



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**ENERGY RESILIENCE IMPACT OF SUPPLY CHAIN  
NETWORK DISRUPTION TO MILITARY MICROGRIDS**

by

Edward A. Anuat

December 2021

Thesis Advisor:

Douglas L. Van Bossuyt

Co-Advisor:

Anthony G. Pollman

**Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2021	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> ENERGY RESILIENCE IMPACT OF SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK DISRUPTION TO MILITARY MICROGRIDS			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Edward A. Anuat				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b> A	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  The ability to provide uninterrupted power to military installations is paramount in executing a country's national defense strategy. Microgrid architectures increase installation energy resilience through redundant local generation sources and the capability for grid independence. However, deliberate attacks from near-peer competitors can disrupt the associated supply chain network, thereby affecting mission-critical loads. Utilizing an integrated discrete-time Markov chain and dynamic Bayesian network approach, we investigate disruption propagation throughout a supply chain network and quantify its mission impact on an islanded microgrid. We propose a novel methodology and an associated metric we term "energy resilience impact" to identify and address supply-chain disruption risks to energy security. A case study of a fictional military installation is presented to demonstrate how installation energy managers can adopt this methodology for the design and improvement of military microgrids.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> microgrid, energy resilience impact, supply chain risk management, disruption propagation, ripple effect, dynamic Bayesian network, Markov chain analysis, mission assurance, military installation			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 67	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.**

**ENERGY RESILIENCE IMPACT OF SUPPLY CHAIN  
NETWORK DISRUPTION TO MILITARY MICROGRIDS**

Edward A. Anuat  
Lieutenant, United States Navy  
BSEE, The Citadel, 2012

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2021**

Approved by: Douglas L. Van Bossuyt  
Advisor

Anthony G. Pollman  
Co-Advisor

Oleg A. Yakimenko  
Chair, Department of Systems Engineering

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ABSTRACT**

The ability to provide uninterrupted power to military installations is paramount in executing a country's national defense strategy. Microgrid architectures increase installation energy resilience through redundant local generation sources and the capability for grid independence. However, deliberate attacks from near-peer competitors can disrupt the associated supply chain network, thereby affecting mission-critical loads. Utilizing an integrated discrete-time Markov chain and dynamic Bayesian network approach, we investigate disruption propagation throughout a supply chain network and quantify its mission impact on an islanded microgrid. We propose a novel methodology and an associated metric we term "energy resilience impact" to identify and address supply-chain disruption risks to energy security. A case study of a fictional military installation is presented to demonstrate how installation energy managers can adopt this methodology for the design and improvement of military microgrids.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

---

# Table of Contents

---

<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2 Manuscript Submission</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1 Energy Resilience Impact of Supply Chain Network Disruption to Military Microgrids . . . . .	3
2.2 Introduction . . . . .	4
2.3 Background and Literature Review . . . . .	4
2.4 Methodology . . . . .	14
2.5 Case Study . . . . .	19
2.6 Discussion and Future Work . . . . .	26
2.7 Conclusions . . . . .	27
<b>3 Conclusion</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1 Conclusion . . . . .	29
3.2 Future Work . . . . .	29
<b>Appendix: Simulation Refueling Logic</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>List of References</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Initial Distribution List</b>	<b>47</b>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

---

## List of Figures

---

Figure 2.1	Generic microgrid resilience curves before, during, and after a disruptive event. . . . .	7
Figure 2.2	Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of a supply chain network (SCN) .	10
Figure 2.3	Discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) model of a node with four operational states . . . . .	13
Figure 2.4	Methodology overview . . . . .	15
Figure 2.5	Microgrid one-line diagram for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey) . . . . .	20
Figure 2.6	Diesel fuel supply chain network (SCN) for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey) . . . . .	22
Figure 2.7	72-hour refueling disruption during islanded operation of current microgrid configuration. . . . .	23
Figure 2.8	72-hour refueling disruption during islanded operation of alternate microgrid configuration. . . . .	25
Figure A.1	Refueling logic for MATLAB simulation. . . . .	31

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

---

## List of Tables

---

Table 2.1	Example disruption risks to supply chain networks (SCNs) . . . .	11
Table 2.2	Facility data for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey).	21
Table 2.3	Failure scenario summary with current microgrid configuration . .	24
Table 2.4	Failure scenario summary with alternate microgrid configuration. .	25

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

---

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

---

<b>BESS</b>	battery energy storage system
<b>CDF</b>	customer damage function
<b>COOP</b>	continuity of operations
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus
<b>CPT</b>	conditional probability table
<b>DAG</b>	directed acyclic graph
<b>DBN</b>	dynamic Bayesian network
<b>DER</b>	distributed energy resource
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOE</b>	Department of Energy
<b>DON</b>	Department of the Navy
<b>DTMC</b>	discrete-time Markov chain
<b>EEDMI</b>	expected electrical disruption mission impact
<b>EMS</b>	emergency management system
<b>ESS</b>	energy storage system
<b>HILP</b>	high-impact-low-probability
<b>IEM</b>	installation energy manager
<b>ISO</b>	International Standards Organization
<b>LAES</b>	liquid air energy storage

<b>LCC</b>	life-cycle cost
<b>LIHP</b>	low-impact-high-probability
<b>MDI</b>	Mission Dependency Index
<b>MILCON</b>	military construction
<b>NPV</b>	net present value
<b>NSA</b>	Naval Support Activity
<b>PV</b>	photovoltaic
<b>RES</b>	renewable energy source
<b>RMP</b>	risk management process
<b>SA</b>	simulated annealing
<b>SCN</b>	supply chain network
<b>SCRES</b>	supply chain resilience
<b>SCRM</b>	supply chain risk management
<b>SE</b>	systems engineering
<b>TEU</b>	total expected utility
<b>UFC</b>	United Facilities Criteria

---

---

## Executive Summary

---

Over the past decade, there has been significant research regarding energy resilience and its context within military applications. Microgrid architectures have been of particular interest due their ability to operate independent of the external utility grid, thereby allowing for sustained operations when the necessity arises. Recent studies have looked at various aspects, such as cost and mission impact, but neglect to incorporate vulnerabilities within the supply chain network. Executive Order 14017 directed the United States government to review the nation’s critical supply chains and found significant risks to both economic and national security. As such, this thesis seeks to further understand the relationship between energy resilience and supply chain disruptions within the microgrid context.

Military microgrids differ from their civilian counterparts due to a concept known as mission assurance. Instead of a financial perspective, the armed forces are concerned about maintaining vital functions in support of national security. This thesis develops a novel metric termed “energy resilience impact” to relate power interruption to mission impact. The metric is incorporated into an overarching methodology which guides installation energy managers in the design and improvement of military microgrids. The steps are organized as follows:

1. Identify Critical Loads
2. Assign Mission Impact
3. Determine Total Assessment Period
4. Model Supply Chain Network
5. Generate Failure Scenarios
6. Simulate Microgrid Operation
7. Calculate Energy Resilience Impact
8. Determine Acceptable Impact
9. Develop Risk Treatment Strategies

A case study is then presented to demonstrate the potential usefulness of this method. The model utilizes Microsoft Excel to model a diesel supply chain which is inputted into a MATLAB simulation. Power generation and consumption is calculated in discrete time

steps to clearly determine when power demand is unmet, allowing for the calculation of expected unserved energy, energy resilience, and energy resilience impact. Two separate architectures were analyzed for the purposes of the case study—a baseline microgrid and one upgraded with hybridized generation sources.

Results showed that microgrids overly reliant on diesel fuel as a primary source of backup power are particularly susceptible to supply chain disruptions. By utilizing the proposed methodology, installation energy managers may conduct similar analysis of their microgrids to identify significant supply chain vulnerabilities. Different architectures may be iterated until a satisfactory result is designed. Lastly, the methodological limitations and indications for future work are highlighted for subsequent extensions of this work.

---

---

## Acknowledgments

---

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Douglas Van Bossuyt, and my co-advisor, Dr. Anthony Pollman, for their patience and dedication during my academic journey here at Naval Postgraduate School. I apologize to my daughters, Sarah and Elissa, for the missed father-daughter time this last year, but I hope to soon make it up to you both. Finally, to my spouse, Vanessa, thank you for pulling double duty during our tour here at NPS. Not only did you manage to take care of the kids (including me), but you also managed to complete a master's in Systems Engineering as well. I'm still not sure how you do it.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

---

# CHAPTER 1:

## Introduction

---

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DoD) has had a vested interest in microgrids due to their ability to increase the energy resilience of military installations. These installations perform a variety of national security functions that differ between armed services (naval air stations, training school houses, depot-level maintenance facilities, etc.), but almost always depend on a continuous power source. In that respect, microgrids provide the electrical infrastructure necessary to maintain military operations despite disruption to the external utility grid. This is mainly due to the incorporation of local energy generation sources (emergency diesel generators [EDGs], photovoltaic [PV] arrays, energy storage systems [ESSs], etc.) during “islanded operation.”

Historically, EDGs have been the energy generation source of choice within the DoD, but these require either on-site fuel storage or continuous resupply during operation. If we consider this dependency on the supply chain network (SCN), the microgrid is not as independent as previously thought. With the changing geopolitical situation, deliberate attacks from near-peer competitors becomes a very real possibility. A prime example includes the 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial pipeline, which severely affected fuel supplies to the East Coast region for approximately six days. Similarly, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has sparked debates in the European theater regarding the ability to effectively shutoff another country’s fuel supply. These examples indicate possible scenarios which may occur at DoD installations.

The ongoing Coronavirus pandemic has also revealed significant vulnerabilities within the nation’s SCNs to the point that the United States (U.S.) president issued Executive Order 14017 (*America’s Supply Chains*) [1]. The order directed a review of the nation’s critical SCNs and found serious risks to both economic and national security. As such, this thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the two research areas of military microgrids and SCNs. Existing research has identified the risk of SCN disruption to military microgrids, but have made no efforts to quantify its impact. In fact, most modeling efforts assume a certainty of resupply, which is an unrealistic assumption. To guide this research effort, the following

questions are posed:

- *What happens to the microgrid after supply chain disruption?*
- *What methods are available to identify, model, and address these types of risks?*

In order to answer these questions, this thesis conducts a thorough literature review of current metrics and methodologies. In particular, this research investigates current DoD guidance in order to establish a comparative analysis tool for installation energy managers (IEMs). The proposed methodology provides IEMs a means to explore possible trade spaces by evaluating the microgrid under worst-case scenario conditions. A case study is then presented to demonstrate this methodology on two separate microgrid architectures. The first configuration is reflective of current DoD installations, while the second represents possible improvements for consideration. This thesis utilizes the “manuscript option” and is structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides broad context of the work submitted; Chapter 2 presents the journal manuscript submitted to *Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute’s* special issue of “Infrastructure Resilience in Emergency Situations” for peer review; and Chapter 3 provides a brief summary of the research and additional future work not mentioned within the article.

---

---

## CHAPTER 2: Manuscript Submission

---

### **2.1 Energy Resilience Impact of Supply Chain Network Disruption to Military Microgrids**

A version of this chapter was submitted in November 2021 to the *Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute's Infrastructures Systems Journal* special issue on “Infrastructure Resilience in Emergency Situations” as: E. Anuat, D. L. Van Bossuyt, and A. Pollman, “Energy Resilience Impact of Supply Chain Network Disruption to Military Microgrids.”

MDPI is an open access publisher that distributes under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Copyright does not apply in the United States but may apply internationally.

## **2.2 Introduction**

The U.S. DoD considers the microgrid an essential building block for improving energy resilience across its installations [2]. Microgrids offer protection from power disruptions, whether natural or man-made, through the utilization of distributed energy resources (DERs) independent of the utility grid. Military installations, especially those in remote areas, are similarly dependent on SCNs to ensure continuity of operations (COOP) [3], [4]. The past three decades of globalization and technological development have driven modern SCNs to become leaner and more efficient [5]; adversely, they are now increasingly complex and less resilient to disruption. The changing geopolitical situation (Nord Stream 2, trade tariffs etc.) amidst the ongoing Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has provided valuable insights on the weaponization of SCN vulnerabilities. In February 2021, Executive Order 14017 [1] directed the U.S. government to conduct a thorough review of the nation’s critical SCNs. Results of the task force [6] elucidated significant risks to both economic and national security—necessitating new perspectives with respect to supply chain risk management (SCRM).

Current analysis techniques for microgrid resilience make assumptions about logistics which may not always hold true. The growing threat from near-peer competitors presents the very real possibility of deliberate attacks on critical infrastructures. As such, we investigate the consequences of SCN disruption to military microgrids operating under islanded conditions. We develop a corresponding methodology to assist IEMs in the identification and assessment of supply-related risks to energy security and, furthermore, provide an impact metric to link power interruption with mission impact.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2.3 provides basic definitions and background information, Section 2.4 presents a methodology to evaluate the impact of SCN disruption to a military microgrid, Section 2.5 demonstrates the proposed methodology on a fictional military installation, Section 2.6 discusses conclusions and potential for future work, and Section 2.7 summarizes the article.

## **2.3 Background and Literature Review**

This section provides background on concepts required to understand the specific contribution of this article. Established methodologies, related research, and initiatives are also

discussed to identify the key drivers and current gaps within the literature.

### **2.3.1 Overview of Military Microgrids**

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defines a microgrid as “a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the [utility] grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the [utility] grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island mode” [7]. This commonly cited definition highlights the three main requirements that characterize a microgrid [8]:

- **IDENTIFIABLE.** The system has both physical and functional boundaries with the main external interface located between the microgrid and the external utility grid [9], [10]. From a systems engineering (SE) perspective, the microgrid not only encompasses the physical equipment and software, but also the people (operators, maintenance organizations, etc.) and processes required to ensure system operability [10], [11].
- **INDEPENDENT.** The microgrid can still function regardless of whether it is connected or disconnected from the utility grid [8], [12]. While operating in island mode, local generation sources (diesel generators, PV arrays, etc.) provide power to critical loads and may be supplemented via ESSs [13], [14].
- **INTELLIGENT.** A microgrid controller manages the resources defined within the system boundary (including the utility grid interface) [12], [15] and may utilize cooperative control when operating in grid-connected mode [16]. Traditional microgrids have primarily focused on islanding, whereas newer "smart grids" use energy management systems (EMSs) to balance electrical demand, schedule the dispatch of resources, and preserve overall grid reliability [15], [17], [18].

The benefits to adopting a microgrid architecture are increased energy security, reduced life cycle costs, and increased utilization of renewable energy sources (RESs) [8], [19]. Of those three, the DoD prioritizes increased energy security to ensure the mission readiness of the armed forces [20]. Historically, DoD installations have relied on dedicated EDGs in a variety of configurations [21] to provide backup power to critical loads [22], [23]; however, these architectures are typically not well integrated with internal resources or the utility grid [22], [24]. Consequently, the installations are left vulnerable during extended power

outages or periods of high stress on the larger transmission and distribution system [22], [25], [26]. Microgrids provide an electrical infrastructure that combines multiple forms of DERs and are better suited to withstand and recover from energy disruptions [22], [24], [27].

