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THESIS

**NCAA FOOTBALL GAME SECURITY IN THE BIG TEN
CONFERENCE: HOW CAMPUS POLICE ARE TRAINED
AND EQUIPPED TO COMBAT TERRORISM**

by

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March 2021

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CAMPUS POLICE ARE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO COMBAT
TERRORISM**

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ABSTRACT

College football stadiums in the Big Ten Conference can host 100,000 fans each home game, which make them potential targets for terrorists or lone wolves who seek to further their agenda through mass casualty events. This thesis answers the following question: How do campus police in the Big Ten Conference protect football stadiums against potential terrorist attacks and coordinate with outside agencies to ensure crowd security without sacrificing the fans' experience? Using a multi-level analysis of the campus and stadium environment, this thesis identifies the different threats and complexities that beset the campus environment and how campus police utilize their resources to defend the football stadium environment. Additionally, this thesis draws comparisons to the security operations of the National Football League, specifically its use of common standards of security across all teams. Universities in the Big Ten have too many disparities between each stadium's security operation, which could lead to potential gaps in the future. This thesis concludes that mandatory reporting of pre-existing mental health conditions and creating common standards for stadium security will alleviate the disparities between each university and fill latent security gaps.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11, 2001
CLI	Campus Liaison Initiative
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
EAP	emergency action plan
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FERPA	Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LE	law enforcement
MSU	Michigan State University
NCAA	National Collegiate Athletic Association
NCS4	National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security
NFL	National Football League
OSU	Ohio State University
PSU	Penn State University
PU	Purdue University
QATT	qualified anti-terrorism technology
SAFETY	support anti-terrorism by fostering effective technologies
SLTLE	state, local, tribal law enforcement
UAS	unmanned aerial system
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
U of M	University of Michigan
U of W	University of Wisconsin

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I. INTRODUCTION

When it comes to Saturday afternoon college football, universities in the Big Ten Conference bring in some of the biggest sporting event crowds in the world. For example, the University of Michigan had an average home game attendance of 111,459 in 2019,¹ ranking second in the world for any sport. (First place goes to May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea, with a capacity of 114,000.²) Along with capacity, the University of Michigan's football stadium sits in the middle of campus with easy access for the general public—like most Big Ten Conference stadiums—and the 111,000 people inside of the stadium are not the only people in the area for the game. Fans and residents are occupying tailgating areas, local shops, restaurants, and bars, all of which sit adjacent to the stadium. In fact, the whole area surrounding the stadium is filled with people before, during, and after each game.

In order to keep these crowds of people safe, the university's campus police departments have to ensure security measures are in place to thwart any possible attack, though the answer is not that simple. Campus police do not have the staffing and funding to protect their football stadiums each week by themselves, leaving the stadium operations to an aggregate of organizations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) of 4/5, which limits funding from federal agencies to assist with events—leaving the security either to the campus police department or to the local and state agencies.³ Events like the Coca-Cola 600, Kentucky Derby, and Oklahoma State Fair all receive federal support due to their rating (3/5) by the DHS.⁴ College football games—according to DHS—are of local and state importance, rather than national importance; thus, the

¹ "NCAA Football Attendance," NCAA, November 19, 2013, <http://www.ncaa.org/championships/statistics/ncaa-football-attendance>.

² Alan Dawson, "The 30 Biggest Sports Stadiums in the World, Ranked by Crowd Capacity," Business Insider, March 18, 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com/ranked-biggest-sports-stadiums-in-the-world-by-crowd-capacity-2018-3>.

³ James M Gehring, "Sports venue security: public policy options for SEAR 4–5 events" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 5, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42632>.

⁴ Gehring, "Sports venue security," 5.

campus police departments, often with coordination with their counterparts in the surrounding community, are the backbone of these security operations.

According to *Forbes*, in 2019, the top three football programs in the Big Ten Conference—the University of Michigan, Ohio State University, and Pennsylvania State University—made profits of \$83 million, \$75 million, and \$54 million respectively.⁵ In principle, then, the schools can afford to pay for the necessary security. Case in point, the NFL has paved the way for security reform with the SAFETY Act, Best Practices Guide, and mandated security measures to name a few.⁶ As Jeffrey Bolstad states, “the NFL’s *Best Practices Guide* is protected under the SAFETY Act,”⁷ but the NCAA is not protected under the Act, leaving the security measures up to each university.⁸

Universities bring different complexities to security compared to other sports venues. The demographics, population, and attendance that fall under the jurisdiction of campus police departments, especially in the Big Ten Conference, are vast, and the student/faculty/staff access to buildings and areas is more relaxed. Campus police departments must contend daily with sexual assaults, burglary, traffic offenses, and the like—all while operating with a small budget, due to lack of federal funding, and with no national standard of operations. Throw in 111,000 people attending a football game each Saturday and the situation becomes even more complex.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

College football in the United States is one of the largest sports interests—arguably the largest nationally—in terms of game attendance, television ratings, and revenue generated for schools each year. Some schools in the Big Ten Conference can continually

⁵ Chris Smith, “College Football’s Most Valuable Teams: Reigning Champion Clemson Tigers Claw Into Top 25,” *Forbes*, September 12, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/chris-smith/2019/09/12/college-football-most-valuable-clemson-texas-am/>.

⁶ Jeffrey S Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Is the League’s Security Scheme Able to Effectively Thwart Terrorist Attacks?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 51-52, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50493>.

⁷ SAFETY Act is the “Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.” It is designed to incentivize companies to create security measures to protect their business. Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 52.

⁸ Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 51-52.

pack more than 100,000 fans into their stadiums each week to watch the teams battle, which is by far the most attendance for a game of any sport in the world. Such crowds could make the games a target for terrorists of all stripes. This thesis seeks to answer to the following question: How do campus police in the Big Ten Conference protect football stadiums against potential terrorist attacks—and coordinate with outside agencies—to ensure crowd security without sacrificing the fans’ experience?

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of the literature on campus policing is rooted in the failures of campus policing and the different responses to incidents that have occurred on campuses across the United States. The amount of literature on specific campus police operations, like stadium security, is very small. Therefore, this literature review will concentrate on literature describing how campus police have professionalized since the days as “watchmen,” literature on campus threats and failures that have occurred on campuses across America, and literature describing the different effects that jurisdiction has on campus policing.

1. Professionalization of Campus Police

Campus policing in the United States has professionalized in every sense over the years, particularly in the last two decades. Not only did the events of 9/11 change campus police departments, but the demand for better law enforcement in protection of students and the campus population has driven legislation and prompted institutions to seek better security solutions. Unfortunately, campus police have not been able to dig into a treasure chest of university specific literature on how to operate their departments because such a trove of literature does not exist. Rather, campus policing has evolved over time, as departments have learned from their mistakes and shared best practices. This section will cover literature on the history of the campus police departments and how they have professionalized over the past 100 years. Then it will identify the different threats that have driven campus police reform, and what current scholars have said regarding the campus police response to the different threats over the past few decades.

Before the 1900s, there were “watchmen” on university grounds who provided security, and ensured property was safeguarded, while enforcing campus codes on school

grounds. These “watchmen”, as Jamie P. Hopkins and Kristina Neff state, “wielded little legal authority or training.”⁹ From 1900 to the end of the 1960s, universities appointed “officers” who would protect property and enforce campus codes—much like the “watchmen” before 1900—but these men were ex-municipal police officers who could provide more experience to the departments. The end of the 1960s saw an increase in anti-war protests, radical groups, and drug use on campuses, all requiring local police to respond. Much like Hopkins and Neff, John J. Sloan III also believes that universities realized that they needed their own agency to deal with their unique situations.¹⁰

The 1970s and 1980s saw the birth of the “modern campus law enforcement agency,” according to Sloan, by creating police departments that have their own leadership—separate from university administration—and have their own armed police officers on campus.¹¹ He explains further that these new departments had experienced law enforcement officers placed in charge of them, which transformed the campus police into departments mirrored—in operational, tactical, and administrative aspects—to their local counterparts, yet tailored to better serve the universities’ needs.¹² Gone were the days of variously professionalized security guards on campus led by university leadership. The students, faculty, and community started to view the police officers as real cops who had gained “credibility” on campus.¹³ In the past 20 years, campus police departments have experienced a bigger push for community-oriented policing—similar to that implemented by local police—which creates better relationships with students/faculty and allows for police officers to become better independent problem solvers.¹⁴

⁹ Jamie P. Hopkins and Kristina Neff, “Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie: The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police Essay,” *Montana Law Review* 75, no. 1 (2014): 4, HeinOnline.

¹⁰ John J. Sloan III, “Campus Crime,” in *21st Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2009), 455, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412971997>.

¹¹ Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 455.

¹² Sloan, 455.

¹³ Sloan, 456.

¹⁴ Sloan, 456.

2. Campus Threats and Failures

In the post-9/11 era, and in the wake of different violent incidents on university grounds—for example, the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre¹⁵, and the 2016 Ohio State University terrorist attack¹⁶—campus police once again have had to change the way they think about protecting their campus populations from terrorism. Still, as Ronnell Higgins (Yale University Chief of Police) states in his work on campus police, “tools that are likely to be available in the future did not exist on college campuses at the time of 9/11 to capture data about possible instances of terrorist threat or activity.”¹⁷ This lack of data and reporting requirements only led to a lag in the reform needed to combat these threats as best as possible, while leaving the police departments to be more reactive than proactive.

The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act) of 1990—Jeanne Clery was raped and murdered in 1986¹⁸—established a federal mandate for colleges and universities to report crimes on campuses.¹⁹ The poor response, reporting, and handling of the crime committed against Clery by the campus police community created an outcry for reform. As Rebecca Graham and Amanda

¹⁵ On April 16, 2007 shortly after 0700, Virginia Tech Senior, Seung Hui Cho, shot and killed two students in a residence hall. Cho then went to his residence hall changed out of his bloody clothes and proceeded to the Blacksburg post office to mail NBC network written and video expression of his hatred toward his fellow students. Shortly after 0900, he chained the doors shut to Norris Hall from the inside and took his two semi-automatic pistols and 400 rounds of ammunition on a shooting rampage. As police were entering the room where Cho was, Cho took his own life. In the end 33 were killed—to include Cho—and 17 were wounded. Gordon K. Davies, “Connecting the Dots: Lessons from the Virginia Tech Shootings,” *Change; Philadelphia* 40, no. 1 (February 2008): 8–15. ProQuest.

¹⁶ On November 28, 2016, a suspected gas leak at Watts Hall led to its evacuation, leaving students congregated outside of the building. Abdul Razak Ali Artan drove his vehicle into this crowd of students injuring multiple people. He then got out of his vehicle with a butcher knife and began slashing and chasing after people. Ohio State University Police Officer, Alan Horujko (who was directing traffic due to the gas leak), saw the car enter the crowd and responded immediately. He chased after Artan and within one minute had fatally wounded Artan using his service pistol. The attack left 13 wounded, and the attacker, Artan, dead. Jennifer Smola, “Officer Who Stopped Ohio State Terror Attack Describes Chaos,” *The Columbus Dispatch*, November 27, 2017, <https://www.dispatch.com/news/20171127/officer-who-stopped-ohio-state-terror-attack-describes-chaos>.

¹⁷ Ronnell A. Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 5, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64908>.

¹⁸ Rebecca Dolinsky Graham and Amanda Konradi, “Contextualizing the 1990 Campus Security Act and Campus Sexual Assault in Intersectional and Historical Terms,” *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research; Bingley* 10, no. 2 (2018): 93–102, <http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1108/JACPR-05-2017-0284>.

¹⁹ Hopkins and Neff, “Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie,” 10.

Konradi state, the Clery family approached their Pennsylvanian State Senator and, “argued that postsecondary administrators were hiding criminal incidents on their campuses to protect their institutional images.”²⁰ A 2017 article in *American Journal of Criminal Justice* also proves that both the 2012 Penn State University sexual assault scandal and another case in 2014 were not handled properly by university administrators, who wanted to save the university from the public’s eye.²¹ Throughout the national university system, the problems of secrecy and failed reporting—to maintain the university’s image—have been a detriment to the professionalization of campus police. Similarly, excluding terrorism activity from any mandated reporting requirement, like the Clery Act, does not help bolster a safer campus environment.

Herman Goldstein argues, “police problem-solving efforts should focus on the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder.”²² Specifically, the underlying conditions that Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun argue through the five main characteristics of a college, and Sloan explains through three “contexts” of crime on campuses as discussed further in Chapter II. Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun identify that depression, coupled with failure and loneliness in a college setting, can intensify problems,²³ and Sloan supports this by describing contexts which relate to a lack of reporting or mishandling of issues by university administrations.²⁴ Additionally, a 2017 study conducted by Kyle et al., identified that a majority of the university population does not want campus police or administrators present in their daily routines.²⁵ Combined, these scholars define an

²⁰ Graham and Konradi, “Contextualizing the 1990 Campus Security Act and Campus Sexual Assault in Intersectional and Historical Terms,” 96.

²¹ Michael J. Kyle et al., “Perceptions of Campus Safety Policies: Contrasting the Views of Students with Faculty and Staff,” *American Journal of Criminal Justice : AJCJ; Louisville* 42, no. 3 (September 2017): 645, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12103-016-9379-x>.

²² “Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners,” U.S. Department of Justice, August 2000, 1, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182731.pdf>.

²³ Kirk Heilbrun, Joel Dvoskin, and Anna Heilbrun, “Toward Preventing Future Tragedies: Mass Killings on College Campuses, Public Health, and Threat/Risk Assessment,” *Psychological Injury and Law* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 93, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12207-009-9040-9>.

²⁴ Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 449.

²⁵ Kyle et al., “Perceptions of Campus Safety Policies,” 661.

environment that is very complex and vulnerable, while also proving to be a difficult place for police to uncover the underlying conditions.

Other scholars contend that mental health and a lack of reporting have led to an increase in violence, mass casualty events, and terrorism. In reviewing the Virginia Tech Massacre, Jeffrey Hunt mentions that Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech Massacre shooter, displayed 17 “red flags” that were known to many individuals and agencies on and off campus.²⁶ While some professors may have been concerned about Seung-Hui Cho’s writings, actions were not taken to ensure Cho received the proper attention necessary. C. Vann Woodward from Yale University writes that “we value freedom of expression precisely because it provides a forum for the new, the provocative, the disturbing, and the unorthodox.”²⁷ For reasons like the aforementioned, students such as Seung-Hui Cho, who may show signs of violence, could actually be depicted as artistic or “dark.” However, the *Strategic Primer on College Mental Health* states, “almost two-thirds of students who meet the criteria for depression do not get help.”²⁸ Therefore, systemic issues combined with a lack of reporting of pre-existing conditions, lack of reporting by faculty or staff, and a population that fights for academic and intellectual freedom prove to make underlying conditions even more of a problem to uncover.

