Army Doctrine's Preparedness for Operations in a Nuclear Environment
Abstract
Following the 2001 attacks on the United States and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States Army transitioned from fighting a nuclear-capable peer and focused on stability and counterinsurgency. In 2017, the United States Army transitioned doctrinal focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations in support of strategic emphasis on great power conflict with nuclear states. Current Army operational doctrine does not establish the necessary foundation for units to be successful in a post-detonation nuclear environment. The commanders and staff officers who routinely planned and trained considering operations in nuclear environments are either general officers or have retired. As the Army updates its operational doctrine, it must include operations in a post-nuclear detonation environment. Peer competitors incorporate nuclear planning and movements into their training exercises. The skills required to adequately plan, prepare, and execute to maintain the initiative in a nuclear environment cannot be learned overnight. These skills and planning factors must be learned and exercised. This monograph analyzes how current Army operational doctrine compares to historical Army operational doctrine in preparing commanders and staff for operations in a nuclear environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1159090
Entities
People
- William R. Goldsworth
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies