

PROPANAL: AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY U.S. PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS
AND ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

BRYAN TERRAZAS, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY
MIA, Columbia University, New York, NY, 2020
B.S., University of California Davis, Davis, CA, 2009

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2021

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-06-2021		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2020 – JUN 2021	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Propanal: An Overview of Early U.S. Propaganda Analysis and Its Role in Contemporary U.S. Army Doctrine				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Bryan Terrazas				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Contemporary foreign propaganda poses an increasing risk, from peer, near-peer, and lesser adversaries alike. Despite this, the current role and purpose of propaganda analysis within Army doctrine is unclear and underdeveloped. In order to better understand its purpose, this thesis uses a qualitative method to examine the origin and evolution of propaganda analysis until its entry into U.S. Army Psychological Warfare doctrine in 1955. As propaganda analysis was often integrated into psychological warfare and intelligence activities, this thesis further examines the division of psychological warfare and intelligence organizations at the end of the War. It examines how many of these organizations conducted propaganda analysis, their relationships with one another, and how the activity was approached. As a result, this study determines that since the Army's doctrinal adoption of propaganda analysis as a distinct activity, the Army has conducted this analysis in a manner that ill-represents its historical legacy and is thus deserving of updates to its methodology, purpose, and conduct.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Propaganda, Propaganda Analysis, Propanal, Psychological Warfare, Psychological Operations, Intelligence, PSYWAR, PSYOP, SOF, USASOC, SOCOM, FBIS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	217	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Bryan C. Terrazas

Thesis Title: Proponal: An Overview of Early U.S. Propaganda Analysis and Its Role in Contemporary U.S. Army Doctrine

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC Rafael E. Linera Rivera, Ph.D.

_____, Member
LTC Patric R. Patterson, M.S.

_____, Member
Kirsten M. Krawczyk, M.A.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2021 by:

_____, Assistant Dean of Academics for
Degree Programs and Research
Dale F. Spurlin, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PROPANAL: AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY U.S. PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS AND ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE, by Major Bryan Terrazas, 217 pages.

Contemporary foreign propaganda poses an increasing risk, from peer, near-peer, and lesser adversaries alike. Despite this, the current role and purpose of propaganda analysis within Army doctrine is unclear and underdeveloped. In order to better understand its purpose, this thesis uses a qualitative method to examine the origin and evolution of propaganda analysis until its entry into U.S. Army Psychological Warfare doctrine in 1955. As propaganda analysis was often integrated into psychological warfare and intelligence activities, this thesis further examines the division of psychological warfare and intelligence organizations at the end of the War. It examines how many of these organizations conducted propaganda analysis, their relationships with one another, and how the activity was approached. As a result, this study determines that since the Army's doctrinal adoption of propaganda analysis as a distinct activity, the Army has conducted this analysis in a manner that ill-represents its historical legacy and is thus deserving of updates to its methodology, purpose, and conduct.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I must give special acknowledgement and gratitude to the receptiveness and professionalism of my thesis advisory board: LTC Rafael E. Linera-Rivera, LTC Patric Patterson, and Kirsten Krawczyk. I will forever appreciate your willingness to humor my unending adjustments and successive revisions throughout this research.

I would also like to give special acknowledgement to my Small Group Advisors and classmates, particularly: LTC (R) Joseph Krebs, LTC Kurt Knoedler, and LTC Joshua Southworth. Your unending enthusiasm for teaching and deep familiarity of doctrine and practices substantially increased my Army knowledge during the year. Between my instructors and classmates, coming to class daily was a pleasure.

I would also like to give special acknowledgement to the leaders, peers, and colleagues throughout the Special Operations community that reignited my passion for the profession and provide unrelenting inspiration and creativity that keeps my mind stimulated daily. There are far too many names to list on that account.

I must also give special thanks to those that have willingly and unwillingly become my sounding board for all manner of unsolicited ideas, tangents, and discussions. Robert Maclean, Joseph Littell, and Daniel White: you three had an especially rough time of it the past few years.

And last but surely not least I must give special appreciation to Bryan Richardson and Bryce Pedersen. Your unrelenting cool-headedness, willingness to humor my requests, and vast intellects helped the seeds of this thesis germinate - whether you knew it or not.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	ix
ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
TABLES	xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	3
Problem Statement.....	6
Purpose of Study	7
Research Question	8
Methodology.....	9
Assumptions.....	9
Definition of Terms	10
Scope.....	12
Limitations and Delimitations	13
Significance of the Study.....	13
Summary.....	14
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	18
Introduction.....	18
Section 1: Early Opinions on Propaganda and Propaganda Analysis	19
Section 2: PSYWAR and Early Propaganda Organizations.....	29
Section 3: Propaganda Analysis in Early Army Doctrine	32
Section 4: Propaganda Analysis in Current Army Doctrine.....	33
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)	40
Section 5: The Current State of Propaganda Analysis.....	41
Summary.....	42
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	51
Introduction.....	51
Methodology.....	52
Step 1: Find.....	53

Step 2: Select.....	54
Step 3: Appraise.....	54
Step 4: Synthesize.....	55
Sources.....	57
Ethical Assurances.....	58
Summary.....	59
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	60
Section 1: The State of Propaganda Analysis through WWII	60
Coordinator of Information.....	61
Office for Emergency Management.....	62
The Office of War Information.....	63
The Office of Strategic Services	67
The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee	68
Army Psychological Warfare and Propaganda Analysis	68
European Theater	68
Pacific Theater	72
Other Psychological Warfare and Propaganda-Related Organizations	77
The Library of Congress	77
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice.....	78
The Post Office Department	78
Section 2: Post-WWII Psychological Warfare and Propaganda Analysis.....	79
The Concern over Psychological Warfare	81
A National Psychological Warfare Organization	82
The Psychological Intelligence Committee	85
The Psychological Strategy Board.....	87
The Central Intelligence Organization.....	90
The Psychological Intelligence Division	94
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service.....	96
The Foreign Documents Divisions	105
The Office of Current Intelligence.....	109
The United States Information Agency	109
The Department of State	111
Section 3: The Army and Propaganda Analysis	112
The Ground General School	115
The Psychological Warfare Division	117
The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare	119
Section 4: Effectiveness of Propaganda Analysis.....	122
FBIS/FBID Effectiveness	123
Army Effectiveness.....	125
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	158
Introduction.....	158
Results and Implications	158

Primary Conclusions	163
Recommendations for Application	167
Recommendations for Further Research.....	170
APPENDIX A STASM Formula	173
APPENDIX B SCAME Analysis	175
APPENDIX C MARCO Analysis	177
BIBLIOGRAPHY	179

ACRONYMS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CPI	Committee on Public Information
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBID	Foreign Broadcast Information Division
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FDD	Foreign Documents Division
FIS	Foreign Information Service
FM	Field Manual
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
GEC	Global Engagement Center
IPA	Institute for Propaganda Analysis
IRI	Office of Research and Intelligence
IWC	Information Warfare Center
JP	Joint Publication
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
NIA	National Intelligence Authority
NSC	National Security Council

OCI	Office of Current Intelligence
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OIR	Office of Intelligence Research
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ORE	Office of Reports and Estimates
ORO	Operations Research Office
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PIC	Psychological Intelligence Committee
PID	Psychological Intelligence Division
POW	Prisoner Of War
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
SIS	Special Intelligence Service
TIS	Technical Information Section
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Document Analysis and Methodology Overview.....	53
Figure 2. Offices within the Office for Emergency Management.....	63
Figure 3. The Evolution of the FBIS.....	105
Figure 4. Proposed Tasks and Purposes of Propaganda Analysis.....	170
Figure 5. Definitions of Proposed Propaganda Analysis Tasks	170

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Planning And Coordination Organizations.....	160
Table 2. Army Organizations.....	161
Table 3. Intelligence Organizations	161
Table 4. Other Organizations	161

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Rival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

—U.S. President, *National Security Strategy the United States of America*, 2017

As a word and an idea, propaganda has for decades carried a negative connotation despite its relatively neutral early definitions.¹ Co-opted by government agencies and media outlets in the early half of the 20th century as the result of its use during the wars, by the end of World War II it had become deeply intertwined in the public's mind with deception, disinformation, and subversion. Today, the world uses the term liberally and in broad context to describe everything from official statements of authoritarian and democratic governments,² press releases from politicians,³ the ubiquitous references of fake news,⁴ and for products and statements from extremist organizations,⁵ terrorists,⁶ and adversarial organizations.⁷

Propaganda has once again become such a major concern in modern America that individuals, corporations, and the government itself are making it a top priority. Facebook, for example, announced in October of 2019 that it would increase its efforts “to counter foreign influence campaigns” that “misrepresent themselves,” and as a means to “reduce the spread of misinformation.”⁸ Within the government, propaganda can now be found referenced in nearly all levels of strategic security and defense plans. Within the 2017 National Security Strategy, propaganda is not only mentioned but associated again with false information, as well as in the 2018 National Defense Strategy to describe the

activities used by revisionist powers and rogue regimes in competition short of armed conflict. From these policy documents, its use trickles down to all facets of U.S. government and policy, from the Department of State and its Global Engagement Center to foundational Joint Doctrine.⁹ Further down, responsibility with the armed forces is leveled upon the U.S. Army, where it is introduced as a concern in the seminal Army doctrine ADP 3-0 Operations.¹⁰

With such a broad range of context, and with such a prolific use of the word, is propaganda the correct term to describe this wide range of activities? Are propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and deception actually related? What exactly is propaganda?

This question does not stop at simply defining the limits of what propaganda is as a concept, but continues to include defining what media, products, speeches, and information can actually fit within that definition. This task can be troubling, as it necessitates a level of comprehension of origins and intentions of the information. It is one thing to level the accusation of information becoming categorized as propaganda, but something quite different to analyze the information to see if it truly warrants it. Once propaganda is identified, and its intended impact understood, this information can then be used to determine the appropriate response. To do this assessment, some level of analysis is required and introduces the concept that will be the focus of this thesis: propaganda analysis and how it is conducted within the U.S. Army.

Background

In order to understand more about propaganda analysis, it is, necessary to have a common understanding of what propaganda itself is and is not. The definition of propaganda has certainly not remained static over time. Although an expanded overview of the word's origins, history, and the evolution of its terminology over time will be explored later within the literature review chapter 2, a contemporary definition will be used at present to help provide some clarity on its application and to provide context for what may constitute propaganda for analysis. In the most current Department of Defense Joint Publication (JP) to discuss propaganda as a term, JP 3-61 Public Affairs, propaganda is defined as "any form of communication misleading in nature designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group to benefit the sponsor. It should not be assumed that all propaganda is misleading or outright lies."¹¹ Although these two sentences seemingly contradict one another with regard to the misleading component of propaganda, and whether all propaganda is misleading, the definition's intent is to convey that the nature of propaganda is to manipulate its audience to think, feel, or do something that its creator wishes. In order to achieve this goal, the propaganda may or may not include misinformation or disinformation. That is to say, the propaganda may use entirely truthful information, but use it in a deceptive way so that the true intention of the creator is not immediately obvious to the audience. Said yet another way, "propaganda is presentation for a purpose; it is the purpose that makes it propaganda, and not the truthfulness or untruthfulness of it."¹² This definition is technically concise in its terms, but simultaneously incredibly broad on what can be included. Therefore, within this definition, and especially when including deception,

analytical thoroughness must be applied to characterize and understand potential propaganda.

This analytical rigor to understanding propaganda is the initial precept to understanding propaganda analysis, chiefly that “propaganda analysis deals with what somebody is trying to make them think.”¹³ Treated as a distinct analytical approach in its earliest form, often separate from traditional intelligence analysis and increasingly divergent from basic and early content-analysis techniques over time, propaganda analysis focuses on adversary or enemy propaganda rather than assessing friendly propaganda effectiveness. The analysis attempts to understand the motives and intentions behind the propaganda’s creation, as well as generate new information and intelligence of the enemy for a variety of purposes, beyond simply as a means to counter it.

Propaganda analysis as an independent process largely began in the interwar period between the Great War and the second world war alongside intelligence and the use of propaganda itself. Although propaganda had been featured extensively in World War I, at the onset of World War II, activities relating to it remained largely within the intelligence division G-2 under the War Department; most frequently nested firmly within counterintelligence doctrine.¹⁴ During the war itself, propaganda’s relationship to intelligence did not change much within Army doctrine,¹⁵ however, multiple organizations were established and had begun documenting and refining more definitive forms of psychological warfare. At this time, the conduct of psychological warfare (the precursor to what later would be termed psychological operations) and the use of propaganda were nearly synonymous and largely interchangeable.¹⁶ Concurrently,

numerous scholars and academics were advancing propaganda analysis theories, having witnessed the power of propaganda within the war as well as its use in the public spaces around it. They included different perspectives on its approach, frameworks within which it was conducted, and theories on how and when best to apply it.

Shortly after World War II, publications of new doctrinal manuals began to incorporate many of the lessons learned during the war. For example, propaganda use and its analysis began a shift from an exclusively intelligence-driven activity to that of a shared psychological warfare (PSYWAR) responsibility. The same war-time doctrine that had included propaganda as an intelligence requirement was updated to reflect that instead of intelligence departments, “the psychological warfare branch of higher headquarters such as army, army group, and theater, (would) carry out counterpropaganda measures.”¹⁷

Over the following decade, Army doctrine grew and refined the role of psychological warfare, as well as the role of propaganda as one of its responsibilities. This growth did not occur in a vacuum, however, as several other government agencies evolved from the former wartime psychological warfare and propaganda organizations, subsuming various parts of what had been wartime psychological warfare responsibilities. In particular, the task of propaganda analysis, once leveraged over several wartime offices, found itself coupled with the production and use of propaganda and saddled between military, Department of State, and intelligence organizations. For a brief period of time, until the mid-1950s, the future of propaganda (and by extension, propaganda analysis) was discussed in various official forums, between key political,

intelligence, military, psychological warfare and propaganda experts, and directed through various policies, executive orders, and doctrinal manuals.

The history of this pivotal period of propaganda analysis has not yet been deliberately collected, and much about the decisions made are difficult to trace. Despite on-going efforts to advance the field during this period, it was not until 1955 in the newly introduced Army Field Manual FM 33-5 Psychological Warfare Operations, that the Army first provided a doctrinal definition of propaganda analysis. Most recently, however, Army PSYOP doctrine has begun to de-emphasize, drop, or otherwise alter the chapters and sections formerly devoted to propaganda analysis.¹⁸ While many other sections unrelated to propaganda and its analysis have been added, and other non-analysis sections refined and improved, these changes have largely relegated a once ostensibly significant portion of the PSYOP profession to the sidelines. In fact, the term “propaganda analysis” has been largely abandoned and replaced within doctrine by “adversary information analysis,” and that “other [information related capabilities] . . . typically lead these activities.” As a result, the process formerly applied to propaganda analysis has been broadened to include the larger field of adversary information, further obscuring the role and utility of propaganda analysis as a distinct and useful activity.

Problem Statement

Army Psychological Operations and its predecessor organizations have long been designated as the military element responsible for conducting adversary propaganda analysis. Despite previous attention and scholastic advancements in propaganda analysis during and in the years immediately following World War II, and its continued emphasis

during several generations of manuals, its emphasis within Army doctrinal publications has diminished in recent years. As a result, the current version of PSYOP and Military Information Support Operations propaganda analysis guidance in doctrine is unclear on the roles, responsibilities, and purpose of its execution; the appropriate time and place of its application; and limited in methodologies from which to conduct its analysis. With a rise in contemporary near-peer, peer, and non-state actors using strategic and large-scale propaganda activities, significant challenges regarding Army PSYOP's place in this competitive space with the limited current doctrinal guidance exists.

Purpose of Study

Research into the transitional and formative propaganda analysis period has helped to clarify the significance and relevance of propaganda analysis as it was originally intended. As the general framework on how to conduct propaganda analysis has remained relatively unchanged within doctrine since its introduction in 1955, illuminating the background of this period helps clarify its role and significance as a directed activity in today's Psychological Operations force. This research helps to elucidate the gap in understanding on how Army PSYOP propaganda analysis is nested within the larger propaganda analysis effort within the U.S. Government. Without a full understanding of this topic, there is the potential for duplicate efforts across organizations as well as the potential for wasted time, resources, and ineffective analysis due to overly broad or narrowed focuses. The purpose of this study was to clarify the foundational period of U.S. Army PSYOP history in order to better understand how the lessons learned from World War II were combined with emerging theories, newly established

government propaganda organizations, and the role of the new Army Psychological Warfare organization in conducting propaganda analysis. It showed that the Army conceptualized and implemented propaganda analysis differently than many of intelligence organizations after the war, and by the standards of its historical past, has conducted only some components of the larger field of propaganda analysis. Ultimately, this exploration results in recommendations on clarifications and changes to current PSYOP doctrine in order to update and improve the understanding and conduct of propaganda analysis.

Research Question

Given this background, an overview of the current situation, and an understanding of the problem that exists, the primary question this thesis answers is how can an understanding of the division of the wartime U.S. Psychological Warfare responsibilities from the end of World War II through 1955 contribute to improved understanding and provide recommendations for the conduct of U.S. Army Psychological Operations propaganda analysis today?

In order to answer this primary question, five subordinate questions are addressed, specifically:

1. What was the state of propaganda analysis at the end of the war?
2. What were the relevant agencies that were created from this division?
3. What were the roles and responsibilities concerning propaganda analysis for these agencies?

4. What roles and responsibilities did Army PSYOP doctrine develop for propaganda analysis as a result?
5. How effective were these propaganda analysis techniques?

Methodology

The primary question is answered by first addressing the five subordinate questions through qualitative analysis. These questions are answered by using inductive reasoning and document analysis of key historical documents from the period. By relying on primary sources and official documents by relevant government organizations, key figures, and government policy, a focused understanding of the decisions (and the reasoning behind them) made regarding propaganda analysis as a psychological warfare-related activity was completed. After this understanding was formed, the final subordinate question regarding the effectiveness of these decisions and their implementation was determined based on the periodic reviews of psychological warfare organizations included within the official documents collected. These evaluations helped to compare how effective the organizations were at conducting their propaganda analysis functions as stated in their charters or other official documentation.

Assumptions

This paper has several underlying assumptions under which the research took place. Foremost is the assumption that there exists no Department of Defense or other government organization that conducts propaganda analysis beyond those mentioned herein, or else on a scale that is meaningful relative to the overall propaganda analysis problem. Though this assumption is somewhat validated for the period of focus by

recently declassified documents, the paper carries this assumption to include present organizations as well. Although this thesis spends time to clarify what is meant by propaganda analysis, as well as what makes it distinct from other related analysis techniques, this thesis assumes that a generally similar approach to what constitutes propaganda analysis for similar purposes has been conducted by the organizations mentioned, rather than a more generalized summarization of propaganda or media assessment. This paper assumes that although the means and mediums of propaganda may have changed, the fundamental nature of propaganda and its effects on human nature have not, and thus the underlying task of propaganda analysis remains valid across time, despite changes in the form propaganda ultimately takes. Lastly, this research assumes that the primary source material available online through government agencies provides an accurate reflection of archival material that exists in the archives themselves. This further rests on the assumption that the digital versions have not been altered or manipulated from the true copy and provide sufficient portrayals of the primary documents themselves, and that the information provided within these government documents is either factually true or was believed to be true by the author or organization during the period it was written.

Definition of Terms

For the sake of clarity, this paper continues the use of the term propaganda throughout for consistency when using historical sources, but also addresses some issues that arise from this decision, as well as expounds on the modern doctrinal differences between it and newer terminologies.

Adversary Information – Information and activities used by an adversary or enemy, in peacetime and wartime, to undermine the legitimacy of operations and the credibility of the force.¹⁹ This term includes: information for effect, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.²⁰

Disinformation – Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence U.S. decisionmakers, U.S. forces, coalition allies, key actors, and individuals via indirect or unconventional means.²¹

DOTmLPF-P – Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) – Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.²²

Misinformation – Incorrect information from any source that is released for unknown reasons, or to solicit a response or interest from a nonpolitical or nonmilitary target.²³

Propaganda – Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.²⁴

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) – Planned political, economic, military, and ideological activities directed towards foreign countries, organizations, and individuals in

order to create emotions, attitudes, understanding, beliefs, and behavior favorable to the achievement of United States political and military objectives.²⁵

SCAME – Source, Content, Audience, Media, Effects – a methodology for propaganda analysis within PSYOP doctrine.²⁶

Scope

This thesis is not an attempt to be a comprehensive history of propaganda, propaganda organizations, psychological operations, the congruent but separate activity of assessing the effectiveness of U.S. propaganda, countering propaganda, or an exhaustive review and search for the best propaganda analysis frameworks.²⁷ Though many of these related topics will be given space within this thesis, the focus is specifically on propaganda analysis and pertinent agencies that conducted it during the inflection point between the end of World War II and the formation of Army PSYWAR doctrine at the onset of the Cold War. While it also includes some review and analysis of academic and public literature on propaganda and propaganda analysis theories and opinions of the period, these are used to contextualize government agency and Army purposes and understandings of propaganda analysis at the time. It is further limited to doctrine not exceeding 1955, as that year provides the first Army Field Manual (FM) that introduced propaganda analysis and a version of what would later become SCAME analysis (a contemporary technique for Army propaganda analysis). By limiting the research to this year, this study returns to the roots of Army propaganda analysis in order to gain better insight into its intent as originally envisioned.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations. This thesis was limited by some material remaining unavailable, classified, or lost to history entirely. Additionally, otherwise available material was temporarily inaccessible due to COVID-19 travel and access restrictions. Some potentially relevant primary resource material was also not digitized and exists in locations that proved inaccessible due to time constraints (such as some that exist solely in NYC archives). Although this confounded some aspects of the research, the available material was sufficient to make sound foundational overviews and conclusions.

Delimitations. This thesis was delimited by classification restraints, to include For Official Use Only (FOUO) classification, and avoided even unclassified summarizations of classified information. It also truncated resources beyond the years prescribed in the research question due to the limited time to conduct research and complete this thesis, except in cases where the material was a review or analysis of primary material from within the years of concern or no other available resources existed to provide understanding to information gaps.

Significance of the Study

The role of Army PSYOP in the developing competitive environment is gaining renewed attention, and the need to respond to the rise of adversarial authoritarian propaganda-using states like China and Russia, combined with propaganda programs of Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations, demanded a re-evaluation of PSYOP DOTmLPF-P decisions. As the U.S. Government stands up organizations like the Global Engagement Center (GEC),²⁸ adds directives for U.S. Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) responsibility of the Information Operations (IO) and influence space,²⁹ and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and 1st Special Forces Command's (1SFC) prioritize the establishment of the PSYOP-led Information Warfare Center (IWC),³⁰ the various roles, responsibilities, and requirements of PSYOP must be solidified. The result of this study provides the most definitive account of the early development of propaganda analysis as a specific PSYOP activity, as well as provides recommendations that validate or improve the organization for growing future requirements in a complex information environment.

Summary

Emerging global threats and requirements have combined with deficiencies in U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine that must be addressed to assist on improving the PSYOP organization and maximizing the effectiveness of its limited resources. In order to clarify what remains of existing propaganda analysis doctrine, and to provide recommendations on updates and improvements, this study examined the foundational period of both the Army PSYOP branch and the professionalization of propaganda analysis as a required and useful activity. By examining the decisions for the division of propaganda analysis roles and responsibilities after World War II, this paper clarifies the original expectations of Army propaganda analysis responsibilities within the larger propaganda analysis field. It proves that post-World War II, the Army largely abandoned or minimized many of the effective techniques and purposes of propaganda analysis, and thus led to a capability gap that continues to exist today.

¹ “Any association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice.” *Oxford English Dictionary*, quoted in Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York: Ig Publishing, 2005), 11.

² Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, “On the Chinese Communist Party’s Obscene Propaganda,” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, June 6, 2020, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-chinese-communist-partys-obscene-propaganda/index.html>; John Maxwell Hamilton and Kevin R. Kosar, “Call It What It Is: Propaganda,” *Politico*, 8 October 2020, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/08/government-communication-propaganda-427290>.

³ Bill Barrow, “GOP governors launch ‘news’ site critics call propaganda,” *AP News*, 19 September 2017, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/f97fbf53c0c84468ae046f861ecf3b64>.

⁴ Dean Jackson, “Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and ‘Fake News’,” (International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy, 17 October 2017).

⁵ Alberto M. Fernandez, *Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks*, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2015 (Washington, DC: Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, October 2015).

⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes* (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), accessed 8 May 2021, https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes/ebook_use_of_the_internet_for_terrorist_purposes.pdf.

⁷ US Congress, House, *Countering Adversarial Propaganda: Charting an Effective Course in the Contested Information Environment: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives*, H.A.S.C. No. 114-59, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 22 October 2015, <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-114hhrg97493>

⁸ Facebook, “Helping to Protect the 2020 US Elections,” 21 October 2019, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/update-on-election-integrity-efforts/>.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: JCS, 25 March 2013; incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017), I-6.

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 31 July 2019), 3-10.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, *Public Affairs* (Washington, DC: JCS, 17 November 2015; incorporating Change 1, 19 August 2016), I-3.

¹² Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 116.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁴ War Department, Field Manual (FM) 30-25, *Military Intelligence, Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 February 1940), 30-31.

¹⁵ War Department, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 June 1944), 70.

¹⁶ Edward P. Lilly, “The Development of American Psychological Operations 1945-1951,” (Psychological Strategy Board, Washington 25, 19 December 1951), 2.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 August 1949), 45.

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 28 June 2013), 6-8 - 6-11.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Training Circular (TC) 18-06, *Special Forces Guide to Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 22 March 2013), 2-27.

²⁰ HQDA, FM 3-53, 6-9.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: JCS, 27 November 2012; incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014), II-9.

²³ HQDA, FM 3-53, 6-9.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations* (Washington, DC: JCS, 7 January 2010; incorporating Change 1, 20 December 2011), GL-4.

²⁵ HQDA, FM 3-53, Glossary-7.

²⁶ Ibid., Glossary-4.

²⁷ There are numerous detailed accounts of various aspects of Psychological Operations history during this period and therefore do not need repeating. Reference: Edward P. Lilly's history from 1945-1951.

²⁸ Barack Obama, Executive Order 13721, "Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center To Support Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584," *Federal Register* 81, no. 52 (17 March 2016): 14685, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-03-17/pdf/2016-06250.pdf>.

²⁹ Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Washington, DC: DOD, 17 September 2020), <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/510001p.pdf>.

³⁰ 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), *A Vision for 2021 and Beyond* (Fort Bragg, NC: 1st Special Forces Command, 2020), accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Documents/1sfc-vision-2021-beyond.pdf>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the principal emphasis of the volume is on propaganda methods, this entire section has been curtailed severely, to include only titles of a representative character.

—Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith,
Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to document the early U.S. Army propaganda analysis period and to better understand the activity's original intent and purpose in order to clarify its contemporary role and application. Although the history of propaganda and its use is well documented during this period, the details of its analysis as a separate and distinct activity were less clearly defined. Due to this oversight, there currently exists little research and focused material regarding the specific research question posed in the introduction chapter.

Overall, this literature review chapter is broken down into a framework of five sections: (1) early opinions on propaganda and propaganda analysis; (2) PSYWAR and early propaganda organizations; (3) propaganda analysis within early Army doctrine; (4) propaganda analysis within current Army doctrine; and finally (5) the current state of propaganda analysis. These sections do not provide comprehensive collections of each topic, but rather provide a foundational understanding as part of the larger body of knowledge. Collectively, they serve to build a basic understanding of what occurred during this period concerning the roles and requirements of conducting propaganda and

its analysis, and construct a framework from which new research and examination can be used to help shed light on how those decisions relate to the present.

Section 1: Early Opinions on Propaganda and Propaganda Analysis

Prior to World War I, the word propaganda was little used beyond those familiar with its origins with the Vatican and Roman Catholic Church. First coined in 1622, Pope Gregory XV established the Office for the Propagation of the Faith (*Congregatio de propaganda fide*) to supervise the Church's missionary efforts.¹ Though British chemist William Thomas Brande noted that by 1842 the word could be associated to "secret associations for the spread of opinions and principles," it did not universally carry this context, except in some cases when stressing its Roman Catholic origins.²

Extensive propaganda was used by both sides during World War I, and led to the creation of the first of many future propaganda organizations within the U.S., such as the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Though propaganda's effective use in determining the outcomes of the war are questionable, "each of the warring nations persuaded itself that its government had neglected propaganda, where as the enemy, on the contrary, had been most effective."³ This use of propaganda, on both domestic and foreign audiences, began to shape mass opinion on the darker aspects of propaganda use, as well as increase interest in researching propaganda use and theory by numerous academics.⁴ Due to the work of the CPI and other organizations during the war, by 1919 the word propaganda had moved to mainstream use, and was appearing in the *New York Times* three times a day; a significant increase from the once a month it had appeared in 1875.⁵ By 1934, *Webster's New International Dictionary* was defining propaganda as

“any organized or concerted group, effort, or movement to spread a particular doctrine or system of doctrines or principles” noting that it often included “secret or clandestine dissemination of ideas, information, gossip, or the like, for the purpose of helping or injuring a person, an institution, a cause, etc.”⁶ Clearly then, prior to the start of the second World War, the perception of propaganda had largely reached its present form.

During the interwar years, and before the second wave of fear concerning propaganda under Hitler arose, Lasswell, one of the foundational contributors to the understanding of propaganda, wrestled with defining what propaganda was and was not in what is considered “the first serious study of the topic.”⁷ While grappling with this concept, which he began to combine with social science theories of the day, the manner in which he chose to characterize and classify it resembled some of the basic questions that would later define propaganda analysis.⁸ Due to isolated efforts and the lack of professional contact in the field, he was concerned that there was no effective means for collective advancement during the day to build the scientific progress of propaganda. In order to rectify this shortcoming, and collect various opinions in the field, the U.S.-based non-profit Social Science Research Council in 1931 attempted to consolidate the work into a single publication. Although focused on propaganda itself, the book’s preface addressed the related propaganda analysis activity, but this was mostly concerned with attempting to understand the effects of advertising and political propaganda on small target audiences; chiefly Americans influencing fellow Americans.⁹

This analysis effort was representative of the period, and was predominantly focused on identifying propaganda techniques themselves to aid in identification and

education of the masses. The likes of Dr. Leonard Doob and Hadley Cantril fell neatly into this category. Cantril had a generally neutral interpretation of propaganda, and instead relied on the intent of the propagandist provide meaning. Rather than providing a framework to analyze propaganda, he instead focused on describing methods used by propagandists as a means to identify it and apply critical thinking to mitigate its effects. These “basic psychological principles” were connecting the idea to attitudes, symbols, or emotions; to build entirely new attitudes using concealed suggestions; and to disguise propaganda as a logical explanation.¹⁰ Similarly, Doob’s major contribution to this field was his eight principles with twenty-eight corollaries that helped to classify various propaganda techniques.¹¹

Alfred McClung Lee also took an early interest in scientific propaganda analysis in order to educate the masses to detect it and for inoculation against its effects. This was seen predominately as a necessary skill in order to safeguard democracy. He proposed five interrelated techniques so that the analyst could better understand the relationship of the propagandist’s goal to its targeted audience. Respectively within these, Lee touched on the significance of acknowledging the role of the context of the propaganda, the role of intuition, the effects of various mediums, the psychology and motives of the propagandist(s), and the specific techniques used to convey the propaganda objective.¹²

In his later works, believing the inevitability of propaganda exposure through the growth of mass communications, Lee continued his effort to prevent the general citizenry of becoming subject to “ever more rigid elites.”¹³ He took a much larger view of propaganda, combining the advertisements of goods and services with the opinions of

values, and though he stressed that propaganda was not evil, he acknowledged that it may well be deceptive. He emphasized that propaganda analysis was more than the study of content and individual messages, but instead part of a usually hidden larger context and more complex situation. Despite acknowledgment of the growing complexity of propaganda, he showed confidence that the everyday consumer could be adequately prepared for its analysis, using social science tools and content analysis, among other approaches. Ultimately, his approach boiled down to a checklist-style formula, meant to identify it generally as well as its source and function.¹⁴

Ivy Lee, another early public relations expert and propaganda scholar, also struggled with some early explorations of the use of propaganda and some limited examination of its analysis, looking through the lens of the developing field of mass psychology. Described as “The One Evil of Propaganda,” his basis of propaganda analysis was posed with the questions: “Who is making the interpretation? What is his interest? What is his purpose? What is his objectives? . . . The evil is the *failure to disclose the source* of the information.”¹⁵ These questions helped contribute to some of the larger key distinctions between an assessment and analysis process. For example, when analyzing adversary propaganda, little is known about the enemy’s intentions and larger purpose, whereas when conducting propaganda assessment, the primary concern is regarding the effectiveness of the effort.

On a less theoretical level, Dr. Bess Goodykoontz, the Assistant U.S. Commissioner of Education, contributed to a growing body of literature on the conduct of propaganda analysis as part of presentations and groups. These presentations focused

more on developing critical thinking skills that aided in the identification of potential propaganda as a means of reducing receptiveness. Though it did include similar structures focused on questioning the intended audience, message, and funding source, the process and its desired intent did not go beyond building a healthy skepticism.¹⁶

The identification and analysis techniques were not universally lauded, as Bruce Lannes Smith of NYU lamented in 1941, “I have myself attempted to teach propaganda analysis, and have talked with other teachers who have tried. Although we have not sampled the field statistically, we all seem to have felt that an extremely high, if not menacing, degree of cynicism develops, especially among adolescents, as a result of the methods in use at present.”¹⁷ In a similar vein, William Garber challenged many of the premises upon which the larger propaganda analysis movement of the period was based. He argued that the goal of understanding propaganda through analysis was best achieved by understanding the entire social context in which it occurred.¹⁸ A major point of contention with the propaganda analysis techniques was the lack of emphasis on truth versus deception, arguing that too much emphasis was placed asking the “why” of the propaganda, rather than first taking the time to understand the “what” and to determine if it was truthful or deceptive.¹⁹ This took aim squarely at the sequential and checklist approaches advocated by so many in the field at this time, including Lasswell in particular, and was conveyed by the phrase, “learn to push the proper buttons in the correct sequence and you have acquired a slave.”²⁰ He further argued the word-counting that then passed as content analysis and semantic and grammatical breakdown of

propaganda provided fallacious merit overall, and a false sense of satisfaction in being able to classify a propaganda technique into some artificial category.²¹

Not all propaganda theorists stuck within the educational vein of propaganda analysis, and instead explored some of its theoretical constructs and meanings. Hans Speier suggested propaganda was essentially making a man believe in something rather than letting him know the truth.²² He argued that it existed in democracies and dictatorships alike, but was especially powerful in the case of dictatorships that exercised a monopoly on its employment.²³ In a democracy, he argued, that any such propaganda would be faced with multiple competing narratives, and thus its power and influence reduced.²⁴ In the case of a dictatorship the propaganda line would be seen as legitimate for lack of an alternative, and public opinion would be replaced by secret opinions.²⁵ This theory thus suggested that the underlying mechanisms of propaganda varied by political system, and thus certain assumptions could be made regarding how the propagandists might use it on its audiences.²⁶

Outside of its civilian development and use, during the onset of the Second World War, propaganda analysis continued to evolve, albeit with a different priority and approach. This early period was marked by blending the theories of these and other social scientists with the means of psychological warfare propagandists and intelligence analysts, and refined with German propaganda. It was during this period that the term propanal–propaganda analysis–began to be introduced into the field. One such emerging theory that was quickly advanced used textual, theme, and symbol analysis to predict behavior. This technique was not wholly ineffective, and propaganda analysts were able

to accurately predict Nazi military plans against Norway.²⁷ Despite these advancements, the Allied Psychological Warfare organizations and other propaganda organizations were not principally concerned with advancing or refining analysis methodologies, but rather achieving quick and practical results.²⁸ The outcome was a lack in structured methodology and a reliance on inference and educated guesses.²⁹ However, these same propaganda analysts realized the limitations of their current methods, and resisted producing regular predictions so as not to mislead decision makers or provide a false sense of reliance on their outputs.³⁰

These techniques marked a shift in propaganda analysis for purposes beyond the identification of propaganda for inoculation. Shortly after the war, Paul M.A. Linebarger noted that the aim of on-going propaganda analysis was understanding the propaganda's intent to change observed behaviors in civilians and the military alike.³¹ This extended beyond solely psychological objectives related to issues like morale, and included enabling strikes, inducing panic, surrender, and disunity with the political leadership.³² This also included propaganda analysis as a means for prediction, based on the premises that the propaganda used by the enemy in its homeland and against its enemies would provide variances in messages and goals that could provide valuable insights.³³ The result of all of this propaganda analysis was as a source of actionable intelligence, which he believed was useful in augmenting military intelligence even outside of improving one's own psychological warfare planning and counterpropaganda purposes.³⁴ His views of propaganda went beyond its analysis, and included an updated perspective on the nuances of modern propaganda that he distinguished as the planned use of mass-communication

between use on the public and military, where its use on military personnel constituted a significant portion of what amounted to psychological warfare.³⁵

Beyond this wartime use, academics continued to use the term propaganda analysis more generally and for less analytically rigorous purposes. For example, Hummel and Huntress used the term “analysis of propaganda” in terms of identifying misinformation within day-to-day life, to assist “the intelligent modern who desires to arrive at some independence of opinion.”³⁶ This rudimentary construct focused on four components for its “Propaganda Process”: “The Event,” “The Propagandist,” “The Propaganda,” and “The Audience.”³⁷ This short checklist-styled methodology and others like it continued on as a common theme within the field of propaganda analysis.

Linebarger himself attempted a similar checklist approach when introducing his propaganda analysis methods, which he defined as the “STASM formula” with a mnemonic device. Although he acknowledged that “there is no secret formula which, once applied, provides an unfailing test for propaganda,” he nonetheless applied rules such as conducting consistent analysis of the same source as means to best identify intentions.³⁸ He also emphasized the timeliness of analysis, namely that collection is ongoing, but that topics and themes will quickly become too dated to be relevant, and thus the downside of extensive analysis is that it becomes quickly irrelevant.³⁹ Describing the dichotomy of both needing to intimately know an area and culture, but also the benefit of an outsider view to be able to identify what truly matters, he argued there is a competition between details and time when conducting propaganda analysis.⁴⁰ Keeping

this limitation in mind, he described the STASM formula as useful when analyzing a single piece of potential propaganda.⁴¹

Despite this note of the STASM formula's limited applicability, it did possess an expansive perspective on the important elements of propaganda and its analysis. The formula itself was meant to capture the five elements of propaganda: the Source (including Media), the Time, the Audience, the Subject, and the Mission, where mission was meant to include the effects.⁴² While this simple formula did provide a framework for remembering the steps of identifying propaganda analysis, it also included some of the broader concepts that had been explored over the years on the nuances of propaganda theory. For example, the 'Source' was meant to also address the inclusion of potential deception.⁴³

Linebarger's views on propaganda did not stop at merely defining or analyzing its basic elements. He also developed distinct assumptions about its use, chiefly that there was overt propaganda from a government or official with an interest in keeping the product accurate and truthful, so as not to tarnish the reputation; and faked products that required equal care in construction but less veracity.⁴⁴ He also discussed two forms of propaganda, the strategic that is aimed at larger areas and for longer durations of time, and tactical that is aimed at smaller audiences for more immediate effects.⁴⁵

Foreshadowing some of the discussions that occurred during the division of propaganda and propaganda analysis responsibilities, Linebarger noted the uncomfortableness of having military organizations using political propaganda in developing countries, and the

overlap of this “political warfare” with that of the more acceptable psychological warfare.⁴⁶

After the war, and for many years following, Alexander George began introducing many of the most advanced theories and techniques for propaganda analysis for intelligence purposes. These were less focused on mere propaganda identification and did not rely on the use of checklist or sequential techniques that were previously advocated. Instead, George introduced the theory that propaganda analysis may not perfectly fit within logical constructs of scientific explanation.⁴⁷ Despite this, he did attempt to capture a scientific methodology used successfully in order to better replicate the results and train analysts in best practices. He argued that when applying content analysis to propaganda analysis, as was done by some analyst during World War II, the success they achieved in producing intelligence was a combination of dealing with the words themselves as well as the inferences and characterizations of the communications the analysts studied.⁴⁸ One of his most significant contributions to the field was his theory of inferences when conducting propaganda analysis. George argued that qualitative inferences are the stronger form of propaganda analysis versus quantitative content analysis.⁴⁹ His findings reaffirmed many of the preceding generation’s notions of the assumptions that underlay propaganda analysis, specifically that “propaganda is inescapably related to real policies” and that although components of the message may be misleading, to achieve its goal and remain effective, it cannot include meaningless content that is disconnected from that of the policy-makers themselves.⁵⁰ Therefore, a proper analysis of the enemy’s propaganda doctrine and use will illuminate key details

not explicitly stated regarding future intentions. These assumptions were intended to be leveraged on all totalitarian regimes, first demonstrated by the Nazis and later applied to the Soviets.⁵¹ Although he was later able to validate many predictions well after they were made, he noted the paradox of using inferences to make predictions that were hard to validate in real time, or to accurately attribute to a range of circumstances.⁵² This was especially true when policy makers requested evidence upon which analysts based their assumptions, only to find it lacking.⁵³

Section 2: PSYWAR and Early Propaganda Organizations

During the period of this research there were several notable propaganda and intelligence organizations related to propaganda analysis. Several were suitable for introduction within this section, but as they are explored in more detail as a result of chapter 4 data collection and analysis, they are instead introduced within that chapter. Beyond these, the first of the many propaganda and PSYWAR organizations was The Committee on Public Information (CPI), also known as the “Creel Committee” after its chairman.⁵⁴ First established during World War I, there was also the Army’s Psychological Warfare Section under the G-2, in the General Headquarters (GHQ), American Expeditionary Force and led by the later renowned Captain Heber Blankenhorn.⁵⁵ These organizations took little effort on conducting what would later become propaganda analysis, but did explore assessing their effectiveness through “morale analysis charts,” a type of quantitative tracking mechanism.⁵⁶

Partially as a result of the success and related concerns of World War I propaganda, and tied to the renewed concerns from new German propaganda and

competing world ideologies, Clyde Miller founded the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in 1937 on Morningside Drive, nearly adjacent to Columbia University. Working with a small team, the IPA began its task of identifying propaganda for the promotion of an informed public.⁵⁷ Through its work, publishing regular pamphlets, bulletins, and several books, the IPA was especially notable for its introduction of the seven basic propaganda devices that continue to guide both propagandists as well as propaganda analysts today.⁵⁸ The organization was indeed concerned with propaganda, but its analysis was oriented largely on the public's and students' critical thinking as it related to being able to identify propaganda encountered, and with strengthening democracy.⁵⁹ This was closely related to the theories covered in the previous section, and was not uncommon during the period as the world grappled with competing ideologies such as communism, fascism, and socialism. It also dealt with anti-Semitic content such as Father Coughlin's speeches.⁶⁰ By 1942, the IPA had ceased to exist, mostly due to the changing nature of propaganda during wartime, but also due to the increased attention and concerns over its right- vs left-leaning analyses of the preceding years and growing fears focused on foreign propaganda rather than domestic.⁶¹

But a need for propaganda analysis continued. As a looming war in Europe increased concerns of public sentiment and Nazi influence, by the mid-1930s several the IPA's contributors had begun some analysis of foreign propaganda as a "mechanism which would gauge public opinion in Latin America."⁶² In September 1940, this effort would become the American Social Surveys at the behest of Nelson Rockefeller, FDR's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA).⁶³ This small organization would identify

the need for more systematic monitoring of and analysis of Nazi and Italian propaganda in South America, later spawning the Princeton Listening Center directed by Harold Graves in the fall of 1939.⁶⁴ It would soon be directed to monitor propaganda emanating from Europe “in order to understand better the psychology behind Nazi propaganda and possibly help predict Axis moves.”⁶⁵ In less than a year, the center would move to Washington as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service and later Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).⁶⁶ This agency, though later secretly within the predecessor agency to the CIA at the time, was actually publicly known and declared to be conducting propaganda analysis.⁶⁷ The remainder of the history of this organization is completed in chapter 4.

Although the role and use of propaganda analysis within the military during the war was less clearly defined, psychological warfare itself was more apparent. By 1945, much of the various psychological warfare responsibilities within the military had been clarified and consolidated under the War Department’s G-2, under the former psychological warfare office’s new name Propaganda Branch and led by Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stanley, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Buttles, and Colonel Dana W. Johnston.⁶⁸ The emphasis of these organizations was production and dissemination of propaganda and psychological warfare, and not necessarily conducting propaganda analysis. This period also marked the lateral movement of PSYWAR and Propaganda functions within the G-2 to that of the G-3 in order to execute more effectively across all the various levels and echelons.⁶⁹ This then would later result on January 15, 1951 in the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare and the Psychological

Warfare Division, a Special Staff independent of the G-3.⁷⁰ Thus began the separation of propaganda as a mostly intelligence function to that of its later place within operations. This period in history, the evolution of psychological warfare, is well documented by Alfred Paddock, but even within coverage of the recommendations and discussions regarding divorcing PSYWAR from intelligence, the connection between propaganda, propaganda analysis, and intelligence is largely absent.⁷¹

Section 3: Propaganda Analysis in Early Army Doctrine

Some early psychological warfare manuals for this period are readily accessible online, but nevertheless, under the methodology criteria outlined in the next chapter, these were considered as material suitable for use in chapter 4. This assisted in understanding the content of propaganda analysis within them, given the added contextual background, and were further supported by less accessible and less known manuals from that period. Despite this decision, the 1955 manual introduced in chapter 1 was covered within this section as a bookend document for this research.

As the new Army Psychological Warfare organizations were established, updated doctrine followed. By 1955, the newly introduced Army Field Manual FM 33-5 Psychological Warfare Operations provided the first doctrinal definition of propaganda analysis. In a chapter foreshadowing its treatment for the coming decades of doctrine, Chapter 13 was titled, “Propaganda and Opinion Analysis,” and described propaganda analysis as, “a recognized method of examining propaganda for the purpose of determining and evaluating the source, content, audience, media and techniques, and effect.”⁷² It continued on to say that the “analysis of enemy propaganda is a

supplementary source of intelligence for psychological warfare” and that “propaganda analysis attempts to answer the model questions: *Who says what to whom, how, and with what effect?*”⁷³ This predecessor to the SCAME analysis framework, with minor revisions, would provide the basis of Army propaganda analysis until its current version.

The manual continued to state that “the information from this analysis, accurately carried out and objectively evaluated, often will reveal or suggest psychological strengths and vulnerabilities that are exploitable.”⁷⁴ It continued with “propaganda analysis in itself does not furnish intelligence adequate to support plans for a psychological warfare campaign except in extreme instances where all other sources of information are unavailable.”⁷⁵ The suggestion that propaganda analysis had some intelligence value parallels wartime views of its relationship, but clearly the intention diverges significantly and was narrowly applicable to supporting psychological warfare purposes only.

The introduction of propaganda analysis in doctrine shares many of the traits of the analysis ideas of the previous sections within this thesis. However, some changes had been made to its use and methods, while other points have been omitted entirely. Clearly, then, some decisions were made during the transition from the wartime propaganda analysis activities to that version of doctrine, and it is during this period that these propaganda analysis decisions are explored in detail.

Section 4: Propaganda Analysis in Current Army Doctrine

Propaganda as a term has not been entirely removed but has been somewhat demoted in PSYOP doctrine and currently lies as one of the components of the broader term adversary information. This, in and of itself, does not pose a significant challenge to

understanding propaganda as a concept; however, the previously specified task to conduct propaganda analysis within PSYOP doctrine has been replaced by adversary information analysis, of which propaganda is only one of four categories. The direct result is that the former propaganda analysis task can now be viewed as information for effect, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda analysis. Cumbersome as the task sounds, it also provides an incredibly broad range of information and influence activity to analyze. The same manual further clarifies that adversary information is analyzed for the purpose of countering its effects, and does not speak directly to other benefits that may result from this analysis.⁷⁶

Further confounding this change, and although the section in the manual is titled “Adversary Information Analysis and Countermeasures,” in a previous introductory section of the manual the word analyze is exchanged for assess, in that PSYOP Soldiers assess adversary information as opposed to analyze it, and the differences of this change are not directly addressed.⁷⁷ This assessment is also directed in conjunction with intelligence and public affairs “to determine the source, intent, target, and effects.”⁷⁸ Although this source, intent, target and effects framework borrows from both the SCAME and MARCO frameworks, it does not adequately fit either and makes it distinctly new.⁷⁹ An attempt is then immediately made to clarify this new framework’s purpose as to determine whether the adversary information needs countering, but is once again described as an analyzation versus an assessment.⁸⁰ The result of this new truncated assessment and analysis framework and stated purpose introduces another unclear analysis framework, and does not receive adequate explanation to differentiate it and

determine its place within the propaganda analysis, propaganda assessment, and adversary information analysis tasks.

As if this terminology was not sufficiently confusing on its own, the task of conducting propaganda analysis remains explicitly directed as such in other doctrine and manuals, specifically to analyze through the SCAME approach and to assess using the MARCO format.⁸¹ Then quite separately, as a part of determining the threat courses of action, there are the requirements to conduct it for predictive analysis, reinforcing the former intention of propaganda analysis as an intelligence process and its use for extrapolating adversary intentions and future actions.⁸² This stands in contrast to FM 3-53 where adversary information analysis is described as the process to determine elements of opposing information.⁸³ The manual once again suggests the predictive abilities of this process but relates it specifically to responding to adversary information activities, highlighting the current conflation of propaganda analysis as a part of the counterpropaganda and counter adversary information task.⁸⁴

The intelligence sections, listed previously as part of the assessment process, are tasked to determine the intended effects and objectives of the adversary's information programs, specifically for the purpose of improving the commander's ability to understand both the adversary's intentions as well as its operations.⁸⁵ Yet again, the manual suggest that this analysis process may be used to produce intelligence for use outside of information activities and for countering adversary information activities or propaganda, but when viewed as part of the larger section, this directive is most likely meant to refer once again to the primary focus of countering adversary information

activities. Regardless, the lack of clarity around this topic further adds to the confusion on roles and purpose of this activity.

Like intelligence, Public Affairs (PAO) is also included in the list of entities responsible in this activity, but is also declared as the lead in the analysis process within the PSYOP manual.⁸⁶ Public Affairs doctrine, however, only directs PAO to conduct “media content analysis” and describes it as providing “an evaluation of the quantity and the nature of coverage, media trends, and agendas.”⁸⁷ This description is oriented on the messages the military operation conveys to the public and their responses, and therefore does not directly relate to the same purpose of propaganda analysis, and consequently creates confusion regarding the role of PSYOP and PAO in conducting it.⁸⁸ Joint Public Affairs doctrine makes similar distinctions and also does not further clarify these roles. The remainder of JP 3-61 also does not address propaganda analysis directly, but rather directs PAO’s role in countering adversary propaganda, and relying on intelligence to provide “historical and human factors analysis [to provide] a context to evaluate and anticipate adversary propaganda and disinformation.”⁸⁹

The most suitable time and place for conducting adversary information analysis is also unclear, as is the appropriate methodology to use for various circumstances. FM 3-53 acknowledges the differing requirements of analyzing a single or limited amount of propaganda versus a larger analysis of programs of propaganda. It terms these two levels as “individual messages and actions” and “adversary information programs.”⁹⁰ In it, it directs the use of both the SCAME and MARCO analysis methods for the individual instances of propaganda, but caveats that MARCO specifically is for determining

intended effect and that SCAME is a more time-intensive process for determining both adversary information program capabilities and objectives.⁹¹ This differentiation alludes that SCAME may be more appropriate for assessing the larger adversary information program, but does not specifically state that either method can or cannot be used, nor does it describe any changes to their application between the two levels.⁹² Considering the amount of data and complexity of a propaganda program versus that of an individual product, the limitation of using identical analysis methods likely indicates the limited utility in one instance or another. There is no further expansion on considerations when analyzing adversary information programs, thus showing the significant limitations of current doctrine even if the purpose were clear.

Joint doctrine does not clarify or add to Army doctrine on these issues. Listed within the Approved Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), there is a task for countering insurgent propaganda that directs efforts to analyze and exploit an adversary's (narrative) propaganda, with JP 3-13.2 (primary), JP 3-13, JP 3-22, JP 3-24, and JP 3-61 as the guiding doctrine.⁹³ Here propaganda analysis is not directly tasked, although analyzing the narrative propaganda hints at a larger objective for propaganda analysis.

In the primary guidance from JP 3-13.2, PSYOP forces are directed to provide a "description of adversary propaganda (including disinformation and misinformation) directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for countering such adversary operations" and to "establish a reporting system to provide relevant information about adversary propaganda, measured impact of MISO, and any anticipated changes to ongoing activities."⁹⁴ However, it does recommend for planning

purposes that “consider preparation of MISO to counter the effects of adversary propaganda before, during, and after US military combat operations.”⁹⁵ The publication directs intelligence analysts and resources to analyzing the Operational Environment, but a broader description of these tasks and needs is related more to the collection, identification, and analysis as it relates to conducting influence and counterpropaganda activities, and not of using propaganda as a means to generate new intelligence.⁹⁶

In addition, PSYOP is directed to conduct this to “sequentially address MISO in peacetime and in support of deterrence options; MISO in support of sustained hostilities (conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns and operations); and joint tactical MISO in support of operational COAs [courses of action].”⁹⁷ This larger spectrum of the conflict continuum stands in contrast to FM 3-53 where this type of activity is directed prior and concurrent to military operations without delineation to where its limits are in advance of an operation.⁹⁸

The remainder of the listed joint doctrine adds little clarity. JP 3-22 does specifically direct intelligence support (but not MISO) to conduct “analysis of . . . propaganda,” but otherwise only addresses propaganda as it relates to countering it.⁹⁹ JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency also repeatedly references propaganda as a tool of insurgents, but stops short of directing its analysis.¹⁰⁰ The supporting Army FM 3-24 takes a similar approach, expounding on the importance of propaganda to an insurgency but not directing its analysis.¹⁰¹ However, FM 3-24.2 states that “tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts” and that “counterinsurgents can often gain insight into tactical goals by analyzing the insurgent propaganda.”¹⁰²

Other manuals provide some clarifications, but fail to rectify some of the current inconsistencies of directing propaganda analysis. One of these manuals flirts with PSYOP's prior relationship within intelligence, stating that PSYOP is not only a consumer of intelligence but also provides raw and refined information that itself can contribute to intelligence.¹⁰³ Though it stops short of calling tactical PSYOP elements intelligence analysts, it uses the "every Soldier is a sensor (ES2)" term to relate the activities of tactical PSYOP elements execute and that PSYOP conducts passive collection activities as part of its surveillance.¹⁰⁴ When encountering adversary or enemy messages, the manual instructs the use of the MARCO propaganda analysis framework to provide information for further development of PSYOP operations, as well as a means of passing up relevant information to a higher headquarters element able to conduct SCAME.¹⁰⁵ This suggests that MARCO represents a hasty propaganda analysis preceding a more detailed SCAME analysis that itself is used for determining enemy themes, their objectives, campaigns, and even capabilities.¹⁰⁶ In another related manual, MARCO is relegated to a rapid tactical usage for determining immediate effects while SCAME is elevated to more time intensive analysis by larger and better resourced elements oriented on the adversary's overall information objective.¹⁰⁷ Both are indicated as frequently conducted at the request of a maneuver element or a higher headquarters, without indication of it becoming an on-going function or specific to only the individual request.¹⁰⁸ The analysis process is further described as an attempt to determine patterns as a means of these assessments.¹⁰⁹ These analyses are also differentiated from other

similar-sounding assessments such as media assessments, vulnerability assessments, and adversary information effects assessments.¹¹⁰

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Propaganda is typically widely disseminated and publicly available, or else it serves a very focused and likely reduced level of effectiveness. Given this, the relationship of Open-Source Intelligence and propaganda analysis is clear. It is then no surprise that the latest Army manual providing an unclassified common foundational overview of OSINT includes references to view propaganda within its purview. Specifically, OSINT includes as one of its aids to the Commander's situational understandings the "views into asymmetric command and control, recruiting, and propaganda activities."¹¹¹ Though it stops short of providing additional depth to this relationship with propaganda, it does note that when dealing with types of deception and the myriad of filters public media may pass before it is obtained, that "it would be of great value if a linguist has insight to cultural normalcies and identifying propaganda."¹¹² A previous version of the same manual makes a more direct connection to propaganda analysis, though not using the term specifically, and includes a brief anecdote of an OSINT cell conducting "study [of] confiscated propaganda and other media" within a Brigade Combat Team in Iraqi during 2004-2005.¹¹³ In addition, this same manual references the role of propaganda as an indicator within Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, a critical step in the Military Decision Making Process and therefore evidence of pervasive inclusion of the role of propaganda analysis throughout echelons of the Army.¹¹⁴

Section 5: The Current State of Propaganda Analysis

There is little current discussion or opinion on the specific research question and topic of this paper. That is not meant to suggest that there is not discussion related to the current state of psychological operations, military information support activities, and propaganda analysis more generally. For example, there are numerous examples of current PSYOP practitioners and experts that bring interesting and new opinions towards a Joint Interagency Task Force for influence,¹¹⁵ changes to the current use and organization of PSYOP forces,¹¹⁶ reviews of past Psychological Operations and Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experiences,¹¹⁷ and recommendations for a unified and innovation Joint PSYWAR force,¹¹⁸ but there is little beyond passing acknowledgement to the specific treatment of propaganda analysis as a distinct and intelligence-focused activity. Typically, if analysis is addressed, it often relates to target audience analysis, assessment of PSYOP influence activities, or intelligence analysis support for planning. However, there are some suggestions for updates to the SCAME framework, though these are not necessarily a main point of discussion so much as an ancillary comment when applying its use.¹¹⁹ For example, in 1987, the SCAME technique was identified as suitable for a starting point when analyzing terrorist propaganda, but was recommended to be combined with other intelligence and analysis techniques to provide a more comprehensive approach.¹²⁰ Conversely, due to a lack of alternative methods, and the continuation of SCAME within doctrine over such a lengthy period of time, when propaganda analysis is attempted by scholars, the SCAME framework is often used without question of its applicability or limitations.¹²¹ There also exists new fields and

methods concerning analysis for social media and online activities; however, they fall outside the scope of this research and will not be fully addressed.

The Global Engagement Center (GEC) provides a new node on at least a portion of the future of propaganda analysis. It was established on March 14, 2016 by President Obama. While it is not a military organization, its purpose is “to direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.”¹²² Although technically a new agency, it actually was a replacement for the former Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, and adopted a more data-driven analytical approach.¹²³ Though it has not been specifically directed to conduct propaganda analysis as an intelligence activity, it has outsourced some of this analysis responsibility to outside organizations.¹²⁴

Summary

Early propaganda analysis theories from the 1930s until 1955 can be characterized as increasingly complex through the adoption of more scientific and quantitative approaches. What started as an academic and theoretical movement that focused on identification and classification of propaganda, mostly as an educational tool for the public to protect democracy, evolved quickly over the period to include analysis to understand the context in which propaganda occurred, to understand policy and politics behind it, and to make accurate inferences and predictions beyond what is

directly stated within propaganda itself. This evolution included the rise and fall of the use of checklist-style approaches in favor of comprehensive assessments and increased statistical analysis. The early organizations that conducted propaganda analysis appeared disjointed and their history's non-linear, with connections between them difficult to trace. Although the history of many operational propaganda organizations are well-documented, as is that of the early period of Army psychological warfare organizations, a clear and direct history of propaganda analysis within them remains cloudy. What is clear is that by 1955, something approaching the contemporary approach to propaganda analysis today was introduced, suggesting that by this period some decisions and purposes for propaganda analysis had been determined after the war. Currently, PSYOP doctrine continues to direct propaganda analysis but its purpose, role, and functions throughout the conflict continuum and across the levels of war remain unclear.

¹ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 9.

² Ibid., 10.

³ Jean Jacques Becker, *The Great War and the French People* (Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 1986), 59.

⁴ John Maxwell Hamilton, *Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American Propaganda* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2020), 454-455.

⁵ Ibid., 455.

⁶ *Webster's New International Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1983), quoted in Alfred McClung Lee, *How to Understand Propaganda* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953), 7.

⁷ Hamilton, *Manipulating the Masses*, 467.

⁸ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda," *The American Political Science Review* 21, no. 3 (1927): 627-631.

⁹ Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), ix-xi.

¹⁰ Hadley Cantril, "Propaganda Analysis," *The English Journal* 27, no. 3 (March 1938): 217-221, accessed 28 February 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2307/806063>.

¹¹ Leonard W. Doob, *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935).

¹² Alfred McClung Lee, "Interest Criteria in Propaganda Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 10, no. 2 (1945): 282-88, accessed 29 March 2021, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2085647>.

¹³ Alfred McClung Lee, *How to Understand Propaganda* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953), vii.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁵ Ivy Lee, "The Problem of International Propaganda: A New Technique Necessary in Developing Understanding between Nations," *Occasion Papers*, no. 3 (3 July 1934): 10.

¹⁶ Bess Goodyknoontz, "Propaganda: What It Is; How It Works; What to Do About It," *Phi Delta Kappa Journal* 17, no. 1 (October 1938): 6-9, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42915387>.

¹⁷ B. L. Smith, "Propaganda Analysis and the Science of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 5 (1941): 250-259, 250, 259, quoted in Alfred McClung Lee, *How to Understand Propaganda* (New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953), 28.

¹⁸ William Garber, "Propaganda Analysis-To What Ends?" *American Journal of Sociology* 48, no. 2 (1942): 240-45, accessed 28 March 2021, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769619>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Hans Speier, "On Propaganda," *Social Research* 1, no. 3 (1934): 376-80, accessed 28 March 2021, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40981387>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany D-Day to VE-Day* (New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949), 113-116, 129.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 33-40, 126-132.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ William Hummel and Keith Huntress, *The Analysis of Propaganda* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949), 73.

³⁷ Ibid., 90.

³⁸ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 111, 117.

³⁹ Ibid., 111-112.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 111.

⁴¹ Ibid., 44.

⁴² Ibid., 43-44.

⁴³ Ibid., 120.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 45.

-
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 47.
- ⁴⁷ Alexander L. George, *The Scientific Status of Propaganda Analysis* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 15 December 1954), iii.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 1-18.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Ithiel De Sola Pool, "Content Analysis for Intelligence Purposes," *World Politics* 12, no. 3 (1960): 480, accessed 28 February 2021, doi:10.2307/2009404.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² George, *The Scientific Status of Propaganda Analysis*, 4-9.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 4-9.
- ⁵⁴ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 67.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 6.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 70.
- ⁵⁷ Clyde R. Miller, "For the Analysis of Propaganda," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (January 1938): 133-134, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://doi-org.eres.qnl.qa/10.1086/265163>.
- ⁵⁸ Institute of Propaganda Analysis, Inc., "Propaganda Analysis: A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda," *Propaganda Analysis* 1, no. 1 (October 1937): 5.
- ⁵⁹ Violet Edwards, *Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis: Revised Edition of Experimental Study Materials for Use in Junior and Senior High Schools, in College and University Classes, and in Adult Study Groups* (New York: Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1938), 1.
- ⁶⁰ J. Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 144.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., 149-150.
- ⁶² Ibid., 184.; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 8840, "Establishing the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 30 July 1941, The American Presidency Project, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209811>.

-
- ⁶³ Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, 184; Roosevelt, Executive Order 8840.
- ⁶⁴ Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, 185.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 185-186.
- ⁶⁷ Oliver Read, "Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," *Radio News* 33, no. 1 (January 1945): 25-30.
- ⁶⁸ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 97.
- ⁶⁹ Alfred H. Paddock Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 45.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 94.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., 45.
- ⁷² Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 33-5, *Psychological Warfare Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 March 1955), 95.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ HQDA, FM 3-53, 6-11.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., 1-8.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., 6-12.
- ⁷⁹ See Appendix C: MARCO Analysis for details on this framework.
- ⁸⁰ HQDA, FM 3-53, 1-8.
- ⁸¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Soldier Training Publication (STP) 33-37F14-SM-TG, *Psychological Operations Specialist Skill Levels 1 through 4* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 28 August 2008), 2-3, 3-2.; See Appendix A: SCAME Analysis and Appendix B: MARCO Analysis for additional details.
- ⁸² Ibid., 3-2 to 3-3.

-
- ⁸³ HQDA, FM 3-53, 6-11.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., 6-8.
- ⁸⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-61, *Public Affairs* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 1 April 2014), 2-5.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid.
- ⁸⁹ JCS, JP 3-61, II-7.
- ⁹⁰ HQDA, FM 3-53, 6-11.
- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² Ibid.
- ⁹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Approved Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database,” accessed 27 October 2020, <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL/>.
- ⁹⁴ JCS, JP 3-13.2, B-9, II-5.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., IV-9.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., xix - xx.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid., B-8.
- ⁹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: JCS, 17 January 2017; incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018), x.
- ⁹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: JCS, 17 August 2018; validated on 2 February 2021), B-10.
- ¹⁰⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: JCS, 25 April 2018; validated 30 April 2020), VII-41.
- ¹⁰¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, May 2014).

¹⁰² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98), *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, April 2009), 2-7 - 2-8.

¹⁰³ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-53.1, *Military Information in Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, April 2015), 5-1 - 5-4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 5-2.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 5-3 - 5-4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training Publication (ATO) 3-53.2, *Military Information in Conventional Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, August 2015), 4-5 - 4-8.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 4-5 - 4-8.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 4-5 - 4-7.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 4-7.

¹¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-22.9, *Open-Source Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, August 2019), 1-4.

¹¹² Ibid., 3-8.

¹¹³ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-22.9, *Open-Source Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, July 2012), 2-14.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 1-5.

¹¹⁵ Bradley M. Carr, “Joint Interagency Task Force – Influence: The New Global Engagement Center,” (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2017).

¹¹⁶ David B. Quayle, Justin J. Schiltz, and Shawn A. Stangle, “Rethinking PSYOP: How DoD Could Restructure to Compete in the Information Environment,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2016), accessed 8 May 2021, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/51600>.

¹¹⁷ Christopher J. Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2005), accessed 8 May 2021, <https://fas.org/irp/eprint/lamb.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Richard B. Davenport, “The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 88, no. 1 (2018): 64-69.

¹¹⁹ Patrick B. Taylor, “The Weaponized Crowd: Violent Dissident Irish Republicans Exploitation of Social Identity Within Online Communities,” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015), 38-39, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA623972.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Michael T. McEwen, “A New Terrorism Intelligence Challenge,” *American Intelligence Journal* 8, no. 2 (1987): 22-24.

¹²¹ Tainov Aidar, “Achilles’ Heel of Daesh Propaganda,” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2017); Helene Lavoix, “The Islamic State Psyops – A Framework,” The Red Team Analysis Society, 8 December 2014, accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.redanalysis.org/2014/12/08/islamic-state-psyops-framework/>

¹²² U.S. Congress, House, Global Engagement Center Authorities Act of 2018, H. Res. 5681, 115th Cong., 2d sess. (2017-2018), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5681/text>.

¹²³ U.S. Department of State, “Technology Engagement Team,” accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/technology-engagement-team>.

¹²⁴ Robert McKenzie, “Measuring the Impact and Effectiveness of Adversarial Propaganda and Disinformation,” (School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY, Spring 2019), accessed 8 May 2021, <https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/capstone-projects/measuring-impact-and-effectiveness-adversarial-propaganda-and>.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In order to examine the division of psychological warfare and propaganda analysis roles, responsibilities, and methods after World War II, this paper employed a systematic qualitative methodology. It documents the origin of propaganda analysis until its entry into U.S. Army Psychological Warfare doctrine in 1955 in a form that closely resembles what currently exists. It provides a comprehensive overview of propaganda analysis' original purposes and applications that helps to clarify its current role in PSYOP doctrine. It achieves this greater understanding by answering how the division of the wartime U.S. Psychological Warfare and intelligence responsibilities helped to establish the foundations of U.S. Army PSYOP propaganda analysis doctrine.

To overcome the challenge of limited research on this topic and to collect applicable and meaningful information from this period, this paper answered the primary question by first addressing the subordinate questions sequentially as they were introduced. This was done by first exploring the policy decisions and organizational functions of the period that augment the foundational writings, theories, and history of propaganda and propaganda analysis introduced in the literature review. This provided a common understanding of the topic as well as framed the intentions and decisions made regarding the role of propaganda analysis implemented by the end of World War II and in the years immediately following. After this understanding of the events around the division of responsibilities was formed, the research addressed the effectiveness of the

larger propaganda analysis organizations and efforts based on available reviews of the organizations conducted during the period (or immediately following it) that assessed the organizations' performance at their respective assigned tasks. Finally, this analysis contributed to conclusions that incorporate the overviews of current propaganda analysis doctrine introduced in chapter 2 with the results found in chapter 4, resulting in various recommendations to improve its use on contemporary issues.

Methodology

The five subordinate questions that were the focus of this research were:

1. What was the state of propaganda analysis at the end of the war?
2. What were the relevant agencies that were created from this division?
3. What were the roles and responsibilities concerning propaganda analysis for these agencies?
4. What roles and responsibilities did Army PSYOP doctrine develop for propaganda analysis as a result?
5. How effective were these propaganda analysis techniques?

These five questions are answered by using inductive reasoning and document analysis of key documents from the period.¹ This process included a find, select, appraise, and synthesize framework that served to ultimately answer the subordinate questions. In the find step, and in order to ensure the historical accuracy of information, the documents selected for this analysis were primary sources such as official documents and memorandums by relevant government organizations, key figures, and applicable U.S. law to the greatest extent possible. Given the age, classification limitations, and difficulty

of obtaining some of the documents from this era, periods or topics that required supplemental buttressing used secondary sources or references to other primary source directives, orders, etc. found within other official documents. Collectively, these documents provided a focused understanding of the decisions (and often the reasoning behind them) made regarding propaganda analysis as a psychological warfare-related activity. See figure 1 below for an overview of this methodology.




Figure 1. Document Analysis and Methodology Overview

Source: Created by author.

Step 1: Find

The first step had two specific goals: a) the identification of reliable, accessible, and legitimate sources of primary documents that fell within the scope of this paper and b) to assist in determining additional topics and organizations that required additional research not identified in the literature review.

Step 2: Select

The second step consisted of determining which documents that were available were suitable and applicable to the propaganda organizations and propaganda analysis. This selection process used dates, organization origins, positions of key figures, and topics discussed within the documents, ultimately selecting only the documents that related to answering research questions or contributing to an understanding of the events surrounding them. The primary documents used to answer these questions consisted predominantly of executive orders, memorandums of policy, memorandums relating to discussions of committees and official communications between key figures and officials, and personal documents of relevant figures.

Step 3: Appraise

The third step used the information found within the documents to determine the relevancy of the data as well as build towards a more comprehensive understanding of what occurred during the period, prior to analysis itself. In order to deconflict proposed policy, discussions of policies, and actual implementation of decisions, selected documents were weighted. Executive Directives or Orders and U.S. law provided the most definitive accounts of dates, changes, and other data. Organizational policy documents provided the next level of authority, while official correspondence provided the least weight. On select occasions, additional context was provided by other documentation as cited in associated footnotes, and by use of reliable secondary sources. Secondary source reliability was determined as a function of the author's access to primary sources, the position of the author, the medium of the source, the time of

publication, and the preponderance of references to the material by other sources as indication of reliability. This step included some iteration back to step one as new organizations or relevant details were identified that warranted additional document finding and selection.

Additionally, and as touched upon previously, the interchangeable use of terminology provided another consideration for appraisal. For example, as psychological warfare and propaganda terms were often used synonymously, what is meant by terms such as psychological warfare intelligence and propaganda analysis can be troublesome, as the former would sometimes include propaganda analysis within its scope, but would also include assessing psychological vulnerabilities of populations, media assessments, and other types of associated information. This research therefore weighted the use of the term “propaganda analysis” more heavily than similar terms, as well as the frequently used term “analysis of propaganda,” as opposed to more generalized and less precise terms. Contextual use was also factored in to determine the author’s intended meaning when otherwise left unstated.

Step 4: Synthesize

The fourth step consisted of synthesizing the documents collected as outlined in the previous steps. These documents were first arranged chronologically to assist in determining the order events occurred to the greatest extent possible, and then coded by organization to provide easily accessible identification of changes over time. These were then grouped by theme or category, such as the Departments or Offices various organizations fell under, and the appropriate data concerning each organizations history,

functions, and actions were captured. This data was then used to provide answers to the subordinate questions. This step also included some iteration back to step one as new concepts, terminology, and relevant details were identified that warranted additional document finding and selection.

To best answer the five subordinate questions, chapter 4 was divided into four sections that best compartmentalize the data and provide clear answers. The first section provides an overview of the largest and most active propaganda analysis organizations of the war, to include an overview of the relationship with psychological warfare and intelligence. The second, third, and fourth questions were answered in the second section by chronologically ordering the largest propaganda analysis and related organizations with their smaller internal organizations nested within. Each entry included the major events, functions, decisions, policy, and evolutions of these organizations from their inception to until abolishment or until 1955 (whichever occurred first), and conveyed the significance of each. The final question of these organizations' effectiveness was answered by a focused examination of only the most significant propaganda analysis organizations as determined in the second section. Their respective levels of effectiveness were based on assessments and reviews done by officials during the period. Though this did not provide a metric that was universally applicable across each organization, it did provide some measure of how well received the organizations' activities were by outsiders, coordinators, and participants. The longevity and scale of the activities also factored in as a function of each organizations' overall propaganda analysis effectiveness.

Document analysis offered an attractive, efficient, and repeatable method for this topic; however, it was not without limitations and disadvantages. Some disadvantages included insufficient details within selected documents, difficulty in obtaining documents, and biased document selectivity.² These disadvantages were mitigated by a number of means. Documents with insufficient details did not inherently limit analysis given that the granular details of individual documents are not critical to the overall research, and instead provide small details to a larger body of understanding. As long as the overall intention, purpose, or decisions from individuals and organizations studied was understood through the whole of documents selected, individual document deficiencies were mitigated. Likewise, limitations on obtaining specific documents were mitigated by the wide-ranging selection of documents over a period of time and representing tangential issues, and thus provided at least a broad understanding of the larger discussions that occurred. As were available and applicable, missing or insufficiently detailed documents were augmented by secondary information on the topic, such as other completed studies. Lastly, selection bias was mitigated by the inclusion of documents that met the selection criteria and directly or indirectly discussed propaganda analysis, to include activities that showed intentions or results of having performed propaganda analysis or related analysis.

Sources

Significant material was available through online databases, through libraries, and within various online archives. The official CIA Freedom of Information Archive (FOIA) website in particular provided a substantial number of directly scanned memorandums,

policy documents, and official correspondence from the period, especially concerning the FBIS and its conduct of propaganda analysis. The Department of State online archive, online National Archives, and other public university online archives provided other large portions of relevant documents. Other sources existed within the CARL library and through interlibrary loans, the author's private collection, and in online databases such as JSTOR and others. Academic literature was assessed based on the location and time of its publication, the expertise of its authors, and the availability of alternate literature on that topic as discussed previously.

Ethical Assurances

This research took care to remain transparent and accountable. All sources were carefully cited or otherwise annotated in order to allow for future validation, follow-up, and clarification of material. The documents used for analysis were all publicly available and consideration was given to the reliability, source, bias, and motives for each document. No major concerns over disingenuous documents or implicit bias by document authors or archival personnel was identified during research.

This research attempted to mitigate any sources of bias. In order to help mitigate author bias, the thesis committee included subject matter experts with diverse backgrounds, selected data was from a variety of source material, and all known assumptions were clearly annotated in chapter 1. Particular attention was paid to the biases and motives for individually authored internal memorandums of a formerly classified nature (but now declassified), in that there may have been reasonable belief at the time that such documents may not have been expected to be viewed by a larger or

informal audience, and as such, may have represented a unique individual's perspective or bias as opposed to that of the larger organization or U.S. government itself.

The study did not include human subject research, interviews, or material from non-literature sources.

Summary

The result of this methodology and research directly answered the primary research question of how an understanding of the division of the wartime psychological warfare responsibilities helps to clarify the conduct of Army propaganda analysis. It also answered the five subordinate questions and fulfilled its purpose of providing additional clarity to some of the confusion of using propaganda analysis. It used credible sources and clear methods to find, select, appraise, and synthesize documents and material that resulted in new understanding of the topic, and provided the basis for sound recommendations to current Army propaganda analysis activities

¹ Glenn Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (August 2009), 27-40, DOI:10.3316/QRJ0902027.

² Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

There is today a special need for propaganda analysis. America is beset by a confusion of conflicting propagandas, a Babel of voices, warnings, charges, counter-charges, assertions, and contradictions assailing us continually.

—Institute of Propaganda Analysis, Inc., “Propaganda Analysis: A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda“

Section 1: The State of Propaganda Analysis through WWII

Propaganda use and propaganda analysis were largely intertwined during the period, with many of the psychological warfare organizations demonstrating both functions. Propaganda analysis itself was largely characterized as decentralized throughout the period, and though significant coordination existed amongst nearly all of the larger organizations, each conducted different versions of what each considered propaganda analysis, or what can be characterized as such in hindsight. Overall, there was no clear methodology to rely on. Each organization had its own propaganda sources and purpose for its analysis within its larger functions; therefore, effectiveness and utility of propaganda analysis varied. Its use was also closely related to intelligence functions, both in intelligence-based organizations as well as more operationally focused organizations. However, there are simply too many intelligence organizations, well-covered in other publications, that sprung up just prior to and during the war to warrant significant space within this thesis. Although several organizations are included, they do not represent the full breadth of the activity that occurred. The exception to much of this was the activities of the FBIS, which is reserved for expansion in Section 2.

Coordinator of Information

The Coordinator of Information (COI), directed by then Colonel William J. Donovan, was established by Presidential Directive on July 11, 1941 and was given broad authority to centralize intelligence efforts.¹ This organization was focused predominantly on building out what would later become the basis of the American intelligence community, and included a new emphasis on covert intelligence. In addition to its intelligence functions, the COI also had connections to early psychological warfare, such as the Library of Congress's former Division of Special Information renamed as the Research and Analysis Branch, that included some research and evaluation on psychological components of the early war effort that were not available to the public.² The COI had other connections to many of the earliest propaganda analysis organizations throughout the government. The Foreign Information Service Branch (FIS) was established alongside the COI and was headed by Robert E. Sherwood.³ It acted as the principle "psychological warfare-instrument" of the COI, chiefly by dissemination means, and worked in conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission and Office of Facts and Figures for enemy propaganda analysis as well as conducting counter-propaganda.⁴ It was ultimately transferred to the Office of War Information in June 1942 and its functions continued by the Overseas Operations Branch.⁵ The overall COI functions of gathering public information and dissemination abroad were transferred to the Office of War Information while the Office of the Coordinator itself (along with the Research and Analysis Branch) became the Office of Strategic Services by Executive Order on June 13, 1942.⁶

Office for Emergency Management

The authority for establishing an Office for Emergency Management was authorized by Executive Order on September 8, 1939 that stipulated the creation of an office during or just prior to an emergency to assist with the increased coordination that would be required for its management.⁷ The Office for Emergency Management was thus established by a subsequent Executive Order on May 25, 1940 for the express purpose of assisting the President and management of the Executive Branch during the looming threat of war.⁸ This Office would spawn a diverse and complicated range of organizations within it for the execution of war-time functions, several of which included psychological warfare, intelligence, and propaganda analysis responsibilities.

Established by Executive Order on July 30, 1941, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) lay within the Office for Emergency Management.⁹ Its purpose was to improve and maintain relationships within the Western Hemisphere to prevent communist and fascist incursions through information and counter propaganda efforts, as well as the conduct of propaganda analysis.¹⁰ It would later become the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) on March 23, 1945 before transferring its information functions to the Department of State on August 31, 1945. It would then be abolished by Executive Order and its remaining functions also transferred to the Department of State on April 10, 1946.¹¹

Originally established within the Office for Emergency Management on October 24, 1941 by Executive Order, the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) contained several smaller offices concerned with propaganda and its analysis.¹² Its overall purpose was for “facilitating the dissemination of factual information to the citizens and country on the

progress of the defense effort and on the defense policies and activities of the Government.”¹³ The OFF also participated as a member of the Committee on War Information that, amongst other policy-making and coordination functions, “outlined general propaganda objectives in the domestic field.”¹⁴ It also contained numerous offices that conducted various levels of propaganda analysis.¹⁵ The Office of Facts and Figures was abolished and its functions transferred to the Office of War Information by Executive Order on June 13, 1942.¹⁶ See figure 2 for a detailed breakdown of various Psychological Warfare and propaganda analysis offices within the Office for Emergency Management.




Figure 2. Offices within the Office for Emergency Management

Source: Created by author.

The Office of War Information

The Office of War Information (OWI) was one of the primary organizations created during the war for conducting activities involving propaganda and propaganda

analysis. It was established on June 13, 1942 by Executive Order within the Office for Emergency Management, and its purpose was to coordinate governmental war information programs at home and abroad.¹⁷ Upon its creation, it inherited the functions of the OFF and the Office of Government Reports, as well as the coordinating functions of the Division of Information and the Foreign Information Service Branch.¹⁸ The various functions and organizations within the OWI were varied, but originally concerned the coordination and handling of domestic information and overt propaganda use overseas, while sharing some overseas responsibilities and covert propaganda usage with the Office of Strategic Services.¹⁹ This arrangement was first altered in December 1942 to give OWI responsibility for overt propaganda while the Office of Strategic Services and military theaters maintained the responsibility for covert propaganda and psychological warfare operations respectively.²⁰ This was again changed by Executive Order on March 9, 1943 to include planning, development, and all dissemination of information, except in the case of military theaters where the Army and Navy would have control as well as in Latin America.²¹

Various organizations within the OWI had direct propaganda and propaganda analysis functions, while others had functions that included what would later be considered elements of psychological warfare. For example, many of the Foreign Outposts within the OWI had functions that ranged from creating and disseminating their own propaganda to intelligence operations and monitoring of enemy propaganda activity.²² The Foreign News Bureau, established in March 1944 (the successor to the Foreign Sources Division of the News Bureau), also had functions that “included the

analysis of enemy propaganda techniques.”²³ The Overseas Operations Branch was directed for a time by Robert E. Sherwood and created from the Foreign Information Service of the COI.²⁴ It conducted much of the overseas wartime propaganda until it was transferred to the Interim International Information Service of the Department of State (later becoming the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs), and coordinated frequently with military operations.²⁵ Its News Division also conducted limited propaganda analysis.²⁶

Other Offices within the OWI had smaller propaganda analysis efforts. The San Francisco Office specifically had a wide range of functions that included propaganda analysis of Japanese material, which was transferred to the Department of State’s Interim International Information Service in August 1945.²⁷ The burden of Japanese propaganda analysis was also shared with other offices such as the Analysis and Research Bureau, created in 1945, that “took over some of the functions of the Propaganda Analysis and Intelligence Divisions of the earlier News and Intelligence Bureau.”²⁸ On the European side, the Policy Division within the Office of War Information in London Office handled both operations intelligence as well as propaganda analysis.²⁹

Despite these smaller efforts, the bulk of OWI propaganda analysis was done through the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence (formerly the Bureau of Research and Analysis).³⁰ Its analyses were also worked extensively through the Department of State, military intelligence organizations, and the Analysis Division that worked closely with the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and Field Intelligence Division.³¹ This complicated arrangement was streamlined in 1944 to function through the Central

Intelligence Division, Regional Analysis Division, and “a special research unit known as the Foreign Morale Analysis Division.”³² The latter Division specifically was created under an arrangement between “the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department General Staff to provide information about morale,” where the OWI Offices focused on more publicly accessible information while the War Department used military sources.³³ These two organizations would collectively become the Joint Morale Survey in spring 1945, with the OWI acting through its new Morale Research Unit and the Army through its Propaganda Section.³⁴

Propaganda directed towards Latin-American countries was handled separately within the OWI. For this reason, it included a technical legal staff within its Latin-American Section that worked alongside the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, established by “Resolution XVII of the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics” between January 15-28, 1942.³⁵ The Committee’s purpose was to “carry out the program of political defense” against, among other activities, “subversive propaganda carried on by the Axis Powers.”³⁶ Although it had a broad range of activities and concerns regarding propaganda largely focused on that of censorship and limiting its dissemination,³⁷ it also included propaganda analysis.³⁸ Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles suggested specifically that the Committee establish an “information center” to work in conjunction with Professor Doob at the OCIAA and conduct deliberate propaganda analysis, while acknowledging the significant time and resource required for such an undertaking.³⁹ The local offices in Montevideo would also conduct its own propaganda analysis.⁴⁰ The purpose of this analysis was to

inoculate against propaganda as opposed to countering it directly, which he believed was less effective.⁴¹ The results of these analyses were then directed to capture “the sources, methods, themes, techniques, and effect of such propaganda.”⁴² The Latin-American Section within the OWI was terminated with the War Division in 1945,⁴³ while the larger Advisory Committee was terminated on November 3, 1948.⁴⁴ The OWI itself was terminated on August 31, 1945 by Executive Order.⁴⁵

The Office of Strategic Services

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established with William J. Donovan as its Director by Presidential Military Order under the JCS on June 13, 1942 and consumed much of the former functions and offices of the COI.⁴⁶ In addition to the collection and analysis of strategic information, it also included “strategic services” and “secret operations” that would become the covert activities of the government and military abroad.⁴⁷ Donovan successfully spent much of the war expanding the OSS and various organizations within it to conduct intelligence, analysis, and various flavors of psychological warfare that included propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and other activities.⁴⁸ He also helped to establish committees and boards such as the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to connect his activities with those of the military.⁴⁹

At the time, propaganda analysis was very much a subdivision of the larger intelligence ecosystem. As such, it lived on in the COI acquired Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), the “Bad Eyes Brigade,” and its associated propaganda analysis functions from its former incarnation.⁵⁰ The OSS was abolished and its remaining functions transferred by Executive Order on September 20, 1945.⁵¹ The R&A Branch was moved

to the State Department and renamed as the Office of Research and Intelligence, and the functions not directly transferred to the State Department were ultimately transferred to the War Department.⁵²

The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee

Due to the growing fears of foreign psychological warfare and the lack of a concerted U.S. effort for the same, the Army G-2 suggested a JCS-level committee in order to coordinate all of the disparate agencies with operations related to psychological warfare.⁵³ The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) was thus created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 3, 1942 and was “envisaged as the ultimate authority over both foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations.”⁵⁴ Its functions included the planning of psychological warfare “in combat theaters and enemy controlled areas,” as well as to develop plans and “integrate psychological warfare with military strategy.”⁵⁵ It would later be reorganized in June 1942 with Donovan as its head so that it could better coordinate between the JCS and OSS and included an advisory panel with the OWI for additional coordination.⁵⁶ This Committee functioned in parallel to the Committee on War Information Policy which included the same members.⁵⁷ The committee’s functions were later absorbed by various other agencies.⁵⁸

Army Psychological Warfare and Propaganda Analysis

European Theater

Similar to other government organizations that involved propaganda, psychological warfare, and intelligence, the three activities shared a complicated history within the U.S. Army through World War II. Additionally, and especially in Europe, both

propaganda and propaganda analysis also shared a history between U.S. and British organizations. The Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID), or G-2, was created in 1885 and modeled after British intelligence organizations.⁵⁹ During World War I, the predecessor Psychological Subsection of M.I.2, Military Intelligence Division, was charged with the collection of information on enemy propaganda, but also included other psychological warfare functions.⁶⁰ Prior to the war on the American side there was within the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), G-2, War Department, a small Psychological Warfare Section.⁶¹ Just preceding the outbreak of war in June 1941, the Secretary of War directed the creation of a Special Studies Group within the G-2 that was tasked with psychological warfare responsibilities.⁶² A few months later in March 1942, just prior to the reorganization of the G-2, the group was renamed as the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2.⁶³ This unit would see almost immediate action in North Africa.⁶⁴ In December 1942, the responsibility for Psychological Warfare was further divided so that theater commanders would control psychological warfare in their areas with the support of OSS restricted to those military operations.⁶⁵ The Psychological Warfare Branch was then abolished, at least in the European theater.⁶⁶ It was replaced Within the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe by the larger Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), and it worked with the OWI and OSS on the U.S.-side, and with the Political Intelligence Department (PID) within the British Ministry of Information (MOI) as well as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), to coordinate the use of propaganda and other psychological warfare activities.⁶⁷

At the time, the belief was that psychological warfare policies originated at the highest levels of government and not necessarily within the higher echelon command within the military.⁶⁸ As the PWD did not maintain formal relations with the Department of State and the British Foreign Office, it relied on the OWI and PID to conduct this liaison.⁶⁹ Near the end of the war, and upon dissolution of SHAEF, the American portion of the PWD would become the Information Control Service led by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure.⁷⁰ Within SHAEF and the PWD, propaganda analysis was provided by the PID and OSS.⁷¹

Within the European Theater of Operations' Psychological Warfare Division, the intelligence section and its activities acted as both a producer and consumer of intelligence for its own forces as well as the armies it supported. A separate Psychological Warfare Intelligence mission existed that deliberately set itself apart from traditional military intelligence concerns and instead focused on political and morale conditions.⁷² Although some of this specialty intelligence requirement was pulled from traditional G-2/G-3 sources, it was also generated internally through interrogations, surveys, and most notably through monitoring of foreign broadcasts.⁷³ Some of this specialty intelligence was also born from the analysis of collected enemy documents, but this was not explicitly tied to propaganda documents exclusively, and a lack of doctrine in this area was notably mentioned.⁷⁴ Political intelligence from these sources was then shared with the G-5 as it generally related to morale and "political climate."⁷⁵

Propaganda analysis by or through the PWD that did occur proved to have varying levels of effectiveness during the European campaign. The monitoring of foreign

printed news and broadcast provided both current intelligence summaries as well as less clearly defined propaganda analysis and “enemy propaganda trends.”⁷⁶ Over time, the outputs of these activities became increasingly valued sources of information throughout the armies and by outside G-2 sections and included reports of Russian, German, and other foreign groups.⁷⁷ Whereas printed news monitoring was conducted at a more tactical level by the units themselves, European radio broadcast monitoring and analysis largely occurred through the BBC.⁷⁸ BBC analysis for its part represented a larger, dedicated, and centralized function of over 1,000 personnel using “elaborate technical equipment,” such as German Hellschreiber device’s that could immediately and automatically print received signals by radio.⁷⁹ Summaries of the tactical reports proved especially effective in the field, partially due to their timeliness, but the analysis as a result of outside organizations and of a less tactical nature proved much less effective for Army purposes.⁸⁰ Some of this invariably included the results from the OWI and OSS’s own propaganda analysis operations, however, whether these organizations conducted propaganda analysis specifically to support Army PWD, for their own purposes, or on behalf of other agencies that they supported with intelligence outside the military is unclear.⁸¹ Regardless, there was a deliberate and on-going relationship between the production and dissemination of propaganda analysis-based intelligence between these organizations and the Army.⁸² What is notably absent was the consideration of conducting propaganda analysis for the specific purpose of countering it directly.

While those Psychological Warfare organizations focused on operations concerning propaganda with auxiliary propaganda analysis functions, there was also a

Propaganda Branch that included deliberate propaganda analysis for a number of purposes. This Propaganda Branch was also established within the Military Intelligence Division under the G-2 on November 15, 1943.⁸³ It existed principally for the additional coordination and planning between the military services, OWI, CIAA, and the State Department.⁸⁴ It also maintained responsibility for psychological warfare within the whole of the War Department.⁸⁵ Additionally, the Chief of the Propaganda Branch acted as the Army Member of the JCS Liaison with the Overseas Planning Board, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, and the State Department, as well as Army Air Force interest in Psychological Warfare after its personnel were absorbed back in to the Propaganda Branch.⁸⁶ The Propaganda Branch's functions also included the responsibility for "the preparation and dissemination of propaganda items for the use of the OWI, CIAA and other non-military and quasi-military organizations."⁸⁷

Within the Propaganda Branch was an Operations Section as well as a Research and Analysis Section. The Operations Section operated as the name suggests and mostly handled administrative requirements, but also was responsible for lesser studies and reports on foreign propaganda than its Research and Analysis Section counterpart.⁸⁸ The Research and Analysis Section was responsible for both daily and periodic reports specifically from foreign propaganda analysis as well as the analysis of "Allied intelligence reports to determine effectiveness of Allied propaganda."⁸⁹

Pacific Theater

The Pacific established its own Psychological Warfare organizations somewhat separate from that of its European counterparts. Not long after the victory in the Battle of

Hollandia in April 1944, the Commander-in-Chief directed a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) be established.⁹⁰ Given the lack of qualified personnel, the new PWB relied heavily on the OWI based out of Australia,⁹¹ though there is some disagreement as to how extensive the coordination actually was.⁹² Pacific PWB elements also coordinated with overseas units of the OSS.⁹³ The new PWB developed its own Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan that included similar purposes as to those of its European counterpart, generally related to the dissemination of truthful messages to degrade enemy morale and to encourage civilian resistance to enemy forces.⁹⁴ These tasks also included similar use of radio, leaflets, newspapers, loudspeakers, and by directly influencing civilians and POWs when possible.⁹⁵ Though the PWB was interested in determining psychological vulnerabilities of target audiences within its area of operations, it did not include deliberate functions of propaganda analysis within its Basic Plan.⁹⁶

In the Pacific theater there were also numerous elements using propaganda and conducting propaganda analysis. The Psychological Warfare Section of the CINCPAC-CINCPOA was producing booklets of its own audited propaganda material used throughout the Pacific region.⁹⁷ The booklet did maintain a consistent formatting for presentation of what data was collected including: an assigned serial number; the assumed time, place, and purpose of the propaganda; some basic comments on its appearance; a specific description of its material and measurements; a direct translation of its message; and its perceived effectiveness (this was directed to be included, but was often omitted in practice) alongside a copy of the propaganda itself.⁹⁸

Non-psychological warfare elements also had a hand in conducting some level of propaganda analysis. Near the end of the war, Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) G-2 was including some propaganda analysis within its audit of the region. Although the term propaganda analysis was not explicitly used, the ‘propaganda efforts’ sections within the audits included many of the features present in other deliberate propaganda analysis efforts.⁹⁹ These included overviews and trends of Japanese radio broadcasts as they evolved over the period, some basic conclusions based on broad Japanese messages, and notably, “propaganda implications.”¹⁰⁰ These implications suggested strategic inferences, for example that the Japanese were using their propaganda messaging as a means to influence future Allied negotiations on peace in more favorable terms.¹⁰¹ This was not a unique occurrence as other strategic implications included: an increasing promotion of the need to maintain control over parts of China and Korea as a critical component to the empire’s longevity towards the end of the war, the fear of Russia’s future involvement, the promotion of the kamikaze spirit, and attempts to promote Muslim fanaticism in Japanese controlled areas.¹⁰² Like many other psychological warfare and propaganda efforts of the time, the summary of the propaganda in the theater nearly seamlessly transitioned from discussing enemy propaganda, friendly propaganda, and effects of each without clear delineation. Its analysis also varied from tactical analysis to strategic analysis with little or no distinction between them, nor suggestions on how the analysis process used varied between the levels of war. For example, these reports included Japanese propaganda themes used operationally on Allied forces, Japanese propaganda responses to Allied operations directed towards its own populations

such as admitting naval defeats, and the psychological effects of conventional Allied military operations on the Japanese such as B-29s bombing the homeland.¹⁰³

These G-2 produced reports included other elements of psychological warfare, analysis, and even the evaluation of propaganda efforts. As part of the Psychological Warfare and Battlefield Propaganda section, Allied propaganda was suggested to be an inevitable part of Allied advances in the war.¹⁰⁴ To support this claim, the report provides a breakdown of Allied propaganda efforts on the Japanese, by phases in the war, coding systems, and other administrative tracking so as to provide a robust picture of the measures of performance and effectiveness, based on POW feedback and responses to different themes.¹⁰⁵ It also included observations of civilian psychology and responses to U.S. presence, performance indicators such as statements of POWs that indicated entire units changing behavior and surrendering as a result of Allied leaflet operations, and an overview of various Allied leaflets used on the Japanese for a variety of purposes.¹⁰⁶

By the end of the war, psychological warfare and by extension, use of propaganda and leaflets, was at least becoming more solidified within the military and perhaps even growing in interest amongst the rank-and-file servicemembers.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, several propaganda-associated entities were working collectively to make assessments of the psychological warfare progress and conducting propaganda analysis.¹⁰⁸ During this period, the PWB regularly received copies of FCC analysis of Japanese radio reactions, which was the same office that provided ongoing propaganda analysis through and after the war as the FBIS.¹⁰⁹ Through 1944 and 1945, the OWI was providing a more comprehensive look of psychological warfare issues, propaganda techniques, and

propaganda analysis throughout the Pacific in a series of monthly reports.¹¹⁰ Although it would also include details on the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) in Europe, its focus was on Pacific propaganda use and served to provide tips of effective practices on Allied propaganda as used by the OWI.¹¹¹ While the newsletter covered a variety of aspects of psychological warfare, it did not use the term ‘propaganda analysis’ nor use any systematic approaches, at least as presented to convey the types of information associated with propaganda analysis in U.S. academia. This may have been a result of the overt nature of the propaganda, specifically that it unambiguously came from the Japanese government and had clear target audiences according to its location and medium. Space devoted to Allied propaganda was focused in various ways on best practices, general overviews, measures of performance in the theater, and motivational or explanatory stories of previous psychological warfare accolades, such as the emphasis on OWI activities when MacArthur returned to the Philippines and used radio and leaflets to announce his return.¹¹² These reports also made more of an effort to provide a distinction between strategic and tactical propaganda use.¹¹³

Aside from these examples, psychological warfare and its relationship with intelligence generally seems to have been handled differently in the Southwest Pacific theater. Even within the War Department General Staff, the Psychological Warfare Section did not supplant but rather implemented military intelligence.¹¹⁴ This meant that the organization’s Collation Section would instead gather its psychological data through other existing military intelligence agencies and provide refined objectives to the Planning Section as a product, rather than developing its own separate intelligence.¹¹⁵

As a result of the experiences and successes in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), a recommendation was made for the development of a Psychological Warfare Course, and a permanent Psychological Warfare Section be established in the War Department General Staff.¹¹⁶ These recommendations, as well as the various functions of the Psychological Warfare Section included resembled the course and organizations that soon followed.¹¹⁷

Other Psychological Warfare and Propaganda-Related Organizations

The Library of Congress

The Library of Congress was established “to provide library facilities and services for the Congress of the United States,” but by the onset of World War II, even it had developed a relationship with propaganda and propaganda analysis.¹¹⁸ Its librarian from 1939 to 1944, Archibald MacLeish, was often pulled away from this duty, first to serve as Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, and then later to serve as the Assistant Director of the Office of War Information; both organizations deeply involved in propaganda analysis.¹¹⁹ In addition, amongst other special wartime services provided, the Library maintained an Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications that conducted propaganda analysis from 1941 until 1943, and a Division of Special Information that was later transferred to the Office of Strategic Services in 1942.¹²⁰ The Experimental Division of the Study of Wartime Communications’ director was none other than Harold Lasswell, who used both a content analysis and somewhat quantitative approach to propaganda or literature analysis.¹²¹

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice

The War Division, preceded by the Special Defense Unit, was established on May 19, 1942 to bring together several of the Department of Justice's organizational units.¹²² Its offices would include the Special War Policies Unit, which was "responsible for directing and coordinating activities of the Department of Justice relating to espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversive activities, and the registration of foreign agents."¹²³ Within this and alongside the FBI, its Subversives Administration Section would investigate subversive activities by Nazis, Communists, and Fascists, while its "Organizations and Propaganda Analysis Section collected, analyzed, and organized information on individuals, organizations, and publications in the United States that were considered to be seditious or potentially seditious."¹²⁴ Additionally, it included a Foreign Language Press Section that both translated and made reports from foreign-language press.¹²⁵ Collectively, these sections conducted, amongst other activities, statistical analyses of propaganda themes.¹²⁶ The Special War Policies Unit was abolished during a reorganization of the War Division on August 28, 1943 and its various functions were transferred to the Department's Criminal Division.¹²⁷ It would be abolished on December 28, 1945.¹²⁸

The Post Office Department

Little changed within the Post Office during the war, however it too included assistance regarding concerns over propaganda by working with the War and Navy Departments to prevent the circulation of unauthorized foreign propaganda through the work of the Office of the Solicitor.¹²⁹ The Office of the Solicitor even went so far in this

as to make “analyses of propaganda contained in second-, third-, and fourth-class mail originating within the United States,” though this analysis was focused on merely identifying it for the purposes of barring the sender from future postal use.¹³⁰

Section 2: Post-WWII Psychological Warfare and Propaganda Analysis

At the end of World War II, military and government leaders remained uncertain as to what form a next global conflict might take. There were continued concerns over the effectiveness of new mass communication capabilities gaining widespread adoption, fears of ideological conflicts and the spread of communism, all intertwined with the threat of Soviet tank divisions in Russia and a looming arms race.¹³¹ Before addressing the Psychological Warfare agencies borne of the recent conflict, a brief coverage of the U.S.’s growing fear from psychological and unconventional warfare in the coming Cold War was warranted. After this short detour the thesis continues by addressing the most significant agencies created and their purpose and functions as they relate to propaganda analysis.

