Fortifying Design in the Army Operations Process: An Imperative for Winning in a Complex World
Abstract
The recent national-level strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations to a focus on great power competition serves as background for this monograph. Although the US Army has conducted a doctrine overhaul to support the new strategic direction, there were no corresponding changes in the Army operations process. Seemingly, the operations process that incorporated design in 2010 to deal with the complexity of counterinsurgency operations would need a similar overhaul to meet the added complexity of large-scale ground combat or potentially the current adaptation of design, the Army Design Methodology (ADM), will suffice. As a result of this disconnect, this monograph evaluates the US Army operations process doctrine against the academic work on design, highlighting three schools of thought within the design field: sensemaking, decision making, and leadership. Additionally, the monograph evaluates the thesis that the ADM is not truly a methodology but instead as part of a broken operations process, with shortfalls manifesting in all three schools of thought. The major result from the research finds that the US Army operations process is not so much broken, as a disconnect exists between the Army's espoused theories on design and the design theory in action. This disconnect leads to the main recommendation of explicitly adopting design as the Army initially envisioned in 2010 and in a manner more aligned with Joint doctrine. By taking this step, the US Army will be better prepared for the complexity of great power competition, large scale combat operations, and the future all-domain battlefield.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1159910
Entities
People
- Stephen G. Jr Tyminski
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies