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## **Russia's Military Discusses the Definition of War**

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## Introduction

Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, in March 2017, noted about war that “In the Russian Federation Military Doctrine it [war] is called a form of the resolution of interstate or intra-state contradictions with the employment of military force.”<sup>1</sup> In the first half of 2017, however, a detailed study was underway in Russia to ascertain if contemporary technologies and conditions had caused war’s definition to change. Warfare is now so destructive (via precise targeting capabilities and increased yields) and transparent (via satellite imagery, sensors, listening devices, etc.) that force on force warfare between major nations possessing these capabilities appears less likely than during Cold War times, although it is not ruled out in areas like the Baltics.

In 2017 Russian military experts, from active and retired officers to candidates for doctoral dissertations, conducted a serious discussion of potential ways to reconsider “war” in line with these developments. The discussion appears to have started in 2016 when, for example, Russia’s General Staff Academy held a conference on the meaning of the term “warfare” under current conditions. A session of the Security Council of Russia the same year also considered the issue of war’s definition, analyzing the characteristics and trends in war’s emergence and evolution. These initial discussions apparently kicked off a far-ranging interchange among experts.

The experts did not agree on a new determination of war, as some analysts stated that military means alone have not totally disappeared, especially when major powers (Russia; the US) confront lesser powers (Ukraine; Iraq, respectively), while other experts elevated nonmilitary means of warfare to a new level of importance and even envisioned the potential for such means to capture territory or cause political change. Gerasimov planned to convene a forum in August 2017 to discuss the results of the interchanges. No report from that meeting has ever surfaced.

Due to the absence of a conclusive statement regarding war, this article has two parts. Part one covers two short discussions of war since the detailed 2017 discussion period. Included here are a description of war from a 2018 article in the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science*; and a description of war from Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov’s 2019 presentation before the Academy of Military Science that was published in the paper *Red Star*. These articles suggest that war’s definition has indeed expanded. Gerasimov’s presentation was particularly startling for its numerous references to the term “waging war.” Part Two covers in some detail the 2017 discussion among military analysts.

## The 2018 and 2019 Discussions

It is unknown if these two articles were the result of the 2017 discussions, but it is possible. The first article represents a summary of numerous nonmilitary aspects of the contemporary period, while the second article describes in no uncertain terms how to wage war in an updated, classical form.

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<sup>1</sup> Valery Gerasimov, "The World on the Brink of War. It Is Not Enough to Take Account of Today's Challenges. Future Challenges Need to Be Forecasted," *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online*, in Russian 15 Mar 2017 - 21 Mar 2017.

In mid-2018, two authors wrote on the topic “The Typology of Warfare: Foundations of Philosophical Analysis.” They defined war as armed struggle between states, different social groups (classes), or peoples (nations).<sup>2</sup> In the past, nuclear weapons reintroduced discussions of changes in war’s nature. Such weaponry changed the sense that war could actually be a continuation of politics by other means, since political goals could hardly be achieved if mankind would be destroyed. This led to a search for new forms and methods of conducting war.<sup>3</sup> Classical war has withdrawn to the background, but the presence of nuclear weapons has not ensured a state’s sovereignty and integrity. This is because, according to the authors, contemporary times are generating warfare types that earlier were just wild fantasies—cyber warfare, network-centric warfare, psychological warfare, and biological warfare. Information, economic, and terrorist warfare is becoming natural. Such new-type war, the authors note, can begin without notice or a declaration of war.<sup>4</sup>

Military coercion is changing, the authors believe, due to the involvement of large international organizations and even corporations. The latter are manipulating minds and making the consciousness of the individual and society an object of coercion as a way to help control the geopolitical situation. Conflicts are shifting to a “low intensity” phase, where electronic weapons are as dangerous as nuclear ones and their use is much cheaper.<sup>5</sup> New fronts of warfare are cultural, ethnic, religious, and so on. A clear boundary between war and peace is absent. States can “use the tactics of irregular formations” and “irregular formations can use existing advanced technologies.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, this article focused on war’s changing nature.

General Staff Chief Gerasimov’s article was focused on both military and nonmilitary issues. He often discussed “war” in his presentations over the years at the Academy of Military Science. For example, in a comparison of his seven speeches at the Academy, the words/phrases “forms and methods,” “nonmilitary,” “asymmetric,” “information,” “command and control,” and “war” were examined for their frequency of use. In each case from 2013-2019, the word used most often was “war,” except in 2014, when command and control was used more frequently.

Gerasimov used the term “war” 12 times in his 2018 presentation, with references to topics such as a state of war, future war, local war, declared, or undeclared war. There were also references to the definition of strategy, which Gerasimov had defined by noting that each war has a logic all its own.<sup>7</sup> His 2018 presentation was more notable for its focus on future war and for its use (three times) of the term “comprehensive destruction” of an enemy force.

In 2019 Gerasimov used the term “war” 27 times. Uses were in relation to 15 different topics, some used more than once, from preparing war, preventing war, or future war to the kinds, nature, state, or outcomes of war. However, the term “waging war” and “wage war” stood out, for

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<sup>2</sup> E. Yu. Shakirova and A. Yu. Cherepanov, “The Typology of Warfare: Foundations of Philosophical Analysis,” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 3 2018, pp. 16-17.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Harold Orenstein, “Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov’s 2018 Presentation to the General Staff Academy,” *Military Review*, January-February 2019, pp. 130-138.

they were used eight times (waging war was only used twice in all of his preceding presentations combined) as follows:

#### *Waging war*

- The principle of waging war is based on the coordinated use of military and nonmilitary measures, with the Armed Forces playing the deciding role.
- Therefore, a search for rational strategies of waging war against a varying enemy acquires priority importance for developing the theory and practice of military strategy.
- We need to clarify the essence and content of military strategy and the principles of preventing war, preparing for war, and waging war.
- But all the same, questions of preparing for and waging war, above all by the Armed Forces, comprise the main content of military strategy.

#### *Wage War*

- Military strategy as a science, ". . . the art of command and control," originated at the beginning of the last century and was developed based on research of the experience of wars. In a general form strategy represents ". . . a system of knowledge and actions to prevent, prepare for, and wage war."
- They [the West] are preparing to wage wars against a "high-tech enemy" using precision-guided munitions [PGM] from the air, sea, and space, with the active conduct of information warfare.
- Under these conditions our Armed Forces must be prepared to wage wars and armed conflicts of a new type using classic and asymmetric methods of operations.
- The development of strategy as a science must encompass two directions: the development of a system of knowledge about war and the improvement of practical activities to prevent, prepare for, and wage war.<sup>8</sup>

The overall topic of Gerasimov's 2019 presentation was vectors of strategy. Thus, the presentation should stand out for its focus on military and nonmilitary methods of implementing strategy and should be closely studied. Russia's response to US actions is the strategy of the active defense, he noted, which envisages a set of measures for the preemptive neutralization of threats to national security. The issue of preemption conjures thoughts once again of the importance of the IPW, where preparations are made in advance for the potential future application of wartime methods. Gerasimov added that the development of strategy as a science must encompass the development of a system of knowledge about war.<sup>9</sup> Thus, as late as March 2019, he still was insisting on more information about war's modern day characteristics, going so far as to request a "system of knowledge" about war.

### **The 2017 Debate on War**

The 2017 discussion that preceded the two articles above was long, broad, and deep. For example, warfare was under examination in a host of military journals, to include the *Vestnik*

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<sup>8</sup> Presentation of Valery Gerasimov, "Vectors for the Development of Military Strategy," *Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) Online*, 4 March 2019.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

*Akademii Voennykh Nauk (AVN or the Journal of the Academy of Military Science (AVN), Voennaya Mysl' (VM or Military Thought), Armeyskiy Sbornik (AS or Army Journal), and others. AVN's first issue of 2017 was particularly fruitful, offering eight warfare-related articles on topics such as war's interpretation and aspects, and its nature, essence, and strategies. The second AVN issue of 2017 contained four such articles, with the main one being the address of General Staff Chief Valeriy Gerasimov on the essence of modern wars at the Academy's annual conference.*

*Military Thought*, while containing fewer articles with “war” in the title, did publish four papers by May 2017, to include one by Colonel (retired) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov on war's nature and content. These two retired officers authored the 2013 new-generation warfare article that caused such a stir in the West and resulted in the assembly of entire teams to study their concept. Other *Military Thought* authors in early 2017 discussed preparations for war and the topic of coalition war, while *Army Journal's* July edition discussed war's levels of classification. While all of the articles mentioned are not covered here, those considered the most important are. The topic was under the microscope in a number of venues.

There are many defining points in these 2017 articles to consider. Here are a few:

- Gerasimov, when discussing hybrid war in March, noted that “In the Western media the combination of such methods has received the name ‘hybrid warfare.’ However, **it is still premature to use this term as an established one.**”<sup>10</sup>
- General of the Army Makmut A. Gareyev and retired Major-General Nikolay I. Turko stated that Russia has the right “to **declare a state of war not only if it is necessary to fulfill international treaties, but also as the result of an assessment of the scale and degree of threats**” to its national security (with respect to the economy, to ideology, or the information sphere).<sup>11</sup>
- More colorfully, Aleksandr A. Bartosh stated, by analogy, that “a **color revolution**, similar to a poisonous mushroom, can grow in soil well manured by those who wage **hybrid wars.**”<sup>12</sup>
- Aleksandr I. Kalistratov listed **nine ways for Russia to counter the hybrid war** activities of the West.<sup>13</sup>
- Valeriy Kiselev noted that “**behavior wars**” involve manipulating behavior algorithms, habits, activity stereotypes, and so on that have been installed in us by our social groups, biographies, and cultural environment.<sup>14</sup>
- Chekinov and Bogdanov continued to stress that military means were still the most prominent way to conduct war, noting in 2017 that “the main specificity of war **remains acts of violence.**” However, they also described the change

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<sup>10</sup> V. V. Gerasimov, “Modern Wars and Real Questions in Regard to the Country's Defense,” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 2 2017, p. 11.

<sup>11</sup> M. A. Gareyev and N. I. Turko, “War: a Contemporary Interpretation of its Theory and Practical Realities,” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2),” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 58.

<sup>13</sup> A. Kalistratov, “War and Modern Times: Modern Wars: Let's Explore the Classification,” *Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal)*, No. 7 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, “For What Kinds of Conflict Should the Armed Forces of Russia Prepare?” *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought)*, No. 3 2017, p. 37.

from the era of human societies to the era of super societies and its designed and managed wars, “a **new-type of war**.”<sup>15</sup>

This article will examine the views of these authors and others about war’s emerging trends and definitions. The discussion begins with a look at *AVN*’s articles, starting with Gerasimov’s and the tasks he imposed on the Academy of Military Science. A summary of the main points of several other journal articles follows.

Three clear lines of thought emerge: that nonmilitary issues and nontraditional methods have risen in importance and must be considered in conjunction with military ones when warfare is contemplated; that war’s essence, in spite of nonmilitary issues, remains armed conflict; and that hybrid war continues to be refuted by several authors as a Russian method of fighting, stating instead that hybrid war is a Western way of war that Russia must confront. Instead Russian theorists are focusing on new-type war.<sup>16</sup> Other popular topics that are discussed include asymmetric, indirect, and information warfare strategies.

### **Articles in the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science (AMS)***

#### *Chief of the General Staff General Valeriy Vasil’evich Gerasimov*

General of the Army Valeriy Vasil’evich Gerasimov is the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He is a member of the Russian Federation’s Security Council and a Hero of the Russian Federation. There is much to learn from his 2017 presentation at the Academy of Military Science, which is devoted to developing **trends** in the application of military force, both military and nonmilitary. Gerasimov noted that the Russian Federation’s 2014 Military Doctrine defined war as a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts by using military force. This definition is under analysis, based on as his comments in this presentation.

One of the primary issues he addresses is activities that do not fall under the definition of aggression. He states that “In the Western media the combination of such methods has received the name ‘hybrid warfare.’ However, it is still premature to use this term as an established one.”<sup>17</sup> This has been a consistent theme of Russian military officers over the past several years, that it is the West that is using hybrid wars, not Russia. President Vladimir Putin recently supported Gerasimov’s point. He stated in an interview in May 2017 with the *Le Figaro* newspaper that there is no need “to think up mythical Russia threats, hybrid wars, and so on. These are your [the West’s] own fancy, and then you scare yourselves, and based on that formulate a policy prospect.”<sup>18</sup>

Gerasimov stated that conflicts now feature changes in the **ratio** of various types of struggle (military, economic, etc.) to the overall political success of a war. The cost of armaments plays a role in the choice of **methods** for military action. New **forms** for applying force have

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<sup>15</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content of War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought)*, No. 1 2017, p. 43.

<sup>16</sup> See the articles by Gerasimov, Derbin, Dolgoplov, Kalistratov, Chekinov/Bogdanov, Semenov, and Kiselev.

<sup>17</sup> V. V. Gerasimov, “Modern Wars and Real Questions in Regard to the Country’s Defense,” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 2 2017, p. 11. In accordance with the five aspects of Russian military thought (trends, forecasts, correlation of forces, forms, and methods) these terms are in **bold** print where used by Gerasimov, along with the concept of new-type war.

<sup>18</sup> Russian *Interfax* News Agency (in English), 30 May 2017.

appeared, such as the digital mass media and social networks, while information dominance remains an “indispensable pre-requisite of combat actions.”<sup>19</sup>

Gerasimov noted that the analysis to date indicates that boundaries between the state of war and peace are being erased. For example, in Syria the USA and NATO used hybrid methods of fighting, which were described as the simultaneous use of traditional and non-traditional actions of military and nonmilitary assets. Hybrid actions use slogans designed to defend democracy or insert democratic values into a country without violence. The protest potential of the population is the “implementer” of these methods, using nonmilitary forms and means with unprecedented technological capabilities that can trigger the collapse of a state’s vital functions, such as in the energy, banking, economic, information, or other spheres.<sup>20</sup> However, this hasn’t changed Gerasimov’s views on war’s overall nature, as he added “the essence of wars in modernity and in the foreseeable future will remain the same. Their main feature is the presence of an armed struggle.”<sup>21</sup> Here he means violent military actions.

In August of 2017 a roundtable was held at the “Army-2017” forum, where the topic “Contemporary Warfare and Armed Conflict: Characteristics and Features” was discussed. This appeared to signal that there would be some form of closure on the topic of war and its evolving nature.<sup>22</sup> No summary of that forum has been produced to date.

**Forecasting** future threats remains an important instrument of military thought, as it is a way of strategically calculating what capabilities are required to contain emerging threats and dangers. Fulfilling these requirements also helps restore the nation’s confidence in the Armed Forces.<sup>23</sup> The Syrian experience required, Gerasimov notes, practices that always couldn’t rely on military science. Many operations were resolved on the spot, indicating Russia has “shown skill in waging a **new-type war**, organizing coalitions, and working with partners”<sup>24</sup> and demonstrating that Russia could carry out operations in a remote theater.

Gerasimov closed his speech by offering what he considered to be military science’s priority tasks in the coming months. First is the necessity of studying new **forms** of confrontation and effective **methods** for countering them. Second is determining measures to counter “hybrid” wars aimed at Russia. Third, it is necessary to study the features of contemporary military conflicts and develop effective **forms and methods** of operating under various conditions. Finally, organizing forces on remote theaters of military operations (Arctic?) requires separate research.<sup>25</sup>

*General of the Army Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev and General (retired) Nikolay Ivanovich Turko*

General of the Army Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev is the President of the Academy of Military Science and Major-General Nikolai Ivanovich Turko (retired) is one of his closest coworkers and a Doctor of Military Science. Gareyev is purportedly the officer who developed the

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<sup>19</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 11.

<sup>21</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 11.

<sup>23</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 12.

<sup>25</sup> Gerasimov, “Modern Wars...,” p. 13.

concept known as the operational maneuver group, according to Russian officials. He fought in the World War II battle for Kursk and he also participated in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Turko taught a series of courses at the General Staff Academy in Russia where he was a professor. He wrote often on information-related topics.

These authors noted that war, as a rule, is an armed clash of various states or a coalition of states with the aim of resolving antagonistic conflicts rising between them.<sup>26</sup> But the main feature of contemporary war's first phase no longer is an armed clash. Rather it is the active employment of "harsh" nonmilitary means in combination with "soft" nontraditional means (first and foremost, information), where the goal is to redistribute the roles and functions of countries instead of the destruction of the enemy. The political process is raised to a second (higher) phase of war when military means are employed.<sup>27</sup> Thus these authors see two phases to war, one nonmilitary and one described as the use of military operations.

In phase one, the mass employment of cybernetic and radio-electronic resources aims to disorganize the entire economic and financial system of opposing countries. The potential moral and psychological subversion of some countries from within, as happened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other countries, can occur due to the use of information technologies.<sup>28</sup> Some scholars believe war is already underway in peacetime.<sup>29</sup>

Contemporary conditions have changed the manner in which war is unleashed, although Russia's laws still indicate that war begins with the commencement of military operations. For example, Article 18 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense," adopted on 3 July 2016, states the following according to the authors:

A state of war is declared by federal law in case of an armed attack against the Russian Federation by another state or group of states, as well as in case of the necessity of fulfilling the Russian Federation's international agreements. Wartime begins at the moment of the declaration of a state of war or at the actual commencement of military operations, and expires at the moment of the declaration of the cessation of military operations, but no sooner than their actual cessation.<sup>30</sup>

Gareyev and Turko then call for changes to the law, noting that Russia has the right "to declare a state of war not only if it is necessary to fulfill international treaties, but also as the result of an assessment of the scale and degree of threats" to its national security (with respect to the economy, to ideology, or the information sphere). They added as justification that NATO's 1949 concept allowed for the participation of armed NATO formations beyond its territories in case of an interruption in the flow of vitally important resources.

