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RUSSIA IN ASIA

Lecture delivered Friday, 3 November 1939


by

Professor Bruce C. Hopper

at the

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

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RUSSIA IN ASIA

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RUSSIA IN ASIA

To carry over from West to East in Bolshevik affairs is today more difficult than in former years. It is not only because of the territorial changes, but because of the unpredictable effect of Stalin's unexpected victory in the West.

Unexpected victories work havoc with appraisals made through use of logic. I have no doubt that the unexpected victory in September-October, 1918, caused the Allies to lose their sense of balance. That is, they expected, and were prepared, to fight for another year. The Americans were geared to take the brunt of the expected offensive in the spring of '19'. But when the German army folded up before us, largely because of the High Command, the Allies screwed up the armistice terms to a severity far beyond Wilson's Fourteen Points, or even the Agreement with Germany of November 5, 1918. And in the sequel they, especially, France, decided to make a punitive non-negotiated peace, which was not in their minds in August, 1918. Hence the Versailles Treaty. I ascribe that to unexpected victory.

Likewise, Hitler had a number of unexpected victories beginning with conscription in 1935, and the march into the Rheinland in 1936, after which he developed his bloodless conquest technique to the point where he listened only to his

"Voices", and lost touch with reality, such as the British Navy. It's true, he expected Britain to fight this time. But, in his case, the unexpected victory psychosis had ripened into the psychosis of dead certainty of victory.

With Stalin, it is different. He has been brooding in the Kremlin, scarcely going outside the walls, for 12 years, since the expulsion of Trotsky. That is partly his seclusive temperament, partly because of fear of assassination. In any case, he has waited a long time for the war in Western Europe. He expected to reap advantage, but never could he have hoped, realistically, for the gift from Hitler of Eastern Poland, the Eastern Baltic, and the ace cards in the deck of the ancient game of Balance of Power. That was quite unexpected. What it will do to Stalin, we don't know; his play of the cards will determine the changes in Russia's position in Asia.

I. New Factor: Russia's Involvement in the West.

1. Molotov's Speech, October 31, 1939

Molotov's speech before the Supreme Council, October 31, was a masterpiece of Bolshevnik cleverness, with an underlying cynicism which betrays the Bolshevnik contempt for Britain and France after they scuttled collective security at Munich.

Leaving aside Molotov's many contradictions, internal to the speech, we hear Molotov imply that Russia intends to make Finland a protectorate (without seizing the Aaland Islands). Strategically the Bolsheviki are justified. The Finns should not have built ten times more air fields than required for their own air force. The obvious deduction was that the air fields were designed for a Nazi assault on Leningrad, only an hour or so away.

We hear him also sigh over the sad perverseness of the Turks in refusing to close the Straits, and for making a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France.

For the Russian relations with Germany we get no key from Molotov, except the obvious statement that Russia will give Germany practical aid, but will remain neutral. The British press seems to regard these words as a rebuff to Hitler. I wonder.

2. Russia's Aid for More Political Expediency.

Last time we noted Russia's capacity to aid Germany, involving the supply of fodder, fats, and oil; the difficulty of transport; the factor of reorganization of Russian industry and railroads by German engineers, etc. Over all these questions hangs the larger variable of the type of war, siege, or Blitz war, and the length of the war. German engineers could perform miracles in Russia, given two years time, and

the abundance of cooperation which would ensue if the Bolshoviks really wanted them to get on with the job.

I would add the factor of Russia's willingness to supply Germany. Under conditions of more political expediency, Russia is willing to supply Germany for a quid pro quo in machinery and aviation and naval instruments because the present line-up gives Russia the balance of power in Europe. Russia's Drang Nach Westen has arrested Germany's Drang Nach Osten, and has set the stage for Sovietization of the Baltic states and part of the Balkans. This redivision of Eastern Europe may be the limit of Stalin's westward moves (I mean after Finland and Bessarabia are dealt with) provided he is content to play the game of Balance of Power.

3. Effect on Bolshovik Eastern Policy.

However, when we think in terms of Bolshovik Eastern Policy, the deal of August 23, to keep Russia a neutral supply, may be but the prelude to a still closer arrangement with the Nazis, even to the point of military partnership to smash the British and French Empires. That is, if Russia finds it too difficult to hold the balance of power in both West and East, on two continents, then will the Nazi-Bolshovik Entente flop over into a military alliance?

