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SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM:  
IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION  
IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN  
CRISIS RESPONSE**

by

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March 2021

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IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND  
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS RESPONSE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis assesses the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program through a review of three partnerships: West Virginia National Guard-Qatar, Colorado National Guard-Jordan, and Massachusetts National Guard-Kenya. The partnerships are first analyzed within a national security and military doctrinal framework for security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. Then, they are evaluated based on an academic framework regarding counterterrorism and military humanitarian assistance. The two frameworks provide a holistic picture of the program's efficacy and areas of improvement. This thesis argues that the program, as conducted within the partnerships evaluated, provides an effective means to pursue counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management security cooperation objectives. The program is successful overall due to the stability and longevity of relationships nurtured within the partnerships, but also for more nuanced reasons that account for the inherent contradictions between providing aid and bilateral assistance. The program can be improved to meet doctrine by diversifying participants in engagements and topics for engagement, in order to better address the complex relationship between terrorism and humanitarian crisis. However, care must be taken to avoid expanding the program unduly in order to avoid incentivizing partner-nation behavior that creates conditions that increase the likelihood of terrorism and humanitarian crises.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
CCMD	Combatant Command
COM	Chief of Mission
CONG	Colorado National Guard
DOD	Department of Defense
FY	fiscal year
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Caliphate
MANG	Massachusetts National Guard
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
SC	security cooperation
SPP	State Partnership Program
TCP	theater campaign plan
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
WVNG	West Virginia National Guard

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## I. INTRODUCTION

After nearly two decades of an unrelenting campaign of counterterrorism in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Africa, the United States is still fighting against extremist terrorists as it began in response to the attacks of 9/11. In fact, U.S. policymakers must wonder whether the last two decades' efforts have produced meaningful results in their goals, as al-Qaeda has now been joined in the realm of transnational terrorism by the Islamic State. How can governments proactively and reactively craft effective counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis strategies that alleviate the ill-effects of both phenomena, which are often tied together? What is the best combination of governmental programs leveraging all aspects of national power to address complex national security questions? What is the military's role in executing these strategies and are its operations value-added in these security cooperation endeavors? This thesis will provide a comparative analysis of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and State Partnership Program (SPP) in order to address these questions. The Colorado-Jordan (CONG-Jordan; est. 2004), West Virginia-Qatar (WVNG-Qatar; est. 2018), and Massachusetts-Kenya (MANG-Kenya; est. 2015) partnerships are the subjects of this study. Specifically, this thesis will examine how each of these SPP partnerships work to address counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response through military means to support U.S. national security cooperation strategy.

The SPP is a Department of Defense (DOD) program that seeks to leverage “whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres.”<sup>1</sup> An SSP partnership is formed between a U.S. state's National Guard and a foreign Partner Nation to create a mutually beneficial relationship to develop both parties' military, security forces, and disaster response capabilities. The concept behind the SPP is to create lasting security cooperation programs that provide a voluntary and consistent means of

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<sup>1</sup> “State Partnership Program,” J5 International Affairs Division, Accessed October 6, 2020, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/>.

engagement in a flexible, tailored approach that recognizes and incorporates the unique challenges and needs of the parties involved, as they change through the duration of the partnership. The SPP is grounded in the guidance of National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States that recognizes “the invaluable advantages that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver.”<sup>2</sup> This core principle—that working with allies to achieve national interests has a synergistic effect—has guided the program since its beginnings dating back to 1994 and the years immediately following the end of the Cold War with the 1991 collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

## **A. BACKGROUND**

The SPP arose from the United States’ recognition that the failed USSR would create both an opportunity and a threat in the newly independent former Soviet Bloc countries in the Baltics. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) more broadly, were forced to reckon with questions of whether to expand the alliance further eastward into the void left by the USSR or pursue some sort of other construct that would work to bring these newly independent states closer to the West in terms of governance, security and stability objectives, and outlook. The original partnerships under the Joint Contact Team construct were formed with the objective of helping former-Soviet Bloc states transition to democratic governments with civilian-led militaries.<sup>3</sup> Within this post-Cold War context, the NGB recognized that it sat in a unique position to provide expertise regarding the creation of a national guard structure and function within these nations, and that this endeavor would keep the NGB itself relevant after the defeat of its primary enemy—the USSR.<sup>4</sup> Throughout the program’s history, the emphasis has lessened on democratic institution-building, as evidenced by the establishment of partnerships with monarchies such as Jordan and Qatar. The evolution

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<sup>2</sup> White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 2, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> William Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Forging and Maintaining Effective Security Cooperation Partnerships for the 21st Century*, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Historical Services Branch of The Office of Public Affairs of The National Guard Bureau, 2014), 15.

<sup>4</sup> Boehm, 2.

and refinement of the program's strategic objectives suggests a recognition that effective national security strategy to address global issues may be better served by the pursuit of security cooperation partners that are undemocratic, when and where democratic partners are unavailable.

## **B. THE PROBLEM**

The SPP is now nearly three decades in existence and has evolved from a Baltic-state centric, democratic institution building military-to-military program to a globe-spanning whole-of-government approach to a vast array of security cooperation objectives across 82 partnerships.<sup>5</sup> In that time, comparatively little academic research has been conducted regarding the real results achieved by the SPP, especially in specific security cooperation objectives. Furthermore, what little research has been done has not been squarely focused on the contemporary academic research regarding how to conduct effective security cooperation programs, or the understanding of national security threats. Altogether, there has been precious little holistic research that identifies what is working and what is failing with specific partnerships, and how the partnerships' contexts contribute to success and failure on the partnership-level in order to make suggestions for improvements across the SPP as a whole.

## **C. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT**

The central question of this thesis is whether the SPP partnerships between CONG-Jordan, WVNG-Qatar, and MANG-Kenya provide an effective means to increase national security through the counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis security cooperation objectives. This thesis utilizes a comparative analysis of three partnerships, limited in scope to counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis security cooperation objectives, to address whether the SPP is effective in delivering positive results in these areas, both geographically and functionally. Whether the SPP should exist and whether the function of the SPP should reside with the NGB or elsewhere is outside the scope of this analysis.

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<sup>5</sup> J5 International Affairs Division. *The State Partnership Program 101*. Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2020. [https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP%20101%20brief\\_June%202020.pdf](https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP%20101%20brief_June%202020.pdf), 3.

Instead, given the proliferation of partnerships and the objectives they seek to address, this analysis assumes that the SPP under the NGB is appropriate, and has the potential to be successful in being a tool for whole-of-government security cooperation endeavors broadly as the bridge between civilian and military capabilities. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the SPP, as conducted within the partnerships evaluated, provides an effective program to pursue security cooperation objectives in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management.

The program is successful overall due to the stability and longevity of relationships that form through the partnership, but also for more nuanced reasons that account for the inherent contradictions between providing aid and bilateral assistance. These contradictory impulses and the unintended side effects that manifest in governance and societal considerations must continually be assessed and addressed in order to improve the shortfalls identified in this analysis. Programs can realize their greatest potential in combatting terrorism through a holistic approach: they must address or acknowledge through careful coordination with the wider security cooperation institution, the social, economic, and governmental realities that combine to incentivize the use of terrorism. Additionally, governments have a duty to form policies that react to terrorist events in a manner that does not exacerbate the problem. This interplay between assistance and the unintended consequences will be discussed at length in Chapter V.

#### **D. SIGNIFICANCE**

The security cooperation objectives of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response are of special concern due to their inextricable nature. One need not look any further than the cycle of terrorism provoked-humanitarian crisis created by the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Caliphate (ISIL, which is now known only as the Islamic State (IS) as their territorial integrity has collapsed, and their members widely dispersed) and the subsequent shocks this sent throughout the region. With the United States' continued attempts to draw down its footprint in the region, it is prudent to identify programs that have successful security cooperation histories and identify what is working, what has been tried and failed, and what may be applicable to use

in the place of active duty forces going forward. It is essential to constantly be reassess what is the best combination of governmental programs leveraging all aspects of national power to address complex national security challenges.

Counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management are security cooperation objectives that are designed, per U.S. doctrine, to be whole of government efforts working in coordination with foreign partners. Thus, research answering which programs under military's purview are most successful at security cooperation execution in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management is essential to answering the broader question: what is the best combination of governmental programs leveraging all aspects of national power to address complex national security questions? This thesis is designed to address part of that gap in understanding just how effective the SPP is regarding counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management.

## **E. SCOPE AND METHODS**

The scope of this thesis is limited to the analysis of the three aforementioned partnerships' operations regarding counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management security cooperation objectives. Each partnership undertakes engagements for other security cooperation objectives, which are outside the purview of this analysis. Additionally, this thesis will not analyze or make suggestions regarding other entities, besides the NGB, that may be more effective or appropriate in performing these functions, other than where research suggests a fundamental mismatch between the nature of the security cooperation objective and the NGB that degrades the efficacy of the program.

Within this limited scope, this thesis first explores the strategic guidance of Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation, JP 3-26 Counterterrorism, and JP 3-29 Humanitarian Assistance, found in Section B of Chapter II. This analysis will be grounded within the discussion and direction of the current NSS (2017). The guiding question will be: what are the most effective practices for humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism SC, according to U.S. doctrine? This question will help to establish the doctrinal framework that will be used to analyze each partnerships' effectiveness from a doctrinal perspective. Section C of Chapter II will outline the major academic arguments

with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism policy, and humanitarian crisis response, in order to establish an academic framework of analysis.

Chapter III provides an overview of the SPP as a whole program. It will provide a historical origins, objectives, and development. Additionally, this chapter will explore what guiding documents exist to manage operations of the program at the NGB-level. It will also detail the creation and maintenance of partnerships, and the generic process for executing partnership engagements. Critically important to this chapter are the details regarding funding and authorities, which have significant impact on the program's execution and associated limitations that will become apparent in the discussion of the actual case studies.

Chapter IV will document each of the individual SPP partnership case studies, and then details each of the case studies' particular contexts and characteristics pertinent to the two security cooperation objectives under study in this thesis. The CONG-Jordan program provides the baseline of analysis as it is much longer-lived than the other two programs of study. Additionally, the three partnerships are in two different are in different geographic Combatant Commands (CCMD), which allows for comparison across two different chains of command, vastly different cultural contexts, and different specific problem sets that nonetheless share many characteristics (Islamic extremist terrorist threats occur in all three countries, for example). The WVNG-Qatar program allows for closer comparisons to be made about conclusions drawn along regional and cultural lines from the more robust CONG-Jordan case study. The MANG-Kenya program allows these conclusions to be tested in a different cultural and CCMD context.

Collectively, sources for Chapter IV include public affairs releases, after action reports, annual fiscal reports, congressionally mandated annual reports, internal and third-party assessments of the program (like those produced by the Government Accountability Office, or academic works), and partnership- and program-level policy and guidance documentation. Interviews were conducted with individuals having first-person experiences at the program or partnership level of the SPP regarding their experiences, expert assessments, and understanding of the SPP's value insecurity cooperation strategy. The interview sources provide nuanced, qualitative analysis regarding stakeholders' evaluations and experiences of the program to flesh out the quantitative analysis approach.

Chapter V addresses whether the structure, objectives, and execution of the SPP as detailed in Chapter IV could be considered effective regarding counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance using the two frameworks established. In Chapter V, focus will be on the ways that each partnership has operationalized the strategic guidance found in doctrine in order to progress towards each case study program's objectives. Policy documents, after action reports, and interviews with program experts regarding their experiences and assessments are used to evaluate how well strategy has been converted into executable tasks.

Additionally, evaluations regarding the quantitative nature of the program were conducted: how many engagements, and what type of engagements, were conducted year over year, where available? By the conclusion of Chapter V, the thesis will demonstrate strengths and weaknesses of the three SPP case study partnerships in two functional objectives, within two different analytical frameworks. Chapter VI is limited to a summary of findings and suggestions regarding future research in this field.

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## **II. INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY COOPERATION WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CONTEXT**

This chapter reviews the broad basis of knowledge regarding security cooperation in humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism objectives. The first portion will explore security cooperation as envisaged by the U.S. government through the NSS. The second part will provide a deeper look by examining security cooperation as codified in military strategic doctrine from whole-of-government to SPP-level. Then, the analysis will canvass the influential academic arguments regarding how the U.S.’ national security is bolstered and best pursued through security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. This will provide a comparative framework to understand the SPP’s security cooperation efforts from both a U.S. doctrinal and research approach. These two frameworks will then be utilized in Chapter IV to assess the three case study programs in the two functional security cooperation objectives, and thus provide suggestions for areas of improvement, or highlight successes, in both objectives.

### **A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

This thesis will focus on the 2017 NSS policy guidance pertaining to the counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response, though the 2015 NSS produced under President Obama contained similar verbiage regarding the topic.<sup>6</sup> The 2017 NSS refers to the priority actions of “Defeat Transnational Terrorist Organizations” and “Reduce Human Suffering” as a function of championing American values abroad.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, guidance pertaining to the engagement with Partner Nations has bearing on this thesis. The 2017 NSS says of the Middle East region that the United States “will strengthen partnerships, and form new ones, to help advance security through stability,”<sup>8</sup> which provides broad

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<sup>6</sup> White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy\\_2.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf), 9–10.

<sup>7</sup> White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, 41.

<sup>8</sup> White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 49.

latitude for security cooperation engagements for both counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response initiatives. The 2017 NSS guidance pertaining to Africa is similarly broad: the United States “will continue to respond to humanitarian needs while also working with committed governments and regional organizations to address the root causes of human suffering.” These statements are necessarily broad to provide strategic guidance to the entire diplomatic and military institutions of government. Therefore, drilling down further into the military guidance that dictates how the NGB translates this national strategy into operational programs is critical for identifying whether the program is effective at meeting strategic objectives.

## **B. UNITED STATES JOINT DOCTRINE**

### **1. JP 3-20 Security Cooperation**

The U.S. government established what it considers to be the best information, ways, and means regarding DOD security assistance, which when administered by the DOD is termed “security cooperation,”<sup>9</sup> in Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation. Security cooperation is “all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests”<sup>10</sup> as defined in the NSS. This doctrine provides strategic guidance regarding the boundaries, principles, and intent of security cooperation in enhancing the U.S.’ national security. Security cooperation can be understood to strengthen and expand “the existing network of U.S. allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations.”<sup>11</sup> As the SPP is a security cooperation program administered by the NGB, it must adhere to JP 3-20, which is aligned with and informed by the priorities established in the NSS.

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*. JP 3-20 (Washington, DC, 2017), [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_20\\_20172305.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, v.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, I-1.

## 2. JP 3-26 Counterterrorism

The relevant portion for this thesis of JP 3-26 Counterterrorism is Chapter 3: Organizing for Counterterrorism. The section regarding Partner Nations details “U.S. strategy against terrorist organizations and individuals associated with terrorist organizations are a mixture of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic options” to form “an enduring counterterrorism partner in the region and often elsewhere.”<sup>12</sup> Thus, there is doctrinally enshrined belief that Partner Nation engagement through whole-of-government instruments of national power can provide lasting results in counterterrorism efforts. Figure 1. Partner Nations Contributions provides a visual depiction of the interconnected nature of humanitarian assistance with creating conditions adverse to fostering terrorism.<sup>13</sup> Of significant note for this analysis are the first four layers of the graphic. These areas are the primary wheelhouse addressed in the operations of the SPP examined in this thesis. Further, Combat Forces make up only a small portion of the counterterrorism effort through security cooperation operations. Instead, the strong foundation supporting counterterrorism efforts by direct military means relies on preemptive strengthening of other aspects of governance and state capacity.




Figure 1. Partner Nation Contributions <sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, JP 3-26 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_26.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf), III-5 and III-6.

<sup>13</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, III-6.

<sup>14</sup> Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-6.

### **3. JP 3-29 Humanitarian Assistance**

The SPP's humanitarian assistance efforts are directed by JP 3-29. The pertinent sections for this thesis examine the intersectional nature of humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism. Specifically, U.S. joint doctrine identifies humanitarian crisis events as providing an opportunity wherein "terrorists may exploit organizations working in emergencies and areas of conflict to raise and move funds, provide logistics support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations."<sup>15</sup> This literature review will examine the relationship between humanitarian conditions and terrorism in further detail under the section that deals with the research arguments pertaining to counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance. For this section, it is sufficient to note that the DOD believes that humanitarian assistance is an integral part of the counterterrorism effort, and military participation or leadership of activities in and with Partner Nations to address human suffering aids security cooperation efforts in the counterterrorism realm.

### **C. ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON SECURITY COOPERATION**

One question this thesis seeks to address is whether the U.S. government's understanding of security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance captures academia's understanding of these objectives and how best to achieve national security in these realms. The following section will address the current trends of thought regarding the management of terrorism and humanitarian crises. It will then explore the intersection between terrorism and humanitarian crisis to illuminate ways in which policies to address one security cooperation objective may undermine or complement efforts in the other objective.

#### **1. Crafting Effective Counterterrorism Strategies**

The academic conversation regarding the origins of terrorism ballooned in the United States after the attacks of 9/11. Significantly, the arguments that once

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Humanitarian Assistance*. JP 3-29 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019). [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_29.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf), A-8.

predominated—that terrorists are crazed madmen, or severely impoverished individuals with nothing to lose—have been stripped of their simplistic appeal as the data failed to provide support for these conclusions.<sup>16</sup> Instead, the data point toward the fact that terrorists, far from originating “from the poorer segments, terrorist operatives are more likely to come from the mid-income and highly educated strata of society.”<sup>17</sup> Savun and Tirone’s collective analysis of economic deprivation leads to terrorism hypothesis shows only “mixed results.”<sup>18</sup> The data further show that terrorists often have what they and their supporters consider to be rational motives and decision-making processes when choosing the path of terrorism, even in the case of suicidal terrorist acts.<sup>19</sup> It is therefore imperative that counterterrorism strategies do not fall into the trap of targeting just economic deprivation, or writing off terrorists as unpredictable, incurable madmen where the only solution is to eliminate them. Such folly will yield no significant results in rooting out terrorism long term.

There is increasing data on both the micro- and macro-level of assessment that supports one argument amongst the many for the origins of terrorism: “low levels of civil liberties and political participation, state repression, abuse of physical integrity rights, and weak rule of law are shown to be associated with greater participation in terrorism”<sup>20</sup> or support for terrorist organizations. The research regarding the causal relationship between aid designed to bolster democratization and civil society has also supported the link between foreign aid designed to support democratization and the reduction in transnational terrorism.<sup>21</sup> However, as there is a contrary body of research that is testing this linkage and

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<sup>16</sup> Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: More Liberty, Less Terror?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 8 (September 2018): 1607–35, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717704952>, 3.

<sup>17</sup> Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 3.

<sup>18</sup> Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 3.

<sup>19</sup> Amien Kacou, “Five Arguments on the Rationality of Suicide Terrorists,” *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18, no. 5 (September 2013): 539–47, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2013.07.010>, 546.

<sup>20</sup> Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 4.

<sup>21</sup> Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 6.

finding that there is insufficient support for a research framework regarding the effect of political participation on moderating terrorist groups.

Dalacoura's analysis of Middle Eastern Islamist terrorist groups assessed the political participation and its effect on terrorism hypothesis and found it incapable of providing a consistent causal relationship with terrorism. Rather, there is greater support from the wide survey of cases for political actors conducting a strategic analysis of their objectives and asking whether terrorism is (un)likely to be the best way to meet these objectives.<sup>22</sup> Her analysis of terrorism in the Middle East found that terrorism is likely to be used if it is deemed to be effective to achieve political objectives. She found that when terrorism is assessed by actors to have ineffective or adverse effect on the likelihood of the group achieving political success, the group moderates. Therefore, counterterrorism strategies would do well to address democratization and civil society building initiatives within the larger context of foreign assistance for security cooperation objectives, but this must not be the sole focus.

Recent research regarding the relationship between military aid and the incidence of terrorism suggests that too much military aid can contribute to the issue of terrorism in the receiving country. Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks found that increasing amounts of military aid to foreign nations is associated with an increase in anti-American terrorists.<sup>23</sup> Their data suggest the causal mechanism to be that recipient governments become less responsive to aggrieved populations and more unwilling to undertake rent-seeking policies when their funding is supplemented by military aid. This insight provides another dynamic regarding effective counterterrorism policy and state capacity to monitor and address terrorist threats through military means, and highlights the interconnected nature between effective governance, economic opportunity, military policy and practice and the incidence of terrorism abroad.

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<sup>22</sup> Katerina Dalacoura, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977367>.

<sup>23</sup> Eugen Dimant, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks, "Paying Them to Hate US: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Anti-American Terrorism, 1968–2014." *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639277>, 29.

Further recent research into the matter of state capacity from Larue and Danzell provides an even more detailed examination of state capacity. Their analysis defines state capacity as a measure of state fragmentation or cohesion regarding the state's ability to deliver consistent governance under the rule of law and respond to popular grievances. Their results show correlation between less fragmentation and a reduction in terrorist events, with more fragmentation being associated with a greater incidence of terrorism, of both transnational and domestic varieties.<sup>24</sup> This bolsters the arguments of Dimant et al. regarding the need for states to maintain responsiveness to the population's grievances. Together, the research suggests that effective security cooperation policy to address terrorism through capacity building needs to be carefully weighed against encouraging corruption or disincentivizing rent-seeking behaviors in the Partner Nation governments. Further, military aid and engagement should undergo additional scrutiny to ensure that increased state capacity in the form of greater state resources and activity in the security sector does not grant undue influence to the military or security establishments at the expense of the rule of law.

With the origins of terrorism far from definitely diagnosed, national security strategists may do well to craft counterterrorism strategies that ameliorate the effects of terrorism and work with foreign partners to reduce reactionary policies that inadvertently encourage terrorism as a method to affect political change, despite not having a clearly defined causal mechanism founded in rigorous research findings. A balanced approach that addresses the complex interplay between state responsiveness through effective governance, the importance of the rule of law, and that above all recognizes that broadly terrorists choose terrorism because they deem it to have the greatest likelihood of eliciting the desired response from the state should guide policymaking decisions.

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<sup>24</sup> Patrick Larue and Orlandrew Danzell, "Rethinking State Capacity: Conceptual Effects on the Incidence of Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, July 13, 2020, 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1776702>, 13.

## 2. Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management

The academic debate regarding humanitarian crisis management will be limited in this analysis to those activities conducted by military forces, and the wisdom and efficacy of using such forces for crisis management. Much debate has centered around using the military, whose primary mission is warfighting through identifying the threat and neutralizing it, in a situation where a country's own citizens may be deemed threatening. Critiques of using the military in humanitarian crisis response, especially in states with weak democratic institutions or highly divided societies, point to issues regarding the military forces may abuse their power under the martial law, authoritarian rule that may not end once the crisis is under control, politicization of aid through association with the military.<sup>25</sup>

The counterargument is that the military “is uniquely postured to provide this assistance because of assets such as transport ships and aircraft, medical personnel, engineering equipment and search and rescue expertise.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally, U.S. supporters of these operations during humanitarian crises argue that military forces operated under the guidance and control of civilian leadership and at the direction of federal crisis management organizations as augmented resources, not the lead agency.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, critiques of employing military forces during humanitarian crises point out in certain limited circumstances, there are benefits to the involvement of military forces that strengthen response efforts and reduce human suffering. However, the counter arguments

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<sup>25</sup> Daniel Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” *Survival* 43, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 97–114. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713660351>; Graham Heaslip and Elizabeth Barber, “Using the Military in Disaster Relief: Systemising Challenges and Opportunities,” *Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management* 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 60–81. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JHLSCM-03-2013-0013>; S. J. Pettit and A. K. C. Beresford, “Emergency Relief Logistics: An Evaluation of Military, Non-Military and Composite Response Models,” *International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications* 8, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 313–31 (continued on next page) <https://doi.org/10.1080/13675560500407325>; Thomas Weiss and Kurt Campbell. “Military Humanitarianism.” *Survival* 33, no. 5 (September 1, 1991): 451–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339108442612>.

<sup>26</sup> David Vergun, “Humanitarian Operations Save Lives, Build Goodwill,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, April 15, 2019. <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/Story/Article/1814289/humanitarian-operations-save-lives-build-goodwill/>.

<sup>27</sup> Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies. “Chapter 1: Introduction to Security Cooperation.” In *The Management of Security Cooperation*, 39th ed. Accessed August 1, 2020. [https://www.dscu.mil/documents/publications/greenbook/01\\_Chapter.pdf?id=1](https://www.dscu.mil/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf?id=1), 10.

regarding the use of military forces to secure the neutral space in humanitarian crises point out that humanitarian aid groups are increasingly identified as supporting or complicit with the military forces that facilitate their operations.<sup>28</sup> Thus, when the military is used in support of civilian humanitarian crisis operations, the humanitarian principle of neutrality is compromised and the operation's success jeopardize.<sup>29</sup> When military forces and their associated governments control access to the neutral space, it could incentivize those governments to manipulate this access and the suffering of the populations for national self-interest at the expense of humanitarian operations.<sup>30</sup>

There is a grey middle ground between practicality of resource utilization, and ideology of the ethics regarding the military's nature and proper role debated in the absence of crisis. This dichotomy is quite artificial, and crumbles under the requirements of action that humanitarian crises create, with no easy answer as to how best avoid the pitfalls. Additionally, considerations in weak states may be significantly different due to the nature of military power upon governance and thus the analysis in this thesis will evaluate each case study Partner Nation upon the framework of state capacity to maintain effective political control to limit military influence over the political environment during a humanitarian crisis.

### **3. The Intersection between Terrorism and Human Suffering**

This section will further explore the potential link between human suffering during periods of crisis and how it affects the incidence of terrorism. How can (in)effective humanitarian crisis management affect the incidence of terrorism? How can counterterrorism policy reduce the likelihood of terrorism-related humanitarian crises? What role can effective bilateral military cooperation play in mitigating the threats to national security of both terrorism and mass human suffering events? The following paragraphs will explore the academic research regarding the ability of states to build

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<sup>28</sup> Richard Barrett, "Contesting the Neutral Space—a Thematic Analysis of Military Humanitarianism," Accessed August 27, 2020, [https://www.academia.edu/34432435/Contesting\\_the\\_Neutral\\_Space\\_a\\_thematic\\_analysis\\_of\\_military\\_humanitarianism](https://www.academia.edu/34432435/Contesting_the_Neutral_Space_a_thematic_analysis_of_military_humanitarianism), 20.

<sup>29</sup> Barrett, "Contesting the Neutral Space," 20.

<sup>30</sup> Barrett, "Contesting the Neutral Space," 21.

capacity in their law enforcement, homeland security, and military forces to create protective measures to disincentivize terrorism and build resilience to terrorism acts that do occur to mitigate human suffering.

The last two decades have provided a growing body of research into the links between human suffering and the incidence of political violence. Studies in this field have shown that increasing numbers of refugees in a host nation contribute to greater civil unrest and conflict in that state,<sup>31</sup> but the increased challenges of hosting refugees does not result in an increase in terrorism across all instances.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, states fearing unrest and destabilization often seek to curtail rights and repress populations in a preemptive attempt to control the situation.<sup>33</sup> Thus, states in the midst of a humanitarian crisis may encounter a flood of humanitarian aid that increases the likelihood of corruption, use of terror tactics to control this resource, and further state repression which could drive radicalization.<sup>34</sup>

When states are faced with decisions on how to respond in the wake of a terrorism incident, it is important to remember the feedback loop between human suffering, radicalization, and the incentivization of terrorism as a tool for political action. Research shows that states are able to play an important role in the trajectory of the crisis in the way that policymakers respond to the crisis, and communicate their counterterrorism efforts in response to, or the face of, ongoing threats.<sup>35</sup> De Graaf concludes that “government statements and memoranda [communicating counterterrorism policy] are not mere texts:

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<sup>31</sup> Seung-Whan Choi and Idean Salehyan, “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 1 (February 2013): 53–75, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212456951>; Idean Salehyan, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization* 60, no. 2 (2006): 335–66; Lebson, Mike. “Why Refugees Rebel: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Refugee Militarization.” *International Migration* 51, no. 5 (October 2013): 133–48. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00780.x>.

<sup>32</sup> Whitaker, Beth Elise. “Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 38, no. 2–3 (June 2003): 211–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002190960303800205>.

<sup>33</sup> Ragnhild Nordås and Christian Davenport, “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013): 926–40.

<sup>34</sup> Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks, “Paying Them to Hate US”; Barber, Ben. “Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid.” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 4 (1997): 8. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20048117>.

<sup>35</sup> International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “Evolutions in Counter-Terrorism Volume I: Reflections from the Last Decade,” The Hague, Netherlands, n.d. Accessed December 2, 2020.

they create reality”<sup>36</sup> regarding the nature and scope of the threat and who should feel threatened.

This process of defining the threat in order to justify policy has important implications for counterterrorism policy as it relates to humanitarian crises. If displaced, minority, or foreign populations are defined as synonymous with, or sympathetic to the terrorist actors as defined by state policy, social conflict can be elevated domestically between “threatened” populations, and “threatening” populations.<sup>37</sup> Thus, governments must not only create humanitarian policies that address the social, political, and economic needs of displaced populations during crises, they must also communicate any policy responses in a way that does not exacerbate the problems associated in a way that makes terrorism a more attractive political action.

Not only does the policy definition of the terrorism threat matter, and the careful consideration of the nuances of at-risk populations in a humanitarian crisis related to terrorism is paramount. For example, traditional views of humanitarian crises stemming from terrorism have often considered youth and women to be victims of these violent acts, and therefore are treated in policy as recipients of aid and protection.<sup>38</sup> Research and data over the last nearly two decades of counterterrorism efforts has shown that this assumption and treatment of a vast swath of vulnerable populations has been detrimental to the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. For example, a full 20% of terrorism plots and suspect arrests involved women, and the voluntary population of women immigrants to the Islamic State caliphate demonstrates that certain terrorist groups have molded effective messaging policies that attract significant numbers of women.<sup>39</sup> In the growing awareness of this reality, U.S. Central Command has formulated a priority specifically to

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<sup>36</sup> International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “Volume I: Reflections from the Last Decade,” 2.

<sup>37</sup> International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “Volume I: Reflections from the Last Decade,” 4.

<sup>38</sup> Moussa Bourekba, “Overlooked and Underrated? The Role of Youth and Women in Preventing Violent Extremism,” Research Report, Notes Internacionales, Barcelona, Spain: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, November 2020, 2. [https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication\\_series/notes\\_internacionales/240/overlooked\\_and\\_underrated\\_the\\_role\\_of\\_youth\\_and\\_women\\_in\\_preventing\\_violent\\_extremism2](https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionales/240/overlooked_and_underrated_the_role_of_youth_and_women_in_preventing_violent_extremism2).

<sup>39</sup> Bourekba, “Overlooked and Underrated? The Role of Youth and Women in Preventing Violent Extremism,” 3.

address the risks associated with improperly managing the care and support for violently displaced persons during counterterrorism operations, or as different actors in the area conduct military operations to reestablish control.<sup>40</sup>

Taken together, this body of research suggests that effective humanitarian crisis management must address the pitfalls of the possibility of aid encouraging corruption, decreasing state responsiveness to popular grievances to address social conflict, and encouraging state repression and abrogation of the rule of law. Additionally, counterterrorism policy needs to address the nuances in at-risk populations, like specifically accounting for women's concerns, in order to mitigate radicalizing messages from terrorist organizations that fill the historic void of governments' policies in this dimension. These capacity building efforts to aid Partner Nations in building their institutions to manage human suffering must recognize the delicate balancing act of ameliorating the effects of crises, but not encouraging negative state actions that at the same time incentivize the use of terrorism to effect political change.

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<sup>40</sup> United States Central Command, "Command Priorities," Accessed January 29, 2021, <https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMMAND-PRIORITIES/>.

### **III. INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU'S STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM**

#### **A. PROGRAM ORIGINS**

The roots of the SPP emerged at the end of the Cold War with what were known Military Liaison Teams (MLT) under the U.S. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) as a “method to establish direct contact with defense ministries and armed forces structures”<sup>41</sup> in Central and Eastern European nations newly independent of the USSR. The MLTs worked in small groups to travel to these former Soviet states under familiarization visits (FAM), designed to exchange information about each military’s practices. These FAMs are a crucial and enduring aspect of the SPP that continue throughout all partnerships through today, despite the change in focus from democratic institution building through military-to-military engagement to whole-of-government security cooperation through shared objectives.

#### **B. GUIDING DOCUMENTS**

The SPP authorized in U.S. Code per Title 10, Section 341 and gives the Secretary of Defense the authority, with concurrence of the Secretary of State, to establish a program between state NGs and Partner Nations’ military, security forces, or other governmental organizations whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response, in order to support U.S. security cooperation objectives.<sup>42</sup> Importantly, per the above, all engagements in foreign countries require that “the member is on active duty in the Armed Forces at the time of such participation,”<sup>43</sup> and thus they are acting in a federal, not state, capacity. The SPP is governed by DOD Instruction 5111.20 State Partnership Program, which delineates the responsible parties and their authorities, and provides an overview of the program management and requirements. The SPP’s central management guide is pending approval, but a draft of the document provides important insight as to the current

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<sup>41</sup> Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 4.

<sup>42</sup> Armed Forces.

<sup>43</sup> Armed Forces.

state of management, processes, and authorities. The entirety of the program’s effort falls under the strategic guidance of the NSS, and the military’s execution falls under the direction of the doctrine in JP 3-20 Security Cooperation, details of which were discussed in the previous chapter. The current Mission Statement of the SPP is:

The State Partnership Program supports the security cooperation objectives of the United States and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) by developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out activities to build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging challenges.<sup>44</sup>

### C. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

This section discusses the SPP-level objectives for SC, not specific objectives at the partnership level, which will be addressed in the following chapter. The SPP is designed to partner a state’s NG with a “friendly or allied nation...to share responsibilities for promoting peace and security.”<sup>45</sup> The partnerships and annual engagements “promote national objectives, stability, partner capacity, and better understanding and trust between the United States and foreign countries.”<sup>46</sup> The SPP is designed to utilize some of the greatest strengths of the NG over active-duty (AD) military units to achieve security cooperation objectives. Primarily, the NG is less expensive to maintain personnel, capabilities, and functions than AD,<sup>47</sup> the personnel are more stable in their positions and thus more apt to build lasting relationships,<sup>48</sup> and the NG has more linkages and access to resources in the civilian sector through the citizen-soldier model.<sup>49</sup> These aspects are

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<sup>44</sup> J53 Security Cooperation Office, “Draft Fiscal Year 2021 SPP Management Guide,” September 1, 2020, 4.

<sup>45</sup> Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 14.

<sup>46</sup> Government Accountability Office, *State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners*, Accessed November 1, 2019, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590840.pdf>, 1.

<sup>47</sup> James Barkley, “State Partnership Program: Enduring in Post Conflict, Fiscally Constrained Environment.” Army War College, PA, March 2013. <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA588589>, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Christopher Lawson, “National Guard State Partnership Program: A Means for Statecraft,” Army War College, PA, March 24, 2011, <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA560100>, 16.

<sup>49</sup> Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 1.

brought to bear on the whole-of-society strategic efforts spearheaded through the Department of State and reliant on the NSS guidance.

#### **D. PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS**

The SPP is managed by the NGB and executed by the CCMD within which the Partner Nation falls. The NG forces of each state within an SPP relationship provide the personnel required to support annual engagements, augmented as needed by the civilian sector or other government agencies in both countries to achieve the specific objectives of engagements. The following paragraphs will discuss how a partnership is established and executed on a standard basis, and Chapter IV will elaborate on the nuances of each partnership under study.

##### **1. Establishing a Partnership**

Foreign countries that wish to partner with the U.S. for particular security cooperation concerns will submit a formal request to the U.S. Ambassador, who must concur that the partnership and the objectives suggested by the requesting nation are in the best interest of the U.S.' national security. Then, the request is sent to the CCDR, who reviews the request from the perspective of defense capabilities, and if they concur, the request is sent to the Chief of the NGB for review and concurrence.

At the NGB level, a review and solicitation for volunteers from the state NGs is distributed. This solicitation details which security cooperation objectives the requesting nation is interested in pursuing. Thus, each state is able to partner with nations that share similar interests and challenges. Finally, after a state is recommended for partnership, the entire process is reversed with every previous party reviewing the final details of the partnership. Upon approval by the requesting Partner Nation, the engagements in support of the defined objectives are able to take place. Figure 2 provides a visual depiction of the partnership establishment process.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 25.




Figure 2. Establishing a SPP Partnership <sup>51</sup>

## 2. Maintaining Partnerships

Each SPP is planned on an annual basis through bilateral engagements. The engagements are designed to “build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging challenges.”<sup>52</sup> The activities occur across a range of security cooperation objectives and align with:

- The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) encompassing the Partner Nation’s geographic area
- The U.S. Chief of Mission’s (COM) objectives
- The Military Departments’ interoperability and training missions and objectives
- The Partner Nation’s national security objectives<sup>53</sup>

Frequency of engagements varies annually based on the wider national security objectives for the CCMD, the priorities of the leadership of state’s NG, the Partner Nation’s leadership and commitment, and contemporary demands on the program. This flexibility in the number and type of engagements to fit the current context’s demands and emerging

<sup>51</sup> Source: Boehm, 25.

<sup>52</sup> J5 International Affairs Division, *The State Partnership Program 101*, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Department of Defense, *State Partnership Program*, 3.

priorities is touted as one of the greatest strengths of the program.<sup>54</sup> However, the SPP as a strategic security cooperation program of record is taking steps to move away from the year-to-year planning model in some important ways as problems the SPP has encountered throughout the decades are being resolved. Further details regarding the case studies' annual engagement frequency and type will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the event that one partner no longer wishes to maintain the partnership, the bilateral program goes dormant and the funding is allocated elsewhere.

### **3. Funding the SPP**

Historically, the SPP has faced issues stemming from the way in which the program is funded and how funding interacts with program management and manning. This section will detail the intricacies of SPP funding and how it creates challenges in meeting national security cooperation objectives. The SPP is managed by the NGB, and the stable-state program management personnel are sourced from the NG. However, engagements with Partner Nations are funded through COCOM Operations and Maintenance (OM) funds. Significantly, the NG personnel must be on active duty (Title 10) orders when they participate in engagements overseas. Thus, a problem in funding is created when moving personnel from Title 32 to Title 10 status, as the care and feeding of these personnel is not captured within OM funds, nor is it accounted for in authorizations under traditional NGB funding streams. Furthermore, engagements are designed to meet specific objectives, which are associated with different authorities. Therefore, any “activity that relies on multiple security cooperation authorities must comply with all legal and policy requirements for each authority relied on, and use the appropriate funding for each authority.”<sup>55</sup> The intricacies of complex engagements spanning multiple objectives complicate planning and manning the activities appropriately in order to utilize the best personnel available to optimize each engagement.

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<sup>54</sup> Lawson, “National Guard State Partnership Program,” 10.

<sup>55</sup> J53 Security Cooperation Division, “Draft Fiscal Year 2021 SPP Management Guide,” 18.

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## **IV. THE SPP PARTNERSHIP CASE STUDIES**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides a brief Partner Nation and regional-specific overview of the major security cooperation challenges faced by the Partner Nations. It will also provide a detailed historical analysis of the origins, objectives, and annual execution of each case study partnership within the context of domestic and regional security cooperation trends. This context seeks to illuminate the circumstances influencing the trajectory of the partnership and identify the extent to which each partnership is able to tailor its execution in response to regional and domestic events affecting Partner Nation-domestic, regional, and U.S. national security priorities. Documentation regarding the specific partnership objectives and program establishment and evaluation criteria is not available at the unclassified, unrestricted level. However, it is worth emphasizing that all partnerships' objectives must be aligned with the TCPs, as well as DOD, COM, and Partner Nation security cooperation objectives. Therefore, this chapter will rely on press releases covering partnership engagements, published program data, and documents published by the DOD, COM, Partner Nation, and CCMDs to construct a reasonable picture regarding program objectives.

### **B. THE COLORADO NATIONAL GUARD-JORDAN SPP**

#### **1. Jordan and the Middle East Context**

Jordan sits in a strategically important position, both geographically and politically, for U.S. interests in the region. Though many crises have beset the Kingdom since its creation in 1921, it has navigated a delicate course that balances the competing pressures of Arab and Western interests in the region. Throughout the decades, Jordan has maintained communication with the United States, and in the last two decades the relationship has strengthened and grown notably. Jordan's primary security concerns relate to regional destabilization from the ongoing Palestinian crisis, upheaval in Syria, and regional power

struggles in the form of Iran and Yemen especially.<sup>56</sup> However, the way in which Jordan conceives of its national security over the decades has evolved. Historically, it prioritized traditional security threats like armed conflict, but now focuses on an approach emphasizing the belief that “stability and prosperity in the political, economic, social, technical, media and environmental fields are considered the true pillars of national security.”<sup>57</sup> The pivot from overt armed threats in the form of war and violence to addressing societal weaknesses in many realms as preconditions to stability and security is of critical importance to this work’s analysis regarding U.S.-Jordan cooperation under the SPP. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of those societal weaknesses and challenges is necessary to place the efforts of the SPP into its proper context.

Jordan must deal with a significant refugee population— nearly 3 million formally registered with the UN Refugee Agency and the UN Relief and Works Agency<sup>58</sup>— displaced mostly from Israel-occupied Palestine, Syria, and Iraq from numerous crises since the country’s creation. The social, economic, and political ramifications of such a large refugee population demand careful national security planning and practice to ensure that the humanitarian situation is effectively managed. As the previous chapters suggest, the intersection of humanitarian crises and terrorism dictate that Jordan must effectively balance the grievances of Jordanians and refugees, with limited resources and a challenging regional context already beset by extremist terrorist movements. However, Jordan perhaps has a relative advantage over its neighboring states with regard to responsiveness to the populations’ demands, as it has never been lulled into the security of a resource-rich rentier state, and already has some representative elections. In reality, though, democratic institutions are effectively very limited in terms of opposition party participation and the

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<sup>56</sup> Jeremy Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report No. RL33546 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 18.

<sup>57</sup> Mamdoh Suleiman Al-Ameri, “Jordan’s National Security Strategy,” *Jordan Times*, August 4, 2020, <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/mamdoh-suleiman-al-ameri/jordans-national-security-strategy>.

<sup>58</sup> “UNHCR Continues to Support Refugees in Jordan throughout 2019,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, December 31, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/jo/12449-unhcr-continues-to-support-refugees-in-jordan-throughout-2019.html>; “Where We Work,” United Nations Relief Works Agency, Accessed February 22, 2020, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan>.

real power wielded by the elected House of Representatives.<sup>59</sup> This limited groundwork of democratic institutions and the potential for representation in government could provide a meaningful option to populations with grievances that might otherwise turn to violence, if they perceived that the path would be more effective.

Jordan is challenged not only by the demands of an enormous displaced population, but by the constraints imposed by the nation's geographic location. Jordan is resource-poor in comparison to other regional actors, and faces shortages of arable land, water, and traditional energy resources to support its growing population.<sup>60</sup> The U.S. Government has shown consistent interest in encouraging public-private bilateral partnerships with Jordanian firms to address these challenges in a mutually beneficial way, specifically through Memorandums of Understanding that provide assistance funds for this purpose.<sup>61</sup> Overall, the United States has provided over approximately \$24 billion in bilateral assistance to Jordan since beginning economic and military assistance in 1951 and 1957, respectively.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, decades of crisis and questionable economic policies have created a growing threat of fiscal crisis due to national debt and balance of payments resulting from limited economic options.<sup>63</sup>

Jordan's attempts to address the brewing debt crisis resulted in a program of neo-liberalist economic reform at the end of the 20th century, which is ongoing and has had consequences on both the Jordanian military and the populace. The government sought to impose economic austerity measures, which had the unintended side effect of contributing to social unrest due to the abrogation of the existing social contract between Jordan's citizens and the monarchy: economic welfare support in return for authoritarian

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<sup>59</sup> Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, 3.

<sup>60</sup> *Jordan: A Key U.S. Partner: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, February 11, 2016, 4.

<sup>61</sup> H., *Jordan: A Key U.S. Partner*: 3–5.

<sup>62</sup> Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, 2.

<sup>63</sup> World Bank Group, *Country Partnership Framework for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for FY17-FY22*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/528081467900685594/pdf/102746-CAS-R2016-0124-OUO-9-Box396270B.pdf>, 3.

governance.<sup>64</sup> As Baylouny notes, this popular disquiet of previous regime-backers that came from breaking the contract was met not with greater democratization as a method of containing the movement, but rather an increase in reliance upon and strengthening of the military and security institutions.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the military and the regime are even more tightly intertwined. All of these factors pose significant challenges to the monarchy under King Abdullah II in creating a political system that is capable of addressing myriad grievances, a contentious social dynamic, and real threats to national security in the form of regional instability and domestic terrorism.

It is important to note that the United States itself sits in a precarious position at the time of this writing with regard to its influence on Jordanian and regional affairs, and how they impact the domestic and regional security context. A changing relationship between the United States and Israel under President Trump exacerbated old points of conflict in the Arab world regarding Israel-occupied Palestinian territory, and stressed the limits of the Kingdom's willingness to maintain the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty.<sup>66</sup> In 2017, the Trump Administration declared recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, overturning nearly three decades of established policy, and throwing the international community into disarray.<sup>67</sup>

This development, in combination with decision in November 2019 to rescind a 1978 State Department legal opinion that stated Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank were inconsistent with international law, has caused great anger in Palestinian and Arab populations towards the United States as apparent Middle East peace-broker.<sup>68</sup> This reaction amongst Palestinian supporters was further solidified upon the unveiling of the

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<sup>64</sup> Anne Marie Baylouny, "Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 277–303, <https://doi.org/10.3751.62.2.15>, 277.