Threats to microgrids include component reliability, natural weather phenomena (hurricanes, floods, climate change, etc.), environmental changes, and other forces capable of disrupting power flow from the utility grid [14], [28]. Microgrids designed for military use are particularly susceptible to various forms of deliberate attack (physical [29], human, and cyber [30]). As assets to national security, military microgrids must be approached with mission assurance at the forefront [31]. DoD Instruction 3020.45 [32] recognizes that energy resilience efforts addressing risks to critical infrastructure directly support the “Mission Assurance Construct”, a DoD-wide process to identify, assess, and monitor the risks to strategic missions. As such, a holistic approach based on risk and associated impact is required to effectively design a military microgrid [14], [33].

### **2.3.2 Measuring Energy Resilience**

The Department of the Navy (DON) characterizes energy resilience as one of the three pillars of energy security, alongside energy reliability and efficiency [34]. While there are a variety of definitions that exist within the literature, resilience essentially refers to a system’s response and ability to maintain vital functions before, during, and after a disruptive event [35]. Military definitions of energy resilience typically align with their civilian counterparts but will notably incorporate the mission aspect as it pertains to critical loads [36], [37]. Within the context of 10 U.S.C. § 101(e)(6) [38], energy resilience ensures “energy availability and reliability sufficient to”: (1) “provide for mission assurance and readiness”, and (2) “execute or rapidly reestablish mission essential requirements“ after an unanticipated energy disruption. This working definition highlights the two main requirements for which military microgrids will be assessed in this article.

The first step towards establishing a suitable metric for energy resilience is to examine a microgrid under perturbation. The performance curve in Figure 2.1 is adapted from Bruneau et al.’s [39] framework for resilience and conceptualizes a microgrid’s response to a disruptive event as a function of time. Typically, system performance outlines a trapezoidal shape as it

transitions through different phases of resilience (avoidance, survival, and recovery) [40]. During the avoidance phase  $[t_o, t_d)$ , the microgrid is in a stable state and can anticipate, prepare, and take precautionary measures against disruptions [41]. The event itself occurs at  $t_e$ ; however, depending on its severity and the microgrid’s absorptive features (physical configuration, casualty control procedures, etc.), system performance may not immediately decline (“invulnerability period”) [40], [42]. Once the microgrid is unable to maintain optimal performance parameters ( $p_{opt}$ ), it enters the survival phase  $[t_d, t_r)$  and may take adaptive measures (load shedding [43], intentional islanding [44], etc.) to protect critical loads. Finally, the recovery phase  $[t_r, t_f]$  aims to restore the system from a degraded to normal operational state and may span from days to years contingent on the damage to critical infrastructure [45], [46]. Depending on the extent of restoration, the microgrid’s recovery behavior may be characterized as either robust [39], adaptive [47], ductile [48], or cascading [49]–[51].




Figure 2.1. Generic microgrid resilience curves before, during, and after a disruptive event. Recovery behavior is dependent on a microgrid’s absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities. Adapted from [52]–[54].

The increasing number of publications related to microgrids has introduced various measures for energy resilience [35], [55]–[65]. Several methods are based on the performance curve depicted in Figure 2.1 and attempt to capture resilience within a single measure [41], [66]. Henry and Ramirez-Marquez [67] quantified resilience as the comparison between recovery and loss, whereas Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio [68] utilized the area between optimal and actual performance curves (the trapezoidal area). Furthermore, researchers [58], [69]–[74] have defined specific components of the “resilience trapezoid” establishing concepts such as absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacity (see Vugrin et al. [52]). However, not all measures are solely performance-based. Related studies [41], [75]–[77] have also explored the resilience-cost tradespace. In particular, Giraldez et al. [78] proposed a customer damage function (CDF) representing interruption cost as a function of outage duration. Hildebrand [79] and similarly Bolen et al. [80] applied net present value (NPV) to ascertain the life-cycle cost (LCC) of energy resilient solutions. A cost-based approach, however, proves difficult when assigning a monetary value to mission assurance and (to a greater extent) national security [36], [81].

Instead, the DoD uses Mission Dependency Index (*MDI*) to distinguish between critical and non-critical facilities aboard military installations [82]:

$$MDI = 26.54 \left[ D_W + 0.125 \frac{1}{A} \sum_{k=1}^A D_B + 0.1 \ln A \right] - 25.54, \quad (2.1)$$

where  $D_W$  is mission intradependency (“within”),  $D_B$  is mission interdependency (“between”), and  $A$  is the number of mission areas identifying interdependency. Through expert elicitation of  $D_W$  and  $D_B$ , a normalized score between 0 and 100 is calculated for each facility, with 100 being most impactful to mission assurance [83], [84]. Some researchers have adapted *MDI* into an overarching resilience metric or methodology. In Peterson et al.’s [14] approach, energy resilience is quantified by expected electrical disruption mission impact (EEDMI), wherein *MDI* provides the input to mission impact per unit time [85]. Moreover, Beaton [86] and Kain et al. [36] incorporated EEDMI in their investigation of resilient microgrid configurations (ESSs and nanogrids). However, despite its widespread use, several critiques [87]–[89] have disputed the efficacy of *MDI*; notably, it neglects *facility* interdependencies and implies that supporting infrastructures (roads, power lines, etc.)

remain operational to service high-scoring assets (an unrealistic assumption) [87]. Related research, particularly Smith [90] and Fish [87], further address these shortcomings.

In 2021, the DoD issued a memorandum [91] regarding energy metrics and standards at military installations, defining energy resilience for a critical load,  $R_C$ , as:

$$R_C = \frac{T_U}{T} = \frac{T_U}{T_U + T_D}, \quad (2.2)$$

where  $T$  is the total assessment period,  $T_U$  is the length of time it receives sufficient energy to provide for mission assurance (“uptime”), and  $T_D$  is the remaining duration of insufficient energy throughput (“downtime”). By this definition, desired mission availability establishes the benchmark for energy resilience. For example, in order to achieve  $R_C = 0.99$ ,  $T_D$  cannot exceed 20 minutes in a two-week period; for  $R_C = 0.98$ , that number is approximately 400 minutes. While Equation (2.2) provides an initial metric for critical load analysis, an aggregate reading must be used to represent the microgrid as a whole [91]. Previous work by Kwasinski [92] used an analogous measure, which we adapt to express microgrid resilience,  $R_M$ , for  $N$  critical loads as:

$$R_M = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N T_{U,i}}{NT} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N T_{U,i}}{\sum_{i=1}^N (T_{U,i} + T_{D,i})}, \quad (2.3)$$

where  $T_{U,i}$  and  $T_{D,i}$  is uptime and downtime, respectively, for an individual critical load  $i$ . A distinct feature of Equation (2.3) is its scalability to portions of the microgrid. For instance,  $N$  can represent the critical loads in a specific lateral or feeder, or a given substation [92]. Also note that while Equations (2.2) and (2.3) resemble well-established definitions of energy availability [93], [94], they are *not* synonymous and differ in application [46], [92]. Energy availability is calculated from numerous maintenance and repair cycles, whereas energy resilience is based on a single disruptive event [92], [95]. Additionally, if repeated over multiple occurrences,  $R_M$  can measure subsequent improvements in design or operational policy [92]. For these reasons, we interpret Equation (2.3) as within DoD guidance and suitable for the research purposes presented in this article.

