

Selective Military Training: A Hybrid Approach for a Future Military Establishment

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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Some senior army officials believe industrial age solutions are being applied to information age problems. This is not conducive given the extent of contextual change between the 20th and 21st centuries. A prime example occurred in 2015 when the Department of Defense stopped excluding women from combat roles. As a result, the Selective Service System was deemed unconstitutional. The system remained viable but the fundamental process of registration was not. Accordingly, the National Commission on National, Military, and Public Service was created to explore the issue and develop recommendations for Congress. Likely, aspects of the current military system will change. This monograph argues that we have an opportunity for public discourse on a new model for part of the American military establishment. Generally, America has shifted between two variations of military establishment. Traditionally, it has been an all-volunteer force. On certain occasions however, compulsive service (a draft) was applied, usually in response to war. Compulsive training or universal military training however is a third variation which has never been adopted, only promoted. It can easily be argued that each of these systems possess properties which have applicability in the future. This monograph asserts that a future military establishment should encompass components of all three into a hybrid variant called "Selective Military Training." Doing so capitalizes on the strength and culture of the all-volunteer force while also preparing viable operational and strategic reserves for future war without overburdening the military establishment or society in general.

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Abbreviations

AVF	All-Volunteer Force
DOD	Department of Defense
M-Day	Mobilization Day
NCOS	National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service
NG	National Guard
NSS	National Security Strategy
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
SMT	Selective Military Training
SSS	Selective Service System
UMT	Universal Military Training

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Section I – Introduction

When the Department of Defense (DOD) stopped excluding women from combat roles in 2015, the Selective Service System (SSS) was deemed unconstitutional. The system remained viable but the fundamental process of registration was not. Registering only men invokes due process violations under the fifth article of the Constitution.¹ The simple answer is to expand registration to encompass all women and men of age. However, this implies that the SSS is currently functioning in the best interests of the United States. This monograph argues that now is the perfect opportunity for public discourse on a new model for part of the American military establishment.

Since reincorporation in 1981, the SSS has conducted annual registration of all male citizens. All manner of legislation has been introduced to change the SSS over the last forty years. Between 2001 and 2016, fourteen bills were introduced to Congress that sought to change the system.² Six of them advocated dismantling the system. Others suggested expanding or ceasing registration while still maintaining the system in “deep stand-by.” In 2004, when America was engaged simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, one bill made it to a floor vote to reintroduce conscription.³ Through it all, the system by and large has not altered course from its inception and continues to function today with a \$23 million budget.

Generally, the purpose of the SSS is to function as a bridge between civilians and the Armed Forces. The SSS mission statement asserts that the organization exists “To register men and maintain a system that, when authorized by the President and Congress, rapidly provides

¹ *National Coalition for Men et al., v. Selective Service System, et al.*, Civil Action H-16-3362, 18 (US District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. 2019). In this context, “Due Process” is used substantively to mean laws cannot result in the unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable treatment of a citizen.

² For further research, see <https://www.loc.gov/search>.

³ *Universal National Service Act of 2003*, HR 163, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced in House 7 January 2003, accessed 14 January 2020, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/163>. Alternatively, in the Senate it was S 89.

personnel in a fair and equitable manner...”⁴ This means mobilization must be speedy to reinforce the organized armed forces. During periods of heightened tension like the Cold War, it is easy to understand this purpose; other times, not. A 2017 DOD report lists other virtues and benefits of the system such as providing a “low-cost insurance policy” for emergencies, a sense of resolve for diplomatic endeavors, and a sense of national obligation for American citizens, binding them to the military.⁵

A RAND study in 2018 identifies the same points and also illuminates embedded fallacies.⁶ Having a system that expedites the flow of untrained personnel into the military does not equate to a low cost insurance policy, demonstrate resolve, or bridge the civilian-military divide. The SSS’s problem is that it was developed in the 20th century to operate within the context of the Cold War, not in today’s information age.

Currently, provisions require the SSS to deliver the first inductees to the Armed Forces by day 193 of a mobilization and 100,000 after 210 days.⁷ This number may seem high, but is not when considering the SSS requisitioned 923,842 personnel over a twelve month period in 1941 under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act.⁸ A key difference between 1941

⁴ US Selective Service System, “About Selective Service,” accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.sss.gov/About/Agency-Mission>.

⁵ US Department of Defense, *Report on the Purpose and Utility of a Registration System for Military Selective Service*, Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Washington, DC, 17 March 2017), 35.

⁶ Bernard D. Rostker, “What to Do with the Selective Service System? Historical Lessons and Future Posture,” Study, The RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA, 2018), 2, 15-16, accessed 20 March 2020, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE197.html>.

⁷ US Selective Service System, “Return to the Draft,” accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.sss.gov/About/Sequence-of-Events>; John Polowczyk, “Selective Service Hearing: Future Mobilization Needs of the Nation,” testimony, National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (Washington, DC, 24 April 2019), 10; National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (hereafter NCOS), *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (March 2020), 107.

⁸ US Selective Service System, “Induction Statistics,” accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/Induction-Statistics>; George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 21; George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 247.

and now is the depth of planning. In 1941, mobilization was backed by years of detailed planning, beginning in 1936 and resulting in Mobilization Regulations and the Protective Mobilization Plan.

Today's mobilization model has not been updated since 1994, failing to keep pace with modernization, military base closures, realignment, or changes in the Joint Force structure.⁹ Moreover, today's registration is not conducted as it was in the 1980's. Registration then involved a journey to the local post office to fill out forms. Mundane and simplistic, the act of going to a federal facility reminded citizens of their societal obligation. Today, registration is primarily completed digitally, mainly through state venues such as driver's license bureaus.¹⁰ Under the Driver's License Legislation Initiative, the new driver receives a letter in the mail stating his obligation and a unique selective service number.¹¹ For many citizens, this was their first introduction to the SSS.¹² This single program alone accounted for nearly one million registrants in 2018.¹³

In terms of the civilian-military divide, a majority of Americans are generally "bewildered" by military operations and the organization itself.¹⁴ The US Armed Forces is a

⁹ John Polowczyk, "Selective Service Hearing: Future Mobilization Needs of the Nation," testimony, National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 11; US Government Accountability Office, *National Security: DOD Should Reevaluate Requirements for the Selective Service System*, GAO-12-623 (Washington, DC, 07 June 2012), 11-12; US Department of Defense, *Report on the Purpose and Utility of a Registration System for Military Selective Service*, 35-37.

¹⁰ US Selective Service System, *Annual Report to the Congress of the United States: Fiscal Year 2018* (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 2018), 6. Total men registered electronically is 2,086,733 compared to 49,876 through the US Post Office.

¹¹ Forty states, four territories, and the District of Columbia participate in the Driver's License Legislation Initiative. States not participating are Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming.

¹² Rostker, "What to Do with the Selective Service System? Historical Lessons and Future Posture," 14; NCOS, *Interim Report*, A report to the American People, the Congress, and the President (January 2019), 8, accessed 20 March 2020, www.inspire2serve.gov.

¹³ US Selective Service System, *Annual Report to the Congress of the United States: Fiscal Year 2018*, 6-7. The actual number is 976,720.

¹⁴ NCOS, *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 31-32.

volunteer organization and has not experienced a draft even after a global war on terror began. Less than ten percent of the total US population are veterans and recruits are more likely to come from families with a military affiliation.¹⁵ As it stands, seventy percent of the military is from the south and west of the country.¹⁶ Among the population eligible for military service, only one percent have the propensity for it and as a result, that service is highly incentivized.¹⁷ Considering this, the current SSS is more akin to a drawbridge that only connects both banks during a time of war.

A low-cost insurance policy must be democratic, which means the SSS must also be “fair and equitable.” In 1980, the SSS reported a ninety-three percent rate of compliance in its first national registration drive since ending the practice in 1973.¹⁸ In 2015, the SSS director reported seventy-three percent on time compliance but overall eighty-eight percent compliance for 2014, citing several states not participating in government information sharing as partly responsible for the balance.¹⁹ The 2018 SSS Annual Report failed to offer an on-time or national total compliance rate despite listing an internal goal of ninety percent.²⁰ Low compliance is detrimental for two reasons. First, if the nation returns to a draft, the SSS could only induct those who had registered, defeating the spirit of fair and equitable burden sharing. Second, non-compliance with registration is currently passively enforced. In the event of a draft, any citizen of the appropriate age not in possession of a unique selective service number would be subject to hefty monetary fines and potential imprisonment. In retrospect, both reasons indicate that

¹⁵ NCOS, *Interim Report*, A report to the American People, the Congress, and the President, 9.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹⁸ Rostker, “What to Do with the Selective Service System? Historical Lessons and Future Posture,” 15.

¹⁹ US Selective Service System, *Annual Report to the Congress of the United States: Fiscal Year 2015* (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 2015), 5, 8; Rostker, “What to Do with the Selective Service System? Historical Lessons and Future Posture,” 15.

²⁰ US Selective Service System, *Annual Report to the Congress of the United States: Fiscal Year 2018*, 4.

registration is actually high cost for individuals. To be low-cost means maximum participation. To achieve that level of participation if a national emergency occurred would require time, thus defeating the purpose of selective service.

Internationally, the SSS converts manpower potential into desired political outcomes. Manpower policy is political bargaining power to deter nation-state aggression. As a last resort, it can compel acquiescence by adversaries. American diplomats engage in international politics but the bargaining power currently at their disposal is limited by the lack of credibility within the mobilization system. In a liberal democracy, SSS policy is not credible if unsupported by the population. American citizens have little knowledge of military manpower policy that does not demonstrate commitment or resolve to allies and adversaries.

A Catalyst and a Committee to Find a New System

As noted above, the SSS's purpose is to provide manpower for a combat force as efficiently as possible. Constitutionally, requiring only men to register is not a violation of due process as long as men can legally be treated differently than women. This judicial conclusion is based on a 1981 federal court case where longstanding DOD policy of keeping women out of combat framed the argument.²¹ In short, Congress has the authority to raise an army and the DOD is best suited to determine what a proper army should look like. Therefore, if DOD policy was to keep women out of combat roles and the purpose of the SSS is to build a fighting force, then women could be treated differently from men.

Until recently DOD policy had been slowly shifting but continued to restrict women from combat roles. In December 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter released a memorandum declaring combat roles open to women.²² With the Carter policy reversal, decades of established

²¹ *Rostker v. Goldberg*, 453 US 57, 57 (1981).

²² Ashton B. Carter, "Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in the Armed Forces," Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Pentagon, Washington, DC, 03 December 2015).

SSS registration procedure must now be amended in the Military Selective Service Act or the act itself might be dismantled in lieu of another method or inaction altogether.

In 2016, a bipartisan congressional effort created the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (NCOS). It was charged under the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act to review the current SSS registration system and offer recommendations to discard it, expand it to include all individuals, or other changes deemed appropriate.²³ The NCOS was to review the topic of ‘service’ and determine how the nation might be strengthened by it.²⁴

Broadly speaking, the NCOS defines service in three areas: national, public, and military. National service is defined as engaging in the delivery of critical services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, education, conservation, and protection of natural resources. The Peace Corps and AmeriCorps are examples of this category. Public service pertains to civilian employment in federal, state, local, and tribal governments and currently includes twenty-one million public servants overall.²⁵ Lastly, military service is participation in any component of the military, currently 2.4 million service members.²⁶

In January 2019 the committee released its interim report which concluded it was examining multiple options including universal service. Universal service, as the NCOS defines it, encompasses each of the above three categories and pertains to all Americans as they come of age. The NCOS breaks service into three measures of scope. First, and least impactful to the ordinary citizen, is universal access which commits government resources to ensure all Americans have equal access to participate in some form of service. Another is universal

²³ NCOS, *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 220.

²⁴ NCOS, *Interim Report*, A report to the American People, the Congress, and the President, 5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁶ US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy (Washington, DC, 2018), 3.

expectation where service remains voluntary but the norm established for all Americans would be the commitment of at least one year in any of the three categories. Finally, and most impactful to the ordinary citizen, is universal obligation which means compelling all Americans to serve in a category of their choice.²⁷

A second provision under the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act stipulated that the President of the United States submit guiding principles to the NCOS and Congress on how best to proceed, whereby the NCOS would refine its recommendations.²⁸ On 3 April 2017, President Donald J. Trump furnished six principles along with his belief that the nation requires a strong military and has historically used selective service registration as a “...hedge against the catastrophe not yet anticipated.”²⁹ Trump’s principles include first and foremost that a “system, process, or program” must exist to provide manpower for the military in an emergency. Second, pathways to service must be established to enable the employment of the country’s talent. Third, whatever mechanism is adopted must draw upon the diversity of the entire American population. Fourth, any “system, process, or program” must be seamless and effective, able to expand and contract as needed. Fifth, service should be incentivized to cultivate a “well-rounded and contributory society.” Finally, the mechanism must utilize best practices from past experience, be fiscally sustainable, and viable in the long-term.³⁰

Understanding the historical background of manpower policy meets the sixth of President Trump’s principles: best practices. Historical review allows the researcher to study policies and legislation introduced and promoted, but ultimately failed for one reason or another. Those failed efforts are worth study because what may not have been appropriate within the context of

²⁷ NCOS, *Interim Report*, A report to the American People, the Congress, and the President, 7.

²⁸ NCOS, *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 220.

²⁹ Donald J. Trump, “Principles for Reforming the Military Selective Service Process, 03 April 2017,” Memorandum (The White House, Washington, DC).

³⁰ Ibid.

yesterday, may be of value today. Throughout US history, there have been two sides to military service: the all-volunteer force (AVF) and the draft. The former is what the US has traditionally relied on to maintain its armed forces. The latter is a system of compulsory service that has been enacted many times, typically as a last resort to reinforce the volunteers. There is another system of military service which achieves the same fundamental purpose as a draft but in a different manner, compulsory training. While it has never been tried, it is typically recognized under the name universal military training. Understanding both compulsory service and compulsory training enhances the understanding of what is feasible, sustainable, and acceptable.

The scope of this monograph is limited to the category of military service but is inseparable from the larger public debate about service in general. Some senior Army officials believe industrial age solutions are being applied to information age problems. By creating the NCOS, an opportunity to present alternative solutions to policy makers arose. Given the broader context of a hyper-technological and information diffused 21st century, the question is how the military establishment can contribute to political discourse on favorable terms? Therefore, this monograph asserts that a potential solution for future military manpower mobilization is not reliant on compulsory service or compulsory training. Instead, a hybrid solution is necessary.

To best describe the characteristics of the hybrid, this monograph follows a path of historical examination before transitioning into a hypothetical survey. Compulsory service is explored first because America has experience with it and the benefits are known. Additionally, it is critical to understand that many legal and ethical frameworks were proven constitutionally acceptable through the experience of war, where compulsory service was used. Next, compulsory training, or universal military training (UMT), is explored to understand what was proposed and why it was necessary. Following the historical study of compulsory service and its rival, the hypothetical scenario involves the concept of UMT as it might exist today, in a modern context. Just because it has not been done in the past does not mean it could not work in the future. Only after an evaluation of modern UMT can an argument be made for a truly hybrid solution which

this monograph describes as “Selective Military Training.” A hybrid approach to manpower policy represents a potential solution fitting for the information age.

Section II – Compulsory Service

Compulsory service has been attempted and its benefits can be measured. In contrast, peacetime compulsory training has only been proposed. The NCOS describes service as “...a personal commitment of time, energy, and talent to a mission that contributes to the public good by protecting the nation and its citizens, strengthening communities, or promoting the general social welfare.”³¹ Comparatively, compulsory service is an obligation of every citizen to serve their nation. Service that they otherwise may not choose to perform. For the purpose of this study, selective service is the sole variation of compulsory service examined.

In wartime, the obvious solution to manpower shortages is to enlist all persons physically fit for service. However, to requisition the entire eligible population requires an equal commitment to equip, train, and transport them. Additionally, conscripting a sizeable portion of the working male population could ruin domestic economic systems, and is likely not needed to overcome an adversary.³² Therefore, only a subset of the eligible population, based on age and health, is needed or compelled to serve in the military.

In a democratic society like the United States, determining who must serve while others do not is a delicate subject. Generally, compulsory selective service is viewed as the least democratic method of building military capacity not because it compels service, but because it applies unequally to a select few. For instance, being drafted essentially amounts to a hidden tax shouldered entirely by those serving. While the draftee benefits from serving the nation, they also

³¹ NCOS, *Interim Report*, A report to the American People, the Congress, and the President, 4.

³² Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), 74; Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), 77-78.

earn less pay and complete arduous training while those not drafted maintain their civilian lives, continuing to earn a living.³³

The history of coerced service in the United States precedes World War I. During the Revolutionary War short-term enlistments, lulls in recruiting, and militiamen who were less interested in staying with the Army made maintaining an AVF challenging. Reluctantly, Washington advised coercive measures be taken up by the Continental Congress in 1777.³⁴ For Congress, the issue was that it could recommend action by the states and even enact legislation, but had no mechanism of enforcement at the national level.³⁵ Further, Congress feared that any attempt to demand more power from the states would be received poorly given the ongoing fighting against a centralized government. Therefore, to fill Continental Army ranks, coercive measures were adopted at the state level using quota recommendations from the Continental Congress.³⁶ After the Revolutionary War, the Army was reduced to as low as eighty enlisted men with some officers and the Continental Congress going to far as to assert that a standing army was not needed.³⁷

Between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, two significant pieces of legislation were enacted illuminating the new country's intention in fighting future war. First, the Militia Law of 1792 established a uniform militia throughout the country. Under this law, all free, white male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five had a universal military obligation to enroll in the local militia. Therefore, the states had the power to call forth manpower

³³ Thomas W. Evans, "The All-Volunteer Army After Twenty Years Recruiting in the Modern Era," *Army History*, no. 27 (Summer 1993): 40-41; Dennis Laich, *Skin In The Game: Poor Kids and Patriots* (Bloomington: iUniverse LLC, 2013), 31; Joshua J. Daily, "The All-Volunteer Force: LSCO, Cost, and a New Implicit Tax on Reserve Forces," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2019), 15.

³⁴ Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 15.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

when needed. Significantly, a second militia act in 1795 altered the 1792 law capping the amount of time a unit could be called upon in any given year to only three months. In effect, the full impact of the state militia manpower pools were nullified unless the conflict could be concluded within a very short window.³⁸ During and after the War of 1812, volunteerism became the mainstream method for augmenting the Regular Army and remained a sufficient source of needed combat power until the early twentieth century.³⁹

Compulsory selective service was adopted during the American Civil War by both belligerents, but not according to the principles of fairness and equality that are expected today. In the 1860's it was acceptable for wealthy men to hire substitutes to fulfill their obligation.⁴⁰ This method netted a quarter of a million men into the national army but was only done after attempts to fill the Army voluntarily failed. Between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the 20th century, nothing related to compulsory service was needed and mainstream America remained non-interventionist.

Due to World War I's expansion, in 1915 Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison proposed a new force structure he called a "Continental Army."⁴¹ Under this system, the Regular Army's size would grow and a new federal reserve force of 400,000 would be created. The proposal was defeated in Congress, but the National Defense Act of 1916 still authorized the creation of a federal Organized Reserve Corps while also retaining the National Guard, and expanding the Regular Army.

Slowly, the American armed forces were making progress toward a military establishment with a capable manpower reserve. Unfortunately, escalating tension with Germany

³⁸ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 30.

³⁹ The time constraint imposed by the Militia Act revision of 1795 was not repealed until 1861.

⁴⁰ *Selective Draft Law Cases*, 245 US 366, 386 (1918).

⁴¹ Garry J. Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 34.

altered the dynamic in 1917. On 18 May 1917, the Selective Draft Law was passed. In December 1917, the Selective Draft Law was challenged in the Supreme Court in what became known as the Selective Draft Law Cases. Objections to the draft law varied but primarily focused on the creation of “involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”⁴² The issue was heard for nearly a month and the findings were unanimous in favor of the draft. The basis of this finding was rooted in sections eight and ten of Article 1 of the Constitution. The former gives Congress the power to raise and maintain the Army and Navy and to develop military policy that is proper and necessary for the defense of the nation. Of importance, section eight also grants militia power to the states. Essentially, states reserve the right to maintain their own militia, separate from the Army. However, in accordance with the Militia Act of 1903, the militia clause became subject to the provisions of the federal government which could stipulate when that militia was federalized for service to the nation.⁴³ Chief Justice Edward Douglas White remarked in the Supreme Court finding on the Selective Draft Law Cases that, “...it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right of the government to compel it.”⁴⁴

So strong was the Supreme Court finding in 1918 that the ruling could not be challenged effectively even in 1940. In that year, the threat of Nazi fascism had galvanized American society to a point where it was socially acceptable in the near term to support compulsive measures for the greater good.⁴⁵ The Army once again was a small professional force backed by larger

⁴² *Selective Draft Law Cases*, 245 US 366, 367 (1918).

⁴³ James Parker, "The Militia Act of 1903," *The North American Review* 177 (August 1903): 278-279, 281, 285-286, accessed 15 January 2020, https://archive.org/stream/jstor-25119439/25119439_djvu.txt. JSTOR. Later, in 1908, the Militia Act of 1903 was amended so that the President of the United States could also set the duration of the activation beyond nine months.

⁴⁴ *Selective Draft Law Cases*, 245 US 366, 367 (1918). Moreover, White continued that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, “...broadened the national scope of the government by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative...” Essentially, the cost of US citizenship is the internalization of an obligation to state.

⁴⁵ Leonard L. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), 247; Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973*, 11.

organized reserves that were not adequately modernized for large scale mobile warfare. When the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, it was cause for concern but it was not until France was defeated in June 1940 that Americans became acutely aware of the lurking danger. Three months later, the US Congress authorized the first peacetime draft in the country's history, known as the Selective Training and Service Act. The main difference between the 1918 and 1940 draft challenges was the ability of the government to compel service during a time of peace and not war. Again, the draft law was upheld and remained constitutionally acceptable.

Cost and Benefit of a Draft System

A draft system, can have numerous benefits, especially if the purpose is in response to a threat in the near to intermediate term. First and foremost, it is a proven method both historically and constitutionally. Historically, compulsory selective service has always been the backbone of the US military establishment. In actual conflict where it was introduced uniformly and at the federal level, it has succeeded in furnishing personnel for both World Wars, Korea and Vietnam.

Conscripting personnel to be trained, equipped, and organized is relatively fast considering size and scope of the enterprise. Between 1941 and 1943, the Army of the United States expanded by 5,532,104 personnel.⁴⁶ Planning though is critical for the process as demonstrated by the Protective Mobilization Plan, Mobilization Regulations, and Victory Program. However, even with elaborate mobilization planning, circumstances arise which moderate the expansion of the force due to equipment shortage or lack of transport.

⁴⁶ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 379.




Figure 1. Army Force Structure in 1941 and 1945. Figure created by author. Data from Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 379.

A draft is a short-term solution which does not take years to develop. Reminiscing on America becoming a belligerent in December 1941, General George C. Marshall said, “We were so utterly unprepared.”⁴⁷ Yet in 1943, America had found its mobilization stride and was industrially aligned with the induction of its personnel. This is in large part due to America’s mobilization ceiling in terms of personnel which was carefully capped at ten percent of the total population by the 1941 Victory Program to prevent crippling the economy or society.⁴⁸ As mobilization progressed through the war, it was further determined that the ultimate strength of the proposed army could be reduced or at least delayed while industry caught up.⁴⁹ Therefore, only drafting a predetermined portion of the population is a wholesale benefit of prior planning.

Finally, a system of compulsory selective service provides for an active and ready force which is socially acceptable to American’s in the near-intermediate term. During the peacetime

⁴⁷ Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, 201.

⁴⁸ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 74; Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in *Command Decisions* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 367.

⁴⁹ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 115; Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” 369-370.

draft of 1940-1941, the US Army's strength grew by several hundred thousand before Pearl Harbor was even attacked.⁵⁰ Because a clear threat was articulated to the people, Congress enacted both the Selective Training and Selective Act of 1940 and the Selective Service Extension Act of 1941. After World War II, despite a rapid demobilization America managed to continually field a large enough conventional force to pursue a strategy of containment in Europe and Asia.

By the late 1960's and early 1970's, public sentiment toward the draft had deteriorated, although the system in itself had continually furnished trained personnel from 1948 through 1973.⁵¹ Drafts have costs. This system is service-oriented, meaning selected citizens are preempted from self-determination for a period of time. Drafted from a few months to sometimes years, draftees perform military duties assigned to them.⁵²

At the macro level, compulsory service is expensive to maintain monetarily and culturally. The shorter the enlistment, the higher the personnel turnover, which necessitates continual retraining to compensate for the loss of experience. Additionally, if the standing army is large, so too is the cost of requisitioning the proportionate population, organizing, equipping, training, and applying them.⁵³

Culturally, the presence of draftees can erode important military characteristics of an army. In 1939, the Army was a prestigious establishment. The Army was selective about its members in part because it was a volunteer army. In comparison, the American Army of the early

⁵⁰ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 379.

⁵¹ Congressional Research Service (CRS), *The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 27 February 2019), 7-9.

⁵² An important consideration of a draft is that when citizens are introduced to the military, they are considered soldiers and sailors and cease to be civilians.

⁵³ Robert P. Patterson, "Statement before Committee on Military Affairs, US House of Representatives, 8 November 1945," in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 11-5 – 11-7.

1970's was hardly recognizable. Its standing army was massive due to world-wide commitments. It could not afford to be selective and instead employed a compulsive system for enlistment. Its ranks were often filled with dissenters that were willing to perform their obligation, but not willing to provide benefit to the institution through a period of faithful and dedicated service. Morale and discipline within the ranks decreased. As the military's proud culture faded so too did society's perception of it.

Finally, compelling citizens to serve is acceptable when there is a clearly articulated need. Maintaining that need in the eyes of the populace is the politician's burden. It can be easy when a looming threat is easily perceptible, such as fascists in 1940, but harder to justify without clear and immediate threats. Sustaining the will of the American people, which provides strategic staying power, becomes more difficult in longer durations, especially with changing administrations. Therefore, compulsory service is a good solution for a military establishment in the near-term and perhaps the intermediate, but not the long term.

Section III – Compulsory Training

Compulsory training or UMT is focused on peacetime training in preparation for war rather than actually building an army during periods of heightened tensions or war. This concept has been advocated by prominent American leaders and continually evolved from the late 18th century to the mid-1900's.⁵⁴ Its basic characteristic is that of an obligation which is embraced by all citizens fit for service and subsequently trained for war in times of peace.

Compulsory training does not have a requirement for continued service after military training. Once the training is complete, citizens are released back to the general population. Trained citizens remain civilians. There is no membership in the formal military establishment

⁵⁴ In 2001 the "Universal Military Training and Service Act of 2001" (HR 3588, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.) was introduced to Congress but subsequently referred to the House Committee on Armed Services and went no further.

associated with the training and the trainees are not considered servicemen. Compulsory trainees are only subject to further military obligation if Congress deemed their induction into service in the best interest of national security. There have been three instances when UMT was advanced. Every attempt ended after a major American war and prominent wartime leaders, like George Washington, John J. Pershing, and George C. Marshall each advocated for UMT legislation.

In 1783, George Washington wrote “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” which offers the clearest example of what he considered essential for national defense. Above all he believed American defense needed a regular standing army and a well-organized militia.⁵⁵ The small army he envisioned would garrison forts and provide defense against Native American attacks. It needed to be large enough to complete administrative activities and nothing more. Of greater importance was the well-organized militia as it was complementary to the Regular Army and foundational. In peace, the standing army performed activities the militia could not. By contrast, the militia’s purpose was to bolster the Regular Army in large scale war. A well-organized militia was separate, as Washington defined it, from an ill-organized militia in terms of organization, equipment, and training.⁵⁶ The entire militia, consisting of all free white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five did not need to be held to the same level of preparedness, just a portion.