This era was marked by the belief that the new availability of mass communication would have dramatic effects in battle, allowing commanders to communicate immediately with the enemy in a manner never before possible during combat.¹³² The optimism in this capability from many was almost palpable.¹³³ This was combined with the immense intelligence potential that new broadcast monitoring abilities seemed to suggest, and could not be achieved previously or by other means.¹³⁴ There was also a sense of urgency in using any and all means to determine Soviet intentions.¹³⁵ The intelligence community, in “light of the universal cry for more information,” believed

that there were many areas of overt information only partially or inadequately tapped.¹³⁶ In discussing the role of intelligence and the CIA in the early years after the end of World War II, the CIA's Director discussed the failures of U.S. intelligence that resulted in the bombing of Pearl Harbor while noting the success of Japanese intelligence from continuous monitoring of U.S. broadcasts.¹³⁷ With increased efforts in this field, the Director stated that by 1948, roughly 80 percent of U.S. intelligence was then derived from publicly available media.¹³⁸ These broadcasts were highlighted to be not just news and public statements of leaders, but also specifically that of propaganda.¹³⁹ As a result, the period, the agency, and the intelligence community placed additional emphasis and importance in the monitoring and analysis of propaganda.

In addition to these beliefs, there was a general concern immediately following the war over a much broader question regarding the future and structure of the U.S. intelligence community. There was an increasing emphasis on and appreciation for the role of intelligence contributing to the national security.¹⁴⁰ One of the first and loudest was Donovan who sought to continue the evolution of his OSS and vision with a central intelligence agency reporting to the President,¹⁴¹ and early on rivaled by Hoover and others who sought to grow the FBI's Special Intelligence Service (SIS) success in the Western Hemisphere alongside support from the War and Navy Departments.¹⁴² Although there were some other opinions,¹⁴³ and interim solutions, Donovan's vision, or something quite close to it, ultimately won.¹⁴⁴ Unsurprisingly, given Donovan's earlier emphasis on the role of propaganda, one of the early functions of the newly established Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was the "conduct of all Federal monitoring of

press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security.”¹⁴⁵ Despite this declaration, propaganda analysis was but one of many smaller activities that were temporarily lost within the changing winds.

The Concern over Psychological Warfare

Embedded within and around the larger intelligence coordination and agency questions was the notion of a field of psychological warfare. This period included an underlying assumption amongst policy makers and members of the defense sector that the threat of an asymmetric and sudden psychological warfare threat loomed just over the horizon, and would erupt with little or no notice.¹⁴⁶ This threat was described as “active psycho-political propaganda” by “powerful foreign groups,” “based upon carefully designed plans of military character carried out systematically,” “using radio and press” as “revolutionary agitation and propaganda.”¹⁴⁷ In response, a significant concern grew over and efforts to understand, counter, and conduct psychological warfare, as part of the information and intelligence requirements and beyond.¹⁴⁸ The literature review chapter, when covering the introduction of propaganda, as well as the original concerns over propaganda analysis, first introduced some of the more general concerns over the nature of psychological vulnerabilities of the period.

As Germany’s use of propaganda increased, and Allied concerns in response grew, the concept of a new way of fighting and winning wars gradually took shape. This idea was manifested over the course of several years by way of a multitude of evolutionary, complementary, redundant, and competing organizations that sought to

explore, understand, and implement new strategies and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare. This section does not capture the complete history, or the nuances of organizations introduced, other than to provide significant and particularly noteworthy events that directly or indirectly affected the evolution and conduct of propaganda analysis during the period.

A National Psychological Warfare Organization

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was established in December 1944 as a largely informal group to coordinate the common interests of the War, Navy, and State Departments. This included some planning for how to handle post-war Germany, for example. In the fall of 1947, the Committee was renamed the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANAC and sometimes SANACC) to reflect the changes to the structure of the military establishment. It was ultimately terminated in June 1949.¹⁴⁹

Amongst the great many issues the Committee explored was the issue of a future peacetime and wartime psychological warfare organization.¹⁵⁰ The Committee defined psychological warfare as, “the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims.”¹⁵¹ The Committee determined that each of its member organizations had a vital interest in the creation of psychological warfare plans naturally in alignment with the functions of each respective department, such as the National Intelligence Authority responsible for the intelligence component.¹⁵² It therefore

proposed a Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) with responsibility for “policies, plans, and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare.”¹⁵³ This included the authority to coordinate psychological warfare plans in the absence of an alternative authority.¹⁵⁴

In an effort to establish a more enduring psychological warfare organization, it further recommended a Washington-based Central Psychological Warfare Committee (CPWC) (with members from Defense and the Central Intelligence Group) that reported to the President or his National Security Council.¹⁵⁵ This plan also included maintaining psychological warfare components within each of the Departments, to include within the theater commander’s organization in the event of war.¹⁵⁶ The peacetime organization was imagined to have a counterpropaganda function as a result of the analysis of foreign peacetime and wartime propaganda, however the wartime organization omitted this function.¹⁵⁷ A later report from the PWC determined “any implementation of psychological warfare pertaining to Intelligence would be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Group under policies established by the National Intelligence Authority in concert with SWNCC and JCS,” although it was unclear if propaganda analysis was considered a part of this.¹⁵⁸ The Subcommittee did establish the PWC on April 30, 1947.¹⁵⁹

When deciding on membership participation in the psychological warfare subcommittee, the Central Intelligence Group had difficulty deciding which section was most appropriate, the intelligence-focused Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) or the operations-focused Office of Special Operations.¹⁶⁰ The recommendation favored the

Office of Special Operations, which at the time did not include the use of propaganda or its analysis as part of its directed functions.¹⁶¹ This difficulty in assessing the proper place of psychological warfare, or more specifically that of propaganda, was a systemic challenge within that of the larger construct of the new Central Intelligence Group. The Office of Operations and the ORE were already having difficulty distinguishing not only the correct office from which to analyze foreign broadcasts, but also on what constituted propaganda for analysis and the extent of analytical rigor that should be applied.¹⁶² In June of 1947, the PWC was renamed as the Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations (SSE), and no other wartime psychological warfare organization existed at that time.¹⁶³

In September of 1947, this new Special Studies and Evaluations subcommittee determined that there should be established in wartime (or threat of war) a National Psychological Warfare Organization under either the National Security Council (NSC) or the SANACC.¹⁶⁴ In addition, and outside wartime, it concluded that the Army, Navy, and Air Force each establish and train “a Psychological Warfare Specialist category.”¹⁶⁵ By late 1947, the Committee was coming to the conclusion that the immediate establishment of a National Psychological Warfare Organization was not needed, but that the State Department would have the primary function of any propaganda measures in a time of peace rather than a security council.¹⁶⁶ An Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs would conduct the coordination of all U.S. foreign information measures, and included “coordination of all federal foreign information facilities,” as well as the development of “specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction

favorable to US interests and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.”¹⁶⁷ This would include the use of overt propaganda and coordination with the CIA for the use of covert or “black” propaganda.¹⁶⁸ The CIA, however, was very resistant to sharing its covert component of psychological warfare, namely covert propaganda use, with outside departments, to include that of the military.¹⁶⁹

In February 1948, George Kennan brought discussion on the topic of the psychological warfare organization by the SANACC to an abrupt halt.¹⁷⁰ On March 23, 1949, the National Security Council approved a directive that the State Department, in collaboration with other applicable government organizations, establish an organization that would be responsible for the planning of wartime overt psychological warfare, while also discontinuing the SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations.¹⁷¹ Although during this period the SANACC had not entirely ignored propaganda analysis in its discussions, and even went so far as to “actively consider” a National Institute for Propaganda Analysis that was referred to the CIA for potential action, there was no evidence uncovered that this recommendation was actually implemented.¹⁷²

The Psychological Intelligence Committee

Although much of the momentum of a national psychological warfare organization was lost, discussion concerning psychological warfare issues did not end. To respond to the continued looming threat and potential of psychological warfare, the DCI put together a Psychological Intelligence Committee (PIC) on January 13, 1950.¹⁷³ The purpose of the PIC was the coordination of “the psychological intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies as they affect the national security,

including intelligence support for the Foreign Information Program and for the planning of psychological warfare.”¹⁷⁴ The committee served an advisory role rather than making any substantive policy or decisions.¹⁷⁵ The FBI and Atomic Energy Commission (EAC) had little interest, but it included membership from the State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and other agencies.¹⁷⁶ As one goal of the PIC was to develop all phases of intelligence production plans for psychological intelligence, the State Department took issue with some elements of the proposed charter.¹⁷⁷ Although the original draft charter included coordination of intelligence functions across government agencies, it made no mention directly of propaganda analysis.¹⁷⁸

Despite its proposed charter, some within the Psychological Intelligence Committee struggled early on to distinguish between intelligence requirements unique for psychological operations and those of traditional political, diplomatic, economic, and other activities already conducted.¹⁷⁹ In fact, the Committee refused to define a central term in its organization and charter, that of Psychological Intelligence, and thus continued to blur the lines on what the committee was trying to accomplish.¹⁸⁰ By the end of 1950, and despite numerous meetings, the Committee had determined that the planning for psychological warfare was still inadequate for both war and peacetime operations and that the effort to this end be “substantially increased” from its small 25-personnel planning effort.¹⁸¹ Within this recommendation, the Committee suggested that the Department of State contribute “analyses of substantive foreign propaganda and of propaganda and overt psychological warfare operations of enemy, allied and neutral countries” to the national effort.¹⁸² The Army and other services, on the other hand, were

suggested to focus on analyses of enemy morale and contribute “specialized military knowledge to current intelligence estimates of the general propaganda and psychological warfare situation.”¹⁸³ The CIA’s perspective was that the intelligence burden should be shared, and requested that any official directives reflect the need for the services to share responsibility within their realms.¹⁸⁴

The Psychological Strategy Board

The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was established on April 4, 1951.¹⁸⁵ This PSB was separate from the brief National Psychological Strategy Board that existed in the Department of State from August 1950 until January 4, 1951.¹⁸⁶ It was composed of members from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the CIA and reported to the NSC.¹⁸⁷ Its purpose was “to authorize and provide for more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.”¹⁸⁸ The PSB was not intended to become an operational agency, but rather act as a planning and coordinating entity using existing departments and agencies.¹⁸⁹ Within this context, the PSB interpreted “psychological operations” to mean a range of overt and covert activities from the “from propagation of truthful foreign information to the subversive operations of both a moral and a physical character.”¹⁹⁰ During this period, there was still the belief that the chance of keeping the peace or otherwise quickly winning a war with the Soviets would be greatly enhanced by the cumulative use of all resources of psychological operations.¹⁹¹ Although the distinctive differences were not clearly defined, the board emphasized these operations were not a

replacement of, or in competition with, orthodox government functions such as diplomacy or military operations.¹⁹²

Within the PSB, the analysis of psychological operations was meant to cover the foreign organizations that conducted psychological operations and was to be jointly covered by both the State Department and the military.¹⁹³ All other departments were expected to contribute as appropriate.¹⁹⁴ Additionally, these previous analysis functions were considered distinct from evaluations of effectiveness of friendly psychological operations, and this function fell to the department conducting the operation.¹⁹⁵

Unlike the previous national organizations discussing the future of psychological warfare, the PSB deliberately included propaganda analysis within its planning. When exploring the intelligence needs of psychological operations and the best means to achieve them, the PSB determined that “propaganda analysis and analysis of psychological operations,” distinct from other psychological intelligence requirements, was to be met by various departments depending on the type and location.¹⁹⁶ The radio broadcast requirement was largely left to the CIA’s broadcast propaganda analysis office, however the State and military departments were expected to contribute depending on the location and the audience targeted. The military, for example, was expected to conduct propaganda analysis specifically directed at its own forces, regardless of location.¹⁹⁷

The PSB staff even conducted its own propaganda analysis as early as 1952, or rather had other organizations conduct it on its behalf, including one of the CIA’s offices.¹⁹⁸ The Army also contributed to these analyses by or through its Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).¹⁹⁹ These analyses were focused on national-

level issues with some association to national security, and included a diverse array of conclusions, including inferences of Soviet intentions, suggested potential counteractions for the propaganda campaigns, as well as recommended responses to responsible leadership.²⁰⁰ The suggestions for appropriate responses indicated that through the Army's propaganda analysis within the OCPW, at least some non-propaganda and psychological operations considerations were incorporated within their propaganda analysis function.

The PSB evolved between administrations to become less focused on long-range planning and more concerned with establishing clear psychological objectives, planning more immediate operations, and evaluating the effectiveness of these plans. Although the Board used propaganda analysis reports to augment its situational understanding and to contribute to policy discussions, they did not constitute a major focus of the Board's work or focus.²⁰¹ The report stated that the Department of Defense's most significant contribution to the national psychological effort was simply the maintenance of military power for deterrence; hardly a dedicated and unique psychological operation nor bearing a clear relationship to propaganda analysis.²⁰² By mid-1953, the PSB was being accused of trying to "psychologize" everything and was recommended to be replaced by a new board that could more effectively achieve the intent of the original board rather than trying to apply psychological factors to all other manners of policy.²⁰³ The PSB was abolished with the establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) by Presidential Executive Order on September 2, 1953.²⁰⁴ The OCB also assumed the outstanding affairs leftover by the PSB until its dissolution.²⁰⁵

The Central Intelligence Organization

The years immediately following the conclusion of the war marked the timely consolidation and growth of U.S. intelligence capabilities. The National Intelligence Authority, the precursor to the NSC, directed its operational arm, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), to “furnish strategic/national policy intelligence to President, State, War, and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the [SWNCC], the [JCS], and other governmental departments and agencies.”²⁰⁶ If propaganda analysis was to be considered an intelligence function, it would have presumably been included within this directive, but aspects of psychological warfare had not yet been clearly delineated. The difficulty in determining the proper place of psychological warfare, and more specifically propaganda, was also still occurring in that of the larger construct of the new CIG. This situation replicated that of the previous SWNCC/SANAC discussion of over the role and purpose of psychological warfare in the new post-war security establishments. This difficulty also extended to both the use of propaganda by the organization for operations as well as its analysis in support of intelligence.

With the passing of the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, Congress replaced the National Intelligence Authority with the National Security Council.²⁰⁷ Its operational arm was the newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led by the Director of Central Intelligence.²⁰⁸ The new Act also enabled the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) composed of the various intelligence department chiefs to advise the DCI and assist in coordination of national intelligence activities.²⁰⁹

Shortly after its inception, some within the CIA expressed apprehension to move in the direction of using propaganda, even covertly.²¹⁰ Nearly simultaneously, two

components of the CIA, the Office of Operations and the ORE, were having difficulty coming to a consensus on how best to handle propaganda related matters.²¹¹ The Office of Operations functions were related to collection of intelligence information from overt sources,²¹² while the ORE had a less clearly defined mission to supply high-level intelligence and estimates for policy.²¹³ These Offices argued over distinguishing not only the correct office from which to analyze foreign broadcasts, but also on what constituted propaganda for analysis and the appropriate analytical rigor that should be applied to it.²¹⁴ In spite of this, by 1949 the ORE had a Propaganda Analysis Section within its Eastern Europe and USSR Division that focused on implications concerning Soviet foreign policy.²¹⁵ The ORE's propaganda analysis section by this time was still somewhat immature and had not yet fully attempted to use content analysis for its methodology, though it was determined to explore it more fully within its office.²¹⁶

Further within the CIA there were several other branches that had functions relating to psychological warfare, including propaganda analysis. The Special Procedures Branch was established on January 1, 1948 within the Special Operations Branch, and would later become the Special Procedures Group on March 22, 1948.²¹⁷ The Group's functions were "to engage in covert psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions" for the purpose of undermining enemy activities while positively influencing public opinion abroad.²¹⁸ The name Covert Psychological Operations as used by the Office of Special Operations was meant to "include all measures of information and persuasion short of physical in which the originating role of the United States Government will always be kept concealed."²¹⁹ Nested further still within the Special

Procedures Group was the Chief of Plans Section. Its responsibilities included conducting “selective analysis of foreign news and other informational sources, including pertinent intelligence collected by Central Intelligence Agency” or otherwise made available to it.²²⁰ This analysis was to be conducted in order to evaluate and counter foreign propaganda.²²¹ It also conducted research on foreign news, international propaganda, and on psychological components of individuals and groups to provide information for its covert psychological operations.²²² Additionally, it was also tasked to evaluate the effectiveness of these operations in regards to both their psychological and propaganda effectiveness.²²³ Therefore, within this small section alone, propaganda analysis was meant to support operations unrelated to propaganda specifically, counter foreign propaganda, and to determine both enemy and friendly effectiveness.

Some officials did not like the idea of conducting covert psychological operations under the CIA, and instead recommended, to “divorce the existing covert psychological operations from the control and operation of CIA . . . and place it under the control and operation of a new Agency.”²²⁴ Discussion over this manner consumed the NSC for some time, and although it included the role of psychological operations, it largely centered on the operational role of covert activities more generally and their rightful place within the security establishment. Bickering reached a level that the CIA even proposed kicking the task to the Department of State simply to be done with the discussion.²²⁵ The function was then given to the CIA,²²⁶ and later the State Department was put in charge of the formulation of plans and policies for national foreign information program in time of peace as well as the transition to war, and coordinate overt plans with the DOD and other

agencies.²²⁷ Later directives amended these changes,²²⁸ and included the idea of establishing a centrally coordinated psychological warfare effort at the national level, but executed locally through the military in its respective regions and through the State Department in non-military controlled regions.²²⁹

The CIA's ambitious Office of National Estimates (ONE) was one of the Offices that frequently requested or utilized the outputs of propaganda analysis during this era. It included all manner of difficult, broad, and detailed intelligence requirements from propaganda analysis. Specifically, the propaganda analysis intelligence support it most desired concerned Soviet national policy and strategy, but also extended to that of Soviet elites and decision-makers, Soviet foreign policy, internal Soviet-bloc relations, Soviet aggressive intentions, and of Soviet estimates of U.S. intentions.²³⁰ Less critical but still valued were Soviet psychological vulnerabilities such as morale and tensions between various groups.²³¹ It also requested propaganda analysis support to assist with requirements concerning Chinese and Soviet relations in all manners of issues, from economic to ideological, and signs of divisions between communist countries.²³² Outside of these requirements, there were requests for information on propaganda programs themselves outside of the strategic and policy concerns, such as the intended audiences, counter U.S. propaganda initiatives and responses, Soviet beliefs on its own propaganda program effectiveness, and all manner of other propaganda program details.²³³ These needs arose from the belief that a "comparison of overt propaganda with hidden policy shifts would probably provide specific keys and general insights on the connection and confluence of propaganda with political policy and estimates."²³⁴ These requests also

served to bridge the gap from mostly intelligence-related manners to that of operational questions concerning improving propaganda programs themselves, though the office did not conduct these activities specifically. Regardless, the ONE relied heavily on all of the propaganda analysis capabilities within the CIA, especially those of its main broadcast and press propaganda analysis sections.

The Psychological Intelligence Division

In late 1950, the CIA considered establishing a permanent Psychological Intelligence Division (PID) within its ORE to further support the budding intelligence and psychological warfare requirements.²³⁵ It was thought that its functions would include going beyond “the field of psychological warfare in the usual sense” and extend to determining the attitudes and opinions of foreign groups as a “basis for major American decisions.”²³⁶ Additionally, it would provide guidance and methodologies to those outside the Division acting as psychological intelligence specialists and coordinators.²³⁷ Within this construct, each Regional Division (not within the PID) would assign a Psychological Intelligence Coordinator to work with PID analysts.²³⁸

The PID was imagined to be based around teams of at least two primary individuals, one with deep experience and knowledge of the “common people” of a region and another with operational psychological warfare experience, preferably from time with OWI, OSS, the Voice of America (VOA), or the Program Evaluation Branch of International Broadcasting Division.²³⁹ In addition, it was hoped that one individual would possess an advanced education in the social sciences that included an ability to use analytical approaches to augment the other specialized members of the team, while

another would possess thorough experience of the particular opponent's propaganda techniques and vulnerabilities.²⁴⁰ The remainders, ideally, would include individuals with deep academic or professional knowledge of a region, such as knowledge of the relevant political systems and ideologies.²⁴¹ Collectively, one of these teams would encompass an "ORE Psychological Intelligence Unit," one of four components that were originally proposed to constitute the Division.²⁴²

Also within the Psychological Intelligence Division, the Functional Branch was to provide support to psychological operations again, liaison between other agencies, and conduct general research while also assessing if psychological objectives have been met. It included several sections within it, such as the Culture and Society Section focused on social science type research such as communism, religion, international relations, politics, culture, as well as estimate prospective themes and instruments to affect the same.²⁴³ The Psychological Techniques Section was responsible for the technical aspects and methodological considerations such as measuring aptitudes, interviews, mass communications analysis, and the study of panic and crisis.²⁴⁴ Separately, the Psychological Warfare Section was to be responsible for the development of intelligence production programs to include surveying situations and trends.²⁴⁵ Lastly, the three Regional Branches provided more focused research and studies within specified regions.²⁴⁶ All of the branches had a responsibility to liaison, analyze their results, and estimate if objectives had been met. None of the functions or tasks specified included propaganda analysis directly, but task organization proposals did include psychological warfare and propaganda specialists within sections.²⁴⁷ By November of 1950, the Interim

PID within the ORE had a small unit consisting of four personnel.²⁴⁸ On April 15, 1951, the Interim Psychological Intelligence Division of the Office of Research and Reports was terminated with the decision to transfer the research support of psychological warfare to the State Department.²⁴⁹ During its existence, it had established a methodology on “psychological susceptibilities” and various other draft reports.²⁵⁰

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Operating for a time as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service within the FCC beginning in February 1941, this organization provided much of the monitoring, translation, and analysis that Alexander George later analyzed to formulate his advance theories of propaganda analysis and the use of inference in its conduct.²⁵¹ It also maintained a close relationship with previously mentioned propaganda analysis organizations including its British counterparts, the OWI, OSS, the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence, and even Army Psychological Warfare Branch during operations in North Africa in 1943.²⁵² Its functions were also differentiated from the FCC’s related Radio Intelligence Division that was instead focused on radiotelegraphic code rather than the enemy propaganda broadcast of the Monitoring Service.²⁵³

The organization would then once again change its name to the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service while remaining within the FCC. By the end of the war, the War Department had increased its interest in the FBIS due to its “auxiliary activity to the intelligence functions of the War and Navy.”²⁵⁴ Although the War Department had previously believed propaganda monitoring and analysis was the responsibility of the Department of State, the FBIS’s propaganda analysis contributions led the War

Department to expand temporarily its monitoring program and incorporate the FBIS within the Military Intelligence Division rather than allow it to liquidate itself during the post-war drawdown period.²⁵⁵ This included providing temporary employment and facilities for previous FBIS personnel.²⁵⁶ For a time then, the military possessed the largest and most effective continuous propaganda analysis organization to date, further augmenting the propaganda analysis capability it had begun to develop during the war, to include receiving FBIS materially. Despite this temporary adoption, the War Department maintained the belief that the State Department was the most suitable organization to lead the activity during peacetime, while continuing its view that it provided contributions of intelligence value.²⁵⁷ Due to this, the intelligence staff requested the CIA make a determination as to the future of the program and activity.²⁵⁸ The FBIS was then transferred from the War Department to the CIG's Office of Collection on June 29, 1946, and then again to the Office of Operations on Oct 17, 1946.²⁵⁹

During this period, the FBIS continued to conduct some propaganda analysis in conjunction with ORE to the CIG in order to inform policy and national estimates.²⁶⁰ These reports were mostly oriented on Soviet propaganda (but included other Communist states) and contained summaries of Soviet policy as it was manifested in propaganda, Soviet perceptions of U.S. policy, quantitative data, notes on contextual references and their significance, and perceived intended audiences.²⁶¹ The reports did stop short of making explicit predictions of future Soviet action, though there are some allusions to its future policy intentions.²⁶²

These reports, though useful, were deemed insufficient to the need for more propaganda analysis.²⁶³ In late 1946, an assessment of the current propaganda analysis effort determined there was no active overall effort in Washington to conduct a complete analysis of either foreign radio or press, and that what was being done was “used principally to obtain spot intelligence.”²⁶⁴ What propaganda analysis that was occurring was credited to the FBIS’s foreign radio collection and analysis, but that no similar centralized effort was being done for press material.²⁶⁵

To rectify this perceived capability gap, both the State and War Departments proposed the need for a central organization to perform analysis of foreign radio, determine regional propaganda themes, improve the collection of foreign press for analysis, supplement field analyses, and reduce overall redundancies.²⁶⁶ As the FBIS was already conducting similar functions, it was perceived as best suited to incorporate the expanded functions, although some collection efforts were determined to be best shared by the State, War, and Navy, and with limited support from the Library of Congress.²⁶⁷ All of this was to be conducted by a relatively minor staff of only 35 personnel, including analysts and administrators.²⁶⁸ Finally, to help establish this change, “an informal advisory committee” was proposed to “assist the operating personnel in the shaping of this activity,” that included personnel from the War, Navy, and State Departments, as well as any other agency who may have a need for the product.²⁶⁹

By mid-1948, sections within the CIA led predominantly by the FBIS, were producing regular propaganda analysis reports that included on-going themes and trends within Soviet broadcast propaganda. These reports included contextual background,

highlighted major points, pinpointed vulnerabilities, and provided at least some recommendations regarding counter-propaganda.²⁷⁰ This counter-propaganda feedback touched on larger Soviet ideology implications.²⁷¹

In October 1949, some of the earlier research on prior FBIS propaganda analysis by Alexander George was making its way through decision-makers within the CIA, particularly within the ORE.²⁷² It concerned his work through RAND that looked at the products of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in the FCC, alongside its British counterpart, and the technique of using content analysis to make inferences.²⁷³ He had notably examined the inference-making techniques that the World War II office made at the time and improved upon it based on his careful research.²⁷⁴ Although he noted that the FBIS was not always correct in its predictions, its success far outweighed its failures.²⁷⁵ The techniques proved to be effective enough that the Assistant Director of ORE sought to expand its use outside just applications to propaganda but to include more generic communications as well.²⁷⁶ He felt the technique was most effective for use on states with highly controlled communications.²⁷⁷ Despite previous accolades and discussion on the expansion of propaganda analysis and the FBIS, by the end of the 1940s, the Service's ability remained limited based on its small task organization for conducting more robust analysis, and had not yet attempted to fully incorporate the newer content analysis techniques in its processes.²⁷⁸

Despite this small size, by 1950 the Foreign Broadcast Information Division (FBID) was regularly producing two primary reports for intelligence that also provided some support to psychological operations titled "Survey of USSR Radio Broadcasts" and

“USSR and Satellite Information Abstracts from Radio Broadcasts.”²⁷⁹ The FBID’s analysis and products were oriented to support the larger intelligence community and requests by offices, however as the PIC attempted to bolster its psychological intelligence efforts, it suggested that these FBID “Survey” reports add a countermeasures section and the “Abstracts” report segregate components of special interest to psychological warfare operations.²⁸⁰ This request attempted to bring propaganda analysis’s purpose back towards supporting psychological warfare-type operations rather than an independent intelligence product as was its focus at the time.

