


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EXTRACTS

FROM THE

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

COMMANDING UNITED STATES TROOPS IN CHINA,

ON

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA.

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EXTRACTS FROM MAJOR GENERAL CHAFFEE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *November 30, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith the following report:

1. Report on the Russian troops, by Maj. W. E. Craighill, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. V.
2. Report on the Japanese troops, by Maj. Charles H. Muir, Thirty-eighth Infantry, U. S. V.
3. Report on equipment, supplies, etc., of the foreign troops, by Maj. S. M. Mills, Sixth United States Artillery.
4. Report on the French troops, by Maj. W. E. Craighill, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. V.
5. Report on the German troops, by Lieut. Col. J. T. Dickman, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.
6. Report on the British troops, by Lieut. Col. J. T. Dickman, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.
7. Reports on the medical organization, equipment, etc., of the various forces, by Maj. W. B. Banister, surgeon, U. S. V.
8. Report on the siege of the legation, by Lieut. J. R. Lindsey, Tenth Cavalry, aid-de-camp.
9. Report on the Paotingfu expedition and murder of American missionaries at that place, by Capt. Grote Hatcheson, Sixth United States Cavalry.
10. Report of march of troops composing Paotingfu expedition, by First Lieut. G. Soulard Turner, Tenth United States Infantry, aid-de-camp to General Wilson.
11. Record of events and current comment, by Lieut. Col. J. T. Dickman, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.

Colonel Dickman on reporting to me was given general supervision of the duty of observing the foreign armies, their equipment, etc., and preparation of reports for the Department. In addition to this special assignment, he has been an able assistant in my intercourse and duties with the cooperating armies. Having completed his reports, he felt that his services would be of greater benefit to his country in command of his regiment in the Philippines than here;

therefore, at his request, I relieved him from further duty on my staff, greatly regretting to do so, however.

All the officers engaged in the observations, which are the basis of reports, have shown much interest in their work. Data on which to base (satisfactory) report of the siege has been difficult to obtain; no one appears to have kept record of events in such detail as to be of much value. The map, which accompanies the report has been prepared under the personal direction of Lieutenant Ferguson, of the Engineer Corps, and is very accurate. From it may be seen the progress made by the besiegers between certain dates, and also the final situation. Attention is invited to the report of Captain Hutcheson, particularly to the portion referring to the murder of the missionaries at Paotingfu. I have no doubt that this report is as near a true statement of the horrible occurrence as is possible to obtain. The three officials recommended by the international commission for execution have been beheaded; the scene of the execution being upon the ground near the wall of the city, where Mr. and Mrs. Bagnell, Mr. William Cooper, Miss Morrill, and Miss Gould were murdered by the Boxers.

On September 1, 1900, I forwarded to your office report of operations of this expedition to include the occupation of Peking, August 14 and 15, so far as then known to me. I have also forwarded from time to time reports of commanding officers sent out on short expeditions for various objects since the date mentioned, and in view of consecutive record for reference briefly refer to them in this report, as follows:

1. By First Lieut. E. R. Heiberg, Sixth Cavalry, with 50 men of Troop A, in conjunction with a force of Bengal lancers of about the same strength. His force marched from Tientsin at 5 a. m., August 15, under instructions to make a reconnoissance and determine the location and the disposition of a force of Boxers reported to be only a few miles south of Tientsin. Lieutenant Heiberg was limited by his instructions to a march of 15 miles going and returning. A force of several hundred of the enemy was observed about 6 miles from Tientsin. Lieutenant Heiberg withdrew his command and returned to his camp in accordance with his instructions, but previous to doing so pushed up to within short range of the enemy without sustaining any loss whatever. The marksmanship of the Chinese was very poor.

2. The developments made by Lieutenant Heiberg, as above stated, were the prelude to a combined movement, August 19, by Americans (412), British (325), and Japanese (200) troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Dorward, of the English army. The enemy was encountered in the vicinity disclosed by the reconnoissance of Lieutenant Heiberg, and variously estimated from 3,500 to 20,000. Colonel Wint estimates them to have been about 5,000. Six troops of the Sixth Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wint, constituted the American forces employed in this action. The march of the Sixth Cavalry was against the front of the position occupied by the Chinese forces. Colonel Wint vigorously attacked and drove the advance troops back about 1 mile, holding his ground until the force under General Dorward had enveloped the right flank of the enemy. When General Dorward attacked, Blocksom's squadron, which had been fighting on foot, mounted and charged hotly at the enemy, who was driven from the field in almost every direction. Forsyth's squadron, in part, supported Blocksom's, but engaged toward its own right as well. The Sixth Cavalry inflicted a loss of 150 dead and sustained a loss of 6 wounded. The action of our cavalry on this occasion was spirited and very praiseworthy for officers and men. This expedition resulted in much benefit. It broke up and practically dispersed for good a considerable force, which, by its presence more than from any power it had to do serious harm, caused alarm to be felt for the safety of Tientsin and the line of communications along the river above and below that city.

3. On August 27 Captain Forsyth, with two troops, I and K, scouted southwesterly from Peking up the Hunho River, under verbal instructions to locate coal mines and determine the condition of the country, the roads to the mines, and the facilities for mining coal. He returned to camp the same day, after marching 41 miles. The country traversed by the troops is very thoroughly cultivated, in vegetables and corn. The inhabitants were going about their labors, showed no fear or apprehension of the troops, and declared there were no Boxers in the vicinity. The coal mines are not worked except to fill orders; accumulations of mined coal in anticipation of sales is not the practice of the coal companies.

4. Being informed that a considerable quantity of rice was in store in the "Hunting Park," south of the city of Pekin, and that a large force of Boxers was engaged in removing the same, I directed Captain Forsyth to take three troops of his squadron and make an investigation. He marched on August 28 with Troops I, K, and L, and decided to strike for the rear of the situation—at the place, as informed by the guide, to which the rice was being carried from the granaries. On his way he was fired upon. He dispersed the enemy's force, which showed up at three or four points, and during the day killed 32. Our troops sustained no loss. The granaries contained about 200,000 pounds of rice; it could not be brought away. A quantity of old arms, lances, spears, and 1,000 pounds of powder were destroyed, and the village in which the Boxers had been quartered was burned. A few days later Captain Forsyth was sent again to the same park and ascertained that Boxers or others were still engaged in removing the rice from the granaries; we did not have transportation to move it into the city, so the rice was burned.

5. Having arranged for the purchase of a herd of sheep, Lieutenant Hyer, with Troop L, was sent to escort it to Pekin. He marched at 1.45 p. m., September 3, and arrived at Shaho, north of Pekin, at 7.30 p. m., 24 miles. The herd of sheep which he was to conduct was not at Shaho, for the reason, as alleged by the party who was to gather it, that a considerable force (about 500) of Imperial troops was in the suburb (being refused admission to the walled city) of Chanpingchow, 6 miles north of Shaho; in consequence of which it was unsafe to collect the sheep. Lieutenant Hyer decided to investigate the report the next day, and, if possible, open the road for the sheep. He marched at 6 a. m., September 4, and, skilfully screening his approach to the place by marching through cornfields, gained close contact without alarming the enemy. The surprise was complete and effective. Twenty-five were killed, the remainder dispersed. One hundred and fifty rifles of various patterns were captured and destroyed. The personal flag and clothing of Chang, military governor of the province of Hupei, were also taken. The enemy retreated to Nankow, where it joined a larger force. In this affair, Lieutenant Hyer showed himself capable in both skill and enterprise in the attack.

6. General Dorward, the senior officer at Tientsin, having received information "that the town of Tuliu, 23 miles distant from Tientsin, is occupied by Boxers who have long held their headquarters at this place," ordered an expedition to operate against the town in three columns. The "canal column" was 750 strong, of which 200 were United States troops (Companies C and D, Fifteenth Infantry), commanded by Maj. E. B. Robertson. The expedition marched from Tientsin September 9, and arrived at Tuliu September 10. The place was occupied without opposition. A portion of the village was destroyed by fire during this day and night, and the remainder, two pawn-shops specially excepted, were destroyed by the British forces detailed and left for that purpose, when the troops marched en route to Tientsin. On the 12th the boats carrying rations for our troops failed to arrive, and in consequence the men were without food or blankets. The British officers hearing of the situation, promptly gave of their supplies, provided blankets, also food for supper and breakfast the following morning. The detachment returned to its camp September 13.

7. Being informed by some missionaries that there were native converts in danger in several towns to the eastward of Pekin, the following letter was addressed to the commanding general of the First Brigade:

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, September 10, 1900.

COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST BRIGADE,
China Relief Expedition.

SIR: The major general commanding directs me to inform you that it has been reported to him that in the vicinity of Watsz (Wa-za), a village about 35 miles southeast of Pekin, there are several Chinese Christians in hiding who are reported in peril of their lives because of Boxers in that locality. They are supposed to be within a radius of 8 or 10 miles of Watsz. The following-named villages have been named as being in the vicinity: Shinschwowz, Liuchuang, Changkichang, Pingku, Sanho, the last named the market town of that section. The Chinese women have been sent to the place (Watsz) to inform the converts that troops will leave here Thursday morning, the 13th instant, and will be at Watsz ready to return to Pekin Saturday morning, the 15th instant, and will escort to Pekin any converts who may report to the commanding officer at that time and place. Please send squadron of cavalry, say three troops, via Sanho, to arrive at Watsz Friday evening or Saturday morning, from whence the troops will return here. The commanding officer should be informed that, from reports made by missionaries, Boxers may be found

in several villages, the number being stated to be 20 to 40 in each village. Also, that near Shieneshien, about 20 miles from here and not far from returning route, 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese troops. When practicable to do so the commanding officer will make it known that we have no wish to harm or disturb peaceful and orderly Chinese people; that if the Christian Chinese are protected by the people and allowed to remain in their homes and at work troops will not fire unless first fired upon. If the commanding officer can secure cattle or sheep, or both, in sufficient numbers to warrant his attention by purchase he may do so; the owners to come here to be paid. If a considerable number is found and the owners will not sell, he may seize and notify the owners to come here for pay.

Very respectfully,

GROTE HUTCHESON,

Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Acting Adjutant General.

Captain Forsyth, commanding the Third Squadron, marched at 7.30 a. m., September 14, but owing to the difficulty in crossing the Peiho, pursued his course in an opposite direction to the one indicated in my letter to General Wilson. He was accompanied by Mr. Arment, a missionary, and several native Christians as guides. At Chudien, a house was searched by Mr. Arment; the owner had fled and was said to be a Boxer. A quantity of ammunition, firearms, and stores were found and destroyed, and the house burned. At Watsz Chinamen were seen to run around a corner of a wall with guns (?) in their hands. They were pursued and one of them killed, when it was found that what was thought to be a gun was a stick. As the squadron approached the village of Hsuch-Chuang-tza, it was fired upon from a wall of a large inclosure, and the fire promptly returned by the troops; the party escaped. During the firing one of the Chinese guides got forward and climbed upon the wall. Being armed, he was taken by the troops to be a Boxer, fired upon, and killed. The action is hardly regrettable, for the guides were out particularly for looting, and had been cautioned to remain back of the advance guard. This property, and one on the opposite side of the road owned by the same man, was searched, and evidence found that the owner belonged to the Boxer party. Captain Forsyth refused to allow the Chinese guides to pillage the place, and compelled the return of property taken out by them. When all this had been done, both places were set on fire. Not many miles from this town the advance guard was again fired upon. In this skirmish one Boxer was killed and one fatally wounded. No other opposition was made, though several villages were visited. The squadron

returned to Peking on September 19, bringing in fourteen Christian Chinese who were not particularly anxious to leave their homes.

8. In the vicinity of Patachow, about 15 miles west of the city of Peking, are eight temples. It has been the custom for several years for foreign ministers to rent temples there and live in them during the summer months. The British Government erected buildings in that vicinity for its minister, which had been completed only a few months before the siege of the legations. These buildings were destroyed by the Chinese during the time of the siege. It was reported the temples had become the headquarters of a considerable force of Boxers; also that they had carried there much valuable property, which seemed an especially important matter to some. Not at all interested in the valuables to be secured by the capture of the temples, I cooperated in the movement for military reasons only; it being desirable to free the country in the vicinity of the route to the coal mines of the presence of any inimical party. My instructions to General Wilson were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *September 15, 1900.*

BRIG. GEN. JAMES H. WILSON,

Commanding First Brigade.

GENERAL: The presence of Boxers, perhaps Chinese troops, to the westward of Peking, in the vicinity of the Hunho River and temples at Patachow, being an obstacle to the passage of coal supply from the mines to Peking, the major general commanding the China relief expedition directs that you proceed to expel from the localities indicated whatever of the forces referred to as may be found. To this end he directs that you march to Linhochow (about 10 miles) to-morrow afternoon, with two battalions of the Ninth and one battalion of the Fourteenth, and such cavalry as you may have in camp. At Linkochow you will be joined by 500 British infantry, 4 guns, and some cavalry. From Linkochow proceed up the left bank of the Hunho to Sanhiatim (about 15 miles), where it is believed your force may arrive at an early hour on the 17th, if the march from Linkochow be made about 3 a. m. It is understood that there is located at Sanhiatim a Chinese arsenal, which should be left in an inoffensive condition. At Sanhiatim you will be in a position to expel the Boxers at Patachow temples by a march toward Peking. Three days' rations will be taken by the troops (two days on pack train). The British cavalry will reconnoiter two-thirds of the distance from Linkochow to Sanhiatim to-day. The officer conducting the reconnaissance will be found in Linkochow. The foregoing instructions in reference to your march are to be considered by you as indicating the purpose of the expedition only and the general course of your march. Execution of detail

at your discretion. The lives and property of inoffensive and orderly Chinese will be protected as far as possible.

Very respectfully,

GROTE HUTCHESON,
Captain Sixth Cavalry, Acting Adjutant General.

Quite a large number of persons were found occupying the temples (no doubt many of them had sought shelter there from Pekin), who were driven out without loss to our troops.

I invite attention to an interesting extract from the report of Major Quinton, commanding battalion, Fourteenth Infantry.

* * * * *

Upon my arrival at this village I was informed that I would be furnished with a guide, and that the guide would be instructed to lead me, with the battalion, to certain heights immediately in rear of a series of Buddhist temples that were supposed to be occupied as rendezvous for Boxers in force. I was further instructed to conceal the force under my command, upon arrival at the summit of the trail, as Japanese troops were to attack the Boxers in front, and that it would be my duty to either capture or kill those who might attempt to escape. Breaking bivouac at 2 a. m., we arrived at the designated village at 5.45 a. m., and here, in the furtherance of the plan before alluded to, I was furnished a guide, Mr. H. G. Squiers, a very intelligent gentleman and reliable man, formerly an officer of the Seventh U. S. Cavalry, and now secretary of the American Legation at Pekin. In conversation with Mr. Squiers I learned that a force of Sikhs was ahead of me, and had about forty-five minutes' start. I further learned that he could take a route that would place my battalion in advance of these Sikhs, if I desired, as the Sikhs had, by some error, deviated from the proper trail to be followed. I begged him to place my battalion upon this trail, and as a result was compelled to march my battalion without any halt for a greater period than two hours. The Sikhs, however, discovered their error, turned the head of their column to the left, and, as a result of this movement, the American and Sikh soldiers—the latter being celebrated, being all hill men, as the "climbers of the world's roof"—found each other at the base of the mountain, about 1,800 feet in height, and presenting an angle of about 50 degrees. The American soldier was handicapped in the climb, as he carried with him on his person rations for one day, 100 rounds of ammunition, a blanket roll, and, as before remarked, proceeded to the climb without any halt for rest. The contest for supremacy was a silent and friendly one, Sikh and American each doing his very best to reach the summit first, and I am more than pleased to state the American soldier won out, reaching the top of the mountain first, the head of the Sikh files, however, being a close second. From the summit a glorious panoramic view was presented, upon which our eyes feasted only briefly, a series of shots from the temples beneath directed upon us as a reminder that we were there for purposes other than viewing scenery, however grand. We knew, before making the climb, that our forces had been

discovered, as five men, possibly a Chinese picket, had been seen by our men while we were still in the valley, and at least fifteen minutes before we reached the base of the mountain. Immediately below us was a large white pagoda, surrounded by handsome buildings, and inclosed by a wall apparently eight to ten feet in height. This pagoda stood up from the valley about 150 feet. The grounds were fairly alive with men, and upon these I directed a close fire that compelled them to seek cover and avenues of escape.

* * * * * *

Meanwhile the fire was kept up on the temples, which were now unresponsive. Noting this, I sent 12 men down the hill to occupy a small knob immediately between the ground we were standing upon and the large white pagoda in the American concession, and, to all appearances, only about 200 yards from the pagoda. It being evident from the fire of the 12 men that the Boxers occupying the pagoda grounds were running out, I then directed Lieutenant Murphy, commanding Company L, Fourteenth Infantry, to proceed to the knob (marked X on the map herewith appended), and make the attempt to occupy the pagoda and grounds inside the wall, while I would hold the fire down from the commanding position that I occupied should it open. This duty Lieutenant Murphy performed, as usual, in a very handsome manner, occupying the pagoda and grounds, and capturing, in so doing, two Gatling guns (old pattern), a large number of gingsals, and almost every description of obsolete weapon that may be imagined. These guns were all placed to sweep avenues of approach from the front, and were liberally supplied with ammunition. The Boxers leaving the pagoda sought refuge down in the valley in a walled cemetery some 600 yards distant from the pagoda. There was no longer any fight in these men. They were evidently seeking cover and safety, as they permitted the Ninth U. S. Infantry, upon whose flank they were, and not more than 250 or 300 yards distant at that, to pass them unchallenged by even a single shot. I was proceeding against them with the two companies under my command, when arrested in my movements by the general commanding, who stated that, in his opinion, any further movements against these men would be inhuman, in which opinion I coincide. Still, the American troops are the only troops now operating in China at this particular juncture that would have spared the lives of these men, and I trust they will prove themselves deserving of the clemency shown them by him.

* * * * * *

The enemy's loss is variously returned. I only know 9 killed. Am altogether unable to give estimate as to his wounded.

* * * * * *

Lieutenant Colonel Dickman also refers in his diary to this expedition. General Wilson refused to allow the town to be burned, while he held command of the military forces, in retaliation for burning foreign missions and summer home of the British legation, as was the wish of the British minister present on the ground.

On the morning of the 18th General Wilson discontinued cooperation with the British force, the object of the expedition having been accomplished, and put the United States troops in march for Peking, where they arrived during the afternoon. The large white pagoda referred to by Major Quinton, often spoken of before the date of this expedition as an object of sufficient interest to foreigners to induce them to ride 15 miles to see, being a tall pile of stone, having no part in the Boxer movement and holding no resentment for foreigners, has been destroyed by Christians. The bells, which were suspended from lofty points and rung only by the passing winds, are welcome souvenirs of an occurrence denounced by Dr. Morrison, correspondent of the "London Times," as vandalism. Dr. Morrison is in error, however, when he charges vandalism on General Wilson because of the destruction of the pagoda. General Wilson refused to permit the destruction of anything while he remained on the ground.

9. While on my way to Tientsin, September 27, I sent a company of the Fourteenth Infantry, stationed at Matow, to investigate the report that there was a large number of Boxers about 8 miles south of the place; a German officer and 8 men out in quest of mules and horses had been fired upon. The officer reported a large force of Boxers in the place. Captain Eastman, commanding the company sent out, was not opposed; he found no sign of a large party having been in the town. I think some of the Chinese of the town fired on the small party of Germans to frighten them away. Every village resorts to more or less firing, usually at night, as a warning to robbers.

10. October 9 some villagers north of the river complained to the commanding officer of the Japanese detachment at Matow that Boxers had raided their town and burned their homes. On October 10 a detachment 150 strong, American, English, and Japanese troops, under command of a major of the Japanese army, marched 8 miles into the country. At this point they were assured by the people that the village just in advance of the column was occupied by Boxers—all Boxers. On near approach to the village it was discovered that French and Italian flags were flying from a church spire or lofty point and from some of the houses. The village was surrounded by a wall in which were many loopholes. On entering the place a detachment of Italian sailors, commanded

by a lieutenant, was found occupying the town, and it was ascertained that the village had been besieged for a couple of months and the inhabitants (native Christians) rendered destitute. The converts had begun foraging on neighboring villages supported by the infantry to obtain subsistence for themselves. In turn, the villages resenting the action of the converts, hostilities ensued, some of the villages being burned.

11. November 22 messengers arrived from villages about 18 miles south to make complaint against robbers and house burners, and asked that American soldiers be sent to drive them away. Captain Cabell with his troop was sent, the messengers guiding them. He succeeded in surrounding the "compound" before daylight and killed eight of the robbers—all that were in the place. The women and children were got out unhurt. Captain Cabell made certain of the character of the party inside the compound before he attacked the place, by inquiry of the chief men of the villages near by.

The foregoing comprise the events where United States troops have been used since the fall of Peking, and the purpose therefor.

About 16,000 troops arrived at Peking August 14 and 15. On September 11 there were 30,700 troops in Peking, according to verbal statement by generals in conference on that date. At this time the number of troops in the vicinity of Peking is about as follows:

Japanese	3,200
French	4,000
German	6,100
British	3,000
American	1,400
Russian	250
Total	17,950

For about three weeks following arrival of the relief column at Peking the condition in and about the city and along the line of communication was bad. Looting of the city, uncontrolled foraging in surrounding country, and seizure by soldiers of everything a Chinaman might have, as vegetables, eggs, chickens, sheep, cattle, etc., whether being brought to the city or found on the farm; indiscriminate and generally unprovoked shooting of Chinese, in city, country, and along the line of march and the river—all this did not tend, as was natural, to gain for the troops the confidence of the masses,

with whom, it is certain, we have no quarrel, but whose labor we needed. It is safe to say that where one real Boxer has been killed since the capture of Peking, fifty harmless coolies or laborers on farms, including not a few women and children, have been slain. No doubt the Boxer element is largely mixed with the mass of the population, and that by slaying a lot, one or more Boxers might be taken in. But when making allowance for occasional killing of a Boxer in this way, it was not in my opinion, creditable for the United States troops to continue to wage hostilities in such a manner. I repeatedly instructed that our troops must be fired upon before firing a shot, and generally that property should not be destroyed. I have noticed that precisely in accordance with the degree of restraint put upon the soldiers harsh treatment of the mass of the population ceased; with protection given to homes and business, fear has vanished and confidence been established. The Japanese and American sections of the city filled rapidly very soon after the occupation of the city, and later, the English section, the people moving from other parts of the city into the sections policed by troops of the nations named. From appearance the Chinese population is more friendly, seemingly has less fear of being harmed by the troops of Japan than any other foreign nation represented in Peking. The commander of the Japanese troops was the first to make known to the people that his purpose was not indiscriminate war, and that if the population remained quiet and orderly in the Japanese section all living there would be protected. That section of the city is densely crowded; there also trade was reestablished soonest. The section of the Chinese city under American control is now greatly overcrowded and very orderly.

The following correspondence is quoted for information:

On behalf of the inhabitants and gentry of that part of the Chinese quarter in the city of Peking, at present under the military jurisdiction of the United States Army, I have sincere pleasure in presenting this testimonial of appreciation and thanks to John C. F. Tillson, captain, Fourteenth Infantry, U. S. A., American member of the international board of police commissioners, and provost marshal, American district, Chinese city in Peking, for the able and efficient manner in which he has performed his duty and protected their lives and property.

Given at Peking, under my hand and seal, this 8th day of November, 1900.

LI HUNG CHANG,

*Imperial High Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary,
Senior Grand Secretary, Grand Tutor to the Heir Apparent,
High Commissioner of Commerce, Viceroy of Chi-li,
Earl of Su yi, etc.*

OFFICE OF PROVOST MARSHAL,
AMERICAN DISTRICT, CHINESE CITY,
PEKIN, CHINA, November 9, 1900.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, LI HUNG CHANG,

Imperial High Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Grand Secretary, Grand Tutor to the Heir Apparent, High Commissioner of Commerce, Viceroy of Chi-li, Earl of Su yi, etc.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your excellency's very kind letter of commendation of the 8th instant, and to return my very sincere thanks.

The army of the United States of America enjoys the proud distinction of being the only army in the history of all the world that has never been used as an instrument of tyranny.

If, in my brief exercise of arbitrary power I have done naught to impair the reputation of the army of my country, and have, at the same time, merited your excellency's esteemed commendation, while endeavoring to extend to your people, as far as possible, that protection to life and property, and that equality before the law so dear to my countrymen, I am indeed proud.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's most obedient servant.

JNO. C. F. TILLSON,

Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, American Member of the International Board of Police Commissioners, Provost Marshal, American District, Chinese City of Peking.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, September 21, 1900.

* * * * *

3. Capt. Frank De W. Ramsey, Ninth Infantry, acting chief quartermaster, will transfer from time to time to Capt. Ira L. Fredendall, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., quartermaster First Brigade, all moneys which he has on hand or may receive from the sale of looted or stolen property.

This money is to be expended under the exclusive direction of the commanding general First Brigade, for the establishment and maintenance of civil order and for the protection of those portions of the city of Peking under American jurisdiction and control, and for the subsistence of deserving destitute of said sections.

All disbursements will be made upon duplicate vouchers approved by the commanding general First Brigade. A monthly account current of receipts and expenditures will be forwarded to the headquarters of the expedition for transmission to Washington.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Chaffee:

GROTE HUTCHESON,

Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Acting Adjutant General.

Until the arrival of an adequate supply of our own transportation, we were compelled, as were other armies, to take possession of mules, carts, and ponies to get forward our supplies. It is impossible to return this property to rightful

owners, no record of place where obtained having been kept, so to rid the command of what is now a nuisance, the carts, mules, etc., will be sold.

Native converts have suffered loss of life and property at the hands of the Boxer in many towns. The Reverend Mr. Tewksbury has adjusted some of this loss in the vicinity of Tungchow, as may be seen from the correspondence which is inclosed, marked "B."

The "scheme of settlement" submitted to Minister Conger by Mr. Tewksbury (copy inclosed) is not readily analyzed throughout, if one desires to ascertain the value put upon one life, or whether or not one home destroyed was of greater value than any other house destroyed. Neither does it appear what shall be the value of the chapel to be provided by the towns, or how much land shall be included in a cemetery. If it be assumed, as an example, that land is worth 50 taels per acre, and the chapel to be provided valued at 200 taels, the cemetery valued at 100 taels, it will be seen that the value put upon one life varies greatly for some of the towns, and may, perhaps, be regarded as unjust. At Lungwang eight lives are reported in the "scheme of settlement" at 300 taels, 3 acres of land, and one cemetery—68.75 taels per life. At San Chin Fang, two lives at 50 taels—25 taels per life. At Hun T'un, two lives at 3 acres of land, a chapel, and a cemetery—225 taels per life. At Yen Chow, one life at 4 acres of land, a chapel, and a cemetery—500 taels per life.

The "scheme of settlement," as it appears to me, is very much in the line of business called "squeeze," which we hear a great deal about in China.

As a further step toward compensating for losses sustained, some of the missionaries have obtained possession of property of considerable value, which has been disposed of at private or public sales. The proceeds, as I understand it, are to be applied to the support of their people. I have heard the statement made that Monsignor Favier, Catholic bishop, has requested the French Government to deduct from its claim for indemnity the sum he has obtained in the manner indicated.

FORBIDDEN CITY.

As reported by telegraph at the time, formal entrance into the Forbidden City was made August 28, the United States forces being represented by 350 men—detachments of artillery,

cavalry, regiments of infantry, and the marines present in Pekin August 14. The place is about a half mile square, and is surrounded by a wall about 25 feet high. Entrance is had by four gates, north, south, east, and west, of which the principal one is the south gate. On taking possession of the Imperial City, which surrounds the Forbidden City, and is also inclosed by a wall, guards were posted at the four gates of the Forbidden City; 3 Japanese guarāns, 1 American, the latter at the south gate. With the Japanese general, I opposed occupation of the Forbidden City or entrance into it, unless immediately evacuated and the gates closed and guarded, which was agreed to. My purpose was to prevent looting of the place. The ministers in conference with the generals were unanimous in the opinion that the grounds should be occupied, at least formally, for the reason that if this was not done, the Chinese people would be made to believe that the cooperating armies had met with defeat at its walls. It may be that the great bulk of the population, which is outside of Pekin, will never be informed of the occupation, in order to keep their faith fixed as before, and if really so ignorant, as supposed, of what is taking place in the empire, they still believe the place withstood all assaults.

I believe but little looting has been done inside the forbidden City, but have heard of articles having been offered for sale which were claimed to be from there. The statement has been made that the American and Japanese guards are in collusion, but I do not believe it. Attention is invited to Inclosure C (reports of Lieutenants Lindsey and Reeves).

RAILROADS.

At this date report is current that the railroad will be repaired and in operation to Pekin about December 15, four months after the armies arrived in the city, and probably two months later than necessary had the matter been taken hold of in a business-like way soon after the battle of Tientsin. What serious objection there could be to the old management repairing and operating the road for use of the cooperating armies, and be compensated for service rendered, I have not been able to discover; but whether the objection was or was not particularly important, it is certain any old management, if given countenance and protection (little of either being required), would have succeeded better than has the method

adopted. As the question has appeared to me, national jealousy and play for advantage in the situation has had more to do with this important matter than has the common interest of all for good communication with the seacoast. Soon after arriving at Peking, the British took possession of the road at the junction with the Paotingfu road, presumably to protect the interests of invested English capital; repairs have been made for a short distance south of the junction and north to the Peking station. At the present time the road is being extended by the British into the city, passage of the roadbed through the wall being a few hundred feet west of the south gate of the Chinese city. The station will be along the west wall of the "Temple of Heaven," directly in front of the entrance to the grounds of the Agriculture Park, occupied by our troops. Fortunately for us, as for others, a moderate stage of water has continued in the river to date, and the chief quartermaster has taken full advantage of it, securing junks wherever to be found, in which he could forward supplies to Tungchow. We have very little left below that place, and as a consequence we are not dependant upon the railroad for transportation of anything necessary for use of the command for several months. Over 5,000,000 pounds are still at Tungchow—grain, hay, coal, wood—to be transported by wagon to Peking. Slow progress is being made toward repair of the Tongku and Shanhaikwan branch of the railroad, which has for us special interest because of the fact that mail must come by that route during the winter.

Colonel Humphrey was sent to Chingwantao, the landing point, to effect arrangements for the landing of our mail and such supplies as may be received during the winter. A landing pier will have to be constructed, and to insure for us right of way rather than be dependent on the courtesy of others, Colonel Humphrey was authorized to pledge an equitable share of the necessary expense to be paid by the United States. He made arrangements to cooperate with the British in the construction of landing facilities. The bridge over the Peitaho will not be reconstructed for many months, and it seems probable that the mail will have to be transported in carts for about 30 miles of the road not yet repaired.

TELEGRAPH.

The telegraph line has been reconstructed all the way to Tongku. The poles used are the best obtainable, and for the

most part good, For a month past we have had excellent service to communication with cable office. Our cable across the Peiho at Taku is occasionally interfered with by the larger of the "lighter ships" entering the river, but the interruptions thus far have not been the cause of much delay in the transmission of messages.

I inclose for your information map of Agriculture Park, wherein are established my headquarters, our storehouses, the hospital, etc., and the camps of the light battery, squadron of Sixth Cavalry, and the headquarters and five companies of the Ninth Infantry. The American troops are the only soldiers at Pekin quartered in tents. The high walls which divide the park into plats of various sizes break the force of the winds quite effectively.

Military movements in the province of Pechili for the past two months have been confined chiefly to such as were ordered by Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, the chief of all being the Paotingfu expedition, about 8,000 men strong, in two columns of about equal strength; one from Pekin by the direct road, the other from Tientsin, following the main road between the two places. The return of a considerable number of these troops to points of departure was in three columns and by different routes from the roads advanced over. Another expedition of consequence, because of its strength, is one to Kalgan, 1,200 strong, which is now returning from that place. I have been informed on good authority that the imperial troops anywhere on the line of march of the foreign forces have been instructed to refrain from all hostilities and to retire from their presence. In some instances the Chinese troops were successful in getting out of the way, while in others they have suffered some loss. The United States troops did not participate in either of the expeditions referred to, it being my opinion that the less the disturbance of the country by military operations, the sooner would arrive the opportunity to diplomatically arrange full reparation for all wrongs committed, and for the further reason that every indication pointed to the utter collapse of organized armed opposition by the Chinese. As regards Boxers, the viceroy of the province has stated that he has issued strict instructions to the officials in the various towns to put them down. Whether he has done so or not, or whether complied with if such instructions were issued by him as claimed, a generally improved

condition of affairs in the surrounding country as regards order is shown by the large decrease in the number of reports of disturbances charged to Boxer account. There are no foreigners living outside of the protection by the troops, which may account for the quiet which prevails to some extent, but notwithstanding this, I am disposed to credit the viceroy with a disposition to suppress what remains of the Boxer element in this province; in this view I am nearly alone.

Very respectfully,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
*Major General, U. S. V.,
Commanding United States troops in China.*

EXHIBIT A.

[English translation.]

ARMY HEADQUARTERS IN EAST ASIA,
WINTER PALACE, PEKIN, CHINA, *November 27, 1900.*

Army headquarters has the honor to respectfully submit to your excellency, in compliance with the request of October 22, a copy of a letter of November 23 from Colonel Garioni, of the Italian forces, and the answer, sent to-day.

SCHWARZHOFF.

To GENERAL CHAFFEE,

Commander in Chief United States troops in East Asia, Pekin.

[English translation.]

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL ITALIAN FORCES IN EAST ASIA,
PEKIN, CHINA, *November 23, 1900.*

I have the honor to respectfully submit to your excellency an answer to your letter of October 25, 1900.

The facts which caused the appearance of a column consisting of English, American, and Japanese troops in Kiakiatao, a Christian village, are as follows:

On October 9 a platoon of our forces, belonging to a detachment which had occupied Kiakiatao on the beginning of said month for the protection of the Christian mission, left the village, accompanied by some Catholics, for the purpose of gaining information as to whether forage and other supplies could be obtained for the troops in the surrounding country. On the march through one of the neighboring villages they were fired upon and were obliged to reply and to set fire to the village and destroy it.

On the following day the mission was attacked by armed inhabitants of the neighborhood. Our detachment notified the headquarters in Tungchow of this event, meanwhile making preparations for a proper defense.

Captain Lieutenant Civalleri came to their assistance from Tungchow, but only arrived after the attacking party had been repulsed and had disappeared.

Immediately after this, Captain Civalleri, still being in Kiakiatao, the said international column arrived, which had left Matao in a hurry, as the inhabitants of the village which had been destroyed the previous day asked for assistance, saying they were pursued by Boxers.

The facts are as follows:

The Catholic mission amounts at the present time to about 1,200 persons, half of which are coreligionists who took refuge there from other villages, where in the past few months their houses had been destroyed and their relatives killed. The mission itself had been subjected during nearly three months to continuous attacks by the Boxers and also to the heavy fire of imperial artillery.

The refugees from the other villages took courage at the approach of the European troops and made claims for provisions and other things taken from them, and probably undertook pillaging expeditions, but after the Italian detachment had occupied Kiakiatao they were prohibited from going out armed, and their claims, which the detachment commander supported, were made lawful.

The commander of the international forces (a Japanese major), who in the meantime had returned to Matao, issued a proclamation by which he prohibited the inhabitants of the neighborhood from bringing provisions to the Catholics in Kiakiatao and ordered them to demand the return of all that they had brought. He promised them assistance, and in case of necessity said he would attack the mission.

Captain Lieutenant Civalleri protested against this proclamation in a conference of the commanders of the different troops in Tungchow, and was assured by the Japanese commander of the village that the major who had issued the proclamation had been recalled to Japan.

The necessity of the service demanded a withdrawal of the detachment from Kiakiatao, but I sent from time to time detachments there so as not to leave the mission wholly unprotected and a prey to the enemy.

GARIONI,

Commander in Chief Italian troops in East Asia.

TO FIELD MARSHAL COUNT VON WALDERSEE,

Commander in Chief International Army, Peking, China.

[English translation.]

ARMY HEADQUARTERS IN EAST ASIA,

WINTER PALACE, PEKIN, CHINA, *November 28, 1900.*

In reply to your letter of November 23, I have the honor to say that it seems to be very imprudent to give such extensive power to detachments sent out a great distance, as in this case. I do not consider it right that troops undertake to support claims of natives for lost property and to exercise revenge for damages. The justness of the claims should be thoroughly examined, as it is easily possible that the troops might be used as a means of satisfying a revenge. A quieting down of the Chinese population, which is urgently desired, will never be accomplished in this manner.

VON WALDERSEE,

General Field Marshal.

TO COLONEL GARIONI,

Commander of the Royal Italian Expedition, Peking.

EXHIBIT B.

PEKIN, CHINA, *September 19, 1900.*

E. H. CONGER, Esq.

DEAR SIR: I am expecting to go to Tungchow soon and wish to ask your help in regard to affairs in one or two villages near there. There has been a movement in some of the villages to settle up some of the claims for destruction of Chinese Christians, etc. I am thinking it may be best to visit these places in person and see if the matter can be adjusted, and possibly payment secured and a measure of protection secured to the villagers. Thus our Christians may be allowed to return in peace, reap their crops, and secure some part indemnity for their losses.

Do you think we can secure a small guard to accompany us on some of these trips? We should go out from Tungchow and in no case be gone over one night. We do not wish a large military escort, as we desire it to meet and talk with the people, not to frighten and destroy, unless of course we meet with armed men. I wonder if you will ask General Chaffee if he is willing to give us a small escort either from Pekin of cavalry or ask Captain Dunlop to help us at Tungchow.

Yours sincerely,

E. G. TEWKSBURY.

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LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PEKIN, CHINA, *September 19, 1900.*

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major General Commanding United States Forces, Pekin.

SIR: The inclosed letter from Mr. Tewksbury expresses his desire for a small escort to visit some villages near Tungchow for the purpose of looking after missionary interests and possibly settling some losses in that locality.

It seems to me that some good might be accomplished by such visits. What shall I reply to him?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

E. H. CONGER,
United States Minister.

—

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *September 20, 1900.*

HON. E. H. CONGER,

United States Minister, Pekin, China.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant inclosing a copy of a letter from E. G. Tewksbury, in which he requests a small guard to accompany him on certain proposed trips from Tungchow for the purpose, as he states "there has been a movement in some of the villages to settle up some of the claims for destruction of Chinese Christians, etc." He is also of the opinion that "it may be best to visit in person these places and see if the matter can be adjusted and possibly payment secured and a measure of protection secured to the villagers." A military guard, of whatever size, furnished

as proposed by Mr. Tewksbury, will necessitate the presence of an officer of the Army, who will be instructed by me to take the name of every person making a claim for damages, amount of damage claimed, and the character of the settlement made, and report the same for transmission to the Government at Washington. While I doubt the propriety of Mr. Tewksbury entering upon the settlement of any claim for damages, whether of Chinese Christians or any other persons, and which may possibly become a question for settlement by the United States, I will, if he desires, furnish an escort as indicated above, but whose period of service on the detail would be subject to termination at any time in my discretion, and the service of the guard will be wholly in the discretion of the officer in command and for no other purpose than the protection of the person of Mr. Tewksbury. If the guard be desired, please inform me by letter.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major General, Commanding United States Forces.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PEKIN, CHINA, *September 25, 1900.*

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major General, U. S. V., Peking.

SIR: Referring to your letter of the 20th instant, which has been submitted to Rev. Mr. Tewksbury, I have the honor to inform you that he is satisfied with the conditions named and desires the guard to accompany him on the expedition proposed.

He will himself confer with you as to the dates.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

E. H. CONGER.

PEKIN, CHINA, *October 14, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, FIRST BRIGADE, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

Peking, China.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report: In compliance with S. O. No. 7, c. s., H. F. B., C. R. E., a detachment of 1 officer and 20 men reported to Rev. Mr. Tewksbury, at Tungchow, October 1, 1900. On October 2 the detachment accompanied Mr. Tewksbury to the following towns: Chung Chia Wan, San Chien Fang, Lu Kuan, and Nin Pao Tun, where mission property and property of native Christians had been destroyed. At the last village it was reported that a large number of Boxers had congregated and that the neighboring villages would be warned of the approach of foreign troops by the firing of a cannon cracker. This was done, but no resistance was offered. Eight guns were found in a temple, and destroyed, together with a number of spears. No other property was molested. On October 3, Tungpan, about 8 miles northwest of Tungchow, was visited and 1,000 taels indemnity collected as part compensation for the destruction of the houses of eleven Christian Chinese in Thutzufang. This money, and that paid later, was collected in this and surrounding villages for whatever share the inhabitants of the various villages may have had in the destruction at Thutzufang. October 5, went to Fuhoo, about 7 miles

northeast of Tungchow. On October 9 went to Tungpan and received 1,000 taels, completing the money indemnity for that locality. Also went to Wu Li Ch'iao and received 500 taels in silver and cash, money indemnity for destruction of property of native Christians in that locality. On October 10 a noncommissioned officer and two men were sent to Fu Hao to bring in some native Christians. This place had been occupied by the French troops until October 5, and my detachment went there that day. About an hour after the three men had left Tungchow to bring in the Christians, a native reported that about 100 Boxers had congregated there and that they would attempt to surprise these men. I took the remainder of the detachment to the village and went to the compound where it was reported that arms were kept. I found about ten men there and dinner cooking for thirty or forty. Had the interpreter tell these men not to leave the room where they were, and posted a sentinel there. One of them ran out toward the sentinel, who shot and severely wounded him. The sentinel says that this man took something from a bundle and ran toward him. The place was searched, and ten guns, a few pistols, and about thirty knives, spears, and sabers found. An attempt had been made to separate the detachment sent for the Christians from the guide with them.

On October 12 the village of Yin Pao Tun paid 2,200 taels for the property destroyed in that village, some of which was mission property. Before this detachment reported to Mr. Tewksbury, he had sent messengers to the villages where property had been destroyed, making the following demands:

1. A money indemnity for the property of the native Christians destroyed.
2. Land for a cemetery.
3. Church location and 6 acres of land to support a minister.

The whereabouts of most of the Christians to whom this property belonged is unknown. Mr. Tewksbury says the money is to be used to support refugees. It was reported to me that at Fu Hao two or three times the amount asked for was collected; the difference was probably kept by the chief men of the village who had charge of the collection. This money was collected by the men who did the damage from inhabitants who are now and always have been peaceful. This is probably the case in other villages also. This detachment went only to villages whose inhabitants were afraid to bring the money to Tungchow. Large amounts were sent into Tungchow and a considerable sum was collected in Tungchow itself. I know of this indirectly, and Mr. Tewksbury promised to give a complete account of it to the American Minister in Peking. As far as I know, no deeds or mortgages were given by any village. I requested Mr. Tewksbury to give me the name of every person making a claim for damages, amount of damage claimed, and the character of settlement made. He replied that he did not know the men whose property was destroyed, nor their whereabouts, but that he thought that he could get the names from some of the native members of his church who were assisting him in collecting this money. I wrote a letter to the adjutant general, First Brigade, China relief expedition, informing him of this, and asking for instructions, but no answer was received. Mr. Tewksbury claimed that this condition of affairs was clearly explained in his letter

asking for the detail. The detachment returned to Peking October 12, 1900, Mr. Tewksbury saying he had no further use for it.

Very respectfully,

P. W. GUINEY,

Second Lieutenant, Sixth Cavalry.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PEKIN, CHINA, *October 23, 1900.*

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major General, United States Volunteers,

Commanding China Relief Expedition, Peking.

SIR: Replying to your communication of the 21st instant, I have the honor to inclose to you a copy of a tabulated report made by Mr. Tewksbury of his settlement of claims of native Christians for property destroyed, etc., etc. It is the only information in this legation on the subject.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

E. H. CONGER.

TUNGCHOW, October 10, 1900.

The following table shows the scheme of settlements made or pending for damages done by the Boxers to Chinese Christians or adherents of the American Congregational Mission:

Village.	Number killed.	Houses destroyed.	Money.	Land.	Chapel.	Cemetery.
			<i>Taels.</i>	<i>Acres.</i>		
Tung Pa	4	27	2,000	7	1	1
Fu Hao	45	23	2,000	16	1	1
Tsao Fang	18	9	500	7	1	1
Lung Wang	8		300	3		1
Ta Chou T'sun	2	5	300	5	1	1
Nin Pao T'un	14	18	1,800	8	1	1
Hsiao He Chuang	2	4	300	5	1	1
San Chieh He	4	7	550	5	1	1
Wu Chia Ying	2	4	400	3	1	1
Lu Ching	1	3	300	4	1	1
San Chien Fang	2		50			
Mai Chuang	5	4	350	5	1	1
Hou T'un	2			3	1	1
Yung Le Tien	15	12	2,500	8	1	1
Ti Tze	12	16	1,200		1	1
Shang Ying	11	10	800	5	1	1
Hsieh Chia Yuan	7	6	500		1	1
Yen Chou	1			4	1	1
Hou T'un	5	6	500	3	1	1
Lu T'sun		7	500		1	1
Nan Chuang Tou		8	700		1	1
Kiu Chia Fu	2	3	600	5	1	1
Kuo Chia Chuang	4	9			1	1
Total	166	184	16,150	96	19	20

Mortgages have been taken in many cases instead of cash. The money received goes to the church and by its committee is divided equitably according to careful estimates of individual losses. The remainder to be used at discretion of church. The 96 acres of land, if rented out, ought to secure an annual income of \$500 for help to widows and orphans, etc. In addition to above, in certain villages, monuments for memorial have been required.

E. G. TEWKSBURY.

REPORT ON THE RUSSIAN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA.

BY MAJ. W. E. CRAIGHILL, FORTIETH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *October 15, 1900.*LIEUT. COL. JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,
Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V., Chief of Staff.

SIR: In compliance with instructions conveyed in your letter of October 7, 1900, assigning to me the duty of observing the Russian and French forces, I have the honor to submit the following report:

The information gained of the Russian forces was meager and unsatisfactory. No reply was made by them to your request for a statement of the location and character of their force present in North China in connection with the relief expedition; and they withdrew from Peking without my being aware of their purpose, and before I was able to get any precise data from them upon which to base a reliable report.

Infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers were observed at Tientsin, on the road between that point and Peking, and at the latter place.

The uniform generally worn by enlisted men was apparently the same for all arms except the distinctive marks. It consisted of a soft, flat, white cap with sloping visor, a white blouse of cotton cloth, very loose and belted at the waist with a leather strap. The trousers were plain black. The foot-gear was heavy top boots, reaching to the calf of the leg. The winter coat was of black cloth, similar otherwise to the summer blouse.

A characteristic feature of the infantry soldier was that he carried no bayonet scabbard. His bayonet was always fixed and his rifle was apparently never out of reach of his hand. The ammunition is carried in pouches on the waist belt. Their rations carried were of the simplest kind, consisting of hard brown bread, salt, pepper, and tea. They were industrious foragers and supplied meat and other items by this means from the abundant resources of the country.

Their troops had no tentage. In their camps the men lived in houses or huts made of native mats or other similar material.

* * * * *

As observed on the march and on guard duty the discipline of their infantry seemed to be up to the excellent standard which it has the reputation of maintaining. A column of two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery, with the accompanying trains, was observed on the road. The infantry was in column of fours well closed up and the battery and trains marching in as compact a formation as the road would permit. At a halt made to allow our train to pass, the Russian infantry closed in mass by the side of the road and the artillery and trains went into park. The movement was made with quiet precision and when completed the column of troops and train was compactly placed in a small, open space by the roadside, ready for the head of it to move out again as soon as the rear of our column had passed.

No opportunity was had to observe their artillery closely. Their cavalry consisted entirely of Cossacks. They were mounted on rough, shaggy little ponies, of about the size of those of the Philippines. They carried a heavy, slightly curved saber and rifle slung over the shoulder.

The Russian transportation, other than the native Chinese carts, consisted of small, very low, four-wheeled wagons, drawn by two ponies, and seemed to have no features worthy of imitation.

A notable feature of their equipment was the traveling field kitchen, consisting of a boiler, mounted in a special wagon, so arranged that it could be in operation while in motion. The arrangement seemed to be a very convenient one, and presents some desirable features. They were observed on the march, the dinner of the men in the process of cooking, so as to be ready when the halt was made. In traveling by rail the whole apparatus was put into a flat car and the process of cooking went on while the train was in motion. When operating over practicable roads or by rail the arrangement seemed one that would give a very prompt and satisfactory service of the men's food.

Very respectfully,

W. E. CRAIGHILL,
Major, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. V.

REPORT ON JAPANESE TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA.

BY MAJ. CHARLES H. MUIR. THIRTY-EIGHTH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *October 24, 1900.*ADJUTANT GENERAL CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
Pekin, China.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following as the result of observation and inquiry concerning the Japanese army:

The brigade of infantry is composed of two regiments, and commanded by a major general, whose staff consists of:

- 1 adjutant, with rank of captain.
- 1 adjutant, with rank of lieutenant.
- 1 veterinarian.
- 2 sergeants.
- 13 privates.

The regiment of infantry, commanded by a colonel, who has a staff of:

- 1 adjutant, captain.
- 1 flag officer, sublieutenant.
- 2 sergeants.
- 1 stable sergeant.
- 6 privates.

The regiment is composed of three battalions, each battalion commanded by a major, who has a staff of:

- 1 adjutant, lieutenant.
- 2 surgeons.
- 1 quartermaster.
- 4 sergeants.
- 1 surgeon sergeant.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant.
- 71 privates.

The battalion is composed of four companies. Each company contains:

- 1 captain.
- 3 lieutenants.
- 1 sergeant major.
- 1 first sergeant.
- 15 sergeants.
- 201 privates.
- 2 trumpeters.

It is thus seen that each company has 4 officers and 220 men. Each battalion has 21 officers and 880 men. Each regiment of infantry has 66 officers and 2,650 men.

A regiment of artillery is commanded by a colonel, whose staff consists of:

- 1 adjutant, captain.
- 2 surgeons.
- 1 quartermaster.
- 2 veterinarians.
- 3 sergeants.
- 1 surgeon sergeant.
- 3 stable sergeants.
- 2 quartermaster sergeants.
- 16 privates.

The regiment is composed of two battalions, each battalion commanded by a major, whose staff consists of:

- 1 adjutant, lieutenant.
- 1 sergeant.
- 6 privates.

Each battalion is composed of three companies, each company composed of:

- 1 captain.
- 3 lieutenants.
- 1 sergeant major.
- 1 first sergeant.
- 13 sergeants.
- 169 privates.
- 6 guns, 6 limbers, and 2 reserve wagons.

Each limber carries 60 shrapnel and 40 high-explosive (said to be thorite) shells, and the total ammunition of the artillery company is 504 shrapnel and 336 high-explosive shells.

The fifth regiment of Japanese artillery, in addition to the above-mentioned six companies (or batteries), had attached two batteries (six guns each) of mountain artillery. The guns were of bronze, 7.5-centimeter caliber, with shrapnel with combination fuze, and shell with percussion fuze. These guns are very light and can be carried on pack mules, one mule carrying the gun, one the wheels, and one the remaining part of the carriage, while the fourth mule carries two chests of ammunition. It is said to be the intention of the Japanese Government to replace these bronze guns with rapid-fire guns in the near future.

A regiment of cavalry is commanded by a colonel, whose staff consists of:

- 1 adjutant, captain.
- 1 flag officer, sublieutenant.
- 2 surgeons.
- 2 veterinarians.
- 1 quartermaster.
- 2 sergeants.
- 1 surgeon sergeant.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant.
- 18 privates.

Each regiment contains three squadrons, each squadron having:

- 1 captain.
- 3 lieutenants.
- 1 first sergeant.
- 1 surgeon sergeant.
- 1 stable sergeant.
- 13 sergeants.
- 132 privates.
- 127 horses.

Thus making the strength of the squadron 4 officers and 149 men, and the strength of the regiment 20 officers and 569 (sic) men.

A battalion of engineers is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, whose staff consists of:

- 1 adjutant, lieutenant.
- 2 surgeons.
- 1 quartermaster.
- 2 sergeants.
- 1 surgeon sergeant.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant.
- 11 privates.

Each battalion contains three companies, each company having:

- 1 captain.
- 3 lieutenants.
- 1 sergeant major.
- 1 first sergeant.
- 16 sergeants.
- 234 privates.

Thus the strength of the company is 4 officers and 252 men, while the battalion has a strength of 17 officers and 771 men.

The division of two brigades of infantry has one regiment of cavalry, one of artillery, a battalion of engineers, and a

battalion of commissariat. This commissariat battalion seems to be divided up and attached to other organizations, furnishing 5 sergeants, 60 men, and 60 pack animals to each battalion of the line. The commissariat men work immediately in rear of the troops, receiving the supplies from what may be termed the last depot or magazine on the line of communications, and distributing them to the troops.

On the line of communications, and forwarding the supplies from one magazine to the next, are the men of the transport service, who cannot be termed combatants. They are trained in time of peace for three months only, and then are allowed to go to their homes. They constitute, however, a kind of transport reserve and are liable to be called upon at any time in case of war. They are as a rule smaller than the soldiers proper, and of a physique inferior to them.

UNIFORM.—The summer uniform of the Japanese soldier, of the same cut as that for winter service, is of white cotton material. It is cool and easily laundered, but has the serious defect of being extremely conspicuous. At the present time the soldiers have been put in winter uniform. The old summer suits are to some extent utilized by the soldiers on fatigue.

The winter uniform, with the exception of the cavalry trousers, which are red, is of a dark-blue woolen material, warm and very neat in appearance.

The cap is slightly bell-shaped, with flat crown and small, drooping visor. It is ornamented by a narrow yellow band at the junction of the crown and sides, and another band or braid at the bottom of the sides, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, yellow in all cases but the commissariat, in which case it is a blue of medium intensity. All caps have a star in the center of the front just above the visor.

The blouse is fairly close-fitting, extends about 3 inches below the belt, and is fastened with five buttons. It has a standing collar faced with the color of the arm, red for infantry, green for cavalry, yellow for artillery, blue for commissariat, and dark-red for engineers. A strap about 2 inches wide extends from the neck to the point of the shoulder, and has on it the number of the regiment. In the cavalry this strap is replaced by a braided shoulder knot, and the blouse has the back seams ornamented with yellow stripes and the front with five horizontal stripes of yellow, the ends terminating in falling loops. This ornamentation, together with the red

trousers, makes a very picturesque and striking uniform, with the attendant disadvantage of being very conspicuous. In the cavalry the trousers below the knee are cut to fit closely and facilitate the wearing of the boot. In the infantry they fit loosely, but are usually confined by a khaki-colored legging, which reaches near to the knee and is fastened by buttons. The security of the fastening is increased at the top by a leather strap with buckle.

The cavalry is furnished with boots and the infantry with a rather coarsely made and low-cut leather shoe. The foot-gear seems much inferior to our own. The greatcoat is of dark blue, fits loosely, extends nearly to the ankles, is unlined, and furnished with a hood. When not worn it is carried compactly rolled and slung over one shoulder, the ends fastened together on the opposite side of the body. During warm weather it seems to be carried and used in lieu of a blanket. The fitting of the uniform is simplified by the great uniformity in size and build of the Japanese soldier. It should require but few sizes to furnish a good fit for all the men.

PACK.—The Japanese have a pack of leather tanned with the hair on. This pack is not in favor and is usually replaced by an elongated cloth bag about 9 inches in diameter. In this bag is carried a reserve supply of 60 rounds of ammunition, some spare parts for the rifle, including a firing pin and its spring; a first-aid package, a small package of thread, needles, and buttons, and an emergency ration for one day. The pail in which is carried the day's ordinary ration is also carried in this bag, except when the pack is worn. In the latter case the pail is carried on top of the pack. The ends of the bag are tied together and the bag is then slung over the shoulder opposite to the blanket roll or greatcoat. The soldier also has a small bag similar to our haversack and carried in the same manner, but much smaller, in which he carries certain miscellaneous articles of his own choice.

RIFLE.—The infantry is at present supplied with the Murata magazine rifle, the magazine being a cylinder under the barrel capable of carrying eight shots, which are forced downward to the carrier by a spiral spring. When the magazine is full there can also be one cartridge in the chamber and another in the carrier. The rifle can be used as a single-loader or as a magazine gun. The magazine is habitually held in reserve and used only at the final stage of the fire.

action. It is charged by inserting the cartridges singly. The rifle, sighted to include 2,000 meters, has an ordinary open leaf slide sight which is not corrected for drift. The Japanese do not seem contented with this rifle as they are preparing to replace it with the .32 new Shiki rifle. The bayonet is not often carried fixed but is usually in the scabbard. It is a short bayonet of the knife type. The ammunition is carried in leather pouches, each with two loops on the back, through which passes the leather belt. Each pouch is divided into two compartments and each compartment receives the pasteboard box carrying 15 cartridges, which, after being inserted in the pouch, has the top removed. Three of these pouches are carried on the belt, thus making, with the 60 rounds carried in the bag, a total of 150 rounds. I am inclined to consider this method of carrying ammunition superior to our own. The leather belt and pouches are no heavier than the web belt, probably a trifle lighter, and the durability is greater. The cartridges are protected from the dirt, retain their lubricant, and are in less danger of being lost. Inserting the original package into the pouch and then removing the top by the aid of the string facilitates the operation of placing the cartridges in the belt and allows a gain of time that might be of material importance when the supply of ammunition is being replenished under fire.

INTRENCHING TOOL.—In the infantry two-thirds of the men carry the small shovel, the blade being about 7 inches broad and the same in depth, and the handle about 1 foot in length. The blade is inserted in a leather guard which is strapped to the belt. The other third of the soldiers carry picks.

CAVALRY ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.—The cavalry is armed with a carbine and saber. The noncommissioned officers also carry the pistol. Only the cavalry of the imperial guard carry the lance.

The carbine is habitually carried across the back, being slung over one of the shoulders. They have no carbine boot.

The saddle is padded and a blanket is also used. Judging by what I saw of the backs of the horses, the saddle is much inferior to our own.

In the rear pouches is carried a set of shoes for the horse; also a leather shield, that can be fastened to the hoof by thongs for use in an emergency.

In the front pouches there is always kept the one-day emergency ration of rice for both trooper and horse.

The horses are extremely small as compared to our own, being no more than ponies, so too, the weight they carry, live and dead, is much less than with our cavalry.

PAY.—The soldiers are divided into three classes, first, second, and third; the class being indicated by three, two, and one stripes of yellow on the lower part of the sleeve. In time of war they receive every ten days:

Third-class private	45 sen.
Second-class private	60 sen.
First-class private	80 sen.
Corporal	1 yen 80 sen.
Sergeant	2 yen 80 sen.

In time of peace officers receive monthly:

Sublieutenant	35 yen.
Lieutenant	45 yen.
Captain	65 yen.
Major	110 yen.
Lieutenant colonel	160 yen.
Colonel	210 yen.
Major general, Commander of brigade	310 yen.
Lieutenant general	420 yen.
General	525 yen.

The officers' salaries are increased by two-fifths in time of war. The yen is equal to about 50 cents gold and the sen to one-half cent gold.

THE RATION.—The ration consists of about 36 ounces of rice, 4 ounces of meat, and 4 ounces of vegetables. One day's ordinary ration is carried in the soldier's aluminum bucket which serves as his cooking utensil, and the hollow lid of which carries the meat portion. One day's emergency rations, consisting of three sacks of very fine quality rice and a tin of meat, containing about 4 ounces, is always carried, and can be used only by order of the commanding officer. It is the intention always to keep the regimental transportation sufficiently far to the front to make it unnecessary for the soldiers to carry more than one day's ordinary ration.

TRANSPORTATION.—The Japanese transportation consists of carts and pack animals. The cart is very light and is drawn by one pony attended by one man of the transport service.

As compared to our army or escort wagon, there is a great loss of man and draft animal labor; for the combatant force

of 18,000 the Japanese had 4,000 noncombatants and 6,000 horses.

The cart does have the advantage of not requiring such heavy or substantial bridges, and can go through narrower trails.

The pack saddle consists of two padded sides joined by iron arches. The packages are tied to or hung upon the saddle. It is well adapted to supplying ammunition to the firing line. One mule takes two boxes and can be led by the routes giving the most protection.

DISCIPLINE.—The discipline of the Japanese army is most excellent. Its military code has been borrowed from those of Europe, and retains their essential features. There are tribunals for the trial of serious offences and the punishment is usually imprisonment. The division commander has authority to approve the death sentence and to have the same executed.

Company, battalion, and regimental commanders can order corrective confinement. The length of time that can be ordered increases with the rank of the commander, the greatest being thirty days.

Only a few years ago, in what Japanese refer to as the "feudal times," corrective chastisement (such as cuffing the offender over the head or kicking him on the shins) was used for inattention at drill, etc. Now such proceeding is forbidden by their military code.

DRILL.—The drill of the Japanese infantry is characterized by simplicity, directness, and precision. In the manual of arms there are but three positions of the piece—order, right shoulder, and present.

The company is divided into three platoons, and each platoon into four groups; the habitual formation seems to be in line or column of platoons at about 5 yards distance. The rear rank stands and marches at about 1 yard distance from the front rank. The column of route is in fours if the road allows; if the road is too narrow for column of fours, then in column of twos. Fours are formed by all facing to the right (or left) and each alternate file stepping to the right oblique, so as to come abreast of the file immediately in front.

In the battle formation, the movements are at a run, the first platoon deploys to the front by an oblique fan-shaped movement, the other platoons kneeling. The front seems to

be about what the front of a company would be in battalion. The advance is made by rushes of about 50 yards, file firing being had at each halt. The two platoons in support follow, taking advantage of folds of the ground to obtain shelter during the halts. The second platoon takes part in the rapid-fire preceding the assault, joining under cover of the fire of the first platoon. The third platoon also comes up to immediately in rear of the firing line and takes part in the assault. In the rushes and the assault the officers and noncommissioned officers are in front, dropping back through the line on halting.

The drill is conspicuous by its precision and the attention paid by each soldier. Each one is wide awake to see what he ought to do, and does it without much prompting from the file closers. It is very seldom that one of the latter is heard to speak to any of the men. •

The Japanese soldier enters the service at 21, serves three years and then goes into the first reserve for five years. After that he goes into the second reserve for four years.

He receives almost no pay, but is actuated by a most intense patriotism and pride in his position as a soldier. He is very obedient, and yet has an individualism that does not always go with such strict discipline. He has a great curiosity to see what is going on, both on and off duty. As a sentinel he stands at ease, but with an air showing that he is a sentinel and that he is constantly on the alert.

The compulsory service and strict physical requirements with the system of reserves, allows Japan to put a large body of trained men in the field at short notice. And if Japan can keep the armament and equipment on a par with her soldiers she is a most valuable ally and a most formidable enemy.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major, Thirty-eighth Infantry.

REPORT ON THE FRENCH TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA.

BY MAJ. W. E. CRAIGHILL, FORTIETH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *October 30, 1900.*LIEUT. COL. JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,
Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V., Chief of Staff.

SIR: In compliance with your letter dated October 7th, 1900, assigning to me the duty of specially observing the French forces, I have the honor to submit the following report:

The total French force present in North China, province of Pechili, on October 1, consisted of about 15,000 combatants of all arms. The force was organized into a division of two brigades, of which the first, composed of marine, infantry, and artillery, was stationed at Pekin and on the line of communication from Tientsin to Pekin. The second brigade, composed of a regiment of zouaves and one of infantry of the line with artillery, was stationed at Tientsin. In detail, the organization was as follows:

AT TIENSIN.

Division headquarters and staff—
Two squadrons of cavalry.
Two companies of engineers.
Two wagon-train companies.

AT PEKIN.

First brigade (8,000 combatants), headquarters and staff:
Chief of artillery.
Supply department.
Medical department.
Detachment of engineers.
Detachment of mechanics.
Sixteenth marine infantry—
Headquarters and two battalions at Tientsin.
Third battalion on the line of communication from Pekin to Tientsin.
Seventeenth marine infantry—
Headquarters and two battalions, at Pekin.
One battalion, at Loukoukiao.

Eighteenth marine infantry—

Headquarters and first Battalion, at Peking.

Second battalion, at Tungchow.

Third battalion, at Matou.

First artillery battalion—

Two batteries, at Peking.

One battery, at Tientsin.

Second artillery battalion, at Peking and Tungchow.

Second brigade (7,000 combatants). The whole brigade was temporarily assembled at Tientsin. Its staff, artillery, and auxiliary troops were the same as those of the first brigade. It contained:

A regiment of zouaves of four battalions of 1,000 men each.

A regiment of infantry of the line of three battalions of 1,000 men each.

The normal organization of the various units in the French service is as follows:

REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Field and staff:

1 colonel or lieutenant colonel.

1 officer attached.

1 adjutant (mounted).

1 commissary (mounted).

1 color bearer (an officer).

1 surgeon.

(Sometimes in addition)—

1 lieutenant colonel.

1 chief musician.

Noncommissioned staff:

1 drum major.

1 pioneer corporal.

12 pioneers.

(Sometimes in addition)—

1 principal musician.

38 musicians.

Staff detachment:

1 transport officer.

1 transport sergeant.

1 chief artificer (mounted, with rank of sergeant major).

1 quartermaster sergeant.

1 chief litter bearer (sergeant).

1 chief armorer (corporal).

3 armorers.

1 sergeant.

1 corporal (clerk).

3 privates (clerks).

1 chief teamster (corporal).

1 chief farrier (corporal).

1 farrier.

- 1 corporal (butcher).
- 2 privates (butchers).
- 1 saddler.
- 4 bicyclists.
- 18 teamsters and grooms.
- 8 orderlies.

Three battalions, each:

- 1 major.
- 1 officer attached.
- 1 assistant surgeon (mounted).
- 1 adjutant.
- 1 assistant surgeon (not mounted).
- 1 artificer sergeant.
- 1 commissary sergeant.
- 1 corporal of field music (trumpet or drum)
- 1 litter bearer (corporal).
- 3 teamsters.
- 3 orderlies.

Four companies, each—

- 1 captain (mounted).
- 3 officers.
- 1 adjutant.
- 1 sergeant major.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant.
- 8 sergeants.
- 1 quartermaster corporal.
- 16 corporals.
- 4 drummers and trumpeters.
- 1 hospital corps man.*
- 4 litter bearers.
- 2 drivers.
- 1 shoemaker (in ranks).
- 1 tailor (in ranks).

Transportation for infantry.

Each company—

- 1 two-horse wagon.

Each battalion—

- 1 one-horse ambulance.
- 1 two-horse wagon for rations.
- 1 sutler's wagon.

Each regiment—

- 13 two-horse wagons for rations.
- 4 two-horse wagons.
- 1 two-horse wagon for baggage.

Total for the regiment:

- 32 two-horse wagons.
- 3 one-horse wagons.
- 3 sutler's wagons.

* In the first company of each battalion the hospital corps man has the rank of corporal.

Strength of company, 250 enlisted.
Strength of battalion, 1,000 enlisted.
Strength of regiment, 3,000 enlisted.

ORGANIZATION OF A REGIMENT OF CAVALRY.

Field and staff:

1 colonel or lieutenant colonel.
1 major.
1 captain or lieutenant.
1 paymaster.
1 commissary.
2 surgeons.
2 veterinarians.

(Sometimes in addition)—

1 lieutenant colonel.
1 major.
2 adjutants.
1 transport officer.

Noncommissioned staff:

1 chief trumpeter (sergeant or corporal).
1 chief armorer.
1 armorer.
1 sergeant (telegrapher).
1 corporal (telegrapher).
4 privates (telegraphers).
1 corporal (clerk).
2 privates (clerks).
1 hospital corps man (corporal).
1 chief saddler (corporal).
1 saddler.
2 bicyclists.
10 to 13 teamsters.
10 to 13 orderlies.

Four squadrons, each—

1 captain.
4 officers.
1 first sergeant.
1 commissary sergeant.
1 quartermaster sergeant.
6 sergeants.
1 quartermaster corporal.
12 corporals.
1 chief farrier (corporal).*
3 farriers.
4 trumpeters.
1 hospital corps man.
2 teamsters.

* Sometimes the chief farrier has the rank of sergeant instead of corporal.

In the ranks:

- 6 pioneers (mounted).
- 3 cadets (mounted).
- 1 saddler (not mounted).
- 1 tailor (not mounted).
- 1 shoemaker (not mounted).

Transportation for cavalry:

Each squadron has—

- 1 traveling forage, four-horse.

Each regiment has—

- 1 four-horse forage wagon.
(or else)

Each squadron has—

- 1 two-horse wagon.

Each regiment has—

- 1 four-horse forage wagon and 1 two-horse wagon,

Besides, in every case the regiment has—

- 2 two-horse sutler's wagons.
- 6 or 12 two-horse wagons for rations.
- 2 one-horse ambulances.

Total strength of squadron 150 sabres.

Total strength of regiment 600 sabres.

ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION.**Artillery staff of an army corps:**

- 1 chief of artillery.
- 1 orderly officer.
- 1 chief of staff, lieutenant colonel or major.
- 3 officers.
- 1 ordnance man, mounted.
- 2 bicyclists.
- 1 corporal (escort).
- 5 privates (escorts).
- 1 corporal (clerk).
- 1 private (clerk).
- 2 wagons for baggage and records.

Artillery staff of a division of infantry:

- 1 colonel or lieutenant colonel commanding the divisional artillery.
- 2 officers attached.
- 2 bicyclists.
- 5 privates.
- 7 horses.
- 1 wagon.

Staff of the reserve artillery—

- Like the artillery staff of a division of infantry.

Organization of a battalion of field artillery:

- 1 major.
- 2 officers attached.
- 1 commissary.
- 1 assistant surgeon.
- 1 veterinarian.
- 1 assistant surgeon (mounted).
- 1 hospital corps man (corporal).
- 1 chief litter bearer (corporal).
- 3 batteries, each—
 - 1 captain.
 - 3 officers.
 - 1 adjutant.
 - 1 first sergeant.
 - 9 sergeants.
 - 1 artificer sergeant.
 - 1 quartermaster sergeant.
 - 1 commissary sergeant.
- 10 corporals.
 - 1 quartermaster corporal.
 - 1 chief farrier (corporal).*
 - 2 farriers (3 in divisional artillery).
 - 6 artificers.
 - 2 blacksmiths.
 - 2 carpenters.
 - 2 saddlers.
 - 1 hospital corps man.
 - 4 litter bearers.

In the ranks—

- 1 shoemaker.
- 1 tailor.

Total enlisted strength of battery, 100 men with 150 horses.

- 6 pieces of 80-millimeter caliber.
- 1 forge.
- 1 battery wagon.
- 1 forage wagon.
- 9 caissons.†

Total, 18 six-horse carriages.

Additional wagons of each battalion—

- 1 one-horse ambulance.
- 1 two-horse sutler's wagon.
- 9 wagons for rations.
- 2 two-horse wagons for baggage.

Organization of a battalion of horse artillery:

Field and staff—

Like the field battery, but no senior assistant surgeon and no corporal of the hospital corps, and no litter bearers. The horse artillery of a division of cavalry has the same field and staff as the field artillery, except it has no litter bearers and has one bicyclist.

*Sometimes the chief farrier has the rank of sergeant instead of corporal.

† In the artillery of a cavalry division, one of the caissons is loaded with cartridges.

Three batteries, each—

Same as the field battery but has no litter bearers.

Organization of a mountain battery:

Like that of the field battery, but has besides,

- 1 veterinarian,
- 1 assistant surgeon (mounted).
- 1 sergeant less.
- 6 pieces, 80-millimeter caliber.
- 6 carriages.
- 70 ammunition boxes.
- 1 forge.
- 8 boxes for tools and supplies.
- 2 unfilled boxes.
- 80 pack mules.
- 6 draft horses or mules.
- 3 wagons for rations.

Organization of a corps artillery park:

Field and staff—

- 1 lieutenant colonel commanding.
- 2 captains (attached as staff).
- 1 major, commanding the troops.
- 1 lieutenant (attached as staff).
- 1 surgeon.
- 4 ordnance men.
- 1 controleur d' armes.
- 2 artisans.
- 1 artificer sergeant.
- 2 bicyclists.

Organization of the artillery park of an army:

- 1 colonel or lieutenant colonel.
- 1 major.
- 2 captains (attached as staff).
- 1 surgeon.
- 9 ordnance men, of whom one is an artificer.
- 2 artisans.
- 6 men.
- 10 horses.

TABLE SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN THE FIELD.

Infantry—Number of cartridges carried per man.

With the troops:	
By the men	120
By company wagons	65.6
By ammunition train	69.1
By baggage train	2.6
	257.1
With the corps reserve train:	
By the army train	48.5
	305.6
Total for both	
At the ordnance depots and arsenal:	
Are intended to replace expenditures from the corps reserve supply and from the ammunition train.	

Artillery—Number of rounds per piece.

	Light battery.		Horse battery, 80-mm.
	90-mm.	80-mm.	
With the troops:			
In the ammunition chests of the battery.....	142.3	156	142
In the ammunition train.....	62.1	89	
	204.4	245	142
With the corps reserve train:			
The army train.....	52.3	93.5	
Total.....	256.7	338.5	142

The expenditures from the corps reserve and the ammunition train are supplied as for the infantry.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF A BATTERY.

Kind of projectile.	80-mm. mounted battery.	80-mm. field, light.	Horse artillery.	90-mm.	95-mm.	120-mm.
Shell.....	70	84	84	75	72	240
Shrapnel.....	420	828	744	750	672	
Fixed ammunition.....						288
Canister.....	12	24	24	29	12	
Total.....	502	936	852	854	756	528
Number of rounds per piece.....	83.5	156	142	142	126	88

ARMS.

The infantry and engineers are armed with the Lebel 8-millimeter rifle. It has a long barrel with the magazine extending under the barrel. Eight shots can be fired without reloading. It has a cut-off to provide for its use as a single shot rifle, but has no safety lock.

The bayonet has a very long, slender rapier-shaped blade. The scabbard is of leather and hangs from the belt by a leather loop.

The ammunition is carried in pouches on a black leather belt. One hundred and twenty rounds are carried in this manner and 40 more can be carried on the person when going into action.

The marine artillery (understood to correspond very nearly to our foot or garrison artillery) is equipped as is the infantry, except that it has a short carbine with long sword bayonet. The carbine is of the same make as the rifle and fires the rifle ammunition.

Its magazine is under the bolt and takes the ammunition in clips of three cartridges each.

The cavalry was said to have a similar carbine, but without the bayonet.

EQUIPMENT.

The pack of the French soldier is very similar to our own knapsack. An overcoat, blanket, and shelter tent are carried rolled horseshoe fashion over the top, with an extra pair of shoes on each side.

A haversack is carried, capable of containing two days' rations, two more days being provided for in the company wagons. Each squad has a mess kettle for cooking the food of the squad; each man is furnished with a knife, fork, and spoon in his haversack, a cup hung on his canteen, and a small tin pail or covered dish on the top of his knapsack.

During the hot weather, the uniform worn was blue cotton cloth, blouse and trousers of the same color. The head-gear was a white helmet with a blue cover, which was worn rolled up from the back, so as to leave the white top and back exposed. The device lacks beauty, but doubtless has an advantage in giving the benefit of a white covering for the head, with the color in front uniform with the rest of the clothing.

The shoes were of heavy black leather, and worn without stockings when in the field. The uniform includes "putties" wound around the leg below the knee, in the fashion of the British infantry.

The winter clothing was of dark-blue heavy cloth, trousers of the same cloth as the blouse and having a red stripe in the marine artillery and infantry, and in the engineers. Troops of the line wear the well-known red trousers of the French service. The winter head-gear worn was the forage cap with red corded seams.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

The system of supplying ammunition for the infantry as indicated in the tabulated statement previously given, contemplates the soldier's carrying a large number of rounds (120) on his person, and if practicable supplying himself with 40 rounds more before going into action, from the company wagons which have about 65 rounds per man. This leaves about 25 rounds remaining as reserve in the company or battalion commander's hands to be brought forward to the line if possible, after the action is in progress, by means he may

have at his disposal. There is a further reserve in the baggage train of about 7,500 rounds for the regiment, which would serve to supplement any local deficiencies which might have occurred by any one unit of the regiment expending more than the average. In the regular ammunition train 69 rounds per man are carried and in the corps train 48 rounds more making a total of 300 rounds per man.

This corresponds very closely to our own practice, except that the French soldier can carry more ammunition in his belt than ours.

Our experience at Santiago, Tientsin, and on other occasions is sufficient to impress the lesson of the difficulty in many cases of getting ammunition forward across the fire-swept space, to a line that is hotly engaged, and of the importance of providing in advance wherever the command is known to be going into a severe engagement, an ample supply of ammunition carried on the person of each soldier. Our belt filled with 100 rounds is as much as a soldier can properly be required habitually to carry on a march or other ordinary duty in the field, and it may be supplemented in an emergency by 40 more rounds carried in the pockets of the blue shirt and 5 in his rifle, but it would seem desirable to follow the custom of the French and many of the other foreign services and provide some habitual and well-settled method of giving our men, before going into action, more ammunition than they can now readily carry.

A noticeable feature of the French army, in common apparently with nearly all except our own, is the provision for a detachment of clerks and orderlies, and the necessary special-duty men for the service at the different headquarters, and of a corps of special-service men for the transportation and other purposes of the supply department. The result of this arrangement by which soldiers are not taken away from their companies on special duty, can not fail to be conducive to the efficiency and better discipline of the various organizations of combatant troops, besides avoiding the serious drain on the strength of the fighting units so familiar in our service as the result of our system of special and extra duty details.

* * * * *

Very respectfully,

W. E. CRAIGHILL,
Major, Fortieth Infantry.

REPORT ON THE GERMAN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA.

BY LIEUT. COL. J. T. DICKMAN, TWENTY-SIXTH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

PEKIN, CHINA, *November 10, 1900.*ADJUTANT GENERAL, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
Pekin, China.

SIR: In obedience to instructions received, I have the honor to submit the following report of the German troops at present serving in North China:

On the 26th of August, 1900, the force of German troops at Peking consisted of 1,200 men, namely, one battalion of marine infantry of 1,000 men, and 200 sailors from the *Hansa*. Captain Pohl, of the German Navy, as senior officer, commanded this force until the arrival of General von Hoepfner about September 1. On September 11 the German commander claimed to have 2,000 men and six guns in or near Peking. At the time of Field Marshal von Waldersee's arrival at Peking, October 17, the German forces in China consisted of the following troops:

First East Asiatic infantry brigade, consisting of the first and second infantry regiments, each of eight companies, with an additional or ninth company for duty on the line of communications.

Second East Asiatic infantry brigade, consisting of the third and fourth regiments, with the same organization.

Third East Asiatic infantry brigade, consisting of the fifth and sixth regiments, with the same organization.

East Asiatic cavalry regiment, consisting of four squadrons.

East Asiatic field artillery regiment, consisting of three *abtheilungen* of three batteries each.

East Asiatic pioneer battalion, consisting of three companies.

East Asiatic railway battalion, consisting of three companies.

One ammunition column *abtheilung*, reenforced by:

2 infantry ammunition columns.

2 artillery ammunition columns.

2 field howitzer ammunition columns.

3 supply columns.

1 field bakery column.

6 field hospitals.

1 horse depot.

- 1 line of communications ammunition column.
- 1 clothing depot.
- 1 hospital ship.

Also the original force of:

- 2 battalions of marine infantry.
- 1 pioneer company.
- 1 battery, old-model guns, caliber 88 millimeters.
- One-fourth of a sanitary company.

The commander of the forces is Lieutenant General von Lessel, stationed in Tientsin, Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, with headquarters at Peking, being commander of the allied troops in China, with Major General Grossgenannt von Schwarzhoff as chief of staff.

The Germans have their troops in quarters; none under canvas. The marine infantry is in the German section in the Chinese city; the artillery is on Haitemen or Ketteler street; the cavalry detachment is near the general headquarters at the Winter Palace. When the Russians withdrew they made over their buildings, gates, etc., to the Germans.

ORGANIZATION.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A BATTALION OF MARINE INFANTRY.

Battalion staff:

Officers and civil officers—

- 1 lieutenant colonel or major, entitled to 1 servant, 2 grooms, and 3 horses.
- 1 adjutant (lieutenant), entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 battalion surgeon, with rank of staff surgeon, entitled to 1 servant.
- 1 assistant surgeon, entitled to 1 servant.
- 1 chief paymaster, with 1 servant.

Enlisted men and minor officials—

- 1 chief musician.
- 9 musicians (noncommissioned officers).
- 19 musicians (gefreite).
- 8 musicians (privates).
- 1 chief clerk (sergeant).
- 1 clerk (noncommissioned officer).
- 1 orderly sergeant.
- 1 drummer sergeant.
- 1 armorer.
- 2 orderlies (privates).
- 5 servants (privates).
- 3 grooms (privates).

Total, 5 officers and civil officials, 55 men and minor officials, 5 personal servants, 3 personal grooms, and 5 horses.

Organization of each company:

Officers—

- 1 captain, with one servant and one horse.
- 1 first lieutenant, with 1 servant.
- 3 second lieutenants, with 3 servants.
- 1 first sergeant.
- 1 second sergeant.
- 13 noncommissioned officers.
- 20 corporals (gefreite).
- 206 privates.
- 4 field musicians.
- 1 sanitary mate.
- 5 servants (privates).

Total, 5 officers, 256 men, 5 personal servants, and 1 horse.

UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT.—The uniform of the German marine infantry is as follows: The blouse (litewka) is of dark-blue woolen material, made full, the sleeves taken in at the wrist like those of our blue shirts. It has a turn-down collar, rather wide, with two white patches about 2 by 3 inches at the ends. Two yellow stripes about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch wide divide the white field into three equal parts longitudinally. The shoulder flaps are of the same color as the blouse. Crossed anchors and a miter at the upper end, and the number of the battalion at the outer end, are embroidered in yellow silk. Loose blue trousers same color as blouse. Short heavy-soled and hob-nailed boots. Small round cap without visor; color blue, piped with white around crown; bulging top; white band $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches wide; circular button showing concentric rings of the national colors is fastened on the band.

Photographs were taken of groups of three men in various uniforms and equipment:

- 1. Feldmarschmässiger Anzug, or equipment for the field.
- 2. Sturmanzug, or light marching order.
- 3. Wachtanzug, for guard duty.
- 4. Fatigue dress.

No. 1 was in khaki uniform, with white helmets having low tops and rather wide brims. They carried a square leather knapsack. The cape, rolled, was fastened in reversed U-shape to the top and sides of knapsack. Brown shelter tent on top of cape. They also carry a water bottle covered with brown felt. The cooking apparatus is carried in the center of the back below knapsack. A small brown haversack is carried on the right side and hangs rather low. The "iron ration" is in the knapsack.

No. 2 carried a water bottle, shelter tent (and poles) of brown canvas, cooking apparatus, and haversack, in addition to arms and ammunition. The clothing was all blue.

No. 3 was the same as No. 2, leaving off the field equipments.

No. 4, working clothes, sailor pattern short jackets, large turn-down collar, made of white drill.

The arm is the Mauser rifle, caliber 79 millimeters. The bayonet (Seitengewehr) is very long, almost a sword. The ammunition is carried in two pouches, attached to a black leather belt which at the back rests on two buttons sewed to the blouse. The pouches contain 45 rounds each; 30 rounds are carried in the knapsack.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT OF THE EAST ASIATIC
EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.

Each regiment has two battalions of four companies each, and an additional or ninth company.

Regimental staff:

Officers—

- 1 colonel, entitled to 1 servant, 2 grooms, and 3 horses.
- 1 lieutenant colonel, entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 adjutant (first lieutenant), entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.

Noncommissioned officers and men—

- 1 clerk (sergeant).
- 1 chief musician.
- 36 musicians (noncommissioned officers and privates).
- 1 driver (private).
- 4 grooms (privates).
- 4 servants (privates).

Total, 3 officers and 47 men, 3 personal servants, 4 personal grooms, and 9 horses.

Battalion staff:

Officers and civilian officials—

- 1 major, entitled to 1 servant, 2 grooms, and 3 horses.
- 1 adjutant (first lieutenant), entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 surgeon, entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 1 horse.
- 1 assistant surgeon, entitled to 1 servant, 1 groom, and 1 horse.
- 1 paymaster.

Enlisted men and minor officials—

- 1 paymaster candidate.
- 1 clerk.
- 1 quartermaster sergeant, with 1 horse.

3 drivers (privates), with 6 horses in charge.

5 grooms (privates).

1 drummer sergeant.

Total, 5 officers and civilian officials, and 12 men and minor officials, 4 officer's servants, 5 grooms and 14 horses.

Company organization:

Officers—

1 captain, with 1 servant and 1 horse.

1 first lieutenant, with 1 servant and 1 horse.

3 lieutenants, with 3 servants and 3 horses.

Enlisted men—

1 first sergeant.

1 second sergeant.

4 sergeants.

10 noncommissioned officers.

18 gefreite (lance corporals).

158 privates.

4 field musicians.

1 armorer.

1 cyclist (private).

3 drivers (privates).

1 groom (private).

1 hospital steward.

Total, 5 officers, 204 men, 5 officer's servants, and 5 horses.

Uniform does not differ materially from that already described, except that the facings are red. Armament and equipment also practically the same.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF THE EAST ASIATIC EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.

The regiment is organized in three abtheilungen, namely: First and second abtheilungen each with two light batteries and one mountain battery, and third abtheilung with two light batteries.

Regimental staff:

Officers—

1 lieutenant colonel, with 1 servant, 2 grooms, and three horses.

1 major, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.

1 adjutant (first lieutenant), with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.

1 chief veterinarian, with 1 servant and 1 horse.

Enlisted men—

1 clerk, with 1 horse.

1 chief trumpeter, with 1 horse.

1 driver, with 2 horses.

4 grooms, with 6 horses.

Total, 4 officers, 7 men, 4 officers' servants, 4 officers' grooms, and 18 horses.

Abtheilung staff:**Officers and civilian officials—**

- 1 major, with 1 servant, 2 grooms, and 3 horses.
- 1 adjutant (first lieutenant), with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 surgeon, with 1 servant and 1 horse.
- 1 assistant surgeon, with 1 servant and 1 horse.
- 1 veterinarian, with 1 servant and 1 horse.
- 1 paymaster, with 1 servant and 1 horse.

Enlisted men and minor officials—

- 1 paymaster candidate, with 1 horse.
- 1 trumpeter (noncommissioned officer), with 1 horse.
- 1 clerk (sergeant), with 1 horse.
- 1 cyclist (private).
- 1 driver (private), with 2 horses.
- 3 grooms (privates), with 3 horses.

Total, 6 officers and officials, 8 men and minor officials, 6 servants, 3 grooms, and 17 horses.

Battery organization:**Officers—**

- 1 captain, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 first lieutenant, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 3 lieutenants, with 3 servants, 3 grooms, and 3 horses.

Enlisted men—

- 1 first sergeant, with 1 horse.
- 1 second sergeant, with 1 horse.
- 3 sergeants, with 3 horses.
- 7 noncommissioned officers, with 7 horses.
- 12 gefreite (lance corporals), with 12 horses.
- 107 privates, with 107 horses.
- 3 trumpeters, with 3 horses.
- 1 driver (private), with 2 horses.
- 5 grooms (privates), with 5 horses.
- 1 blacksmith, with 1 horse.
- 1 hospital steward, with 1 horse.

Total, 5 officers, 142 men, 5 officers' servants, 5 officers' grooms, and 153 horses.

UNIFORM.—Blue blouse, loosely fitting; black trousers, reenforced with black leather; short boots; black, patent leather helmet, plated with much metal. Armed with the latest model Mauser carbine, caliber 79 millimeters. Black belts; ammunition carried in two pouches shaped like the new field-glass cases, pouches above the hips and containing three clips of 5 cartridges each. Trousers have a red welt. Shoulder flaps also red, with shell and flame embroidered in yellow.

All the men of the battery are armed with the Mauser carbine, which is a very strong shooting weapon. It is carried by passing a short sling over one shoulder.

The men also carry a revolver. It is secured in a holster of fair leather. The cartridges are carried in a separate pouch, slung from a strap over the left shoulder and resting at the small of the back. The caliber of the revolver seemed large, about 11 millimeters. In the equipment above described, which was represented to me as "feldmarschmässig," there were no haversacks, knapsacks, or water bottles.

The new field pieces, caliber 77 millimeters, appear somewhat heavier and shorter than our field gun. They are bronzed and suitably engraved on the chase near the trunnions. Near the muzzle there is an enlargement of the exterior diameter of about 2 inches. The rifling is with increasing twist up to within 7 centimeters of the muzzle, after which there is uniform twist. The breech mechanism, which is of the single-motion block type, contains an arrangement which automatically ejects the powder case when the breech-block is opened after firing the piece. The motion of the breechblock cocks the piece, which is then fired by pulling the lanyard, the firing pin (Schlagbolzen) impinging on a cap in the powder case. There is also a simple safety arrangement which renders it impossible to discharge the piece. When the piece is loaded the projectile is placed in the breech, followed by the case containing the powder charge. Close the block and the piece is ready to fire. The powder cases are picked up to be reloaded and primed.

The brake is thrown into condition for action by a lever; after that it acts automatically upon recoil. A strong, flat-braided galvanized wire rope is wound around the enlarged brass hub of the gun-carriage wheels. As the wheels move to the rear this rope draws the brake-shoe up against the wheel with the firmest kind of a grip.

At the end of the trail, and resting on the trail when not in action, is a large spur, 18 inches long. When the piece is unlimbered this spur is let down from the end of the trail by simply revolving it to the rear. Its edge, 18 inches long, then rests on the ground in a direction perpendicular to the plane of fire. With the combined action of the brake and the spur the movements of the piece are small.

In the limber chest 36 rounds are carried, all shrapnel. Two case shots are carried attached to the trail.

The gun carriages are painted light-blue, the iron parts black. A soft Russia-leather cover protected the breech mechanism and another the muzzle.

The officers spoke highly of the accurate shooting qualities of the gun, and altogether seemed very proud of it.

The abtheilung commander (major) wore light-blue uniform, being a simple blouse and riding breeches; a low forage cap with bulging top, and small, black patent-leather visor; silver-cord shoulder knots.

The horse equipments of the battery were of fair leather with silver ornaments, and were kept in excellent condition. The horses were Walers of rather coarse breed.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CAVALRY REGIMENT OF THE EAST ASIATIC EXPEDITIONARY CORPS, WITH FOUR SQUADRONS.

Regimental staff:

Officers and civilian officials:—

- 1 colonel, with 1 servant, 2 grooms, and 3 horses.
- 1 major, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 adjutant (first lieutenant), with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 1 chief surgeon, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 1 horse.
- 1 assistant surgeon, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 1 horse.
- 1 paymaster, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 1 horse.
- 1 chief veterinarian, with 1 servant and 1 horse.
- 1 veterinarian, with 1 servant and 1 horse.

Enlisted men and minor officials:

- 1 paymaster candidate, with 1 horse.
- 1 clerk (sergeant), with 1 horse.
- 1 chief trumpeter (second sergeant), with 1 horse.
- 6 grooms (privates), with 6 horses.
- 1 driver (private), with 2 horses.

Total: 8 officers and officials, 10 men and minor officials, 8 officers' servants, 7 officers' grooms, 23 horses.

Squadron organization:

Officers—

- 1 captain, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 3 horses.
- 1 first lieutenant, with 1 servant, 1 groom, and 2 horses.
- 3 lieutenants, with 3 servants, 3 grooms, and 6 horses.

Enlisted men—

- 1 first sergeant, with 1 horse.
- 1 second sergeant, with 1 horse.
- 4 sergeants, with 4 horses.
- 8 noncommissioned officers, with 8 horses.
- 3 trumpeters, with 3 horses.
- 20 gefreite (lance corporals), with 20 horses.
- 112 privates, with 112 horses.
- 1 blacksmith, with 1 horse.
- 1 hospital steward, with 1 horse.
- 2 drivers, with 4 horses.
- 7 grooms (privates), with 7 horses.

Total: 5 officers, 160 men, 5 officers' servants, 5 officers' grooms, 173 horses.

UNIFORM.—The German troops did not bring their full-dress uniforms. The cavalry soldiers on guard at the field marshal's headquarters were dressed as follows:

Helmet of enameled black leather, with eagle and spike, and a quantity of other metal; chin strap covered with metal, except the part that goes under the jaws. The chin strap is not worn on the chin but passes just in front of the throat.

The blouse of wool, light-brown color, with turn-down collar; two patches of scarlet, about 2 by 3 inches, near ends of collar.

Trousers are black, reenforced with black leather.

Boots of black leather reach to the knee.

Neither gloves nor gauntlets were worn by the men.

ARMAMENT.—The German cavalry is armed with the Mauser carbine, caliber 79 millimeters, latest model. The soldier carries 45 cartridges in nine clips on his person; 50 rounds are carried on the saddle. The saber is attached to the belt when dismounted.

The lance is of steel tubing, bronzed; cross-section of the point is rectangular. A black and white pennant is attached to the lance.

EQUIPMENTS.—The waist belt is of fair leather. Another belt of fair leather passes over the left shoulder. It has four small pockets on the portion passing over the breast and five at the back, each holding one Mauser clip with five cartridges. The spurs are permanently fastened to the heels of the boots; the rowel has eight points.

The horses are mostly Walers and a rather sorry lot. It is true they are still out of condition from their long voyage, but no amount of training will remedy their defective conformation, such as ewe necks and goose rumps.

The German saddle is of fair leather, flat seat, low pommel, broad cantle, long side bars, padded. The excellent brown woolen blanket is large enough to cover the whole horse. It is folded into nine thicknesses. The girth is a leather strap fully four inches wide; it is fastened by means of buckles well up on the blanket. Two saddle skirts reach about half way down to the stirrups and protect the trousers, serving to some extent as sweat leathers. Light breast straps are used to keep the saddle from slipping to the rear. The saddle skirts have a slightly raised roll in front to increase security against the rider's slipping forward. The surcingle is not

used. The horse is bitted with curb and snaffle, the latter of course detachable. The curb bit is a mild one with a large bar with light port.

The carbine is carried in a boot, or more properly speaking, a case attached to the cantle on the right side. It hangs vertically and is secured in the case by a strap.

The pouch on the right side of the pommel contains the soldier's underwear and other small articles. The pouch on the left side of the pommel holds horse brush, currycomb, and horse cloth. To each of the pommel pouches are attached two small pockets, one holding two horseshoes and the other five clips of cartridges. The cooking utensils in a fair leather case are attached to the left cantle. The saber also is suspended from the cantle on the left side. The overcoat (gray color), rolled, and one day's grain are carried on the cantle. The extra blanket carried in cold weather is placed under the saddle, on top of the saddle blanket. The "iron ration" is carried in the right pommel pouch. The stable-clothes, made of drill, are folded and carried strapped under the pommel pouches, the blouse on one side and the trousers on the other. The halter shank is rolled and the end fastened to the halter on the left side.

All the leather horse equipments are of fair leather.

A socket for the lance is attached to the right stirrup.

The German troops are not provided with canvas but depend upon billeting. In a country as densely populated as China, this is, of course, entirely feasible. One serious disadvantage is the danger of infection to men and animals. Proper officers precede the main body of the command and mark the accommodations for men and animals on the entrances of houses and inclosures. Practice makes them skilful and they do it very rapidly.

The marching of the troops, as far as observed, has been excellent. The organizations kept well closed up with a few stragglers. It is true, however, that the weather has been especially favorable.

The German officers are well educated—many of them speaking several languages—clean and well dressed, polite, punctilious in their military courtesies, and imbued with zeal for their service.

The discipline of the men as far as observed at Peking is excellent. They present a neat appearance and are respectful

to officers of all nations. There have been complaints from Tientsin and other points as to dirty appearance and rough conduct of German officers; it is believed these cases are exceptional.

It was observed that some of their men on foot salute with the hand, whereas most of them simply turn the head and raise the chin and look at the officers. This seems to be the rule with mounted men. Such method of saluting did not impress me favorably.

Detachment commanders give the command "eyes right" or "left" and if under arms take the parade step upon meeting officers.

* * * * *

The German soldier strikes me as obedient and thoroughly under control of his officers.

* * * * *

Very respectfully,

J. T. DICKMAN,

Lieutenant Colonel, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.

REPORT ON THE BRITISH TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA.

BY LIEUT. COL. J. T. DICKMAN, TWENTY-SIXTH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

PEKIN, CHINA, *November 1, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.

SIR: In compliance with your letter of instructions of October 5, 1900, creating a department of military intelligence, and with the verbal assignment of the director of that department, I have the honor to make the following report on the organization and working of the British troops of the relief expedition of the allied powers in North China:

In the latter part of June, 1900, when it became apparent that an expedition would have to be sent to China, the commanding general of the British forces in India, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, drew up a scheme for the mobilization of an expeditionary force to China, the essential features of which are reproduced below.

1. At the request of Her Majesty's Government a division of all arms, to be entitled the China expeditionary force, as

detailed below, will be mobilized at once and dispatched to China.

2. COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE.—The force will be made up as follows:

First infantry brigade:

- Seventh Bengal Infantry (Fort William).
- Twenty-sixth Bombay Infantry (Quetta).
- First Sikh Infantry (Kohat).
- Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry (Rawal Pindi).
- No. 39 native field hospital (Jubbulpore).
- No. 43 native field hospital (Lucknow).
- No. 1 brigade supply column.

Second infantry brigade:

- Second Bengal Infantry (Dera Ismail Khan).
- Fourteenth Sikh Infantry (Nowshera).
- Fourteenth Gurkha Rifles (Bakloh).
- Third Bombay Infantry (Chaman).
- No. 63 native field hospital (Poona).
- No. 66 native field hospital (Bangalore).
- No. 2 brigade supply column.

Of these troops the first brigade reached the theater of operations, No. 43 native field hospital took station at Tientsin and Weihaiwei. The second brigade remained at Hongkong, except No. 66 native field hospital, which was reported as en route from Hongkong.

Divisional troops:

- Twelfth battery R. F. A. (Jullundur), at Pekin.
- No. 7 ammunition column unit (Mooltan), at Pekin.
- First Bengal Lancers (Lucknow), at Pekin.
- First Madras Pioneers (Bangalore), at Pekin.
- No. 4 company Bengal Sappers and Miners (Roorkee), at Pekin.
- No. 3 company Madras Sappers and Miners (Bangalore), at Tientsin.
- No. 2 company Bombay Sappers and Miners (Kirkee), not arrived.
- One printing section at Tientsin.
- Eight special signaling units, British infantry (Calcutta), at Pekin.
- Section B., No. 22, British field hospital (Calcutta), at Tientsin.
- No. 42 native field hospital (Umballa), at Tientsin.
- No. 2 brigade supply column at Pekin.

Line of communication troops:

- Twenty-second Bombay Infantry (Whow and Indore) garrison troops.
- Third Madras Infantry (Secunderabad), at Hongkong.
- One telegraph section, Madras Sappers and Miners (Bangalore).
- One railway section (Calcutta).
- One ordnance field park.
- One engineer field park.

Section A, No. 25, British field hospital (Madras), as base hospital for British officers and soldiers.

No. 47 native field hospital (Whow).

No. 41 native field hospital (Secunderabad) for sick and wounded returning from the field.

No. 4 medical store depot (Calcutta).

One native general hospital, 400 beds (Calcutta).

One native military base depot at Weihaiwei.

One base supply depot.

Punjab coolie corps:

No. 1 Punjab Coolie Corps (Pekin).

No. 2 Punjab Coolie Corps (Tientsin).

No. 3 Punjab Coolie Corps (Tientsin).

No. 4 Punjab Coolie Corps (Tientsin).

No. 54 native field hospital (Meean Meer).

3. **STRENGTH, ESTABLISHMENT, AND BAGGAGE.**—(a) All units will proceed at field-service strength and scale of equipment, relief scale of baggage, and field-service scale of tentage. Officers will take all their uniforms (except tunics and mess kits) and troops will take serge or cloth clothing in addition to field-service kit. The relief scale of baggage will be as far as port of debarkation only.

(b) Native infantry and pioneer battalions will be provided with full field-service complement of 12 British officers.

4. **DEPOTS.**—Depots will be formed as prescribed in the field-service equipment tables. Native infantry depots will be on scale F.

5. **SUPPLY BATTERY.**—The Fifty-seventh battery R. F. A. will be the supplying battery of the Twelfth battery R. F. A.

6. **MOVEMENTS IN RELIEF.**—Prescribes changes of station so as to occupy garrisons vacated by the mobilized division.

7. **COMMAND AND STAFF.**—Commanding officers and staffs to be as follows:

Divisional staff:

Commanding, with the local rank of major general: Brig. Gen.

Sir A. Gaselee, A. D. C., K. C. B., I. S. C.

Aid-de-camp: Capt. B. T. Pell, the Queen's Royal West Surrey regiment.

Aid-de-camp: Lieut. R. A. Steel, Seventh Bengal Cavalry.

Deputy adjutant general: Brig. Gen. E. G. Barrow, C. B., I. S. C.

Assistant adjutant and quartermaster general: Lieut. Col. G. H.

W. O'Sullivan, R. E.

Deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general: Capt. E. Phillips, Fifth Gurkha Rifles.

Marine transport officer: Commander F. H. Elderton, Royal Indian Marine.

Deputy assistant quartermaster general for intelligence: Capt. E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment.

Field intelligence officer: Capt. MacG. R. E. Ray, Seventh D. C. O. (Rajputs).

Principal medical officer: J. T. B. Barkey, V. H. S., I. M. S.

Special service officers:

Capt. G. H. G. Mockler, Third Madras Infantry.

Capt. the Honorable H. D. Napier, First Central India Horse.

Capt. G. De S. Barrow, First Bengal Cavalry.

Commanding Royal Engineers: Maj. G. K. Scott-Moncrief, R. E.

Adjutant Royal Engineers: P. E. Picton, R. E.

Assistant engineer (railways): Lieut. H. E. C. Cowie, R. E.

Assistant field engineer (telegraphs): Lieut. S. G. Loch, R. E.

Superintendent army signaling: Capt. R. C. Rigby, first battalion, Wiltshire Regiment.

Provost marshal: Capt. R. B. Low, D. S. O., Ninth Bengal Lancers.

Ordnance officer: Capt. M. S. C. Campbell, R. A.

Field paymaster: Capt. C. N. Baker, military accounts department.

Staff surgeon: To be detailed from the force.

Chief commissariat and transport officer: Maj. J. W. Bond, assistant commissary general.

Assistant to chief commissariat and transport officer: Lieut. H. N. Young, deputy assistant commissary general.

Divisional transport officer: Maj. F. C. W. Rideout, assistant commissary general.

Assistant to divisional transport officer: Maj. H. D. McIntyre, Eighth Madras Infantry.

Commissariat and transport officer for divisional troops: Lieut. L. M. P. Deas, deputy assistant commissary general.

Assistant to commissariat and transport officer for divisional troops: Lieut. R. M. Hall, Thirteenth Bengal Lancers.

Veterinary officer: Veterinary Capt. E. H. Hazelton, A. V. D.

First infantry brigade staff:

General officer commanding: Brig. Gen. Sir Norman R. Stewart, Bart., I. S. C.

Orderly officer: Maj. A. W. Leonard, Fifth Infantry, Hyderabad contingent.

Deputy assistant adjutant general: Capt. T. Jermyn, Second Sikh Infantry.

Deputy assistant quartermaster general: Capt. H. T. Brooking, Twenty-first Madras Pioneers.

Brigade signaling officer: Lieut. C. R. Scott-Elliot, Fourth Madras Pioneers.

Brigade commissariat and transport officer: Capt. R. E. Vaughn, assistant commissary general.

Assistant to brigade commissariat and transport officer: Capt. D. R. Adye, Sixth Infantry Hyderabad Contingent.

Second brigade staff:

General officer commanding: Brig. Gen. O. M. Creagh, V. C., I. S. C.

Orderly officer: Capt. W. A. Watson, Second Central India Horse.

Deputy assistant adjutant general: Capt. J. M. Stewart, Twenty-fifth Gurkhas.

Deputy assistant quartermaster general: Capt. J. A. Houisson-Crawford, Seventh Bombay Infantry.

Brigade signaling officer: Capt. J. Gaisford, Twenty-fifth Punjab Infantry.

Brigade commissariat and transport officer: Capt. F. C. Rampini, deputy assistant commissary general.

Assistant to brigade commissariat and transport officer: Lieut. M. R. W. Nightingale, Twenty-fifth Gurkhas.

Line of communications and base staff:

Base commandant and in charge of line of communications: Col. L. R. H. D. Campbell, I. S. C.

Deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general base and communications: Lieut. Col. J. C. Swann, First Bombay Grenadiers.

Principal medical officer of line of communications: Lieut. Col. H. F. P. F. Esmonde-White, I. M. S., Madras.

Commandant native military base depot: Maj. W. S. De LaMain, Seventy-third Bombay Rifles.

Adjutant native military base depot: Lieut. E. C. Creagh, Fourth Punjab Infantry.

Base commissariat and transport officer: Capt. A. W. Cripps, assistant commissary general.

Assistants to base commissariat and transport officer: Capt. F. E. Geoghegan, deputy assistant commissary general, and Lieut. W. St. G. Chamier, deputy assistant commissary general.

Transport officers:

Senior transport officer: Maj. S. G. Radcliff, Thirty-third Madras Infantry.

Transport officers for Chinese transports—

Capt. J. A. Douglas, Second Bengal Lancers.

Capt. E. A. Stotherd, Fourth Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.

Lieut. W. L. O. Twiss, Twenty-fifth Madras Infantry.

Lieut. C. L. Peart, Fourth Sikh Infantry.

Indian Coolie Corps:

First corps—

Commandant: Maj. St. G. L. Steele, Second Bengal Lancers.

Second in command: Lieut. C. H. Alexander, Sixth Bombay Cavalry.

Second corps—

Commandant: Capt. J. L. Ross, Twenty-first Gurkhas.

Second in command: Lieut. H. S. Garrett, Third Bombay Infantry.

Third corps—

Commandant: Capt. E. B. C. Boddam, Twenty-fifth Gurkhas.

Second in command: Lieut. F. H. Goldthorp, Third Punjab Cavalry.

Fourth corps—

Commandant: Capt. P. W. Drake-Brockman, Fifth Bengal Infantry.

Second in command: Lieut. G. A. H. Beatty, Ninth Bengal Infantry.

8. CONCENTRATION AT PORT OF EMBARKATION, AND EMBARKATION.—(a) and (b) Ports of embarkation are designated.

(c) The director of the Royal Indian Marine will arrange as expeditiously as possible for the necessary sea transportation for conveyance of the force to China, all vessels to call at Hongkong for orders. He will inform the general officers commanding at ports of embarkation concerned of the vessels he proposes to charter. These will then be surveyed in accordance with army regulations, and reports made to army headquarters regarding the transports engaged, the date of sailing, and the allotment proposed. As dates of sailing become known, the general officers commanding at the ports of embarkation will arrange by telegram, in direct communication with the general officer commanding the districts concerned, for the movement of units to the port, copies of all such communications being sent to army headquarters and to the headquarters of the command concerned.

(d) Prescribes slings for sick animals, 25 per cent.

(e) and (f) Prescribe temporary increase of certain staff department officials.

(g) Prescribes construction of additional railroad platforms to facilitate detrainment of men, animals, and stores, and hiring of extra storehouses at ports of embarkation; also for additional side tracks, if necessary.

(h) The general officers commanding Presidency and Bombay districts will be responsible for receiving transports and stores for the force, for their accommodation, and for their loading on the transports.

(i) As far as possible stores of one description will be loaded together, those which are likely to be first required being loaded in the vessel last.

(j) Prescribes troops with which the field hospital will embark.

(k) The arms, ammunition, and equipment of each unit will accompany the unit in the same vessel or vessels so as to be available at once on disembarkation.

(l) The lieutenant generals commanding the forces will make all necessary arrangements for rest camps en route, and for the supply of ice on the line of rail if considered necessary; and will sanction such reduction in the regulation number of troops allotted to each compartment as they may for climatic reasons consider desirable.

9. Provides for sending some officers and men ahead to Hongkong.

10. Assigns the divisional staff office to the fourth division as the divisional office of the force and directs its dispatch to Calcutta; provides for assignment of clerks and typewriters to divisional office; assigns brigade staff officers to the brigades of the force; assigns a base and line of communication office; assigns offices for the commanding royal engineer, the superintendent of signaling, and the books for the provost marshal of the force; prescribes books, regulations, and files of orders to be taken; and forms a medical staff office.

11. (a) Prescribes that all units shall be armed with the .303 rifle or carbine and shall carry proper proportion of spare parts.

(b) Prescribes five additional vents per gun.

(c) Prescribes ammunition to be carried as follows:

NATIVE INFANTRY:

On soldier	100
First regimental reserve	80
Second regimental reserve	120
Ordnance reserve	450
Total	750

NATIVE PIONEER BATTALION:

On soldier	60
First regimental reserve	120
Second regimental reserve	120
Ordnance reserve	450
Total	750

COMPANY OF SAPPERS AND MINERS:

On soldier	50
First regimental reserve	100
Ordnance reserve	250
Total	400

NATIVE CAVALRY:

On soldier	50
First regimental reserve	100
Ordnance reserve	250
Total	400

ARTILLERY, PER CARBINE:

On soldier	20
------------------	----

In addition to foregoing scale, small-arm ammunition at the rate of 50 rounds per file or carbine will be furnished to all units for practice on the voyage.

Battery ammunition, 750 rounds per gun (including case shot), or 4,500 rounds per rifle, on carriages, in ammunition column, and ordnance reserve.

(d) Designates arsenal from which ordnance field park stores and personnel are to be drawn.

(e) Prescribes extra signal equipments to be taken.

12. (a) Assigns one Maxim gun and 30,000 rounds to each battalion, 6,200 rounds being with the command and the balance in ordnance park.

(b) For practice en route 110 rounds per gun (Maxim).

13. Reserve of horse shoes and nails.

14. Designates arsenal which furnishes the engineer field park.

15. Prescribes detail and concentration of eight special signaling units (British infantry) without delay.

16. A native general hospital of 400 beds complete with tents to be shipped from Calcutta. A hospital ship to be equipped. Further details of medical arrangements.

17. Ambulance transport.

18. Necessary veterinary arrangements to be made by the principal veterinary officer in India.

19. Commissariat equipment.

20. CLOTHING.—(a) All troops and followers will be supplied with clothing on the "Sumner" scale as laid down in the field-service department code "commissariat-transport." The issue will be made to units before they leave stations, if possible; otherwise the officer responsible for the equipment of the units concerned will inform the general officer commanding at the post of embarkation by telegram of the articles required to complete, and these will be issued before embarkation.

(b) Winter scale of clothing, including warm coats, British, to be shipped in bulk; to be issued upon orders of commanding general.

(c) Deficiency in warm clothing to be made up and shipped as soon as possible.

(d), (e), and (f) Refer to details about boots and reserve supplies of clothing.

(g) Sea kit to be supplied to troops as they embark.

(h) Foreign-service kit to be issued to all native troops and followers.

21. **EQUIPMENT.**—All troops to be equipped on the field-service scale. Certain troops to take their mobilization equipment; others to draw theirs from designated places. Ammunition column equipment also prescribed.

22. **STRETCHERS.**—Field and blanket stretchers to be taken by units as follows:

Battery of artillery, 2 and 4.

Regiment of cavalry, 8 and 16.

Company of sappers and miners, 2 and 4.

Battalion of infantry or pioneers, 8 and 16.

23. **FUEL.**—Ten days' supply of fire wood to be taken.

24. **SUPPLIES.**—(a) Forty days' sea rations and a reserve of thirty days' land rations, including compressed fodder and grain for horses and transport animals, will be placed on each transport.

(b) In addition, two months' supplies including grain for horses and transport animals, but exclusive of compressed fodder, will be taken from Calcutta for the whole force, making a total of three months' supply in all. A further two months' supply will be prepared and dispatched hereafter.

(c) Supplies will be packed in water-proof bags where necessary.

25. **TRANSPORT.**—(a) Only the obligatory pack mules will accompany the force and, except in case of units embarking at Bombay, the mules will be embarked on the same vessel with the unit to which they belong.

(b) The obligatory mules, allotted to units, include mules for the carriage of reserve or emergency rations in the field, which are as follows:

Native infantry, 8 mules per battalion.

Native pioneers, 8 mules per battalion.

Company, sappers and miners, 2 mules per company.

British field hospital, 1 mule per hospital.

Native field hospital, 2 mules per hospital.

A reserve of 500 sets of pack saddlery to be shipped from Calcutta.

26. Organizes a native military base depot.

27. Directs establishment of postal arrangements.

28. **TELEGRAPHS.**—(a) A telegraph section from the Madras sappers and miners, consisting of 2 British noncommissioned

officers, 2 Havildars, 2 Naiks, and 12 sappers will accompany the force.

(b) In addition 12 military signalers will be attached to the section for duty.

(c) Equipment for this section to be issued by the telegraph department.

29. RAILWAYS.—A railway section, consisting of two warrant or noncommissioned officers and 48 public followers, will accompany the force.

30. SURVEYORS.—Four native soldier surveyors detailed for duty with intelligence staff.

31. MAPS.—Maps and handbooks will be issued from army headquarters to all corps and units for the use of all officers with the force.

32. Regulations as to submission of reports.

33. Prescribes voyage report to be rendered.

34. Prescribes special returns and list of arms, clothing, etc., to be prepared while on the voyage.

35. OFFICERS' MESSES.—Scale discretionary as far as base of operations. On leaving base, as given in Field Service Manual.

36. PRESS CORRESPONDENTS.—Officers belonging to the force will on no account be allowed to act as press correspondents. Applications for permission to accompany the forces as press correspondents will be made to the adjutant general in India. Not more than one correspondent will be allowed for each newspaper. Officers appointed press correspondents will not be employed in any military capacity whatever.

37. CONCESSIONS AND PRIVILEGES.—(a) Staff officers, transport officers, special service officers, and others, will draw the pay of their appointments from the date of their arrival at ports of embarkation.

(b) All ranks may be granted an advance of three months' pay.

(c) The troops and followers of the force will be considered on field service for all concessions and privileges from the date of embarkation until they return to India.

(d) Free passage to their homes may be granted to the families of all native followers.

41. PUNJAB COOLIE CORPS.—Four Punjab coolie corps will be raised at once under the orders of the lieutenant general commanding the forces, Punjab. The corps will be composed of Punjabi Mohammedan coolies recruited from

men accustomed to carry loads and marching. Each corps will be organized as follows:

- 1 commandant (regimental officer),
- 1 second in command (regimental officer).
- 2 British noncommissioned officers.
- 20 sirdars, at one per 50 coolies.
- 40 mates, at one per 25 coolies.
- 2 transport agents, second class.
- 8 sweepers.
- 1 section, No. 54, native field hospital.
- 1,000 coolies.

(b) The establishment will receive clothing as laid down in regulations.

(c) EQUIPMENT.—Four yards of coarse country cloth should be provided to each coolie to secure the load on the back. Daos or kukries for arming the men should be arranged for by the ordnance department at the rate of one per sirdar, mate, and follower, and taken in bulk.

(d) Rations will be issued from date of arrival at port of embarkation. While awaiting embarkation rations will be issued as follows:

Atta or rice	pounds..	1½
Dhal	ounces..	3
Ghi	do..	1
Salt	do..	½
Fuel	pounds..	1½

From date of embarkation the corps will receive rations at the scale authorized for fighting men.

(e) Camp equipage will be supplied at the rate of one G. S. 40-pound tent British N. C. O., and one N. C. 45-pound tent to every seven men.

(f) The British officers will draw the pay of their appointments from date of joining at the station to which ordered for the purpose of raising the corps.

(g) Rates of pay:

	Per month.
Commandants	Rs. 300
Second in command	do. 200
Noncommissioned officers	do. 20
Sirdar	do. 18
Mates	do. 15
Coolies	do. 12
Sweepers	do. 9
Transport agents	do. 40

(h) Each corps will be furnished with one section of No. 54 native field hospital complete in every respect.

* * * * *

The reader of the foregoing scheme for mobilization and dispatch of an expeditionary force can not fail of being impressed with its thoroughness, and its painstaking attention to every detail. The instructions contain many excellent features, evidently based on large experience, and readily appreciated.

It is observed that on the staff of the commanding general there are 28 officers, presumably detailed on account of special fitness, but not taken from military units forming the combatant force of the expedition. This would be a large staff for a division of troops forming part of a corps, but for an independent force on a transmarine expedition a great many special officers are needed; very few, if any, could be removed without impairing the efficiency of the service.

The brigade staff consists of six officers, about the same as our own.

The line of communications and base staff consists of six officers besides the commandant. The organization seems to be well adapted to secure efficiency. The transport officers also have a separate organization. According to report of Maj. S. M. Mills, Sixth United States Artillery, the various staff officers were well selected and placed the British force in the field rapidly, well equipped and in good condition.

The infantry brigade consists of four regiments; however, as the strength of the latter is only 700 combatants, the brigade is not by any means cumbersome. The special troops for the division are particularly well represented; the proportion of artillery for the force that actually took part in the operations was ample.

A specially commendable feature was found in the completeness of the units, which were all filled up to the full number of fighting men; when necessary, men were taken from other regiments and attached so as to secure the full complement of 721 enlisted men in each battalion.

The British authorities probably had a clear idea as to what they purposed to do, for we find them prescribing summer and winter clothing to be taken, and making definite arrangements for depots and subsequent supply.

The plan of sending suitable officers ahead to make arrangements for arrival of troops, such as hiring storehouses, constructing ramps and platforms, and building additional side tracks, is admirable; so is the fixing of responsibility for

failure. The regard for the comfort of the command by providing rest-camps, insisting upon ice in the cars when necessary, and reducing the number of passengers in compartments, attracts attention.

If the requirements of paragraph 10 of the order, transferring divisional, brigade, and other staff office establishments to the expedition for duty, were only partially carried out, it must have been of great advantage to those who were organizing such offices for field service. Instead of being obliged to "rustle" among the enlisted men of the command for clerks and typewriters inexperienced in military business, efficient men accustomed to the work, acquainted with military forms, and provided with typewriter, stationery, and office paraphernalia, relieved the commanding general's adjutant of much worry about clerical work, which was systematically carried on from the outset, instead of being perhaps for weeks in an unsatisfactory condition.

DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIVE INFANTRY BATTALION (PUNJAB OR BENGAL).

	Peace.	War.
British officers:		
Commandant	1	1
Wing commanders	2	2
Wing officers	5	9
Medical officer	1	1
Total	9	13
Native officers:		
Subadars	8	8
Jemadars	8	8
Total	16	16
Hospital assistants	2	1
Noncommissioned officers and men:		
Havildars	40	—
Naiks	40	—
Sepoys	796	720
Drummers and buglers	16	—
Sepoys ward orderlies	4	1
Total	896	721
Public followers:		
Tindal	1	3
Lascars	4	3
Bhistis	8	8
Sweepers	8	8
Bazaar establishment	2	2
Cooks	—	16
Pakhalis	—	8
Mochis	—	2
Bearers	4	2
Total	27	59

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIVE INFANTRY BATTALION (PUNJAB OR BENGAL)—
continued.

	Peace.	War.
Private followers:		
Officers' personal servants		13
Officers' syces		13
Officers' grass cutters		7
Hospital assistants' servant		1
Hospital assistants' pony attendant		1
Total		35
Cattle:		
Chargers	9	13
Ponies, officers'		7
Pony, hospital assistants'		1
Total	9	21

The battalions of Madras, Bombay, Hyderabad, have this same war strength.

Allowances.	Baggage.	Tentage.
	<i>Pounds.</i>	<i>Pounds.</i>
Officers	70	80
Native officers	40	40
Men	25	-

The following are approximate definitions of names of common occurrence in the native regiments:

Bhisti: A camp follower provided with a bag or skin in which he carries water for the troops on the march.

Bazaar establishment: A clothing depot.

Duffadar: A native sergeant of cavalry.

Havildar: A native sergeant of infantry.

Jemadar: A native lieutenant.

Khalassis: Men who have charge of tents.

Lascar: A man taking care of tents.

Maund: Weight of 80 pounds.

Mochi: A saddler.

Naik: A native corporal.

Pakhali: A native water carrier with pony and equipment.

Ressaidar: A native second captain of cavalry.

Ressaidar-wordi-major: A sort of sergeant major of cavalry.

Ressaldar: A native captain of cavalry.

Salootri: A head farrier.

Sepoy: A native infantry soldier.

Silladar: Applied to cavalry whose horses are purchased out of the chundee or horse fund, paid in by those desiring to enter the cavalry service.

Sowar: A native cavalry soldier.

Subadar: A native infantry captain.

Syces: Grooms.

Tindal: An ordnance storekeeper.

Twenty men are allowed one tent weighing 160 pounds.

The difference between peace and war strength is left at home and organized into companies J, K, L, M, each under a native officer. A British officer is detailed as commandant, another as adjutant; a recruiting officer endeavors to fill up the companies, and sergeants expert as drill masters attend to the instruction.

Equipment tables prescribe what articles shall be carried on the person, on the horse, in the kit, and in the baggage by officers, native officers, men, and followers.

Certain articles, such as blankets, shoes, putties, socks, and waterproof sheets are furnished free; on the winter scale, certain articles of warm clothing are also furnished free.

AMMUNITION.—First regimental reserve, 50 rounds per man. This is carried on 30 mules in boxes of 600 each.

Total regimental reserve, 130, of which 80 rounds per man are carried on 19 camels. Recent regulations increase reserve ammunition to 200 pounds per rifle.

Intrenching tools for battalion:

Felling axes	8
Picks	80
Bill hooks	40
Shovels	60

The total pioneer equipment is carried on 3 mules per company and 8 mules for the two wings; total, 32.

The total obligatory transportation of a battalion is 84 mules, to which is added normal transportation on 102 camels, the normal transportation being what is usually furnished on mobilization.

Three mules carry the signaling outfit for the battalion.

When camels are not available there is alternative transportation at a fixed scale, the combinations being as follows:

First alternative: Obligatory pack mules and mule carts.

Second alternative: Obligatory pack mules and pack mules.

Third alternative: Obligatory pack mules and bullocks.

The weight of reserve rations and compressed fodder prescribed to be carried to detraining stations is five tons.

Spare parts for small arms are also carried. All the details are carefully worked out in tables.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIMENT OF BRITISH INFANTRY IN INDIA.*

	Peace.	War.
Lieutenant colonel.....	1	1
Majors.....	4	—
Captains.....	5	—
Lieutenants.....	9	25
Second lieutenants.....	8	—
Adjutant.....	1	1
Quartermaster.....	1	1
Medical officer.....	—	1
Total.....	29	29
Warrant officers:		
Assistant surgeon.....	—	1
Sergeant major.....	1	—
Band master.....	1	—
Noncommissioned officers and men:		
Quartermaster sergeant.....	1	—
Sergeant drummer.....	1	—
Armorer sergeant.....	1	—
Orderly room sergeant.....	1	—
Orderly room clerk.....	1	—
Color sergeants.....	8	800
Sergeants.....	32	—
Sergeant pioneer.....	1	—
Corporals.....	40	—
Drummers.....	16	—
Privates.....	900	—
Total.....	1,001	800
Commissariat.....	—	1
Public followers:		
Tindal.....	1	—
Lascars.....	4	—
Ward servants.....	—	1
Bhistis.....	16	16
Sweepers.....	16	8
Bazaar establishment.....	2	2
Cooks.....	—	8
Bearers.....	4	12
Total.....	43	47
Private followers:		
General servants.....	—	10
Officer's syces.....	—	9
Officer's grass cutters.....	—	4
Medical officer's servant.....	—	1
Assistant surgeon's servant.....	—	1
Assistant surgeon's pony attendant.....	—	1
Total.....	—	26
Commissary sergeant's servant.....	—	1
Commissary sergeant's pony attendant.....	—	1
Cattle:		
Chargers, officer's.....	5	9
Ponies, officer's.....	—	4
Pony, assistant surgeon's.....	—	1
Pony, commissary sergeant's.....	—	1
Total.....	5	15

*The figures in these tables, in some instances seemingly incorrect, are as given in report.—Ed.

Among the articles prescribed to be carried on the person by officers are found the sword, revolver, watch, notebook, map, clasp-knife, field-glasses, first-aid packages, and emergency ration.

AMMUNITION.—Soldiers carry 100 Lee-Metford cartridges.

First regimental reserve, 94 per man on 32 obligatory mules.

Second regimental reserve, 145 Lee-Metford and 26 per pistol; 100 maunds on 20 camels.

The total transport for the regiment amounts to 649 maunds, which is carried on 100 obligatory pack mules and 135 camels; adding 5 per cent reserve, 105 mules and 142 camels.

Reserve rations and forage to detraining station weigh 13,000 pounds.

The allowance of tentage, baggage, etc., and the arrangement about alternative transportation, and formation of depots are much the same as in the native regiments.

ESTABLISHMENT OF FIELD BATTERY, R. A.

	Peace.	War.
Officers.....	5	5
Noncommissioned officers and men.....	167	162
Total	162	167
Assistant surgeon.....		1
Native drivers:		
Naik.....	1	1
Drivers.....	8	9
Total	9	10
Public followers:		
Tindal.....	1	
Store lascars.....	12	4
Tent lascars.....	2	
Mistry smith.....	1	1
Fireman.....	1	1
File men.....	2	2
Hammer men.....	2	2
Mistry carpenter.....	1	1
Carpenter.....	1	1
Mochis.....	2	2
Ward servant.....		1
Pakhalis.....	3	3
Bhisti.....	1	
Sweepers.....	3	3
Jemadar syces.....	3	3
Syces.....	73	23
Grass cutters.....	110	
Bullock drivers.....	2	
Cooks.....		3
Bazaar establishment.....	1	2
Bearers.....	4	6
Total	225	58

ESTABLISHMENT OF FIELD BATTERY, R. A.—continued.

	Peace.	War.
Private followers:		
General servants		2
Officers' syces		10
Officers' grass cutters		5
Warrant officer's personal servant		1
Medical officer's pony attendant		1
Total		19
Cattle:		
Horses, private	7	10
Horses, public	110	143
Ponies, officers'		6
Pony, medical warrant officer's		1
Bullocks	5	
Total	122	160
Harness and saddlery:		
Sets, universal	13	24
Double sets, lead	28	30
Double sets, wheel	19	25
Ordnance:		
Guns	6	6
Carriages		
Gun carriages	6	6
Wagons, ammunition	6	6
Wagon, forage	1	1
Wagons, store	2	2
Store cart	1	1
Total	16	16
Ammunition:		
Shrapnel	828	828
Case shot	36	36
Total	864	864

	No.	Chargers.	Batmen.	Syces.	Grass cutters.
Major	1	2	1	2	1
Captain	1	2	1	2	1
Subalterns	3	6	3	6	3

Reserve rations and forage to detraining stations, 4 tons.

Total transport of field battery 180 maunds, for which there are 8 obligatory mules and 41 camels, including 5 per cent reserve.

AMMUNITION COLUMN TO SUPPLY THREE AND FOUR BATTERIES.

	Peace.	War.
Officers.....	3	4
Captain.....	1	1
Lieutenants.....	2	2
Total.....	3	3
Hospital assistants.....	1	1
Sergeant major.....	1	1
Quartermaster sergeant.....	1	1
Noncommissioned officers and men:		
Farrier sergeant.....	1	1
Shoe smiths.....	2	2
Collar maker.....	1	1
Trumpeter.....	1	1
Noncommissioned officers.....	3	4
Gunners.....	6	8
Total.....	14	17
Public followers:		
Lascars.....	12	16
Mochies.....	3	4
Native smiths.....	3	4
Head carpenter.....	1	1
Carpenters.....	2	2
Fireman.....	1	1
File man.....	1	1
Jemadar syces.....	2	2
Syces.....	32	40
Syces, attached.....	3	4
Pakhali.....	1	1
Bhistis.....	1	1
Sweepers.....	2	2
Bazaar establishment.....	2	2
Ward servant.....	1	1
Bearers.....	6	6
Cook.....	1	1
Total.....	74	89
Private followers:		
Servants, syces, and grass cutters.....	15	15
Cattle:		
Horses, private.....	6	6
Horses, public riding.....	4	4
Horses, attached.....	3	4
Horses, draft.....	138	178
Ponies, officers'.....	3	3
Pony, hospital assistant's.....	1	1
Total.....	155	196
Harness and saddlery:		
Sets, universal.....	4	4
Double sets, lead.....	45	58
Double sets, wheel.....	24	31
Traces, short, pairs.....	3	4
Total.....	76	97
Carriages:		
Wagons, ammunition.....	18	24
Wagon, forage.....	1	1
Wagon, store.....	1	1
Gun carriage.....	1	1
Total.....	21	27
Rounds per wagon.....	74	74

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIVE CAVALRY REGIMENT (BENGAL OR BOMBAY).

	Peace.	War.
British officers:		
Commandant	1	1
Squadron commanders	4	4
Squadron officers	4	5
Medical officer	1	1
Total	10	11
Native officers:		
Ressaldars	4	
Ressaldars	4	
Ressaidar wordi-major	1	
Jemadars	8	
Total	17	
Noncommissioned officers and men:		
Kote duffadars	63	457
Duffadars		
Sowars	518	
Camel sowars	8	8
Trumpeters	8	8
Farriers	8	8
Salootri	1	1
Ward orderlies (dismounted sowars)	2	1
Total	608	483
Hospital assistants	2	1
Public followers:		
Mochis		4
Lascar	1	
Iron smiths		4
Bhistis	8	8
Bazaar establishment	3	2
Cooks		16
Pakhalis		8
Sweepers		8
Bearers	4	6
Syces, native officers	17	
Grass cutters	17	
Grass cutters, double	316	198
Hospital water carrier	1	
Hospital sweeper	1	
Total	368	263
Private followers:		
Officers' servants		11
Officers' syces		23
Officers' grass cutters		12
Native officers' and hospital assistants' servants		9
Hospital assistant pony attendant		1
Total		56
Cattle:		
Horses, officers'	21	23
Horses, troop	615	495
Ponies, officers'		12
Ponies, native officers'		9
Ponies, grass cutters'	316	198
Pony hospital assistant		1
Camels, riding	8	8
Total	960	746

Depot establishments:

- 1 squadron officer.
- 2 native officers.
- 2 acting kote duffadars.
- 6 duffadars.
- 2 pay duffadars or sowars.
- 2 farriers.
- 2 trumpeters.

109 sowars.

Transport, peace:

87 mules, with 87 drivers.

Transport, war:

On march, 1 jemadar, 2 duffadars, 59 drivers.

In camp, 45 drivers and mules, with 207 grass cutters of regiment, will supply forage, being at rate of 1 grass cutter and pony or mule for every 2 horses or camels.

Chargers, ponies, and private followers.

	No.	Chargers.	Ponies.	Servants.	Syces.	Grass cutters.
Commandant	1	3	2	1	3	2
Squadron commanders	4	8	4	4	8	4
Squadron officers	5	10	5	5	10	5
Medical officers	1	2	1	1	2	1
Native officers	17		9	9		1
Hospital assistants	1		1			

Field-service Regulations, under "Field-service kit," prescribes what is to be worn on the person, on the saddle, and what is for transport (70 pounds).

Baggage to be weighed before leaving on service, and weights not to be exceeded.

Distribution and weight of tentage is similarly prescribed.

Allowance of books and stationery for campaign is fixed in tables.

Ammunition, 60 rounds per carbine of 466 to regiment, in 45 boxes.

Signaling, hospital, and medical outfit also prescribed.

Pioneer equipment for regiment: Sixteen axes, 40 shovels, 16 picks, and 2 crowbars. They are carried on troop horses, one per squadron.

For forges and saddle shops of regiment there are allowed 1,280 pounds.

Loads are:

- 160 pounds for pack mules.
- 400 pounds for mule carts.
- 800 pounds for bullock carts; not to be exceeded.

Reserve rations and forage for regiment carried to detraining stations, weight 12 tons.

The regimental adjutant keeps a "mobilization box." Contents: Books, orders, documents relating to mobilization, such as lists of men absent (kept up quarterly), list of those to be left behind, lists of equipment, blanks and stationery for two months.

Officers to have a field kit constantly in readiness.

All officers and men are inspected by surgeons before starting. All clothing and equipment is looked over; also all horses, eliminating those under 5 or over 15 years of age.

The regiment for the field has 10 British combatant officers and 500 natives; it is divided into four squadrons. The remainder is formed into a depot, which has one British officer for administrative duties, one *ressaldar*, and one *jemadar*; the former for recruiting and equipment, the latter for training and discipline. Eight *duffadars* are assigned for drill. All surplus baggage is stored after being carefully marked. There are strict rules about care of stored property.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPANY OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

	Peace.	War.
British officers	2	4
British noncommissioned officers	2	2
Native officers	3	3
Hospital assistant		1
Native noncommissioned officers and men :		
<i>Havildars</i>	6	6
<i>Naiks</i>	10	10
<i>Sappers</i>	150	150
<i>Buglers</i>	2	2
Driver establishment	20	20
Ward orderly		1
Total	188	189
Public followers :		
<i>Bhistis</i>	2	2
<i>Sweepers</i>	3	2
<i>Cooks</i>		5
<i>Lascar</i>	1	
<i>Bazaar establishment</i>		1
<i>Bearers</i>		6
<i>Pakhalis</i>		2
Total	6	18
Private followers :		
Officer's personal servants		4
Officer's <i>syces</i>		9
Officer's grass cutters		4
Hospital assistant, servant		1
Hospital assistant, pony attendant		1
Total		18
Cattle :		
<i>Chargers</i>	2	8
Company first line equipment mules	18	18
<i>Ponies, officers'</i>		4
Pony, hospital assistant		1
Total	20	31

ENGINEER SECTION AND PARKS.

	Printing section.	Photo- lithograph section.	Pontoon section.	Engineer field park.	Engineer siege park.
British officers	-----	-----	1	1	1
British warrant officers	-----	-----		1	1
British noncommissioned officers	1	2	2	2	2
Native officers	-----	-----	2	-----	-----
Hospital assistant	-----	-----	1	-----	1
Total	1	2	6	4	5
Native noncommissioned officers and men :	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Havildars	-----	-----	3	1	1
Naiks	-----	-----	4	1	1
Sappers	4	4	64	-----	2
Bugler	-----	-----	1	-----	-----
Ward orderly	-----	-----	1	-----	-----
Total	4	4	73	2	4
Public followers:	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Bhistis	1	1	1	1	1
Cooks	1	1	2	1	1
Pakhali	-----	-----	1	1	1
Bearers	-----	-----	6	6	6
Sweepers	-----	-----	1	1	-----
Native writer	-----	-----	-----	1	1
Hired artificer	-----	-----	-----	1	18
Khatassis	-----	-----	-----	12	20
Total	2	2	11	35	48

Private followers: 3 servants, 6 syces, 3 grass cutters for officers; 2 servants and 2 pony attendants for hospital attendants. Cattle: 6 chargers and 5 ponies.

Field kits, baggage, tents, books, forms, and stationery are similar to those of other troops.

Ammunition: The regimental reserve is 60 rounds per man and 26 rounds per pistol.

The company also carries hospital establishment, medical stores, and great coats on 55 obligatory mules.

The printing section has 6 mules.

The photo-lithographic section also has 6 mules.

The pontoon section also carries reserve ammunition, etc., and the bridge train. The latter is drawn by 12 pack mules and 268 bullocks, and weighs 1,975 maunds.

The engineer park weighs 861 maunds.

The engineer siege train weighs 1,626 maunds.

Special orders are usually given concerning the mobilization and carriage of the siege park and pontoon sections.

The organization evolved by the British forces in India differs from that of European armies in many details. When the regiments of infantry go to war they only send a battalion of eight companies of an average strength of 90 natives. About one-fifth of the normal strength is left at home to take

care of public property and the families of the fighting men. These being organized, correspond to the depot battalions of European armies.

The British officers are all superior in rank to the native officers; the caste system of India lending itself admirably to this arrangement. The sphere, officially and socially, of each is clearly defined, both races having their own reasons therefor; the prejudices of each are not only respected but guarded by authority, and friction, so likely to arise in other armies, is to a large extent avoided.

The number of camp followers seems quite large. The frugality of the natives and the low rate of pay permit this; with European troops they would be kept busy providing for themselves..

By sending only what are to a certain extent picked men into a campaign many elements of weakness are removed and casualties on account of sickness or exhaustion should be low. Filling up battalions to uniform strength is also an advantage, for it equalizes the work of all the units.

Among the camp followers there are men of special utility in caring for the equipment of the regiment; others, such as *bhistis*, or water carriers, and *pakhalis*, or water carriers with pony equipment, are found necessary in hot climates, especially in regions where water is scarce.

The division of labor common in the Orient, and the small amount of work one man will do, also foster the increase in the number of camp followers. It is to be remembered, however, that a large percentage of the expense of camp followers is compensated for by the cheapness of forage for the many animals and by the rendering of many services which in our army are hired.

The keeping of a mobilization box is an idea which might well be adopted in modified form in our service. It would at least furnish a reserve supply of stationery and blanks which could be drawn on until depots are established.

The organization of the British infantry is similar to that of the native regiments, except as to officers, and calls for no special comment. The British field battery is of the same strength as ours; it has a diversified number of camp followers.

The organization of the cavalry regiments is into four squadrons and a depot. The number of servants, syces, grass

cutters, and other camp followers is astounding; of grass cutters there is one with a pony or mule for every two horses. The horses are obtained in a peculiar way. Each native before enlisting puts up a sum of 200 to 300 rupees into the horse fund or chundee. The British Government furnishes only the arms and ammunition. The silladar horses and equipments are property of the regiment; a British officer administers the fund. Upon expiration of term of service they become the property of the soldier. If he desires to dispose of them, the officers appraise their value and the money therefor is paid to the man.

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT.

INFANTRY.

ARMAMENT.—Rifle, Lee-Metford; latest model is known as the Lee-Enfield; caliber, .303; sights to 1,800 yards; peep-sights at left side, 1,600 to 2,900 yards. The magazine carries 8 cartridges, in some guns 10, latest model. The cut-off is a simple slide across opening of magazine.

The magazine, which is in front of the trigger guard, is loosened by a separate trigger and then hangs by a short chain.

The bayonet is of moderate length, similar to ours, but has double edge. The rifle seems to be good and serviceable. The officers speak highly of it. It has good endurance, as the native soldier takes excellent care of it. Some that had been in use for nine years appeared almost as good as new, having been rebronzed. As a single-loader it seemed to be convenient to operate.

The ammunition is carried in three pouches, two in front above the hip, and the third at the small of the back. The belt of fair leather, as are the pouches, is supported by two broad straps passing over the shoulders and crossing on the back. All the fair leather equipments seen here presented a very handsome appearance.

The British soldier in the Orient carries but little besides his rifle and ammunition. A water bottle and a small haversack capable of holding one day's rations completed his load. In cold weather he also carries a warm coat. The rest of his outfit is carried on pack mules. This at once places him at great advantage; he should still be in good condition after other troops are fatigued with their burdens.

CLOTHING.—The foot-gear consists of black leather brogans, with thick soles, hobnailed. They reach above the ankle and are laced. They impress me as being thick, heavy, and stiff. Socks and underwear are not worn by native troops as a rule. Putties are of wool, khaki color. Trousers are loose, baggy at the knee, where they are confined by the putties; color of trousers, khaki.

The blouse, also of khaki, has breast pockets and brass buttons. The shoulder flaps of khaki color have one end sewed to the blouse; the other is fastened with a button. The regimental device and lettering are pinned to the flap. The collar is low standing, without ornaments. Turbans, khaki color, with peaked hat inside. The turban is wound around the head and holds the peak or kullah, which is gold-braided for officers.

In some regiments sandals are worn, as regimental commanders may prefer.

The foregoing is the clothing of the Twenty-sixth Baluchistan Regiment. The other native regiments differ only in detail.

The British troops wear khaki-colored helmets, waterproof, flexible, and durable.

The full-dress uniforms of native regiments observed on the occasion of the Field Marshal von Waldersee's entrance into Peking, October 17, 1900, were as follows:

Twenty-fourth Punjab Regiment: Turban, dark blue; coat, scarlet, with broad white border; white collars, cuffs, and shoulder flaps. Trousers, black, knee, red welt, $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch wide; putties, dark blue. Sandals, turned up at toes. A few men of the Twenty-second Punjab Regiment (attached) had red and white stripes in their turbans, dark collar and shoulder flaps, and wore brogans.

First Sikh Regiment: Turban, plain khaki; coat, khaki, yellow collar, flaps, and cuffs; trousers, khaki; putties, light-brown.

Third Sikhs: Attached, black trimmings.

Twenty-sixth Baluchistan Regiment: Turban, khaki; red peak. Coat, khaki, piped with red; red collars, cuffs, and flaps. Trousers, scarlet; short white leggings. Officers have gold shoulder knots, and collars are edged with gold braid.

Seventh Rajput Regiment: Turban, khaki, with red ornaments on front; coat and trousers, khaki; red chevrons for noncommissioned officers. Putties, light brown.

The camp followers conform in a general way to the uniforms of the troops. A long strip of khaki-colored muslin is wound around and forms the headdress. Another strip is wound around the waist, and a third strip is converted into a pair of trousers. A sort of jacket over the shirt completes the toilet, which is seen to be of the simplest, rendering the tailor's art largely superfluous.

The quality of the clothing, especially of the woollens, is excellent. The warm coat, British, of khaki color is of heavy woolen goods and lined. It is loose, and reaches down about one-third of the way between the hip and the knee. The officers and many of the men have vests of skin, and the coat also is sometimes lined with sheep or other skin.

The officers always present a clean, neat, and comfortable appearance. The full-dress uniforms in khaki are handsome. They appear to be well satisfied with the armament, clothing, and equipment of their infantry. In the campaigns in India, it may be required to adapt itself to so many different kinds of climate and temperature, at such short intervals of time, that observation in the regular climate of the temperate zone forms a rather inadequate basis for criticism. The shoe does seem too heavy, a criticism borne out by the fact that many regimental commanders prefer the sandal. Its durability in rough country is not doubted, but we may well question the mobility of men with legs of such deficient muscular development when operating in hill country and handicapped with such shoes.

CAVALRY.

The native, or Silladar, cavalry of the British forces is mounted on light, active, medium-sized, and well-bred horses, purchased with the chundee or horse fund already explained. They are colored by squadrons. The government brand is on the hoof only, and is renewed at every third shoeing. The horses are picketed in various ways, some by halter and one hind foot, others by one fore foot and one hind foot. Many sore backs were observed.

ARMAMENT.—Carbine, saber, and lance. Officers carry a revolver. The carbine is still of the old Enfield pattern, single shot. It is carried in a boot, hanging vertically from the right of the cantle. The saber is attached to the belt. It is sharpened before starting on campaign. The lance is of

bamboo, with a triangular point. The revolver carried by the officers seems a poor affair. Ammunition is carried in pouches attached to belt. All equipments are of fair leather. The saddle, also of fair leather, has very long side bars. There is no cincha, the fastening being with strap and buckle. Two pairs of extra shoes are carried in small pouches resting behind the cantle. There are two large pouches attached to pommel. The biting is with curb and snaffle; the curb bit is too heavy, according to our notion. The picket ropes are fastened around the neck, and, in some cases, a net or bag is carried below the girth, which seems a curious place for it. The only feature attracting notice as perhaps worthy of imitation is the lining of closely shorn sheepskin on the under surface of the bars. This makes a contact between the saddle and pad or blanket, which prevents the slipping to the rear, so common at rapid gaits.

The uniform is khaki, similar to that of the infantry, except in the matter of riding breeches.

The saddlery and equipment are remarkably well cared for. The shoeing is excellent.

ARTILLERY.

The British artillery has already been reported upon by an artillery officer. A few additional observations are submitted. The construction and equipment of the battery strikes one as solid—heavy enough for siege artillery. The spare wheel is carried in front of the rear chests of the caisson, an awkward place to get at. The arrangements for handling the ammunition are also unsatisfactory; it being necessary to take the projectiles and powder from the chests and place them in leather cases resting on the limber bars. The large, closed store cart has a weight of over 50 pounds on the pole yoke. The Australian horses, or “walers,” as they are called, are rawboned, underbred animals. They require a great deal of grain to keep them in condition, and they are lacking in endurance. They are noticeably weak in the hind quarter. Many sore backs are observed in the battery. The supply of artificers of various kinds appears more than ample. The whole equipment is well cared for.

CAMP FOLLOWERS.

The number of camp followers present with the British force in the province of Pechili is not definitely known, but

there is no reason to believe that it is much below that authorized by regulations. For the division of very nearly 10,000 combatants, officers, and men, the scheme of mobilization proposes the use of 7,715 public and 1,245 private followers, 4,332 belonging to the coolie corps. Out of these 8,950 camp followers, 5,939 were to be used on the line of communications, leaving practically 3,000 for use with the troops. The allowance of camp followers for the different organizations is as follows:

	Public.	Private.
Division staff	1	138
Brigade staff		35
Infantry regiment	59	35
Cavalry regiment	263	56
Battery	72	21
Pioneer regiment	59	35
Ammunition column, etc	25	8

The discipline among the men, considering all the circumstances, was remarkably good. There was no drunkenness, which is accounted for by their religion, and but few cases of rape or murder were heard of. It is very doubtful whether an equal number of Caucasian camp followers of any nation could, under the circumstances, have been held under even approximately as good restraint. The great bulk of them seem to be continually active in bringing in forage, fuel, and other supplies for the troops, in addition to the regular transport service from the base.

TRANSPORTATION.

The total number of pack mules contemplated to be used for the division was 2,007, to which may be added 621 ponies. Of these 432 pack mules and 175 ponies were for the line of communications. The various kinds of transportation service were carried on by means of coolies, carts, and pack mules; later on, trains of camels impressed or hired were also largely employed.

The pack mule of India is a small, hardy animal with slender limbs. He is expected to carry a load of 2 maunds, or 160 pounds. The saddle consists of two large pads on wood joined by iron arches. It is fastened to the animal with a strap. Attached to the saddle is a breeching with crupper, and also

breast straps. This harness serves the double purpose of preventing slipping of the load when going up or down steep slopes and being used for draft purposes under favorable conditions. The saddle sits down low, thus bringing the pressure on the ribs rather than on the back; the arches are sufficiently high to prevent possibility of contact with the backbone. The load having been made up in packages of equal weight, secured with ropes in such a way as to leave two iron rings free to slide on the part protected by leather, are simply hooked to the saddle and suspended from two stout iron hooks about 4 inches below the summits of the pommel and cantle arches. A stout chain passes from the halter to a hook in the cantle of the preceding mule; they are thus fastened together in groups of three, and the native driver leads the bunch on foot.

For draft purposes two iron bars from the cart are secured to the tops of the saddles; these support the pole of the cart; it is then only necessary to hook traces to the harness which is already on the mules. The whole arrangement is simple and inexpensive. It could undoubtedly be much improved by our practical people; but the idea is there, and it is good. Such transportation would be most suitable for our infantry detachments operating in close or rough country in the Philippines. There is no means of making an accurate comparison of the cost of the pack feature of this transportation with our own pack trains for lack of definite data available here or elsewhere. The following is submitted as a conservative guess at the cost of maintenance of fifteen of each kind of mules in service for one year in the Philippines:

India mules:

Fifteen mules at \$30	\$450
Fifteen harness and pads at \$20	300
Salaries of five drivers at \$10 per month,* native ration included	600
Total	1,350

American pack-train:

Fifteen mules at \$150	2,250
Fifteen aparejos complete at \$50	750
Salaries of three packers at \$60 per month and ration	2,400
Total	5,400

* Usual salary paid servant boys now is \$8 (Mexican) per month.

This takes no account of the increased cost of superintendence with riding mules, bell mares, chief packer, cook, and blacksmith; nor of the transportation of men and animals from the center of the United States and across the Pacific Ocean. Nor is even an attempt of comparison made in the cost of forage, the American mule being fed on oats and hay carried half way round the world, whereas the Indian mule would thrive on a little palay and the native grass cut by his driver. The American mule can carry a considerably greater load, but his habitual load does not exceed that of the smaller mule by more than 30 per cent. These data are submitted for serious consideration; they certainly justify immediate experiment. It is believed that with a little care and good judgment an ideal transportation, both pack and wheel, for our infantry commands in the Philippines, could be devised, leaving our large teams for the supply of stations situated on fairly good roads, and our American pack trains to accompany the cavalry. The pack and harness arrangement, with simply a wider spread of arch, could also be applied to the ox or to the carabao for pack or draft purposes through the tropical morass. As a matter of fact this would not be an experiment in the true sense of the word, but simply a trial of something that has been in use for centuries under conditions closely approximating our own. It is safe to say that our present back transportation for infantry costs five times as much as it should.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS.

There seems to be no effort, not even a desire, on the part of the British staff to preserve units intact. In their orders for a march, and in their reports, we find them referring to so many rifles or lances rather than to battalions, companies, platoons, or squadrons. There may be special reason for this, making it desirable to have fragments of regiments at various points; ordinarily such a course is not a good example to be followed.

The British field force at the time of departure from Tientsin is reported as 2,920 men. On the road it is a difficult matter to make an estimate of the number of fighting men in a column on account of the large number of camp followers. What appears to be a formidable force may really be much smaller for business purposes. An official distribution statement of the British forces in Pechili for October, 1900,

furnished by the chief of staff, gives the following stations and figures:

Pekin:

Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Gaselee, K. C. B., A. D. C.
 Headquarters staff.
 First brigade staff.
 Twelfth battery Royal Field Artillery, 6 guns.
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 290 men.
 First Bengal Lancers, 340 men.
 Sixteenth Bengal Lancers, 440 men.
 Hongkong Artillery, 2 guns and 1 Maxim.
 Madras Sappers and Miners, 170 men.
 Seventh Bengal Infantry, 290 men.
 Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, 300 men.
 First Sikh Infantry, 400 men.
 Twenty-sixth Bombay Infantry, 460 men.
 Total of all arms 3,100, with 8 guns and 1 Maxim.

Liukochao:

Capt. A. H. Bingley, detachments and details, 50 lances, 80 rifles, and 1 Maxim; total 130.

Fengtai:

Capt. G. J. Soady, 20 lances, 280 rifles, 1 Maxim.

Tungchao:

Maj. T. Scott, 25 lances, 370 rifles.

Matao:

65 lances and 50 rifles.

Hohsiwu:

Capt. C. Barnes, 25 lances and 85 rifles.

Tsaisun:

55 lances.

Yangtsun:

26 lances and 85 rifles.

Peitsang:

25 lances and 85 rifles.

Hsiku:

50 rifles.

Tientsin:

Brig. Gen. L. Campbell, commanding lines of communication and staff.

Battery B, Royal Horse Artillery, 6 guns.

Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 115 men.

Australian Contingent, 375 men, 4 guns, and 4 Maxims.

Hongkong Regiment, 175 men.

Chinese Regiment, 130 men.

Bombay Sappers and Miners, 180 men.

Seventh Bengal Infantry, 225 men.

Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, 300 men.

Thirty-fourth Punjab Pioneers, 730 men.

First Sikh Infantry, 185 men.

First Madras Pioneers, 450 men.

Total all arms, 3,000 with 10 guns.

Sinbo:

Capt. the Hon. H. D. Napier, 75 rifles.

Approximate totals of fighting men and guns, 1,070 lances, 6,540 rifles, 10 guns.

The British forces are provided with Maxim guns and necessary ammunition at the rate of one per battalion of infantry or pioneers. There are no reports to show that effective offensive use of them was made in the campaign. The British troops take excellent care of themselves. Besides arranging for the comfort of their men and animals, they have accumulated supplies of fuel and forage, repaired the British legation, macadamized streets, put up revetments, etc. There are many indications showing that they are experienced campaigners. The readiness with which they put up small flags on buildings, carts, and stores of all kinds; their skill in finding the supplies and valuables of the enemy; the posting of signs and guide posts—these, and many other details, show an experience in which American troops are deficient. Their officers, also, had superior knowledge of the character of foreign troops and knew how to conduct their intercourse with them, which was another advantage.

The discipline of the British troops is excellent. Through the caste system of India, respect for superiors is a habit with the native. The Mohammedan does not drink, another source of aid to good discipline. They take the best of care of their horses, arms, and equipments, and appear to be properly dressed on all occasions. They are respectful, not only to their own, but to foreign officers, saluting on every proper occasion. In battle they will protect their British officer at all hazards and go wherever he leads them. A large part of the British officers speak the native tongue, and the understanding between the European and the Indian seems to be perfect. In case regiments of native troops in the Philippines are contemplated, a detailed study of the British system in India can not fail to be of the greatest benefit to those who have the matter in charge.

Very respectfully,

J. T. DICKMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.

REPORT ON THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN NORTH CHINA.

BY MAJ. W. B. BANISTER, SURGEON, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
PEKIN, CHINA, *November 16, 1900.*

CHIEF SURGEON CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
Pekin, China.

SIR: In compliance with letter from adjutant general's office, China Relief Expedition, dated October 16, 1900, I have the honor to submit the following report on the medical departments of the various nations represented. As the letter bears date of October 16, these observations were necessarily made after the close of the campaign and under somewhat different conditions than what prevailed during the campaign.

BRITISH.

The English, from the mixed character of their forces, the different customs and diet of the two factors, and peculiar caste customs of the natives of India, have two separate field establishments, one for English and one for Indian troops; in fact the entire medical departments are separate and distinct. They do not treat British and Indian soldiers in the same field hospital, but would have two field hospitals, one for each. In the British army there are six lines of medical assistance. The first line, the aid rendered on the field of battle by the medical officer of each unit and his hospital assistant, and they use the "first field dressing," which corresponds to our "first-aid package." Each soldier is provided with a first-field dressing, which is carried in an inner pocket on the right breast of the field-service khaki coat, the pocket being provided with a flap and buttons. It consists of, first, an outer cover of millerained khaki drill, sewn; second, an inner cover of thin waterproof (mackintosh), size 12 by 6 inches; third, a gauze bandage, 4½ yards long; fourth, compress of compressed charpie, of flax between layers of gauze; fifth, antiseptic agent used is corrosive sublimate, 1 to 1,000. It will be observed that but one compress and but one bandage are provided, the triangular bandage being

omitted. The package examined by me belonged to the British service; another one I examined belonged to the Indian service and contained a triangular bandage, but the rest of the material was very coarse and rough. The first-aid package is inferior to the one in use in our service. Three trained stretcher bearers to a company and four to a squadron are allowed. Each hospital assistant carries a first medical companion, corresponding to our orderly pouch; and one set of stretcher bearers carries a field-surgical haversack, corresponding to our hospital-corps pouch; but in both instances are inferior to ours and it would not be to our advantage to copy them. So with each regiment or unit, there would be on the battle line one medical officer, one hospital assistant, and three stretcher bearers to each company. This is exclusive of the personnel at the dressing station, which is supplied from the bearer company. The basis of the British medical field service is the field hospital which is equipped for 100 beds, and is made up of four sections of 25 beds, each section distinct and complete in itself in equipment and personnel. The sections are designated as A, B, C, and D, and each section of medical and surgical stores is made up of five pairs of boxes, twenty pairs for each field hospital; each box is marked so as to indicate the number of the field hospital to which it belongs, the section, and the number of the box in each section. Two of these boxes are medical panniers, and one contains a case of instruments for amputation, etc., and they correspond to our medical and surgical chests, but the comparison is in our favor. Each box is limited not to exceed 80 pounds in weight, so that it can be carried by either coolies, mules, camels, or carts.

The field hospital can equip one bearer company, composed as follows:

- 2 medical officers.
- 4 assistant surgeons or hospital assistants, carrying field surgical haversacks.
- 5 ward servants or ward orderlies, carrying field medical companions.
- 2 cooks.
- 2 water carriers.
- 2 sweepers.
- 2 pairs field medical panniers for dressing station.
- 5 medical companions; one for collecting station and four for dressing station.

24 field surgical haversacks.

2 field hospital boxes (Nos. 6 and 7) containing spare splints, etc.

1 surgeon tent for dressing station.

1 Ford's lamp for dressing station.

24 tally books.

50 blankets for dressing station.

20 pillows carried in dandies.

12 towels.

6 wash basins.

1 pair of kajawales carrying kitchen utensils, brandy, essence of nut-ton, etc.

2 hospital distinguishing flags, 8 directing flags, 4 lanterns (bull's-eye) for searching for wounded after dark.

Tents for wounded as required.

The bearer company carries the wounded from the collecting station to the dressing station, and then to the field hospital. We have nothing to correspond to the varied character of the British bearer company. Its personnel consists of but 15.

A British field hospital is composed, when packed, of twenty-eight packages, a native field hospital of twenty-three packages. On the advance from Tientsin to Peking the medical department of the British force, consisting of the Welsh Fusiliers, marines, and naval brigade, brought one section, but without tents, and one field hospital for Indian troops consisting of First Sikhs, Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, Seventh Rajputs, and First Bengal Lancers, but no tentage. As their losses were very slight this proved sufficient. The second line of medical assistance is the bearer company above described; the third, the field hospital; the fourth, the field hospitals along the line of communication with the base; the fifth, general hospitals, which are limited to a maximum of 500 beds; the sixth, hospital ships.

With the field hospital a medical-supply depot goes. On the march to Peking no regular system could be employed, as is generally the case with a flying column. The medical-supply depot was left back at Tientsin, and no tentage could be brought. The four sections containing the field hospital were incomplete. The wounded were removed from the fields to boats, and wherever transported, by dhoolies, which consist of litter beds suspended from long bamboo poles and closed in by green curtains, which protect the patient from the sun and public gaze. The British troops had eight of the dhoolies,

though the usual allowance is five to a section. As the Indian troops had four sections, this entitled them to 20 dhoolies, but they had 28. It requires four bearers to carry a dhooli, two at each end, and even then it looks like a heavy load. The wounded, after being collected, were carried to the hospital junks and by them conveyed to Tientsin and thence by boat to the general hospital at Weihaiwei. There was no transportation employed by any of the armies on the expedition that could compare with our hospital ambulances. In each section are two medicine panniers, one of the two containing a case of instruments similar to the capital operating case in our service.

In the British service the arms and accouterments are brought to the hospital with the patient and taken charge of by the pack store sergeant.

TRANSPORTATION.—On the Peking expedition no other transportation seemed to be provided for the wounded than the dhoolies, and stretchers for use on the battle-field. The stretcher in use in the Indian service is composed of two bamboo poles with canvas stretched between, and an iron bar, to hold the poles apart, at each end. It has no legs, and so, when placed on the ground loaded, the patient would only have the thickness of the canvas between him and the ground.

The packages of the field hospital can be transported by coolies, pack mules, camels, etc. They have no transportation equal to our escort wagons for their supplies or equipments.

SANITATION.—In camps on the march the excreta, kitchen refuse, etc., are received in trenches and covered with dry earth several times a day. Latrine screens are provided, which consist of wide pieces of canvas and are very effective for the purpose. On the march from Tientsin orders were issued to boil all water used for drinking purpose, but in two days was revoked, as it was found impracticable to carry out the order. The British field hospital is located at the Chefoo Palace, is large and airy, and kept quite clean. The buildings on one side of the courtyard are used as wards for British troops, those on the other for native troops (Indian), but the two are separate in every respect, and both seem to be in good sanitary condition.

The dry-earth system is employed and the usual precautions are taken to prevent contagion and the spread of typhoid fever. Under field conditions elaborate systems of disinfection are not practicable and are not attempted. The interesting fact in this connection is the statement of the medical officers of the Indian medical service that the Indian troops are practically immune to typhoid fever, and they seldom see a case among them. The British troops are, however, as susceptible as the Americans. The cots in use in the Chefoo hospital were improvised by the pioneer corps, and though rough, were comfortable. The floor of the bed was made of interlacing rope, and mattresses were provided, but no sheets or pillow cases. Special diet for patients is provided out of the stock of "medical comforts," consisting of arrowroot, concentrated soups, condensed milk, corn flour, extract beef, essence of mutton, and pepper. It seems to be the opinion of the medical officers of the British service that the medical department is undermanned and no allowance is made for probable casualties, sick men, etc. The most valuable feature of the English medical department is the definite composition of the field hospital. It is composed of four sections, each complete in itself and with its own independent transportation for its equipment. This independent transportation is one of the greatest needs of our medical department, and the adoption of the English field hospital system would be a decided advantage. The field hospital is stored in the depots, rigidly inspected, and kept up to the standard requirements. When a force is mobilized, so many sections, or one or more field hospitals, are ordered to accompany it, and so the medical department of the command is not left to, possibly, an inexperienced medical officer, but always consists of a standard equipment. The general condition of the troops is good and there seems to be but little sickness among them at present, and but four cases of typhoid fever have occurred, notwithstanding the fact that the effort to have all drinking water boiled was abandoned.

In the cavalry, instead of a field surgical haversack, a field surgical cavalry bag is provided which is similar in contents to our surgeon's field case.

Field hospital of four sections of English army.

	British sections.				Native sections.			
	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.
Medical :								
Army medical staff officers	1	2	3	4				
Indian medical service officers					1	2	3	4
Hospital assistants					2	4	6	8
Medical warrant officers	2	4	6	8				
Military :								
Pack-store sergeants	1	2	3	4				
Pack-store havildars					1	2	3	4
British nurse orderlies	2	4	6	8				
Native ward orderlies					2	4	6	8
Hospital :								
Ward servants	5	10	15	20				
Cooks	2	3	5	6	1	2	3	4
Water carriers	2	3	5	6	1	2	3	4
Ward sweepers	3	5	8	10	2	3	5	6
Carpenters				1				1
Pakhali Bhisti	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Commissariat :								
First hospital storekeeper	1	1	1	1			1	1
Second hospital storekeeper			1	1	1	1	1	1
First assistant hospital storekeeper	1	1	2	2				
Second assistant hospital storekeeper					1	1	2	2
Tailors	1	1	2	2				
Head washerman	1	1	1	1				
Washerman	1	3	6	7	1	1	2	2
Total	24	32	66	55	14	24	38	49

JAPANESE.

The medical department, including all grades and assistants from the combatant force, is chiefly characterized by the large number allowed for hospital purposes, and in this respect is on a scale that we could hardly hope for in our service, but the result is the prompt removal of the wounded from the field, with sufficient personnel to form temporary field hospitals from the front to the base. Each regiment on active service has 6 surgeons, 3 with the rank of captain and 3 lieutenants; 3 hospital stewards and 12 privates of the hospital corps; and 48 assistant stretcher bearers. These are soldiers detailed for this duty. The Japanese in their war experience so far have operated in large bodies, generally a division, as on this campaign, and their medical organization is with that idea and is divisional, capable of subdivision. They really have several lines of medical assistance. The first line is the use of the first field dressing, corresponding to our first-aid package, and consisting of a triangular bandage, three gauze compresses, and one safety pin. The three pieces of gauze are neatly wrapped in tough brown paper, the triangular bandage folded around it, and the whole package contained in waxed paper. Every soldier is provided with one.

The privates of the hospital corps are provided with what corresponds in appearance and contents to our Hospital Corps pouch. When a regiment goes into action three of the six surgeons belonging to it remain on the firing line with the privates, three of the surgeons take station at a temporary dressing station with the steward, and the patients are brought to them by the stretcher bearers and, when necessary, the forty-eight assistant stretcher bearers, or as many as can be utilized, but they do not wear the Geneva cross, and belong to the combatant force. This temporary dressing station is a second line of medical assistance. Each battalion is allowed two medicine panniers and one of the two contains a case of surgical instruments, and each is allowed four stretchers. With this material and the hospital corps pouches this station is equipped.

In the case of a division being in action, what the Japanese call the "sanitary corps" takes position some safe distance in rear of the regimental dressing station, and as soon as this is effected the three surgeons at the temporary dressing station at once leave it and join the sanitary corps. This body is composed of 500 men, in two companies of 250 each, and commanded by a major of infantry. From this body bearers are sent to bring into what now becomes the collecting station all the wounded from the temporary dressing station, and also to remove the wounded from the collecting station so formed to the field hospital. All work done toward the front from the collecting station is called front work and all toward the field hospital rear work, and is apportioned out accordingly. The field hospital is at a safe distance in rear of the sanitary corps and each field hospital consists of 200 beds. In case a forward movement is contemplated and the field hospital has not been evacuated, another field hospital moves forward with the division. The field hospital is the fourth line of medical assistance.

The station of the sanitary corps corresponds to our ambulance station and is the third line. On being asked what the plan of action was when the Japanese retreated instead of advancing, as had just been described, the chief surgeon of the Japanese forces in China replied that as in none of their wars so far the Japanese army had ever retreated, they had no experience in that direction. The field hospital is separable into

two sections, instead of four as in the English army, and is twice as large as the English field hospital.

From the field hospital the wounded are sent to the field hospitals on the line of communication. During this campaign the Japanese had field hospitals of this character at Tungchow, Yangtsun, Tientsin, and Taku. These hospitals constituted the fifth line of medical assistance. There are two field hospitals at Pekin, and the larger one is located in a Chinese house. The beds consisted of bedsacks filled with straw, rather uncomfortable beds, I should think, and inclosed in wooden frames. This frame rested on the platform which constituted the bed in a Chinese house. Each patient's feet were next to the wall, so that the nurses could easily feed and administer the medicine prescribed. There were sufficient wards to shift the patients to a new ward from time to time, while the one last occupied could be cleaned, disinfected and aired. Matting was on the floors, but practically no furniture in the wards themselves. The appearance on the whole was neat and clean, and the customary sanitary precautions employed to prevent the spread of typhoid fever, etc. A few cases of typhoid fever developed among the Japanese and were called Pekin fever, rather an unscientific classification. There were only thirty-six patients in hospital. In a country as dirty as China, with every sanitary rule violated by the natives, with every facility for water contamination from shallow wells, it would be expected that foreign armies would suffer principally from typhoid fever. Such has not been the case and but few cases have occurred in the allied forces during this campaign.

CAMP SANITATION.—Orders were issued in the Japanese army to have the water used for drinking purposes boiled, but the chief surgeon of their forces told me that practically the order was not carried out, and that the Japanese soldiers used the water wherever they reached it. For excreta the trench regularly covered with dry earth was used. They suffered principally with diarrhea and sunstroke. The general condition of their men at the end of a campaign in which they bore the most active part, always in the lead and clearing the country of the enemy in advance of the other allies, was excellent.

The Japanese soldier will probably average 5 feet 5 inches in height, is very compactly built, and presents excellent muscular development.

TRANSPORTATION.—The only transportation possessed by the Japanese was pack mules and native carts, and some coolies. The wounded were transported on stretchers. Their stretcher is composed of two bamboo poles with a canvas bed, the poles being kept separated by an iron rod fixed to one of the poles. When the rods are detached from one of the poles the litter can be rolled up or closed. It has no legs, and when loaded and placed on the ground only the canvas intervenes between the patient and the ground. It is much inferior to our litter in value and in appearance. Our litter has been much admired by the surgeons of the allied forces, particularly the Japanese, who have often commended it.

The patients were transported from the temporary field hospital on stretchers to the hospital junks and thence to Tientsin and Taku, from there on steamers to Heroshiman, Japan, where the base hospital was established. The field hospitals were located in houses, and, like all others, the Japanese did not seem to be provided with tentage for hospitals. Having made a campaign in the country before, and being well informed as to the resources of the theater of action, they no doubt reckoned on being able to dispense with tents. Their set of medical and surgical chests consists of six, the allowance for a regiment, and distributed one medical and one surgical to each battalion. They are of basket work, covered with a black leather case, with the red cross printed on it. The front of each case lets down, exposing the drawers just as in our cases, over which they possess no point of superiority. The case of instruments in the surgical chest is far inferior to ours. They have nothing in their equipment equal to, or similar to, our detached service chest. It was the general impression among medical men with the expedition that the Japanese medical service was most efficient and complete; removing the wounded promptly along their field hospitals to the base. This was not due to any superiority in equipment, but to a better organization of the personnel for field service and the numbers they have at their disposal for this service. This same feature was noticeable in other departments; for instance, in their pack trains there was a soldier to each animal, leading him and taking care of him.

The Japanese had one division of about 8,000 men. Their casualties, far greater than those of any other army, were as follows:

Wounded.....	900
Killed.....	200
Total casualties.....	<u>1,100</u>
Deaths from disease.....	120
Total deaths.....	<u>320</u>

Eleven per cent were wounded and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent died. One surgeon and two privates of the hospital corps were wounded.

GERMANS.

The Germans had no force on the advance to Peking, and these observations were made in the German hospital at Tientsin, and the information relative to their medical department was obtained principally from the surgeon in charge and refers to field operations. A German battalion is nearly as strong as one of our regiments, a German regiment being about 3,000 strong. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind; otherwise, judged from our standard, the allowance of medical officers, etc., would appear out of proportion. The German regiments, however, that came to China had only two battalions to a regiment, making the organization 2,000 strong. Each regiment has 6 surgeons, the senior being a major, but having charge of a battalion, with a first lieutenant as assistant, as well as a general supervision. The other battalion would be in charge of a captain with a first lieutenant as assistant.

As only two battalions composed the regiments here there would be only 4 medical officers on duty with each. There is 1 noncommissioned officer, corresponding to our hospital steward, on duty with each company and instructed in all we understand by first aid, and in action they become assistants to the surgeons on the firing line and at the dressing station. In addition, there are four privates in each company who belong to the combatant force, and do not wear the Geneva cross, who are especially trained as litter bearers and in first aid, and one litter to each company is allowed. Each battalion has one medicine wagon for medicines and dressings, etc. The organization is really divisional, as with each division there is a sanitary company with 6 surgeons and 100 men to

act as litter bearers and bring in the wounded from the temporary dressing stations to the collecting station. When a division goes into action, the medical officer of the rank of first lieutenant remains on the firing line with each battalion, and the captain takes position at the temporary dressing station in the rear, and the wounded are brought there by the four stretcher bearers of each company. This arrangement is only temporary, for as soon as the sanitary company gets into position the surgeon at the temporary dressing station joins it and the temporary station is abandoned, and the wounded are thereafter brought from the firing line by the sanitary company. The sanitary company has 8 ambulances and 72 litters. The ambulances work as far forward toward the firing line as safety permits, and carry the wounded to the station of the sanitary company and from there to the field hospital. Each division has six field hospitals, and this does not seem excessive when it is borne in mind that a division is composed of not only four regiments, each 3,000 strong, but also its complement of cavalry and artillery. Each field hospital has a capacity of 200 beds, which in actual practice would approximate an allowance of 10 per cent of beds relative to the strength of the division. Each field hospital has 6 surgeons, 9 noncommissioned nurses, 12 hospital nurses, 2 noncommissioned officers to look after the clothes, arms, etc., of the patients, 18 men from the train division (laborers really), 1 wagon master, and 3 officials (consisting of an inspector, bookkeeper, and druggist), the entire personnel consisting of 55. There are 10 wagons belonging to the field hospital; 4 for blankets, pillows, etc., 2 for medicines, 2 for provisions, 1 ambulance, and 1 wagon of special pattern for the "officials" (three) to ride in. Two of the six field hospitals of the division are generally held in reserve, and when necessary one is moved up to the station of the sanitary company. The two field hospitals held in reserve can be used at some other point where the casualties have exceeded the 10 per cent allowance or move forward should the division advance, together with such other of the field hospitals as were not occupied.

TRANSPORTATION.—The first means employed for the removal of wounded is the litter. The litter used in the German army is different in many particulars from ours. It is much heavier, and consists of the litter poles with strong brown canvas attached, and the handles sliding in slots under

the litter pole, thus materially reducing the length of the litter when it is intended to be used in an ambulance. It is also provided with a head rest with a pocket underneath in which there fits a rectangular canvas pouch containing one package compressed cotton, six small triangular bandages, one large square bandage and two small, six first-aid packages, a small tin box containing one dozen safety pins, four cambric bandages, one field tourniquet, one aluminium drinking cup, two splint boards, a piece of sticking plaster, one iodoform sprinkler, one pair cutting-pliers to cut the clothes of the wounded when necessary, and one small bottle. The litter has legs of strap-iron arranged to fit on two wheels; the wheels are not used in the field, only for carrying patients short distances, such as from one wing of a hospital to another, and the arrangement is a very practical one for that purpose. One first-aid package is issued to each soldier in the German army and carried sewn into the lining of the front part of the bosom of the blouse on the left side. It is only half the size of the one in use in our Army, and consists of two gauze compresses, one narrow bandage, one safety pin in waxed paper, the whole inclosed in a gray canvas cover, sewn.

The orderly pouch is carried by the steward attached to each company and the allowance is one to every 200 men. The orderly pouch is larger than the one in use in our service, is composed of black leather with metal compartments in it and contains more medicines than ours, as the pouch under the head-rest of the litter contains the dressings. In addition, one large pouch of untanned leather is allowed to each 800 men, and these two, with the first-aid package each soldier carries, make up the equipment of the temporary dressing station. The large pouch is known as the bandagentornister. Each sanitary soldier has a pocket on either side of the belt in front for dressings, etc.; one contains a small case of instruments like the one in our hospital corps pouch.

The ambulances differ very much from ours, and carry four patients. The litters, two above and two below, are pushed in, the legs resting in grooves, and the interior of the ambulance is really divided longitudinally in two parts by an upright bar, with horizontal bars running the length of the ambulance for the inner legs of the two upper litters to rest in. It is not necessary to remove the patient from the litter to put him in the ambulance, as is the case with our ambulances

which carry four patients recumbent, and it is very difficult to transfer a patient badly wounded from a litter to the upper berths in our ambulance, as I have found in actual practice. The German ambulance is also heavier than ours, but not so well suited to bad roads. One medicine wagon is allowed to each battalion, but a special pattern is used at the field hospital which is most excellently arranged. The medicines are arranged in compartments in a rectangular case with small rollers on the lower side, and roll into the medicine wagon. For use the cases are drawn out and present the appearance of a handsome dispensing set in position. The dispensary and drug-room of the German hospital at Tientsin were equipped with the contents of two of these medicine wagons. The hospital has a capacity of 350 patients. These medicine wagons are used only at the field hospitals as they are quite heavy and not well adapted for bad roads.

HOSPITAL.—The German hospital for the troops here is located in a very large building known as the German University, and is excellently equipped for hospital work. The medical department is divided into three sections, one for internal diseases, one for external, and one for venereal, besides isolation wards. A very interesting part of its equipment is a Roentgen-ray apparatus, with a dynamo of 3-horsepower and a benzine motor. From this plant light is provided for the operating room. A special carriage is provided to carry the outfit in the field, but it is so heavy and of such wide gauge that it could be moved only over the best roads.

SANITATION.—The hospital is provided with a distilling plant for water for drinking purposes, use in the laboratory, etc., with a capacity of 2,000 liters daily. It is such a plant as is used in ships for this purpose and is operated by mechanics from the navy. This plant does not, however, furnish sufficient water, so the water of the Peiho is first cleared with alum in the proportion of grams L to 1 liter. The clear water is poured off and boiled and again settled with alum before using. Strict orders are issued to forbid the use of any but boiled water, even for cleaning the teeth, and any violation of the order is severely punished. The water sterilization is carried out more strictly, and the equipment for the purpose is more extensive than with any other service here, but the day I visited the hospitals there were 220 cases of dysentery in the wards, and 31 cases of typhoid fever. On

calling the attention of the surgeon in charge to this fact in connection with their plant, he replied that the soldiers drank unboiled water notwithstanding the orders to the contrary. There was also quite a large sterilizing plant for the sterilization of mattresses, blankets, etc., by steam. The dejecta were received in vessels containing corrosive sublimate solution and the body clothing was boiled. Several of the wards are on the second floor and a water-closet was attached to these wards of a peculiar character. The urinals had pipes leading from them to a drain beneath the ground and emptying into a stream at some distance off. For the removal of fecal matter, holes had been cut in the floor of two stories and large pipes made of sheet iron passed through them to the basement below, beneath which were large tubs on trucks arranged to run on a tramway. The feces were carried off and buried in trenches with chloride of lime. A well-equipped bacteriological laboratory and one for chemical work was in operation, and all suspected cases of typhoid fever were subjected to the Widal reaction, using a dilution of 1 to 30 instead of the 1 to 10 in general use. No cases of autumnal fever had been found, but the plasmodia of intermittent fever had been found in a number of cases. The laboratory was also equipped for water analysis, and a bacteriologist and chemist were on hand to attend to the two departments, respectively. There were in use to increase the capacity of the hospital several portable houses or wards, each with a capacity of 30 beds and quite comfortable, and costing each in Germany 1,200 marks. They seemed to be having some difficulty keeping them warm, as each house had a stove, but a flue had been built under the floor for a fire to be built in after the Chinese fashion, and in addition the walls on the outside were being covered with straw in bundles held in position with a light wooden framework, and I understand the straw was to be plastered over with mud. There were in the hospital 352 patients, of whom 220 were dysentery. Out of 31 cases of typhoid fever one had died. Total number of cases admitted to hospital 430. There had been no operations of a capital nature performed, and the operating room was not completed or equipped for use at the time.

The German medical department is most complete and excellently arranged, but was evidently gotten up with the idea of being used over fine roads such as are common in

Europe. The ambulances, which are excellent in principle, are too heavy for our service. The medicine wagons for the field hospitals are very heavy but the best arranged that could be devised. Some modification in respect to that objection would make them suitable for our service, and they would be invaluable.

FRENCH.

Each French regiment of infantry has four surgeons, one major, one captain, one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant. When the regiment goes into action the surgeons are stationed at the "poste de secour" (temporary dressing station), the wounded are carried from the firing line to the poste de secour by the company stretcher bearers (brancardiers), four men being detailed for this duty from each company: They are combatants and do not wear the Geneva cross. This seems to be a constant feature in European armies but much decried in ours. One pouch corresponding to our hospital corps pouch is allowed to each litter squad of four men. These stretcher bearers are allowed as follows:

48 to a regiment of infantry.

16 to a battalion of chasseurs.

24 to six batteries of artillery.

4 to a company of pioneers.

These men are in a regiment, under charge of one sergeant and a corporal for each battalion. Each regiment has 12 nurses (infirmiers), one to each company; they are noncombatants and wear the Geneva cross. Each soldier and officer carries a first-aid package, consisting of charpie enveloped in gauze, one compress, one bandage, and two safety pins enveloped in material impervious to water. Each hospital corps private (infirmier) carries a haversack with dressings and a small pouch on each side of the belt in front, one of which, besides dressings, contains a pair of hemostatic forceps. To each battalion of infantry is allowed one "sac d' ambulance," resembling in appearance the square haversack carried by the French infantry, and on the top of this is strapped a roll for the aid of the asphyxiated, containing a flannel gown, a pair of hair gloves, a brush, and instructions for use are included in the case. This is peculiar to the French Army, as I know of no other possessing it. The "sac d' ambulance" contains medicines and dressings and is for use on the march and in case of accident. For the cavalry there is provided a pair of

saddlebags containing dressings, medicines, etc., and corresponding to our orderly pouch for mounted orderly, but is much more convenient to carry. Each regiment of infantry and of horse batteries has one one-horse medical wagon. These medical wagons are very different from the German, and are simply to transport the four regimental panniers and the two reserve panniers containing dressings, the six panniers containing altogether 300 dressings. Also eight liters, one cask of 10 liters and one of 30 liters, two marine lanterns, one with red globe and one with white, one small red cross flag and one national flag. The four medical panniers are numbered 1, 2, and 3. No. 1 for medicines and for daily use on the march, and is not taken to the first dressing station; No. 2 for operations; and No. 3, of which there are two, for dressings only, are for use at the dressing station (*le poste de secours*). From the dressing station the bearers carry the wounded to the "*relais d' ambulance*," which mark the furthestmost point to the rear that the *brancardiers* go. Here also the regimental work ends, and the service of the ambulances and hospitals begin. The word "*ambulance*," as used by the French, means a temporary field hospital, has its own personnel and a capacity of about 50 beds. Its personnel works no further forward than the "*relais d' ambulance*." From the ambulance the wounded are moved back to the "*hôpital de campagne*," which is a field hospital of a more permanent character, with a capacity of 100 beds, divided into two sections. The ambulances having sent the wounded to the *hôpital de campagne* is ready to move forward on an advance. The dressing stations (*postes de secours*) of the four regiments composing a division, empty into the ambulance of that division. In a corps there is an ambulance in rear of the cavalry component, one in rear of the first division of infantry, one in rear of the artillery component, and the ambulance in rear of the second division of infantry is divided into two sections. These empty into six "*hôpitaux de campagne*," one for the cavalry, one for the first division, one for the artillery, and one for each section of the second division, and one called the hospital of special distinction.

The "*hôpitaux de campagne*" mark the limit of the "*zone of the front*," and empty into the hospital of evacuation, which is the beginning of the "*zone of the rear*" and included in this zone are the various hospitals on the line of

communications to the base hospitals which mark the beginning of the "zone of the interior."

The regimental panniers are of wicker-work, with a lid, and are out of date. For detached service with the cavalry, there are used by the French two chests of wood, Nos. 1 and 2, and a pannier which simulates in contents regimental panniers, Nos. 1, 2, and 3; but they are inferior in every respect to our detached service chest.

TRANSPORTATION.—The French litter is similar to the German, except that it has wooden legs and when used in an ambulance is suspended by straps. It would not be desirable to imitate it. The French ambulance accommodates 10 patients sitting up or 4 recumbent. The inner poles of the two litters above and below are supported front and rear by straps attached to vertical iron bars, and on the outer side attached to a hook in the side of the ambulance. The French also have a litter on wheels similar to and for the same use as the one of the Germans.

HOSPITALS.—(1) The general hospital contained 58 patients, 10 of them being typhoid and 28 dysentery. No precautions were taken to prevent the spread of the disease, neither as regards the bedding, body clothes, bed pans, etc. The wards themselves were clean, but there was considerable refuse material about the building. The beds were of iron and comfortable. There was no laboratory equipment. Its capacity was 100 beds. There were 20 nurses on duty and 2 surgeons. (2) The hôpital auxiliaire contained 140 patients, of which 12 were typhoids, 60 dysentery, and 40 diarrhea. The hospital was provided with a Roentgen-ray apparatus, and microscope for blood examinations. Most of the beds were narrow litters resting on supports at each end. There was a very good, well-equipped operating room.

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ITALIANS.

The Italians formed no part of the relief column that marched to Peking, and have a very small force in China, two battalions, and so no opportunity has presented itself to observe their equipment. They have a small hospital in Tientsin, and there were 25 patients, 5 cases of dysentery and 20 of malaria. Some of the patients were on folding cots and several only on litters resting on supports. * * * It

was well supplied with surgical instruments and preparations were in progress to perform a Bassini operation, for the radical cure of hernia, the next morning at 9 o'clock. * * *

The Italian first-aid package is less than one-half the size of ours, and is composed of a brown, waterproof material with wax paper enveloping two pink gauze compresses and a pink roller bandage and two ordinary pins in waxed paper. Antiseptic agent used is corrosive sublimate solution. Each regiment has seven medical officers; one with the rank of captain, six with the rank of first lieutenant. Six stretchers and 24 stretcher bearers are allowed to each regiment, 2 to a company, also two ambulances to a regiment. The sanitary company is 70 strong, and to a division is allowed two field hospitals of 200 beds each, divisible into two sections. With two divisions, however, there are five field hospitals. The Italian litter is quite a poor one. I witnessed the operation, Bassini's, for the radical cure of hernia at the Italian hospital in Tientsin to-day, November 6, and it was most skilfully performed. Silk sutures were used throughout, for both buried and superficial sutures, and the skin was united by the mattress suture.

RUSSIAN.

The Russian army had left Peking before an opportunity presented itself to investigate their medical equipment, and only a comparatively small party of it remained at Tientsin, and I was unable to obtain their losses during the campaign, partly on account of the difficulty of being understood, and principally because I could not find anyone among those who remained who seemed to know. Each regiment of infantry has four battalions, with one surgeon to each battalion, and a regimental surgeon, making five in all. Their position in battle is at the temporary dressing station. Each company is allowed 8 stretcher bearers and 4 stretchers, making 128 bearers to a regiment, and 64 stretchers, a Russian regiment of infantry being made up of sixteen companies. The wounded are sent from the first-aid station to the brigade hospital and then to the division hospital, which has a capacity of 200 men and 10 officers. Their wounded were carried down the river in junks to the hospital at Taku, and from there to Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

TRANSPORTATION.—The Russian litter consists of two long litter poles slipped through a fold in the canvas, and passing through rings on the iron legs front and rear and tied to the cross bars front and rear. It is heavy and much inferior to our litter. The wounded were transported in the two-wheel cart without springs. It was necessary for the patient to be recumbent; the tailboard was fixed in a horizontal position so as to make the bed of the cart long enough. The same kind of carts was used to transport medicines, but those used for this purpose were provided with rubber springs or buffers to prevent the medicine bottles from being broken by the jolting of the carts. * * * Their medical equipment, on this campaign at least, was of the very roughest character and very little of it. The Russian soldier certainly does not seem to be accustomed to any refinements in medical equipments in the field, nor to expect them.

HOSPITALS.—There were four hospitals in the east arsenal, one of them being a movable field hospital, and containing 196 patients, suffering principally from dysentery and typhoid fever. I was informed there were 200 cases of typhoid in the east arsenal, and there were 127 in the wards visited by me.

Both hospitals were similarly equipped, but the movable hospital had carts for transportation purposes, the other had not. The beds consisted of iron legs with a connecting cross bar for head and foot pieces, and with rough boards placed across them. Each patient lay on a bed sack filled with straw and covered with a sheet. Tea was used instead of boiled water. Soup seems to be the other principal article of diet to both sick and well. The bread used is a coarse brown bread.

There was no laboratory equipment, nor a microscope in these hospitals. I was informed that the total number of the sick among the Russian troops was 900. I could not obtain a first-aid package for examination, and was informed that not all the Russian troops had yet been supplied with them.

The Russians on their campaign were certainly very meagerly supplied and had been helped out to some extent by the Red Cross Society.

Respectfully submitted,

W. B. BANISTER,
Major and Surgeon, U. S. V.

**OBSERVATIONS ON EQUIPMENTS, SUPPLIES, ETC., OF
THE FOREIGN DETACHMENTS OF THE EXPEDI-
TIONARY ARMY IN NORTH CHINA.**

BY MAJ. S. M. MILLS, SIXTH UNITED STATES ARTILLERY.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
TIENTSIN, CHINA, *September 12, 1900.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
China Relief Expedition, Peking, China.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following observations in connection with the equipment, supplies, etc., of the foreign detachments of troops that accompanied the expeditionary army in the forced march to Peking, beginning August 4, 1900.

I was attached to the staff of the major general commanding the forces in China, pursuant to telegraphic instructions to Major General Chaffee from the War Department dated July 17, 1900, and reported for duty at Nagasaki.

Upon arrival at Tientsin, and as the column was about to take up the march, I was instructed by the major general commanding to report to Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, commanding the British forces, for duty and observation, and as a medium of communication between the two generals during actual combats. I remained with the British staff during the march to Yangtsun and in the engagements at Peitsang and Yangtsun; after that and until the allied troops reached Peking, as there was no expectation of serious resistance, I was on duty with the staff of the major general commanding.

During the forced and hurried march to Peking there was little opportunity to observe much in detail the foreign detachments, and afterwards in my duties, first as acting judge advocate of the American forces and later as chief ordnance officer at Tientsin, my time was occupied, so that I could make only cursory investigation as circumstances offered. Such as I have been able to gather under these circumstances is submitted in this report for such disposition as the commanding general may choose to make of it.

The British force was composed entirely of troops from India, some of which had arrived at Tientsin but a few days before the arrival of our own Ninth Infantry, and others

about the time of the arrival of the Fourteenth Infantry and Reilly's battery of artillery.

I was impressed at once with the complete organization and fitness of this force as it was finally prepared for the field in the few days allotted it. It consisted of a part of an expeditionary force mobilized in India, completed in all details before leaving the point of embarkation, and preceded by officers of intelligence and transport department, to make provisions for the arriving troops.

Maj. Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, its commanding general, and quartermaster general of India, was detached for this duty, and arrived with his trained and efficient staff, selected from the commands in India and not from the troops composing his own force, which would thereby have been weakened. His staff consisted of some seventeen officers, not counting transport officers and those on duty at the bases and on line of communication. These staff officers were all line officers who had been trained in their special duties (it must be remembered that there are no permanent staff officers in the Indian army), and for the time being some of them had increased rank. With the exception of the chief of staff and deputy adjutant general, Brig. Gen. E. G. Barrow, C. B., I. S. C., they were all young men under 40 years of age; General Barrow was a man perhaps 50, and the general commanding a man perhaps 57 years old. This staff performed the duties of deputy adjutant general, deputy quartermaster general, and assistants to these—intelligence officers, engineers, army signaling, ordnance, provost marshal, field paymaster, medical, commissary and transport, line of communication and base staff, etc.

I mention the foregoing facts somewhat in detail to contrast for a moment, not in criticism, for I understand all the difficulties we labor under for want of proper legislation, organization, and preparedness, but to accentuate the fact that, notwithstanding all this lack of staff assistance on this occasion and in many other campaigns in our history we were able to overcome and carry to successful issue what seemed, for lack of preparation, very doubtful.

In this remarkable short campaign the credit is entirely due to the splendid capacity, energy, and untiring endurance of the major general commanding, who, single-handed and practically alone so far as trained organized staff assistance

was concerned (though the staff worked arduously) mobilizing himself and one aid-de-camp before leaving his country; picking up officers here and there en route for staff duty; supplying himself with a field desk and a few picks and shovels at San Francisco; finally arriving upon the scene of operations to find a few marines and the Ninth Infantry, the latter sadly decimated in numbers by recent operations, but fortunately fully equipped as a regiment (thanks to the judgment of the military authorities of the Philippines) with transportation, supplies, medical and other stores; and with this allowance, and under these circumstances, organized the American forces and doing fully his share of the fighting, carried to successful issue this historical campaign.

BRITISH FIELD FORCE.

Seventh Bengal Infantry.....	500
First Sikh Infantry.....	500
Punjab Infantry.....	300
Royal Welsh Fusiliers.....	300
Royal Marines.....	300
Hongkong Regiment.....	100
First Chinese Infantry.....	100
Total infantry.....	2,100
First Bengal Lancers (cavalry).....	400
Royal Navy Artillery, 4 naval guns.....	150
Hongkong Artillery, 2 naval guns and 4 Maxims..	120
No. 12 field battery, 6 field guns.....	150
Total combatant force.....	2,920

Two additional regiments joined after arrival at Peking, and an entire division has since then joined; these are not included in these figures.

The regimental organizations of the British and native Indian troops, I will assume, are well known, as they have frequently been reported upon.

I, myself, as a military representative in India some years ago, reported much in detail on the subject of the native troops. I will note one change particularly, among others, which at that time was unfavorably commented upon, viz, the lack of British officers for duty with the native regiments; this has been changed and the number now increased to ten officers.

The question of transportation in the field is the first important matter that presents itself, and on this march all varieties were used.

The allied troops primarily depended upon the junks which were poled and dragged up the Peiho. This necessarily confined the march to the roads near the river, or so that they could reach the junks every few days. In addition to this, transportation for the daily needs of the troops had to be supplied. With the United States troops this was accomplished by the use of coolie bearers, 20 to a company, and with the usual four-mule escort wagons, the latter carrying rations only. The British used small pack mules, the other nations one-horse carts. The Russians used a pattern much larger than that used by the Japanese, as their horses were larger.

Field transportation (pack mules) of the British is in the charge of the Indian coolie corps, an organization comprising 2 British officers, the senior with the rank of major, 2 British noncommissioned officers, and various native officers, sirdars, etc., in charge of subdivisions, and 1,000 coolies (natives) to each corps. Besides this corps a certain number of pack mules with their native drivers is told off to each unit or organization, about 20 linked together in threes, for each separate regiment, and to other separate units a number depending upon their strength. For the officers, one mule to each two throughout the entire command. These impedimenta of the British army in India, which have for so many years excited criticism of military experts from an European or American standpoint, proved most efficient in the present campaign, and altogether the best on account of the bad and difficult roads. A great many mules for the British and carts for the Japanese and Russians were required on this march, as they carried all the equipments of the soldier except his rifle, ammunition, and water-bottle or canteen, and one day's ration, whereas the American soldier had to carry four days' rations on the first march, blanket roll, meat can, and tin cup, which overweighted him in comparison with other troops. If we had met with the rainy weather which was confidently predicted for August, or if for any reason our heavily laden wagons could not have kept up with the column on account of the condition of the roads, it would have been a much more serious problem. As it happily turned out, except on one occasion, the wagons were always with us at night, and the transportation, though very limited, was on the whole satisfactory.

The question of water supply for drinking purposes on the march was a serious matter. Our men had only the canteen,

which it was difficult, if not impossible, to fill from buckets at the wells, and much inconvenience was caused during the excessive heat of the day for the want of water. The British have a canteen about the size of our own, which is carried on the person; besides, they have two mules for each regiment, which carry 25 or 30 gallons in sheep skins suspended across the backs of the animals, and in addition "bhists" or water carriers, who carry in skins a smaller quantity on their backs for distributing to the men on the march and for filling their canteens. These accompany the troops on the march on all occasions.

In addition to supplying the men with water, this system enables the selection of the best water in quantity to last until the next best supply is reached, and the troops are not forced to drink any and all kinds as they find them.

For garrison purposes the British have numberless small, low, two-wheeled vehicles upon which is placed a barrel some 4 feet long and about 18 inches in diameter, covered with a woolen blanket; the barrel has a faucet in one end. This barrel is wheeled and drawn by two men and is used in carrying water from distant wells to troops in camp.

The Russians, in addition to their canteens or water bottles, had a little copper or brass bucket with a hoop handle, which could be readily lowered into wells with rope attached. They also had one-horse carts following the column with distilling arrangements, large circular caldrons in which fires were kept nearly all the time on the march, preparing water for drinking and other purposes.

The commanding general on one occasion called my attention to an ingenious and convenient arrangement he had observed in the Japanese column for carrying picks, shovels, etc., on the backs of Japanese ponies. I did not have an opportunity of seeing this myself, but I observed the matter especially in the British contingent. The pioneer corps in this service carries all the tools required for its work, including mining operations, on the pack saddles of three small mules for each company.

On one mule are carried picks, shovels, hoes, and spare helves; all helves are short and of a uniform length. There is provided a strong wooden frame in which the implements are placed with the helve pointing downward, when the frame is on the mule's back. The helves are put through spaces

between the two upper parallel strips to keep them in place, and the helms rest on the lower cross-piece to which they are lashed with small rope and secured, and kept free from the animal's body. These two filled frames have on either vertical strip a strong iron ring which, when placed on the mule, is hooked on to a correspondingly strong hook on the broad and well-padded saddle, one frame on either side. The tampering bars, crowbars, and other long-handle implements and materials are placed in light frames, and are carried similarly attached to the pack saddle by the mule's side and parallel with his body.

The weight carried by each mule is not over 280 pounds; in addition each pioneer soldier carries a colter or large hoe on his back, in a fair leather case; the handle of the hoe, which is 2 feet long, is detachable, and is carried in a fair leather socket. The leather of these cases is of the very best quality. These arrangements are of the most simple kind; the engineer officer in command informed me that they for years experimented with many designs suggested, but had more recently returned to this arrangement again. As all their transportation in India is by pack animals, I dare say they have evolved a good system.

The question of the disposition of the wounded after proper attention at the first dressing stations was happily solved by the arrival of the junks during the night after the engagements, and the wounded were immediately sent to the base hospital at Tientsin. This was the plan adopted by all nations. But for the convenience of the shelter afforded by the junks, and the open line of communication with Tientsin, the difficulty of providing shelter for and transportation of the wounded on the march, as we had no tents and the wounded could not well be left behind, would have been immensely increased.

SUPPLY AND AMMUNITION.

The ammunition is carried upon the person in two small boxes attached on either side to the waist belt; the amount carried is relatively small to that carried by our own troops. This is the method adopted by all nations, including the Germans and Italians, which I have observed since the close of the campaign.

The weight carried (100 rounds) by the American troops in the woven belt about the waist is burdensome in the extreme

during a long, hot march, so much so that most of the men are unable to bear this weight at the waist and have to lower the belt to the hips. I observed no method of supplying troops with ammunition while in action except by the British, and with them it was done by pack mules specially told off for the purpose.

ARTILLERY.

There is not much to be said on this subject, as the nations represented, with the exception of the British and ourselves, had none of their better or modern artillery on the forced march. They will, undoubtedly, with the troops now arriving and to arrive, be supplied with their best and most efficient weapons, particularly the Germans, who were not represented at all in the relief column.

The Japanese had several batteries of small caliber, but of the old-time Krupp patterns; one of the batteries was of brass. The French had one 8-centimeter battery, which was not in action, I believe, until after our arrival in Peking. The Russians had two batteries of small caliber, and one Maxim battery on wheels with shields, but they were of old, obsolete types, brought from the east coast of Siberia. The British had, in addition to the only modern field guns, which I will describe somewhat in detail, a Maxim battery packed on mules. Both of these Maxim batteries were of rifle caliber. They also had two or three naval guns, 3-inch caliber, of high power, which were taken to Tungchow on the junks, but did not reach us until after the fall of Peking.

The following information in regard to the British 15-pounder field guns, which was the only what might be called modern gun accompanying the expedition, is submitted; some of the points noted, I believe, will be new to artillery officers, though the Ordnance Department may be familiar with them.

DESCRIPTION OF 15-POUNDER B. L. FIELD GUN (BRITISH).

Material, steel.

Total length, 92.35 inches.

Weight, 7 hundredweight.

Bore:

Diameter, 3 inches.

Length in calibers, 28 calibers or 84 inches.

Capacity, including chamber and grooves, 647 cubic inches.

Chamber:

Diameter, 3.625 inches.

Length, 11 inches.

Capacity, 117 cubic inches.

Rifling:

System, Polygroove hook section.

Twist, increasing from one turn in 120 calibers at breech to one turn in 28 calibers at 35.8 inches from muzzle; remainder uniform, one in 28 calibers.

Length, 71.6 inches.

Number of grooves, 12.

Depth of grooves, 0.04 inch.

Width of grooves, 0.06 inch.

Means of rotation consist of copper driving bands.

The vent is the radial T removable, 1 inch in front of obturator.

Breech-closing arrangement is the interrupted screw, with the De Bange obturator.

SIGHTS.—The gun is side-sighted, provided with two rows of sights. The tangent sights are of steel. It is also provided with Scott's telescopic sight, and with rifles and the necessary apparatus for use in imparting instructions in laying the gun.

A memorandum of examination is issued and kept with each gun and a record preserved of the number of rounds fired, four blank cartridges being counted as equal to one round of projectile. All guns are required to be examined after firing 150 rounds.

BRAKES.—The brake consists of two brake shoes, two steel-wire ropes, two sets of suspending chains, and two drag washers with Q link. The brake shoes (which are in one steel forging with the sides splayed out to the front) are attached to the sides of the carriage near the trail eye, by the wire ropes; the inner sides are connected by the suspending chains to the axletree, and when in use the outer sides are connected with the drag washer. The drag washer has a loop for use with the drag rope, and on the opposite a Q link or sliding hinged hook, similar to that used for traces.

In action, the shoes are placed on the ground, behind and against the wheels, and the outer suspending chains are connected to the drag washers. On recoil the wheels of the carriage run on the brake shoes, the steel-wire ropes being of sufficient length to insure the wheels riding on the shoes during recoil. On running up the gun the wheels leave the shoes, which remain in position for the next recoil. When not in use the shoes and outer chains are hung on hooks fixed

to the axletree for the purpose, and the wire rope on the hooks on either side of the trail.

CARRIAGE.—The carriage consists of two side brackets, a trail eye, a top carriage, with hydraulic buffer and gun cradle, double-screw elevating gear, shoe brakes, etc.

The side brackets are flanged steel, connected with transom stays and a trail eye. The trail eye is of wrought iron, the eye being fitted with a movable piece of hard steel. The top carriage consists of two steel guides connected by transom stays and a tubular stay; it is pivoted at the front to the axletree, and supported at the rear by the elevating screw. The gun is a close fit in the gun cradle, to which it is secured by cap-squares fitting over the trunnions. The breech of the gun is connected with a rear sliding bracket, which, together with the cradle, slides in guides formed on the upper part of the top carriage. The top carriage is fitted with a hydraulic buffer to admit of the gun recoiling axially and so lessen the shock, due to firing, on the main carriage. The hydraulic buffer is connected to the top carriage by trunnions, and the piston rod, which passes through both glands of the hydraulic buffer, is attached to the rear sliding bracket. The gun recoils about 4 inches on the top carriage, during which the motion is gradually imparted to the whole structure, thus lessening the strain upon it due to firing. The gun is returned to the firing position by volute springs on the front part of the piston rod; the hydraulic buffer consists of a cylinder, a piston with rod, and front and rear glands. The bore of the cylinder is slightly tapered so that the space around the piston, for the flow of the liquid, varies during recoil. By this means an approximately constant pressure is maintained in the buffer throughout its stroke. The front gland is made to fit into a recess in the piston so as to form a small hydraulic cushion which prevents injury to the buffer by concussion caused by the return of the gun.

Weights (approximate), packed with personal equipment and detachment, are as follows:

	Cwt.	Qr.	Lbs.
Carriage and limber with gun	41	2	0
Wagon carriage and limber with gun.....	42	3	16

The battery is provided with pole draft, and all carriages are painted khaki color. Twenty-four carbines are issued to each battery for guard purposes.

The ammunition, range, etc., are as follows:

Ammunition, shrapnel, shell and case shot.
Weight of shrapnel shell, 14 pounds 1 ounce.
Weight of charge, 15½ ounces of cordite, size 5.
Weight of projectile, 15 pounds.
Fuzes, time and percussion.
Extreme range, 5,500 yards, 14° 39' elevation.
Remaining velocity at this range, 668 f. s.
Muzzle velocity, 1,569 f. s., jump nil.

UNIFORMS, HEAD-GEAR, ETC.

The Russian troops in the field wore white blouses, dark-blue trousers, and black leather boots into which the legs of the trousers were tucked. The officers wore close-fitting white frock coats, dark-blue trousers, and dark leather boots, legs of trousers tucked in boots. The officers and men wore a bell-shaped white forage cap. The Japanese officers and men wore tight-fitting white jackets, white trousers, and puttie leggings, black leather shoes, and white forage caps, chasseur-shaped. They and the Russians were very conspicuous as far as the eye could see. The French wore loose-fitting blouses and trousers of blue drilling, trousers tucked in boots, and a white helmet, not unlike our own helmet in shape, covered with blue drilling, same color and quality as material of clothes. The Germans, those whom I have seen since the campaign, wear a frock coat, rather short skirt, close fitting, buttoned in front, single row of brass buttons, and trousers tucked into boots, both coat and trousers of khaki, darker in color than our own, with a tinge of green, and for head-gear a plain, coarse, low straw hat, with the right side of the brim turned up and secured to the side with a small rosette. The British officers and men wear khaki blouse and trousers, blouse conforming to the figure, puttie leggings for the men and good heavy black shoes; the officers wear a new pattern of stiff leather leggings called the "puttie" legging, and fair leather shoes; the officers and men wear a rather high pith waterproof helmet covered with khaki, same color as clothes, projecting well down over the neck behind, with a light, thin, leather chin strap. This dress for the British is absolutely uniform, both for officers and men, at all times in the field without the slightest departure. I do not hesitate to state that the British were the best and most suitably dressed of any nation, and better equipped than the troops of any nation in the field.

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The helmet such as the British use (or some similar pattern, projecting over the back of the neck, with air space between the soft band encircling the head and the body of the waterproof, light pith helmet of khaki color), is the most desirable head-gear for the broiling sun of the Tropics, or in other hot climates.

I must commend, in closing this subject, the excellent quality and in every way satisfactory russet or fair leather shoe provided the American troops.

I am not called upon or expected to make any report upon the military operations of the campaign, but I hope it will not be amiss if I record my observations of that part of the American force, the Fourteenth Infantry, which took part in the engagement at Yangtsun with the British troops, and not at all times under the eye of the major general commanding the American force or any member of his staff other than myself. The Fourteenth Infantry was leading the American column on the march from Peitsang on the morning of the 6th of August. Both the American and British columns halted (they had been marching on parallel lines during the morning, and were the leading allied troops). When they reached a point about 3,000 yards from the line of several villages and intrenchments called Yangtsun, the British and American generals with their respective staffs, and later the Russian general with his staff, assembled on a high sand mound in the vicinity and surveyed and discussed the outlook. After allowing the troops to rest for a half or three-quarters of an hour, it was decided between the commanding generals of the British and American forces that the Americans would form on the right of the British. The head of the American column was already on the right, and the Russians, when they came up, would form on the left of the British. The entire force of both commands at this time was on the left or west side of the railroad embankment and between it and the river; the Japanese were on the opposite side of the river, the Russians were following in the rear and on the same side of the river and railroad embankment as the English and Americans. Before separating and previous to the advance, General Chaffee turned to the British general and said: "My right flank is in the air and unprotected; I need some cavalry to cover my right flank." As soon as General Chaffee had left the mound General Gaselee turned to me and said: "I wish

you would please place the First Bengal Lancers," which were just then coming up from the rear, "on the American right to protect that flank." I did this, giving to Colonel Gartside-Tipping, commanding the lancers, the instructions I had received.

The American force, excepting the Fourteenth Infantry, then crossed the railroad embankment, deployed, and was the first to draw the enemy's fire. I remained with the British throughout the engagement, except when absent carrying messages to the American commander. Without reconnoissance or further examination, the first Sikh regiment (British) moved forward about 300 yards and deployed in five lines as they slowly advanced; the first line at intervals of 10 or 12 yards, the second at intervals of 6 or 7 yards, and following at 150 or 200 yards, and so on throughout, the last line at intervals of 2 or 3 yards. This deployment was made with the excessive extended intervals in anticipation of meeting artillery fire.

The British field battery moved forward and took position on the left and in advance of the British left, about 500 yards. A space was left between the right flank of the British infantry (the Sikh regiment) and the railroad embankment for the deployment of the Fourteenth Infantry; the embankment at this point was about 10 or 12 feet high. This regiment was deployed in the usual three lines at appropriate distances, the third line, consisting of two companies, constituting the reserve. The first line of this deployment was slightly in the rear of and overlapping the first line of the Sikhs. The head of the Russian column was gradually approaching this line on the left of the British. The advance was made about 11 o'clock, or perhaps a few minutes earlier. The Russian infantry did not deploy or form any part of the attack at this time, probably because the advance was made before they had time to get into line. Later a Russian battery took position on the left of the British battery and fired a few shots, I am told, after the village was captured.

The advance was rapidly continued and a village captured by a charge of the Sikhs and Fourteenth Infantry, the leading lines of the two regiments with their respective colonels and other officers entering the village neck and neck. There were no intrenchments in front of this village.

A glance at the map will show that the ground between the river and the railroad embankment contracts very rapidly as

you approach the village where the railroad crosses the river by an iron bridge. The railroad embankment also becomes very high during the approach, and at or near the village is 30 or 40 feet high. This limited space becoming narrower and narrower, and it now being impracticable to extend the line to the right or left without dividing the command on account of obstacles (the railroad embankment and the river), men were necessarily huddled together, which undoubtedly caused the many casualties which are reported. Later, at 12.30 p. m., the Russians arrived at the railroad bridge and opened fire from this point with artillery, sending out in advance Cossacks and infantry in the attack of villages off to the right on the same side of the river which the American troops under General Chaffee had been subduing during the earlier part of the day.

The Japanese, being on the opposite side of the river, did not have an opportunity of participating in the direct attack. The Fourteenth Infantry and the British took no part in this latter bombardment of the village by the Russians. The allied troops bivouacked at this place for the night and the next day.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL M. MILLS,
Major, Sixth Artillery,
Attached to staff of Major General Commanding in China.

REPORT ON THE SIEGE OF PEKIN.

BY FIRST LIEUT. J. R. LINDSEY, TENTH CAVALRY, A. D. C.

PEKIN, CHINA, *November, 1900.*

MAJ. GEN. ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Commanding China Relief Expedition, Peking, China.

SIR: In obedience to your personal instructions to ascertain the probable origin of the "Boxers," give a brief general outline of their recent movements, and report upon military features connected with the siege of the legations at Peking, I have the honor to submit the following:

THE BOXERS.

So much that is a mere recital of pet theories by those who think they know, or an indulgence of a fertile imagination

by those who do not know, has been said and written about the Boxers that it has been difficult to ascertain much that may be termed real facts. In general terms the Boxer movement may be thus described:

China has for all time been honeycombed with societies of all kinds for all purposes; even thieves, beggars, etc., are thoroughly organized. The "I Ho Ch'uan" Society, or "Fist of the Patriotic Union," improperly translated as "Big Sword," "Big Knife," or "Boxers," has been in existence for many years, but under the latter names within the last year or two only. The recent movement originated in the southwest corner of the province of Shantung under the rule of Hu Hsien, as prefect of the department, and Li Ping Hing, as provincial governor. As a means of checking the comparatively recent foreign aggressions resulting in the seizure of certain parts by the Russians, British, and Germans, an imperial edict was issued, after the coup d'état in 1898, directing every provincial governor to raise in his province a volunteer militia. In a very strong antiforeign province, with a notorious antiforeign governor (encouraged by even a more antiforeign prefect), it was an easy step to incorporate in the volunteer militia an antiforeign society, which on account of its already existing organization dominated over the new and imperfectly organized militia, and yet received through the militia official sanction of its existence; thus from almost its very incipency it might be said that the Boxers received a kind of encouragement from the Government. On account of the strong antiforeign feeling in the Shantung province, due partly to the introduction of numerous foreign inventions which threw many Chinese out of work, partly to the recent seizure of Kai Chau by the Germans, but principally to a positive objection to having their religion and mode of worship changed by the foreign missionaries, there seems to be little doubt that the so-called Boxers, under the direction of their early patron, Hu Hsien, were from the outset bent on striking a blow against foreign aggression. Their first step was against the Chinese Christian converts (or "secondary devils"), whom they particularly despised for accepting a religion so despicable; next, against the missionaries, who were the cause of their religious troubles; next, against modern improvements, particularly railroads, which monopolized all carrying trade; then, against those Chinese who had

dealings with foreigners; finally, against all foreigners, especially the foreign ministers at Peking.

The grotesque exercises in which the Boxers were drilled in bands were performed with the idea that thereby they would be rendered invulnerable; thus was the natural fear of the Chinese for the foreigners overcome. Later on they would perform these exercises under rifle fire till its effect, temporarily, at least, relieved them of their delusion.

The Germans' demand for the removal of Li Ping Hing was acceded to, but Hu Hsien was appointed governor instead. The movement spread over the province even more rapidly than ever, and the numerous outrages committed caused the attention of the ministers at Peking to be drawn to the rapid growth and wide extent of the movement, and, in accordance with treaty rights, they demanded Hu Hsien's removal, which was reluctantly made. Hu Hsien went from Shantung to Peking, where (through a friend who was a tutor of the emperor) he became the adviser of the queen dowager; certainly he never lost her favor, as he was afterwards appointed governor of Shansi, in which province the imperial household sought refuge when Peking was taken by the foreign forces. Yuan Shih K'ai, an able official, was then appointed over Shantung, and he set about vigorously to suppress the Boxer movement; in fact, did practically rout them out of the province. Because it was a seat of "foreign devils" and their inventions, and perhaps because Li Ping Hing, the deposed governor, had settled between it and Shantung, the province of Chili, in which is situated Peking, became the hotbed of the Boxers. The whole region between Peking and Paotingfu was alive with them and Peking itself threatened. The foreign ministers, appreciating how little the imperial government had done to suppress the movement and fearing that high officials were encouraging it, about May 28 sent for more guards. The railroad had not yet been interfered with, and on the afternoon of May 31 the guards, 350 strong, among which were fifty marines from the *Newark* and the *Oregon*, arrived at Machia Fu, the depot of Peking, and marched unmolested to their respective legations. At this time there were in and about Peking, associating and friendly with the Boxers, about 15,000 imperial troops under command of General Tung Fu Hsiang, notorious for his hatred of foreigners. No opposition whatever was offered to the entrance of the

guards, but steps were soon taken to prevent the arrival of any more, the railroad and telegraph lines being completely destroyed.

The following facts seem to indicate clearly the complicity of the imperial government with the Boxers in the attack on legationers:

That the attack on the legationers was made by imperial troops; the Chinese barricades were everywhere mounted with flags bearing the name and designation of regular Chinese officers and their commands, and captured men and arms belonged to the Chinese army;

That decrees were issued organizing, arming, provisioning, and paying the Boxers; appointing Prince Chuang and Kang I to their command; urging members of imperial family to be no less patriotic than the Boxers; and mentioning princes and ministers in command of the Boxers;

That Viceroy Yu Lu ordered provisions and fire arms distributed among the Boxers;

That whenever the Chinese Government desired to communicate with the ministers, the firing would cease for the time;

Thus, there seems to be no doubt of the Government being involved; but it may be added in its defense that, being very unpopular with the Chinese people, lest it encouraged and abetted the movement against the foreigners, it might have suffered an overthrow from its own people.

The last train from Peking left at 3 p. m., June 4. The chancellor of the Japanese legation was murdered and his body horribly mutilated on June 11.

The missionaries in the neighborhood of Peking gathered at their missions; but all the missions, except the Peitang (French), the Methodist, and the Roman Catholic, were burned on the 13th of June. The Roman Catholic mission and the buildings at the west end of Legation street went on the 14th; and the Chinese city, that part of Peking south of the Tartar wall, on the 16th, the fire originating at a store in which foreign goods were sold. The Methodist mission, being the nearest to the legation quarter, was the refuge of the missionaries till compelled to enter the compound of the British legation on the 20th. It was on this date the German minister was murdered and his secretary wounded while on their way to the Tsung-li-Yamen.

THE SIEGE.

Sir Claude McDonald, minister from England, was selected on account of his military experience, extending over twenty-five years, to command and direct the defense. He selected Mr. H. G. Squiers, first secretary of the United States legation, as his chief of staff, and the necessary committees for management of internal domestic affairs were appointed and organized.

The number of armed soldiers were:

Nation.	Officers.	Men.
American	3	53
Austrian	5	30
British	3	79
French	3	45
German	1	50
Japanese	1	24
Russian	2	79
Italian	1	28

In addition to the above-mentioned there were about 200 foreign civilians armed with guns of all kinds, making in all a fighting strength of about 600. The Americans armed about 50 civilians with their extra Martinis and had one Colt gun, the English one Nordenfelt, the Italians one rapid-fire (1-inch), the Austrians one rapid-fire gun, and the Russians several large bore rifles, something like "jingals," which made a very loud noise and which the Chinese greatly feared. An old gun found in an old foundry was loaded with pieces of old iron and brick, and used once or twice to frighten temporarily the Chinese. The Americans had about 300 rounds of ammunition per man; the Russians about 65 per man, but reloaded quite a number; and the Germans 40. The number of rounds possessed by other nations has not yet been learned. The total number of men, women, and children was about 3,500. The Christian converts under the missionaries rendered valuable service in all construction work; Catholics worked principally in Japanese legation; the Protestants, on the wall.

It has been impossible to ascertain anything definite regarding the number of Chinese engaged in the siege, but from reports would think 2,000 a conservative estimate. It is known that they had four pieces of artillery on the imperial wall north of British legation, at least two on the Chienmen,

one on the Hatamen, and one at foot of ramp near the Hatamen. Some were 3-inch modern guns, firing shells made in 1896, others were old-fashioned, firing solid shot. The effect of their artillery fire acted principally on the morale and against the barricades.

The general plan of defense was to hold a line including all the legations and that part of the Tartar wall from the ramp immediately south of United States legation to the canal or water gate, and, if burned or forced back from outer legations and the wall, to make a final stand in the British compound. The importance of securing and holding the wall referred to was early recognized; first, because in the hands of the Chinese they would have a position from which the Chinese could destroy almost every legation; and, second, by holding the water gate an easy entrance could be effected for the relief column. After the arrival of the marines on May 31, in addition to the guard at the legation gates, outposts were established by the Americans on Legation street about 300 yards west of gate and on street in rear of the legation; by the Italians, just east of their legation on the street (*b*); and by the British, north of their legation on bridge across canal (*b*). This constituted the very first step in the defenses. Soon it became necessary to make barricades across the streets in order to keep out the swarms of suspicious people. These barricades were first built of old carts, wheels, and rubbish of all kinds, but were afterwards made good and strong of dirt and brick. By the 13th of June barricades had been built by the Russians across Legation street (*d*); by the British, at its outpost on canal bridge; by the French and Austrians, just north of the Austrian legation (*e*); by the Italians, across Legation street at their legation (*f*); by the Germans, across the street running along the Tartar wall (*g*) and on the wall (*h*); by the Americans at (*i*); and by the Americans and Russians at (*j*). Afterwards the Americans and Russians increased their barricades on Legation street by (*k*) and (*l*). The whole of Legation street was being fired upon from every direction, the fire from the Chienmen (*m*) being at times severe. The Chinese soon recognized the value to them of a position on the wall south of the legation district, and began advancing from the Chienmen. If the foreigners were going on the wall at all, they must do so before the Chinese reached and held the ramp. Accordingly, a party of American

marines, 15 Germans, and 10 French, under Captain Myers, were sent up on the wall by the east ramp, with instructions to force the Chinese back and secure themselves by barricade. Barricade (*i*) had to be abandoned. A sharp fire from the Chinese in the houses at base of west ramp made the ditch (*o*) necessary for approaching the wall and for future communication. On reaching the top of the ramp the party met with a lively fire from along the wall and up the west ramp, and for protection they began building the barricade (*n*) at the top of the east ramp. A barricade at the top of the west ramp would have made their position more tenable, prevented Chinese from reaching wall by west ramp, and avoided the necessity of afterwards, at great risk, having to storm a barricade built at that very place by the Chinese. But, taking into consideration the fire up the ramp and along the wall, the difficulty of constructing with Chinese labor any sort of a barricade at any place can be imagined, but no time should have been lost in building barricade in proper place. The line of defense on June 20 is shown by (—), which indicates the limit of foreign control; this line was prepared for defense as shown, but was manned at points only where a necessity existed. Communication was necessary between the English and Japanese legations, so the wall (*r*) and the ditch (*q*) were constructed, principally by Christian Chinese, who also held (*p*). This construction was quite difficult, as the British had withdrawn their outpost on the bridge, leaving a free field of fire from the Chinese on the imperial wall at (*s*), and as there was then quite a little water in the canal. The Chinese burned the buildings on north and west of Japanese legation and forced defenders back on June 22. On June 23 the British advanced their line on the north, and themselves burning buildings adjacent to Mongol market, on July 6 advanced their lines to a better position. The ditches (*u*) behind the walls in British legation were to intercept any Chinese mines, and were effective in preventing the successful completion of the mine (*v*) in the northwest corner. The old and valuable Hanlin Library was sacrificed by the Chinese in an attempt to burn out the British. Step by step were the Japanese forced back to the comparatively limited line they held when the siege was raised. At the French legation the Chinese successfully planted and exploded the mine (*w*), burned the

minister's house and those adjoining, and forced the French almost to abandon their legation.

About the German legation the lines suffered but one slight change. At first the Germans had a position on the wall south of their legation, but their communications were poor, as they were subject to fire from Hatamen in going from barricade (*g*) to the foot of the ramp, and a good many were killed in so doing.

The barricade on the wall behind the American legation had scarcely been built when the Chinese from the Chienmen turned their guns on it, battered it down, and forced the foreigners off the wall; but the position was immediately retaken and the barricades strengthened and extended across the wall half way into the bastion. The Chinese continued advancing along the wall under shelter of barricades, constructed principally at night, till they had built a strong barricade (*y*) across the wall and top of west ramp and breached the wall on north side, establishing communication by the ramp to position behind their barricades.

All the while firing was kept up on the legation from the wall. Observing that on account of the thickness of the foreigners' barricade (*n*) and the smallness of their loopholes they could fire straight to the front only, the Chinese extended their barricade (*y*) by the right flank, curving to the front until within a few feet of the foreigners; so close were they that stones were thrown at the foreigners. On July 1, the Chinese attacking from the Hatamen drove the Germans from their barricade (*h*) on the wall and in the street below (*g*), and by the 3d of July had built a strong barricade at (*a'*); so it will be seen the position on the wall behind the American legation was the only hope of retaining the wall, and that was being attacked from both sides. In the further operations on the wall this fire from both directions necessitated in any position a shelter from each. To do something was imperative, so at 2 o'clock on the night of July 3, Captain Myers, with 53 men (15 American marines, 23 British, and 15 Russians) charged the Chinese barricade, the Americans and British attacking the center and right flank, and the Germans the left, with view of cutting off escape and preventing assistance by the ramp. Within ten minutes the position was taken at a loss of 2 Americans killed and 1 wounded. Captain Myers

was wounded in the leg by running into a spear lying on the ground. A number of Chinese killed had been thrown over the wall, but 27 were buried. After Captain Myers was wounded, Captain Hall was in command on the wall. The foreigners then constructed the barricade (*b*), extended barricade (*r*) to southern side of bastion, using material represented by dotted lines (*c'*), opened their own wall at (*d'*), and dug the small ditch (*e'*), for sheltered communication. Scarcely had the foreigners fortified themselves from the attack by the Chinese on the Chienmen side than they had to begin operating toward the Hatamen for possession of the water gate. After the attack on night of July 3, the Chinese began building a tower of brick (*f'*) from which they could fire over the foreigners' barricade when they were moving toward the Hatamen, and from which they could fire directly into the American legation. A ditch 10 feet deep across the wall at this tower and a tunnel 6 feet long, had been dug, showing their intention to undermine the foreigners. The foreigners utilized the Protestant Chinese under charge of missionaries as overseers in constructing their barricades, usually at night. The first party sent out to construct a barricade to the east, becoming intimidated, built (*g'*) only a few feet away; practically no advantage. Similarly, a party under a corporal of marines built (*h'*), of scarcely any appreciable advantage considering the fact that the Chinese had advanced from (*h*) to (*a'*) in two days. Under the supervision of Captain Hall the barricades at (*k'*) were built on nights of July 12 and 13, at (*l'*) on the 15th, and the shelter ditch (*m'*) for communication afterward constructed. In constructing these barricades, the working party advanced and built their barricade as quickly as possible, then dug the ditch. (*n'*) is a partially constructed bomb-proof cover. Securely fortified in this position the foreigners held command of the water gate and canal, and kept the Chinese off till the relief column, which arrived on August 14, raised the siege. At the end, the American marines were disposed as follows: Three men at an outpost (*o'*) on canal in immediate command of gate; 7 in Fort Myers; 15 on wall over canal gate; two posts, 3 men each, in Russian bank compounds; 3 men at Legation street; and the remainder, about 7 or 8, at barricade on Legation street.

REMARKS.

The number of killed and wounded can be seen from the list hereto attached, marked A. The one wounded American civilian is said to have received his wound while in the act of looting. There were two or three determined attacks by the Chinese, especially the one just prior to the arrival of the relief column; but during the greater part of the siege the firing was desultory and individual. "Snipers"—sharpshooters under cover—caused a great deal of trouble and were much feared; there were not a great many. There is much evidence about the legations of a heavy rifle fire, but little of the artillery. This leads to a wonder as to what became of the terrific hailstorm of shot and shell continually poured upon the besieged. I am told that 2,000 shots were fired and counted in one week. Poor artillery, poor marksmanship, and perhaps counting old "jingals" and such Chinese guns as artillery must account for the little effect.

Considering the number of Chinese actually engaged in the attack and the thousands that were available, the situation of the legation quarter near the Tartar wall, and the positions of the Chinese, I seek in vain some military reason for the failure of the Chinese to exterminate the foreigners. The half-hearted offense must be due to cowardice or to a lack of intent really to destroy the legations and kill the foreigners. I am inclined to believe that both causes operated. The cowardice of the Chinese is well known; the absence of the necessary intent may be explained by a disinclination of the government to oppose the legationers except so far as to divert attention from itself.

The foreigners fought bravely, endured many hardships, and suffered untold miseries in anticipation of the barbarous death which seemed inevitable; and though much has been and will be told of this side of the siege, it nevertheless remains that there were few new developments of any importance to the military world.

SIEGE OF THE PEITANG.

The Peitang, or the French mission, is situated just within the west wall of the imperial city, and is, therefore, entirely separated from the legation quarter. Here all were Catholics,

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against whom the Chinese were particularly active because of the deep root Catholicism was taking in China, due to their methods in directing attention to raising, educating, and Christianizing the Chinese children. Within the large compounds were located all the buildings pertaining to such an institution—cathedral, convent, orphanage, dwelling houses, schoolrooms, etc. The regular contingent consisted of 600 people, including priests, sisters, Christian Chinese men, women, and children, but the influx of refugees just prior to the siege swelled the number to nearly 3,000 souls. One year's supplies for 600 people had just been laid in, and as soon as Christians began to pour in on them an effort was made to gather in more supplies, but interference of the Chinese rendered it futile.

On the 1st of June, 30 French, and on the 10th, 10 Italian soldiers were dispatched to defend the mission. Beginning work after the arrival of the French, barricades were built at (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f). The barricade (g) was built by the Chinese, but afterwards taken by the foreigners; the trench (h) was dug for communication, and a kind of bombproof constructed at (l), but neither used very much. Also a small bombproof cover with connecting ditch was built at (k); the walls at (l) were reenforced. On the 19th of June the Chinese opened fire, on that day killing 47 persons and burning one house. Last communication with the legations was had on the 21st of June. Monsignors Favier and Jardin, priests of the mission, directed the defense, the plan being to hold outer wall as long as possible and if forced back to make final stand in cathedral (j), which was loopholed for defense.

In addition to number of officers and soldiers shown in exhibit hereto attached, 10 Christian Chinese were armed with the spare guns on hand. The French had 300 rounds of ammunition per man; the Italians, 90; a few cartridges were reloaded; some spears were made but never used. The Chinese are roughly estimated at 2,000 with about 22 pieces of artillery, some of which were Krupp guns.

The foreigners were generally disposed as follows: 15 men at south entrance; 5 men in buildings in southwest corner; 5 in tower (m); 3 or 4 in outpost at (n); 3 in each outpost at (o) and (p), and 5 in (q). The Chinese artillery fire was at times terrific, but not very damaging; beginning with the 24th of

July, for three days artillery fire was almost continuous; on first day 580 shots were fired, on second 355, and on third 255. After this the artillery fire ceased for about eight days. Thereafter it was desultory till the very end, when it opened up a heavy fire again. Rifle fire was directed upon the foreigners from all sides. The buildings, especially the cathedral, show effect of a heavy rifle but not so great artillery fire. The Chinese artillery was very poor, their marksmanship worse. Very few lives were lost from gunshots. Occasionally the Chinese would make an attack; a few volleys from the outposts would check them. The foreigners made a sortie out of the south gate and captured one gun; there being no ammunition for it, it was useless to them for defense. The Chinese attempted to plant a mine at (*r*) and two at (*s*), but were discovered and forced to abandon them. Three small mines at (*t*) were exploded, killing one man and damaging the buildings near. The foreigners became aware that a mine was being planted somewhere in the northwest corner, and, while digging a trench along the wall to intercept, the mine (*u*) exploded, killing 1 brother and 23 Christians working under him. The foreigners dug a mine themselves in the northeast corner, which was continually being attacked, but had insufficient powder for it. On the 12th of August at 6 o'clock in the morning the Chinese set off the mine (*v*), leaving a crater about 80 feet in diameter and 30 feet deep. The explosion was terrific, completely demolished adjacent buildings and walls, and killed 5 Italian soldiers (one of the outposts), 1 brother, about 20 Chinese men, and 50 children. The most serious attack was made on the south gate; on the northwest corner the Chinese fired from rifle pits. A few pieces of artillery were fired from positions on the north not indicated on map; probably a change in the position of some battery. The arrival of the Japanese and French troops on August 16 dispersed the Chinese and raised the siege. A reference to the exhibit will show the number of soldiers killed and wounded. In addition to these, about 44 Chinese Christians, adults, and 50 children were killed, and about 250 adults and as many children died of starvation. Mules, burros, ponies, etc., were used for meat, and even leaves from the trees were boiled for food. At the end there was on hand for the remaining about 2,400 people, 1 mule and 400 pounds grain—a little

over $2\frac{1}{2}$ ounces apiece—and this frugal allowance remained only at the cost of 500 deaths from starvation. To enable them to keep up defense as long as possible, soldiers had greater allowance than others.

The comparatively few deaths from gunshots among soldiers continually fighting, the fact that most of the wounds were in the head, that 1,500 rounds of ammunition remained out of the original 10,000, and greater than all, that after a siege extending over two months this handful of soldiers withstood the attack, shows that the greatest care and attention were continually exercised, proves that the best possible dispositions were made, and accords to the soldiers an enviable claim to one of the noblest and bravest defenses known in history.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. R. LINDSEY,

First Lieutenant, Tenth Cavalry, Aid-de-Camp.

Number of men and casualties during the sieges of Peking and Peitang.

	Number.		Killed and died of wounds.		Wounded.		Casualties in per cent.			Died of diseases.		Volunteers and independents.		Total.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Legations:															
American	3	53		7	2	8	12.5	17.8	30.3				1	7	11
Austrian	5	30	1	3	3	8	11.4	31.4	42.8					4	11
British	3	79	1	2	2	18	3.7	24.4	28.1			3	6	6	26
French	3	45	2	9		37	22.9	77.1	100.0			2	6	13	42
German	1	50		12		15	23.5	31.4	54.9			*1	†1	13	16
Japanese	1	24		5		21	20.0	84.0	104.0			‡5	8	10	29
Russian §	2	79		4	1	18	4.9	23.9	28.3		2	1	1	7	20
Italian	1	28		7	1	11	24.1	41.4	65.5					7	12
Total	19	388	4	49	9	136	13.1	35.6	48.7		2	12	23	67	167
Peitang:															
French	1	30	1	4		8	16.1	25.8	41.9					5	8
Italian	1	11		6	1	3	50.0	33.3	83.3					6	4
Total	2	41	1	10	1	11	25.6	27.9	53.3					11	12
Grand total	21	429	5	59	10	147	14.3	34.9	49.1		2	12	23	78	179

* Baron von Ketteler.

† Mr. Cordes.

‡ Including Caps. Ando.

§ Including Cossacks of the legation.

REPORT ON THE PAOTINGFU EXPEDITION AND MURDER OF AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AT THAT PLACE.

BY CAPT. GROTE HUTCHESON, SIXTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
TEMPLE OF AGRICULTURE,
PEKIN, CHINA, *November 12, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,
Pekin, China.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report upon events and observations incidental to an expedition composed of English, French, German, and Italian troops from Peking, China, to Paotingfu, China, and return, which I had the honor to accompany in the capacity of an attaché or aid-de-camp on the staff of the commanding general, Lieut. Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, English army (Indian contingent).

In compliance with paragraph 3, Special Order No. 55, Headquarters China Relief Expedition, dated Peking, China, October 11, 1900, I reported in person to Brig. Gen. E. G. Barrow, chief of staff, British expeditionary force in China, during the evening of that date, and was directed to report to General Gaselee at once for instructions. A short time later I did so, and was instructed to join the command at or near Lukochow, the location of the first camp and where a concentration would take place.

My immediate party consisted of one officer besides myself (First Lieut. G. Soulard Turner, Tenth Infantry, aid-de-camp on the staff of Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson), two mounted orderlies, one cook, and one civilian teamster, six in all. I was furnished with an excellent team of 4 mules, a good, serviceable, standard pattern army wagon, tentage with other necessary camp equipage, and carried supplies for twenty-five days. By taking these preliminary precautions, the party was made independent and quite able to care for itself, which not only was most satisfactory to us, but also relieved those with whom we were associated of all care for our welfare.

On October 12 we proceeded from camp in the Temple of Agriculture to Changyantsuan, a small village some 4 miles

south of Lukochow, arriving there about 5.30 p. m., and where we found the forces either in camp or billeted in the village. I reported to General Gaselee and was informed my tents would be pitched each night with his headquarters. He also told me that during marches I would ride with him, or elsewhere, as I might desire.

The following marches, camps, and distances were made:

October 12, Pekin to Changyantsuan, 15 miles.
October 13, Changyantsuan to Luiliho, 17 miles.
October 14, Luiliho to Sunlintien, 14 miles.
October 15, Sunlintien to Piedentze, 16 miles.
October 16, Piedentze to Kucheng, 10 miles.
October 17, Kucheng to Anshu, 9 miles.
October 18, remained in camp at Anshu.
October 19, Anshu to Paotingfu, 11 miles.
Total distance, 92 miles.

Thus, an average distance of a trifle over 13 miles was covered each marching day.

The road was an ordinary dirt one, not metaled or macadamized, had been used for many years, and is the main highway for travel between Pekin and southwestern China. The streams are generally bridged with heavy stone bridges, some perhaps one thousand years old, and one, known as Marco Polo's Bridge at Lukochow, is said to have been crossed by that celebrated traveler. They are all built alike, and, while much out of repair, should stand solid for many years to come. One river, the Peiho, is not bridged for wagons and was forded (a modern railroad bridge spans this river). The ford is practicable except immediately after heavy rains. In some places the road, years ago, was paved with huge blocks of granite. These places, like the bridges, have not been kept in repair, and many of the stone blocks are out of place, much worn, and deep ruts occur between the blocks. These places on the road are difficult, but passable, for artillery and wagons.

The soil is generally sandy, the country flat, almost treeless, except here and there small groves are found; is highly cultivated and thickly settled, with villages almost every mile. Large quantities of forage could be secured everywhere, as the harvest was about completed, and the fields now look barren and almost without sign of vegetable life; yet it is the richest agricultural district I have seen.

The military force marching from Peking and known as Column B was made up as follows:

Lieut. Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, British army, commanding.

British force:

Major General Richardson, commanding British contingent.

Cavalry, four squadrons Sixteenth Bengal Lancers, 400 men.

Infantry—

Two companies First Sikhs, 200 men.

Two companies Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, 200 men.

Two companies Twenty-sixth Baluchistans, 200 men.

Total infantry, 600 men.

Half company Madras Sappers and Miners, 90 men.

Twelve battery Royal Field Artillery (4 guns), 125 men.

Total British effective, 1,215.

German force:

Colonel von Normann, First Regiment, East Asiatic Infantry, commanding.

Cavalry detachment, First East Asiatic Cavalry, 1 officer and 12 men.

Infantry—

Second battalion, First Regiment, East Asiatic Infantry, 400 men.

Second battalion, Second Regiment, East Asiatic Infantry, 400 men.

Total infantry, 800 men.

Artillery—

One field battery of 6 guns.

Four guns (Krupp model, 1893).

Two guns (Krupp model, 1898).

Total artillery, 200 men.

Total German effective, 1,013 men.

French force:

Colonel Lalubin, Seventeenth Regiment, Marine Infantry, commanding.

Infantry, two battalions (seven companies), Seventeenth Regiment, Marine Infantry, 800 men.

Artillery, one battery (4 guns), Marine Mountain Artillery, 150 men.

Total French effective, 950 men.

Thus, the total effective force of Column B was 3,600 men.

The Tientsin column, known as Column A, was composed of the following troops:

General Bailloud (French) commanding the entire column and the French troops.

French force:

Cavalry, one squadron Chasseurs d'Afrique.

Artillery, one field battery, 6 guns (of the line).

Infantry, between two and three battalions of zouaves, infantry of the line, and infantry of marines.

One pioneer section.

German-Italian contingent:

General von Kettler (German), commanding.

German force:

Cavalry, one field troop.

Artillery, one field battery, 4 guns (Krupp model, 1898).

Infantry, one regiment of two battalions.

One field hospital.

Italian force:

Artillery, one field battery, 6 guns.

Infantry—

Two companies (bersaglieri).

Detachment engineers.

Baggage, two-thirds of a battalion column.

British force:

General Lorne-Campbell, commanding; (General Pipon, commanding artillery).

Cavalry, one troop, First Bengal Lancers.

Artillery—

Battery B, Royal Horse Artillery, 6 guns.

Detachment quick-firing guns (Maxims) 2 guns.

One 12-pounder (sea gun) and 2 machine guns with Australian contingent.

Infantry—

Six companies, Twentieth Punjabs.

Four companies, Hongkong Regiment.

Ulwar Imperial Service Infantry (one battalion).

One company Australian Marines.

Sappers and miners.

Half company Bombays.

Actual strength of all the units of Tientsin column was not obtainable. Estimated strength about 3,600 effective men.

A small part of this force (French troops), claiming to be a reconnoissance, had proceeded to Paotingfu, considerably in advance of the main column, arriving there as early as October 12, and later, about October 15, this detachment was reenforced by other French troops until the total strength was about 400 men; but they did not enter the city, taking possession of the four outer gates only.

The Tientsin force marched in three columns on parallel roads, the troops of each nation making up a separate force except the Italians, who marched with the Germans.

On October 18 the commanding general of the combined Tientsin force (General Bailloud) reported to General Gaselee at Anshu, when arrangements for proceeding to Paotingfu were completed.

Accordingly, the entire force concentrated at the latter place October 19.

AT PAOTINGFU.

