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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS:
How Ideological Factors Shape Alliances and Partnerships**

By:

Eric S. Fowler

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

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**PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS:
How Ideological Factors Shape Alliances and Partnerships**

by Eric S. Fowler

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.


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Abstract

Since its earliest days, the United States of America has amplified its power through relationships with other nations. In a world characterized by increasing Great Power Competition, the United States can take actions now to improve potential outcomes of future international relationships and enhance the power of US-led institutions. This study applies sequential mixed methods, leveraging quantitative and qualitative techniques to explore the propensity for states to foster effective and resilient international relationships based upon theoretically relevant ideological factors. Variance observed in Great Power ideological factors likely influences the quality and character of international relationships each can form and maintain. Data also suggests neither China nor Russia would benefit from pressing other states to pick sides in a 21st Century Cold War. Consequently, principled diplomacy—encouraging others to adopt western values and liberal institutions—is the United States' best single investment in a better peace. Furthermore, the US should incorporate assessments of ideological factors in strategic guidance to prioritize investments that benefit diplomatic power generation most.

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Dedication

I dedicate this research program to my wife and children
and all the souls who gave their lives in defense of others.

Today is NOT the day we fail! —EA. Hanson

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Acknowledgments

God is good. This thesis would not have been possible without the scholars who ventured before, exploring and explaining the world's governments and cultures in terms of numbers and in-depth descriptions. Specifically, I could not have pursued my research were it not for the countless researchers contributing to and are actively expanding both the Polity V Project and GLOBE Study databases. My sincerest appreciation also goes to my faculty advisors and instructors at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School for investing their time and effort into my professional development as a senior military officer, a strategic thinker, and a writer.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The end of the United States' unipolar moment and the world's return to Great Power Competition are themes appearing with increased frequency in the contemporary discourse on US national security and foreign policy.¹ As evidenced in multiple strategic publications, such as the 2017 *National Security Strategy*, 2018 *National Defense Strategy*, 2018 *National Military Strategy*, and 2018 *Joint Strategic Plan*, policy-makers and practitioners in the fields of security and diplomacy continue to wrestle with what Great Power Competition is and what it means for the future.² Anchored in the recent memory of many senior leaders, current notions of Great Power Competition build on the Cold War's conceptual foundations, a game seemingly familiar but with new players and potentially new rules.

As leaders in both the Departments of Defense and State wrestle with familiarity and foreignness in the current international system, they appear to approach the challenges comprehensively, as an independent state and as a leader in the broader community of nations.³ In a recently updated report to the United States Congress regarding Great Power Competition, Department of Defense officials acknowledge that the government must invest both in native capabilities and capabilities resident in

¹ Ali Wyne, "If America's Unipolar Moment Is Nearing Its End, What Comes Next?" *The Modern Warfare Institute at West Point*, published February 20, 2019, <https://mwi.usma.edu/americas-unipolar-moment-nearing-end-comes-next/>.

² Alexander Boroff, "What Is Great-Power Competition, Anyway?" *The Modern Warfare Institute at West Point*, published April 17, 2020, <https://mwi.usma.edu/great-power-competition-anyway>.

³ Hal Brands, "American Grand Strategy in The Post-Cold War Era," in *New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0*, ed. Russell W. Glenn, 133-148 (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 2018).

international partners for the US to prevail.⁴ Additionally, the most recent US Department of State-US Agency for International Development *Joint Strategic Plan* emphasizes the role increasing partner and allied capacity and resilience play in protecting American interests at home and abroad.⁵ Though acknowledging the influence allies and partners have in national security is essential, deciding how to invest in such relationships is far more complicated.

Investment in others is not without risk, especially in matters as consequential as national security.⁶ The level of risk present within any international partnership reflects the states' character and their resilience against defecting from the relationship under stress.⁷ Anticipating how current or future allies or partners might respond in a moment of crisis is one of two real challenges facing national decision-makers charged with deciding who, when, and how to invest in other nations. The second challenge is knowing how the United States should engage current or future allies or partners to elicit the best short-term and long-term outcomes. Only with a better appreciation for the states within a given international relationship can decision-makers mitigate the risk associated with one party relying upon the other.

Since its earliest days, the United States of America has amplified its power through relationships with other nations. Positive, practical, beneficial relationships, be they interpersonal or international, build upon a sense of shared understanding, if not

⁴ US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), *Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress*, CRS Report R43838 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, October 29, 2020).

⁵ US State Department, *Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018 - 2022* (Washington, DC: State Department, 2018), accessed November 3, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Joint-Strategic-Plan-FY-2018-2022.pdf>

⁶ Erin Gibbs, et al., *Risk Balance and Security* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008), 11.

⁷ David Denney, *Risk and Society* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005), 7-11.

shared purpose and identity. The most tragic potential outcome from a period of Great Power Conflict would reveal the United States did not honestly share understanding with its international partners, did not appreciate the character of its international relationships, and did not engage partners appropriately. International relationships are complex and adaptive endeavors, rarely tracing their existence to the influence of one single factor but a convergence of multiple factors that require appropriate context.

Despite American popular culture evoking images of John Wayne in the role of rugged individualist and some scholars championing an extreme brand of independence called *American Exceptionalism*, the United States is not reluctant to cooperate.⁸ The US has a long history of building shared power through relationships with other states. As a fledgling nation fighting for independence from Britain, emissaries from the United States committed to a *Treaty of Alliance* and a *Treaty of Amity and Commerce* with France, securing vital foreign logistical and operational support for a war-weary Continental Army.⁹ During the nation's growing pains that manifested in the American Civil War, the Union leveraged diplomatic relations with European powers to prevent formal recognition of and meaningful material support to the rebellious Confederacy.¹⁰ In conflicts spanning the 20th century, the United States fought alongside international partners in almost every major conflict, from the *Allied Powers* of World War I to the

⁸ Seymour M. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 1, 17–19, 165–174, 197.

⁹ Office of the Historian, “French Alliance, French Assistance, and European Diplomacy during the American Revolution, 1778–1782,” US Department of State, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/french-alliance>.

¹⁰ Office of the Historian, “Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861–1865,” US Department of State, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/confederacy>.

Coalition of the Willing in the Gulf War.¹¹ Even today, the United States maintains relations with nearly every state in the community of nations, capturing each relationship's nuances in various treaties and agreements on peace, trade, defense, human rights, law enforcement, environmental matters, and others.¹² The pool of potential allies and partners is ample for the United States. For myriad reasons, the US actively cultivates favorable relations with all states as a general rule – even those perceived as antagonistic.¹³ While pursuing favorable relations, the US Department of State grants each Country Team wide latitude to chart a diplomatic course within their assigned country, so long as local goals align with the broader US national interest.¹⁴ Such latitude provides unparalleled flexibility for foreign service officers to respond to the unique influences of time, place, and culture, but little in the way of a clear template for success.¹⁵

Despite each country team pursuing their diplomatic strategy, each as varied as their host nation, two distinct approaches are evident: one *principled* and one *pragmatic*.¹⁶ The principled and pragmatic diplomatic approaches could easily seem

¹¹ Office of the Historian, “US Entry into World War I, 1917,” US Department of State, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/wwi>; Office of the Historian, “The First Gulf War,” US Department of State, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf>.

¹² US State Department, “Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020,” accessed December 3, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf>.

¹³ Anton Smith, Interview with Eric Fowler, Personal interview, Norfolk, November 10, 2020.

¹⁴ Smith, Interview.

¹⁵ Within the United States Government, both the Departments of State and Defense possess the authority to engage in foreign relations. The Secretary of State serves as the central executive agent for US foreign relations, deriving broad statutory authority to advance the interests of the American people through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance from Title 22 of the US Code. The Department of Defense has the capability to enter into bilateral military-to-military relationships as well, deriving limited statutory authority to promote *Security Cooperation* with international partners from Titles 22 and 10 of the US Code. Though the DoD does play a role in forming and maintaining international relationships, its role is minor in scope and scale compared to that of the Department of State.

¹⁶ Smith, Interview.

binary, but in practice, foreign service professionals apply both approaches to some degree simultaneously. Changes in the host nation, the international environment, or the US national interest influence each diplomatic approach's relative application, shifting between the two poles based on the moment's circumstances.

During periods of relative peace, most country teams prioritize principled diplomacy whenever possible.¹⁷ As conditions change, however, necessity may dictate principle yield the preponderance of effort to pragmatism, effectively trading the opportunity to invest in western values for the opportunity to cash out on national interests. Adapting one's diplomatic approach based upon changes in current conditions and knowing which conditions matter most is a process best informed by international relations scholarship. One of the most influential pieces of scholarship underpinning contemporary US foreign relations thinking is Stephen Walt's seminal 1987 work, *The Origin of Alliances*. Walt's work provides insight into the reasons why states might choose to either balance against or bandwagon with an existing or emerging superpower and, to a lesser degree, why some international relationships are more resilient than others.¹⁸ Though the context within which Walt conducted his original research was solidly within a Cold War context, its timing makes his research all the more relevant for the current Great Power Competition discussion.

Walt's research identified four broad categories of influence in alliance-formation decision-making: *threat perception*, *foreign-aid dependence*, *political penetration*, and *ideological effect*.¹⁹ Threat perception refers to how states pursue international

¹⁷ Smith, Interview.

¹⁸ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

¹⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 32-33.

relationships in response to the perceived power, proximity, aggressiveness, and urgency of potential adversaries relative to their sense of power and self-sufficiency.²⁰ Foreign-aid dependence refers to how states pursue international relationships in response to the quantity, quality, and predictability of aid received relative to their sense of need and ability to gain support elsewhere.²¹ Political penetration refers to how states pursue international relationships in response to how resilient their domestic government and population are from the influence or manipulation of a perceived threat.²² Ideological effect refers to how states pursue international relationships in response to levels of liberal governance, perceived cultural similarity, and the degree to which their government possesses a sense of domestic legitimacy.²³

In a world characterized by Great Power Competition, staring at the potential for Great Power Conflict, and perhaps a cold or hot war, the United States can take actions now that improve potential outcomes in the future.²⁴ While current diplomatic approaches vary widely, fluctuating among varied mixtures of principled or pragmatic engagement, data suggests opportunities exist for a far more deliberate approach. Specifically, the data reveals that the United States, China, and Russia may be more or less isolated from international partners to greater degrees than initially thought, shaping the nature and character of international relationships each state can form and maintain. Moreover, ideological affinities among states worldwide for China and Russia do not support either of these powers pressing states to pick sides in a 21st Century Cold War.

²⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 32-33.

²¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 46.

²² Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 49.

²³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 40.

²⁴ Jeff Rathke, "Stumbling US Diplomacy Flattens Washington's Influence Curve," *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University*, published April 6, 2020, <https://www.aicgs.org/2020/04/stumbling-us-diplomacy-flattens-washingtons-influence-curve/>.

Consequently, the US stands to benefit most from long-term strategic investment in principled diplomacy, with the intent on influencing other states worldwide towards increasingly western values and more liberal institutions. Considering the insights data-minded analysis provides, incorporating relative governmental and cultural similarity goals into the US pursuit of generally positive relations with every state will likely help prioritize investment where it matters most.

Chapter 2: Methods and Procedure

Section 1: Research Questions

Given that the United States faces increased competition developing and maintaining allies, it is necessary to consider the risks of investing in current and future international relationships. On a practical level, the US must identify leverage points within the competitive environment and understand the comparative advantages the US and its adversaries possess. As risk defines the competitive environment, mitigating that risk defines the two primary research questions, specifically: What ideological factors help states anticipate how a current or future partner may respond in a moment of crisis? How do ideological factors inform the character of diplomatic engagement required to elicit the best short-term and long-term outcomes?

In support of the primary questions, research questions specific to the quantitative analytical methods used within help guide empirical data exploration include: How do regime-type factors influence international relationships? How do cultural factors influence international relationships? How do ideologically-informed bi-lateral relationships influence the international system? Additional research questions specific to qualitative analytical methods help guide an even deeper analysis of existing data. Specifically, how do the ideological factors identified during quantitative analysis express themselves in actual international relationships? And, how can the statistical results obtained in the quantitative phase be explained?

Section 2: Research Design

This study employs a sequential mixed methods design, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis elements in a single research program, using results from one to

inform the other, to produce findings unlikely revealed by one method alone.²⁵ Though admittedly more complicated than a single-method study, this approach creates the opportunity for one method to offset another's shortcomings by exploring the same information from different perspectives.²⁶ In quantitative research, numerical data and their associated logic set conditions for identifying patterns, determining relationships, and testing dependencies.²⁷ Alternatively, qualitative research develops a more comprehensive and textured appreciation for phenomena, advancing from knowledge on the nature of a relationship to understanding the texture of the relationship's character.²⁸

Section 3: Advantages and Limitations of the Sequential Mixed Methods

Though any research design has several pros and cons, the sequential mixed methods design possesses noteworthy advantages and disadvantages. Sequential methods leverage initial quantitative data to focus subsequent qualitative explorations and are useful when quantitative analysis produces unexpected results.²⁹ Consequently, mixed methods are more complex, require more steps, and often need more time to complete. A sequential mixed methods design is appropriate and a useful approach to the topic, with advantages outweighing disadvantages within this study's context.

Though the research topic is global, this particular study's scope and scale are limited. Specifically, the study engages extant theory and extant data, focusing on adding

²⁵ John W. Creswell, *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Research* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill/Pearson Education, 2002).

²⁶ Jennifer C. Green and Valerie J. Caracelli, Eds., *Advances in Mixed-Method Evaluation: The Challenges and Benefits of Integrating Diverse Programs* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997).

²⁷ Carol M. Charles and Charles A. Mertler, *Introduction to Educational Research* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2002).

²⁸ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 15.

²⁹ Nataliya Ivankova et al, "Using Mixed-Methods Sequential Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice," *Field Methods* 18 (2006): 20-23.

value by bringing together the two elements in a novel way. Regrettably, not all phenomena have secured such attention as to warrant their own discrete dataset. Such is the case for the focus of this study, namely international relationships. As no formal coded dataset exists indexing the relative character and strength of bilateral international relationships, quantitative analysis of the phenomena cannot benefit from applying robust statistical tests. Accordingly, the primary goal of the quantitative methods applied in this study is to identify observable phenomena supporting subsequent qualitative analysis. As such, the research's overall nature is not definitive but rather plausibility-probing, filtering novel information through existing theory to illuminate a new perspective.

Section 4: Quantitative Considerations

Within this study, quantitative analysis variables result from the confluence of identified research questions and a review of the relevant literature. Throughout the study, the central conceptual dependent variable is the *International Relationship*, and the two primary independent variables used are the ideological influences of *Liberalism* and *Cultural Similarity*.³⁰ Though no discrete dataset exists to provide a comprehensive and theoretically relevant quantitative accounting of bi-lateral international relationships, extant datasets (i.e., The Polity V Project and The GLOBE Study) provide relevant information regarding measures of both liberalism and cultural dimensions.³¹

Section 5: Qualitative Considerations

Within this study, the qualitative analysis focuses on exploring and explaining the results from quantitative analysis in a more literal manner.³² To account for both

³⁰ See Appendix 1: Variables in the Quantitative Analysis

³¹ See Appendix 1: Variables in the Quantitative Analysis

³² John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).

expected and unexpected quantitative observations, the study reflects upon three separate case studies.³³ These cases rely upon historical reports regarding the identified bi-lateral international relationships since 1997, focusing variation in the relative levels of diplomatic engagement predicated on liberalism and/or cultural similarity.³⁴ Though outliers and exceptions are bound to exist beyond the cases included in this study, those considered apply the typical result/maximal variation principle appropriate to the field.³⁵

Section 6: Hypotheses and Data Operationalization

Though Walt's research program contained over thirty distinct hypotheses, this study's limited scale necessitates focusing on a few core hypotheses relevant to ideological effect.³⁶ Despite this reduction in core hypotheses, engaging empirical data tends to necessitate modifying existing hypotheses to reconcile the numerical logic from one study to another study's theoretical logic. Furthermore, applying data-modified hypotheses within a specific context creates even more opportunities to develop novel, context-specific, synthesized hypotheses. In total, this study considers 15 distinct hypotheses (i.e., three core, four data-modified, and eight synthesized) in its exploration of international relationships.³⁷ The hypotheses considered are appropriate to this study because each specifically addresses US decision-makers' challenges with deciding who, when, and how to invest in other nations.³⁸

³³ See Appendix 2: Case Study Selection

³⁴ See Appendix 3: Qualitative Data Collection

³⁵ Ken Black, *Business Statistics: Contemporary Decision Making 6th Edition* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

³⁶ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 46.

³⁷ See Appendix 4: Hypotheses and Data Operationalization

³⁸ In the context of Walt's Cold War era study, the *who* represents potential partner nations, the *when* represents the period just prior to one nation's need partner assistance, and the *how* represents the leveraging of cultural incentives and disincentives to form and strengthen partnership.

Chapter 3: Research

Section 1: Quantitative Data Analysis

Subsection 1: Hypothesis 1a (Higher Individual Polity)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, 53 states (32%) have a higher Polity Score value (+9 or +10) than the United States; 17 states (10%) have the same score (+8); 96 states (58%) have a lower score (+7 to -10).³⁹ For Russia, 107 states (65%) have a higher Polity Score (+5 to +10); 6 states (4%) have the same score (+4); 53 states (32%) have a lower score (+3 to -10). For China, 148 states (90%) have a higher Polity Score (+10 to -6); 8 states (5%) have the same score (-7); 10 states (6%) have a lower score (-8 to -10).⁴⁰

Based on its individual Polity Score (+8) being greater than 58% of the states, the United States is the theoretically most desirable Great Power partner than China or Russia. Similarly, Russia's Polity Score (+4) being higher than only 32% of the states makes it theoretically a more desirable partner when compared with China alone. China is the theoretically least preferred partner as its Polity Score (-7) is among the lowest possible.

Subsection 2: Hypothesis 1b (Higher Combined Polity)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, all 163 international

³⁹ See Appendix 5: Polity Scores.

⁴⁰ The Polity V Project associates Polity Scores ranging from +10 to +6 with established liberal Democracies; +5 to +1 as Open Anocracies; 0 to -5 as Closed Anocracies; and -6 to -10 as established illiberal Autocracies. These four categories provide useful benchmarks from which to assess relative position on the liberalism scale. The United States, with a score of +8, as well as all of western Europe and all of NATO (less Turkey), fit well within the established liberal Democracy category. Russia, with a score of +4, fits squarely in the open Anocracy category and China, with a score of -7, is squarely in the established illiberal Autocracy category; Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, "Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018," accessed September 10, 2020, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5v2018d.xls>.

relationships involving the United States (+8), excluding those with China or Russia, have a higher combined Polity Score value than the same relationship when Russia (+4) or China (-7) is a party, e.g., US-Japan (+18) versus Russia–Japan (+14) versus China–Japan (+3).⁴¹ Similarly, all 163 international relationships involving Russia (+4), excluding those with China or the United States, have a higher combined Polity Score value than the same relationship when China (-7) is a party, e.g., Russia–India (+13) versus China–India (+2). Based upon its higher individual Polity Score, the United States is theoretically the most desirable Great Power partner when compared with China or Russia. Russia is theoretically a more desirable partner only when compared with China alone. China is the theoretically least preferred partner based upon its low individual Polity Score.

Subsection 3: Hypothesis 2a (Polity Similarity)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, 50% of the states possess Polity Score value within ± 4 of another state, and 33% of the scores are within ± 2 points of each other. As each of the Polity groups manifests in 5-point blocks on the 20-point scale, a ± 2 point difference in Polity Score value suggests the two states within the pairwise comparison share functionally similar levels of liberalism.⁴²

Within the Polity dataset, nearly 33% of the states possess a Polity Score value within ± 1 of the United States (+8), and almost 60% have a Score value within ± 2 points.⁴³ For Russia (+4), only 10% of the states maintain a Polity Score value within ± 1

⁴¹ See Appendix 6: Combined Polity Scores.

⁴² The Polity V Project associates Polity Scores ranging from +10 to +6 with established liberal Democracies; +5 to +1 as Open Anocracies; 0 to -5 as Closed Anocracies; and -6 to -10 as established illiberal Autocracies; Marshall and Jaggers, “Polity V Project.

⁴³ See Appendix 7: Polity Similarity Scores.

point, and less than 20% possess a Score value within ± 2 points.⁴⁴ Only 8% of the states have a Polity Score value within ± 1 point of China, and just 10% maintain a Score value within ± 2 points.⁴⁵ Based upon it sharing a greater degree of similarity in Polity Score, both in terms of quantity of states and quality of score similarity, the United States is theoretically the most desirable Great Powers partner than China or Russia. Russia is theoretically a more desirable partner only when compared with China alone. China was the theoretically least preferable partner based upon its lesser degree of similarity in Polity Scores.

Subsection 4: Hypothesis 2b (Cultural Similarity)

Within the cultural dataset of 62 society records, the average difference between the United States' aggregate cultural dimension values and another state was ± 3.09 points, with 30 (49%) of the societies having a score within ± 3 points.⁴⁶ For Russia, the average difference in aggregate cultural dimension values from that of other societies was ± 2.46 points, with 45 (74%) of the societies having a score within ± 3 points. For China, the average difference in aggregate cultural dimension values from that of other societies was ± 3.60 points, with only 20 (33%) of the societies having a score within ± 3 points. Based upon it sharing a greater similarity of cultural dimension values, both in terms of quantity of states and quality of value similarity, Russia is theoretically the most desirable Great

⁴⁴ See Appendix 7: Polity Similarity Scores.

⁴⁵ See Appendix 7: Polity Similarity Scores.

⁴⁶ See Appendix 8: Cultural Dimension Scores for information regarding the range, median, and average values associated with the overall dataset; See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores for information regarding the range, median, and average values associated with each potential Great Power partnership. When focusing on the data specific to potential Great Power partnerships, The average difference is ± 3.05 and the median, or middle value, in the dataset is 2.94. Consequently, ± 3 represents a reasonable benchmark for relationships with better-than-average or worse-than-average levels of cultural similarity; Robert House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations: Advances in Global Leadership*, vol. 1 (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999).

Power partner compared to the United States or China. The United States is theoretically a more desirable partner only when compared with China alone. China was the theoretically least desirable partner based upon its lesser degree of similarity of cultural dimension values.

Subsection 5: Hypothesis 3a (Combined Polity – USA versus PRC)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, the United States (+8) is theoretically a preferable partner to China (-7) for all 164 remaining states due to its greater Polity Score value.⁴⁷ As with Hypothesis 1b, all international relationships in which the US (+8) is a party will have larger relationship values than the same relationship where China (-7) is a party, e.g., US-Japan (+18) versus China-Japan (+3).

Subsection 6: Hypothesis 3b (Combined Polity – USA versus RUS)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, the United States (+8) is theoretically a preferable partner to Russia (+4) for all 164 remaining states due to its greater Polity Score value.⁴⁸ As with Hypothesis 1b, all international relationships in which the US (+8) is a party will have larger relationship values than the same relationship where Russia (+4) is a party, e.g., US-Japan (+18) versus Russia-Japan (+14).

Subsection 7: Hypothesis 3c (Combined Polity – PRC versus RUS)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, Russia (+4) is theoretically a preferable partner to China (-7) for all 164 remaining states due to its greater Polity Score value.⁴⁹ As with Hypothesis 1b, all international relationships in

⁴⁷ See Appendix 10: Great Power Partner Preference – Combined Polity.

⁴⁸ See Appendix 10: Great Power Partner Preference – Combined Polity.

⁴⁹ See Appendix 10: Great Power Partner Preference – Combined Polity.

which Russia (+4) is a party will have larger relationship values than the same relationship where China (-7) is a party, e.g., Russia–Japan (+14) versus China–Japan (+3).

Subsection 8: Hypothesis 3d (Cultural Similarity – USA versus PRC)

Within the dataset of 62 society records, the United States is theoretically a preferable partner to China for 33 of the 60 remaining states. The US shares greater aggregate cultural similarity with the identified states than did China.⁵⁰ Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, using polity values as a proxy for culture, the United States (+8) is theoretically a preferable partner to China (-7) for 118 of the 164 remaining states due to the US sharing greater similarity in polity score value with the identified state than did China.⁵¹ Conversely, China is theoretically a preferable partner for 46 of the 164 remaining states.

Subsection 9: Hypothesis 3e (Cultural Similarity – USA versus RUS)

Within the dataset of 62 society records, Russia is theoretically a preferable partner to the United States for 39 of the 60 remaining states due to Russia sharing greater aggregate cultural similarity with the identified states than the US.⁵² Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, using polity values as a proxy for culture, the United States (+8) is theoretically a preferable partner to Russia (+4) for 86 of the 164 remaining states due to the US sharing greater similarity in polity score value with the identified state than did China.⁵³ Conversely, Russia is theoretically a preferable partner for 66 of the 164 remaining states. Of note, 12 of the 164 remaining states' theoretical

⁵⁰ See Appendix 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity.

⁵¹ See Appendix 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

⁵² See Appendix 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity.

⁵³ See Appendix 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

preference is inconclusive as their Polity Score values are equidistant (i.e., ± 6) from both the United States and Russia's values.

Subsection 10: Hypothesis 3f (Cultural Similarity – PRC versus RUS)

Within the dataset of 62 society records, Russia is theoretically a preferable partner to China for 55 of the 60 remaining states due to Russia sharing greater aggregate cultural similarity with the identified states than China.⁵⁴ Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, using polity values as a proxy for culture, Russia (+4) is theoretically a preferable partner to China (-7) for 124 of the 164 remaining states due to Russia sharing greater similarity in polity score value with the identified states than did China.⁵⁵ Conversely, China is theoretically a preferable partner for 40 of the 164 remaining states.

Subsection 11: Hypothesis 3g (Competition versus Conflict)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, the United States (+8) is theoretically a preferable partner to Russia (+4) and China (-7) for all 164 remaining states due to both its greater individual Polity Score value and its greater combined Polity Score value in each of the international relationships.⁵⁶ Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, using polity values as a proxy for culture, the United States is the preferred partner for 86 (53%) of the 163 remaining states. China is the preferred partner for 40 states (25%), whereas Russia is the preferred partner for only 25 states (15%). Twelve states' preferences remain inconclusive, i.e., state scores are equidistant (± 6) from Russia and the United States.⁵⁷ Within the dataset of 62 society records, assessing culture

⁵⁴ See Appendix 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity.

⁵⁵ See Appendix 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

⁵⁶ See Appendix 5: Polity Scores; Appendix 6: Combined Polity Scores.

⁵⁷ See Appendix 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

directly, Russia is the preferred partner for 35 of the 59 remaining states, with the United States being the preferred partner for 20 states and China being the preferred partner for four states.⁵⁸

Subsection 12: Hypothesis 4 (Ideological Effect on Pragmatism)

Within the Polity dataset of 166 active country records, China has the greatest proportion of theoretically low-ideological effect relationships of the three identified Great Powers.⁵⁹ Specifically, 119 of China's 165 potential international relationships are likely to favor a pragmatic versus principled diplomatic approach, preferencing short-term gains over long-term goals. The United States has a moderate proportion of theoretically low-ideological effect relationships; 47 potential relationships likely to favor pragmatism over principle. Russia has the smallest proportion of theoretically low-ideological effect relationships; 29 likely to favor pragmatism over principle.

Within the dataset of 62 society records, China has the greatest proportion of theoretically low-ideological effect relationships of the three identified Great Powers once more.⁶⁰ Specifically, 41 of China's 61 potential international relationships are likely to prioritize short-term gains over long-term goals. The United States still has a moderate proportion; 31 potential relationships likely to favor pragmatism over principle. Again, Russia has the least; 16 potential relationships likely to favor pragmatism over principle.

Section 2: Quantitative Results

Analysis of the available statistical data through the lens of liberalism suggests,

⁵⁸ See Appendix 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity; Though the findings are remarkably different between the two datasets, such differences reflect the risk of using one metric to proxy for another and highlight the importance of understanding the underlying logic behind any particular quantitative measure.

⁵⁹ See Appendix 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

⁶⁰ See Appendix 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity.

presuming Walt's ideological effect is true, democratic states are theoretically preferential international partners for most, if not all, nations in the world.⁶¹ Consequently, the pool of candidates preferring ideologically-based relationships with Anocracies and Autocracies dwindle rapidly as the Polity Score value of the would-be partner drops.⁶² When considering Great Power partners' theoretical desirability through the lens of liberalism (vis-à-vis regime-type), the United States is preferential to Russia, and Russia is preferential to China (H_{1a}, H_{1b}, H_{2a}, H_{3a}, H_{3b}, H_{3c}). The singular value defining the dataset makes Great Power preference ranking straightforward and absolute, regardless of the would-be partner.

When considering the theoretical desirability of Great Power partners through the lens of cultural similarity, the data contains many more potential points of similarity and difference than a single value on a scale from +10 to -10. Presuming Walt's ideological effect is true, analysis of the available data suggests that Russia possesses the most preferential culture for partnership compared to that of the United States or China.⁶³ However, the US possesses a culture preferential for partnering with more states than China (H_{2b}, H_{3d}, H_{3e}, H_{3f}). The group of values defining the dataset makes the preferential ranking more nuanced and relative, respecting the other would-be partner state's characteristics more than regime-type alone.

When considering the theoretical effect that relative desirability has on the international environment, differences in regime-type and cultural data appear to contradict each other once again (H_{3g}). Analysis of the available data through the lens of

⁶¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 40.

⁶² See Appendix 5: Polity Scores.

⁶³ See Appendix 11: Great Power Preference – Cultural Similarity.

liberalism (vis-à-vis combined Polity Scores) suggests that presuming Walt's ideological effect is true, the likelihood of China and/or Russia pressing for conflict is at its absolute theoretical minimum.⁶⁴ Using polity values as a proxy for culture in an assessment of cultural similarity, the likelihood of China and Russia, individually or combined, to press for conflict is at a theoretically moderate level, i.e., >53% of available partners in the dataset prefer the US as international partner.⁶⁵ Analyzing Cultural data from a cultural similarity perspective, the likelihood of China and/or Russia pressing for conflict should be at a theoretically elevated level, i.e., <35% of available partners in the dataset prefer the US as international partner.⁶⁶ The incomplete nature of the cultural data notwithstanding, polity data analysis provides a more comprehensive picture. Interestingly, analysis suggests that the international environment is not conducive for Russia or China to press for the international community to choose sides.

Remarkably, when considering the theoretical effect that relative desirability has on diplomatic approaches during periods of Great Power Competition, the differences between regime-type and cultural data all but disappear (H₄).⁶⁷ Both datasets reflect conditions where the preponderance of China's potential international relationships are theoretically susceptible to low-ideological effect, relegating their most likely diplomatic approach in the relationships to pragmatism instead of principle. Both datasets reflect conditions where far fewer international relationships are susceptible to low-ideological effect for Russia and then the United States, affording them the ability to apply pragmatic

⁶⁴ See Appendix 10: Great Power Preference – Combined Polity.

⁶⁵ See Appendix 12: Great Power Preference – Polity Similarity.

⁶⁶ See Appendix 11: Great Power Preference – Cultural Similarity.

⁶⁷ See Appendix 11: Great Power Preference – Cultural Similarity; See Appendix 12: Great Power Preference – Polity Similarity.

and principled diplomatic approaches with far greater discretion than China.

Analysis of available data through the lens of ideologically-informed bilateral relationships, i.e., combining phenomena from H_{3g} and H_4 , suggests the current international environment favors a coalescing around a US-Russia bi-polar international system more than US-China or Russia-China systems.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the data does not support establishing strong ideologically-informed bilateral relationships among any pair of the identified Great Powers. Still, of the three potential partnerships, Russia-China is the most culturally compatible. The analysis does not preclude the influence of other, more pragmatic factors that might provide sufficient impetus for partnerships of convenience or necessity.

Section 3: Qualitative Analysis

Although quantitative analysis of empirical evidence can highlight a phenomenon's existence, it rarely provides sufficient context to address how or why it manifests. How and why questions require engagement with the larger contemporary discourse on bi-lateral international relations. Review of the historical record regarding specific bilateral international relationships appearing in scholarly and professional publications since 1997 provides just such engagement. Exploring relative levels of diplomatic engagement predicated on liberalism, cultural similarity, and other non-ideological factors, the qualitative analysis addresses both ideological factor expression and explanation in an actual international relationship context.

Each of the subsequent three case studies explores its identified international relationship using a common approach. First, each case study describes its identified

⁶⁸ See Appendix 11: Great Power Preference – Cultural Similarity; See Appendix 12: Great Power Preference – Polity Similarity.

relationship in terms of existence and overall quality. Second, each study describes how liberalism and culture manifest within each state and as an influence between them. Third, each case study describes the broader context, accounting for the ways threat perception, foreign aid dependence, and political penetration influences the bilateral relationship in addition to ideological factors. The case studies, when considered together, account for the theoretical influences present in international relationship-formation and maintenance behavior.

Subsection 1: United States and United Kingdom (Positive-Similar)

According to the US Department of State, "The United States has no closer partner than the United Kingdom."⁶⁹ With over two centuries of generally positive diplomatic, economic, and military relations shared between the two nations, the US–UK relationship represents a long-term mutual investment. Consequently, the trans-Atlantic partnership is one of the strongest in the world.

Though the two states express representative governments differently, both fit squarely within Polity V Project's Open Democracy range of values. The United States and the United Kingdom both execute periodic, free, open, multi-party elections that lead to generally non-violent, seamless transitions of power. Each state government exercises a checks and balances system, with the representation of and responsibility to the people functioning as the most substantial influence.

Though the intervening centuries have allowed American society to develop a character all its own, the United States owes much of its cultural heritage to the British as a former colony. Consequently, the societal values and practices observed in both the

⁶⁹US State Department, *US Relations with United Kingdom* (Washington, DC: State Department, 2020), accessed February 6, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-united-kingdom/>.

United States and the United Kingdom appear very familiar to one another. The two states maintain the second smallest aggregate difference in Cultural Dimension Scores of any of the identified Great Power partnerships (± 0.70) within the data, only slightly broader than the US–Australia relationship (± 0.38).⁷⁰

In broad terms, Americans and Britons share similar worldviews.⁷¹ Both societies tend to value individualism over collective deference.⁷² Both societies tend to focus on the immediacy of life instead of long-term plans.⁷³ Both societies tend to treat men and women with equal value, identity, and agency.⁷⁴ Both societies tend to favor collegiality over formality.⁷⁵ And both societies tend to accept uncertainty as part of life rather than as something to be deliberately managed.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores

⁷¹ See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores

⁷² See Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship; In-Group Collectivism scores.

⁷³ See Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship; Future Orientation scores.

⁷⁴ See Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship; Gender Egalitarianism scores.

⁷⁵ See Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship; Power Distance scores.

⁷⁶ See Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship; Uncertainty Avoidance scores.

Table 1: Qualitative Data: United States – United Kingdom Relationship.

	Great Power	Partner State	Difference
	United States	United Kingdom	
Polity V Score	+8	+8	±0
In-Group Collectivism	4.25	4.08	±0.17
Future Orientation	5.31	5.06	±0.26
Gender Egalitarianism	5.06	5.17	±0.11
Power Distance	2.85	2.80	±0.05
Uncertainty Avoidance	4.25	4.11	±0.11
Polity Score Similarity		±0	
Combined Polity Score		+16	
Overall Cultural Similarity		±0.70	

Source: Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations.

From a non-ideological standpoint, threat perception theoretically presents itself as either a bandwagoning effect for one state threatened by another or a balancing effect when two states are threatened by a third. Though the US–UK relationship was understandably rocky in its formative period, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States has menaced the other in open hostility since the War of 1812—over two centuries ago. However, the Central Powers of WWI, the Axis of WWII, and the Soviets during the Cold War are compelling examples of threats against which the US–UK relationship balanced. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, however, it is difficult to ascribe such existentially threatening influence to another international power.

Foreign aid dependence, another non-ideological perspective, theoretically represents a source of leverage for a state with means over a state in need. Though the World Bank categorizes both the United States and the United Kingdom as High-income

economies, the US does provide limited foreign aid to the UK.⁷⁷ Between 1997 to 2018, USAID reports that the United States provided over \$72M in foreign aid to the United Kingdom, predominantly for Public Health and Social Services Emergency, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities.⁷⁸ Though \$72M sounds substantial, it is less than 5% of the UK GDP for a single year (1997) and less than 1/1000th of a single percent over the 20 years rendered.⁷⁹ It is hard to sustain the notion that the United States leverages any appreciable foreign aid influence over the United Kingdom.

Also, non-ideological, political penetration theoretically represents a source of leverage for a state whose domestic political situation is vulnerable to the placement and access to shape another state's foreign relations. Both the US and the UK maintain formal and informal lobbying mechanisms within their governments, providing domestic and foreign interests with a means to gain the requisite access for influence. According to the non-profit US lobbying watchdog, the Center for Responsible Politics, the United Kingdom registered just under \$8M in US lobbying efforts between 2016 and 2020.⁸⁰ However, the two states' well-established and free press systems monitor, scrutinize, and manage external actor influence, limiting their vulnerability to the effects of political

⁷⁷ Available data from the annual United Kingdom Statistics on International Development reports reflects no substantial foreign aid provision from the UK to the US; UK Department for International Development, "Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2018," accessed January 5, 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2018>; US Agency for International Development (USAID), "Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of US Foreign Aid," accessed January 7, 2021, https://explorer.usaid.gov/prepared/us_foreign_aid_country.xlsx.

⁷⁸ US Agency for International Development (USAID), "US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2018," accessed January 9, 2021, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports>.

⁷⁹ World Bank, "GDP (current US\$) - United Kingdom," accessed January 11, 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GB>.

⁸⁰ Center for Responsible Politics, "Foreign Lobby Watch: United Kingdom," accessed January 13, 2021, <https://www.opensecrets.org/fara/countries/65>.

penetration. The existence of a free press precludes neither the United States nor the United Kingdom from affecting one other's politics. Instead, sufficient examples exist of one country pursuing policies counter to the other's wishes, suggesting neither is a puppet of nor a puppet master to the other.

As both partners tend to see the world in the same way, communication between them may require minor translation of language but not a more substantive translation of cultural context. Without the burden of reorientation and reframing, the US–UK relationship is culturally streamlined for high efficiency and enhanced effectiveness. Of the influences Walt theorizes as most informative, the US–UK *special relationship* appears to be influenced by similarly liberal governments, strongly similar cultural values and practices, and a shared appreciation for what constitutes a threat.⁸¹ However, Walt's foreign aid dependence and political penetration leverage points do not appear to influence the US–UK relationship. Consequently, the relationship seems to be of a character far more principled than pragmatic and likely very resilient against external pressure.

Subsection 2: China and Czechia (Negative-Different)

According to the European Institute for Asian Studies, "relations between the Czech Republic and China continue to persevere despite a turbulent decade in their bilateral relationship."⁸² With over a century of diplomatic and economic relations shared between the two peoples, a China–Czechia relationship persists.⁸³ A central feature in

⁸¹ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017), 198.

⁸² Simon Hewitt, "Czech Republic-China relations: An Eventful Decade." Last modified October 11, 2020, accessed January 11, 2021, <https://www.eias.org/news/czech-republic-china-relationsan-eventful-decade/>.

⁸³ Hsi-Huey Liang, "China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis," in *The Munich Crisis, 1938*, ed. Erik Goldstein and Igor Lukes (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012), 349.

this long history is the disruptive influence communism had on the two peoples, both in its depressive nature and in the dominant Sino and Soviet styles' divisive influences.

China (-7) and Czechia (+9) are at opposite ends of the Polity V Project spectrum. China is a highly centralized autocratic single-party communist regime that controls all public and private activities of activities within the state. On the other hand, Czechia elects leaders across all levels, national through local, via recurring, free, open, multi-party elections. Though Czechia was once under the Soviet Union's totalitarian umbrella, communism's hold on the Czech people was always tenuous at best, surrendering to the country's historical democratic political system during the Velvet Revolution of 1989.⁸⁴

Within the data available, China and Czechia (± 7.39) have the second greatest difference in Cultural Dimension Scores of the potential Great Power partnerships.⁸⁵ The greatest difference in scores belongs to the Russia–Czechia (± 8.53) relationship.⁸⁶ Hints of these cultural differences were evident to one observer even in the earliest years of their relationship, with him noting that elites in the two countries thought of time differently, one in years and the other in decades.⁸⁷

Looking deeper, the worldviews of Chinese and Czechia are genuinely quite different.⁸⁸ Chinese society tends to value collective concepts of self, whereas Czech society values individuality.⁸⁹ As noted nearly a century ago, Chinese culture tends to focus on long-term plans, contrasted with Czech society's focus on life's immediacy.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Rob Cameron, "Velvet Revolution: Czech Republic 25 Years," last modified November 17, 2014, accessed January 13, 2021, <http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-30076941>.

⁸⁵ See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores

⁸⁶ See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores

⁸⁷ Liang, "China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis," 351.

⁸⁸ Hofstede Insights, "Country Comparison: China & Czech Republic," accessed March 05, 2021, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/china,czech-republic/>

⁸⁹ See Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship; In-Group Collectivism scores.

⁹⁰ See Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship; Future Orientation scores.

However, both communities, Chinese and Czechia, tend to manifest paternalistic trends that treat men and women with disparate value, identity, and agency.⁹¹ Both societies tend to favor societal norms of formality over collegiality.⁹² However, Chinese culture tends to manage uncertainty through rigid social expectation systems, while Czech society tends to accept uncertainty as a natural part of life.⁹³

Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship.

	Great Power	Partner State	Difference
	China	Czechia	
Polity V Score	-7	+9	±16
In-Group Collectivism	5.80	3.18	±2.63
Future Orientation	4.73	2.95	±1.77
Gender Egalitarianism	3.68	3.78	±0.10
Power Distance	3.10	4.35	±1.25
Uncertainty Avoidance	5.28	3.64	±1.64
Polity Score Similarity		±16	
Combined Polity Score		+2	
Overall Cultural Similarity		±8.53	

Source: Marshall and Jaggers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations.

From a threat perception standpoint, neither China nor Czechia has a history of menacing the other in open hostility. However, Czechia's still-fresh memories of the struggle for freedom from communism color their perceptions of threat differently than the people of communist China.⁹⁴ As a whole, the China–Czechia relationship does not appear to manifest as a response to either bandwagoning or balancing.

From a foreign aid dependence perspective, neither China nor Czechia maintains

⁹¹ See Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship; Gender Egalitarianism scores.

⁹² See Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship; Power Distance scores.

⁹³ See Table 2: Qualitative Data: China – Czechia Relationship; Uncertainty Avoidance scores.

⁹⁴ Natalie Liu, "Czech Diplomat Sees Spat with China Through History's Lens," last modified July 11, 2020, accessed January 15, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/europe/czech-diplomat-sees-spat-china-through-historys-lens>.

transparent records on the exchange of Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Other Official Flows (OOF) monies.⁹⁵ However, the World Bank categorizes Czechia as a High-income country and China as an Upper middle-income Country, suggesting foreign aid likely flows from Czechia to China.⁹⁶ The information available regarding economic exchanges between the two states reflects a greater emphasis on enhancing access to each other's markets for raw materials and finished goods than development monies.⁹⁷ In early 2020, as the global pandemic was starting to overtake Wuhan and the world's attention, Czechia was one of the first European nations to send medical relief supplies to China. China reciprocated in kind to Czechia a couple of months later.⁹⁸ Despite the presence of economic ties between the two states and their general interest in strengthening the relationship for mutual benefit, evidence suggests China does not leverage any appreciable foreign aid influence over Czechia or vice-versa.⁹⁹

From the political penetration perspective, neither China nor Czechia maintains open and transparent lobbying systems like the United States and the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, it isn't easy to ascertain whether China or Czechia interests necessarily

⁹⁵ AIDDATA, "China's Global Development Footprint," last modified November 17, 2014, accessed January 13, 2021, <https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance>.

⁹⁶ USAID, "Foreign Aid Explorer."

⁹⁷ Jason Hovet and Jan Lopatka, "Chinese, Czech Presidents Forge Strategic Partnership on Prague Visit," last modified March 29, 2016, accessed January 23, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-china-idUSKCN0WV1F0>.

⁹⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Czech Republic Sent Material Aid to China to Fight the Coronavirus," last modified February 15, 2020, accessed January 21, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/china/czech-republic-sent-material-aid-china-fight-coronavirus>.

⁹⁹ Dusan Stojanovic, "China's 'Mask Diplomacy' Wins Support in Eastern Europe," last modified April 14, 2020, accessed January 19, 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/76dff4b113e82d85716262895909f151>; Tim Gosling, "China's Mask Diplomacy Won't Work in the Czech Republic," last modified May 21, 2020, accessed January 15, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/21/china-mask-diplomacy-czech-republic-coronavirus-pandemic-influence-huawei-5g-milos-zeman/>.

¹⁰⁰ François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier, *China at the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations*, Report, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017, 75-88, accessed January 17, 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21666.8>.

influence one another through formal government channels. However, Czechia and its European neighbors maintain an active press, highlighting the Chinese-Czechia relationship's ebb and flow. Over the last decade, a Chinese energy conglomerate, the now-defunct CEFC China Energy Corporation, quietly bought sizeable positions in several influential Czech companies and brands.¹⁰¹ Concurrent with the presumably private investments, Czech media outlets noted changes in national policy and national news coverage overwhelmingly pro-China.¹⁰² The honeymoon did not last long. Some Czech political leaders openly engaged with Tibet and Taiwan representatives, eliciting a very volatile and public exchange between the Chinese ambassador and Czech elected leaders.¹⁰³ China and Czechia are capable of influencing the politics of the other. Still, it is unclear as to the durability of such influence as each state continues to pursue policies prioritizing their self-interest.

Despite some points of similarity, both China and Czechia tend to see the world in a very different way. Communication between the two likely requires the far more challenging and consequential translation of cultural context in addition to the mere translation of language. With the additional burden of reorientation and reframing, the China–Czech relationship struggles under the burden of low efficiency and diminished effectiveness. Of the influences Walt theorizes as most informative, the China–Czechia relationship appears to be influenced primarily by economically fueled political

¹⁰¹ Hovet and Lopatka, “Chinese, Czech Presidents Forge Strategic Partnership on Prague Visit;” Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Emily Tamkin, “Prague Opened the Door to Chinese Influence. Now It May Need to Change Course,” last modified March 16, 2016, accessed January 25, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/16/prague-to-czech-chinese-influence-cefc-energy-communist-party/>.

¹⁰² Jichang Lulu, “China’s ‘Economic Diplomacy’ in the Czech Republic: From Promises of Investment to Threats of Retaliation,” last modified February 2, 2020, accessed January 27, 2021, <https://sinopsis.cz/en/embassy-threats/>.

¹⁰³ Gosling, “China’s Mask Diplomacy Won’t Work in the Czech Republic.”

penetration and little else. Walt's ideological effect, threat perception, and foreign aid dependence leverage points do not appear to wield much positive influence in the China–Czechia relationship at all. Consequently, the relationship appears to be of a character almost solely based upon pragmatism instead of principle. Evidence suggests the two states are quite vulnerable to pressures related to topical issues internal to and external to the pair.

Subsection 3: United States and Qatar (Positive-Different)

According to the United States Department of State, "bilateral relations are strong, with the United States and Qatar coordinating closely on a wide range of regional and global issues."¹⁰⁴ With nearly fifty years of generally positive diplomatic, economic, and military relations shared between the two nations since Qatar became independent from the United Kingdom, the US–Qatar relationship appears to be mutually beneficial. Qatar hosts the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Headquarters, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) routinely coordinates regional military operations from Qatari facilities. Though the two states' governments are quite different, the people are remarkably similar. So, the relationship persists.

The United States (+8) and Qatar (-10) are at opposite ends of the Polity V Project spectrum. The United States elects leaders across all levels, national through local, via periodic, free, open, multi-party elections. On the other hand, Qatar is a hereditary monarchy supported by a widely integrated single ruling family that occupies almost all ministerial positions. Though Qatar has experimented with electoral processes in a portion of its national legislature and some provincial posts, its government's general

¹⁰⁴US State Department, US Relations with Qatar (Washington, DC: State Department, 2020), accessed December 28, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-qatar/>.

tenor remains primarily authoritarian.

Despite vast differences in government type, the cultural divide is not quite as large. The US–Qatar relationship (± 3.93) has a lower than average level of cultural similarity than other potential Great Power partnerships and is roughly halfway between the most and least similar potential partnerships in the dataset, i.e., US–Australia (± 0.38) and Russia–Czechia (± 8.53).¹⁰⁵ Looking deeper than the aggregate level of cultural similarity, a comparison of individual Cultural Dimensions provides the opportunity for a more nuanced assessment.

The worldview of Americans and Qatari are quite similar in many ways, with one prominent exception — norms regarding women’s role in society.¹⁰⁶ Both societies tend to value individualism over collective deference. Both societies tend to focus on the immediacy of life instead of long-term plans.¹⁰⁷ Both societies tend to favor collegiality over formality.¹⁰⁸ And both societies tend to accept uncertainty as part of life rather than as something to be deliberately managed.¹⁰⁹ The principal area where the two societies diverge regards how they express value, identity, and agency differently for men and women.¹¹⁰ Qatari society favors a paternal orientation towards women, and the United States favors greater relative egalitarianism.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores.

¹⁰⁶ Hofstede Insights, “Country Comparison: Qatar & United States,” accessed March 05, 2021, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/qatar,the-usa/>

¹⁰⁷ See Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship; In-Group Collectivism scores.

¹⁰⁸ See Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship; Future Orientation scores.

¹⁰⁹ See Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship; Gender Egalitarianism scores.

¹¹⁰ See Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship; Power Distance scores.

¹¹¹ See Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship; Uncertainty Avoidance scores.

Table 3: Qualitative Data: United States – Qatar Relationship.

	Great Power	Partner State	Difference
	United States	Qatar	
Polity V Score	+8	-10	±18
In-Group Collectivism	4.25	4.71	±0.46
Future Orientation	5.31	5.92	±0.60
Gender Egalitarianism	5.06	3.38	±1.68
Power Distance	2.85	3.23	±0.38
Uncertainty Avoidance	4.25	4.82	±0.82
Polity Score Similarity	±18		
Combined Polity Score	-2		
Overall Cultural Similarity	±3.93		

Source: Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*.

From the perspective of threat perception, neither the United States nor Qatar has a history of menacing the other in open hostility, strongly reducing the likelihood of bandwagoning. However, as a protectorate of the UK from 1917 to 1971, Qatar would likely have perceived WWI, WWII, and Cold War threats in a similar way as the United Kingdom. Qatari perceptions of threat, combined with the character of the US–UK relationship, supports their tendency to partner with the United States as a balance against mutually recognized threats.¹¹² After its independence in 1971, Qatar was free to make its own foreign policy decisions, electing to pursue positive relations broadly throughout the region and the world. Currently, Qatar maintains active relations with Iran, China, and some transnational organizations known for terrorism, which recently led to the restoration of fractured relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,

¹¹² Office of the Historian, "A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Qatar," Department of State, accessed January 3, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/countries/qatar>.

Egypt, and Yemen.¹¹³

From the perspective of foreign aid dependence, the US does provide limited foreign aid to Qatar, despite the World Bank categorizing both the United States and Qatar as high-income countries.¹¹⁴ Between 2006 to 2018, USAID reports that the United States provided over \$11M in foreign aid to Qatar, mostly for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs.¹¹⁵ Qatari foreign aid tends to focus on supporting regional neighbors and countries far less financially secure. Still, in 2006, Qatar's Emir did pledge \$100M in relief to those Americans most impacted by Hurricane Katrina.¹¹⁶ As was the case in the US–UK relationship, it is hard to support the notion that the US leverages any appreciable foreign aid influence over Qatar.

From the political penetration perspective, Qatar does not maintain a transparent lobbying system that subjects itself to public scrutiny like that of the United States. Consequently, the US's level of access to influence its national interests within Qatar is difficult to ascertain. However, according to a non-profit US lobbying watchdog, the Center for Responsible Politics, Qatar registered over \$126M in lobbying efforts within the United States between 2016 and 2020.¹¹⁷ US news reports claim Qatar's steep rise in lobbying coincided with an attempt to secure the American President's support in Qatar's

¹¹³ Frank Gardner, “Qatar Crisis: Saudi Arabia and Allies Restore Diplomatic Ties with Emirate,” last modified January 5, 2020, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55538792>.

¹¹⁴ Though information regarding Qatari foreign aid practices has been getting better in recent years, data remains sparse and difficult to assess; Homi Kharas, “Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid,” in special issue, *Silatech Working Papers* 15, no. 11 (November 2015), <https://silatech.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/trends-and-issues-in-qatari-foreign-aid-en.pdf>; USAID, “Foreign Aid Explorer.”

¹¹⁵ USAID, “US Overseas Loans and Grants.”

¹¹⁶ Michele Kelemen, “Qatar Pledges \$100 Million to Help Katrina Victims,” *All Things Considered*, aired May 7, 2006, on NPR. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5389562>.

¹¹⁷ Center for Responsible Politics, “Foreign Lobby Watch: Qatar,” accessed January 13, 2021, <https://www.opensecrets.org/fara/countries/143>.

bid to reestablish positive diplomatic relations with their closest regional neighbors.¹¹⁸

Both parties in the United States–Qatar relationship are likely capable of influencing the other's politics in various ways. Still, each state continues to pursue policies primarily according to their self-interest, often against the other's preferences.

Of the influences Walt theorized as most informative, the US–Qatar relationship appears to be influenced primarily by cultural similarity and shared appreciation for what constitutes a threat. Walt's liberalism, foreign aid dependence, and political penetration leverage points do not appear to wield much influence in the US–Qatar relationship at all. Despite some moderately influential ideological effects, the overall relationship appears to be of a far more pragmatic character than a principled one. Consequently, the relationship is likely quite vulnerable to external pressure.

Section 4: Qualitative Findings

When exploring the identified cases through the lens of relationship existence, all three state pairings maintained some relationship. The United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a formal bilateral international relationship for over 200 years.¹¹⁹ China and Czechia have maintained formal bilateral relations for over 100 years despite multiple changes in their national governments. The United States and Qatar have maintained a formal bilateral international relationship for nearly 50 years. Of the three, the China–Czechia relationship was the most unexpected as the two states are so vastly different from one. The existence of a functional China–Czechia relationship suggests that the identified factors of liberalism, government, and culture may be insufficient to

¹¹⁸ Julie Bykowicz, “The New Lobbying: Qatar Targeted 250 Trump ‘Influencers’ to Change US Policy,” last modified August 29, 2018, accessed January 15, 2021, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-lobbying-qatar-targeted-250-trump-influencers-to-change-u-s-policy-1535554647>.

¹¹⁹ US State Department, *US Relations with United Kingdom*.

fully explain the existence of international relationships.

As relationship existence remains consistent across all three cases, the next issue at hand is relationship quality. Despite a rocky start, the United States maintains an overwhelmingly positive relationship with the United Kingdom and a generally positive relationship with Qatar. Assessing the quality of the China–Czechia relationship appears highly variable, depending largely on current issues and the country responding. This high degree of variability suggests that though liberalism, government, and culture may be insufficient to explain a relationship’s existence, they may be instrumental in explaining the relationship’s quality.

Given the variation in the general quality of relationships across the three cases, further exploration into the effect each of Walt's theoretical influencers has on the relationship is useful. The overwhelmingly positive US–UK relationship coincides with both strongly similar levels of liberalism and a high degree of cultural similarity. The generally positive US–Qatari relationship coincides with strongly dissimilar levels of liberalism but a moderate degree of cultural similarity. The awkward China–Czechia relationship coincides with both strongly dissimilar levels of liberalism and a low degree of cultural similarity. The situation suggests that though both liberalism and cultural similarity are necessary for an overwhelmingly positive relationship, neither is sufficient on their own. Furthermore, the absence of both liberalism and cultural similarity appears to be a rocky foundation for an international relationship.

When considering the cases through the theoretically relevant lens of threat perception, interesting trends emerge regarding military cooperation's relative prominence within the relationship. The positive US–UK relationship and modest US–

Qatari relationship each have strong military cooperation levels, perhaps stemming from a shared worldview on what constitutes an existential threat. The awkward China–Czechia relationship does not reflect any appreciable level of military cooperation, perhaps as a function of Czechia's perceptions of threat emanating from its communist past and associating such a threat with China's communist present. Though none of the cases evidenced bandwagoning, the UK and Qatar may see their relationships with the US as a means to balance against other perceived threats. Under different conditions, threat perception may have a stronger influence on alliance formation in general. Still, in the cases reviewed within the research, evidence suggests threat perception manifests more in how partners cooperate than if they cooperate.

When considering the cases through the theoretically relevant lens of foreign aid dependence, interesting trends emerge regarding the relative prominence of economic cooperation within the relationship. The positive US–UK relationship reflects the exchange of minimal monies under the auspices of aid. However, the condition is logically consistent with the stature of both states as High-income countries. The modestly positive US–Qatari relationship reflects a similarly small exchange of monies under the auspices of aid, logically consistent with both states' stature as high-income countries. The quantity of aid exchanged within the stilted China–Czechia relationship could not be reliably measured; however, evidence suggests that aid resources from each state are generally not targeted towards one another. Though foreign aid dependence may have a stronger influence on alliance formation under different conditions, evidence within the research suggests that foreign aid dependence does not play a substantial role in high-income or upper-middle-income countries' decisions.

When considering the cases through the theoretically relevant lens of political penetration, interesting trends emerge regarding the relative degrees to which parties invest in formal and informal political lobbying or leverage economic integration within the relationship. The positive US–UK relationship reflects minimal investments in political lobbying by either country, but the level of economic integration in the pairing is quite high. The modest US–Qatari relationship reflects an elevated investment by Qatar in political lobbying to influence United States' policy, while economic integration between the two is more modest. The degree to which foreign investment in formal lobbying mechanisms influences the China–Czechia relationship could not be measured reliably; however, evidence of growing economic integration, specifically increasing Chinese economic investment and influence in Czechia. Though under different conditions, political penetration may have a stronger influence on alliance formation in general, at least in the cases reviewed within the research, evidence suggests political penetration increases as a factor as ideological effect decreases.

Exploring the cases reveals several phenomena consistent with the way Walt's theoretically relevant influences are expected to express within international relationships. Ideologically, cultural similarity correlates positively with the quality of the relationship and appears to have greater influence over the relationship's character than levels of liberalism alone. Threat perception appears to correlate somewhat positively with the overall quality of the relationship and the character of military cooperation within the relationship.

On the other hand, the cases also reveal some phenomena inconsistent with Walt's expectations. For instance, at least within the cases reviewed, foreign aid dependence did

not appear to play a substantive role in any relationship. Political penetration, specifically regarding the level of foreign investment in lobbying, appears to correlate negatively with the relationship's quality. The level of economic integration does not appear to reflect any appreciable influence on relationship quality or character. Interestingly, reassessing the presence of a foreign lobby and foreign economic leverage in ideological terms, the phenomena appear to correlate negatively with liberalism and cultural similarity.

Chapter 4: Discussion

Section 1: Overview

The purpose of the sequential mixed methods research was to explore the propensity for states to foster effective and resilient international relationships based upon identified ideological factors evidenced in quantitative data from extant theoretically relevant datasets and the qualitative analysis. In the research's quantitative phase, research questions addressed how identified ideological variables informed state relationship-forming behavior. In the qualitative phase, three cases selected via a typical result/maximal variation principle explored statistical tests results in greater depth.

Section 2: Interpreting Quantitative and Qualitative Results

Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis phases of the research produced results consistent with Walt's ideological factors of liberalism and cultural similarity. As such, the data available in the Polity V Project and GLOBE Study datasets should be considered informative as to the expected character a given international relationship assumes based upon the underlying ideological effect. States with illiberal tendencies or dissimilar cultures may very well develop a basis for a meaningful relationship, be they partnership or even alliance. Instead, it highlights that states with illiberal tendencies or dissimilar cultures will likely require far more effort to form and maintain relationships than if the ideological factors were more favorable.

The role ideological factors play in international relationships informs the character of diplomatic engagement needed to elicit the best short-term and long-term outcomes relative to the wants, needs, and conditions encompassing the engagement. As a general rule, the character of almost any international relationship is of sufficient

quality to support engagement on a pragmatic level. The transactional nature of such exchanges means that one state need only discover the price the other state seeks to enact for compliance with a particular demand, at a particular time, for a particular duration.

Conversely, the character of international relationships founded upon shared ideological factors is of a different quality, supporting deeper engagement on a principled level. The transitive nature of such principled exchanges means that one state need only promote commitment and demonstrate cooperation on a particular course to elicit a likely positive response. Principled diplomacy among ideologically similar states does carry a cost, but that price may not be the most important factor in securing a favorable outcome.