Lastly, much like the evolution of professionalized campus police departments over the last 100 years, the next step for campus police, as Higgins points out, is for collaboration and more integration into regional responses and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).²⁹ Similarly, a 2005 *National Summit on Campus Public Safety* report gives one recommendation that “campus police and security operations should be a viable part of the

²⁶ Jeffrey I. Hunt, “A Review of: The Virginia Tech Massacre: Strategies and Challenges for Improving Mental Health Policy on Campus and Beyond,” *Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychopharmacology* 25, no. 10 (2015): 825, ProQuest.

²⁷ C. Vann Woodward, “Chairman's Letter to the Fellows of the Yale Corporation,” Yale College, December 23, 1974, <https://yalecollege.yale.edu/get-know-yale-college/office-dean/reports/report-committee-freedom-expression-yale>.

²⁸ Louise A. Douce and Richard P. Keeling, *A Strategic Primer on College Student Mental Health*, (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 2014), 3, https://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/College_Student_Mental_Health.pdf.

²⁹ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces” 4.

nation's intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes and should be incorporated into all regional and national efforts to improve the intelligence network.”³⁰

3. Jurisdiction Effects on Campus Police

Whether campus police can achieve this level of effectiveness in keeping the population on campus safe is also bound and to some degree determined by legislation. Hopkins and Neff wrote in 2014 on the jurisdictional limits of campus police, highlighting the legal and social differences between public and private university police departments.³¹ They noted a private university police officer does not have the same legal authority as a public university police officer, and more so, a public university police officer may be bound to different jurisdictional restrictions state to state. For example, in 2010 a Boston University (private institution) Police officer was found to have improperly arrested a man who had an active warrant because the stop was made off campus—outside of the officer's jurisdiction.³² Further Hopkins and Neff state, “jurisdiction may further be extended to cover the entire municipality in which the campus is situated via mutual agreement or court designation.”³³

Campuses are getting larger in size, which means more crimes are occurring on them; add terrorism as a possible threat, and the demand for campus police efforts are at a boiling point. This demand has created even more challenges for campus police departments on identifying their jurisdictional limits on and around the campus.³⁴ Leigh Jahnig in the *Northwestern University Law Review*, wrote that while public universities have clear state derived authority, private universities do not have the same uniformity on where their authority is derived.³⁵ For example, in the Big Ten Conference there are 14

³⁰ Sheldon Greenberg, *National Summit on Campus Public Safety: Strategies for Colleges and Universities in a Homeland Security Environment*, (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2005), 8, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=210917>.

³¹ Hopkins and Neff, “Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie.”

³² Hopkins and Neff, 15–16.

³³ Hopkins and Neff, 17.

³⁴ Hopkins and Neff, 9.

³⁵ Leigh J. Jahnig, “Under School Colors: Private University Police as State Actors Under § 1983,” *Northwestern University Law Review*; *Chicago* 110, no. 1 (2016): 264, ProQuest.

universities, 13 of which are public schools whose authority is derived through state legislation, giving the campus police their own dedicated authority to enforce laws/regulations. In contrast, Northwestern University is a private institution that certifies its campus police officers at a state-approved police academy.³⁶ While there is a difference in where the authority is derived, the Big Ten Conference campus police departments have similar authority through state legislation.

In this connection, in 2015, Brian Reaves published a special report on campus law enforcement detailing data from four-year campuses with 2,500 students or more from 2011-2012. His report highlights that

75 percent of campuses were using armed officers; 9 in 10 public campuses were using sworn officers, compared to 4 in 10 on private campuses; 7 in 10 had a memorandum of understanding with outside law enforcement agencies; most sworn campus police officers had arrest (86 percent), and patrol (81 percent) jurisdictions that extend beyond campus boundaries; and most sworn campus police officers were authorized to use a sidearm (94 percent), chemical or pepper spray (94 percent), and a baton (93 percent).³⁷

Some scholars also note that infringement of student's rights is cause for issue with campus police departments' newer policies and operations. Eric Hoover, in *Police in Dorms: Student Safety or Privacy Infringement?*, states that in 2006 Washington state courts ruled police officers could not patrol dormitories at the University of Washington due to privacy violations.³⁸ Hoover also states that schools like Florida State University have programs where police officers are assigned a dormitory to help build relationships with students, and that the common areas—like hallways or lounges—of dormitories are considered public areas, open to routine patrols.³⁹

³⁶ "Responsibilities: University Police - Northwestern University," Northwestern University, accessed May 23, 2020, <https://www.northwestern.edu/up/about/responsibilities.html>.

³⁷ Brian A Reaves, *Campus Law Enforcement, 2011–2012*, (Washington, DC: Department of Justice-Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015), 1, <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cle1112.pdf>.

³⁸ Eric Hoover, "Police in the dorms: student safety or privacy infringement?," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*; *Washington* 54, no. 46 (July 25, 2008): A15, ProQuest.

³⁹ Hoover, "Police in the dorms."

Higgins writes that, “detailed agreements, including mutual aid agreements that describe the operational framework and collaborative working relationship between the departments, are often created among municipal police agencies and campus police... this is especially important due to the frequency of protests and student demonstrations on some campuses.”⁴⁰ Concurrently, in *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*, they recommend that “mass demonstrations and other major events are too large and complex for a single agency to manage alone.”⁴¹

The ever-growing threats throughout history on college campuses have created the professional organization you see on campuses across the United States today. The organizational differences may lead to parsed outcomes in application, but the future operations and ability to serve the campus population while collaborating with the local/state agencies is critical. Campus police have had growing pains and the professionalized gaps between institutions only show that further analysis is needed in campus police department operations. Taking these professionalized police departments and advancing the conversation on how to manage the stadium environmental challenges is the aim of this thesis. Campus police departments ability to collaborate with local, state, and federal agencies, while maintaining the trust and confidence of the campus population, is the goal in the fight on terrorism.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis addresses the importance and professionalization of the campus police forces in the Big Ten Conference and their ability to protect football stadiums from potential terrorist attacks, with emphasis on coordinating with outside agencies. Sources used include published reports, government-produced and government-sponsored reports, official press releases, mainstream news articles, as well as studies on threats as they have evolved over the past 20 years since 9/11. Key sources of data have included multiple reports and studies conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Justice

⁴⁰ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces” 8.

⁴¹ Police Executive Research Forum, *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018), 109, <https://www.policeforum.org/assets/PoliceResponseMassDemonstrations.pdf>.

Statistics, the Department of Justice, and a report on *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*.

To assess the campus police and their ability to protect football stadiums, this thesis analyzes the different threats that campus police departments face across the nation—to include everyday policing crimes, mass shootings, and terrorism—and their efficiency in handling different types of crimes as an organization and university. Analyzing the professional aspect of campus police in the campus environment, by specifically analyzing past incidents involving the different threats, it is important to understand the abilities of the campus police departments in the Big Ten. Additionally, the goal is to find out how effectively campus police departments interact with their local, state, and federal counterparts to combat the different threats.

Next, an analysis of the football stadium environmental specifics is conducted to assess whether campus police operate efficiently and identifies the footprint campus police have in the security efforts for football games. Analysis of the football stadium operations provides further research for the following chapters' analysis of possible response options and areas of improvement. Sources for this research include interviews with campus police leaders at Penn State University, Michigan State University, and the University of Wisconsin, who provided insight on Big Ten Conference specific information regarding stadium security operations.⁴² Additional resources include threat assessments from the Department of Homeland Security and National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security (NCS4).

Finally, the main concentration for this research is to find out whether there are recommendations for other response options—like the NFL's *Best Practices for Stadium Security* guide—while also assessing the good practices currently in place, and any shortfalls that can possibly be identified for strengthening security at the different stadiums across the Big Ten Conference. Special attention is given to ensure both the fans' and local

⁴² The NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the research plan for this thesis and determined that no further IRB approval was required.

population's civil liberties are not being violated, while ensuring any recommendations keep the fan's experience into consideration.

D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter II builds on the professional organization campus police have transformed into overtime by analyzing different campus threats and complexities that have shaped the campus police organization—primarily since 9/11. The analysis is not Big Ten Conference university centric in order to assess the overall issues campus police face in their everyday policing operations across all campuses in America. Chapter III uses a micro-level approach to examine the football stadium environment and its threats in the Big Ten Conference to identify possible areas for greater security, specifically how campus police coordinate and integrate local, state, and federal law enforcement for game-day operations. Chapter IV compares the NFL stadium security operations to universities, emphasizing university issues in the Big Ten Conference, while also analyzing the NFL's *Best Practices for Stadium Security* guide to establish a model that can be used by the Big Ten Conference universities. Chapter V concludes with recommendations to build not only a stronger Big Ten Conference for campus police department stadium security operations, but for university administrations across the United States.

II. CAMPUS THREATS AND COMPLEXITIES

College campuses in the Big Ten represent the quintessence of academics and higher learning. The universities are not cloistered in large cities where famous attractions, sunny beaches, and professional teams reign supreme. Rather, Big Ten campuses are the main attraction in their respective towns. The coffee shops, bars, diners, bookstores, and local businesses are there primarily to support the campus and its community of students, staff, faculty, and fans. Known for their timeless architecture, massive stadiums and mature landscapes, these grassy havens serve as a perfect backdrop to a cool autumn day. The excitement, nervousness, and anticipation of each school year holds new students in awe, while overloading their senses and emotions for what lies ahead. Many are eager to find their dorm or meet their new roommate, while others are wondering where the nearest party will be tonight. What is not typically on their minds—and rightfully so—is whether there will be violent crimes, mass shootings, or a terrorist attack on campus.

Understanding both the possibility of these incidents and the overall environment of a Big Ten campus is important to answering the question of what macro-level problems campus police departments typically face—which is vital to further answering the main question of this thesis: how campus police in the Big Ten Conference protect football stadiums from potential violence or terrorism. Understanding the macro-level problems will aid in the analysis of the micro-level problems that beset Big Ten stadium environments on game day. This chapter will first establish that the threats—ranging from mass shootings and terrorism to everyday campus policing issues—that may beset the campus community are much like those found in any other city or population in America. Highlighting past incidents on campuses across America will establish the difficult environment in which the campus police operate, contrary to the euphoric scene above.

The second section of this chapter is dedicated to identifying the problems and complexities on a campus in order to understand the peculiarities faced in policing and protecting the campus community inside the walls of the ivory tower. Additionally, the problems inside the walls of the campus—for example mental illness, radicalization, lack of reporting—are issues that separate the problem set confronting the campus police from

other civilian police agencies and could make it difficult to protect against mass casualty or terrorist attacks while keeping the students, staff, faculty and fans' experience in mind. Understanding on the macro level problems inside the campus community will provide insight into the real problems which beset campus police when protecting football stadiums on game day—ultimately driving home the various possible vulnerabilities for universities not only in the Big Ten Conference, but in stadiums across the United States.

A. THREATS THAT BESET CAMPUSES

Universities have arguably been viewed as institutions epitomizing an ivory tower, righteously looking down on the world as they grow and develop students' minds in a free and unfettered environment. The historical debate over the accuracy of the title has not been one-sided, though, which is characteristic of great institutions.⁴³ The early years of academic institutions of higher education were met with little influence and investigations from outside agencies, but the past 20 years have exposed what really happens inside the ivory towers. As Fisher et al. argued, the victimization on college campuses is contrary to the image of these universities as ivory towers.⁴⁴ Bad things really do happen inside the walls of the great academic institutions. This section will highlight this reality with the analysis of crimes such as mass shootings, terrorism, and everyday policing issues that campus police must face in order to keep the campus community safe and secure.

1. Mass Shootings

The first difficult crime for campus police to prevent is mass shootings. On the morning of August 1, 1966, at the University of Texas, as Michael Rosenwald described the scene in the *Washington Post*, a student and ex-marine named Charles Whitman began firing from atop the Texas Tower, “the University’s most distinguishing landmark and...

⁴³ Steven Shapin, “The Ivory Tower: The History of a Figure of Speech and Its Cultural Uses,” *British Journal for the History of Science; Norwich* 45, no. 1 (March 2012): 1–27, <http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S0007087412000118>.

⁴⁴ Bonnie S. Fisher et al., “Crime in the Ivory Tower: The Level and Sources of Student Victimization,” *Criminology* 36, no. 3 (1998): 671, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1998.tb01262.x>.

symbol of academic excellence and personal opportunity.”⁴⁵ The killing and chaos lasted 96 minutes, resulting in 14 dead and 31 wounded.⁴⁶ Fast forward 41 years to April 16, 2007, at Virginia Tech, where, according to Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, a student named Seung Hui Cho “carried out what would become one of the deadliest school shootings in the world.”⁴⁷ His shooting spree claimed 32 lives and injured 17 more.⁴⁸ Fortunately, according to Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, “events involving mass killings on college campus are fortunately rare.”⁴⁹ Yet, while this may be true, a college campus is not immune to acts of violence, crimes, and terrorism, which have continued to be seen across the United States—much like any city or municipality, such as Columbine, and Sandy Hook, which has experienced mass shootings and violence.

The aftermath of a campus mass shooting typically entails sweeping legislation or policy changes, program reviews, and federal funding for programs that have nothing to do with campus police or police departments that have to respond to the incidents. This response is a reaction to an incident, rather than a proactive approach that could help identify the problems before they come to fruition. However, Hunter et al. “contend that mass shooting incidents fit the standard definitions of terrorism to a greater degree than is often reported by government officials, academics, and media outlets.”⁵⁰ They assert that researchers must be more diligent in their investigations of mass shooting events in order to accurately place them in the correct category.⁵¹ This categorization is important due to

⁴⁵ Michael S. Rosenwald, “The Loaded Legacy of the UT Tower Shooting,” *The Washington Post*, July 31, 2016, 2, ProQuest.

⁴⁶ Paul D. Barnard, “A Sniper in the Tower: The Charles Whitman Murders,” *Security Management; Arlington* 42, no. 3 (March 1998): 136, ProQuest.

⁴⁷ Diana A Drysdale, William Modzeleski, and Andre B Simons, *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education* (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010), 1, <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/campus/campus.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, *Campus Attacks*, 1.

⁴⁹ Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, “Toward Preventing Future Tragedies: Mass Killings on College Campuses, Public Health, and Threat/Risk Assessment,” 93–99.

⁵⁰ Lance Y. Hunter et al., “Are Mass Shootings Acts of Terror? Applying Key Criteria in Definitions of Terrorism to Mass Shootings in the United States from 1982 to 2018,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 0, no. 0 (May 14, 2020): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2020.1762108>.

⁵¹ Hunter et al., “Are Mass Shootings Acts of Terror?”

the increased funding, policing, and intelligence coordination involved with anti-terrorism efforts, as opposed to identifying possible mass shooting suspects. Furthermore, their research identified similar characteristics between mass shooters and terrorists including “social alienation, identity crises, and failure to adapt to the expectations of society.”⁵² Therefore, grouping the mass shootings and terrorism as one may help universities in obtaining additional training and proactive policing, while also preventing the marginalizing of incidents that do not catch the attention of government officials, academics or media outlets.

