Getting It Wrong: A Critique of the CIA's Early Covert Operations
Abstract
The CIA's initial regime change operations between 1953 to 1961 were marred by intelligence leaks and lacked critical mission assessments. In addition, perceptions held by top-level decision makers were so distorted that unsupported claims of communist infiltration were made in order to support the decision to proceed with an operation. Three operations were conducted in the span of eight years with nearly indistinguishable similarity, and the third operation resulted in failure. It was only after that failure that investigations revealed the extent of the problem. After examining these three cases, this thesis concludes that the accrual of misperceptions with regard to intelligence and unexamined mission tactics led to the failure at the Bay of Pigs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1150439
Entities
People
- Nicholas I. Bryant
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School