In 1786, Secretary of War Henry Knox submitted a plan to Congress which proposed UMT.⁵⁷ Under this system, all male citizens reaching age eighteen would enroll in the militia and gradually move through a series of corps as they aged.⁵⁸ Due in part to the feebleness of

⁵⁵ George Washington, “Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1 May 1783,” *Founder’s Online*, National Achieves, accessed 20 March 2020, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11202>.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Robert A. Graham, “Universal Military Training in Modern History,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 241 (September 1945): 12-13. Accessed 25 September 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1025895>.

⁵⁸ The advanced corps (ages 18-21) was the first of three classes devised by Knox which spanned a citizen’s life. In this corps, training would be received in camps, annually, for six weeks periods. When a citizen aged out of the advanced corps upon turning twenty-two, he would then enter the “main corps,” which formed the majority of all militiamen, those between ages twenty-two and forty-six. During this

American government at the time, nothing became of the plan during the period of the Articles of Confederation and the early days under the Constitution. In January 1791, the Knox plan was rejected by Congress because it represented a potential instrument of coercion which was unsettling for the American public.⁵⁹

In response, a committee led by Elias Boudinot submitted a plan to Congress in 1791 which offered another alternative for a UMT type military establishment.⁶⁰ This plan was in keeping with the Knox plan and would have accomplished what Washington desired which was to separate the “young from the inertia of the old-timers.”⁶¹ Colonel Jerimiah Wadsworth introduced the bill in the Second Congress but by March 1792 it was completely altered.⁶² The bill was passed as the Militia Act of 1792 with Wadsworth even voting against it and became a central feature of the American military establishment for the next 100 years.

Washington did not care if the adopted “peace establishment” was founded on principles of an AVF or one of compulsory service. His main objective was to separate the young and the able for training in peace to establish what he considered a well-organized and uniform militia. The closest he came to achieving this goal was through the Knox plan of 1791 and the Wadsworth Bill of 1792, with both failing in Congress. UMT was an acceptable option for a

period, no organized training was required. When the citizen turned forty-seven, he would graduate again, this time into the “reserved corps,” which was essentially a home guard that could be called upon when the main corps was activated.

⁵⁹ John M. Palmer, *America In Arms: The Experience of the United States With Military Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 43-44.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 46-54.

⁶¹ Ibid., 47. In Boudinot’s bill, all able-bodied males aged eighteen to fifty were considered the militia and those between eighteen to twenty-five would be organized and trained separately as a general militia. Within each regiment or battalion of general militia, the younger citizens (eighteen to twenty-five) would form the light companies which trained separately. Additionally, each general militia brigade was required to have at least one cavalry troop and artillery battery formed by volunteers from that brigade. Each of the light companies of younger citizens would train four times a year together and twice each year with the remainder of their brigades.

⁶² Ibid., 48-51. All provisions for federal inspection and supervision were cut, the separate organization and training of volunteers was eliminated, and no requirement for organized training remained. Everything Washington had envisioned as necessary for a well-organized militia being the foundation of a peace establishment was taken out of the legislation.

peace establishment but given the context of the time, politically unacceptable. Elected officials were unwilling to give a centralized government any effective military power, as Wadsworth's Bill would have done.⁶³ The concept of UMT remained dead until the early 20th century.

During the period of Reconstruction following the Civil War, Emory Upton asserted that citizen-soldiers were not great at soldiering, and therefore when called, should be organized into existing professional army units and be led by professional officers.⁶⁴ It was not until the late 1890's that reformers such as Elihu Root made major transformations in the force structure of the Army. His reforms were oriented primarily on moving the Army away from the old regimental system of the frontier army and closer to the concept envisioned by Upton.⁶⁵

As with the American Revolution, after World War I much emphasis was put toward erecting a better military establishment. Notable figures in this debate were John M. Palmer, an officer with experience on the general staff and a passion for manpower policy, and James W. Wadsworth, a lifetime politician with a similar passion for national defense. Together, both figures worked in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to craft and shape the National Defense Act of 1920. Both believed in preparedness and sought a system of UMT that catered to the "genius of the American institution."⁶⁶ Palmer states the topic was heavily debated in Congress but failed to pass as written for two main reasons. First is what he called the "spirit of 1920," whereby it was politically unacceptable to claim that war was possible after the war to end all wars.⁶⁷ If there was no future war, then why have a UMT program? Second, the War

⁶³ Palmer, *America In Arms*, 52. Between the First and Second Congress party lines had formed between politicians in favor of centralized power like Alexander Hamilton and those who opposed it, like Thomas Jefferson, who advocated government by the masses.

⁶⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 108; William A. Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign For Universal Military Training After World War II* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 16-17.

⁶⁵ Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, Inc., 1938), 253; Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 23-24.

⁶⁶ Palmer, *America In Arms*, 159.

⁶⁷ Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 35.

Department was not united on the idea of UMT.⁶⁸ In Congress the party line was described by Wadsworth as a “...minority united solidly against universal training and a majority sadly divided.”⁶⁹ These were the conditions that led to the defeat of UMT for a second time as the foundation of a long-term deterrence option for the military establishment.

The third push to adopt UMT came during World War II and continued until after the war ended. Unlike the previous two instances, this time the Army Chief of Staff General Marshall sought to begin planning for the post war military establishment as early as 1943.⁷⁰ Marshall knew in World War II that America might emerge as perhaps the preeminent power. To prevent a relapse of events such as the Versailles Treaty and an environment similar to the interwar period, America would have to remain committed overseas to rebuild allies and reform past enemies. To this end, a quality post war military establishment was critical.

One of the first challenges Marshall faced was to ensure the War Department was united on UMT.⁷¹ Gaining cooperation from the entire War Department was critical to avoid the UMT debacle of 1920. On 25 August 1944, Marshall published War Department Circular No. 347, stipulating that UMT was to be the foundation of post-war military establishment planning from then on.⁷²

From a military point of view, UMT was a strategic necessity. It was as a means to speed mobilization in the future. When America entered the Second World War, it did so poorly

⁶⁸ Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 45-46. In opposition was the sitting Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, who wanted to continue more or less with the expansible army status quo, placing the citizen-soldier in subordination to the professional soldier.

⁶⁹ Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 20.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 31-32.

⁷¹ Marshall brought Palmer back into military service as a brigadier general and advisor to the special planning division in the War Department specifically to plan for the post war military establishment.

⁷² Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 45-48. Between 1943 and 1945, other notable figures supporting UMT were Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower

prepared industrially and organizationally even after fifteen months of peace time conscription.

The War Department wanted to avoid a similar situation in the future.⁷³

Compounding the need for rapid mobilization was the effect of technology and science on military affairs. Guided missiles and long-range bombing negated America's strategic ocean buffer and the destructive power of an atom bomb could paralyze a mobilizing country.⁷⁴

Another fear emerged with the prospect of cold war with the USSR and the belief that any future large-scale war would require a first strike against the benefactor of world peace, the United States.⁷⁵ In the absence of a world organization like the United Nations that guaranteed international peace, the US had to be respected internationally as a nation that could protect itself. A final challenge was the effect of demobilization on the NG and the ORC.⁷⁶ With World War II enemies vanquished, demobilizing the mass of citizen-soldiers became a priority, but the structure of a new military establishment had not been settled. Rapid demobilization and volunteer recruiting could produce an army ill-suited to accomplish the tasks of occupation and rebuilding, especially in the face of a peer adversary. This Cold War mentality reinforced the need for

⁷³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, 211.

⁷⁴ Harry S. Truman, "Message to Congress on Universal Military Training, 22 October 1945," in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 8-1; Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Statement to the Committee on Military Affairs, US House of Representatives, 15 November 1945," in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training*, (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 12-2; J.L. Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," presentation in *Background Material for War Department Presentation to the Committee on the Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 11 February 1947* (Washington, DC: War Department Legislative and Liaison Division, 11 February 1947), 3-5.

⁷⁵ Eisenhower, "Statement to the Committee on Military Affairs, US House of Representatives, 15 November 1945," 12-5; Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," 2; Truman, "Message to Congress on Universal Military Training, 22 October 1945," 8-1; Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 33-41.

⁷⁶ Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," 11; US War Department, "Universal Military Training Information Pamphlet," in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 20-4 and 20-5.

mobilization protocols backed by a manpower policy that established a robust capability before war.⁷⁷ For the military, UMT was a means to a strategic end.

Politicians such as President Harry Truman chose to adopt UMT for reasons other than military necessity. UMT represented an opportunity to achieve social change like better literacy and uniform education for the nation or vocational and professional training for the work force.⁷⁸ Exemplifying this mentality are remarks Truman made in 1946: “I want you to be known as the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training. I want that word ‘military’ left out. The military phase is incidental to what I have in mind.”⁷⁹ For politicians, UMT was a means to a different end, one focused on social improvement.

Initially, concepts for UMT were drafted by the War Department and the American Legion. Both were similar but differed in terms of options for the trainees.⁸⁰ In January 1947 both plans were reviewed for the chairman of the Advisory Commission on Universal Training by the US Attorney General Tom C. Clark to determine constitutionality. In Clark’s opinion on UMT he stated, “...either of the two proposals for the establishment of a system of universal military training...would be well within the constitutional powers of the federal government.”⁸¹ According to Clark, if the Supreme Court found in 1918 that a mutual obligation existed between

⁷⁷ Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, “Universal Military Training, Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy Report to the US House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 July 1945,” in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 7-3; Truman, “Message to Congress on Universal Military Training, 22 October 1945,” 8-6; Henry L. Stimson, “Statement before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Establishment Policy, US House of Representatives, 15 June 1945,” in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 4-1; Eisenhower, “Statement to the Committee on Military Affairs, US House of Representatives, 15 November 1945,” 12-2 and 12-3.

⁷⁸ Truman, “Message to Congress on Universal Military Training, 22 October 1945,” 8-2.

⁷⁹ Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 119.

⁸⁰ US War Department, “Outline of the War Department Plan for Universal Military Training,” in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 19-1 – 19-2; Tom C. Clark, “Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training: Letter Opinion For The Chairman Advisory Commission On Universal Training,” May 22, 1947, accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.justice.gov/file/20631/download>.

⁸¹ Clark, “Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training: Letter Opinion For The Chairman Advisory Commission On Universal Training,” May 22, 1947.

the government and its citizens which was further upheld through the peacetime drafts of 1940-1941, then it was within the power of Congress to compel military service from the citizen under circumstances of UMT.⁸² This was then not a legal matter, but a policy matter. If Congress deemed national security to need UMT, then Congress had the authority to pass legislation to compel service from citizens. The key was articulating the circumstances which necessitated the policy.

After Clark offered his opinion the War Department plan was merged with the American Legion plan.⁸³ Later in 1947, the plan for UMT included provisions that would make every eligible white male attend compulsory military training lasting between six and twelve months. Citizens were to register at eighteen years of age and be examined for physical and mental fitness. The period of training was set at one year and firmly based on the initial mobilization experience of the US in World War II.⁸⁴

Annually, it was forecast that 1,000,000 physically and mentally suitable males would reach the age of eighteen.⁸⁵ Of this one million, the Army and Air Force would be allotted 750,000 for training. The Navy would receive the balance of 250,000. The Army's envisioned UMT force structure consisted of three tiers: an active and inactive force, and an unassigned pool of trained citizens. To fulfill post war duties the interim Regular Army would form the first tier and was to consist of 1,070,000 soldiers and airmen.⁸⁶ The second tier was the mobilization day

⁸² Clark, "Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training: Letter Opinion For The Chairman Advisory Commission On Universal Training," May 22, 1947.

⁸³ Robert P. Patterson, *Address before the American Legion Convention, 2 October 1946*, in National Security Program: Universal Military Training (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 17-3 – 17-5.

⁸⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, 212-213; Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 35-41.

⁸⁵ Patterson, *Address before the American Legion Convention, 2 October 1946*, 17-4.

⁸⁶ Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," 8-10. The word "Interim" in this context means the performance of non-typical duties such as the occupation of Germany and Japan. When the peacetime Army was not required in strength overseas, the Regular Army would be reduced to 875,000 personnel.

force (M-Day) and consisted of the National Guard at 680,000 and the Organized Reserves at 876,000.⁸⁷ The third tier was the largest and consisted of three million trained but unassigned citizens who could be rapidly inducted. These personnel could not be mobilized nearly as fast as the National Guard or Organized Reserve but could organize into fighting formations very rapidly compared with ordinarily drafted citizens. In total, under the revised UMT plan, the combination of all three tiers represented a sum of 5.5 million and could expand further if the situation warranted it.⁸⁸




Figure 2. The Proposed Structure of UMT in 1947. Figure created by author. Data from J.L. Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," presentation in *Background Material for War Department Presentation to the Committee on the Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 11 February 1947* (Washington, DC: War Department Legislative and Liaison Division, 11 February 1947), 8-10.

⁸⁷ Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," 8-10. Mobilization-Day force indicates an organization of forces such as the National Guard or Organized Reserve that are not at the same level of preparedness of the Regular Army but are part of the military establishment. These forces will mobilize upon order from Congress and the President of the United States to fulfill their military roles in an active capacity.

⁸⁸ Collins, "The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment," 8-10.

Cost and Benefit of a UMT System

The benefits a UMT system include the creation of a large reserve pool while limiting the impact to society and the economy. During training citizens may also acquire a cultural connection or reinforced sense of national pride in their training and opt to volunteer in the first or second tiers of the Army. Temporally, UMT or compulsory training is a long-term solution for a potential problem, unlike compulsive selective service which is a near-term solution projected onto an immediate problem. Financially the program was estimated to carry a sizable commitment of around \$1 billion per year.⁸⁹ A significant sum when compared to the envisioned War Department peacetime budget of \$3.8 billion. Moreover, economists in 1945 stated the actual cost of the total military establishment would be far higher if the opportunity cost for the trainees were factored in, potentially doubling the War Department budget.⁹⁰

Functionally, UMT is a strategy oriented on deterrence versus force. After World War II, avoiding war was seen as financially and morally responsible. According to War Department estimates, the cost of war had exponentially risen from the 18th to the 20th century and skyrocketed with World War II.⁹¹ Just one week of war in 1945 cost \$1.75 billion.⁹² In terms of preparedness, the ability to wage war effectively from the outset was believed to be the key for

⁸⁹ Rainer Schikele and Glenn Everett, "Economic Implications of Universal Military Training," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 241 (September 1945): 104-108, accessed 19 September 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1025906>.

⁹⁰ Ibid. According to Rainer Schikele and Glenn Everett, a trainee cohort consisting of 770,000 men diverted from civilian employment for one training year carried with it the burden of \$1.9 billion in goods and services that would otherwise not be contributed to the economy. Realistically, they argued the direct and indirect cost of operating the UMT program would equal the active budget of \$4 billion and bring the total cost of proposed UMT closer to \$8 billion.

⁹¹ Taylor, *Every Citizen a Soldier*, 58-60. Essentially, the combined cost of the Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican-American War, Civil War, Spanish-American War, and World War I amounted to \$173 billion. World War II on the other hand totaled over \$300 billion. Both amounts use the value of the dollar in the 1940's.

⁹² US War Department, "Universal Military Training Information Pamphlet," 20-1 and 20-11. This sum in 1945 is roughly equivalent to at least \$25.1 billion in 2020 according to <https://www.measuringworth.com>.

ending the war quickly and thereby avoiding a costly protracted fight.⁹³ Internationally, the United Nations was still in its infancy and remained uncertain of whether it would develop a mechanism to ensure the peace. The United States guaranteed that peace.

Disadvantages however are numerous. From a military perspective, UMT does not contribute directly to combat units by producing military personnel, only militarily trained citizens. In peace, the organized components of the Army will only receive immediate benefit from this system if some citizens agree to volunteer and make use of their obligatory training. The capacity required for the system to function properly as a deterrent takes longer periods of time to cultivate. In the 1940's, the period was five years, after which the UMT system could be relied upon to react immediately to a national emergency. Therefore, in the interim build-up period the military would be weakened.

As late as 1948, Secretary of State George Marshall testified before Congress that there was one remaining item which, up to that point, had not yet been solved.⁹⁴ If a key premise of UMT was to keep the standing army small and therefore cheap, how was this to be accomplished while also training 1 million new men annually? Further, how can the small standing army function properly and accomplish its peacetime administrative tasks if great resources were required just to train the annual cohort?

Research suggests that a secondary problem resides in the hypothetical situation where a trained cohort was called forward. Who would lead this massive influx of recruits aged nineteen to twenty-four? Well before World War II, the Army knew mobilization required the synchronization of personnel and materiel. A painful and unplanned for lesson was omitting the

⁹³ According to the War Department information pamphlet on UMT, if any future war was won just three days faster than it would have without UMT, then the entire institution pays for itself. US War Department, "Universal Military Training Information Pamphlet," 20-11.

⁹⁴ US Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, April 1, 2, and 3, 1948, 8.

expansion of the leadership corps to match the Army.⁹⁵ Creating units was accomplished much faster than training officers to lead the units. The main problem in officer procurement was the uncertainty of the total strength troop basis.⁹⁶ An unknown troop strength number produced cascading fluctuations in the flow of leaders through various officer schools. UMT would solve the initial issue of uncertainty in the total strength of the force, but not solve the issue of creating quality leaders fast enough to match the call up of a young general reserve pool.

Section IV – If America Had UMT Today

Because the US has never enacted UMT, there is merit in attempting to understand what UMT would look like in practice. This section will establish the modern context regarding the information age, the international situation, the current US force structure, and the domestic US environment. Then it will apply the 1940's version of UMT to discern acceptability, suitability, and feasibility.

The industrial age created technology that made it possible for globalization physically while the information age has achieved globalization cognitively. The heart of the issue is understanding the effect of problems produced via the information age on practices, norms, standards, protocols, agreements, individuals, organizations, and institutions that were shaped in the preceding industrial age.

Nearly thirty years have passed since the decline of the Soviet Union and the rise of a sole superpower. This period has yielded relative peace with limited wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere but no major conflict on the scale of World War II. Globally, the US continues to

⁹⁵ Between 1941 and 1943, while the Army expanded by millions of soldiers, the Army officer corps failed to keep pace. At the beginning of the war there were only 15,000 officers in the Regular Army. By the end of the war, that number grew to nearly 800,000. Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 379.