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<sup>26</sup> M. A. Gareyev and N. I. Turko, "War: a Contemporary Interpretation of its Theory and Practical Realities," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Gareyev and Turko, "War: a Contemporary...", p. 5.

<sup>28</sup> Gareyev and Turko, "War: a Contemporary...", p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Gareyev and Turko, "War: a Contemporary...", p. 7.

<sup>30</sup> *Federal'nyi zakon "Ob oborone" (s izmeneniami na 3 iuliia 2016 g.) (redaktsiia, deistvuiushchaia s 1 ianvaria 2017 g.)*. [www.docs.cntd.ru](http://www.docs.cntd.ru).

The complexity of the contemporary international situation serves as a basis for increasing the country's readiness to repel clearly hostile acts by military and nonmilitary means. In regions where there are antiterrorist operations, a "military situation" or an "emergency situation" may be introduced. Presently there is no defense if an opponent employs cybernetic, information, psychological, or other effects against Russia's population. The appropriate retaliatory actions should be coordinated at the government level, with each country able to declare a state of war proceeding from its own national interests.<sup>31</sup> The task for the scientific community is to grasp the essence of warfare.<sup>32</sup>

*Alexander Vladimirovich Dolgopolov*

Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Dolgopolov is a graduate of the Higher Military Aviation Electronic School in Kharkov. He served as a navigator-operator on long range aircraft and chief of staff of an air regiment. In 2010 he became the deputy chief of the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the General Staff.<sup>33</sup> It is not known if he is still in that position.

He wrote that there exist unanswered questions with respect to the nature and essence of war, which requires clarification on contemporary war's definition due to the new means and methods for its conduct.<sup>34</sup> Such clarification was also the case in the past. A. Snesev and Alexander Svechin, two renowned Russian and Soviet military theorists at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, made significant contributions to the development of the "science of war." In their research they noted that war as a phenomenon "is the consequence of not only political, but also economic and social relationships."<sup>35</sup> Thus they understood that war was not just a military function. Svechin in particular noted in his two-volume work, *Strategy in Classic Military Works*, that "war is conducted not only on an armed front, but also on class and economic fronts."<sup>36</sup> Snesev, in his 1926 review of Svechin's *Strategy*, noted that war can be waged not only by the sword, but also by other means such as agitation, crushing of the enemy's economy, or the reconstitution of one's own forces.<sup>37</sup>

Dolgopolov singled out four basic directions that are influencing the formation of a new approach to warfare. First is the appearance of new actors (persona, subjects). He states that "To some degree war is a continuation of politics not only of a state, but also of civilized formations (non-existent or quasi-states)."<sup>38</sup> An example of this would be the so-called "Islamic State," which essentially is not a state. A second direction is the development of new military-theoretical concepts, such as partisan warfare, terrorist, or asymmetric warfare, where one of the subjects of war is not a state but could even be a nongovernmental organization. In the past, if the essence of

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<sup>31</sup> Gareyev and Turko, "War: a Contemporary...", p. 9.

<sup>32</sup> Gareyev and Turko, "War: a Contemporary...", p. 10.

<sup>33</sup> A. V. Dolgopolov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of Warfare Forms and Methods in a Network Centric Environment," *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought)*, No. 2 2011, p. 49.

<sup>34</sup> A. V. Dolgopolov, "A Contemporary Understanding of the Essence and Content of War," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, pp. 41-42.

<sup>35</sup> Dolgopolov, "A Contemporary...", p. 42.

<sup>36</sup> A. Svechin (ed.), *Strategiia v trudakh voennykh klassikov* [Strategy in classic military works], Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1926, as cited in Dolgopolov, "A Contemporary...", p. 42.

<sup>37</sup> Dolgopolov, "A Contemporary...", p. 45.

<sup>38</sup> Dolgopolov, "A Contemporary...", p. 44.

war's goals was based on expanding one's living space and consolidating economic power, today's priority appears to be ensuring political influence and domination in all regions of the world.<sup>39</sup>

A third direction determining the essence of modern war is the rapid development of high technologies. They are revolutionizing the means of military force and changing how to conduct war, such as via noncontact confrontations. Finally, the fourth direction is the appearance of new spheres and corresponding methods of confrontation, which are undoubtedly conditioned by the mass introduction of information and communication technologies into theory and practice. No less important is the wide dissemination of other types of confrontation (economic, information, political, etc.) within the framework of war.<sup>40</sup> The latter includes the alteration/breakdown of the consciousness of the opposing side, also known as *консциентальная война*. Its goal is to shift the orientation of a person's values and is not conducted with the employment of military force, but rather actions in the information domain. Thus, changes in war's essence are being conditioned by both the substantive broadening of the means (especially nonmilitary) of confrontation and by changes in the order and sequence of employing military and nonmilitary means during war.<sup>41</sup>

The culminating stage of war to Dolgoplov, as with Gerasimov, remains the employment of the means of armed struggle. The armed forces' employment is the obligatory condition for defining "war."<sup>42</sup> As a result there are now two views on war to consider, while the truth may be found somewhere in the middle:

One (the classical, traditional) view consists of the fact that the principal subject of military science, together with issues of the development of the armed forces, their technical equipping, military economy, and military training and education, is armed struggle. The other (expanded) point of view sees as the subject of military science warfare both as a whole and on the same level as armed struggle; it proposes other types of struggle (information, diplomatic, economic, cybernetic, etc.) as a subject for research.<sup>43</sup>

In contemporary military conflicts, indirect and asymmetric methods of operation are being employed more and more. This circumstance conditions the necessity of studying the capabilities of various types of confrontation in the interests of safeguarding military security and waging war.<sup>44</sup> Dolgoplov added that these ideas have been confirmed, for the most part, essentially being the content of the concept of the "new type" war (hybrid war: Dolgoplov's insert), which has appeared in military conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Syria.<sup>45</sup> Here he appears to be highlighting US methods.

*Evgeniy Anatol'evich Derbin*

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<sup>39</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", p. 44.

<sup>40</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", pp. 44-45.

<sup>41</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", p. 45.

<sup>42</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", p. 46.

<sup>43</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", p. 47.

<sup>44</sup> Dolgoplov, "A Contemporary...", p. 47.

<sup>45</sup> Here Dolgoplov appears to be referring to the article of Colonel-General Andrey Kartapolov in the *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 2 2015, pp. 26-36.

Evgeniy Anatol'evich Derbin is a Major-General in the reserves and a professor on the information security cadre at the Russian Government Linguistic University. He stated that his article was an attempt to understand the possibilities and ways of getting out of a situation of conceptual stagnation about the concept of war. He noted that interpretations of international legal standards about war are obsolete, since they associate war with the entry into a certain state of relations between states, and pair this with a public "declaration." Further, war is paired with the employment of a specific type of resources for pressuring the enemy, as determined by the technological wave of innovation—traditionally, means of physical destruction. He adds that at present, "when resolving conflicts among states this ceases to be a required condition for the achievement of a goal, inasmuch as the capabilities of means of destruction have now moved beyond the boundaries of the destruction of the physical capabilities of the living force."<sup>46</sup>

States, classes, and individuals are seeking unchallenged control over resources in order to dominate in spheres of interest using human, economic, military, and even legal resources. Derbin lays blame on the West for this circumstance, stating that its traditions correspond to intolerant attitudes toward the existence of "evil," insisting that it must be destroyed due to its existence. Eastern traditions, on the other hand, confront evil and take into account the interests and values of the other side (or evil). This indicates to Derbin that Russia cannot have allies, partners, or friends in the form of states or representatives of Western civilization.<sup>47</sup>

Derbin adds that technological advances in political, economic, and military capabilities allow for aggressors to dispense with methods of armed struggle from the past.<sup>48</sup> He also offered a variant of, in his words, a "new-type" of warfare in which he discussed various stages of a conflict in a table/figure under the title "Variant for Assessing the Development of the Military-Political Situation and Conflict Resolution by Implementing Forms and Methods of Hostile Actions."<sup>49</sup> This diagram is attached at Appendix One and most likely represents how Derbin views a hostile power's (the United States) use of force in Syria.

#### *Aleksandr Georgievich Semenov*

Aleksandr Georgievich Semenov is a candidate of technical sciences and a senior scientific official. He discussed the nature and content of war from, as he noted, an evolutionary point of view. However, his article focused on what he termed the West's desire to impose on all countries "its matrix of governance, consumerism, and socio-economic hierarchy leveraging a wide arrangement of achievements in economics, science and technology, and other areas."<sup>50</sup> He states on two occasions that globalization is the new-type of war being waged by the West against the world, and he added later that the West's goal is to create a unipolar world between 2020 and 2040.<sup>51</sup> He lists numerous tools that characterize this type war. They are: peaceful civilians; mass media; countries' leadership; management capabilities; psychological, informational, and communication resources; socially oriented forms and methods of work with the masses; cyber-

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<sup>46</sup> A. V. Derbin, "Methodological Aspects of an Analysis of the Essence of Contemporary War," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 11-12.

<sup>47</sup> A. V. Derbin, "Methodological Aspects...", pp. 13-14.

<sup>48</sup> A. V. Derbin, "Methodological Aspects...", p. 15.

<sup>49</sup> A. V. Derbin, "Methodological Aspects...", p. 17.

<sup>50</sup> A. D. Semenov, "War: Its Essence and Content from an Evolutionary Point of View," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 31.

<sup>51</sup> A. D. Semenov, "War: Its Essence and Content...", pp. 31-32, 34.

technologies; precision weapons; terror; money; bribery; blackmail; threats; sanctions; lies; setups; and so on.<sup>52</sup> He summed up his Western diatribe in the following manner:

Globalization is the reason for the destruction of countries and for profound changes in the mental and moral makeup of people all over the world. Peace on the planet can be maintained based on an alternative belief system different from that of the West... While in those times [medieval and prehistoric] there were no moral, ethical, and humanitarian rules of war, today these rules are violated and used as leverage to accuse the opposing side of violations. This type of practice is characteristic of a number of Western countries, terrorists, organizations, and their sponsors.<sup>53</sup>

*Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bartosh (2016)*

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bartosh is the director of the Information Center for Questions of International Security at Moscow's Government Linguistic University. His article focused on information warfare issues and offered suggestions on how to apply them against the West's proclivity, in Bartosh's opinion, to use information technologies (IT) to develop and succeed in the use of color revolutions and hybrid war. This article was published in 2016. It is used here because Bartosh published a second, follow-on article with the same title in 2017.

Subversive IT methods, in his opinion, have led to increasingly chaotic international relations due to today's competitive environment. This environment has fostered new types of conflicts combining traditional military power with political, IT, financial, and other components.<sup>54</sup> These developments are centered on the activities of the United States, who inspired, he believes, the coup d'état in Ukraine. Indirect strategies are on the rise as well, with the West setting up color revolutions and hybrid wars that introduce controlled chaos with military power no longer the only player.<sup>55</sup> Now nations are manipulating perceptions and falsifying historical facts through the use of IT. Information war uses IT and the mass media to achieve geopolitical goals. It is also used in warfare in order to gain unilateral advantages in collecting, processing, and using information on the battlefield.<sup>56</sup>

Bartosh underlined the purpose of his article when he stated that it focusses on information-war strategies pertaining to subversive information-psychological operations against a country. The U.S. and NATO, he believes, support the consistent execution of subversive cyber operations as part of their information war strategies. These strategies, when viewed as a key military-political tool, are characterized by deliberate and planned measures that affect the awareness of all social groups to distort perceptions and disorganize any countermeasures against aggression. Color revolutions are used against a relatively small range of targets, while hybrid war's scale can reach an entire population of a country over a long period of time. In summary, Bartosh adds, "one of

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<sup>52</sup> A. D. Semenov, "War: Its Essence and Content...", p. 33.

<sup>53</sup> A. D. Semenov, "War: Its Essence and Content...", p. 34.

<sup>54</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One)," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 2 2016, p. 85.

<sup>55</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One)," p. 86.

<sup>56</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One)," p. 87.

the principal targets of information war is public and individual awareness and the subconscious, especially that of the youth, elites, and military service members.”<sup>57</sup>

Two definitions of information war were provided in the article. The first was that of information warfare specialist Igor N. Panarin, who stated that

Information war is a multifaceted strike, i.e., a combination of IT operations against the adversary’s government and military control system and the military-political leadership, which even in peacetime would produce favorable decisions for the initiating side, and during conflict would completely paralyze the adversary’s control infrastructure.<sup>58</sup>

Bartosh felt that Panarin’s definition was balanced in regard to its human and technical aspects.

The second definition, by A. M. Sokolova, defined information war as an IT and media realm standoff. It is designed to achieve political goals:

Information war is a combination of measures to achieve superiority over the adversary by affecting its IT systems, processes, and networks, as well as the public and individual, including military service members, awareness and subconscious while at the same time protecting one’s own IT environment.<sup>59</sup>

Bartosh summarized this section by noting that today’s political realities call for an extended use of IT and communication technologies in conflicts with the involvement of intelligence agencies. Information war is now an assault on the information space of an opposing side to achieve strategic goals. Here the focus is on undermining cognitive aspects of activities in a victim country, where belief systems are destroyed and fake economic and moral assumptions implanted. Color revolutions and hybrid wars are examples, he notes, of “multifaceted conflicts characterized by the purposeful and adaptive use of military force, economic strangulation, and subversive IT operations.”<sup>60</sup> Adaptability is the key characteristic for any information war strategy, defined as “the ability to provide an adequate response to a changing environment or to request from lower level systems,” a process of adjusting capabilities and their use to fit a changing environment.<sup>61</sup>

Adaptive management uses a managed chaos strategy based on adjusting the purpose of IT operations for changing external or internal circumstances to reach a goal with the required effectiveness. The use of several types of adaptive strategies can be part of a unified plan for waging information war.<sup>62</sup> The strategies of obliteration and exhaustion are discussed in Bartosh’s 2017 article, which is next.

*Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bartosh (2017)*

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<sup>57</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 88.

<sup>58</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 88.

<sup>59</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 88.

<sup>60</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 89.

<sup>61</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 89.

<sup>62</sup> A. A. Bartosh, “Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part One),” p. 90.

This article focused on the use of information warfare and technology activities that are designed to cause regime change through, in author A. A. Bartosh's words, either obliteration or exhaustion strategies in conjunction with color revolutions and hybrid war. Clearly the target of these strategies is, in Bartosh's opinion, Russia. He states, for example, that "we can conclude that the hybrid war against Russia has been waged for an extended period of time, with information technology warfare being its most important component."<sup>63</sup> Further he adds that adversaries using hybrid war tactics combine indirect measures with a threat of military aggression against Russia, forcing the country into more military expenditures.<sup>64</sup>

Bartosh notes that color revolutions and hybrid wars are conflicts that combine traditional military power with other components (political, financial, etc.). These latter components are enhanced by indirect strategies designed to drill conflicting information into the minds of the people and the ruling elite that utilize the following components:

- A discussion of internal corruption;
- A list of perceived internal grievances, such as differences in income levels, the inadequacy of the elite group, lack of upward-mobility, and health care, education, judiciary, social security, ethnic, and inter-religious problems;
- A list of perceived external issues, such as instability and discontent fueled by foreign and national media;
- The introduction of distorted historical and ideological ideas, falsely interpreted values and interests, and emotional appeals and slogans based on national identity.<sup>65</sup>

[Author: this summation sounds like what the Russians are doing to the West. Obliteration is paired with color revolutions and exhaustion is paired with hybrid below]

The use of these tactics qualifies, in Bartosh's opinion, as a strategy of obliteration due to the quick pace and implementation of conflicting information, which can be enhanced through information-psychological technology activities.

For color revolutions, this would mean the dynamic overthrow of government and the resulting regime change. To expedite the process, at some point an event is staged (e.g., provoke law enforcement into using unnecessary force, highlighting unjust judicial decisions, etc.) and the "manipulated masses make their uncompromising demands upon authorities." There is no planned defeat of the armed forces in this scenario.<sup>66</sup> The initial stage of the strategy of obliteration involves the painstaking collection of information, and can take a very long time. This is followed by a powerful head-on strike over a short period of time (just a few weeks in some cases) to achieve some significant political outcome.

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<sup>63</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 58.

<sup>64</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 59.

<sup>65</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," pp. 56-57.

<sup>66</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 56.

If the obliteration strategy does not work, then an aggressor will shift to a hybrid strategy focused on exhausting the target nation through the use of a wide range of measures, especially cyber strikes designed to inflict an indirect exhaustion effect. By weakening one's resources, an aggressor state causes psychological instability capable of disrupting the unity and integrity of the target state. Bartosh notes that "an important role under this strategy is given to ruining traditional moral values and reformatting cultural life and belief systems."<sup>67</sup> Exhaustion strategies apply sanctions, break up the ruling elite, undermine the economy, and diminish the will of the population, with the objective being to force the target country into exorbitant military expenditures.<sup>68</sup>

Bartosh adds that once a critical decision point is reached about instituting a coup d'état, the situation transitions back to a strategy of obliteration by initiating a color revolution.<sup>69</sup> As previously noted, he uses the analogy that a color revolution, similar to a poisonous mushroom, can grow in soil well manured by those who wage hybrid wars.<sup>70</sup> Thus he implies that a color revolution can occur either on its own or as a follow-on to hybrid war actions. Exhaustion and obliteration strategies are a destructive tandem (moving from obliteration to exhaustion and back to obliteration) that target critical elements of today's world and create chaos in target countries.<sup>71</sup>

One conclusion Bartosh reaches is that information warfare capabilities that target large segments of Russia's population make it an urgent task to develop information-psychological warfare countermeasures and methods of controlling and defending cyberspace. "The effectiveness of today's Russian strategy of countering information warfare," he notes, "to a large extent depends on a clear awareness and cognizance of our national values and interests as well as scientific justification of their hierarchy and prioritization."<sup>72</sup> National values must be promoted (especially culture and belief systems), a sense of historic memory and self-identity restored, a "soft" force developed to counteract subversive strategies of information warfare, and a model designed for delivering preventive information-psychological technology counter-strikes.<sup>73</sup>

#### *Nikolay Nikolaevich Bolotov*

Nikolay Nikolaevich Bolotov is a doctor of military science and colleague at the scientific research laboratory for information security at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. His article examined war in the information sphere.

Bolotov writes that war is understood as the totality of armed struggles with violent actions as its principal and decisive means. Other means of pressure, such as nonmilitary actions, work only with large military forces in reserve, which forces the weaker side to subordinate itself to the will of the other side.<sup>74</sup> However, one sphere of struggle or war that is found in both military and nonmilitary operations is confrontations in the information sphere.

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<sup>67</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 57.

<sup>68</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 58.

<sup>69</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 57-58.

<sup>70</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 58.

<sup>71</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 58.

<sup>72</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," p. 59.

<sup>73</sup> A. A. Bartosh, "Adaptive Strategies of Information Warfare (Part 2)," pp. 60-61.

<sup>74</sup> N. N. Bolotov, "The Essence and Content of the Concept of 'War in the Information Sphere,'" *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2017, p. 23.

Information warfare is understood to be operations undertaken to achieve information superiority via effects on an enemy's information and information systems, while protecting one's own systems. The importance of information has elevated it to the form of an independent type of weaponry. An information weapon is a means for destroying, distorting, or stealing large amounts of information, and extracting from it the necessary information after penetrating its security system. Such weapons can be secretly employed, cause irrecoverable damage without violating another nation's borders or sovereignty, employ both military and civilian cyber forces, and involve minor losses and high effects. Such weapons are basically invisible, nonlethal, selective, and scalable.<sup>75</sup> Their goal is to achieve information superiority, defined as attaining and maintaining a favorable situation in the information sphere for the resolution of operational tasks of force groupings. It is characterized by the superior functioning and stability of one's information structures over those of a potential opponent. Bolotov notes that only after achieving information superiority can other tasks (air, land, sea, and space) be resolved. Information-related tasks include obtaining intelligence, gaining unsanctioned access to an opponent's information resources, disseminating disinformation, suppressing elements of an opponent's information infrastructure, and destroying or disrupting information systems.<sup>76</sup>

Before conflict erupts, an information situation is developed that is favorable to the operations of one's own forces. Once military operations commence, all restrictions, including those concerned with observing norms and laws, are removed. Electronic strikes and the use of high-tech weapon strikes against important targets of an enemy's information infrastructure are delivered and information operations forces and means are brought into action. The following statement was then made:

Recently, technologies acquired a new development regarding the rendering of information-psychological pressure on the mass consciousness, with the aim of manipulating public opinion. This has been confirmed by the experience of military actions in Syria, where the US and its allies, enemies of the legal President of Syria Bashar Assad, who is waging an irreconcilable war against ISIS, unleashed a large-scale war against him in the information sphere, with the goal of toppling the legal government.<sup>77</sup>

Bolotov accused the West of disseminating specially prepared disinformation to influence public opinion; and accused Western news resources of regularly spreading lies and half-truths. Western methodology involves having foreign officials cite nongovernmental sources that convey Russian participation in some event. Then Western mass media spins the attack, contending that Russia's actions are crude and ineffective. Information is streamed through fabricated information packages. The side affected is unable to conduct their own information clarification work, since they must concentrate their efforts on verifying these packages and preparing rebuttals.<sup>78</sup> [Author: from a Western point of view, this method tracks precisely with what Russian propaganda and their legion of trolls attempt to accomplish with disinformation efforts aimed at the West.]

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<sup>75</sup> N. N. Bolotov, "The Essence and Content...", p. 23.

<sup>76</sup> N. N. Bolotov, "The Essence and Content...", p. 25.

<sup>77</sup> N. N. Bolotov, "The Essence and Content...", pp. 26-27.

<sup>78</sup> N. N. Bolotov, "The Essence and Content...", p. 27.

Bolotov concluded his article with two interesting thoughts. First, he stated that information sphere operations resolve tasks that are comparable in scale and importance with tasks that are resolved using fire resources, thus appearing to equate information operations with war-type activities. Second, he noted that information operations “in the future need to be viewed as a promising independent type of combat operation, through which decisive results can be achieved.”<sup>79</sup>

### **Articles in the Journal *Military Thought***

*Sergey Gennad’evich Chekinov and Sergey Alekseevich Bogdanov*

Sergey Gennad’evich Chekinov (at last known reference point) is the Chief of the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Professor. He is a Colonel in the reserves. Lieutenant General (reserves) Sergey Alekseevich Bogdanov is a Doctor of Military Science and Professor, and is one of the main scientific colleagues at the Center for Military Strategic Research of the General Staff.

These authors believe that it is premature to change the concept of war, even if today it is characterized not only by force alone but also by other, non-violent means to solve international relations issues.<sup>80</sup> Many factors (politics, aims, the projected scale of military operations, and economic, morale, and the psychological potentials of opposing states) affect war’s content. They note that:

The growing role of other forms of struggle (economic, ideological, psychological, informational, and others), in our opinion, does not change the nature of future wars; armed struggle remains the crucial factor but will be used actively with all other kinds of confrontation...this has impacted not only and not so much on the ‘physical realm’ of the subjects of war (the individual, the army, the state) as much as in the sphere of the spiritual, psychological, mental.<sup>81</sup>

The authors then describe various types of wars. Traditional war occurs when objectives are achieved by forceful actions where unconventional ways merely complement armed forces’ activities.<sup>82</sup> However, Chekinov and Bogdanov add that traditional war’s purpose “lies not in the destruction of an increasing number of military forces of the enemy” but rather in creating conditions “where their use is ineffective,” leading to an enemy’s total defeat.<sup>83</sup> Contactless war, as the term implies, is another type of war where military, economic, moral, and psychological capabilities of the state allow for the ability to strike a host of different targets. However, it is doubtful that future wars will be contactless in the authors’ opinions.<sup>84</sup>

An information war is a third type, whose nature and content is to weaponize information, computers, and communications technologies to suppress an enemy or to disorganize its

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<sup>79</sup> N. N. Bolotov, “The Essence and Content...,” p. 28.

<sup>80</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content of War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought)*, No. 1 2017, p. 30.

<sup>81</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content...,” p. 32.

<sup>82</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content...,” p. 33.

<sup>83</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content...,” p. 35.