Radio propaganda analysis was of considerable interest by the end of the decade, partially due to ongoing contributions to national estimates and intelligence, but also due in part due to the findings from the Dulles report of 1949.²⁸¹ This report recommended more analytical analysis of broadcast while the Jackson report that followed lauded the quantitative analysis approach.²⁸² Despite this, some concerns over the role and extent of the interpretive and inferential analysis used by the FBIS as part of an intelligence function were left unresolved.²⁸³ The Office of Operations that the FBID operated within at one point interjected into the discussion regarding the role of propaganda analysis and political analysis and came to three main conclusions: 1) that propaganda analysis was “a specialized technique performed on a well-defined circumstances body of raw materials” while political analysis was something much broader and varied, 2) that propaganda analysis was a type of “unfinished” intelligence to add to an all-source analysis, and 3) both propaganda analysis (by trained, full-time propaganda analysts) and political analyst could coexist.²⁸⁴

Furthering propaganda analysis's relationship with high-level policy and politics, by early 1951, the FBID had incorporated at least some of the content analysis methodology first proposed by Alexander George and proven effective during World War II.²⁸⁵ From this, the propaganda analysts had come to the conclusion that Soviet propaganda could yield two main types of inferences: about the Soviet propagandists and policy-makers, to include their intentions and mentalities (amongst other things), and its possible effectiveness on its audiences.²⁸⁶ The ORE office commented that although effective, the technique required "considerable background research into the structure and behavior patterns of the government and the elite involved in a given system of communication" and that the content analysts must be paired with a separate analyst with extensive knowledge of the topic based on other sources.²⁸⁷ The FBID also developed its own list of "sixteen principles of propaganda," similar to the principles surveyed in the literature review, but instead focused for use on analyzing propaganda as opposed to the more common lists used to assist the development of propaganda.²⁸⁸

During this period, the FBID propaganda analysis techniques and methodologies were developed into a more formalized process that was increasingly distinct as a procedure from a generalized intelligence analysis process. By late 1952, the Division was operating near maximum capacity given its personnel strength such that it was apprehensive to allow its analyst additional but basic intelligence course attendance that might limit its production capability.²⁸⁹ It also believed its analytical process and needs were sufficiently different from that of other intelligence functions that the course also provided little applicable added value to those that attended, and that a more appropriate

use of time and training was through actual on the job training.²⁹⁰ It emphasized the need for specialized knowledge of “current information on the political, sociological and economical situations as opposed to highly specialized area study” more commonly taught in intelligence courses.²⁹¹ Despite this, there was no universal agreement on the issue, and FBID personnel continued sending its analysts to various Strategic Intelligence School courses for further development.²⁹²

Growth within the field and the propaganda analysis effort continued to expand. On September 30, 1952, the Special Reports Branch of the FBID expanded from fifteen to twenty-four positions while the London Bureau grew three positions in response to the Branch’s propaganda analysis effort.²⁹³ The Special Reports Branch was a subordinate section within the larger FBID consisting of a Publications Unit, a Far East Section, a Soviet Section, and a Research Section, the majority of which were filled with analysts positions.²⁹⁴ This Branch, as part of its established on-going analysis of Communist propaganda, produced several reports including its “Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts,” “Survey of USSR Broadcasts,” and “Survey of Far East Broadcasting.”²⁹⁵ The London Bureau office in particular tied propaganda analysis more closely with psychological warfare, and placed dedicated propaganda analysts alongside psychological warfare analysts under a single chief analyst for this effort and sought to elevate “certain elementary analytic operations.”²⁹⁶

A discussion also ensued in late January 1952 regarding joining the two separate but related propaganda analysis offices of the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) and FBID, further bolstered by the intelligence community and the Department of State

expressing continued interest and need in enduring propaganda analysis services.²⁹⁷ In lieu of the merger of these two offices, and to assist offices without sufficient capability to read through foreign material, the Division began including a “Political Abstracts from Foreign Radio Broadcasts” in its Daily Reports beginning February 13, 1952.²⁹⁸ This product was somewhat removed from its historical analysis lane and blurred the line between simple translation services and political intelligence.²⁹⁹ The Division did not consider its work as a purely translation or collection activity, but rather that of analysis and in the production of “studies on specific questions regarding the propaganda out of critical areas and the propaganda beamed to those areas by other countries.”³⁰⁰ Yet despite this, FBIS translation services of Soviet broadcasts were so fast that the analysts were sometimes able to receive the beginning portions of the broadcast before the transmission was complete.³⁰¹

Beginning October 1st, 1952, the Division also began “systematic quantitative analysis of Communist Chinese broadcasts” and reported them weekly in its new “Trends and Highlights of Peking Broadcasts.”³⁰² The Division also continued to issue reports analyzing “indicators of imminent hostilities in Soviet domestic newscast.”³⁰³ The Division shared its intelligence information with the Army G-2, OCI, State, VOA, and PSB through its B Wire service.³⁰⁴ FBID received weekly collection requirements from other intelligence offices from which it could focus and guide its radio monitoring activities to answer specific questions or requirements.³⁰⁵ Although some requests had tenuous fits within the scope of capabilities the Division offered, it never turned down the ill-fitted requests.³⁰⁶

Analysis functions did not remain static, and in early 1953 the propaganda analysis changed “from a weekly survey type of activity to concentration on the chief of intelligence and psychological warfare requirements to which propaganda analysis may contribute.”³⁰⁷ In a Status of National Security Progress report, these changes were characterized as having improved specialized quantitative and content analysis support, as well as timelier to the requesting offices.³⁰⁸ This assessment was also distinct and deliberately evaluated separately from related matters such as a purely monitoring function and translations and assessments of foreign documents generally.³⁰⁹

Despite these internal improvements, the Division continued its relationship with the British through the BBC by monitoring both the Baltic States and the Northwest Soviet territories.³¹⁰ This was after several radio-based propaganda analysis reports prepared for ONE led to “substantive” contributions to intelligence production.³¹¹ Due to its successes, FBID monitoring services continued increasing in quality and quantity through 1952 and 1953, especially as it related to Soviet peripherals.³¹² These outputs became a source of some tension between their operational use in psychological operations and their intelligence value becoming compromised in the future, and this led to calls for policy decisions resolutions at echelons above the FBID itself.³¹³ This tension further highlighted the continuous pull for propaganda analysis between its operational and intelligence suitability. For the remainder of 1953, the Division hoped to continue increasing its propaganda analysis capability and maintain closer relationships with ONE and OCI.³¹⁴

The positive trend of FBIS outputs, strong relationships with various other organizations, and increasing emphasis on growth did not remove all issues of coordination for its propaganda analysis efforts. The Army's Psychological Warfare Division, for example, appeared reluctant to share its needs and problems with its covert and overt activities, despite FBID requests, and may have resulted in duplicated efforts.³¹⁵ Additionally, FBIS propaganda analysis reports began including a warning preceding its analysis indicating that its reports were not coordinated with other offices, and that "inferences or hypothetical conclusions drawn solely from propaganda content should be tested against other evidence before being accepted."³¹⁶ Nevertheless, the work of the FBID would move steadily on over time, outlasting all of the prior propaganda analysis organizations that existed previously while absorbing others. See figure 3.




Figure 3. The Evolution of the FBIS

Source: Created by author.

The Foreign Documents Divisions

Unlike the FBIS, the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) had not always been a propaganda analysis organization. Instead, it had its origins in the joint War-Navy Washington Documents Center created in 1945 to consolidate various Government linguistic services after the war.³¹⁷ This Branch would later become the Foreign

Documents Branch (FDB), prior to assuming the name of the Foreign Documents Division.³¹⁸ Its functions included receiving foreign periodicals and documents, to include current foreign periodicals other than the daily press, and to catalogue, summarize, and translate.³¹⁹ The mission of the FDD within Operations was to act as the central translation service and the exploitation of all types of foreign language press for intelligence purposes at the request of other agencies.³²⁰ This distinction of press (printed material) was one of the explicit differentiations between it and the FBIS which instead focused on broadcast material. The Division's functions also extended into the development of new methods for exploitation.³²¹ Although these functions did not explicitly include propaganda by name, the inclusion of the term printed material was broad enough to reasonably assume that printed propaganda was handled through the office.³²² Some of these functions had been occurring previously through the German Documents Section and Special Documents Section that were operated by the War Department before their consolidation.³²³

As a major source of translations within the Agency, the FDD was coordinating its exploitation activities across multiple offices and agencies of the military, other government agencies, and limited civilian institutions.³²⁴ This included various types of support for translations and special projects for other Departments that seemingly had their own internal propaganda and translation sections, to include the State Department.³²⁵ It also used some analytical methodology within the Branch that mirrored that of other sections that did conduct deliberate propaganda analysis, stating that it “utilizes ‘Estimates of Intelligence Target Potential’ developed by the Office of Reports

and Estimates as its primary requirements and priority guide for operations.”³²⁶

Therefore, through the FDD, the CIA was sharing yet more of its output with the Department of Defense, such as various strategic intelligence reports looking for Soviet responses to the U.S. atomic bomb usage and on the topic of biological warfare.³²⁷

By June, 1950, the FDD was looking to grow its office and its intelligence capabilities.³²⁸ It was sharing information with the State Department’s psychological operations counterparts in the Office of Intelligence Research, which was appreciative of the FDD’s increasing capacity and “emphasis on trends rather than on minor details.”³²⁹ It was a heavily utilized translation department to augment other translation divisions.³³⁰ It also had at least a loose working relationship with the Army G-2.³³¹ As its intelligence contributions grew, and it dabbled with some propaganda analysis, there began a discussion of moving the Foreign Documents Division from the Office of Operations to the ORE, the Office of Collections and Dissemination, or even to “the proposed Research and Reports Division.”³³²

At least part of the slow adoption of propaganda analysis within the FDD, as well as the CIA’s overall propaganda analysis services, was the difficulty in obtaining the requisite amount of propaganda needed to conduct proper analysis, especially in conflict areas where it was needed most.³³³ To support this deficiency during the Korean war, it sought to build a propaganda network amongst the propagandists themselves within places such as North Korea in the hopes of gathering additional intelligence regarding Chinese and North Korean movements.³³⁴ This activity very much blurred the lines between propaganda analysis and more traditional intelligence disciplines, and involved

some aspects of psychological warfare typically present within propaganda analysis activities.³³⁵

Towards the end of 1952, the FDD had proven itself capable of conducting satisfactory support for propaganda analysis through the completion of trial projects at the request of the Office of Policy Coordination, ONE, and OCI.³³⁶ In order to better service this capability, the Division requested additional specialists it needed to best perform this type of analysis.³³⁷ In this capacity, it did not operate solely or specifically as an archival service, and instead relied on its own Documents Control Branch for this function.³³⁸ The propaganda analysis function also became distinctly separated from a simple translation service or document analysis exploitation service.³³⁹ By late September 1952, the Division was authorized to increase its personnel to sufficient number in order for it to initiate an on-going propaganda analysis function rather than its previous ad hoc attempts.³⁴⁰

When first establishing dedicated propaganda analysis personnel within the FDD upon authorization to conduct the function, propaganda analysts were divided into regional sections with the intent of being able to apply special knowledge.³⁴¹ As emphasis on propaganda analysis grew these analysts were requested to be moved into a dedicated Press Propaganda Branch under a Propaganda Analysis Coordinator that reported directly to the Division Chief.³⁴² This change also included promotion in position classifications for the Propaganda Analysis Coordinator to ensure that the new Branch had equal responsibilities with other FDD Branches.³⁴³ Propaganda began to be included in the specific functions of the Division, with its Office of the Chief's functions

involved not only in the development of new methods and techniques for exploitation of foreign documents and review of all available foreign documents for intelligence, but also “press propaganda analysis and psychological warfare support to certain CIA offices.”³⁴⁴

The Office of Current Intelligence

The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) within the CIA was established in late 1950 and was charged with the production of current intelligence primarily to support the DCI and the CIA more generally.³⁴⁵ OCI itself conducted some independent version of propaganda analysis as a component of its current analyses and estimates.³⁴⁶ It was also done to validate FBID/FDD propaganda analysis, but it was clear that in both cases it was conducting this analysis in a limited capacity relative to the other offices.³⁴⁷ Despite this overlap, the OCI viewed FBIS and FDD propaganda analysis activities critically, and generally viewed propaganda analysis’s role as means for understanding foreign propaganda mechanisms and programs for psychological warfare, and not as an independent intelligence function. It did, however, rely on the propaganda analysis of both the FBID and FDD for information for its own analyses.³⁴⁸

The United States Information Agency

The decade following World War II was characterized by a continuous centralization of activities as well as the establishment of new organizations to meet newly identified requirements. The United States Information Agency (USIA) mirrored this trend, and was established by updated directives meant to respond to the period’s discussions on foreign information programs and psychological warfare.³⁴⁹ When a

significant report of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) to the PSB on the National Psychological Effort came with the decision of the President to form one United States Information Agency, and after seeing the effects of the MSA's own Information Division's effectiveness abroad, the USIA was formed with the incorporation of the information resources of both the State Department's International Information Administration and the Mutual Security Act.³⁵⁰ The MSA, for its part, had already concocted a plan to share analysis of European information programs with that of the State and Defense Departments, though it focused on survey opinions and had been stopped by Washington.³⁵¹ This organization was not engaged in covert operations, but was involved within the larger psychological warfare and information dissemination of the period.³⁵² On September 9, 1954, it also became a participant in the intelligence community and recipient of both national intelligence and military intelligence.³⁵³

Within this realm, the USIA established its own small intelligence organization that initially included nearly 100 personnel.³⁵⁴ Its Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI) was charged with "analysis of propaganda in all its aspects," the analysis of foreign public attitudes, and determining the effectiveness of overseas information activities by mid-1956.³⁵⁵ The propaganda analysis task included such issues as determining adversary propaganda manning, sources of financing, mediums, identification of vulnerabilities, changes in themes and trends, as well as "intentions."³⁵⁶ This list of tasks essentially replicated the questions within the early STASM framework and the later Army SCAME framework with the FBIS intentions added. The outputs of these propaganda analysis

functions were to provide “facts upon which USIA can base information policy, program planning, and operational decisions.”³⁵⁷

Though somewhat late to the propaganda analysis field by the time of its establishment, the USIA was very much aware of the details regarding the ongoing debate of advanced content analysis and inferences for conducting propaganda analysis between OCI and FBID, and was conducting its own investigation concerning more details on the use and role of propaganda analysis.³⁵⁸ USIA’s interest in propaganda analysis within the intelligence support was heightened for reasons similar to many of the previous organizations that expressed interest in it: there was a lack of information available due to the tight restrictions and policing of Soviet controlled areas.³⁵⁹ Regardless, the USIA’s question concerning the application of inferences and content analysis within propaganda analysis was left unanswered within the period studied.³⁶⁰

The Department of State

The Department of State supported psychological warfare activities as well as directly contributed to propaganda analysis. The Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) was the Department of State’s manifestation of the OSS’s former Research and Analysis Branch.³⁶¹ As part of its intelligence support, it completed reports using propaganda analysis that were shared between the various other propaganda analysis organizations.³⁶² Its capabilities were extremely limited due to a small staff of analysts, but was able to produce intelligence specifically designed for counter-propaganda activity.³⁶³

Additionally, as part of the NSC’s ongoing need for “psychological intelligence” to support to overt and covert propaganda as well as psychological warfare programs, the

Department of State created a Psychological Intelligence Research Staff to increase governmental and non-governmental coordination.³⁶⁴ Its information Division also had partial responsibility for generally countering Soviet propaganda through the use of overt propaganda.³⁶⁵ The Office of Information and Cultural Exchanges, however, had sole responsibility for the more difficult and complex job of answering propaganda behind the Iron Curtain.”³⁶⁶ The State Department also supported overseas collection of foreign documents, although there was no specific directive that assigned this responsibility.³⁶⁷

The State Department’s International Information Administration (IIA) was established on January 16, 1952. Its purpose was “the conduct of the Department’s international information and educational exchange programs,” and “to maintain and further strengthen integration of the United States international information and educational exchange programs with the conduct of foreign relations generally.”³⁶⁸ This organization had ties to many of the psychological operations activities under discussion at the national level. Much of the State Departments overseas information operations were conducted through the United States Information Service (USIS) and its Information Center Service, prior to the establishment of the USIA.³⁶⁹ Other elements such as Public Affairs officers and others conducted limited analysis and intelligence-related work pertinent to their geographic areas that had some connection to the psychological intelligence as discussed in the PIC.³⁷⁰

Section 3: The Army and Propaganda Analysis

Like many other government organizations after the war, there were some disagreements within the Army surrounding the relationship between psychological

warfare, propaganda, propaganda analysis, and the relationship with intelligence.³⁷¹

Some of this related to the negative connotation that the term propaganda had within the American public, but also that the use of propaganda inadequately described the functions of the Propaganda Branch; in addition to the changes in functions between a wartime and peacetime organization.³⁷² There were concerns that the Propaganda Branch only incidentally contributed to intelligence production, despite its role under the MID.³⁷³ Though stopping short of suggesting its abolishment, functions related to propaganda and some psychological warfare matters were recommended to be transferred to the new CIG and the Propaganda Branch be re-designated as the Psychological Warfare Branch.³⁷⁴ This explicitly included the analysis of propaganda, both foreign and domestic, and suggested that they were both intelligence matters and not functions that the War Department had any reason to conduct.³⁷⁵

A decision was proposed regarding the future of the Propaganda Branch based on its relationship with its intelligence function, essentially that if it could contribute to the production of intelligence, then it remain within the Collection Group, or that if it could not, then it be either deactivated or transferred outside the Army.³⁷⁶ Some within the CIG itself believed that it was in fact an intelligence function within the military, and should remain there.³⁷⁷ The response was that propaganda had two aspects, one rooted in operations through dissemination, and the other within intelligence and “the collection and analysis of propaganda promulgated from one foreign country to other countries, including the U.S.”³⁷⁸ Therefore, the belief was that in peacetime the State Department would have the lead of operational psychological warfare functions and the military

component would be relegated to training and development.³⁷⁹ Intelligence would also take on a different form in which existing collection functions and capabilities in intelligence agencies would be better suited to the task, to include the Central Intelligence Group.³⁸⁰ It was therefore recommended the Propaganda Branch be deactivated with some functions transferred to the Combat Intelligence and Training Group (CI&T), with concurrence with the CI&T Group Commander.³⁸¹

At the same time, an argument for establishment of a permanent Psychological Warfare Division as a component of the War Division Special Staff (WDSS) was proposed.³⁸² The argument was based on both its perceived success during World War II as well as the looming threat of a future war where the adversarial parity might be broken by such a capability.³⁸³ It acknowledged that the psychological warfare effort until this point had been fragmented and inefficient as a result the combination of the several military and non-military organizations, while suggesting an over-reliance on civilians for its conduct.³⁸⁴ Rather than injecting a psychological warfare capability with non-military connections within the command of conventional units, the point was made that the capability would nest well within the Special Staff and provide the centralized coordination that had been lacking previously.³⁸⁵ It also argued that the capability was incapable of sudden creation but rather required on-going study by specially educated practitioners with specialized equipment while maintaining the experiences from the previous war.³⁸⁶ There was no reference to propaganda analysis in this argument.

Outside assistance from Johns Hopkins University's Operations Research Office (ORO) was used to assist and provide additional input. It was contracted by the Army to

initiate Project POWOW in 1949 to study through more analytical means how best to optimize psychological warfare. It looked to determine the optimal types of unit organization and personnel, as well as to conduct studies of previous experiences using propaganda through various mediums. Amongst its findings, it determined that doctrine had been unclear on functions and relationships with both intelligence and operations.³⁸⁷

The Ground General School

The Intelligence School at the Ground General School at Fort Riley was setup in the interim period after the war but prior to the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Organization. It included manuals for legacy elements based on the experiences from World War II, such as the Tactical Psychological Warfare Detachment.³⁸⁸ This detachment's role was the tactical execution of combat psychological warfare, defined as "the imposition of a belligerent's will on that of his opponent by means of propaganda," through the use of loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio.³⁸⁹ The concept of a Tactical Psychological Warfare Detachment was created as an operational element, however the detachment commander was also directed to "furnish periodic reports of analysis of enemy propaganda to the commanding general and his staff," a function separate from analyzing the target audience populations for psychological considerations.³⁹⁰ The detachment also included an Intelligence Section, but this was to come from conducting interrogations of enemy POWs for the purposes of gaining new intelligence used to craft new and more effective messages, and to determine the effectiveness of previously disseminated propaganda.³⁹¹ Although there was a brief section regarding the study of

tactical leaflets, its purpose was to understand them better in order to improve the conduct of their use.³⁹²

The Ground General School also published a manual alongside its tactical psychological warfare for the conduct of “strategic psychological warfare.”³⁹³ To further assist in capturing psychological warfare lessons and techniques from the war, this text was drafted with a focus on “modern strategic psychological warfare (or long-range propaganda).”³⁹⁴ It defined strategic psychological warfare as “the wartime use of long-range propaganda to enemies and neutrals in support of military and political operations” that existed as an enduring requirement, long before the time of war.³⁹⁵ Additionally, it clarified that at the time the Army’s role in strategic psychological warfare was “the wartime continuation and application of propaganda which has been started in time of peace,”³⁹⁶ and that the peacetime policy is controlled by the Department of State, and propaganda directed by it.³⁹⁷

This manual also directed some propaganda analysis, stating that under the JCS the Army had “broad responsibilities for psychological warfare operations” that included unambiguously that the Army was responsible for “collecting, evaluating and interpreting sociological and psychological information, including an analysis of foreign propaganda affecting the military interests of the United States.”³⁹⁸ It further directed an Analysis Unit that, although focused on general intelligence analysis, was to conduct analysis of U.S. propaganda, assess enemy morale, and “a study of the effect on our own forces of enemy psychological warfare with recommendations for advisable counter-propaganda measures.”³⁹⁹

Simultaneously to these doctrinal developments, the Ground General School provided supplemental doctrine regarding the function of monitoring friendly and enemy broadcasts for the purpose of gathering news and “certain information about the enemy or our allies.”⁴⁰⁰ Monitoring was not meant to occur sporadically with big announcements but was continuous, emphasizing that even mundane broadcasts could provide unintentional intelligence.⁴⁰¹ Outside general monitoring requirements, special monitoring missions sought additional specific pieces of information.⁴⁰² These included: assessments of enemy knowledge of its own battle damage assessments, future enemy propaganda themes, intelligence on planned maneuvers (such as references to cities the enemy considered important and therefore might target), and to evaluate if friendly propaganda objectives were being met.⁴⁰³ This description of the goals of Army propaganda analysis thus transcended basic translation, spot reporting, or even assistance to counter propaganda, and included the intent to determine predictions of enemy future operational behavior. The reports based on these monitoring activities were intended to be used for six separate purposes: newscasts, development of new propaganda themes, counterpropaganda, intelligence (plans and movements of enemy), to evaluate friendly propaganda program effectiveness, and lastly to determine new techniques for reaching target audiences.⁴⁰⁴

The Psychological Warfare Division

Elements of the newly established Psychological Warfare Division would see operational use during the Korean war, and would conduct regular propaganda analysis.⁴⁰⁵ At the start of the war in 1950, the psychological warfare responsibility

within the Eighth Army fighting on the peninsula was with the G-2 intelligence, but would later change to the G-3.⁴⁰⁶ The main thrust of this analysis was within the Intelligence Branch established on February 1st, 1951.⁴⁰⁷ One of its five missions assigned was to “be responsible, in coordination with G-2, for the study and analysis of enemy propaganda for psychological warfare purposes.”⁴⁰⁸ This mission was again separate from pretesting of leaflets, other non-propaganda related intelligence analysis, and also evaluating the effectiveness of friendly propaganda.⁴⁰⁹ The propaganda analysis process involved a few steps, depending on the source of propaganda. Enemy leaflets were collected through G-2 channels after generic intelligence analysis had occurred and the leaflets had been processed as enemy documents.⁴¹⁰ The leaflets would then be scanned for a basic content analysis in order to identify themes and changes in themes, however in practice, leaflets were received too sporadically to supply sufficient sample sizes for accurate quantitative analysis, and over time the charting of leaflet analysis was abandoned.⁴¹¹ Loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts were tracked by various categories (Korean, English, musical, intelligible or unintelligible) and frequency of themes, from which trends could be discovered and analyzed.⁴¹² Radio broadcast monitoring reports were conducted and shared by the FBIS daily with the Intelligence Branch.⁴¹³ Psychological intelligence collection was also aided by leaflet analysis to determine the effectiveness of U.S. propaganda on Koreans by way of POW interrogations, which also provided additional intelligence to the Branch.⁴¹⁴ Collectively, these means of propaganda analysis were used to determine enemy propaganda vulnerabilities for use in friendly propaganda operations, and themes were reported on Disposition Forms and

briefed to the Branch Chiefs.⁴¹⁵ Any themes or trends identified as major changes in political, military, or propaganda stance of Communist countries was reported to the Chief of Staff.⁴¹⁶

The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare

On January 15, 1951, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was established by General Order and led by BG McClure. The Office was under the supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the General Staff of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.⁴¹⁷ Its mission was to “formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields.”⁴¹⁸ One of its additional functions was the evaluation of both U.S. and foreign propaganda.⁴¹⁹ Also within the new organization, its intelligence section was directed to “formulate intelligence requirements for psychological and special operations” but to pull that intelligence from the higher G-2 sections.⁴²⁰ It included a function for its Psychological Operations Division to evaluate the effectiveness of both U.S. and foreign psychological operations, but this was not specifically tied to propaganda analysis.⁴²¹ It also shared the responsibility for the implementation of new doctrine and techniques through the Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces (OCAFF) and alongside the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.⁴²²

The Chief was also a member of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC), a subcommittee from the PSB, in order to coordinate policies established from the PSB.⁴²³ This provided the direct linkage of the Army’s

psychological warfare program to those occurring at the national level. The Office also provided representatives to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to advise on psychological warfare matters.⁴²⁴ From its inception, the new Office acknowledged its lineage from an intelligence background that later transitioned into plans and operations.⁴²⁵

The newly implemented Psychological Warfare Officer Course during this period included a block on “intelligence for psychological warfare,” of which half (22 hours) was devoted entirely to propaganda analysis.⁴²⁶ This section in the curriculum included lessons on: “the purpose and capabilities of propaganda analysis; content analysis, theme and emphasis charts; spot analysis; findings,” and an “evaluation of friendly propaganda.”⁴²⁷ The course also directed its psychological operations officers to read Sykewar (referenced in the literature review) and expanded topics on the “scope and purpose of propanal,” and the use of content categories at “theater, Army, and lower levels,” as well as “systematic propaganda analysis.”⁴²⁸ It also included lessons on the use of “statistics derived by technicians of propaganda analysis” and the “use of qualitative analysis.”⁴²⁹ The curriculum was so extensive that at least one office within the CIA felt that the Army’s Psychological Warfare Officer’s course material on propaganda analysis was so superior to its own curriculum that the material was copied and borrowed.⁴³⁰

Despite this accolade, a survey of the overall course and the teaching material found that propaganda analysis was perhaps overly emphasized, too complicated or requiring too much specialized knowledge for an Army psychological warfare officer,

and that the activity was a difficult method of obtaining information about enemy soldiers.⁴³¹ This finding suggested that the role of Army propaganda analysis, at least as seen by the those officers conducting the survey, was focused only on providing intelligence on enemy morale and psychological vulnerabilities, and less so on operational or strategic intelligence findings. There was some suggestion to revise and focus propaganda analysis for intelligence into something resembling an evaluation of friendly and enemy propaganda analysis, and away from the broad range of purposes already included.⁴³² Regardless, the extensive listing of propaganda analysis topics and techniques that were present in the course encompassed many of the lessons and methods discussed and implemented throughout the larger propaganda analysis field of the period.

Building on the limited broadcast monitoring doctrine from the Ground General School, the instruction at Fort Bragg at the time did not limit the origins of monitored broadcasts, but it did specify that within the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, the monitoring section should remain near the company headquarters, thus implying a relatively localized effort.⁴³³ Transcriptions and translations from this monitoring would then be sent to the Group's S-2 for the propaganda analysis itself.⁴³⁴ Also notable, the FBIS was specifically mentioned as a conduit from which specific radio listening assignments would be given, thus suggesting that not only did a direct relationship exist from the CIA's strategic and Army's tactical propaganda analysis elements by 1952, but that they at least somewhat coordinated their efforts deliberately.⁴³⁵ It is unclear if different types of analysis were used between the organizations, if the tactical element was meant to supply the FBIS with more material, or if the FBIS also wanted the Army's

own analysis to augment its own. Nevertheless, after the Korean War had ended, the Army Communications Staff in the Pentagon continued to use the FBIS analysis, going so far as to “liberalize its attitude toward FBIS traffic” in 1955 in order to “facilitate the dispatch of vital information from FBIS Bureaus.”⁴³⁶

Propaganda analysis also occurred through the Psychological Warfare Staff at the theater-level.⁴³⁷ At this level the Survey Section, nested within the Intelligence Section, was instructed “to analyze enemy propaganda and psychological warfare to discover trends and indications of enemy intentions” as well as “to provide intelligence useful for counter-propaganda activities.”⁴³⁸ This separation of purposes, the indications of intentions and the counter-propaganda, provided a clear distinction between two of the primary propaganda analysis purposes between all of the various propaganda analysis organizations to this time. It combined previous connections made regarding the widespread knowledge of Alexander George’s theories and methodologies through the strategic propaganda analysis organizations and the connections between the Army, CIA, and various psychological operations boards. It also provided clear evidence that the Army was fully aware of this complex and advanced type of propaganda analysis.

Section 4: Effectiveness of Propaganda Analysis

Each organization that conducted propaganda analysis had a different focus and set of functions, had varying resources at its disposal, and conducted propaganda analysis in its own unique way. However, the FBIS and Army were the main organizations that stood out for evaluation of effectiveness, given the enduring nature of their conduct of this analysis as well as the scale of their effort.

FBIS/FBID Effectiveness

The CIA's internal assessment of propaganda analysis was broken up into two basic processes: a low-level "collative compilation" for basic information or for countering, and a more systematic approach using content analysis.⁴³⁹ Without a large enough requisite sample of data, it determined the content analysis approach would be limited and would then only be suitable for "spot inferences which may be useful as intelligence information or for counter-propaganda," but not sufficient for generalizations about larger propaganda programs or for predicting enemy intentions and appropriate responses.⁴⁴⁰ When looking at propaganda programs to analyze, there were also two different objectives to the analyst available with a range of inferences associated: that of PSYWAR objectives and that of estimates.⁴⁴¹ PSYWAR objectives included things like themes, what the propaganda wanted the enemy to think, and what the friendly program should do in response.⁴⁴² The estimates objectives were meant to relate more towards politics and policy issues and included things such as intensity of propaganda programs, what the policy makers intend to do, and what the appropriate friendly political program response should be. Attempting the more difficult inference questions with inadequate resources was considered a wasted motion.⁴⁴³

Propaganda analysis at the strategic level proved effective repeatedly, in addition to the findings of Alexander George. For example, on November 1, 1950, barely two weeks after the Chinese Communist entered North Korea, FBIS propaganda analysis was used to infer that the Chinese force that had entered the war was larger than the current estimates available through the military and other current intelligence sources.⁴⁴⁴ In fact, "solely on the basis of the very unusual Chinese Communist propaganda campaign," the

estimate was put at the very least at one hundred thousand Chinese, and possibly many times more.⁴⁴⁵ These fairly accurate estimates were in opposition to the otherwise reported 18,000 “volunteers” by other intelligence organizations.⁴⁴⁶ By late November, propaganda analysts had again effectively contributed to or come to an accurate estimate of Chinese long-term objectives and Soviet intervention.⁴⁴⁷ Other internal assessments determined that in retrospect of the analysis of previously studied propaganda it would have successfully predicted the Communist bloc break with Tito, potentially up to several weeks in advance, and potentially the Berlin blockade and Soviet intentions regarding North Korea.⁴⁴⁸ This effectiveness was caveated with the fact that it provided a notably inexpensive intelligence resource.⁴⁴⁹

Two outsiders provided some assessment as to the FBIS propaganda analysis effort. A RAND study recommended to keep propaganda analysis autonomous and separate from political analysts in order to provide independent evidence, to increase its operations and to better establish patterns, and to establish a coordination or liaison between other intelligence offices.⁴⁵⁰ Sherman Kent, one of the early contributors to strategic intelligence analysis, recommended propaganda analysis should be an on-going element in the intelligence process based on his assessment of its usefulness for his Office of National Estimates, and that the FBID and FDD were the most effective at conducting it.⁴⁵¹ He concurred with the RAND study that suggested its effectiveness could have been improved by more dedicated time, resources, and especially if done by trained experts.⁴⁵² This endorsement indicated that at the highest levels of the intelligence community, there was not only an interest in propaganda analysis as a unique activity, but

that it was actively contributing to the policy-making apparatus of the NSC and the President.

Not all assessments of propaganda analysis, or the capabilities of the FBIS/FDD for that matter, were hugely appreciative and supportive. The OCI questioned some of the inferential assumptions used in FBIS propaganda analysis techniques and instead felt its analysis only served to support other intelligence.⁴⁵³ It therefore believed that propaganda analysis outputs were suitable only for certain problem areas, and only when done in conjunction with its own or other analysis offices.⁴⁵⁴ It concluded that propaganda analysis should be limited exclusively to producing conclusions regarding the nature and direction of propaganda output,” and that any conclusion beyond that were “dangerous” and “hazardous.”⁴⁵⁵

Army Effectiveness

Clear evidence of the effectiveness of specific Army propaganda analysis techniques were not discovered during this research, but there was some indication that a version used did provide some value. This occurred during a monitoring mission of the Allied Landing in Italy during World War II where the goal was to determine whether the German broadcasts gave any indication of anticipation of the landings.⁴⁵⁶ The monitoring mission did not provide evidence of knowledge or anticipation of the date and location of the Allied landings. The absence of evidence did not conclusively validate the assumptions implicit in the monitoring mission, however, there was also no evidence of the Axis powers becoming aware of the details, and resistance during the landings was light.⁴⁵⁷ Another indicator was the CIA adoption of propaganda analysis curriculum in its

own propaganda analysis instruction, though this only provides some evidence that the Army's instruction for propaganda analysis of the type the FBIS conducted was effective, and provides little or no evidence as to the effectiveness of propaganda analysis for tactical purposes. A final indicator to the Army's propaganda analysis effort was simply the enduring nature of propaganda analysis within doctrine, but is contrasted with the sudden decline in emphasis mentioned in chapter 1.

¹ The National Archives, *1941 Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America*, Book 1 (Washington, DC: Division of the Federal Register, 1941), 357-358.

² The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, vol. 1, *Civilian Agencies* (Publications Nos. 51-7) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 223.

³ *Ibid.*, 224.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 222-223.

⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 8248, 'Reorganizing the Executive Office of the President,' 8 September 1939, The American Presidency Project, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210008>.

⁸ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 87.

⁹ Roosevelt, Executive Order 8840.

¹⁰ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 237, 241-242.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 226-227, 242.

¹² Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 8922, "Establishing the Office of Facts and Figures," 24 October 1941, The American Presidency Project, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210148>.

¹³ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 284.

¹⁴ Ibid., 285-286.

¹⁵ Ibid., 284-288.

¹⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 9182, “Establishing the Office of War Information,” 13 June 1942, The American Presidency Project, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210709>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 547-548.

²⁰ “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,” 23 December 1945, 1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

²¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 9312, “On the Office of War Information,” 9 March 1943, The American Presidency Project, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209876>.

²² The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 572.

²³ Ibid., 554.

²⁴ Ibid., 563.

²⁵ Ibid., 562-563.

²⁶ Ibid., 568.

²⁷ Ibid., 570.

²⁸ Ibid., 571.

²⁹ Ibid., 573.

³⁰ Ibid., 566.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 1054.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Carl B. Spaeth and William Sanders, “The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense,” *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 2 (1944): 218-41, accessed 16 March 2021, doi:10.2307/2192694.

³⁸ Benjamin Sumner Welles, “Consultation, The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the American Representative (Spaeth),” (Washington, DC, 28 May 1942), in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics*, vol. 5, ed. E. R. Perkins and Almon R. Wright (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), document 61, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d61>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ William Dawson, “Telegram from the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State,” (Montevideo, 26 June 1942), in *Foreign Relations: The American Republics*, vol. 5, ed. E. R. Perkins and Almon R. Wright (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), document 64, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d64>.

⁴¹ Welles, Consultation.

⁴² Cordell Hull, “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson),” (Washington, DC, 24 June 1942), in *Foreign Relations: The American Republics*, document 63, accessed 16 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d63>.

⁴³ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 792-793.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1054.

⁴⁵ Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9608, “Providing for the Termination of the Office of War Information, and for the Disposition of its Functions and of Certain Functions of the Office of Inter-American Affairs,” 31 August 1945, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9608/executive-order-9608>.

⁴⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services,” 13 June 1942, The American Presidency Project, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210715>.

⁴⁷ F. B. Royal and A. J. McFarland, "Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," 27 October 1943, 2-6, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp09k00541r000700090021-5>.

⁴⁸ A general overview of OSS history, as well as references to the various memoranda and orders that established many of the OSS offices, can be found in: Office of Special Operations, "Notes for ABD from EFH," 4 April 1952, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00499r000500110002-8>.

⁴⁹ Office of Special Operations, "Notes for ABD from EFH," 2-3.

⁵⁰ Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis," *Occasional Papers* 1, no. 5 (November 2002), 1-13, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/static/aa47b490ac1c52c04c467a248c5cbace/Kent-Profession-Intel-Analysis.pdf>.

⁵¹ Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions," 20 September 1945, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231394>.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-2013* (Washington, DC: JCS, April 2013), accessed 9 May 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Organizational_Development_of_the_JCS.pdf.

⁵⁴ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC), "Appendix A, Draft Charter, SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.)," 10 December 1946, 10, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

⁵⁵ "Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare," 1.

⁵⁶ Office of Special Operations, "Notes for ABD from EFH," 2-3.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ SWNCC Subcommittee on PWC, "Appendix A," 10.

⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *Studies in Intelligence* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 27, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78t03194a000400010022-7>.

⁶⁰ “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,”
1.

⁶¹ Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force: An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945* (PSD, SHAEF, 1951), 5.

⁶² “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,”
1.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ PWD, SHAEF, *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force*, 6.

⁶⁵ “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,”
1.

⁶⁶ MIS Memo 147, 31 December 1944, quoted in “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,” 23 December 1945, 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

⁶⁷ PWD, SHAEF, *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force*, 5.

⁶⁸ The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, “Report on Psychological Warfare,” (Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study Number 131, n.d.), 3, accessed 17 March 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3406>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ PWD, SHAEF, *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force*, 7.

⁷¹ Ibid., 23.

⁷² The General Board, “Report on Psychological Warfare,” 22.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 22-25.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 25-26.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 26.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 22.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ MID Memorandum No. 78, 15 November 1943, (Tab A), quoted in “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,” 23 December 1945), 2, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

⁸⁴ Ibid.; “Memorandum, Proposed Function of the PWB, MID,” n.d., 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

⁸⁵ Military Intelligence Division (MID), G-2, MID 912, “Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff,” (Washington 25, 22 May 1946), 1-2, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100056-9>.

⁸⁶ Military Intelligence Division (MID), G-2, MID 912, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff,” (Washington, DC, 22 May 1946), 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100057-8>.

⁸⁷ Robert H. Dunlop, “Functions of the Propaganda Branch, Military Intelligence Division, W.D.G.S.,” (Washington 25, DC, 21 February 1944), 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

⁸⁸ War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff Circular No. 5-2, *Organization: Military Intelligence Division, G-2 (Exclusive of Military Intelligence Service)*, (Washington, DC: War Department, 19 October 1944), 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ United States Army Forces, Pacific, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, *Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945* (General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 15 March 1946), 3, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² MID, G-2, MID 912, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff," 2.

⁹³ Intelligence and Leaflet Unit, Office of War Information, "Area III – Far East," *Leaflet News Letter* 1, no. 10 (27 July 1945): 23, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2074>.

⁹⁴ Bonner F. Fellers, "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan," (Psychological Warfare Branch, 29 March 1945), 2-3, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4358>.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 12.

⁹⁶ Psychological Warfare Branch, "Psychological Warfare Conference," (Manila, 7 May 1945), 25, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4358>.

⁹⁷ United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, "Psychological Warfare Propaganda Material: Part 2," August 1944, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3307>.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 1-324.

⁹⁹ Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas (HQ, USAFPOA), "Part One: 1944 Progress of the War in Pacific Ocean Areas," (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, HQ, USAFPOA, 30 June 1944), 52, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4702>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 54-56

¹⁰³ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 58.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 58-63.

-
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 59-70.
- ¹⁰⁷ Intelligence and Leaflet Unit, "Area III – Far East," 6, 1.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 10, 7.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 5.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., 6, 1.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid., 8-12.
- ¹¹² Ibid., 22.
- ¹¹³ Ibid., 24.
- ¹¹⁴ Bonner F. Fellers, "Appendix B, Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan, Steps in Planning," 12 April 1946, 18, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.
- ¹¹⁵ Bonner F. Fellers, "Psychological Warfare against Japan, SWPA, 1944-1945," 15 March 1946, 17, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.
- ¹¹⁶ "Excerpts from Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945," 23 December 1945, 3-4, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁸ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 66-68.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid., 66-67.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid.
- ¹²¹ A. Geller, D. Kaplan, and Harold D. Lasswell, "An Experimental Comparison of Four Ways of Coding Editorial Content," *Journalism Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1 December 1942): 362, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1177/107769904201900403>.
- ¹²² The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 788.
- ¹²³ Ibid., 789.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 788.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 801.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 803.

¹³¹ Raymond S. McLain, "Leadership and the Information Program," *Army Information Digest* 3, no. 9 (September 1948): 58.

¹³² Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Group, "General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Letter to Louie," 17 May 1946, 1, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, "Using the World's Information Sources," *Army Information Digest* 3, no. 11 (November 1948): 5.

¹³⁵ Task Force on Intelligence Activities, "Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government," (Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Washington, DC, May 1955), vi-vii, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86b00269r000100020004-4>.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 237.

¹³⁷ Hillenkoetter, "Using the World's Information Sources," 3-6.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴¹ William J. Donovan, "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to President Truman; Attachment 2, Paper by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan)," (Washington, DC, 25 August 1945), in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, ed. C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), document 3, accessed 17 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d3>.

¹⁴² John Edgar Hoover, "Memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to Attorney General Clark," in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of*

the Intelligence Establishment, document 5, accessed 17 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d5>.

¹⁴³ Clayton Bissell, "Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of the War Department General Staff (Bissell) to Secretary of War Patterson; Subject: Discussion with Secretary of Navy Regarding Joint Intelligence," (Washington, DC, 22 October 1945), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 30, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d30>.

¹⁴⁴ Harry Truman, "President's Letter of January 22, 1946," (Washington, DC, 22 January 1946); National Intelligence Authority (NIA), N.I.A. Directive No. 1, *Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group*, 8 February 1946, 1-6, accessed 9 May 2021, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/Index_of_NIA_Directives_Undated.PDF.

¹⁴⁵ National Intelligence Authority (NIA), National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 5, *Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence* (Washington, DC, 8 July 1946), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 160, accessed 18 March 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d160>.

¹⁴⁶ State-War-Navy Coordinating (SWNC) Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, "Enclosure: Psychological Warfare," (Report by the SWNC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, 10 June 1947), 45, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100008-2>.

¹⁴⁷ State-War-Navy Coordinating (SWNC) Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, "Appendix A, Facts Bearing on the Problem," (Report by the SWNC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, 10 June 1947), 54, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100008-2>.

¹⁴⁸ William J. Donovan, "Extract of Memorandum from Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan to Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith," 17 September 1943, accessed 9 May 2021, https://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch3_a.htm.

¹⁴⁹ Civilian Agency Records, State Department and Foreign Affairs Records, "Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," The National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-353.html#:~:text=The%20State%2DWar%2DNav%20Coordinating,military%20questions%20referred%20to%20it>.

¹⁵⁰ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Ad Hoc Committee, SWNCC 304/1, "Psychological Warfare, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee," 10 December 1946, 3, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁵³ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Ad Hoc Committee, SWNCC 304/1, "Appendix A, Draft Charter for SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.)," 10 December 1946, 6, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Ad Hoc Committee, SWNCC 304/1, "Appendix B, Draft Charter for SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.)," 10 December 1946, 23, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

¹⁵⁶ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Ad Hoc Committee, SWNCC 304/1, "Annex C to Appendix B, Draft Charter for SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.)," 10 December 1946, 28, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

¹⁵⁷ SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee, SWNCC 304/1, "Appendix B," 20.

¹⁵⁸ Chief, Advisory Council, "Disposition Form; Subject: Psychological Warfare," 6 December 1946, 1, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020006-9>.

¹⁵⁹ SWNCC, "Appendix A, Facts Bearing on the Problem," 49.

¹⁶⁰ Donald Edgar, "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: CIG Membership on SWNCC Sub-Committee for Psychological Warfare (SWNCC 304/1)," 28 May 1947, 1, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100043-3>.

¹⁶¹ Assistant Director, Special Operations (S), S.O. Directive No. 18, *Organization and Functions of the Office of Special Operations*, 6 June 1947, 1-13, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a001000030032-3>.

¹⁶² Chief, Latin American Branch, ORE, "Memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Director for ORE; Subject: Central Intelligence Group Intelligence Report on 'Propaganda of anti-American Tendencies'," 11 June 1947, 1-2, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00566r000100070034-8>.

¹⁶³ SWNCC, "Appendix A, Facts Bearing on the Problem," 49.

¹⁶⁴ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, “Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation; Subject: Psychological Warfare,” 30 September 1947, 45-48, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100009-1>.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁶⁶ E. K. Wright, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter,” (Washington, DC, 4 November 1947), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 248, accessed 10 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d248>.

¹⁶⁷ National Security Council (NSC), NSC Memorandum 4, “Report by the National Security Council on Coordination of Foreign Information Measures,” (Washington, DC, 17 December 1947), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 252, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d252>.

¹⁶⁸ Wright, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter.”

¹⁶⁹ E. K. Wright, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright) to the Chief of the Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs); Subject: NSC Notes on Psychological Operations,” (Washington, DC, 2 December 1947), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 251, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d251>.

¹⁷⁰ George F. Kennan, “Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett),” (Washington, DC, 17 February 1948), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 259, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d259>.

¹⁷¹ “Annex to Appendix, Review of SANACC Studies Pertaining to Psychological Warfare, A Supplement to SANACC 304/15,” 23 March 1949, 116, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100008-1>.

¹⁷² State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, “Status Report, 1 September 1948–30 September 1948,” 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500200010-5>.

¹⁷³ R. H. Hillenkoetter, "Memorandum, Psychological Intelligence Committee," 7 April 1950, 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200010012-7>.

¹⁷⁴ R. H. Hillenkoetter, "Memorandum to the Executive Secretary National Security Council; Subject: Support for the Voice of America," (Washington 25, 21 April 1950), U.S. Department of State, 2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://foia.state.gov/documents/cia/3e7d.PDF>.

¹⁷⁵ "Proposed Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," 30 March 1950, 1-3, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200010013-6>.

¹⁷⁶ Prescott Childs, "Memorandum for the Director; Subject: Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," 28 August 1950, 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160001-0>.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

¹⁷⁸ "Proposed Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," 1-3.

¹⁷⁹ Melville J. Ruggles, "Letter on Psychological Intelligence Committee," 22 May 1950), 1-2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160002-9>.

¹⁸⁰ Melville J. Ruggles, "Memorandum to the Chairman of the Psychological Intelligence Committee; Subject: Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," (18 June 1950), 1-2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160003-8>.

¹⁸¹ "Report to the Director of Central Intelligence on Foreign Intelligence Support for the National Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare," 18 December 1950, 2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500150002-0>.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸⁴ Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, "Memorandum of Conversation dated 22 January 1951; Subject: 'Psychological Intelligence'," 25 January 1951, 1-2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500180025-2>.

¹⁸⁵ Director, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), “Psychological Strategy Board,” (Washington, DC, 18 September 1951), 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00384r000100190003-0>.

¹⁸⁶ Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 60–61.

¹⁸⁷ Director, PSB, “Psychological Strategy Board,” 1.

¹⁸⁸ Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), “Concept of the Organization to Provide Dynamic Psychological Operations in the Cold War,” 21 May 1951, 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000600010072-2>.

¹⁸⁹ “Implementation of the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951, Establishing a National Psychological Strategy Board,” 30 April 1951, 2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01446r000100140055-2>.

¹⁹⁰ PSB, “Concept of the Organization to Provide Dynamic Psychological Operations in the Cold War.”

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ “Analysis of the Intelligence Needs of Psychological Operations together with an Indication of How They Should Be Met,” 21 January 1952, 5, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500080016-8>.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹⁸ The Office within the CIA responsible for this propaganda analysis report was the FDD; “Analysis and Planning to Counteract Soviet Biological Warfare Propaganda and the ‘Hate America’ Campaign; Staff Study on Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign (PSB D-25),” 11 June 1952, 1-2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100092-1>.

¹⁹⁹ Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), “Subject: Staff Stuff - Preliminary Analysis of the Communist BW Propaganda Campaign with Recommendations,” (25 July 1952), 2, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500050003-5>.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

²⁰¹ Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), “Memorandum for the Psychological Strategy Board; Subject: Status Report on the National Psychological Effort as of June 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board,” 24 July 1953, 1-26, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400100003-0>.

²⁰² Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), “Annex B, Semiannual Psychological Activity Status Report of the Department of Defense,” 24 July 1953, 1, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400100003-0>.

²⁰³ William Y. Elliot, “Memorandum for Dr. Arthur Flemming; Subject: The Jackson Committee Report, Chapter 7 – Critical Comments,” 1 July 1953, 1-7, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00268r000100020005-6>.

²⁰⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Executive Order 10483, “Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board,” (Washington, DC, 2 September 1953), accessed 11 May 2021, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234438>.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ National Intelligence Authority (NIA), Draft, N.I.A. Directive No. 1, *Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group*, 4 February 1946, 1, accessed 11 May 2021, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/NIA_Directive_No_1_Proposed_Policies_for_CIG_21_Feb_1946.PDF.

²⁰⁷ Act of July 26, 1947 (“National Security Act”), Public Law 80-253, 61 STAT 495, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299856>.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ R. H. Hillenkoetter, “Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the National Security Council,” (Washington, DC, 19 September 1947), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 222, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d222>.

²¹⁰ Lawrence R. Houston, “Memorandum from the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter; Subject: CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions,” (Washington, DC, 25 September 1947), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 241, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d241>.

²¹¹ Chief, Latin American Branch, ORE, “Memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Director for ORE,” 1-2.

²¹² Task Force on Intelligence Activities, “Report on Intelligence Activities,” 38.

²¹³ Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee, Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of ORE Production with Conclusions, First Report,” 19 July 1949, 1-5, accessed 12 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp67-00059a000400050001-1>.

²¹⁴ Chief, Latin American Branch, ORE, “Memorandum to the Deputy for ORE,” 1-2.

²¹⁵ Theodore Babbitt, “Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Content Analysis,” 12 October 1949, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500190006-2>.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Donald H. Galloway, Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5, *Activation Of Special Procedures Group* (Washington, DC, 29 March 1948), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 263, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d263>.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ R. H. Hillenkoetter, “Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers),” (Washington, DC, 5 May 1948), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 271, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d271>.

²²⁵ R. H. Hillenkoetter, “Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay),” (Washington, DC, 9 June 1948), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence*

Establishment, document 287, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d287>.

²²⁶ National Security Council (NSC), NSC Memorandum 10/2, “National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects,” (Washington, DC, 18 June 1948), in *Foreign Relations: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, document 292, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292>.

²²⁷ National Security Council (NSC), NSC Report 59/1, *The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning* (Washington, 9 March 1950), in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, ed. Douglas Keane and Michael Warner 9 Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20070, document 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d2>.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ “National Psychological Warfare Planning, Part 1, Analysis of Major Categories and Requirements,” 17 November 1950, 1-7, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500130070-2>.

²³⁰ Office of National Estimates, “Proposed Requirements for Propaganda Analysis,” 7 January 1954, 1-4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000600050006-3>.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., 4-6.

²³³ Ibid., 7-9.

²³⁴ Ibid., 9.

²³⁵ Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), “Psychological Intelligence Division, ORE,” 25 August 1950, 1-4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000300090009-2>.

²³⁶ Ibid., 1.

²³⁷ “Memorandum; Functions and Responsibilities of the Interim Psychological Intelligence Division,” accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01084a000100030010-4>.

²³⁸ Theodore Babbitt, Office of Reports and Estimates (O/RE), O/RE Operating Procedure Order No. 22, “Subject: Establishment of an Interim Psychological

Intelligence Division,” 3 November 1950, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01084a000100030009-6>.

²³⁹ Memorandum, “Psychological Intelligence Division, ORE,” 1-4.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Office of Reports and Estimates (O/RE), “Statement of Functions, Functional Branch (Psychological Intelligence Division),” 17 October 1950, 3-5, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200040013-3>.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 6-8.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 9-11.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 12-13.

²⁴⁷ Office of Reports and Estimates (O/RE), “Table of Organization, Psychological Intelligence Division,” 17 October 1950, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200040013-3>.

²⁴⁸ Director, Interim Psychological Intelligence Division, “Memorandum; Subject: Comment on first draft report of the Psychological Intelligence Committee to the DCI,” 27 December 1950, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500150002-0>.

²⁴⁹ Max F. Millikan, “Memorandum; Subject: Status Report, Interim Psychological Intelligence Division,” 17 April 1951, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP75-00662R000100190026-6/mode/2up>.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ The National Archives, *Federal Records of World War II*, 938.

²⁵² Ibid., 566, 939.

²⁵³ Ibid., 938.

²⁵⁴ Hoyt S. Vandenberg, “Memorandum for Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Subject: Monitoring of Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts,” 12 February 1946, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp64-00658a000100140056-2>.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Historical Staff, "CIA Support Functions: Organization and Accomplishments of the DDA--DDS Group, 1953-1956," vol. 1, (chap. 1 and 2), (The DCI Historical Series, July 1960), 7, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00708r000300040001-2>.

²⁶⁰ Central Intelligence Group, "Analysis of Soviet Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts," 23 July 1946, 1-12, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002800040002-5>.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 1-5.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Memorandum to Assistant Director for Operations, CIG; Subject: Centralized Reporting of Propaganda and Intelligence in Foreign Radio and Press," 5 November 1946, 1-3, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003400110037-7>.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 1.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 2-3.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 1.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 2-3.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 1-3.

²⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Information Report; Subject: Most Frequent Propaganda Themes," 14 July 1948, 1-9, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-00809a000500730062-9>.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Prescott Childs, "Memorandum for the Executive; The 'Rand' project on Content Analysis," 2 November 1949, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/>

readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500190006-2; Babbitt, "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Content Analysis," 1-2.

²⁷³ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Subject: Inferences Based on Soviet Propaganda," 3 January 1951, 1-13, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04864a000200010003-5>.

²⁷⁴ Alexander George's studies went beyond inferences and included creating assumptions as to the conditions under which enemy propaganda was created, assessment of their own morale and forces, and others. These assumptions laid the foundation for other inference systems to be developed for use beyond that of the Nazi propaganda during World War II; Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Babbitt, "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Content Analysis," 1-2.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ The FBIS was renamed around this time to the Foreign Broadcast Information Division (FBID), however, it continued to be referenced as both FBIS and FBID within official documents, and occasionally as the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch. This research did not locate the specific documents to determine the significance of these variations, other than an assumption that the name changes were due to larger CIA organization nomenclature revisions and that the continued use of FBIS served as an enduring and well-known reference; Assistant Director of the Office of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, "Revision of FBID Publications," 22 August 1950, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160001-0/>.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Alan M. Warfield, "Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Operations; Subject: FBID Progress Report 1952," 12 January 1953, 4, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300080013-9>.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Acting Assistant Director for Operations, "Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence); Subject: Propaganda Analysis Activities of the Office of

Operations,” 8 August 1955, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500060067-0>.

²⁸⁵ CIA, “Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts; Subject: Inferences Based on Soviet Propaganda,” 1-13.

²⁸⁶ The FBID propaganda analysts chose to break propaganda into three aspects: intent of the propagandist, content of the message, and effects on the audience. The FBID was generally unconcerned with the content beyond its impact on the intended effect. Specific to the intent, the analysts saw that as multi-faceted, and sought to understand both the conscious and deliberate intentions and the subconscious and unintended intentions; *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Babbitt, “Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Content Analysis,” 1.

²⁸⁸ CIA, “Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts; Subject: Inferences Based on Soviet Propaganda,” 1-13.

²⁸⁹ Chief, Foreign Broadcast Information Division, “Office Memorandum; Subject: Comment on Office of Training Basic Intelligence Course,” 7 November 1952, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp54-00355a000100020008-5>.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Warfield, “FBID Progress Report 1952,” 5.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁰¹ National Security Council (NSC), NSC Report 161, *Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1953* (Washington, DC, 14 August 1953), in *Foreign Relations: The Intelligence Community*, document 155, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d155>.

³⁰² Warfield, “FBID Progress Report 1952,” 17.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 19.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., 20.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 28.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 22.

³⁰⁸ National Security Council (NSC), NSC Report 142, *Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1952* (Washington, DC, 10 February 1953), in *Foreign Relations: The Intelligence Community*, document 146, accessed 11 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d146>.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Warfield, “FBID Progress Report 1952,” 1.

³¹¹ Ibid., 1-2.

³¹² Ibid., 1.

³¹³ Ibid., 2.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 31.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 27.

³¹⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Radio Propaganda Report, Chinese Communist Broadcasts to Formosa, Basic Survey Series BS.9,” 1 April 1955, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79r01012a006300040037-0>.

³¹⁷ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, “Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Survey of the Foreign Documents Division, Office of Operations,” 19 November 1955, 10, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp62-01094r000100030023-0>.

³¹⁸ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Tab A, Index of Directives Authorizing Functions of Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140022-0>.

³¹⁹ Sheffield Edwards, “Memorandum, Subject: Functions of the Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” 17 April 1947, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200050064-2>; Donald Edgar, “Functions of the Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” 11 April 1947, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100010117-9>.

³²⁰ “Foreign Documents Division, Office of the Chief,” 1 June 1951, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060028-1>.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² “Functional Statement, Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” 2 June 1948, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140014-9>.

³²³ Edwards, “Memorandum; Subject: Functions of the Documents Branch, Office Of Operations.”

³²⁴ “Suggested Comments for Budget Report; FDD Coordination of Foreign-language Document Exploitation,” 17 May 1950, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000100090016-5>.

³²⁵ J. J. Bagnall, “Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report – July 1951,” 7 August 1951, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050018-9>.

³²⁶ Executive Director, “Functions and Further Development of Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” 8 June 1948, 5, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140021-1>.

³²⁷ John H. Ohly, “Memorandum for Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Subject: Analysis of Soviet Press and Radio Reaction,” (Washington, DC, 28 March 1949), 1-39, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a000400230008-1>.

³²⁸ Acting Chief, Foreign Documents Division, “Office Memorandum; Subject: Request for Organizational Changes,” 7 June 1950, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03568a000100270007-4>.

³²⁹ J. J. Bagnall, "Office Memorandum, Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report - January 1952," 7 February 1952, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050012-5>.

³³⁰ Foreign Documents Division, Office of Operations (OO-FDD), "Memo for the File," 23 April 1952, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000300010007-4>.

³³¹ J. J. Bagnall, "Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report - June 1952," 8 July 1952, 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050007-1>.

³³² "Functional Supervision of the Foreign Documents Division, O/O," 22 November 1949, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04718a000100300002-7>; R. H. Hillenkoetter, "Memorandum; Subject: Approval by the NSC of Much of the Dulles Report," 12 July 1949, 3, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r002600240008-4>.

³³³ CIA, "Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts."

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ "Study of Augmented Personnel Necessary for FDD to Fulfill its Mission," 4 August 1952, 4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060017-3>.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁴⁰ J. J. Bagnall, "Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report - September 1952," 10 October 1952, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050004-4>.

³⁴¹ Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, "Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Administration); Subject: Reallocation of Existing T/O Positions within Foreign Documents Division," 30 June 1953, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060005-6>.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Foreign Documents Division, Office of Operations, “Functions and Activities,” 31 October 1954, 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200070054-1>.

³⁴⁵ Task Force on Intelligence Activities, “Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government,” 46.

³⁴⁶ Acting Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, “Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence); Subject: Inspector General’s Questions Concerning Propaganda Analysis and OCI’s Memo, ‘Propaganda Highlights’,” 6 September 1955, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp62-01094r000100060028-2>.

³⁴⁷ “Increased Intelligence Support of USIA by CIA,” 27 October 1954, 4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100150008-5>.

³⁴⁸ Acting Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, “Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence),” 1.

³⁴⁹ Operations Coordinating Board, “Report on NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1,” (Washington, DC, 21 July 1954), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d183>.

³⁵⁰ Mutual Security Agency, “Report of the Mutual Security Agency to the Psychological Strategy Board on the National Psychological Effort, January 1- June 30, 1953,” 2 July 1953, 7, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400050013-5>.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

³⁵² Operations Coordinating Board, “Annex B, Report of the United States Information Agency on Implementation the Recommendations of the Jackson Committee Report (List A),” 30 September 1953, 4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000600150002-4>.

³⁵³ Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), “Implementation of the Report of the Survey of USIA’s Intelligence Needs and Assets,” 5 October 1954, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00400r000300060022-4>.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 3.

³⁵⁵ Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), IAC-D-82/7, “Annex to Brief for U.S. Information Agency Membership in the IAC, United States Information Agency

Office of Research and Intelligence,” 4 June 1956, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00400r000300060020-6>.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 2.

³⁵⁸ Office of the Director, Planning and Coordination Staff, “Memorandum for the Assistant to the DD/I (Administration); Subject: Response to your Budget Questions,” 26 October 1954, 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100150007-6>.

³⁵⁹ “Increased Intelligence Support of USIA by CIA,” 4.

³⁶⁰ The FBIS continued to function as a propaganda analysis office, to include adding new groups under its umbrella, well into the 70s and beyond. The role of both propaganda analysis and political analysis continued to be debated as well.; Ibid.; Deputy Director for Intelligence Management Staff, “Report for the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Subject: Transferring the FBIS Media Analysis Group,” 27 November 1974, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01495r000700020003-3>.

³⁶¹ Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9621.

³⁶² “Increased Intelligence Support of USIA by CIA,” 4.

³⁶³ Psychological Intelligence Committee (PIC), “DRAFT Memorandum, DCI’s Psychological Intelligence Committee, Minutes of Meeting,” 8 May 1950, 1-5, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160003-8>.

³⁶⁴ NSC, NSC Report 161.

³⁶⁵ Sidney W. Souers, “Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Secretary of Defense Forrestal,” (Washington, DC, 24 October 1947), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d245>.

³⁶⁶ Harold B. Hinton, “U.S. Moves to Offset Moscow’s Propaganda: Decision to Launch Counter-Offensive in Germany Sets New Policy,” *The New York Times*, 2 November 1947, E7.

³⁶⁷ Task Force on Intelligence Activities, “Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government,” 237.

³⁶⁸ Department of State, Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4, “Establishment of the United States International Information Administration (IIA),” (Washington, DC, 16 January 1952), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d294>.

³⁶⁹ Department of State, “Annex A, The Foreign Information Program: Status Report for Fiscal Year 1952,” in *Status Report on the National Psychological Effort and First Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board* (Psychological Strategy Board, 1 August 1952), 16, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003200050002-4>.

³⁷⁰ PIC, “DRAFT Memorandum, DCI’s Psychological Intelligence Committee, Minutes of Meeting,” 1-5.

³⁷¹ C. V. Allan, “Functions of the Propaganda Branch,” 3 May 1946, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁷² Chief, Propaganda Branch, “MID 912, Functions of the Propaganda Branch,” 5 April 1946, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁷³ Allan, “Functions of the Propaganda Branch, 1-2.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Military Intelligence Division (MID), MID 385, “Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Study of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Activities,” 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁷⁶ K. K. Wright, “Memorandum from the Director of Information; Subject: Functions of the Propaganda Branch,” 10 April 1946, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁷⁷ Assistant Director, CIG, “Letter to Louie,” 1.

³⁷⁸ C. V. Allan, “Memorandum from the Chief, Collections Group to A.C. of S., G-2,” 6 May 1946, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.; P. E. Peabody, "Memorandum from the CI&T Group to the Executive Director," 10 May 1946, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

³⁸² MID, G-2, MID 912, "Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff," 1-2.

³⁸³ Ibid.; MID, G-2, MID 912, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff," 1-4.

³⁸⁴ MID, G-2, MID 912, "Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff," 1-2.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ MID, G-2, MID 912, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff," 1-4.

³⁸⁷ Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office (ORO), "Revised Summary of ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31, 1952," vol. 1 (The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, MD, 28 July 1952), 85-92, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/007783.pdf>.

³⁸⁸ Intelligence School, *Tactical Psychological Warfare: The Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment* (Fort Riley, KS: The Ground General School, September 1947).

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 2.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 3.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 4.

³⁹² Ibid., 13-14.