2. Terrorism

The second crime that is devastating for academic institutions and pertinent to campus police is terrorism. Haner and Lee argue that in the United States, there has not been a real threat of terrorism toward educational institutions, rather there have been some individual small-scale attacks carried out by individuals who were assumed to be associated with a terrorist organization.⁵³ Attacks in 2013 at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in 2015 at University of California, Merced, and in 2016 at Ohio State University (OSU) all were conducted by individuals who shared an affiliation with, had been inspired by, or had been in contact with ISIS⁵⁴—fitting Haner and Lee’s small-scale argument. They further argue that education institutions remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks and contend that extremist groups have identified the prevailing nature of this vulnerability and recruited or inspired individuals to carry out their plans, specifically on large groups or crowds.⁵⁵ Consequently, individuals gaining assistance, inspiration, or ideology from terrorist organizations is another layer of complexity campus police have to counter or defend against, similar to any city or municipality police force, but the main difference is that the vulnerabilities of the campus are known to the terrorist organizations, making the institutions of higher education more likely a target than other possibilities.

⁵² Hunter et al., 5.

⁵³ Murat Haner and Heejin Lee, “Placing School Victimization in a Global Context,” *Victims & Offenders* 12, no. 6 (December 11, 2017): 860, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2017.1361675>.

⁵⁴ Haner and Lee, “Placing School Victimization in a Global Context,” 860.

⁵⁵ Haner and Lee, 860.

It is difficult to compare cases like the 2016 OSU terrorist attack where there were no deaths—aside from the attacker who was killed by the responding police officer⁵⁶—to mass shootings like the Virginia Tech Massacre. In other words, no victims, but ties to ISIS equals terrorism; four or more killed in a single event with a gun and no ties to an organization equals a mass shooting. The differences between the two are the motive and inspiration, but the outcome of both incidents was caused by a single person who had displayed one or more of the characteristics mentioned by Hunter et al.: “social alienation, identity crises, and failure to adapt to the expectations of society.”⁵⁷ Working to find the root cause or inspiration for the perpetrator may help place the incident into a specific category—mass shooting or terrorism—but it does not help the campus police stop future attacks. Therefore, for the sake of this thesis mass shootings will be grouped in the same category as terrorist attacks when considering campus police and the nature of the threat.

Separate from mass shootings and terrorism—though both could have been categorized as a mass murder if executed differently—is the threat that goes without widespread reporting or coverage due to lack of casualties, and categorization. On October 1, 2005, at the University of Oklahoma, an explosive device detonated just one hundred yards away from a football stadium packed with more than 84,000 football fans. The only person killed or injured in the explosion was the bomber, identified as Joel Henry Hinrichs III.⁵⁸ Reporting of the events are not conclusive—due to lack of information from university officials and police departments—though the FBI officially closed the case in 2006 with the narrative that the individual committed suicide with no intent to harm others.⁵⁹ If this bomb had been detonated before or after the game in the same location, the casualties would have been in the hundreds. The campus police could have had a phenomenal plan that day, with proper coordination with local, state, and federal agencies

⁵⁶ Jennifer Smola, “Officer Who Stopped Ohio State Terror Attack Describes Chaos.”

⁵⁷ Hunter et al., “Are Mass Shootings Acts of Terror?,” 5.

⁵⁸ Phil Cross, “FOX 25 Investigates: Declassified FBI Records Provide New Insight into 2005 OU Bombing,” KOKH, July 13, 2016, <https://okcfox.com/news/fox-25-investigates/fox-25-investigates-declassified-fbi-records-provide-new-insight-into-2005-ou-bombing>.

⁵⁹ Cross “FOX 25 Investigates: Declassified FBI Records Provide New Insight into 2005 OU Bombing.”

to keep the stadium a “hard target.” Yet, a student with a backpack was able to make a home-made explosive and carry it to within one hundred yards of the stadium undetected.

Would this event have been a mass murder event, or would it have been categorized as a terrorist attack, if three or more people had been killed? Sadly, this incident gets placed into the suicide category, and mandatory university reporting will report the incident to other universities as a suicide, rather than a near-miss mass murder attempt. The institutions involved with such events are able to turn a blind eye to the incident and keep their university’s name out of the spotlight by keeping the coverage down. After the local, state and federal agencies found that Hinrichs did not have an affiliation to, or been inspired by, a terrorist organization, the problem was quickly pushed under the rug to save the reputation of the university, keeping other campus police across the nation at a disadvantage for preventing future incidents of this nature.

3. Everyday Campus Policing Issues

As this chapter has established, everyday campus policing issues that can beset the campus community are much like those found in any other city or population in America. A second similarity can be seen in the way that cities and local municipalities have their own problem sets that differentiate each police department. Those differentiations are likely based on each respective city’s differences in demographics, industry, population size, and location in relation to other cities or municipalities. Similarly, campus police—specifically in the Big Ten Conference—share a problem set that is very similar in nature. For example, the University of Michigan (U of M) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, which is a city of approximately 120,000 people covering an area of approximately 28 square miles,⁶⁰ while Penn State University (PSU), located in State College Borough, Pennsylvania, is a town of approximately 42,000 people covering an area of approximately 19 square miles—according to the United States Census Bureau.⁶¹ Yet, U of M had 48,090

⁶⁰ U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Ann Arbor City, Michigan,” accessed October 20, 2020, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/annarborcitymichigan/PST040219>.

⁶¹ U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: United States,” accessed November 19, 2020, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/statecollegeboroughpennsylvania/PST045219>.

enrolled in 2019,⁶² while PSU had 46,723 enrolled in 2019.⁶³ The stark differences extending beyond their campuses affect how these universities interact with local or state police departments, but their everyday policing issues on campus may be more alike in nature due to their enrollment populations, making the everyday campus policing issues much more like those in any other city or population in America.

Where the campus police start to separate themselves from their local and state police counterparts is in the construct of their departments. Campus police are a department of the university, which is an institution of higher education first. The majority of the funding that campus police receive for operations comes from the university directly. Other funding comes from federal grants, and the athletic department for special events, but the allocation of funds is largely determined by the university administrators. The administrators at some universities have not had the best track record of reporting and research has shown that there are institutional flaws that prevent campus police from being fully informed and prepared to combat crimes of any type.⁶⁴ Fisher et al. states that “grassroots efforts by campus crime victims and their parents and lobbying efforts by Security-On-Campus Incorporated... have prompted the U.S. Congress... to approve laws addressing disclosure of student victimization,”⁶⁵ which has helped push institutions into getting ahead of the problems. However, this difference in reporting sets the campus police departments apart from the local and state police agencies.

Similarly, Yale Chief of Police Ronnell Higgins explains that, crime, and violent acts such as the 1986 rape and murder of Jeanne Clery⁶⁶ “galvanized the federal government to institute measures to regulate and ensure campus safety,”⁶⁷ establishing

⁶² “University of Michigan Facts & Figures,” University of Michigan, accessed October 20, 2020, <http://umich.edu>.

⁶³ “Historical Comparison of Enrollment,” Penn State University, accessed October 20, 2020, <https://factbook.psu.edu/factbook/StudentDynamic/EnrollmentFallToFallComparison.aspx?SemesterCodes=201819FA201920FA&FBPlusIndc=N>.

⁶⁴ Louise A. Douce and Richard P. Keeling, *A Strategic Primer on College Student Mental Health*.

⁶⁵ Fisher et al., “Crime in the Ivory Tower,” 672.

⁶⁶ Jeanne Clery see Chapter 1.

⁶⁷ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 41.

mandatory reporting requirements like The Clery Act that hold institutions accountable and force them to inform the community of day-to-day crimes.⁶⁸ The institutions delegate this responsibility to the campus police to ensure proper tracking, reporting, and community information sharing is being completed, but ultimately the institution is held accountable. The process for every day crimes has been overhauled through legislation, and concurrently institutional resistance has been reduced over time, but the system is not without flaws. The one problem that Higgins identifies is that terrorism is not included in the U.S. Department of Education, *Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting* required categories,⁶⁹ which supports the earlier argument regarding legislative gaps in mandatory reporting.

Another example supporting the institutional failure in regard to everyday campus policing issues is the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre, which not only highlighted the institutional problems, but also the local and state police actions in responding to incidents on campus. Prior to the 2007 shooting, the emergency preparedness and public safety departments functioned much differently on campuses. The Clery Act had identified issues with everyday crimes, but the Virginia Tech incident has raised the idea of campus security to a different level. Zach Winn quotes Virginia Tech consultant Gene Deisinger in his article in *Campus Safety Magazine*: “it [the mass shooting] highlighted the whole spectrum of emergency preparedness and management in higher education, from prevention and mitigation to response capabilities... it wasn’t just the university, a lot of local agencies were overwhelmed as well.”⁷⁰ Everyday crimes—such as sexual assaults, theft, larceny, etc.—have been the main focus for campus police and institutions over the years, with more concentration solely on the institution and the campus police operations. Now the growing threat of terrorism and mass shooting incidents has brought the local, state, and

⁶⁸ Hopkins and Neff, “Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie: The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police Essay,” 133.

⁶⁹ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 42.

⁷⁰ Zach Winn, “The Virginia Tech Shooting’s Impact on Emergency Preparedness,” *Campus Safety Magazine*, April 13, 2017, https://www.campusafetymagazine.com/clery/virginia_tech_shooting_anniversary_emergency_preparedness/.

federal agencies into the fold where greater information sharing, dissemination, and coordination is necessary to combat terrorism, and ensure violent crimes are prevented.

The different threats and attacks discussed show that the institutions and campus police have a steady strain of issues to plan for, deal with, and become better at handling. Legislation has been put in place to make sure the institutions are not hiding information regarding everyday incidents behind their walls. Campus police departments have been inundated over the years to the newer threats on campus—in the most unfortunate ways—which has resulted in more professionalization and mirroring of local, state, and federal tactics and procedures. The majority of attacks on campus have been directed at the daily student population, though the other possible threat occurs when you add 100,000 fans coming into the stadium from all directions and in masses. Thomas Leasor wrote in the *Campus Law Enforcement Journal*, “that events at stadiums and arenas have been attractive targets to malevolent individuals and terrorist generally due to anticipated media coverage, large crowds, vulnerable fan admittance procedures, and protective procedures that are less apparent or not as rigorous as at other private facilities.”⁷¹ Therefore, an understanding the specifics of the campus environment is vital to identifying the underlying conditions for why these individuals choose to act, and figuring out how to combat the threat.

B. PECULIARITIES OF THE CAMPUS ENVIRONMENT

The campus environment—particularly the unique population and “the walls” of the institution—contains many layers of complexity that create complications in policing and securing campuses. This section will identify the different peculiarities and complexities of the campus population by first, describing the different characteristics of the campus that make it a perfect storm for mass shooters, terrorism and violent acts on campus; by second, by identifying the different contexts of the campus environment; and finally by describing the different aspects of a campus population—to include the potential

⁷¹ Thomas D. Leasor, “Resources for Campus Police Chiefs to Combat Threats of Terrorism or Violence at Football Stadiums,” *Campus Law Enforcement Journal; Hartford* 47, no. 4 (August 2017): 47, ProQuest.

for both mental health problems and radicalization—and how the lack of reporting hinders the campus police departments.

1. Campus Characteristics

John J. Sloan III argues that, “campus crime is not simply about answering basic questions such as ‘how much is there’ at a particular school, but is rather a multidimensional phenomenon that touches the lives of members of the campus community—students, staff, and faculty members—in a variety of ways.”⁷² Therefore, it is not enough for police to simply respond to an incident; rather, as Herman Goldstein articulates, “police problem-solving efforts should focus on the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder. By doing so, police can address the problem rather than simply ameliorate the symptoms.”⁷³ An analysis of the different types of characteristics found on most campuses can provide insight on these underlying issues.

Terrorism, mass shooters, and violent acts on campus—while rare—have commonalities, which can be seen on any campus in America. They all occur without notice, without clear reason or intent, and police typically rely on confessions, testimony, or a manifesto to understand the root of perpetrator’s actions. The incident is typically reacted to with surprise by bystanders. Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun hypothesize this is due to five characteristics of a college:

Campuses are completely open; the campus population is at the age where the highest level of crime is associated; there is a pronounced power difference between student and faculty; students are alone and stressed leading to intensification of those feelings; and faculty may not relay to the health center and campus police when they encounter a student in need or making threats.⁷⁴

⁷² Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 449.

⁷³ U.S. Department of Justice, “Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners.”

⁷⁴ Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, “Toward Preventing Future Tragedies,” 93.

These hypotheses are similarly supported by Fisher et al. who state in *Criminology*, “the victimization research has consistently supported these national level statistics.”⁷⁵

Violent perpetrators do match a few of the characteristics or arguments mentioned by both Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, and Fisher et al. that are unique to the campus setting. For example, the lack of communication by the University of Oklahoma in 2005—only five news or magazine articles were contacted while conducting research on the 2005 University of Oklahoma bomber—fits the stereotype that the institution wants to keep good standing with the public on incidents where violent acts of terrorism may be involved.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, in the declassified FBI report for the 2005 University of Oklahoma bombing, it mentioned Hinrichs had received counseling for depression in 2003, and had recently been removed as a National Merit Scholar due to falling grades,⁷⁷ which, as noted previously, are two of the characteristics—depression and academic failure—identified by Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the FBI report also indicated that he left a letter on his laptop in his apartment that stated, “none of you are worth living with. You can all kiss my...”⁷⁹ This letter is similar to the video, photograph, and writings package sent by the Virginia Tech Shooter, Seung-Hui Cho to NBC news on the day of his rampage.⁸⁰ Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun argue that depression, coupled with failure and loneliness in a college setting, can intensify problems.⁸¹ Working to understand these characteristics may help identify indicators, or problems within the walls of the institutions.

In other words, based on the population and nuances of campus life, the campus environment seems like a perfect storm when it comes to the opportunity for mass shootings, terrorism, and everyday crime. To support this Fisher et al. concluded by stating,

⁷⁵ Fisher et al., “Crime in the Ivory Tower,” 674.

⁷⁶ Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 449.

⁷⁷ Cross, “FOX 25 Investigates.”

⁷⁸ Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, “Toward Preventing Future Tragedies,” 93.

⁷⁹ Cross, “FOX 25 Investigates.”

⁸⁰ “Virginia Tech Shootings Fast Facts,” CNN, April 9, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/index.html>.

⁸¹ Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun, “Toward Preventing Future Tragedies,” 93.

“the total number of security personnel [on a college campus] was unrelated to victimization.”⁸² Their study suggests that crime prevention training, awareness campaigns, and simply asking another student to watch someone else’s property would help reduce the risk of victimization on campuses.⁸³ Campus police may be able to get ahead of sexual assaults, larceny, burglary, and other everyday criminal acts through such methods, but what keeps the lone wolf terrorist from running a car through a crowd of students, or a lone wolf terrorist from killing thirty or more people with a firearm? This is the billion-dollar question campus police, and the institutions are trying to solve.

2. Campus Contexts

The college campus is a unique community when it comes to crime. Much different than a city or municipality, the campus is an institution of higher learning—a place where students come to grow, educate themselves, and find out who they are going to become when they grow up. The dichotomy brings people from all over the world to one location, where they meet other young adults with differing views and differing ideals, all for a common goal of higher learning. Yet outside of this common goal for higher education, the campus is not immune to crimes and other heinous acts—like terrorism. Sloan explains, “to better understand campus crime, one needs to realize that it involves several contexts—the legal, the social, and the security—and that each context is interrelated with the others.”⁸⁴ Campus police fall into the security portion, but the other two contexts are equally as important to understand the entire university environment.

The legal context of campus crime is handled by the judicial and legislative branches. Generally, universities can be held liable if anything happens on campus to an individual. The individual has the right to recoup any damages lost while under the care and responsibility of the university, if the judicial system deems the university is negligent.⁸⁵ This responsibility is much different than a local, or state administrator who

⁸² Fisher et al., “Crime in the Ivory Tower,” 703.

⁸³ Fisher et al., 704.

⁸⁴ Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 449.

⁸⁵ Sloan, 449.

would not be held liable for crimes or damages their citizens incur while living in their community on privately owned property. In the past, universities—for these reasons—kept issues inside “the walls” of the institution. Administrations would deal with issues, crimes, and policy violations themselves in order to keep the reputation of the university in good regard, and if the local police were involved, the police would handle them quietly.⁸⁶ The outcome, though, was often a mishandling of issues, lack of reporting, and lack of justice for victims of crimes—which brought the Clery Act and other legislative changes on campuses in America.

Legislation like the Campus Security Act of 1990 changed the landscape of how institutions handled crimes on campuses. The Security Act ensured that the public had an annual report of crimes occurring on campus and security policies were readily available for that institution. Failure to comply would result in a fine and possible loss of federal funds, under Title IX, for that university.⁸⁷ The Campus Security Act of 1990 was amended multiple times until 1998 when it was “renamed the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act in remembrance of Jeanne Clery.”⁸⁸ Sloan believes that such legislative acts are no more than symbolic, due to the real change needing to occur in the institutions, and enforcement of crimes.⁸⁹ The campus police relationship with the administration is critical in order to gain real trust in reporting, and ensure that legislation in place is followed, regardless of the picture the university may want to paint for themselves.

The social context tries to identify the extent, nature, and reasons for campus crime and victimization.⁹⁰ Rebecca Graham and Amanda Konradi “argue that the rape and murder of Jeanne Ann Clery typified the larger issue of campus crime in the media, as

⁸⁶ Sloan, 449.

⁸⁷ Sloan, 450.

⁸⁸ Sloan, 451.

⁸⁹ Sloan, 452.

⁹⁰ Sloan, 5.

rhetoric of campus crime unfolded.”⁹¹ Further they mentioned that the college student is a naïve, and easy prey, which may explain a piece of the reasoning for victimization.⁹² However, the 15 years of surveys that Sloan referenced paint a picture of alcohol, drugs, and a student’s routine as examples why the college campus is a primed place for crimes and victimization.⁹³ The social context helps show that university crime, while much safer compared to non-campus crime, is important for campus police in determining how they deal with their population. National data is not always indicative of what is going on inside the campus, and the local community’s social context may not be indicative of what is going on inside the campus “walls.” While the “ivory tower” label may not entirely be reflective of today’s universities, they also are not the war zones that media sometimes portrays them as.⁹⁴ Campus police can use these social contexts to find the hot spots on campus, set up education and training opportunities, and better attack these crimes that occur on a more regular basis.

The last aspect is the security context. The security context applies solely to the campus police departments and the public safety organizations under the universities’ charge. Sloan’s description of the security context is brief and to the point, stating there are different components—like administrators, campus police, emergency management, etc.—inside a university’s security structure that control the campus security environment.⁹⁵ Bridging the gap to ensure the different campus security departments are focused, coordinated, and informed is the common theme seen in research and literature which can help campus police better serve the people inside their community. Though, coordinating these components to meet the common and emerging greater security challenges can prove

⁹¹ Graham and Konradi, “Contextualizing the 1990 Campus Security Act and Campus Sexual Assault in Intersectional and Historical Terms,” 94.

⁹² Graham and Konradi, 94.

⁹³ Sloan, “Campus Crime,” 453.

⁹⁴ Sloan, 454.

⁹⁵ Sloan, 454.

daunting. Higgins states, “there are not yet rows of textbooks and time-tested playbooks to which campus police can turn.”⁹⁶

Campus crimes like sexual assault, theft, and burglary are all subject to mandatory reporting, though terrorism is left to be a mystery—statistically speaking. For this reason, terrorism typically gets lumped into the broader umbrella of homeland security, and national security practices instead of campus security because of the other crimes and immediate issues universities face daily. Therefore, campus police have to take it upon themselves to ensure information is being disseminated, and they are always looking for literature or reports to improve their operations. Penn State Police Lieutenant Edward Delaney explained their police department and athletic department are always looking at outside agencies—like the FBI and DHS—for best practices, to conduct threat assessments, and in ensuring Penn State is a hard target in all aspects.⁹⁷ Most campus police departments train for the worst-case scenarios, but not all departments have experienced this type of crime or event, making assessments, communicating with schools who have experienced these scenarios, and continually searching for innovations a cornerstone of their operations.⁹⁸

3. Campus Population

While Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun’s characteristics of a college and Sloan’s contexts for campus violence can assist in understanding the peculiarities of the campus environment in general, the other portion of the campus environment that merits consideration is the university population itself. The five categories that Heilbrun, Dvoskin, and Heilbrun describes are finite—open campus, perfect age for crime, faculty to student power difference, students on their own, and lack of reporting; and the three contexts that Sloan highlights are concrete—legal, social, and security. Yet they are all aspects that have indicators that can be tracked are understood. The population of a university, on the other hand, is malleable—individual students, faculty, and employees are much more sporadic,

⁹⁶ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 4.

⁹⁷ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

⁹⁸ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

rotational, and are harder to track or understand on an individual basis—especially when compared to a city or municipality.

This section will analyze the radicalization, mental and behavioral health, and individual lack of reporting on a campus, which will assist in further understanding the underlying issues that campus police face on a day-to-day basis and make the population served much different than the local or municipality population police have to deal with. A 2017 study conducted by Kyle et al. further supports this analysis by stating that students and faculty did not support “a theme of comprehensive safety policies,”⁹⁹ indicating that the majority of the population served on campus does not want campus police or administrators present in their daily routines. All of this combined adds up to a population that is primed for radicalization, does not have a system in place capable of handling and reporting mental health to the proper individuals, and which wants individual freedoms (resulting in a lack of reporting).

a. Radicalization

In “Domestic Terrorism, Cyber Radicalization, & U.S. College Students,” Marie Wright, states that the radicalization process, “...poses a specific challenge to higher education because some of the individuals who are becoming radicalized are college and university students.”¹⁰⁰ Students are best described as “ordinary individuals with U.S. citizenship or residency, with no criminal or terrorist history, who can hold legitimate travel documentation.”¹⁰¹ These attributes create nearly impossible odds for campus police departments in their efforts to unearth possible violent criminals or terrorists. As Hamm, Spaaij, and Cottee state in *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism*,

Wholly absent is research on factors associated with the radicalization of individuals who become lone wolves. There are no publicly available FBI reports dealing specifically with lone wolf terrorism... despite the fact that a 2009 DHS report concluded that “lone wolves and small terrorist cells

⁹⁹ Kyle et al., “Perceptions of Campus Safety Policies,” 661.

¹⁰⁰ Marie Wright, “Domestic Terrorism, Cyber-Radicalization, & U.S. College Students,” *Forensic Examiner; Springfield* 20, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 14, ProQuest.

¹⁰¹ Wright, “Domestic Terrorism, Cyber-Radicalization, & U.S. College Students,” 17.

embracing violent rightwing extremist ideology is [sic] the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States.¹⁰²

Yet all across America universities open their arms to all different types of groups and individuals, representing different ideologies, to attend classes or lecture on their campuses. Higgins states that “the openness and accessibility of college campuses along with a heightened awareness of the duty to protect community members with differing views from harassment and discrimination are all emerging and converging challenges facing university campuses today.”¹⁰³ Whether it be the 2017 white supremacist march through the University of Virginia campus,¹⁰⁴ or the 2017 speech at the University of California, Berkeley by right-wing political commentator Ben Shapiro—which was met by hundreds of protestors—campus administrators welcome this freedom of expression, even if it is “tearing at the campus’s social fabric.”¹⁰⁵ Inviting these differences on campus can quickly lead to an extreme event that could become lethal, or even inspire a lone wolf to go rogue.¹⁰⁶

Other pieces of the capricious puzzle on campus radicalization include the increased activity occurring online and recruitment or influence of possible lone wolf terrorists. In a 1974 letter to the fellows of the Yale Corporation, Chairman C. Vann Woodward writes, “we value freedom of expression precisely because it provides a forum for the new, the provocative, the disturbing, and the unorthodox.”¹⁰⁷ While most universities would agree with Woodward, this statement is the epitome of the college experience. The unfettering amount of ideology, theory, and history that is soaked up by a student, while in a new environment filled with stress, loneliness, and new people, provides

¹⁰² Mark Hamm, Ramón Spaaij, and Simon Cottee, *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 13, ProQuest.

¹⁰³ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 55.

¹⁰⁴ Higgins, 55.

¹⁰⁵ Prudence Carter and R. Jay Wallace, *Report of the Chancellor’s Commission on Free Speech*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, April 10, 2018), 5, https://chancellor.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/report_of_the_commission_on_free_speech.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 57.

¹⁰⁷ Woodward, “Chairman’s Letter to the Fellows of the Yale Corporation.”

the perfect recipe for radicalization. Conducting research on a topic of interest can lead a student down many paths on the internet. The curiosity for knowledge can quickly turn into a passion, or obsession, and when guided by the right person, can lead to a path of unintended ideology or circumstances. Heinrichs was an Engineering major who ended up making a homemade bomb in his apartment. Seung-Hui Cho was an English major who wrote detailed poems and papers about events that he eventually made a reality. In other words, students in the campus setting constitute a very vulnerable crowd to start with. Inject protests, ample time to consider different ideologies while no one is around to watch over or supervise your actions, and you have a recipe for disaster.

b. Mental and Behavioral Health

Similar to mental health, radicalization is typically visible through behavioral indicators that can give signs of possible angst or violent intentions which need to be addressed. For example, Jeffrey Hunt mentions that Seung-Hui Cho displayed 17 “red flags” that were known by almost every “network of individuals and agencies in academics, student affairs, law enforcement, mental health centers, and the courts.”¹⁰⁸ Ensuring all personnel working on a campus—not just the campus police—are trained to identify indicators of all types of behavior health is vital. The problem cannot only lie in the hands of the campus police and emergency management departments to react and respond in a time of crisis. The underlying issues to the bigger problems need to be given to the police to handle prior to incident. Problems identified in much of the literature on mental illness, post 2007 prove that the problem is a systemic failure of identifying individuals who show signs of violence, and possible harm to others.¹⁰⁹ The *Strategic Primer on College Student Mental Health* states “almost two-thirds of students who meet the criteria for depression do not get help.”¹¹⁰

Similarly, another issue with mental health is pre-existing conditions that carry over to the university setting with no known awareness or reporting. In 2008 the Center for the

¹⁰⁸ Hunt, “A Review of: The Virginia Tech Massacre,” 825.

¹⁰⁹ Douce and Keeling, *A Strategic Primer on College Student Mental Health*, 3.

¹¹⁰ Douce and Keeling, 3.

Study of Collegiate Mental Health (CSCMH) at Penn State University conducted a national survey of 28,000 students across America, finding that prior to college 34 percent had experienced counseling, 21 percent had previous psychiatric medications, and 19 percent had seriously considered suicide.¹¹¹ This type of information is rarely, if ever, relayed to the campus police or the behavior health department of the university, leaving students requiring assistance without proper care or treatment. The lack of knowledge of pre-existing conditions is only exasperated on campus when students are alone for the first time in their life, in a stressful environment, and no one to talk to.

c. Individual Lack of Reporting

Quite possibly the most important aspect could be the lack of reporting by individuals—student, staff, and faculty—when an individual is showing signs. It has been proven that this lack of reporting only gets worse when the student is on a campus where students and faculty either fail to report, or the university has a reputation of not taking reports seriously. Aradhana Sood and Robert Cohen state that the 2007 Virginia Tech shooter had a litany of events that should have been reported or triggered administration action, yet a poor culture that lacked support to students and faculty who made complaints, coupled with an inadequate system to address and communicate complaints, resulted in thirty-two people dead.¹¹² Sood and Cohen argue that

It is time to reexamine information sharing with an eye towards public safety, while maintaining reasonable limitations on who can access which files in order to protect an individual's privacy. Before students can begin classes, colleges require proof of immunizations out of concern for contagious disease outbreaks on campus. But other significant threats face students beyond measles, mumps, or polio.¹¹³

The lack of reporting is all too common in the campus environment and as stated earlier by Higgins, terrorism is not mandated for reporting in the college setting. This is a

¹¹¹ Aradhana Bela Sood and Robert Cohen, *The Virginia Tech Massacre: Strategies and Challenges for Improving Mental Health Policy on Campus and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2014), 77, ProQuest.

¹¹² Sood and Cohen, *The Virginia Tech Massacre*, 83.

¹¹³ Sood and Cohen, 84.

shock when considering radicalization or lone wolf terrorism in America on college campuses. Campus police and university administrators have a very difficult task in front of them, though the problems point toward the underlying conditions of policies, environment, and individuals—not the campus police or university administrators directly. As with the Clery Act, coming up with a comprehensive policy may fix specific functions, though, the environment and individuals who are protected by privacy, basic rights, and intellectual rights have to be receptive of the policies enacted, and ensure they are upheld. Informing students that they are better protected from theft if they lock up their items is in the best interest of the student and will more likely be implemented. On the other hand, telling the student that they have an obligation to report suspicious online activities is not so obvious—as seen in this chapter—and will most likely not occur.

C. CONCLUSION

College campuses are just like cities with all of the regular problems and vulnerabilities that might afflict any population; however, particular aspects of the campus life make the ivory tower harder to police and protect. A macro-level analysis of the campus environment identified the real problems' campus police face and the importance of identifying vulnerabilities and overcoming hurdles in the institutions that are neither prevalent or present in cities or municipalities. The deeper rooted issues, complexities, and peculiarities of a college campus are the biggest threats to the security of universities across America—specifically, the institutional and individual lack of reporting that could aid campus police in better identifying the underlying problems on campus before they turn deadly. The next chapter will build on this macro-level analysis by introducing the micro-level problems of the stadium environment and the different issues and difficulties campus police face in protecting football games from potential attacks.

III. STADIUM ENVIRONMENT

There is nothing sweeter than waking up on a beautiful fall Saturday morning in the Midwest to falling leaves, morning dew, and college football. Before the sun comes up, the stadium environment on campus comes to life in the form of campus personnel, stadium personnel, fans from all directions, and news and media outlets gearing up to enjoy a gridiron classic. Generators, smokers, and grills will be fired up before dawn, coffee will be replaced with the fans' favorite morning alcoholic beverage, and friends will be made with total strangers simply because they are wearing the same colors. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, the 110,000+ fans, in excitement for the upcoming game, will fill parking lots, hotels, bars, restaurants, and the famous golf course tailgating area located directly across from the iconic "Big House" stadium. Most of these fans will be thinking about football, tailgating games, and heckling, which will leave looking for suspicious activity, or something out of place that could potentially harm others, to the professionals.

These professionals, on game day and the days leading up to, have to worry about both their everyday policing problems *and* the crowds that will arrive on Saturday. Campus threats, as discussed in Chapter II, will be in the forefront of campus police minds, though now the possibility of an outside threat creates an even more complex security environment. On average, the population of the town or city, campus, and surrounding areas in the Big Ten Conference will increase by 65,065 people.¹¹⁴ The campus police will now have to use their resources and assets to ensure the stadium, population and the university are defended from terrorism, possibly originating outside of the local population. Yet, the law enforcement officers will not know all of the people who are coming to the game. Officers do not know the mental health conditions of the fans and spectators; officers do not know whether any of the visitors hold an allegiance to a terrorist organization; and the overall intentions of the fans and spectators are a collective mystery. For this reason, campus police departments across the Big Ten must depend on their training, their

¹¹⁴ NCAA, "NCAA Football Attendance."

partnerships with outside agencies, and their ability to react in order to protect the fans' experience, while maintaining a safe and secure environment for all.

This chapter will examine the stadium environment in the Big Ten Conference and offer an analysis of how campus police coordinate and integrate local, state, and federal law enforcement to tackle game day operations for football games. First, a general examination of the campus police involvement in stadium security operations will identify the circumstances influencing each university within the Big Ten to operate its game-day security somewhat differently. The insights of campus police leadership from Penn State University (PSU), Michigan State University (MSU), and the University of Wisconsin (U of W) regarding specific stadium operations will highlight disparities among the respective Big Ten Conference campus security operations. Second, an analysis of the local, state, and federal law enforcement coordination will identify the different aspects—augmentation, unified command structure, and intelligence, etc.—which strengthen the Big Ten conference stadium security apparatus. This micro-level analysis will highlight the efficiency with which the Big Ten campus police departments are providing stadium security and identify areas of that security in which the Big Ten conference may improve. Individually, each university in the Big Ten has a sound plan but achieving the highest levels of security across the conference is the next step in maximizing the safety and security effectiveness of high-profile and high-attendance Big Ten college football games.

A. BIG TEN CONFERENCE STADIUM SECURITY

The range of issues that campus police face in their everyday policing—such as campus threats and mental health issues—can compound during game-day operations, especially, with the addition of the stadium environment threats. To a large part, the stadium environment is related to the success of the Athletics Department, and the Athletics Department at each university generates significant funding for both the campus police department and outside agency assistance. Analysis of the Big Ten Conference stadium security operations will establish how campus police function specifically in the stadium environment to protect against terrorism and violent crimes. First, responses from PSU, MSU, and the U of W campus police leaders will be examined to identify the differences

between each campus police department in stadium security operations. Next, this section will identify the disparities between Big Ten universities, particularly Athletics Department revenues, funding of operations and how budgets are applied to the stadium security environment. Overall, the disparities highlighted in this section identify an array of existing models for stadium security that could be corrected with a “best practice guide” or common standards of operations.

1. Campus Police in the Stadium

While campus police in the Big Ten are not going to have a television show or movie created about them and their daily lives in law enforcement, this group of professionals is trained, equipped, versatile, and specialized—providing a force capable of executing comparably to its local and state counterparts. Of the Big Ten schools that responded to this thesis’ request—PSU; MSU; and U of W—all have sworn campus police officers that have law enforcement certifications from the state. The only private institution in the Big Ten is Northwestern University, but according to the university’s campus police department website, its police officers are sworn state police officers, just like the public universities in the Big Ten.¹¹⁵ The campus police officers are also all armed and trained in a similar fashion, which is guided by each state’s certification requirements.¹¹⁶ At PSU all campus police officers operate under Act 120,¹¹⁷ but there are also armed security units—Department of Defense (DOD) funded—that are utilized during game days and operate separately under Act 235.¹¹⁸ This operational distinction stands in slight contrast to MSU’s police department, for example, that does not have armed security units employed in its department.¹¹⁹ The employment of armed security units gives the PSU police department

¹¹⁵ Northwestern University, “Responsibilities: University Police - Northwestern University.”

¹¹⁶ Hopkins and Neff, “Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie,” 133.

¹¹⁷ “Act 120: Municipal Police Academy,” Criminal Justice Training Center, accessed September 21, 2020, <https://www.iup.edu/crimjustice/training-programs/act-120/>.

¹¹⁸ “Lethal Weapons Training Program,” Pennsylvania State Police, accessed September 21, 2020, <https://www.psp.pa.gov:443/lethalweapons/Pages/default.aspx>.

¹¹⁹ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

the ability to hire more personnel due to DOD funding, without using its department's funding.¹²⁰

Staffing is another area that varies across university campus police departments, especially considering the different university satellite campuses. At PSU, police officer Lt. Edward Delaney explained that there are approximately 70 university police officers who work during football games, but there are approximately 175 total officers in the department across 22 different campuses.¹²¹ The low number supporting the football games is due to the number of campuses and the operations still required to ensure safety and security of the campus separate from the football games. In contrast, according to MSU police officer Lt. Shaun Mills, MSU has approximately 80 sworn police officers, all of whom support football games, unless the officers are policing the campus on their regular shift.¹²²

Such divisions as Emergency Management, Behavioral Threat Management, Physical Security, Community Engagement, and Student Auxiliary Officers are in place to assist the campus police departments during special events and football games. The planning and coordination that occurs is headed by the top positions in each division, but the majority of the funding for football games—if not a voluntary position—remains the responsibility of the Athletics Department.¹²³ These supportive divisions are crucial to the overall construct of the stadium security effectiveness and assist the campus police in expanding their security apparatus. Specialized divisions provide areas of expertise that can be vital in the event of a casualty, or incident. According to Lt. Delaney, these university personnel have a great relationship with the campus police department and are very involved in the planning process of Saturday football games.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²¹ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²² Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

¹²³ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²⁴ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

Lastly, the campus police departments in the Big Ten have special operations divisions that may include K-9 divisions, UAV/UAS units, and bomb squads that are employed at their respective universities. These divisions within the campus police departments are funded through university or federal budgets, or may be augmented through local, state, or federal assistance. For example, PSU has a two-person bomb squad that is trained and certified through the Pennsylvania State Police,¹²⁵ while the MSU police department does not have a bomb squad, but rather coordinates with the Michigan State Police directly for that function.¹²⁶ PSU also has a UAV/UAS Drone Unit that assists in aerial reconnaissance during football games; currently, it is the only school in the Big Ten that has this capability. One consensus across the Big Ten is that all campus police are well-trained—via state LE certifications/training requirements—in active shooter, mass casualty, and chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear incidents. Additionally, special events divisions or operations divisions in the Big Ten are a vital asset to each department, and if the campus police do not directly have the capability, the local/state/federal agencies will coordinate the response.¹²⁷

2. Stadium Security Funding

Campus police departments in the Big Ten operate their departments under funding from the university and bill their respective Athletic Departments directly for anything sports related. If the police department finds an area of training, or specific equipment, that would serve its efforts during a football game, that department reaches out to the Athletic Department directly for funding. Such specialized equipment may include metal detectors, wands, K-9 programs, threat assessments, etc.¹²⁸ In a 2019 *Forbes* article, U of M was the third most valuable football program in America, averaging \$83 million dollars in profits over the most recent three years.¹²⁹ This large budget might suggest that there is plenty of

¹²⁵ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²⁶ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

¹²⁷ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²⁸ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹²⁹ Smith, “College Football’s Most Valuable Teams.”

money that can be allocated to security operations on game day—but with only seven of the fourteen Big Ten schools making the national “top 25” list in 2019, the gap in athletics revenue means that the school with the lowest profit margin has less funding for its security operations. As of this writing, the twenty-third ranked team on the national list, and seventh in the Big Ten, is the University of Wisconsin, which averaged a profit of \$48 million dollars over the most recent three years, nearly half the profit that U of M made.¹³⁰

While the level of security a university can afford is a disparity from university to university in the Big Ten Conference, there are even more expenses—specifically just in Athletics—that draw from sports-related revenues. According to a report by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, OSU’s expenses for athletics totaled approximately \$220 million—the highest in the Big Ten Conference.¹³¹ In contrast, Purdue University (PU) spent the least on athletics, approximately \$98 million for 2018.¹³² This disparity among the two schools results from multiple factors: scholarships paid, number of facilities maintained, coaching expenses, game expenses and travel, etc., and while the percentages spent on each factor are roughly the same at both universities—game expenses and travel were 11 percent at each—OSU had more than twice the athletic budget of PU.¹³³ This difference means that game day operations, facility infrastructure improvements, and excess funding for athletics spending vary greatly from university to university.

While Athletic Department funding is a metric of how well resources can be applied to a problem set in a security related operation, it is not the only source of funding. The universities around the Big Ten receive funding and assistance from federal government grants and programs. DHS has given PSU funding and grants for barriers and camera

¹³⁰ Smith, “College Football’s Most Valuable Teams.”

¹³¹ “Big Ten Conference: College Athletics Financial Information (CAFI) Database,” Knight Commission On Intercollegiate Athletics, accessed April 28, 2020, <http://cafidatabase.knightcommission.org/fbs/big-ten>.

¹³² Knight Commission On Intercollegiate Athletics, “Big Ten Conference.”

¹³³ Knight Commission On Intercollegiate Athletics, “Big Ten Conference.”

systems to be used for stadium security operations.¹³⁴ DHS also has a “Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program” to aid in preventing targeted violence and terrorism.¹³⁵ The Big Ten university campus police chiefs interviewed for this thesis confirmed they have officers who work with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) program in order to train and enhance terrorism/counter-terrorism and intelligence operations for their departments, joint efforts funded solely through the FBI.¹³⁶ Additionally, the PSU Bomb Squad training and certification process is funded through the Pennsylvania State Police, while fully operated by PSU police officers.¹³⁷

The disparity of funding from one university to the next in the Big Ten is an indicator for how security operations vary among Big Ten universities. These disparities could lead to deficiencies, ultimately leading to security gaps that could potentially create issues for campus police and supporting agencies during football games. The Big Ten Conference does not have any specific guidelines or direct funding in place to create standards of operations for security or a “best practices guide” for the stadium environment. Therefore, for example, OSU could equip its stadium with the latest technology due to its high revenue, while PU is left with old technology to protect a similar venue.

B. STADIUM COORDINATION IN THE BIG TEN

Campus police rely on different agencies and departments within the university to ensure the safety and security for football games because the police cannot do it alone. Individual universities have proven their security apparatuses can be effective, though this analysis will identify the many variables each university must consider each week outside of the direct threats it experiences in everyday policing on campus. The first part of this section will highlight the different types of law enforcement augmentation that coordinate and assist the campus police in stadium operations. Second, the unified command concept

¹³⁴ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹³⁵ “Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program,” Department of Homeland Security, February 14, 2020, <https://www.dhs.gov/tvtpgrants>.

¹³⁶ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹³⁷ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

will be assessed to understand how the campus police involve different entities in the stadium security operations to keep fans safe and secure during football games. Third, an overview of the intelligence operations local, state, and federal agencies bring to the stadium security operations will highlight the critical part intelligence plays in thwarting terrorism or possible violent acts in the days leading up to game day. Lastly, this section will highlight the non-law enforcement support, the vetting of personnel, and the types of personnel used for operations inside and outside of the stadium.

1. Law Enforcement Augmentation

The campus police departments around the Big Ten are not capable of handling the thousands of fans who will fill campus stadiums each weekend without outside assistance. PSU will be able to provide approximately 70 of its own officers but game day operations call for more than 250 law enforcement officers to properly police the stadium.¹³⁸ Local and state agencies will provide the remaining personnel through overtime positions and special event detail positions in order to meet the demands of the stadium security operations. Since 9/11, the different law enforcement agencies have been working on integration and coordination procedures, training in countering violent acts, and intelligence networking to harden the different homeland security missions in America. The Virginia Tech massacre further highlighted the lack of integration and coordination between the different agencies and how that lack can lead to a disaster if the proper steps are not taken or implemented. For similar reasons, the Big Ten campus police have put emphasis on ensuring law enforcement augmentation is implemented properly and that each agency is manned, trained, and equipped to work together.

Lt. Delaney states that the local, state, and federal agency augmentation and assistance prior to and during game day is a vital part of the campus police department's planning and coordination.¹³⁹ The Command and Control portion of the event planning may be, "one of the most important principles of effective inter-organizational

¹³⁸ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹³⁹ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

performance.”¹⁴⁰ For this reason, law enforcement augmentation—especially the use of many levels of law enforcement agencies—is crucial in determining chain of command prior to an incident occurring. The research conducted for this thesis demonstrates that the Pennsylvania State Police are a respected and highly trained force, but the PSU campus police are the campus law enforcement experts and have a value that cannot be diminished. Campus police are an asset more now than ever in the United States, but their capacity and capabilities are still hindered or limited by funding and training.

A 2017 article in the *Campus Law Enforcement Journal*, authored by Thomas Leasor, highlighted the results from a survey with NCAA Division 1-A campus police chiefs, stating that just over three-quarters of the police departments use anywhere from one to ten different law enforcement agencies for a single football game’s security.¹⁴¹ While the Big Ten falls into the three-quarters that use different agencies, the more chilling indicator found in the survey is “that the certified law enforcement officers working home football games are not required to receive any kind of terrorism and/or violence response training.”¹⁴² This statistic was backed during the interviews conducted for this thesis with PSU, MSU, and U of W. Each of the three respective campus police departments does terrorism/counter-terrorism training—just not with every single police officer on the force—which makes the augmentation of the different law enforcement agencies a vital portion of the security operations each football game. The augmentation of local, state, and federal agencies allows for collaboration and coordination on a level that the campus police may not be readily trained or equipped to handle.