### 2.3.3 Modeling Supply Chain Network Disruption

A supply chain refers to the socio-technical network required to identify, target, and fulfill a specific demand [96]. Although fundamentally simple, SCNs are increasingly complex depending on the scope or perspective [97]–[99]. Consider the SCN depicted in Figure 2.2. The individual entities, referred to as “nodes” in graph lexicon, are involved in the conversion, logistics (distribution, storage, etc.), and transaction of materiel to an ultimate customer [100]. Relationships between nodes, or “arcs”, are physical and functional connections (routes, communications, etc.) represented by uni- or bi-directional flows [96], [100]. Within the SCRM literature, the degradation and interdiction of specific arcs has been a key area of interest for civilians and military alike [101], [102]. In many instances, cash-flow management is of specific interest to ensure business continuity and long-term profitability [103], [104]. However, despite the private sector’s preference towards a financial perspective, the U.S. government views SCRM through the lens of mission assurance. DoD Instruction 5200.44 [105] defines SCRM as a systematic process to protect mission critical functions by administering susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and threats throughout a SCN. The process takes a four-step approach towards managing risk (identification, assessment, treatment, and monitoring) in line with International Standards Organization (ISO) 31000 guidelines [106], [107].




Figure 2.2. Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of a supply chain network (SCN). A ripple effect occurs following a disruption (red diamond) between a manufacturer ( $M_2$ ) and distributor ( $D_2$ ), negatively affecting the distributor and three downstream customers ( $C_2$ ,  $C_3$ , and  $C_4$ ).

SCN risks fall into two broad categories according to source [108]. *Operational risks* are inherent uncertainties within the SCN (unknown supply and demand, safety recalls, etc.) and are typically low-impact-high-probability (LIHP) occurrences [109]; in contrast, *disruption risks* refer to high-impact-low-probability (HILP) events ordinarily caused by external forces [109]. Prominent examples are listed in Table 2.1 for reference. Specific to HILP events, a phenomena known as the “ripple effect” occurs when a disruption, rather than remain localized to a node or portion of the SCN, continues to cascade downstream (shown in Figure 2.2) [110]. The potential impacts may result in longer lead times or damaging financial implications throughout the network [110], [111].

Table 2.1. Example disruption risks to supply chain networks (SCNs).

<b>Initial Impact</b>	<b>Disruption Risk</b>	<b>Example</b>
Single node	Deliberate attack	Insider threat [112] Cyberattack [113], [114] Terrorist attack [115]
	Logistics delay	Inclement weather [116] Transportation accident [117] Port congestion [118], [119]
Multi-nodal	Natural disaster	Hurricane [120], [121] Earthquake [122] Wildfire [123]
	Material shortage	Trade tariffs [124] Shipping route blockage [125] Civil unrest [126]
	Financial crisis	Market volatility [127], [128] Economic recession [129] Global pandemic [130]

As such, there has been significant literature regarding the ripple effect and its consequences across various domains [110]. Gholami-Zanjani et al. [131] assessed its effect on the food industry as a basis for location-allocation and inventory-replenishment decisions. Chauhan et al. [132] developed a tripartite ripple effect model investigating the benefits of a nested SCN topology, whereas others have applied mathematical optimization (mixed-integer and

stochastic programming, etc.) in their studies of disruption propagation [133], [134]. Of note, an emerging research area within SCRM is the use of dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) as a method for transient analysis [135]. A DBN approach can effectively capture the temporal probabilistic dependencies between nodes through the use of conditional probability tables (CPTs) and interconnected time-slices [136]. Specifically, Hosseini et al. [137] proposed a ripple effect model integrating DBNs with discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), thereby also accounting for the dynamicity (vulnerability, recoverability, etc.) of individual nodes. The DTMCs are equalized into a greater DBN (representing the SCN) to simulate the propagating behavior of supplier disruption [137].

For example, consider the SCN node in Figure 2.3. The four states represent varying levels of operational capacity—fully operational ( $\pi_0$ ), semi-disrupted ( $\pi_1$ ), heavily-disrupted ( $\pi_2$ ), and fully disrupted ( $\pi_3$ ). As a Markovian process, predictions can be made of its future states based solely on its current state (memoryless) [138], with the transition probabilities associated with state changes reflecting nodal reaction and response. In this case, the initial shock due to disruption ( $\lambda_1$ ,  $\lambda_2$ , or  $\lambda_3$ ) may result in a regression to one of three states depending on severity. Cascading failures ( $\lambda_4$ ,  $\lambda_5$ , and  $\lambda_6$ ) represent scenarios in which the inability to complete satisfactory repairs incurs additional damage [139]. Otherwise, if repairs ( $\mu_2$ ,  $\mu_4$ , and  $\mu_5$ ) are successful, then the node may revert to a more operationally capable state or, if able, employ surge capacity ( $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_3$ ) to accelerate the recovery timeline [140]. It is also possible for the node to remain in its current state ( $\alpha_n$ ) rather than transition to another. Assuming that the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, then there exists an equilibrium condition in which state probabilities no longer change after a sufficiently large time interval, irrespective of the initial state [141]. These steady-state probabilities may be solved for algebraically or through a series of matrix operations.




Figure 2.3. Discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) model of a node with four operational states. The state transitions ( $\alpha_n$ ,  $\lambda_n$ , and  $\mu_n$ ) represent various reactions and responses to disruption risks.

Subsequently, a collection of DTMCs may be integrated into a Bayesian network (the SCN in Figure 2.2), wherein the causal relationships between parent and child nodes are described by CPTs [142]. The Bayesian network is then characterized as dynamic when its random variables are indexed over a discretized timeline, allowing a node at  $i$ th time-slice to be conditionally dependent on its parents at the present time-slice *and* its own state in a previous one [143]. Thus, a DTMC-DBN approach is an effective tool for modeling not only disruption risks but also the ripple effect which occurs thereafter. Individual nodes or sections may be further examined to formulate observations regarding total expected utility (TEU), service level, and arc criticality [137]. But this method is not without its disadvantages. As the number of variables increase (states, parents, etc.), probability calculation quickly becomes intractable [144]. Specifically, the accuracy of CPTs is heavily dependent on expert elicitation or historical data, which may or may not be readily available [145], [146]. To cope with the challenges of a scant data environment, Liu et al. [147] introduced a robust DBN optimization model for small-size instances and a simulated annealing (SA) algorithm to handle larger-scale problems.

### **2.3.4 Specific Contribution to the Literature**

Existing research [10], [14], [22], [25], [36], [79], [80], [85], [86], [148], [149] has repeatedly identified SCN disruption as a significant threat to military microgrids. However, to our knowledge, the downstream impact has yet to be quantified. The interrelated study of energy-specific SCNs (petroleum, natural gas [150], etc.) has primarily focused on supply chain resilience (SCRES) [151], not necessarily translatable to our research purposes. In fact, islanding allows a microgrid to operate independent of the SCN for a period of time, yet for military installations reliant on EDGs the uncertainty of fuel resupply presents an interesting dichotomy. Hossain et al. [152] and Wang et al. [153] suggested incorporating these uncertainties (limited fuel, sparsity of solar irradiation, wind, etc.) into resilience-oriented operation models as part of future work.

This article contributes a novel methodology and associated metric to support the design and improvement of military microgrids subject to SCN disruption. We utilize an integrated DTMC-DBN approach to model these disruption risks and capture the resulting ripple effect in terms of “energy resilience impact”. Due to its quantitative nature, DoD IEMs can clearly compare between varying energy resilient solutions under worst-case scenario conditions. Additional benefits may be realized to include the identification of node and arc criticality with respect to installation energy security.

## **2.4 Methodology**

This section presents a methodology to identify, model, and address supply chain disruption risks to military microgrids using the proposed energy resilience impact metric. We systematically integrate various methods into a comparative analysis tool for the purpose of minimizing mission impact. The steps are organized in accordance with Figure 2.4 and may be tailored to incorporate preferred practices directed by local installation guidance.




Figure 2.4. Methodology overview. This method is offered as an evaluative tool to assist installation energy managers (IEMs) in minimizing microgrid susceptibility to supply chain disruption risks.

