

# Russian Arms Sales and Military Advisors in the Central African Republic: Copying and Pasting from the Soviet Playbook

A Monograph

by

MAJ Stephen J. Laz  
US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2020

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 21-05-2020		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> JUN 2019 – MAY 2020	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Russian Arms Sales and Military Advisors in the Central African Republic: Copying and Pasting from the Soviet Playbook			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  Stephen J. Laz, MAJ			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Advanced Military Studies Program			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The soft power tactics Russia is using in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sub-Saharan Africa are similar to the tactics used by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. Russian arms sales and advisors in the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa cause instability by undermining the CAR's government control over its territory. Russia today is trying to achieve its strategic goals of opening new markets for resources, fostering a dependency on Russian military weapons and training, and gaining political support in international and regional politics. These methods and goals taken from the Soviet play book are being adapted to the modern era. As we do not yet know the impact that Russian arm sales, military advisors, and subversion in the CAR will have, examining Soviet policy and actions during the Cold War, and US and European responses can provide a framework with which to understand Russian objectives and actions in the CAR today. This comparison can help draw direct correlations to how Russian arms sales support their foreign policy at the expense of the CAR's security and stability in order anticipate the future effects, and develop strategies to counter them in order to bring about peace and security in the CAR.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Russian arms sales, Central African Republic, Soviet Foreign Policy, Wagner Group, military advisors, Cold War					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	55	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

## Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Stephen J. Laz

Monograph Title: Russian Arms Sales and Military Advisors in the Central African Republic:  
Copying and Pasting from the Soviet Playbook

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Monograph Director  
Matthew S. Muehlbauer, PhD

\_\_\_\_\_, Seminar Leader  
Travis Jacobs, COL

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies  
Brian A. Payne, COL

Accepted this 21st day of May 2020 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Acting Director, Office of Degree Programs  
Prisco R. Hernandez, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the US government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

## Abstract

Russian Arms Sales and Military Advisors in the Central African Republic: Copying and Pasting from the Soviet Playbook, by MAJ Stephen Laz, 55 pages.

The soft power tactics Russia is using in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sub-Saharan Africa are similar to the tactics used by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. Russian arms sales and advisors in the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa cause instability by undermining the CAR government's control over its territory. Russia today is trying to achieve its strategic goals of opening new markets for resources, fostering a dependency on Russian military weapons and training, and gaining political support in international and regional politics. These methods and goals, taken from the Soviet playbook, are being adapted to the modern era. As we do not yet know the impact that Russian arm sales, military advisors, and subversion in the CAR will have, examining Soviet policy and actions during the Cold War, and US and European responses, can provide a framework with which to understand Russian objectives and actions in the CAR today. This comparison can help draw direct correlations to how Russian arms sales support their foreign policy at the expense of the CAR's security and stability in order to anticipate the future effects, and to develop strategies to counter them so as to bring about peace and security in the CAR.

# Contents

Acknowledgements .....	v
Abbreviations .....	vi
Figures .....	vii
Tables .....	viii
Introduction .....	1
Methodology .....	6
Literature Review .....	8
The History of the CAR .....	14
Soviet Arms Sales, Military Advisors, and Foreign Policy .....	18
Modern Russian Arm Sales, Military Advisors, and Foreign Policy .....	28
Conclusion and Recommendations .....	35
Bibliography .....	43

## Acknowledgements

Special thanks to my wife Amy for supporting me during my time at SAMS and throughout my career.

## Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PMC	Private Military Contractor
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Figures

Figure 1.	2018 Arms Sales Transparency .....	4
Figure 2.	African Voting Opposing the USSR in the UN General Assembly 1983 to 1987 ....	27
Figure 3.	Russian Poster in Bangui.....	30
Figure 4.	Central African Republic Imports .....	33

## Tables

Table 1. Soviet Arms Sales to Africa during the Cold War .....	18
Table 2. Soviet Union, France, and the United States Arms Sales to CAR during the Cold War .....	23
Table 3. Russian Arms Exports 1991 to 2018.....	36

## Introduction

The United States must not remain complacent, however, for we can be sure that the (Eastern) Bloc will soon turn its attention to these countries. It is extremely important that we keep this great continent and its strategic resources on our side. Therefore, the United States should do everything possible to limit Soviet economic activities in the area which might tend to bring any of the Sub-Sahara countries within the sphere of Soviet influence.

— Central Intelligence Agency, *Foreign Economic Policy Recommendations for Africa South of the Sahara*, 1984

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, Africa has been a peripheral theater for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and, later, Russia. These nations have competed in multiple domains short of engaging each other in large scale combat operations. With tensions rising in Europe, Russia has focused efforts on expanding its power in Africa. Russia's leadership feels threatened by increased North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) influence in Eastern Europe, which it views as Russia's historical sphere of influence. Russia is searching for ways to regain its position as a world power, and sees Sub-Saharan Africa as ripe for exploitation, and as a region where it can challenge America's power and leadership in the international system.

Great power competition is spreading to Sub-Saharan Africa as Russia, the United States, China, and former European colonizing nations, strive for political influence and resources in the region. The region is rich in resources and potential investment opportunities, but its security and stability issues have limited economic growth and investment. To gain access to these opportunities and to strengthen African nations, foreign countries are using hard and soft power to gain influence and open new markets. Soft power tools include, but not limited to, economic aid, humanitarian aid, diplomatic support, security force assistance, and arms sales. The United States and some European countries provide military aid such as counter-terror or anti-pirate operations to stop the spread of extremism and promote the rule of law. The United States hopes

to create secure environments for economies, people, and legitimate governments to flourish in Africa while simultaneously trying to “limit the malign influence of non-African powers.”<sup>1</sup>

The current conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) dates back to 2005 when tribal and religious tensions boiled over after contested elections. France, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the African Union have provided troops to support the CAR’s government since then. In 2017, Russia renewed its Cold War ties to the CAR by providing arms sales and private military contractors (PMC) to serve as advisors and trainers to the CAR’s military. These efforts, authorized by the UN, are yet another attempt by outside powers to strengthen the CAR’s military in order to enable its government to regain control of its sovereign territory. Providing weapons, troops and trainers was not done for free though, as nations do not give something for nothing. The 2018 Sochi agreement between the CAR and Russia allows weapons and Russian trainers into the CAR. The agreement labels it a donation but it “contains provisions for Russian exploitation of minerals, resources and energy sources as well as the development of infrastructure and enhanced commercial relations.”<sup>2</sup> Russia has worked with the CAR’s “elected leaders to mortgage mineral rights—for a fraction of their worth—to secure Russian weapons,” and gain bases in the CAR from which it can further its influence.<sup>3</sup>

This paper argues that Russian methods and objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are nothing new. Rather, they are similar to those of the USSR in the Cold War. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that aid in “the Soviet-era model—with its pros and cons—proved quite effective at

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 10, accessed November 15, 2019, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew McGregor, “How Russia Is Displacing the French in the Struggle for Influence in the Central African Republic,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 74 (May 2018), accessed October 30, 2019, <https://jamestown.org/program/how-russia-is-displacing-the-french-in-the-struggle-for-influence-in-the-central-african-republic/>.

<sup>3</sup> General Thomas D. Waldhauser, *2019 Posture Statement to Congress* (Washington, DC: US Army Africa Command, 2019), 9, accessed October 29, 2019, <https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2019-posture-statement-to-congress>.

the stage of the development of statehood in African countries . . . these decisions were primarily politically motivated, now they are part of the humanitarian assistance.”<sup>4</sup> Creating a framework to recognize and anticipate Russian goals, methods, and potential outcomes allows policymakers and planners to disrupt its efforts to undermine legitimate governments or international efforts in Africa, if not eliminate them. Russian arms sales and operations, when deliberately obfuscated, hamper efforts to broker and secure a permanent peace in the CAR<sup>5</sup> (see figure 1).

---

<sup>4</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Interview to TASS News Agency,” Official Website of the President of Russia, October 21, 2019, accessed October 29, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858>.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Small Arms Survey, Russia’ ranks low on the transparency of arms sales when measured against other arms exporters. This is measured by using reports to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database, report on arms treaties, and submissions of national reports that are either not submitted or ignored.




Figure 1. 2018 Arms Sales Transparency. Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi, *Trade Update 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus* (Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018), 31, accessed January 4, 2020, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018.pdf>.

Russia is continuing to seek ways to erode international support of the United States, NATO, and Western Europe. Nonetheless, Russia is not willing to risk an all-out war with NATO. Instead, “Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out costly confrontation (including a new arms race).”<sup>6</sup> Russian actions in the Crimea and Ukraine demonstrate its desire to only wage war in a limited theater and do so where it can pull off a *fait accompli* to force other nations to accept the border changes as the new status quo. In response, NATO and the United States have increased their activity in Eastern Europe to signal to Russia that it will not happen again.

This has led Russia to look for new ways and areas to exert power and influence for both Russia and its leaders. Additionally, Putin’s “recent interest in Africa is in large part pragmatic. Western sanctions on Russia’s economy mean that Moscow is keen to find new markets and to strike new partnerships. Its interests—according to leaked documents—range from gold in Sudan, to phosphates and mineral resources in Mauritania, to diamonds in DRC.”<sup>7</sup> The CAR serves as a case study to identify the methods used by Russia to increase its powers abroad in areas that suffer from a lack of security and stability. Russia’s use of soft power continues to erode historical ties between African nations and Europe as well as to attempt to thwart the United States’ efforts to assist with security and stability in the region. By identifying these methods and motivations, the United States can develop approaches to counter Russia’s efforts to increase instability in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world.

The soft power competition the United States faces today in Sub-Saharan Africa is similar to the opposition it faced in the Cold War. The USSR used arms sales and military

---

<sup>6</sup> Vladimir Putin, *Russian National Security Strategy* (Moscow: Russian Federation President, December 2015), 6, accessed October 31, 2019, <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Luke Harding, “Pragmatism and Ideology Drive Kremlin’s Interest in Africa,” *The Guardian*, June 11, 2019, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/pragmatism-and-ideology-drive-kremlins-interest-in-africa>.

advisors in the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa to cause instability and advance its strategic goals: opening new markets for resources needed for Soviet production, fostering a dependency on Soviet military weapons and training, and gaining political support in international and regional politics. Examining Soviet policy and actions during the Cold War, and the United States' and European responses to these actions, provide a framework to understand and anticipate Russian objectives and actions in the CAR today. Current Russian arms sales and use of military advisors support similar objectives as in the Cold War and are similarly designed to the Cold War mentality of preferring “non-military means of achieving their objectives. They will probably regard the present world situation as ripe to develop further in their favor through continuation of such tactics.”<sup>8</sup> This comparison helps draw direct correlations to what the Russians are trying to achieve with their arms sales and military advisors today, and how they support Russian foreign policy at the expense of the CAR's security and stability.

## Methodology

This paper displays the similarities between Soviet and Russian activity and goals in the CAR to demonstrate that Russia's current activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are nothing distinctly different from the USSR's activities during the Cold War. This part of the paper explains its methodology, focusing on the scope, limitations, and assumptions. The next section provides a review of scholarly works providing insight into understanding politics in the CAR, Soviet foreign policy, and Russian foreign policy. The fourth section of the paper provides an overview of the tumultuous history of the CAR and the origins of the current conflict to understand the conditions that prompted foreign intervention due to instability. The next two sections focus on Soviet and Russian activities and foreign policy concerning the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa, to

---

<sup>8</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, November 1957), 2, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000267692>.

allow a comparison of the two eras. The conclusion of the paper examines the similarities between Russian and Soviet methods and objectives and offers recommendations for the United States on how to counter destabilizing Russian activities in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The scope of this paper focuses on the CAR and how Russian arms sales and military advisors further the latter's interests at the expense of the former's stability and security. It examines broader trends of Soviet and Russian policies in Sub-Saharan Africa to understand their actions, as neither nation telegraphed their objectives and activities. These trends include using arms sales and advisors to gain influence due to the limited ability to supply economic aid, and using any means necessary to create a friendly government to support their foreign policy in the United Nations. Due to the clandestine nature of these activities there is limited available information on Russian objectives. This in turn, requires a reliance on open sources to gain an understanding of Russians effects in the CAR. Both the conflict and Russian activity in the CAR are ongoing, and policy makers cannot yet understand or accurately predict the effects that Russian arms sales and activity there are going to have long term if left unchecked.

This paper holds two assumptions. First, Soviet Policy toward sub-Saharan Africa remained somewhat constant during the Cold War. While these policies and methods changed slightly over time, the USSR continuously sought to create instability to exploit new nations for their own political gain at the expense of their Western enemies. Additionally, reports on Soviet activity in one nation can be assumed to be indicative of Soviet intentions and methods in other countries as the Soviets tried to replicate success across the continent. The other assumption is that contrary to Russia's denying the Wagner group—a PMC organization—is acting as a proxy for Russia to further its foreign policy objectives abroad, it is in fact used by the Russian government and its leaders for that exact purpose. Doing so allows Russia to have deniability should anything go against international norms or laws. Reports have shown that the head of the Wagner Group has ties to the Russian Kremlin, and that it is linked to actions in the Ukraine and

Syria in support of Russian objectives. The Wagner Group is fulfilling the role of providing Russian military advisors to the CAR, but they are not members of the military but PMCs.

To examine Soviet actions and objectives during the Cold War, a variety of Cold War governmental sources, as well as scholarship, from that time provides a framework to comprehend and investigate these actions and their effects. These sources demonstrate how Soviet policies and actions played out and either successfully supported or failed to support its strategy. This method creates a model to compare and contrast current Russian arms sales and use of military advisors and their impact. Current Russian activities and objectives in the CAR are best understood by viewing it through the lens of the Gerasimov Doctrine and its 2015 National Strategy. To identify how Russia is implementing these objectives and methods, current United States' government reports, news articles, Russian reports, and NGO reports on arms sales in Africa, offer a holistic view of what it has been doing in the CAR since 2017. This analysis and synthesis of a variety of sources allows for a comparison between the two eras and provides the framework for the way forward to help mitigate security and diplomatic instability in the CAR.

## Literature Review

To understand the background of the current situation in the CAR, it is necessary to understand how African nation states formed, the governing concepts of non-democratic regimes, and how individual strongmen gain and consolidate power. This background provides an understanding of how the USSR and Russia used arms sales to gain influence and power despite the struggle for democracy in these nations. Finally, modern scholars offer an understanding of Russian intent, and the Gerasimov Doctrine provides the framework within which to understand current Russian activities in the CAR and place it in the wider context of Russian strategy and foreign policy.

Jeffery Herbst's *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, provides historical insight into "the failure of many African states to consolidate their

authority . . . and the adoption of highly dysfunctional policies.”<sup>9</sup> Herbst provides the framework to understand the origins of the current security and economic issues that have hindered the CAR’s stability and growth. Herbst argues that Africa’s problems stem from European attempts to “create a system of boundaries new to Africa; they established novel economic systems on mines and cash crops; they built infrastructure systems that still determine patterns of trade.”<sup>10</sup> Efforts to make these regions into prosperous colonies were limited due to the cost of administering the region and building needed infrastructure. As a result, the colonial administrators exerted power from the colonial capitals and “penetrated rural areas in a partial and incomplete manner.”<sup>11</sup> These areas possessed a degree of autonomy from the colonial government, space for local groups to exert power, and allowed refuges or groups to escape conflict by moving across arbitrary borders. Herbst’s analysis of European colonial rule shows it succeeded by “manipulating local structures” to support the colonial rulers and businesses.<sup>12</sup> The lack of formal power structures, infrastructure, and administration became an issue African nations gained independence, as new leaders faced “the problem of how to extend power over their territories given the incomplete and highly variable administrative system they inherited from Europeans.”<sup>13</sup> This situation provided opportunities for foreign nations to attempt to exploit resources for their own gain as African nations struggled to establish control over their territory.

In *Non-Democratic Regimes*, Paul Booker offers the tools to understand the CAR’s history of non-democratic rule and how it provided opportunities for foreign nations and companies to exert power and control over the nation and its resources. Many nations like the CAR, historically experienced “open military rule by a junta or by a military government, with

---

<sup>9</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 97.

leading military officers installed in the countries president and or/ government ministers.”<sup>14</sup> Army officers overthrew their predecessors, both elected and non-elected, to gain power and at times disguised their rule as democratic with sham elections. The CAR’s military leaders ruled through personal relationships and depended upon the loyalty of their subordinates and tribes by providing them government positions, money, and or power. Some nations established what Booker called a mixed economy, where the “mixture of states’ controls and market forces, state ownership, and private ownership” created a policy of “nation-building that would replace tribalism and other parochial loyalties” to allow these rulers to extend their control over parts of their country they had not historically ruled over.<sup>15</sup> Military leaders, once in office, launched self-coups, bids to increase their own power, and “extend control over the political system in some extra-constitutional way,” to cement their control over the government. They did this through means like abolishing elections, suspending parliament, or ignoring the constitution and laws completely.<sup>16</sup> To understand how these non-democratic leaders held onto office, Booker explains that they established the legitimacy of their rule after consolidating their power with coercion to enforce their new policies. If the international community denied these claims of legitimacy, the CAR’s rulers, like other African leaders, strengthened “their control over society and state machinery. . . . To hold on and use the use the public offices/powers it has seized or misappropriated” until the next coup or foreign intervention.<sup>17</sup>

William Reno in *Warlord Politics: African States* helps to understand how Sub-Saharan leaders consolidated power with the use of foreign aid. Reno argues that corruption and illicit acts have “become widespread and integral to building political authority in parts of Africa” and that “political authority and command over resources comes mainly through the decisions of specific

---

<sup>14</sup> Paul Booker, *Non-Democratic Regimes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 26.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

individuals who act to serve their private interests, largely without regard for formal government institutions, rules and processes.”<sup>18</sup> Leaders used national resources “to convert wealth into political resources, buying the loyalty of some and buying weapons to coerce others and thus gain more resources,” until the next leader or militia group offered a better deal to foreign investors and took power.<sup>19</sup> Consolidating power provided opportunities for companies and nations to use arms sales and money to gain influence and resources because businesses did not demand reforms required by international monetary organizations, like the International Monetary Fund. Local militaries were controlled through training and arms shipments to help create safe “production centers” to guarantee returns on these investments, and deny insurgents the ability to disrupt these businesses.<sup>20</sup> These officials and military leaders struggled with caring about reforms at the expense of their patronage networks and control over territory and resources. During the Cold War, both the West and the Soviet Bloc used patronage networks to control strongmen in Africa and keep them friendly. This led to gangsterism where “rival security forces with foreign funding, multiple party militias, and ‘action forces’ that enjoy the patronage of individual politicians continue as instruments of disorder, as strongmen and rulers vie with one another for power.”<sup>21</sup> As a result, nations in Africa normalized the operating concept of using foreign weapons and money to eliminate rivals and expand their control.

Sergey Mazov’s *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo 1956-1964*, uses Soviet and Western sources to understand the former’s objectives, activities, and attitudes towards Sub-Saharan West Africa during the early Cold War, while demonstrating that African nations had agency and did not always roll over for either side. Mazov’s book illustrates how the USSR began their attempts to influence Sub-Saharan Africa. He

---

<sup>18</sup> William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), ix.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 69-70.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

argues that Soviet efforts in Africa began in 1956, and that under Nikita Khrushchev there was “no Soviet African blue print per se, only some drafts of it based on flawed knowledge of the continent and its inhabitants.”<sup>22</sup> His book shows that the USSR’s push for communism was not welcome in all nations. Instead, the Soviets had to be flexible in searching for new African allies who might reject communist ideology, but would still be friendly to the USSR, and devote time and resources to support these African leaders. To make inroads into Africa, the Soviets used information warfare to gain support for communists through radio, telegraph, and print publications.<sup>23</sup> Mazov provides insight into American and Soviet intervention, along with the UN, in the Congo in 1960. His illustration of how different actors reacted to the instability helps provide an understanding of the situation the CAR finds itself in today and how foreign powers seek opportunities to exploit or means to block an enemy’s influence.

Nataliya Bugayova’s and Darina Regio’s article, “The Kremlins’ Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update,” August 2019, provides a modern view on Africa’s place in Russia’s strategy and foreign policy. They assess that “Russia sees an opportunity to expand its military footprint and mitigate the negative economic consequences of the its deteriorating relationship with the West. It also likely aims to balance against the global influence of China.”<sup>24</sup> The authors view Africa as providing Russia five global and strategic benefits. The first way is to expand its markets “to boost its economy without reform and by developing new revenue streams and undermining sanctions imposed by the West.”<sup>25</sup> Second, with the growth of Africa and its need for power to sustain infrastructure, Africa offers a place where Russia can export nuclear

---

<sup>22</sup> Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964* (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2010), 6.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>24</sup> Nataliya Bugayova and Darina Regio, “The Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update,” Institute for the Study of War, August 23, 2019, 2, accessed September 4, 2019, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-campaign-africa>.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

technology to bring power to that region.<sup>26</sup> Third, proliferating Russian bases throughout Africa expands its global footprint and influence while threatening Western interests.<sup>27</sup> Fourth, opportunities to “pull Africa into its global information sphere” helps Russia gain support for its actions by creating media partnerships and broadcasting Russian information operations to help “normalize its violations of international norms to undermining the sanctions regime.”<sup>28</sup> Finally, Russia is attempting to “pull Africa into a network of states that gravitate towards Russia,” so as to challenge the United States-led international system that currently dictates how states behave and interact with each other.<sup>29</sup>

In 2013, Russian General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, penned an article that has been labeled the Gerasimov Doctrine. Gerasimov wrote “the role of non-military means achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness” indicating a preference for operating below the threshold of nation-on-nation armed conflict.<sup>30</sup> To adapt to the new state of war, Gerasimov believes the military must adapt to fight what the West calls a hybrid version of war and not engage the enemy where it is strong, sound military advice that is not new. However, Gerasimov asserts that the use of overt or conventional forces is for the “achievement of the final success in the conflict.”<sup>31</sup> Prior to that point, Russian operations should be “supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special operations

---

<sup>26</sup> Bugayova and Regio, “The Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa,” 3.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>30</sup> General Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” *Military Review* (January-February 2016): 24, accessed July 20, 2019, [https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\\_20160228\\_art008.pdf](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 24.

forces.”<sup>32</sup> Russian shadow activities in the CAR fit this mode of operation. The ability of Russia to operate under the threshold of war allows them to set conditions for friendly regime changes with lesser resources than a conventional invasion, and minimizes international anger.

## The History of the CAR

Since the CAR gained independence from France on August 13, 1960, it has been in a state of conflict or under the control of strongmen. From the late 19th century until 1946, the people in the French colony Ubangi-Shari, the colony that became the CAR, had limited control over their politics and resources like many other colonies in Africa. In 1946, France established the French Union to replace its colonial empire. This granted the CAR some autonomy over local matters and the ability to have a representative in Paris to present its needs and concerns to the French government.

The CAR’s first president, David Dacko, maintained ties to France in order to receive French aid for its economy, military, and foreign affairs. In 1965, in what would be the first of many coups, Jean-Bédél Bokassa, commander of the army, overthrew Dacko, who was losing domestic and foreign support due to a declining economy and increasing national debt. Bokassa discarded the constitution, dissolved the legislature, and ran the government through a cabinet supported by France, which was allowed to “retain control of the diamond (and potential uranium) output of the country.”<sup>33</sup> Bokassa declared himself emperor and ruled until Dacko, with French support, overthrew him in 1979. In 1981 General André Kolingba ousted Dacko and ruled through a junta. Kolingba’s “reliance on tribal nepotism and favoritism to ensure political support . . . spurred growing dissent within his regime and resentment among the country’s

---

<sup>32</sup> Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 24.

<sup>33</sup> Jan S. F. van Hoogstraten, Thomas E. O’Toole, and Tamara Lynn Giles-Vernick, “Central African Republic,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, October 2019, accessed October 31, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

approximate 80 ethnic groups.”<sup>34</sup> As a condition for foreign aid to help the struggling the country, the World Bank forced Kolingba to write a constitution and hold national elections in 1986. Kolingba and his supporters controlled these sham elections, allowing him to maintain his rule.

After the Cold War’s end, there was a rise of democracies around the globe. In the CAR, Ange-Félix Patassé, a former prime minister, became the first democratically elected president since independence and led the nation from 1993 to 2003. Patassé’s rule faced constant unrest, with three attempted coups during his time in office.<sup>35</sup> In 1996, the unpaid military looted the capital of Bangui, and bandits and militia groups started to disrupt trade and agriculture production across the county. To restore order, Patassé created a paramilitary group called the Squad to eliminate the bandits who committed crimes through executions, circumventing the judicial system.

In January 1997, the warring sides signed the Bangui Accords, and the French military closed its last base in the CAR. The United Nations Mission to the CAR provided security for the 1998 elections and remained active until 2000. In yet another coup, former army chief General François Bozizé, deposed Patassé, drafted a new constitution, and won national elections in 2005. Beginning in 2012, Bozizé’s rule was challenged by a coalition of militia groups called the Seleka who “originated mainly from the marginalized northern part of the country, which is predominantly Muslim.”<sup>36</sup> The Seleka continued to fight Bozizé’s government until 2013, when the two sides agreed to a cease-fire and a power-sharing deal that addressed several rebel demands, such as the release of prisoners and the withdrawal of foreign troops in the country. The

---

<sup>34</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Central African Republic: On a Tightrope* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1983), 2, accessed February 23, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00287r000500160001-1>.

<sup>35</sup> van Hoogstraten, O’Toole, and Giles-Vernick, “Central African Republic.”

<sup>36</sup> Ludovic Lado, “What Is Religious about the Conflict in Central African Republic?”, *Africa Up Close* (Wilson Center Blog), May 19, 2014, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/what-is-religious-about-the-conflict-in-central-african-republic/>.

ceasefire “resulted in a coalition government including the rebellion's leadership” bringing some of the Seleka militia groups into the government to give them representation.<sup>37</sup>

In 2013, the Seleka rebels toppled the Bozizé government and captured the capital on March 24. Michel Djotodia, a Seleka leader, took charge of the CAR's government, suspended the National Assembly, and canceled elections. Djotodia could not gain international support or recognition from the Economic Community of Central African States, and the African Union suspended the country from the organization and imposed sanctions. In September 2013, Djotodia tried to disband the Seleka militia groups due to increasing violence, but many ignored him. As violence increased, Christian groups in the CAR turned to militias, called anti-Balaka, to protect themselves. The anti-Balaka first formed in 2009 to “counter the unbearable exactions and insecurity generated by organized armed robbery on the roads. At this initial stage, it had not political nor religion connotation.”<sup>38</sup> It was only after the Seleka were evicted from Bangui, the anti-Balaka carried “out reprisal violence against Seleka fighters, adding an element of religious animosity to the violence that had previously been absent” in addition to the power and tribal elements that that contributed to violence.<sup>39</sup>

Due to the increasing violence, on December 5, 2013, the United Nations Security Council authorized an African-led peacekeeping force, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to restore peace in the CAR “with a mandate to protect civilians and disarm militia groups.”<sup>40</sup> On January 23, 2014, the CAR elected Catherine Samba-Panza, the Mayor of Bangui to serve as interim

---

<sup>37</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “Africa: Central African Republic,” *The World Factbook*, October 18, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html>.

<sup>38</sup> Lado, “What Is Religious about the Conflict in Central African Republic?”

<sup>39</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “Violence in the Central African Republic,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic>.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

president and oversee a transitional council to restore peace and democracy. In April 2014, MINUSCA, which currently has 14,000 members, arrived to provide security for the CAR. Its forces have since been attacked by the both anti-Balaka and Seleka militia groups, suffering losses.<sup>41</sup> MINUSCA has had a hard time enforcing peace due to “significant challenges in fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians and dismantle armed groups, primarily due to lack of infrastructure and reluctance to use military force.”<sup>42</sup> Elections were delayed until 2016, when former Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra won the national election. Meanwhile, the CAR’s conflict with Seleka and anti-Balakas militias has yet to end. These groups control upwards of 80 percent of the country and limit government control over its resources and borders.<sup>43</sup> Since 2013, “approximately 370,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while more than an estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2017.”<sup>44</sup> The lack of stability in the CAR has allowed Ugandan and Sudanese rebels, like Joseph Koney’s Lord’s Resistance Army, opportunities to hide in the CAR and use the ungoverned territory to fight their own governments’ contributions to regional instability and violence.<sup>45</sup> Instability and violence have hindered any attempts to reform the nation or create significant economic development. Efforts by the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies have failed to broker a lasting peace, a peace which would allow the CAR to solve and eliminate threats to its security.

---

<sup>41</sup> United Nations, MINUSCA, “Targeted Attack Results in Death of MINUSCA Peacekeeper in Bria,” MINUSCA Press Release, December 4, 2018, accessed November 15, 2019, <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/targeted-attack-results-death-minusca-peacekeeper-bria>; Agence France-Presse, “United Nations Peacekeeper Killed in CAR,” *Today*, June 11, 2018, accessed January 15, 2020, <https://www.today.ng/news/africa/united-nations-peacekeeper-killed-car-121560>.

<sup>42</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “Violence in the Central African Republic.”

<sup>43</sup> McGregor, “How Russia Is Displacing the French.”

<sup>44</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “Africa: Central African Republic.”

<sup>45</sup> United Nations, Security Council, SC/2127, *Lord’s Resistance Army*, United Nations, Security Council, March 7, 2016, accessed January 5, 2020, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/entity/lord’s-resistance-army>.

## Soviet Arms Sales, Military Advisors, and Foreign Policy

During the Cold War, the USSR saw Africa as an outlet for its arms sales and an area to cultivate potential allies with the desire “to increase its own influence at the expense of the west and the PRC.”<sup>46</sup> The majority of these sales focused on Northern Africa, with large portion of weapons going to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, and the Sudan. Angola and Mozambique were the only nations of Sub-Saharan Africa that received large arm sales due to their civil wars between communist and Western backed forces (see table 1). This was mainly due to the ease from which the Soviets or their proxies could ship goods via international waters, limiting international oversight and lessening transport costs.

Table 1. Soviet Arms Sales to Africa during the Cold War

Total Arms Sales per country from Soviet Union, 1958-1991, expressed in millions							
Algeria	13698	Central African Republic	6	Guinea-Bissau	144	Somalia	978
ANC (South Africa)*	0	Congo	202	Libya	23290	Sudan	710
Angola	6000	Egypt	20780	Madagascar	94	Tanzania	404
Benin	32	Equatorial Guinea	5	Mali	242	Uganda	222
Botswana	5	Ethiopia	4884	Mauritania	30	Western Sahara	7
Burkina Faso	12	Ghana	48	Morocco	142	Zambia	444
Burundi	5	Grenada	1	Mozambique	1097	ZAPU (Zimbabwe)*	1
Cape Verde	45	Guinea	280	Nigeria	730	Zimbabwe	6
<b>Total World Wide Soviet Arms Sales</b>							
	403003						
*Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions.							
**Figures may not add up due to the conventions of rounding.							

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, TIV of Arms Exports from Soviet Union, 1958-1991,” accessed January 3, 2020, <https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

One of the USSR’s main goals was spreading communism to create allies, and access to resources while denying them to the West. The CAR and Sub-Sharan Africa were ripe for Soviet interference as the national liberation movements gained steam in the 1950s and 1960s, as

<sup>46</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Involvement in Africa* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, January 1978), 1, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81b00401r002100070030-2>.

African leaders “might be expected to seek accommodation with the Bloc and with internal extremist elements” who did not have the historical baggage of being colonizers in Africa or support from western governments.<sup>47</sup> Leaders in Moscow saw opportunities in Africa due to the “political instability, economic backwardness and lingering resentment toward Western colonial powers” that would not require the heavy involvement needed in other parts of the globe.<sup>48</sup> The USSR was largely unsuccessful in establishing “Marxist-Leninist vanguard” parties who would be “relatively more stable and dependable Soviet allies” and who would look towards Moscow for leadership and education.<sup>49</sup> Some African leaders did not accept communism and the strings attached; as a 1981 Central Intelligence Agency report stated, there were “suspicions among Africans of Soviet intentions, which has been reinforced by Moscow’s arm twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for short term tactical gains, and by African awareness of attempted Soviet subversion.”<sup>50</sup> CAR President Dacko, in an attempt to get Western for the CAR, told Israel “he could turn to the Soviet-Chinese Bloc, but was sure he would end up under heavy domination by them.”<sup>51</sup> The lack of a warm reception by African leaders led the USSR to adopt the policy that if they could not create communist allies, then they would at least support the growth of nation states friendly to the USSR to achieve increased international standing and support.

---

<sup>47</sup> Lawrence Devlin, Chief of Station Leopoldville, *Memorandum From the Chief of Station in Leopoldville to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968* (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1964-1968), accessed September 1, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d119>.

<sup>48</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Involvement in Africa*.

<sup>49</sup> Daniel R. Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The Liberation Movement Connection* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 11.

<sup>50</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Policy and Africa* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, March 1981), ix, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83b00140r000200100029-2>.

<sup>51</sup> Myer Feldman, *Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962* (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1961-1963), accessed September 1, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d142>.

To gain access to the CAR and other African nations, the USSR “used its ability and willingness to supply large amounts of military equipment to gain access to African countries.”<sup>52</sup> The Soviet arms industry was crucial to its foreign policy and provided weapons to any customer that supported its objectives. The arms industry was one of the pillars of its domestic economy as the USSR searched “for new export markets for the mountains of weapons produced by the USSR’s military-industrial complex,” and to support their allies in the fight against capitalism.<sup>53</sup>

In former colonies like the CAR, governments and rebel groups alike were willing customers. As a CIA report noted in 1966, there was “usually a broad gulf between the educated elite and the masses, and many younger military and civilian officials covet the positions held by the older generation. Political power is generally centralized in the capital, and a ridiculously small military or civilian group can quickly seize the government machinery.”<sup>54</sup> To seize power, weapons were needed and the Soviets filled this void. Violence and conflict occurred regularly as European nations relaxed and later relinquished control of their former colonies, and these new nations were not yet ready to assume responsibility for controlling their territory. In the Congo from 1960 to 1965, local soldiers rebelled against Belgian officers, plunging the nation into civil war resulting in foreign intervention to restore the peace and avoid a communist takeover as decolonization spurred years of war. Due to the desire of European governments to keep their colonies under their control, Europeans held the key positions in industry and government, and owned large tracts of land while denying these positions and land to local employees. When new

---

<sup>52</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Involvement in Africa*, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Leonid L. Fituni, *Africa Notes: Russia's Arms Sales to Africa: Past, Present, and Future - September 1992* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1992), 1, accessed September 15, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-notes-russias-arms-sales-africa-past-present-and-future-september-1992>.

<sup>54</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *African Coup Possibilities* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, March 1966), 1, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00826a000400010026-3>; Central Intelligence Agency, *Staff Notes: Middle East and South Asia* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, May 1975), 3, accessed February 1, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00865A001000200001-9.pdf>.

national governments replaced the colonial governments, local leaders and workers replaced European colonists who left. New leaders had never held managerial or supervisor positions, like Bokassa in 1962 who rose from captain to commander of the CAR's army in less than two years, resulting in a steep learning curve in order to run governments, militaries, and industries.

Due to sub-Saharan Africa's distance from the USSR and its own weak economy, the Soviets were unable to provide sufficient economic aid to help these nations grow, making arms sales to governments and rebels the most effective way to gain influence and power. Moreover, the continent was not a priority, and African nations complained "about poor Soviet performance in the economic development field and the low level of Soviet economic aid"—which led to more friction, and African leaders searching for other international partners who could offer other forms of aid other than arms sales.<sup>55</sup> The USSR never had enough access to enough ports or railroads to move goods to or from the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa at the rate the West did, due to it not having the historical links like other nations who colonized Africa. The Soviets were looking for access to the interior to be able to gain more influence from its limited African bases.<sup>56</sup> In addition, the amount of economic and humanitarian aid needed to make a difference was lacking as the Soviet economy's growth slowed after the 1960s; the Soviets could not purchase goods from Sub-Saharan African nations, and relied on arms sales to help its economy function.<sup>57</sup> Other nations provided economic investments for better prices and in larger quantities, making it a domain where the USSR could not hope to compete; the USSR accounted for only 1 percent of sub-Saharan Africa' exports and imports from 1975 to 1979, while the West was never below 50 percent.<sup>58</sup> This allowed the CAR and other nations to play foreign governments who

---

<sup>55</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Involvement in Africa*, 5.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>57</sup> David E. Albright, *The Washington Papers/101: The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 95-96.

<sup>58</sup> Albright, *The Washington Papers/101*, 28-30.

wanted access to resources and political support against each other to get the best deal of aid and technical support. If leaders did not like a deal, they could change sides, or threaten it, to get even more compromises as they worked to establish new nations.

The CAR and other sub-Saharan governments faced potential threats from rebels or within their own military, and Soviet arms sales were seen as means to secure liberation, peace, or gain more power. The USSR found willing customers who welcomed its equipment and advisors. Soviet leaders were eager to deal with legitimate governments or, if that did not suit their purpose, then any group that could help further their interests. Working with rebel groups allowed the Soviets to exert power and influence through “the now familiar pattern of penetration, infiltration, subversion, dissidence and guerrilla warfare” at the expense of legitimate governments backed by the West.<sup>59</sup> The Soviets supplied both small arms and major combat systems like tanks, jet aircraft, anti-air missiles, and artillery in Africa, though - with respect to the CAR - not as much as France (see table 2). The United States and Western Europe supplied weapons and troops to support friendly legitimate governments and counter the spread of communism in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of these arms sales, nations “such as Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provided the stages for some of the bloodiest proxy battles between ‘East’ and ‘West’ of the Cold War.”<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> United States National Security Council, *Statement of U.S. Policy Toward West Africa, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV 1 April 9, 1960* (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1961-1963), accessed September 2, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d27>.

<sup>60</sup> Anna Naomi de Sousa, “Between East and West: The Cold War’s Legacy in Africa,” *Al Jazeera-Africa*, February 22, 2016, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/east-west-cold-war-legacy-africa-160214113015863.html>.

Table 2. Soviet Union, France, and the United States Arms Sales to CAR during the Cold War

Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1958 to 2018							
Note: The 'No. delivered' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL < <a href="http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods">http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods</a> >.							
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database							
Information generated: 11 February 2020							
Supplier/ recipient (R)	No. ordered	No. designation	Weapon description	Year(s) of order	Year of delivery	No. of delivered	No. Comments
<b>France</b>							
R: Central African Republic	1	Bell-47/OH-13	Light helicopter	(1961)	1961	1	Second-hand
	1		DC-3/C-47 Skytrain			(1961)	1961 1 Second-hand; aid on independence
	3		MH-1521 Broussard			(1961)	1961 3 Second-hand; aid on independence
	1		SA-313B Alouette-2			(1961)	1961 1 Possibly second-hand; aid on independence
	3		DC-3/C-47 Skytrain			(1964)	1966 2 Second-hand; aid
	(5)		MH-1521 Broussard			(1965)	1965 5 Second-hand
	1		DC-4/C-54			1968	1968 1 Second-hand; aid
	2		Rallye-235			1977	1978 2
	(25)		ACMAT APC	APC	(1982)	1983	(25)
	5		VAB-VTT	APC	1983	1983	5 Aid; 4-wheeled version; incl 1 VAB-ECH ARV
	1		AS-350/AS-550 Fenec			(1984)	1984 1 Aid; incl for government VIP transport
	(5)		VAB-VTT	APC	(1987)	1988	(5) 4-wheeled version; incl 1 VAB-ECH ARV version
<b>Soviet Union</b>							
R: Central African Republic	1	Mi-8T	Transport helicopter	(1985)	1985	1	Supplier uncertain
<b>United States</b>							
R: Central African Republic	1	C-130B Hercules	Transport aircraft	2006	2006	1	Second-hand; C-130A version

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for 1958 to 2018,” accessed February 11, 2020, <https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

Due to its limited resources and lack of successes in gaining support of legitimate governments in Libya, Ethiopia, and Angola, the USSR saw that their efforts “might go considerably further in certain situations-e.g., by supporting indigenous Communist or other forces in local military action, or even sending Soviet ‘volunteers,’ judging that grave risk of general war would not result.”<sup>61</sup> Soviet arms sales, coupled with military advisors in the CAR and in sub-Saharan Africa, caused instability in the hope of creating regimes friendly to the USSR by exploiting “tribal and ethnic divisions have prevented the growth of real national unity.”<sup>62</sup> The USSR, and its allies, particularly Cuba, provided weapons, troops, advisors, and equipment with the intent of “supporting activities to overthrow and disrupt governments in Chad, Sudan,

<sup>61</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962*, 2.

<sup>62</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *African Coup Possibilities*, 1.

Somalia, Morocco, Niger, Upper Volta.”<sup>63</sup> These military advisors, who also trained legitimate forces, could also be used to train rebel groups on how to use the weapons and the tactics that could defeat the government forces should the government turn towards the West or weaken in their commitment to Moscow.

Even when the Soviets did support legitimate governments, they still were able to cause instability. In the CAR, Soviet arms and advisors caused tension and distrust between military leaders and Emperor Bokassa. He used the Soviets to train his own higher-paid special bodyguard to protect himself from a possible coup like the one that happened in 1975 in Chad - which led to lower morale in the rest of the army, as well as tensions between himself and CAR leadership, as he favored those of his own tribe over other tribal groups.

A small number of military advisors thus had a large effect in increasing the influence of the USSR, either by working through legitimate government forces or rebels, at a fraction of the cost of conventional forces. Soviet conventional forces in Africa lacked the ability to sustain themselves over the distances required to wage a war in Central Africa. The USSR did not have sufficient air or ground forces stationed in Somalia or Angola to directly support many of its potential partners in the continent’s interior, and Soviet bombers did “not have the range to reach targets throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa,” so supporting indigenous forces through advising was the best option available.<sup>64</sup> The USSR was not ready to commit large forces to Africa, and in the 1970s and 1980s: rather, “5,000 to 7,000 Soviet military advisers were stationed on long-term contracts” in sub-Saharan countries.<sup>65</sup> This was a very small number compared to the Soviet troops stationed in Europe, and designed to keep conflict below the threshold of open war in a secondary theater.

---

<sup>63</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Discontinuing Support to Those Fighting for Freedom and Democracy* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1984), 1, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001500060025-2>.

<sup>64</sup> Albright, *The Washington Papers/101*, 99.

<sup>65</sup> Fituni, *Africa Notes: Russia's Arms Sales to Africa*, 2.

In the biggest and bloodiest conflicts, where the USSR and its communist allies did have substantial support, Soviet military advisors and arms sales supported civil wars. Soviet and other communist nations' support and arms sales led to decades of civil war in Mozambique and Angola. In these nations, both the Soviets and the West supplied the means as their partners struggled for power. The civil war in Angola was between communist-backed forces and pro-western forces backed by South Africa that lasted from 1975 until 2002. This war escalated to the level of large-scale combat operations, as both sides used armored forces and close air support to make Angola an African Cold War battleground. A lasting effect of the war has been the millions of mines that still threaten and kill people in Angola.<sup>66</sup>

While supporting instability in the CAR and its neighbors, the USSR tried to parlay this newfound influence and partners into support on the international stage. The Soviets, through their support for Libya's efforts to influence Chad's civil war, the conflict in the Congo and alleged links to some CAR rebel groups, caused security concerns for the CAR and the United States.<sup>67</sup> Operating in Africa was easier than in Europe because "Soviet initiatives in the region are less like to meet with U.S. resistance" than they would in "Latin America or the Middle East."<sup>68</sup> The Soviets hoped that by providing arms sales to African leaders, the latter would reciprocate with support in the UN in votes against the United States and its NATO allies, and lessen "the possibility the United Nations actions against Soviets."<sup>69</sup> The Soviets had four foreign

---

<sup>66</sup> Mines Advisory Group, "Angola," MAG International, accessed January 4, 2019, <https://www.maginternational.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/angola/#>.

<sup>67</sup> William J. Casey, Director Central Intelligence, *Memorandum For: Deputy Director for Operations, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Subject: Libya* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1984), i, accessed February 23, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001500060007-2>; Central Intelligence Agency, *Central Intelligence Bulletin* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1960), accessed February 1, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00975a005400380001-0>; Central Intelligence Agency, *Central African Republic: On Tight Rope* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1983), 9, accessed February 23, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00287r000500160001-1>.

<sup>68</sup> Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa*, 8.

<sup>69</sup> David Morrison, *The U.S.S.R and Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 33.

policy goals. They were to align Soviet and underdeveloped African nations' interests, disrupt Western relationships with former colonies, gain international influence for the Communist Bloc, and conduct propaganda in support of its foreign policy.<sup>70</sup> This did not always work, as the Soviets faced the "difficulty of translating military or economic assistance into lasting political influence."<sup>71</sup> Instead, these nations generally voted in what was their best national interests, which sometimes aligned with the USSR's interests, and sometimes not. The Central Intelligence Agency found that "despite Soviet efforts to influence African voting in the General Assembly, UN records suggest that African support for anti-Western rhetoric in UN resolutions is self-initiated and generally has little to do with Soviet Bloc lobbying efforts"<sup>72</sup> (see figure 2).

---

<sup>70</sup> United States Department of State, *Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions* (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, August 1960), accessed September 10, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v02/d145>.

<sup>71</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Policy and Africa*, viii.

<sup>72</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *African Group Voting Behavior in the United Nations General Assembly* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1988), 7, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90g01353r001400130017-9>.




Figure 2. African Voting Opposing the USSR in the UN General Assembly 1983 to 1987. Central Intelligence Agency, *African Group Voting Behavior in the United Nations General Assembly* (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1988), 10, 12, accessed September 3, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90g01353r001400130017-9>.

On December 25th, 1991, the USSR collapsed. Its successor state, the Russian Federation, had to now look towards its own borders to maintain its sphere of influence and internal stability as the nation began a new future. Russia tried to maintain its arms industry, but Sub-Saharan Africa dropped even lower on its priority list as Russia continued the recent Soviet decision to only trade arms for hard currency. This was an issue as “many African countries were accustomed to trading with Moscow on a soft-currency basis and had little hard currency to spare.”<sup>73</sup> Russia no longer had the means to loan money to buy arms on credit and was forced to

<sup>73</sup> Fituni, *Africa Notes: Russia's Arms Sales to Africa*, 3.

cease arms sales and military training to nations that could not afford it, thereby ending their Cold War relationships. As Russia struggled to regain its position of power, former African partners of the Soviets turned to Europe, African international organizations, the United States, and the UN for support in reducing violence and creating stable and secure environments.

## Modern Russian Arm Sales, Military Advisors, and Foreign Policy

Since 2009, Russia has renewed its competition with the United States and Western Europe in Africa using soft power, primarily arms sales, military advisors, and the promise of energy to gain influence. Russia is following its 2015 National Strategy and the 2013 Gerasimov Doctrine, exploiting the CAR's and surrounding nations' instability to create customers for its arms industry, cultivate international political support, and find ways around imposed sanctions. Russia is attempting to renew its Cold War ties with African leaders, some educated in Moscow. This might include "political and media advisers to help with elections, together with long-term military assistance and training," in exchange for "concessions in mining for gold and other precious minerals, and oil and gas contracts, as well as transnational railway and road-building deals."<sup>74</sup> These deals occur both in and out of the spotlight, last for five years, and "include Russian promises of hardware and training as well as coordination in areas such as counter-terrorism and piracy."<sup>75</sup> In 2015, its national strategy called for competing in Africa to "perceptibly change the geopolitical order on the continent" in favor of Russia, but not at a level that would precipitate to direct conflict with the United States, or international community condemnation.<sup>76</sup> Instead, Russia is using "salami style tactics," a method for gaining power that

---

<sup>74</sup> Harding, "Pragmatism and Ideology Drive Kremlin's Interest in Africa."

<sup>75</sup> Aaron Ross, "Factbox: Russian Military Cooperation Deals with African Countries," *Reuters*, October 17, 2018, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-africa-russia-factbox-idUKKCN1MR0KZ>.

<sup>76</sup> Agence France-Presse, "How Russia Is Boosting Its Role in Africa with Weapons, Investment and 'Instructors,'" *South China Morning Post*, August 14, 2018, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2159622/how-russia-boosting-its-role-africa-weapons-investment-and>.

involves eroding the opposition's (the West and United States) support slowly and gaining power without the competition realizing they have lost a position of advantage until it is too late.<sup>77</sup>

Russia is attempting to covertly try and weaken the United States' position in Africa—but it does not want to hinder the United States as it pulls resources from Africa to face the threat of China and Russia in Europe and the Pacific.

To achieve its strategic goals, Russia uses multiple tools such as arms deals, PMCs, information operations, business deals, social media, and diplomacy to further its objectives. For example, Russian operatives have used a variety of ways to influence the CAR's and its peoples view of them. They have used Facebook to push messages with “pro-Russian themes, showing photographs of local residents in T-shirts bearing a giant red heart and the slogan ‘Russia 2018’ . . . (erected) Billboards . . . around the capital, Bangui, with pictures of local soldiers under a Russian flag,” and CAR officials have handed out publications that promote Russian interests<sup>78</sup> (see figure 3). This is nothing new when compared with what the USSR did during the Cold War, except technology has made “the kinds of operations Soviet psyops teams once could only fantasize about—upending the domestic affairs of nations with information alone . . . plausible.”<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 66-67.

<sup>78</sup> Dionne Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries: Russia's Playbook in Central African Republic,” *The New York Times*, September 30, 2019, accessed October 27, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/world/russia-diamonds-africa-prigozhin.html>.

<sup>79</sup> Molly K. McKew, “The Gerasimov Doctrine,” *POLITICO Magazine*, October 2017, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538>.

DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS,  
IMAGES ARE NOT INCLUDED  
IN THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION.

Figure 3. Russian Poster in Bangui. Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa Ward, “Putin’s Private Army,” *Cable News Network*, August 16, 2019, accessed, February 1, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/>.

Arms sales have served as the primary method for getting Russia’s foot in the door as the CAR’s government struggles to regain control of its territory. In 2017, Russia gained the UN’s approval for exemption from an arms embargo to provide the CAR’s government with weapons and trainers. The United States delayed this process until it forced Russia to agree to “submit additional information on the serial numbers of the weapons . . . so that we can track weapons going into CAR”; this demand sought to prevent weapons ending up in non-CAR military hands while forcing transparency on Russian arms exports.<sup>80</sup> Initially, Russia sent 170 PMC and 5 military members with weapons to the CAR and “have trained more than 1,000 Central African Republic troops.”<sup>81</sup> Russia originally applied to supply the CAR with “900 pistols; 5,200 assault

---

<sup>80</sup> News 24, “UN Gives Green Light on Russia Arms to C. Africa,” *News 24*, December 16, 2017, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/un-gives-green-light-on-russia-arms-to-c-africa-20171216>.

<sup>81</sup> Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-military-africa.html>.

rifles; 140 sniper rifles; 840 Kalashnikov machine guns; 270 RPGs; 20 anti-aircraft guns; and millions of rounds of ammunition, hand grenades, and mortars” to strengthen its army.<sup>82</sup>

Recent estimates show that Russia’s PMCs advisors and trainers have grown upwards to 1,000 PMCs who are not only providing instruction to the CAR’s army, as originally intended, but are also “providing security to the government and helping safeguard key economic assets” under contract with Russia.<sup>83</sup> By using PMCs, Russia limits the commitment and anxiety that having uniformed troops in the region entails, and this allows Russia to potentially pull out of areas and not lose face if they fail, as these are not official military personnel. According to Paul Stronski, Senior Fellow at the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PMCs are also cost-beneficial as they “are often self-financing through their work guarding key resources,” and give Russia the chance “to expand its security presence and political influence in the country at virtually no cost and little risk.”<sup>84</sup> A side effect of more Russian PMCs on the ground is that they create a secure environment for Russia to operate in and extend their influence in the region.

Russian PMCs in the CAR fulfill a variety of roles for both the CAR and Russia. They range from military advisors to serving as bodyguards for the CAR’s president. This has the double effect of securing the president from a possible coup or threat to his wellbeing, as well as influencing and monitoring whom the CAR’s president does or does not meet. The Russian PMCs serving as military trainers are also conducting operations with the CAR’s military, some with reports indicate they may be guilty of war crimes.<sup>85</sup> A Russian PMC, Valery Zakharov, a former Russian intelligence official, is the Security Advisor to the CAR’s President, granting him

---

<sup>82</sup> Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi, *Trade Update 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus* (Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018), 71, accessed February 4, 2020, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018.pdf>.

<sup>83</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation, “Russia Africa Summit: What’s behind Moscow’s Push into the Continent?”, *BBC News*, October 23, 2019, accessed October 29, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45035889>.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries.”

access to the country's inner workings and allowing him to advance Russian interests.<sup>86</sup> Karim Meckassoua, former President of the CAR National Assembly, allegedly lost his office after a vote of no confidence due to his blocking Russian efforts to control CAR's mineral wealth without consent of the National Assembly.<sup>87</sup> Other PMCs are securing the mines under Russian control. Russian contractors are also using an airstrip in the CAR to move men, material, equipment, or resources with little to no oversight from local authorities. Reports have stated that "Russian mercenaries have flown private planes—near to a site where they are training local soldiers—and loaded them with diamonds" to ensure Russia gets its money out of the CAR and back to Russia.<sup>88</sup>

International pressure and sanctions have driven Russian leadership to expand operations into the CAR to create new economic opportunities. Since 2014, "Russia has signed at least 19 military cooperation deals with governments in sub-Saharan Africa," signaling its return to Africa.<sup>89</sup> These deals provide new buyers for Russian arms, and in return enrich Russian leaders and open new markets. In the CAR, Russia gained mineral and mining rights as "the government is selling mining rights for gold and diamonds at a fraction of their worth to hire trainers and buy arms from Moscow"—thus allowing Russia's leaders to make up for lost business opportunities and income.<sup>90</sup> Lobaye Invest Sarlu, a Russian mining company with ties to the head of the Wagner Group, received "permits in the Yawa and Pama regions to . . . identify possible gold and diamond deposits."<sup>91</sup> Since 2009, senior Russian leaders have made multiple trips to the CAR and

---

<sup>86</sup> Al Jazeera, "Russia in Africa: Inside a Military Training Centre in CAR," *Al Jazeera News*, April 14, 2019, accessed October 31, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2019/04/russia-africa-military-training-centre-car-190411152658162.html>.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Searcey, "Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries."

<sup>89</sup> Ross, "Factbox: Russian Military Cooperation Deals with African Countries."

<sup>90</sup> Schmitt, "Russia's Military Mission Creep."

<sup>91</sup> Mathieu Olivier, "Russia's Murky Business Dealings in the Central African Republic," *The Africa Report*, August 23, 2019, accessed February 28, 2020, <https://www.theafricareport.com/16511/russias-murky-business-dealings-in-the-central-african-republic/>.

Sub-Saharan Africa to renew historical ties of friendship and build new prospects for Russian businesses. The problem facing Russia is that, except for arm sales, trade with the CAR remains low when compared to neighboring countries, China, and Europe, making it hard to offer lucrative and sustainable trade deals (see figure 4).




Figure 4. Central African Republic Imports. The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “CAR Total Imports,” accessed September 3, 2019, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/caf/>.

The October 2019 Russia-Africa Conference was a bid by Russia to show the world its appeal to Africa and gain closer ties to the CAR and other African nations, with the hope of receiving more support in the UN General Assembly. Russia sees in Africa’s 54 nations the UN’s “largest voting bloc and one of its most coherent, making them attractive allies for Russia.”<sup>92</sup> The conferences’ motto “For Peace, Security and Development” demonstrates that Russia’s military assistance and arms sales are the primary way to foster Russian advances into Africa. Russia sees its role as helping “Africans solve existing security issues themselves, as it will strengthen African states, their sovereignty and independence.”<sup>93</sup> In exchange for votes in the UN General Assembly, Russia hopes to offer its UN Security Council role and power in a way that “supports

<sup>92</sup> Reuters, “Russia Expands Its Military and Business Ties to Africa,” *Reuters*, October 17, 2018, accessed September 9, 2019, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-10-17/russia-expands-its-military-and-business-ties-africa>.

<sup>93</sup> Putin, “Interview to TASS News Agency.”

the legitimate aspiration of African states to pursue their own independent policy” without foreign interference.<sup>94</sup>

The CAR provides a bridge between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, enabling the spread of Russian influence and arms sales in an ever-growing unstable part of the world. Leaked Russian documents indicate Russian officials see the CAR as “buffer zone between the Muslim north and Christian south” which allows Russia to spread its influence and work with potential customers in both regions.<sup>95</sup> The CAR’s geographical position allows Russia to use its airports and its proposed bases to launch or support Russian influence in other nations. This allows Russia and its PMCs to move weapons, personnel, and resources easier than having to rely on less direct routes through non-friendly countries, as well position Russia to expand its operational reach in its efforts to undermine the West.

Russia is expanding its ties to CAR’s various political and rebel factions in an attempt to gain more influence and control over non-government-controlled minerals. In some areas of the CAR, Russia has “partnered with murderous rebels to obtain diamonds in areas where the trade is outlawed, cashing in on the very lawlessness they have been brought in to end.”<sup>96</sup> These actions occur outside the international spotlight, and three Russian journalists who were investigating the Wagner Group were killed in the CAR. Most recently, Russia worked outside the United Nations’ peace process to try and create a settlement between the CAR’s government and the various rebel factions at a conference in the Sudan in 2018.<sup>97</sup> This peace process was at odds with French and African Union efforts to restore peace, and France “reprimanded Russia for overseeing a parallel

---

<sup>94</sup> Putin, “Interview to TASS News Agency.”

<sup>95</sup> Luke Harding and Jason Burke, “Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert Influence in Africa,” *The Guardian*, June 11, 2019, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa>.

<sup>96</sup> Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries.”

<sup>97</sup> Michelle Nichols, “Russia, China Abstain on U.N. Central Africa Vote, Unhappy With France,” *Reuters*, December 14, 2018, accessed December 1, 2019, <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1OD0PW-OZATP>.

peace process that has undermined the established United Nations peace process.”<sup>98</sup> The Russians enticed the warring sides to agree to sign an initial peace settlement, but then things quickly fell apart and violence swiftly resumed. Russia wants to be seen as a power broker in Sub-Saharan Africa, similar to what the Soviets tried to do during the Cold War.

Through forming ties with CAR rebel groups, Russia is not just confusing the domestic political situation. It is exploiting it by trying to negotiate for rights to mines and minerals with rebel groups who do not have the authority to do so. PMCs surrounding the CAR’s president means Russia can influence his security strategy, access to government officials, and meetings with Western institutions and nations. In some cases, individuals investigating Russian activities have felt intimidated, and in the most extreme case reported that “members of Parliament were gathered outside the capital and bribed to vote out the Parliaments president, who had been viewed as unfriendly to Russian interests.”<sup>99</sup> Russia is hurting the current and future economy of the CAR by securing mines and access to resources for prices that are below market value, keeping those profits from staying in the CAR to fund security and development. Instead of paying a competitive price and conducting transparent business dealing that can help the CAR’s economy grow, Russia is conducting modern economic colonization at the expense of the country and its people and taking the wealth back to Russia.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa was for the USSR, and is for Russia, a peripheral theater in which they have limited ability to influence and offer long term support for potential partners. The actors on the ground have changed, but the means and ways have not. In the end gaining African support for its foreign policy and becoming a global power again is Russia’s

---

<sup>98</sup> Marcel Plichta, “France and Russia Fiddle While the Central African Republic Burns,” *World Politics Review*, November 28, 2018, accessed October 31, 2019, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26852/france-and-russia-fiddle-while-the-central-african-republic-burns>.

<sup>99</sup> Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries.”

long-term goal. Russia’s approach to the CAR mirrors the Soviet tactics of “high level goodwill visits, broadened contacts, promotion of cultural and other exchanges, expanded foreign trade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid” to gain influence.<sup>100</sup> Russia today has taken the playbook from the Soviets, dusted it off, and copied it to try to gain influence and access to markets for the lowest cost possible. Soviet and Russian arms sales and military training in size and value have never matched the United States’ and Western European sales in Africa. In recent years, the majority of Russian arms sales have occurred outside of Africa; with just over ten percent going to the continent. Most of these sales were with nations north of the Sahara while sales to Sub-Saharan nations remain low in comparison (see table 3).

Table 3. Russian Arms Exports 1991 to 2018

TIV of arms exports from Russia, 1991-2018, Total per Country									
Afghanistan	586	Brazil	184	Czechia	253	Greece	1094	Kyrgyzstan	38
Algeria	11931	Bulgaria	165	Djibouti	23	Guinea	1	Laos	153
Angola	611	Burkina Faso	34	Ecuador	80	Hungary	1180	Latvia	9
Argentina	15	Cameroon	45	Egypt	3782	India	39613	Libya	90
Armenia	605	Chad	34	Equatorial Guinea	14	Indonesia	1147	Lithuania	77
Azerbaijan	2186	China	35331	Eritrea	406	Iran	3894	Macedonia	27
Bahrain	10	Colombia	169	Ethiopia	789	Iraq	2147	Madagascar	18
Bangladesh	855	Congo	14	Finland	294	Jordan	292	Malaysia	1862
Belarus	977	Cote d'Ivoire	0	Georgia	4	Kazakhstan	2022	Mali	23
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0	Croatia	122	Germany	29	Kenya	20	Mexico	474
Botswana	4	Cyprus	559	Ghana	68	Kuwait	459	Mongolia	195
Morocco	156	Pakistan	693	Singapore	28	Thailand	50	Uzbekistan	18
Mozambique	2	Palestine	29	Slovakia	442	Turkey	201	Venezuela	3898
Myanmar	1660	Peru	421	Slovenia	34	Turkmenistan	370	Viet Nam	7229
NATO**	58	Poland	362	South Africa	50	UAE	1783	Yemen	1180
Nepal	20	Qatar	8	South Korea	492	Uganda	650	Zambia	14
Nicaragua	134	Romania	231	South Sudan	82	Ukraine Rebels*	24	Zimbabwe	22
Niger	7	Rwanda	68	Sri Lanka	190	United Kingdom	2		
Nigeria	257	Senegal	32	Sudan	997	United Nations**	24		
Northern Alliance (Af)	228	Serbia	97	Syria	2184	United States	16		
North Korea	489	Sierra Leone	1	Tajikistan	108	Uruguay	7		
<b>Total</b>	<b>140057</b>	<b>Total to Africa</b>	<b>17510</b>	<b>Percentage of Arms Sales to Africa</b>			<b>12.50%</b>		
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions.									
Figures may not add up due to the conventions of rounding.									
A '0' indicates that the value of deliveries is less than 0.5m									

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for 1991-2018,” accessed February 11, 2020, <https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

Beyond arms sales and military training, trade and economic assistance or potential investments are not a viable option. Russia has never been a significant trading partner with the

<sup>100</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962*, 2.

CAR or Sub-Saharan Africa, as its trade deals or potential markets have limited potential for growth due to distance and limited transportation infrastructure. This means that Russia's only practical recourse to gain influence are limited arms sales and military assistance. According to Judd Devermont, Director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, arms sales are used to arm and train weak governments ruled by autocratic rulers who are inclined to relate to President Putin's and Russia's way of doing business with little regard to law and human rights.<sup>101</sup> Conflict equals opportunity, and opportunity means a market for arms sales and foreign intervention, both of which suit Russia. The greatest difference in the arms sales, and military training and assistance of the two eras, is who is doing the advising. During the Cold War, the Soviet military conducted military assistance and training, and the USSR's foreign policy gains were to further the spread of communism and not mainly about wealth secured from diamond and gold mines. Since 2014, PMCs are conducting military training and assistance for Russia. These PMCs do not have the same oversight, rules, or regulations that guarantee they will adhere to international rules and norms in war zones.

The Soviet and Russian playbooks are similar in other ways as well. The Soviets sought to capitalize on the anti-colonial fervor that gripped the national liberation movements in an attempt to gain a foothold in the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa. This allowed the Soviets to offer aid without the historical baggage of colonization and be perceived as a friend rather than a former oppressor of Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia has copied this rhetoric from the Soviet era playbook, and is using the same message today. Putin has stated that Russia "played a significant role in the liberation of the continent, supporting the struggle of its peoples against colonialism, racism and apartheid" while the West was responsible for decades of oppression and would never

---

<sup>101</sup> Schmitt, "Russia's Military Mission Creep."

give them the same fair chance as Russia.<sup>102</sup> As with the Soviets in the Cold War, Russia today has shown that it is willing to work outside international norms or without respect to nations' sovereignty to gain influence with potential partners, whether they are legitimate or not, by conducting peace negotiations and working with rebel groups that do not have the authority to sign away mining rights.

During both eras, African leaders received education and training in the USSR, later Russia, to forge closer ties between leaders to be exploited at a later time. Educating African leaders in Moscow helped to drive a wedge between the new nations and their former colonizers so they would turn to Moscow for support and leadership. Russia's 2019 Africa summit tried to do the same, but the effectiveness of this is unknown. Russia has also trained African military members in Russia to build closer security ties; "in the past five years alone, more than 2,500 service personnel from African countries completed studies at the military educational institutions of the Russian Defense Ministry."<sup>103</sup> Training African militaries on Soviet or Russian equipment helps with demonstrating the value of these weapons and training assistance, helping to ensure future deals as nations become dependent on Moscow's arms and military support. This has given Russia opportunities to exploit at the expense of the West, which are not always willing to supply arms and training to regimes of African leaders with checkered pasts regarding human rights. No matter the era, Russian or Soviet, the goal has always been to increase the state's power using the cheapest and quickest means possible with little to no regard for the consequences.

Currently the United States is shifting its resources and focus from Africa, primarily its military forces, to focus on the perceived threats from China and Russia.<sup>104</sup> This is creating opportunities for Russia to expand its influence as it fills security gaps left by the United States.

---

<sup>102</sup> Putin, "Interview to TASS News Agency."

<sup>103</sup> Putin, "Interview to TASS News Agency."

<sup>104</sup> Katie Williams, "House Bill Tries to Force Trump to Keep Troops in Africa," *Defense One*, March 4, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, <https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2020/03/exclusive-house-bill-tries-force-trump-keep-troops-africa/163501/>.

President Trump has called for cuts to foreign aid and the United States is “only going to give foreign aid to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends.”<sup>105</sup> This shift aligns with the 2017 United States National Security Strategy, and changes US policy to focus on countering the threat of China and Russia, both at home and abroad. The United States and its military have a finite amount of resources to reform its army for large scale combat operations and focus on deterring Russia and China. This means that the resources and manpower the United States spent on helping Africa fight extremism and piracy will decrease, and other nations must step in or step up their efforts and aid to fill this void.

There are four ways that the United States can help counter instability in the CAR, and by extension Russian efforts to cause unrest for Russia’s own gain, while still pivoting to Europe and the Pacific as the main security threat. The first is to try and bring Russian arms sales, military assistance, and military training in line with international efforts. The United States was able to accomplish this in 2017 with making Russia agree to track its arms sales to lift the arms embargo and can do it again through the UN. Bringing Russia into the fold can lead to monitoring Russian arms sales and activities by the international community and serve to coordinate efforts to achieve stability and security in the most efficient way possible. Working through the UN’s different bodies, rather than going at it alone, the United States should seek to get buy in from African nations whom Russia is targeting due to their vulnerability and lack of funds for development.

If the United States is unable to take the lead on this, then it must be willing to support another nation or groups like the African Union and Economic Community of Central African States to end Russian subversion. Making host nation governments more aware of the hidden implications of agreeing to Russian support limits its ability to sow discord behind a host government’s back. Rather than work against or parallel to each other, it is best to nest Russian

---

<sup>105</sup> Alex Ward, “Read Trumps Speech to the UN General Assembly,” *VOX*, September 25, 2018, accessed March 5, 2020, <https://www.vox.com/2018/9/25/17901082/trump-un-2018-speech-full-text>.

arms sales and military assistance within United Nation's efforts, and, if not, then revoke their mandate to do so under the UN. This can help further the CAR government's control of its territory and ensure that its military does not abuse any international laws.

The next step the United States can take is to counter Russia's messaging on its role and dedication to the CAR and Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia has never seen Africa as its main focus. It views it as part of the world that is to be used, and when not needed, discarded—just like Russia did after the collapse of the USSR. The United States can counter the message that Russia has always been there for Africa by reminding African leaders that when the USSR collapsed, Russia abandoned its ties to Sub-Saharan Africa for almost 20 years - whereas the United States and Western Europe maintained and expanded their ties, arms sales, and trade since the fall of the USSR. This messaging allows the United States to counter Russia's claim of unwavering support to Africa and its people. Using the history of Soviet activities also allows the United States to show its partners and the public in Africa the negative impact Soviets had with their arms sales and military advisors. Doing this can capitalize on some leaders' already held suspicions of Russia's motives in Sub-Saharan Africa, as not all believe that Russia's motives are as pure as portrayed, and know that they are not always in the interest of the host nation and its people. Using a personal approach to get this message is more effective than relying on billboards and Facebook messages which will be seen as propaganda and easily defaced or countered. By working through personal relationships, the United States has a better chance of success in getting African nations and leaders to understand the dangers of working with Russia, and that there is no system of checks and balances to hold Russia accountable.

To counter the harm of Russian arms sales and activities, the United States must bring Russia's activities and goals out into the open and deny Russia the ability to operate in the shadows. Russia's activities in the CAR are working because there is little to no transparency, which means Russia and its PMCs can use any method needed to advance their interests. By bringing these activities into the open, Russia would be denied the ability to operate without the

eyes of the world on them and to face possible condemnation or legal action to stop their efforts. Instead, Russia's grab for power and resources could be exposed so that other African leaders can avoid these same Russian tactics in a bid to achieve fairer deals for external support.

The final approach the United States can pursue, and the most resource intensive, is to expand its military assistance, economic assistance, and arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa while emphasizing lack of detrimental political and economic strings attached. While the United States does give aid with some requirements on the part of the receiving nation in accordance with American law, they are not designed to give the United States control over any nation's resources or government. These requirements are there to foster a safe and secure environment for governments and people to thrive as the United States wants "our economic partners in the region to thrive, prosper, and control their own destinies. In America's economic dealings, we ask only for reciprocity, never for subservience."<sup>106</sup> Any economic assistance, which should be increased, must be kept separate from any arms deals or military assistance, so as not to conflate the two. Increased aid will help nations like the CAR foster a secure environment and create local infrastructure to create income and food for their citizens, and offer alternatives to relying on violence to survive and provide for one's family. Offering economic aid helps the United States expand its own businesses and investments in the CAR and Africa, as does partnering with African businessmen, workers, and farmers, resulting in increased economic ties and relationships.

Increased military sales can help provide the needed equipment for sub-Saharan governments' militaries to secure their territory rather than having American troops be involved in conducting military operations to end the violence. While this may require some additional military support like Security Force Assistance Brigades, this is less resource intensive than

---

<sup>106</sup> John Bolton, *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Whitehouse, Heritage Foundation, December 2018), accessed October 29, 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>.

relying on Special Operations Forces to be thinly spread around the continent conducting ongoing operations for years to come. US forces should support ongoing African Union and UN missions, so it can take a supporting role to these nations while still working to achieve security and stability in the region. This limits the amount of personnel required to train, oversee, and issue these weapons, allowing the United States to do an economy of force mission while still achieving its goals of supporting legitimate governments like the CAR.

The CAR will continue to have security issues for the foreseeable future as multiple foreign and local efforts attempt to bring about peace. The most effective way for this to occur is for a unified effort by the CAR's government, UN, Russia, and the United States to create and foster a secure environment. This cannot occur as long as Russia's arms sales and military advisors in the CAR continue to have a destabilizing effect on the CAR and the surrounding region. Government officials and scholars cannot predict what effect Russia's arms sales and efforts to destabilize the region will have, but they can look at the past Soviet actions and goals to help build that mental model to better understand possible alternative futures to avoid unfavorable ones and pick one most likely to result in a lasting peace. As the United States pivots to great power competition, it must continue to challenge Russian activities that threaten peace and stability in Africa, to prevent it from spreading instability. This must be accomplished in the most economical and efficient way possible, as the United States does not wish to return to the Cold War mode of competition through proxies and continuing a cycle of violence. Instead, the United States must continue to work with host nation partners and international bodies to create a secure environment for people and democracy to thrive.

## Bibliography

- Agence France-Presse. "How Russia Is Boosting Its Role in Africa with Weapons, Investment and 'Instructors.'" *South China Morning Post*, August 14, 2018. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2159622/how-russia-boosting-its-role-africa-weapons-investment-and>.
- . "United Nations Peacekeeper Killed in CAR." *Today*, June 11, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2020. <https://www.today.ng/news/africa/united-nations-peacekeeper-killed-car-121560>.
- Al Jazeera. "Russia in Africa: Inside a Military Training Centre in CAR." *Al Jazeera News*, April 14, 2019. Accessed October 31, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2019/04/russia-africa-military-training-centre-car-190411152658162.html>.
- Albright, David E. *The Washington Papers/101: The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- Bolton, John. *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy*. Washington, DC: The Whitehouse, Heritage Foundation, December 2018. Accessed October 29, 2019. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>.
- Booker, Paul. *Non-Democratic Regimes*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- British Broadcasting Corporation. "Russia Africa Summit: What's behind Moscow's Push into the Continent?" *BBC News*, October 23, 2019. Accessed October 29, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45035889>.
- Bugayova, Nataliya, and Darina Regio. "The Kremlin's Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update." Institute for the Study of War. August 23, 2019. Accessed September 4, 2019. <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-campaign-africa>.
- Burke, Jason, and Luke Harding. "Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert Influence in Africa." *The Guardian*, June 11, 2019. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa>.
- Casey, William J., Director Central Intelligence. *Memorandum For: Deputy Director for Operations, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Subject: Libya*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1984. Accessed February 23, 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001500060007-2>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Africa: Central African Republic." *The World Factbook*. October 18, 2019. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html>.

- . *African Coup Possibilities*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, March 1966. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00826a000400010026-3>.
- . *African Group Voting Behavior in the United Nations General Assembly*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1988. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90g01353r001400130017-9>.
- . *Central African Republic: On Tight Rope*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1983. Accessed February 23, 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00287r000500160001-1>.
- . *Central Intelligence Bulletin*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 1960. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00975a005400380001-0>.
- . *Discontinuing Support to Those Fighting for Freedom and Democracy*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1984. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001500060025-2>.
- . *Foreign Economic Policy Recommendations for Africa South of the Sahara*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1958. Accessed October 29, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61-00391r000200020009-8>.
- . *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, November 1957. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000267692>.
- . *Soviet Involvement in Africa*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, January 1978. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81b00401r002100070030-2>.
- . *Soviet Policy and Africa*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, March 1981. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83b00140r000200100029-2>.
- . *Staff Note: Middle East and South Asia*. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, May 1975. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00865A001000200001-9.pdf>.
- Council on Foreign Relations. “Violence in the Central African Republic.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic>.
- de Sousa, Anna Naomi. “Between East and West: The Cold War’s Legacy in Africa.” *Al Jazeera-Africa*, February 22, 2016. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/east-west-cold-war-legacy-africa-160214113015863.html>.

- Department of Defense. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2019. <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
- Devlin, Lawrence, Chief of Station Leopoldville. *Memorandum from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968*. Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1964–1968. Accessed September 1, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v23/d119>.
- Feldman, Myer. *Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962*. Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1961-1963. Accessed September 1, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d142>.
- Fituni, Leonid L. *Africa Notes: Russia's Arms Sales to Africa: Past, Present, and Future - September 1992*. Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1992. Accessed September 15, 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-notes-russias-arms-sales-africa-past-present-and-future-september-1992>.
- Gerasimov, Valery, General. "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations." *Military Review* (January-February 2016): 23-29. Accessed July 20, 2019. [https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Military\\_Review\\_20160228\\_art008.pdf](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Military_Review_20160228_art008.pdf).
- Harding, Luke. "Pragmatism and Ideology Drive Kremlin's Interest in Africa." *The Guardian*, June 11, 2019. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/pragmatism-and-ideology-drive-kremlins-interest-in-africa>.
- Harding, Luke, and Jason Burke. "Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert Influence in Africa." *The Guardian*, June 11, 2019. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa>.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Heritage Foundation. "Index of Economic Freedom: Angola." Accessed January 4, 2020. <https://www.heritage.org/index/country/angola>.
- Holtom, Paul, and Irene Pavesi. *Trade Update 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus*. Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018. Accessed February 4, 2020. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018.pdf>.
- Kempton, Daniel R. *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The Liberation Movement Connection*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

- Lado, Ludovic. "What Is Religious about the Conflict in Central African Republic." *Africa Up Close* (Wilson Center Blog), May 19, 2014. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/what-is-religious-about-the-conflict-in-central-african-republic/>.
- Mazov, Sergey. *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo 1956-1964*. Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- McGregor, Andrew. "How Russia Is Displacing the French in the Struggle for Influence in the Central African Republic." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 74 (May 2018). Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://jamestown.org/program/how-russia-is-displacing-the-french-in-the-struggle-for-influence-in-the-central-african-republic/>.
- McKew, Molly K. "The Gerasimov Doctrine." *POLITICO Magazine*, October 2017. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538>.
- Mines Advisory Group. "Angola." MAG International. Accessed January 4, 2019. <https://www.maginternational.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/angola/#>.
- Morrison, David. *The U.S.S.R and Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- News 24. "UN Gives Green Light on Russia Arms to C. Africa." *News 24*, December 16, 2017. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/un-gives-green-light-on-russia-arms-to-c-africa-20171216>.
- Nichols, Michelle. "Russia, China Abstain on U.N. Central Africa Vote, Unhappy with France." *Reuters*, December 14, 2018. Accessed December 1, 2019. <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1OD0PW-OZATP>.
- Olivier, Mathieu. "Russia's Murky Business Dealings in the Central African Republic." *The Africa Report*, August 23, 2019. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.theafricareport.com/16511/russias-murky-business-dealings-in-the-central-african-republic/>.
- Plichta, Marcel. "France and Russia Fiddle While the Central African Republic Burns." *World Politics Review*, November 28, 2018. Accessed October 31, 2019. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26852/france-and-russia-fiddle-while-the-central-african-republic-burns>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "Interview to TASS News Agency." Official Website of the President of Russia, October 21, 2019. Accessed October 29, 2019. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858>.
- . *Russian National Security Strategy*. Moscow: Russian Federation President, December 2015. Accessed October 31, 2019. <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.
- Reno, William. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

- Reuters. "Russia Expands Its Military and Business Ties to Africa." *Reuters*, October 17, 2018. Accessed September 9, 2019. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-10-17/russia-expands-its-military-and-business-ties-africa>.
- Ross, Aaron. "Factbox: Russian Military Cooperation Deals with African Countries." *Reuters*, October 17, 2018. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-africa-russia-factbox-idUKKCN1MR0KZ>.
- Schelling Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
- Schmitt, Eric. "Russia's Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa." *The New York Times*, March 31, 2019. Accessed August 7, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-military-africa.html>.
- Searcey, Dionne. "Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries: Russia's Playbook in Central African Republic." *The New York Times*, September 30, 2019. Accessed October 27, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/world/russia-diamonds-africa-prigozhin.html>.
- United Nations, MINUSCA. "Targeted Attack Results in Death of MINUSCA Peacekeeper in Bria." MINUSCA Press Release, December 4, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2019. <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/targeted-attack-results-death-minusca-peacekeeper-bria>.
- United Nations Security Council. SC/2127, *Lord's Resistance Army*. United Nations Security Council. March 7, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2020. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/entity/lord's-resistance-army>.
- US Department of State. *Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions*. Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, August 1960. Accessed September 10, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v02/d145>.
- US National Security Council. *Statement of U.S. Policy Toward West Africa, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Africa, Volume XIV 1 April 9, 1960*. Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1961-1963. Accessed September 2, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d27>.
- van Hoogstraten, Jan S. F., Thomas E. O'Toole, and Tamara Lynn Giles-Vernick. "Central African Republic." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, October 2019. Accessed October 31, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.
- Waldhauser, Thomas D., General. *2019 Posture Statement to Congress*. Washington, DC: US Army Africa Command, 2019. Accessed October 29, 2019. <https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2019-posture-statement-to-congress>.
- Ward, Alex. "Read Trumps Speech to the UN General Assembly." *VOX*, September 25, 2018. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.vox.com/2018/9/25/17901082/trump-un-2018-speech-full-text>.
- Williams, Katie. "House Bill Tries to Force Trump to Keep Troops in Africa." *Defense One*, March 4, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. <https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2020/03/exclusive-house-bill-tries-force-trump-keep-troops-africa/163501/>.