view to eliminating this requirement as an Army task or to meeting the minimum requirements prior to overseas shipment of affected personnel.
- (5) Explore the feasibility of having the Sixth Fleet:

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Trieste, November 1952.

(a) Assigned the mission of providing tactical
air support and air defense to TRUST. ~~SECRET~~

(b) Charged with the entire responsibility for
providing aerial photographic reconnaissance for TRUST including
photo reproduction, interpretation and distribution.

b. It is recommended that United States Forces, Trieste:

(1) Implement effectively existing CBR plans, directives
and training programs.


(2) Initiate mine warfare training at the earliest
practicable date.

1 Incl
Rept of AFF Insp of
US Army Trieste, Nov 52

/s/ John R. Hodge
/t/ JOHN R. HODGE
General, U. S. Army
Chief

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2 January 1953

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Army Field Forces

SUBJECT: | Report of Inspection of Trieste United States Troops,
by AFF Inspection Team, November 1952

I. ADMINISTRATIVE.

1. Authority. - Pursuant to instructions contained in letter, OCAFF, 8 October 1952, subject: "Letter of Instructions," as amended by Department of the Army Message No 921813, 22 October 1952 (TAB A), the officers indicated therein departed Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 24 October 1952, for inspection of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), United States Forces, Austria (USFA), and Trieste United States Troops (TRUST).

2. Scope. - This report covers Trieste United States Troops (TRUST) only. Separate reports have been made upon United States Army, Europe and United States Forces, Austria. The composition of the inspecting party, its itinerary, and lists of units and installations inspected are contained in tabbed annexes to this report.

3. Conduct of Inspection.

a. Training was witnessed at the unit level and staff visits were made to various headquarters and service installations in Trieste during the period 6-7 November 1952. Members of the inspection group were afforded the opportunity of discussing command, organization,

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equipment, and training problems with members of TRUST and unit commanders and staffs.

b. At a conference on 7 November 1952 at Trieste, a report of findings of the inspection was made to the Commanding General, TRUST.

4. General observations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in Sections III and IV. Detailed conclusions and recommendations are contained in separate branch reports, TABS E, F, G, and H.

II. MISSION.

5. The mission of the inspecting party was to determine "Status of Training," and "Operational Readiness," of units of TRUST and cover other specific matters as set forth in letter of instructions (TAB A).

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

6. Joint Operations.

a. Provision has been made for Naval gunfire support for TRUST.

b. Plans for Naval air support for TRUST consummated in 1950 are adequate. However, continued planning is hampered by the uncertainty of a definite assigned responsibility of supporting service. The current command structure of Allied Forces Southern Europe as pertains to tactical air support available from Sixth Fleet needs clarification in order that joint planning may be continuous.

c. No provisions have been made for obtaining aerial intelligence from air photos.

d. No provisions have been made for air defense.

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7. Personnel.

a. The command has approximately half of its authorized strength of noncommissioned officers, a situation created by heavy losses of such personnel, the receipt of an insufficient number of NCO's from the CONUS, and the restrictive promotion policy outlined in DA Circular No 73, 1952.

b. The receipt of large numbers of enlisted personnel during the past several months with less than six months service remaining seriously affects the continuity of operations.

c. There is a serious shortage of medical officers in this command, which does not employ indigenous personnel of this type.

8. Organization.

a. The reorganization of the engineer and signal elements of the command effected during the past year and, in part, in accordance with 1951 OCAFF recommendations, has materially improved the organizational structure for the support of tactical operations. Further improvement with respect to the engineers will result from favorable action by the Department of the Army on the additional reorganization proposed by TRUST.

b. Tactical air control parties (TACP's) have been organized from Army overhead personnel (PX warehouse personnel, etc) and have been trained to direct both Navy gunfire and air support aircraft.

9. Training.

a. The status of training of all units of this command is excellent. A comprehensive, well organized and supervised training program, which includes all current Department of the Army and AFF requirements, is in effect.

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The military courtesy, morale, appearance, and general attitude of all members of this command is outstanding and indicates a high state of training and discipline.

b. Units conduct firing practices and participate in field exercises and maneuvers in Germany, Austria, and Italy.

c. Local range facilities are limited; however, maximum use is made of them and some field firing is conducted at various maneuver areas.

d. Unanimous opinion of all commanders was that the Department of the Army basic education policy was unnecessary and a waste of time when applied to individuals required to serve for only 24 months.

e. Insufficient emphasis was being placed on the implementation of the CBR training program.

f. Requirements for mine warfare training had not been established for all units, and indoctrination of personnel of appropriate echelons not yet instituted.

10. Equipment.

a. Maintenance. - The problem of excessive maintenance time required on World War II type wheeled vehicles noted at the time of the 1951 OCAFF inspection has been materially reduced by the receipt of a high percentage of the authorized number of vehicles of current types as replacements.

b. Ammunition Inspection and Surveillance. - At Department of the Army direction, and in accordance with 1951 OCAFF recommendation, ammunition inspection and surveillance personnel have been made available to TRUST.

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c. Equipment of Replacements. - In contrast to findings in 1951, the receipt in the command of replacements from the United States who are short, required items of individual equipment no longer constitutes a problem.

d. Whereas no major shortages of authorized weapons or equipment limiting the operational capability of the infantry regiment were noted, a serious deficiency exists in antitank capabilities of TRUST as a whole. In this command there is an urgent need within the infantry battalion for a midrange antitank weapon such as the 105-mm recoilless (BAT) with carrier.

e. TRUST does not have ground-to-air radio sets (AN/TRC-7) authorized by current T/O&E's for infantry battalions and regiments, K-20 cameras for use in Army light aircraft, or the mobile darkroom (AN/TFQ-7) authorized for division signal companies.

11. Supply Economy and Cost Consciousness. - Training in supply economy and cost consciousness, and the implementation of that training continues at the active and effective level noted in 1951.

12. Status of Training. - The status of training of Trieste United States Troops is excellent, with the exception of CBR defense which is estimated to be no more than satisfactory.

13. Operational Readiness.

a. Combat units of TRUST are in an excellent condition of operational readiness to perform normal type missions.

Over
5

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b. Detriments to operational effectiveness may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The absence of an air defense plan.
- (2) Lack of a definite service responsibility for the provision of tactical air support and of a suitable control agency.
- (3) Lack of adequate number of NCO's due in part to Department of the Army's restriction on promotion of enlisted men.
- (4) Limited length of service of enlisted personnel in the theater due to current CONUS training policies.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.

14. Joint Operations. - It is recommended that Department of the Army explore the feasibility of having the Sixth Fleet:

- a. Assigned the mission of providing tactical air support and air defense to TRUST.
- b. Charged with the entire responsibility for providing aerial photographic reconnaissance for TRUST including photo reproduction, interpretation, and distribution.

15. Personnel. It is recommended that Department of the Army:

- a. Give special consideration, in view of the relatively small authorized strength of the command, to maintaining TRUST at that strength.
- b. Consider the advisability of reducing the "service in higher position in recommending unit" requirement, as imposed by DA Circular No 73, 1952, in order to permit the promotion of personnel otherwise qualified, and of increasing the promotion quota allocations to the command.

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c. Consider the advisability of increasing to twelve months or more the service remaining requirement for oversea shipment, as the recent larger inputs into the Army become available for assignment.

d. Provide sufficient medical officers to bring TRUST to reduced authorized strength.

16. Organization.

a. It is recommended that the Department of the Army expedite action on recommendations submitted by TRUST for the reorganization of engineer units of that command.

b. It is recommended that TRUST give consideration to making available, within their troop basis, a minimum of three officers and six enlisted spaces in order that the Army Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) can be assigned to infantry battalions on a full time basis.

17. Training.

a. It is recommended that Department of the Army re-examine the basic education policy with a view to eliminating this requirement as an Army task or to meeting the minimum requirements prior to oversea shipment of affected personnel.

b. It is recommended that TRUST:

(1) Take action to decrease the overhead requirements to enable the regiment to have a larger number of personnel available for training.

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(2) Implement effectively existing CBR training plans, directives, and programs.

(3) Initiate mine warfare training at the earliest practicable date.

18. Equipment.

a. It is recommended that the Department of the Army expedite the development, production, procurement, and distribution of the 105-mm recoilless rifle (BAT) with carrier.

b. It is recommended that TRUST initiate action to obtain ground-to-air radio sets (AN/TRC-7), K-20 cameras, and mobile darkroom (AN/TFQ-7) for use by the division type signal company in conjunction with photographs taken from light aircraft.



E. D. POST
Brigadier General, GS

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTENTS

BASIC REPORT

Administrative Matters
Conclusions
Recommendations

TAB

SUBJECT

A	Letter of Instructions
B	Composition of Inspection Team
C	Itinerary
D	Command Organization, Trieste US Troops
E	Branch Reports (to include schools)
E1	Infantry
E2	Armor
E3	Engineer
E4	Signal
E5	Medical
E6	Chemical
F	Personnel
G	Intelligence
H	Air-Ground Operations

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

8 October 1952

TO: Brigadier General E. D. Post

1. You will head an inspection team to determine the status of training and operational readiness of units of United States Army in Europe. In carrying out this mission, particular attention will be paid to:

- Operational readiness of combat units
- Joint training in air-ground operations
- Adequacy of equipment
- Training Centers
- Training facilities
- Schools
- Depots
- Personnel assignment

2. The team will be composed of the following:

- Brigadier General E. D. Post
- Colonel A. F. Kingman
- Colonel P. L. Neal
- Colonel W. H. Lewis
- Colonel J. A. Heintges
- Colonel C. E. Dovell
- Colonel L. M. Johnson
- Colonel B. W. Poor
- Lt Colonel T. St J. Arnold
- Lt Colonel P. E. Smith
- Lt Colonel L. T. Bondshu
- Lt Colonel R. N. Denniston
- Lt Colonel M. A. Darragh
- Lt Colonel W. A. Edens
- Lt Colonel G. A. Clayton
- Major James Humphry, III
- Major J. C. Ryan

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3. Inspection itinerary will be completed with Commander-in-Chief, European Command, after arrival, to include visits to Austria and Trieste Commands by such members of the team as you consider necessary.

4. Upon completion of your visit, you will report to the Commanding General in each command (or his designated representative), the findings resulting from your visit and the substance of the report you intend to submit to this Office. In all reports made as a result of your visit, a positive statement that the foregoing instructions have been carried out will be included.

5. Your report to this Office will be made as soon as practicable upon return. It is desired that deficiencies and inadequacies noted in the 1951 inspection report be particularly noted and commented upon.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL HODGE:

/s/ M. F. Grant
/t/ M. F. GRANT
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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CONTROL NUMBER
T-5957

INCOMING MESSAGE

SUSPENSE DATE

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED PRIORITY

FROM: AGPA-OS DEPTAR

TO: OCAFF Ft Monroe Va

Nr DA 921813

DTG: 222254Z Oct 52

Ref your msg OCAFF 699A. Signed Bergin, TAG.

By order Secretary of The Army so much of DAIO AGPA-OS 200.4 (8 Oct 52) 10 Oct 1952 which directs 17 officers to proceed on or about 23 Oct 1952 on TDY approximately 30 days to Germany; France; Austria; Italy and Trieste amended to delete Lt Col Lowell T Bondsh. 051670 QMC and to substitute Lt Col George A Treger 030746 QMC, OCAFF.

Red by AG Dist 0700 October 52.

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NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

ACTION: G3

INFORMATION: Secy, QM, AG Pers, AG Control

23 October 52

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OFFICERS COMPRISING INSPECTION TEAM

TRUST, NOVEMBER 1952

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE NUMBER</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Elwyn D. Post	Brig Gen		G3
Chauncey E. Dovel	Colonel		Medical
Paul L. Neal	Colonel		Signal
William H. Lewis	Colonel		Engineer
John A. Heintges	Colonel		G3 (Inf)
Leonard M. Johnson	Colonel		Chemical
Thomas St. John Arnold	Lt Col		G3 (Air Support)
Page E. Smith	Lt Col		CAAC (AAA)
Robert N. Denniston	Lt Col		G2
Walter A. Edens	Lt Col		G3 (FA)
George A. Clayton	Lt Col		G3 (Inf)
James Humphry, III	Maj		G1
Jeremiah C. Ryan	Maj		G3 (Armor)

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ARMY FIELD FORCES' INSPECTION

TRIESTE, NOVEMBER 1952

5 November 52

ARRIVED: Trieste, Italy

6 November 52

Inspection of combat and service units and installations

7 November 52

Conference with Commanding General and staff, TRUST

8 November 52

DEPARTED: Trieste, Italy

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
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COMMAND
ORGANIZATION
TRUST

November
1952



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BRANCH REPORTS

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ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS

NOVEMBER 1952

INFANTRY

I. GENERAL.

1. Observations of the 351st Infantry Regiment were limited to one day. Appropriate briefings, availability of unit commanders and staff officers, and the concentration of units and training areas enabled the infantry representatives to gain a good impression of the combat readiness and training status of the 351st Infantry Regiment.

2. The inspection did not reveal any major deficiencies. The state of training and operational readiness of the 351st Infantry Regiment was considered to be quite satisfactory. Officers and men appeared to be proficient in their duties and performing their work in an aggressive and enthusiastic manner. The military courtesy and general attitude of all personnel of this command contacted on and off duty was exceptional and indicated a high state of training, morale, and esprit.

3. Commanders stated that the rapid turnover of personnel made it difficult to maintain a uniform state of training and operational readiness. Concurrent orientation and refresher courses are conducted to accomplish the integration of newly arrived personnel into the current training cycle as quickly as possible.

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4. The training hours in this Command differ from those in USAREUR and USFA in that the morning hours 0730-1230 are devoted to formal training and the afternoon hours 1330-1630 are utilized to conduct schools, athletic programs, care, cleaning and maintenance of weapons and equipment, training tests, etc.

5. The inability of commanders to promote deserving and qualified individuals caused a morale problem and adversely effects discipline and re-enlistments.

6. Units conduct field training in training areas in Germany, Austria, and Italy. The recent acquisition of the training area in Italy provides units with a greater opportunity to conduct field training. AFF tests are conducted during the yearly training cycle.

7. Officer and NCO schools are effective in training small unit leaders.

8. The local range facilities are extremely limited; however, maximum use is made of them and some firing is also conducted at the various maneuver areas.

9. Commanders stated there has been a definite improvement in the status of training of replacements, but additional emphasis on weapons training, individual and small unit tactics, and fundamentals of the school of a soldier is desirable.

10. The Department of the Army policy requiring a minimum of a five (5) year basic education for oversea personnel is considered an unnecessary

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burden to the unit commander. Commanders stated that adequate spaces were available within the organization to place individuals not possessing this basic education. Basic education is conducted during the afternoon from 1430-1630. Men requiring this education are available for training with their units during morning hours.

This system is considered a better solution to the problem than that used in USAREUR and USFA where men requiring basic education are given 12-week courses away from their units during which time the unit commanders have no opportunity to train such men in military subjects or integrate them into their units.

11. A serious deficiency exists in antitank capabilities within this command. The only antitank defense available is that which is organic to the 351st Infantry Regiment. There is an urgent need for a midrange anti-tank weapon within the Infantry Battalion. Commanders emphasized an urgent need for a weapon such as the 105-mm recoilless rifle (BAT) with carrier.

II. SPECIFIC.

12. 351st Infantry Regiment.

The morale, courtesy, and discipline are superior. Close command supervision of training, administration, and supply was evident throughout. Troop information and recreational facilities were adequate.

Established current training doctrine is being followed and has been incorporated into a comprehensive and aggressive training program. Individual and unit training is being stressed to enable the unit to operate

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effectively. Administrative and overhead requirements materially reduce the number of assigned personnel available for training daily. This handicaps team training.

The triangular concept is being stressed. The training cycle includes all phases of training with the unit commander conducting individual training as warranted. Training tests are being conducted as required.

Troop housing is adequate and housekeeping is superior.

III. ORGANIZATION.

13. Infantry rifle platoons are not organized in accordance with T/O&E 7-17, 15 May 1952, which authorizes two (2) LMG's in the weapons squad and 2 BAR's for rifle squad. The additional fire power would greatly enhance the capability of the rifle platoons.

IV. EQUIPMENT.

14. No major shortages of authorized weapons or equipment that would decrease the operational capability of the regiment were noted.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS.

15. That action be taken by Department of the Army as follows:

a. Re-examine the present basic education policy with a view toward eliminating this requirement as an Army task, or accomplishing the minimum requirement prior to oversea shipment of affected personnel.

b. Expedite development, production, and distribution of the 105-mm recoilless rifle (BAT) and carrier.

c. Re-examine the enlisted promotion policy with a view to eliminating the critical need of noncommissioned officers in TRUST, with

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emphasis on lowering restrictive time-in-position limitations and increasing quota allocations.

d. Require noncommissioned officers who have received rapid promotion under combat conditions in Korea to attend appropriate leader's courses at branch service schools prior to reassignment to units in CONUS or oversea commands.

16. That action be taken by TRUST as follows:

Take positive action to decrease the overhead requirements to enable the regiment to have a larger number of personnel available for training.

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ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS

NOVEMBER 1952

ARMOR

I. GENERAL.

1. Armor units of US Forces in Trieste (TRUST) are the 88th Reconnaissance Company and the Tank Company of the 381st Infantry Regiment.

II. PERSONNEL.

2. Although the over-all TRUST troop ceiling of 5000, which is imposed by international agreement, results in most units being organized at reduced strength, both armor units are maintained at full strength.

3. All armor-trained personnel received by this command are correctly assigned. The number of armor-trained personnel received was not adequate to fill the needs of the two armor units and the balance of replacements assigned to these units are infantry trained.

4. The 88th Reconnaissance Company requires school-trained tank mechanics.

III. TRAINING.

5. There were no changes in the schedule or methods of training from that reported by Army Field Forces Inspection, Trieste, 1951. The over-all status of training and the methods of training observed were superior.

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6. Both armored units have a high degree of operational readiness and upon receipt of new equipment as scheduled will have a high degree of combat effectiveness.

7. All personnel in both units have participated in the combat firing exercises conducted by the 351st Infantry Regiment.

8. All personnel of the Tank Company, 351st Infantry Regiment, have received transition training on tank M47 at the Seventh Army Tank Training Center, USAREUR.

9. Adequate ranges are available for firing all armor weapons except the main armament of the tanks. Tank gunnery is conducted at ranges available in northern Italy.

10. Present marksmanship training for all members of this command includes the firing of small arms and machine guns at a moving tank. One of the M4A3E8 tanks of the tank company is used as the target tank for this training. Upon receipt of tank M47 it will no longer be feasible to use the tank company equipment for this purpose without major modifications to one of the tanks M47 which would seriously affect the operational readiness of that tank. The tank unit requested that consideration be given to retaining one of the present M4A3E8 for use as a target tank.

IV. EQUIPMENT.

11. The 351st Tank Company is equipped with M4A3E8 (76-mm) tanks. Information received by the command indicates that the full authorization of M47 tanks will be received in the near future.

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12. The 88th Reconnaissance Company is equipped with M24 light tanks. No major maintenance problems are being experienced with this equipment but, in order to maintain the required standard of combat effectiveness, replacement of the present M24 with the T41 or with rebuilt M24's is required.

13. The nature of the terrain over which these units operate is extremely rugged and rocky and results in excessive wear on rubber tracks and road wheels.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS.

14. It is recommended that:

a. Department of the Army take action to insure that only steel tank tracks are furnished to TRUST.

b. Department of the Army approve the request by TRUST to retain one M4A3E8 as a target tank if logistic support is feasible. The use of this tank provides a valuable and essential training aid for all combat elements of the command.

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ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS - NOVEMBER 1952

ENGINEER

I. GENERAL.

1. Conduct of Inspection. - The inspection of TRUST engineer activities was made by visits to staff sections and units in garrison. Time available permitted limited observation only of training activities. Spot checks were made of unit administration, housekeeping, discipline, military courtesy, and supply economy. Opportunities to discuss organization, equipment, and training problems with unit commanders were exploited to the maximum, with particular attention to the status of personnel and equipment and the effect thereof on training and operational readiness. Results of the inspection were discussed with the TRUST Engineer, and major points of constructive criticism were presented in the closing conference with the Commanding General, TRUST, on 7 November 1952.

2. Activities Visited. - The following activities were visited:

517th Engineer Combat Co - Capt H. F. Outman, CO

7106th Engineer Service Co - Capt Earnest F. Hawthorne, CO

Engineer Section, TRUST, - Lt Col Harry F. Kirkpatrick, Engr

3. Organization.

a. The present organization provides the following:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Engineer Section, TRUST	8	-	8

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<u>Unit</u>	Authorized Strength		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
517th Engineer C Co	<u>4</u>	-	<u>127</u>
7106th Engr Svc Co	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>185</u>
TOTALS	19	2	320

This organization reflects a change since the OCAFF inspection of 1951. The 517th Engineer Combat Company has been activated locally during the past year, utilizing troop spaces formerly allotted to 7107th Engineer Service Company.

b. Plans are being made to reorganize the TRUST Engineer Section and the 7106th Engineer Service Company to provide a Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Combat Battalion (T/O&E 5-16N), less the Assault Platoon, at reduced strength, and an Engineer Maintenance Detachment. The organization to result will be as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	Authorized Strength		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Hq & Hq & Svc Co, Engr C Bn	<u>8</u>	-	<u>138</u>
517th Engr C Co	<u>4</u>	-	<u>127</u>
7106th Engr Maint Det	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>61</u>
TOTALS	19	2	326

This reorganization plan has been submitted in detail to DA for approval.

c. The TRUST Engineer, in addition to his staff duties, functions as Post Engineer and as commander of engineer units. When the reorganization is affected, the battalion commander will perform all functions, and under tactical conditions will command also the British engineer component (66th Indep Fd Sqn RE) of the Combined British - US Tactical Command (BRUSTAC).

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II. PERSONNEL.

4. Strength. - The authorized and assigned military strengths of engineer components at the time of this inspection were as follows:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Authorized	19	2	320
Assigned	18	2	321

5. NCO Shortage. - A shortage of NCO's in the first three grades exist in all units. Few NCO replacements are received and promotions within the units are limited by grade ceilings and restrictive criteria with reference to time in grade and position.

6. Specialists. - The number of refrigeration mechanics and fire fighting personnel received from CONUS sources is insufficient to satisfy the local requirements. Replacements being received do not have engineer basic training.

III. TRAINING.

7. Engineer Unit Training. - Training of the 517th Engineer Combat Company is conducted in accordance with TRUST directives based on an annual training cycle which includes individual, small unit, and combined branch phases. The 7106th Engineer Service Company trains in required subjects for 12 hours per week.

8. Engineer School. - TRUST has not established a separate engineer school but obtains quotas sufficient to its needs from the USAREUR Engineer School.

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9. Mine Warfare Training. - Copies of the draft training circular and other OCAFF material on the revised Mine Warfare Doctrine had been received by TRUST. However, no definite plans had been prepared, at the time of this inspection, for the indoctrination and training of TRUST personnel therein.

IV. EQUIPMENT.

10. No critical shortages of engineer equipment exist. The 517th Engineer Combat Company has received M47 dump trucks and other interim type vehicles to replace WW II equipment. No urgent need was expressed for items of development or service test equipment.

V. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

11. All engineer services are provided by the 7106th Engineer Service Company, supplemented by indigenous personnel as required. Facilities are adequate. No shortage of supplies were reported.

VI. OPERATIONAL READINESS.

12. The 517th Engineer Combat Company is in an excellent condition of operational readiness to perform primary and normal combat missions. The appearance of personnel, military discipline and courtesy, and housekeeping within the unit is superior. The effectiveness of service elements in the performance of assigned functional missions is satisfactory. The capability of the service company to perform alternate missions under tactical conditions is marginal due to limited training afforded.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

VII. CONCLUSIONS.

13. Organization. - The organizational structure of engineer units for support of tactical operations has been improved during the past year within the capability of the local command. Further improvement in this regard will result from the additional reorganization proposed by TRUST (par 3b above).

14. Personnel. - All engineer activities are substantially at full strength; however, there is a shortage of qualified NCO's, refrigeration mechanics, and fire fighting personnel.

15. Training. - Prescribed training effectively maintains the combat readiness of the 517th Engineer Combat Company and meets minimum requirements in prescribed subjects for the 7106th Engineer Service Company.

16. Equipment. - No major problems exist in the engineer units.

17. Supply and Maintenance. - Facilities and organization are adequate. No shortage of essential supplies exists.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

18. It is recommended the Department of the Army:

a. Expedite approval of plans for reorganization of engineer units in accordance with recommendations submitted by TRUST.

b. Restudy the limitations on promotion of enlisted personnel to alleviate NCO shortages in TRUST units.

19. It is recommended that TRUST:

a. Initiate Mine Warfare Training at the earliest practicable time in accordance with guidance furnished by OCAFF TM No 8, 5 November 1952.

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b. Reorganize engineer units in accordance with current plans as early as DA authority therefor is received, and initiate requisitions for additional organizational equipment as required.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS - NOVEMBER 1952

SIGNAL

I. GENERAL.

1. The units and installations visited were:

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS (Hq & SigO)	TRIESTE
508th Signal Company	TRIESTE
Signal Section General Depot	TRIESTE

2. All recommendations included in 1951 OCAFF report have been carried out.

3. The Signal organization is now capable of supporting both the field and garrison mission of TRUST.

II. PERSONNEL.

4. The Signal Company is critically short of experienced NCO's as follows:

1 ea Cryptographic Sergeant	MOS 1805
1 ea High Speed Radio Sergeant	MOS 1766
1 ea Radio-Teletype Instructor Sergeant	MOS 1766
1 ea Chief Signal Supply Sergeant	MOS 1581

Because of the small number of Signal Corps troops available, it has been impossible to select and train on-the-job the above personnel. Selection by name of individuals from continental United States sources is indicated in this instance.

Over
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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5. Other specialists are being trained on the job when not received as replacements.

6. No indications of misassignments were evident.

III. ORGANIZATION.

7. The reorganization of the 7105th AU Signal Service Company (a T/D unit) into the 508th Signal Company, (a T/O&E unit) capable of performing tactical missions, has been accomplished as recommended in the 1951 OCAFF report.

8. The Signal section of the TRUST Supply Depot maintains current signal supply stocks and is performing advance depot maintenance. TRUST is dependent upon the Leghorn Depot for base maintenance and combat reserve supplies.

IV. TRAINING.

9. The Signal Company is training intensively on infantry tactics by rotating the personnel through field combat exercises.

10. Specialist and team training is performed on the job. Officer supervision was noteworthy in all phases of training.

V. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

11. Excess supplies reported in the 1951 OCAFF report have been moved to Leghorn. The TRUST depot stocks have been reduced to current requirements.

12. Maintenance was excellent.

VI. OPERATIONAL READINESS.

13. The signal units of TRUST are operationally ready to perform their mission.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

VII. CONCLUSIONS.

14. The present signal organization of TRUST is capable of performing the mission.

15. The quantity of signal supplies on hand is adequate for current supply and maintenance, plus a minimum reserve of consumable items for field operations, but not enough for sustained operations in the field.

16. The 508th Signal Company (-) is critically short of four experienced MOS's which are critical ones which cannot be expected through the normal replacement system.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

17. It is recommended that the Department of the Army favorably consider the individual selection of four experienced signal NCO's for assignment to TRUST as follows:

1 ea Cryptographic Sergeant	MOS 1805
1 ea High Speed Radio Opr Sgt	MOS 1766
1 ea Radio-Teletype Instructor Sgt	MOS 1766
1 ea Chief Signal Supply MSGT	MOS 1581

18. It is recommended that the Signal Officer, TRUST, maintain very close liaison with his opposite number in the Leghorn LOFC to insure that an adequate reserve stock of signal supplies and consumables such as field wires and batteries are on credit for TRUST.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION
TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS - NOVEMBER 1952
MEDICAL SERVICE

I. GENERAL.

1. The medical facilities of the United States Troops (TRUST) consist of the following units and installations:

Unit	CO
Surgeon's Office, TRUST	Col Stanley W. Mathews, MC
7th Station Hospital	Col Stanley W. Mathews, MC
Medical Company, 351st Inf Regt	Maj David J. Edwards, MC
537th Medical Service Detachment	1st Lt James E. Byrd, MSC

2. This report is based on an inspection of the medical units in TRUST and on conferences with the Surgeon and his subordinates.

3. The organization of the medical service in TRUST is superior for its present mission.

4. The 7th Station Hospital is adequately staffed and equipped and is capable of carrying out its present mission without the use of indigenous professional personnel; however, in the event of an emergency the fixed hospital would be abandoned. The improvised field hospital assemblage now set up is cumbersome and would be quite difficult to combat load and transport in present allotted vehicles. It does not meet the requirements of mobility essential in rendering medical support in retrograde and delaying actions. A mobile surgical hospital assemblage should be furnished the theater to correct this deficiency.

5. The evacuation policy within TRUST is sixty (60) days in the station hospital and one hundred twenty (120) days in general hospitals in

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USAREUR. Emergency evacuation under present conditions is via MATS to USAREUR. Routine evacuation from the theater is via transports which call at Trieste approximately every five weeks. In the event of a major emergency, evacuation presents problems commensurate with the tactical situation. Land, air, and surface transportation will be utilized to the extent available to render the most expeditious service.

6. Medical supply support is from Leghorn, Italy, and is maintained by the 537th Medical Service Detachment which operates the Medical Depot in Trieste.

II. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

7. Personnel.

a. There is a constant shortage of medical officers in Trieste. This is brought about by officers departing from Trieste ahead of the arrival of their replacements in the theater. This lag in some cases is as much as five months and may be influenced by the limitation on the number of US military personnel stationed in the Zone "A" at any one time on a duty status. The number authorized is five thousand (5,000) troops in the theater. When one service is overstrength, another has to remain understrength until attrition has corrected the ill. A solution to maintain adequate medical support is to have filler replacements on the transport that comes in to take medical personnel out. Indigenous doctors are not employed in the theater.

b. There is a shortage of medical NCO's, particularly the first three grades. This condition will become more accentuated within the next six months and will require remedial action from continental United States.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

This shortage has been brought about by expiration of service and the shortage of career soldiers in the theater with sufficient time in grade to be eligible for promotion to these key positions.

8. Training.

a. Medical training of individuals and units in the theater was observed and found to be well conducted, conforming to current directives and meets the highest Army standards.

b. Cold injury training is being conducted in all medical units from a preventative as well as from a treatment indoctrination.

c. CBR training is being conducted and stressed in each medical unit with the required number of officers and NCO's school trained to carry out the program in the medical units and instruct all personnel.

d. Weapons familiarization and qualification is being conducted and emphasized in all medical units.

e. Morale and esprit de corps were high. Military courtesy and discipline were excellent throughout the theater, and saluting was rendered with appropriate greeting.

9. Medical Equipment and Assemblages.

a. Medical equipment and assemblages are maintained in excellent condition. There are no shortages which interfere with the medical service carrying out its present mission; however, it would be of great advantage to replace the improvised field hospital assemblage with an assemblage of a mobile surgical hospital which could be used to advantage in field exercises and in the event of an emergency.

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b. Cost consciousness program was being conducted and accentuated in all units.

10. Medical Supply and Maintenance.

a. Medical supply, maintenance, and hospitalization are rated excellent. There are still some excess supplies present which were reported last year to The Surgeon General's Office as excess to the needs of the theater. Some of these excess supplies have been shipped to USAREUR, others to Leghorn, and the remainder are stored and maintained awaiting instructions from The Surgeon General's Office as to disposition.

b. Evacuation presents the same problems that are commensurate with tactical situations in theaters where distance, terrain, and isolation are major factors. Land, air, and surface transportation are being utilized at present time and in the event of an emergency the best method available would be employed.

c. Recommendations made and deficiencies noted during 1951 inspection by OCAFF team have been given due consideration and have for the most part been corrected.

11. Operational Readiness. - The medical units of TRUST are well trained and capable of rendering medical support to the combat troops. This could be improved by making available a mobile surgical hospital assemblage to TRUST, and by having filler replacement personnel arrive on the same ship which returns troops to the continental United States.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

12. It is recommended that the Department of the Army:

a. Furnish sufficient medical corps officers to TRUST to bring the medical units up to reduced authorized strength.

b. Make available medical NCO's of the first three grades to TRUST for assignment in units where shortages exist in these key personnel.

c. Make available a mobile surgical hospital assemblage to replace the improvised hospital assemblage now available in TRUST. This assemblage to be used in field exercises and in the event of an emergency.

13. It is recommended that TRUST:

a. Requisition a mobile surgical hospital assemblage for use in the field and in event of an emergency.

b. Continue to emphasize field training with unit T/O&E equipment stressing maintenance, combat loading, and mobility.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS - NOVEMBER 1952

CHEMICAL

I. GENERAL.

1. The inspection was conducted during the period 5-8 November 1952.
2. The objective of the inspection was to examine the operational readiness of units from a CBR training standpoint.
3. At the time of the inspection there were no Chemical Corps troop units or personnel in TRUST.
4. This report is based on conferences with members of the staff at Headquarters, TRUST, and visits to infantry and ordnance units of the command. Unit commanders, from regiment to company, were interviewed with reference to CBR training as were numerous noncommissioned officers and privates in the units.

II. ORGANIZATION.

5. CBR training was planned and supervised by G3, Headquarters, TRUST, assisted by the Ordnance Officer, who was also acting as Chemical Officer. Chemical equipment and supplies were handled by ordnance personnel.
6. The Ordnance Officer advised that a requisition had been submitted to the continental United States for a Chemical Officer, and that a recommendation had been made to set up a separate Chemical Section.

Over

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III. TRAINING.

7. A general CBR directive and training program for the period 1 October 1952 - 31 December 1953 had been issued for the command. This indicated the responsibilities of the various echelons of command, the objectives, and outlined the general types of training to be carried out. If properly implemented, the planned program is considered adequate.

8. At the time of the inspection all units had CBR personnel properly assigned by orders. However, of those assigned, only approximately 10 per cent of the CBR officers and about 60 per cent of the CBR NCO's were school trained. It was planned to utilize quotas allotted by the Seventh Army CBR school in USAREUR to the maximum for both officers and NCO's, and to organize a school in TRUST early in 1953 providing approximately 35 hours of instruction, in order to train the remainder of the unit personnel.

9. Gas masks for all individuals have been issued to units, but, except for a pool of masks sufficient to equip one battalion, the masks are stored in unit supply rooms in their original tin containers, unopened. Up to date, no CBR play has been included in field exercises. Individuals queried regarding their actions in case of CBR attack indicated varying degrees of proficiency. Some exhibited a satisfactory knowledge of the subject, and others apparently had had no contact with the subject since basic training. Since none of the command or staff personnel appeared to have a comprehensive idea of the exact status of CBR training in the troop units, it was suggested that systematic tests be made along the lines of the tests

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SECURITY INFORMATION

that had recently been carried out in the continental United States. Copies of the testing procedure were furnished the training personnel of G3 Headquarters, TRUST.

10. A period of scheduled instruction of the lecture-conference type on the subject of defense against atomic attack was observed and rated superior.

IV. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY.

11. The command was equipped with substitute standard gas masks (M-4). None of the standard (M9A1) masks had been received.

12. No T/O&E equipment or basic load shortages were reported.

13. Chemical equipment and supplies were being handled in an excellent manner by the Ordnance Corps personnel.

14. No chemical repair or maintenance facilities were available in Trieste. Unserviceable items for repair are shipped to USAREUR.

15. Portable flame throwers were on hand with which a limited amount of training had been carried on.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

16. The general CBR directive and plans for training are adequate, but more emphasis should be placed on the implementation of the program and careful follow-up measures should be instituted including tests to determine the status of training.

17. The addition of a Chemical Section to Headquarters, TRUST, would be highly advantageous, particularly from an operational and training standpoint.

Over
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18. To be in a proper state of readiness, gas masks should be assigned and fitted to the individual, and be accessible for use in training.

19. The status of training and operational readiness from a CBR standpoint cannot be rated higher than satisfactory.

VI. RECOMMENDATION.

20. It is recommended that TRUST implement effectively existing CBR plans, directives, and training programs.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRUST, NOVEMBER 1952

PERSONNEL

I. GENERAL.

1. a. The inspection of Trieste United States Troops included GI and SI activities, as well as individual units of the command. The personnel policies and procedures devised by the command are considered excellent.

b. Morale, discipline, and appearance of the troops are superior.

II. PERSONNEL PROCESSING.

2. Replacements arriving in the theater are temporarily housed at one of the Casermas. There the necessary processing and unit assignments are effected.

3. Records of replacements are generally inaccurate and incomplete.

4. Tentative assignments to units are made by a TRUST classification and assignment team, which boards incoming ships at an African or Italian port prior to arrival at Trieste.

5. The lack of required numbers of branch-trained personnel, principally in engineer and armor, necessitates the assignment of infantry-trained replacements to units of the aforementioned branches.

6. School trained specialists are being properly assigned.

Over

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SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

7. The command avails itself of the USAREUR school system to augment its requirement for school-trained personnel not available in sufficient numbers from the CONUS training base.

III. STRENGTH STATUS.

8. TRUST units are slightly overstrength in officers, and twenty-three (23) understrength in enlisted personnel. However, based upon Department of the Army allocations during the next several months, the command estimates that there will be a shortage of approximately 400-500 enlisted personnel by January 1953. If such a condition materializes, the effectiveness of the command (limited to a total strength of 5000) will be reduced accordingly.

9. There is a serious shortage of noncommissioned officers, a result of the restrictive policy contained in DA Circular No 73, 1952. Total shortages by grade are as follows: E7, 65; E6, 172; E5, 454; E4, 627; E3, 285. There is accordingly a large overage in the number of personnel in grades E2 and E1. This situation has an adverse effect on morale, discipline, and unit effectiveness.

10. Action has been taken by the command to activate, within the present personnel strength ceiling, a medium field artillery battery.

11. There is a serious shortage of medical officers in the command. This situation is aggravated by the fact that, in some cases, such officers return to the continental United States before replacements arrive in the theater.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12. a. There is a shortage of MOS's as follows:

3322 Refrigeration Specialist
1383 Fire Fighter
1805 Cryptographic Specialist
1766 High Speed Radio Operator
1581 Signal Supply Specialist

b. The last three MOS's represent a critical shortage, in the higher grades, in the 508th Signal Company. Referring to MOS 1766, there is a definite requirement for one sergeant, high speed radio operator; and one sergeant, radio-teletype instructor.

IV. CONCLUSIONS.

13. According to present forecasts, the number of replacements to be supplied by the Department of the Army in the next six months may not equal the losses. A small command should not be allowed to fall below authorized strength.

14. The number of personnel with six months or less service remaining received in the command during the past year seriously affects the continuity of operations.

15. The limited number of enlisted promotion allocations has an adverse effect on the morale and discipline in units.

16. There is a critical shortage of personnel possessing the following MOS's: 3322, 1383, 1805, 1766, and 1581.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS. - It is recommended that Department of the Army:

17. Allocate sufficient number of replacement personnel to maintain the command at authorized strength.
18. Take action to insure that records of replacements are complete and accurate prior to oversea shipment.
19. Consider the advisability of increasing to twelve months or more the service remaining requirement for oversea shipment, when the recent larger inputs into the Army become available for assignment.
20. Consider the possibility of reducing the "service in higher position in recommending unit" requirement, as stipulated by DA Circular No 73, with a view to permitting TRUST to promote personnel otherwise qualified, thereby alleviating the serious shortage of noncommissioned officers.
21. Transfer sufficient medical officers to TRUST to meet existing requirements.
22. Provide TRUST with the higher graded enlisted personnel fully qualified in the MOS listed in paragraph 12 above.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS - NOVEMBER 1952

INTELLIGENCE

I. GENERAL.

1. Intelligence in TRUST is receiving excellent command emphasis in performing its occupational, strategic mission and in preparation for its efficient performance in a combat situation. Within the past six months the following actions have been completed to improve intelligence training:

a. A school program has been established to train members of the G2 Section.

b. A thirty (30) hour training program has been established to train unit intelligence personnel in their duties.

c. A training officer has been added to the G2 Section.

d. The S2's of the tactical units have been relieved of many of their additional duties and are now devoting about seventy-five per cent of their efforts to their intelligence functions.

2. The observed intelligence actions and policies at TRUST actively implement the Department of the Army letter, 1 July 1952, subject: "Combat Intelligence Deficiencies."

II. ORGANIZATION.

3. Intelligence specialists, i.e., interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle personnel, etc, are assigned to the headquarters and not organized into an MIS organization. Recently an administration section has been established to handle the administration of the American

Over

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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personnel working in the Interrogation Center. Although this system of having these personnel assigned directly to Headquarters, TRUST, probably allows the G2 closer direction and greater flexibility in handling their activities, he is losing some of the advantages that could accrue through their being assigned to a T/O&E MIS organization; such as:

- a. Being able to requisition replacements and authorized equipment on a T/O&E basis.
- b. Being assured of receiving trained MIS specialist replacements qualified to perform their MOS functions.
- c. Having a firm organizational basis on which to plan an augmentation for a combat situation.
- d. Relief from detailed direction of their activities through mission directives to the commander.
- e. Relief of administrative and supply responsibility for such personnel.

4. The 17th CIC Detachment is organized and functioning to perform its occupational and tactical missions. No changes in T/O&E 30-500 were recommended.

5. The officers contacted strongly recommended that the T/O&E's for divisions be changed to include a G2 air officer. OCAFF is presently studying the addition of G2 air officers to the T/O&E of divisions and infantry and airborne regiments.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

III. TRAINING.

6. An aggressive intelligence training program is being conducted within all units in the command. In addition, 351st Infantry is conducting a thirty (30) hour training program for intelligence personnel. This program will cover all intelligence functions and should form a firm basis for further on-the-job training of its students.

7. Training is being conducted on recognition of Soviet and satellite forces. A request has been sent to Seventh Army for the use of the Seventh Army indoctrination team. Instruction in the recognition and use of Soviet weapons and equipment is hampered by the lack of such equipment.

8. The TRUST quota for the USAREUR Intelligence School is always filled but is too small to furnish the required intelligence trained personnel. American officers serving in TRUST are being sent to British Intelligence Schools in England whenever possible.

9. CIC has established a very comprehensive unit training program covering all facets of combat intelligence and counterintelligence, this instruction being conducted during duty hours.

10. Aggressor is being used in all maneuvers and field exercises by both the American and British troops in TRUST. It is believed that the command had sufficient Aggressor uniforms and equipment and a survey of the Aggressor equipment status was being made at the time of the inspection.

11. Instruction was being conducted in first phase of Escape & Evasion training. It is contemplated that when this first phase training

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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is completed, practical instruction would be incorporated in field exercises upon receipt of authority from Department of the Army to conduct such training.