### 2.4.1 Step 1. Identify Critical Loads

First, the IEM must identify all critical loads necessary for mission fulfillment. This is best accomplished by decomposing the installation into individual facilities and delineating which require a continuous power source. While it is possible to provide further classification at the subsystem or component level, the added specificity may not be required. We recommend incorporating these facilities into an electrical one-line diagram to represent the collective microgrid. This will help conceptualize the problem space and, more importantly, distinguish power-flow requirements for later simulation.

## 2.4.2 Step 2. Assign Mission Impact

Subsequently, a mission impact ( $M_C$ ) score between 0 to 100 is assigned for each facility. As an adaptation of Peterson et al.'s [14] metric,  $M_C$  is unitless and measures relative importance to mission assurance. The IEM may either utilize  $MDI$  from Equation (2.1) or develop a new method, though we advocate the former for  $M_C$ . Essentially, this step quantifies the answers to the following questions [14], [83]:

- How long can functions cease without adversely affecting the installation's mission?
- To what degree can the mission continue assuming complete loss of functionality?
- Does disruption propagate throughout the installation and cause additional losses?
- Is there redundancy available? Or can functions be transferred to another facility?

$M_C$  scores are vetted by the relevant stakeholders to support emergency management decisions (load shedding schema, repair strategies, etc.) and later, in Step 9, evidence for funding prioritization (redundancy upgrades, military construction (MILCON) proposals, divestiture, etc.) [84].

## 2.4.3 Step 3. Determine Total Assessment Period

The IEM then determines the total assessment period,  $T$ , for follow-on calculations and simulation.  $T$  should encompass the required "days of autonomy" mandated by the applicable armed service although a larger time interval may be selected for analyzing alternative architectures. Note that, for an *overly* large duration, additional attributes (equipment reliability, maintainability, etc.) warrant consideration. We suggest sizing  $T$  to include at least two refueling cycles or 14 days, whichever is greater. Such a duration is sufficient to observe the aftereffects of SCN disruption whilst still adhering to DoD guidance and policy.

## 2.4.4 Step 4. Model Supply Chain Network

Next, the IEM employs Hosseini et al.'s [137] integrated DTMC-DBN approach to model the energy SCN. Beginning with the installation and working backwards, the IEM accounts for all entities that affect the value stream. Each node will have a corresponding DTMC to represent various operational states and, if parental dependency exists, an associated CPT. We encourage jointly developing this model with logistics specialists in order to accurately depict the transition and conditional probabilities. Moreover, mapping the *entire* SCN is

likely extraneous when determining the (relatively) short-term sustainment of an islanded microgrid. The scope of analysis should in effect be driven by  $T$ . As  $T$  increases, disruptions farther upstream have increased potential to negatively impact the installation.

#### **2.4.5 Step 5. Generate Failure Scenarios**

Afterwards, the IEM generates a set of failure scenarios that can occur within the SCN. As there is no one-size-fits-all approach to identifying disruption risks, the distinct circumstances of each node must be examined. Historical data if available should serve as a primer for consideration. Different locales will also have area-specific threats (weather-related, waterborne, neighboring population, etc.) to coincide with those anticipated in the current geopolitical situation. As a guideline, we submit the following types of scenarios for use (refer to Table 2.1 for specific examples):

1. **BASELINE SCENARIO.** Normal SCN operation with zero disruptions throughout  $T$ ;
2. **WORST-CASE SCENARIO.** No access to the energy SCN for the entire duration of  $T$ ;
3. **SINGLE NODE SCENARIO(S).** Disruption affecting a node integral to SCN function;
4. **MULTI-NODAL SCENARIO(S).** Disruption affecting multiple nodes simultaneously.

#### **2.4.6 Step 6. Simulate Microgrid Operation**

Upon generating the failure set, the IEM is ready to simulate islanded microgrid operations. Relevant inputs include but are not limited to: EDG (generator sizing, refueling schedule); PV (array size and efficiency); ESS (capacity rating, charge and discharge efficiency); and EMS (load profile and shedding schema). The simulation should cover periods of high stress (peak load times, low irradiance levels, etc.) to further exacerbate microgrid vulnerability. Then, using power-flow analysis, the IEM calculates power generation and consumption at discrete time steps with unmet demand as the primary output of concern.

#### **2.4.7 Step 7. Calculate Energy Resilience Impact**

Energy resilience may now be calculated at specific critical loads or for the entire microgrid using Equations (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. However, these measures treat each load with equal importance—inaccurate as defined by  $M_C$ . Hence in order to relate these metrics to

mission assurance, we must establish a new relationship between terms. Assuming linearity between  $R_C$  and  $M_C$ , we can express energy resilience impact on a critical load,  $E_C$ , as:

$$E_C = M_C(1 - R_C), \quad (2.4)$$

essentially quantifying the ripple effect at that particular load. Repeating this process across the installation yields the maximum energy resilience impact,  $E_C^{\max}$ , for  $N$  critical loads:

$$E_C^{\max} = \max_{i \in [1, \dots, N]} \{E_{C,i}\}, \quad (2.5)$$

allowing us to further define energy resilience impact on the microgrid,  $E_M$ , as:

$$E_M = E_C^{\max} + \underbrace{\left[ \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^N E_{C,i}) - E_C^{\max}}{(\sum_{i=1}^N M_{C,i}) - E_C^{\max}} \right]}_{\text{impact modifier}} (100 - E_C^{\max}) \quad (2.6)$$

Therefore, the most affected critical load sets the baseline value for  $E_M$  which, in turn, is increased by the remaining ratio of expected to possible  $M_C$  (“impact modifier”). If  $MDI$  was used for  $M_C$ , then  $E_M$  is likewise unitless and ranges from 0 to 100 depending on severity. A score of 100, while unrealistic, indicates instantaneous loss of mission support for the entirety of  $T$ ; conversely,  $E_M = 0$  corresponds to complete invulnerability.

### 2.4.8 Step 8. Determine Acceptable Impact

Finally,  $E_M$  is compared to predetermined threshold or objective values. Rather than establishing a subjective cutoff value, the IEM may utilize a percentage of total installation  $M_C$ —e.g., 5% of a 200  $M_C$  total would yield a target of  $E_M < 10$ . If calculated impact is tolerable, then subsequent steps are unnecessary as the microgrid is deemed sufficiently resilient to all scenarios. Otherwise, the IEM proceeds to Step 9 for subsequent analysis.

### **2.4.9 Step 9. Develop Risk Treatment Strategies**

The IEM examines the simulation results to pinpoint the main drivers of mission degradation. If multiple issues are identified, then SCN vulnerabilities are addressed in descending  $E_M$  order as resolving higher priorities may have trickle-down effects. Potential microgrid improvements (system configuration, operational policies and procedures, etc.) are continuously iterated through Steps 6 to 8 in an effort to minimize  $E_M$ . Once an adequate solution is obtained, design recommendations are forwarded to the installation commander for ultimate consideration.

## **2.5 Case Study**

This section demonstrates the proposed methodology on a fictionalized version of Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey). We investigate the consequences of SCN disruption on two separate microgrid architectures to illustrate how an IEM may utilize this method. The steps are organized in parallel with Section 2.4 (Methodology) for ease of reference.

### **2.5.1 Step 1. Identify Critical Loads**

The naval installation depicted in Figure 2.5 is a typical office distribution found on military installations [14]. The microgrid consists of six facilities (EP1 through EP6) spread across two feeders (BUS1 and BUS2) and interconnected with the utility grid. During island mode operation ( $S3 = \text{“OPEN”}$ ), the critical loads are supported by two paralleled EDGs, each rated at 330 kW with approximately 1,925 gal of diesel fuel between storage and service tanks. The blue elements indicate an alternate configuration explored later in Step 9.




Figure 2.5. Microgrid one-line diagram for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey). The current configuration is comprised of two emergency diesel generators (EDGs), six loads (EP1–6), and a utility connection at BUS1. Other possible generation sources (blue elements) include battery energy storage systems (BESSs) and photovoltaic (PV) arrays. Adapted from Peterson et al. [14].

### 2.5.2 Step 2. Assign Mission Impact

$M_C$  scores are assigned to each critical load using existing  $MDI$  values derived from Equation (2.1). Table 2.2 summarizes facility size, hourly power demand, and mission impact upon disruption. As evidenced by  $M_C$ , EP4 is the most impactful load towards mission assurance, followed by EP6 and EP5. The three small offices (EP1, EP2, and EP3) are of relatively low importance. Furthermore, EP2 is designated as a non-critical load ( $M_C = 0$ ) and will immediately shed upon introducing the islanded condition.

Table 2.2. Facility data for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey). Mission impact ( $M_C$ ) was assigned using Mission Dependency Index ( $MDI$ ). Adapted from Peterson et al. [14], Kain et al. [36], and Deru et al. [154].

Load	Facility Type	Floor Area (ft <sup>2</sup> )	Avg Load (kW)	Max Load (kW)	$M_C$
EP1	Small office	5,500	2.8	7.0	12
EP2	Small office	5,500	2.8	7.0	0
EP3	Small office	5,500	2.8	7.0	19
EP4	Medium office	53,628	32.3	75.9	88
EP5	Large office	498,588	267.0	679.0	43
EP6	Warehouse	52,045	10.9	26.6	67
Total		620,761	318.6	802.5	229

### 2.5.3 Step 3. Determine Total Assessment Period

Since EDGs serve as the primary source of backup power for NSA Monterey, Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-540-01 [155] dictates at least seven days of fuel stored “either in a dedicated on-site main fuel tank or from a confirmed delivery source”. In that respect, both requirements are fulfilled with 3,850 gal of stored diesel fuel and resupply scheduled every seven days. The total assessment period,  $T$ , is therefore set to 14 days.

### 2.5.4 Step 4. Model Supply Chain Network

The diesel fuel SCN is illustrated in Figure 2.6. NSA Monterey,  $N_1$ , is supplied by the nearest bulk terminal,  $N_2$ , on a weekly basis. Two refineries,  $N_3$  and  $N_4$ , provide regular fuel shipments (common pipeline, tanker, barge, etc.) to the bulk terminal station for storage and blending. Since  $T = 14$  days, we refrain from developing this model further due to the inherent capacities of each entity. The solid arcs signify conditional probabilities between nodes, while the dashed arcs represent the state transitions at each time-slice ( $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ ).




Figure 2.6. Diesel fuel supply chain network (SCN) for Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSA Monterey). The military installation ( $N_1$ ) is preceded by a bulk terminal ( $N_2$ ), which in turn receives stock from two refineries ( $N_3$  and  $N_4$ ). Solid arcs correspond to conditional relationships between parent and child nodes. Dashed arcs denote discrete state transitions from  $t - 1$  to  $t$ .

### 2.5.5 Step 5. Generate Failure Scenarios

The following scenario was developed for the purposes of this case study:

*“A nation-state adversary has targeted NSA Monterey for an energy denial attack in an effort to probe DoD installation vulnerabilities. The event is triggered on the next occurrence of islanded operation. Following a severe wildfire, NSA Monterey is forced to operate independent of the utility grid for approximately two weeks. The nation-state adversary seizes this opportunity to strategically attack the nearest bulk terminal station. As a result, the regional fuel SCN is fully disrupted for three days.”*

### 2.5.6 Step 6. Simulate Microgrid Operation

We modified Peterson’s [85] MATLAB simulation to accommodate fuel inputs on an hourly basis (see Figure A.1). The perspective is typical of high-level architectural methods and

therefore does not account for phase imbalances, power factor issues, or other similar concerns [14]. At each time step, power generation is calculated and provided as necessary to each critical load.  $M_C$  is used as the determining factor for shedding loads when total demand is unmet.

Figure 2.7 portrays the aforementioned scenario, wherein the EDGs supply sufficient power to all critical loads while fuel is readily available.  $N_2$  is subsequently disrupted from  $t = 160$  to  $t = 231$  (72 hours), preventing weekly scheduled refueling at  $t = 168$ ; consequently, the on-site fuel supply is fully exhausted and critical loads are shed from  $t = 178$  to  $t = 287$  (110 hours), approximating to 33.4 MW·h of expected unserved energy (EUE). Note that while the disruption period is less than 110 hours, the remaining 38 hours correspond to the repair efforts to reestablish normal operational capacity.




Figure 2.7. 72-hour refueling disruption during islanded operation of current microgrid configuration. Two slaved 330 kW emergency diesel generators (EDGs), each with 1925 gal storage capacity, support all critical loads after isolating from the utility grid. A supply chain network (SCN) disruption occurs from  $t = 160$  to  $t = 231$ , preventing weekly scheduled refueling at  $t = 168$ . The ripple effect reduces refueling expected utility (in gal) until normal operational capacity can be restored at  $t = 288$ . Critical loads are unmet from  $t = 178$  to  $t = 287$ , approximating to 33.4 MW·h of expected unserved energy (EUE).

### 2.5.7 Step 7. Calculate Energy Resilience Impact

$E_M$  is then calculated using Equations (2.4) through (2.6). The resulting values are summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Failure scenario summary with current microgrid configuration.

Load	$M_C$	EUE (kW·h)	$R$	$E$
EP1	12	292.8	0.6726	3.9286
EP2	0	-	-	-
EP3	19	292.8	0.6726	6.2202
EP4	88	3,402.0	0.6726	28.8095
EP5	43	28,304.8	0.6726	14.0774
EP6	67	1,141.0	0.6726	21.9345
Microgrid	229	33,433.4	0.6726	45.2249

### 2.5.8 Step 8. Determine Acceptable Impact

Threshold values were established to obtain both  $R_M > 0.95$  and  $E_M < 10$ . Since the current microgrid configuration fails to achieve the designated criteria, we move on to Step 9 to develop potential mitigation plans.

### 2.5.9 Step 9. Develop Risk Treatment Strategies

One possible solution is to incorporate other forms of DERs and reduce overall dependency on EDGs. Consider the alternate architecture presented in Figure 2.5. If we supplement the current configuration with a 19,000 m<sup>2</sup> PV array operating at 0.19 efficiency and a 330 kW/3.3 MW·h battery energy storage system (BESS), we are able to obtain the threshold values. In fact, the added DERs prolong the requirement for refueling by assisting in power consumption throughout the day. Figure 2.8 shows the given failure scenario on the updated microgrid. Some critical loads are still lost; however, this time, only those with lower  $M_C$  scores (EP1, EP3, EP5) are shed during peak loading times (as seen in the sloped sections). Table 2.4 summarizes these results.




Figure 2.8. 72-hour refueling disruption during islanded operation of alternate microgrid configuration. The current architecture is supplemented with a 19,000 m<sup>2</sup> photovoltaic (PV) array operating at 0.19 efficiency and a 330 kW/3.3 MW·h battery energy storage system (BESS). The same disruption scenario occurs from  $t = 160$  to  $t = 231$ , preventing weekly scheduled refueling at  $t = 168$ . Critical loads with lower mission impact ( $M_C$ ) scores are shed during peak loading times (sloped sections), totaling to 11.8 MW·h of expected unserved energy (EUE).

Table 2.4. Failure scenario summary with alternate microgrid configuration.

Load	$M_C$	EUE (kW·h)	$R$	$E$
EP1	12	115.4	0.9256	0.8929
EP2	0	-	-	-
EP3	19	115.4	0.9256	1.4137
EP4	88	0	1	0
EP5	43	11,604.9	0.9256	3.1994
EP6	67	0	1	0
Microgrid	229	11,835.7	0.9554	4.1882

## 2.6 Discussion and Future Work

We found that even in a relatively small microgrid, there is substantial investment when incorporating PVs and BESSs. The area required to house the arrays is roughly a third of the facility footprint. In remote or crowded areas, real estate is a valued commodity which may or may not be justified in these design improvements. Another possible solution is to simply increase the on-site storage capacity to a minimum of 8,000 gal total. As a result, the microgrid would be self-sufficient for up to two weeks regardless of disruption duration. However, in doing so, the installation deepens its dependency on fuel resupply.

These types of dilemmas are ultimately up to the installation commander for adjudication, which  $E_M$  aims to support.  $E_M$  is not a replacement for established energy resilience measures but should rather be used in conjunction. The metric also builds on commonly accepted definitions and methodologies within the DoD, such as  $R$  and  $MDI$ . Additionally, while not a focus of our research,  $E_M$  may be utilized to determine the impact of internal microgrid disruptions (equipment failure, deliberate attack, etc.). In a similar manner to identifying arc criticality,  $E_M$  may be used to identify key areas requiring redundancy or protections within the microgrid boundary. For example, in Figure 2.5, the interconnection between BUS1 and BUS2 would likely result in a high  $M_C$  score due to single point of failure. Progressing through the methodology could present potential solutions (line hardening, redundant lines, etc.) to further increase the installation resilience.

Of note, the IEM should consider the following limitations regarding this methodology. First is the dependency on  $MDI$  despite its flaws. The assigned values are only as accurate as the elicited responses to four surveyed questions. While our methodology provides the latitude to incorporate new methods,  $MDI$  is currently the best possible candidate for  $M_C$ . Another limitation arises when the modeled SCN expands in size. The process of generating accurate CPTs and DTMCs becomes exhaustive, especially in cases with insufficient sample data. Future iterations of this methodology should consider other processes, such as noisy-or modeling or Liu et al.'s [147] SA algorithm. Finally, the developed metric,  $E_M$ , only pertains to a specific installation. The calculative perspective is from the affected SCN node; therefore, the  $E_M$  value on one installation has no bearing on another and provides no comparative value.

As indicated by our research, we recommend a fundamental shift from an overdependency

on diesel fuel to more sustainable energy generation sources. However, if conversion is unobtainable, then future research should look to harden the SCN. In particular, researchers can investigate various SCN topologies for military use or identify the necessary level of redundancy to reduce  $E_M$ . While we intentionally disassociated from a cost-based approach, there is potential to correlate cost with  $E_M$ . Prescribing a dollar amount to mission assurance would provide an additional dimension when justifying resilience improvements in the DoD context. Furthermore, power generation is only one of the critical infrastructures that affect  $M_C$ . Other systems include water distribution, transportation services, and cyber networks. We surmise that it is possible to develop an overarching resilience framework to encompass multiple functional areas.

## **2.7 Conclusions**

This article presented a novel methodology for conducting high-level resilience analysis of military microgrids. Instead of focusing on cost or performance alone, we developed a metric termed “energy resilience impact” to relate power interruption to mission assurance. We demonstrated its potential usefulness in evaluating the ripple effect due to supply chain disruption risks. In particular, we found that military installations overly reliant on EDGs as the primary source of backup power present liabilities towards mission assurance. By utilizing this methodology as a comparative analysis tool, IEMs can improve the design of current microgrid configurations. Lastly, several directions for future work were highlighted to extend on the research presented in this article.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

## CHAPTER 3: Conclusion

---

### 3.1 Conclusion

This thesis sought to answer the following questions regarding military microgrids:

1. *What happens to the microgrid after supply chain disruption?*
2. *What methods are available to identify, model, and address these types of risks?*

In regards to question 1, results of this research identified that microgrids dependent on an energy SCN (diesel fuel, natural gas, etc.) are particularly vulnerable to SCN disruption. Unless large amounts of fuel are stored on-site, the SCN will always be a single-point of failure for independent operation. In order to minimize this effect, it is recommended that military microgrids incorporate other forms of energy generation sources (PV arrays, BESSs, wind turbines, etc.) to increase overall sustainability.

For question 2, the literature review found no current methods available to identify, model, and address SCN disruption risks to military microgrids; therefore, a novel methodology was developed and demonstrated in Chapter 2. Furthermore, an impact metric was provided to relate current measures used by the DoD. By utilizing the proposed methodology, IEMs can develop alternate microgrid configurations for consideration. The framework is intended to be tailorable to incorporate varying local installation guidance or preferred practices. However, there is room for improvement which is explored in the next section.

### 3.2 Future Work

Utilizing *MDI* as the quantifier for mission impact is this methodology's biggest weakness. Future research could generate a new quantification method that is less subjective in nature. That research should focus on supporting critical infrastructures, such as electric power lines, transportation routes, and critical access points, instead of solely facility-based. This follows the logic that an adversary is more likely to attack less protected-assets, while still attempting to inflict the maximum amount of damage as possible. DoD facilities are more

difficult to attack due to physical and personnel security measures in comparison to the aforementioned infrastructures.

In recent years, cyber security has been of particular interest to the DoD. The incorporation of new technologies in day-to-day operations has opened new vulnerabilities within military installations. The 2021 Colonial pipeline and 2017 Ukraine cyber attacks exemplify these concerns. Future research could look into these potential risks and provide specific contributions to assess cyber security risks. Moreover, resilience can be brought into this context to mature the concept of cyber resilience within DoD installations. Similar work by O'Halloran et al. [156] reviewed the life-cycle assessment of cyber-physical systems to identify and address malicious attacks through design. Incorporating their methodology within the context military microgrids could prove fruitful early in the SE design process.

Another area of potential research resides within the energy resilience impact metric itself. In this thesis, the relationship between  $M_C$  and  $R_C$  is assumed as linear which may or may not be the case. Other distributions (exponential, logarithmic, etc.) may be examined to further increase the accuracy of results. If multiple functional areas for resilience are incorporated (cyber resilience, SCRES, etc.), then an overarching resilience framework may also be generated.

Lastly, researchers may desire to study the transition to more sustainable energy storage methods for islanded operations. One potential technology is Liquid Air Energy Storage (LAES), which cryogenically stores liquid air by using excess energy [157]. The potential results may outweigh the negative aspects and result in an improved electrical infrastructure for military use. This work could build on the design tool generated by Siritoglou et al. [158] while emphasizing the mission impact-cost trade space to supplement future investment decisions.

