Air-Ground Success and Failure: Lessons Learned from Korea, November to December 1950
Abstract
The 2018 National Defense Strategy describes a global security environment rife with continuous competition against rival regimes that desire to create a new world order hostile to the United States' national interests. Accordingly, the primary national security concern is now inter-state strategic competition. While succeeding in competition may deter rival regimes' hostile actions, what if this deterrence fails and competition escalates to armed conflict? The Joint Force must then resort to coercion to compel the rival to change their behavior. Joint operations tend to leverage superior air power to support military coercion. Rivals recognize this advantage and seek ways to either match the capability or asymmetrically counter it. This situation is evident in the Western Pacific as tensions continue to fester between the United States and China. In this monograph, the author examines the application of air power in support of joint operations during the Second Chinese Offensive in Korea from November to December 1950. At that time, the United Nations Command (UNC) planned to fight to the Yalu River and reunify the Korean peninsula. Despite significant advantages in land, sea, and air over the Chinese Communist Forces, the UNC failed to achieve their goal and withdrew south of the 38th parallel. Today's Joint Force can learn valuable lessons from the UNC's failure that remain relevant to use of coercion and force projection. The intent of the author is to use an analysis of a historical case study to educate military planners on possible pitfalls that may preclude success before embarking on a limited, coercive campaign against the People's Liberation Army in the Western Pacific region.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1161050
Entities
People
- John C. Henderson
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies