Iraqi Army Will to Fight: A Will-to-Fight Case Study with Lessons for Western Security Force Assistance Synopsis

Abstract

In this report, Ben Connable applies RAND's analytic model of will to fight to the regular Iraqi Army, conducting three historical case studies: the 19801988 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 20042011 military advisory period. A main finding is that the Iraqi Army units tend to be brittle: They are capable of fighting effectively, but they are inflexible and break too easily. There is no single-factor explanation for this brittleness. Efforts to change it will need to focus on numerous underlying factors, and Connable provides specific recommendations for the U.S. security force assistance mission in Iraq.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2022
Accession Number
AD1156740

Entities

People

  • Ben Connable

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Brittleness
  • Case Studies
  • Collapse
  • Combat Effectiveness
  • Combat Forces
  • Education
  • Identities
  • Iran Iraq War
  • Iraqi-War
  • Leadership
  • Military Education
  • Military Training
  • Situational Awareness
  • Training
  • War
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Systems Analysis and Design