

CHINA AND THE ENTICEMENT POINT STRATEGY

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Strategic Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

CHINA AND THE ENTICEMENT POINT STRATEGY, by Kaman Lykins, 101 pages.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has utilized an Enticement Point Strategy (EPS) as a tool to enhance its soft power effects in Cambodia and Kenya as it relates to the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). The PRC offers a symbiotic relationship with other nations. In the short term, China gets access to resources, infrastructure, and intellectual property within the nation in exchange for the economic potential (infrastructure, manufacturing, and economic growth potential) for national development. In the long term, if the nation takes advantage of the economic growth potential, its national development across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum will feed Chinese progress and make China the economic and manufacturing center of the international community.

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ACRONYMS

NSS	National Security Strategy
EPS	Enticement Point Strategy
PRC	People’s Republic of China
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic
IMF	International Monetary Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DSO	Data-set observations
CPO	Casual-process Observations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OECD	Observatory of Economic Complexity
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
WTO	World Trade Organization
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN	United Nations
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
KDF	Kenyan Defense Force

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CHAPTER 1

INTERNATIONAL ENTICEMENT AS A STRATEGY

Peaches and plums do not speak, but they are so attractive that a path is formed below the trees.

— Ancient Chinese Saying, quoted in “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s keynote speech,” in *China Daily*

Introduction

In a world where “seduction is more powerful than coercion,”¹ China is proving it can focus and exercise multiple facets of the elements of national power (diplomacy, information, military, and economics) to achieve its strategic objectives. The results of such a strategy have been noticed on both Eastern and Western continents with many nations wondering where such symbiotic seduction will lead. China dangles the potential for national development backed by its enormous investment power while it promises global infrastructure to fuel the world economy. However, the fear of debt traps and neo-colonialism loom shadowlike over what has become the major influential shift in international policy in a century.

This shift is referred to by many names: Great Power Competition, Three Wars Strategy, Gray Zone, and New Generation Warfare.² For the purposes of this work, the term “durable disorder” as coined by Sean McFate is used to describe the current international environment.³ Durable disorder is a space in time where peace and war exist simultaneously and where the weapons of engagement are designed and employed unique to the current situation. Flexibility and longevity are critical characteristics in this new arena. China has utilized these characteristics effectively and the United States has finally noticed.

The United States has recently made operating within durable disorder a national priority. The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) lists “Preserve Peace through Strength” as its third pillar stating, “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”⁴ Although a coherent US strategy in durable disorder has yet to emerge, understanding China’s vision, methods, and strategic objectives is crucial in providing the US with an advantage before it is too late.

China has already begun maximizing its position in durable disorder by utilizing soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye,⁵ to achieve its strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Historically, China has faced a militarily dominant West with colonial tendencies and consequently, feels a need to protect itself. It has, therefore, decided to take advantage of durable disorder, or what it calls “Three Warfares”.⁶ China’s own survival, rather than what appears to be a sense of national benevolence, is at the heart of this movement. Applying soft power effects, China is making strides for its own survival while simultaneously providing economic power to fledgling nations.

Cambodia and Kenya are on the front lines of Chinese soft power effects and conducting case studies of them will shed light upon the potential of this upcoming world-wide strategy. Cambodia has been involved diplomatically and economically with China for more than a millennium and its contemporary relationship sheds new light on this developing Chinese strategy. Kenya also has a deep history with China, but in modern times is relatively new to the allure of Chinese efforts. It is, therefore, important to comprehend China’s intentions with respect to both nations, as well as its objectives with the West.

Historical Context

The threat of Western powers to Asia is not a new issue for the Chinese. In 1793, Lord George Macartney was sent from London on a diplomatic mission to China in order to ensure trade agreements and begin diplomatic relations. After much pomp and circumstance, Macartney was dismissed back to England without achieving his objectives.⁷ Further, British attempts to initially open diplomacy and trade with the Chinese failed because China viewed the British as “barbaric” and in need of Chinese intellectual and spiritual help, despite Macartney’s display of England’s technological “superiority”. These initial characteristic conflicts led to the Opium Wars of the 1800s. In 1842, the British military advantage was such that the Chinese were forced to give up Hong Kong, pay \$6 million in indemnity and open five ports for trade among other concessions.⁸ Western imperialism and its propensity for violence changed the very nature of Chinese international relations throughout the 19th century.⁹ Japanese and U.S. aggression coupled with the threat from Europe forced the Chinese to endure a “century of humiliation” which lasted from 1840 to 1949. This laid the foundation for Chinese protectionist efforts and unified the country under Mao Zedong’s communist banner. Chinese communism was then combined with the horsepower of capitalism under Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese industrial machine began to churn.

China faced two major problems with its rapid economic growth. First, China had to tackle the need to stabilize and maintain its economic growth and support the expansive middle class. Second, China had to balance itself against Western military strength and its tendency for neo-colonialism disguised as a form of dichotomous international order. Contemporarily, the Chinese approach to these issues provides an

answer to the threat of Western dominance in the context of durable disorder and provides a way for China to unify nations across the globe while putting the Chinese economy at the center.

Enticement Point Strategy

China began an Enticement Point Strategy (EPS) in Southeast Asia and on the African continent as an answer to their multiple dilemmas. The EPS is China's attempt to build relations with developing nations. China works by providing infrastructure, investment capital, and business partnerships in exchange for resources, exports, and future economic partners in the short-term. Concurrently, China is promising the potential for national development in the long-term. China is, therefore, able to ensure its economic stability while simultaneously deterring, what it views, as Western aggression.

The EPS focuses on a symbiotic relationship between China and developing nations. For the purposes of this work, Cambodia and Kenya will be used as case studies. In the short-term, China gains access to resources, infrastructure, and intellectual property in the form of patents, student and cultural exchanges, and business leadership exchanges while trading for the economic potential (infrastructure, manufacturing, and economic growth) for national development. In the long-term, if the benefactor takes advantage of the national development potential offered by the Chinese, its increased capability across the elements of national power spectrum: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) will feed Chinese progress and make China the economic and manufacturing center of the international community (figure 1). The unique capabilities of the Chinese political and economic model provide the framework for this plan.

China is a hybrid capitalist economy with a communist government. This combination political and economic model harnesses the economic potential of a capitalist economy with the efficient singular focus of a communist government. Chinese leaders have coined this a “socialist market economy”.¹⁰ The result for China has been historic economic growth: from 1979 to 2018, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in China has increased from \$183.98 to \$9,770.85.¹¹ The overall GDP growth has averaged 9.5% from 1979 to 2018.¹² This internal economic growth, coupled with international investment, has not only presented China with distinct economic opportunities but also challenges.

A growing middle class is one challenge China is confronting. To stabilize the middle class economically, the Chinese government realized their manufacturing would need to be exported to neighboring fledgling economies, yet the infrastructure and economic instability of these nations were not to the national development level necessary for such interaction. Further, these neighboring nations could not, in the foreseeable future, acquire the essential resources to push themselves through national development under their own power. Political unrest, poor education, underdeveloped infrastructure, and a host of other issues plagued these struggling nations. Interestingly, the solution was in the problem.

The Belt and Road Initiative

China has begun to invest their cash, labor, and manufacturing capabilities into developing nations. These investments provide potential support in sustaining Chinese economic growth, while laying the foundation for developing nations to increase their capability as economic partners with China in the future. This plan for symbiotic

relationships was announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 and was called the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) which has more recently been renamed the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Xi clarified its purpose during an APEC summit in November 2017.

The Belt and Road Initiative calls for joint contribution and it has a clear focus, which is to promote infrastructure construction and connectivity, strengthen coordination on economic policies, enhance complementarity of development strategies and boost interconnected development to achieve common prosperity. This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world.¹³

China will attempt to alleviate the strains on its economy by investing in underdeveloped nations. China will agree to build infrastructure and invest in manufacturing potential within the host nation. As short-term “payment” for this investment, China will receive intellectual property, natural and man-made resources, guarantees of diplomatic partnership, and potentially military partnerships. In the long-term, nations receive necessary infrastructure, economic investment, and diplomatic partnership required to potentially advance through the national development process (figure 1). China would then be able to export its manufacturing and have customers for its goods as these nations progressed.

However, economic investment and infrastructure are not enough to aid developing nations through the national development process (figure 1). China realized that diplomatic, information, and even military relations would be necessary to pursue this solution. Nadège Rolland, Senior Fellow, The National Bureau of Asian Research stated,

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is generally understood as China’s plan to finance and build infrastructure projects across Eurasia. Infrastructure development is in fact only one of BRI’s five components which include strengthened regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. Taken together, BRI’s different components serve Beijing’s vision for regional integration under its helm.¹⁴

The BRI utilizes Chinese diplomacy, information, and economic means and ways to achieve international partnerships. China analyzes the needs of a nation, applies the necessary mixture of the elements of national power (diplomacy, information, and economics), and then offers a potential symbiotic relationship to meet those needs. China gains intellectual property, ability to export manufacturing, and resources in exchange for infrastructure, financial investments in manufacturing, economic growth, and national development potential to the host nation.

The BRI is the mechanism to achieve the grand strategic objectives of the EPS but it is not to be confused as the overall strategy. The BRI is a tool to build the partnerships the EPS requires for success. The overarching grand design of the EPS is to protect China from economic collapse and aggressive Western unipolar globalism. By focusing their economic excess on developing nations through the BRI, China potentially maintains its economic growth and builds a conglomerate of nations with economic, diplomatic, and even military ties to them.

China has evolved the EPS in three phases. The first phase has focused on Central and Southeast Asia. The second phase has begun in Europe, Africa, and South America. The third phase will include the Middle East and the United States. Cambodia, as part of phase one of the EPS, and, as discussed previously, has already begun to reap the benefits and the negatives of the relationship. The Chinese are now focused on the African continent for phase two of the EPS.

Enticement Point Strategy Systems Model




Figure 1. Enticement Point Strategy Systems Model

Source: Created by author.

China and Cambodia

China and Cambodia are not new to being trading partners having engaged in trade together since the Khmer Angkor Kingdom in 1200 AD.¹⁵ However, the Cambodian economy dwindled from 1960 to 2000. Additionally, growth was relatively minimal between 1993 and 2000 despite shifting to a free market economy in 1993.¹⁶ Cambodian per capita GDP has grown from \$302.56 in 1993 to \$1,510.33 in 2018. GDP in Cambodia grew from \$2.5 billion in 1993, to \$24.54 billion in 2018. In 2017, Chinese and Cambodian trade totals reached \$6 billion with Chinese exports to Cambodia

accounting for 87% of the total.¹⁷ Talks are now focusing on a possible military exchange program that will permit Chinese ships to be positioned on a Cambodian naval base in southwest Cambodia.¹⁸

However, this partnership has not only benefitted the Chinese financially, but has also shown benefits for Chinese foreign relations. The Chinese have leveraged influence over Cambodia, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), specifically regarding the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.¹⁹ Thus, the EPS as a symbiotic system grants the Chinese the ability to take advantage of opportunities on the international stage as they arise and leverage those opportunities for Chinese benefits financially and diplomatically. The Chinese are now looking to the African continent to apply the EPS through the BRI.

China and Kenya

The Chinese have conducted diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the African continent since the voyages of Zheng He in the early 1400s.²⁰ There are currently 54 nations on the African continent and China is currently involved, in some way, with all of them. This work will focus on China's engagements with Kenya specifically. The Chinese economic development in Nairobi and Mombasa, as an example, have made positive strides for Kenya. Goods that use to take 12 hours to move between the two cities now only takes 4 hours, thanks to an expanded rail system paid for by China. Engineers that drive the train and maintain it are native Kenyans trained in China. The relationship between the two nations has also stretched into the cultural and diplomatic realms as well. However, the EPS is still in its infancy in Kenya and its success is yet to

be determined. The Kenyan case study also provides the opportunity to look at the flexibility of the BRI and EPS.

Cambodia's initial EPS contact was more diplomatically based however, the Kenyan version is more economically based. This might indicate the Chinese are adjusting their capabilities with the EPS and are displaying flexibility in its practice. This work will investigate this potential as part of its analysis.

Research Question

This work will answer the question: Will the Enticement Point Strategy (EPS) as conducted through the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) have a similar strategic impact in Kenya as it has had on Cambodia? Further, this work discusses the tenets of the EPS, and the potential success or failure of the EPS as evidenced in the Cambodia and Kenya case studies. The importance of these concepts is essential within the contemporary framework of durable disorder. If China can achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of violence to avoid war through orchestrating diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements, it positions itself to rework the world order with its own values as paramount.

This research question leads to several secondary questions. How flexible is the BRI in achieving maximum effect in various nations and cultures? What are the differences in way the EPS is utilized in Cambodia and Kenya? How does the EPS fit into the larger Chinese strategy? What are the possible measures the United States can make with the EPS? Further, the design and success of the EPS will also be examined. Finally, this work will assess the potential of success for other nations and set up the issue of future uses of the EPS.

Limitations and Delimitations

China currently has diplomatic, economic, and military relations with numerous nations throughout the world. This work will focus specifically upon Cambodia and Kenya as case studies of the Chinese EPS. Further, these relations will be measured through two specific elements of national power; economic and military, with the intent of outlining the success or potential for success of the EPS as conducted by China. The diplomatic element of national power will be discussed throughout this work but will not be analyzed in detail.

Numerous factors play a role in economic development, military strength, and the development of nations. The scope of this work will not permit an effort to analyze all the factors and variables influential to the progress of nations. Rather, this work will focus upon specific factors and attempt to judge their proportionate value to the actual development or potential development of Cambodia and Kenya.

This work will not attempt to frame the EPS beyond the elements of national power. This work will limit its efforts to only the economic and military elements of national power as exercised by the Chinese in the EPS. These two elements are less subjective and more quantifiable than are diplomatic or informational elements. Further, the elements of economics and military are primary focuses of the BRI principles as stated by Nadège.²¹ Both will give an accurate, though limited, measure of the success of the EPS in Cambodia and its potential success in Kenya.

Measuring a nation's economic overall strength has historically been based upon the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, economists have learned GDP has limitations and measuring GDP singularly is not enough. This work will measure the

effectiveness of the economic element of national power through overall GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, imports, and exports trade between Cambodia, Kenya, and China, respectively. This will give a quantifiable, albeit limited, understanding of the economic element within the EPS and its effects upon Cambodia and Kenya necessary for comparison. The purpose of these indicators is to measure the effectiveness of China's infrastructure, monetary, and business investments in creating national development potential within Cambodia and Kenya.

This work will also measure the overall improvements in Cambodia and Kenya national militaries due to Chinese interactions. These measures will involve overall military exports and imports and military exercises between China, Kenya, and Cambodia. This will provide a general understanding of military interactions between these three nations and will aid in determining if the purposes of the EPS are being met as outlined.

Conclusion

The Chinese have employed the EPS, with the BRI as its principle mechanism, to great effect in Cambodia, and have recently begun to focus similar efforts in Kenya. The purpose of the EPS is to ensure the survival of China against international competitors, while creating an atmosphere to sustain China's economic growth. The EPS offers economic and infrastructure development, diplomatic and even military partnerships to developing nations in exchange for resources, manufacturing exports and intellectual property. This symbiotic system is designed to place China at the center of the economic world, thus insuring their survival against the West in the new environment of durable disorder.

This work will attempt to determine if the EPS can be as successful in Kenya as it has been in Cambodia. Further, it will lay the groundwork for a more in-depth analysis of the future of the EPS and its potential for success in the international environment of durable disorder.

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

² Sean McFate, *The New Rules of War* (New York: HarperCollins, 2019), 64.

³ Ibid., 74.

⁴ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, December 2017, accessed 14 October 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*.

⁶ Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

⁷ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 43-44.

⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁹ Ibid., 57.

¹⁰ Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, 11 September 2015, accessed 17 January 2020, file:///C:/Users/lykin/Desktop/CGSC/MMAS/Articles/Economic/China%20Economic%20Rise_History,%20Trends%20and%20Implications.pdf.

¹¹ The World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US\$) – Kenya, China,” 2018, accessed 29 February 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=KE-CN&start=1960&view=chart>.

¹² Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise.”

¹³ ZD, ed., “Full text of Chinese President Xi's address at APEC CEO Summit,” *Xinhua*, 11 November 2017, accessed 17 January 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm.

¹⁴ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), *Hearing on “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later,”* Testimony by Rolland Nadege, 25 January 2018, accessed 17 January 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Rolland_USCC%20Testimony_16Jan2018.pdf.

¹⁵ W. E. Willmott, “History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia Prior to the French Protectorate,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 7, no. 1 (1966): 15–38, doi:10.1017/S0217781100003100.

¹⁶ The World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US\$) – Cambodia,” 2018, accessed 20 February 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=KH&start=1960&view=chart>.

¹⁷ Sommothea Tann, “How Chinese money is changing Cambodia,” *DW*, 22 August 2019, accessed 25 September 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/how-chinese-money-is-changing-cambodia/a-50130240>.

¹⁸ Dr. Jeffery Becker, “What Is the PLA’s Role in Promoting China-Cambodia Relations?” *The Diplomat*, 19 April 2017, accessed 19 August 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-is-the-plas-role-in-promoting-china-cambodia-relations/>.

¹⁹ Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina, and Ben Blanchard, “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement,” *Reuters*, 25 July 2016, accessed 14 August 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6>.

²⁰ Ousman Murzik Kobo, “A New World Order? Africa and China,” *Origins* 6, no. 8 (May 2013), accessed 29 February 2020, <https://origins.osu.edu/article/new-world-order-africa-and-china>.

²¹ USCC, *Hearing on: “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later.”*

CHAPTER 2

FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.

— Deng Xiaoping, quoted in “Context, not history, matters for Deng’s famous phrase,” in *Global Times*

Introduction

As discussed previously, China’s Enticement Point Strategy (EPS) attempts to provide an environment for sustained economic growth while providing China with protection from Western dynamic ethnocentrism. The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) is the strategy’s forward driving mechanism. Will this strategy prove as effective in Kenya as it has in Cambodia? What are the tenets of the EPS? Are the tenants flexible enough for employment in various countries?

A fundamental understanding of International Relations (IR) theory is a critical lens to understanding the current international environment. Second, a foundational knowledge of Eastern thought is important to understanding China’s specific desired exercised role in this environment. Finally, general historical context and contemporary results of the EPS in Kenya and Cambodia as they relate to contemporary Chinese strategy is necessary in providing a full understanding of its calculated results.

International Relations Theory

The field of international relations is defined as, “a branch of political science concerned with relations between nations and primarily with foreign policies.”¹ These relations range from total war to peace. Nations use multiple tools to create, maintain, or

increase their national leverage within these relations. These tools are commonly broken down into “hard” and “soft” power.

Joseph S. Nye’s book *Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics*, explains the difference between hard and soft power using contemporary examples of the United States’ leadership.² He argues both forms of power are essential for understanding and operating in international relations and the improper balance of one over the other in the incorrect context can lead to undesired results. Additionally, Nye explains the necessity of soft power and its usefulness in modern international relations.

A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.³

Nye argues hard power is easier to conduct than soft power for two reasons. First, many soft power assets are beyond the control of governments and second, tend to "work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes takes years to produce the desired outcomes."⁴ Nye identifies three general categories of soft power: "culture", "political values", and "policies."⁵ These three categories work in synchronization to shape the environment advantageously for the nation engaging them. Using Nye’s construct, if done properly, a nation’s strategic objectives are achieved without warfare. If conducted improperly, a nation’s strategic objectives are not met, and potential conflict arises.

Man, the State, and War by Kenneth Waltz⁶ attempts to divide the causes of war into three “images” or frameworks. The first framework is individuals. Waltz argues war

is often caused by politicians or individual leaders. He further maintains human nature plays a major role in determining the fate of nations and their international relations. For the second framework, Waltz contends the domestic constitution of states themselves leads to war. He calls this image, states. Waltz calls the third image the international system. Waltz argues the “anarchical” matrix of the international system is the most influential aspect to war. Anarchy is defined, in this context, as the lack of an overriding authority to which states may appeal for relief of grievances. This authority vacuum leads to a constant environment of distrust and one positioned for conflict, even armed conflict.⁷

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. Mearsheimer⁸ argues, like Waltz’s third image, international insecurity is based upon the anarchic structure of international politics. Great powers, therefore, act aggressively to maintain power or gain influence regionally for their own survival. He further argues great powers have three main objectives: regional hegemony, maximum wealth, and nuclear superiority.⁹

Understanding China through this model adds insight to its actions, although the objects of Mearsheimer’s model were not achieved in the order he outlined. China first maximized its internal economic machine, Mearsheimer’s objective two, and then its nuclear capability as outlined in objective three. Once these objectives were met, China launched its goal to be the dominant influence in Asia as discussed in Mearsheimer’s objective one. Even with this small sequential discrepancy, Mearsheimer’s model is generally still applicable to the overall understanding of China’s strategic objectives. However, simply knowing the model without an appreciation of the current international

environment does not provide enough relevance for a thorough comprehension of Chinese efforts.

Durable Disorder

Sean McFate maintains the world has entered a new era of conflict he calls “durable disorder”. In his book, *The New Rules of War*, McFate discusses the fallacies of modern international theory, particularly involving war and peace.¹⁰ He claims war and peace coexist in durable disorder and conventional war is obsolete.¹¹ He further argues nations learning to achieve their strategic ends in durable disorder have a significant advantage over nations focused on conventional war. He does not pose any new frameworks for understanding international relations but reapplies known frameworks of conflict to describe a future where non-kinetic means will dominate the international landscape.

China has maximized its significant means to reshape strategic action and reach strategic ends by framing their efforts through the elements of national power, diplomacy, information, military, and economic. The result has been increased economic and international influence across the globe and effective manipulation of the Westphalian world order. Efficient military investment has been limited to defensive posturing and foreign military sales to increase interoperability and foreign dependence.¹²

McFate argues, Western powers have effectively dominated the military sphere and forced this evolutionary international change but were and are unprepared for what comes next.¹³ The Chinese, in contrast, have successfully navigated these new waters by seizing opportunities to aid nations stagnant in national development. By providing means and opportunity for weaker nations to grow in national strength, they achieve

deterrence from Western dominance, increased strength for partner nations, economic sustainability, and fiscally less need for military dominance. Simultaneously they achieve their own national objectives. It is a formula discussed lightly by McFate, but one Western nations must become accustomed to witnessing yet not participating in.

Ultimately, McFate discusses, the West has invested in hard power rather than soft power and the era of utilizing hard power is rapidly concluding.¹⁴ While the West invested in military might, the Chinese have invested in infrastructure with its neighbors and have built multinational cohesion with the promise of future development and national strength. It would seem China was able to anticipate the future arena of conflict, or “durable disorder” and has enabled itself with the proper weapons of choice. The Chinese have taken advantage of international opportunities to prepare themselves and others for the future while the West has perpetually been afraid of its own shadow.¹⁵ These actions are based on several fundamental differences between Eastern nations and Western nations and their view of international relations.

Eastern vs. Western Thought

It is therefore important to have an elementary understanding of the difference between Eastern and Western thought. To begin, Eastern rational thought is vital to understanding Eastern international relations. Western and Eastern views of nation states, their purposes and potentials and a myriad of other misalignments regarding how the world functions create an environment of miscommunication, miscalculation, and mistakes in foreign policy. This field of study is vast and in depth and only a general understanding will be attempted for the purposes of this work. The alternative would be

to simply give a Western view of the EPS which would greatly limit the depth of the discussion and overlook possible resolutions through an Eastern lens.

In summary, Western culture attempts to control the environment for their benefit. Further, individual rights supersede the rights of the group the individuals belong to.¹⁶ These two major facets of thought are in complete opposition to Eastern thought. Eastern culture values the group over the individual. Eastern cultures view the environment as mostly unchangeable, and a nation can only prepare itself to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves rather than force the opportunity to emerge.¹⁷ This lens presents the view China is merely offering the opportunity for developing nations to set themselves up for the seizure of future international opportunities as they present themselves. This view further sheds light on the Chinese way of avoiding national entanglements regarding human rights, political structures, and even violence.¹⁸ In the East, your business is your business as long as it does not affect the relationship of the group. China provides the opportunity for national development regardless of the nation's current situation and leaves it up to them to take advantage of it.

In Francois Jullien's *A Treatise on Efficacy*,¹⁹ he attempts to compare and contrast the fabric of Eastern and Western thought on individuals, communities and nations. He argues Western thought was founded in Greek logic and tradition and this view has dominated the European continent and the Western hemisphere.²⁰ This view is based on logic and the ability of humans to control their environment through science and their perception of it. Emphasis on the individual's place in the universe or in the environment are limited to what he or she can control or understand. Humans are

considered almost an outside influence on the environment, rather than a participating part of the environmental system.²¹

In contrast, Eastern thought is based upon the ancient concept humans are an integral part of the environmental system itself and have no real control of it. They are like other living things and must learn to adapt to ever changing situations and events apart from control.²² Science is viewed with scrutiny and is transient in the system, often displaying its folly but rarely accounting for it. Therefore, humans are meant to be strictly adaptable, flexible, and nearly predestined, regardless of their desires.

Understanding this dialectic creates an unusual lens for studying international relations in general and the struggle in durable disorder between the US and China more specifically. The US, Jullien argues, attempts to constantly determine its destiny by applying activities to certain parts of the environment (politically, militarily, economically or informationally) in hopes the environment will submit, and the US can achieve its objectives through forced change.²³ The Chinese approach the world as a system and attempts to simply make subtle adjustments to themselves to maintain their inherent supremacy and adapt to changes beyond their control.²⁴ Constant adaptations to a changing world come naturally and are desired over endeavoring to initiate or even control the change itself. Thus, opportunity trumps challenges and nations determine their destiny not by will, but by occasion. This perspective sheds light upon Chinese strategic decision making and illuminates their motivations.

The Geography of Thought by psychologist Richard E. Nisbett challenges the differences between Eastern and Western individual's decision making and thought matrices.²⁵ He analyzes various demographics from both Asia and the United States

through a variety of surveys and experiments to understand the fundamental mentalities of each. He then compares those differences and outlines how the dichotomous thought process can be cross examined and understood more completely. Arguably the writing is focused on individuals and small demographic groups, but the insight is extremely valuable when applied to Asian nations and the United States generally.

Western populations tend to take a less familial view of the world than Easterners. In general, Western populations are quite selfish and constantly look at the world through an individualist lens.²⁶ In contrast, the Eastern belief is much more familial and individual efforts or perspectives are valued in as much as they add to the group. Self-sacrifice as a virtue is not a matter of personal courage but is rather an essential element of belonging to the group and is a natural state of inclusion.²⁷

Therefore, China's approach to international relations is vastly different than Western perspectives. China perceives itself to be the center of the world and always has been. While their dominance has not always been evident or even enforceable, it has no need to be. Rather, China sees itself as the father of the family. Other nations are its children and it, therefore, has an obligation to provide opportunities for them which will benefit the nation and China symbiotically.²⁸ The US is viewed as the unruly teenager who is unpredictable, moody, short-sighted, and selfish.²⁹

This perspective is not meant to be insulting; nor is it meant to make China appear to be rigorously benevolent. Rather, it helps to clarify why China conducts business the way it does and helps the West adapt accordingly. Strictly speaking, rather than perceive China as an enemy to be defeated or controlled, the West should see China as a future co-existent. Although self-preserving, China has chosen friendship over alliance with its

neighbors to protect itself from what it believes as an overly aggressive and intrusive West.³⁰

Described as one of the most important books of Chinese and United States relations, *On China* by Henry Kissinger outlines a brief Chinese history from a diplomatic perspective and dives into the contemporary history from Mao until 2011.³¹ Dr. Kissinger offers insight into how Chinese diplomacy is conducted, its foundations and the techniques it has used in the past, namely in Korea and Vietnam. His intimate knowledge of Chinese diplomacy is valuable albeit dated and will serve as a backbone of understanding as China and the United States enter a new era of durable disorder and comprehending motivations, techniques and ultimate outcomes will be important.

Kissinger begins with a brief description of Britain's first diplomatic attempts with China. The British engaged with the Chinese government in Beijing in 1793.³² Upon arrival the British envoy, Lord George Macartney, requested he be given permanent residence in the capital to facilitate trade relations between the two nations. When the Chinese officials asked why this was necessary, the British responded the United Kingdom could assist the Chinese in national development. The Chinese refused the offer and Macartney returned to England without meeting any of his objectives. The British were insulted by the response. How could any nation other than a Western nation, assume to be superior? Rather than attempt to empathize with the Chinese perspective, the British seized an opportunity to inflict their will upon the Chinese at the end of the Opium War.

This simple scenario paints the same picture we see today. Kissinger suggests Western powers trend towards being aggressive and culturalist. Western nations have

determined their opinions of morality, relationships, human rights, governmental power, and use of military force is the only way nations should conduct themselves.³³ Anything other than the international order the West has built is wrong, dangerous, and must be confronted.³⁴ This ethnocentric perspective is fraught with conflict in its future as evidenced by multiple world wars, colonialism, wars on terror, and a myriad of other aggressive confrontations.³⁵ The Chinese believe their way of operating in the world is the correct method and Western powers are a threat to the world.³⁶ However, military dominance by the West has necessitated the use of different strategies, thus the EPS has been devised.

Dr. Julia Lovell's recent book, *Maoism: A Global History*, describes the global impact of Mao Zedong's version of social engineering. His views have dominated China for nearly 100 years and have created the current state of government rule for Chairman Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).³⁷ She also examines the effects of Maoism throughout the world, and its effects on Chinese international priorities and interactions.

Specifically, in chapter 6 of Lovell's book, she addresses Chinese efforts on the African continent. Lovell discusses diplomatic relations and the strength of China's "charm offensive" in Kenya.³⁸ She also describes how the historical relations between many nations in Africa and China have forged the current environment and shaped China's contemporary strategy.

In chapter 7 of Lovell's book, she describes the strategic importance of Cambodia to the Chinese plan for Southeast Asia. She takes a brief historical look at the diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations, particularly the importance of the last

century.³⁹ Further, she attempts to explain how this history has shaped the existing relationship and the Chinese overall strategy. Cambodia has played and will continue to play an important role in Chinese international development.

Cambodia and China Relations History

The people of Cambodia have a history which spans several thousand years. Throughout its history Cambodia has played a central role in Southeast Asian trade and political interactions. The ancient history of Cambodia is not entirely relevant to its current state as a semi-democratic nation, but several key historical points must be illuminated for interpreting Cambodia and its' relationship to China, in a contemporary context.

The first contact between China and Khmer (Cambodia, or as it was known in China, Funan), occurred in about 100 A.D., although historians argue it might have been as early as the first century B.C. or even earlier.⁴⁰ Regardless of time frame, indications are, "relations between China and South-east Asia since the Western Han times seem to have commercial and diplomatic rather than cultural, and such Chinese as had settled in the region confined their interests to trade."⁴¹ Diplomatic relations between China and Khmer were conducted between 225 and 330 A.D. Initially, emissaries from Prince Wu were sent to Southeast Asia and embassies and payments of tribute followed.⁴² Geographically, Chinese ships utilized ports in Khmer to conduct trade with Sino-Indian merchants. The diplomatic and economic relationship between Cambodia and China lasted through the 7th century.⁴³ However, Khmer's strength was undermined, and the nation succumbed to a power struggle with the Chen-la kingdom and trade with China declined.⁴⁴

The Khmer Empire achieved its pinnacle status in the 12th century. The Khmer Empire established itself as the center of trade on the Southeast Asian peninsula and enjoyed wealth and status as goods moved through its capital of Phnom Penh. One of the empire's main trade partners was China. In fact, one of the most well-known documented historical accounts of the great city of Angkor was written by a Chinese merchant in the 12th century named Zhou Da-guan.⁴⁵ However, he documented few Chinese were living in Angkor. Rather, a substantial Chinese population lived in Phnom Penh and at one point represented more than 1 of 7 inhabitants of the city.⁴⁶

The Angkor kingdom declined after the 12th century and the Cambodian people existed as a center of trade from nations all over Southeast Asia, to include the Chinese, although its former political and military strength were never again realized.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, Chinese immigrants continued to live in various pockets throughout the country. William E. Willmott states, "The accounts of early French and English explorers attest to the fact that Phnom-Penh was primarily a Chinese city prior to the entry of French political influence in the middle of the nine-teenth century."⁴⁸ There were so many Chinese, in fact, taxation and governance of so many foreigners became a problem for the ruling Khmer.⁴⁹ Special laws were written specifically for European and Chinese interactions in Cambodia; however, no individual registration was ever enforced.⁵⁰

In summary, the Chinese and Cambodians have had nearly uninterrupted economic and political relations for more than 2,000 years. These relations gave rise to Chinese communities throughout the country. Thus, the Cambodians and Chinese are not strangers to each other, and their history is much longer than the West often gives

credence. This background is essential to understanding the contemporary economic and military relations between the two nations.

Kenya and China Relations History

The great explorer Zheng He sailed throughout Southeast Asia and Eastern Africa between 1405 and 1433.⁵¹ His early expeditions facilitated a visit of African ambassadors to China in 1419 which lasted two years.⁵² Specific information regarding these initial contacts is limited, but diplomatic and even trade relations were begun. However, China isolated itself for nearly 400 years, and consistent contact with the African continent was lost, although the name of Zheng He continued to carry significance to future explorers.⁵³

Contemporarily, China's significant engagements with Africa can be traced to the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955.⁵⁴ Western colonialism on the continent was coming to an end and the nations of Africa were anxious to pursue nationalism and avoid the entanglements of the Cold War. Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru established the Non-Alignment Movement in 1961 and 120 developing nations, including many in Africa, signed on to protect themselves from the bilateral dangers of the Cold War.⁵⁵ China took advantage of the situation and offered a different alternative to developing nations, which lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1990.⁵⁶

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the largest member of the non-aligned group, China emerged as the de facto leader of the developing world. Although a communist nation, China declared both the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led Western powers neo-colonialists. China presented itself to the developing world as an alternative ideological partner that shared the experience of colonial domination and exploitation.⁵⁷

These efforts resulted in China offering military training, intelligence, and weapons to rebels fighting for freedom in six African nations.⁵⁸ These relations extended into the nation of Zambia, where China financed the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad Project (TAZARA) in the late 1960's. Zambia originally sought funding for the project from the World Bank, but was denied. Through a thirty-year interest free loan from China, the project was completed in 1975.⁵⁹ This project framed China as a viable option for Africa in a seemingly bipolar world as discussed by Tanzania President Julius Nyerere, "all the money in this world is either Red or Blue. I do not have my own Green money, so where can I get some from? I am not taking a cold war position. All I want is money to build [the project]."⁶⁰

Nyerere's words represents a critical aspect of China's strategy. Diplomacy is relevant only to the extent China sees its benefit. Otherwise, China does its best to not interfere with national politics or internal issues. This has proven an effective approach as Western nations demand ideological conformity in exchange for friendship. Liu Shaye, former China Ambassador to Canada said,

Some Westerners said China's cooperation with African countries is a practice of 'colonialism,' while the African people said the West is re-colonizing Africa. Let's see what colonialism is—grabbing resources with violence, enslaving African people, seizing land and destroying African culture. China helps some African countries build roads, bridges, hospitals and schools. We buy African resources with equivalent exchanges. China never interferes with other countries' internal affairs, or imposes China's culture and values, but communicates with the African countries on an equal basis. We support the African countries solving their problems independently.⁶¹

Although Kenya and China have been interacting for centuries, the contemporary relationship will be the focus of this work.

Conclusion

The sources outlined in this work will aid in answering the question of the EPS' success in Cambodia and potential success in Kenya. These sources will also outline the parameters of international relations, Eastern and Western thought, and an understanding of contemporary economic and military interactions between Cambodia, Kenya, and China. Finally, these sources will set the stage for further research regarding the EPS' flexibility in the short-term and its viability as a long-term national strategy within durable disorder.

¹ Merriam-Webster, "International Relations," accessed 25 January 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international%20relations>.

² Nye, *Soft Power*.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ McFate, *The New Rules of War*.

¹¹ Ibid., 36.

¹² Anthony H. Cordesman, "China's New 2019 Defense White Paper" (Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 24 July 2019), 2.

¹³ McFate, *The New Rules of War*, 25-42.

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- ¹⁴ Ibid., 36.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 64-70.
- ¹⁶ Francois Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy between Wester and Chinese Thinking* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), chapter 1.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 17.
- ¹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 215-216.
- ¹⁹ Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy Between Wester and Chinese Thinking*.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ibid., 15-19.
- ²³ Ibid., 47-48.
- ²⁴ Kissinger, *World Order*, 225.
- ²⁵ Richard E. Nisbett, *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why* (New York: Free Press, 2003).
- ²⁶ Ibid., 55.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 61.
- ²⁸ Kissinger, *World Order*, 214.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 61.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 69-73.
- ³¹ Kissinger, *On China*.
- ³² Ibid., 36-43.
- ³³ Ibid., 520.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 462-463.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 465.
- ³⁶ Kissinger, *World Order*, 226.

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- ³⁷ Julia Lovell, *Maosim* (New York: Penguin Random House Ltd., 2019).
- ³⁸ Ibid., 193.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 256.
- ⁴⁰ William E. Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia, 1967), 16.
- ⁴¹ Brian Harrison, *South-east Asia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1963).
- ⁴² Pelliot, Paul. ""Le Fou-Nan" ." *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d' Extreme-Orient*, vol iii, part 2, 1903: 249-251.
- ⁴³ Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy between Wester and Chinese Thinking*.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 86.
- ⁴⁵ Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia*, 4.
- ⁴⁶ Bernard P. Groslier, *Annuls du Musee Guimet*, vol. 1xii (Paris: University of France Press, 1958), 194.
- ⁴⁷ Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia*, 26.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 27.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 28.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 31.
- ⁵¹ Kwasi Konadu, "Zheng He's Ming Dynasty Voyages to East Africa," *African History* 360 (11 March 2018), accessed 29 February 2020, <https://www.kwasikonadu.info/blog/2018/3/18/zheng-hes-ming-dynasty-voyages-to-east-africa>
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Kobo, "A New World Order? Africa and China."
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

THE METHOD

The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops.
— Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*

Research Question

Will the Chinese EPS, as it relates to the BRI, have the desired effects on Kenya, as it did on Cambodia? The tenets of the EPS will be applied through two elements of national power; military and economic, although diplomatic elements will be touched upon. A process trace methodology through case study comparison of these soft power effects in Cambodia and Kenya will provide insight as to whether the EPS can be defined as the mechanism of soft power for China. If so, the effectiveness of the EPS in Cambodia in general will be determined as well as the potential for success in Kenya or other nations. If not, another mechanism or framework must be created.

Methodology

This work will be centered around a process tracing methodology. Process tracing is defined by Dr. David Collier, Chancellor's Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, as "an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence— often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena."¹ Typically, this means focusing on one particular case study and examining the potential causal mechanisms for observed outcomes.²

According to Dr. Collier, process tracing involves "(a) the empirical foundation of qualitative research, and (b) the data matrices analyzed by quantitative researchers, which

may be called data-set observations (DSOs).”³ He further categorizes these two methodological tools as causal-process observations (CPOs) and uses the term “process tracing” in general reference to the combination of the DSO and the concept of empirical quantitative research methods.

The foundation for this methodology relies upon two key factors. The first, referred to as description, plays the key role in effective CPO.⁴ This involves analyzing change and its direction while determining causation. This is at the heart of CPO. However, if the change is inadequately described, causation can hardly be justified, and the analysis falls short of reality. Thus, an adequate and in-depth description of the changes and their analysis is critical in determining justified causation.

Description itself can be divided into multiple tools such as events in space and time which are evaluated, and patterns are discovered. These patterns are tested for causality against either counterfactual values, or quantitative data. Counterfactual values “are seen as plausible alternatives, but that do not occur in the case study.”⁵ The use of quantitative data is not simplified to one event but finds its value in sequenced and patterned events to determine causation. Often these events can appear unrelated, but, upon scrupulous evaluation systematic relationships are discovered and causation achieved. Applying both counterfactual values and quantitative data analysis may not be necessary for every case study, but preparation to do so should not be overlooked.

The second part of the foundation to CPO is sequence. Process tracing looks at the sequence of all identifiable variables involved in the CPO as a vital factor to determining causation. Intervening variables as well as dependent and independent variables must not only be described but sequenced appropriately.⁶

Dr. Collier continues by stating process tracing results can be classified by whether it is necessary or sufficient for them to pass four tests. The four tests are straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive. Dr. Collier explains, “If a given hypothesis passes a straw-in-the-wind test, it only *slightly* weakens rival hypotheses; with hoop tests it *somewhat* weakens them; with smoking gun tests it *substantially* weakens them; and with doubly decisive tests passing them *eliminates* them.”⁷ While the process tracing methodology is a strong tool for determining causation in a multi-variable social environment, there are weaknesses in the methodology. Specifically, determining causality absolutely in a complex and complicated system such as international relations involving economic, military, political, and social factors is not possible. Thus, probability of causation will be the determination of factor causality. Further, this work will be limited to economic and military factors, with only a limited glance toward diplomacy, for determining causality of national development potential. Finally, this work will attempt to determine the direction and purpose of economic and military factors rather than the monopolistic nature of their success.

This work will utilize a comparative case study between Cambodia and Kenya and the potential effects of the EPS within the selected elements of national power. Chinese soft power efforts through the EPS are focused economically on national development through infrastructure investment, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade agreements, business partnerships, and management training. In military terms, the EPS is focused on increased military imports and exports, basing, and combined military exercises. These elements of national power in Cambodia and Kenya will be compared both historically and in the contemporary environment.

Economic growth in Cambodia and Kenya will be analyzed by looking at overall GDP and GDP per capita before and after major Chinese involvement. Although numerous variables are contributors to these two economic factors, Chinese FDI, imports and exports will be analyzed to determine if in fact Chinese contributions proportionately have made the difference in overall GDP or GDP per capita growth in Cambodia and Kenya.

Economic growth in Cambodia and Kenya will also be viewed through overall exports and imports in each nation. A study of trade imbalances between imports and exports will aid in determining current economic strength and potential strength or weakness in the future. Evenly balanced imports and exports are signs of a healthy economy, while major differences in imports and exports are signs of an unhealthy economy. This trade analysis will focus on China with Cambodia and China with Kenya, but will also include other nations for comparison.

Military imports and exports are an indicator of economic strength and military prioritization. Military imports and exports in Cambodia and Kenya will be historically and contemporarily analyzed. Military imports and exports will be mainly focused on trade between China, Cambodia, and Kenya but will also include other nations for comparison.

An increase in military exercises with China is also important to understanding the soft power effects of the EPS. The overall number of military exercises will be analyzed along with the relative delta over time of military exercises with China specifically. This will provide insight into military relations between the nations.

Challenges

There are several challenges with process tracing and case study methodology. First, there are multiple variables inherent to economic and military development. Second the inherent complex nature of international relations. As a result, absolute causality is impossible to determine. In both cases, proportionality of Chinese leverage will be the deciding factor as to the viability of the EPS tenets.

The macro-economics is one of the complex and complicated variables of development. Tariffs, infrastructure, consumer confidence, political instability, resource allocation, and a plethora of other factors play a part in shaping the current and future economic picture of any nation. This work will not address all economic factors related to economic growth or strength. Rather, the proportion of Chinese investment into the economy will be measured against the overall growth and strength of the economy to assess if the Chinese investment can be considered a major contributor to the change. If so, the EPS is a viable model for understanding Chinese international interaction.

Further, military growth and strength are difficult to measure. Troop levels, equipment upgrades, and joint military exercises offer a glimpse into military potential, but fail to provide a complete analysis of overall military growth and strength. This work will focus on military imports and exports, the number of overall exercises, and Chinese military investment in general to provide a snapshot of Chinese effectiveness in increasing a nations' military capabilities. This information will provide parameters for judging the success of the EPS in enabling foreign militaries.

The Enticement Point Strategy

The EPS model is a representation of China's grand strategy for achieving two major objectives. The first objective is stabilizing its own economy by outsourcing manufacturing, providing infrastructure, and economic growth potential through aid and investments to fledgling nations in need of these tools for national development. The second objective is to strengthen China's international position to provide maximum survivability in the Western world order.

The top of the model has China listed as a hybrid capitalist and communist nation with a growing middle class and desire to maintain or strengthen its international position. China conducts this through the BRI in three phases. Phase one focuses on Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Phase two focuses on Europe, Africa, and South America. Phase three focuses on the Middle East and North America. These phases were begun in order but are currently functioning simultaneously.

Nations give China, in the short-term, natural resources, access to intellectual property in the form of student exchanges, leadership and managerial exchanges, technological exchanges, and diplomatic relations. The host nation receives access to infrastructure, manufacturing, and financial aid and low interest loans. These provide it with the opportunity to grow through the national development stages, on the right, if it desires.

The national development portion of the model is based upon a nation's level of strength as applied to itself and the international community. Measuring a nation's strength is no simple task and this work recognizes this particular challenge in the field of international relations. For example, a national development model attempting to

incorporate all aspects of a nation state such as populations, economics, culture, religion, demographics, and politics, would sacrifice usefulness for accuracy. In contrast, a model working without proper significant categories will perform just as poorly sacrificing accuracy for usefulness. Therefore, the EPS focuses generally on the strength of a nation to utilize the elements of national power for themselves and in the international community. The more stability this strength provides, the further the nation can progress through the model. Ultimately, the national strength is projected to regions and at its zenith, the world.

The model begins with dependent nations, or nations which are solely reliant, by virtue of their status or colonial rule, upon other nations. As a nation grows in strength it gains its independence, achieves significant autonomy as a national strength, then grows into a regional strength where it can significantly affect regionally adjacent nations through its policies and practices. Here the shape of the national development portion of the EPS model is significant.

There are not as many truly dependent nations as there have been in the past. Colonies of stronger nations have nearly disappeared; thus, the dependent portion of the model is small. Correspondingly, there are not many truly elite strength nations either. There are, however, many nations in the national strength and regional strength categories, thus, this portion of the model is the largest.

The national development portion of the model is based upon a nation's ability to function within the elements of national power, referred to as the DIME construct. Therefore, dependent nations with less strength through these elements, have lower-case dime. Ultimately elite nations have formidable elements of national power, represented

by capital letters in their DIME with other nations demonstrating variations between these extremes. This portion of the EPS model is labeled national development rather than national evolution because movement through this portion may not be desired, nor does it happen on its own, but is the result of conscience effort and requires fundamental infrastructure, relative economic stability, and the ability to maintain relative autonomy.

If the host nation makes efforts to develop through the national development model, China potentially will receive economic partnership, international influence, and alliances across the globe, thus securing their position in the Western world order. Whether the host nation chooses to take advantage of the national development potential or not, the Chinese can establish relations and provide the opportunity. Thus, the Chinese have placed themselves in a “win-win” scenario where the host nation feels the freedom of opportunity, and the strength of a partner in China regardless of what they chose to do in the future, or even what they have done in the past.

The model outlines many advantages for China’s strategy, as well as challenges. Although many challenges will present themselves, two major challenges will be studied. First, overburdening growing nations with debt can bring risk to the relationship and endanger the world’s view of China’s intentions. Second, these significant economic investments pose a threat to China’s economic stability in the short-term.

Cambodia and Kenya in the EPS

The data acquisition for this portion of the work will come from contemporary studies, articles, and journals. Further inquiries will be focused on measurement criteria and agencies which measure economic and military capabilities and strength. There are

many viewpoints regarding China's relationship to Cambodia and Kenya and several key points will drive the data acquisition process.

Measuring a nation's economic wellbeing and strength is a complex undertaking. Numerous factors interact in a system of ebbs and flows where measurements are rarely static or exact. Harvard University Professor Karen Dynan and Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy's Louise Sheiner writes, "changes in real GDP do a reasonable job in capturing changes in economic well-being" with an exception.⁸ Dynan and Sheiner argue non-market activities require greater representation within economic health measurements. They argue digital economies and improvements in the quality of current technologies are underrepresented within GDP measurements.⁹ This work acknowledges GDP and its variants are not perfect in measuring a nation's economic well-being, but are adequate, as Dynan and Sheiner discuss, for a general understanding.¹⁰

The purpose of this work is not to give a detailed analysis of economic health for China, Kenya, or Cambodia but simply provide indicators Chinese economic interaction has reasonably improved Kenyan and Cambodian economies generally. Therefore, this work will focus on GDP, GDP per capita, imports and exports, trade imbalances, and debt ratios to gauge economic strength and condition.

The economic health of Kenya and Cambodia will be measured utilizing six main sources: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These sources will offer a combined picture of overall GDP, per capita GDP, imports and exports, trade imbalances and debt ratios. The combination of these sources will be necessary in providing a well-

rounded look at these nations' economic situations as well as China's economic relations with them.

The World Bank works in conjunction with the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations (UN) in four major areas. First, the World Bank works with multiple statistical forums as well as the UN Statistical Commission "to develop appropriate frameworks, guidance and standards of good practice for statistics."¹¹ Second, the World Bank aids in the creation of international parameters for indicators like the Millennium Development Goals. Third, it helps establish "data exchange processes and methods."¹² Finally, the World Bank collects, analyzes, and then distributes data both online and in print for users across the globe.

The IMF was established in 1944 "to ensure the stability of the international monetary system-the system of exchange rates and international payments enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other."¹³ The IMF currently consists of 189 member nations and a \$1 trillion lending capacity.¹⁴ It offers a 0% interest rate for low-income nations and has designated \$303 million for technical and policy-oriented training as well as peer learning.¹⁵ The IMF has extensive contemporary economic data on Kenya, Cambodia, and China.

The OEC is a simple online products exchange from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Media lab.¹⁶ It collects and presents trade data involving imports, exports, trade imbalances and economic complexity charts on nations with populations greater than or equal to 1.25 million, whose trade value is greater than or equal to \$1 billion and whose product trade value is greater than or equal to \$10 million.¹⁷ Through

measuring Revealed Compared Advantage (RCA) and using the theory of Economic Complexity, OEC is able to deliver accurate trade information on nations within the pre-determined parameters previously outlined.

The AEI is an American think tank based in Washington, D.C. and comprised of scholars, academics, business leaders, and staff which provide data and analysis on a variety of policy areas, most notably for this work in economics and foreign and defense policy.¹⁸ For the purposes of this work, AEI's China Global Investment Tracker will be used to provide data on Chinese investment from 2005 to the present.¹⁹ These investments are outlined by nation and by major economic sector.

The WTO focuses on international trade rules between nations to ensure trade between nations flows "as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible."²⁰ Further, the WTO identifies and assists with the needs of developing nations, aids in settling trade disputes, and assists with actual trade negotiations across the world.²¹ Trade disputes and trade information are categorized and documented in detail. China, Cambodia, and Kenya are all members of the WTO and as such have profiles on their current trade agreements and any disputes in their record for review.

The AIIB is a "multilateral development bank with a mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia."²² Founded in 2016, the AIIB currently has 102 members, to include Cambodia and Kenya.²³ The AIIB maintains detailed records on development loans and projects, specifically on the BRI. These records will aid in providing a more detailed view of BRI funding and projects in Cambodia and Kenya.

Military strength, historically and recently, will be examined utilizing information from multiple sources to include journals, articles, studies, and interior reports. These

references will be focused upon overall military acquisition, military imports and exports, and number of military exercises between China and Kenya, and China and Cambodia. This information will serve as the basis for analysis of the overall military strength of each nation. A major source of this information will be the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

SIPRI was founded in 1966 and “is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control, and disarmament.”²⁴ Since 1969, SIPRI has provided a year book which presents information on arms purchases, arms transfers, overall military expenditures, and other databases for many nations.²⁵ Kenya, Cambodia, and China have records in SIPRI databases and arms and military information will be documented from them.

Conclusion

The Chinese are engaging in the EPS to increase their soft power capabilities in Cambodia and Kenya through the BRI. The effectiveness of this strategy can be judged through an analysis of economic and military growth and strength in Cambodia and Kenya, respectively. Economic growth analysis will look at GDP, GDP per capita, imports, and exports. Military growth and strength analysis will look at overall military imports and exports and exercises with China compared to other nations. This assessment will provide the necessary information to determine if the EPS has worked in Cambodia and has potential to work in Kenya.

¹ David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *Political Science and Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-830, accessed 11 February 2020, <https://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3827/Understanding%20Process%20Tracing.pdf>.

² Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 206.

³ Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing.”

⁴ James Mahoney, “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research.” *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 120–47.

⁵ Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing.”

⁶ Mahoney, “After KKV, 120–47.

⁷ Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing.”

⁸ Karen Dynan and Louise Sheiner, “GDP as a Measure of Economic Well-being,” (Hutchins Center Working Paper #43, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, August 2018).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

¹¹ The World Bank, “About us,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/about>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ International Monetary Fund (IMF), “About the IMF,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://www.imf.org/en/About>.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Observatory of Economic Complexity, “About the Site,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://oec.world/en/resources/about/>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ American Enterprise Institute, “About,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://www.aei.org/about/>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ World Trade Organization (WTO), “The WTO,” accessed 5 March 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Home,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “About SIPRI,” accessed 5 March 2020, <https://www.sipri.org/about>.

²⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

THE ENTICEMENT OF CAMBODIA AND KENYA

We need to strengthen international development cooperation so as to create more opportunities for developing countries, help them eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

— President Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) and delivers a keynote speech”

Cambodia Economy

Cambodia achieved its freedom from France as a colony in 1953 and was under the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979. Under the Khmer Rouge the Kingdom of Cambodia became a communist state and was officially called Democratic Kampuchea. For four years the people starved and were executed by the notorious Pol Pot regime. Citizens could not own land nor own a private business and nearly 1 in 4 of Cambodians were killed during this period.¹ The devastating effects of the Khmer Rouge years have been covered by historians and has been well documented in detail. The economic shock of the Khmer Rouge also had a lasting impact.

In an attempt to overcome the economic effects of the Khmer Rouge, in 1989 Cambodia established a free market economy and began privatizing businesses, encouraging foreign investment, reducing price controls, and privatizing land ownership.² In 1999 Cambodia became a member of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in 2007 also became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Additionally, China has granted Cambodia Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which allows them to ship goods to China with reduced duty payments.³ China also established the Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone in Sihanoukville, Cambodia

and created the Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation in 2006. In a meeting in Vietnam in 2010, China included Cambodia in its ASEAN-China Priority Project for the Implementation of Work Program (WP). This created interconnected transportation lanes from China throughout Southeast Asia to include Cambodia.⁴ These economic partnerships and political bodies have helped fuel Cambodian economic growth. GDP in Cambodia grew from \$2.5 billion in 1993, to \$24.54 billion in 2018 (see figure 2).⁵




Figure 2. Cambodia GDP

Source: Trading Economics, “Cambodia GDP,” accessed 3 February 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/gdp>.

Cambodian per capita GDP has grown from \$302.56 in 1993 to \$1,510.33 in 2018 (see figure 3).⁶ Average growth has been 8% from 1998 to 2018. The World Bank

reports Cambodia reached middle-income status in 2015 and has them projected to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030.⁷

This growth, as demonstrated by the GDP per capita, is not singularly focused on the upper class or government officials, although their benefit has been proportionately higher overall. Notwithstanding the disparity, poverty in Cambodia has dropped from 47.8% in 2007 to 13.5% in 2014. Thus, in just seven years, Cambodia lowered its poverty by nearly 72%. Trade with and economic FDI from China have been major factors in this growth. This cooperation has been partially credited to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with Chinese immigration connections. These SMEs have family ties to mainland China which aid the SMEs in avoiding governmental bureaucracy at the local and even federal levels and facilitate business investments and trade.⁸




Figure 3. Cambodia GDP per Capita

Source: Trading Economics, “Cambodia GDP per Capita,” accessed 3 February 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/gdp-per-capita>.