³⁹³ The Ground General School, Special Text No. 8, *Strategical Psychological Warfare* (Fort Riley, KS: The Ground General School, 15 February 1949), 1.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 1.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 3-4.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 7.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 14.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁰⁰ Army General School, “PW-61-S-51, Student Summary, Monitoring: Section 1, Outline of Conference,” 1951, 1.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, “Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted by the Eighth Army Units in Korea, 25 June 1950 thru 27 July 1953,” (Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, February 1954), 1-4, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1181>.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Ibid., 10-12.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 4-5.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., 12.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ The Psychological Warfare School, *Special Orientation Text: Psychological Warfare Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: The Psychological Warfare School, 1 February 1952), 3.

⁴¹⁸ Department of the Army, Special Regulation No. 10, *Organization and Functions, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff* (Washington 25, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1951), 1.

⁴¹⁹ The Psychological Warfare School, *Special Orientation Text*, 3.

⁴²⁰ Department of the Army, Special Regulation No. 10, 3.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 2-6.

⁴²² The Psychological Warfare School, *Special Orientation Text*, 5.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁴²⁵ Department of the Army, Special Regulation No. 10, 1.

⁴²⁶ The Psychological Warfare School, "Program of Instruction for Psychological Warfare Office Course (MOS 9305)," (Fort Bragg, NC, January 1952), 7.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁴³⁰ "Office Memorandum; Subject: Army Psychological Warfare Officers Course," (20 September 1954), 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61-00017a000200060021-2>.

⁴³¹ Lawrence Schlesinger and Harriet Beckwitt, "Staff Memorandum on Psychological Warfare Job Requirements and Training: An Evaluation of the Psychological Warfare School Curriculum," (Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, Washington, DC, June 1956), 38-45, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/484337.pdf>.

⁴³² Herbert Avedon, "Memorandum for LT Colonel L.K Cannon, Jr., Subject: Suggest Rewrite of TC 13," (Washington 25, DC: 14 August 1953), 7-8.

⁴³³ The Psychological Warfare School, *Special Orientation Text*, 11.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴³⁶ Alan M. Warfield, "Progress Report for May, 1955," 6 June 1955, 2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300100008-2>.

⁴³⁷ The Psychological Warfare School, *Special Orientation Text*, 21-22.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Task Force Chairman, "Definition of Propaganda Analysis," 27 February 1952, 1, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500030010-5>.

⁴⁴⁰ This also source provides an intriguing peak into some of the deeper analysis methodology and framework used by the CIA during this period.; Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 1-2.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Oliver E. Clubb, "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk); Subject: Communist Intentions: Korea," (Washington, DC, 1 November 1950), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d730>.

⁴⁴⁵ Edward W. Barrett, "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs," (Washington, DC, 3 November 1950), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d736>.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency; NIE-2/1, National Intelligence Estimate, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," (Washington, DC, 24 November 1950), accessed 14 May 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d877>.

⁴⁴⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Division, "Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts." 12.

⁴⁴⁹ The FBID propaganda analysts applied several additional layers to their assumptions as well as more advanced propaganda analysis techniques that related to game theory, strategy, psychology, and are quite interesting to read. Some additional details in this regard, the logic behind them, and historical examples can be found in this

source. Additional technical details can be found in the works by Alexander George.; Ibid., 1-13.

⁴⁵⁰ George G. Carey, “Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Subject: Propaganda Analysis Activities of the Office of Operations,” 10 June 1955, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500060111-0>.

⁴⁵¹ Sherman Kent, “Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Operations, Subject: Overall Requirements for Propaganda Analysis,” 7 January 1954, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000600050006-3>.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Huntington D. Sheldon, “Memorandum for the Assistant Director of Operations, Subject: OCI Comments on Analysis of Foreign Radio Propaganda,” 26 May 1954, 1-2, accessed 14 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91t01172r000400030001-5>.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Army General School, “PW-61-S-51, Student Summary, Monitoring,” 2.

⁴⁵⁷ Nicholas Roland, “Operation Shingle: Landing at Anzio, Italy, 22 January 1944,” Naval History and Heritage Command, November 2018, accessed 19 March 2021, <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1944/anzio.html>.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Whatever the complexities of the puzzles we strive to solve, and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store them, there can never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intelligence device supreme.

—Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*

Introduction

This study focused on the earliest period of propaganda analysis organizations and activities within the United States. As a result of propaganda analysis' historical coupling with propaganda use and psychological warfare during the same period, some research inevitably included the role of these activities as well as intelligence as necessary to frame and understand the role of propaganda analysis. The previous chapters covered the evolution of propaganda analysis theories within the U.S. as well as the evolution of organizations that conducted it. It also covered the impact of policy decisions on the role of propaganda and the implications of these changes. This chapter presents the findings of this research, answers the primary and secondary questions, and provides final conclusions and recommendations as a result of these findings.

Results and Implications

The primary question is answered by first providing sequential answers to the five subordinate questions, and then the primary question is answered with six primary conclusions based on the data presented and three subsequent recommendations. The subordinate questions were:

1. What was the state of propaganda analysis at the end of the war?
2. What were the relevant agencies that were created from this division?
3. What were roles and responsibilities concerning propaganda analysis for these agencies?
4. What roles and responsibilities did Army PSYOP doctrine develop for propaganda analysis as a result?
5. How effective were these propaganda analysis techniques?

From its inception after World War I until the end of World War II, propaganda analysis evolved from a new theory principally meant to identify propaganda and to understand its objectives, both largely for the ability to inoculate against its effects. The field of professionals working on it was relatively small but mostly inter-connected, and funneled first through New York City's Institute for Propaganda Analysis and ultimately into the national policy-making spotlight and throughout the government. It was conducted in both ad hoc fashion by small untrained teams and in centralized well-trained centers for extended periods. Its purpose ranged from mere identification of propaganda, to supporting psychological warfare activities and military operations, and to inferring implications of enemy strategy. By the Second World War's end, the state of propaganda analysis within the U.S. Government could be characterized as decentralized, unfocused, lacking in clear doctrine or methodologies, but increasingly sophisticated and effective.

The role of propaganda analysis in the decade following the end of World War II was deeply intertwined within the numerous intelligence and psychological warfare organizations that sprung up. Some were concerned with policy related to propaganda

analysis, while others were merely consumers of its products. Some conducted it internally and intermittently while others were focused solely on its conduct. It is difficult to classify many of the operational organizations, planning committees and boards, and coordinating bodies as distinctly intelligence-based, psychological warfare-based, or otherwise. Generally, the period marked on-going discussion of the proper place of psychological warfare within the various Departments as well as its role as either intelligence or operations, and propaganda analysis mostly followed along as a byproduct. However, propaganda analysis was also conducted by dedicated offices in various capacities in many of the Departments outside of this discussion. See tables 1-4.

Table 1. Planning And Coordination Organizations

Organization	Role	Responsibility
State-War-Navy Committee SWNCC/SANACC	Coordinate between War, Navy, (Air Force) and State Departments post-WWII	Future peacetime and wartime Psychological Warfare organization
Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC/SSE)	Develop policies, plans, and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President)	Authority to coordinate psychological warfare plans in the absence of an alternative authority
Psychological Intelligence Committee (PIC)	Served an advisory role rather than making any substantive policy or decisions	Coordination of psychological intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies as they affect national security; intelligence support for the Foreign Information Program; planning of psychological warfare
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)	Not an operational agency, but a planning and coordinating entity using existing departments and agencies	To authorize and provide for more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations

Source: Created by author.

Table 2. Army Organizations

Organization	Role	Responsibility
Propaganda Branch	Primary Psychological Warfare organization of the U.S. Army after WWII	The analysis of foreign and domestic propaganda; other psychological warfare coordination and planning responsibilities
Ground General School	Doctrine and training organization of the U.S. Army shortly after WWII	Create and conduct training for tactical/strategic psychological warfare to include propaganda analysis and foreign broadcast monitoring
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD)	Primary Psychological Warfare organization of the U.S. Army after the Propaganda Branch	Conduct psychological warfare abroad, and limited analysis of foreign propaganda; other psychological warfare coordination and planning responsibilities
Office of the Chief, Psychological Warfare (OCPW)	Responsible for Psychological Operations and Special Operations under the Army G-3	Formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy; recommend policies and supervise the execution of Army programs; evaluation of US and foreign propaganda

Source: Created by author.

Table 3. Intelligence Organizations

Organization	Role	Responsibility
Central Intelligence Agency (CIG/CIA)	A central agency for the coordination of all national intelligence	Coordinate and evaluate national intelligence, provide reports to the Executive and NSC; included several offices with propaganda analysis functions
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE)	An intelligence office within the CIA	Contribute to high-level intelligence and estimates for policy; conduct of limited propaganda analysis
Chief of Plans Section	A subordinate office within the Special Procedures Group, Office of Special Operations, CIA	Selective analysis of foreign news and other informational sources, including pertinent intelligence collected by Central Intelligence Agency, and determine effectiveness
Psychological Intelligence Division (PID)	An intelligence office within the ORE	Support the budding intelligence and psychological warfare requirements
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS/FBID)	Primary CIA foreign radio broadcast translation and analysis office	Collection, translation, analysis, and propaganda analysis services and reports for intelligence and government requestors
Foreign Documents Division (FDD)	Primary CIA foreign documents and press translation and analysis office	Collection, translation, analysis, and propaganda analysis services and reports for intelligence and government requestors
Office of Current Intelligence (OCI)	Production of current intelligence primarily to support the DCI and the CIA	Conducted independent propaganda analysis as a component of its current analysis and estimates

Source: Created by author.

Table 4. Other Organizations

Organization	Role	Responsibility
Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI)	Provide an intelligence office within the US Information Agency (USIA)	Analysis of propaganda in all its aspects, the analysis of foreign public attitudes, and determining the effectiveness of overseas information activities
Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)	Provide an intelligence office within the Department of State	Provide reports using propaganda analysis that were shared between the various other propaganda analysis organizations

Source: Created by author.

The Army began incorporating psychological warfare into its doctrine almost immediately after the end of World War II based on its wartime experiences. At least partially as a result of the drawdown of wartime organizations and its associated funding, the Army was forced to temporarily adopt the FBIS within its intelligence organization. It thus had exposure to the propaganda analysis mechanisms of a non-military organization, which invariably influenced its own propaganda analysis perception. Over successive versions, Army psychological warfare emphasis expanded to include training and doctrine that was fundamentally similar to that which exists today. Subsequent versions of manuals also grew propaganda analysis from a basic monitoring mission and analysis that appeared similar to early 1930s theories into something more robust. Then, with the establishment of OCPW and related officer training courses, the propaganda analysis curriculum and training grew to a full-scope discipline that included the concepts and training lessons representing the breadth of propaganda analysis experiences. Despite this, the primary doctrinal manual for psychological warfare FM 33-5 (and the predecessor to contemporary PSYOP manuals) provided far less on the topic.

The effectiveness of respective organizations propaganda analysis efforts proved difficult to capture. Smaller organizations or organizations that provided limited duration or sporadic propaganda analysis did not result in sufficient products or discussion during the period to determine how effective each was within the confines of this research. At the same time, the larger and enduring organizations provided propaganda analysis for mostly different organizations and purposes and are difficult to compare. Providing an evaluation of these organizations' effectiveness relative to the intended purpose was

confounded by competing thoughts on the topic as well. The FBIS provided a prime example of this, where it received high praise from many notable figures over the course of years on its ability to fulfill its primary role of foreign broadcast propaganda analysis, yet it too received critical evaluations periodically from credible sources. Other offices that did not retain propaganda analysis functions often transferred the function to new offices, and many of these ultimately ended up the responsibility of the FBIS. Regardless, the enduring nature of the propaganda analysis task within the CIA's FBIS and the Army's propaganda analysis provides the single best metric of the activity's effectiveness, providing decades of unbroken activity of presumably marginal utility to warrant such an investment.

Finally, the primary question this thesis sought to answer was how can an understanding of the division of the wartime U.S. Psychological Warfare responsibilities from the end of World War II through 1955 contribute to improved understanding and provide recommendations for the conduct of U.S. Army Psychological Operations propaganda analysis today? This question is best answered by six primary conclusions and three recommendations.

Primary Conclusions

1. Propaganda analysis is an intelligence function. Whether traced back to its military or other U.S. Government roots, propaganda analysis had its origins within intelligence organizations, or the intelligence sections of non-intelligence organizations. Although some of its fundamental theories, assumptions, and social science techniques were born from academia, the conduct of propaganda analysis as a regular activity, with

dedicated staff conducting it for a dedicated purpose, is deeply rooted within intelligence. In fact, some of the pioneering intelligence figures, those responsible for much of the modern intelligence framework, had their intelligence careers deeply intertwined within the same organizations that pioneered propaganda analysis.¹ As such, many of its evolutionary methodologies, practices, and uses have their origins in the same. Additionally, though many did not survive long-term, the majority of the offices during both World War II and immediately following were intelligence sections. It was not until the Army ultimately shifted the psychological warfare responsibility to operations, after years of debate, that propaganda analysis itself was pulled from an entirely intelligence function. By then, its structure, conduct, and purposes were those of its intelligence past, and closely resemble more contemporary propaganda analysis frameworks and methods. Its use was routinely recommended to include intelligence and specially trained analysts, often with deep experience and education within specified regions, and its conduct instructed to be on-going, dedicated, and focused. Its only significant debate as an intelligence function was whether it was its own intelligence field, akin to a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) versus Propaganda Intelligence (PROPINT) or other specialty, or whether it merely provided intelligence to all-source or political analysts for further analysis. It was deliberately separated from even focused psychological warfare intelligence functions, and was mostly treated as its own unique activity. Only the classification of its title purpose, intelligence, has meaningfully changed to that of operations.

2. Propaganda analysis as a term has been used to describe and direct several functions. Depending on the organization and time the term propaganda analysis was used, the actual purpose for its analysis meant something different. This generally meant the following activities: conducting a spot analysis on a specific piece of propaganda as a means to identify it, a trend analysis over time to understand a propaganda campaign, an analysis of propaganda to understand its objectives, analysis to determine policy and strategic intent, and an evaluation to determine friendly and enemy propaganda effectiveness. This variety of meanings partially contributed to the various misunderstandings of the propaganda analysis' merits and effectiveness, as it was not always clear what its conduct was attempting to provide, and how its products were best used.

3. Propaganda analysis is best performed by dedicated propaganda analysts. A routine recommendation of psychological warfare and especially of propaganda analysis over this period was that both were most effective when conducted by specially trained and dedicated personnel. Although the relationship of propaganda analysis with intelligence was repeatedly made, and comparisons made between the propaganda analysis process and purpose with that of other intelligence processes, the most qualified organization and credible figures clearly recommended it remain compartmentalized from more general approaches, that is personnel receive specialized training on its conduct, and that it was most effectively performed when personnel had sufficient experience and backgrounds within propaganda, the region, the language, and the propaganda analysis procedure itself.

4. The current SCAME and MARCO frameworks are derivative of techniques developed only for the identification of propaganda. When compared to the STASM and other frameworks presented in the 1930s and 1940s, the fundamental questions have been reorganized more than have been revised. The result of this conclusion is that current doctrine directs any and all propaganda analysis be conducted with a method that is not only dated and lacking in modern theories, social science, and psychological updates, it uses a framework designed for identification and inoculation of propaganda that was not intended for additional purposes.

5. Many of the theories and benefits of propaganda analysis proposed during the period of this study remain applicable today. The presentation of contemporary propaganda may be altered today, but its direction and the behest of nation-states and policy-makers make many of the assumptions regarding making inferences from its analysis unchanged. The abundance of broadcast propaganda from 1945-1955 has been largely replaced with streaming television channels, news programs, and online media; however, it remains part of a larger propaganda program, planned and directed for a purpose, and thus provides intelligence value just as in previous decades. The main instigators of foreign propaganda remain largely the same with China and Russia, and further support many of the theories that suggest authoritarian-sourced propaganda provides the best type of propaganda for analysis of implications. Although its emphasis as a source of intelligence is somewhat diminished today, given the preponderance of other sources of information and media, propaganda analysis retains its potential for secondary source intelligence to validate conclusions from other sources, and provides a

similarly inexpensive intelligence opportunity relative to many other more technical and monetarily demanding methods.

6. Propaganda analysis is most effectively done by a centralized organization. A reoccurring determination during the period was that propaganda analysis was not a wasted use of resources and effort. The implication that the complex and vast array of offices originally conducting it reducing over time is not indicative of its lack of effectiveness or merit, but rather an issue of efficiency of resources and maximization of specialization. Many offices were not disbanded but were rather consolidated in other offices, further supporting that the effort was evolving rather than disappearing.

Recommendations for Application

1. New doctrine and methodologies should be developed for propaganda analysis and incorporate intelligence analysis doctrine and modern data analysis techniques. It should also include updates in methodologies and considerations for new media types, especially that of social media, modern data science approaches, and applicable techniques and lessons learned derived from decades of FBIS experience. Some effort should also be taken to differentiate propaganda analysis as distinct from more generalized OSINT activities, as this research has shown the methodologies, assumptions, and products produced are distinctly separate from more generalized public information collection and analysis. This would also present an opportunity to clarify the shared role of propaganda analysis between the various Information Related Capabilities (IRCs), particularly with the Public Affairs section. The time and place of propaganda analysis also deserves revision, given the preponderance of evidence indicating it proves

most effective when conducted over longer lengths of time and against an ideological or political enemy, especially that of a centralized and authoritarian nature.

This recommendation also includes treating propaganda analysis specifically as an intelligence task. Although this recommendation has authority implications between Title 10 and Title 50 restrictions that are not explored within this study, but broadly speaking, collection can be centralized, systems developed if they don't exist, and separate intelligence military occupation specialties (MOS) can be developed if needed to maintain appropriate authorities. This better supports psychological operations, frees intelligence billets that otherwise are attempting to conduct this in an ad hoc manner, and is aligned with historical experience of having a dedicated staff for its conduct.

2. Propaganda analysis within the Army is best conducted by psychological operations personnel. Additionally, psychological operations should increase its conduct of propaganda analysis, to include a dedicated section devoted to the task. This recommendation is partially derivative of the third conclusion that propaganda analysis is best performed by dedicated propaganda analysts. However, it also incorporates the fact that present psychological operations personnel already maintain the requisite regional, language, and propaganda backgrounds. What is currently lacking is the directive and mission to perform propaganda analysis as an enduring function, and the required resources to support it. Given that its conduct is most effectively performed by a centralized team, as shown by this research, and given the new prevalence of state-backed or directed propaganda (especially through social media), the Information Warfare Center (IWC) and the psychological operations Technical Information Sections

(TIS) are well suited to devote the requisite time, resources, and personnel to the conduct of propaganda analysis. Regular conduct of propaganda analysis by these or other dedicated PSYOP elements would thus support enhanced regional and cultural knowledge within the regiment, improve support to PSYOP operations, and help support non-PSYOP organizations with various levels of intelligence.

3. Propaganda analysis should be a broad term used to describe four intelligence tasks for five operational purposes. From the original formulation until its present form in contemporary doctrine, the term propaganda analysis has been used to describe various types of activities, all nested within some type of application of analytical processes to propaganda. Unfortunately, as a result, when a commander now directs propaganda analysis, it is otherwise unclear on which specific task and purpose is being asked, and which will be received. Therefore, and based on the various propaganda analysis variants conducted over this period, this thesis presents the four intelligence tasks that propaganda is historically and logically applicable. Each of these tasks is generally related to a different level of war and an associated increase in resources and time needed, ascending from tactical to strategic. Additionally, each of these tasks supports one or more operational purposes. Using this construct, and applying the terminology proposed, a commander can better understand the capabilities and limitations of an organization's propaganda analysis conduct. Also, commanders and analyst can use precise terms and immediately understand the intent, requirements, and time required for its conduct. This recommendation would be further supported by the first recommendation for new and improved propaganda analysis doctrine, specifically tailoring methodologies and best

practices to appropriate tasks, purposes, and the effects of transitioning between levels of war. See figures 4 and 5.




Figure 4. Proposed Tasks and Purposes of Propaganda Analysis

Source: Created by author.

Spot Analysis – To identify new adversary propaganda techniques, trends, campaigns, propagandists, and influence groups; to determine adversary areas and topics of interest; and to understand the current information environment Trend Analysis – To understand changes in adversary operations, priorities, propaganda campaigns, themes, and the information environment over time; to identify psychological vulnerabilities Implications – To determine psychological operations program objectives and other military operations; e.g. future enemy movements, areas of interest, morale, etc. Strategic Intent – To determine adversary policy, national objectives, and psychological vulnerabilities; to predict future strategic objectives

Figure 5. Definitions of Proposed Propaganda Analysis Tasks

Source: Created by author.

Recommendations for Further Research

While conducting research for this thesis, several topics arose that were of interest but outside the scope or capability to research further. However, they're not without

merit, and provide interesting and useful related topics based on previously completed research that may yield additional useful conclusions and recommendations.

1. Based on the recommendation for the updated intelligence and operations task and purposes for propaganda analysis, further research to develop suitable methodologies and analytical process based on each of the purposes would significantly improve Army ability to conduct propaganda analysis for a purpose. Various broad and nuanced approaches could be taken within this, such as attempting case studies to validate historical examples that may exist of portions of the recommendation, or by using the newly proposed framework as a theoretical lens to gauge them. A relationship between intelligence derived from propaganda analysis applied to each operational purpose could help clarify how applicable each relationship is, and if tactical spot report propaganda analysis has any bearing on effective counter propaganda series, or even support to conventional or special operations beyond psychological operations themselves.

2. The application of strategic inferences, based on the framework proposed by Alexander George, applied to modern social media analysis techniques also provides an attractive and practical area for further research. This could be tested against its applicability to China, Russia, North Korea, or others, and provide not only validation of the technique, but also serve to augment doctrine improvements and even provide current intelligence as a byproduct.

3. A case study analysis of the historical utility of SCAME or MARCO effectively contributing to military operations using the proposed propaganda analysis purposes, to determine if any are well-suited. This would serve to not only provide data

to support or invalidate SCAME and MARCO as useful frameworks, but also assist in providing updated doctrine on their or other useful techniques towards propaganda analysis.

4. During the period of this research, the terms and concepts of disinformation and misinformation were imbedded or otherwise included within the scope of propaganda analysis. Contemporary use of these terms has them separated from propaganda, and much of the research related to foreign influence that may otherwise be characterized as propaganda has focused solely on deception. Additional research comparing these new techniques, case studies, and findings with original propaganda analysis research may yield evidence of overlap and therefore useful corollaries, or may provide additional insight for the improvement of both propaganda analysis as well as its mis- and disinformation cousins.

¹ Jack Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” 1992, 91-94, accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/1992-2/the-kent-kendall-debate-of-1949/>.

APPENDIX A

STASM FORMULA

a. Source

- (1) True Source (“Where does it really come from?”)
 - (a) Release channel (“How did it come out?”) if different from true source without concealing true source
 - (b) Person or institution in whose name material originates
 - (c) Transmitting channel (“Who got it to us?”), person or institution effecting known transmission—omitting, of course, analyst’s own procurement facilities
- (2) Ostensible Source (“Where does it pretend to come from?”)
 - (a) Release channel (“Who is supposed to be passing it along?”)
- (3) First-use and second-use source (first use, “Who is said to have used this first?”; second use, “Who pretends to be quoting someone else?”)
 - (a) Connection between second-use source and first-use source, usually in the form of attributed or unacknowledged quotation; more rarely, plagiarism
 - (b) Modification between use by first-use and second-use sources, when both are known
 - (i) Deletions
 - (ii) Changes in text
 - (iii) Enclosures within editorial matter of transmitter
 - (iv) Falsification which appears deliberate
 - (v) Effects of translation from one language to another

b. Time

- (1) Time of events or utterance to which subject-matter refers
- (2) Time of transmission (publishing, broadcasting, etc.)
- (3) Time of repetitions
- (4) Reasons, if any are evident, for peculiarities of timing

c. Audience

- (1) Intended direct audience (“in English to North America”; “a paper for New York restaurant operators”)
- (2) Intended indirect audience (program beamed “in English to North America” but actually reaching Hong Kong and Singapore by deliberate plan of the sender; “a paper for New York restaurant operators” being faked and sent to Southeast Europe in fact)

- (3) Unintended audience (a Guadalcanal native studying *Esquire*; your aunt reading the *Infantry Journal*; a Chinese reading American wartime speeches against the “yellow devils” of Japan)
 - (4) Ostensibly unintended direct audience (such as an appeal to strikers in very abusive-sounding language, sent to businessmen to build up opinions *against* the strikers, or Hitler’s black use of the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion)
- d. Subject (“What does it say?”)
- (1) Content listed under any convenient heading as though it were *straight news or intelligence*
 - (2) Content epitomized as demonstrating *new propaganda technique* (such as, “Now they’re trying to get us out of Tientsin by appeals to our isolationists!”)
 - (3) Content which may be useful in *counterpropaganda* (such as, “They said that the Greeks are our witless puppets, so let’s pass that along to the Greeks”)
 - (4) Significance of content for *intelligence analysis* (examples: When the Japanese boasted about their large fish catch, it was an indication their fishing fleet was short of gasoline again, and that the fish catch was actually small; when the Nazis accused the Jews of sedition, it meant that rations were short and that the Nazi government was going to appease the populace by denying the Jews their scanty rations by way of contrast)
- e. Mission
- (1) Nation, group, or person attacked
 - (2) Relation to previous items with the same or related missions
 - (3) Particular psychological approach used in this instance (such as wedge-driving between groups, or between people and leaders, or between armed services; or demoralization of audience in general; or decrease of listeners’ faith in the news)
 - (4) Known or probable connection with originator’s propaganda plan or strategy

Note: “Such an outline would be useful only if it were applied in common-sense terms, without turning each item into an elaborate project and thus losing the woods in the trees. In most cases, it would suffice to state the item briefly for reference and study in the order of the entries.”¹

¹ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*.

APPENDIX B

SCAME ANALYSIS¹

1. Identify the source of the propaganda.
 - a. Identify the actor, the authority, and the author of the propaganda.
 - b. Identify dissemination source.
 - c. Determine the credibility of each element of the source with the target audience.
 - d. Identify proper classification of the document (SCAME work sheet).
2. Analyze the propaganda message content.
 - a. Identify the objective of the message.
 - b. Identify the arguments used.
 - c. Analyze the morale of the source (high/low).
 - d. Analyze any involuntary information in the message (news, opinions, and entertainment).
 - e. Analyze any biographical information in the message.
 - f. Analyze any economic information in the message with verified information to reveal possible problems.
 - g. Analyze propaganda inconsistencies that may reveal source conditions.
 - h. Conclude the intent/agenda of the source.
3. Identify the propaganda message audience.
 - a. List the apparent audiences.
 - (1) List the audience's reaction to the message.
 - (2) List probable reasons each apparent audience was targeted.
 - b. Determine the intermediate audience.
 - (1) Determine each intermediate audience's reaction to the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each intermediate audience was targeted.
 - c. Determine the unintended audience.
 - (1) Determine each unintended audience's reaction to the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each unintended audience was targeted.
 - d. Determine the ultimate audience.
 - (1) Determine each ultimate audience's reaction to the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each ultimate audience was targeted.
4. Analyze the media conveying the propaganda message.
 - a. Identify method of dissemination.
 - b. Determine transmission mode.
 - (1) Determine if overt.
 - (2) Determine if covert.
 - c. Determine frequency of dissemination.
 - d. Identify placement of the propaganda within a medium.

- e. Identify or conclude place of origin.
 - f. Classify technical characteristics.
 - (1) Identify frequency.
 - (2) Identify modulation.
 - (3) Identify signal strength.
 - (4) Identify retransmission station.
 - (5) Determine number of pages.
 - (6) Determine quality of paper.
 - (7) Determine print quality.
 - (8) Identify color/black and white.
5. Analyze the propaganda message effectiveness.
- a. Use the following information in analysis:
 - (1) Determine target audience responsive actions.
 - (2) Analyze participant reports.
 - (3) Analyze observer commentaries.
 - b. Evaluate the information gathered from responsive actions, participant reports, and observer commentaries.
6. Submit to supervisor for review and approval.

¹ HQDA, STP 33-37F14-SM-TG, 3-98 - 3-99.

APPENDIX C

MARCO ANALYSIS¹

1. Identify the propaganda message.
 - a. What does the propaganda say to do?
 - b. What is the objective of the message?
 - c. What, if any, persuasive argument is used?
 - d. What is the morale of the source?
 - e. Analyze any involuntary information in the message (news, opinions, and entertainment).
 - f. Analyze any biographical information in the message.
 - g. Analyze any economic information in the message.
 - h. Determine propaganda inconsistencies and inaccuracies.
 - i. Obtain geographic information.
2. Determine the propaganda message audience.
 - a. List apparent audiences.
 - (1) Determine each apparent audience's perception of the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each apparent audience was selected.
 - b. Determine the intermediate audience.
 - (1) Determine each intermediate audience's perception of the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each intermediate audience was selected.
 - c. Determine unintended audience.
 - (1) Determine each unintended audience's perception of the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each unintended audience was selected.
 - d. Determine the ultimate audience.
 - (1) Determine each ultimate audience's perception of the message.
 - (2) Determine the reason each ultimate audience was selected.
3. Determine the target audience's (TA's) response to assess propaganda message effectiveness.
 - a. Use the following information in analysis:
 - (1) Determine TA response/reactions.
 - (2) Analyze participant reports.
 - (3) Analyze observer commentaries.
 - b. Evaluate the information gathered from responsive actions, participant reports, and observer commentaries.
4. Analyze the carrier, the media conveying the propaganda message.
 - a. Track frequency (how often) of dissemination.
 - b. Determine placement (position) of the propaganda within a medium.
 - c. Identify place of origin.
 - d. Classify technical characteristics; for example:

- (1) Identify frequency.
 - (2) Identify modulation.
 - (3) Identify signal strength.
 - (4) Identify retransmission station.
 - (5) Determine number of pages.
 - (6) Determine quality of paper.
 - (7) Determine print quality.
 - (8) Identify color/black and white.
 - e. Determine method of dissemination.
 - f. Determine transmission mode.
 - (1) Determine if overt.
 - (2) Determine if covert.
5. Identify the originator of the propaganda message.
- a. Determine the actor (person or entity presenting the message), the authority (person or entity in whose name the statement is made), and the author (person or entity who initiates the message) of the propaganda.
 - b. Identify dissemination source.
 - (1) Government agencies.
 - (2) Police.
 - (3) Political parties.
 - (4) Mass media.
 - (5) Military organizations.
 - (6) Hired personnel.
 - (7) Volunteers.
 - (8) International media.
 - (9) Underground networks.
 - c. Determine the credibility of each element of the source.
6. Submit to supervisor for review and approval.

¹ HQDA, STP 33-37F14-SM-TG, 3-101 - 3-102.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Bernays, Edward. *Propaganda*. New York: Ig Publishing, 2005.
- Becker, Jean Jacques. *The Great War and the French People*. Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 1986.
- Doob, Leonard W. *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935.
- Edwards, Violet. *Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis: Revised Edition of Experimental Study Materials for Use in Junior and Senior High Schools, in College and University Classes, and in Adult Study Groups*. New York: Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1938.
- Hamilton, John Maxwell. *Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American Propaganda*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2020.
- Hummel, William, and Keith Huntress. *The Analysis of Propaganda*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1949.
- Lasswell, Harold D., Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith. *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935.
- Lee, Alfred McClung. *How to Understand Propaganda*. New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953.
- Lerner, Daniel. *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany D-Day to VE-Day*. New York: George W. Stewart Publisher, Inc., 1949.
- Linebarger, Paul M.A. *Psychological Warfare*. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.
- Mitrovich, Gregory. *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
- The National Archives. *1941 Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America*. Book 1. Washington, DC: Division of the Federal Register, 1941.
- . *Federal Records of World War II*. Vol. I, *Civilian Agencies*. Publications Nos. 51-7. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951.

Oxford English Dictionary. Quoted in Edward Bernays. *Propaganda*, 11. New York: Ig Publishing, 2005.

Paddock, Alfred H. Jr. *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*. Rev. ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.

Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEPF). *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force: An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945*. PWD, SHAEPF, 1951.

Sproule, J. Michael. *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Webster's New International Dictionary. 2nd ed. Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1983. Quoted in Alfred McClung Lee. *How to Understand Propaganda*, 7. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953.

Journals and Periodicals

Bowen, Glenn. "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method." *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (August 2009): 27-40. doi:10.3316/QRJ0902027.

Cantril, Hadley. "Propaganda Analysis." *The English Journal* 27, no. 3 (March 1938): 217-221. Accessed 28 February 2021. <https://doi.org/10.2307/806063>.

Davenport, Richard B. "The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 88, no. 1 (2018): 64-69.

Davis, Jack. "Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis." *Occasional Papers* 1, no. 5 (November 2002). Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/static/aa47b490ac1c52c04c467a248c5cbace/Kent-Profession-Intel-Analysis.pdf>.

———. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." *Studies in Intelligence* (1992): 91-103. Accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/1992-2/the-kent-kendall-debate-of-1949/>.

Garber, William. "Propaganda Analysis-To What Ends?" *American Journal of Sociology* 48, no. 2 (1942): 240-45. Accessed 28 March 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769619>.

Goodyknoontz, Bess. "Propaganda: What It Is; How It Works; What to Do About It." *Phi Delta Kappa Journal* 17, no. 1 (October 1938): 6-9. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42915387>.

- Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H. "Using the World's Information Sources." *Army Information Digest* 3, no. 11 (November 1948): 5.
- Institute of Propaganda Analysis, Inc. "Propaganda Analysis: A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda." *Propaganda Analysis* 1, no. 1 (October 1937): 5.
- Intelligence and Leaflet Unit, Office of War Information. "Area III – Far East." *Leaflet News Letter* 1, no. 6 (27 June 1945): 23. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2077>.
- . "Area III – Far East." *Leaflet News Letter* 1, no. 10 (27 July 1945): 7. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2074>.
- Lasswell, Harold D. "The Theory of Political Propaganda." *The American Political Science Review* 21, no. 3 (1927): 627-631.
- Lee, Alfred McClung. "Interest Criteria in Propaganda Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 10, no. 2 (1945): 282-88. Accessed 29 March 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2085647>.
- . "The Analysis of Propaganda: A Clinical Summary." *American Journal of Sociology* 51, no. 2 (1945): 126-35. Accessed 28 February 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2771415>.
- Lee, Ivy. "The Problem of International Propaganda: A New Technique Necessary in Developing Understanding between Nations." *Occasion Papers*, no. 3 (3 July 1934): 10.
- McEwen, Michael T. "A New Terrorism Intelligence Challenge." *American Intelligence Journal* 8, no. 2 (1987): 22-24.
- McLain, Raymond S. "Leadership and the Information Program." *Army Information Digest* 3, no. 9 (September 1948): 58.
- Miller, Clyde R. "For the Analysis of Propaganda." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (January 1938): 133-134. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://doi-org.eres.qnl.qa/10.1086/265163>.
- Pool, Ithiel De Sola. "Content Analysis for Intelligence Purposes." *World Politics* 12, no. 3 (1960): 480. Accessed 28 February 2021. doi:10.2307/2009404.
- Read, Oliver. "Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service." *Radio News* 33, no. 1 (January 1945): 25-30.

- Smith, B. L. "Propaganda Analysis and the Science of Democracy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 5 (1941): 250-259, 250, 259. Quoted in Alfred McClung Lee. *How to Understand Propaganda*. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., March 1953.
- Spaeth, Carl B., and William Sanders. "The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense." *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 2 (1944): 218-41. Accessed 16 March 2021. doi:10.2307/2192694.
- Speier, Hans. "On Propaganda." *Social Research* 1, no. 3 (1934): 376-80. Accessed 28 March 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40981387>.
- Geller, A., D. Kaplan, and Harold D. Lasswell. "An Experimental Comparison of Four Ways of Coding Editorial Content." *Journalism Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1 December 1942): 362. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1177/107769904201900403>.

News

- Barrow, Bill. "GOP governors launch 'news' site critics call propaganda," *AP News*, 19 September 2017. <https://apnews.com/article/f97fbf53c0c84468ae046f861ecf3b64>.
- Facebook. "Helping to Protect the 2020 US Elections." 21 October 2019. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/update-on-election-integrity-efforts/>.
- Hamilton, John Maxwell, and Kevin R. Kosar. "Call It What It Is: Propaganda." *Politico*, 8 October 2020. <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/08/government-communication-propaganda-427290>.
- Hinton, Harold B. "U.S. Moves to Offset Moscow's Propaganda: Decision to Launch Counter-Offensive in Germany Sets New Policy." *The New York Times*, 2 November 1947.
- Pompeo, Michael R., Secretary of State. "On the Chinese Communist Party's Obscene Propaganda." Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, 6 June 2020. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-chinese-communist-partys-obscene-propaganda/index.html>.

Reports

- 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). *A Vision for 2021 and Beyond*. Fort Bragg, NC: 1st Special Forces Command, 2020. <https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Documents/1sfc-vision-2021-beyond.pdf>.
- Aidar, Tainov. "Achilles' Heel of Daesh Propaganda." Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2017.

- Carr, Bradley M. “Joint Interagency Task Force – Influence: The New Global Engagement Center.” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2017.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Historical Staff. “CIA Support Functions: Organization and Accomplishments of the DDA--DDS Group, 1953-1956.” Vol. 1 (Chap. 1 and 2). (The DCI Historical Series, Washington, DC, July 1960). Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00708r000300040001-2>.
- Fernandez, Alberto M., *Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks*. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World: U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2015. Washington, DC: Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, October 2015.
- George, Alexander L. *The Scientific Status of Propaganda Analysis*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 15 December 1954.
- Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas (HQ, USAFPOA). “Part One: 1944 Progress of the War in Pacific Ocean Areas.” Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, HQ, USAFPOA, June 30, 1945. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4702>.
- Jackson, Dean. “Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and ‘Fake News’.” International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy, 17 October 2017.
- Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office (ORO). “Revised Summary of ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31, 1952.” Vol. 1. ORO, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, MD, 28 July 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/007783.pdf>.
- Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-2013*. Washington, DC: JCS, April 2013. Accessed 9 May 2021. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Organizational_Development_of_the_JCS.pdf.
- Lamb, Christopher J. *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2005. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://fas.org/irp/eprint/lamb.pdf>.
- Lavoix, Helene. “The Islamic State Psyops—A Framework.” The Red Team Analysis Society, 8 December 2014. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://www.redanalysis.org/2014/12/08/islamic-state-psyops-framework/>.

- Lilly, Edward P. "The Development of American Psychological Operations 1945-1951." Psychological Strategy Board, Washington 25, DC, 19 December 1951.
- McKenzie, Robert. "Measuring the Impact and Effectiveness of Adversarial Propaganda and Disinformation." School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY, Spring 2019. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/capstone-projects/measuring-impact-and-effectiveness-adversarial-propaganda-and>.
- Quayle, David B., Justin J. Schiltz, and Shawn A. Stangle. "Rethinking PSYOP: How DoD Could Restructure to Compete in the Information Environment." Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2016. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/51600>.
- Roland, Nicholas. "Operation Single: Landing at Anzio, Italy, 22 January 1944." Naval History and Heritage Command, November 2018. Accessed 19 March 2021. <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1944/anzio.html>.
- Task Force on Intelligence Activities. "Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government." Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Washington, DC, May 1955. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86b00269r000100020004-4>.
- Taylor, Patrick B. "The Weaponized Crowd: Violent Dissident Irish Republicans Exploitation of Social Identity within Online Communities." Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA623972.pdf>.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). *The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes*. Vienna: UNODC, 2012. Accessed 8 May 2021. https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes/ebook_use_of_the_internet_for_terrorist_purposes.pdf.
- United States Army Forces, Pacific, Office of the Commander-in-Chief. *Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945*. General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 15 March 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.
- U.S. Department of State. "Technology Engagement Team." Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/technology-engagement-team>.

Military Publications

Army General School. "PW-61-S-51, Student Summary, Monitoring: Section 1, Outline of Conference." 1951.

Department of the Army. Special Regulation No. 10, *Organization and Functions, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1951.

———. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 August 1949.

———. Field Manual 33-5, *Psychological Warfare Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 March 1955.

The Ground General School. Special Text No. 8, *Strategical Psychological Warfare*. Fort Riley, KS: The Ground General School, 15 February 1949.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Training Publication 2-22.9, *Open-Source Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, July 2012.

———. Army Training Publication 2-22.9, *Open-Source Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, August 2019.

———. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 31 July 2019.

———. Army Training Publication 3-53.1, *Military Information in Special Operations*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, April 2015.

———. Army Training Publication 3-53.2, *Military Information in Conventional Operations*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, August, 2015.

———. Field Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, May 2014.

———. Field Manual 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98), *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, April 2009.

———. Field Manual 3-61, *Public Affairs*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 1 April 2014.

———. Field Manual 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 28 June 2013.

———. Soldier Training Publication 33-37F14-SM-TG, *Psychological Operations Specialist Skill Levels 1 through 4*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 28 August 2008.

- . Training Circular 18-06, *Special Forces Guide to Information Operations*. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 22 March 2013.
- Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army. “Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted by the Eighth Army Units in Korea, 25 June 1950 thru 27 July 1953.” Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, February 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021.
<https://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1181>.
- Intelligence School. *Tactical Psychological Warfare: The Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment*. Fort Riley, KS: The Ground General School, September 1947.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). “Approved Universal Joint Task List Database.” Accessed 27 October 2020. <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL/>.
- . Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC: JCS, 25 March 2013; Incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017.
- . Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: JCS, 17 January 2017; Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018.
- . Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*. Washington, DC: JCS, 27 November 2012; Incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014.
- . Joint Publication 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*. Washington, DC: JCS, 7 January 2010; Incorporating Change 1, 20 December 2011.
- . Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*. Washington, DC: JCS, 17 August 2018; Validated on 2 February 2021.
- . Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: JCS, 25 April 2018; Validated 30 April 2020.
- . Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*. Washington, DC: JCS, 5 September 2003.
- . Joint Publication 3-61, *Public Affairs*. Washington, DC: JCS, 17 November 2015; Incorporating Change 1, 19 August 2016.
- The Psychological Warfare School. “Program of Instruction for Psychological Warfare Office Course (MOS 9305).” Fort Bragg, NC, January 1952.
- . *Special Orientation Text: Psychological Warfare Operations*. Fort Bragg, NC: The Psychological Warfare School, 1 February 1952.

War Department. Field Manual 30-25, *Military Intelligence, Counterintelligence*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 February 1940.

———. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 June 1944.

Law. Executive Orders, and Directives

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Executive Order 10483, “Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board,” 2 September 1953. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234438>.

Obama, Barack. Executive Order 13721 of March 14, 2016, “Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584.” *Federal Register* 81, no. 52 (17 March 2016): 14685. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-03-17/pdf/2016-06250.pdf>.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. Executive Order 8840, “Establishing the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,” 30 July 1941. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 8 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209811>.

———. Executive Order 8248, “Reorganizing the Executive Office of the President, 8 September 1939.” The American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210008>.

———. Executive Order 8922, “Establishing the Office of Facts and Figures,” 24 October 1941. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210148>.

———. Executive Order 9182, “Establishing the Office of War Information,” 13 June 1942. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210709>.

———. Executive Order 9312, “On the Office of War Information,” 9 March 1943. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209876>.

———. “Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services,” 13 June 1942. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210715>.

Secretary of Defense. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*. Washington, DC: DOD, 17 September 2020. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/510001p.pdf>.

- Truman, Harry S. Executive Order 9608, "Providing for the Termination of the Office of War Information, and for the Disposition of its Functions and of Certain Functions of the Office of Inter-American Affairs," 31 August 1945. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9608/executive-order-9608>.
- . Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions," 20 September 1945. American Presidency Project. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231394>.
- U.S. Congress. Act of 26 July 1947 ("National Security Act"). Public Law 80-253. 80th Cong., 1st sess. 61 STAT 495 (26 July 1947). Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299856>.
- U.S. Congress. House. Global Engagement Center Authorities Act of 2018. H. Res. 5681. 115th Cong., 2d sess. (2017-2018). <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5681/text>.
- . *Countering Adversarial Propaganda: Charting an Effective Course in the Contested Information Environment: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives*. H.A.S.C. No. 114-59, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 22 October 2015. <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-114hhrg97493>.
- U.S. President. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, 2017. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

Department of State

- Barrett, Edward W. "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Subject: Chinese in North Korea." Washington, DC, 3 November 1950. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea*. Vol. 7, edited by John P. Glennon. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, Document 736. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d736>.
- Bissell, Clayton. "Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of the War Department General Staff (Bissell) to Secretary of War Patterson; Subject: Discussion with Secretary of Navy Regarding Joint Intelligence." Washington, DC, 22 October 1945. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 30. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d30>.

- Central Intelligence Agency. "Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency; NIE–2/1, National Intelligence Estimate, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea." Washington, DC, 24 November 1950. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea*. Vol. 7, edited by John P. Glennon. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, Document 877. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d877>.
- Civilian Agency Records, State Department and Foreign Affairs Records. "Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee." The National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-353.html#:~:text=The%20State%2DWar%2DNavy%20Coordinating,military%20questions%20referred%20to%20it>.
- Clubb, Oliver E. "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk); Subject: Communist Intentions: Korea." Washington, DC, 1 November 1950. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea*. Vol. 7, edited by John P. Glennon. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, Document 730. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d730>.
- Dawson, William. "Telegram from the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State." Montevideo, 26 June 1942. In *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics*. Vol. 5, edited by E. R. Perkins and Almon R. Wright. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, Document 64. Accessed 16 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d64>.
- Department of State. Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4, "Establishment of the United States International Information Administration (IIA)." Washington, DC, 16 January 1952. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*. Vol. 2, Part 2, edited by Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, Document 294. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d294>.
- Donovan, William J. "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to President Truman; Attachment 2, Paper by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan)." Washington, DC, 25 August 1945. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 3. Accessed 17 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d3>.

Galloway, Donald H. Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5, *Activation of Special Procedures Group*. Washington, DC: Office of Special Operations, 29 March 1948. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 263. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d263>.

Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H. "Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the National Security Council; Subject: Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee." Washington, DC, 19 September 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 222. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d222>.

———. "Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)." Washington, DC, 5 May 1948. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 271. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d271>.

———. "Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)." Washington, DC, 9 June 1948. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 287. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d287>.

———. "Memorandum to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council; Subject: Support for the Voice of America." Washington 25, DC, 21 April 1950. U.S. Department of State. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://foia.state.gov/documents/cia/3e7d.PDF>.

Hoover, John Edgar. "Memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to Attorney General Clark." Washington, DC, 29 August 1945. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 5. Accessed 17 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d5>.

- Houston, Lawrence R. "Memorandum from the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter; Subject: CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions." Washington, DC, 25 September 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 241. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d241>.
- Hull, Cordell. "Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson)." Washington, DC, 24 June 1942. In *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics*. Vol. 5, edited by E. R. Perkins and Almon R. Wright. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, Document 63. Accessed 16 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d63>.
- Kennan, George F. "Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)." Washington, DC, 17 February 1948. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 259. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d259>.
- National Intelligence Authority (NIA). NIA Directive No. 5, *Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence*, 8 July 1946. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 160. Accessed 18 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d160>.
- National Security Council (NSC). NSC Memorandum 4, "Report by the National Security Council on Coordination of Foreign Information Measures." Washington, DC, 17 December 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 252. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d252>.
- . NSC Memorandum 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects." Washington, DC, 18 June 1948. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 292. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292>.

- . NSC Report 59/1, *The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning*. Washington, DC: NSC, 9 March 1950. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, edited by Douglas Keane and Michael Warner. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, Document 2. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d2>.
- . NSC Report 142, *Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1952*. Washington, DC: NSC, 10 February 1953. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, edited by Douglas Keane and Michael Warner. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing, 2007, Document 146. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d146>.
- . NSC Report 161, *Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1953*. Washington, DC: NSC, 14 August 1953. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, edited by Douglas Keane and Michael Warner. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing, 2007, Document 155. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d155>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. "Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1." Washington, DC, 21 July 1954. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, edited by Douglas Keane and Michael Warner. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing, 2007, Document 183. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d183>.
- Souers, Sidney W. "Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Secretary of Defense Forrestal." Washington, DC, 24 October 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 245. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d245>.
- Welles, Benjamin Sumner. "Consultation, The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the American Representative (Spaeth)." Washington, DC, 28 May 1942. In *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics*. Vol. 5, edited by E. R. Perkins and Almon R. Wright. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, Document 61. Accessed 16 March 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d61>.

Wright, E. K. "Memorandum from the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter." Washington, DC, 4 November 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 248. Accessed 10 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d248>.

———. "Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright) to the Chief of the Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs); Subject: NSC Notes on Psychological Operations." Washington, DC, 2 December 1947. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, edited by C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 251. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d251>.

Policy, Correspondence, Summaries (Identified Author)

Acting Assistant Director, Current Intelligence. "Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence); Subject: Inspector General's Questions Concerning Propaganda Analysis and OCI's Memo, 'Propaganda Highlights'," 6 September 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp62-01094r000100060028-2>.

Acting Assistant Director for Operations. "Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence); Subject: Propaganda Analysis Activities of the Office of Operations," 8 August 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500060067-0>.

Acting Chief, Foreign Documents Division. "Office Memorandum; Subject: Request for Organizational Changes," 7 June 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03568a000100270007-4>.

Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board. "Subject: Staff Stuff - Preliminary Analysis of the Communist BW Propaganda Campaign with Recommendations," 25 July 1952. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500050003-5>.

———. "Memorandum for the Psychological Strategy Board; Subject: Status Report on the National Psychological Effort as of June 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board," 24 July 1953. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400100003-0>.

- Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee, Central Intelligence Agency. "Analysis of ORE Production with Conclusions, First Report," 19 July 1949. Accessed 12 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp67-00059a000400050001-1>.
- Allan, C. V. "Functions of the Propaganda Branch," 3 May 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- . "Memorandum from the Chief, Collections Group to A. C. of S., G-2," 6 May 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Group. "General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific. Letter to Louie, 17 May 1946." Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- Assistant Director, Office of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency. "Revision of FBID Publications," 22 August 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160001-0/>.
- Assistant Director, Special Operations (S.O.). S.O. Directive No. 18, *Organization and Functions of the Office of Special Operations*, 6 June 1947. Accessed 10 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a001000030032-3>.
- Avedon, Herbert. "Memorandum for LT Colonel L.K Cannon, Jr.; Subject: Suggest Rewrite of TC 13." Washington 25, DC, 14 August 1953.
- Babbitt, Theodore. "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Content Analysis," 12 October 1949. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500190006-2>.
- . Office of Reports and Estimates (O/RE), O/RE Operating Procedure Order No. 22, "Establishment of an Interim Psychological Intelligence Division," 3 November 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01084a000100030009-6>.
- Bagnall, J. J. "Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report – July 1951," 7 August 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050018-9>.
- . "Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report - January 1952," 7 February 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050012-5>.

- . “Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report – June 1952,” 8 July 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050007-1>.
- . “Office Memorandum; Subject: FDD Monthly Progress Report - September 1952,” 10 October 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00500r000200050004-4>.
- Carey, George G. “Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Intelligence); Subject: Propaganda Analysis Activities of the Office of Operations,” 10 June 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500060111-0>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. “Information Report; Subject: Most Frequent Propaganda Themes,” 14 July 1948. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-00809a000500730062-9>.
- . “Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts; Subject: Inferences Based on Soviet Propaganda,” 3 January 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04864a000200010003-5>.
- . “Tab A, Index of Directives Authorizing Functions of Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations.” Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140022-0>.
- . “Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts; Subject: Sociological-Propaganda Network,” 5 April 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-00809a000700030017-8>.
- . *Studies in Intelligence* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976). Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78t03194a000400010022-7>.
- Central Intelligence Group. “Analysis of Soviet Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts,” 23 July 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002800040002-5>.
- . “Analysis of Soviet-Controlled German Broadcasts,” 24 July 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002800050002-4>.
- Chief, Advisory Council. “Disposition Form; Subject: Psychological Warfare,” 6 December 1946. Accessed 10 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020006-9>.

- Chief, Latin American Branch, ORE. "Memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Director for ORE; Subject: Central Intelligence Group Intelligence Report on 'Propaganda of Anti-American Tendencies'," 11 June 1947. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00566r000100070034-8>.
- Chief, Foreign Broadcast Information Division. "Office Memorandum; Subject: Comment on Office of Training Basic Intelligence Course," 7 November 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp54-00355a000100020008-5>.
- Chief, Propaganda Branch. "MID 912, Functions of the Propaganda Branch," 5 April 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- Childs, Prescott. "Memorandum for the Executive; The 'Rand' Project on Content Analysis," 2 November 1949. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500190006-2>.
- . "Memorandum for the Director; Subject: Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," 28 August 1950. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160001-0>.
- Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. "Commission Report on Intelligence Activities," June 1955. Accessed 12 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61-00017a000200040001-6>.
- Deputy Director for Intelligence Management Staff. "Report for the Deputy Director for Intelligence; Subject: Transferring the FBIS Media Analysis Group," 27 November 1974. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01495r000700020003-3>.
- Department of State. "Annex A, The Foreign Information Program: Status Report for Fiscal Year 1952." In *Status Report on the National Psychological Effort and First Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board*. Psychological Strategy Board, 1 August 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003200050002-4>.
- Deputy Assistant Director for Operations. "Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Administration); Subject: Reallocation of Existing T/O Positions within Foreign Documents Division," 30 June 1953. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060005-6>.
- Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency. "Memorandum of Conversation dated 22 January 1951; Subject: 'Psychological Intelligence'," 25 January 1951. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500180025-2>.

- Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Memorandum to Assistant Director for Operations, CIG; Subject: Centralized Reporting of Propaganda and Intelligence in Foreign Radio and Press," 5 November 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003400110037-7>.
- Director, Interim Psychological Intelligence Division. "Memorandum; Subject: Comment on First Draft Report of the Psychological Intelligence Committee to the DCI," 27 December 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500150002-0>.
- Director, Psychological Strategy Board. "Psychological Strategy Board." Washington, DC, 18 September 1951. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00384r000100190003-0>.
- Donovan, William J. "Extract of Memorandum from Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan to Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith," 17 September 1943. Accessed 9 May 2021. https://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch3_a.htm.
- Dunlop, Robert H. "Functions of the Propaganda Branch, Military Intelligence Division, W.D.G.S." Washington 25, DC, 21 February 1944. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- Edgar, Donald. "Functions of the Documents Branch, Office of Operations," 11 April 1947. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100010117-9>.
- . "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: CIG Membership on SWNCC Sub-Committee for Psychological Warfare (SWNCC 304/1)," 28 May 1947. Accessed 10 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100043-3>.
- Edwards, Sheffield. "Memorandum; Subject: Functions of the Documents Branch, Office of Operations," 17 April 1947. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200050064-2>.
- Elliot, William Y. "Memorandum for Dr. Arthur Flemming; Subject: The Jackson Committee Report, Chapter 7 – Critical Comments, 1 July 1953." Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00268r000100020005-6>.
- Executive Director. "Functions and Further Development of Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations," 8 June 1948. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140021-1>.

- Fellers, Bonner F. "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan." Psychological Warfare Branch, 29 March 1945. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4358>.
- . "Appendix B, Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan, Steps in Planning," 12 April 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.
- . "Psychological Warfare against Japan, SWPA, 1944-1945," 15 March 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3314>.
- Foreign Broadcast Information Division. "Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts," 3 January 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04864a000200010003-5>.
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Radio Propaganda Report, Chinese Communist Broadcasts to Formosa, Basic Survey Series BS.9," 1 April 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79r01012a006300040037-0>.
- Foreign Documents Division, Office of Operations. "Memo for the File, 23 April 1952." Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000300010007-4>.
- . "Functions and Activities," 31 October 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200070054-1>.
- The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater. "Report on Psychological Warfare." Psychological Warfare Section, Study Number 131, United States Forces, European Theater, n.d. Accessed 17 March 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3406>.
- Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H. "Memorandum; Subject: Approval by the NSC of Much of the Dulles Report," 12 July 1949. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r002600240008-4>.
- . "Memorandum, Psychological Intelligence Committee," 7 April 1950. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200010012-7>.
- Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). "Implementation of the Report of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets," 5 October 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00400r000300060022-4>.

- . IAC-D-82/7, “Brief for the U.S. Information Agency Membership in the IAC,” 4 June 1956. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61-00549r000100230002-8>.
- . IAC-D-82/7, “Annex to Brief for U.S. Information Agency membership in the IAC.” United States Information Agency Office of Research and Intelligence, 4 June 1956. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00400r000300060020-6>.
- Kent, Sherman. “Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Operations; Subject: Overall Requirements for Propaganda Analysis,” 7 January 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000600050006-3>.
- Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. “Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Survey of the Foreign Documents Division, Office of Operations,” 19 November 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp62-01094r000100030023-0>.
- Military Intelligence Division (MID). MID 385, “Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: Study of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Activities.” Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- Military Intelligence Division, G-2. MID 912, “Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff,” 22 May 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100056-9>.
- . MID 912, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff.” Washington 25, DC, 22 May 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100057-8>.
- Millikan, Max F. “Memorandum; Subject: Status Report, Interim Psychological Intelligence Division,” 17 April 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP75-00662R000100190026-6/mode/2up>.
- Mutual Security Agency. “Report of the Mutual Security Agency to the Psychological Strategy Board on the National Psychological Effort, January 1- June 30, 1953,” 2 July 1953. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400050013-5>.
- National Intelligence Authority (NIA). Draft, N.I.A. Directive No. 1, *Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group*, 4 February 1946. Accessed 11 May 2021. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/NIA_Directive_No_1_Proposed_Policies_for_CIG_21_Feb_1946.PDF.

- . N.I.A. Directive No. 1, *Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group*, 8 February 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/Index_of_NIA_Directives_Undated.PDF.
- Office of the Director, Planning and Coordination Staff. “Memorandum for the Assistant to the DD/I (Administration); Subject: Response to your Budget Questions,” 26 October 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100150007-6>.
- Office of National Estimates. “Proposed Requirements for Propaganda Analysis,” 7 January 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000600050006-3>.
- Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). “Psychological Intelligence Division, ORE,” 25 August 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000300090009-2>.
- . “Statement of Functions, Functional Branch (Psychological Intelligence Division),” 17 October 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200040013-3>.
- . “Table of Organization, Psychological Intelligence Division,” 17 October 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200040013-3>.
- Office of Special Operations. “Notes for ABD from EFH,” 4 April 1952. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00499r000500110002-8>.
- Ohly, John H. “Memorandum for Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Subject: Analysis of Soviet Press and Radio Reaction,” Washington, DC, 28 March 1949. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a000400230008-1>.
- Operations Coordinating Board. “Annex B, Report of the United States Information Agency on Implementation the Recommendations of the Jackson Committee Report (List A),” 30 September 1953. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000600150002-4>.
- Peabody, P. E. “Memorandum from the CI&T Group to the Executive Director,” 10 May 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

- Psychological Intelligence Committee. "DRAFT Memorandum, DCI's Psychological Intelligence Committee, Minutes of Meeting," 8 May 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160003-8>.
- Psychological Strategy Board. "Concept of the Organization to Provide Dynamic Psychological Operations in the Cold War," 21 May 1951. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000600010072-2>.
- . "Annex B, Semiannual Psychological Activity Status Report of the Department of Defense," 24 July 1953. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400100003-0>.
- Psychological Warfare Branch. "Psychological Warfare Conference." Manila, 7 May 1945. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4358>.
- Royal, F. B., and A. J. McFarland. "Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," 27 October 1943. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp09k00541r000700090021-5>.
- Ruggles, Melville J. "Letter on Psychological Intelligence Committee," 22 May 1950. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160002-9>.
- . "Memorandum to the Chairman of the Psychological Intelligence Committee; Subject: Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee," 18 June 1950. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500160003-8>.
- Schlesinger, Lawrence, and Harriet Beckwitt. "Staff Memorandum on Psychological Warfare Job Requirements and Training: An Evaluation of the Psychological Warfare School Curriculum." Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, Washington, DC, June 1956. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/484337.pdf>.
- Sheldon, Huntington D. "Memorandum for the Assistant Director of Operations; Subject: OCI Comments on Analysis of Foreign Radio Propaganda," 26 May 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91t01172r000400030001-5>.
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), Ad Hoc Committee. SWNCC 304/1, "Psychological Warfare, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee," 10 December 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.

- . SWNCC 304/1, “Appendix B, Draft Charter for SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.),” 10 December 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.
- . SWNCC 304/1, “Annex C to Appendix B, Draft Charter for SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.),” 10 December 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare. “Appendix A, Draft Charter, SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.),” 10 December 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85s00362r000700110003-9>.
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations. “Enclosure: Psychological Warfare.” Report by the SWNCC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, 10 June 1947. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100008-2>.
- . “Appendix A, Facts Bearing on the Problem.” Report by the SWNCC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, 10 June 1947. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100008-2>.
- . “Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation, Subject: Psychological Warfare,” 30 September 1947. Accessed 10 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100009-1>.
- State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations. “Status Report, 1 September 1948 – 30 September 1948.” Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500200010-5>.
- Task Force Chairman. “Definition of Propaganda Analysis,” 27 February 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03097a000500030010-5>.
- Truman, Harry. “President’s Letter of January 22, 1946.” Washington, DC, 22 January 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/Index_of_NIA_Directives_Undated.PDF.
- United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. “Psychological Warfare Propaganda Material: Part 2,” August 1944. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3307>.

Vandenberg, Hoyt S. "Memorandum for Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers; Subject: Monitoring of Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts," 12 February 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp64-00658a000100140056-2>.

War Department, Military Intelligence Division (MID), G-2. MID 912, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff." Washington 25, DC, 22 May 1946. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100057-8>.

War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff. War Department General Staff Circular No. 5-2, *Organization: Military Intelligence Division, G-2 (Exclusive of Military Intelligence Service)*. Washington, DC, 19 October 1944. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

Warfield, Alan M. "Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Operations; Subject: FBID Progress Report 1952," 12 January 1953. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300080013-9>.

———. "Progress Report for May, 1955," 6 June 1955. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300100008-2>.

Wright, K. K. "Memorandum from the Director of Information; Subject: Functions of the Propaganda Branch," 10 April 1946. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

Policy, Correspondence, Summaries (Unidentified Author)

"Analysis of the Intelligence Needs of Psychological Operations together with an Indication of How They Should Be Met," 21 January 1952. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500080016-8>.

"Analysis and Planning to Counteract Soviet Biological Warfare Propaganda and the 'Hate America' Campaign; Staff Study on Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign (PSB D-25)," 11 June 1952. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100092-1>.

"Annex to Appendix, Review of SANACC Studies Pertaining to Psychological Warfare, A Supplement to SANACC 304/15," 23 March 1949. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400110008-1>.

"Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare," 23 December 1945. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.

- “Excerpts from Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945.” 23 December 1945. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- “Foreign Documents Division, Office of the Chief,” 1 June 1951. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060028-1>.
- “Functional Statement, Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations,” 2 June 1948. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp57-00042a000100140014-9>.
- “Functional Supervision of the Foreign Documents Division, O/O,” 22 November 1949. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04718a000100300002-7>.
- “Memorandum; Subject: “Functions and Responsibilities of the Interim Psychological Intelligence Division.” Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01084a000100030010-4>.
- “Implementation of the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951, Establishing a National Psychological Strategy Board,” 30 April 1951. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01446r000100140055-2>.
- “Increased Intelligence Support of USIA by CIA,” 27 October 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00750a000100150008-5>.
- MIS Memo 147, 31 December 1944. Quoted in “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,” 23 December 1945, 1. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- MID Memorandum No. 78, 15 November 1943, (Tab A). Quoted in “Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare,” 23 December 1945, 2. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- “Memorandum; Proposed Function of the PWB, MID.” n.d. Accessed 9 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003600020029-4>.
- “National Psychological Warfare Planning, Part 1, Analysis of Major Categories and Requirements,” 17 November 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500130070-2>.

- “Office Memorandum; Subject: Army Psychological Warfare Officers Course,” 20 September 1954. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61-00017a000200060021-2>.
- “Proposed Charter for the Psychological Intelligence Committee,” 30 March 1950, 1-3, Accessed 9 May 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-01143a000200010013-6>.
- “Report to the Director of Central Intelligence on Foreign Intelligence Support for the National Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare,” 18 December 1950. Accessed 11 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003500150002-0>.
- “Study of Augmented Personnel Necessary for FDD to Fulfill its Mission,” 4 August 1952. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000200060017-3>.
- “Suggested Comments for Budget Report; FDD Coordination Of Foreign-language Document Exploitation,” 17 May 1950. Accessed 14 May 2021. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-00706r000100090016-5>.