Just before the column reached Paotingfu, General Gaselee was met by a large delegation of Chinese officials from the city, led by Ting Yung, the fantai or provincial treasurer, which had proceeded a couple of miles from the wall on the north road for the purpose of showing the readiness of the officials to turn the city over to the combined foreign military forces without opposition, and extend a welcome to all soldiers that they might be considered guests of the city; to offer certain presents, which were declined; and to say that certain general arrangements had been made to provide the troops in part with food and shelter. They also expressed the hope that the troops would be kept out of the city, and were fearful lest the place be sacked and burned.

But little was said to them, General Gaselee replying that action would depend upon circumstances, and that he would deal only with the highest official.

Upon arrival at the city it was seen that the gates were held by the French soldiers under the command of Colonel Droude. They had arrived seven days before and taken possession of the gates, but had not entered the city, and it had been protected. General Gaselee rode to the north gate only, not entering; some Chinese soldiers were inside, but without arms. Immediately after this a conference of the military commanders was held, and it was decided not to enter the city that afternoon, the English and French agreeing to this proposition, the Germans protesting. All went into camp or quarters outside of the walls. Another conference was held at 3 p. m., when it was decided to enter the city formally at 10 a. m. the following morning, October 20. The procession to be made up of the different commanding officers with small staffs and escorts.

Accordingly, the next morning the entry was made, and the four flags of the nations represented by a military force (English, French, German, and Italian) were placed side by side over the four gates. The city was divided into four quarters, and one gate given over to each nation to be guarded, north to the English, south to the Italians, east to the Germans, and west to the French. It was also decided to move general headquarters into the city, and, accordingly, the next

day, October 21, General Gaselee with his staff occupied the Liang-Chiang-Hui-Kwan, or the Guild of the province of Chiangsu and Chiangsi, one of the most important places in the city, where he remained during his stay in Paotingfu.

It was further decided to take formal military possession of the city. A military chief of police was appointed, and the city was divided into four military districts, one of which was assigned to each nation for guard, protection, police, and the quartering of troops, if desired. The German, French, and Italians, in part or in whole, quartered their men in their respective districts, but the English troops remained in camp outside the walls, simply detailing in the city a force of sufficient size to furnish the necessary guards. By the evening of October 22 all these changes had been effected.

By this time it was currently reported that the French and Germans intended to occupy the city with a considerable force during the winter, and that the French were anxious to preserve the city from pillage and destruction. They had already taken charge of the railroad and were pushing repairs.

The buildings, shops, and tracks at Paotingfu had suffered little during the summer, and the road to the south for some 40 miles to Tingchow was in operation, and had been operating more or less all the time. But little is to be done to make it serviceable in that direction to the present terminus, Chengtingfu, rails and ties only to be laid. The railroad is being repaired by the railroad company officials under the protection of French soldiers. From Paotingfu northward to Peking considerable work remains to be done. Already the road has been opened up and is in operation some 8 or 10 miles to the north, and it is claimed by those in charge that it will be running to Peking in from four to six weeks.

Upon arrival, October 19, the harsh, cruel, and inhuman treatment of foreigners during the past summer was looked into, and all manner of stories were repeated. The action of the people here looked so damaging for officials and the inhabitants generally that it seemed some steps in the way of punishment for the wrongful deeds should be taken. On the morning of October 20 General Gaselee spoke to me about the matter and asked for my opinion as to the punishment of any persons guilty of atrocious conduct. He also expressed a desire to know what I thought would be General Chaffee's

plan of action under the circumstances, and how my Government might view his action or the action of the combined military commanders. It was desired to know this especially, as more Americans had suffered and been murdered here than any other nationality, and so far as the actual number killed was concerned the United States had been the greatest sufferer.

I replied that no special power had been delegated to me, and that I could scarcely presume to speak for my Government, but that—

First. In my opinion the United States would uphold the prompt punishment of any officials whose guilty connivance was clear and plain, provided such punishment was meted out for the purpose of example and not to satisfy any petty feeling of revenge or retribution.

Second. That any steps General Gaselee thought necessary and proper under the circumstances would in my opinion meet with the approval of and be indorsed by General Chaffee; and

Third. That in view of the tense state of feeling because of the stories of the atrocious treatment and brutal murder of missionaries that had come to light, I suggested that a commission or board of inquiry should be instituted to make an impartial examination into the conduct of the officials and any other accused persons, and whose report and recommendation might serve as a basis for action.

General Gaselee said some such idea had occurred to him.

The next day, October 21, an international commission was instituted to make inquiry into the treatment of the foreigners of various nations who had suffered at Paotingfu. It was composed of:

General Bailloud, French army, president.

Colonel Ramsey, British (Indian) army.

Lieutenant Colonel Salsa, Italian army.

Major von Brixen, German army.

Mr. J. W. Jamison, civilian, British consul at Shanghai.

The latter, who was present with the forces, has an intimate knowledge of the Chinese language and of the customs and character of the Chinese people.

Before proceeding to the results of the labors of this commission and following in the natural sequence of events the story of the American missionaries takes its place.

STATEMENT AND ACCOUNT OF THE TREATMENT AND DEATH
OF CERTAIN AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AT PAOTINGFU, JUNE
30 AND JULY 1, 1900.

The following statement is made up from accounts of numerous persons and believed to be substantially correct, though little direct testimony of eye-witnesses can be secured, and that bearing only upon some stages of the occurrences.

It must also be borne in mind that the events to be described happened nearly four months ago, and, except in a general way, have passed from the minds of most people here; that immediately following the occurrences they were much talked about, so that different versions and stories were currently believed to be true; that the principal actors have fled; that few persons can now be found who will admit having been present, and, above all, the slight regard in which the truth is held by the Chinese people.

The following Presbyterian missionaries, viz, Mr. and Mrs. Simcox and three children, Dr. and Mrs. Hodge, and Dr. George Y. Taylor, lived in several buildings located in one compound situated near the village of Changchiachuang, lying about 1 mile north of the north gate of the city.

On the fourth day of the sixth Chinese month (June 30, 1900), between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the compound was surrounded and attacked by Boxers and villagers, the attack being led by a local Boxer leader of minor rank, named Chu Tu Tze, known throughout the city as a ruffian and bad character generally, but who, the day before, had been presented with a gilt button by the niehtai (provincial judge), Ting Yung (at this writing fantai, or provincial treasurer.)

This button, which was worn by the man at the time of the attack, was in the nature of a decoration or badge of distinction, and was presented by the niehtai as indicating his appreciation of the man's zeal and energy in the Boxer movement. The incident is mentioned merely as pointing out a certain official sanction to the proceedings of that and the following day.

As soon as the compound was attacked the persons mentioned all took refuge in one building, from the upper story of which they could defend themselves. All other buildings in the compound were set fire to and soon destroyed, but a brave defense was made by the besieged, in the course of which Chu Tu Tze was killed and 10 Boxers wounded. Dr.

Taylor addressed the crowd from one of the upper windows in a vain effort to induce it to disperse, but without avail, and the Boxers, being without firearms, could not dislodge and secure possession of their victims. Finally a successful effort was made to set fire to the building. Soon after, the two young sons of Mr. Simcox, Paul and Francis, aged, respectively, about 5 and 7 years, rushed from the building into the open air to escape suffocation from the dense clouds of smoke. They were immediately set upon by the crowd, cut down, and their bodies thrown into the cistern.

The other inmates of the house perished in the flames.

The Chinese Christians and servants, to the number of perhaps twenty, living in the compound, also perished, but whether they were killed or were burned does not appear clearly.

One Chinese Christian who tried to kill himself by jumping into the cistern was taken therefrom and removed to the city and tortured during the night in an effort to secure evidence against the missionaries, corroborative of their alleged practices of cutting out eyes, hearts, etc., and of kidnapping children. This man was afterwards put to death.

In the American Board mission compound, located in the south suburb, lived the following American missionaries, viz, Rev. Mr. Pitkin, Miss Morrell, and Miss Gould. Near by, in another compound, the following English missionaries lived: Mr. and Mrs. Bagnell and one child, and Mr. William Cooper.

About 7 a. m. on the fifth day of the sixth Chinese month (July 1, 1900), being the day following the occurrences described above, and while local excitement ran very high, the American Board mission compound was attacked by Boxers, accompanied by a throng of looting villagers. Mr. Pitkin had already heard of the conduct of the Boxers in attacking the mission to the north of the city and during the night had prepared for the worst, writing a letter of farewell to his wife and friends and burying it with certain small articles of personal and church property near the corner of the house. All were dug up by the Chinese and have not been recovered. The two women, who had occupied a house at the farther end of the compound, had been brought to Mr. Pitkin's house, and, upon being attacked, all took refuge in the chapel and later in a smaller building near by. Mr. Pitkin was armed

with a revolver, with which he defended himself and his charges until the ammunition was exhausted, when the crowd poured into the house and seized the occupants, dragging them out. In the *mêlée* Mr. Pitkin was shot and then beheaded, his body being buried with six or seven Chinese Christians in one pit just outside the compound wall. The head was carried away and into the city, and, it is generally reported, taken into the yamen of the *niehtai*, Ting Yung, as an evidence of the good work of the Boxers, and was seen no more.

During this time and later a force of about 30 Chinese soldiers stood outside the gate of the Pitkin compound with a knowledge of the proceedings, but taking no active part therein. They appear to have remained neutral, doing nothing.

Miss Gould and Miss Morrell were taken out of the compound and into the city. Miss Gould appears to have been so greatly frightened by the rough and brutal conduct of the Chinese that she had fainted from shock and fear, and remained in a more or less comatose condition for some time and was unable to walk. She was accordingly bound hand and foot and slung on a pole or lance, as pigs are carried in China, and taken to the city. Miss Morrell, being a fearless woman of considerable moral strength, was able to walk, and did so. In this manner, Miss Gould being carried and Miss Morrell walking, but being led by the hair, they were taken to the Chi-Sheng-An Temple, in the southeast corner of the city near the wall, one of the headquarters of the Boxers, where they remained all day. En route the streets were thronged with people, many of whom clutched and tore the clothing of the two women, which soon was much tattered, but no deliberate effort to parade them in a nude state was made. Neither does it appear that they were violated, such in fact is highly improbable, but they were roughly handled and knocked about.

Chinese Christians and servants in the American Board mission compound, to the number of perhaps ten, also perished about the time of Mr. Pitkin's death and were buried with his body.

During the day, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnell, one child, and Mr. William Cooper (?) were also brought to the Chi-Sheng-An Temple, and presumably all were put through a form of

examination as to their guilt, according to the general custom of the Boxers. (The experiences of the Bagnell party are not touched upon until this time, having no direct bearing upon the treatment of Americans.)

Late in the afternoon, about 6 o'clock, perhaps, the entire party was conducted out of the city. During the day Miss Gould had recovered her strength and self-possession and was able to walk.

The following method was adopted: The hands were bound and held in front of the body, the wrists about the height of the neck; a rope was then tied about the wrists, passing to the rear around the neck, thence to the wrists of the next person behind, thence about the neck, and so on. The child was not bound, but ran along clinging to her mother's dress.

The end of the rope in front was seized by two men, and the doomed party thus led in single file, all bound together like Chinese criminals, viewed by an immense throng of the populace, were led through the streets, passing out by the south gate to the place of execution at the southeast corner of the wall, between the moat and the wall.

Here all were executed by being beheaded, except the child, which was speared by a Boxer.

The bodies and heads were insecurely buried in one pit about 40 yards from the south wall and about 70 yards west of the corner.

Both compounds and graves were personally visited by me.

I certify this to be a true account, as gathered from various sources, and substantially correct.

GROTE HUTCHESON,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry.

PAOTINGFU, CHINA, *October 25, 1900.*

The international commission, formerly referred to and described, held daily sessions to include the 27th of October, when it concluded its principal investigations, submitting the following recommendations, which were formally indorsed by General Gaselee and sent to His Excellency, Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, for final action:

The following Chinese officials were recommended to be put to death by the Chinese method in vogue for criminals—beheading: Ting Yung, the fantai or provincial treasurer,

formerly and at the time of the murders of the missionaries the niehtai or provincial judge; Quei Heng, the chief Tartar official of the city and one of the most prominent men to offer moral, financial, and official aid to the Boxer movement; and Wang Chan Kuei, a lieutenant colonel in the Chinese army and the military commander of the cavalry camp opposite the east gate of the city where the Bagnell family repaired without avail for refuge, and by whom their silver and other valuables were removed.

The following official was recommended to be degraded and removed from office and held at Paotingfu under military restraint until his successor is appointed and arrives: Shen Chia Pen, the niehtai or provincial judge, but who was prefect of the city at the time of the murders.

The following official was recommended to be sent to Tientsin for trial: T'an Wen Huan, the present taotai, who, it is alleged, sent money and arms from Tientsin for Boxers at Paotingfu.

The board further recommended that the gates of the city be destroyed, that all pagodas and other buildings on the walls be burnt, and that the southeast corner of the city wall be demolished.

On October 27, in accordance with orders from General Gaselee, the following public places were blown up and destroyed:

Cheng-Huang-Miao Temple, this being the temple of the tutelary divinity of the city, and considered especially precious, so that its destruction was a blow to the pride of the people and its loss viewed as a disaster and punishment to the city.

Chi-Sheng-An Temple, this being the temple in the southeast of the city, one of the Boxer headquarters, and the place where Miss Morrell, Miss Gould, and the Bagnell family were examined and held by the Boxers for some hours previous to their murder.

A list of some twelve or fifteen temples was submitted by the English with request that they be destroyed during the winter by troops occupying Paotingfu. What action was taken in the matter is unknown to me.

On October 26 (Rev.) J. W. Lowrie, a missionary who belonged at Paotingfu and whose residence in the Presbyterian mission compound had been destroyed, handed me a

letter requesting that a suitable building or buildings be set aside in the city for the use of the Presbyterian mission, the American Board mission, and the Chinese Inland mission (English). The request was made by him in the name of all, as being the only representative present of the three missions.

It was favorably indorsed by me and forwarded to General Gaselee; the latter sent it to General Bailloud requesting favorable action; any building set aside to be for temporary occupancy only and to be used until such time as permanent arrangements could be perfected.

Prior to the arrival of the Pekin troops, a company of French soldiers proceeded to Chentingfu to release certain missionaries there. Mr. and Mrs. Griffith, a young child, and Mr. Brown, all English missionaries, were released and brought back, but they had not suffered any unusual hardships and had been cared for by local officials. There had been no American missionaries at the place, and I could not learn of the whereabouts of any in the southern part of Shansi. Another English family of missionaries, the Greens, being man, wife, and child, with a sister-in-law, a Miss Cregg, had endured much suffering and hardship during the summer. Their story was a sad one, indeed, but arriving here September 6, after the fall of Pekin, they had received attention.

I visited the compounds belonging to the American Board mission, the Presbyterian mission, and the Chinese Inland mission (English), and viewed the ruins and desolation. The grave of Mr. Pitkin was pointed out, and the graves of those murdered at the southeast corner of the wall were also visited.


During the stay of General Gaselee at Paotingfu several reconnoissances and foraging parties from the troops of various nations were sent out to scout the country in the vicinity. As a rule, the villages and their inhabitants were peaceful, but at one place to the west, in the hills in the vicinity of Mantchang, Boxers were encountered and three British soldiers wounded. A second and stronger party of British forces sent there later destroyed the village and killed about 100 persons, presumably Boxers or Boxer sympathizers, as the village was found to be intrenched, and some weapons—rifles, swords, and spears—hidden or buried, were discovered.

During the march to Paotingfu the presence of the French flag was noticeable everywhere. Each village that was reached fairly blazed with them. Various explanations were offered, but probably the real reason was a desire to establish prior occupancy in case of future diplomatic difference. Similarly, Paotingfu was occupied by the French before the arrival of the combined forces, and the railroad extending through that place to Peking on the north and Ting on the south was under protection of the French and was being repaired by the railroad officials. The road was not entirely dismantled, though that portion extending north toward Peking was partially destroyed, its destruction having been accomplished after the fall of Peking. To the south the road had not been destroyed, but was operated by the Chinese until prior to the arrival of the French troops. Chinese troops retired upon it and partially destroyed some of the engines at Ting. Considerable rolling stock is still at Paotingfu, but only one small yard engine. The buildings and shops located there are all intact. The protection of French rights and investments in this property was the ostensible reason for the activity of French soldiers, they being the first to occupy all places of importance.

Paotingfu is to be occupied this winter by German and French troops; 2,000 Germans and 1,200 French were left when General Gaselee ordered all others back, and these were to be increased to some extent. It was currently reported about October 26 and 27 that an expedition of French and Germans would penetrate as far to the west as Taiyuan before cold weather, and, from the preparations being made in the way of supplies and the evident hostile feeling of the Germans for the Chinese, it is not at all unlikely that such will be done; the Germans going to punish Chinese, the French going to keep in touch with the Germans. The French policy toward the Chinese is quite the opposite, it being their desire to establish themselves as having the most kindly feeling for them.

As an evidence of this, the French commander protested in writing against any troops being quartered in Paotingfu, submitting the claim that the city was under French protection and their rights and claims should be respected by reason of prior occupancy. This claim was not allowed.

SKETCH
SHOWING
ROUTES OF MARCHING COLUMNS
PAO-TING-FU FORCE
OCT., 1900



Scale of Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50 100 miles

THE RETURN FROM PAOTINGFU.

The following order indicates the routes of the marching columns returning from Paotingfu; they are indicated also on the appended map:

PAOTINGFU FORCE ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, PAOTINGFU, CHINA,

October 24, 1900, 3 p. m.

1. In accordance with instructions received from his excellency, Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, Column B of the Paotingfu force will return to Pekin in three columns as below detailed, to arrive at Pekin on or about November 6, 1900.

(a) WESTERN COLUMN.—The troops at Ichoo, under the command of Colonel von Normann, to reconnoiter westward to the Great Wall, returning thence along the foot of the hills to Pekin.

(b) CENTRAL COLUMN.—The remainder of the German-Italian troops of Column B, under the command of Colonel Garioni, to march in the general direction of Yungcheng, Sincheng, Kuan, and Huangtsun to Pekin; probable date of departure October 28.

(c) EASTERN COLUMN.—The remainder of the British contingent of Column B, less details mentioned below, under the command of Major General Richardson, to move in the general direction of Yungcheng, Paikoutien, Yungtsing, Langfang, and thence north to Pekin; probable date of departure October 27.

Mule transport only to be taken, if possible. All carts that can be spared are to proceed by the direct road through Chochou with a small escort, for which purpose all weakly and footsore men and horses are to be detailed. Captain Douglass will command this convoy, and will withdraw with it all British detachments on the line of communication south of Luikucho.

2. Major General Campbell will detail one field troop of cavalry under a British officer to accompany General von Gayle to Ichou on the 26th of October, and return thence to Pekin with the Ichou or western column, whence they will rejoin the headquarters of their regiment.

3. Major General Campbell's brigade will return to Tientsin by a route to be hereafter published, leaving Paotingfu on or about October 26.

4. Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Gaselee, with his personal escort, will leave Paotingfu for Pekin by the direct route through Chochou on the 27th instant.

5. The following paragraph of Army Orders No. 603, dated Tientsin, October 8, is republished for the guidance of officers commanding columns:

"4. In order to utilize the resources of Paotingfu and of the villages, etc., on and in the vicinity of the lines of communication for the supply of troops, every act of violence against the peaceful inhabitants and all unauthorized requisitions are to be avoided. On the other hand, as far as is practicable, on each side of the line of march the peaceful population is to be protected from oppression by Boxers, and as against the latter the severest measures are to be taken."

By order,

G. H. W. O'SULLIVAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, Staff Officer, Paotingfu force.

General Lorne-Campbell's route of march from Paotingfu to Tientsin was designated as follows: Through Changteng, Chiucheng, Wangchiakou to Tientsin.

I accompanied General Gaselee, who returned by the main road. We left Paotingfu October 28, arriving at Lukochow on the 31st, where General Gaselee, with his staff and escort, camped for the night. I obtained permission for my party to proceed to Pekin. We accordingly did so, arriving about 5 p. m.

The return march was made without special incident.

I have endeavored to cover fully the important features of the expedition, especially with reference to events at Paotingfu.

Incidental to it, however, some good opportunities for the observation of the forces of other nations during actual field work were presented. These have been covered in an admirable way in the report of First Lieut. G. Soulard Turner, Tenth Infantry, herewith submitted. But I shall take occasion at a later date to submit some remarks upon observations made of special military features noted.

The experience was novel and interesting, and not without its valuable lessons.

The party was shown every courtesy and consideration by General Gaselee personally, and by each member of his staff, and at Paotingfu the most kindly interest in the fate of the American missionaries was manifested by all, and needful steps taken to punish the guilty.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

GROTE HUTCHESON,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry.

REPORT ON MARCH OF TROOPS COMPOSING PAOTINGFU EXPEDITION.

BY FIRST LIEUT. G. SOULARD TURNER, TENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY, AID-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL WILSON.

PEKIN, CHINA, *November 2, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition of international troops against Paotingfu, October 12 to 31. Pursuant to instructions contained in Special Orders, No. 55, dated Headquarters China Relief Expedition, October

11, I reported to Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee on October 12 at Lipafang, and was assigned by him for duty on his staff as additional aid-de-camp and military attaché. I desire to take this opportunity to thank General Gaselee and the officers of his staff for their kind and courteous treatment throughout the expedition.

The first march to Lipafang, covering 16 miles, was made independently by each contingent. The command was consolidated there under the command of General Gaselee, the French force joining the following day at Luluiho. The second march was to Luluiho, covering a distance of $14\frac{1}{2}$ miles. From thence the march was to Sunglientien, $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles; thence to Peiho, $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles; thence to Kuchientien, 9 miles; thence to Anhsu, 9 miles. At Anhsu a halt of one day was made for the purpose of resting the troops, gathering forage, reconnoitering, etc. On October 19 the command marched to Paotingfu, 13 miles distant from Anhsu, making a total distance of $92\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

General Gaselee was met about 3 miles from Paotingfu by a deputation composed of the principal officials of the town, with a large retinue of servants and followers. These persons informed General Gaselee that quarters had been provided for the different contingents in the adjacent villages, and that parties had been sent to the surrounding villages to collect forage and supplies for the troops. In fact, throughout the whole march from Pekin, the officials of all the principal cities were anxious to learn what was the pleasure of the commanding general, so that they might conform to his desires. Supplies were frequently offered, and every assistance given to gain the favor of the foreign troops. The English contingent, as far as possible under the circumstances, paid for the supplies, forage, and animals that they commandeered. The Germans gave due-bills on the Chinese Government for the supplies, etc., received by them.

The Chinese army, variously reported at from 1,000 to 5,000, was encountered by the reconnoitering party on the flanks. Trouble was avoided with them, however, except in one case, as they seemed to be only too anxious to clear the line of communication, as had been requested of them by General Gaselee. The exception referred to was an encounter between the Germans and Chinese troops in a small village west of Anhsu. A foraging party of 50 men had been sent out, and

upon their return they reported that they had encountered a detachment of 1,000 infantry and cavalry. It is said the Chinese opened fire, but without effect. The Germans replying wounded two Chinese and captured the village, together with 500 infantrymen, with arms and ammunition; two Krupp guns, 9-pounders, and a number of flags. The cavalry escaped.

In each town on the line of march French flags were found on gates, walls, and residences of officials and citizens. It was reported that a French officer, with a small escort, rode one day in advance of the column, promising protection to all persons who would fly the French flag. The result of this came to nothing, as the towns were looted along the whole line of march, to a greater or less degree, according to the opportunity afforded the soldiers by various halts.

The part of the Paotingfu expedition which marched from Peking, known in official reports as Column B, was composed of the following troops:

British, under command of Lieut. Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee: Four squadrons Sixteenth Bengal Lancers, 400 men; two companies First Sikhs, two companies Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, two companies Twenty-sixth Baluchistans, the infantry comprising 600 men; one-half company Madras Sappers and Miners, 90 men; four guns Twelfth Royal Field Artillery, 125 men; total 1,215 men.

Germans, commanded by Colonel Von Norman: One battalion First East Asiatic Regiment, 400 men; one battalion Second East Asiatic Regiment, 400 men; one battery 4 guns, 150 men; one battery 2 guns, 50 men; total 1,012 men.

French, under command of Colonel Lalubin: Two battalions Seventh Marine Infantry, 800 men; one mountain battery, 4 guns, 150 men; total 950 men.

Italians, commanded by Colonel Salsa: One battalion Seventh Infantry Regiment, 300 men, and 200 sailors, acting for the expedition as infantry; total 500 men.

Total of the entire column 3,677 men.

EQUIPMENT.

BRITISH.—The equipment of the British Indian troops, as regards clothing, was about as follows: Khaki uniform with shoes and putties; turbans in place of hats, and a short but very heavy "top-coat," carried slung on the shoulder. Accouterments of the infantry soldier are haversack, canteen, rifle

and bayonet, with three cartridge boxes holding 100 rounds of ammunition, worn on a waist belt, two in front and one behind. Following each infantry regiment are a number of pack mules, varying in number with the size of the command and the character of the march, carrying extra ammunition, stretchers, intrenching tools, bedding, tentage, and all the extra clothing the men might need. The tent used by these troops is a conical wall which holds 16 men and weighs 160 pounds. The cavalry is armed with lance, saber, and rifle; the saddle is fitted with two packets in front, blanket roll, carbine, and saber are slung behind. The artillery is armed with a carbine. Pack mules are provided for both artillery and cavalry.

GERMANS.—The German marching uniform consists of loose-fitting coat and trousers, made of dark-blue cloth, low boots, and a small cap without visor. The infantry soldier carries haversack, canteen, intrenching tool, knapsack, and shelter tent half. In and upon the knapsack is packed a rain coat, a khaki suit, which is donned after marching; an extra pair of shoes, towel, soap, and a mess can somewhat similar to ours, but much larger and heavier. He also carries rifle, bayonet, and two cartridge boxes. The cavalryman is armed with lance, carbine, and saber, and wears his saddle packet and blanket roll in a similar manner to the English cavalryman. The canteen which is carried by the cavalryman is fitted with a leather cover, which can be taken off and used as a water bucket. It will hold about two quarts of water. The saddle used seems to be very heavy and cumbersome. The artilleryman is armed with a carbine.

FRENCH.—The French soldier wears a blue uniform, with shoes and short leggings. He carries a cap and helmet, which seem to be interchanged at his discretion. The accouterment consists of canteen, haversack, ration can, knapsack, two cartridge boxes, blanket roll, rifle, and bayonet. Cooking utensils for a company are distributed amongst the men, so that it was not unusual to see one soldier carrying a pot, another a coffee urn, etc. The intrenching tools of the French were carried on mules.

ITALIANS.—The Italians were clad in blue, wore helmets and light boots. The naval contingent wore shoes, with leggings. The equipment of the Italian soldier is exactly similar to ours: canteen, haversack, shelter tent half, and blanket

roll; but he carries cartridge boxes in place of a belt; in fact all the troops of the expedition, excepting the Australian contingent, carried cartridge boxes in place of belts. Reserve ammunition was carried by all the forces on pack mules.

The English battery was composed of four 3.6-inch guns, with limber and caisson for each, battery wagon and forge, with twenty-four extra horses. The battery presented a fine appearance on the march, and was apparently well disciplined and drilled. The most evident fault to an observer is the extreme weight of the harness and carriages, and the large amount of accouterment and paraphernalia that is carried hanging about the guns and caissons, most of which, it seems, could be dispensed with.

The German artillery consisted of six guns, four of which were 8.8-centimeter, Krupp model '93, and two 7.7-centimeter, Krupp model '98; with a combination battery wagon and forge, carrying supplies for the entire battery for one day. The four large guns each have limbers attached, and there are six caissons to the battery, three for shrapnel and three for shell. The latter caissons are distinguished by a broad yellow band around the body. Caissons carry 75 rounds, and the limbers 25 rounds of ammunition. The gun carriages, caissons, and limbers are quite heavy. The harness and animals of all guns, including the mounts of the men (these being horse batteries), were native acquisitions and very poor. The two smaller guns presented a better appearance. The carriages, limbers, and caissons, except the wheels, were built of steel, small and exceedingly light, without superfluous equipment, and apparently capable of great mobility. The character of this report does not permit of a detailed description of the breech mechanism of this piece; it is sufficient to say that the arrangement is both simple and strong, and the idea is apparently an excellent one, on account of the fact that the charge and projectile can be loaded simultaneously in separate chambers, and the breech can be opened and closed by two motions of a lever. The powder charge for this piece is put up in brass canisters, which are ejected automatically after firing, and are saved for reloading.

The French had four small, light mountain guns mounted on small carriages and drawn by one horse each. The ammunition was carried on pack mules. These pieces were not first-class.

With the German contingent was a portable oven, made of sheet iron, mounted on four wheels, and drawn by four mules; also a specially constructed wagon, which is used to mix the dough for bread. This oven has a capacity for 500 three-pound loaves per day. The baking is done during the night. While on this trip all the German troops were supplied with fresh bread daily.

The transportation of Column B was as follows:

BRITISH.—To carry fourteen days' rations and three days' forage, the British used 144 two-mule carts (English pattern, capacity 800 pounds each), 39 Pekin carts, two mules each, 17 pack mules, and 12 extra mules ready harnessed. To carry seven days' rations, extra ammunition, intrenching tools, officers' and men's bedding, tentage, etc., 1,000 pack mules. The hospital transportation consisted of 32 litters, 8 coolies to each, 4 carrying at one time; 13 dinghaboys (ambulances), 2 mules each, besides several carts and mules with each organization carrying litters and hospital supplies.

The German transport consisted of Chinese carts, the number being increased and decreased from day to day, so that an accurate statement can not be given.

The French had carts like the Germans, but had in addition about 50 camels.

The Italians had at the start 28 Chinese carts and 25 Italian carts. The quantity of their transportation was also increased.

The French, German, and Italian transports were throughout a nondescript collection of native carts and animals, poorly organized and handled, excepting the camels of the French. These animals seemed to be suitable for work of this nature. They carried about 500 pounds each, and were always well up with the transport column.

The English transport may well be noticed more closely. The quantity used for transporting supplies for the Pekin contingent can not be taken, however, as a criterion for the British-Indian service. The actual allowance for the field is given as one mule to every twelve men, but on this expedition no limit was set, and the transport was added to from day to day, worn-out mules being replaced by fresh ones, and additional animals being added as required. These mules were commandeered from the country, and were either paid for on the spot, or a due-bill given on the commissariat at Pekin. The maximum price paid was \$50 and the minimum

\$25, Mexican money. The British cart is a two-wheeled vehicle, made with a pole for two mules; it is very heavy, and has an extreme carrying capacity of only 800 pounds. The weight of a pack for one pack mule is prescribed in government regulations as 120 pounds, and the ration of the mule is 5 pounds of grain per day. The mule harness is an ingenious arrangement which can be used, with very little alteration, as a pack or draft harness, so that in case a cart is irreparably damaged a part of the load can be packed on the mules. The remainder of the load would probably fall to the extra mules, which were at all times with the transport. The pole of this cart is fitted with a horizontal iron bar, which adjusts on top of the pack saddles when used as draft harness. An iron rod fitted to the bits being substituted for a breast yoke. The mules used by the British were too light for the work required of them, and in a rapid maneuver would hardly stand the necessary work. In some of the carts the British used native horses, which seemed to stand the work better than the mules. The English pack mule is not herded as in our service, but is tied by chains in tandems of three, one coolie being told off to lead each tandem; he also waters, feeds, and cares for the animals. In their endeavor to keep out of the mudholes and to select the easiest part of the road for themselves, the coolies often allowed their animals to become considerably strung out, but were always able, however, to close up before coming into camp. As a whole, the transport was well disciplined and cared for. In the morning it was never late starting, and at night it was always well up with the troops, unless delayed by a French, German, or Italian transport in front of it. Two officers were detailed to take charge of and remain with the baggage at all times; they started it in the morning at the proper time and in its proper place, and at night conducted it to its position in the camp; they also saw that the animals were fed and properly cared for. All drivers, packers, and men employed with the transport belong to what is known as the coolie corps, which must have comprised on this expedition at least 800 men. The German, French, and Italian contingents used soldiers as drivers. All transport was properly guarded.

CAMPING.

All the troops comprised in the Peking column, except the English, were billeted in villages at every halt, and also

during the stay at Paotingfu. The selection of quarters was made by officers from each organization, sent ahead with the advance guard for that purpose, the town being previously divided into districts, one for each contingent, by the adjutant general of the force. The buildings selected for quarters were marked with chalk, showing the company, regiment, etc., that were expected to occupy them. The troops were always billeted without delay or confusion. The English system for camping a command is exceedingly good, and is about as follows: An officer of the commanding general's staff, usually the adjutant general, is sent forward each day to select a suitable site, being previously instructed just how far to go. After the general site has been selected, an officer from each organization is sent forward, with assistants, to report to the staff officer before-mentioned and to ascertain from him the general location of his particular camp. After this is done, each officer proceeds to his position, lays off accurately and marks with flags (different colors for different organizations) the exact location of the company streets, kitchens, picket lines, etc., of his subdivision. The hospital, headquarters, and transport are marked in the same way. As each organization reaches camp it is met by its representative and conducted without delay or confusion to its proper location. The camp sites were always well selected, and as near water and fuel as circumstances would permit. They presented a neat, orderly appearance, with proper roadways, straight picket lines, company streets, etc.

MARCHING.

The marches, with the exception of three, were exceedingly short. The weather was fine and the roads good. The different contingents alternated in the advance. There was practically no straggling amongst the British and Germans. The Italians and French were somewhat inclined to lag, but the severe measures taken by their officers prevented any serious breaking up of the column. Attention could not help being drawn to the soldierly manner and bearing of the Germans, whose extremely heavy kit did not seem to affect them in the least. Too much credit cannot be given for the handling and work of the English sappers and miners, who, mounted on horses, with their tools in suitable racks, also on horses, rode just behind the advance cavalry, and rendered

excellent service, repairing roads, filling mud holes and boggy places, and preparing ramps for the camping ground, which were almost always above or below the road level. * * * Marches were always begun about 7 a. m., and continued without halting for dinner until camping ground was reached, generally about 3 p. m. Practically speaking, the troops were always prompt in starting.

* * * * *

ADVANCE GUARD AND RECONNOISSANCE.

The column always marched with a regularly formed advance guard (without flankers), furnished by the leading contingent, and a rear guard furnished by the rear contingent. In addition, the English cavalry formed a screen in front, with flanks well drawn back, covering with about 20 men, some 2 miles of front. Patrols of from 6 to 10 men were constantly on the flanks, and reconnoitered the country for at least 5 miles on either side.

Outposts were always established at a halt, and proper precautions taken to guard against surprise. The country contiguous to Paotingfu for 30 miles in all directions was divided into four districts, one being given to each force, for reconnoitering, and from which to draw forage and supplies. In the British service, with the advance cavalry, rides what is called an "intelligence officer," who is furnished with a competent interpreter, and the necessary means of communication, i. e., mounted men. It is the duty of this officer to gather information of all kinds that may be of use to the commanding officer, both before and during the march. On this expedition this duty was well performed, and the commanding general was at all times well informed of what was taking place in front. In this connection it may be well to call attention to what is termed route information. Before leaving Pekin the field press outfit of the sappers and miners printed and distributed among the proper officers, a sheet stating the route from Pekin to Paotingfu, with each camping place designated, giving immediate and total distances of each, general character of the roads, locations of rivers, whether they were bridged, and also general information regarding the enemy, and the likelihood of an encounter with him, with authority for the statements and date of same.

The gathering of this information is the work of the intelligence officer. The line of communication between Peking and Paotingfu was kept open by cavalry patrols, and temporary posts of from 6 to 20 men, left in the principal towns along the line. Communication was had with Peking by courier every 3 days. The British had with them a complete signaling outfit, for both heliograph and flashlight. The latter was used most advantageously at Paotingfu.

RATIONS AND SUPPLIES.

The continental contingent of Column B did not provide itself with rations for the entire trip. The English contingent, however, was fully equipped for the intended duration of the expedition, i. e., twenty-one days. The German, French, and Italian troops were expected to subsist to some degree on the country, and did so; particularly is this true of the French and Italians. The Germans carried from Peking nine days' rations, the Italians seven days' rations, and the French, who joined us at Luluiho, two days' rations. Depots were established along the road in rear of the column, and were supplied from Peking; the troops in turn were supplied from them, until Paotingfu was reached, when considerable supplies were also received from Tientsin by boat. The ration for the Indian troop consisted of tea, flour, a kind of grain called "atta" (similar to rice), fresh meat when possible, butter, and a season component. The English ration in the field is about as follows: 1 pound of fresh or canned meat, 1 pound of soft or hard bread, 1 pound of potatoes, cheese, jam, and a season component. Grog is sometimes issued to the men. The German ration on this trip consisted of what is known "erbswurst," a canned mixture of peas, meat, and potatoes; canned dried fruit, eaten either dry or boiled; fresh bread, baked every day, in portable oven hereinbefore mentioned. Some tea and coffee were issued, but mostly cocoa, which was drunk in large quantities. There was also a seasoning component. The Germans, in addition, carried at all times what is called "eisener bestand." This is simply an emergency ration of compressed meat and vegetables, and is only used in cases of great necessity. The French, as before stated, depended largely on the country, and, as their soldiers were good foragers, they did not fare badly. The ration carried consisted of canned meats, rice, hard bread, tea, and

coffee. Wine was also issued; the allowance being about 3 centiliters per day. Tea was carried in canteens whenever possible; water, if drank at all, was first sterilized by using permanganate of potash. All contingents drove along with their baggage trains numbers of sheep and cows, so that fresh meat was frequently issued.

HOSPITAL SUPPLIES, ETC.

The British arrangements for the care of sick and wounded were excellent. Column B had 32 litters with bearers, 13 ambulances, each with a carrying capacity of four men, beside additional stretchers with each organization. During the stay at Paotingfu, a first-class hospital was established in a suitable building just outside the city. The Germans, French, and Italians had from 10 to 12 Peking carts, which had been altered until they were suitable for transporting two men. Stretchers were carried on carts. So far as could be learned no hospital was established at Paotingfu, during the occupation, by any of the above-mentioned contingents.

TIENTSIN FORCE, COLUMN A.

The force from Tientsin, known as Column A, under command of General Bailloud, French, consisted of the following troops:

British, commanded by Lorne-Campbell: One company Australian marines, 2 machine guns and 1 twelve-pound naval gun; six companies of the Twentieth Punjab Infantry; four companies First Bengal Lancers; field battery Royal Horse Artillery, 6 guns, 2 quick-firing guns, Maxim; one battalion Ulwar Imperial Service Infantry; half company sappers and miners.

French: One squadron of Chasseurs d'Afrique, one battery of 6 guns, three battalions of zouaves, one pioneer section.

Germans: Two battalions of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one battery of 4 guns, one field hospital.

Italians: Three companies of infantry, one battery of 6 mountain guns, one pioneer detachment.

The Germans and Italians were commanded by General von Kettler.

This force marched from Tientsin in three columns, with most of its heavy baggage on barges in the canal. It arrived

at Paotingfu as follows: Germans and French, Friday, October 19; British, Monday, October 22. This column was consolidated with Column B, from Pekin, and both were under the command of Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee during the stay at Paotingfu. Upon the break-up at Paotingfu General Lorne-Campbell was sent with his command to return to Tientsin via Changteng, Chiucheng, and Wangchiakou. The German, French, and Italian troops were divided, some remaining at Paotingfu and some returning to Pekin with other columns mentioned elsewhere. It was not feasible to obtain the exact numbers of these different contingents.

The road to Paotingfu is the main highway from Pekin to central China. It is a broad, level country road. It is composed of the alluvial soil of the great plain, varying in width from 6 to 50 feet. At the present time it is in excellent condition, but during rainy weather would be exceedingly heavy. There are stretches, however, where it is sandy, particularly from Luluiho to Lukochow. There are no materials at hand except the soil of the country for permanent repairs, but any amount of kaoling can be had suitable for temporary reconstruction for the passage of an army. The roadbed for almost the full distance is sunk below the level of the country, notably from Luluiho to Lipafang, due, it is said, to the traffic of many years and to heavy rains. There are four bridges of considerable size on the road; they are that at Lukochow over the Hunho, at Luluiho over the river of the same name, at Chowchow over the Paikoho, one between the latter place and Luluiho. The first of these bridges, known to foreigners as the Marco Polo bridge, is interesting from the fact that it was described by the noted traveler of that name. It is about 500 feet long, 30 feet wide, and has ten piers. Luluiho bridge is 300 feet long, 30 feet wide, and has twelve piers. Chowchow bridge has eight piers; it is 150 feet long and 20 feet wide. The bridge between Chowchow and Luluiho is about 150 feet long, 20 feet wide, and has four piers. All these bridges are entirely built of stone, and are in construction like all Chinese bridges. There are two or three smaller bridges on the route, some of which have fallen into disuse, the roads running entirely around them. All these bridges are suitable for the passage of artillery and baggage trains. There are many villages along the main road, as throughout all northern China. In this instance there are only about six

worthy of notice: Lukochow, Liangshanchien, Luluiho, Chowchow, Tinghsing, and Anhsu. These are all walled towns of the usual Chinese type. The houses are for the most part built of mud; the various yamens and principal buildings are of brick. The surrounding country is open and flat. Any one of these towns could be easily defended, except Lianshanchien, which has on its north side a considerable hill from which the town could be commanded. In fact, it was from this hill that the town was shelled and compelled to surrender, by the Germans, shortly after the relief of Peking. The Delta Plain of North China, it is believed, needs no further description. It is deemed sufficient to say that the country between Peking and Paotingfu is no exception to the rule, a fertile soil and a complete state of cultivation. At this season of the year, when the crops are harvested and the country is clear, it is an ideal one for cavalry and infantry, and with a properly equipped and handled pioneer detachment, light artillery could be freely used.

There are seven rivers on the line of march. The principal is the Hunho, at Lukochow. These rivers are all of the same general character, spreading over a large bed during the wet season and dwindling to almost nothing during the winter. The beds and banks change from year to year. The Peiho and Suho were forded. The bottoms were hard but sandy, and would probably wash during a freshet. At the ford of the Peiho the velocity was about 2 miles per hour. The vicinity of any one of these rivers affords good camping ground for a force of any size. Water is also available near any of the large towns and most of the smaller ones. Wood can not be obtained except in the towns, and then only in small quantities. In this season of the year forage of all kinds is abundant along the whole route. Later on and during the spring it would probably be more difficult to gather it in large quantities; but it is not thought that it would be a serious question at any time.

There are no natural positions which strike one as being particularly fitted for military defense, except perhaps a low line of hillocks around Lianshanchien and Lukochow.

There is one railroad on the line of march. Before the recent Boxer movement this was a single-track, standard-gauge, stone-ballasted road, with an allowance in the construction of the roadbed and all bridges for an additional

track. This road has been torn up; the rails are left, but ties, fish plates, etc., have been carried away. The telegraph line has also been destroyed. The railroad company, under the protection of the French forces, has rebuilt about 10 miles to the north of Paotingfu. The road to the south of Paotingfu as far as Tingchow, about 40 miles, was left undisturbed, as were also the station house, roundhouse, repairing shops, and a considerable quantity of rolling stock at Paotingfu. The telegraph line is also being rebuilt.

On October 15 the Peiho was reached. As this stream was not bridged, and was too deep to ford without great discomfort to the men, a pontoon bridge was constructed by the English sappers and miners, from boats furnished by the Chinese at Tienhsing. This work was accomplished between the hours of 3 p. m. of the 15th and 7 a. m. of the 16th, the troops starting to cross at the latter hour. This bridge was a complete failure. The crossing of the British infantry shook it up considerably, and it was necessary to repair it before other troops could follow. During the passage of the Germans, French, and Italians it was again badly racked, and when the light transport started over one boat sank, thus absolutely destroying its usefulness. A new bridge was immediately started, but no one waited for its construction, and it was not completed. The baggage train and rear guard forded the stream, which was 2 feet and 9 inches in depth. The failure of this bridge was due to the fact, in the first place, that it was badly located, both as regards the ford and the best locality for crossing, and also that valuable material at hand was not made use of. The river was poorly reconnoitered; just below the location of the pontoon bridge there was a small island which might have been utilized to great advantage. The bridge was just below the ford, and the crossing of the artillery and cavalry caused considerable wash, which was instrumental in displacing the boats. Considerable quantities of railroad rails and sleepers were at hand, and could have been used to good effect; and, in fact, upon our return it was found that the bridge had been removed to the island referred to, and that both rails and sleepers had been made use of in its construction.

Upon reaching the city of Paotingfu, it was found that a body of French soldiers, reported at 500, had arrived several days before and taken possession of the gates and walls, but

had not entered the city officially. The sentinels over the gates had orders to permit no one in the city, which orders were confirmed by General Gaselee, and strictly adhered to until after the conference had been held and proper arrangements made. On October 20 the commanding general and his staff, and the generals and staffs of each contingent, entered and rode through the city. At a conference on the same day it was decided to allow the troops, who had been quartered in the suburbs, to enter. On October 21 General Gaselee and staff moved into quarters inside the town. A proper police was established to preserve order, and the city was divided into four districts, each contingent being assigned one district with its gate. On October 22 and 23 the French, Germans, and Italians moved into the city, the English remaining in camp outside the walls, placing, however, a suitable guard in their section of the city. The country around Paotingfu was equally divided among the different forces for purposes of forage and supplies. On October 21 an international court of inquiry, composed of an officer from each contingent and Mr. Jamieson, of the British diplomatic corps, was ordered to meet and investigate the murder and outrages committed on the subjects of the several nations in the vicinity of Paotingfu. After a careful investigation of the facts, the court made the following recommendation: The commanding officer of the imperial troops at the time of the murders, to be beheaded; the fantai, or provincial treasurer, to be beheaded; the Paotingfu representative of the imperial government of Pekin to be beheaded; the heitai, or provincial judge, to be degraded and deposed from office; the taitoi, a provincial official, to be sent to Tientsin for trial. The decision of the court was sent to Field Marshal Count von Waldersee for approval. In addition, as a punishment to the city for the atrocities committed in its midst, the Temple of the Tutelary God, and a temple of lesser note in which the missionaries were confined before being murdered, were blown up. Beside this, the destruction of the gate towers and the southeast corner of the city wall was ordered. The facts connected with the treatment and murder of the American missionaries have been fully described by Captain Hutcheson, Sixth United States Cavalry, and are fully concurred in; it is not considered necessary to repeat them herein.

The troops were returned to Peking by different routes. The order for the movement is given below. This order is quoted verbatim in order to show the form of English field orders, which throughout the expedition were concise and to the point. They follow to the letter in this regard a little pamphlet published by Major Trench, of the Royal Artillery:

PAOTINGFU FORCE ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS, PAOTINGFU, CHINA,

3 p. m., 24/10/00,

1. In accordance with instructions received from his excellency, Count von Waldersee, Column B of the Paotingfu force will return to Peking in three columns as below detailed, to arrive at Peking on or about the 6th of November, 1900.

A. THE WESTERN COLUMN.—The troops at Ichou, under the command of Colonel von Norman, to reconnoiter westward to the Great Wall, returning thence along the foot of the hills to Peking.

B. CENTRAL COLUMN.—The remainder of the German-Italian troops, of Column B, under the command of Colonel Garioni, to march in the general direction of Yungcheng, Sincheng, Kuan, and Huangtsun to Peking; probable date of departure 28th October.

C. EASTERN COLUMN.—The remainder of the British contingent, Column B, less details mentioned below, under the command of Major General Richardson, to move in the general direction of Yungcheng, Paikoutien, Yungtsing, Langfang, and thence north to Peking; probable date of departure October 27th. Mule transportation only to be taken, if possible; all carts that can be spared are to proceed by the direct road through Chochou, with a small escort, for which purpose all weakly and footsore men and horses are to be detailed. Captain Douglass will command this convoy, and will withdraw with it all British force detachments on the line of communication south of Lukochow.

2. Major General Campbell will detail one field troop of cavalry under a British officer to accompany General von Gayle to Ichou on the 26th October, and return thence to Peking with the Ichou or western column, whence they will join the headquarters of their regiment.

3. Major General Campbell's brigade will return to Tientsin by a route to be hereafter published, leaving Paotingfu on or about 28th October.

4. Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Gaselee, with his personal escort, will leave Paotingfu for Peking by the direct route through Chochou on the 27th instant.

5. The following paragraph of Army Orders dated Tientsin, 8th October, is republished for the guidance of officers commanding column:

"4. In order to realize the resources of Paotingfu, and the villages on and in the lines of communication, for the supply of troops every act of violence against the peaceful inhabitants, and all unauthorized requisitions are to be avoided. On the other hand, as far as practicable, on each side of the line of march, the peaceful population is to be protected from oppression by Boxers, and as against the latter the severest measures are to be taken."

By order:

(Signed) G. H. W. O'SULLIVAN,
Staff Officer, Paotingfu Expedition.

General Gaselee and his staff left Paotingfu on the morning of the 28th with a small escort, and arrived without incident at Lukochow at 1 p. m. on the 31st. As General Gaselee desired to remain all night in Lukochow, for private reasons, we obtained his permission to push on, and did so, arriving at Pekin about 5 p. m., having covered the distance in four days.

The return march of the British Indian infantry escort could not help but attract attention; without any apparent effort they made from 23 to 25 miles per day by 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon and were all anxious to go on to Pekin on the last night, instead of stopping at Lukochow.

The French soldiers, zouaves, and Chasseurs d'Afrique that were in Paotingfu upon our arrival, impressed one much better than the marine infantry, i. e., colonial troops, that marched with Column B. They were well-developed men, disciplined from long service, soldierly in their manner and appearance, and compared most favorably with any troops in Paotingfu. The French colonial troops were neither soldierly in their bearing or appearance, marched poorly, and seemed to be poorly disciplined.

The German troops throughout generally received favorable criticism. They were absolutely disciplined, and at all times displayed the most willing obedience to their officers. Their marching was almost perfect, though in a long and hard campaign, it is thought that their heavy equipments, heretofore mentioned, would prove very burdensome. Each man carried an intrenching tool of some description, a pick, ax, or spade, which was small and light, but apparently strong. This is considered to be an excellent idea when pack mules are not provided. In the English service the equipment of the men was exceedingly light; they carried, in addition to their arms, only a water bottle and a haversack, the remainder of their equipment, tentage, etc., being transported on pack mules, which followed just behind; thus the men were always able to make camp promptly, and prepare their meals in a brief time. In addition they had the advantage of being unincumbered while marching.

The English contingent throughout was thoroughly equipped with a signaling detachment, an engineering detachment, and sappers and miners. They made all the reconnoissances on the march, prepared a route map, gathered information, and

were directly responsible for the excellent manner in which the troops were marched and camped.

* * * * *

Very respectfully,

G. SOULARD TURNER,
First Lieutenant, Tenth Infantry, Aid-de-camp.

RECORD OF EVENTS WITH CURRENT COMMENT, AUGUST TO NOVEMBER, 1900.

BY LIEUT. COL. J. T. DICKMAN, TWENTY-SIXTH INFANTRY, U. S. V.

PEKIN, CHINA, *November 5, 1900.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

Pekin, China.

SIR: In addition to my report on the organization, etc., of the forces of the allied powers in North China, I have the honor to submit certain observations, principally extracts from my diary, parts of which may be of interest and worth preserving.

Stationed at Pototan, Panay, P. I., and in command of the central district of the island, the telegraphic order from General Hughes "to pack my war bag and come as soon as practicable prepared to sail for Taku," reached me on July 24. On the 26th I arrived at Iloilo, 22 miles distant, and on the 28th sailed for Manila, via Romblon, on the *Isla de Negros*. Arrived on the 30th, and, after reporting at headquarters, sailed on the *Thomas* August 1 for Nagasaki, arriving August 6. Transferred immediately to the *Indiana*, but was obliged to wait six days for the Fifteenth Infantry; the delay, though annoying, was made use of in visiting points of interest. Finally sailed on August 13, and came to anchor off Taku late on the 16th. On the morning of the 17th we were informed that Peking had fallen three days before, and that, therefore, as far as participation in the campaign was concerned, the troops on board were practically out of it. Much regret was expressed, yet the importance of promptness was fully appreciated at the time, and more so afterwards.

The 17th, day and night, was spent in loading the lighter *Foochow*; we left at 6 a. m. of the 18th, and arrived at Tongku in a few hours. At Tientsin, where we arrived a few hours later, the pictures of desolation created by the

war confronted us, many ruined buildings, wrecked rolling stock, dead Chinamen floating in the river, etc. The next day was spent in collecting baggage, under the usual difficult conditions, and rearranging it for field purposes. On the morning of the 20th, in company with General Barry and aids, and Major Muir, Thirty-eighth Infantry, U. S. V., and Troops I, K, and L, Sixth Cavalry, we started for Peking, making Yangtsun, distance 19 miles, the same day. On the 21st we reached Matao, distance 37 miles; on the 22d Tungchao, 14 miles; and the 23d Peking, 13 miles, and to camp 4 miles farther. Total distance marched, 87 miles.

The railroad is double track, standard gauge, well ballasted, and solidly constructed throughout. At this time it was in operation as far as Tientsin, being managed by Russian officers and troops. The passenger cars, especially the toilet rooms, were extremely filthy. The destruction of the road from Tientsin on was most thorough. Both ties and rails had been removed and burned or thrown into the river. The bridges were destroyed or badly damaged.

As we left our anchorage the waters became of a lighter and lighter green; as we approached the earth forts of Taku we were floating in the yellow, muddy outflow of the Peiho or North River. As we proceeded up the tortuous course of the river, it was seen that the earthworks had suffered very little damage. The country is low, flat, partly covered with water, destitute of trees, and extremely monotonous in appearance. The mud houses along the stream and on the higher spots are scarcely perceptible in the landscape. In the winter this country must be the most desolate imaginable. The surface is dotted with numerous mounds which are graves, salt piles, or storehouses for ice or other supplies. Upon closer inspection we found the Chinese houses to be built of adobe or else of reeds plastered with mud. West of Tongku a few trees begin to make their appearance. The country is a vast plain of sandy soil, under water in places, and little suited to cultivation, as is shown by the thin crops. The conditions gradually improve as the distance from the seashore increases. At Yangtsun it is still flat and sandy, but the trees are more numerous and the soil is better, fair crops being raised. The Peiho at Yangtsun is a yellow, muddy stream, reminding one of our western rivers. It is about 50 yards wide, and at this time had a good current.

The mountains are dimly visible to the north and west. The soil is well cultivated and covered with crops of kaoling, millet, and maize, with some vegetables, such as beans, egg plant, and sweet potato. There are occasional sand dunes, especially near Matao. No sign of a road was discovered anywhere, nothing but cart trails. Large, wide dams were constructed to confine the floods of the Peiho. The tops of these dams became the road for the wagons and carts of the army, though never intended to be used as such, for at intervals there were piles of earth intended for repair of breaks in the dam. Near Pekin there are some stone roads, but they are so badly worn that now they are usually avoided. The country up to and surrounding Pekin is a wide, cultivated plain, with occasional groups of trees, of which most seem to have been planted. All the villages along the way have been utterly wrecked, looted, and destroyed. Tungchao got off easier than the other places, at least such was its condition as our column went through. The walls of Tungchao, which are about 30 feet high and 25 feet thick, are still in a pretty fair state of preservation, at least on the outer faces. The river here has dwindled to a small stream barely navigable for junks. On the water front there are considerable accumulations of logs which are floated down from the hills at the time of the floods. There is no lumber, the logs being sawed up by hand as the lumber is needed. The villages were all deserted. No attempt seems to have been made to bury the dead Chinamen, the hogs and dogs of the country being permitted to dispose of them. There are no buzzards or other birds of that kind in this country. The reason for this probably lies in the fact that there is usually nothing for them to eat. No domestic animals are allowed to die a natural death; if one should do so accidentally he would be utilized by the Chinamen anyway. All wild animals have been crowded out of this densely populated section. One of the principal annoyances attending military operations in this country lies in the scarcity of fuel, unless houses be torn down for the sake of firewood. There are no streams of good water, and the wells are probably more or less polluted with the filth of ages.

At Tongku we had our first view of the Cossacks, the nomads of the Steppe. Their horses were of all colors, scrubby, shaggy, and dirty, with stallions, mares, and even

colts among them. The men had no tents, but made shelters of pieces of canvas, sheets of corrugated iron, matting, or similar articles. They seemed heavy-set, husky fellows, perfectly at home in their squalor.

At Peitsang we found Company G of the Ninth Infantry and some Japanese troops. At Matao there were American, English, and German troops. At Tungchao, the head of the river navigation, all nations were represented. The crossings of the Peiho at Peitsang and Yangtsun were on floating bridges made of junks, which served the purpose fairly well.

At Hosiwu the British sappers were at work constructing field fortifications for the defense of the place; this on account of rumors that the Boxers were to attack the line of communications.

There was much indiscriminate shooting heard along the road, especially in the vicinity of the Russians and along the river. It was probably indulged in to some extent by soldiers of all nations shooting at dogs, chickens, etc., and was a source of annoyance for several weeks, not without danger. One of our lieutenants was hit in the hand by a stray bullet.

Irrigation is used to a limited extent by means of pumps worked by men or animals, the water being applied principally to vegetables. The sandy character of the soil and the fact that it has been cultivated for many centuries makes some kind of fertilizer necessary. In the use of all kinds of manure, both liquid and solid, the Chinese, as is well known, are experts. The soil is well plowed and the fields are kept remarkably clean of weeds. No machinery was seen in use. The cutting of kaoling and maize is done by means of a small scythe, the blade not more than 8 inches long, wielded by one hand, while the other gathers the stalks. As might have been expected from the nature of the Chinese, there is very little diversification of products. The kaoling, which resembles sorghum very much, is planted closely together in rows. It grows on long, slender stems, with comparatively few leaves, to a height of 15 feet. Mounted men are lost in a field of it as completely as if they were in a forest. Planting it so closely provides less grain; but that is not the only product. The long, straight stem is a very important building material; the stump, and even the roots, are used for fuel, so that in winter one of these fields is as clean as an Arizona desert in August.

Mountains are visible to the north and west of Pekin in successive ridges; the nearest foothills to the west are about 10 miles away. There are a few bits of rolling ground nearer to the city, but not of enough importance to affect the general landscape. In the country west of Pekin there are many minor ravines, principally sunken roads or trails worn down and washed out by centuries of use. These are serious obstacles for mounted troops across country. In some cases they are impassable even for infantry. There is a fine stone road of comparatively recent construction from Pekin northwest to the summer palace, a distance of about 7 miles, but it is the only bit of road to be found in this part of China. There are no special difficulties for military operations different from those of other inhabited countries of the temperate zone. Nearly all the country from Tientsin to Pekin and around the latter city is a vast field of waving grain, and is usually densely populated. The Peiho from Tientsin to Tungchao is practically a wide canal, and, in the absence of good roads and sufficient transportation on wheel or pack animals, has facilitated supply of the invading force to a great extent. With a sufficient supply of light-draft steam launches transport on that line would be an easy matter.