IV. OPERATIONAL READINESS.

12. Intelligence in TRUST is in a state of combat readiness. A separate intelligence communications net has been established which includes the Commanding General, TRUST, down to reconnaissance company. Experience during field exercises indicates that this net operates rapidly and efficiently.

13. A British - American interrogation center is in continuous operation. This center is prepared at all times to conduct operations in a combat situation, and to furnish interrogation services to troop units.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

14. Intelligence in TRUST is receiving excellent command emphasis.

15. A vigorous intelligence training program is being pushed throughout the command.

16. Advantages should accrue to TRUST by the assignment of a MIS T/O&E Organization.

17. The 17th CIC Detachment is organized and functioning to perform its mission.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.

18. It is recommended that the Commanding General, TRUST, consider the advisability of requesting a MIS T/O&E Organization.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION

TRUST, NOVEMBER 1952

AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS

I. GENERAL.

1. The subject of tactical air support to Trieste United States Troops is of particular concern due to the limited troop basis and the importance of the mission of the command. At the present time there is no provision for artillery support in TRUST. However, a medium battery will be organized as soon as personnel becomes available. Although naval gunfire is expected to be available from two destroyers and one cruiser, this fire support is limited to a considerable extent in quantity, range, and ammunition supply. There are no US Air Force units located near or capable of supporting ground forces in Trieste, at the present time. However, the favorable cognizance of the air support requirements by the US Sixth Fleet offers an adequate solution to this problem.

II. COMMAND STRUCTURE AND JOINT RELATIONS.

2. A permanent naval liaison group is established in Trieste and works closely with Headquarters, TRUST, in planning for and training in close air support matters. One Air Force liaison officer is assigned to Headquarters, TRUST.

3. The US Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, has two aircraft carriers, each carrying 95 to 105 aircraft (F-2H, F-4U, AD-6, and similar type) all capable of close support roles in support of Trieste forces and

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USFA. These carriers will be based 200-400 airline miles from the target area.

III. ORGANIZATION.

4. A tactical target list has been completed by Headquarters, TRUST; however, joint planning is hampered by lack of a definitely assigned supporting service. Present plans for tactical air support were worked out jointly between TRUST and the Sixth Fleet in 1950. The current command structure of Allied Forces Southern Europe, as pertains to tactical air support available from Sixth Fleet, needs clarification in order that joint planning may be continuous.

5. Due to the limited troop basis, no T/O&E or T/D ground organization for air support has been organized. Expedient measures have been taken to provide air request and control facilities. Personnel of the G2 and G3 Sections of Headquarters, TRUST, have been designated as G2 air and G3 air. Tactical air control parties (TACP's) from Army overhead personnel (PX warehouse personnel, etc) have been organized and trained. These TACP's have been trained to direct both naval gunfire and air support aircraft.

6. A control echelon to function at Headquarters, TRUST, as a combination fire support co-ordination center and tactical air direction center has been organized using Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. An air request net within TRUST has been provided as well as an air request net between TRUST and its supporting air. Army light aircraft and an Air Force AT-6 are available for use in a "Mosquito" role.

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7. No provisions have been made for naval navigational aids, i.e., beacons, etc, to insure that naval aircraft will arrive in the target area in the event of intervening inclement weather. Nor have provisions been made for radar-controlled close air support bombardment.

8. No provisions have been made for obtaining aerial intelligence from pilots, nor for aerial photo reconnaissance including Army photo interpreters, engineer aerial photo reproduction facilities, and photo distribution facilities.

9. No usable basic reconnaissance cover has been provided.

10. No provisions have been made for air defense.

IV. TRAINING.

11. A recent maneuver conducted by TRUST was effectively supported by the Sixth Fleet, affording commanders and staff officers an opportunity to become thoroughly indoctrinated with the capabilities and limitations of tactical air.

12. Current air support doctrine was being utilized to the extent practicable.

13. Operational plans do not include a specific amount of air support for TRUST.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

14. United States Army in Trieste and the Sixth Fleet, through mutual co-operation, have provided for a satisfactory degree of close air support in their plans. However, progress in planning is hampered by the uncertainty of the service responsibility for providing air support to TRUST.

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15. The requirements of TRUST would be best satisfied if the Sixth Fleet were definitely assigned, through appropriate channels, the mission of providing TRUST with tactical air support. Such an arrangement would permit continuity of planning and would insure for TRUST tactical support required.

16. There is a need for at least three (Army) tactical air control parties on a full-time basis in order that one TACP can be assigned to each infantry battalion.

17. There is a need for at least one (Navy) tactical air control party in Trieste on a semipermanent or permanent basis.

18. There is a need for naval navigational aids such as beacons, etc, in Trieste to insure that naval aircraft will arrive in the target area in the event of intervening inclement weather, as well as for radar control of close air support bombardment.

19. There is a need for aerial photo reconnaissance, for basic cover; and for some means of obtaining aerial intelligence from pilots.

20. There is a need for ground-to-air radio sets (AN/TRC-7) authorized by current T/O&E's for infantry battalions and regiments, K-20 cameras for use in army light aircraft, and for a mobile darkroom (AN/TFQ-7) currently authorized to division signal companies.

21. There is a need for the preparation of air support plans at regimental and battalion level.

22. Air support should be included in the operational plans and provide a specific amount of air support for TRUST.

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.

23. It is recommended that Department of the Army:

a. Explore the feasibility of having the Sixth Fleet assigned, through appropriate channels, the mission of providing tactical air support to TRUST.

b. Request the Chief of Naval Operations to:

(1) Station in Trieste personnel and equipment required to provide aircraft navigational aids and a minimum of one Marine tactical air control party.

(2) Have Naval or Marine reconnaissance support made available to TRUST.

(3) Make provisions for radar control of close air support bombardment.

24. It is recommended that TRUST:

a. Give consideration to making available, within their troop basis, a minimum of three officers and six enlisted spaces in order that Army tactical air control parties can be assigned to infantry battalions on a full-time basis.

b. Initiate action to obtain ground-to-air radio sets (AN/TRC-7), K-20 type cameras, and mobile darkroom (AN/TFQ-7) for use by the division type signal company in conjunction with photographs taken from light aircraft.

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