To avoid from providing a “road map” for a terrorist or violent criminal, the law enforcement augmentation that occurs during a Big Ten football game is layered, complex, coordinated, and well planned. The budgetary constraints, lack of training resources, and

¹⁴⁰ Paul Denton, “Intercollegiate Athletics Safety and Security Best Practices Guide” (National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security (University of Southern Mississippi), April 13, 2017), 111, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=810147>.

¹⁴¹ Leasor, “Resources for Campus Police Chiefs to Combat Threats of Terrorism or Violence at Football Stadiums,” 48.

¹⁴² Leasor, “Resources for Campus Police Chiefs to Combat Threats of Terrorism or Violence at Football Stadiums,” 48.

overall terrorist threat concerns that the campus police face are all assuaged and supported through law enforcement augmentation by the different agencies enlisted each football game. The campus police could not safely secure a Big Ten football stadium on their own, and the support given by the different agencies is what really creates the safe and secure environment for fans, students, faculty, and the supporting staff.

2. Unified Command

Campus police and campus emergency management maintain command and control during football games with assistance from outside agencies including federal agencies. The unified command concept—or also known as Incident Command System (ICS)—comes from the 2005 Department of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, which established the National Incident Management System (NIMS), “to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”¹⁴³ The main goal is to provide structure and direction while managing any incident regardless of the size. The structure allows for “dividing the problem into components of a command and control structure corresponding to responsibilities and objectives, and then designating officers to be responsible for outcomes.”¹⁴⁴ To apply this concept to a Big Ten football game, the different police agencies, fire, emergency services, and athletics department all manage a component of the command and control structure. In most cases—as gathered through interviews for this thesis—the campus police chief will be the main individual in charge of the overall operation at his or her Big Ten university.

This unified command concept is a vital portion of the operation that allows for a central authority to oversee the entire operation, while providing a command center where the multiple components of the operation can collaborate, make decisions, and effectively manage the overall security and operations of the football stadium. This unified command concept assists also in the planning phase of the football stadium operations. Having a command structure in place, that is well defined, and with components identified allows

¹⁴³ Anice I. Anderson, Dennis Compton, and Tom Mason, “Managing in a Dangerous World-The National Incident Management System,” *Engineering Management Journal: EMJ* 16, no. 4 (December 2004): 3, ProQuest.

¹⁴⁴ Anderson, Compton, and Mason “Managing in a Dangerous World,” 4.

for the different augmented agencies to understand their roles and responsibilities in order to better task and prepare for each individual involved. While each Big Ten university operates stadium and event security differently, each university operates under a unified command concept that clearly dictates each organization's roles and responsibilities, while collaborating and cooperating with each other to ensure maximum security and operational coverage for each football game.

As an example, a brief hypothetical scenario will best describe how a unified command operates during a football game in the Big Ten Conference. At PSU, the tailgating area is located right outside of the stadium. If there was a fight or individual with a weapon appears in that area, then the immediate response would be made by the mix of campus police officers and/or local and state police officers patrolling the tailgating area. The responding officers would then report by radio to the unified command center, which would assist by activating emergency services to render aid for any injuries, direct K-9 teams to respond, and issue any necessary additional notifications to other stadium security personnel. Additionally, the unified command would alert the UAV squad to move the UAV overhead to help get eyes on the problem for the command post and assist in tracking anyone either involved in the incident or trying to escape the area with a weapon. If the situation becomes out of the control, then there would be a single entity—the unified command—to help coordinate and direct the many different organizations assisting in managing the situation. Instead of the organizations involved trying to manage and coordinate on an individual basis, the unified command is able to consolidate efforts, coordinate a calculated response, and ensure that other areas of the event are not transformed into soft targets by the distraction.

Another aspect of the unified command concept that relates to incidents during an event is the Emergency Action Plan (EAP). The EAP is developed, maintained, and implemented by the unified command in the event of an incident. These pre-planned responses are designed to include every possible incident that could occur and include every entity that will have a component of the overall security and stadium operations structure. While every Big Ten campus police Chief interviewed mentioned an EAP, Leason states that, “only 48 percent noted it is required by university policy that they

practice their EAP annually prior to the beginning of each football season.”¹⁴⁵ The EAP is a great concept, but if the organizations included in the EAP are not regularly practicing the operations, then the unified command will not be as effective. Training and exercises provide the organization, “immediate feedback on the effectiveness of the plan and its ability to perform essential functions during emergencies.”¹⁴⁶ Having multiple agencies involved requires training, and preparation to make sure the unified command is as effective as it can be.

3. Intelligence Operations

Since 9/11, law enforcement intelligence operations—referred to as intelligence-led policing (ILP)—has become a large initiative for local and state law enforcement agencies seeking to develop an intelligence capacity which assists integrating information within the entire information sharing environment (ISE).¹⁴⁷ Higgins, states that in 2005, “the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing recommended that ‘campus police and security operations should be a viable part of the nation’s intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes’” and that “cooperation between higher education and several government agencies” has been established by the FBI through the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB).¹⁴⁸ However, this inclusion of educational institutions and campus police into the intelligence process is not as in depth and effective as it sounds.

Intelligence at any level has information gaps and there are multiple intelligence requirements that must be met in the ISE. These requirements are federal agency driven and as John Comiskey states in 2010, “they fail to provide the comprehensive intelligence

¹⁴⁵ Leasor, “Resources for Campus Police Chiefs to Combat Threats of Terrorism or Violence at Football Stadiums,” 49.

¹⁴⁶ Brandon Lane Allen, “Continuity of Operations Planning Preparedness of NCAA Division I Athletic Departments” (PhD diss., University of Southern Mississippi, 2011), 32, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/916383124?fromopenview=true&pq-origsite=gscholar..>

¹⁴⁷ David L. Carter and Jeremy G. Carter, “Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy,” *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 313–14, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403408327381>.

¹⁴⁸ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 52.

needs of SLTLE agencies.”¹⁴⁹ The result is a lack of any formal process for the lower level agencies—like campus police—to establish their intelligence requirements. For this reason, the FBI created a program called Campus Liaison Initiative (CLI) with the mission to, “continuously enhance liaison relationships with colleges and universities in an effort to increase mutual cooperation and information sharing between campuses and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).”¹⁵⁰ In this program, as Higgins states, campus police officers are “deputized as special U.S. marshals... are required to obtain top-secret security clearance,” and are able to attend “regular meeting [to] ensure that appropriate leaders are briefed on current matters germane to their jurisdiction as well as regional and national trends.”¹⁵¹ PSU and MSU each have one officer assigned to a JTTF, though not every university in the Big Ten Conference participates in the program.

The campus police officers assigned to the JTTF are not full-time participants, and according to Comiskey, “SLTLE agencies should make known their intelligence requirements to FBI via JTTFs,”¹⁵² supporting the argument that local level intelligence requirements are not being fed to the national intelligence community. Campus police may have a direct line to the intelligence community, vis-à-vis JTTFs, but the role of campus police in this relationship is generally in a passive nature. For those who do not have direct JTTF liaisons, Lt. Delaney states that, “the state and federal agencies provide the most assistance with intelligence operations leading up to game day.”¹⁵³ The PSU police department coordinates with the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) for its intelligence information and investigative data.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, MSU coordinates directly

¹⁴⁹ SLTLE is an acronym for State, Local, Tribal Law Enforcement. John Grattan Comiskey, “Effective State, Local, and Tribal Police Intelligence the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Enterprise - a Smart Practice” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 5, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5460>.

¹⁵⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *FBI Campus Liaison Program*, accessed May 21, 2020, <http://archive.org/details/FBICampusLiasonProgram>.

¹⁵¹ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 54.

¹⁵² Comiskey, “Effective State, Local, and Tribal Police Intelligence the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Enterprise - a Smart Practice,” 131.

¹⁵³ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹⁵⁴ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

with the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC).¹⁵⁵ In other words, the campus police officers who are assigned to the JTTF are the direct representatives of local law enforcement, though the entire mission of keeping the football stadiums safe for football games is a collaborative effort on all levels, working through each fusion center.

The end goal for campus police is to ensure a safe and secure environment for all involved in the stadium and local area operations, which is accomplished through coordination with outside agencies. The intelligence operations—regardless of JTTF involvement—are effective for universities in the Big Ten Conference to keep the stadium environment safe, and to maintain communication between all levels of government for counter-terrorism efforts. The different paths available to intelligence—non-existent 20 years ago—have given the campus police and universities a bigger picture to assess when trying to maintain a safe and secure stadium each week. Inclusion of the campus police with the intelligence process will bolster better planning, and preparations between the different agencies, while assisting in the unified command concept where information is disseminated to each component involved. The federally developed programs have certainly paved the way for lower level agencies to be involved, though more reform to ensure “campus police and security are positioned as key stakeholders in a campus’s counterterrorism efforts,”¹⁵⁶ and programs like the CLI may help expand intelligence operations for universities via JTTFs.

4. Stadium Operations

Campus police and the supporting agencies have come a long way since 9/11, and the stadium environment appears to be as safe as ever, though there are always innovations and ideas that must be on the horizon in order for the organizations charged with stadium security to stay ahead of any potential threat or adversary. The biggest threat is still the lone wolf attacker, who is unpredictable, hard to track, and most of the time efficient. Ensuring vetting procedures are conducted properly may be the biggest issue inside the stadium environment, especially since there is not a Big Ten or NCAA standard of

¹⁵⁵ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

¹⁵⁶ Higgins, “Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 54.

operations. Simply flooding the stadium and surrounding areas with law enforcement is not the answer because campus police want to be able to ensure crowd security without sacrificing the fans' experience. Therefore, finding a balance between the two is only compounds the issue, and when taking into account the lack of a "best practice guide" or organizational standard at the Big Ten or NCAA level, it is clear that stadium security comes down to each university's preference, funding, and leadership.

The operations with the most personnel that can make a difference in safety and security lie in the hands of the individuals working the areas without armed security. The professionals who deal with the violent acts, petty crimes, and intelligence each day are well versed in the event of an incident, but the stadium operators have a vital role to be played. The campus police departments' role in vetting, training, and allowing access varies from school to school, but overall, the Athletic Department has command and control of the overall non-law enforcement stadium operations. At PSU a private company is hired to vet personnel,¹⁵⁷ while the MSU police department does all of the vetting of personnel with help from local/state/federal agencies for background checks.¹⁵⁸ Brent Plisch, assistant chief of Police at the University of Wisconsin, states, "Athletics maintains all contracts with private security for access control to the stadium, however the police department is always involved in reviewing and assisting with the selection of those contracts."¹⁵⁹

Outside of the stadium the procedures are all similar in nature—the law enforcement individuals carry the bulk of the responsibility with emergency services and non-law enforcement individuals sprinkled throughout the different posts and entry points to collect cash for parking and tailgating areas, etc. The University of Wisconsin applies a multi-layered approach as individuals approach the gate. There is a uniformed law enforcement patrol on the outer layer: local and state police patrolling their jurisdictions and campus police patrolling their jurisdiction. Then there are non-sworn security

¹⁵⁷ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹⁵⁸ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

¹⁵⁹ Brent Plisch, personal communication, November 12, 2020.

personnel who conduct screenings and ticket entry, backed up by Athletic guest services personnel, and each gate has a law enforcement officer to ensure there is an armed presence.¹⁶⁰ Somewhere outside of the stadium is also where the incident command post, as part of the unified command concept, will be located to help coordinate and establish a headquarters for all leadership to collaborate.

Inside of the stadium the multi-layered approach is inverted, placing law enforcement personnel on the innermost part of the field protecting the players, coaches, and field personnel from any disturbance generated by the crowd. Working away from the field, there are a number of non-law enforcement personnel working the different concessions, vendor stands, ticketing booths, etc. Then there the non-law enforcement security personnel who work for Athletics to help crowd control, scout out any potential issues, and keep eyes and ears on the areas that are not frequented by fans and guests of the stadium. Athletic guest services then help maintain order and vetting into the stadium seating areas. These non-law enforcement personnel do not serve a security centric position but are key in identifying any behavior inside of the stadium seating area that may require attention from law enforcement officers.

The interior stadium operations may be mainly Athletics driven, but the operation itself is highly coordinated with the campus police department. Strategically, the main law enforcement and security personnel are placed at the exterior and inner-most interior to ensure that each fan is enjoying their time in a safe and secure environment. Security personnel are spread throughout the stadium to conduct patrols for fan safety, crowd control, etc., but these personnel are also trained to look for items that may be out of place or suspicious in nature. Overall, the equipment and technology that a stadium is outfitted with then becomes a vital part of safety and security for the fans' experience.

Big Ten universities and universities with higher revenue have the upper hand when it comes to the equipment with which a stadium is outfitted with. Closed-circuit television (CCTV), metal detectors, biometrics, UAVs, etc., enhance the fans' experience by reducing the need for extra personnel and allowing for constant monitoring of areas that may not

¹⁶⁰ Brent Plisch, personal communication, November 12, 2020.

receive the attention it would during routine patrolling. UAV's have also been employed to keep a "birds-eye" view of the different areas around the stadium and can help counter any UAV threat that the stadium may face. The problem is that higher revenue equals a larger capacity for technology and stadium security tools, which places universities with smaller budgets in a predicament that cannot be solved on their own. Creating a stadium standard across the Big Ten Conference would identify these deficiencies and help smaller budget schools bridge the gap through Big Ten Conference funding.

C. CONCLUSION

The football stadium environment that the Big Ten Conference universities manage—much like the rest of the NCAA—is different than other organizations of this scale. Getting 100,000 fans into a stadium to safely watch a football team play is a difficult feat, and there are nuances—i.e., campus threats, mental health issues, funding disparities—to the university construct that may hinder the ability to protect fans and maintain security at the highest level possible at every university. Campus police do an amazing job in managing their staffing, budget, equipment, and jurisdiction, though campus police could not execute the football stadium operations without the help of non-law enforcement personnel, the Athletics department, and the multiple law enforcement agencies enlisted. While intelligence sharing and JTTF inclusion could bolster the overall counter-terrorism operations of the campus police, this thesis concludes that the lack of a "best practice guide," or any standard operating procedure for stadium security is the biggest threat to the Big Ten Conference police departments as a whole. The different ways that each department handles its stadium operations may be efficient to each circumstance, but that can lead to gaps not only in intelligence, but gaps in procedures for vetting, procedures in access control, and the like. A Big Ten standard would make each university more efficient and could be expanded to other NCAA schools in Division IA.

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IV. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE COMPARISON

The teams and owners in the National Football League (NFL) may not have a full-time campus to manage, but the stadium security environment in the NFL is very similar to that of the Big Ten Conference. More specifically, how each organization must protect against domestic threats and terrorism—due to high-attendance and live national attention, which, makes each event the ideal target for terrorists. On the other hand, the NFL’s security model is much different than the Big Ten Conference. Therefore, this chapter will compare the NFL stadium security operations to universities, emphasizing the lack of an organizational security standard by Big Ten universities, differences in funding, and divergent police composition by the NCAA and Big Ten universities—in stark contrast to the unified approach of the NFL. This chapter will also analyze the use of the NFL’s *Best Practices for Stadium Security* guide to understand why the Big Ten Conference has not implemented such measures and to establish a model that can be used by the Big Ten Conference.

A. NFL VERSUS BIG TEN IN THE STADIUM

The NFL has been a standard for best practices in stadium security since 9/11 and for its ability to certify in Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT) under the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act.¹⁶¹ According to the 2010 DHS, “Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan,” “On December 19, 2008, the NFL’s *Best Practices for Stadium Security* was granted SAFETY Act approval. These guidelines for stadium security management are designed to deter and defend against terrorist attacks at sports stadiums.”¹⁶² More specifically, the guidelines are used to standardize planning, evacuations, threat assessments, emergencies, and the vetting of stadium personnel.¹⁶³ Meanwhile, the NCAA and Big Ten Conference have no standard

¹⁶¹ Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 52.

¹⁶² “Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan 2010,” Department of Homeland Security, 132, <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-commercial-facilities-2010.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Department of Homeland Security, “Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan 2010,” 132.

“best practices guide” or common standards for stadium security, leaving disparities between each university and how they manage the stadium environment. Leading to possible security gaps that may be latent at individual universities in the Big Ten for game-day stadium operations.

1. NFL Stadium Security

The NFL, as an organization, is comprised of private owners who do not have their own private team police departments or private jurisdictions—NFL stadiums fall under the local jurisdiction in which their stadiums reside—like any other business owner. In the article, *Policing the 2016 Super Bowl Stadium*, the authors explained how the new San Francisco 49ers stadium in Santa Clara, CA resulted in the Santa Clara Police Department creating a new special events police officer position, comprised of 136 sworn officers who already work in departments from 43 different jurisdictions, for use during events at the stadium. The cost for these new officers comes directly from the stadium funds, not the Santa Clara Police Department funds, so the ability to hire law enforcement officers to help protect the new stadium is at no-cost to the public, and the officers are already working in other jurisdictions,¹⁶⁴ which alleviates the NFL owners from any responsibilities to man, train, and equip the police departments.

To make it even easier for the NFL owners, Elizabeth Brown and Michael Sellers explain how building a new stadium in Santa Clara, CA, for the 49ers, authorizes “the creation of the Santa Clara Stadium Authority... to develop strategies to allow it to effectively handle construction, then operational, challenges without depleting city resources needed for day-to-day services.”¹⁶⁵ This authority hired special event unit leadership which then “studied 21 stadium operations across the country and created an operations plan and manual for all events at Levi’s Stadium based on National Football League Best Practices.”¹⁶⁶ All that is left for the NFL owners is to ensure they are

¹⁶⁴ Elizabeth Brown and Michael Sellers, “Policing the 2016 Super Bowl Stadium,” *PM. Public Management; Washington* 98, no. 1 (February 2016): 14, ProQuest.

¹⁶⁵ Brown and Sellers, “Policing the 2016 Super Bowl Stadium,” 13–14.

¹⁶⁶ Brown and Sellers, 14.

compliant, and the San Francisco 49ers Security Team is supporting the special event unit leadership. The NFL's "best practices guide" allows for the owners, stadium security team, and law enforcement agencies to make sure standard practices are installed as a baseline for additional security measures that may be specific to the stadium in Santa Clara, CA.

Additionally, the SAFETY Act—created by the United States government—incentivized the use of measures and equipment that would serve any company that had to deal with protecting assets or critical infrastructure from terrorism. The ability to qualify as a QATT was dependent on the technologies utilized by that company and making sure they meet Department of Homeland Security (DHS) standards for operation.¹⁶⁷ All the NFL has to do is ensure they are utilizing the correct equipment, following the proper measures, and they will get the "stamp of approval" from the DHS. This common standards for stadium security leave the guessing or trial and error out of the equation when manning, training, and equipping a security apparatus that is able to protect the stadium each week.

Jeffrey Bolstad identifies that the security operations of stadiums in the NFL are operated much like those in the Big Ten Conference. A partnership is established between the private NFL ownership and public law enforcement agencies. A mutual aid agreement is implemented to ensure jurisdiction, roles, and responsibilities are established. The stadium security operates under a unified command, with assistance from different agencies to provide law enforcement, traffic control, crowd mitigation, and intelligence operations. Though, where the operations differ is where the NFL's security plans do not extend past the property line of the stadiums—into tailgating areas, surrounding parking lots, etc. The areas surrounding the stadium are left to the local law enforcement to handle, which may not receive the same attention as the NFL stadium, or be included in the unified command structure.¹⁶⁸ Also, depending on the stadium, the NFL ownership has different aspects to it—some rent, some own outright.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Bolstad, "Enhancing the NFL's Counter-Terrorism Efforts," 52.

¹⁶⁸ Bolstad, 56–75.

¹⁶⁹ Arash Markazi, "Column: Chargers Aren't the Only NFL Team That Rents," *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2019-08-07/rams-chargers-stadium>.

In the NFL, the security operations all follow the *Best Practices Guide for Stadium Security* because as owners it is in their best interest to adhere to a collective policy for safety, and it is much easier for thirty-two NFL teams to agree—and qualify for QATT—than the 130 NCAA football teams in Division I football.¹⁷⁰ NFL stadiums fall under the umbrella of the local jurisdiction in which they reside, making the stadium another building in the city that the local police department needs to ensure the safety and security for—just on a larger scale.

2. Big Ten Conference Differences

Big Ten Conference football games are a unique setting in comparison to NFL games. While thousands of fans filling a town or city in the hours leading up to a football game is something the Big Ten universities are used to, it would be wrong to imply campus police, towns or cities, and supporting agencies are as well exercised as the cities that are home to the thirty-two NFL teams. In the sleepy, agricultural town of State College Borough, Pennsylvania—home to Penn State University (PSU)—the crime set that is produced by the 42,000 residents, is not the same as what the Los Angeles, California (LA) Police Department (LAPD) has to deal with on a daily basis. Yet, PSU will see 36,000 more fans in its stadium each game than the two LA NFL teams will see.¹⁷¹ This will test the skills, training, coordination, and integration of different agencies on a level that is not typical of their daily operations.

The NFL and NCAA organizations are vastly different in the approach in establishing stadium security and there is no implication that one organization is more advantageous than the other. The differences may highlight how complicated it can be for campus police departments to man, train, and equip themselves to defend their stadiums, but the stadiums in the Big Ten Conference all have campus jurisdictions that surround the stadium itself, sometime for a few miles. Most tailgating areas, parking structures, etc., are extensions of the stadium that are located on or near other buildings on the campus.

¹⁷⁰ Department of Homeland Security, “Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan 2010,” 132.

¹⁷¹ “SoFi Stadium, Home of the Los Angeles Rams & Chargers - Stadiums of Pro Football,” Stadiums of Pro Football, accessed November 19, 2020, <https://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/stadiums/sofi-stadium/>.

Creating a larger area of concern for terrorism or violent incidents to occur in their purview, but out of sight of the actual stadium itself. This increased area of responsibility brings an extra level of complexity, which is increased by the lack of uniformity in the Big Ten Conference due to a number of factors: size of the university and campus, location of the university, funding from the Athletic Department, size of the university police department, and memorandum of understandings with local/state police.

One campus police department, in the Big Ten, is not built like the other, not funded like the other, and does not operate game day like the other—opposite of the NFL’s composition. For example, Lt. Edward Delaney described that, “PSU has their stadium surrounded by cow fields and heavy agriculture, which PSU police department has sole jurisdiction over.”¹⁷² University of Michigan’s (U of M) iconic “Big House” stadium, on the other hand, is in the middle of Ann Arbor where the jurisdiction boundaries are much closer in proximity to the local authorities. This difference in composition shows how stadium security operations vary across the different Big Ten universities, which directly affect their police department operations. For instance, at PSU the Athletic Department controls the parking lots, the ticket booths, and visitor access points via hired staff from a private company called Whelen, while the PSU police department patrols the stadium and surrounding areas, conducts traffic control, patrols the tailgating areas, and has a special operations unit available for response.¹⁷³ At Michigan State University (MSU), Lt. Shaun Mills explains, the university police handle all access control, traffic control, and tailgating areas, while the local and state police augment officers in areas inside the stadium, outside the stadium, and beyond for any additional areas needing coverage.¹⁷⁴ Two polar opposites in execution.

Universities and campus police departments are not built for stadium security operations of 100,000 or more capacity each weekend. The seven weeks a year that football games are played in their stadiums does not render assistance from 136 police officers like

¹⁷² Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹⁷³ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

the Santa Clara Police Department, and campus police departments cannot afford to have that amount of police officers full-time. The campus police have to find assistance for game day, and in the NCAA the university's Athletic Departments pay for that assistance. According to Lt. Edward Delaney—Penn State University (PSU) Police Officer—in order to get help for game day, campus police have to enlist local and state law enforcement agencies, stadium personnel, and non-law enforcement security to properly manage the stadium environment—solely funded by the PSU Athletic Department.¹⁷⁵

Consider for context, the NFL is a similar to an upper-class individual or Fortune 500 organization who hires a personal security company to protect their gated home or buildings. The universities across the Big Ten Conference on the other hand, are similar to a *range* of lower to upper class individuals or small-business to Fortune 500 organizations—dependent on their universities budget—who may or may not be able to afford the elaborate security protection. It is hard to put a standard on security when every customer cannot afford the service, resulting in a lack of standardization for NCAA universities across the board. Wealthy universities can spend more money on elaborate security, while lesser universities have to spend where they can, while still ensuring the maximum protections for their stadium environment.

The NFL enjoys a simple business model, with little to worry about outside of their organization or stadium walls. They run a business, provide an avenue for entertainment, employ personnel, and pay for the safety and security of spectators via private and public security services. The NFL teams make money—some more than others—and they spend money all in similar fashion. In the Big Ten Conference, a university funds their own safety and security on campus—with help from federal grants and programs—while the athletic department specifically funds the safety and security of the stadium environment. PU spends \$20 million dollars on facilities and equipment, while OSU spends \$51 million dollars in the same area.¹⁷⁶ Yet, both universities have stadiums with over 100,000 capacity, which they fill each home game. This disparity in funding and spending in the

¹⁷⁵ Edward Delaney, personal communication, September 11, 2020.

¹⁷⁶ Knight Commission On Intercollegiate Athletics, "Big Ten Conference."

Big Ten is an area of concern. The NFL has a *Best Practices guide* and SAFETY Act approval like most businesses have insurance policies, but the Big Ten has not set a common standard that certain universities cannot afford or qualify for. So, the result is individual insurance plans that each university can afford, tailored to their individual situations and capacity.

B. BEST PRACTICES GUIDE

All 32 NFL teams are operating under the SAFETY Act with its implementation of the NFL's *Best Practices Guide*. Yet, every NFL team is not qualified as a QATT under the SAFETY Act—QATT is a technology certification that is earned through specific equipment being installed in stadiums. As Bolstad explains, additional oversight, protection, and liability insurance is provided by QATT, by creating a level of security that can be duplicated, tailored, and strengthened if desired, and the *Best Practices Guide* alone ensures that every team is compliant with the “common threshold of protection at all stadiums.”¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, the NCAA and Big Ten Conference has no SAFETY Act approval, and there is no alternative standard for stadium security or “best practice guide” approved to adopt at each university. Individual universities are left to establish their own security standards, ultimately approved by the university administration and campus police leadership. This section will further examine the NFL's and Big Ten's common security standards to identify a path forward for the Big Ten and NCAA to gain a common standard stadium security option that could be applied to all universities.

1. NFL's Implemented Guide

Bolstad states that post 9/11 “the Department of Homeland Security's division of Command, Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA) created the *Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security for Sporting and Entertainment Venues Resource Guide*, or BPATS, to give guidance to companies wishing to seek liability protections in case of a terrorist attack.”¹⁷⁸ The CCICADA BPATS is the guidebook to

¹⁷⁷ Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL's Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 53.

¹⁷⁸ Bolstad, 53.

qualify as QATT, and the *Best Practices Guide* that the NFL created starts the process for each individual team to earn certification as a QATT under the SAFETY Act. According to the DHS website, as of 2018, there were only eight out of thirty-two teams that had venues protected under the SAFETY Act.¹⁷⁹ Meaning the other twenty-four teams in the NFL have the *Best Practices Guide* implemented but have not yet met certification standards for QATT under the SAFETY Act.

Even with the NFL's revenues and operating income being higher than the Big Ten's, comparatively, not every team is able to certify for QATT.¹⁸⁰ Meaning the 24 teams in the NFL have similar operating procedures for stadium security, but the additional technological measures have not reached the level for certification. Funding is one deciding factor for this lack of certification, though, most of the stadiums that have met this standard have either been built post SAFETY Act or been through a renovation since the QATT standards were established. Some NFL owners that have older stadiums may not want to spend the additional funds required to make their stadium QATT certified, risking the additional liability insurance that would be applied under the SAFETY Act.

Overall, there is a standard of stadium security operations that the DHS created for sports venue use across the board. Professional sports teams, like the NFL, have taken the BPATS guidebook to create an NFL's *Best Practices Guide*, tailored specifically to the NFL's needs, which received DHS approval. The minimum standard has been implemented by all thirty-two teams in the NFL, which ensures that all stadiums are compliant and practicing similar security measures for football games and other venue events. There may be intricacies from one stadium to the next, and there are eight stadiums that have QATT certification, but the presence of a minimum standard gives every stadium a guidebook to work from, and a tool to improve upon as a collective. Bolstad found that the NFL's *Best Practices Guide* receives an annual review in hopes of improving upon

¹⁷⁹ "Snapshot: SAFETY Act Program in Its 15th Year, Passes 1,000 Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies," Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2018, <https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2018/07/06/snapshot-safety-act-program-its-15th-year-passes-1000>.

¹⁸⁰ Mike Ozanian, "The NFL's Most Valuable Teams 2020: How Much Is Your Favorite Team Worth?," *Forbes*, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2020/09/10/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams-2020-how-much-is-your-favorite-team-worth/>.

lessons learned, and to fill any gaps that may exist in the *Best Practices Guide*.¹⁸¹ Further describing an environment where common standards can create a stronger solution for protecting stadiums in the United States from potential terrorist attacks. A standard that the Big Ten Conference and NCAA lacks.

2. Big Ten's Best Option

While there is no formal NCAA agreement or Big Ten agreement, there is a “best practices guide” that some campus police departments adhere to in the Big Ten Conference, but the membership and adherence is not totalitarian like seen in the NFL. The National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security (NCS4) “is the nation’s only academic center devoted to the study and practice of spectator sports safety and security.”¹⁸² NCS4 was created from a dissertation at the University of Southern Mississippi and has since morphed into a full-fledged academic-business venture. Outside of best practices for sports safety and security, the organization certifies personnel, trains personnel, and distribute annual reports from collegiate surveys to help strengthen stadium safety and security operations across the United States.¹⁸³ Currently, there are only five personnel certified as Sports Security Professionals through NCS4 from three universities—U of M; Ohio State University (OSU); and PSU—in the Big Ten, and there are NCS4 Advisory Committees from three Big Ten universities—U of M; OSU; and University of Nebraska.

In an interview with Lt. Mills, he states, “MSU follows the NCS4 best practices for game day operations,”¹⁸⁴ but the university does not have anyone certified as a Sports Security Professional, or have an Advisory Committee recognized by NCS4.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, while MSU may follow the best practices of NCS4, there is no uniformity between how

¹⁸¹ Bolstad, “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 54.

¹⁸² “The National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security,” National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security, accessed September 21, 2020, <https://ncs4.usm.edu/>.

¹⁸³ National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security, “The National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security.”

¹⁸⁴ Shaun Mills, personal communication, September 15, 2020.

¹⁸⁵ National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security, “The National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security.”

universities operate and how any other universities in the Big Ten, who follow NCS4, operates their stadium security operations. The only uniformity found during the course of interviews is that the campus police departments in the Big Ten reference NCS4 when asked about a “best practices guide.” The different approaches by universities leaves the stadium specifics for campus police involvement the furthest from uniform. Which in part, is due to the wide range of resources and capabilities afforded to each department by their Athletics Department. Ultimately, leaving possible gaps at each school due to the lack of a “best practice guide.”

NCS4 gives the Big Ten Conference and other conferences in the NCAA a starting point that has DHS funding and backing, that could alleviate some of the initial start-up costs to each university. The NCS4 has a “best practices guide” that could be advanced if the Big Ten Conference would adopt and work with NCS4 for a permanent solution. Having an individual school, like PSU, work independently with the DHS and NCS4 helps only PSU. The findings, the solutions, the errors will not be spread across the other schools in the Big Ten automatically. The only way will be for proactive campus police leaders to go out on their own and meet or speak with other campus police leaders in the Big Ten Conference. Even then, the lack of a mandatory standard could leave any recommendation or findings by one campus police leader, to fall on deaf ears by the other university leadership—especially if funding is involved.

The disparities in university and athletic department revenue across the Big Ten Conference may be the largest factor, but that disparity cannot be changed easily. The disparity each university campus police department has in standard stadium security operations is the disparity that can be affected easily. The NCS4 option is a solution, though anything that gives a minimum, backed by the DHS, will create a platform and collaborative tool that can further protect the stadium environment in the future.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified that the NFL has set the standard for stadium security operations and has paved the way for an effective model that can be reproduced by other leagues and conferences across America. If the Big Ten Conference establishes a “best

practice guide” or common standards for stadium security, the model could expand to other conferences across the NCAA as well. Working as a collective—like the NFL—will only create stronger conferences in the NCAA and the Big Ten Conference, who had the highest revenue in 2018, is in a great position to make a “best practices guide” common stadium security operations.¹⁸⁶

One might object here that the Big Ten Conference is better off allowing each university to fend for itself due to the disparities in athletics revenue, staffing, and amount of stadium attendance. Allowing each university to manage its own security apparatus as they choose is more in line with how universities across the United States operates with most issues they deal with on a daily basis. Limiting a university to what type of security they can have could ultimately slow innovation and weaken security measures that could be exploited given a larger budget than other universities. Yet, by creating a standard for stadium security or “best practice guide,” the gap between the highest revenue university and the lowest revenue university will be lessened. The Big Ten Conference could allocate more funds to the lower revenue schools to bridge the gap between universities and to ensure that all campus police departments have the tools necessary to protect all stadiums each week.

The NFL has a proven model that has been backed by the DHS and has received SAFETY Act approval. While each NFL team operates on a similar business model, devising a standard for all universities will only improve the bar in which all universities have to operate at. Collaboration and cooperation by Big Ten Conference universities will strengthen the game day security apparatus, while maintaining the safety and security for the fans that attend each week.

¹⁸⁶ Steve Berkowitz, “Power Five Conferences Had over \$2.9 Billion in Revenue in Fiscal 2019, New Tax Records Show,” *USA Today*, accessed January 4, 2021, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/07/10/power-five-conference-revenue-fiscal-year-2019/5414405002/>.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Campus police departments have come a long way since their days as “watchmen.” The past 20 years have seen more professionalization due to the different violent crimes, mass shootings, radicalizations, and acts of terrorism that have occurred on campuses. This national attention by campus police departments—attributed to an increase in mass casualty events, and media coverage—has brought the campus environment into the spotlight where the university administrators do not want to be. Instead of safe, and worry-free academic environment, this thesis found that college campuses are more like cities, yet with different aspects that can make the “ivory tower” harder to police and protect. This macro-level analysis of everyday campus policing and threats is important to identify, because adding 100,000 fans to a campus in the Big Ten Conference each autumn Saturday will test every resource and capability the campus police and university have. A micro-level analysis of the stadium environment found disparities between the different universities in the Big Ten Conference, specifically with stadium security operations, budgets, and outside agency coordination. Consequently, the respective campus police departments are leaving themselves open to the possibilities of policing or stadium security gaps—which could be mitigated with a standard of operations.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis offers two recommendations to strengthen campus police departments for not only stadium security but everyday policing threats.

1. Universities must reform the mental health system on campuses—primarily through federal legislation aimed at mandatory reporting of pre-existing conditions and the inclusion of campus police as individuals possessing the proper training and security credentials to receive such information without violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
2. At the conference level, the Big Ten must create common standards for stadium security to alleviate the disparities between each university and fill any possible security gaps that may be latent at individual universities in the Big Ten for game-day stadium operations.

1. Mental Health System Reform

Federal legislation reform is necessary to establish mental and behavioral health reporting requirements for schools and universities across America to correct flaws that have led to incidents like the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre. The major mass shootings and terrorist attacks on campuses in the United States, as discussed in Chapter II, have uncovered systemic issues with a mental health system that does not allow for universities to receive information on pre-existing conditions of an attending student. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) protects against this access to mental health information. As Stephanie Pearl writes in “HIPAA: Caught in the Cross Fire,” different reforms on gun control in America, like the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA), have challenged HIPAA laws on the grounds of public health and safety.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, Sood and Cohen argue that, establishing legislation to allow mandatory reporting for mental health cases can help mitigate issues before they ever arrive on campus, and they point out that student immunization records are currently required by universities prior to admittance. I

Permitting individuals within campus police departments who possess the proper training and security credentials to receive information regarding the mental health condition of students could alleviate any HIPAA violations, while bolstering the safety and security of individuals on campus.¹⁸⁸

The mass shootings and terrorist attacks on campuses have also uncovered a lack of reporting issues within university walls. Elliott, Fatemi, and Wasan state, “the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) was enacted in 1974 to safeguard the privacy rights of students and to make their educational records freely accessible to them.”¹⁸⁹ While mental or behavioral health records do not fall under FERPA, faculty and campus administrators maintain their own educational records and notes regarding

¹⁸⁷ Stephanie E. Pearl, “HIPAA: Caught in the cross fire,” *Duke Law Journal* 64, no. 3 (2014): 561, JSTOR.

¹⁸⁸ Sood and Cohen, *The Virginia Tech Massacre*, 84.

¹⁸⁹ Teresa L. Elliott, Darius Fatemi, and Sonia Wasan, “Student Privacy Rights-History, Owasso, and FERPA,” *Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice* 14, no. 4 (October 2014): 1, ProQuest.

students, which do. “The [FERPA] Act ends by stating that an institution may include in the education record information regarding disciplinary action against a student... that posed a significant risk to the safety or well-being of that student, other students, or other members of the school community.”¹⁹⁰ Therefore, the legislation for faculty and campus administrators is in place to identify issues within a university, though, a lack of knowledge or a lack of awareness may be suppressing indicators that could help prevent another Virginia Tech Massacre.

Lack of knowledge or a lack of awareness is where university administrations and campus police must fill in the gaps. University administrations must foster an environment where faculty, staff, and students are knowledgeable and empowered to identify issues or indicators of possible mental or behavioral health concerns with individuals on campus. As Herman Goldstein writes, “police problem-solving efforts should focus on the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder.”¹⁹¹ For this reason, campus police must concentrate on consistent community policing projects that include mental and behavioral health training for the faculty and students. In tandem with university mental and behavioral medical staff, presenting case studies like the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre may provide a forum to promote reporting and to educate the university of indicators.

Additionally, government agencies and private organizations need to have more oversight on the mental health programs on campuses. Not every issue associated with the lack of reporting is legislative in nature. As Chapter II notes, a comprehensive policy may fix specific functions, though, the social environment and individuals who are protected by privacy, basic rights, and intellectual rights have to be receptive of the policies enacted, to ensure they are upheld. The lack of university knowledge of pre-existing conditions is exasperated on campus when students are alone in a stressful environment for the first time in their lives with no one to talk to. Students and faculty who witness signs of mental or behavioral problems with peers or students must report this activity through the proper channels on campus in order to break the error chain and ensure that the individuals who

¹⁹⁰ Elliott, Fatemi, and Wasan, "Student Privacy Rights-History, Owasso, and FERPA," 7.

¹⁹¹ U.S. Department of Justice, "Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners," 1.

need proper care receive it. Lack of action could lead to another Virginia Tech incident somewhere else in America. Both the legislative branch and universities alike bear the responsibility for the current lack of reporting.

2. Standard for Stadium Security

The Big Ten Conference must create a top-down standard for stadium security operations to eliminate any disparities or weaknesses in the stadium environment by implementing a model that will be actionable for each university in the Big Ten. This standard would foster collaboration, “best practices,” and greater oversight for universities that currently operate with an individual university model. The Big Ten Conference is in the best position in the NCAA to make this happen. According to Steve Berkowitz, the Big Ten Conference made \$781 million in revenue in 2018, paying out \$55 million dollars to 12 of the 14 schools—the highest payout to any NCAA conference.¹⁹² Instead of paying out \$55 million to each school for their own allocation of funds for security and stadium operations, portions of this revenue could be specifically allocated for security and stadium operations spending to ensure all schools are meeting the standards and guidelines set forth by the conference. Too much responsibility and freedom are currently given to each university to make these security and safety decisions, with little oversight and scrutiny by outside agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.

As Chapter III discusses, the current complexity of revenue and spending for a Big Ten university results in campus police departments and university administrations working with the Athletic departments to ensure the stadium security apparatus is manned, trained, and equipped as necessary. The University of Michigan (U of M), Ohio State University (OSU), and Penn State University (PSU) are the three Big Ten universities with stadiums over 100,000 in attendance each Saturday—yet a disparity exists between each universities budget for facilities and equipment. According to the Knights Commission College Athletics Financial Information (CAFI) database, OSU budgets \$51 million for facilities and equipment, yet PSU budgets \$20 million in the same area, and PSU has

¹⁹² Berkowitz, “Power Five Conferences Had over \$2.9 Billion in Revenue in Fiscal 2019, New Tax Records Show.”

approximately 2,000 more in attendance each Saturday they need ensure the safety and security for.¹⁹³ Recommending a conference standard for security operations would help bridge the budgetary gaps between the different schools and help create a model that is sufficient for all universities in the Big Ten Conference.

Two other areas where the standards or “best practice guide” will assist in strengthening the security apparatus for universities are training and intelligence operations—specifically regarding terrorism and mass casualty events. While campus police currently train on mass shooters, and terrorist threats, the terrorism/counterterrorism training for law enforcement and non-law enforcement security personnel is not mandatory. As found in Chapter III, campus police departments in the Big Ten also have officers who work with the FBI as JTTF officers—though their role is more passive—serving as a line of communication, vice serving in a proactive counterterrorism and intelligence position. The standards for stadium security would address training and intelligence requirements that will create conference-wide procedures for campus police and their partners in law enforcement to follow. Additionally, the standardization of training should include annual table-top exercises and coordinated training with outside agencies—law enforcement, emergency management, etc.—prior to each football season, to ensure the Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is appropriately employed for its stadium security apparatus.

The last area in which the standards for stadium security or “best practice guide” would strengthen stadium security in the Big Ten Conference is the vetting of stadium personnel who will be working inside of each university’s stadium. The current infrastructure employed by each university in the Big Ten is another disparity that could possibly lead to gaps in safety and security of the stadium environment. One school may utilize an outside agency for background checks and vetting, while another school utilizes the campus police department. Creating a standard operating procedure or minimum expectation for vetting that fits each university’s capabilities will only harden the entire security operations for the Big Ten Conference as a whole. The best practices and

¹⁹³ Knight Commission On Intercollegiate Athletics, “Big Ten Conference.”

operations at one university may be lacking sufficient scrutiny in whom they hire to fill non-law enforcement roles in concessions or visitor access; therefore, a standardization will help strengthen these gaps and prevent future gaps in security.

These recommendations to create standards for stadium security or a “best practice guide” do not suggest the Big Ten Conference should create entities or organizations to operate each university security operation. These tasks should remain in the hands of each individual university administration, campus police department, and athletic department. By creating a standard or guide, the Big Ten would be able to gather the best ideas and greatest innovations in stadium security to ensure each stadium is operating at a high level of security each Saturday, with a minimum standard established that can be replicated regardless of budgetary constraints. The Big Ten Conference universities—specifically the campus police and athletics departments—are doing a great job with the current construct, but the possible gaps and areas of improvement at one university could be overlooked due to funding and a lack of oversight. Creating a standard of operations or a “best practice guide,” managed at the Big Ten Conference level, with direct input from universities, would strengthen an already strong security apparatus for more safety and security of all who attend each Saturday’s football game.

B. CONCLUSION

This thesis found that terrorist attacks on football stadiums are not very likely, and a correlation between non-football stadium related mass casualty threats and a lack of reporting are the biggest issues campus police face in everyday policing—not stadium related security threats. An analysis of the stadium environment concluded that campus police have a sufficient security apparatus in the Big Ten Conference, backed by strong coordination with outside agencies, and athletic department assistance, though disparities among each university could leave potential security gaps which could lead to future failures. This thesis benefits most from the personal interviews conducted with Penn State University, Michigan State University, and the University of Wisconsin campus police departments, which identified the differences each campus police department uses in their execution of stadium security. The differences in university budget, athletics budget,

stadium capacity, etc., lead to vast differences in how each department handles its security. Creating standards for stadium security operations would bridge this gap.

Campus police do an amazing job in managing their manning, budget, equipment, and jurisdiction, though they could not execute the football stadium operations without the help of non-law enforcement personnel, the Athletics department, and the multiple law enforcement agencies enlisted. The Big Ten Conference must ensure all stadiums are practicing the best and most innovative techniques in their stadiums so potential gaps can be identified and future security issues can be avoided. This thesis concludes that campus police are doing a great job in the Big Ten Conference, and there is high confidence in their ability to protect football stadiums against potential terrorist attacks without sacrificing the fans' experience.

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