⁹⁶ Trevor C. Wieggers, "The Leadership Gap In Extremis: Challenges Of Officer Procurement In World War II." Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2019), 163-169.

enjoy a status of preeminence in warfare as the world's most lethal and globally connected fighting force. As a byproduct of policy, US strategy has shifted between collective security, selective engagement, primacy, and cooperative security.⁹⁷ As desirable as a return to homeland defense might be, the current world order with international laws and norms established through decades of interaction makes abandoning these institutions unacceptable.⁹⁸

Further, the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) also describes the nature of the global environment as different from that which existed during the bipolar years of the Cold War.⁹⁹ The world is competitive, no longer the domain in which a superpower can extend influence without constraint due to a variation of threats. State powers like Russia and China seek to expand their influence by undermining the existing order of nations. Other state powers like Iran and North Korea attempt to destabilize regions to secure their political goals. Emergent enemies are ideologically rooted transnational terrorist and criminal groups, such as the Islamic State. These adversaries are the products of the information age and reflect a diffusion of power to the lowest levels. This latter group is equally significant and confounding because non-state actors can mobilize populations opposed to democratic ideals without regard for the boundaries of a sovereign state. Additionally, the manner in which each variant can act are not solely limited to armed conflict in the traditional domains of air, land, and sea. In the information age, technology provides new avenues for operations in the domains of space and cyberspace as well as the information environment where action can be both catastrophic and non-attributable.

The goals of the NSS as well as the unclassified summary of the National Defense Strategy, make it clear that the US will retain a position of preeminence, strengthening

⁹⁷ Robert Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 178-188.

⁹⁸ John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 1-10, 258.

⁹⁹ Donald J. Trump, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (The White House, 17 December 2017), 2-3, 25-26.

multinational allies and partners, and protecting multilateral forums to pursue vital interests..¹⁰⁰ These vital interests include: homeland defense, promotion of American prosperity, preservation of peace through strength, and the advancement of American influence..¹⁰¹ United States commitments are global because US issues and interests are global.

Accordingly, the US military is robust and employs an AVF which includes an active component with a similarly sized reserve. Combined, the total of both components was 2,351,602 in 2017..¹⁰² The active component is both tactically proficient and employed operationally around the world. The reserve however, is strategic in nature. A majority of the multi-functional capabilities required for large scale combat operations only exist within the Army Reserve or the National Guard..¹⁰³ The rationale is to maximize the ratio of combat forces in the active component, where they can be dispatched immediately in response to a range of dangers and to stay within the authorized troop strength imposed by Congress. In the event of major conflict, the multi-functional capabilities in the organized reserve are called upon as needed.

This design has worked well, and its prestige according to most Americans is better than the Vietnam era..¹⁰⁴ There are costs associated with this design however. It becomes problematic when the strategic-organized reserve is used operationally in a rhythmic cycle of mobilization and demobilization, as occurred during the years of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Such a cycle exhausts both the principal fighting force and the strategic reserve.

¹⁰⁰ US Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (19 January 2018), 5-9; Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 4, 19, 25-26, 29, 37-41.

¹⁰¹ Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 3-4.

¹⁰² US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, 3-4.

¹⁰³ John Polowczyk, “Selective Service Hearing: Future Mobilization Needs of the Nation,” testimony, National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 5-6; James Stewart, “Selective Service Hearing: Future Mobilization Needs of the Nation,” testimony, National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (Washington, DC: 24 April 2019), 2-6.

¹⁰⁴ Megan Brenan, “Americans Most Satisfied With Nation's Military, Security,” Gallup Poll, 28 January 2019, accessed 24 March 2020, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/246254/americans-satisfied-nation-military-security.aspx>

Maintaining a fully professional and modernized force in a perpetual state of readiness is expensive but possible. A dormant draft mechanism does continue to support the AVF. Essentially, its purpose is to deliver unorganized and untrained citizens to the Armed Forces as rapidly and fairly as possible. Once the SSS bridges the gap between civilian and the Armed Forces, the total system functions to transform the manpower resources of the country into power potential. The ability to grow the Army quickly can be applied to compel rival nation-states to change their behavior. In its dormant form (essentially in times of peace), the potential created by the draft mechanism is also a type of power which can deter unwanted behavior.

However, focusing on a policy of deterrence necessitates two things specifically. First, the threat of the use of force must be credible. Second, the adversary must understand what will cause the threat of force to be used. In other words, the threat must understand US objectives and acknowledge US resolve to pursue them.¹⁰⁵

Future warfare, as stated in 2018 by Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley, will be long, hard, and fought between nations.¹⁰⁶ The US military may continue to enjoy preeminence, but is actively seeking modernization to counter rising conventional threats. Conceptually, multi-domain operations will become the doctrinal foundation for the joint force of the future, replacing the long-embraced air-land battle doctrine of the Cold War. This new concept posits that successful operations will need to be synchronized across combinations of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace in order to overcome peer competition.¹⁰⁷ Rather than

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 36-43.

¹⁰⁶ Mark A. Milley, "Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon" (lecture, Association of the United States Army, 4 October 2016), accessed 27 May 2019, <https://www.ausa.org/events/ausa-annual-meeting-exposition/sessions/eisenhower-luncheon>; Meghann Myers, "Milley: Future wars will be long, they'll be fought on the ground, and spec ops won't save us," *Army Times* (July 2017), accessed 27 May 2019, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/07/27/milley-future-wars-will-be-long-theyll-be-fought-on-the-ground-and-spec-ops-wont-save-us/>.

¹⁰⁷ US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 15-23.

structure operations sequentially in terms of intensity, joint operations will now occur continuously between two interwoven periods: competition and conflict.

Modernization of equipment and the doctrine to employ it also evolve at a much higher rate than it did in the industrial age. It is a reciprocal effect which is paradoxical in nature. Once a new capability is employed, the inevitable countermeasure is developed which leads to its nullification.¹⁰⁸ Deterrence, according to Thomas Schelling, “posits a response to something unacceptable but is quiescent in the absence of provocation.”¹⁰⁹ Strategically, a policy of deterrence requires the adversary to acknowledge a credible threat. In this case, primacy and deterrence depend on a capability that rests on more than sophisticated technology, although this ability is not deleterious.

Hypothetically, if today’s US military establishment were built upon a foundation of UMT, that system would operate within the context of the factors mentioned above. It is impossible to predict the interplay between a type of military structure that has never been tried within a specific social system and the reaction of that system in response. Using the same criteria proposed for UMT in 1948, some measure of accuracy can be found in determining its acceptability, suitability, and feasibility today.

Acceptability

Broadly, acceptability here will only be broken into two components: social and constitutional. Historically, a political leader could steer social perception by clearly articulating needs and requirements to the people. Even in the late 1940’s, society was either neutral to the implementation of UMT or in favor of it. When measures of obligatory service have been extolled in the past, it was the ability of leaders to clearly articulate threats to national security,

¹⁰⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 28-31.

¹⁰⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, preface x.

and by extension the citizens themselves, which were major determining factors.¹¹⁰ When considering the effect of a draft on public opinion, especially when it is run poorly or during an unpopular war, political inability to persuade the American people of a threat can erode support for the effort entirely.¹¹¹ Therefore, political savviness plays a large part in maintaining support for a UMT establishment but if its chief purpose remains wedded to military necessity, and distributed fairly and equitably, it may be easier to swallow in the long run.

The other aspect of acceptability involves the Constitution. As noted in the previous sections, the ability of the federal government to call upon the state National Guards in time of need and also its ability to compel the service of ordinary citizens are a matter of policy. Compelling citizens to serve is constitutional if Congress deems it necessary and proper while the Supreme Court also upholds the legality of such an order, like the peacetime draft of 1940-1941. In 1947, the US Attorney General asserted that UMT be “sufficiently close, in type and purpose” to that of the draft of 1917 and the “circumstances of enactment be deemed sufficiently similar.”¹¹² In short, the 1947 UMT proposal met that criteria in law. Any UMT system today would also have to abide by those same landmarks. Fundamentally, this means the recent shift in DOD policy and its cascading effect on draft eligibility, any system of UMT today would have to accommodate gender neutrality in fairness and equitability.

Suitability

Practically, UMT must also be suitable and meet the demands of the current US military. Similar to the previous category, UMT as it was proposed in its final form from 1948 provide the

¹¹⁰ William M. Raymond, “Uncle Sam says, ‘I Want You!’ – The Politics of the Draft and National Service,” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005), 36-38.

¹¹¹ Laich, *Skin In The Game*, 22-25, 31-32.

¹¹² Clark, “Authority to Establish System of Universal Military Training: Letter Opinion For The Chairman Advisory Commission On Universal Training,” May 22, 1947.

criteria, meaning this projection will resemble the latest 1940's version but use demographic data from today's environment.

First, in 1948 the US population was approximately 147 million and it was forecasted that each age cohort contained approximately 1 million fit for service.¹¹³ According to the US Census, the population of the US in July 2019 was 328 million.¹¹⁴ In late 2017 it was estimated that there were 31.7 million citizens between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four that were eligible for service.¹¹⁵ If this number is divided by seven (seventeen minus twenty-four) then the approximate number of yearly fit youth is over 4 million. This is the number that would be trained each year, and would increase as the general population rose.

Just the top two tiers of 1940's UMT were envisioned to have a strength greater than the total of today's combined joint force of 2.4 million.¹¹⁶ Even the drawn down Regular Army with no occupational duties would have numbered 2.6 million men. Obviously, there are several macro and micro differences between today's military and that of seventy-two years ago. A prime example is the separation of the Air Force from the Army. A more nuanced example is branch specialization like cyber.¹¹⁷ This lesson is more conceptual since seventy-two years ago UMT was meant to provide extensive manpower.

¹¹³ Patterson, "Address before the American Legion Convention, 2 October 1946," 17-4.

