Hard Hands at a Glance: Decision-Making Mechanisms and the Case of William T. Sherman in 1864

Abstract

U.S. Army doctrine assumes that better decision-making and tactical success leads to better operational outcomes. History, however, provides a more nuanced record. William T. Sherman's 1864 Atlanta campaign provides ample opportunity to test whether tactical decision-making and the achievement of stated operational outcomes. The case supports the idea that military decisions are composed of a tactics and logistics mechanism. It also provides evidence that successful tactics can matter to operational success but are not necessary.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 18, 2021
Accession Number
AD1157548

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  • David A. Zelaya

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  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

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