We found the headquarters of the American commander at the office of the American legation. The staff, Fourteenth Infantry, Sixth Cavalry, and Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, were in the large compound known as the Temple of Agriculture, in the southern portion of the Chinese city. The British forces occupied another large inclosure east of ours known as the Temple of Heaven. A large part of the Chinese city was in ruins, the destruction being greatest in the vicinity of the Chienmen, in what is now the German section. Many of the streets were simply a succession of piles of brick and mortar, the wood still smoldering in some places. The stench from human and other carcasses, compost heaps, and green stagnant pools, and the clouds of dust consisting of dried excreta and other filth, made traveling through the streets about as disagreeable as could be imagined. Add to this the grotesque appearance of the Chinese shops still standing, with their strange lettering and gilded dragons; the massive walls and gates of the Tartar city; the numerous statues of dogs and dragons in stone or bronze, sometimes of colossal size; the many different kinds of soldiers, from the Mohammedan

of India with bare legs and brilliant turban to the heavy-booted Cossack from Siberia; and the filthy Chinaman with his pigtail and garlic breath pervading the whole, and you have a conglomerate impression never to be forgotten.

The city was divided into sections for guarding, police, and other purposes.

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Legation street extends from the Haitemen to the Chienmen, and is so called because most of the foreign legations have their compounds on this street. The lamp-posts were split and shivered by bullets; the walls are scarred in many places. The Hôtel de Pekin was barricaded, and all the rooms of the second floor had been repeatedly perforated by projectiles. All the houses west of the American legation were destroyed. Signs of very heavy rifle and artillery fire were plentifully in evidence. All this destruction was wrought by the Chinese in their efforts to burn out the people holding the legations.

On the day of our arrival we visited the Temple of Heaven. In the eastern part of this large compound there are two beautiful pagodas. The one farther to the north is decorated in blue, yellow, and gold; the other one has less brilliant colors. Both are artistic in design and in good condition, and probably the most attractive pieces of architecture to be found in Pekin. About 100 yards farther to the south there is a large circular platform in white marble; this is known to the Chinese as the center of the universe.

The feeling toward the Chinese was, of course, exceedingly bitter. It was generally accepted that the principal attacks had been made by imperial Chinese troops instigated by the empress dowager.

On the 24th of August we visited the Peitang (north cathedral), or French mission. In this inclosure, the walls of which are over a mile in length, 250 persons perished during the siege. The place was defended by 30 French and 10 Italian soldiers; of these 23 were for duty at the close. Rations were issued at the rate of 2 ounces per day. When relief came there were only 800 pounds of food left for 3,000 people. Two thousand four hundred shells were fired into the place. The south end of the church is marked by thousands of bullets. The east side is badly damaged by artillery fire. A sheet of zinc as large as an "A" target found in the defenses had 200 bullet holes in it. Four large mines were exploded. The

crater of one was 70 feet in diameter and 30 feet deep. Nothing can give a clearer idea of the cowardly nature of the Chinese than the fact that a handful of men was able to hold this large place against a numerous enemy armed with artillery in position on commanding walls.

The British legation also bore many marks of the siege. In the reception room the upper left-hand corner of the frame of the portrait of Queen Victoria had been carried away by a shell; the portrait itself was not damaged. General Barrow told me that at the recent siege of Kimberley, the Queen's portrait was damaged in an identical manner.

From the two fine pagodas on Coal Hill a good view is had of all Pekin and the surrounding country, but especially of the Imperial Palace or Forbidden City. According to tradition this hill was once an enormous pile of coal collected by one of the emperors as a reserve. This is probably a myth, for no indications of coal have been found lately.

The roofs of all the buildings in the Forbidden City are covered with imperial yellow tile, and the corners and edges are roughed up with pottery dogs, dragons, and women mounted on roosters.

At a conference of ministers and commanding generals on the 25th of August at the Spanish legation, General Chaffee introduced the writer as his chief of staff. All the other generals were attended by the senior officers of their staff and by interpreters, when necessary.

The question of entering the Forbidden City was brought up and discussed. In the vote which was taken, Japan and the United States were against, all the others for the proposition. It was agreed to make the formal entry at 8 a. m. of Tuesday, August 28. No cavalry or artillery were to take part, mounted; the generals and their staffs were to ride horses, but no others. Troops to enter at south gate, and march through the north gate, and be dismissed. The question of the order of the march gave rise to a long discussion, the Japanese and Russian generals both claiming first place. General Linievitch proposed that the Japanese and Russians go in at the head, side by side. General Fukushima said he would leave the matter to the final decision of General Yamaguchi. The latter eventually sent word that the Russians could go first. As in all probability there would be few or no spectators, there was little reason for

insisting on the honors. The order of entry and the number of soldiers corresponding to each nation in the procession were then fixed as follows:

1. Russians	800
2. Japanese	800
3. English	400
4. American	400
5. French	400
6. German	250
7. Austrians	60
8. Italians	60

The French and German contingents were entirely out of proportion with the degree of their participation in the campaign, the French being very feebly, and the German not at all, represented in the attack on Peking. General Frey claimed he now had 8,000 troops in China.

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Among the numbers of dead animals along the road from Tientsin we saw no American horses or mules, which speaks well, not only for the better quality of our animals but also for their better treatment.

On this day, August 25, a soldier of the Fourteenth Infantry brought in an immense double-humped camel loaded with vegetables; it created a sensation in camp.

The Germans at this time claim to have 1,200 men, namely: One battalion of marine infantry, strength 1,000, and 200 sailors from the *Hansa*; 1,000 more are expected in a few days. Captain Pohl is the commander. General Fukushima stated that the Japanese now have 6,000 horses, 18,000 combatants, and 3,000 to 4,000 camp followers in China, and that they are placing a depot of six months' supplies in Tientsin.

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AUG. 27.—The chiefs of staff met at the marble bridge on the main road to the south gate and made the final arrangements for the placing of the troops preliminary to the procession.

AUG. 28.—General Linievitch and staff rode around and looked at the various troops, except the British, and received their salutes. The Russians took entire charge of the ceremony of formal entry into the Forbidden City. It passed off in accordance with previous arrangements, except that the

Austrians came last. The Russians had two bands of music. The conduct, appearance, and marching of their men were good. The Japanese moved off promptly in their turn. They presented a uniform, neat, and compact appearance, and marched with precision, using a sort of a subdued goose-step, similar to the German step, and permitting full swing of the arm. The British troops, preceded by bagpipes and drums, were a composite body, all arms being represented. The marching of the American troops was as good as any there. The men seemed to be taller and slighter of frame than the European troops. In this connection it is to be remembered that the Americans wore better fitting clothing and that, having just come up from a long period of service in the Tropics, their weight probably averaged 10 pounds below normal.

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All officers were obliged to dismount in order to go through the palaces. In one of the interior courts the Russian troops were drawn up and cheered the troops of the other nations as they passed by.

After the troops had been dismissed the officers in a body inspected a number of buildings, etc. These nearly all were very dirty and dilapidated, both inside and out. No Chinese were found inside the palace, except several hundred eunuchs, servants, etc. Though reluctant about opening temples, they were respectful and no shots were fired. The whole ceremony was over in an hour.

There were some massive bronze dogs, 8 feet high, and also some dragons, birds, and turtles in bronze. The carvings on the marble steps were very fine. There were also many excellent old cloisonnée objects in the temples and huge bronze vases on the outside. As a whole, the exhibition was exceedingly disappointing. The glories of the place have long ago departed, and the puny imbeciles of to-day do not even keep clean the massive works of art left by their ancestors. The filth and decay prevalent in the heart of the Sacred Palace are a fair index to the condition of the Celestial Empire.

The American uniforms were the only ones bare of decorations. The absence of an American band of music was noticed, for the other bands were not provided with any of our national airs to play as we marched past the Russians.

Three troops of the Sixth Cavalry scouted the imperial hunting park to the south of the city. Found Boxers near the southern border. Killed 30 and brought in some cattle. Burnt the villages from which shots were fired. No casualties on our side.

There seems to be no system of sewerage in Peking. It is said that formerly there was a good system in various parts of the city; at present there are some traces left. Most of the principal streets are high in the middle with wide and deep ditches on the sides. The ditches are often filled with foul water which from green has turned to black. There are no sidewalks anywhere. In rainy weather the streets not paved are almost impassable. It is said that it is not a rare case for men or animals to be drowned in the streets of Peking. One of our spring wagons almost disappeared from view in a mudhole on the west side of the Imperial City recently. All the houses are of a single story and are surrounded by brick walls built as far into the street as possible. Beside the great walls inclosing the Chinese City, the Tartar City, the Imperial City, and the Palace or Forbidden City, there are minor walls everywhere, every property being inclosed and forming what is called a compound. The doors on the streets follow the same general rule; there are no knobs, handles, or latches, and it is impossible to enter without the assistance of somebody on the inside. The roofs of the buildings are generally of tile, but no system of catching and preserving the rainfall was observed.

Lieutenant Colonel Shiba, the military governor of the Japanese section of the Tartar city, stated that all of Prince Tuan's property had been destroyed by the Japanese, but that the property of friendly or neutral princes would be protected. The Japanese provost guard consists of three battalions and two companies. The police of the Japanese section at this time is good. Chinese families are returning to their homes, good order prevails, and shops and markets are being opened.

At the Russian legation on August 31 there was an interview between Generals Chaffee and Linievitch. The latter was very cordial. The generals discussed the return of Prince Ching and the measures necessary to prevent conflict between his cavalry escort and our troops. General Chaffee stated that the government of the city of Tientsin, with a

Russian governor at its head, was asking for funds with which to meet current expenses, and had suggested the return of captured silver in order to apply it to that purpose. General Linievitch did not appear to be favorably impressed with the idea and stated that such procedure was quite contrary to Russian custom. The generals also discussed the question of feeding the people of Peking and the measures necessary to meet impending starvation. General Linievitch acquiesced in a general way, but did not manifest any anxiety concerning the prospect. General Chaffee stated that his troops had captured 250,000 pounds of rice in the imperial hunting park, and that he would have it brought in to feed the destitute.

The question of go-downs at Tongku, held and not used by the Russians but needed by our supply departments, was also brought up. General Chaffee promised to submit a more accurate description of their location in writing, so that General Linievitch could decide whether to turn them over to the Americans or not.

SEPT. 1.—Visited German headquarters and met General von Hoepfner, recently arrived. Subsequently visited Japanese headquarters, met Generals Yamaguchi and Fukushima, and obtained permission to visit the quarters of the Japanese troops. Accompanied by an aid, visited the Forty-first Infantry Regiment, stationed in the city, and was pleasantly entertained by the officers. Found the troops quartered in houses. Everything was cleaned up, lime scattered in many places. There are no bunks; the bedding is placed on low platforms or on the kongs or Chinese stoves. Left the city by the north gate and crossed the Anting Plain, which was used by the garrison as a drill ground. The Chinese barracks, nearly a mile north of the city wall, are occupied by the Japanese troops. The buildings are new and kept in good order. Supply depots and administrative offices have been established and the troops seemed as much at home as if they had been there for years. After a visit to the cavalry barracks, we asked to look at the horses and stables. For some reason or other we were shown very few horses. The commander reported 20 killed and 50 wounded in the campaign, and 10 per cent with sore backs; said nothing about the effect of heat and exhaustion. From other sources it was learned that only about 80 out of 300

came through in serviceable condition. The horses are small, but probably quite suitable for messenger service or even for mounted infantry. The shoeing seems to be conducted on incorrect principles. The blacksmith in my presence fitted a foot to the shoe by holding the hot shoe to the foot long enough to burn a flat surface. The horses are geldings raised in Japan. Some of the officers ride stallions, and it was observed that they make as much trouble as do the Filipino and Spanish stallions.

The artillery was found in a large place inclosed by walls. There was only one battery, the remainder having been sent toward Tientsin, so as to be nearer the base and therefore less difficult to supply. The commander of the Japanese artillery stated that on the day of the attack on Peking he had 55 guns on a front of 1,000 yards at a distance of about 1,000 yards from the east wall, the distance being subsequently diminished to 500 yards. Among the opposing guns there were four modern weapons.

On September 2 the Russian telegraph line was reported as having reached Peking, but it was not in working order, having been broken in several places. The Russians and Japanese had several hundred men working on their lines. Their work of construction and operating has not produced the results obtained by our Signal Corps with much inferior force. The decision was arrived at that from this date on only official telegrams would be handled as the office was overrun with business, urged by all the troops and the legations—not forgetting reporters.

Three troops of the Sixth Cavalry went on another expedition to the hunting park; killed two Boxers. Found that one-half of the rice discovered recently had already been removed. The remainder was destroyed to keep it from being used by the enemy.

An incident occurred to-day which shows the state of preparedness of European armies for each other and the watchfulness they exercise on each other's movements. General von Hoepfner, of the German army, speaking to Captain Sicre, the French chief of staff, asked whether the latter did not speak very good German. The French officer smiled and felt like evading the question, but finally replied in fluent German. The German officer was speaking French and the

French officer German, all a part of the general readiness for war.

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The relations between the Americans and the Japanese are very cordial. Not being able to speak a word of each other's language, the soldiers, nevertheless, have a password or greeting used by them exclusively.

It is hardly necessary to speak of the friendly feeling existing between officers and men of the English and the American forces.

At a conference of generals this afternoon General Linievitch, presiding officer, stated that Admiral Alexieff, in dispatches of the 20th, 24th, and 25th of August, had forwarded information coming from an official at Shanghai to the effect that two Chinese armies in Shantung, one of 5,000 and the other of 15,000, were marching on Tientsin in order to operate against our line of communications. No other generals had heard of these movements.

The Russian commander also had a report that the viceroy of Wuchau had sent 5,000 troops north in haste. The Russian general suggested that the English and Americans patrol to the south and southwest, the Russians to the northwest, and the Japanese north. General Frey of the French army offered to send a battalion half-way on a straight line to Matao. It was agreed that each general was to send out detachments to a distance of 10 to 12 miles in the portion of the country adjoining his section of the city.

General Linievitch also stated that he had recently received from Admiral Alexieff information that the Russian troops were to winter here in practically their present strength, in all about 15,000 men. The Germans stated that they hoped to have about the same number; the Japanese that they would have 22,000 between Tongku and Pekin. General Linievitch further stated that he had no intention of forming an expedition to go to Paotingfu; that he had instructions to remain in Pekin until further orders.

A committee of superior officers was agreed upon to determine what buildings may be used for officers and men and what should be reserved for Imperial use. General Chaffee suggested that the officers designated, or to be designated, meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock a. m. and proceed to business, which was agreed to.

SEPT. 3.—The committee on imperial buildings met at the Coal Hill gate of the Forbidden City. Then visited and inspected the palace of Tscheng-kwang-cheng, at the east end of marble bridge; the buildings at Chingchienshi, now occupied by French troops; the winter palace of the empress dowager, guarded by Russians; and the emperor's palace on the island. Also visited many other buildings around the ponds. There is a railroad track along the west shore of the ponds, and there are special cars, about the size of our antiquated horse cars, decorated and furnished in the imperial yellow. There were no locomotives; we were informed that motive power was furnished by coolies manning the yellow ropes still attached to the cars. How truly Chinese! The ponds are covered with a dense growth of water lilies, so that boats could scarcely leave the boathouse on the east shore.

SEPT. 5.—On the tower at the south gate of the Chinese city a British signal station has been established, a portion of the roof being removed in order to secure a platform. The party was at work with a heliograph endeavoring to communicate with outposts in the direction of Liukochao. In place of a shutter on a separate tripod the English use a key attached to the mirror, enabling them to remove the flash from the receiving station and bring it back by slight movements of the mirror. The apparatus did not seem to work well, it being necessary to adjust it frequently. The reason is, of course, simple enough. Without a heavy tripod and solid base for the instrument the movement of the key will soon destroy the adjustment.

Lieutenant Hyer, Sixth Cavalry, is reported to have struck several hundred Boxers about 20 miles from Peking. Killed 23 and captured flags and some property.

SEPT. 6.—The committee on buildings continued its labors and visited a number of temples in the northern and eastern parts of the city.

Mr. Webb C. Hayes arrived on this day, also General Wilson with his aids, Lieutenants Reeves and Turner.

SEPT. 7.—Report of committee on buildings drawn up by Major von Brixen, German army, approved and signed by all the members.

SEPT. 8.—Visited the Forbidden City as a member of Admiral Alexieff's party. All small articles had been removed since

previous visit. Chinese attendants were in uniform and more numerous. Also visited Twelfth Battery R. A. and the First Bengal Cavalry.

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SEPT. 11.—At the conference of this day General Linievitch related the incidents of an alleged fight between seven companies of infantry, 100 Cossacks, and one battery on one side and a force of Chinese on the other; and he thought that in future operations only considerable bodies should be sent out.

Word was sent by Prince Ching that there are still about 1,000,000 people in Peking. He asks for permission to bring in food and for guards to protect merchants and venders. General Gaselee stated that there were many Chinese in all sections of the city except the Russian, where there were only dogs. It was agreed to by all that Prince Ching be requested to notify the Chinese people that they can come in to trade and will be protected; and that the generals promise to exert themselves to protect, in every way, the Chinese coming in with provisions from the country. Orders to be issued by the commanding generals that all detachments going out must be under officers, native officers, or noncommissioned officers; the latter to have an order in writing showing the nature of their duty. Orders also to be issued to stop indiscriminate firing, especially from junks.

The Russian general then stated that they had a fully equipped Red Cross hospital which was sent by the empress dowager of Russia, and that he offered the use of said hospital to all the generals for the reception and treatment of all severe cases which could not well be handled in ordinary field hospitals, the number of cases being limited only by the capacity of the hospital.

The announcement was then made that General Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, of the German army, was expected to arrive at Tientsin near the end of this month. The French, Japanese, and American generals stated that they had not received definite orders to place themselves under the field marshal's command.


General Chaffee then asked the opinion of the conference as to the number of troops that ought to be kept in Peking for the winter. The general opinion seemed to be that in case no hostile demonstrations occurred before the end of October

a reduction of the garrison to 10,000 men could safely be made. The Chinese were considered incapable of extensive field operations, especially at a time when there would be no crops on the ground. A verbal statement of the various commanders as to the number of troops actually in Pekin or immediate vicinity brought out the following:

	Men.	Guns.
Russians	6,200	24
Japanese	10,000	24
English	3,000	8
Americans	2,500	6
Italians	3,000	-----
Germans	2,000	6
French	4,000	21
Total	30,700	89

This statement is believed to be unreliable, each representative being interested in magnifying his importance and weight by exaggerating the number of his troops. It was agreed that soldiers were not to be allowed to move about the city with arms, except when on duty; and they were not to go into other sections of the city without a pass.

SEPT. 13.—Starting at the South gate of the Chinese City, we rode on top of the wall west to the southwest corner, then north and east to the Tartar City. The Tartar wall is 15 to 20 feet higher than the Chinese wall, and there is no connection between them. Rode around the Tartar City to the Chiho gate. The southwest portion of the Chinese City is well cultivated, and the country outside of the wall, as far as we could see, seemed densely populated, large villages lying adjacent to the walls on the west, north, and east sides. The houses in the Tartar City are larger and cleaner than in the Chinese quarter. There are many shade trees, so that the general aspect of the city is that of a large park with many buildings in it. Although Pekin is supposed to have a population of over 1,000,000 people in ordinary times, fully one-half of its inclosed area is not occupied by buildings. The top of the wall is everywhere practicable for carriages; with a little work, principally cleaning up, it could be made one of the finest drives in the world, the width being 40 to 50 feet between the crenelated facing wall rising 5 feet above the roadway.



At this time the various gates were held by guards, as follows:

South gate of the palace by Americans; the other three gates by Japanese.

Nos. 49, 58, 59, 60 by British.

Nos. 61, 62, 48, 55 by Americans.

No. 56 by Germans.

No. 50 by French.

No. 51 by Italians.

Nos. 47, 57 by Russians

Nos. 43, 44, 45, 46 by Japanese.

No. 53 by British and Japanese.

The wall was not seriously damaged. The pieces of artillery and the smoothbore muskets 8 feet long and weighing 40 pounds (known as "jingals") were all of ancient pattern. The tower at the northwest corner was destroyed by fire. The débris was almost sufficient to form a ramp at the angles of the wall, thus rendering escalade an easy matter.

SEPT. 16.—Pursuant to letter of instructions from General Chaffee to General Wilson, dated Headquarters Chinese Relief Expedition, September 15, 1900, and to Special Orders No. 2, Headquarters First Brigade, Chinese Relief Expedition, two battalions of the Ninth United States Infantry, one battalion Fourteenth United States Infantry, and 25 troopers, Sixth Cavalry, left camp at about 3 p. m. to take part in an expedition against the Boxers, reported with headquarters at the Patachao temples, about 10 miles west of Pekin. * * * The command left the city at the gate between the American and German sections and reached the end of the stone road, marked by arches, at 6.07 p. m.

The stone road is built of blocks of granite, 18 inches thick, 2 feet wide, and 4 to 8 feet long. The blocks are worn smooth and the road is full of holes. The coping has fallen away and many of the blocks have sunk below the general surface of the road, probably because proper foundation was never prepared. The road is very difficult in wet weather and bad for carts or wagons at any time. It is said that this road was traveled by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century, and that it is referred to in his writings. Our rate of marching was slow; we arrived at Liukochao at 7.50 p. m., one hour after darkness had set in. The British contingent was already in quarters. Some preparations had been made for our arrival; vacant houses had been swept out and there was fuel for cooking. The arrival in camp at such a late hour was a


serious inconvenience; besides, there was neither forage nor water that night.

The Germans were to leave Peking at 5 a. m. next day with eight companies and six guns, covering the territory north of us and closing avenues of escape toward Peking. A Japanese force of one battalion was to leave the city by the northwest gate and, marching on roads north of the territory to be traversed by the Germans, was to occupy a ridge about a mile east of the objective at daylight of the 17th. The commanding officers and their adjutants assembled at General Wilson's headquarters at 8.30 p. m. and received the plans and orders for the morrow.

SEPT. 17.—Pursuant to Field Orders No. 1, Headquarters Anglo-American troops, the combined forces started at about 2 a. m., and after a short delay got straightened out on the road in the order specified. The course was northwest along the Hunho, and the rate of progress very slow, presumably on account of reconnoissance by the advance guard. Occasional shots were heard. These at the time were considered to be signal shots by the enemy, but it seems more probable that they were simply blank cartridges fired by the Chinese, according to their custom, for the purpose of scaring off thieves. There was a long delay soon after daylight to await reconnoissance of a village at the foot of the hills. The Sikhs and the Fourteenth Infantry battalion were then placed in the advance. The plan was for these advance troops to climb the hills (see sketch), thus turning the enemy's supposed position to the temples; the main body to pass along the foot of the hills to the east and advance directly up the valley; the Japanese to shut off escape to the east and the Germans to the south. The Fourteenth Infantry followed in rear of the Sikhs, but when half way up the hill passed them and reached the summit first. The writer with four rifles proceeded north to the pass about 1 mile distant to cut off escape of the refugees. Our advance up the hill had been observed, but no resistance was made although there was a fine opportunity to do so.

Firing by our troops commenced soon after arrival at the summit and was continued by them and the Sikhs for fifteen minutes, from the precipice overlooking the temples and adjacent buildings in the village below, but we neither saw nor heard a return fire. One company was sent down the hill to

SKETCH OF TEMPLE REGION.



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enter the village and another (Captain Taylor's) followed us toward the pass. We saw some women and children and a few men, with bundles, making their way toward the hills, but no soldiers with guns. Our fire from the hill top was uncontrolled. I saw men against the sky line firing offhand at ranges of fully 1,000 yards. The fire discipline seemed to me to be of the poorest kind. Captain Murphy's company drove out some men who had taken refuge in the yards of the temples, and the casualties to the enemy were probably nearly all caused by this company. The result of the morning's work was ten dead Chinamen and occupation of the temples; no casualties of any kind on our side. However, there was ample evidence that the place had been used as headquarters by the Boxers. Two machine guns were well placed to sweep the entrance of the valley; in addition, about 10,000 cartridges, a quantity of powder, and a number of jingals were captured. The Japanese troops arrived at their position at the appointed hour; the Germans did not show up at all. It was a very large expedition to accomplish a small object, reports having greatly exaggerated the strength of the enemy.

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The name of this temple region is Ssupingtai, meaning the four terraces. It has been the custom of the Americans and English, residing in Pekin, to lease certain temples and their compounds, for occupancy, as a summer resort. The name of the white pagoda, a beautiful and conspicuous landmark which was blown up by the British after departure of the Americans, in revenge for the destruction of the English summer buildings by the Boxers, was Ling-kuang-ssu. Mr. Conger's temple was named San-shan-erh, the same as Tremont temple. Mr. Bambridge's temple was named Ta-pai-ssu.

The Indian troops, in the turning force, were hill climbers, but they were easily passed by the Fourteenth Infantry in spite of the load carried by the latter. The Welsh Fusiliers, who had not climbed any hills, seemed to be pretty well fagged out.

A detachment of Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Lieutenant Ferguson, corps of engineers, was sent toward Sankiatien to destroy an arsenal located at that point.

SEPT. 18.—Lieutenant Ferguson returned at 7 a. m. Lancers occupied the town. Nothing was found in the arsenal. The machinery had been rendered useless by the Boxers by carrying off important parts. The place was destroyed.

Orders to return to Peking at 7.45 a. m.; arrived at city at 1 p. m.

On the 17th some powder scattered loosely on the ground in the temple yard occupied by our troops became ignited while our soldiers were cooking; four of them were badly singed.

SEPT. 19.—Captain Forsyth's squadron, Sixth Cavalry, returned from a trip toward the east, bringing back twelve Chinese Christians. The command found everything quiet, people at work. The troops were offered water and refreshments everywhere. There was nobody in danger. It appears the missionaries wanted to show the troops simply for future effect by impressing the natives with the power of the foreign devils, apparently at their disposal.

SEPT. 20.—Visit to the summer palace. The group of buildings and temples used as a summer residence by the Chinese emperors is situated on the north bank of a lake, partly, at least, artificial, located at the foot of the hills, about 7 miles northwest of Peking. Russian troops are in possession.

There are five steam launches and one imitation of a side-wheel steamer, in white marble, on the lake. The whole property is in a good state of preservation. The road is of heavy blocks of stone and in excellent condition.

There are other points of interest in the city well worth visiting. Such are the Observatory, the Llama and Confucius temples, the White Ming Pagoda, etc.

SEPT. 25.—The conference of generals called for this morning met at 9.40 a. m. The German forces being in the field, their representative was absent. General Linievitch announced that the works held by the Chinese at Lutai and Pehtan, and about the surrender of which pourparlers had taken place, were captured on the 20th and 21st of September by a force composed of French, German, and English troops, also that Mukden and Kirin had been taken by the Russians without resistance. He stated that there was no news of Boxers in the vicinity of Peking from Russian sources, but that the Japanese reported Boxers near the hunting park south of the city.

General Wilson inquired whether opposition to the Russian forces in Manchuria had ceased; to which General Linievitch replied that he had unofficial information that every point of importance in Manchuria was now probably occupied by

Russian troops. Railroad construction had been resumed at Harbin, the point of departure of branches, east into Russian territory, and south for Port Arthur, and that he considered north China pacified. Replying to inquiry of General Fukushima, he stated that he had no information concerning ninety battalions of Chinese troops reported to be marching to Mukden. The Japanese commander at Huansun, south of the hunting park, reported the presence of 2,000 Boxers about 10 kilometers farther to the south. An officer's patrol was attacked at a point 5 kilometers south of Huansun by 500 Boxers. This morning the Japanese sent out three companies and two mountain guns to complete the battalion at Huansun for operation against the Boxers. A German patrol was attacked farther to the east, south of the southeast corner of the park. The Germans sent out two battalions and a battery of six guns. The above-mentioned facts were communicated by General Fukushima. General Linievitch then stated that he had important news to communicate, namely, that he had orders to leave Peking with all his troops except one battalion of rifles and one company of sappers; that he would depart on the 27th and that the Russian minister would also leave somewhat later. Also that Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching have plenary powers to negotiate with the Russian representatives. Pourparlers would take place at Tientsin. General Wilson asked what effect the withdrawal of the Russian troops would have on the repair of the railroad. General Linievitch replied that it would continue; that good work was being done at the Yangtsun end, but that there was difficulty at the Peking end, owing to lack of supplies. That railway material was coming from Shanghai and Vladivostok and that the work would progress rapidly; that, however, it would be difficult to predict the date of conclusion of the work on account of the damaged condition of several large bridges. Upon inquiry the Russian general further stated that Colonel Tretsakoff, of the sappers, would be in command of the Russian forces, remaining near Peking. He also stated that all the allied powers had accepted in principle the idea of quitting Peking. Inquiry by General Wilson developed that this statement applied only to the legations, not to the troops. General Linievitch also stated that the Russian telegraph line would remain in operation and that it would be at the disposal of such generals as might find it necessary or

convenient to make use thereof. He announced that General Yamaguchi, of the Japanese army, being the next in rank, would replace him, and that inquiries in future should be addressed to the Japanese staff; and that the Russian forces remaining in Pekin would number about 1,300 men. After conversation and discussion on these points the conference adjourned amid mutual expressions of appreciation and courtesy.

SEPT. 29.—Conference at 9 a. m., General Yamaguchi, Japanese army, presiding. The presiding officer brought up the question of a common cemetery for the deceased officers and soldiers of the allied powers. The British general stated that most of their troops were Mohammedans and that it was customary to cremate the bodies. The Japanese general stated that they followed the same custom. The French preferred their consecrated ground at the Peitang. The Americans stated that they already had a suitable place and expected eventually to remove the bodies to America. The Germans stated that they were arranging for a place just north of the Tartar wall and east of the Haitamen. This disposed of the question and it was dropped.

The question of the reception of Field Marshal Count von Waldersee then came up. It was agreed that one battalion was to be drawn up at the future residence of the Field Marshal; one squadron to meet him on the road; and the generals, each with two staff officers, to await him at the Haitamen. General von Hoepfner, of the German army, was to take charge of the arrangement of details.

The German supply departments have not been as efficient as was expected. German officers express a desire to purchase commissary stores, cigars, clothing, horses—in fact anything. French officers also try to buy cigars. Colonel Alexander and other British officers having heard that some American troops are about to be withdrawn, made inquiry whether some horses would not be sold instead of being shipped back to America. The impression seems to be abroad that the Americans will sell anything—a purely commercial people, of course—this the reward for the kindness of our Government in permitting the more destitute to purchase khaki and other clothing, cigars, etc., presumably at a profit, though admitted to be remarkably cheap. Such little incidents throw a side light on the character of the European,

who seems in many cases to be incapable of conceiving of truthfulness and unselfishness in others.

OCT. 3.—Review of American troops in the space between Temples of Heaven and Agriculture at 2 p. m. Troops present: Ninth Infantry, Fourteenth Infantry, marines, Light Battery F, of the Fifth Artillery, and third squadron of the Sixth Cavalry. Marching and appearance of the troops very creditable. Many of the foreign ministers and generals with their staff officers were present.

The British loss in an explosion of powder at Tungchao on September 16 was 36, including Captain Hill. The explosion was due to carelessness in setting off quantities of Chinese powder on the same spot.

* * * * *

OCT. 5.—The work of cleaning up Legation street and repairing the walls was commenced. A Chinese banner is flying over the Russian legation. It indicates that the governor of the eastern part of the Tartar city has his office at this place.

OCT. 9.—Conference at 9 a. m. All the troops represented.

The first business was a statement by Sir Robert Hart to the effect that the Chinese fear a famine this winter; that food and coal will be very scarce. They therefore ask for protection against seizure of men, animals, provisions, and fuel by soldiers. Sir Robert Hart proposed to secure this protection by means of a license or pass in conjunction with an international flag or device. The licenses were to be issued by the four principal merchants or chiefs who had charge of this movement, and they were to keep a register of all licenses issued, the various commanders also to issue such licenses as they might deem desirable. The merchants on their part agreed to facilitate the furnishing of supplies to the military authorities and remove all difficulty on that score. Licenses and flags were to go together so as to prevent fraudulent use of the privilege.

General Chaffee asked how these passes were to be made intelligible to the sentinels of the various nations. In reply thereto, Sir Robert Hart stated that a word in each language would be sufficient to establish the authenticity of the papers. It was further proposed that on these licenses men, animals, and provisions were to be permitted to pass freely through the gates and in the various parts of the cities.

General Gaselee called attention to the fact that all the Powers had already bound themselves to prevent interference with trade and to stop unlawful seizures of all kinds. He therefore proposed that trade be perfectly free without passes of any kind.

Sir Robert Hart, continuing, stated that it was proposed to bring in food from the country and Tientsin and coal from the hills, and, that if his plan were adopted, he further suggested that suitable proclamations be issued and widely distributed with instructions to all Chinese to make their complaints at proper headquarters.

When it came to a vote on the proposition, the Russians stated that they were not interested, as their troops would all have left Peking in four or five days. The proposition failed to obtain a single affirmative vote.

After further discussion, during which it was stated by General von Hoepfner and others that enforcement of rules and regulations was a matter of military discipline under suitable orders of the commanding generals, the idea of issuing a proclamation to the Chinese, assuring them of protection in their commercial pursuits conducted on the same basis as before the siege be issued, and that the generals would issue orders to that effect, was adopted. It was agreed that all carts and other means of transport were to be examined when entering or passing out of the gates for arms and munitions of war, and that export of food and furniture was to be stopped.

Sir Robert Hart drew up a proclamation, subsequently to be translated into Chinese, which was adopted by the conference, and which Sir Robert Hart promised to have printed and distributed to the various headquarters. The principal objection to Sir Robert Hart's original plan, for which he submitted and read a set of regulations, was found in the fact that it placed restrictions on trade, because, if passes were required, then those without passes would by inference be engaged in traffic illegally and subject to interference. Moreover, the four merchants referred to would probably enjoy a monopoly and use the opportunity to exact money for passes to be issued by them or in other ways form a combination interfering with small dealers and their customers.

The question of reorganizing the police force of the city was then brought up, and General Chaffee proposed that a

chief of police be designated, and nominated Colonel Shiba of the Japanese army for that position. General Yamaguchi stated he desired to reflect on the question for a day or two, and the question was left for future discussion.

With reference to an international club for officers at the building east of the marble bridge across the pond, it was agreed that each general was to send a representative to form a committee of organization, the first meeting to be at the call of the Japanese commander. General von Hoepfner then made a statement that he desired to invest the arrival of General von Waldersee with more ceremony. He proposed to fire a salute with cannon from Haitamen, to drink a toast at the German legation, and to line the route to the general's headquarters with the troops of all nations. This was agreed to, the chiefs of staff to arrange details with General von Hoepfner.

About 3 p. m. a delegation of Chinese, dressed up in their best clothes, preceded by a band, appeared at headquarters and presented to General Chaffee two red silk umbrellas mounted on bamboo poles. The spokesman made a speech in very good English, eulogizing the Americans for their kindness and justice to all, and thanking the General and all the American officers for the protection the Chinese had enjoyed in the American quarter. He dwelt on the contrast between Americans and Europeans, saying that America appeared to the Chinese as a sort of heaven; that the Americans did not come here to seize territory, but to protect all the people, and that the Chinese were proud to be under the shelter of the American flag. He also remarked that if the civilized nations were to be judged by what had been seen here of the acts of European soldiers, then the Chinese must prefer to remain barbarians. The umbrellas, he said, had no intrinsic value, but were presented in accordance with Chinese custom to symbolize the gratitude and appreciation with which the Americans were regarded by the Chinese for their justice, kindness, and fair dealing. General Chaffee, in reply, thanked the speaker and his delegation for their present; stated that it would be taken to America and its significance explained; that the fact of presentation would be cabled to his Government, etc.

OCT 17.—Field Marshal Count von Waldersee entered the Tartar City at Haitemen at about 11.30 a. m. Cavalry escort

consisted of one platoon each of American, British, and Japanese troops. Salute of 19 guns from top of wall. The generals and staff officers joined his suite. The troops lined the streets (*Spalierbildung*) along the route, which was on Legation street to Chienmen; then north to south gate of Forbidden City; then west to winter palace. French, Germans, and Italians and the Japanese legation guard were east of canal bridge; the British troops occupied the remainder of Legation street; the Americans then reached to the southwest corner of the Forbidden City. The battalion of honor at the winter palace was composed of one company of American, English, German, Japanese, and Latin troops. The field marshal rode a horse and wore the uhlan uniform. The English troops were in full dress, the American in field dress. The troops, especially the English, looked well. At the winter palace the guard of honor executed a march past in column of fours. American, English, and Japanese companies did excellent marching. The Germans, who were all picked men, pounded the pavement with their hobnailed boots, executing an unusually high parade march. It is said to be excellent exercise. The French made a fair appearance.

* * * * *

OCT. 20.—The American section is now, and has for a month past been crowded with Chinese. The German section just across the street is almost deserted, all the shops and marketing being on our side of the avenue. The Chinese say they are robbed by the German, and also, but to a less extent, by the French. The English quarters also are still comparatively vacant. The Americans are respected and well treated by all the foreigners and seem to be popular everywhere. The American section certainly is a picture of contentment, and swarms with Chinese, who do not feel safe until they have crossed our lines.

OCT. 21.—The Fourteenth Infantry left for Manila. An escort of two troops of cavalry and the light battery accompanied the regiment to outside of city wall. At the place where the attack on Pekin began the regiment received the salute of the troops and the battery. General Chaffee (accompanied by his staff) addressed the officers and bade them farewell.

In the foregoing notes all matter likely to be reported in other papers has been omitted. A detailed account of the

conduct of the missionaries and of the troops with reference to acquisition of property was also omitted because probably already reported.

Very respectfully,

J. T. DICKMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V.

SUMMARY
OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN
CHINA AND MANCHURIA.

(521)

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The antifoign feeling of the Chinese became more intense after the seizure by Germany, in 1897, of Kiaochow and the subsequent enforced cessions made to England and Russia at Weihaiwei and Port Arthur. It helped the dowager empress to carry out her *coup d'état* in 1898, when she practically deposed the emperor Kwang Su, and from that time, fomented and encouraged by the ruling powers, it continued to increase until it culminated in the outbreak of 1900.

Boxers commenced to be heard of by Europeans in the latter part of 1899, and the progress of the movement was watched and noted by the diplomats in Pekin, who did not at first realize its full significance. For an account of the origin and objects of the society see Lieutenant Lindsey's report, page 447.

In January, 1900, after the murder of Mr. Brooks, an English missionary, in Shantung province, all the ministers addressed letters to the Chinese Government, calling attention to the extreme gravity of the situation, and urging that steps be taken to suppress the society. New occasions, from time to time, brought forth additional letters from the ministers, separate, identic, and joint notes, the replies from the Tsung-li-Yamen being usually tardy, vague, and generally evasive and unsatisfactory. In March the American minister suggested the sending of a war ship into Chinese waters, but even at that time it was thought in the United States that it was desired more for moral effect than for active service.

Boxer outrages increased in numbers and occurred at many different points. Warnings and remonstrances addressed to the Chinese Government by the several ministers failed to make the Government exert itself to suppress them. The situation was dangerous and threatening, and about the latter part of May the different ministers called on their respective governments for guards to protect the legations, the Tsung-li-Yamen being notified that these guards had been summoned

and would arrive immediately. Those for the American legation consisted of a detachment of 48 marines, 3 blue jackets, 2 machinists, and a hospital apprentice, landed from the U. S. S. *Oregon* and *Newark* at Taku by Admiral Kempff. They left Tongku by boat on the morning of May 29, arriving in Tientsin about 11 p. m. Permission to travel over the railroad as an armed party had been refused by the viceroy, who would not accord it without the authority of the Tsung-li-Yamen. They were the first foreign troops to arrive in Tientsin, and were received with great enthusiasm by the foreign residents. The detachment remained in Tientsin till Thursday, May 31, waiting for the other legation guards, and for permission to go on to Peking, and all started at half past 4 in the afternoon by rail, reaching the railroad station outside the city about 11 at night. From there they marched to the city, the American detachment heading the column, through 4 miles of silent, densely packed throngs of natives, and our men took quarters adjoining the legation compound in rear of the Russian bank. The guards numbered 350 men, and were for the legations of Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Their arrival was most reassuring to the foreigners, and had the effect of improving the situation in the city, though in the surrounding country the Boxers were still active. The German and Austrian guards arrived two days later, and two days after their arrival rail communication was suspended.

The situation outside Peking grew rapidly worse, so that by June 9 the ministers were convinced that serious danger was to be apprehended, and sent messages to the fleet at Taku asking for additional guards. These were to come as far as possible by rail and then march overland to Peking, but, though they started promptly, the relief party was unable to get through. The call for help had been delayed too long.

Events now followed each other rapidly. On June 12 occurred the murder of the chancellor of the Japanese legation by the soldiers of Tung Fuh Hsiang at the Yungting gate, and next day hordes of Boxers entered by the Hatamen gate and swept through the city, burning missions and killing and torturing native Christians. On the 19th the ministers were informed by the Tsung-li-Yamen that the threat to bombard the Taku forts was regarded as an act of

war, and that they must leave Peking within twenty-four hours. As a matter of fact, the bombardment had already taken place, and the forts had been captured. The ministers at once met and addressed a note to the Yamen protesting that the time was too short to get ready for such a move, inquiring what measures would be taken to insure their safety en route, specifying the least amount of land and water transportation that would be required, and insisting that they should be accompanied by some members of the Tsung-li-Yamen. For the purpose of adjusting and regulating these questions they demanded an audience of Princes Ching and Tuan on the following morning, and an immediate answer to their note. It was rather fortunate that the ministers found affairs in the city too much disturbed for them to visit the Yamen in a body on the following morning as they intended. Baron Ketteler, who went against the advice of his colleagues, was killed on the way, and it is more than probable that a similar fate would have befallen the others, had they started. On the same morning a note was received from the Yamen withdrawing the ultimatum of the day before, and stating that, as the country between Peking and Tientsin was overrun with brigands, it would not be safe for the ministers to go there, and they should therefore remain in Peking.

It had been decided by the foreigners, in case of attack, to hold all the legations as long as possible, falling back when necessary for united defense on the British legation, where a final stand would be made. The order to leave Peking and the murder of Baron Ketteler hurried matters, and before the time limit fixed by the Chinese had expired—4 p. m. June 20—all the women and children, foreign representatives, etc., had moved into the British legation. This turned out to be most fortunate. The rescinding of the ultimatum was intended by the Chinese to lull suspicion, and their treachery was plainly shown by the fact that, precisely at 4 o'clock fire was opened on the legations by Chinese soldiers who had been secretly stationed under cover at various vantage points, resulting in the death of one Frenchman and the wounding of an Austrian. The siege of Peking had begun. (See Lieutenant Lindsey's report, p. 451.)

THE SEYMOUR RELIEF EXPEDITION.

In pursuance of the determination of the United States to take adequate measures for the protection of American lives

and property endangered by the widespread disorders in the Chinese empire, Rear Admiral Kempff, commanding all United States war vessels north of Hongkong, arrived at Taku on the 28th of May. Other governments had taken similar action to protect their several interests, and by June 4 the international fleet off Taku numbered twenty-five warships, from which men were landed to be sent to Peking as guards for the different legations.

On June 3 Admiral Kempff landed 50 more men with the consent of the Chinese Government, and on the 5th 50 additional men were disembarked for the protection of Americans at both Peking and Tientsin. He then called on the home authorities for additional ships and men to meet the emergency.

By this time the Boxers were overrunning the country from Tientsin west to Paotingfu and thence northward to Peking and beyond. Murders and depredations were reported on every side. From Tientsin on June 5 came the news that the Boxers were closing in on that city, which was practically under arms, and that even larger bodies were moving from beyond Yangtsun to attack it. The Chinese army, under General Nieh, which was presumably opposing the Boxers, was beaten by them in one fight, and the soldiers said it was useless to fight Boxers as they could not be killed by bullets. On June 9 great alarm was felt by the foreigners, who expected an immediate attack, and on that day also came from Peking urgent messages from the ministers asking for assistance. The senior naval commanders at once made up a force of all available men from the various war ships, to start immediately for Peking under the command of Vice-Admiral E. H. Seymour.

The first train from Tongku had on board 300 British, 112 Americans, 40 Italians, and 25 Austrians. Starting about 6 o'clock on the morning of June 10 it reached Tientsin at 7.30 a. m., and left there two hours later, proceeding without opposition beyond Yangtsun, near which was a camp of 4,000 Chinese troops under General Nieh. At 3.30 p. m. it reached a point a few miles from Lofa, where it had to be stopped in order to make repairs to the railroad, and remained there over night. Here the expedition was joined by two more trains, increasing the total force to 1,798 officers and men, as follows: English 905, German 450, Russian 112, American

112, French 100, Japanese 54, Italian 40, Austrian 25. Early the next morning, June 11, the train pulled into the station, where the engines were watered, and were there joined by a fourth train, containing 200 Russians and 58 French, making the number 2,056. The trains proceeded a little before noon, leaving a guard at Lofa of an officer and 30 men, afterwards reenforced to 60, to protect the line. From Lofa the expedition advanced without special incident until it reached a point about 3 miles from Langfang, when the leading train was attacked by Boxers, who had first tried and failed to cut off an advanced party with repairing tools, and now advanced in skirmishing order to the attack. They were soon repulsed by rifle fire, leaving about 35 killed.

On the next day, June 12, as soon as the line was repaired, the trains moved forward, and arrived in Langfang. Here it was found that the line beyond was much damaged, the damage being recent, and evidently done by parties of Boxers who operated just ahead of the relief force. As some days would have to be spent at Langfang repairing bridges, etc., a party of 3 officers and 44 men was sent to Anting, about 13 miles beyond, to hold that station and prevent further injury to the road. The party reached Anting next morning and was subjected to repeated attacks, which were repulsed with heavy loss to the Boxers, estimated, with those previously killed, to be about 150. Its ammunition running low, the detachment wisely returned to the main body, which it rejoined in the afternoon of June 13. Another party of 60 men went out the same afternoon for the same purpose, but failed to accomplish the object of the trip and returned the next day, June 15, having killed about 25 Boxers without any casualties on their side.

At Langfang, in the forenoon of the 14th, the outposts ran in, closely followed by Boxers in great numbers, who made a most determined rush on the forepart of the train which was then drawn up alongside of a well. They came in loose formation, with the utmost courage, under a withering fire, some even reaching the train before being killed, and suffered a loss of about 100 before retreating. In this affair five of the Italian contingent were killed. They were on outpost near a deserted village which concealed the approach of the enemy until too late for them to escape.

In the afternoon a messenger reported an attack on Lofa station, and reenforcements were dispatched at once to assist the guard, but on arrival it was found that the worst of the attack was over. However, the reenforcements harassed the retreating Boxers, who left about 100 killed behind, besides losing two small cannon. Two English seamen were wounded in the skirmish, of whom one afterwards died.

The difficulties of the expedition increased. Repairs had to be made under the protection of strong guards, only to be again destroyed by the Boxers, both in front and behind them. On June 16 the road to Tientsin was found to be broken, and communication had been cut off since the 13th by the numerous bands who infested the country. The determined opposition the relief force met had so delayed its advance that provisions and ammunition were running low. It was believed they could not get by railroad any farther than Anting, whence they would have to march overland, which could not be done without some means of transport for supplies. They were cut off from their base and ignorant of what was happening there. Admiral Seymour had a few days before tried to send orders to Tientsin directing junks, provisions, and ammunition to be sent to Yangtsun, where the railroad crosses the river, for the purpose, if found desirable or necessary, of making it a base for a start by water to Tungchow, and thence marching to Peking, a distance of about 13 miles, but none of his messengers succeeded in getting through. On the morning of June 17 train No. 1 reached Yangtsun after much difficulty and delay, and the station was found to be entirely destroyed, and communication by rail with Tientsin impossible to restore with the means at hand. Messages were then sent back to Lofa and Langfang, recalling trains 2, 3, and 4, the advance by rail being found to be impracticable, and the isolation and separate destruction of the trains a possibility. In the afternoon of June 18, train No. 3 came back from Lofa, and later in the evening Nos. 2 and 4 from Langfang. The latter had been unexpectedly attacked about half past 2 in the afternoon of June 18, by a force estimated at 5,000 men, including cavalry, large numbers of whom were armed with magazine rifles of the latest pattern. Captured banners showed that they belonged to the army of General Tung Fu Hsiang, who commanded the Chinese troops in the hunting park outside Peking, showing that the Chinese

imperial troops were being employed to defeat the expedition. This army was composed of especially picked men, 10,000 strong, commanded from the palace. They were said to be well armed, but indifferently drilled. The attack was made in front, and on both flanks, but was repulsed with much loss to the assailants, who, however, when they saw our forces retiring toward the trains, rallied and again attacked. They were beaten off with even greater loss than before, and then finally retreated. The Chinese loss in this encounter was 400 killed; the allies had 6 killed and 48 wounded.

The allies were now reunited at Yangtsun, and, on June 19, the commanders of the different units held a conference, at which it was decided to abandon the trains, and withdraw to Tientsin, marching by the left (north) bank of the river. The American contingent, under the command of Captain McCalla, was given the advance. An attempt to establish friendly relations and procure supplies from the authorities of the town was unsuccessful, due to their fear of the vengeance of the Boxers, who were in force in the neighborhood.

Preparations for the retreat were quickly made, four junks that had been seized the day before being used to convey the wounded, and at 3 p. m. a start was made. After a short march, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, all bivouacked for the night. An early start was made next day, the 20th. Progress, regulated by the speed of the junks under the management of unskilled men, was necessarily slow, and was further obstructed by the continuous fighting to force a way through a succession of villages that had to be carried either by rifle fire or with the bayonet. The latter was most effective, the cheers of the men as they advanced seeming to intimidate the Chinese, who would fall back without waiting to receive the charge. About 8 miles was the distance accomplished in the day's march. The march was resumed June 21, at 7.30 a. m., the opposition offered by the enemy being still more obstinate on this day. Soon after the column had moved, a body of about 200 Chinese cavalry was seen in the distance to the left of the advance. At first they were thought to be Cossacks, but as they approached nearer to reconnoiter, they were seen to be Chinese. A few well-directed shrapnel from the 9-pounder made them withdraw to a distance, where they hovered for the remainder of the day, firing when opportunity offered. After the cavalry had been driven off, the

enemy opened fire with a field gun. This was repeated from time to time during the advance, but was each time checked by the 9-pounder of the allies whenever the position of the Chinese gun could be located. The advance continued through the villages along the river, and through the town of Pei-tsang, and was opposed at every step. At 6 p. m., the enemy being found to occupy a strong position from which he could not be dislodged during the remaining hours of daylight, a halt was called and further movements considered. The distance accomplished during the day was only 6 miles.

A night march was now resolved on, as offering the best chance to get through, and, after a few hours' rest, the column started about 1 o'clock in the morning (June 22). Resistance was encountered early in the march, but the troops struggled on, and at 4 a. m. arrived opposite the imperial armory near Hsiku on the right bank of the river, from which an unexpected heavy rifle and gun fire was opened on them. Luckily cover was at hand in a village near by, and behind the river bank, which was immediately taken advantage of, and when the rear column had come up, and the junks containing the wounded had been placed in the best possible position, an attack was made with rifle fire on the river front, killing some and driving others of the Chinese from their guns, while two parties were dispatched, one above and one below, crossing the river unobserved and carrying the armory by assault.

A determined attempt by the Chinese to retake the armory in the afternoon was defeated with heavy loss to them. The allies also suffered severely, among their killed being Commander Buchholtz, I. G. N., whose death was a blow, not only to the Germans, but to the whole force. The main body and the wounded crossed over in the afternoon, and occupied the armory.

The enemy again attacked unsuccessfully about 6 o'clock on the morning of June 23. In the armory were found a number of guns, about 15 tons of rice, and large quantities of ammunition and war material of the latest pattern. The situation of the allied forces was now much improved, though difficulties still confronted them. The necessity of carrying the wounded, now numbering 230, prevented them from forcing their way to Tientsin, as nearly the whole command would have to be used in the task, leaving very few available

for fighting. Repeated attempts to get news of their situation into Tientsin had been futile, owing to the country being so closely watched; but on the 23d a native courier managed to get through. He had been captured by Boxers and tied to a tree, but, having destroyed his message before being taken, nothing incriminating was found on him, and he was finally released, and managed with difficulty to get through the lines at Tientsin; he was the first one to get through. A Chinese soldier, wounded and captured by the allies while trying to enter the armory, said that General Nieh's army was much discouraged at their want of success, and that the attempts to retake the armory were made with twenty-five battalions, nominally of 500 men, but probably of not more than 300 or 400 each. While the armory was occupied, its guns, by an aggressive fire on a Boxer stronghold near by, and a fort lower down the river, kept the enemy from giving the allies much further trouble. Early on June 25 one of the guns of the Chinese fort was seen to be firing toward Tientsin, and, to create a diversion, two of the guns in the armory were trained on it, upon which the Chinese gun turned its fire on the armory. At 6 o'clock the relief column came in sight, and at 7 arrived outside the armory. It was commanded by the Russian colonel, Shirinsky, and was composed of forces of the various nations, Russians preponderating.

Preparations were soon made for the return of the combined force and for the destruction of the arsenal which contained about \$15,000,000 worth of war stores. The command crossed the river in the afternoon and bivouacked on the bank for the night, and the return march was commenced at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, fires being lighted immediately after in five different places in the armory by two English naval officers who remained behind for the purpose, afterwards rejoining the main body. The dense volumes of smoke, and the occasional explosions seen and heard afterwards, gave assurance that the destruction must have been tolerably complete.

The whole command arrived at Tientsin, without further incident, about 9 a. m. The wounded were at once cared for, and the various detachments rejoined their own forces.

The expedition had failed of its main object, the rescue of the ministers in Pekin; but it is likely that the severe losses

suffered by the Chinese in their repeated attacks must have impaired their morale by showing them that the Boxers were not invulnerable, and thus made easier the task of the larger and better equipped force that afterwards succeeded. The capture and destruction of the arsenal near Hsiku, with its immense stores of war material, were also some compensation for the danger and toil involved.

No reliable estimate of the number of the Chinese engaged in opposing the allied forces can be given. Admiral Seymour says the number increased gradually until the armory near Hsiku was reached, when General Nieh's troops and the Boxers both joined in the attack, but they must have outnumbered our force many times. The traditional courage and gallantry of the United States Marine Corps was exemplified in the conduct of the American force of marines under the command of Capt. B. H. McCalla, U. S. N., whose valuable services to the expedition received special praise and recognition from its commander.

Strength of expedition.

Nation.	Officers.	Men.	Guns.	In command.
Austrian -----	1	24		Lieutenant Prochaska.
British -----	62	*853	One 6-pounder Hotchkiss q. f.; three 9-pounder M. L.; two Maxim, caliber .45; six Nordenfeldt, caliber .45.	Vice Admiral Sir Edward H. Seymour, K. C. B.
French -----	7	151	One field gun -----	Captain de Moralles.
German -----	23	427	Two Maxims -----	Captain von Usedom.
Italian -----	2	36	One Maxim -----	Lieutenant Sirianni.
Japanese -----	1	52		Captain Mori.
Russian -----	7	305	One field gun -----	Commander Chagkin.
United States -----	6	106	One 3-pounder; one Colt automatic -----	Capt. B. H. McCalla.

* 640 seamen, 213 marines.

The losses were as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.
British -----	27	97
Germans -----	12	62
Russians -----	10	27
Americans -----	4	25
French -----	1	10
Italians -----	5	3
Japanese -----	2	3
Austrians -----	1	1
Total -----	62	228

THE CAPTURE OF THE TAKU FORTS.

The departure of the relief expedition under Admiral Seymour on June 10 left Tientsin with but a small force for defense in case of attack. By the 13th instant the Boxers had possession of the native city and almost surrounded the place, cutting off all communication with the relief expedition, and threatening communication with the base at Taku.

Word was received on June 14, at Taku, from the consuls at Tientsin, that all the railway cars and rolling stock at Tongku were to be sent up the line for the purpose of sending a Chinese army to Tongku, and orders were at once given to the allied vessels in the Peiho to prevent any stock from being moved, and to oppose with force any movement of the kind taking place. By the evening of the next day, June 15, it was learned that the mouth of the river was being protected by electric mines, and that the forts were being provisioned and reenforced, whereupon, by agreement reached at a conference held on the following day, the naval commanders notified the viceroy of Chili at Tientsin that, in view of the danger to the allied forces marching to Peking, and to those at Tientsin, they (the commanders) would occupy the Taku forts, temporarily, at 2 a. m. on the 17th instant.

The time fixed by the allies for taking possession of the forts was 2 a. m., and it was arranged that, if not surrendered then, they would be bombarded at 4 a. m., but at 10 minutes of 1 on the morning of June 17 the Chinese anticipated the action of the allies by opening fire simultaneously from every gun in the forts that could be trained on the ships. This was said to have been done by the express direction of the dowager empress, the notice of the commanders being regarded by the Chinese Government as a declaration of war, and it being believed that the dismemberment of the empire had been resolved on by the powers. If fire was opened by direction of the empress, it shows that the Chinese had telegraphic communication with Peking after it had been closed to foreigners.

The dispositions for the attack had been agreed on, and the several vessels were in their assigned places when the forts opened fire, except the *Itis* and *Lion*. To enable these to take their stations with safety, the English torpedo boat destroyers *Fame* and *Whiting* were ordered to capture four

imperial Chinese destroyers, lying at the dockyard between Taku and Tongku. This was handsomely done, a few Chinese being killed and wounded on one of their destroyers, there being no casualties among the English.

The Taku forts are described by Lord Beresford as three forts of the Chinese type, armed with numerous cannon of different systems and calibers, poorly placed. The forts are built of soft coast mud that dries in time and is called in derision by Europeans "harveyized mud." It sometimes crumbles to pieces by the discharge of its own guns. This last does not agree with the statement of Admiral Kempff, who, in a report apropos of the bombardment, says that "the forts being of thick mud and grass adobe, were but little damaged by the gun fire, although they received a host of projectiles." They are known as the North, Northwest, and South Forts. The two former are on the north side and the latter on the south side of the entrance to the river.

The movements of the gunboats were directed by the Russian captain, Dobrovolsky, of the *Bohr*. Those joining in the attack were the *Koreetz*, *Guilak*, and *Bohr*, Russian; the *Iltis*, German; *Lion*, French; and the *Algerine*, British. The engines of the Japanese gunboat being disabled, she was moored near Tongku to protect the railroad station there.

The plans of the allies included a land attack, to be conducted by Commander Craddock, of the British navy. The forces engaged were as follows:

British: 23 officers and 298 men; Commander Craddock, H. M. S. *Alacrity*.

German: 3 officers and 130 men; Commander Pohl, H. I. M. S. *Hansa*.

Japanese: 4 officers and 240 men; Commander Hattori, I. J. S. *Kasagi*.

Russian: 2 officers and 157 men; Lieutenant Stankewitch.

Italian: 1 officer and 24 men; Lieut. J. Tanca, I. M. S. *Calabria*.

Austrian: 2 officers and 20 men; Lieut. Ernt. Tatni, of the *Zenta*.

A total of 904 officers and men.

The fire from the forts was quickly returned by the gunboats and continued all night, increasing in intensity at daylight, when it became most damaging to the Chinese. The British landing party was put ashore from the *Algerine* after the firing commenced, and joined the others who had marched from Tongku, at a rendezvous previously agreed on. It was arranged that, after an effective bombardment, the Northwest Fort should first be attacked, then the North Fort, and finally

the long string of works on the south bank of the river known as the South Fort.

The attack on the Northwest Fort was to be an assault at the west gate, after forcing or scaling which, an entrance to the inner fort was to be found and attacked. The first advance was made about 3 o'clock in the morning, but the line was halted when about 1,000 yards from the fort, and then retired a short distance to gain cover, pending further bombardment by the gunboats. But little damage had so far been done to the fort, all its guns were still in action, and the commanders agreed that an attack, if delivered then, would result in serious and unnecessary loss. Fire by the gunboats on the Northwest Fort had ceased, on the request of Commander Craddock, about the time preparations were being made for the first advance, but was kept up on the other forts. It was resumed on the Northwest Fort by the *Algerine* and *Itlis*, on the receipt of his second message to Commander Stewart of the *Algerine*, who passed it on to the other vessel by boat. This was about a quarter to 4, and being now daylight, the fire was more accurate and effective, so that about half past 4 the return fire of the heavy guns had been silenced, and preparations for the final attack were then made. When the line had previously retired, a British detachment had remained under cover of a small rise in the ground, about 300 yards to the front. They were joined, shortly before the advance, by the Russians, who took position on the left. The Italians were in loose formation on the right flank slightly in rear, the military road interfering somewhat with their getting into line. The other forces and the remainder of the British were in close support. All moved off briskly when the advance was ordered, and when the charge was sounded the Japanese marines, who were with the supports in column of route along the road, led by Captain Hattori, ran quickly to the front and raced abreast of the English across the intervening 300 yards to the west gate, all scaling the parapet together. Captain Hattori was the first man in and helped Commander Craddock up, being soon afterwards killed. The inner gate was forced by the rifle fire of the allies, which gave them complete possession. The other defenses of Taku were taken with little opposition. The Chinese left the Northwest Fort by a protected passage leading to the North Fort, which latter they abandoned without a fight; and the South Fort was captured two hours later, the garrison

fleeing after the magazine had been exploded by shells from the gunboats; they were not pursued. The casualties among the land forces included 1 warrant officer killed and 6 men wounded, of the British. The Japanese lost Captain Hattori and 2 men killed and 6 men wounded, of whom two died afterwards. The bodies of 450 Chinese were found in the Northwest Fort, and a prisoner stated that about 50 bodies had been thrown into the moat. Of the naval vessels the Russian *Guilak* suffered most, having 10 men killed, 2 officers and 47 men wounded; most of these casualties were caused by a shell penetrating one of her smaller magazines and exploding some charges in it. The vessel was disabled during the action by injuries to her machinery and was hulled several times. The *Ilitis* also suffered severely, having 8 men killed, and the Captain and 30 men were wounded. The manner in which this ship was fought was the admiration of the whole squadron, and unstinted praise for his conspicuous service was awarded to the commander in official reports of the British naval commanders.

The *Lion* had 1 man killed, and the *Koreetz* had 2 officers and several men killed and wounded. The British loss was small.

After the operation all available men were landed from the fleet. The forts were occupied, and placed in as good a state of defense as possible, a night attack, or rush by great numbers of Boxers, being feared. The British garrisoned the Northwest Fort, the Japanese had the North Fort, the Russians and Germans jointly occupying the South Fort.

A series of old forts extend along the Peiho from the seacoast to Tientsin; there are seven all told, of which the most important is the Singchen, about 13 miles above Tongku, armed with large caliber modern guns. An expedition sent on June 26 found the fort abandoned, and returned after disabling the guns and destroying a large amount of ammunition. This was fortunate for the allies, as the fort commanded both the river and the Tientsin road, and, if properly manned and served, could have made the passage of the river extremely difficult to force.

Admiral Kempff being unwilling, in the absence of specific instructions, to engage in an act of war against China, the *Monocacy* took no active part in the bombardment, remaining moored at her berth near the railroad station, giving shelter

and protection to many foreigners during the night. Notwithstanding her inaction the vessel was fired at many times during the night, and was struck once by a Chinese shell, which damaged the vessel and two of her boats, but caused, luckily, no casualties. Commander Wise at first thought this might be due to wild shooting, but was later convinced that it was designed, and steamed out of range to a safe position a couple of miles up the river behind a bend. This was about 5 o'clock, and three-quarters of an hour later, the fire slackening and the Japanese flag being seen flying over one of the forts, he returned to his berth.

Much regret was felt and expressed in the United States that our forces had not joined in the attack on the forts. This feeling was shared by officers and men of the *Monocacy*, who would have rejoiced in being able to give "her ancient smooth bores a last chance."

The reduction of the forts was a necessary step to the safe progress of any international relief expedition, and was justified by subsequent events. Admiral Kempff no longer hesitated to join heartily with the allies in all the measures deemed necessary for the safety of the foreigners, representing to the home authorities that the Chinese Government was paralyzed and in sympathy with the Boxer outbreak; that the occupation of the forts was justified; that the firing by the Chinese on the *Monocacy* was an act of war, her pacific character being known, and that it was now necessary to join with the other powers for common defense and safety and for the honor of the country. His course was promptly approved by the Government, and he was directed to act concurrently with the other powers according to his best judgment.

Having secured their base at Taku, the most urgent task that faced the allies was to reopen the way to Tientsin and relieve the foreigners besieged in that city.

Maj. L. W. T. Waller, U. S. M. C., reached Taku on the day after the bombardment. He landed on the 19th instant, with 5 officers and 131 men of the Marine Corps, under orders to move forward with the first relief column. On the 20th he proceeded to Tongku and, assisted by Captain Wise, of the *Monocacy*, got a train together and proceeded up the railroad, taking a construction car with him. By hard work he managed to repair the road, and reached a point about 18 miles out, where he overtook a Russian party of 400 men.

The road here was impassable, and both parties bivouacked for the night, agreeing that the position should be held until reenforcements came up. Very early in the morning the Russian commander told Major Waller that he would push on and try to get into Tientsin to aid in its defense. This was against the judgment of the American commander, who thought the chances for pushing through the Chinese force, with only 530 men and no guns, were very slim, but deciding to make the attempt, the 3-inch rifle, which had proved defective, was disabled and rolled into the river, and the little party of Americans followed closely after the Russians on their march for the besieged city. A detachment of marines, commanded by Lieutenant Powell, with a Colt gun, was in the advance, which proceeded, without opposition until 7 a. m., to a point opposite the imperial arsenal, where the enemy opened a light flank fire, which was quickly silenced. A few minutes later they encountered a heavy front and flank fire from an intrenched force of from 1,500 to 2,000, that proved too strong for the small attacking force, and they were compelled to retire. The Colt gun was fought, under a fierce fire, until all but one of the detachment was killed, and, having jammed several times, was, after being disabled, abandoned by Lieutenant Powell. The allies retired, fighting for some distance, to a point 4 miles in rear of their bivouac of the night before. The marines succeeded in carrying off their wounded, but had to leave their dead behind. Their casualties were 4 killed and 9 wounded. The news of this affair received in the United States came in a dispatch from Admiral Kempff "that in ambush near Tientsin, on the 21st, 4 of Waller's command were killed and 7 wounded," and made a deep impression. They were the first losses of Americans in actual fighting known to have occurred, and the serious nature of the emergency began to be better understood. In his report Major Waller says nothing of an ambush, but the suddenness of fire from so large a force, and the abandonment of the dead and their only remaining gun, indicate conditions closely resembling a surprise.

The determined resistance to the advance of the allies showed that a much larger force would be required before it could be overcome; and this came in the afternoon, when bodies of Russians, English, and others arrived to reenforce them. The British had arrived at Taku on June 21, on the

Terrible, landing immediately and starting for the front a few hours later. Their progress had been delayed by the derailment and overturning of two of the leading trucks, and by the necessity for making repairs from time to time along the route. The force consisted of 7 officers and 327 men of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and a naval brigade of about 150, commanded by Captain Craddock, in all between 500 and 600 men.

The next day, June 22, was occupied in clearing the line of communication of Boxers and in moving up and establishing a base of supplies at the end of the railroad, where they were joined by an additional body of Russian infantry and a field battery of 4 guns. The force now numbered about 2,500 men, of whom 1,500 were Russians and the rest British, German, Americans, Italians, and Japanese, of strength in the order given. The advance was again made on the 23rd, in two columns along the railroad, Russians on the right, British and Americans on the left, the Americans having the advance and the right of the firing line. The start was made at 4 o'clock, and at 7 o'clock the enemy was encountered about 6 miles from Tientsin and was at once attacked, the enemy returning a heavy fire. From this point the columns diverged, the Russians making the railway station their objective, the left column moving to attack the military school. The latter force fought its way for 5 miles, rushing many villages at the point of the bayonet. The military school was not strongly held, and the enemy was soon driven out, leaving about 25 killed and wounded behind. This school was the most threatening point to the settlements held by the enemy, and was taken about 1 p. m., the besieged pouring out of their intrenchments to greet their rescuers as they crossed the river. The right column had also been successful and occupied the railway station about the same time. The losses were: Russians, 4 killed, 30 wounded; Americans, 1 killed, 3 wounded; British, 1 killed, 3 wounded.

After a day of much-needed rest came the march on the 25th to rescue Admiral Seymour's force, and the return, without molestation on the 26th, of rescuers and rescued. The marines had 3 men wounded on the 25th instant.

While every one engaged in the defense and rescue of Tientsin did their full share of work and fighting, it is generally admitted that the Russians, who greatly outnumbered the other

nationalities, bore the brunt of both, and are entitled to most of the credit for its safety and rescue. The British commander, Bayley, testified cordially to this, and, writing a few days after the rescue from the scene, the correspondent of "The Times" says: "The foreigners of Tientsin declare that they owe their lives to the Russians, without whom the other small detachments would have been overwhelmed." He adds that "the small American contingents have everywhere distinguished themselves, and, by common consent, they are placed in the lead in every movement, with the British close beside them."

TIENTSIN.

Tientsin is situated at the junction of the Yunho (better known as the Grand Canal) and the Peiho rivers, 31 miles by rail and 51 by the river from Tongku, the distance to Pekin by rail being 83½ miles. It consists of the native walled city, and suburbs so extensive that it is difficult to tell exactly where the city begins or ends. The walled city is a square inclosure bounded by walls about 4,000 feet long on a side, running in the direction of the four cardinal points. The walls are about 25 feet high and 20 feet thick at the top, faced with the dark-gray brick of the country. They are very old, the earthen rampart and the interior revetment having in many places fallen down, especially along the south face. The population, reputed to be 1,000,000, is probably exaggerated.

The foreigners live in the three concessions (British, French, and German) that fringe the river below the city, covering an area of something less than 500 acres. These have been highly improved, and contain handsome municipal buildings, library, theater, hotels, churches, etc. An outer mud wall surrounds the concessions and the interior city. A race course located outside the mud wall, 2 or 3 miles southwest of the British concession, was the scene of several conflicts between the foreigners and the Chinese.

After the departure of the expedition commanded by Admiral Seymour, there remained in Tientsin a scanty garrison of less than 600 men to guard the city and to keep communications open. It was composed as follows: British, 243; Germans, 110; French, 50; Austrians, 50; Japanese, 50; Americans, 43; and Italians, 40. On June 11 the number was increased by the arrival of 150 English seamen and marines, and on the

13th came about 1,800 Russians, including some cavalry and field guns, making the total strength about 2,500 men.

The Boxers and their sympathizers took advantage of the weakness of the foreigners by obstructing the operations of forwarding supplies and reinforcements and keeping the line open to Admiral Seymour's party. This was done by large threatening mobs thronging the railway station and interfering with the operations, and, finally, tracks were torn up and bridges destroyed, so that by the 13th instant communication with the admiral was entirely cut off. The day after the expedition started from Tientsin the Chinese began to close their shops and leave the settlement, evidently anticipating trouble. The Boxers had entire control in the walled city by the 15th of June, and the European troops were kept busy guarding the settlement from the depredations of numerous roving bands of Boxers, now very active. The last armored train from Tientsin, with refugee women and children, got through to Tongku on the 16th. On the same day the Boxers made their first attack on the settlement, where they burned several houses before being driven off. They also attacked the railway station held by the Russians and, on the following day, other points on the railroad, all of which attacks were repelled without loss to the allies.

The bombardment of the Taku forts seemed to be the signal for fiercer attack and greater activity on the part of the Chinese. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of June 17 the bombardment of Tientsin commenced, and shells began to fall in the foreign settlement. The military school on the river opposite the British concession was occupied by the Chinese, who had mounted some guns there, and this place was so close to the settlement and so threatening to its safety that the allies arranged an attack on it, which was successfully carried out. Only slight resistance was offered, the attack being unexpected. The buildings and guns were destroyed, but the position was afterwards reoccupied by the Chinese, and retaken on the 23d by the relieving allies. The British loss was 1 killed and 4 wounded.

The bombardment continued all night and the next day without intermission. On subsequent days there were occasional lulls. The cannonading was accompanied by attacks of the Chinese in great numbers on different points, more especially on the railway station, where, on the 18th and 19th,

the allied troops were hard pressed more than once. Tientsin was fighting for its life during the days from the 17th to the 23d of June, when the relief force pushed through to its rescue. On the 26th the numbers of the Europeans were increased by the return of the Seymour party, and fears for the safety of the garrison were now allayed. The hostile Chinese occupied the native walled city and contiguous towns and villages, showing much energy and resource in extending their lines in a semicircle from the northeast to the southwest, their right resting at first on the race course and their left on the Lutai Canal, threatening the European settlements from three sides. They had mounted guns at various points in the walled city along the railroad embankment northeast of the city. These caused considerable loss and annoyance to the allies, and many were so well masked that the allies had great trouble to locate them.

On June 24 the allied forces in Tientsin numbered 4,450; their strength was increased by the return of the Seymour expedition a couple of days later. Although apprehension of immediate danger had been relieved, the situation was still grave, the Chinese continued to threaten the settlements, and, regarding the return of the Seymour expedition as a defeat for the foreigners, the antiforeign feeling spread and emboldened the enemy in their attacks. Many of these came from the large arsenal about 2 miles east-northeast of the British concession, and the Russians, who were on that side of the river, were anxious to capture it. It was known as the Eastern Arsenal, and was the scene of the repulse of the American and Russian relieving column on the 22d instant, and of a previous attempt of the Russians to drive out the enemy. They now secured the cooperation of the Germans, British, and Americans, and early in the forenoon of June 27 commenced to bombard it. The Russians and Germans were to make the main attack, while the British and Americans (600 strong) were to act as supports or reserves; but the latter, as soon as they arrived on the ground, went into action, marching parallel to the left face of the arsenal, under a flanking fire, until they reached a point where they could turn and face the arsenal, then advancing under a harassing shrapnel fire to within 250 yards, when bayonets were fixed and a charge ordered that drove the Chinese out. The Russians and Germans were likewise successful in their attack on the

center and right face of the arsenal, and, the affair having terminated successfully, the British and Americans withdrew, and the arsenal was destroyed. The Russians lost 1 officer (a doctor) and 6 men killed and 42 men wounded; the British 7 killed and 21 wounded. The Russian commander, General Stössel, gives high praise to the conduct of the Germans in the fighting, commending their gallantry, discipline, and professional knowledge. The American contingent consisted of Second Lieut. W. E. Jolly and 40 men of the Marine Corps, accompanied by Lieut. A. E. Harding, who went along as a volunteer. In the attack our men charged over the parapet with a British company, being the first in this part of the fight, Lieutenant Harding capturing an imperial flag. The men were part of Major Waller's party. They had marched 97 miles in five days, fighting all the way, and had lived on one meal a day for six days, always cheerful and willing.

After the destruction of the arsenal the shelling of the settlement ceased for a while, though sniping was still carried on, causing a few casualties among outlying pickets. Reinforcements continued to arrive, and the position of the allies was daily strengthened by the arrival of fresh troops. Eight hundred Japanese reached the scene on the 29th of June, making the allied strength about 8,300, of which 1,200 were Japanese. Communication with Taku was had by river, which was open all the way, while the railroad could be used within 12 miles of the town. The allies for several days undertook no further active movements, pending the arrival of further reenforcements, until July 1, when a reconnoissance was made by a combined force of Americans, British, Russians, and Japanese, about 1,200 strong, toward the native city, which developed resistance from a number of small parties of the enemy who were, however, easily dislodged. On the 3d another reconnoissance, conducted by the Russians on the left side of the river, resulted in driving the Chinese from a new position they had taken up to the east, threatening the railroad station. It, however, required the assistance of some Japanese troops, and the help of the British 12-pounder before it was successful.

The Chinese, on June 28, flooded a part of the country, near the western quarter of the native city, by cutting the canal, but the allies were not inconvenienced, if that were

the intention, as the part flooded was of small area and near the city.

On July 2 a detachment of French marines arrived, 340 strong, with 6 mountain guns. On July 4, about 5 o'clock in the morning, the Chinese opened fire from several guns mounted near the railway bridge over a canal, and, later, large bodies of troops were seen moving beyond the Western Arsenal, but, on being shelled, they withdrew and kept out of range. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon a most determined attack was made on the railroad station by large numbers of Chinese, but it was repulsed. It is said that the allies were much aided in their defense by a timely severe thunderstorm and a heavy fall of rain, which dampened the ardor of the attacking force that was pressing the allies very hard when the storm broke. The 5th was quiet except for an attack by the Russians on the Chinese guns to the north of their camp, under cover of which they succeeded in moving two locomotives and three trucks from the exposed station to the protection of their own camp. On the 6th the Chinese commenced firing from some guns they had succeeded in planting and masking about 1,000 yards from the station. The attempt of our guns to silence them resulted in a general bombardment. Two naval 12-pounders from the *Terrible* and two 9-pounder Krupps, from the Taku forts, arrived on July 4. These, with the 12-pounders already possessed by the allies, were mounted on the mud wall, and replied to the enemy's fire, but had great difficulty in locating the Chinese guns, which were in position among ruined houses where the flash could hardly be seen. The French and Japanese field batteries joined in the firing, with the result that the guns in the Chinese fort were silenced for a time. The French set fire to the viceroy's yamen, the Japanese shelling the arsenal and preventing the guns mounted there from firing at the 12-pounders while engaged with the forts in the city. An attempt by Major Bruce of the First Chinese Regiment (English), to capture a small quick-firing gun that had been pushed up to within short range of the settlement, and whose position had been discovered, was unsuccessful, and the party was obliged to retire with a loss of 2 killed and 5 wounded, the commander (Bruce) and Ensign Esdaile being among the wounded. The latter was severely wounded and died July 7. The Chinese fire was promptly resumed on the 7th, and at

noon the allies again bombarded as before, while a Japanese cavalry reconnoissance was made to the southwest, towards the race course, which at once drew a heavy rifle fire from that direction, confirming the suspicion that the enemy was endeavoring to work around to the south from the native city, threatening the allies' communications. During the night the grand stand and buildings were set on fire by the enemy and consumed. The next day the allies arranged for a combined movement to drive the enemy from his position in a village near the race course and to capture the Western Arsenal. The force was composed of Japanese, 1,000; British, 850; Russians, 400; Americans, 150; and moved out before daylight on the 9th, through the Taku gate, then turning to the right (west) the Japanese and British artillery soon engaged the enemy, while the Japanese cavalry on the left came upon a body of Boxers, whom they charged and dispersed, killing about 200 of them. The infantry meanwhile had taken some earthworks, where they captured four small Krupp guns and a few rifles, then, turning to the north, continued to advance, the Chinese retiring precipitately toward the Western Arsenal (the Hai-Kwang-Sze, or Joss House Arsenal). By the time the force reached the arsenal from the south another detachment of Japanese and Americans had arrived, having marched along Sankolins Wall from the settlement, and the combined force attacked the arsenal, which, after a short bombardment, was rushed and taken by the Americans and Japanese. The Japanese now advanced beyond the arsenal toward the south wall of the city, but the Chinese were collected here in force, and the heavy artillery and rifle fire made it inadvisable to persist. The country to the west having been flooded by the enemy, it was impracticable to operate in that direction, so, after burning the arsenal, which was untenable by the allies, the expedition returned. During the action the British and French concessions were heavily shelled by the Chinese, from the north-eastern batteries, without suffering much damage.

The day's operations were conducted by the Japanese general, Fukushima. The Japanese composed the largest fraction of the troops engaged, and did most of the fighting. The mobility of their infantry and the dash and vigor of their cavalry were shown in the fighting, and are attested by their casualties, amounting to about 50 killed and wounded. The

British had 1 killed and 3 wounded; the Russians and Americans had no casualties. The Chinese lost between 300 and 400 in killed.

It was hoped that the success of the allies' attack would make the enemy withdraw into the walled city; it did relieve the pressure of the allies' left by freeing the batteries in the British concession from the direct and enfilade fire, to which they had been exposed from the Western Arsenal, and by diminishing the number of guns bombarding the settlement, but the moral effect on the Chinese was not lasting, and the enemy retained enterprise enough to make a very determined attack on the railroad station in strong force. The station had been held by the Russians from June 19 to July 4, when they withdrew, and afterwards the position was held in turn by detachments of the allies. On July 11 there were 100 men each of the British, French, and Japanese contingents. The attack commenced about 3 o'clock in the morning, by about 2,000 Chinese troops and Boxers, on the Russian advanced posts, and was pushed so vigorously that many of the enemy got in among the tracks near the station. Half a Russian company was surrounded and had to fight its way through with fixed bayonets. The fighting lasted about three hours and was very stubborn, but eventually the enemy was driven off with heavy loss, estimated at from 350 to 500 killed. The allies had about 150 casualties, mostly among the French and Japanese; the Russian loss being 4 killed and 1 officer and 18 men wounded; the British 3 killed and 16 wounded. About noon the allies again bombarded the forts in the native city, and succeeded in demolishing a pagoda near the fort in the city, which was used as a look-out place; the return fire was vigorous, but did no damage. Besides the operations mentioned, there were frequent attacks by small parties of the enemy; almost continual sniping from nearby cover, and every day, for some hours, a shelling of the settlements, the periodic outbursts followed by corresponding lulls. They usually commenced before daylight, ceasing before noon, and beginning again late in the afternoon.

One of the industries of Tientsin is the manufacture of coarse salt by the evaporation of sea water. The product is stacked along the river bank covered by matting, under which

snipers found concealment, and, using smokeless powder, it was hard to discover them.

The most difficult positions the allies had to defend were the railway station and the French concession. The station had been held by the Russians from June 19 to July 4, when it was garrisoned by a mixed force of British, French and Japanese seamen or marines, 100 or more, as their commanders felt able to furnish them, each nation having also a reserve for their own men. The station was one of the main points of attack, the enemy desiring to destroy the rolling stock, and to secure an advantageous position from which to bombard the settlements. The French concession was the one nearest to the Chinese city, and in consequence suffered the most.

At this time the Russians occupied the Eastern Arsenal and their camp on the left bank of the Peiho, south of the railway station. The other nationalities were located on the right bank of the river, mainly in their respective settlements, but varying their dispositions as necessity required, all responding promptly and cheerfully to calls for cooperation and assistance among themselves. The Germans were in the university grounds at the extreme southeast end of their concession; their main object was to keep the Peiho open for communication with Taku. This they accomplished without difficulty, there being no interruption in forwarding supplies to the full capacity of the lighter accommodations.

The strength of the allied forces in Tientsin on July 11 was as follows: Russians, 4,450; Japanese, 3,090; French, 2,160; British, 1,420; American, 560; Germans, 400; Austrians, 50; Italians, 40; total, 12,170. The strength of the enemy can not be positively stated, but was thought by Admiral Seymour to be not less than 20,000, counting Boxers and regular Chinese soldiers. It included the troops of General Nieh's army that had originally pretended to oppose the Boxers, but soon threw off the mask and openly opposed the allies in the Seymour expedition. This army contained about 13,000 men, some of whom had been drilled by German officers and later by Russian officers. They were well armed with Mauser rifles, provided with artillery of mixed caliber and Maxims, but were poorly disciplined. General Nieh was reported as having either been killed in the attack by the allies on July 9 or having committed suicide on account of the Chinese reverses.

The Chinese army, threatening the allies and opposing their advance to Peking, was superior in fighting qualities to any previously known to Europeans. In addition to the modern weapons and the training received from their foes, the Chinese were inspired by hatred of foreigners and religious fanaticism to an intrepidity foreign to their ordinary habits, as shown by their repeated fierce attacks and stubborn resistance when themselves attacked. They had ample supplies of all kinds of modern warlike stores, the extent of their preparations being shown by the immense quantities that were found and destroyed by Admiral Seymour at Hsiku and by the allies in the arsenal near Tientsin, of the value of many million dollars.

The heavy artillery at the disposal of the allies was markedly inadequate, and was much inferior to that of the Chinese, which seemed to increase daily in weight, and was worked with remarkable efficiency. It was believed by many that the positions of the allied troops from time to time were signaled, or in some way made known to the Chinese, by spies inside the lines, and that the Chinese had the assistance of Europeans in the working of their guns; this last on the authority of skilled observers, who claimed to have themselves seen it.

The allies labored under the disadvantage of being a polyglot army with different systems of supply and drill, and without a single controlling head or a definite plan of operations. In arranging movements requiring the cooperation of several contingents, messages had to pass between the various commanders suggesting plans that might or might not be agreed to.

They had so far been obliged to confine their operations to those necessary for holding their position and keeping their communications intact, but the daily losses from the enemy's bombardment, and the opportune arrival of reinforcements of Japanese and Americans on the evening of the 11th, hastened the adoption of plans to capture the city and drive the Chinese away.

Up to the middle of June the United States had hoped to be able to do all that was necessary for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens in China by means of its naval forces; but the situation at that time became so grave that

the sending of troops was reluctantly decided on, and instructions were sent to the military commander in the Philippines to designate the organizations available for this service. Of these the first to receive marching orders was the Ninth Infantry. A severe storm that damaged the railroad and prevented it from reaching Manila delayed its departure until June 27, when the regiment sailed on the transports *Logan* and *Port Albert*, with a total strength of 39 officers and 1,271 men, commanded by Col. E. H. Liscum, a veteran of the civil and Spanish wars, in both of which he had been severely wounded. Two battalions of the regiment arrived at Taku on Saturday, the 7th of July, were lightered ashore on the 10th, and towed up the river the next day, reaching Tientsin in the evening, preceding by a few hours a battalion of marines under Colonel Meade, who had left Taku at 8 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Tientsin after midnight. The third battalion of the Ninth reached the scene of operations in time to take part in the fighting of the 13th instant. The theory adopted by our Government, that the Chinese troubles were due to the excesses of irresponsible persons who could not be controlled by the Chinese authorities, was adhered to in Colonel Liscum's orders to proceed to Peking via Taku and Tientsin, report to the American Minister there, and cooperate with him in establishing order. General Fukushima, with a body of Japanese troops, also arrived at the same time as our forces, and Admiral Seymour, who had been the senior officer in rank, returned with his staff to his flagship off Taku bar, and the officers and men of the *Centurion* who had been with him on the relief expedition were sent back to their ship.

Admiral Seymour having returned to his post at Taku, the conduct of military operations was now assumed by General Fukushima as ranking officer of the allied forces present in Tientsin. The arrival of the Ninth Infantry and our marines, together with a substantial reenforcement of Japanese troops, had so augmented the strength of the allied forces that on July 11 an attack on the whole Chinese position was projected, with the object of capturing the city and driving the enemy from all their strongholds. As finally arranged, the plan was that the Russians and Germans were to attack the enemy's positions to the northeast of the city, while the Japanese, British, French, and Americans were to move against the native city from the southwest. For this latter movement it

was decided that the allies would be in line at 3 a. m. and march in three columns, 500 yards apart, on the Western Arsenal; the French, 900 strong, on the right, to move to their position by crossing the mud wall in the extra British concession; the center column, consisting of the Japanese, 1,500 strong, to go by the way of the race-course gate; the left column, composed of six companies of the Ninth Infantry, a detachment of United States marines, in all about 900 men, and the British force of 800 men (500 military, 300 naval), marched out by the Taku gate. To the left of the left column was a body of about 150 Japanese cavalry.

The arsenal, which had been reoccupied by the Chinese after the action of the 9th instant, was cleared of the enemy by the Japanese, who were first on the ground, the left column being detained by the necessity of clearing out small parties of the enemy from villages during its advance, and the French having suffered a check at a bridge in the mud wall, which they had to cross while exposed to fire. The allies now disposed themselves along the mud wall, the Ninth Infantry and the marines, with the British, being to the west of the arsenal. The combined artillery formed up a short distance south of the wall and bombarded the city about 5.30 a. m. After a bombardment of about an hour it was decided to attack, French occupying the right; Japanese, center; Americans and English on the left; the objective being the south gate. The attack was begun by the Japanese, and their eagerness to advance necessitated a hurried movement, under heavy fire, by the marines and the English fusiliers to get into position on the left of the Japanese. For the purpose of further support to the Japanese left, and also to support the attack of the marines and fusiliers, the Ninth Infantry was selected. In the hurry and excitement of the occasion the order for this movement was either not correctly given, or was misunderstood by Colonel Liscum, who led the regiment to the right after passing through the gate in the mud wall. They were immediately under a heavy and destructive fire from the fort and wall, and from a line of loopholed mud houses on their right front near the city wall, toward which the regiment deployed hastily and advanced by a series of rushes, finally reaching the canal outside the city wall where they were compelled to halt, securing such cover as was practicable. While crossing one of the numerous dikes the color

bearer was hit, and picking up the colors, Colonel Liscum stood, apparently looking for a ford or some way of crossing, when he was shot in the abdomen and fell mortally wounded. The position occupied by the regiment was a most difficult one. While somewhat sheltered from fire from the south wall, the regiment was exposed to fire from hidden snipers. The distance from two Chinese guns across the canal was only about 75 yards, and they were also under a deadly fusillade from the German flour-mill about 300 yards to the right front, where the enemy was strongly intrenched. By sunset the regiment had lost heavily in killed and wounded; Colonel Liscum and 22 men killed, 3 officers and 70 men wounded. It was said that the dark-blue shirts worn by the men of the Ninth offered a conspicuous target for the Chinese rifles.

The country around Tientsin to the west is described as a waste of marshes with lagoons and wandering rivers. The Changho, the Hunho, and smaller streams join the Peiho somewhere in this mesh, but are very much confused. About the city to the north are rice fields and gardens and beyond these are the marshes, across which the railway is built on an embankment made of bamboos driven in the earth, the space between the rows being filled in. Colonel Meade says the marines crossed the wall in skirmish order, finding the country between the wall and the city flat and level. There were grave mounds, dikes, and ditches in great numbers, constituting ready-made trenches, which were a great help, as without them on such an open fire-swept plain they would have had great difficulty in advancing, and would have been compelled, with only the bayonet, to throw up hasty intrenchments. During the day the Chinese kept up a terrific fire from machine guns and modern rifles, as well as from jingals, a favorite weapon with them. These last are an adaptation of the breech-loading action to a barrel about 7 feet long, that requires two, and sometimes three men to fire. They have a long range, and when they hit the bullet is heavy enough to stop anything. The wall of the native city was well-manned with artillerymen of the imperial army and with Boxers. Many were armed with old-fashioned and obsolete weapons, muzzle-loaders and matchlocks, and, in the suburbs outside the south gate great numbers of Boxers sniped from concealment among the mud houses and grave mounds.

The arrangement for the attack included the cooperation of the naval guns under the direction of Captain Bayley, of the Royal Navy. They were controlled by telephone from a signal tower in the British concession. They were in readiness at 4 a. m., but owing to the darkness and mist, fire was not commenced until half an hour later. A heavy fire was kept up to the west in order to subdue that of the enemy from the wall on both sides of the south gate, as our troops advanced from the southwest, until signaled to cease as the Japanese had entered the city. This message was sent by General Dorward in response to a request received from General Fukushima's chief of staff about 1 p. m., and soon after a general assault was made by the allies. The advancing troops were, however, met by so heavy a fire from the wall, increasing in intensity as they approached, that it was apparent that the Japanese had not entered the city, and the assaulting lines were forced to take cover close to the canal around the city. Orders were sent for the guns to open fire again, which they did so effectively that the troops in the advanced trenches suffered very little loss during the rest of the day.

On the left the United States marines and the British fusiliers had reached an advanced position, and occupied a line of trenches about 800 yards from the enemy. In their front was a bad swamp through which a stream meandered, rendering further advance in that direction impossible. They were subjected to severe fire during the day, but protected that flank, repelling two attempts by the enemy to flank the allied forces, one about 8 a. m. and another at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Toward evening the most threatening demonstration of the day was made by large bodies of the enemy on the same flank, but, with the assistance of the naval guns that directed their whole fire on the enemy, and under cover of rifle fire from troops on that flank, the attack was repelled. After dark the marines and fusiliers were withdrawn with very slight loss, and formed up behind the mud wall. This withdrawal was most difficult, the enemy having the range so accurately that his shot struck the crest of the trenches and threw dirt in the faces of the men. It was made, in small parties of eight or ten men, by rushing from one mound or trench to another. The dead and wounded had previously been moved to the rear. General Dorward in his official

report says the movement reflected great credit on the American commander, Colonel Meade, and Captain Gwynne of the fusiliers. The extrication of the Ninth Infantry had then to be undertaken. It was done after dark under the fire of the naval guns, directed on the barriers along the fringe of houses between the French settlement and the city, from which most of the fire on the Americans had come, and, with the assistance of an English naval detachment, the dead and wounded were brought back, and the regiment reached the mud wall in safety. Early in the attack two French companies had been detailed to clean out the Chinese from the ground between the French settlement and the city from which, later, the deadly fire on the Ninth Infantry had proceeded, but they were unable to make any headway, and abandoned the movement.

The Japanese and other troops still clung to their advanced positions close to the city wall, and dispositions having been made for the protection of the flank and rear, the troops tried to make themselves as comfortable as possible, provisions and water being sent forward to the troops on the line by the British commander. The day had been an unusually hot, trying one for the attacking force, which cheerfully endured the hardships and bravely faced the dangerous fire of the foe for many hours. During the night there was some rain.

About 3 a. m. next day, July 14, the Japanese sappers crossed the canal by a bridge they had constructed during the night, blew in the outer gate, and clambering over, opened the inner gate, through which the allies entered unopposed, the Chinese having withdrawn during the night to the suburbs to the north and west.

General Dorward, in a letter to Colonel Meade written immediately after the fight, in a most manly fashion, assumes the blame for the mistake of the Ninth Infantry going to the right instead of the left "for not remembering that troops wholly fresh to the scene of action and hurried forward in the excitement of attack were likely to lose their way," but he points out that the position taken up by the regiment and so gallantly stuck to all day under a galling fire "undoubtedly prevented a large body of the enemy from turning the right of the attacking line and inflicting serious loss on the French and Japanese."

Casualties as given in General Dorward's report in attack on south gate:

British, 2 officers and 12 men killed, 1 officer and 16 men wounded.

Americans—

Ninth Infantry, 1 officer and 22 men killed, 3 officers and 70 men wounded.

Marines, 1 officer and 4 men killed, 2 officers and 25 men wounded.

French, 110 killed and wounded.

Japanese, 70 killed, 300 wounded.

Austrians, 5 men wounded.

They are reported by Col. R. L. Meade, U. S. M. C., as follows:

Americans, 24 killed, 98 wounded, 1 missing.

English, 17 killed, 87 wounded.

Japanese, 320 killed and wounded.

French, 13 killed, 50 wounded.

Russians and Germans, 140 killed and wounded.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, 750.

The Russian column moved out on the other side of the river. It had been arranged that, having the longer march, they should move in time to attack the batteries at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, the forces on the south to attack as early as possible in order to attract the bulk of the Chinese to that side of the river, and so facilitate the capture of the batteries by the Russians. A German account says the force consisted of twelve companies of Russian and two German troops, with two Russian field batteries and a French mountain gun battery; that they outflanked by an eastward movement, and carried the Chinese northeast position north of the Lutai canal and others along the railroad embankment east of the city, capturing twelve guns, and blowing up two magazines, also that the Russian General stated in his report that it was the Germans who captured the guns, exploded the magazines and distinguished themselves in the vanguard. Their casualties were 6 Germans wounded. The Russian column was commanded by General Stössel. The German contingent was composed of men from the Gefion, the Irene, and the Kaiser Augusta commanded by Captain Weniger. Other accounts mention but one explosion, i. e., near the Lutai Canal. The weight of evidence seems to give the credit for the explosion of this magazine, full of brown powder, near the Lutai Canal, to a shell from the French battery. The explosion occurred

about 5 a. m., and is described as being of tremendous violence, throwing a column of black smoke 600 feet into the air, breaking glass and shaking buildings in the settlement. Fortunately it caused no serious casualties among the allied forces, which were 500 to 600 yards distant, though many men and horses were thrown down, and the mules of the French mountain battery bolted. General Stössel, the Russian commander, was thrown from his horse and received some slight injuries from falling débris, but was able to resume his command after an hour's rest.

. After the capture of the outlying Chinese positions, a movement in two columns, one attending a flank movement from the right, was made against the fort near the city, but the resistance was too obstinate to be overcome, and the allies were able only to hold the ground they had gained on that side, having pushed the Chinese back steadily all day, suffering severe losses.

On the 14th, after the entry of the allies into the city, the Northeast Fort, as it was called, was taken, with the assistance of the Japanese, about midday, rendering unnecessary the arrangements made by the Russians for bringing up additional artillery, and repeating the attack. The American troops, represented by detachments of the Ninth Infantry and of the marines, assisted in the operations on the north and east, being located near the railway station, a dangerous position, exposed to almost continuous severe fire from the Chinese artillery during the whole day, causing many casualties among them.

After the city was taken the allies pushed on as fast as possible to the north suburbs, and captured about 200 junks that afterwards proved very useful in the advance on Peking. A system of military government was soon instituted, and the city was divided into four districts for administrative and police purposes, each district being under the control of one of the nationalities.

As described by various correspondents, the conditions existing in the walled city when the allies entered exemplified in a most striking manner the horrors of war; hundreds of Chinese dead lay about in the streets or were piled along the walls; others wounded lay as if dead if approached, fearing to be killed, as doubtless many were. The stench arising from dead animals was intolerable. The overheated air

was sodden with smoke and the noisome smell of carrion. Swollen corpses lay about in every position of agony, on which clustered swarms of flies that arose in clouds with an angry buzz when disturbed. All about was evidence of the immense damage done by the allied guns in the shattered and burning houses, among the smoldering ruins of which were many charred corpses being eaten by pigs and dogs. The city wall itself suffered little damage, notwithstanding the tremendous fire directed against it by the foreign artillery; it was evidently not heavy enough to produce much effect.

The suburbs of the city gave indication of what the conditions must be inside. The allies, when they fought their way to the walls, saw floating in the canals and ditches dozens of headless bodies with the hands tied behind their backs, and rows of heads decorated the outer wall, hung by their pigtails, all slain by their own people because they refused to fight or were suspected of being in sympathy with the foreigners.

Under normal conditions the place festered with the accumulated rubbish from a dense population, packed into a labyrinth of hovels around the palaces of viceroys and petty taotais, so there was no exaggeration in the language of one writer who said that "the walls of the city, on the day it was occupied, surrounded a square mile of such filth, ruin, and death, such turmoil and pillage as history could hardly duplicate." The looting and pillage of the city, mostly by the natives, but joined in by many Europeans, was, on the first day, entirely unrestrained; later, the allied commanders, as soon as attention could be given to it, adopted severe repressive measures to put a stop to it, and the scandal was soon discontinued. The Japanese, on account of the admirable discipline under which their soldiers are held, are said to have done the least looting. Strict orders from our officers and American training and instinct prevented our men from engaging in this orgy of thieving and outrage.

In reestablishing order, carrying out absolutely necessary sanitary measures, providing for the care of the sick and wounded, supply and welfare of the troops, besides the military problems of securing their communications from interruption, guarding against attack, and by frequent reconnoissance, keeping informed as to the enemy's force and whereabouts, and preparing for the advance to relieve the legations, the allies had occupation enough to keep them busy.

THE RELIEF OF PEKIN.

The situation at Peking, temporarily obscured by affairs at Tientsin, again became the subject of deepest interest. The intense anxiety of the civilized world for the safety of the foreigners, and the desire for their rescue, caused impatience at the seeming unnecessary delay in starting the relief expedition, and much criticism of the allied commanders was indulged in by the press.

As usual, the estimates of the Chinese forces were widely divergent, and ranged from 8,000 to 30,000 thought to be opposed to the allies in their march to the capital. This is not surprising in view of Lord Beresford's statement that even in peace times no one knows the strength of the Chinese army, not even the Chinese Government itself, and that of General Wilson, who says that its total strength can not be exactly ascertained, and that a mere statement of the number of men belonging to it would be of no value, as many enrolled are neither armed nor equipped, and others are not performing any service, but pursuing civil vocations.

The allied commanders held frequent conferences and generally agreed that an advance was impracticable without substantial reinforcements and supplies of all kinds. These were now continually arriving, and the task of preparing for the advance kept all busy. The obstinate resistance by the Chinese in the fighting that had already taken place showed that their armies had profited by foreign military instruction, and the grave consequences of a reverse to the allied forces made it necessary that the relief expedition, when once started, should be strong enough to overcome any opposition it was likely to meet. The reports about this time from Peking were conflicting. Circumstantial accounts of the massacre of the Europeans on July 6 and 7, furnished by what has since been called the "Shanghai liar," July 16, came with a shock to the civilized world, and in Europe generally the fact of the massacre was reluctantly but gradually accepted as true. The belief may have operated to dull the energy of preparation for rescue, for if there were no foreigners to save, there was no need of haste, but in America the "Conger" message received at Washington on the 20th, showing that the foreigners were alive on July 18, was given full faith by the Government, and the earliest possible start of the expedition

was continually urged, and these views were impressed upon the commanders of our forces in China.

From the beginning of the troubles the interested powers had hurried war vessels and troops to the scene of action. On June 30, the British admiral, Bruce, reported forces landed at that date as follows:

	Officers.	Men.
Russia.....	117	5,817
Japan.....	119	3,709
England.....	184	1,700
Germany.....	44	1,300
France.....	17	387
America.....	20	329
Italy.....	7	131
Austria.....	12	127
Total.....	520	13,500

With 53 field guns and 36 machine guns.

Reenforcements were arriving every day, and ten days later it was estimated that the force at the disposal of the powers was about 20,000. On July 11 the "London Times" published a statement of the strength of the powers in Chinese waters, from which it appears that England had then two battleships, three armored cruisers, two protected cruisers of the first class and three of the second class, a dispatch vessel, four sloops, two gunboats, and four torpedo-boat destroyers, all having a complement of 6,000; there were also en route, or under orders to proceed thither, two battleships, one first, three second, and two third class protected cruisers, and two gunboats, with a total complement of 4,000. The British forces landed included, besides seamen and marines from the various ships, 384 officers and men of the Second Royal Welsh Fusiliers and Royal Engineers, four companies of the Hong-kong Regiment, which is recruited from Mohammedans of the Punjab; one mountain, and one field battery of the Asiatic Artillery, all from Hongkong, and 200 men of the Chinese Regiment from Weihaiwei. The Indian contingent, then embarking for China under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Gaselee, consisted of 223 British officers, 308 British warrant and noncommissioned officers, and 9,540 native officers and men, with 7,170 camp followers, 1,280 horses and ponies, 2,060 mules, 6 guns and 11 Maxims.

The Russian naval force consisted of three battleships, three armored cruisers, one protected cruiser of the second class, and two armored gun vessels with a complement of 4,500, besides an armored cruiser on the way with a complement of 567; other vessels were on the station, or on the way from Vladivostok, and, at either Port Arthur or Taku, seven torpedo gunboats, having a complement of about 800. The Russian troops landed at Taku up to the middle of June numbered 3,000, commanded by General Stössel; this number was nearly doubled by the end of the month, and more, it was thought, had since been landed, mainly drawn from the garrison at Port Arthur.

The Germans had one first and four second class protected cruisers, and three gunboats, with a complement of 2,219, and on the way and under orders six battleships, an armored cruiser, a protected cruiser of the third class, and a dispatch vessel, total complement 4,600. They had already landed 1,350 officers and men from the ships, including some troops from the garrison at Kiaochow, marines, a field battery, a Chinese company, pioneer section, and some naval artillery. Two thousand three hundred marines, under the command of General von Hoepner, were en route, and the gunners for a 6-gun battery, with teams, were to come from Kiaochow and a battery of 3.4-inch guns from the home army, besides other reenforcements then arriving—1,200 men intended as relief crews for the ships. From German sources of July 11 we learn that the forces intended for the East were to consist of a corps of more than 10,000 men, principally infantry. Two battalions, each about 800 strong, to be taken from the infantry regiments, the third to remain in Germany as a reserve; cavalry to the number of 1,000. For economical reasons, the horses were to be procured by purchase in the Dutch colonies. The men were to be transported on steamers of the North German Lloyd Company.

The artillery was to consist of two field and one mortar battery. There being already three field batteries at Kiaochow with the two battalions of marines, the troops would have at their disposal 36 field pieces. Large units of pioneers and detachments of railway troops were also to be sent, in the belief that the conditions would make their services very necessary. With the troops already on the spot (3,300) composing the three battalions of marines, the total strength would be somewhat more than 15,000 men.

The emperor, moreover, had ordered further reenforcements, consisting of an infantry brigade of eight battalions on a war footing, 800 men; three squadrons of cavalry and four batteries, including a field howitzer battery; these were to be composed of volunteers from the active army, and were to leave at the end of July. Still later Berlin advices, July 26, stated that, in addition to the regular forces (naval and marine infantry) already started or soon to leave for China, the Government had organized an East Asiatic expeditionary corps, to be commanded by a lieutenant general (Von Lessel) and to consist of two brigades of infantry of two regiments of eight companies each, commanded by major generals; a cavalry regiment of three squadrons, and a field artillery regiment of four batteries, and of various howitzer batteries, ammunition and train detachments, and the necessary staff. The advance detachment of this corps sailed from Genoa on the 24th of July, and a large part was to leave from Bremerhaven on the 28th, the remainder in about a week later.

The French naval force comprised one first-class and three second-class protected cruisers, and two gunboats, having a total complement of 1,800; on the way and under orders were one armored cruiser, one first-class, and five second-class protected cruisers, with a total complement of 2,300.

From the French ships under the command of Rear Admiral Courrejolles, a force of about 400 blue jackets had been landed up to June 30. Marine troops were also sent from Saigon, the capital of French Cochin-China, and by July 3 2,000 men in all were expected to have arrived; 2,500 more left Toulon on June 29, and early in July, from the same port, were shipped three battalions, each of 600 men; two batteries of artillery of 110 men each, with 75 horses and mules; sections of telegraphists and hospital attendants, with stores and ammunition, while another battalion of marines was being formed at Toulon for the same service, and a brigadier general was to proceed to Taku to take command of the forces.

Advices dated July 26 from the United States military attaché, gave the following information:

The French expeditionary force for service in China was to be a division composed as follows:

First brigade, General Frey commanding:

Three regiments marine infantry (sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth), each of three battalions of 600 men, to be raised later on to 800 men.

Four mountain batteries and two field batteries, with 3.15-inch guns, 800 men, and 720 mules.

Artillery mechanics, engineers, telegraphic and hospital corps, 50 men of each.

Second brigade, General Bailloud commanding:

One regiment of zouaves, four battalions of 1,000 men each.

One regiment of infantry of the line, three battalions of 1,000 men each.

Three batteries of 3-inch guns, presumably the latest model (75-millimeter gun), 550 men, and 95 mules.

Two squadrons Chasseurs d'Afrique, 300 men, 300 horses.

Detachment of the park artillery, 180 men.

Detachment of divisional engineers, 40 men.

Detachments of general-service men for various special services, 800 men.

Grand total, 15,220 men.

Of the above-mentioned the Sixteenth Marine Infantry, two mountain batteries, and one field battery were then at Taku. The remainder of the first brigade had left France, except one battery to sail from Toulon about August 1. The second brigade was to sail from France and Algeria between the 10th and 20th of August. The sending of a battery of short 4.7-inch guns, two companies of troops of the train, a section of railroad troops, and a balloon section was also being considered, and it was intended to send from Saigon a number of coolies for service with the troops, amounting to 10 for each company or battery.

The Italians had two third-class protected cruisers at Taku with a complement of 514 men, while on the way and under orders were two armored cruisers, and two protected cruisers of the second class, with a total complement of 1,550. Seven officers and 131 men had been landed, and an expeditionary corps of 2,000 men, half of infantry of the line and half of bersaglieri was to sail from Italy about July 15.

Austria had one torpedo cruiser on the station, the *Zenta*, from which 140 officers and men had been sent ashore, and its force was to be increased by the addition of two armored cruisers and one protected cruiser of the second class, with a total complement of 1,350.

The Japanese naval force comprised one armored cruiser, four second-class and three third-class protected cruisers, with a complement of 2,740, besides several torpedo destroyers. A battleship, an armored cruiser, and a second-class protected cruiser were known to be under orders, and other formidable

vessels were available, if required. The Japanese forces landed up to June 30 were over 3,800 in number, and additional forces were being rapidly moved to the field of action.

The United States had on July 11 in China the battleship *Oregon*, the cruisers *Baltimore*, *Newark*, *Don Juan de Austria*, and the gunboats *Helena*, *Nashville*, *Yorktown*, and *Monocacy*. The *Oregon* left Hongkong for Taku June 24, but received a serious injury by striking an uncharted rock, and was then undergoing repairs at the Japanese government docks at Kuri. The *Brooklyn* had arrived a few days before from Manila with Admiral Remy on board, who was to succeed Admiral Kempff. The cruiser *Buffalo* and the *Iris*, *Alexander*, *Saturn*, and *Hannibal* were under orders for Taku, and the gunboats *Princeton* and *Marietta* were directed to be in readiness for the same service.

Up to June 30 Admiral Kempff had landed 20 officers and 329 men, with guns, from the ships at Taku. The Ninth Infantry and a battalion of marines had reached Tientsin July 11, in time to take part in the attack on the walled city on the 13th.

The Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Col. A. S. Daggett, and Reilly's Battery (F) of the Fifth Artillery, sailed from Manila July 15 on the transports *Indiana* and *Flintshire*. They were already at Tientsin when General Chaffee arrived at Taku, about the last of July, on the *Grant*, having on board the Sixth Cavalry, besides a number of unassigned recruits for the organizations already on shore. These were disembarked as expeditiously as practicable, considering the difficulties from lack of facilities, shown by the fact that it took two days to unload the horses for Reilly's Battery.

There were now landed:

Organization.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Sixth Cavalry and recruits...	27	1,088	1,110
Battery F, Fifth Artillery...	4	138	142
Ninth Infantry, 12 companies...	39	1,271	1,310
Fourteenth Infantry, 8 companies	26	1,118	1,144
Total.....	96	3,610	3,706

Ordered to Nagasaki and available for service in China, if required:

Organization.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
E, Engineer Battalion	2	150	152
First Cavalry, 8 troops	20	834	854
Third Cavalry, 4 troops	10	428	438
Ninth Cavalry, 8 troops	20	834	854
Third Artillery, 4 batteries ..	11	452	463
Seventh Artillery, 3 batteries..	9	469	478
First Infantry, 8 companies ..	24	1,058	1,082
Second Infantry, 8 companies ..	22	1,058	1,080
Fifth Infantry, 8 companies ..	22	1,058	1,080
Eighth Infantry, 8 companies ..	22	1,058	1,080
Fifteenth Infantry, 8 companies	22	1,058	1,080
Total	184	8,457	8,641

In addition to these, the Third and Seventeenth regiments of infantry were ordered to be in readiness, if emergency arose calling for their services, and there were on the way 500 marines, which, with those already in China, would make three battalions of 400 men each.

Careful preparation was made by the various staff departments for the equipment and supply of the troops, and the care of sick and wounded. The Adjutant General published a memorandum on July 17 showing what had been done in that direction by each department, which is summarized as follows:

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The troops from Manila had with them 8 medical officers, 46 hospital corps men, regimental field hospitals of 25 beds, besides outfit for a general field hospital of 350 beds; medical supplies for 5,000 men for three months, and a hospital fund of \$500.

From San Francisco had already sailed a total of 18 medical officers, one of whom was provided with \$50,000 of public funds from the medical and hospital appropriation, and \$1,000 of hospital funds, and 78 assigned and unassigned members of the hospital corps.

On the *Meade*, sailing August 1, were to go 8 or more medical officers, one of whom, Assistant Surgeon Fuller, U. S. A., assigned to the Fifteenth Infantry, was to have a field hospital of 50 beds, and \$10,000 hospital funds, and a detachment

of 18 hospital corps men, to which a larger unassigned list might be added.

Details of further preparations were not then complete.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The chief commissary at Manila was charged with the supply of troops in China, and furnished with information that enabled him to estimate and call for the necessary supplies, for which orders were then placed. The Department had foreseen, and had directed him to provide for the probable necessity of supplying the marines and seamen on shore service with the army, and of having on hand at least six months' supply in the depot in China before November 1, when the usual obstruction of navigation by ice in the Gulf of Pechili might be looked for. Fifty thousand dollars in gold had been invoiced to him for use in China.

The Ninth Infantry left Manila with thirty days' rations and their transport carried to Taku a three months' supply for 5,000 men.

The two squadrons of the Sixth Cavalry carried eighty-five days' field rations and three bake ovens, and the Fifteenth Infantry was to take sixty days' field rations, this last being the number to be supplied to all the troops then under orders, as fixed at the request of the chief commissary in Manila.

The meat ration furnished consisted of forty days' bacon and twenty days' canned meats—meat stew, corned-beef hash, and corned beef; fresh or desiccated potatoes, or a combination of the two, to be supplied from San Francisco. The chief commissaries at Manila and in China were informed as to the character of the meat ration for use in China, and given all available information as to the possibility of procuring fresh meat and vegetables there. Manila was recommended as the most convenient point for the location of the main base of supply, with a secondary base somewhere in China, probably Taku.

SIGNAL CORPS.

One first lieutenant and 10 men of the corps sailed with the Ninth Infantry, carrying material and instruments for 50 miles of field telegraph line, and on the *Grant*, with General Chaffee, 2 officers and 8 men, with material for 100 miles of line. Maj. George P. Scriven, signal officer of volunteers, was ordered to report to General Chaffee as signal officer of

the command. Four other volunteer signal officers were available for foreign service if required.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Abundant supplies of winter clothing for the troops, including ponchos, arctic overshoes, and blanket-lined canvas hoods; 1,400 Sibley stoves and 7,000 joints of stovepipe were to be shipped from San Francisco on transports leaving July 16 and August 1. Troops leaving the States for China carried a complete outfit of tropical clothing in addition to their regulation winter clothing and tentage; those from the Philippines were fully equipped with tentage and a supply of unlined blouses, light-weight trousers, woolen undershirts, cotton stockings and drawers; D. B. flannel shirts, sufficient for 5,000 men, and 360 Sibley stoves were shipped from Manila.

With the Ninth Infantry were sent 98 mules, 19 escort wagons, 4 ambulances, 1 Dougherty wagon (4-mule), 1 delivery wagon (2-mule), and forage for thirty days, and with the troops leaving Manila were ample supplies of all quartermaster's stores and the regimental quartermasters were furnished with funds.

From San Francisco on the transports *Leelanaw* and *Con-nemaugh*, and from Portland on the *Lennox*, were shipped a total of 901 horses for the Sixth Cavalry, 14 draft and 100 pack mules, 28 riding horses for packers, and 2 bell mares; 100 aparejos with complement of packers, cargadores, etc., for two complete pack trains, and full supplies for three months of horse and mule shoes, nails, farriers' tools, veterinary medicines, rope, lanterns, etc. The pack trains, mules, and supplies were shipped on the *Lennox*, and the forage on the three vessels included oats for one hundred and ninety-six days, and hay for ninety-eight days for all the animals. The quartermasters on the several transports had each been provided with \$10,000 in gold—public funds. There was also ordered to be placed on the transport at San Francisco, on which the Fifteenth Infantry was to sail, a supply of paulins, stable brooms, rakes, rope, nails, boilers for boiling drinking water, lanterns, buckets, water kegs, field cooking ranges, and carpenter tools for each company.

Four hundred thoroughly broken mules were en route to Seattle available for use wherever needed, and 285 aparejos, 100 sterilizers, capacity 25 gallons per hour, were being made to be sent to San Francisco by express as soon as possible.

Eight would be ready to go on the *Meade* on August 1, with two distilling plants, having a capacity of 600 gallons per day. Sterilizers are intended for making potable river or other fresh water which is impure; the distilling plants, in addition to that use, furnish potable water from sea water. Additional distilling plants were to go by succeeding transports until a sufficient number was furnished for the needs of 6,000 men.

Other matters were attended to, such as the procuring and supply of lumber, fuel, small cast-iron stoves, procurable in Japan, suitable for the soft coal of that country, to be used by the troops, in addition to the Sibleys provided. The transfer of troops and freight on Manila transports sailing from San Francisco, at Nagasaki, to lighter-draft transports running between that port and Taku, was arranged for. Animal ships were chartered, and fitted up as fast as they arrived, to carry 4,000 animals, mules and horses, as might be needed.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The base to be at Manila—the Cavite Arsenal—to which all supplies from the United States, not going direct to China, should be sent, unless, by courtesy of Japan, a depot should be established at Nagasaki. The Chief of Ordnance reported on hand an abundant supply of ammunition for small arms and machine guns of rifle caliber for a prolonged war on a large scale. For large-caliber guns there were on hand 400 to 500 rounds each, and orders placed for more. For all the service 3.2-inch field guns there were 500 rounds and provisions made to keep up the supply indefinitely, all of smokeless powder; also black-powder cartridges, caliber .45, that could be used for Gatling guns of that caliber, the smokeless-powder cartridges of that size, made for the Springfield rifle, having proved unreliable.

In addition, orders were already placed in England for 50 Colt automatic-machine guns, caliber .30, with cartridges and accessories complete; for two complete batteries, of 6 guns each, of 12-pounder Vickers-Maxim mountain guns, and 300 rounds of ammunition; and two batteries, 6 guns each, of 1-pounder Vickers-Maxim automatic guns, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition, to be delivered at the earliest practicable moment.

Of 25 Colt automatic guns under construction for the Navy Department at the Colt factory, that Department had authorized 12 of them to be turned over to the Army, but they had still to be sighted for ranges over 1,000 yards, which would take some time.

The settlement of the time for the advance was left by the powers to the several commanders, whose views, doubtless, differed and changed from time to time as circumstances altered, as to the number of men required, and the degree of preparation necessary. On July 23, by which time the railroad from Taku to Tientsin had been reopened for traffic, the number of troops in Tientsin was reported to be 28,000, and, by the end of the month, the strength of the allies was increased by further arrivals of American, English, and Japanese reenforcements, including the commanders selected for the forces of the two first named, General Chaffee and Sir Alfred Gaselee. From the tone of the press dispatches received about this time in the United States, it was feared that no advance could be made before the middle of August, and it seems to be a sufficient answer to the harsh criticisms of the commanders that the advance was begun nearly two weeks earlier than was expected, while the discreteness with which their plans were made is shown by the fact that it had been in progress a day or two before it was known to the general public. The credit for the early start is mainly due to the American, English, and Japanese commanders, who, following the instructions and wishes of their governments, collectively urged, and finally impressed upon the others, the absolute necessity for pressing forward to Peking at the earliest possible moment.

At a meeting held on the 3d of August it was arranged to begin the advance on the following day with approximately 20,000 men, made up as follows:

	Men.	Guns.
Japanese	10,000	24
Russians	4,000	16
British	3,000	12
Americans	2,000	6
French	800	12
Germans	200	
Austrians and Italians	100	
Total	20,100	70

Reconnoissance had shown that the Chinese occupied an intrenched position on both sides of the Peiho, near Peitsang, which it was decided to force, and then to push on to Yangtsun, so as to secure the passage of the river at that important strategic point. It was generally agreed upon by the allies that the Japanese, English, and Americans were to operate along the right bank of the river, the other allies on the left bank.

Reports from Tientsin were that General Lung was at Yangtsun with about 10,000 men, while General Ma, the viceroy (Yung Lee), and the taotai of Tientsin were at Peitsang, with about the same number of men. Russian and Japanese estimates of the strength of the enemy at Peitsang were 8,000 and 11,000, respectively. The army was said to be short of provisions and ammunition, and much disheartened by their defeat. Information from the Russian general staff at St. Petersburg was to the effect that the greater part of the defeated troops of Generals Lung and Ma were at Yangtsun with some of General Nieh's division which had been dispersed, and that, on the road to Peking and in the capital, there were about 50,000 trained Chinese troops and large numbers of "Boxers," whose force was by no means broken.

On August 31, after ample time to get correct figures, Reuter's Agency gives the numbers of the allied forces engaged in the relief expedition as:

Japanese, 6,600 infantry, 220 cavalry, 450 engineers, 53 guns.

Russian, 3,300 infantry, 180 cavalry, 22 guns.

British, 1,832 infantry, 400 cavalry, 13 guns.

American, 1,600 infantry, 75 cavalry, 150 marines, 6 guns.

French, 400 marines, 18 guns.

A total of 15,607 men and 112 guns.

The absence of the Germans, Austrians, and Italians is explained by a telegram from Tientsin received at Berlin, August 11, that said: "After the fight at Peitsang, the Germans, Austrians, and Italians returned to Tientsin, probably having no transportation for their supplies;" and one from General Frey, dated Tientsin, August 9, received at Paris, saying: "Upon my return to Tientsin I offered the Germans, the Austrians, and the Italians, who are not at present represented in the column, to facilitate the dispatch of a detachment to cooperate, if necessary, in the capture of Peking. They accepted with gratitude, and the French forces,

which had been left at Tientsin, are now making forced marches with them to join the column."

The number of guns with the command as given above is in excess of the 70 agreed upon by the commanders, the greater part of the increase being in the number taken by the Japanese. Colonel Churchill, the British military attaché to the Japanese, said that they had 54, not 24, guns; three field batteries of 6 guns, and six batteries of mountain guns. The same authority gives the strength of the French artillery as two mountain batteries firing melinite, and that of the Russians as two field batteries, 8 guns each.

The troops of each nation were under the control of their own commanders, who gave the necessary orders for carrying out the general plans and movements agreed to.

The American contingent, commanded by General Chaffee, was composed of the Ninth and Fourteenth regiments of infantry and Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, in all, about 2,000 men. The Sixth Cavalry was left behind as a guard, and was waiting the arrival of its horses. The British, commanded by General Gaselee, consisted of four companies of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the First Bengal Lancers, First Sikhs, 250 of the Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry, and 400 of the Seventh Bengal Infantry, the twelfth field battery (6 guns), the Hongkong Royal Asiatic Artillery (2 naval 12-pounders and 4 Maxims), and the naval brigade (4 guns), about 400 strong—125 seamen and 278 marines.

The Japanese division was commanded by General Yamaguchi, General Fukishima being chief of staff. Their artillery consisted of three field batteries and six mountain batteries.

The Russians, commanded by Lieutenant General Linievitch, had two regiments of infantry, nominally of 2,000 men each, but they were not of full strength; two field batteries, and some Cossacks. The French, under General Frey, had about 400 men of the marine infantry from Cochin China and two batteries of mountain guns.

The movement commenced on the afternoon of August 4, when the Americans and British moved from their camps and bivouacked at Hsiku, the Japanese following and taking a position in advance a little while before midnight. The Russians and French were on the other side of the river, the former on the right.

The general idea was that the Japanese, British, and Americans should operate along the right bank, while the other allies should act on the left side of the river. The position of the enemy comprised a line of intrenchments running generally northeast and southwest, on both sides of the railroad, their right resting on an embankment running westerly from Hsiku and the left, nearly 5 miles away, at a camp near a railroad bridge, beyond which the country had been flooded, the center being greatly strengthened by a series of well-hidden rifle pits and trenches. From the river to their extreme right, where they had a battery on the embankment, a single line of intrenchments crossed the plain, and on the other side of the river their position was strengthened by a canal running along its whole length. The plans of the allies contemplated the turning of both flanks of the enemy's position. On the right bank the attack was to be made by the Japanese, supported by the Americans and British. Before daylight the whole force on the right bank moved forward to the west under cover of the embankment, the Japanese, about 3 a. m., capturing the battery on the embankment by a rapid advance under a brisk rifle fire (the celerity of the movement made their loss small) and afterward drove in the enemy's right flank for some distance along their intrenchments, and at daylight the artillery opened on the Chinese from behind the embankment. The artillery duel lasted about half an hour, when the Chinese fire slackened and soon ceased altogether. While it was in progress the Japanese infantry, supported by a mountain battery on their right rear, had, under cover of the high maize, worked up close to the enemy's position on the river bank, into which they charged, a little after 5 o'clock, displaying great gallantry, and suffering heavily from the fire in their front, as well as from a severe cross fire from the opposite side of the river. The enemy was driven in succession from one intrenchment after another, and now the entire force on the right side advanced, all crossing the protecting embankment, moving across the plain in open order to the attack, the Japanese proceeding along the river, the British next, and the Americans on the left. The enemy did not wait and practically made no further resistance, except for some occasional firing at long range from villages along the river. The example of the flight from the first intrenchments was contagious, and the whole army retreated across

to the left bank of the river toward Yangtsun. By 9 a. m. all firing had ceased and Peitsang was occupied by the allies, where they halted, the work laid out for the day being finished. The casualties show that the Japanese did about all the fighting, and the credit for the victory is freely and cheerfully accorded to them by the Americans and British.

On the other side the Russians and French, with whom the British naval brigade was cooperating, were unable to outflank the Chinese position owing to the flooded condition of the country, but the rout of the enemy by the Japanese compelled them to abandon all their works, and the Russians and French moved up and occupied those on their side of the river. The Chinese were able to save their guns, except the battery on the embankment captured by the Japanese, by withdrawing them early in the fight, and this must have predisposed the rest of their army to its prompt retreat. The Japanese losses in the action were 60 killed and 240 wounded; the British, 1 killed and 25 wounded, 14 slightly; the Russians had 6 wounded; the others had no casualties.

The enemy did not suffer heavily. In the intrenchments near the river, before which the Japanese had lost so many, but few Chinese dead were found after the fight. This was true of most of their line, except on the extreme right, where about 50 dead Chinamen were counted.

The allies pushed forward after the retreating Chinese for a mile or two until stopped by inundations. The enemy had cut the river bank at several points and flooded the country. They then returned to Peitsang and, joined by the Russians and French, all bivouacked for the night, covered by strong outposts thrown out 2 or 3 miles in advance.

The halt at Peitsang was utilized to bring up supplies and prepare for the forward movement. When the start was made from Tientsin the sight presented by the enormous amount of road transportation is said to have beggared description; it included pack animals of all kinds, horses, ponies, mules, donkeys, carts of all shapes and sizes from the little "coster's barrow" drawn by Japanese ponies, to what were called the "huge American prairie wagons, each drawn by four enormous mules," that trailed for miles behind the troops. Everything on wheels had been impressed into the transport service, even the cows bearing packs for the Japanese, and loaded camels plodding along with the Russian trains.

Coolies dragged carts, staggered under heavy burdens, and poled or tugged up the river clumsy junks or scows loaded with stores, but notwithstanding the seeming immensity of the trains, each contingent was hampered by the inadequacy of the means for moving its most necessary supplies.

The plans for the next day, the 6th, provided for an early start, the Japanese to continue marching on the right bank, repairing the breaks as they went forward, the rest of the allies to move on the main road on the left bank of the river. The Americans had the advance. They were followed by the Russians and French, who clung to the river road; after them came the British, who by marching on more direct roads were able in a few hours to pass them and overtake the Americans. About half past 9 the advance, a small party of Cossacks, got in touch with the enemy, who occupied a strong position about 3 miles away, in a group of villages situated in the angle made by the railroad embankment and the river. The ruins of the Yangtsun station on the left bank marked about the center of the position, their right being close to the river resting on a village, and their left extending beyond the railroad among other mud villages.

Generals Chaffee and Gaselee made prompt dispositions for attack, with one Russian battalion on the left, the British in the center, and the Americans on the right, the other troops being too far behind to be available at the moment. The twelfth field battery (British), supporting the left of the British line, commenced to shell the village in front of the railroad station. During the artillery firing the infantry reached the positions assigned them, and deployed for the advance. The Ninth Infantry advanced on the extreme right, beyond the railroad embankment, supported by Reilly's battery, followed, on their right rear, by the First Bengal Lancers, assigned to operate on that flank; on the left of the embankment the Fourteenth Infantry, then the British, the First Sikhs being on the front line, supported by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and Twenty-fourth Punjab Infantry. About the time that the dispositions were completed General Linievitch arrived, and stated that his troops were advancing on the left, along the river embankment. The whole line now moved forward in regular order across the 5,000 yards of level plain, covered by the high maize that separated it from the enemy, and had covered nearly half the distance before meeting a

severe shell and rifle fire, the Fourteenth Infantry suffering the largest losses. The latter part of the advance was more rapid and irregular, and when nearing the enemy, Colonel Daggett led his regiment, at a run, across the remaining distance. The enemy broke and ran before the embankment was reached; the fight was won on that flank, and the position occupied.

On the left the Russians had been fighting for two or three hours, and, when the enemy retreated, had moved up a battery in rear of the captured village and shelled parties of Chinese, who were retreating in all directions.

In this affair all the American forces were engaged, and to their superb fighting qualities, steadiness, and dash, was mainly due the allied success. Their casualties show that the hardest of the fighting fell to their share, and the British commander acknowledged officially the valuable assistance to his fighting line rendered by Major Quinton and Captain Taylor of the Fourteenth Infantry. Our losses were 10 killed and 55 wounded in the Fourteenth, and 9 wounded in the Ninth. The British had 6 killed and 38 wounded, of whom 24 were slightly wounded, besides a fatal case of sunstroke. The Russian commander reported, immediately after the fight, 2 officers and 116 men wounded; a later account made it 7 killed and 20 wounded.

The two days' marching and fighting had been most fatiguing from the great heat and the dust of the shadeless roads. The high maize being too thin to shut off the direct rays of the sun, but, extending for miles in all directions, effectually cut off any breeze, and left the air still and loaded with the dust particles raised by the moving men and animals. All were so exhausted that it was decided to halt at Yangtsun one day for rest and to bring up the supply trains.

When the expedition started from Tientsin this point had been the immediate objective. Its position at the crossing of the river by the railroad made it a point of strategic importance in a march on the capital. The allied commanders held another conference here and agreed upon a definite order of march. All were to proceed on the right bank of the river, the Japanese leading, followed by the Russian, American, and British contingents, in the order named. The French, on account of defective transport service, remained at Yangtsun.

On August 8 the troops again took the road. A great deal

has been written of the fatigue and hardships of the march from Tientsin to Peking, due to heat and dust, the scarcity of good water, and of supplies, on account of the inadequate transport, but the necessity for haste made them unavoidable, and all bore privation with patience, if not with cheerfulness. The march of this day brought the main body to Nantsaitan, where it rested for the night, and on the 9th it again started. The Japanese, still in the advance, had a brush at Hosiwu, where they shelled the Chinese position, and after some sharp skirmishing drove them out and occupied the town before any of the allies came up. The march of the following day, the 10th, brought them to Matow, which is described as being strongly fortified. It was not a long march, about 12 miles, but the conditions made it most trying, and all suffered, stragglers of every nationality being numerous along the line of march. The 11th of August was somewhat cooler and a slight shower of rain was a welcome relief.

The Japanese reached Changchiawan in the forenoon, and, after making a strong reconnoissance, discovered the Chinese in a position about 3 miles south of Tungchow, from which they were dislodged by means of artillery fire, the enemy retiring into the city. Tungchow is the most important place between Tientsin and Peking and is a great depot for all kinds of supplies for Peking. It is a walled city, and might, if defended, have proved a formidable obstacle to the progress of the allies, but early on the morning of the 12th, when the Japanese were preparing to attack, they found that it had been evacuated during the night and the place was occupied without opposition; all rested there during the 12th. The French entered the city immediately after the Japanese; being few in numbers and less burdened with impedimenta, they had been able to push on from Yangtsun and pass the rest of the allies.

The expedition was now within 13 miles of Peking, and plans and preparations were made for the attack on the city. A conference was held on the 12th at which an advance on the 13th in four columns was agreed on, each contingent to concentrate about 5 miles from the walls, when another meeting of the commanders would arrange the details for the attack to be made on the 15th. The American column was to move on a line south of the canal, running from Tungchow to the north gate of the Chinese city (Tungpianmen); the Russians

to pursue a parallel course on the north side of the canal; the British to march to the south of the Americans, and the Japanese to move north of the Russians, over the ancient stone causeway that ran to the eastern gate of the Tartar city, the Tsihuamen or Tsekwamen.

The attack was precipitated on the 14th by the Russians, who, instead of halting as agreed upon, are said to have continued their advance of the day before toward the walls, and during the night attempted to surprise the Tungpjen gate. They were met by a hot fire, and becoming involved had to continue the fight, whereupon all the allies pushed forward to the attack, each advancing as rapidly as possible on the particular gate that lay in their line of march. English and Japanese papers alleged that the time agreed upon by the allies for the attack had been anticipated by the Russians, who expected to enter the city without much if any fighting, and thereby gain the prestige and any other advantages that would result from the prior occupation of the city by their troops.

The American line of march brought them to the Tungpjenmen, where the Russians were engaged. They had advanced along the left of the canal under good cover, Captain Reilly's guns shelling the Tsekwamen from a hill offering a favorable position for this purpose, thereby assisting the Japanese in their attack on this gate. In face of the fire of Chinese sharpshooters an American company scaled a corner of the wall by the Tungpjen gate, about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, and then the Americans and Russians crowded through the gate into the Chinese city, the former fighting their way westward parallel with the wall, from which the enemy had to be driven step by step.

The attacks by the Japanese, Russians, and Americans had the effect of concentrating the forces of the enemy to defend the threatened points, leaving the east (Shawo) gate of the Chinese city free to be entered by the British, who had marched on the left of the allied columns; and the Americans fighting the Chinese on the wall, enabled the British to move without opposition, and to take advantage of the situation by making their way through the water-gate tunnel under the wall, being the first to reach the legations. The Americans entered through the same passage an hour or two later, somewhat disappointed not to have been the first in, but rejoicing in the

successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition—the rescue of the legations. Our casualties on this day were not heavy; in the Fourteenth Infantry there were 8 wounded, 1 in Battery “F,” and an officer and 2 men of the marines.

The resistance at Tsehuamen and Tungchihmen to the Japanese attack was most obstinate, and was only finally overcome at the Tsuhua gate some hours after dark, and at a cost of many casualties among the attacking force, which, having finally succeeded in blowing up the gate and setting the watch tower on fire, rushed in with the greatest dash and enthusiasm, in the face of the heavy fusilade from the Chinese on the wall. Gaining the top, the Japanese infantry drove the enemy along the wall in the moonlight and fully avenged their own losses at the gate. The Russians had likewise a hard fight, lasting fourteen hours, at the Tungpien gate, and suffered heavy losses, having 1 officer (Colonel Antinkoff) and 20 men killed, and 5 officers and 120 men wounded.

Many Chinese were still in the Imperial City, and next day, the 15th, General Chaffee’s command attacked and carried in succession the different gates, including the one giving access to the Forbidden City, which was entered at 3.30 p. m. by a company of marines, who hoisted their flag over one of the buildings. They remained here until half past 5, when they were ordered to withdraw, leaving a guard at the gate. This was the first and only occupation of the Forbidden City by the allied forces.

From the wall at the Chienmen, which had been held by the Americans overnight, Captain Reilly’s battery shelled each of the great gateways before the infantry advanced. It was while directing these operations that he was killed by a bullet through the head. The withdrawal by General Chaffee from the Forbidden City was in deference to the sentiment that, that being the final evidence of victory, the occupation should be shared by all the allies, though it may be questioned whether any of the other allied commanders would under the same circumstances have shown the same self-restraint. In other parts of the city the work of clearing out the enemy was going on, the Japanese and Russians operating on the east and to the north, and the British in the Chinese City to the south. The casualties of the Americans during the operations of the 15th were 7 killed and 19 wounded.

The most important work now remaining to be accomplished was the rescue of the Catholic missionaries and Chinese converts at the famous Peitang cathedral and mission, which covered an extensive area inclosed by walls and located in the Imperial City near the west wall. An account of the siege of this place is given in Lieutenant Lindsey's report, page 456.

On August 16 a combined Russian, French, and English force was organized to raise the siege of the Peitang, and proceeded thither, meeting with some resistance and suffering some casualties in its progress. Before their arrival the operations of the Japanese in the northwest portion of the city had practically ended the siege, but the French had the gratification of being actually the first to enter the defended inclosure and receive a welcome from their fellow-countrymen.

With reference to the subject of looting in China the following quotation from the Tokio correspondent of the "London Times," in its weekly issue of December 28, 1900, is interesting: "Appreciations of the western soldier are now beginning to be written in Japan, not by the ordinary correspondent whose tendency to paint pictures rather than to sketch portraits renders his testimony apocryphal, but by sober men of business or of letters who, visiting China, have founded opinions of their own observations, or on converse with active participants in the Chili campaign. The estimates of these writers of the various units of the allied army differ as to their fighting capacities, but are uniform when they discuss conduct and discipline. All agree in placing the United States soldier at the head of the list. No excesses of any kind stand to his discredit. 'Excesses' in the vocabulary of these critics do not include the soldier's common fault of inebriety. No one claims any special virtue for the American in that respect. The appreciations deal solely with crimes, robbery, incendiarism, murder, and outrage. Not one of these is laid to the charge of the United States private. According to Japanese account, his behavior from first to last was that of a gentleman. It is noted that something of the kind might have been expected since a majority of the volunteers serving in the American ranks are men of education and of means, with too much self-respect to be betrayed into disgraceful acts merely because an opportunity offers to commit them with impunity."

The question of the occupation of the Forbidden City was the subject of much deliberation by the allies, and was

considered at several conferences of the commanders. On the one hand it was argued that, if it were occupied, it would be such a desecration of the most sacred places of China that it could never be reoccupied by the imperial court, while if not done, the whole lesson of the campaign would be lost on the Chinese, who would be made to believe that it was protected by their gods, and that the hated foreigners had really been, as usual, beaten by the invincible Chinese army.

An account of the formal ceremonies relating to the entry of the allied troops into the Forbidden City that were finally agreed to, is given in Colonel Dickman's notes in this volume, page 499.


The allies, having decided to take possession of the forts and town of Shanhaikwan, a British war vessel sent for the purpose arrived there on September 30 and demanded its surrender. The Chinese commander at once evacuated and the British flag was raised over the forts and the railway station, but having no men to spare for sufficient guards, the vessel returned to Taku with the news. After a conference of the admirals, an international fleet sailed at once for Shanhaikwan, consisting of three Russian, four German, two French, two Italian, one Austrian, and two British war vessels. Resistance had been anticipated, and plans made for a bombardment by the navy, and a landing of troops at Chingwangtao about 7 miles south of the city whence they were to march and storm the forts.

The Russian troops, to the number of 3,000, were the first to arrive in town, having marched along the railway from Tongku. They were soon joined by the forces of the other powers, that came by sea.

Shanhaikwan, in the north of the Gulf of Pechili, at the place where the Great Wall comes down to the sea, is an important strategical point covering the only practicable line of communication between China and Manchuria, and is also one of the principal stations on the railway, with large quantities of rolling stock and railroad supplies. There is no harbor here, but landing on the wide sandy beach is practicable in fine weather. It is protected by eight forts armed with Krupp guns.

The possession of Shanhaikwan was valuable to the allies in giving them a landing place in the gulf, connected by rail with Tientsin and Peking, and available when Taku was closed

SKETCH MAP OF MANCHURIA.



by ice. It had also an important influence on the Russian operations in Manchuria, in closing the communications of the Manchurian forces with China, while opening up those of the Russians.

On October 17 Field Marshal Count von Waldersee arrived in Pekin and took command of the allied forces. On the 21st the Fourteenth Infantry left for Manila. Military operations in the province of Pechili to the end of December were such as were ordered by the commander in chief, Von Waldersee. The United States had no part in the taking of Shanhaikwan and did not join in any of the numerous punitive expeditions organized by the different powers. Those in which they were engaged for military or humane purposes are referred to in General Chaffee's report of November 30, 1900.

OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA.

Manchuria occupies the northeastern part of the Chinese Empire, has an area of 362,210 square miles, and is touched on the north, east, and west by Russian territory. It is the original home of the ancestors of the present ruling dynasty, and is known in China under the name of Loun-San-Chen, these syllables being distinctive parts of the full Chinese names of the three provinces of which it is composed, viz, Amur, Kirin, and Mukden, the populations of which are estimated at 2,000,000, 7,000,000, and 6,000,000, respectively.

The original plan for the construction of the Siberian railway through Eastern Siberia, along the Amur River, was abandoned on account of the great difficulties attending the building of the road between Stretensk, on the Shilka River, and Khabarovsk, the latter at the junction of the Usuri and Amur rivers, where the railroad runs south to Vladivostok. In 1896 Russia secured by treaty from China a concession for a railway, to run southeasterly through Manchuria, from a station on the Trans-Baikal section of the Siberian railway to a point on the line from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. Work on this road was commenced August 10, 1897, at Poltava, a station on the South Usurian frontier, by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the provisions of the treaty for the building and operation of the road. In the organization of this company, and the building and

management of the road, Russian interests controlled, and it was practically a section of the Siberian railway, running in harmony with it. When Port Arthur was acquired by Russia, in 1898, further railway concessions were received, and the building of a connecting line from there to the main line of the Manchurian railway was commenced. The southern portion of this branch, from Port Arthur, Talienwan, and Mukden, was opened for traffic on November 24, 1899. At the beginning of July, 1900, rails were being laid on this line at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles per day, and work having been carried on from both ends simultaneously, it was expected that Vladivostok and Port Arthur would be connected by rail by the end of the month.

The length of the main line is 960 English miles, that of the southern branch is 650 miles. When work on the main line was first commenced it was expected to be completed by 1903, but this time will be much shortened by the system, early adopted, of working simultaneously at different places. The ordinary labor of building the road was done by Chinese coolies, of whom nearly 100,000 were employed, and the line was protected by about 6,000 Cossack guards, distributed in small parties along the line and its branches.

When the Boxer movement spread into Manchuria, early in June, its first manifestations were hard to distinguish from the operations of the Hungus, or native Manchu brigands, who had frequently harassed and annoyed engineers, surveyors, and small working parties on the railroad from the commencement of the work. But the excesses increased along the lines of the Chinese eastern railway, consisting of the destruction and robbery of railroad material, as well as in a threatening attitude toward the personnel building the road, and when the accounts of these were first received in St. Petersburg, comprehensive orders were given, June 25, for the mobilization of the troops in the Amur military district, for increasing the strength of the troops of Eastern Siberia, and of the garrisons of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and a couple of weeks later for the transfer of troops from European Russia, while the area of mobilization was extended to the district of Siberia and the territory of Semirechensk of the district of Turkestan, including the Cossack troops in both regions. A battalion of fortress infantry was also organized for Nicholsk.

The rising in China did not seriously affect the region of the Manchurian railway until after the end of June, with the exception of small disturbances at Haicheng, Liaoyang, and Mukden, which were soon suppressed, and for which the local Chinese authorities disclaimed any responsibility, while they assured the agents of the railway of their unalterable friendship for Russia. As late as July 3 the Chinese governors (tsiantsiouns) of Tsitsikar, Kirin, and Mukden guaranteed the security of their provinces if only the Russians would not begin hostile action. Whether they were sincere or not the movement was probably too strong for them to resist, and it was soon joined by several Manchurian officials, as well as by some of the Chinese troops. On July 4, at Mukden, the governor was arrested by his own assistant or deputy, who headed a large body of rebels against Tielin. The coal mines belonging to the railway at Yantai were attacked, the railway bridge at Liaoyang was burned, a Catholic mission near Mukden was destroyed and the church burned, and shops with European wares plundered. The tsiantsioun of Tsitsikar informed the Russian railway engineers of the calling out of the Chinese troops in Northern Manchuria to protect the railway against a possible rising of Boxers. Later, after the appearance of a seditious proclamation at Kirin (Ghirin), the governors of Tsitsikar and Kirin said they could not answer for the conduct of the Chinese soldiery in case of an attack on the Russian colony.

About July 6 or 7 an alleged imperial edict was published by the Chinese authorities at Kirin, directing the Chinese troops to unite with the Boxers, and on July 8 a communication, joined in by all the governors, was sent to the chief engineer of the railroad requiring all Russian railroad officials and guards to leave Manchuria under Chinese escort, in consequence of an imperial edict to transfer the line and property to the care of the Chinese. On July 10 a regular Chinese force came to the station at Hailar (Chajlar, Khailar, Khalar), a Manchurian town near the Trans-Baikal boundary, and threatened the Russians with war unless they withdrew.

Compliance with these demands was compelled by superior force, and on the western section engineers, officials, working-men, and guards sought and found refuge at Staro-Tsurikhait, while on the eastern part the refugees were sheltered at Nicholaevsk. The Chinese burned station buildings and otherwise

damaged the road after the Russians left. While these occurrences were taking place at many different points along the railroad, the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg was assuring the Russian Government that the events then taking place in Manchuria were not in accordance with the views of the Pekin Government, and that he would make serious representations to his Government of the grave consequences that would follow if hostilities in Manchuria did not cease.

The disturbance in the northern and central parts of Manchuria had more the appearance of having official sanction, and of hostilities being carried on by the regularly organized troops of the Chinese Empire, than that in the southern part, where the popular or Boxer element was more in evidence. This may be explained by the latter being more accessible to the Shantung and Pechili provinces, and more likely to have been permeated with the notions having their origin in these provinces, and also from the fact that when the Taku forts were taken the soldiers of the Chinese garrisons decamped in all directions, many of them going north into Manchuria, and helped to spread the troubles by organizing or joining lawless bands of rioters, who scoured the country, committing outrages on persons and property.

Harbin (Kharbin) lies right in the center of Manchuria, on the Sungari River, where a large railroad bridge is in process of construction. It is the junction point of the main line with the southern branch running to Port Arthur. The Manchurian Railway is in three divisions, the western, eastern, and southern, each in charge of a constructing engineer, and is further divided into 22 sections. The Chinese eastern railway starts from Kaidalovo, a station on the Trans-Baikal section of the Siberian railway, passes the Chinese boundary at the village of Nagadan, and runs to Hailar (Khailar, Khalar), a place of 3,000 inhabitants, thence to Tsitsikar, Harbin, Ninguta, to Nicholaevsk on the Usuri railroad, about 60 miles north of Vladivostok. Harbin, where the chief engineer resides, is the headquarters of the construction corps, the principal depot of railroad supplies, and the point from which all the varied activities of railroad construction received their initial impulse.

Material, etc., received at Vladivostok was from there sent by rail to Khabarovsk, and thence by the Sungari River to Harbin, where it was distributed east, west, and south on the

three divisions of the road. A considerable Russian settlement had grown up at this point, and, when the disturbances came, there were several thousand people, employees, workmen, etc., with their families, living there. The number was increased by accessions from points along the railroad of people driven in by the Boxers, French and English missionaries and other refugees from the Liaotung peninsula, including large numbers of Chinese converts whom the Russians had resolved to protect.

At Harbin, when the Chinese governor demanded the transfer to him of the railroad and equipments, under the plea of guarding the same, the demand was refused, and the governor general of the Amur (General Grodekoff) was appealed to for help. Meanwhile everything possible was done for defense by General Gerngross, the commander of the Manchurian Railway guards, and Chief Engineer Yugovitch, all the outlying detachments that could reach the shelter of Harbin being concentrated at that place. The region from Harbin south to Tielin was one of the most disturbed districts, and by the middle of July the Russian guards were harassed by nearly 18,000 Chinese troops and Boxers. From about July 10 they were cut off from communication with the outside world, but detachments for their relief were quickly organized and dispatched, one from Khabarovsk, going up the Sungari River, another from the Usuri district (Nicholaevsk), and a third from the Trans-Baikal region, each detachment having a strength of from 7,000 to 9,000 men. The detachment from Khabarovsk, under General Sakharoff, proceeding in boats, had on its way captured the fortress at Bayantum, and by July 28 reached Siansin, a distance of over 500 versts (332 miles) from its starting point. Here it had a fight with about 4,000 Chinese, who were driven off, and the town, an important one of about 50,000 inhabitants, was captured. /

Siansin is situated at the junction of the Sungari and Mudantsian rivers. The Russians bombarded the town for four hours, and, while the bombardment was in progress, the Cossacks waded a stream up to their necks, and drove the Chinese back at all points. They had stoically endured the cannonade, and endeavored to oppose the advance of the Russians from behind cover, but, the advance being persisted in, they finally threw down their arms and ran away. The Russians took many guns, and had only 1 man killed and 6

wounded, while the Chinese losses were said to have been enormous.

No further serious opposition was encountered, and on August 3 the detachment arrived at Harbin.

On July 24 some 2,500 persons left Harbin on two steam-boats and six barges, eventually reaching Khabarovsk in safety. On July 26 the Chinese made an attack on the landing place on the river, where all the property and provisions of the besieged had been deposited, as being the most convenient spot, if their rescuers came, as looked for, up the river. The Chinese were repulsed, with the loss of three of their guns, which were used against them on the occasion of their next attack on July 30, when they approached from the direction of Ajehe (Nje-Khe), on the east of Harbin. The Russian advance guard, 7 miles from Harbin, successfully opposed the Chinese attack, compelling them to take shelter behind some buildings, from which they retired after dark. The Russian loss in these two affairs—3 officers and 57 men killed, and 93 men wounded—shows the fierceness of the attacks and the severity of the fighting, as it is to be presumed that the losses on the part of the assailants were even larger.

The Russian success at Harbin was most important and timely; the relief column arriving when the ammunition of the defenders was running low, and when the Chinese were planning a determined attack to be made by 10,000 men, assisted by cannon, from all the towns in the district. After Harbin was relieved, measures were taken to make it secure from attack, by the construction of strong fortifications, the river was cleared by expeditions directed against hostile towns and villages, and preparations were made to repair the railroad and resume construction work. The advance guard of the column from Nicholaevsk, in the Usuri district of the Maritime province, commanded by General Chicagoff, arrived at Harbin about the same time as General Sakharoff's (August 3), having, on its march, had several engagements with the Chinese, the most important of which was at Ekho, where it captured and destroyed a considerable Chinese fortress.

Hun Chun (Koun-Choun) is an important fortified town about 25 miles from the Russian and Korean frontier. Its capture was ordered by General Grodekoff, as the Chinese troops assembling there threatened the Russian frontier and

menaced the communications of the column operating from Nicholaevsk. The place was taken July 30 by General Aigoustoff's force from Novokievsk, of three regiments of riflemen, two sotnias of Cossacks, one mountain and one mortar battery, after a hard fight in which the Chinese lost heavily. The town and its environs were deserted by the inhabitants, many fleeing half naked. The Russians lost 2 officers and 6 men killed, and 4 men wounded.

Blagoveshchensk is a Russian town of about 32,000 inhabitants, and 3,700 houses, mostly of wood, and is situated on the left bank of the Amur at its junction with the Zeya. It is nearly in the middle of the line of waterway—the Amur—that connects the ends of the Siberian railway, the river being traversed during the season of navigation by steamboats, while in winter travel goes on over the ice. It was originally a military post simply, named "Oustzeisk," and was established in 1856, becoming a city in 1858 and receiving the name Blagoveshchensk, meaning "good news," because here the governor, Mouravieff, proclaimed the good news of the annexation of the Amur region to Russia. It is the chief place of the Amur region, the residence of the military governor of the district, and the center of military, civil, and judicial administration.

On July 14, after the Russians had started the detachments for the relief of Harbin, the Chinese to the number of 8,000 made their appearance, and opened fire on Blagoveshchensk with a number of guns, besides firing on the Russian military transports from many points on the Manchurian side of the river.

When the bombardment opened so unexpectedly, the Russians had only 2 companies of their local troops there, some improvised militia, and a few Cossacks from the surrounding villages. The bold attack by the Chinese was probably due to their knowledge that the Russian frontier was stripped to make up the Harbin relief parties, and to their belief in the genuineness of the imperial edicts declaring war on Russia, which they communicated to the Russian military authorities.

On July 15th General Gribovsky's small relief column marched in from Stretensk and replied to the Chinese fire with a battery of six guns, and on July 17, receiving further reenforcements of a couple of battalions, an effective rifle fire was directed on the Chinese, who persisted in their

cannonade until evening, when their artillery was gradually withdrawn.

The Chinese are said to have had about 18,000 men and 45 guns along the right bank of the Amur from Aigun to Sakhalin, opposite Blagoveshchensk. The latter town was defended for nearly two weeks by two battalions of local troops, one reserve battalion only partly armed; about 1,000 militia armed with old-fashioned rifles, four sotnias of Cossacks, eight light field, and two boat guns.

On July 27 reinforcements arrived from the Trans-Baikal region under General Renenkampf, and from Khabarovsk under Colonel Servianoff, consisting of nine battalions of infantry, eight sotnias of Cossacks, 30 field guns, 2 mortars, and 12 bronze guns; offensive measures were resolved on by the Russians. Early in the morning of August 2 they crossed the river in two columns and seized the half-burned town of Sakhalin. The next day, August 3, the march toward Aigun was taken up. Aigun is over 20 miles from Blagoveshchensk by water. It is an old town containing about 15,000 inhabitants, of whom many are Mohammedans. It has a fort or citadel, is the residence of a local governor, and in the early days figured frequently in disputes between the Russians and Chinese over rights of passage on the river. At the village of Kolushan the Chinese were encountered and driven back, the Cossacks capturing in the action two long-range steel guns. The troops remained here for the night, and the next day, August 4, the advance on Aigun was resumed. The Russians opened fire with mortars on the town and a fortified camp close by, setting fire to many houses, and causing many noncombatants to fly in the direction of Tsitsikar. The fighting was obstinate, and was marked by the aggressive character of the tactics of the Chinese, who attempted to turn both flanks of the Russians, while offering a determined resistance to the attack of their own center. The Chinese were successively dislodged from four strong positions, some of which they attempted to reoccupy, but finally retreated, partly along the bank of the Amur, but mostly toward Tsitsikar, pursued by the Russians.

The Russian artillery was so well handled in the fight that it is given credit for the small number of casualties on their side; 1 officer and 10 Cossacks killed, and 2 officers and 24 men wounded. The captures included several siege and field

guns, quick-firing pieces, many Mauser and Peabody rifles, and a variety of warlike stores, powder, projectiles, etc. Primitive Chinese weapons, standards, and Boxer flags were also among the spoils.

On August 10 the pursuers came up with the Chinese at the village of Sinchan, about 27 miles from the Amur. The Chinese were the rear guard of 4,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 12 guns, posted in a strong position on the eastern slope of the pass of Khingan, in the Little Khingan range. The Russian advance detachment attacked, and was, for a time, hard pressed, owing to the superiority of the Chinese numbers, but a successful flank attack and the timely arrival of reinforcements compelled the Chinese to retire. The pass itself was not won until August 12, and then only after a bloody fight and a successful turning movement carried out at night by the Russians. Four Krupp (67-millimeter) guns were taken, besides ammunition, etc.

The Chinese retired by the main road toward Tsitsikar, followed on August 16 by the Russians, who, in succession, occupied Monokhe and Mergen. At the latter place a Russian garrison was established, and here the Chinese asked for a cessation of hostilities, which was not agreed to. From captured correspondence it was learned that the Chinese commander and his chief of staff were both killed in the fight at Khingan (Chingan-Hingan) Pass. On August 25 the Russian vanguard crossed the Nemer, a tributary of the Nonni, where it rested for a short time, after which it moved to a position about 56 miles from Tsitsikar. Continuing the advance, on August 29, being within 7 miles of the town, General Renenkampf turned off southeast, so as to approach it along the road from Harbin. The Chinese infantry, observing the turning movement, abandoned its position without firing a shot. The Russians subsequently formed up in battle array about three-quarters of a mile from the town and sent a message to the tsiantsioun demanding unconditional surrender, and a request for his attendance in person at the Russian headquarters, an hour being given for compliance. A few minutes later it was noticed that the Chinese troops were moving southward, at the same time that the Chinese chief of staff and the city officials met the Russians, who assured them that the peaceful inhabitants would not be molested. The Chinese troops were ordered not to move, but as they

began to retire and seek cover behind the nearest buildings, the Russian artillery was ordered to open fire, and the Cossacks endeavored to intercept them, pursuing them for about 3 miles. The Chinese force at Tsitsikar numbered 2,700 men. The governor had disappeared and was at first reported to have fled with the troops, but some Cossacks subsequently met a mounted Chinese escort, who said they were carrying away his dead body. This was the official who had threatened to burn Khabarovsk. It is supposed that when the Russians sent for him he feared they intended to take him prisoner and therefore committed suicide.

The detachment commanded by General Orloff from the Trans-Baikal was slow in organizing. The unsettled feeling among the nomadic tribes of the border between China and Russia, and the necessity of clearing the Chinese from the territory along the Argun River delayed his start, which did not take place until July 28, when he crossed the frontier near Nagadan. The Russian patrols there encountered the Chinese outposts, which were driven in, the Russians capturing 24 oxen and wagons. On July 30 part of his detachment attacked and drove back a force of regular Chinese troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, capturing a gun, flags, rifles, and ammunition. The commander of the Chinese and 200 of his men were killed. The Russian loss was 7 killed and 20 wounded. On the same day Hailar was occupied by General Orloff after defeating 5,000 Chinese under General Kwangdo, who escaped with a bodyguard of 600 cavalry. Over 2,000 Chinese are reported to have been slain, many throwing themselves into the river Hailar to avoid pursuit, while the inhabitants fled toward Tsitsikar. The Russians took 8 prisoners.

The Russian success was so complete that a strong impression was made on the wavering Mongol nomad bands, many of whom came in and offered their submission to General Orloff, who sent them away pardoned and satisfied.

The work of repairing the railroad and telegraph line was commenced as soon as Hailar was occupied, and all being quiet on the frontier, and on that section of the railway, General Orloff's detachment left Hailar on August 3. His advanced guard came up with the enemy near Djermete Station and engaged the Chinese, who after a long fight retreated, leaving a number of baggage wagons in the hands of the Russians.

On August 14 General Orloff's column again moved forward, his vanguard forcing the Chinese, 7,000 strong, from Yakshi, which the Russian main body occupied, while the vanguard moved forward to Mendukhe. . On the 20th the main body moved to Mendukhe and on the 21st his cavalry reached Khargo, while his vanguard occupied Iretka. On August 24 he fought the Chinese, who held a strong position in the Djedin Pass of the Great Khingan Yange west of Orgo. The Russians took the pass after long fighting, capturing 6 modern steel guns with ammunition and 16 flags, including the white standard of the Chinese commander. The Chinese retreat was disorderly and they abandoned all their baggage. The Russians lost 3 killed and 11 wounded. This was the last fighting required of this column, and, marching unmolested, on September 2 it came in touch with the troops of General Renenkampf, at Tsitsikar. The Chinese troops had all retreated from this place, going south. Prisoners reported that the Chinese general, Pao, was killed in the action at Yakshi on August 14. He commanded the Chinese troops that threatened Harbin earlier in the campaign. Examination of the road between Tsitsikar and Harbin showed that it had suffered but little injury, and the telegraph line even less.

The capture of Tsitsikar cleared the main line of the railway from the presence of Chinese troops and left the Russians in control of its whole length of 950 miles. It ended the first phase of the Manchurian campaign.

The Chinese were pursued south from Tsitsikar by the combined forces of Generals Orloff and Renenkampf, marching over very difficult country. The advance reached the Sungari River on September 11, and a fight took place at the ferry. On the following day Bodune was occupied, and on the 13th and 14th the main body crossed the river.

General Orloff's command remained at Bodune as a garrison, while General Renenkampf proceeded with his force toward Kirin. His task was unexpectedly simplified by the fact that a telegram from Prince Ching to the governor general of Kirin province was received on September 19 by the Russian military governor, General Grodekoff, from the Russian state department. The telegram directed the Chinese governor to cease hostilities and to protect the railway. This was in order to facilitate peace negotiations, Prince Ching concluding his telegram by saying: "The danger threatening the dynasty calls for specially serious attention, and it is

most earnestly to be desired that all further complications should be avoided."

The telegram was forwarded to its destination through various channels, in the care of a trusted officer, and as a result, on the afternoon of September 24, General Renenkampf occupied Kirin without opposition, the Chinese soldiers laying down their arms. The city is the capital of the province of the same name. It is a large, important, and rich town of 250,000 inhabitants, situated on the upper reaches of the Sungari River, surrounded on three sides by a stone wall. Here were located small arms and powder factories, and a Russian church and school.

The country between Kirin and Siansin, through which runs the eastern portion of the main line of the Manchurian railway, is very populous, containing several millions of inhabitants. The work of restoring order through this region made necessary many expeditions directed against hostile towns and strongholds of brigands, numerous patrols being also required, on account of the scattered bands of Chinese that kept the country disturbed.

SOUTHERN MANCHURIA.

By the beginning of July the whole of South Manchuria was in a state of disturbance, the railroad and telegraph lines had suffered much damage, and many outrages had been perpetrated on foreigners. Chinese soldiers collected in large numbers near Inkau, Mukden, and other places on the railroad. The Russians promptly occupied Tashitsao and Inkau, to which points detachments were sent from Port Arthur. From Tashitsao a short line of railroad runs to Inkau and Naichwang, where it meets the extension of the Pekin, Kinchow road.

The southern detachments of the railway guards, under Colonel Mischenko, who were cut off from Harbin, had to fight their way south, first to Liaoyang, where they were attacked on July 7 and obliged to retire to Aisantsian, where they were surrounded by the Chinese. They were finally rescued by a detachment from Tashitsao, after losing 48 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Other small parties of guards, whose retreat to the south was cut off by the Chinese, succeeded eventually in reaching Korean territory with great difficulty and after incurring many casualties.

The railway stations south of Tashitsao had also been guarded by small parties of Russians, while the towns in their vicinity were occupied by Chinese troops provided with artillery. From the middle of July these isolated detachments had been subjected to repeated attacks by the Chinese troops. On July 26 the railway station at Kaichou was burned, and Tashitsao was attacked by a large force of Chinese, who advanced in two columns from the north and the east, but were repulsed.

On July 27 the Russians, under Colonel Khorunjenkoff, consisting of one regiment of rifles, a light battery, and a half sotnia of Cossacks, attacked and captured the fortified town of Sunechen (Hiung-yo-tcheng), the station south of Kaichou. On July 31 reenforcements of artillery and infantry having arrived at Inkau, General Fleischer marched from that place on Kaichou, Colonel Khorunjenkoff being directed to move from Sunechen at the same time and attack the city from the southeast, while the Cossacks from Tashitsao were to cut off their retreat. The plan to capture the Chinese miscarried, Colonel Khorunjenkoff having, before receiving the order, attacked on the 1st of August with his own force, and had captured the city, taking twelve guns of old pattern, as the column under General Fleischer arrived. Fatigue prevented pursuit. After the taking of Kaichou, the three detachments were united under the command of General Fleischer. The port of Niuchwang was occupied by the Russians on August 4.

It was now decided to drive the Chinese from Haicheng, where, on August 1, they had burned the station, rolling stock, bridge, etc. Garrisons were left at Inkau, Tashitsao, and Sunechen, and the Russians started on August 10, defeating parties of the enemy on the 10th and 11th and taking four guns. At daybreak on the 12th the intrenchments in front of the city were carried and the city taken.

General Fleischer's force consisted of one regiment of rifles and parts of two other regiments, two companies of railway guards, two Cossack sotnias, and four guns. The Russians had 7 men wounded, while the Chinese, estimated at 5,000, are said to have lost 500 killed and wounded. They retreated to the hills east of the town, leaving two more guns behind. The railroad was now clear to Haicheng, and the Russians remained here for several weeks preparing for further

operations. At Mukden the Chinese were reported to be 5,000 strong and well supplied with artillery. About the 1st of September reports were to the effect that the Chinese were assembled at Old Niuchwang and Liaoyang, about 30,000 strong and covered by advance guards. Further reinforcements for the Russians reached Inkau, and General Subbotich took command of all the troops operating in this section. These now comprised eleven battalions of infantry, 40 guns, two sotnias of Cossacks, and four sotnias of railway guards. Three columns were organized, the left, under General Fleischer, of six battalions, 10 guns, and two sotnias of Cossacks, to march on Liaoyang by way of Old Niuchwang; the center column, Colonel Artamonoff (five battalions and 26 guns), marching by the direct road, while the flying column of Colonel Mischenko, of four sotnias of the railway guards and 4 guns was to protect the right flank of the center column.

The general operations in Southern Manchuria were directed by Admiral Alexieff, the principal military movements being conducted at first by General Fleischer and afterwards by General Subbotich.

On September 26 the safety of Inkau and Niuchwang being assured, and the railway between Haicheng and Tashitsao repaired, General Subbotich's forces resumed the advance. Old Niuchwang was occupied after a sharp fight, the Chinese retiring to Liaoyang. The next day Shaho, an intrenched position on the railroad, was taken after a spirited fight, in which the Russians lost 8 killed and 25 wounded. On the 28th the Russians neared Liaoyang, where the enemy barred the way by holding a strong position in front of the town, along the crest of a hill difficult of approach.

The Russian attack was made in three columns. One, Colonel Mischenko's, was directed against the Chinese left flank, where the fighting began, the Chinese right being threatened by General Fleischer. Colonel Artamonoff commanded the column that moved against the front of the Chinese position about half past 8 in the morning, meeting artillery fire, which did not, however, inflict much damage, owing to the failure of the shells to explode after striking the soft ground. Before 11 o'clock General Fleischer's movement had silenced the Chinese guns on that flank and only a feeble rifle fire opposed the central column, which soon occupied the position from which the Chinese had fled, leaving

behind them food, rifles, and ammunition. Two Krupp guns and one Maxim were also taken.

The Russians fired at the retreating foe, but were unable to pursue from lack of cavalry and the great fatigue of the men due to the intense heat and their strenuous exertions. At half past 2 Liaoyang was occupied by General Fleischer, though Colonel Mischenko's detachment did not arrive until after 5, having met a more obstinate resistance in his front. The Russians had 16 men wounded in the day's fighting. The loss of the Chinese is not stated.

On September 30 the Russians moved out of Liaoyang and marched to Yantai (Yen-thai), the Chinese giving way in disorder and flying in all directions. On October 1, the advance party of the Russian vanguard reached the village of Baitaipu, 8 miles from Mukden. Here the Russian commander received a petition, written in English, from the merchants and Christians in Mukden, begging him to occupy the town as soon as possible. Inquiry among native inhabitants and Chinese prisoners elicited the information that anarchy prevailed in the city, which had been deserted by the Chinese authorities, and was being plundered by the Chinese soldiers. On the afternoon of the following day, October 2, the city was occupied by the advance detachment of the Russian vanguard, which received only a desultory fire from the Chinese, who immediately took to flight, firing their rifles as they ran through the streets.

The imperial palace and the gate of the inner town were at once taken possession of by the Russians, and the next morning, October 3, the Russian vanguard marched into and through the city, taking up their quarters outside the wall on the north side. In the afternoon the main body arrived and pitched its tents on the plain on the south side of the city.

Great quantities of military stores were found in the city, over 50 Krupp and Maxim guns, 8,000 shells, about 7,000 rifles, 20,000,000 cartridges, gunpowder, etc.

Detachments were sent out to clear the railway lines, both north and south, one under General Mischenko proceeding to Tielin, which was taken on October 6, and connection made with the forces under General Renenkampf.

Hidden stores of all kinds were found in Mukden as search was made, and in examining government buildings to

determine their suitability for quartering troops, it was discovered that most of the important ones had been mined by the Chinese, and only the prompt occupation of the city by the Russians had prevented their destruction.

The capture of Mukden finished the large operations of the Manchurian campaign, but much remained to be done in the pacification of the country, the suppression of roving bands of disorganized Chinese soldiers and Boxers and of robber bands of Manchu brigands. Some of the expeditions for this latter purpose were of considerable magnitude, where long-established strongholds of hungus had to be attacked and destroyed. Operations of this character were carried on to the end of the year.

Though Manchuria was now practically entirely controlled by Russia, that country disclaimed any intention of annexation, and in November invited the Chinese Government to nominate governors to resume administrative functions in the several provinces from which their predecessors had been expelled. Their authority is exercised under limitations prescribed by the Russians, who, in addition, reserve to themselves a zone extending along the railway, the maintenance of tranquillity on which is secured by their own troops.

The losses of the Russians in the Pechili and Manchurian campaigns, up to November 1, 1900, were 23 officers and 257 soldiers killed, and 67 officers and 1,305 men wounded.

MOBILIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN EASTERN ASIA.

The following details are from official reports published in the Russki Invalid on various dates:

In the beginning of the Chinese troubles the first Russian troops landed in Pechili were taken from those stationed in Kwantung (Port Arthur), their places being filled by others sent from the Amur military district. On August 1 the forces in Pechili and Kwantung amounted to sixteen battalions, 32 guns, six Cossack sotnias, two sapper and two and a half railway companies.

It was believed that there would be no danger in thus withdrawing troops from the Amur, as no offensive operations by the Chinese were looked for in that region. Subsequent events having shown this view to be erroneous and that hostilities had been planned a long time beforehand by

the Chinese Government, orders were issued on June 25 for the mobilization of the troops of the Amur district, and on June 30 the reserves in the Kwantung territory were ordered out.

Meanwhile disturbances having occurred in Mongolia and Kuldja along the Russian frontiers, and the troops of the Amoor district, even after being increased to war strength, being hardly sufficient for the necessities of the service in Manchuria and Pechili, instructions were given on July 1 to change the battalions of the first and second brigades of the infantry of the line of Eastern Siberia into regiments of rifles of two battalions each to form two additional brigades, the fourth and fifth; to increase the Vladivostok fortress regiment of infantry into two regiments of three battalions each, and to form at Port Arthur a fortress regiment of four battalions.

On July 6 orders were issued to transfer from European Russia to the far east the third and fourth brigades of rifles with their artillery and parks, one railway battalion, six companies of sappers, and one company of pontoniers, and on July 14 similar orders were given for the transfer of the first, second, and fifth brigades of rifles with their artillery and parks, the second battery (quick-firing) of the artillery of the guard, one battalion of sappers and twelve ambulances. Directions were also given to form another brigade (the sixth) from the third brigade of Eastern Siberia.

On July 21 the area of mobilization was extended to the troops of the Siberian military district, and to those of the Semirechensk district (belonging to Kurdestan) including the Cossack troops of the latter district.

After the taking of Peking the orders for the transfer of the first and second rifle brigades from European Russia to Eastern Asia were revoked, so that only the third, fourth and fifth rifle brigades were sent to the East, the third by land, the others on transports via Odessa. The strength of these brigades was 7,976 men—four regiments of 1,994 men each—with their artillery, three light batteries of eight guns each, besides the auxiliary troops mentioned.

On July 24 orders were issued for the formation from the troops then in the far East, and to arrive from Europe, of four Siberian army corps, including an expeditionary corps. As the troops from which these corps were to be formed were

already on hostile soil (only a small contingent remaining in Russian territory, while those sent from Europe were still at sea), these corps were organized only on paper and had no effect on the operations in China or Manchuria.

The first corps, headquarters Vladivostok, is composed of troops stationed in time of peace in the Ussuri and Primorski regions; the second corps, headquarters Blagoveshchensk, of troops serving in the Amur district. The third is formed of the small detachments stationed in the Trans-Baikal, the reserves of the Siberian military district, as well as the temporary reenforcements brought from Europe. The fourth (the expeditionary corps) was to be composed of the troops brought from Europe by sea.

The slowness of sea transportation, the interruption of communications on the Amur by the operations of the Chinese, and the inability of the Siberian railway to meet the enormously increased demands upon it, offered great obstacles to the prompt movement of troops and supplies. They were finally surmounted by the energy of the Russians, aided by the military incapacity of the Chinese. According to Russian reports, although men of the reserve to the number of 100,000 were called to the colors for the mobilization of the unorganized units, no delay took place, and the percentage of those not responding was very small. Some detachments were ready earlier than expected and consequently the organization of trains and other special services was delayed. The project of changing the Siberian reserve artillery unit of two batteries into four units of two batteries each had to be abandoned.

While the mobilization and transportation of the fighting troops were going on, it was necessary at the same time to form 16 reserve battalions, of which the 8 for the Amur district were only hinted at in the plan of mobilization. In addition there were needed 5 horse and foot Cossack reserve sotnias, 5 horse depots for 2,200 horses, 53 hospitals, 12 artillery parks, and 3 sanitary transports.

In the Amur district in one month from the date of the orders for mobilization, 5 Cossack regiments with a total of 27 sotnias; 2 infantry regiments with a total of 10 battalions, 1 foot Cossack brigade of 4 battalions, and 3 Cossack batteries were placed on a war footing. In the Siberian district 7 infantry regiments with a total of 35 battalions, and 1

Cossack division of the second and third class were mobilized. At the same time the whole population capable of bearing arms was called into service (including Cossacks who had not yet attained, or who had already passed the age at which they were liable to military duty), and were formed into organizations for frontier service. Reserve battalions and even recruits took part in the fighting.

The Third European Rifle Brigade reached Stretensk by the end of August and was transported by boat via the Shilka and Amur Rivers to Harbin to act as a mobile reserve. It did not arrive at Harbin until the beginning of October. The first detachments of the Siberian Cossack Brigade, and other units of the Third Siberian Army Corps reached the Trans-Baikal August 28. The Fourth European Rifle Brigade reached Port Arthur September 6 and the Fifth Brigade arrived at Vladivostok about the middle of September.

At this time 18 battalions, 25 sotnias, and 78 guns, mostly of the Second Siberian Army Corps, were available for an advance against Kirin from the north. The city surrendered without fighting on September 23.

The following table gives the strength and distribution of the Russian troops in Eastern Asia about the middle of October, when the principal military operations had ceased:

	Battalions.	Sotnias.	Guns.
Second Siberian Army Corps:			
In province of Tsitsikar	12	24	22
As reserve (the Third European Rifle Brigade from Third Siberian Army Corps)	8		
In province of Kirin	26	29	102
As reserve (Fifth European Rifle Brigade and 5 battalions of Sixth East Siberian Rifle Brigade)	13		24
First Siberian Army Corps:			
In Southern Manchuria, including the troops of Kuantung ..	21	9	34
Fortress battalions	2		
In Pechili	12	5	*44
Frontier guards in the Amur and Siberian districts	26	25	28
Fortress battalions	2		
In the Semirechensk district near Kuldja	8	22	28
Guards for consuls at Urga and Kuldja		4	4
Total	126	118	336

* Eight machine guns.

The total strength in Eastern Asia, including the troops brought from Europe, was 3,900 officers and 173,000 men. To assemble these forces of three times the ordinary strength of the Siberian troops, there were transported into the Trans-Baikal over the Siberian railway and across the Baikal Lake 54,410 men and 11,407 horses. By transport from Europe

10,107 men were brought to Vladivostok and 9,709 to Port Arthur. The total number of troops transported by rail and water to the military district of the Amur was 74,226 men. There was transported to Irkutsk by rail 22,610 tons of various military stores. Three thousand three hundred and ninety-four tons were carried by the Siberian railway to the Trans-Baikal, while 7,917 tons were brought over sea to Vladivostok and 10,460 tons to Port Arthur.

During October 5,400 men and 2,906 horses were brought over to Eastern Asia. The railway transported nearly 1,700 tons of supplies and there were sent by water about 2,100 tons. An idea of the difficulties encountered by the transport service may be gathered from the statement that within a period of three months there were carried from Stretensk over the Shilka and Amur rivers 46,209 men, 9,145 horses, and 4,370 tons of supplies. These included, besides war material, provisions, clothing, and medical stores sufficient to last over the first months of 1901.

The composition of the various columns operating in Manchuria, as first organized, was as follows:

Orloff: 4 battalions, 6 sotnias, 6 pieces of horse artillery. Rationed for two and one-half months.

Rennenkampf: 6 battalions, 3 sotnias, 34 guns.

Sakharoff: 4 battalions, 3 sotnias, 16 field guns, 10 siege guns, detachment of engineers.

Chicagoff: 2 battalions, 4 sotnias, 8 guns.

Aigustoff: 6 battalions, 2 sotnias, 22 guns.

Fleischer: 16 battalions, 8 sotnias, 76 guns, 2½ companies of engineers, 1 siege park.

Valkoff: 4 battalions, ½ sotnia, 4 guns (taken from the Chinese), ½ company engineers.

Immediately after the taking of Mukden, orders were issued for the demobilization of the troops in the east. This was desirable for military and financial reasons, as well as on account of the distress growing out of the scanty harvests, high prices, scarcity of laborers, etc., and it was carried out as fast as practicable. By the middle of December the troops in the Siberian military district were on a peace footing. Some of the seven infantry regiments had then been disbanded and formed into reserve battalions, and the two brigades to which they belonged seem also to have been broken up. A new reserve battalion has been formed in this district, increasing the number to eight.

In the territory of Semirechensk the troops were to be reduced to peace strength, and the detachments of the Turkestan Rifle Brigade to return to their original stations, except one battalion that was to remain temporarily with the artillery detachments, the Third Rifle Park and the number of wagons and ambulances actually needed.

With regard to the Cossack troops, the immediate demobilization of the regiments of the third class, the batteries and the brigade of infantry Cossacks was ordered. This order also applied to the regiments of the second class, excepting such of the latter as it was absolutely necessary to retain temporarily under arms.

Greater difficulty attended the reduction of the forces in Manchuria on account of the setting in of cold weather, necessitating the establishment of road houses or warming stations for marching troops, and because of the closing of navigation on the Shilka and Amur rivers by freezing. Besides, although the regular Chinese troops had been defeated and dispersed, roaming bands of Boxers and disorganized Chinese soldiers scoured the country, so that the 5,000 men of the railway guard were insufficient to protect the railway. For that reason it was determined to retain temporarily a portion of the invading troops in Manchuria. The First, Fourth, and Fifth East Siberian Rifle Brigades were selected with the expectation that one of these brigades would be returned to the Amur military district in the spring, where there were then only the Second and Sixth Rifle Brigades, the third being stationed in the peninsula of Kwantung. In the Amur military district the two infantry regiments incorporated into the First Siberian Infantry Brigade were reduced to reserve battalions, of which two new ones were organized.

After the cessation of military operations in the province of Pechili, the troops were gradually withdrawn to Kwantung to be returned to the military district of the Amur. The reinforcements brought from Europe had also begun to return before the end of December, and it was expected that the movement would be completed in the first six months of 1901.

The complete reduction to peace strength and the return of the European detachments will depend on the outcome of the situation in the East.

The "Valkoff" column, referred to herein, was formed at Shanhaikwan from troops that had marched in along the railroad when the place was occupied by the allies. It left there October 4, 1900, under orders to march on Kinchow and beyond, clearing the railway as it advanced. Continuing beyond Kinchow, it made connection with the troops from Inkau, who had, on October 6, seized the railway station on the right bank of the Liaoho near Niuchwang.

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