Why Special Operations? A Risk-Based Theory
Abstract
There is today a burgeoning discussion in the literature as to what really constitutes a "special operation," what makes the forces that conduct them "special," whether these aspects are so different from conventional military operations and forces as to warrant their own theory, and, if they do, what such a theory should be. This paper addresses an aspect of special operations that has yet to be explained adequately - the question of why special operations are conducted. The answer lies in the consideration of risk. Because policy-makers are inherently reliant upon some form of popular support to maintain their positions of power, they are also inherently averse to taking risky actions. The centrality of risk to policy decisions leads directly to this definition: special operations are unorthodox military solutions to difficult policy problems that lower the level of risk to policy-makers. This definition leads to a risk-centric theory of why special operations are conducted: if policy-makers have a difficult policy problem and they are unsatisfied with the level of risk presented by orthodox solutions or inaction, then they will choose special operations. After deriving this theory, this paper evaluates it, applies it to the raid on Osama bin Ladens compound in Pakistan, and discusses implications of the theory for the future of US special operations forces.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 18, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1145674
Entities
People
- Jonathan Schroden
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses