Lessons Learned from Oversight of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Efforts in Afghanistan
Abstract
I am pleased to be here today to discuss oversight of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Since 2002, USAID has obligated over $18 billion to help rebuild Afghanistan through a wide range of projects and programs in areas such as healthcare, education, and agriculture, among others. This effort has been unprecedented in its cost and scope. It has also provided a unique opportunity to examine the challenges of undertaking a large-scale reconstruction initiative in an environment like Afghanistan. Since the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)was established in 2008, it has developed a large body of work focused on USAIDs efforts in Afghanistan. This work has involved every facet of SIGARs organization and has been communicated through almost 50 audit and inspection reports, 22 quarterly reports to Congress, and other special publications. Taken individually, these reports provide specific examples of how various USAID projects were planned, implemented, and overseen. They also highlight concrete instances of waste, fraud, and abuse, where it has occurred. Taken as a whole, however, these reports reveal broader lessons about what has worked and what has notlessons that can be used to inform future contingency operations and, to the extent possible, to strengthen and improve the U.S. governments continued efforts in Afghanistan throughout the Transformation Decade and beyond. In my testimony today, I discuss four of those lessons.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2014
- Accession Number
- AD1140351
Entities
People
- John Sopko
Organizations
- Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction