Emergence of Collective Cooperation and Networks from Selfish-Trust and Selfish-Connections
Abstract
Emergence of collective cooperation in an inherently selfish society is a paradox that has preoccupied biologists, sociologists, and cognitive scientists alike for centuries. We propose a computational model and demonstrate through simulations how collective cooperation can emerge from selfish interests: the goal of improving each individuals own rewards. We also demonstrate how the same selfish interests lead to the dynamic emergence of a network of interconnected agents. Our model includes two simple mechanisms: Selfish-Trust (ST)and Selfish-Connection (SC). ST involves the possibility of relying on others in a society of agents when it is beneficial to the individual, and SC involves the possibility of connecting to other agents when those agents help improve the individuals own benefit. Our simulation results suggest that collective co- operation can emerge from ST and a complex dynamic net- work can emerge from ST and SC. The simulated data demonstrate an important property of many living organisms: patterns of temporal complexity, which are essential to transfer information among agents of any society of living beings.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 24, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1142747
Entities
People
- Cleotilde Gonzalez
- Korosh Mahmoodi
Organizations
- Carnegie Mellon University