¹¹⁴ US Census Bureau, "Quick Facts; United States," accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219#PST045219>.

¹¹⁵ NCOS, *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 32-33.

¹¹⁶ In 1948, the interim Regular Army would have been 1,070,000 men and the combined M-Day force would have been 1,755,000 men for a total of 2,825,000.

¹¹⁷ US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, 3-4.




Figure 3. Comparison of the Past Proposed and Modern Hypothetical Unassigned Reserve Pool. Figure created by author. Data from J.L. Collins, “The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment,” presentation in *Background Material for War Department Presentation to the Committee on the Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 11 February 1947* (Washington, DC: War Department Legislative and Liaison Division, 11 February 1947), 8-10.

If UMT was adopted today within constitutional parameters it would be even more robust. The Regular Army, National Guard and Army Reserve might fluctuate up or down in strength but the real defining difference would be the unassigned pool of trained citizens. Today that pool would consist of 12 million citizens, both men and women, with another 4 million in training. This number represents the total available for all branches of service. If the Army and Air Force slice was similar to that of 1948, 9 million men and women would be trained to the standards of those branches and await the call to arms.¹¹⁸ Another 3 million would be in training and becoming available at intervals of 187,500 personnel every three months. At that rate of growth, if the entire unassigned pool of 12 million citizens did not currently exist, newly trained citizens would surpass in number today’s Regular Army and Air Force in just over one year.

Conceptually, the easiest way to envision the difference between today’s AVF and that of 1948’s planned UMT establishment is with layered pyramids, one upright and the other inverted.

¹¹⁸ In 1948, the army slice was 750,000 out of approximately 1,000,000 in an age cohort. The navy received the balance.

The 1948 pyramid would seem more traditional with the principal fighting force at top representing the smallest layer. The M-Day reserve forces would be in the center representing a larger contingent of personnel and the bottom would be largest with a vast personnel reservoir. Today's pyramid would be inverted. The principal fighting force would be at the top, but instead represents the base. The center would be the Ready Reserve composed of joint National Guard and Reserve.¹¹⁹ At the bottom would be the Individual Ready Reserve, representing a mere fraction of the combined total of the Armed Forces. This category is similar to the UMT unassigned pool in that they do not routinely train but different in that they once were in the active component or Ready Reserve and remain service members still.




Figure 4. Proposed UMT Force Structure Compared with Current Force Structure. Created by author. Data from US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy (Washington, DC, 2018), 3-4.

If the two pyramids were superimposed so that the proposed 1940's UMT establishment became today's military structure, it is entirely conceivable that such a force could contend with the modern strategic environment. Moreover, as Eliot Cohen posits, a larger defense department is necessary to contend with the variety of threats pervasive in today's world.¹²⁰ Under a modern

¹¹⁹ Such as Army National Guard and the Air Force National Guard or the Marine Corps Reserve and the Navy Reserve.

¹²⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & the Necessity of Military Force*

UMT program, it would also be easier to delineate the strategic reserve from the operational reserve. Within the current defense structure, the Ready Reserve is the strategic reserve but has been utilized in an operational role throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A triple tiered pyramid of the UMT design may make it more conducive for the US to secure global interests. The principal fighting force can be used abroad as it currently is now, while the state National Guards and Reserves are in stand-by with multi-functional capabilities absent from the active force. Of course, the strategic reserve would be the unassigned pool of 12 million US citizens, called forward only under circumstances of strategic necessity. In this manner of thinking, UMT forming the foundation of a current military establishment would be wholly suitable.




Figure 5. Comparison of Proposed 1947 UMT and Current Force Structure. Figure created by author.

Feasibility

In terms of feasibility, a modern UMT focused program comes with significant challenges. As Secretary Marshall stated in 1948, one of the more confounding problems with UMT was how to routinely train the masses without overburdening the ‘small’ professional army. Modern UMT would magnify this problem for two reasons. If the system is truly democratic in nature, the system must equitably adhere to all citizens. As the population increases, so does the

(New York: Basic Books, 2016), 195.

size of the cohort that must be trained annually. Second, women must also be included within the cohort, as gender can no longer be considered in isolation from the broader definition of a citizen's obligation to the nation. Again, in 1948, the annual cohort of fit youngsters to be trained was around 1 million men. The US population since 1948 has doubled and with it the size of that contingent. Now roughly 2 million young men must be trained annually. Adding women into the equation further doubles the required induction rate to roughly 4 million fit men and women coming of age annually.¹²¹ If broken into quarters of the year, 1 million citizens would begin training and one million would be finishing training, every three months.




Figure 6. Comparison of Cohort Size and Training Time Concept. Figure created by author. Data from Robert P. Patterson, "Address before the American Legion Convention, 2 October 1946," in *National Security Program: Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: War Department, January 1947), 17-3 – 17-5.

Once the Legion and War Department Plans were merged in 1947, options were offered at the six-month mark of training allowing citizens to choose their own path forward. At that point many could choose to enlist in the Organized Reserve, the National Guard, or the Regular Army; thus becoming a full-fledged member of the military establishment and fulfilling the balance of their obligation. Based on merit, some could opt for civilian education where they joined the enlisted Organized Reserve Corps and pursued technical degrees or join the Reserve

¹²¹ NCOS, *Inspired to Serve*, The final report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, 32.

Officers Training Corps, leading to a commission. Roughly half would continue their obligatory training in the camps for the full year and then be released as civilians once again.¹²² That model worked as a means of filling the various military components, keeping them at optimal strength and replenishing the reservoir of unassigned citizens. Today, if there was no change in the strength of the active component or the Ready Reserve commensurate with the increase in population, the opportunities to join the military establishment would narrow while the majority of the cohort would be forced to finish obligatory training. Therefore, the original issue of “who” trains the annual cohort is not nullified in 2020, but compounded further.

Avoiding the extreme cost of maintaining a large standing army is a mainstay of the UMT program, further impacted by the rise of today’s population. At any given time, 4 million trainees will be somewhere in the process of training. In strictly Army terms, if a corps is roughly 100,000 troops in size and has four divisions within, then conceptually the active component of the Army would be responsible for training the equivalent of forty corps made up of 160 divisions annually.¹²³ Additionally, the Army would still be responsible for performing its main function of garrisoning installations and securing US interests globally. Of course, this is a gross oversimplification but is meant to convey the gravity of training resources required to successfully absorb in quantity while not sacrificing quality under UMT.

Without continuing further into aspects of training, demographically the force itself would be greatly altered. Forty percent of today’s service members are under the age of twenty-five.¹²⁴ If the active force was not expanded in a proportionate ratio to compensate for massive unassigned pools, the metric would be completely inverted. Those under twenty-five would

¹²² US War Department, “Universal Military Training Information Pamphlet,” 20-9 – 20-10; Collins, “The Post War Military Establishment and Manpower Requirements for the Military Establishment,” 13-14.

¹²³ A more precise estimate would be thirty corps and 120 divisions since the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard would also be responsible for training their respective quotas.

¹²⁴ US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, 8.

become the majority to the range of ninety percent, while only ten percent of the force is over twenty-five years old. In times of peace, or competition short of a national emergency, this would be no large issue. In times of large-scale war however, with 12 million under the age of twenty-five being called to service, that simple demographic depicts a future where the military would be hard pressed to lead itself.




Figure 7. Comparison of Current Age Demographic with Hypothetical UMT Population. Figure on left: US Department of Defense, *2017 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community*, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy (Washington, DC, 2018), 8. Figure on right created by author.

One of the great issues encountered with rapid US mobilization in 1942 was that leaders became increasingly sparse while the force expanded, especially in the Army. Leaders take time to train. In World War II, the predominant source of junior grade officers was the Officer Candidate School (OCS), which acquired suitable candidates from the Army. Two issues made this practice difficult. First, if quality candidates could not be found in the Army then either the quality of the candidate decreased or quality leaders were stripped from elsewhere, such as the non-commissioned officer corps. A paradox was then established whereby producing an officer

meant he was either a sub-standard creation or created leadership gaps elsewhere.¹²⁵

Hypothetically, with an unassigned pool of basic trained and vetted citizens, the Army would likely not have the issue of not knowing who had the propensity to be a leader and better mitigate against stripping the National Guard, Reserve, and Active components of non-commissioned officers.

The second issue revolves around infrastructure and likely creating a negative effect. Facilities and instructors had to be available to train the officer candidates, and large numbers of them in order to provision the divisions as they were formed. With a system of UMT, trained citizens from the unassigned pools would require much less time to organize and less overall time to collectively re-train as fighting formations. This rate of organization is likely too fast for the creation of a proportionate number of junior officers to lead them. By late 1942, OCS facilities alone were commissioning 23,000 officers a month and that was still too few to keep pace with the activation of thirty-eight divisions in that same year.¹²⁶ As an example, if a single infantry division in 1943 required around 500 junior officers, then the hypothetical rapid mobilization of 160 divisions (one-third of the unassigned pool) under UMT today would require a corresponding 80,000 officer complement. Again, a gross oversimplification, but meant to underscore the difficulty of providing leaders for such a massive force. At stake is another mainstay of UMT, the ability to mobilize overwhelming force rapidly by having the unassigned reservoir in the first place.

¹²⁵ Wieggers, "The Leadership Gap In Extremis: Challenges Of Officer Procurement In World War II," 107-122, 167-168.

¹²⁶ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 374; William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 8; Arthur T. Coumbe, Steven J. Condly, and William L. Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars? An Analysis of Army Officer Testing* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute & US Army War College Press, 2017), 139-145.




Figure 8. Early 1940's Rate of Organization against Rate of Leader Creation. George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 39, 70.

Mobilization of equipment and materiel presents a final challenge of UMT feasibility as it must be closely synchronized with the organization of personnel.¹²⁷ In particular, materiel is confounding from a fiscal perspective. Today's information environment, among many other things, is characterized by the ubiquitous presence of technology and the rapidity by which gadgets become obsolete by the invention of newer gadgets. Under UMT, large repositories of equipment would have to be developed and stored. Every type of materiel, from the tank, to trucks, to rifles, maps and compasses. This is the only way mobilization of huge unassigned pools can be as seamless as possible.

Storing this equipment is not the issue. Maintenance of it will cost sums to the taxpayer, but even more costly will be the requirement to modernize or replace it. This is a type of strategic paradox referred to by Edward N. Luttwak in *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Robert R. Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army, Study Number 4* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 2-3.

¹²⁸ Luttwak, *Strategy*, 28-31.

Essentially, when a capability such as a tank, is developed, it is then only a matter of time before an adversary develops a counter-measure to it, nullifying the initial advantage. If complete stores of equipment were provisioned for an unassigned pool of twelve million citizens, it would only be a matter of time before the entire store was technologically obsolete and had to be either restocked or modified. Today's average M4 carbine cost the taxpayer around \$700 each. If that weapon were mass produced and stored for the unassigned force pool, it would approximate \$8.4 billion of sunk equipment costs. When, not if, the carbine becomes obsolete it will cost substantially more to field newer models of sophisticated equipment to restock the repository. \$8 billion dollars is a relatively minimal amount to pay for one item of equipment but when considering the complete array of equipment sets and major end items like tanks, the figure grows exponentially. Many, if not all, other pieces of equipment would follow the same pattern of contemporary predominance, mass production, storage, upkeep, obsolescence, and inevitable replacement.

Section V – Selective Military Training; A Hybrid Approach Balancing Obligatory Service and Training with Volunteers

The current military establishment is based on the AVF. It has become the most efficient fighting force in the world. However, the variety of threats combined with global US interests has placed unrealistic goals on this small but highly professionalized force. Amidst the complexity of a modern age which requires new solutions, one thing is clear: the US has an inconsistent history of manpower policy. A new policy regardless of its form, must capitalize on the strengths of those past experiences while also avoiding their weaknesses. While America has great experience with an AVF, it also has profound experience with compulsory service but not with compulsory training. An information age solution to manning the services may be a hybrid of all three approaches.

Selective military training (SMT) as described here is a combination which incorporates elements of compulsory service, compulsory training, and an AVF. It may not be the best solution but it is a conceptual approach for further research. A fitting description of SMT would be a manpower policy that seeks to leverage the AVF as a principal standing formation alongside the Ready Reserve. This force could then capitalize on the merits of a selective draft to identify and groom personnel talent for an unassigned pool of manpower that can be called upon when needed as a strategic reserve. Conceptually, the SMT military establishment resembles a pyramid with equal sides and three layers within it. It relies on the known strength of an experienced, professional, and technically sophisticated volunteer force to form the active component which can be applied globally. This volunteer element is at the apex of the pyramid. It is the smallest but also the most immediately available capability with which the US can use to extend its influence around the world. It is tactical in nature, seeking culmination in victory and securing US interests.




Figure 9. Selective Military Training Force Structure. Figure created by author.

At the center of the pyramid is the ready reserve composed of Title 32 National Guard and various Title 10 reserve components. These are also volunteers, and resemble the makeup of the current establishment. They are inactive in that military business is not their primary role, but active in that they consolidate and train at regular intervals throughout the year. This reserve is not tactical but functions at a more operational level. Its makeup is multi-dimensional and has the

capacity to perform each of the missions assigned to the active component. A predominant necessity is preserving the ability to do those things which the active component does not typically perform, and thereby freeing the active force to be more agile. In non-typical endeavors, those which are most traditionally associated with the military, these multifunctional capabilities are essential for the successful prosecution of large-scale combat operations.

The base of the pyramid is the most divergent from our current military establishment. It is the largest and formed through the selective draft of citizens according to their physical and mental fitness, but also their competencies and attributes. These citizens are trained in the military art but not considered part of the military establishment. Upon completion of their training, citizens return to their civilian roles. In this manner, the strength of the UMT paradigm is used to create the backbone of a strategic reserve that can be mobilized rapidly. It is not, however, truly universal. All citizens would be required to register and all would be examined for fitness, skills, talents, and attributes, but not all would be trained. In this manner the system is selective and similar to the drafts of old. Personnel requisitioned would be proportionate to the amount that can be feasibly mobilized with haste and only those which can tip the scales at the outbreak of a national emergency. An example is a citizen with specialized cyber skills, something that is highly desirable to the military but not generally in abundance. In this way, the military establishment can avoid the task of training the entire mass of an age cohort or attempting to provision a repository of shelf-life equipment.

Arguably, the most difficult aspect of this policy would be the selection of a skilled individual for military service and moving away from the traditional US use of a draft lottery. This is a perfect reflection of the previously noted tax dilemma. For ordinary personnel needed in high-density positions such as infantry or artillery, the selection would function as it has in the past, complete randomness in accordance with mental and physical fitness requirements determined by the DOD. For the skilled citizen however, new DOD policy would have to be forged so that cognitive abilities and skills could be used to categorize all members of an age

cohort. With a quantifiable determinant of what constitutes a desirable cognitive trait needed for the defense of national security, youth could be differentiated. There are already standards which apply equally to men and women that determine physical and mental fitness for service. The same can be sought to determine cognitive fitness and specialized skills. Within this cognitive category, all members of the age cohort that qualify would be subject to the same randomness of a lottery program. Further, cognitive capability would be the new metric differentiating some men and women from others. It is possible that this metric could be constitutionally applied, through revised DOD policy, without violating due process in the same manner women used to be distinguished from men in draft registration.

As George Washington wrote over 200 years ago, citizens selected for the unassigned reserve are the “Van and flower of the American forces...[and] should meet with such exemptions, privileges or distinctions, as might tend to keep alive a true Military pride, a nice sense of honour, and a patriotic regard for the public.”¹²⁹ Those citizens volunteering and selected should be recognized for their commitment. Everything from educational benefits, to preferred federal employment status, to tax credits or even tax exemption are options within the capacity of the state to direct and bestow. In this way, the strength of the AVF can continue to incentivize and harbor the prestige of the fighting force.

Developing a pool of selected citizens may not sound appealing to the average American today. The notion is not customary and therefore uncomfortable. In the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have been authorized by Congress and employed in hundreds of instances.¹³⁰ During this same period, the US has lost major battles but never a major war. A trend common in the initial stages of US wars is a lack of preparation during the period of peace

¹²⁹ Washington, “Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1 May 1783.”

¹³⁰ Congressional Research Service, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2019*, Congressional Research Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 17 July 2019), 1.

preceding them.¹³¹ George Marshall indicated as much when he wrote his final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army: “We can be certain that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one.”¹³² Over the past seventy years, the US has fought several wars, not on the scale of World War II, but it can be extrapolated that Marshall was referring to the probability of a third world war. In the same report he also made recommendations for a future military establishment based on UMT.

While the future cannot be predicted, future large-scale combat could accrue 100,000 casualties within a single year.¹³³ By this metric, the US military may sustain more casualties than it can replace using the SSS in the first year of conflict. This rate of attrition may be devastating for a military strategy centered on an AVF in a time when the pace of war is much faster than World War II or Korea. Therefore, modernization of the military establishment should be a priority on a holistic level. If the US is truly concerned with winning the first battle and not losing the next big war as Marshall believed, then it should be innovating now. Innovations should not cease with the active and reserve components alone; it must incorporate the linkage between citizen and service member. Currently, this linkage is known as the Selective Service System, which is now unconstitutional. While American lawmakers endeavor to repair the SSS and help bridge the civilian-military divide, now should be the time for military leaders to embrace the prospect of the unthinkable, the next war that cannot be lost.

The December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was an event that steered American resolve for war. It was not however, the event which unified society and made possible the peacetime draft which prepared America for that war. This galvanizing event occurred during a time of

¹³¹ Charles E. Heller, and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 327-331.

¹³² Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, 214.

¹³³ David R. Jones, “Large-Scale Combat Operations, Casualties, and the All-Volunteer Force,” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2019), 39.

peace and preceded the December 7 attack by fifteen months. Today, or tomorrow, a similar unifying event may come as a strategic surprise, and could take many forms. At that point, how long will it take to build military capacity? If the object were to recreate the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, then military capacity will be generated rapidly but possibly take years to fully develop. Moreover, if the act expires (as it almost did in September 1941), and the US is not committed to war but still under a state of heightened tension, then the newly formed military forces will face the risk of disintegration.¹³⁴ Under a system resembling selective military training, the capability to rapidly generate coercive military power is never far from reach and not at risk of expiration during periods of anxiety.

This monograph does not advocate immediate overhaul of the military establishment. An American military establishment must be an extension of society and society must support its existence. It does however, promote the idea of seeking opportunities for innovation that may be uncomfortable because they have never been tried before. The proper time to introduce and explore the concept of SMT should not be after an adversary achieves strategic surprise.

¹³⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, 15; Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 145.

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