<sup>65</sup> Baylouny, "Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy," 278.

<sup>66</sup> Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, 5–6.

<sup>67</sup> Security Council, *United Nations Position on Jerusalem Unchanged, Special Coordinator Stresses, as Security Council Debates United States Recognition of City*, 8128th Meeting, security cooperation/13111 (New York, NY: United Nations, 2017), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13111.doc.htm>.

<sup>68</sup> Richard Gonzales, "State Department Loosens U.S. Policy On Israeli Settlements In West Bank," *NPR.Org*, November 18, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/11/18/780587255/state-department-loosens-u-s-policy-on-israeli-settlements-in-west-bank>.

January 2020 “Peace to Prosperity” plan forwarded by the Trump Administration. Though the plan had no realistic chance of being adopted, it solidified the perception of favoritism by the United States towards Israel’s political and security goals at the expense of Palestinians and the surrounding Arab nations, especially those hosting large populations of displaced Palestinians.<sup>69</sup>

Jordan has so far limited overt criticism of the Trump Administration’s Israel policy as it relates to Palestinian territories. However, the United States’ current stance supporting or tacitly condoning Israel’s efforts to exert greater control over occupied territories could have dire implications for the U.S.-Jordan relationship. The perception that the United States is not an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process may jeopardize the acceptance and support of U.S. security cooperation activities in the region. The public relations backlash from the Peace to Prosperity 2020 plan have the potential to undermine counterterrorism goals by providing a rallying cry for extremist organizations that target both the U.S. and U.S.-friendly governments. It may also impair the joint Jordan-U.S. effort to mitigate the humanitarian crises besetting Jordan and region more broadly, as the displaced Palestinian populations grow increasingly aggrieved with the Jordanian government as they sense the likelihood of repatriation or a Palestinian state slipping further from the realm of possible. Thus Jordan, as host to millions of Palestinian refugees, faces a growing challenge of effective governance and state capacity to support that population long term, while simultaneously meeting the challenges of supporting the Jordanian population in a resource scare and instable region.

## **2. Colorado National Guard—Jordan Partnership**

a. Origins. The CONG-Jordan Partnership was established in 2004 and grew out of the working relationship solidified in response to 9/11 attacks and a shared interest around aviation.<sup>70</sup> Today, the relationship spans from military and civilian expert exchanges, to aviation, to leadership and women in the military.

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<sup>69</sup> Gilead Sher and Daniel Cohen, *Is There a Practical Roadmap for Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” Vision?* (Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2020), 1.

<sup>70</sup> Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 43.

b. Objectives. This section will explore the strategic objectives established by the U.S. COM in Jordan, the TCP, and the DOD regarding security cooperation between Jordan and the United States. For CENTCOM, the TCP strategy is found in the Posture Statement of the CENTCOM Commander. For the purposes of this analysis, only the pertinent sections will be discussed as they intersect with humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism efforts in Jordan. CENTCOM is postured to “mitigate the risks associated with these [IDP, refugee, and Syrian Democratic Forces] populations by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure,” but it recognizes that “military solutions do not exist” once radicalization takes hold of large populations,<sup>71</sup> and thus there is a heavy emphasis on cooperative preemptive policy. Therefore, it is essential to note how the Posture Statement fits in with the COM priorities for Jordan, and Jordan’s own national security interests, as discussed in the first part of this chapter.

The U.S. Embassy in Jordan provides the focal point of bilateral relations and efforts to further U.S. national security interests in Jordan. Per the Embassy, the U.S. recognizes the special role that Jordan plays as a moderating and stabilizing force in the region against extremism and human suffering.<sup>72</sup> As such, the United States is “Jordan’s single largest provider of bilateral assistance”<sup>73</sup> and within this expansive web of assistance, engagement, and capacity building sits the long-standing SPP partnership.

c. Execution. The CONG-Jordan partnership is the region’s longest running partnership, but is also one of the entire program’s most successful and fruitful partnerships in terms of consistent engagement and reciprocity. This section will detail the types of engagements, and focus on how they have evolved with regards to changing regional and domestic challenges. It is, however, important to note that public records regarding the first

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<sup>71</sup> *Posture Statement of General Kenneth F. Mckenzie, Jr., Commander, United States Central Command*, House Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2020, <https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURE-STATEMENT/>

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Embassy in Jordan, “Policy & History,” Accessed November 18, 2020, <https://jo.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/>.

<sup>73</sup> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Jordan,” U.S. Embassy in Jordan, June 30, 2020, <https://jo.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/>.

several years of the program's engagements- from 2004 until 2012 -are unavailable. This record keeping deficiency was a central component of the Government Accountability Office's review of the program in 2012, which concluded that the ability to assess the program's effectiveness was severely undercut by this dearth of data.<sup>74</sup>

However, there are mentions of early endeavors and the partnership's influence on bilateral security cooperation more broadly. The SPP used the established partnership channels to more effectively tailor Jordanian support to coalition operations in Afghanistan through the mid-2000s and later. After identifying shortfalls in cross-cultural competency of U.S. personnel, the coalition leveraged Jordanian capabilities to establish Female Engagement Teams, which were able to access a part of society off-limits to the male-dominated deployment teams.<sup>75</sup> These teams also worked as outreach and education teams regarding messages of moderate Islam in order to counter radical violent Islamist teachings forwarded by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, in 2012, an engagement of Public Affairs personnel worked to create a program of social media that sought to create social media content for regional use to engage with civilian populations. The objective was to build mutual understanding through culturally sensitive press materials that reduce the potential of tension between military operations and the civilian populations that result in human suffering and opportunities for radicalizing propaganda.<sup>77</sup>

The focus on women's issues in society and the military featured heavily in engagements, with eight iterations of engagements of women leaders occurring between 2009–2012.<sup>78</sup> The series seeks to broaden the discussion on women's issues throughout society and has “included female congressional and business leaders from the Colorado

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<sup>74</sup> Government Accountability Office, *State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners*, 3.

<sup>75</sup> Jessica Geffre, “Jordan, Colorado National Guard Conduct First Public Affairs Exchange,” *National Guard*, May 18, 2012, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/575084/jordan-colorado-national-guard-conduct-first-public-affairs-exchange/>.

<sup>76</sup> Geffre, “CONG-Jordan PA Exchange.”

<sup>77</sup> Geffre, “CONG-Jordan PA Exchange.”

<sup>78</sup> Nicole David, “Colorado National Guard, Jordanian Armed Forces Conduct Eighth Women's Leadership Engagement.”

state legislature as well as female leadership of the Colorado Guard”<sup>79</sup> and the Jordanian military. The focus on women’s issues is particularly important regarding the intersection between military and civilian spheres for dealing with humanitarian crises and counterterrorism in Jordan. The professionalization of the military forces, with the traditional female gender roles of caring for the family and providing important aspects of childhood education regarding cultural norms, is an important asset. The relationship elevates women’s issues during the refugee crisis in Jordan, as the majority of refugees in Jordan are woman and children.<sup>80</sup> The line of communication, understanding, and empathy that the focus on these issues provides is among the many soft skills and benefits that the partnership provides in order to build trust between the partners and the communities they serve.<sup>81</sup> Evidence of the ongoing effort can be found in annual reports and public affairs releases through 2019.<sup>82</sup> In addition to more nuance capacity building of this nature, the partnership serves to build capacity in more tangible, measurable skills in the effort to mitigate the humanitarian refugee crises in Jordan, and aid in regional counterterrorism efforts.

The records for SPP engagements between CONG-Jordan become much more robust in 2015, after the institution of the annual report to Congress, as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014. The FY 2015 Annual Report to Congress highlights the 18 engagements conducted over the FY, and 33% of the engagements were focused on aviation competencies.<sup>83</sup> The focus on aviation is significant because Jordan seeks to utilize its aircraft in both regional counterterrorism activities and providing airlift support to regional humanitarian crises. The FY 206 Annual Report to

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<sup>79</sup> David, “Colorado National Guard, Jordanian Armed Forces Conduct Eighth Women’s Leadership Engagement.”

<sup>80</sup> IPSOS Group SA, *Unpacking Gender: The Humanitarian Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan* (New York, NY: United Nations Women Regional Office for Arab States, 2014), <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68233.pdf>, 5.

<sup>81</sup> David, “Colorado National Guard, Jordanian Armed Forces Conduct Eighth Women’s Leadership Engagement.”

<sup>82</sup> “The State Partnership Program Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report to Congress.” Congressional Report. (Arlington, VA, December 14, 2016), 20–1; “The State Partnership Program Fiscal Year 2016 Annual Report to Congress.” Congressional Report. (Arlington, VA, July 11, 2017), 20–1.

<sup>83</sup> Department of Defense, “SPP FY15 Report,” 20–1.

Congress demonstrates that Jordan and the CONG maintained a similar level of program activity—with 17 engagements.<sup>84</sup> The number of engagements focusing on aviation also remained at approximately one-third, with an emphasis on sharing information on best practices and interoperability. The following FYs’ reports are unavailable to the public; but Public Affairs releases show the continued interest and emphasis on aviation engagements within the partnership to improve counterterrorism efforts domestically and regionally.<sup>85</sup> The FY15 and FY16 annual reports also demonstrate an enduring commitment to the women’s leadership and social media programming efforts.<sup>86</sup>

## C. THE WEST VIRGINIA NATIONAL GUARD-QATAR SPP

### 1. Qatar and the Middle East Security Context

Qatar has long played a more limited role in regional security issues, given the country’s population and resource constraints. However, it is an important player in counterterrorism efforts regionally. Qatar’s domestic security context is very stable compared to many of its neighbors. It has successfully prevented terrorist attacks on its soil from Islamist extremist organizations that are more common in the region.<sup>87</sup> Additionally, it adheres to a counterterrorism strategy that balances military and internal security with “intensive investment in education and increasing economic opportunities” for populations, both domestically and internationally, who are more at-risk for radicalization.<sup>88</sup> However, these regional power struggles have resulted in Qatar pursuing policies that support radicalization and violent extremism in the region—such as close ties with Iran, Yemeni Houthi rebels, and Palestinian groups, which further exacerbates the intrastate competition and tensions.

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<sup>84</sup> Department of Defense, “SPP FY16 Report,” 20–1.

<sup>85</sup> Jim Greenhill, “Joint Training with Jordan a ‘Win-Win,’ Says General Lengyel,” *National Guard Bureau*, February 11, 2019, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/1753613/joint-training-with-jordan-a-win-win-says-gen-lengyel/>

<sup>86</sup> Department of Defense, “SPP FY15 Report,” 10; Department of Defense, “SPP FY16 Report,” 20.

<sup>87</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Qatar* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Accessed November 19, 2020), <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/qatar/>.

<sup>88</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Qatar*.

Qatar's contemporary experience within the region is fraught with contention in large part due to these ties. From mid-2017 until early 2021, the country was blockaded by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt for traffic by land, sea, and air. The crisis resulted from ongoing tensions stemming from allegations that Qatar foments unrest in the region through support of Islamist groups-especially the Muslim Brotherhood- and its relationship with Iran.<sup>89</sup> Throughout the crisis, the United States maintained the established ties with Qatar, and worked towards resolution of the crisis to balance its competing national security interests and ties to governments on both sides of the crisis. Though the blockade was recently lifted, there has not been significant progress made towards resolving the underlying conditions that led to its imposition in the first place, and thus the strategic dynamics remain tenuous. This demands that the United States weave a delicate path through its many relationships in the region in order to continue to forward its regional agenda.

The United States finds Qatar to be an important partner in countering Iran strategically.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the United States uses al-Udeid Air Base as headquarters for U.S. Central Command, and the airbase provides extensive staging capabilities for ongoing U.S. military operations throughout the greater Middle East and CENTCOM region. The United States leveraged the strategic opening that the schism between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors has created. Where once Qatar was much more economically dependent on regional imports, the United States now constitutes the largest supplier of imports to Qatar.<sup>91</sup> Thus, the United States receives significant economic and military support from the bilateral ties maintained with Qatar. This relationship with the United States is also critical to Qatar for a number of reasons.

Qatar has limited ability to provide for its own security and defend its sovereignty without powerful allies. According to the CIA World Factbook, the country is

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<sup>89</sup> "Qatar Blockade: Five Things to Know About the Gulf Crisis," *al-Jazeera*, June 5, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/qatar-blockade-five-things-to-know-about-the-gulf-crisis>.

<sup>90</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report No. R44533 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 9.

<sup>91</sup> Department of State, "ICS Qatar," 2.

comparatively tiny both geographically, at nearly the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut, and in population.<sup>92</sup> There are roughly 2.5 million people living in Qatar, but only between 11–12% of that population are citizens as of a 2015 census, with the remainder consisting largely of migrant workers. Qatar is able to support its citizens with extensive services and benefits through a robust patronage network funded by oil and gas reserves. The monarchy has deftly exploited these resources to raise the national profile and influence abroad, as well as to keep peace and stability at home, despite general and acute instability in the region throughout the decades since Qatar’s independence from Britain’s protectorate status. Qatar has rejected hosting large numbers of refugees from the various crises in Palestinian territories, Syria, and Iraq.<sup>93</sup> Thus, Qatar faces fewer challenges regarding direct management of refugee population and their associated grievances, or the popular grievances that refugees could trigger from the host population. However, Qatar is involved in regional humanitarian crisis management and alleviating human suffering through aid distributions. These activities fall outside the scope of the SPP relationship, but it is worth noting that Qatar plays an influential role through participation in regional affairs.

## **2. The WVNG—Qatar Partnership**

a. Partnership Origins. The diplomatic relationship between the United States and Qatar was established through cooperation in support of Iraq against Iran during the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War.<sup>94</sup> Bilateral affairs are managed by the U.S. Embassy in Doha. Qatar and the United States have a long history of military cooperation, especially with providing access for permanent staging and operations in the Middle East through al-Udeid Air Base, the largest American military base in the region, established in 1996.<sup>95</sup> This military cooperation facilitated the expansion of relations to creation of a SPP partnership in 2018.

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<sup>92</sup> “CIA World Factbook Qatar,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed November 16, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html>.

<sup>93</sup> “Qatar: Gulf’s First Refugee Asylum Law,” Human Rights Watch, October 30, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/30/qatar-gulfs-first-refugee-asylum-law>.

<sup>94</sup> Katzman, U.S. *Policy—Qatar*, 12.

<sup>95</sup> Katzman, U.S. *Policy—Qatar*, 12–13.

b. Partnership Objectives. The partnership is grounded in the same regional and national strategic guidance as that discussed in the section examining the CONG-Jordan SPP, since they fall within the same CCMD. Therefore, this section will only detail where the partnerships diverge at the nation-level as they pertain the COM and Qatari national security context specifically. Qatar’s national security context domestically and within the region is focused on regional balancing of powers, and resolving the humanitarian crises of the region, as discussed at the outset of this section. Further strategic objectives specific to Qatar governing the SPP objectives are directed by the State Department mission. The U.S. Embassy in Doha works to coordinate bilateral cooperation “on a wide range of regional and global issues. Qatar has played a constructive financial, political, and military role in addressing regional turmoil, and in partnership with the United States, has contributed to progress, stability, and prosperity in the region.”<sup>96</sup> The SPP partnership objectives are:

to increase military and diplomatic cooperation, develop and expand defense capabilities and mutually beneficial training interactions. In addition, the two entities [Qatar and WVNG] will work to increase interoperability of forces and deter and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities in the region.<sup>97</sup>

c. Partnership Execution. Given that the partnership is still nascent, it is difficult to ascertain the trajectory of the program at this time. The partnership was formally announced in May of 2018, so the budget allocations for annual engagement planning had already been doled out. Therefore, the initial engagements occurred in FY19. Additionally, little engagement has been able to take place during CY2020, due to the ongoing SARS-CoV-2 global pandemic. This means that the program had about 15 months in which to plan and execute engagements since its foundation. However, even given these time

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<sup>96</sup> Department of State, *U.S. Relations with Qatar* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-qatar/>.

<sup>97</sup> Zoe Morris, “Qatar, West Virginia Guard Establish New Partnership,” *U.S. Department of Defense News*, May 16, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1523739/qatar-west-virginia-guard-establish-new-partnership/>.

constraints, the participants have engaged in a small number of familiarization exchanges and subject-matter expert engagements.<sup>98</sup>

The first official engagement occurred in February 2019 and focused on aviation. Qatar and the WVANG shared information regarding capabilities, experiences, and training with the Qatari C-17A and C-130J transport aircraft.<sup>99</sup> Qatar focuses its transport capabilities on aiding in airlift operations during humanitarian crises and operations in support of their national security objectives, like counterterrorism or regional stabilization.<sup>100</sup> The participation of the WVANG aviators alongside their Qatari counterparts ensured that there is a broader basis of familiarity and understanding between the partners should coalition operations be required in the future that demand a high level of interoperability.

The SPP also works within larger, ongoing partnership efforts between the two countries under established security cooperation lines of effort. At the end of 2020, the WVNG SPP participated in the annual exercise Operation SPARTAN SHIELD, which seeks “to promote regional stability, increase joint capability among our friends and allies in the region, and to continue a long-standing partnership between the United States and Qatar.”<sup>101</sup> The personnel from the SPP brought expertise regarding military engineering and decision making processes in support of regional stability operations.<sup>102</sup> This type of engagement demonstrates the program’s construct to augment and complement existing security cooperation efforts, while bringing capabilities from the NG to active duty commands (CENTCOM, in this instance).

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<sup>98</sup> Edward Wriston, “W.Va. Guardsman Graduates Arabic Course in Qatar,” *National Guard Bureau*, September 3, 2020, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2335886/wva-guardsman-graduates-arabic-course-in-qatar/>.

<sup>99</sup> Holli Nelson, “West Va. Air Guard and Qatar Share Insights through Exchange,” *National Guard Bureau*, September 5, 2019, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/1952463/west-va-air-guard-and-qatar-share-insights-through-exchange/>.

<sup>100</sup> Global Security, “Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) Transports,” Accessed November 19, 2020, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/qatar-air-force-transport.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> Wriston, “WVNG Joins SPP Partner Qatar in Virtual Exercise.”

<sup>102</sup> Wriston.

## **D. THE MASSACHUSETTS NATIONAL GUARD-KENYA SPP**

### **1. Kenya and the West Africa Security Context**

Kenya, in comparison to the other two case study Partner Nations, arguably faces more daunting security challenges stemming from myriad issues domestically and regionally. The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index ranks Kenya as the 29th most fragile country out of 178 globally ranked.<sup>103</sup> However, much of Kenya’s security threat environment and the accompanying instability originates from the proximity to failed states, like Somalia (ranked 2nd globally for state fragility), and South Sudan (3rd), and Ethiopia (21st), and Uganda (24th).<sup>104</sup> The surrounding instability, as well as formidable domestic challenges that contribute to domestic instability will be covered as they impact the security environment and the SPP partnership in the humanitarian crisis and counterterrorism realms.

Kenya is sub-Saharan Africa’s third largest economy, bolstered by regional finance and transportation sectors, and a top tourism destination for the region.<sup>105</sup> However, though Kenya has a relatively larger economy in the region, it also suffers significantly from economic inequality. The World Bank estimates Kenya’s GINI Coefficient—the measure of income inequality in a country—is in the top 15–20% of all nations every year.<sup>106</sup> This extreme level of inequality demands effective governance to address economic grievances of a large, and growing, population where wealth, opportunity, and resources are not distributed equitably. However, this demand for effective governance and institutional capability has not been consistently met by the real capabilities of the government.

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<sup>103</sup> The Fund for Peace, “Country Dashboard | Kenya,” Fragile States Index, Accessed November 19, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

<sup>104</sup> The Fund for Peace, “Fragility in The World 2020,” Fragile States Index, Accessed December 9, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

<sup>105</sup> Lauren Blanchard, *In Focus: Kenya*, CRS Report No. IF10168 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10168.pdf>, 1.

<sup>106</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook Country Comparison GINI Coefficient,” The World Factbook, Accessed November 19, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html>.

Kenya's history as a British colony imparts significant challenges to institution building. First, the modern day nation state of Kenya did not exist in its territorial form prior to its creation as a British colony, and thus the people and government had no historical memory of nationhood to refer to after independence from Britain in 1968.<sup>107</sup> This is significant because an established sense of nationhood has been demonstrated to have a stabilizing effect on post-colonial governments by providing a historical reference point for normalcy and institutional expertise on how to govern once colonial direction departs.<sup>108</sup> Kenya is attempting to meet the challenges through democratic governance, but the record has been spotty with its implementation, and minority ethnic groups are often suspicious of the central government's commitment to representative governance.<sup>109</sup> President Kenyatta's ruling party has been frequently accused of oppressing opposition movements, perpetuating human rights abuses, and failing to address significant levels of government corruption, which has impeded some efforts at security cooperation between the United States and Kenya.<sup>110</sup> However, Kenya does play an important role regarding regional security cooperation to counter Islamist extremist terrorism in the region, from both al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda affiliates.

Kenya faces significant threats from Islamist extremist organizations operating in the region, which have frequently attacked military, government, and civilian targets. The groups undertake these attacks in an effort to destabilize the country and deter counterterrorism efforts, which Kenya does with a number of organizations, such as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab grew out of a militant Salafi group named al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) whose "core was a band of Middle East-educated Somali extremists that was partly funded and armed by al-Qaeda's chief, Osama bin Laden."<sup>111</sup> Additionally, the failure of Somalia's central government to control

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<sup>107</sup> Rollin Tusalem, "The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure," *Polity* 48, no. 4 (October 2016): 445–95, 470.

<sup>108</sup> Tusalem, "The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure," 463.

<sup>109</sup> Blanchard, *In Focus: Kenya*, 1.

<sup>110</sup> Blanchard, *In Focus: Kenya*, 2.

<sup>111</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, "Al-Shabab Backgrounder," *ForeignAffairs.com*, Accessed November 19, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab>.

affairs within its borders provides the potential for “collaboration among militant Islamist organizations in the region, including al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda”<sup>112</sup> in the permissive operating environment. This reality of the potential for terrorist networks to move from one permissive operating environment to another should they face effective counterterrorism policies demonstrates the need for policies that are sustainable and effective across many countries. The fall of ISIL’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria could push militants to seeks refuge in places like Somalia, directly threatening the stability of Kenya.

However, al-Shabaab is not the only group operating in the permissive region around Kenya, as the civil war and violence in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have contributed significant numbers of refugees to Kenya’s population. Additionally, the destabilizing effects of COVID have provided an additional hurdle to the government to maintain security in the nation while managing the crippling effects of economic lockdowns on the tourism industry and agricultural outputs, upon which a large portion of the economy depends. The World Bank estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased poverty rates by 4%, or created an additional 2 million poor people, in Kenya.<sup>113</sup>

## **2. MANG—Kenya Partnership**

**Origins.** The conjoined effects of political and social instability, along with the threat of terrorism, provided ample fodder for security cooperation initiatives under the SPP, and it is out of these drivers that the partnership arose. Specifically, for the purposes of this analysis, the focus is that MANG and Kenya partner to address capacity building in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response security cooperation efforts regionally and domestically.

**Objectives.** The AFRICOM Theater Strategy, produced in 2018 and providing strategic guidance through 2027, contains heavy emphasis on security through partnership.

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<sup>112</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “Al-Shabab Backgrounder.”

<sup>113</sup> World Bank Group, *Navigating the Pandemic*, Kenya Economic Update (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020). <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail, ii>.

Additionally, the biggest challenges identified in the strategy guidance are state fragility, violent extremist organizations, and U.S. access and basing options.<sup>114</sup> The MANG-Kenya SPP is specifically designed to meet the National Strategy for Counterterrorism guidance to “emphasize the use of all instruments of American power, with a focus on non-military capabilities” and “encourage working with a wide-range of partners in both the public and private sectors.”<sup>115</sup> Additionally, the first three of six TCP key approaches are directly supported by the partnership: 1) Strengthen Partner Networks; 2) Enhance Partner Capability; 3) Develop Security in Somalia.<sup>116</sup> These objectives set by the CCMD, and within the larger security and defense strategies, also dovetail with the U.S. Embassy mission in Kenya to “strengthen economic stability, security, health, education, environment, rule of law, and democratic governance in Kenya, as well as by countering violent extremism.”<sup>117</sup>

Significantly, there is a difference in emphasis between AFRICOM and CENTCOM regarding the extent to which large numbers of forces and materiel are dedicated in a permanent fashion to achieving security cooperation objectives in theater. The emphasis arises from the statement “AFRICOM works by, through, and with” U.S. partners in the CCMD Theater Strategy, which places particular emphasis on the partner nations being responsible for the vast majority of security cooperation operations.<sup>118</sup> The central driver with regard to AFRICOM is less willingness to place the burden of operations on the U.S. military, either in active duty or NGB roles and resources, to achieve the desired effects.

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<sup>114</sup> AFRICOM, *United States Africa Command: Theater Strategy 2018–2027* (Stuttgart, Germany: 2008), <https://www.africom.mil/document/33088/us-africa-command-theater-strategy-2018-2027p>, 3–4.

<sup>115</sup> *Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander United States Africa Command: Hearing before the Armed Services Committee, Senate, 116th Congress, 1st sess., February 7, 2019.* <https://www.africom.mil/document/31480/u-s-africa-command-2019-posture-statement>, 12.

<sup>116</sup> S., *Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser*, 13.

<sup>117</sup> Department of State, *U.S. Relations With Kenya* (Washington, DC: Bureau of African Affairs, 2020), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-kenya/>.

<sup>118</sup> AFRICOM, *Theater Strategy 2018–2027*, 4.

Execution. The partnership focuses primarily on capacity building and professionalization of the Kenyan military force. The first full year the program conducted engagements (FY16), there were nine activities that supported the CCMD Lines of Effort. Press releases regarding partnership engagements were not available on the National Guard Bureau news site, unlike information regarding the partnerships between CONG-Jordan and WVNG-Qatar. However, the MANG does utilize Facebook and other social media platforms to occasionally communicate information to the public regarding engagements. Features of the page include engagements designed to provide information sharing on “base defense, tactical convoys/internal convoy protection, and a collective CBRN training.”<sup>119</sup> These efforts demonstrate support of the strategic objective to create a more resilient Kenya with greater internal capacity to mitigate and respond to the regional terrorist threats, as well as prepare for any associated humanitarian disaster of a CBRN nature. However, the engagements were limited to military participants, as far as could be determined.

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<sup>119</sup> “Massachusetts National Guard State Partnership Program,” Facebook, Accessed December 3, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/Massachusetts-National-Guard-State-Partnership-Program-1751209748285864>.

## **V. ASSESSING THE CASE STUDIES WITHIN THE DOCTRINAL AND RESEARCH SECURITY COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS**

### **A. THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK**

This section assesses the case studies within the doctrinal framework provided by the discussion in Chapter II, Section 1. The objective of using the doctrinal framework of analysis is to identify where the SPP may deviate from doctrinal guidance, and therefore fail to align with stated national objectives and strategic guidance regarding how to leverage national resources to achieve those objectives. Importantly, national security strategy provides broad, ambitious vision regarding a nation's strategic priorities, and one must keep in mind that strategy reflects the perspective and values of the nation's leadership that is created it. For the U.S., the White House produces the NSS that is informed by and creates a narrative regarding the historical and ideological context that contributes to the contemporary state of affairs, as well as how the executive branch believes the desired end state can be achieved.

Effective security cooperation necessitates that two nations share at least some common perspective about the historical context that created joint national security priorities, and what means can be reasonably expected to effectively realize a positive outcome to achieve the shared vision. The job of the SPP is to translate this narrative understanding of complex security cooperation contexts, challenges, and objectives into actions to work towards a desired end state that meets both nations' vision through program construct and execution. A brief review of the key takeaways from Chapter II, Section I will help to maintain the focus of analysis in this section. Analyzing the programs through this framework will identify where programs have room for improvement, or are achieving national security strategy guidance.

#### *Doctrinal Framework Takeaways*

Security cooperation is a whole-of-government effort to expand the network of U.S. allies and partners in order to create more effective and efficient defense capabilities and improve security and stability globally. Within security cooperation, counterterrorism

policy focuses heavily on preemptive state capacity building in sectors outside of direct combat operations against threats. Terrorism and human suffering are inextricably linked, and neither security cooperation objective can be addressed without consideration to the unintended consequences that can manifest in the other.

### **1. CONG—Jordan SPP**

This partnership, perhaps unsurprisingly given its longevity and consistency of engagement, is the most developed and nuanced partnership, spanning extensive efforts in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. The array of exercises regarding aviation, crisis response, and professionalization of forces demonstrate that this particular partnership is working to fulfill the doctrinal guidance to coordinate whole-of-government efforts in security cooperation. Of specific note, the participation of female leaders outside of the military in the women's issues engagements highlights the careful consideration of other sources of expertise and experience that can provide a more holistic understanding of societal and military issues more broadly. Another example of effective whole-of-government efforts are evidenced in the social media messaging campaign that included not just Public Affairs personnel, but members of other governmental institutions as well that crafts coherent and consistent messaging across the governments.

The partnership also actualizes the doctrinal belief that military forces can have a value-added effect with regard to providing resources and expertise during humanitarian crisis response operations. The airlift aviation exchanges are of particular note in this regard because the coordinated assets of military airlift provide a capability largely unavailable to the private or non-governmental actors during ongoing crisis operations. Therefore, using the doctrinal framework of analysis, it is possible to conclude that the variety of participants across the spectrum of government and private sector and the diversity of engagements contained within this SPP partnership does embody the doctrinal guidance for effective security cooperation in the counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response objectives. Thus, the doctrinal framework suggests that the SPP in Jordan is well established within the national-level strategic guidance which is formulated to achieve objectives of countering terrorism and managing humanitarian crises through whole of

government efforts. The CONG-Jordan SPP embodies this framework and direction through consistent, robust participation of military, other governmental, and non-governmental personnel in engagements.

## **2. WVNG—Qatar SPP**

There is very little data available regarding the partnership with which to evaluate its performance within the doctrinal framework due to the relatively recent founding of the partnership. However, it is possible to see evidence that the partnership is firmly planted in the strategic guidance in that it is squarely focused on addressing the NSS objectives affecting the region in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. The significant consideration regarding how the WVNG-Qatar partnership deviates from the CONG-Jordan partnership is in the limited participation of non-military and non-governmental actors. This is perhaps because the program is nascent; but given that engagements have thus far been limited to military-to-military exchanges and military capabilities in pursuit of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management objectives, there is room for improvement and growth to meet the doctrinal guidance to leverage whole-of-government capabilities.

The WVNG-Qatar SPP, because Qatar supports humanitarian crisis operations in the region largely through monetary donations and outreach programs to the tune of billions of dollars,<sup>120</sup> should work to expand engagement participation more widely to include non-governmental personnel who are experts in effective crisis management operations and refugee support. This would ensure that resources across the spectrum of national power were more effectively synced and aware of military efforts and capabilities, and thus if a crisis were to occur, there would be fewer familiarization challenges that could seriously degrade crisis response. Furthermore, Qatar should look to programs like Jordan, which has branched outside of governmental sources regarding tackling difficult and changing societal issues, such as gender discrimination. Not only would diversifying SPP engagements benefit Qatar to better understand these challenges, but the U.S. personnel

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<sup>120</sup> Government Communications Office, “Qatar Foreign Policy.”

involved in the exchanges would be exposed to the nuances of Qatar's specific societal challenges and how they are managing them, which has the potential to improve U.S. policies and practices with regard to similar issues.

### **3. MANG—Kenya SPP**

This partnership differs slightly from the previous two analyzed because the CCMD guidance, nestled within the larger national security strategy, demonstrates that there is reluctance to dedicate the number of forces and resources to AFRICOM security cooperation operations that are provided to operations in CENTCOM. This is potentially a significant aspect of the SPP in AFRICOM and Kenya specifically. Because there are fewer security cooperation operations being conducted through other programs, the focus and emphasis of efforts is necessarily placed more on the SPP. However, the data regarding program execution, where available, demonstrates the lack of broad and creative utilization of the partnership framework to expand operations outside of engagements. The military engagements conducted thus far encompass military familiarization and professionalization which help the Kenyan security and defense forces to operate more effectively both domestically and abroad, especially the Horn of Africa.

Kenya's participation in AMISOM directly highlights their shared interest in the United States' national security priority of countering violent extremism in Somalia. The skills and capabilities that the SPP has helped to bolster are being immediately utilized against the regional threats of al-Shabaab, violent extremists fleeing from failed states like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and threatening Kenya's stability, as well as providing more robust domestic security capabilities. However, the engagements continue to focus heavily on military capability and response options, rather than creating a holistic approach to humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism. Significantly, the MANG-Kenya program could be expanded to deal especially with Kenya's weak democratic institutions in a manner that discusses civilian control of the military, rule of law in the use of military force, and appropriate utilization of military forces during peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Therefore, this analysis concludes that the MANG-Kenya program has great potential to be the focal point of efforts in security

cooperation between the two countries, but this opportunity has thus far not been seized fully.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Overall, this analysis finds that the SPP partnerships examined do reflect the values and strategic guidance of U.S. doctrine, which is the expression of the U.S. government's beliefs regarding how to effectively pursue security cooperation objectives. Specifically, the three programs examined were particularly noteworthy in their ability to bring together participants from each country's military entities. However, only the CONG-Jordan program demonstrated in the available data to regularly use the SPP's authorities to bring in a diverse array of participants both within and outside the government as appropriate to a single focal point with consistent engagement to meet established objectives in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response.

#### **B. THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK**

Security cooperation doctrine states emphasizes the belief that military-to-military engagements can “help democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure, and authoritarian states liberalize.”<sup>121</sup> However, as discussed in Chapter II, there are aspects of bilateral aid and engagement that can have adverse consequences in terms of state capacity and stability with regard to managing human suffering and counterterrorism efforts. This section will explore the SPP within the academic framework provided in Chapter II, Section II regarding the pitfalls of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management strategy, as well as assess how well the program navigates the complex interplay between these two phenomena across the three case studies. It bears repeating the highlights of the framework established in Chapter II, Section II regarding the key takeaways on terrorism/counterterrorism, humanitarian crisis management, and the intersection between the two security cooperation functions.

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<sup>121</sup> Derek Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security cooperation, and The Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Second (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 10.