II. Bolshovik General Policies in the East.

To get at the root of this question we should note the fundamental Bolshovik Eastern policies in past years, in

order to ask if these are to be changed.

1. Lenin on Imperialism

In Lenin's analysis the East is the weak link of capitalism; imperialism is dying capitalism. Therefore, said Lenin, the Russian revolution must attack capitalism through the East, by uniting the native nationalism of Asia with the proletarian revolution of Europe.

2. Technique of Winning the East.

From the beginning the Bolshevik technique of winning the East has been to aid all Asiatic peoples in their efforts to shake loose from Western imperialism, to aid all natives to throw off the foreigners, and in a later stage to aid the native mass to throw off their landlords and bourgeoisie.

To that end the Bolsheviks renounced all the unequal treaties imposed on Asiatic peoples, all the debts owed to the Tsarist government, and fraternized with the natives on a basis of revolutionary comradeship.

In the active sense, the Bolsheviks aided many Asiatic peoples in their liberation, assured them of self-determination and cultural autonomy if they cared to join the Soviet Union, and in general adopted an attitude of tutelage.

On the economic side they offered industrialization, special privileges under the Foreign Trade Monopoly, and a supply of cheap goods, as well as educational and health facilities.

Inside the Union they have built a huge industrial plant, especially in the West Siberian section, which acts as a magnet to the kindred peoples over the border. They set up model Soviet Republics for the natives along the border to teach modernization by example. Fortunately for them Siberia proved to be the richest mineral domain of the earth which has thus far escaped exploitation. Students of the Soviet system have maintained that this storehouse of natural wealth insured the world against the Bolsheviki ever going Napoleonic for conquests over the frontier. The events in Poland and the Baltic do not exactly belie that assumption, as Stalin's moves thus far are justified on the grounds of defense strategy.

And so we have assumed that regardless of what happens in Europe the Bolsheviki are building their strength deep in the heart of the Eurasian continent, remote from the ocean and air bombers, and thus a citadel for Sovietization of all Asia.

It is only now that I begin to wonder if Stalin's unexpected victory in the West may have caused him to modify these long range objectives, again to split the flow of revolutionary energy between West and East, as was true of the early years.

III. Bolshevik Relations with Asiatic States.

This is a huge question: Russia is both West and East, geographically, but can Russia be both West and East politically, diplomatically, etc. with full horsepower?

We can approach an answer by noting Russia's relations with the various Asiatic states:

1. Turkey

The Bolsheviks helped Turkey throw out the Greeks, to gain independence, and to nullify the Treaty of Sevres. The Russians were the champions of New Turkey at the Lausanne Conference, 1924, which gave Turkey a new deal in the form of a more favorable treaty. And later, 1936, Litvinov led the way in revising the prohibition against fortifying the Straits, thus the Montreux Convention, by which Turkey regained full status as a sovereign power.

Besides such military and diplomatic assistance the Soviet government has, over the years, given Turkey considerable technical assistance for industries, supplies on credit, etc. We might say there is every reason to believe the Turks and the Bolsheviks will seek to avoid offending each other, with such a solid background for friendship.

2. Iran

With Iran, (or Persia), the relations have not been so cordial. The Bolshevik renunciation of privileges in Persia, and their first treaty of 1921, were instrumental in

nullifying the celebrated "Egyptization" treaty which Lord Curzon imposed on Persia in 1919, and paved the way for the action of Shah Riza Khan (1928) in abrogating the capitulations and fixed five percent customs duties which the Western powers had fixed on Persia one hundred years before (1828, Treaty of Turkmanchai).

Nevertheless, the Persians have always feared Russia. The Shah built his railway through uneconomical territory in order to avoid a terminal too close to Soviet territory. The economic objective of that railway from the Caspian to the Gulf is to break the dependence of Northern Persia on the Soviet market.

Persia remains the land Suez for Russia to reach warm water from the inland industrial empire of Siberia, and is therefore forced, in self-protection to keep the Russian and the British pressures counter-acting each other without grinding Persia down again between the grindstones.

3. Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Bolsheviks are up against the mullahs, since the abortive reforms of Amanullah.

4. India

In India there has been an active and violent Communist party, but Bolshevik aid has been limited to training of agitators in Moscow. If the potential revolution flares out, at the end of this war, we may expect the Bolsheviks to

aid the masses, after the British have been put out by the middle class. The Bolsheviks have waited a long time for India to get ripe.

(A Nazi-Bolshevik tie-up, of course, could be directed Eastward to attack Britain through India, raiding the Iraq and Persian oil fields on the way).

5. Nomadlands; Soviet Preserve; Client States

In the Nomadlands of Old China we get into the Soviet preserve, the client, native republics nursed over the years, and definitely attached to Moscow.

Outer Mongolia owes its separation from China to the Bolsheviks, and adopted a soviet form of government. Its experiments with Marxism were only partially successful, however, and it is now in what is called a period of "non-capitalist development". Meanwhile, Outer Mongolia, with a Soviet-trained army, and Soviet supplies, education, etc. is the main example of Soviet tutelage over backward peoples.

By the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1936, Outer Mongolia has become a military outpost of the Soviet Union, so that it is no longer feasible to distinguish between the Outer Mongols and the Buriat Mongols inside the Soviet Union. In my view the Mongol people will one day be united - Buriats, Outer Mongols, and Inner Mongols now under the domination of Japan, all in one Soviet republic.

The two other areas, Sinkiang and Tannu Tuva, especially Sinkiang, are important for the moment mostly as highways to Western China. They belong lock, stock and barrel to Soviet Russia, and will continue so.

The Nomadlands are the key to Bolshevnik strategy in the triangle of Russia, Japan, and China. These regions cannot stand alone. No other power can get at them, not even Japan. For a show-down in the Far East, the Bolcheviks have a fairly solid backlog of support, built up over the years. What generosity the Bolshevniks have they lavish on the various racial groups along their Asiatic frontier.

6. China

A. Russia and Kuomintang

Russia's relations with China must always be viewed in terms of long range objective. The Bolshevniks intend to reach eventually the two mass blocs, India and China. Their first attempt to guide the Chinese revolution ended in the expulsion of Bolshevnik advisers in 1927, from which Stalin has not recovered. Moscow does not trust the Kuomintang, which is associated with the Soong dynasty of Chinese capitalists. Nevertheless, the Russians would rather aid the Kuomintang than see China conquered by Japan. Accordingly, they have sanctioned the United Front of Chinese Communists with Chiang Kai Shek, hoping that, in due course, the Kuomintang and Japan

will exhaust each other, leaving the field to the Communists who will nationalize the land and put new China on the right road for modernization. Hence the Russian non-Aggression Treaty of 1937 with the Kuomintang, which amounts to a paper assurance of non-interference for the course of the war.

B. Strategy of the War

As Walter Mallory ably points out, Chiang Kai Shek has followed a consistent strategy of defense:

1. To force the Japanese to extend their action as widely as possible.
2. To make Japanese progress as costly as possible.
3. To withhold the fruits of victory (the "scorched earth" policy)
4. To seek foreign aid, when comes a more favorable constellation of the powers.

Chiang Kai Shek thus planned for three stages:

1. Defensive, until the Japanese are completely extended.
2. Guerilla fighting to harass the Japanese lines of communication
3. The counter-offensive

Optimists would say that, since the successful Chinese counter-offensive from Changsha in early October, the

plan of defense had entered the third stage.

We get fresh news, now and then, of the new roads through China's back doors. The Burma road, 716 miles from Kunming to Lashio, is complete, and is evidently a feat of engineering. Its value will be lessened during the rains. Three-fourths of the traffic is by coolie and mule, pulling some 10,000 two wheeled carts with rubber tires. This coolie drawn traffic is an ingenious solution of the mountain difficulty because of the vast number of carts, and the fact that munitions are not perishable.

The Burma-Yunnan railway, which parallels the highway, will take two more years to complete. The Chungking-chongtu railway seems to be well underway.

The Northern Highway is complete except for 12 miles over the pass into Szechuen. The southern network is evidently the object of wonder even for foreigners.

C. Present Situation

The spirits are again high in China. As Dr. Hu Shih says, the Chinese have been through Valley Forge, and are now looking forward to Yorktown.

There is some danger of a clash between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The United Front has now lasted for two years -- a long time.

There is also, I suppose, danger that Wang Ching-wei will be able to set up some sort of puppet government. It's interesting that he calls his group the Orthodox Kuomintang, and claims the mantle of Sun Yat-sen. How much following he can get, even in occupied China, is very questionable.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai Shek's government still has foreign assets of about 100 million dollars gold, even though the Chinese dollar has fallen to eight American cents.

D. Future Russian Aid

As to future Russian aid, we can believe that Stalin doesn't want the war in China to stop, any more than he wants the war in Europe to finish with a love feast between Britain and Germany.

Japanese reports have it that the four northwestern provinces of China are being Sovietized. If true, that would indicate that the Dolshoviks are getting ready to take a hand, to supply Chinese Communists with greater facilities. There might arrive a situation in which the Chinese Communists of the North are better equipped than the Kuomintang troops. Moscow has made three barter-loan agreements with the Kuomintang since the war started, the last one, in August, 1939, calling for the delivery to China of goods valued at \$140 million gold. Soviet airplanes, delivered under this contract, took part in the fighting north of Changsha last month.

Since the armistice on the Mongol border, large numbers of Soviet troops are reported as moving into China via Sinkiang, along with guns and airplanes and five hundred technicians.

7. Japan

The outbreak of war in Europe reminds us that Japan is not in such a favorable position as in 1914 to scoop up the loot, or even any extensive war profits. The fact is, Japan has suffered very striking reverses in 1939.

A. Japan's Reverses, 1939

The general story is that the Japanese army extremists were trying to convert the Anti-Communism Pact, 1936, with Germany, into a military alliance, especially after Mussolini signed on the dotted line for Hitler last May.

They were balked by the more cautious members of the Cabinet. Consequently, they resorted to military action in the field, hoping that by precipitating hostilities with Russia and forcing the hand of Britain, they would force the Cabinet into an alliance with Germany. Taking these reverses in order:

1) On the Mongol Border

The Japanese army opened the fireworks on the Mongol border on May 20, the very day the extremist plan for alliance with Germany was rejected in Tokyo. Through the summer

we received astonishing reports of the number of airplanes shot down. In the end, the Japanese admitted 18,000 casualties. The Armistice of September 15 has stopped the fighting, while both sides exchange and bury their dead.

That border fighting is always curious. It turns on and off, without ever aspiring to the dignity of a war. At one time they were fighting over the Buir Nor, which used to be full of fish, until the river changed its course.

This time they were fighting over the right bank of the Khalka river, which is the true, natural boundary. But Mongols have grazed their flocks on both sides of the Khalka since immemorial times. It seems that the Outer Mongols had crossed to the right bank to a favorite rendezvous of Mongols, as they have always done. Suddenly, the Japanese army declared that to be an act of aggression, on May 20.

Both sides will be at it again. I don't think they will have a boundary commission. The sport must go on.

2) Tientsin

Now, the first effort of the Japanese army to force the hand of the foreigners was the Amoy affair, when the American, British, and French navies moved into action.

Next, they tried it out on the International Settlement, Shanghai; their demands for revision of the regulations were refused by both Britain and United States in May.

So, there was one thing left, to harry the British alone at Tientsin, where America has no jurisdiction. That affair makes strange reading with the electric barricade, and floods, to complicate the scene.

The British did consent to hand over the four Chinese suspected of murder, but on August 18, the British rejected the Japanese demands in regard to currency and a new order in North China. Britain said it was a matter for multi-partite consideration.

3) United States Denunciation of 1911 Treaty

Some credit for strengthening the British hand must be given to America's denunciation of the 1911 Trade Treaty, which therefore expires January 31, 1940.

4) Nazi-Bolshevik Pact, August 23, 1939

The hardest blow of all was, of course, the Nazi-Bolshevik pact of August 23, by which Hitler handed the Bolsheviks back to Japan as a special problem of Dai Nippon.

5) Chinese Military Victory

With all these defeats for the scheme of forcing the Cabinet into an alliance with Germany, crowned by the Nazi bolt to the Bolshevik enemy, the Japanese army was driven back on a military diversion, and so undertook the offensive toward Changsha, from which it retreated in a disorder that indicated an important Chinese military victory.

Add up all these items, and consider that the Japanese were unable to cut the Canton-Hankow railway in the middle; unable to capture the western section of the Lunghai railway; unable to mop up the guerillas; unable to put Wang Ching-wei on a seat not too hot for him, -- and we get a picture of Japanese reverse which can be only a prelude to general retrenchment.

B. Japan's Retrenchment

The first shift is in the Cabinet. General Abe, Prime Minister, and General Hata, War Minister, represent moderate elements in the army. Abe has announced his intention of carrying through the program in China. We are free to wonder how.

The Japanese must, perforce, sit on the fence in regard to the European war. After the loss of face in the Nazi double cross (in re. anti-Communism) the Japanese are not likely to trust any nation for some time to come.

They must regain Britain's confidence. My own view is that they will try to resume the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

They must also regain American confidence. The government in Tokyo is considerably alarmed by the effect of Ambassador Grew's plain talk. We may expect they will offer, before January 31, 1940, to discuss many things besides trade with Washington.

This may be the moment that students of Japan have often mentioned, the moment when the moderate elements will begin to return to power. The Navy has united with civilians against the Army. The threat in the north is very obviously that the Bolsheviki will snipe off Northern Manchuria, their old short-cut to Vladivostok.

There is the danger, of course, that if Russia gives military aid to Germany then the Allies will appease Japan, (at the expense of China) and attempt to use Japan against the Bolsheviki.

IV. Potential Effect of the Nazi-Bolshevik Cooperation on the East.

Now, in this skeleton of facts and relationships we must fit the present Nazi-Bolshevik cooperation, and ask to what end it might lead.

1. If More Political Expediency?

The first set of speculations would rest on the assumption that Stalin views the compact as one of mere political expediency by which, without rendering military support to Germany, he wields the balance of power in European politics, with a ringside seat at every important conference.

So long as the stalemate continues in the West, Russia rolls up a higher coefficient of power on balance, relative to the Western powers. If the stalemate goes on for two years, Russia will have her industries reorganized by German engineers, her railroads put in order, and will gradually increase in efficiency, without risking the passive peasant re-

sistance which becomes an immediate danger if Russia goes to war.

One must admit, that after these lean years, the years of purging the ranks of talent, such a prospect is what might be called delectable to the Kremlin.

However, a military reverse for either side in the West might upset that calculation. As the new balancer Stalin cannot wish for either Germany or the Allies to conquer the other. His bill of fare calls for exhaustion of all, so that the Soviet system will be salvaged from the catastrophe of the purge.

Another variable is the psychosis of unexpected victory. We have no idea how this affects the cold blooded master of Russia. We do know Stalin can wait, as Russia is in a state of permanent mobilization, war or no war.

So, I am going to propose a second set of speculations:

2. If the Nazi-Bolshevik Entente Evolves into
Military Partnership?

True, Molotov did not mention it; but he wouldn't.

A. Economic Propulsion

The economic propulsions toward such a partnership are very strong. The two totalitarian regimes are geared to the barter system; they both have managed currencies; they both have the equivalent of a Foreign Trade Monopoly.

Such an economic partnership would mean the marriage of German technique and surplus of skill with Russian space and natural resources. The Russians have an innate admiration for German gifts of organization. A parallel relationship was that between Britain and America in the 19th century, when British brains and capital developed our internal frontier.

A working exchange, on the basis of comparative advantage, would warrant the Russians delivering war supplies on credit against a long term pledge of technical assistance from Germany. That is, so long as Germany would be doing the military job for the team.

If such an economic partnership could evolve, without the military pattern, it might prove to be the salvation of Europe. It would certainly change the economic climate of Europe if the Germans could apply their energy to the development of Eurasia.

Given the temper of the world, however, it is not realistic to talk of such a partnership except in military terms.

B. Evidence of Collusion since August, 1939

The historical cooperation of Russia and Germany was broken by the Kaiser, 1890 and again, temporarily, by Hitler in 1933.