<sup>84</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content...,” pp. 36-37.

management and introduce chaos. Another goal of information war is to demoralize enemy personnel and the wider population. In the information sphere man's consciousness is also a target of attack.<sup>85</sup> Network-centric warfare is a type of war described as warfare based on nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos and is characterized by rapid control and self-synchronization. However rapid command and control is not the goal here, the authors state, but rather the timely use of strengths and advantages.<sup>86</sup>

Hybrid warfare is, in Chekinov and Bogdanov's opinion, becoming the main way to ensure the realization of national interests. They are thought of as a kind of military action and confrontation that allows for the use of indirect actions. Its essence lies in the conduct of hostilities by regular military units and detachments of non-state actors. NATO generals feel this type of warfare offers them a distinct advantage, they add.<sup>87</sup>

Chekinov and Bogdanov also discuss what they term as the Cold War or a new-type of war that is progressing with the process of globalization. The management of a new-type of war is not just for world domination by the West but for controlling processes for its advantage. New-type war uses non-military means such as political pressure, information sabotage, security service work, cunning diplomacy, and speculation on humanitarian issues. It ensures that processes are designed and managed<sup>88</sup> and that the violent "westernization" of other peoples of the world is a main goal of the weapon. New-type war involves not only conquest but the re-division of the world. There exists a state of permanent war of this new-type where distinctions between military and peaceful means disappear. It splits conquered countries into warring parts, creating a "fifth column" for themselves. It is not a war that one perceives but is presented as propaganda to the masses as people try to avoid war. They then make two claims that are at the very least simply bizarre, that "Russia will remain the enemy of the West" and that the West will calm down "only when our country and our people have been relegated to a state worthy of ridicule and contempt."<sup>89</sup>

Finally, the authors briefly discuss environmental wars against humanity, which are those designed for the ownership of vital resources (fertile lands, forests, freshwater sources, mineral resources, oil, etc.) with little compassion for the environmental effects on the population. There will be consumers of natural resources and donor countries.<sup>90</sup>

In conclusion, Chekinov and Bogdanov state that, despite the claims of some for revisions of the essence and content of war, the application of armed force is the main criterion for distinguishing war as a special period of confrontation.<sup>91</sup> Any war has shown that some military and non-military forms of struggle were used. However, the main specificity of war remains acts of violence. The content of change has been in the transition from the era of human societies to the era of super societies and toward designed and managed wars, a new-type of war.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", pp. 37-38.

<sup>86</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 38.

<sup>87</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 39.

<sup>88</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 40.

<sup>89</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 41.

<sup>90</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 42.

<sup>91</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 42.

<sup>92</sup> S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Evolution of the Essence and Content...", p. 43.

*Valeriy Aleksandrovich Kiselev*

Valeriy Aleksandrovich Kiselev is a retired Colonel and professor at the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He writes that two lines of thought have emerged in regard to how warfare is conducted. First, modern wars are designed to destroy a country's military and its economic infrastructure without the use of ground troops, just aerospace weapons. Second, after infrastructure is destroyed, wars can be conducted to seize territory by eventually relying on ground forces to obtain the war's objectives.<sup>93</sup> In both examples, the use of precision weaponry begins the active phase of conflict after being preceded by diplomatic, economic, and financial moves. There is a third type of warfare, however, and it is one that relies on illegal armed formations or private military companies. In all cases Kiselev refers to conflicts in which the US military has been involved.<sup>94</sup>

Illegal armed formations are actually, in Kiselev's opinion, a major element of so-called hybrid warfare. These formations include combat wings of extremist religious organizations, such as Salafism and Wahhabism. Such organizations are joined by two new spheres of combat actions, namely outer space and information. This means that combat will be very different from the past. Kiselev adds that "The presence or absence of assets, methods, and forms of information warfare can significantly affect the outcome not only of a single operation, but also of the entire military action."<sup>95</sup> He adds that for technologically advanced countries, cyberspace can be viewed as an operational environment for combat actions. The latter can be conducted in the form of individual computer network operations or actions can be combined with electronic warfare, psychological operations, and fire damage actions to destroy adversary assets. Such threats can take the form of criminal terrorist organizations, individual hackers, or cyber communities or even the secret services of some states.<sup>96</sup>

Kiselev believes that in future wars, information confrontation will play a prominent role in the form of a set of measures aimed at exerting influence on the will, emotions, behavior, psychology, and morale of the adversary. Information confrontation implies attacks not only on information but also on information networks, especially those conducting decision-making. Information confrontation's main forms and methods will include psychological operations, ensuring data security, fooling adversaries, electronic warfare, computer network operations, and the physical destruction of adversary assets and targets, among other issues. Information and cyberwar are expected to merge and provide feed-forward and feed-back between psychic changes such as psywars and neurowars. The kinds of warfare he envisions [Author: it was hard to decipher whether he was discussing US or Russian methods] will include technological and information confrontations, behavioral warfare, and internal-policy subversive acts.<sup>97</sup> Behavioral wars drew special attention, as Kiselev described them as a new warfare type, which are the weapons of tomorrow:

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<sup>93</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict Should the Armed Forces of Russia Prepare?" *Voennaya Mysl'* (*Military Thought*), No. 3 2017, p. 37.

<sup>94</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 38.

<sup>95</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 40.

<sup>96</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 40.

<sup>97</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 41.

At the core of those is manipulating behavior algorithms, habits, activity stereotypes, etc. that have been installed in us by our social group, and also by our biographies and cultural environment. In short, the instruments for behavioral warfare work by separating the habit from the previously formed type of activity, the situation that has formed the latter, and using behavior patterns to achieve other objectives.<sup>98</sup>

Kiselev then goes on to state that network centrism has turned into cognitive centrism, which requires more military scientific thought on the issue. He added:

Talking of cognitive centrism, one should first of all understand what we should teach the troops and especially commanders. And only on the basis of advanced ideas about the nature and content of future warfare can we discover the trends in military thought, the forms and methods of combat actions, and then work out and create a relevant material base for combat operational training with all that in mind.<sup>99</sup>

Future war must envision how long-range hypersonic guided missiles (such as Russia's Yu-71 Glider) will work with reconnaissance and strike systems and electronic warfare systems to both uncover adversary plans and targets and then to take them out with the correct mixture of exposure, control, and destruction means. The reconnaissance and strike systems must be developed in conjunction with precision-guided weapons and not separately.<sup>100</sup>

Finally, Kiselev notes that the ratio between weapons and specialized hardware will continue to increase versus the number of servicemen needed. Technology will continue to determine tactics.<sup>101</sup> Hardware and weapons are not the only factors to consider, he adds, since the value of asymmetric actions to eliminate adversarial advantages continues to rise in importance. Asymmetric actions include keeping preparations for combat actions secret, uncovering adversary weaknesses, focusing on vulnerable places (facilities) of adversaries, and imposing one's own version of conflict on the adversary (one's will). However, imbuing officers and servicemen with high morale remains the most important condition for success in future war. In closing, Kiselev noted that the theory of a new-type war must be elaborated, and it is "vital to develop the theory of asymmetric and indirect actions in conditions when the adversary acts with coalition" groupings where they maintain numerical and technological superiority.<sup>102</sup>

## **Two Articles on the Classification of War**

Two articles in 2017 covered the same topic, the classification of war. The first was published in *Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal)* by Alexander Ivanovich Kalistratov, and the other, by Olge Mikhaylovich Gorshechnikov, Aleksandr Ivanovich Malyshev and Yuriy Fedorovich Pivovarov, was published in *AVN*. The two are compared here for analysis purposes.

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<sup>98</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 42.

<sup>99</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 43.

<sup>100</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 43-44.

<sup>102</sup> Valeriy A. Kiselev, "For What Kinds of Conflict...", p. 46.

*Armeysky Sbornik (Army Journal)*

Alexander Ivanovich Kalistratov

Retired Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Kalistratov served as a Professor in the Operational Art Department of the Combined-Arms Academy of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces. He is well known in military circles for his work on the history of military art. His work on these and other issues is often prominently positioned in the journal *Military Thought*.

Kalistratov wrote an interesting article on various ways to think about classifying war in 2017. However, his focus was clearly on defining and discussing hybrid war, as he did not dwell much on war's classifications as originally stated. He described hybrid war as a mixed type of war, combining strategies of indirect actions and crushing opponents. He wrote that 70-80 percent of these types of wars use indirect strategies and 20-30 percent use armed violence.<sup>103</sup> The principal method of using them is forcing a crisis using a "fifth column" to create divisions within a state system and thereby deepen the crisis. An armed opposition will then use direct or indirect means to bring a political force to power. He states that the term comes from the United States.<sup>104</sup>

Hybrid wars became especially effective with the powerful development of the mass media and communication technologies, he noted. They enable the opposition to influence human consciousness and the subconscious of masses of people to carry out disobedience and sabotage.<sup>105</sup> Kalistratov identified three forms of hybrid war as follows: when the "fifth column" has for a long time been "preparing the ground" for external aggression conducted under the guise of humanitarian goals and limited employment of military force; when the armed forces of the aggressor destroy a state's infrastructure in a short time, and the "fifth column" sets up the unobstructed takeover of the country's territory and subsequent control of the country; and when the armed forces of the aggressor and the "fifth column" act in sync and successively in the accomplishment of each strategic task. Here, armed force on the part of the aggressor achieves the maximum success under the guise of an "innocent" ideological cover.<sup>106</sup>

The most characteristic features of contemporary "hybrid" warfare were described as follows:

- A change in the correlation of combat and noncombat activities of the opposing sides in favor of the noncombat aspects;
- The establishment of control over the system of the state's administration of the country, affecting it by means of "agents of influence" among the ruling elite of the given country and its force structures;
- The creation, within the framework of a state system of the victim country, of a special organizational mechanism of "external control," making it possible to establish indirect and covert control over the processes of the vital activities of the side that is subject to aggression;

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<sup>103</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times: Modern Wars: Let's Explore the Classification," *Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal)*, No. 7 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>104</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times....," p. 10.

<sup>105</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times....," p. 11.

<sup>106</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times....," p. 12.

- A long preparatory period associated with the reorientation or destruction of the traditional values of the victim nation, changing them to the psychological attitudes and myths of the active side;
- The undermining of the spiritual and moral foundations of the people, with the subsequent destruction of the basic principles of the nation's existence;
- The formation of the perception by the mass consciousness of the people that the external aggression is a civilized transformation of a backward society to a different one, one that has a higher degree of development;
- The absence of a precise hierarchy and regularity of interaction with the elements of the destructive forces of the victim country in the network structure of the active side;
- The employment of the most effective weapons against critically important targets of the state and against its armed forces, with the strict observation of the restriction on mass employment of contemporary means of destruction;
- The conduct of wide-scale armed struggle under an ideological cover. As a rule, this is supposedly a struggle for human rights, for the establishment of democracy in a foreign country, for the freedom of entrepreneurship, against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, for the defense of ecology, etc.;
- The "voluntary" transfer of a country's strategically important resources or sections of its territory to a geopolitical enemy under the aegis of a step on the path of the development of society.<sup>107</sup>

Of special interest is that in his article Kalistratov used the new-type warfare methodology of Russian Western Military District Commander Colonel-General Andrey Kartapolov to describe hybrid war in 2015, thereby equating the two in his version, and the percentages he used above for indirect and direct strategies also appeared first in Kartapolov's article.<sup>108</sup> He also used General Staff Chief Valeriy Gerasimov's definition of "war" from the latter's address at the Academy of Military Science in March 2017, in which Gerasimov noted that it was too early to classify war as hybrid.<sup>109</sup> Kalistratov asked "How, then, does one oppose the strategies of such hybrid wars? For this, it is necessary to do the following:"

- Maintain the stability of state and social institutions and the public consciousness against any attempts on the part of external and internal forces to distort and transform the country's socio-political system;
- Oppose any attempts to destroy sovereignty by means of the employment of various information technologies. It is important to effectively disseminate in real time true information about the state of affairs in the country;
- Learn to impose one's own rules of the game and advocate a proper interpretation of events in the global information field;

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<sup>107</sup> Kalistratov. References he noted with this footnote were those of Manoylo, A.V., "Color Revolutions in the Context of Hybrid Wars," *Pravo i Politika (Truth and Politics)*, No 10, 2015, pp. 1400-1405; Polovenko, O., and Groznyy, O., "Hybrid War: Myth or Reality?" *Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)*, 2 February 2015. Polovenko, and R. N. Pukhov, "The myth about 'hybrid war,'" *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (Independent Military Review)*, 29 May 2015.

<sup>108</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times....," pp. 12-13.

<sup>109</sup> A. Kalistratov, "War and Modern Times....," p. 5.

- Maintain at the necessary level the index of the population’s public optimism and the stability of personnel in the state apparatus and force structures on the basis of the formation of a national idea and national ideology, and of success in the field of protecting the country’s sovereignty and national interests;
- Organize effective external and internal intelligence activities;
- Take timely and decisive measures to isolate leaders of a destructive opposition, to close mass media organs that are supporting such opposition, and to block financial influxes from abroad;
- Introduce martial law in a timely fashion and rigorously implement wartime laws;
- Decisively suppress mass disorder and cases of the manifestation of anarchy, sabotage, and disobedience; and
- Maintain the combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces at a level that guarantees the substantial damaging of any potential enemy in case of aggression.”<sup>110</sup>

This list could also apply to how the US should counter Russian influence operations.

***Journal of the Academy of Military Science***

*Oleg Mikhaylovich Gorshechnikov, Aleksandr Ivanovich Malyshev, and Yuriy Fedorovich Pivovarov*

Oleg Mikhaylovich Gorshechnikov is Chief of the Scientific Research Section of Military History at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Aleksandr Ivanovich Malyshev and Yuriy Fedorovich Pivovarov are senior colleagues at the same location.

These authors were clearly anti-Western in their presentation. They noted that radical forces have appeared, where the West has tried to force democracy, create opposition forces, seize power, murder or remove political leaders, dissolve force structure and cause socio-economic instability. They begin by noting that a discussion of the typology of contemporary wars and armed conflicts is due to the fact that conflicts are no longer a simple socio-political phenomenon. Armed struggle today, in their opinion, is the result of a so-called paradox of chaos, where strong armies yield the field of battle to weaker and more poorly organized enemy forces.<sup>111</sup>

A Western method, hybrid operations, is used, they believe, to impose democracy on some regions of the world. They are described as something that arose at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century when traditional and nontraditional ways of fighting were combined. Their chaotic employment can even overcome well prepared force, since they utilize a different space-time model where economic and other forms of struggle begin long before the employment of the means of armed struggle.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> A. Kalistratov, “War and Modern Times....,” pp. 14-15.

<sup>111</sup> O. M. Gorshechnikov, A. I. Malyshev, and Iu. F. Pivovarov, “Problems of the Typology of Contemporary Wars and Armed Conflicts,” *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No 1. 2017, p. 48.

<sup>112</sup> O. M. Gorshechnikov, A. I. Malyshev, and Iu. F. Pivovarov, “Problems of the Typology....” p. 52.

Gorshechnikov, Malyshev, and Pivovarov write that, for Russia, military conflict is defined as a form of resolving conflicts with the employment of military force. It encompasses all types of confrontation. The authors see three characteristics of modern military conflicts, with each depending on the goals of the sides: are they aggressive (a threat to peace, an act of aggression to illegal acquire power and/or resources); liberating (defense against aggression, either individual or collective); or peacekeeping (struggle for peace through the employment of armed forces as a third side in the conflict). Armed struggle remains the principal form of confrontation.<sup>113</sup> The authors define war as a socio-political crisis phenomenon that is a special form of resolving conflicts between states, during which the opposing sides, in addition to the forms of struggle during peacetime, shift to armed struggle and a state of action that differs from peace.<sup>114</sup>

Of primary interest in the article was a diagram of how the authors classified modern armed conflicts. The three characteristics of conflict have been mentioned (aggressive, liberating, and peacekeeping). Other attributes, with specific sub elements, were listed as well (see Appendix Two for the actual schematic from the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science*):

- **With respect to military-political goals:** military conflict; war (large scale, regional, and local); and armed conflict (international and domestic)
- **With respect to methods of unleashing conflict:** surprise attack; gradual involvement; after strategic deployment; and covert operations.
- **With respect to subjects:** military intervention; civil war; ethnic conflicts; military expansion; and military coup.
- **With respect to medium of conduct:** aerospace, ground, naval, and information.
- **With respect to participants:** coalition, states, and private persons.
- **With respect to the principles of employment of forces:** classical operations; asymmetric operations; network-centric operations; and hybrid operations.
- **With respect to the dynamism of the sides:** maneuver operations; positional operations; retaliatory operations; preemptive operations; and blockade operations.
- **With respect to duration:** blitzkrieg (up to several days); fast-moving (up to several months); protracted (up to several years); and long (more than ten years).
- **With respect to forms:** strategic operations and actions; operations and combat operations; joint special operations and actions; operations to force peace on the aggressor; peacekeeping operations and actions; and counterterrorist operations and actions.
- **With respect to types:** offensive (counteroffensive) operations; defensive operations; armed struggle to reestablish constitutional order; armed struggle against terrorism; and armed struggle against separatism, extremism, and nationalism.

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<sup>113</sup> O. M. Gorshechnikov, A. I. Malyshev, and Iu. F. Pivovarov, "Problems of the Typology..." pp. 52-53.

<sup>114</sup> O. M. Gorshechnikov, A. I. Malyshev, and Iu. F. Pivovarov, "Problems of the Typology..." p. 54.

