Shift to Generalization Within U.S. Infantry Divisions: World War II Historical Analysis of a Common Problem

Abstract

Planners and leaders, throughout time, face a common problem. How best to organize a force for the next war? In a modern context, the challenge includes integrating capabilities at echelon, managing risk on the battlefield, and employing formations within shipping, manpower, and budgetary constraints. Planners in the twentieth century devolved into two theories, generalized formations, containing all capabilities at lower echelons, and specialized formations tailored to individual missions or operations. Cementing tactical biases, World War II was the conflict in which the US transitioned to generalization. In doing so, the US Army continues to struggle with integrating capabilities into its force structure. This study examines the implementation of emerging technologies within US infantry divisions, discusses the shift to generalization, and examines the causes. The thesis concludes that in generalizing the formation, planners never really solved the problems that specialization sought to address, invoking a recurring problem in the Army for years to come.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 21, 2020
Accession Number
AD1159339

Entities

People

  • Jacob W. Knell

Organizations

  • School of Advanced Military Studies

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Armored Vehicles
  • Artillery
  • Battles
  • Case Studies
  • Combat Operations
  • Command And Control
  • Employment
  • Force Structure
  • Governments
  • Military History
  • Military Organizations
  • North Africa
  • Second World War
  • Task Forces
  • Training
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design