Since the two regimes performed their platonic marriage in August, there has been considerable evidence of collu-

sion, e.g., in the timing of the announcement of their pact; in their partition of Poland, involving prearranged movements of troops; in the Russian occupation of the Baltic which is being evacuated even by German families of five centuries domicile; by Russia's refusal to pledge neutrality at Turkey's request, etc. Collusion in the Balkans is not yet evident, but it is a long time till Christmas at the rate politics now move.

C. Dynamics of a Partnership

Viewing the potential partnership from the angle of dynamics, we see that it would fit nicely into the Bolshevik plan of World Revolution, of smashing the states system so that there will be only international class lines; of Sovietizing the revolutionary areas, even to the point of putting the German National Socialist revolution on the Bolshevik rails.

Both regimes have common cause in their drive against Christianity (the creeping morass of materialism), and against the old regime of sea power, gold, interest rates, etc. Both also look with favor upon the prospect of redivision of the earth, of smashing the British and French Empires, and reintegrating the map in the form of a revolutionary federation of totalitarian regimes, in which state sovereignty will have given way to the myth of the Führer Prinzip.

Events of the last two months indicate that those of us who talked this way, even two years ago, were not so wrong as others who took the Nazi-Bolshevik radio war seriously.

After reading Molotov's speech, Portinax, whom I greatly respect, cabled from Paris that Stalin would quit the Nazis as soon as the profits from the transaction are exhausted. I admit that. What I do not admit is that the profits will be exhausted in Europe. There is still Asia.

Germany can hold the Westwall during the winter and still spare enough divisions and airplanes to take a flier with the Red Army down through Persia and Iraq, scooping up oil for their motors, and threatening India via the Gulf. Given the control of foreigners by the G.P.U., and government censorship of the telegraph, such a dash could be carried out with fairly close secrecy as far as the Persian frontier.

So again, what will Stalin want: balance of power in his hands, or world revolution? How does unexpected victory work on his nightly dreams?

D. Can (Will) Japan Cooperate?

Then, another question. Can, or will, Japan work in with such an alliance? Here again, we get quick answers. Walter Duranty seems to think Japan might do so. Walter Lippmann, another thinker I respect, writes that it is reasonably certain that Stalin has abandoned China to the Japanese, and that he can overcome Japanese suspicions of Russia by helping them conquer China, as he helped Hitler conquer Poland. Another card Stalin has with the Japanese is to insure them against the effects of a possible American embargo.

Lawrence Dennis seems to believe that Japan must join Stalin and Hitler because what Japan wants to do can not be done in the old fashioned British way, which the Japanese have imitated in the past; it can only be done by the new Hitler-Stalin formula, by playing their game in disregard of Britain, France and America.

Japan's dilemma may prove to be: whether to share North China with Russia in order to get loot from Britain and France in southeastern Asia; or to share with the Western democracies, allowing China to survive, meanwhile holding her position in the North, ready to square away against Russia if the going gets rough.

My own view is that the American Navy, by its sheer weight will eventually drive Japan to the side of Britain, even to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The whole question

is so fluid that we can only put the figures in column without attempting to add them up. In any case, it seems unlikely to me that Japan will become the sea arm for the Nazi-Bolshevik combine.

V. American Policy

Since the outbreak of the European war, America assumes a key role in the Far East. We become the free agent among the great powers. That would terrify our isolationists if they learned about it; they would, somehow, find more doors to shut.

I consider the first problem in American foreign policy to be this: we must try to figure out where the horsepower will be, not tomorrow, but in twenty years time. What will be the pattern of the Far East in twenty years? After all it is already forty years since John Hay proclaimed the Open Door Policy. With that in mind, I give my guess:

1. The New China

The horsepower will be in the new China. I believe China has passed the perelom (Russian for crisis in illness). The new China developing in the West is not going to have extra-territoriality or any other foreign impositions. There is natural wealth in that country. Most of the enterprizing talent has migrated there from the coast. As Japan becomes exhausted in the attrition; as Japan's artificial foundations are laid bare; as the Japanese people weary of heavy taxation for the costs of a war which yield no immediate economic relief, -- then the tide

must set in the opposite direction, with the Chinese recovering much, if not all, of the coastal plain.