Unlike Walt's ideological effect, which tends to inform the nature of an international relationship, the influence of threat perception, foreign aid dependence, and political penetration appear to inform the relationships' character. Specifically, the non-ideological influences engage a very pragmatic logic that could exist within a very principled relationship or define a very transactional one. Evidence suggests that the factors inform particular issue areas within which the two states will limit their engagement rather than represent a broader foundation for deep cooperation.

Section 3: Implications and Recommendations

The most compelling insight from the research is that China, as a nominal Great Power, has a greatly diminished ideological draw compared to either the United States or Russia. Supposing that China's staunchly illiberal autocracy and insular cultural profile make them a poor candidate for an ideologically informed international relationship, China will have no choice but to continue to engage the world in an almost entirely pragmatic fashion. Limiting China's diplomatic approach to transactional engagements

may explain its proclivity towards predatory economic practices, lawfare, and intimidation. If the rest of the world, even many of its closest neighbors, are so ideologically dissimilar, then China will have to leverage the less attractive assets and capabilities it has remaining.

Consequently, US leadership should seriously consider China as something other than a Great Power as the term is currently used. Continuing to speak of and treat China as if they were a superpower or leader of a unified bloc of similar states is ill-informed at best and misleading at worst. To the degree that US actions inform others' foreign policy, repeated references to China as a Great Power may inadvertently reinforce Chinese foreign relations efforts as a de facto form of endorsement. Even if China were to decry the move as offensive or dismissive, few states would commiserate with China as a matter of principle per the data.

The second most compelling insight from the research is that Russia, despite its history of destabilizing neighbors, use of assassination, and employment of paramilitary surrogates, has a vastly superior ideological connection with the world than China and a not insignificant draw in comparison to the United States. Several states within the international community, and not just former Soviet clients, possess a worldview more similar to Russia than the United States or China. States sharing a worldview similar to Russia are not necessarily more likely to engage in similarly unsavory actions. Still, many more states would likely overlook Russian tactics than one might think under conditions where pragmatism informs relationships more than principle. As such, a Great Power Competition need not lead to a second Cold War. Still, if it did, the most likely bipolar international system to form from the current power players would coalesce

around two poles, the all-to-familiar American and Russian blocs.

Consequently, the US inclusion of Russia among the *Great Powers* is appropriate and opportune. Russia may no longer be the political force behind a unified bloc of similar states, but they do represent a common cultural influence. Therefore, any principled diplomatic approaches that lead to better, more normalized relations with Russia will likely have similarly positive repercussions in states sharing cultural similarities with Russia. In some cases, the key to improving relations with a third nation may be to improve relations with Russia. Whether or not the US pursues principled relations with Russia or relegates the relationship to pragmatic diplomacy, the US would be wise not to draw too grave a distinction between the US and Russian worldviews; as several states maintain worldviews closer to those of Russia than to the US.

The third insight of note is the power of potential inherent in principled diplomacy during times other than a crisis. Suppose government norms and cultural preferences in values and practices are malleable and can be shaped over time by iterative engagement.¹²⁰ Influencing a potential partner nation's government and culture towards greater similarity increases the likelihood that principal guides relations between the two states can vice pragmatism. Principled diplomacy provides a mechanism by which the US can engage both a potential partner nation's government and society, encouraging, exercising, and investing in what are to be shared values and practices.

The benefit of governmental and cultural similarity may be self-evident, but there is little in the way of a clear template for developing shared values and practices. Each potential partner nation's case is unique, with its own governmental norms and various

¹²⁰ Gert Jan, "BOSS Blog 1: Do Cultures Change?" *Geert Hofstede*, last modified 19 May 2019, accessed March 12, 2021, <https://www.geerthofstede.com/booss-blog-1-do-cultures-change/>.

cultural dimensions to influence, explaining why the US Department of State grants each Country Team such wide latitude to chart a diplomatic course within their assigned country.¹²¹ Consequently, experts with deep cultural knowledge of their assigned posts are best suited to tailor precise engagement programs and projects to elicit the most beneficial governmental and cultural responses.

Nevertheless, several desirable engagement characteristics are universal. Principled diplomatic programs should be long-term, with benefits that compound over time to “extend the shadow of the future” in such a way as to promote continued cooperation.¹²² Whether or not principled programs result in large physical changes in the state or cost great sums, projects should prioritize large-scale, bi-lateral, person-to-person engagement instead of merely offsetting costs through direct payments. Meaningful governmental and cultural transformation occurs more efficiently and effectively through repeated positive personal exposure to desired practices and values, not financial transactions.¹²³ Within these guidelines, practitioners of principled diplomacy can still maintain a great deal of the freedom afforded them by Department of State leadership.

Ideological factor analysis is insufficient to replace the deep cultural knowledge of professional foreign service personnel. Still, it may prove necessary to help them focus their efforts on US foreign relations' ideological factors. For example, reviewing the US-Philippines relationship shows two highly liberal democratic governments with distinct cultural dimension profiles.¹²⁴ The distinctiveness in how each society manifests culture

¹²¹ Smith, Interview.

¹²² Robert M. Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 124.

¹²³ It is worth noting that governmental and cultural similarities manifest along a relative continuum, meaning that so long as Chinese and Russian values remain consistent, states drawing closer to the US would be distancing themselves from China and Russia. Such distancing might preclude formation of new international relationships or strain existing ones.

¹²⁴ See Table 4: Qualitative Data: United States – Philippines Relationship.

leads to the two sharing a poorer-than-average level of overall cultural similarity, likely increasing the cost of communication and frustrating deeper cooperation.¹²⁵ Closer examination of the cultural data reveals that the preponderance of cultural dissimilarity in the United States – Philippines relationship manifest through differences in the two societies’ collectivism and uncertainty avoidance characteristics.¹²⁶ The effect of these cultural differences can be acknowledged and mitigated through ongoing diplomatic relations and perhaps reduced through long-term, principled diplomatic engagement.

Table 4: Qualitative Data: United States – Philippines Relationship.

	Great Power United States	Partner State Philippines	Difference
Polity V Score	+8	+8	±0
In-Group Collectivism	4.25	6.36	±2.11
Future Orientation	5.31	5.93	±0.61
Gender Egalitarianism	5.06	4.58	±0.49
Power Distance	2.85	2.72	±0.13
Uncertainty Avoidance	4.25	5.14	±1.14
Polity Score Similarity		±0	
Combined Polity Score		+18	
Overall Cultural Similarity		±4.47	

Source: Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations.

The fourth insight worth making explicit is that many states share similar worldviews, values, and practices with the United States. Unfortunately, all but the most culturally astute observer likely overlook these similarities. Culture is admittedly a complex and nuanced concept, simultaneously requiring years of in-depth study to appreciate fully and being prone to gross oversimplification when time is short. As

¹²⁵ See Table 4: Qualitative Data: United States – Philippines Relationship; Polity V Score and Overall Cultural Similarity.

¹²⁶ See Table 4: Qualitative Data: United States – Philippines Relationship; In-Group Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance scores.

Americans tend to favor thinking of time as always in short supply, oversimplification of cultural concepts at the strategic level leads to a myopic awareness of culture, leaving countless opportunities to deepen ties with other nations untapped.¹²⁷ On a fundamental level, investment in a deeper understanding of how government types and cultures reflect the deeper values and beliefs of a people will help states, especially the United States, and their people see and seize opportunities otherwise left untouched.

Consequently, the US should invest both in its people and its tools. With their years of in-depth cultural education and experience, professional foreign service personnel benefit the nation greatly. With the incorporation of data-driven systems into decision-making, tools can help strategic leaders make better sense of cultural nuances and complexities in time-constrained environments. The path from novice to professional diplomat is familiar to those within the community, but the process of turning data into foreign policy is likely less clear.

As demonstrated through this research, a basic comparison of the available government and cultural dimension data highlights relative similarities and differences—on a measurable and nuanced scale—for many within the community of nations. Anyone engaging with foreign partners, be they diplomat or defense attaché, should use the measures of relative government and cultural similarity and difference to inform the likely effort required for a given cooperative or coercive activity. Furthermore, deeper exploration of the available data proved useful in this research for reflecting on current practice and widely-held beliefs. Policymakers can integrate data-driven cultural analysis and assessment into strategic policy documents such as the US Department of Defense

¹²⁷ See Appendix 8: Cultural Dimension Scores; United States Entry, Future Orientation score.

Guidance for the Development of Alliances and Partnership at the strategic level.

The last insight worth noting is that none of this research would have been possible without the empirical evidence resident in the data. Dedicated scholars structured and systematized the complexity and nuance of governments and cultures worldwide, and now policymakers and practitioners reap the benefit. The process to date has been largely an academic endeavor, but public and private endeavors both have a part to play in improving access to data.

Consequently, the US Government should invest in filling critical gaps in current data structures and consider expanding research into related fields supporting policy and practice. Specifically, the US Government should invest in the continuing GLOBE effort to bring the remaining 109 states missing from the Cultural Dimension-related datasets into the study.¹²⁸ The investment could take the form of financial backing, more importantly it could take the form of engagement with partner and would-be partner nations to encourage participation in the global research program. In a parallel but independent program, the US Department of State should sponsor a comprehensive index measuring all potential international relationships' relative strength and character.¹²⁹ Such an index would encompass tens of thousands of entries. Still, in the absence of a comprehensive dataset, the US Departments of State and Defense should leverage scholars at one of the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) to

¹²⁸ Such research is an arduous task as the research programs supporting these quantitative assessments of culture are complicated and costly. Nevertheless, the power of quantitative measures is in the *n*-, the quality that enables aggregation and extrapolation, comparison, and regression. Until theoretically-relevant datasets are complete and readily available, scholars and practitioners will turn to other data to act as a proxy, with all the risk indirect measures entail.

¹²⁹ This study would have benefitted greatly from a robust dependent variable capable of unlocking access to several more sophisticated and theory-probing statistical tests. In the absence of such a metric, future scholars must continue to rely upon qualitative measures to make up for this shortcoming of the extant literature.

fill the gap. Coding the few hundred US, Chinese, and Russian bi-lateral relationships will enable additional study, inform policy, and shape security cooperation guidance. From such a focused dataset, diplomatic and defense professionals can assess the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of specific states of interest, such as Malaysia, Egypt, India, or Panama, comparing each to the US, China, and Russia to find opportunity for principle and pragmatism where others find only complexity and confusion.

Section 4: Conclusion

Since its earliest days, the United States of America has amplified its power through relationships with other nations. In a world characterized by increasing Great Power Competition, the United States can take actions now to improve potential outcomes of future international relationships and enhance the power of US-led institutions. Stephen Walt identified several reasons why states should foster effective and resilient international relationships, of which ideological factors were one. Empirical evidence in quantitative and qualitative data reveals that great power ideological factors likely influence the quality and character of the international relationships each state can form and maintain. Data also suggests neither China nor Russia would benefit from pressing other states to pick sides in a 21st Century Cold War. Consequently, principled diplomacy—encouraging others to adopt western values and liberal institutions—is the United States' best single investment in a better peace.

Appendix 1: Variables in the Quantitative Analysis

Within the study, quantitative analysis variables result from the confluence of identified research questions and a review of the relevant literature. Throughout the study, the central conceptual dependent variable is the *International Relationship*, accounting for its existence and character. The first shortcoming inherent in the research is that no discrete dataset provides a comprehensive and theoretically relevant quantitative accounting of bi-lateral international relationships. Consequently, the variable's expression is a nominative description of the state pairing whose existence and character can only be evaluated fully through qualitative methods.

Walt's articulation of the theoretically-informed *ideological effect* present in international relationships provides the foundation for the two primary independent variables used. Specifically, Walt accounts for the influence of *liberalism* and *cultural similarity* in the context of ideological influence.¹³⁰ Unlike the dependent variable, the two independent variables do have discrete datasets that provide comprehensive and theoretically relevant quantitative data from which to draw for use in the research.

The quantitative data requirement levied by the three variables in the research, namely *international relationships*, *liberalism*, and *cultural similarity*, can be satisfied through engagement with two well-established and well-respected international relations datasets. The Polity V Project, curated by Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, is a comprehensive longitudinal index of states and the degree to which their governments reflect liberal or illiberal qualities.¹³¹ The GLOBE Study, organized by Robert House, is

¹³⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 40.

¹³¹ Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project."

one of the world's largest cross-cultural anthropological studies, exploring cultural preferences in values and practices.¹³²

The Polity V Project dataset meets the research's requirement for data regarding *international relationships* and *liberalism*. Specifically, it provides both a comprehensive list of currently-recognized nation-states and a theoretically relevant and robust annual measure of regime type for each of those nation-states in the form of a *Polity Score*.¹³³ *Polity Score* values' principal influence is the degree of liberal qualities identified within a given state's regime, making it particularly relevant to the *liberalism* variable.

The GLOBE Study dataset meets the majority of the research's requirement for data regarding *cultural similarity*. Specifically, it provides a theoretically relevant index of *Cultural Dimension* values for fifty-eight modern nation-states.¹³⁴ The GLOBE Study's Cultural Dimensions measure values and preferences across seven different categories, five of which correlate highly with regime type, with four of those demonstrating a statistically significant relationship to military effectiveness on the battlefield.¹³⁵ As each Cultural Dimension score represents a given society's cultural orientation within a particular category, a state's Cultural Dimension profile provides a means to compare and thereby assess relative *cultural similarity*.¹³⁶

¹³² House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*, 2.

¹³³ See Appendix 5: Polity Scores.

¹³⁴ It is important to note that the GLOBE study, as many other endeavors in the field of cultural anthropology, acknowledges states exist but preferences grouping people along socio-linguistic boundaries over geopolitical boundaries. As such, through the preponderance of records in the GLOBE study reflect the characteristics of a nation-state, some records subdivide state entities into disparate socio-linguistic groups. For example, records for Switzerland are divided into French-speaking Swiss and German-speaking Swiss; South Africa into black and white populations; Germany into pre-reunification East Germany and West Germany; and a record for Hong Kong as distinct from China. Consequently, the GLOBE Study of 62 Societies accounts for only accounts for 58 states in the international system.

¹³⁵ Eric S. Fowler, "Culture and Military Effectiveness: How Societal Traits Influence Battle Outcomes," PhD diss., Old Dominion University, Norfolk, 2016, accessed September 1, 2020, https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=gpis_etds.

¹³⁶ See Appendix 8: Cultural Dimension Scores.

The GLOBE Study provides a far more robust and granular measure of culture than does the Polity V Project; however, the GLOBE's *n*- of 58 states diminishes its applicability within this research to roughly one-third of the currently recognized states. Scholars commonly use measures of liberal or illiberal qualities within governments to reflect characteristics within the governed society. Consequently, the research uses *Polity Score* data as a proxy for national culture in assessments of *cultural similarity*, both as a companion operationalization of the variable and to offset the limited *n*- of the GLOBE Study.¹³⁷ Though neither dataset satisfies the research's overall requirement for *cultural similarity* data alone, both datasets are used to their fullest extent.

¹³⁷ Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 4 (2004): 526.

Appendix 2: Case Study Selection

Within the sequential mixed methods design of the research, the qualitative phase focuses on exploring and explaining results from the preceding quantitative phase in a more literal manner.¹³⁸ In light of the patterns and trends evidenced in the quantitative analysis, three cases exemplify the typical result/maximal variation principle.¹³⁹ The three case categories comprise positive international relationships marked by robust ideological similarity, negative international relationships marked by robust ideological difference, and positive international relationships existing despite robust ideological differences. The third, counter-intuitive category likely accounts for diplomatic approaches varying along the spectrum between principle and pragmatism.

The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom serves as the case typifying a positive international relationship marked by robust ideological similarity.¹⁴⁰ The relationship between China and the Czech Republic, or Czechia, serves as the case typifying a negative international relationship marked by robust ideological differences.¹⁴¹ The relationship between the United States and Qatar serves as the case typifying a positive international relationship existing despite robust ideological differences.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).

¹³⁹ Ken Black, *Business Statistics: Contemporary Decision Making 6th Edition* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

¹⁴⁰ 2. Barack Obama, "Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Theresa May of the United Kingdom and an Exchange With Reporters" (speech, Hangzhou, China, September 4, 2016), Administration of Barack Obama, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201600559/html/DCPD-201600559.htm>.

¹⁴¹ Xinhua, "Shanghai Terminates Sister-City Ties with Pragu," last modified January 15, 2020, accessed January 15, 2021, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/15/WS5e1e48a0a310128217271045.html>.

¹⁴² Kristin McHugh, "View from Qatar," *Common Ground*, aired October 29, 2002, on Stanley Center for Peace and Security. <https://stanleycenter.org/common-ground/week-of-october-29-2002/#2>.

Appendix 3: Qualitative Data Collection

The qualitative data required to support the explanation and exploration of phenomena measured in the quantitative chapter necessitates engagement with familiar and unfamiliar sources. Principle explanation of the meaning behind Polity Scores and Cultural Dimensions resides in companion information to both the Polity V and GLOBE datasets.¹⁴³ Deeper exploration, however, requires engagement with the larger contemporary discourse on bilateral international relations in scholarly and professional publications. A review of historical reports regarding specific bi-lateral international relationships since 1997 provides a body of evidence for assessing the relative level of diplomatic engagement predicated on liberalism and/or cultural similarity versus Walt's less-ideological factors of threat perception, foreign-aid dependence, and political penetration.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Though scholars continue to debate the relative speed and extent to which cultures may change over time, limiting review of historical reports to the 25-years following quantitative data collection limits this research program's exposure to major shifts in a given state's cultural norms; House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*, 155.

Appendix 4: Hypotheses and Data Operationalization

Though Walt's research program on alliance formation contained over thirty distinct hypotheses across multiple categories, the research's limited scale necessitates restricting the scope to just three hypotheses within the ideological effect category.¹⁴⁵

The core relevant hypotheses that carry over from Walt's research are:

H₁: States with liberal ideologies will maintain more resilient alliances than those with illiberal ideologies.

H₂: The greater the similarity in domestic ideologies held by the two states, the more likely the two are to form and maintain an alliance.

H₃: The greater the bi-polarity condition is in the international system, the more likely ideological effect will influence alliance formation decisions.

The core ideologically-focused hypotheses are appropriate to this study because they specifically address the challenges facing US decision-makers charged with deciding who, when, and how to invest in other nations.¹⁴⁶

Subsection 1: Data-Modified Hypotheses

Engaging empirical data often necessitates modifying existing hypotheses to reconcile the numerical logic from one study to another study's theoretical logic. Since the Polity V dataset represents a given state's degree of liberalism on a scale from +10 to -10 (i.e., from liberal democracy to illiberal authoritarianism), new hypotheses are needed.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, a new hypothesis is required to account for the meaning that

¹⁴⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 46.

¹⁴⁶ In the context of Walt's Cold War era study, the *who* represents potential partner nations, the *when* represents the period just prior to one nation's need partner assistance, and the *how* represents the leveraging of cultural incentives and disincentives to form and strengthen partnership.

¹⁴⁷ Marshall and Jaggers, "Polity V Project."

GLOBE Study data has within Walt's original theoretical logic. Although GLOBE measures of culture are far more complex than Polity Scores, spread across multiple dimensions and having meaning only in relative terms, their application in this study is simplified to a composite measure of relative sameness.¹⁴⁸ For the research, these new polity-informed and culture-informed hypotheses are:

H_{1a}: The higher the Polity Score of a state, the more desirable it is as an international ally or partner (anticipated increased resiliency).

H_{1b}: The higher the combined Polity Score achieved within a state pair, the more desirable is the international relationship (anticipated increased resiliency).

H_{2a}: The smaller the difference between Polity Scores within a state pair, the more desirable is the international relationship (reduced coordination cost).

H_{2b}: The smaller the overall difference between Cultural Dimension Scores within a state pair, the more desirable is the international relationship (reduced coordination cost).

Subsection 2: Context-Modified Hypotheses

In addition to the new hypotheses produced by combining existing theory and empirical data, applying the hypotheses within a specific context creates additional opportunities. Specifically, exploring the intersection of Walt's theoretical logic and data from the Polity V Project and GLOBE Study within a US-centric context of Great Power Competition allows for developing novel synthesized hypotheses. For the research, the new contextually informed hypotheses are:

H_{3a}: Given the choice between the United States and China, most states would

¹⁴⁸ House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*.

- prefer the US as an international ally or partner (anticipated increased resiliency vis-à-vis higher Polity Score).
- H_{3b}: Given the choice between the United States and Russia, most states would prefer the US as an international ally or partner (anticipated increased resiliency vis-à-vis higher Polity Score).
- H_{3c}: Given the choice between China and Russia, most states would prefer Russia as an international ally or partner (anticipated increased resiliency vis-à-vis higher Polity Score).
- H_{3d}: Given the choice between the United States and China, most states would prefer the US as an international ally or partner (reduced coordination cost vis-à-vis similar Cultural Dimension Scores).
- H_{3e}: Given the choice between the United States and Russia, most states would prefer the US as an international ally or partner (reduced coordination cost vis-à-vis similar Cultural Dimension Scores).
- H_{3f}: Given the choice between China and Russia, most states would prefer Russia as an international ally or partner (reduced coordination cost vis-à-vis similar Cultural Dimension Scores).
- H_{3g}: The greater the preponderance of states preferring the US as an international ally or partner, the less likely other Great Powers are to shift towards conflict from competition (reduced utility vis-à-vis higher opposition cost).
- H₄: The lower the ideological effect within an international relationship, the more likely diplomatic approaches will reflect pragmatism to achieve short-term gains over principle to achieve long-term goals.

Appendix 5: Polity Scores

Table 5: Polity Scores.

State Name	Score
Australia, Austria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay	+10
Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, France, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, South Africa	+9
Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Korea South, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Timor L'este, United Kingdom, United States	+8
Armenia, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia	+7
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Zambia	+6
Ecuador, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Suriname	+5
Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Russia , Ukraine, Zimbabwe	+4
Djibouti, Gabon, Tanzania	+3
Algeria, Fiji	+2
Ethiopia	+1
Libya, South Sudan, Yemen	0
Afghanistan, Burundi, Uganda	-1
Angola, Chad, Mauritania, Singapore, Togo	-2
Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Jordan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela	-3
Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan-North, Turkey	-4
Cuba	-5
Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan	-6
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China , Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Laos, Vietnam	-7
Oman, Turkmenistan, UAE	-8
Swaziland, Syria, Uzbekistan	-9
Bahrain, North Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia	-10
Maximum	+10
Minimum	-10
Average	+4
Range	20

Source: Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project."

Appendix 6: Combined Polity Scores

Table 6: Combined Polity Scores

State Name	Combined Polity Score with United States	Combined Polity Score with China	Combined Polity Score with Russia
Australia, Austria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay	+18	+3	+14
Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, France, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, South Africa	+17	+2	+13
Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Korea South, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Mexico, Myanmar', Philippines, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Timor L'este, United Kingdom, United States	+16	+1	+12
Armenia, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia	+15	0	+11
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Zambia	+14	-1	+10
Ecuador, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Suriname	+13	-2	+9
Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Russia , Ukraine, Zimbabwe	+12	-3	+8
Djibouti, Gabon, Tanzania	+11	-4	+7
Algeria, Fiji	+10	-5	+6
Ethiopia	+9	-6	+5
Libya, South Sudan, Yemen	+8	-7	+4
Afghanistan, Burundi, Uganda	+7	-8	+3
Angola, Chad, Mauritania, Singapore, Togo	+6	-9	+2

Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Jordan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela	+5	-10	+1
Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan-North, Turkey	+4	-11	0
Cuba	+3	-12	-1
Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan	+2	-13	-2
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China , Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Laos, Vietnam	+1	-14	-3
Oman, Turkmenistan, UAE	0	-15	-4
Swaziland, Syria, Uzbekistan	-1	-16	-5
Bahrain, North Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia	-2	-17	-6
Maximum	+18	+3	+14
Minimum	-2	-17	-6
Average	+12	-3	+8
Range	20	20	20

Source: Derived from Marshall and Jaggers, "Polity V Project."

Appendix 7: Polity Similarity Scores

Table 7: Polity Similarity Scores.

State Name	Polity Similarity to United States	Polity Similarity to China	Polity Similarity to Russia
Australia, Austria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay	+2	+17	+6
Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, France, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, South Africa	+1	+16	+5
Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Korea South, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, United Kingdom, United States	Equal	+15	+4
Armenia, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia	-1	+14	+3
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Zambia	-2	+13	+2
Ecuador, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Suriname	-3	+12	+1
Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Russia , Ukraine, Zimbabwe	-4	+11	Equal
Djibouti, Gabon, Tanzania	-5	+10	-1
Algeria, Fiji	-6	+9	-2
Ethiopia	-7	+8	-3
Libya, South Sudan, Yemen	-8	+7	-4
Afghanistan, Burundi, Uganda	-9	+6	-5
Angola, Chad, Mauritania, Singapore, Togo	-10	+5	-6
Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Jordan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela	-11	+4	-7

Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan-North, Turkey	-12	+3	-8
Cuba	-13	+2	-9
Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan	-14	+1	-10
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China , Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Laos, Vietnam	-15	Equal	-11
Oman, Turkmenistan, UAE	-16	-1	-12
Swaziland, Syria, Uzbekistan	-17	-2	-13
Bahrain, North Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia	-18	-3	-14
Maximum	+2	+17	+6
Minimum	-18	-3	-14
Average	-4	+11	0
Range	18	17	-14

Source: Derived from Marshall and Jaggers, "Polity V Project."

Appendix 8: Cultural Dimension Scores

Table 8: Select Cultural Dimension Scores.

State Name	In-Group Collectivism ¹	Future Orientation ²	Gender Egalitarianism ²	Power Distance ²	Uncertainty Avoidance ²
Albania	5.74	5.42	4.19	3.52	5.37
Argentina	5.51	5.78	4.98	2.33	4.66
Australia	4.17	5.15	5.02	2.78	3.98
Austria	4.85	5.11	4.83	2.44	3.66
Bolivia	5.47	5.63	4.75	3.41	4.70
Brazil	5.18	5.69	4.99	2.35	4.99
Canada	4.26	5.35	5.11	2.70	3.75
China	5.80	4.73	3.68	3.10	5.28
Colombia	5.73	5.68	5.00	2.04	4.98
Costa Rica	5.32	5.20	4.64	2.58	4.58
Czechia ³	3.18	2.95	3.78	4.35	3.64
Denmark	3.53	4.33	5.08	2.76	3.82
Ecuador	5.81	5.94	4.59	2.30	5.16
Egypt	5.64	5.80	3.18	3.24	5.36
El Salvador	5.35	5.98	4.66	2.68	5.32
United Kingdom	4.08	5.06	5.17	2.80	4.11
Finland	4.07	5.07	4.24	2.19	3.85
France	4.37	4.96	4.40	2.76	4.26
Georgia ³	6.19	5.55	3.73	2.84	5.24
Germany ⁴	4.52	5.23	4.90	2.69	3.94
Germany ⁵	4.02	4.85	4.89	2.54	3.32
Greece	5.27	5.19	4.89	2.39	5.09
Guatemala	5.63	5.91	4.53	2.35	4.88
Hong Kong	5.32	5.50	4.35	3.24	4.63
Hungary	5.25	5.70	4.63	2.49	4.66
India	5.92	5.60	4.51	2.64	4.73
Indonesia	5.68	5.70	3.89	2.69	5.23
Iran	6.03	5.84	3.75	2.80	5.36
Ireland	5.14	5.22	5.14	2.71	4.02
Israel	4.70	5.25	4.71	2.72	4.38
Italy	4.94	5.91	4.88	2.47	4.47
Japan	4.63	5.25	4.33	2.86	4.33
Kazakhstan ³	5.26	5.05	4.75	3.15	4.42
Kuwait	5.80	5.74	3.45	3.17	4.77
Malaysia	5.51	5.89	3.78	2.97	4.88

Mexico	5.71	5.86	4.73	2.85	5.26
Morocco	5.87	5.85	3.74	3.11	5.32
Namibia	4.52	6.12	4.25	2.86	5.13
Netherlands	3.70	5.07	4.99	2.45	3.24
New Zealand	3.67	5.54	4.23	3.53	4.10
Nigeria	5.55	6.04	4.24	2.69	5.60
Philippines	6.36	5.93	4.58	2.72	5.14
Poland	5.52	5.20	4.52	3.12	4.71
Portugal	5.51	5.43	5.13	2.38	4.43
Qatar	4.71	5.92	3.38	3.23	4.82
Russia³	5.63	5.48	4.18	2.62	5.07
Singapore	5.64	5.51	4.51	3.04	4.22
Slovenia ³	5.43	5.42	4.83	2.57	4.99
South Africa ⁶	5.09	5.20	4.26	3.65	4.79
South Africa ⁷	4.50	5.66	4.60	2.64	4.67
South Korea	5.54	5.69	4.22	2.55	4.67
Spain	5.45	5.63	4.82	2.26	4.76
Sweden	3.66	4.89	5.15	2.70	3.60
Switzerland ⁸	3.97	4.79	4.92	2.44	3.16
Switzerland ⁹	3.85	4.80	4.69	2.80	3.83
Taiwan	5.59	5.20	4.06	3.09	5.31
Thailand	5.70	6.20	4.16	2.86	5.61
Turkey	5.88	5.83	4.50	2.41	4.67
United States	4.25	5.31	5.06	2.85	4.00
Venezuela	5.53	5.79	4.82	2.29	5.26
Zambia	5.84	5.90	4.31	2.43	4.67
Zimbabwe	5.57	6.07	4.46	2.67	4.73
Maximum	6.36	6.20	5.17	4.35	5.61
Minimum	3.18	2.95	3.18	2.04	3.16
Average	5.10	5.44	4.50	2.77	4.61
Range	3.18	3.25	1.99	2.31	2.45

¹ Practice-Based Cultural Dimension Score

² Values-Based Cultural Dimension Score

³ Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)

⁴ West Germany / Former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

⁵ East Germany / Former German Democratic Republic (GDR)

⁶ Black population sub-set of South Africa

⁷ White population sub-set of South Africa

⁸ Swiss-German-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

⁹ French-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

Source: Derived from House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*

Appendix 9: Cultural Similarity Scores

Table 9: Cultural Similarity Scores.

State Name	Similarity to United States	Similarity to China	Similarity to Russia
Albania	4.50	1.78	1.37
Argentina	2.98	4.05	1.94
Australia	0.38	5.02	3.87
Austria	1.79	4.78	3.39
Bolivia	3.10	3.21	2.05
Brazil	2.86	3.94	1.83
Canada	0.49	5.53	3.82
China	5.06	---	2.11
Colombia	3.69	3.73	1.81
Costa Rica	2.46	3.15	1.58
Czechia ¹	6.59	7.39	8.53
Denmark	2.00	5.88	5.54
Ecuador	4.36	3.06	1.48
Egypt	5.51	1.95	2.24
El Salvador	3.66	3.16	1.57
United Kingdom	0.70	5.02	4.09
Finland	2.06	4.98	3.68
France	1.48	3.76	2.94
Georgia ¹	4.75	1.57	1.46
Germany ²	0.74	4.76	3.27
Germany ³	1.85	5.65	4.78
Greece	2.85	3.12	1.61
Guatemala	3.88	3.37	1.26
Hong Kong	2.98	2.73	1.57
Hungary	2.83	3.72	1.60
India	3.44	2.84	1.11
Indonesia	4.38	1.78	0.79
Iran	5.02	1.78	1.66
Ireland	1.23	4.28	2.85
Israel	1.38	3.93	2.47
Italy	2.31	4.70	2.59
Japan	1.51	3.55	2.34
Kazakhstan ¹	2.30	2.86	2.55
Kuwait	4.67	1.83	2.02
Malaysia	4.12	2.09	1.46

Mexico	3.59	2.56	1.43
Morocco	5.05	1.30	1.79
Namibia	3.02	3.64	2.13
Netherlands	2.03	6.44	5.15
New Zealand	2.41	5.12	3.96
Nigeria	4.60	2.85	1.30
Philippines	4.47	3.18	1.75
Poland	2.90	2.20	1.58
Portugal	2.34	4.02	2.00
Qatar	3.93	3.17	3.01
Russia¹	3.72	2.11	---
Singapore	2.53	2.92	1.65
Slovenia ¹	2.79	3.06	1.05
South Africa ⁴	3.34	2.82	2.21
South Africa ⁵	1.94	4.24	2.15
South Korea	3.47	2.94	0.83
Spain	3.10	3.76	1.65
Sweden	1.66	5.86	5.07
Switzerland ⁶	2.20	5.93	5.19
Switzerland ⁷	1.50	4.80	4.38
Taiwan	4.01	1.10	1.13
Thailand	4.86	2.63	1.60
Turkey	3.82	3.31	1.55
United States	---	5.06	3.72
Venezuela	3.81	3.31	1.58
Zambia	4.03	3.13	1.37
Zimbabwe	3.59	3.35	1.32
Overall	USA	PRC	RUS
<i>n</i> -	183	61	61
Maximum	8.53	6.59	7.39
Minimum	0.38	0.38	1.10
Average	3.05	3.09	3.60
Median	2.94	3.02	3.31
Overall Range	8.15	6.21	6.30

¹ Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)

² West Germany / Former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

³ East Germany / Former German Democratic Republic (GDR)

⁴ Black population sub-set of South Africa

⁵ White population sub-set of South Africa

⁶ Swiss-German-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

⁷ French-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

Source: Derived from Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project;" House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*.

Appendix 10: Great Power partner Preference – Combined Polity

Table 10: Great Power Partner Preference – Combined Polity.

State Name	United States versus China	United States versus Russia	China versus Russia	Overall Preference
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China , Colombia, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea North, Korea South, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar', Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia , Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan-North, Suriname, Sweden, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor L'este, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, Ukraine, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States , Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Preference – United States	163	163	---	163
Preference – China	---	---	---	---
Preference – Russia	---	---	163	---

Source: Derived from Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project."

Appendix 11: Great Power partner Preference – Cultural Similarity

Table 11: Great Power Partner Preference – Cultural Similarity.

State Name	United States versus China	United States versus Russ	China versus Russia	Overall Preference
Albania	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Argentina	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Australia	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Austria	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Bolivia	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Brazil	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Canada	USA	USA	RUS	USA
China	---	RUS	---	---
Colombia	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Costa Rica	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Czechia ¹	USA	USA	PRC	USA
Denmark	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Ecuador	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Egypt	PRC	RUS	PRC	PRC
El Salvador	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
United Kingdom	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Finland	USA	USA	RUS	USA
France	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Georgia ¹	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Germany ²	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Germany ³	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Greece	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Guatemala	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Hong Kong	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Hungary	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
India	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Indonesia	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Iran	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Ireland	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Israel	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Italy	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Japan	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Kazakhstan ¹	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Kuwait	PRC	RUS	PRC	PRC
Malaysia	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS

Mexico	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Morocco	PRC	RUS	PRC	PRC
Namibia	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Netherlands	USA	USA	RUS	USA
New Zealand	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Nigeria	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Philippines	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Poland	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Portugal	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Qatar	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Russia ¹	PRC	---	---	---
Singapore	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Slovenia ¹	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
South Africa ⁴	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
South Africa ⁵	USA	USA	RUS	USA
South Korea	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Spain	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Sweden	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Switzerland ⁶	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Switzerland ⁷	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Taiwan	PRC	RUS	PRC	PRC
Thailand	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Turkey	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
United States	---	---	RUS	---
Venezuela	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Zambia	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Zimbabwe	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Preference – United States	33	21	--	20
Preference – China	27	--	5	4
Preference – Russia	--	39	55	35
Tie	2	2	2	3

¹ Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)

² West Germany / Former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

³ East Germany / Former German Democratic Republic (GDR)

⁴ Black population sub-set of South Africa

⁵ White population sub-set of South Africa

⁶ Swiss-German-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

⁷ French-speaking population sub-set of Switzerland

Source: House et al., *Cultural Influences on Leadership and Organizations*.

Appendix 12: Great Power partner Preference – Polity Similarity

Table 12: Great Power Partner Preference – Polity Similarity.

State Name	United States versus China	United States versus Russia	China versus Russia	Overall Preference
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea South, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar ⁷ , Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Timor L'este, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States , Uruguay	USA	USA	RUS	USA
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Zambia	USA	Tie	RUS	Tie
Algeria, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Russia , Somalia, Suriname, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zimbabwe	USA	RUS	RUS	RUS
Afghanistan, Burundi, Libya, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen	PRC	RUS	RUS	RUS
Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China , Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea North, Kuwait, Laos, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan-North, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam	PRC	RUS	PRC	PRC
Preference – United States	118	86	---	86

Preference – China	46	---	40	40
Preference – Russia	---	66	124	25
Tie – US/Russia	---	12	---	12

Source: Derived from Marshall and Jagers, "Polity V Project."

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