- **With respect to methods of pressure on the enemy:** simultaneous operations; successive operations; taking a region (territory) under control; isolation of a region of military (combat) operations; and sabotage and partisan operations.
- **With respect to the resources employed:** with the employment of nuclear weapons, WMD, or weapons based on new physical principles; and the use of conventional weapons or information-psychological resources.<sup>115</sup>

## Conclusions

The extensive Russian military discussion of war above appears to contain two parts upon analysis. First, it describes trends in the world and how those trends and developments are changing war's characteristics and how it is understood and viewed. While many Russians still consider war to be the actual use of military conflict, there is a growing comprehension of a number of nonmilitary issues that have become so powerful that they may be capable of causing territorial or political change. Second, the discussion often refers to the West attacking Russia in the nonmilitary sphere of activity. Westerners reading Russia's discussion believe the attacks are actually what Russia is doing against them. That is, each side sees things differently. Russia states that it is "the attacked," "the manipulated," or "the victim" of these issues and its leadership sees conspiracies everywhere. The West, however, tends to find Russian charges against the West reflecting exactly what Russia is doing against them, especially attacking and manipulating the West via the media, use of trolls, or use of digits. Russian activities during the 2016 US elections are evidence that these charges against Russia are not farfetched.

The discussion indicated that the study of war in Russia covers, but is not limited to, the following topics: the methods and concepts to fight nonmilitary activities; features of nonmilitary actions; new actors (private armies, illegal groups, etc.) and technologies; war declaration issues; information-technology enhanced exhaustion and obliteration strategies; and the necessity in Russia to develop strong values and nationalist thought to counter information-psychological strikes and the West's hybrid warfare activities. One author noted that information operations can even be considered as an independent type of combat operation where decisive results can be obtained.

After 2017, the discussion of war slowed, probably indicating that specific decisions were made in regard to its definition. Only about four articles a year addressing war were found in publications such as the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* and *Military Thought* in 2018. Most address war in relation to either hybrid operations of the West or the West's information-psychological actions aimed at Russia. Soon it is expected that Russia will publish a new military doctrine. In that document, the West may find conclusive evidence as to whether, after the extended discussions of 2017, the definition of war has or has not changed. In the meantime, analysts will be wise to become familiar with all of the variants proposed by specialists, as a combination of them may eventually evolve from military decision-makers.

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<sup>115</sup> O. M. Gorshechnikov, A. I. Malyshev, and Iu. F. Pivovarov, "Problems of the Typology..." p. 53.

## Appendix One

Outline of the “Development of the Military-Political Situation and Conflict Resolution by Implementing Forms and Methods of Hostile Actions” in which Syria is mentioned. See Russian version below, followed by the English translation, annotated with numbers.

		6	12	18	24
		<b>ПОДГОТОВИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ЭТАП</b>	<b>ПЕРВЫЙ ЭТАП</b> (на стадии подготовки выдвинуть на мировое общественное мнение до начала реализации на меж-континентальном уровне)	<b>ВТОРОЙ ЭТАП</b> (начало реализации) (была бы реализована международная политика безопасности)	<b>ТРЕТИЙ ЭТАП</b> (применение решений на международном уровне)
1	ЗАДАЧА	7	13	19	25
2	ВРЕМЯ	7	13	19	25
3	Октябрь-ноябрь 2013 г.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Создание поводов для эскалации конфликта на территории САР</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Выделение и саботирование мирового общественного мнения относительно целей и содержания действий руководства САР по защите государственного суверенитета</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Боевые и специальные действия вооруженной оппозиции против правительственных войск САР, Проведение политических требований</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Сигналы политического руководства САР. Обеспечение полного контроля над событиями и процессами на территории международного рынка</li> </ul>
4	Декабрь-январь	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>формирование 8</li> <li>заключительных организационных сил, выступающих против экономической и социальной политики правительства САР</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>определение претензий со стороны руководства Суданской Арабийской Инициативы (САИ) на проведение вассала против интересов арабского мира</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>общественные выступления и привлечение средств и Дамаска</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>подготовка и проведение международных конференций (Женева, Манчестер-2) и привлечение глобальной сети БЛА</li> </ul>
5	Февраль-апрель 2014 г.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>осуществление выдвинутых из решения, принятого руководством САР и международной сфере деятельности, и мировое общественное мнение на других сферах борьбы</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>формирование образа нарастающей военной угрозы со стороны САР</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>размещение боевых группировок оппозиции и вооруженных протестов на севере САР</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>эскалация боевых действий и провокационные призывы к санкциям против руководства САР</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>осуществление работы рыночных механизмов внешнего сектора международной</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>организация протестов вступившей либеральной и авторитаристских группировки</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>эскалация боевых действий и провокационные призывы к санкциям против руководства САР</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>проведение ударов со стороны Иран и др. союзных государств на военные объекты Сирии</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>осуществление работы рыночных механизмов внешнего сектора международной</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>создание образа угрозы масштабного применения химического оружия</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>инициативы спонсировать деятельность администрации США и ЕС на войну в Сирии и международной группировки войск НАТО</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>осуществление в СМИ фактов массовых жертв от применения вооружения</li> </ul>

Рис. 7. Вариант оценки развития военно-политической обстановки и разрешения противоречий путем реализации форм и способов враждебных действий

1. Missions
2. Time
3. October-November 2013
4. December-January
5. February-March 2014
- 6. Preparatory stage: This is the first column in the Russian version.**
7. Creation of reasons for escalation of violence on Syrian territory
8. Formation of radical opposition, internal political forces coming out against the Syrian government's economic and social policies
9. Pressure against decisions by the Syrian leadership in the economic sphere of activity and world public opinion in other spheres of struggle
10. Complication in the operation of the market mechanisms for the export of energy resources
11. Prevention of the sovereign Syrian government from implementing its economic policies
- 12. First stage: Second column**
13. Deception of world public opinion with respect to the goals and substance of the Syrian leadership's actions to protect the sovereignty of the state
14. Claims presented by Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Qatar about the conduct of policies against the interests of the Arab world
15. Formation of a model of a growing military threat from Syria
16. Organization of protest addresses by liberal and antigovernment groups
17. Creation of a threat model of the Syrian Armed Forces' large-scale employment of chemical weapons
- 18. Second stage: Third column**
19. Combat and special operations by the armed opposition against Syrian government forces. Presentation of political demands
20. Public addresses and employment of weapons in Damascus
21. Deployment of opposition combat groupings and capture of population centers in northern Syria
22. Escalation of combat operations and use of poisonous substances by opposition bands
23. Commencement of statements by representatives of the US and EU on introducing NATO force groupings into Syria
- 24. Third stage: Fourth column**
25. Change of Syria's political leadership. Guarantee of complete control over extraction and sale of mineral energy resources
26. Preparation and conduct of international conferences (Geneva, Geneva-2), with a declaration of demands to replace Assad
27. Propaganda in the world mass media and through the Internet about political programs for the reconstruction of Syria
28. Delivery of strikes by Israel and other contiguous states against Syrian military targets
29. Presentation of facts in the mass media about violence by government forces against the opposition.





## Basis of Domestic [RF] Classification of Contemporary Military Conflicts

1. Aggressive (threat to peace, violation of peace, act of aggression)
2. Liberation (individual and/or collective defense against aggression)
3. Peacekeeping (struggle for peace on the basis of a mandate from the UN Security Council, OSCE, CTSO)
4. As a third side in a conflict
5. With respect to military-political goals
6. Military conflict
7. War
8. Armed conflict
9. Large scale; regional; local
10. International; internal
11. With respect to method of unleashing
12. With respect to subjects
13. Surprise attack
14. Gradual involvement in conflict
15. After strategic deployment
16. Covert operations
17. Military intervention
18. Civil war
19. Ethnic conflicts
20. Military expansion
21. Military coup
22. With respect to medium of conduct
23. With respect to participants
24. Aerospace
25. Ground
26. Naval
27. Information
28. Coalition
29. States
30. Private persons
31. With respect to principle of employment of forces
32. Dependent on dynamism of the sides
33. With respect to duration
34. With respect to forms
35. With respect to types
36. With respect to method of pressure on the enemy
37. With respect to the resources employed
38. Classical operations
39. Asymmetric operations
40. Network-centric operations
41. Hybrid operations

42. Maneuver operations
43. Positional operations
44. Retaliatory (retaliatory-meeting) operations
45. Preemptive (preventative) operations
46. Blockade operations
47. Blitzkrieg (up to several days)
48. Fast-moving (up to several months)
49. Protracted (up to several years)
50. Long (more than ten years)
51. Strategic operations and actions
52. Operations and combat operations
53. Joint special operations and actions
54. Operations to force peace on the aggressor
55. Peacekeeping operations and actions
56. Counterterrorist (antiterrorist) operations and actions
57. Offensive (counteroffensive) operations
58. Defensive operations
59. Armed struggle to reestablish constitutional order
60. Armed struggle against terrorism
61. Armed struggle against separatism, extremism, and nationalism
62. Simultaneous operations
63. Successive operations
64. Taking a region (territory) under control
65. Isolation of a region of military (combat) operations
66. Sabotage and partisan operations
67. With the employment of nuclear weapons
68. With the employment of WMD
69. With the use of conventional weapons
70. With the employment of weapons based on new physical principles
71. With the use of information and psychological resources