You can believe that or not; I do. And that's why I don't want to see America withdraw from the Far East, not from the treaty ports, not from the Philippines.

In five years time our best customer in the Far East will not be Japan but New China, being industrialized in the interior, and working toward the coast, thus reversing the dictum of Admiral Mahan.

I say, stay in the Far East to keep that section of the earth geared to our system of trade, in event that Europe is forced to make the Carthaginian peace with Hitler and Stalin by going totalitarian in self-defense.

2. Discrepancy between Our Naval and Diplomatic Frontiers

I know there is a contrary view. The most able expression of that contrary view I heard from a naval officer. He pointed out that our naval and diplomatic frontiers coincide in the Atlantic, about 2,000 miles off shore.

But in the Pacific our naval frontier is 1,500 miles west of Pearl Harbor, whereas our diplomatic frontier is somewhere on the Yangtse. Therefore, he said, our naval arm must be lengthened to support the diplomatic arm, or the diplomatic arm must be pulled back to the limit set by the naval establishment. He, himself, was in favor of pulling back the diplomatic arm, as

our main interests are in South America.

With all respect, I take exception to that view. It is a perfectly sound thesis from a strictly naval point of view. The navy is in a position from which it might be called upon to do an impossible job.

But I would point out that world politics have ceased to have logic; treaties are no longer kept; debts are no longer paid. This is the Blitz era of transition in which the pace is not set by reasoning statesmen, but by irrational fanatic creatures who are guided by mystic Voices, the music of the spheres. Europe can never recover the bastion lost in Czechoslovakia. Nor would we, as a nation, recover from the disaster of deserting the Far Eastern scene when Britain and France are threatened in their right to exist as states.

We have a friend in China. And friends are getting scarce.

3. Strategic Factor of Russia in the Arctic

Then, there is the strategic factor of Russia in the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route, and the prospect of polar air routes, the increased value of ice and islands as landing fields, etc. all adding up to a requirement of self-interest that we hold what we have in order to face the brave new world, after this war, with strategic bases of our own in the television era of swift air transport.

4. May we Eventually Need a Strong Japan?

I also raise this question: may we not one day need a strong Japan with sea power to patrol the Pacific with us? By that I mean that as we once favored the rise of Japan, so we may again favor Japan if a newer and greater danger comes from the continent of Asia in the form of a German-Russian combine.

If Russia supplies Germany, and we supply Britain and France, and the war lasts several years, then, in time, we must be in the camp opposed to Russia. Already, since the war started, American-Russian relations have deteriorated. Again, it comes back to Stalin and his unexpected victories.

It may not make sense to hope for a strong China and a strong Japan at the same time. And yet, a chastened Japan, purged of militarism, and given trade opportunities by the West, would be a different Japan; all that is possible. In fact, it is probable, in ten years time.

VI. Conclusion.

I realize I have raised more questions than any one can answer. My justification is that we live in an era of enormous changes. We are living through the transition from the first to the second industrial revolution. We are passing from the coal and iron age to an age of electricity and aluminum. We are passing from inorganic or physical chemistry to organic chemistry; we can visualize an entirely new civilization based on new materials made from plants and fibres .. and age of plastics.

In this transition the struggle for power is a struggle

to set the pattern of the new age. The states system may go down with the crash. The states system has accentuated racial differentiation. Peace, on a world scale, can come only through a system that softens racial hatreds, whether by inter-marriage, or inter-mingling in commerce. At the same time, I don't want to live in a totalitarian world. That would merely mean big empires to replace the present states, and the empires would fight each other. Science will (willy-nilly) integrate world. By world trade (free world trade, with each area enjoying its comparative advantage), and by international division of labor, that integration could come gradually. That would be *lex economica*. The role of leading the way is handed to America by history and by geography. But America is not yet mentally mature. America still has the psychosis of the Thirteen Colonies, with the army at Valley Forge. Years must pass. But one day, when we have molted down our foreign born, when the great American race achieves an identity amongst peoples, this country with its preponderant economic power will have the wisdom to accept the responsibility of power and set the fashion in the free world trade, international division of labor, and thus, peace, - at the end of the transition.

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