Safety Engineering of Weaponized Autonomous Systems
Abstract
This capstone explores the applicability of the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) framework and the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) methodology to guide consideration of system safety concerns posed by future variants of Sea Hunter. The author analyzed the Sea Hunters navigational mission behaviors from a high-level perspective of a functional hierarchy, discussing the specific steps of how basic STAMP/STPA can be used to identify safety hazards and safety hazard casual factors on a complex system such as Sea Hunter. Using the STAMP/STPA methodology, the author provides a functional hierarchy example of the potential system safety hazards involved on the different hierarchy levels in the steering system on Sea Hunter. This capstone discusses how STAMP/STPA can be used to identify system-level hazards, identify unsafe control actions, and identify loss scenarios in the example. The U.S. Navy needs to ensure that its assessment capabilities can be used to adequately identify and evaluate safety hazards, safety hazard causal factors, safety controls, and safety risks of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). AWSs are defined as weapons that can independently select and attack targets. STAMP/STPA is a promising approach to safety analysis; further examination of its applicability and utility in the context of AWS is recommended. If beneficial, this toolset could help the U.S. Navy accelerate the development of fully autonomous technology.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1150520
Entities
People
- Javon A. Felder
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School