Time Is the Longest Distance between Objectives: Temporal Considerations for Achieving Convergence during the New Guinea and Leyte Campaigns of WWII
Abstract
Doctrine, training and leader development emphasized limited contingency operations (LCO) in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Army's myopic approach to LCO and reemergence of peer-capable threats has left the US Army ill prepared to address the evolving security environment. These changes coupled with recent combat experiences provide the motive to retrain and familiarize LSCO doctrine and EAB organizations as operational formations enabling success on future battlefields. The lenses of doctrine, Army MDO concepts, history, and theory form the basis to answer my hypothesis built upon the framework of my proposed research questions. Doctrine and current MDO published concepts will be important to understand how current doctrine was informed by superseded versions and how both are informing new concepts for future application. This study utilizes Dr. Robert Leonhard's theories on maneuver warfare, warfare in the information age, and application of time and spatial considerations in the application of large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Theories of war and operational art which formed the basis for ALB combined with Leonard's theories will facilitate a meaningful understanding of the MDO tenet of convergence. The monograph will study through the lens of history, General MacArthur's effort in World War II (WWII) specifically the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO), campaigns of New Guinea, and Leyte during the period of January 1944 July 1945. These campaigns are instances to best contextualize temporal considerations to achieve convergence of effects during large scale combat operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1158911
Entities
People
- Joseph J. Dumas
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College