Cambodia has also begun experimenting with accepting Chinese currency, the RMB, from tourists alongside US dollars, which it currently uses nationwide. In 2013 the National Bank of Cambodia initiated RMB clearance. In Phnom Penh in 2015, the Cambodian government held a “forum on the internalization of RMB to expand the use of RMB denoted bank products by the Bank of China Phnom Penh Branch.”⁹

These upward economic trends are significantly due to stimulation from Chinese investments which have provided necessary capital to such a degree that Cambodia’s need to utilize RMB as a viable currency is logical. While investments from the US and other foreign nations have played an important role in Cambodia’s growth, China has

played the largest role as evidenced by total investments through the BRI as well as imports and exports in Cambodia. Initial assessments validate China's use of the EPS to be functioning properly in meeting its objectives of offering the potential for Cambodia to move through the national development model by extending investments in infrastructure, manufacturing, and growth potential to Cambodia.

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) reports from 2005 to 2018, China has invested \$14.58 billion dollars into various Cambodian economic sectors.¹⁰ The Agriculture sector has received \$680 million, energy has received \$5.15 billion, entertainment has received \$400 million, finance has received \$170 million, metals has received \$500 million, real estate has received \$1.36 billion, technology has received \$200 million, transportation has received \$5.81 billion and the tourism sector has received \$310 million.¹¹ These investments were in preparation for, and in coordination with Cambodia's involvement in the BRI.

Cambodia's official involvement in the BRI began in May 2015 when the Cambodian National Assembly voted to ratify an investment proposal of \$62.3 million in the AIIB along with 56 other nations.¹² Chinese investments in Cambodia have grown significantly over the past 20 years, making China the largest foreign investor in Cambodia from 2016 to 2019.¹³ Investments include \$4.2 billion in infrastructure development such as power plants, offshore oil exploration, casinos, condos, hotels, restaurants, and other small businesses.¹⁴

However, the cost of China's favor has been significant. Currently, Cambodia owes nearly half of its \$6 billion in foreign debt to China, with an additional \$3.5 billion in BRI lending, according to the Center for Global Development.¹⁵ This negative effect

of the EPS poses a definite threat to the strength of the economic relationship between China and Cambodia. However, the risk seems outweighed by the potential for economic growth China is offering and the relationship remains strong.

One tool of the EPS economic element of national power is the use of trade to strengthen the economic ties between Cambodia and China. Cambodia's trade relationship with China has seen increases in recent years. In 2017, the Chinese accounted for 40%, \$4.77 billion, of overall imports to Cambodia, while the United States lagged behind at 2.8%, \$333 million (see figure 4). Cambodia exports 19%, \$3.06 billion, of its merchandise to the United States and only 6.3%, \$991 million, of its merchandise to China¹⁶ (see figure 5.) Fundamentally this means Cambodia acquires capital through exports to the United States and then transfers the wealth to China through imports. Thus, the EPS has provided Cambodia with the ability to maximize its profits through exports, but provided the means to siphon those profits back to China as a short-term gain for the Chinese per the EPS systems model. As a secondary advantage, the EPS has promoted better economic relations between China and Cambodia which benefits both nations significantly.

Cambodian Imports by Nation

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Figure 4. Overall Cambodia Imports by Country

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Cambodia,” accessed 22 February 2020, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/khm/>.

Cambodian Exports by Nation

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Figure 5. Overall Cambodia Exports by Country

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Cambodia,” accessed 22 February 2020, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/khm/>.

In 2017, Chinese and Cambodian trade totals reached \$6 billion with Chinese exports to Cambodia accounting for 87% of the total.¹⁷ This represents one of the main purposes of the EPS which is to provide China with the ability to export manufacturing and goods. The key to the success of the EPS is its ability to prime the symbiotic relationship potential between Cambodia and China. Benefits must be attainable to both nations or the EPS ceases to be effective. As evidence, Cambodia enjoyed a positive trade balance of \$3.82 billion in 2017, in contrast to 1995 when the trade deficit was negative at \$819 million in net imports (see figure 6).

Cambodian Imports and Exports, 1995-2017

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Figure 6. Overall Cambodia Imports and Exports

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Cambodia,” accessed 22 February 2020, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/khm/>.

Simply put, this means the Cambodian economy has grown significantly for more than 20 years, and China has been the key factor. The Cambodian economy is far from perfect, however, as seen when comparing wealth disparity among social groups. Wealth tends to be focused on the upper class and Hun Sen’s government, despite the significant drop in overall poverty. However, there has been a steady decline in wealth disparity since 2007 as represented in a drop in the GINI index of .41 to .29 in 2014.¹⁸

Additionally, Cambodian debt displays a danger, particularly regarding Chinese investments. In December of 2019, the IMF Article IV Consultation Staff Report stated Cambodian account debt to GDP ratio was estimated at 12%.¹⁹ The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) claims 15% is a dangerous threshold, while around 10% is optimal for the GDP to debt ratio.²⁰ The Cambodian GDP growth rate was estimated to decline for 2020 to 6.8%, thus widening the debt to GDP ratio to 13.5% in 2020 greater than the

optimal 10% ratio. Thus, the economic news for Cambodia is not all positive, but neither is its debt picture overwhelmingly negative. This would demonstrate the EPS is not without risk, which Cambodia has accepted in exchange for reaping the advantages the EPS offers them.

A report by Serey Sok and Nyda Chhinh of the Department of Economic Development at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) summarizes the Cambodian economy by stating,

Based on its strong record of economic growth, poverty reduction and Rectangular Strategy implementation, Cambodia has now surpassed the Human Assets Index threshold for LDC graduation and is fast entering the Economic Vulnerability Index lower bound. Furthermore, Cambodia now ranks fifth amongst all countries in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including halving the poverty rate (CMDG 1).²¹

Sok and Chhinh further argue Cambodia needs to slow its economic growth and use of natural resources in order to protect future development. The threat posed by Cambodia's economy growing too fast is further evidence the EPS is operating as planned. China has provided the means and it is now up to Cambodia to control its own growth and achieve its desires through the national development process per the success of the EPS.

The positive strides Cambodia's economy has made in the last three decades are indisputable. Additionally, the Chinese have undoubtedly played a major role in this progress. Therefore, the economic element of the EPS has been a successful strategy for both Cambodia and China. The symbiotic objectives of the EPS are being met and are showing signs of continued success as the relationship blossoms. The economy is not the only element of national power the EPS utilizes. The EPS also employs the military element of national power to achieve its objectives.

Cambodia Military

The Cambodian military saw major restructuring efforts in 1993 with the merger of the Cambodian's People's Armed Forces, the Khmer Rouge, and the National United Army. In 1999 the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces was created and absorbed the patchwork military of the 1993 restructuring effort.²² Currently, the best estimates for Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) strength are 120,000 military personnel, 17 helicopters, 5 air transports, 263 tanks, 340 armored vehicles, 570 rocket projectors, 150 towed artillery, and 22 patrol boats in its navy.²³ The RCAF is ranked 107th of 138 nations in military capability. China has seized on the investment opportunity this fledgling military has presented and is providing the means for Cambodia to grow its military capabilities while strengthening military ties with China.

Since 1999, the Chinese have invested \$155 million dollars into the RCAF (see figure 7).²⁴ This took the form of attack helicopters, portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, and transport aircraft among other investments. While the amount of financial investment may not be impressive compared to overall FDI from China, the amount of training and education between the Chinese and Cambodian militaries is noteworthy.

Cambodian Major Weapons Transfers from China, 1999-2018

Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1999 to 2018

Note: The 'No. delivered' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <<http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>>.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 22 February 2020

Supplier/ recipient (R)	ordered	No. designation	Weapon description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year delivery	of delivered	No. Comments
China							
R: Cambodia	(4)	Type-062-1G/Lushun	Patrol craft	2007	2007	(4)	Part of \$60 m deal (aid and/or financed by Chinese loan); designation uncertain (reported as '46m patrol craft')
		(50) 12	FN-6 AS365/AS565 Panther	Portable SAM Helicopter		(2008) 2009 2011 2013	(50) Possibly FN-16 version \$195 m deal (financed by Chinese loan); incl 4 armed version
		2	MA60	Transport aircraft		2012	2012 2

Figure 7. Weapons Transfers from China to Cambodia, 1999-2018

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, "Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1999 to 2018, SIPRI, March 2019, <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN6143BB09C0E418a0fff00b0bd195914e097225bd2211bd864026676d9a5c953a90b13d774073>.

As an example, China financed a military school 80 km from Phnom Penh in 1999. The school admits 200 cadets for four-year courses, and another 200 for shorter 6-month courses both of which are designed and supervised by China's Defense Ministry.

²⁵ Local staff at the school are supplemented by Chinese advisors and cadets are required to attend classes in China for six months. The site is nearly 148 hectares and the Chinese have built more than 70 additional buildings since 2002.²⁶

Additionally, the Chinese increased joint exercise cooperation with Cambodia. In 2016 the 15-day joint exercise program “Golden Dragon” was initiated. This program was still being conducted in 2018.

Hundreds of Cambodian and Chinese soldiers began a 15-day joint military exercise in central Cambodia . . . involving live-fire rocket launches from helicopters, mock tank battles, and anti-terrorism and emergency relief training. China will also reportedly also donate tanks and armored personnel carriers on the occasion.²⁷

Talks are now focusing on a possible military exchange program which will permit Chinese naval ships to be positioned at a Cambodian naval base in southwest Cambodia²⁸. The possibility of such a military partnership was reported in the Wall Street Journal on 22 July 2019²⁹, but Hun Sen, the Cambodian Prime Minister, denied the reports as being against the Cambodian constitution. US diplomats concurred with the initial reports and contend China and Cambodia have reached such an arrangement for naval partnership, despite Hun Sen’s supposed constitutionally based denial.

China and Cambodia have developed a mature military relationship in both training, education, arms deals, and money. These facets of interaction are strengthening historic ties and providing potential basing for Chinese naval vessels near the Malacca straits. Another purpose of the EPS is to provide a symbiotic relationship between China and Cambodia through the elements of national power, specifically military relations. China’s military element of the EPS in Cambodia has been effective and will continue in the future to produce positive effects for the Chinese and Cambodian governments.

In conclusion, China has utilized the EPS elements of national power, specifically, economic, and military elements, to provide Cambodia with infrastructure and economic growth potential for positive movement along the national development

model (see figure 1). In return, China has received diplomatic leverage in ASEAN and a strategic partnership with an emerging economy in Southeast Asia. As a result, diplomatic ties and loyalty have also grown.³⁰ The EPS is working successfully in Cambodia and shows no signs of slowing its progress in the future.

Kenya Economy

China's work through the EPS in Kenya has also shown potential. Similar to Cambodia, China has focused on providing economic growth possibilities to Kenya. The GDP for Kenya has more than doubled over the past 10 years. In 2010 the GDP was \$40 billion and by 2019 the GDP had grown to \$89 billion (see figure 8).³¹ 2020 GDP is expected to exceed \$89 billion, with GDP growth around 5% annually. GDP per capita has seen positive movement as well over the past 10 years (see figure 9). Kenyan GDP per capita was \$951.7 in 2010 and jumped to \$1202.1 by 2018.³² This would demonstrate, that while the overall economic strength of Kenya is growing, Kenya's ability to distribute those savings to the general population across various demographics is limited. Still, Kenya's overall economic picture is a positive one.




Figure 8. Kenya GDP

Source: Trading Economics, “Kenya GDP,” accessed 4 February 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/gdp>.

The source for this growth has been FDI, particularly from the Chinese. Per the EPS model, China provides the means for movement along the national development model in exchange for resources, manufacturing potential, and even intellectual property in the form of exchanges, business leadership forums, and economic partnerships. The BRI serves as the main mechanism for the EPS, and Kenya has been a focus of the BRI in Africa. Kenya has accepted this position and has even encouraged it.³³ However, the difference between the economic potential of Kenya and Cambodia requires Chinese investments to adapt appropriately.




Figure 9. Kenya GDP per Capita

Source: Trading Economics, “Kenya GDP per Capita,” accessed 4 February 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/gdp-per-capita>.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, Kenya’s economy is a subsistence agriculturally based economy.³⁴ Agriculture makes up 26% of the GDP in Kenya, while another 27% is contributed through agriculturally connected economic sectors.³⁵ Agriculture in Kenya is responsible for employing more than 80% of the population.³⁶ This poses a significant threat to the growing nation as its economy is particularly vulnerable to natural phenomenon, particularly drought. Technological development in the agriculture sector is in high demand as is the development of the manufacturing sector. China has seen this potential, adapted to it, and has taken advantage of the opportunity such an economy presents.

For Kenya, China has held true to Liu Shaye's concepts of cooperation and minimal government interference rather than neo-colonialism with a particular focus on economic partnership.³⁷ China's economic investments have aided Kenya in its own drive to achieve national development. China has provided nearly \$4.8 billion dollars toward Kenyan development since 1964.³⁸ As of 2016, Kenya's foreign debt to China was estimated at nearly \$3.1 billion dollars and its FDI growth was the fastest in Africa at 47%.³⁹ China is playing an intimate part in Kenyas' "Vision 2030" economic development policy which outlines FDI, Develop Finance Institutions (DFI), Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), and other resources to maximize financial and infrastructure effects in Kenya in order to achieve "high-industrialized" economic status by 2030.⁴⁰

As part of this initiative, China opened a fifth Chinese African Development Fund (CADF) office in Nairobi in 2016.⁴¹ This branch has allocated funds utilized to finance several infrastructure projects in Kenya, most notably the standard gauge railway (SGR) from Mombasa to the nations of Southern Sudan and Uganda. Table 1 is a list of ongoing or completed projects in Kenya financed by China.

China Projects in Kenya, 2010-2018

Table 1. Current/Completed Chinese Financed Projects in Kenya

Investment Project	Cost of Investment	Year
Standard Gauge Railway (3-Phases)	\$4 Billion	2014-2018
Thika Super Highway (Lot 3)	\$100 Million	2009-2012
Nairobi Northern and Eastern Bypass	\$85 Million	2009-2012
Nairobi Southern Bypass	\$158 Million	2013-2016
Nairobi Western Bypass	\$180 Million	2017-2019
Fiber Optic Cable	\$60 Million	2012-2016
Drilling of Geothermal wells in Olkaria	\$195 Million	2010-2015
Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital- Eldoret	\$560 Million	2015-2018
Kenyatta University Teaching and Referral Hospital	\$100 Million	2011-2016
High Grand Falls Dam	\$1.5 Billion	2017-2012

Source: Antony Kamakia, “Financing for Development and Socio-Ecological Transitions: A Review of Chinese Investments in Kenya,” *Macrothink Institute* 7, no. 2 (2018): 38, accessed 29 February 2020, file:///C:/Users/lykin/Desktop/CGSC/MMAS/Templates/MMAS/Financing_for_Development_and_Socio-Ecological_Tra%20(1).pdf.

Chinese investments have played the key role in Kenya’s expansive growth. Prior to Chinese investment, Kenya’s GDP rose from an estimated \$791.3 million in 1960 to \$5.752 billion in 1993 representing an increase of \$4.961 billion dollars over 33 years. In contrast, with Chinese aid, from 1993 to 2018, Kenya’s GDP grew to \$87.908 billion, or an increase of \$82.156 billion dollars in only 25 years. This demonstrates significant growth due to substantial Chinese involvement.

Further, the wealth has been relatively consistent across the demographic spectrum of the Kenyan population. Kenya’s economic development is represented by slow and steady growth since 1960, but substantially improved growth since 1993.⁴²

Prior to Chinese investment, Kenyan GDP per capita growth rose from \$97.45 dollars in

1960, to \$220.07 dollars in 1993. Growth then rose substantially to \$1,710.5 dollars in 2018 with Chinese aid.

The AEI reports China has invested more than \$17 billion dollars into Kenya from 2005 to 2018..⁴³ This money has spread across various sectors of the Kenyan economy. The Agriculture sector has received \$640 million, energy has received \$5.47 billion, health has received \$390 million, real estate has received \$1.03 billion, technology has received \$170 million, transportation has received \$7.32 billion and the utilities sector has received \$100 million. The rest of these investments have been spread among various smaller sectors of the Kenyan economy..⁴⁴ These investments have manifested themselves in the Kenyan economy in various forms, but particularly in exports and imports.

Exports and imports provide a glimpse of the EPS in action as it demonstrates benefits to both Kenya and China. Kenya currently imports 23% or \$3.91 billion of its goods from China (see figure 10). The next closest import competitor is India at 9.8% or \$1.68 billion dollars. The United States exports 3.2% or \$548 million to Kenya. This shows China plays a major role in Kenyan imports as a primary supplier to the Kenyan economy. There is an imbalance, however, when these figures are placed against overall Kenyan exports.

Kenyan Imports by Nation

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Figure 10. Overall Kenyan Imports by Country

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Kenya,” accessed 17 February 2020, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ken>.

Kenya’s current top export partner is the United States. Kenya exports 8.7%, or \$538 million, to the United States, versus only 2.1%, or \$127 million, to China (see figure 11). China currently ranks near the bottom of nations receiving exports from Kenya, with multiple African nations receiving between 8.2% (Uganda) and 2.6% (South Sudan). In fact, several European nations receive more imports from Kenya than China.⁴⁵ Thus, Kenya exports evenly across several continents and shows no preference to any particular nation in its exports. This demonstrates China’s investments not only concern Kenya, but other nations which receive exports from Kenya.

Kenya Exports by Nation

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Figure 11. Overall Kenyan Exports by Country

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Kenya,” accessed 17 February 2020, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ken>.

Kenya’s current account debt-to-GDP ratio is 4.6%, down from 6.8% in 2017.⁴⁶ This represents a healthy threshold according to the BIS 10% standard, but, public debt in Kenya remains high at nearly 61% of GDP. This is partially due to internal economic factors like drought and government policies, but the fact remains Kenya’s overall economic health is stable.

China has been an intimate part of Kenyan economic growth since 1964.⁴⁷ Although China does not have exclusivity to the Kenyan economic apparatus, the growth and potential development of Kenyan infrastructure and economic strength is fundamentally due to the financial relationship Kenya shares with China. This relationship is far from perfect, as Kenyan foreign debt attests, but the results of Chinese investment in infrastructure and financial aid for Kenya have proven positive. Monica Juma, Kenya’s Foreign Minister stated on 10 January 2020, “Kenya thanks China for its

long-term help and support for Kenya's economic and social development and appreciates China's constructive role in promoting peaceful development in Africa.”⁴⁸ Such sentiments show the long-term potential of the BRI as a mechanism of the EPS and further exemplify why nations, like Kenya, have shown they are not only willing but anxious to be involved with the economic growth potential China offers. These benefits have extended into the military realm as well, although information availability is limited.

Kenya Military

The Kenyan military, established in 1964, is an emerging entity. The current Kenyan military, or Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) was established in 2010 under Article 241 of the Kenyan Constitution and was supplemented with a Kenya Defense Force Act in 2012.⁴⁹ Presently, the KDF only requires, on average, 1.3% of Kenyan GDP as of 2019.⁵⁰ Although boasting a defense force with Army, Navy, Air Force, and even paramilitary police force, the Kenyan military is not a robust part of the nation. Regardless, the Chinese have provided weapons sales since 2002⁵¹ as indicated by the SIPRI chart (see figure 12).⁵²

Kenya Major Weapons Transfers from China, 2000-2019

Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 2000 to 2019

Note: The 'No. delivered' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <<http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>>.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 25 March 2020

Recipient/ supplier (S)	ordered	No. designation	Weapon description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year delivery	of delivered	No. Comments
Kenya							
S: China	6	Y-12	Light transport ac	(1999)	2000	6	
		32	WZ-551	APC	(2006)	2007	32
		(4)	AS365/AS565 Panther Helicopter			2009	2010 (4) Z-9WA armed version
		5	AS365/AS565 Panther Helicopter			2012	2014-2015 5 Z-9WA armed version
		(35)	VN-4	APV/APC		2015	2016 35 For police
		25	CS/VP3	APC	(2016)	2016	25 For police

Figure 12. Weapons Transfers from China to Kenya, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, "Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 2000 to 2019," SIPRI, March 2019, <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN6143BB09C0E418a0fff00b0bd195914e097225bd2211bd864026676d9a5c953a90b13d774073>.

China has also provided leadership exchange programs at senior levels.⁵³ Qiu Yi, the Defense attaché for the Chinese embassy in Kenya stated in 2017, "The leaders from Kenya and China have agreed to promote bilateral relationship to comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and reached consensus on expanding and deepening Kenya-China pragmatic cooperation in all fields."⁵⁴ As recently as 8 December 2019, the missile frigate Weifang of the 33rd escort fleet docked in the Mombasa port for supply and maintenance work.⁵⁵ The ship had participated in joint exercises after leaving its home port of Qingdao on 29 August of the same year.⁵⁶ The current Kenya and China

military relationship is immature but ground work is being laid for its maturation in the coming decades.

While Kenya lacks the military relationship history and strength with China enjoyed by Cambodia, indications are strong the relationship will blossom in the future. Military leadership exchanges and weapons sales as well as emergency response to natural disasters is shaping the environment for future interaction.⁵⁷ Thus, China has seen a need in the Kenyan military and is moving to fill the gap for its own benefit and for the advantage of Kenya.

Conclusion

China has embarked on a robust and risky endeavor to provide the means for national development to both Cambodia and Kenya. Initial indicators are the EPS, with the BRI as its mechanism, are functioning as planned and nations in need of national development are being given the means to progress, if they desire. Cambodian economic growth and increased military cooperation with China have shown China's efforts with the EPS are bearing fruit as intended. Indications are Kenya is also following in the same vein and will continue to do so as the future unfolds. In conclusion, the EPS is functioning as advertised and has shown success in Cambodia and Kenya with the potential for further success in both states. The EPS, therefore, is a viable systems model for framing contemporary understanding of China's strategic objectives as well as future research into China's international relationships.

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CHAPTER 5

THE FUTURE FOR ENTICEMENT

Since you are aware of the strength of your adversaries, use all possible means to divide them; go warily, use cunning - thus will you prove yourselves good strategists.

— Li Hongzhang, Chinese diplomat, 1879,
quoted in Henry Kissinger, *On China*

Introduction

China is currently using an EPS through the BRI to enhance their soft power effects in Cambodia and Kenya. China has utilized the elements of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics to frame opportunities for developing nations to progress through a national development model (figure 1). China provides the infrastructure, manufacturing potential and economic investments to enable nations to progress through national development. In return, China receives, in the short-term, intellectual property, natural resources, trade agreements, business partnerships, military partnerships, and exportation of manufacturing. In the long-term, China creates a spiderweb of economic, military, and political collaborations across the globe while making themselves the center of the modern economic world.

Cambodia and Kenya represent two distinctly different nations attempting to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the EPS. China has been able to customize the EPS for the individual needs of each nation to maximize its effectiveness. This customized phase approach has proven highly effective in Cambodia and is showing signs of effectiveness in Kenya as well. If this model proves to be successful, it can be

applied to many nations across the world, increasing China's political reach and influence.

EPS Momentum

This work has provided a framework for understanding China's strategic potential with the EPS. This framework should be expounded upon by scholars and professionals who desire more understanding of Chinese intentions and potential for focused international interaction. Such studies should be centered on the EPS with the indications of the positives and negatives it provides.

Overall, China's EPS has provided and continues to provide positive strides economically and militarily for both Cambodia and China. Further, China's EPS is arguably also moving forward with positive effects in Kenya economically and militarily, although portions of the relationship are still maturing. The EPS framework appears to provide a realistic understanding of China's intentions and mechanisms for international relations to meet its strategic ends. Cambodia and Kenya have proven such relationships are operative and is expanding.

Cambodia and China

Cambodia's economy has significantly benefited from its partnership with China. Cambodia's GDP and GDP per capita have grown tremendously which has driven its poverty levels down by nearly 72%.¹ Cambodian trade deficits have also seen constructive movement with a trade surplus of nearly \$4 billion in 2017..² While Cambodia's total debt to GDP ratios have increased, the overall economic picture is a positive one, with China at the center of this change.

Further, Cambodian military strength has increased, thanks to Chinese investments in military education, weapons, and joint exercises with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). Cambodian military relations with the US have declined in recent years and the Chinese have taken advantage of its historic friendships and familial relationships necessary to increase their position of influence. These positive strides will continue in the foreseeable future and the observed symbiosis nests directly with the power of the EPS.

Finally, China has gained diplomatic strength in political bodies such as ASEAN through its relationship with Cambodia. When the dispute over the Spratly Islands was a hot topic for the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, China utilized its influence over Cambodia to curb the ASEAN vote in China's favor.³ The EPS provides China with the ability to leverage diplomatic strength through its military and economic relationships to its benefits.

Thus, China and Cambodia have seen many of the benefits outlined in the EPS. Through the BRI, Cambodia has received infrastructure, increases in manufacturing, increased imports and exports, and greater regional influence. China has nurtured a political ally, increased imports and resources in the short-term and the promise of a regional economic and military partner in the long-term. It can therefore be strongly argued, the EPS is working for China and Cambodia.

Kenya and China

In Kenya, as in Cambodia, the economic growth with Chinese investments has been encouraging. Kenyan GDP and GDP per capita have seen promising movements and the benefits of the growth have propelled Kenya forward as they have sought national

development. Current trade, with imports more singularly focused than exports, has shown tremendous growth and the potential continues to climb. However, the economic news of Kenya is not all positive, with debt ratios growing to dangerous levels, particularly regarding Chinese investments. Despite this downward trend, the overall economic news in Kenya is positive. It has experienced upward movement and China will continue to provide the means for national development to this potentially powerful African nation.

The military news is also optimistic for Kenya. Chinese military investments have been robust, and joint exercises have increased. This portion of the relationship is still in its infancy, and only time will tell if China is able to continue its plans to increase the strength of its military ties with Kenya. Increased military ties will lead to stronger Chinese diplomatic influence and increase the potential of Chinese influence on the African continent, similar to the case in Cambodia and ASEAN.

In summary, the EPS has been executed to great effect in Cambodia and Kenya through the military and economic elements of national power. These effects have shown strong results for Cambodia and Kenya and the benefits to China have been noted as well. The future of these interactions will determine the longevity and flexibility of the EPS as the environment of durable disorder continues.

Recommendations

The macroeconomic ramifications of the EPS will require further analysis from scholars qualified to provide such expertise. As previously mentioned, a simple analysis of GDP, GDP per capita, export and import imbalances, and other economic indicators merely provides a systematic view of implications of the EPS. Economists, social

scientists, and international relations theorists and practitioners can offer more conclusive results through data collection and researched analysis of more indicators than the scope of this work could reasonably assume. However, this work has provided the necessary lens through which this research should be attempted.

Additionally, military information is limited and a full analysis of China's military involvement with Cambodia and Kenya could not be attempted in this work. Rather, indicators were analyzed to determine the viability of the EPS as a framework for understanding Chinese international strategic intentions. Determining the strength of military cooperation is a task for military strategists, skilled observers, and scholars. This work, again, has provided the necessary framework for such an undertaking.

If China is able to utilize the EPS to effect in other nations, as it has in Cambodia and Kenya, it has the potential to significantly alter how the international community views the BRI and China's rise. The EPS provides a useful tool and framework for scholars and students of international relations. In the long-term, China would place itself at the center of the economic world which would then readily translate to military strength and diplomatic survivability. The strategy is a bold but should be seen as an increasingly effective one.

Ultimately, China is seeking a balanced use of the elements of national power to achieve strategic objectives in a more audacious fashion than has previously been experienced. Economic power and the use of wealth to invest in foreign nations is not a new concept but doing so without dictating internal government management or getting entangled in internal government struggles is new. Further, exercising these powers for the benefit of less-developed nations in hopes the investment pays off in the long-run is

not a new idea either. However, doing so with such a focused, centrally directed, and unified manner is new, particularly without dictating how the nation conducts itself within its own borders while also allowing it to determine its own destiny.

If successful, the EPS could develop an economic web of nations with the potential to bring hundreds of millions out of poverty and pave the way for national development potential unheard of in history. Nations need only act on the potential China offers. Optimistically, the EPS has the potential to distribute wealth evenly across the world as nations take advantage of the investment and national development capacity China offers while simultaneously assisting to eliminate the drivers of instability and even war.

However, if unsuccessful, the EPS could drive nations even further apart through debt and economic instability, leading to more inequality while dashing hopes of national development and increasing the risk of violence as nations attempt to reclaim their economies from the Chinese failed EPS pile of rubble. Pessimistically, nations would turn on each other, friction would increase, and the world could move from durable disorder to actual war.

Future Research

To determine which of these scenarios is most probable, several aspects of this research must be expanded, and many questions must be answered.

1. Has China benefited enough from their investments in the EPS through the BRI to cover the cost of the investment?
2. How flexible is the BRI to internal national struggles like violent changes of leadership, civil war, or economic collapse?

3. Does the EPS have other mechanisms outside of the BRI, if so, what are they and how effective have they been?
4. The concept of the national development model needs to be refined.
5. How will the EPS be executed in more developed nations which do not necessarily require China's investments to achieve their strategic goals?
6. How has the diplomatic element of national power been effective in the EPS?

The EPS hinges on the return on investment China receives from the nations it empowers. Current information on just how much money China has recuperated from the BRI is unclear, or even reported as dishonest, and presents further research opportunities, requiring access to the necessary data such as, exact figures on imports and exports from China as they apply directly to the BRI. This will then aid in determining if, in fact, the EPS is a viable model from the Chinese perspective. If Chinese BRI investments are repaid with adequate profit margins over time, the EPS can be judged as an effective model of achievement for Chinese strategic goals. If not, the tremendous wealth lost through the BRI has the potential to prove devastating to the Chinese economy which would then affect the entire world.

This work examined Cambodia and Kenya and the effects of the BRI as a mechanism of the EPS on their economies and militaries. The world is much larger than these two nations, other countries involved in the BRI should be examined with scrutiny to determine if the China's efforts have also been beneficial to them as well. If the BRI can be effective in other nations of various races, cultures, and religions, then it may prove to be a universal mechanism and the EPS can be reasonably judged as an effective international strategic framework for analysis. However, this work did not have the scope

to view the EPS as a world-wide strategy and did not examine the potential for soft-power effects outside of Cambodia and Kenya.

Additionally, are there more mechanisms for the EPS other than the BRI? Would China's FDIs in general be considered economic mechanisms of the EPS? Would China's diplomatic efforts be considered a more political mechanism for the EPS? Do these mechanisms have to work in synchronization, or are they massed against the nation without coordination as a form of modern passive "blitzkrieg" to overwhelm a nation and in practicality force it to capitulate to Chinese actions? The EPS poses a solid model for understanding China's strategic goals, but what drives it needs to be understood more fully. Future research should use the EPS as a framework and examine, in depth, China's ability to utilize the elements of national power in coordination, sequence, and synchronization to achieve its strategic ends across the globe.

The national development portion of the EPS systems model requires much more analysis. International relations theorists have yet to provide an adequate systems model which captures how nations develop over time from disorganized societies to superpowers. Less well known is how the elements of national power aid a nation in achieving this development. The EPS systems model is able to maintain its integrity with only a minimal understanding of the national development model but is limited due to this gap in the research. Overall, the central issue of exclusivity remains the core issue: If a model is detailed enough to provide insight into national development, it lacks broad enough parameters for inclusion of all nations. Conversely, if it is broadened to incorporate all historical journeys of national growth, it fails to provide the detail needed for focused analysis. The dichotomous character of such a dilemma is not easily or

readily overcome; but such a model must be researched and developed in order to create a vernacular for the understanding of national development generally and its application to the EPS specifically.

Finally, the EPS draws upon the potential for growth of developing nations. However, how does the EPS work in nations not requiring China's powerful investment potential? How will China adapt the EPS to nations not beholden to its monetary might? Answers to this question will provide essential information regarding the overall flexibility of the EPS and provide future insight into its survivability as a strategy as well. Can developed nations withstand the temptation to participate in the EPS? If so, what are China's plans to incorporate these nations into another possible version of the EPS? Ultimately, what does the future hold for the EPS considering these types of nations and how effective will it be?

Finally, diplomacy is the foundation for both economic and military interaction between nations. This work did not delve into these murky waters where quantitative evidence is scarce and judging positive and negative diplomacy is nebulous. The skill of contemporary Chinese diplomats must be evaluated using the EPS as a framework for assessment criteria and diplomatic objective achievements. The EPS outlines numerous intentions of China's diplomacy and, therefore, provides a framework of understanding China's diplomatic objectives.

Conclusion

The Chinese have initiated the EPS in order to increase their survivability as a minimum, or create a foundation for their rise to global preeminence in the world order. Harnessing the singular focus of a communist government with the power of a hybrid

capitalist economy, China has begun investing in nation states attempting national development internally, regionally, and internationally. Investing in developing nations' economies and militaries provides China with invaluable partnerships necessary for its own sustainment. Additionally, these investments provide opportunities for diplomatic leverage to China throughout the world. Cambodia is a compelling example of this symbiotic strategy at work and Kenya is poised to achieve similar outcomes. The EPS has shown its magnitude and will grant more nations the opportunity to follow the same course and reap similar results.

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