### *Terrorism Takeaways*

Terrorism does not originate solely from economic deprivation or the actions clinically insane, or irrational, actors. In many instances, but not all, is the incidence of terrorism and support for terrorist groups associated with lower levels of democratic governance, rule of law, and state repression. States that are responsive to the grievances of their populations have lower incidence of terrorism, and foreign aid to support states that reduces state responsiveness and/or increases repressiveness, and undermines democratic norms has the potential to be counterproductive. Finally, terrorism is a political tactic of choice when conditions suggest that it will be the most effective means for the actors to achieve their goals.

### *The Military in Humanitarian Crisis Management Takeaways*

The military can provide effective and exclusive resources and expertise to managing a large-scale humanitarian crisis, but ill-conceived use of the military in humanitarian crises can exacerbate trends towards undemocratic norms in countries with weak democratic institutions. Further, use of the military can politicize aid and threaten aid operations through eliciting violent targeting of aid personnel and resources by armed opponents.

### *The Intersection of Humanitarian Crisis and Terrorism Takeaways*

Unresolved large-scale humanitarian crises increase domestic and regional instability, and increase the likelihood of state repression and undemocratic policies in response. During humanitarian crises, states can stoke or allay the tensions between host and hosted populations through the messaging of their policy decisions and practices. Effective humanitarian crisis management policy is holistic and tailored to nuance in the needs of the displaced populations—men, women, children for example—which addresses grievances that incentivize the use of terrorism to force political change.

#### **1. CONG-Jordan SPP**

The partnership between CONG-Jordan serves as a model that other partnerships should strive to emulate. The partnership as it is executed receives high marks for a number

of reasons when analyzed within the research framework. First, the partnership has branched out to including non-military participants on a consistent basis to augment engagements and contribute to a better understanding of the bilateral efforts to achieve counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis objectives. Second, the partnership has recognized the importance of creating a narrative regarding their efforts in these objectives that resonates across different sectors of society. Third, the military capacity building of Jordan's air forces through the SPP has realized greater capability for Jordan to conduct counterterrorism operations and humanitarian airlift in support of bilateral security objectives in the region. However, though the program has had significant and lasting progress in shaping and responding to issues in these areas, there are notes of caution regarding potential pitfalls.

Jordan is a monarchy and thus the capacity building and aid provided to it through the SPP, though very small, needs to be carefully monitored to assess whether it is creating incentives towards undemocratic governance. Additionally, the joint efforts of CONG-Jordanian SPP forces needs to continually be regarded within the larger context of the politicization of aid and whether the security cooperation operations are inducing terrorism by feeding counterproductive propaganda and narratives of terrorist threats. Overall, this SPP partnership would benefit from more analyses of annual engagements and feedback regarding the unintended consequences of security cooperation operations from academia and government sources alike.

## **2. WVNG-Qatar SPP**

The WVNG-Qatar partnership is quite new, and thus the analysis provides an important baseline with which to measure the trajectory and development over the coming years. Primarily, the partnership demonstrates the continued mutual focus on military aviation capabilities in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. However, given Qatar's government structure as an absolute monarchy, care should be taken to ensure that the security cooperation efforts do not have the adverse effect of inducing the government to reduce responsiveness to their population, or increase repressiveness. This partnership is the best case study with which to highlight the delicate nature of the intersection between

partnerships with non-democratic allies for counterterrorism efforts, and acknowledging the potential for seeding security issues of the future through these partnerships.

### **3. MANG-Kenya SPP**

This partnership is limited to military-to-military engagements, and thus would also benefit to expanding their participants to other sectors of government and society. Additionally, the security situation in Kenya- the fractured social and political landscape, the existing humanitarian crises, and the regional threats- demands greater coordination of efforts to ensure that operations in one area do not adversely affect another. Additionally, the comparative reticence of U.S. policymakers to commit U.S. resources and forces to directly address security challenges in East Africa further heightens this imperative. However, it should be kept in mind that limited resources and aid are not necessarily drawback. Kenya cannot rely on the United States to solve the security situation, and thus rent-seeking behaviors such as policy responsiveness maintain their importance. Additionally, fewer U.S. personnel and military operators in the country reduces the opportunity of damaging propaganda or politicization of the military presence in humanitarian crisis management efforts.

### **4. Conclusion**

The SPP as analyzed within the research framework shows a balanced approach to security cooperation that addresses many of the concerns highlighted in academia regarding the execution of security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. Specifically, the potential for the program to provide a singular focal point of operations across a broad array of actors could help provide the balance necessary to avoid the unintended consequences of foreign aid. The limited availability of funds for the SPP broadly necessitates prioritization of partnerships that are providing positive feedback to the decision-makers. It also helps to mitigate the pitfall of excessive aid to governments, which disincentivizes rent-seeking behavior and responsiveness to the receiving country's own population. The funding is not provided directly to the partner nation in order for it to fund its own pet programs. Rather, engagements are planned with detailed participant

rosters, objectives, and requirements on an annual basis and the partner nation's government is not at liberty to expend funds outside of this narrow engagement.

Additionally, as evidenced by the engagements of the CONG-Jordan program, there is a proven example to conduct an array of engagements with many different governmental and non-governmental partners. This example should be kept in mind by other programs less developed in longevity and scope as a blueprint for further operations that more elegantly address the competing and contradictory needs of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. The MANG-Kenya partnership especially could benefit from diversifying efforts to address the complex social, economic, and political challenges faced by the nation and region, as the program does not face the steep competition for resources and attention that the CENTCOM partnerships face. The WVNG-Qatar program rests on a stable domestic foundation, unlike that of the other two case studies. Therefore, great care should be taken to proactively assess the partnership for the potential to create problems where they currently do not exist, prior to expanding operations unduly.

### **C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The SPP case studies analyzed in this thesis combine policies that have great potential to provide a holistic, dynamic focal point in military-centered counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. However, the limited scope of execution in the MANG-Kenya and WVNG-Qatar programs should be addressed as to meet the doctrinal whole-of-government approach, which also coincides with better addressing the interconnected nature of terrorism and humanitarian crisis events. The CONG-Jordan program is well established and diverse, and by both framework measures, successful. However, care should be taken across the board to not extrapolate the success of a program that is comparatively small regarding budget and personnel and conclude that increasing these aspects will yield more success. Instead, continual evaluation of performance through thorough data collection and a constant evaluation of terrorism/counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management theories needs to be incorporated through the planning and execution processes of the SPP to provide the best chance at meaningful security cooperation results. Further, care should be taken in assessing this program to not focus

overly on creating assessment metrics that inadvertently demand the SPP become a crisis-response program. The nature of the program is to provide a stable, ongoing, and strategic engagement venue to allow for whole-of-government and whole-of-society resource concentration and synergy. Until very recently, the reactionary, under-planned, and unpredictable nature of funding and engagements undercut the program's ability to maintain strategic focus. In fact, the current Security Cooperation Branch Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rodriguez, at the NGB Headquarters level interviewed January 24, 2021 for this thesis cited the lack of predictable funding, and thus engagements, as the biggest challenge to success the program faces.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rodriguez, State Partnership Program Questionnaire.

## VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

### A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This analysis concludes that the SPP as executed between CONG-Jordan is effective, from both the doctrinal and research perspectives in bolstering counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response in Jordan. The WV-Qatar and MANG-Kenya partnerships are effective in the narrow scope of military-to-military engagement for the two security cooperation objectives assessed. However, they do not do enough to realize the whole-of-government doctrinal objective, and this limited focus also undermines their ability to meet measures of effective counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management under the academic research framework.

Another major shortfall identified in this analysis is the lack of data regarding program execution and assessment throughout a partnership's lifespan. The record-keeping inconsistency, and a failure to evaluate the program top-to-bottom and comparatively over the decades of its utilization is a missed opportunity to close the assessment loop to answer the question of whether the program actually moves the needle of progress towards achieving security cooperation objectives. Significantly, the DODI 5111.20 states that the Chief of the NGB must approve activities annually, and in coordination with approval, provide an assessment to what extent the previous year's activities made progress in achieving theater and country-specific objectives.<sup>123</sup>

There is very little publicly available information regarding the after-action evaluations of the program, and consistent program-wide or even partnership-level analyses of performance are not published. The only significant review of the program conducted by a governmental organization occurred in 2012 from the Government Accountability Office. Significantly, that review also identified the lack of records regarding program evaluation and standardization of records to be an issue. The SPP must overcome this significant deficiency in order to provide information to decision-makers to assess and address deficiencies or replicate success in a way that also makes the effort

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<sup>123</sup> Department of Defense, *State Partnership Program*, 9.

transparent and accessible to potential partners outside the narrow military or government channels already established. It is significant to note that this analysis, using both the doctrinal and academic frameworks, does lend some insight into program metrics that may be useful in assessing whether the program is designed and executed effectively both in terms of national security doctrine and strategy, as well as in line with the best research available regarding humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism.

First, the program needs to avoid setting metrics that force it into a crisis response organization. Rather than asking whether the SPP was involved in responding to a crisis, or terrorism-related incident, program assessments should seek to identify where skills and knowledge regarding security cooperation in these areas has been leveraged. If a humanitarian crisis develops in an SPP country, did the NG (or equivalent) respond with coordinated effort between non-governmental and governmental assets? Was the response politicized or propagandized? In the event of a terrorist attack, and the NG (or equivalent) responded, was the response appropriate in terms of respecting the rule of law and human rights, so as not to exacerbate the situation and potentially contribute to greater radicalization?

Second, metrics can be developed that are not tied to downstream effects and analysis. Instead, the SPP should focus on expanding engagement of non-governmental, and non-military, participants in engagements wherever possible. Furthermore, knowledge of the SPP is not extensive within the NGB. Billets are often dual-hatted, meaning that the personnel are not serving solely the official duties required by the SPP, but are working on a part time basis in support of the SPP mission. It is also essential for the program to establish more effective records keeping practices, but also to create an outreach program that relays information to the wider public regarding SPP opportunities and objectives. The lack of publicly available information is an effective deterrent to wider participation because it requires prior knowledge of the program's objectives and opportunities from members of the wider public, or it forces program participants to know who and what they are looking for outside of military channels and bring them in proactively. Thus, the NGB is not fully leveraging their in-house capabilities to support this program. Neither condition

is optimal for leveraging all of society's capabilities and resources to their maximum potential.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION**

This thesis should serve as a baseline look at the interconnected nature of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management policy through security cooperation operations under the SPP. In order to understand whether the SPP is effective more broadly, research should be done regarding partnerships that have gone dormant, the participation of partners in regional security operations prior to and after establishing partnerships, and trend analysis regarding year-over-year program execution. Finally, additional research regarding the trends of democratic governance in SPP partner nations should be examined given the complex nature of terrorism and humanitarian crisis response- is the program contributing to undemocratic trends and thus undermining future success in these objectives? However, much of this research will encounter the same wall that this thesis attempted to work around: the lack of public data. Proxies such as news releases, social media, and conversations with program officials are useful, but cannot provide the full picture that a robust data repository provides.

This thesis argues that the SPP, as conducted within the partnerships evaluated, provides an effective program to pursue security cooperation objectives in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. The program is overall successful due to the stability and longevity of relationships that form through the partnership, but also for more nuanced reasons that account for the inherent contradictions between providing aid and bilateral assistance. The partnerships can be improved to meet doctrinal intent by diversifying participants in engagements, and topics for engagement, in order to address the complex relationship between terrorism and humanitarian crisis. However, care must be taken to avoid expanding the program unduly in order to avoid incentivizing partner nation behavior that increases the likelihood of terrorism and thus humanitarian crisis.

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