Sorry we're late, eh? Paradigms for Canadian mobilization.
Abstract
The fundamental tensions for the Canadian Army are to retain forces of sufficient mass and capability to be effective in operations, to deploy and sustain these at intercontinental distances, and to have these forces ready in time to effect change. This tension is described in modern readiness theories and exemplified in the Canadian experience in the Korean War. Based on flawed assumptions after the Second World War, Canada was embarrassingly unready for conflict and deployed forces to Korea only after pressure from allies and two spectacular operational reversals on the peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the doctrine for mobilization retains some of the same flawed assumptions. This study examines Canada's preparation for the Korean War, compared against Cold War readiness theories, current doctrine, and futures studies to make recommendations for updates to Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine for Mobilization from an Army perspective. The conclusions recommend parameters for a complementary Force Generating Concept study. Ultimately, this study is relevant for any national army which can imagine a need to be ready for a future expansion.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 18, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1157257
Entities
People
- Todor Dossev
Organizations
- United States Army