# APPENDIX: Simulation Refueling Logic




Figure A.1. Refueling logic for MATLAB simulation.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

---

## List of References

---

- [1] *America's Supply Chains*, E.O. 14017, Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC, USA, 2021 [Online]. Available: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/03/01/2021-04280/americas-supply-chains>
- [2] M. Smith and D. Ton, "Key connections: The U.S. Department of Energy's microgrid initiative," *IEEE Power Energy Mag.*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2018 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1109/MPE.2013.2258276>.
- [3] B. Xiong, R. Fan, S. Wang, B. Li, and C. Wang, "Performance evaluation and disruption recovery for military supply chain network," *Complex.*, vol. 2020, May 2020 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/9760604>.
- [4] B. Reinders, "Designing a robust supply chain for military operations: A multi-agent simulation approach considering platooning," Master's thesis, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands, 2019.
- [5] M. E. Johnson, "Supply chain management: Technology, globalization, and policy at a crossroads," *Interfaces*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2006 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.1060.0214>.
- [6] E. Slotkin, M. Gallagher, D. Norcross, D. Bacon, C. Houlahan, M. Waltz, M. Sherrill, and S. Bice, "Report of the Defense Critical Supply Chain Task Force," House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC: USA, 2021 [Online]. Available: [https://armedservices.house.gov/\\_cache/files/e/5/e5b9a98f-9923-47f6-a5b5-ccf77ebbb441/7E26814EA08F7F701B16D4C5FA37F043.defense-critical-supply-chain-task-force-report.pdf](https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/e/5/e5b9a98f-9923-47f6-a5b5-ccf77ebbb441/7E26814EA08F7F701B16D4C5FA37F043.defense-critical-supply-chain-task-force-report.pdf)
- [7] D. T. Ton and M. A. Smith, "The U.S. Department of Energy's microgrid initiative," *Electr. J.*, vol. 25, no. 8, 2012 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2012.09.013>.
- [8] A. Hirsch, Y. Parag, and J. Guerrero, "Microgrids: A review of technologies, key drivers, and outstanding issues," *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, vol. 90, 2018 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.03.040>.
- [9] C. Marnay and O. C. Bailey, "The CERTS microgrid and the future of the macrogrid," Technical Report; Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Berkeley, CA, USA, 2004.

- [10] R. Giachetti, C. Peterson, D. Van Bossuyt, and G. Parker, “Systems engineering issues in microgrids for military installations,” *INCOSE Int. Symp.*, vol. 30, 2020 [Online]. doi: <https://doi.org/j.2334-5837.2020.00751.x>.
- [11] B. Blanchard and W. Fabrycky, *System Engineering and Analysis*, 5th ed. Harlow, Essex, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2014.
- [12] E. Wood. What is a Microgrid? [Online]. Available: <https://microgridknowledge.com/microgrid-defined/>. Accessed May 23, 2021.
- [13] J. M. Guerrero, M. Chandorkar, T.-L. Lee, and P. C. Loh, “Advanced control architectures for intelligent microgrids: Decentralized and hierarchical control,” *IEEE Trans. Ind. Electr.*, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 1254 – 1262, 2013.
- [14] C. J. Peterson, D. L. Van Bossuyt, R. E. Giachetti, and G. Oriti, “Analyzing mission impact of military installations microgrid for resilience,” *Syst.*, vol. 9, no. 3, 2021. Available: <https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/9/3/69>
- [15] D. Ton and J. Reilly, “Microgrid controller initiatives: An overview of R&D by the us. department of energy,” *IEEE Power Energy Mag.*, vol. 15, pp. 24–31, 2017.
- [16] T. Caldognetto, P. Tenti, A. Costabeber, and P. Mattavelli, “Improving microgrid performance by cooperative control of distributed energy sources,” *IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl.*, vol. 60, pp. 3921–3930, 2014.
- [17] E.-K. Lee, W. Shi, R. Gadh, and W. Kim, “Design and implementation of a micro-grid energy management system,” *Sustain.*, vol. 8, p. 1143, 2016.
- [18] W. Bower, D. Ton, R. Guttromson, S. Glover, J. Stamp, D. Bhatnagar, and J. Reilly, “The advanced microgrid: Integration and interoperability,” Technical Report; Sandia National Laboratories: Albuquerque, NM, USA, 2014.
- [19] C. Schwaegerl, L. Tao, P. Mancarella, and G. Strbac, “Can microgrids provide a new paradigm for network operation? an evaluation of their technical, commercial and environmental benefits,” in *International Conference and Exhibition on Electricity Distribution*, 2008.
- [20] “Energy policy of the department of defense,” 2019, 10 U.S.C. § 2911.
- [21] S. Elia, E. Santini, and M. Tobia, “Comparison between different electrical configurations of emergency diesel generators for redundancy and reliability improving,” *Period. Polytech. Electr. Eng. Comput. Sci.*, vol. 62, pp. 144–148, 2018.
- [22] S. Van Broekhoven, N. Judson, J. Galvin, and J. L. t. C. Marqusee, “Microgrids for domestic military installations,” *IEEE Power Energy Mag.*, vol. 11, pp. 40–45, 2013.

- [23] J. Marqusee, D. Jenket, and S. Ericson, “Emergency diesel generator backup power systems for military bases,” Technical Report; National Renewable Energy Laboratory: Golden, CO, USA, 2020.
- [24] S. B. Van Broekhoven, N. Judson, S. V. Nguyen, and W. D. Ross, “Microgrid study: Energy security for DoD installations,” Technical Report; Lincoln Laboratory: Lexington, MA, USA, 2012.
- [25] D. Schill, “Improving energy security for air force installations,” Ph.D. dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA, USA, 2015.
- [26] Mercurio, A. Microgrids and Energy Security: The Business Case. [Online]. Available: <https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=217>. Accessed May 24, 2021.
- [27] S. Shi, B. Jiang, X. Dong, and Z. P. o. M. Bo, “Protection of microgrid,” in *10th IET International Conference on Developments in Power System Protection (DPSP 2010)*, 2010.
- [28] S. Peyghami, L. Wang, P. Davari, and F. Blaabjerg, “Mission-profile-based system-level reliability analysis in DC microgrids,” *IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl.*, vol. 2019, pp. 5055–5067, 55.
- [29] T. E. Griffith, Jr., “Strategic attack of national electrical systems,” Master’s thesis, Air University Press Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, USA, 1994.
- [30] Y. Xiang, H. Wang, and N. Liu, “Coordinated attacks on electric power systems in a cyber-physical environment,” *Electr. Power Syst. Res.*, vol. 149, pp. 156–168, 2017.
- [31] Department of Defense, “Mission Assurance Strategy,” Washington, DC, USA, 2012.
- [32] Department of Defense, “Mission Assurance (MA) Construct,” Washington, DC, USA, 2018.
- [33] C. Hanley, “The Growing Need for Resilience in an Evolving Electric Grid,” in *eT&D Workshop, Aalborg, Denmark*, 2017.
- [34] Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command, “3 Pillars of Energy Security,” Washington Navy Yard, DC, USA, 2018.
- [35] S. Hosseini, K. Barker, and J. E. A. Ramirez-Marquez, “Review of definitions and measures of system resilience,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 145, pp. 47–61, 2016.

- [36] A. Kain, D. L. Van Bossuyt, and A. Pollman, “Investigation of nanogrids for improved navy installation energy resilience,” *Appl. Sci.*, vol. 11, p. 4298, 2021.
- [37] N. Judson, A. L. Pina, E. V. Dydek, S. B. Van Broekhoven, and A. S. Castillo, “Application of a resilience framework for military installations: A methodology for energy resilience business case decisions,” Technical Report; Lincoln Laboratory: Lexington, MA, USA, 2016.
- [38] “Definitions,” 2019, 10 U.S.C. § 101.
- [39] M. Bruneau, S. E. Chang, R. T. Eguchi, G. C. Lee, T. D. O’Rourke, A. M. Reinhorn, M. Shinozuka, K. Tierney, W. A. Wallace, and D. A. von Winterfeldt, “Framework to quantitatively assess and enhance the seismic resilience of communities,” *Earthq. Spectra*, vol. 19, pp. 733–752, 2003.
- [40] A. Gholami, T. Shekari, M. H. Amirionun, F. Aminifar, M. H. Amini, and A. Sargolzaei, “Toward a consensus on the definition and taxonomy of power system resilience,” *IEEE Access*, pp. 32 035–32 053, June 2018.
- [41] R. Giachetti, D. L. Van Bossuyt, W. W. Anderson, and G. Oriti, “Resilience and cost tradespace for microgrids on islands,” *IEEE Syst. J.*, pp. 1–11, 2021.
- [42] E. D. Vugrin, D. E. Warren, and M. A. A. Ehlen, “Resilience assessment framework for infrastructure and economic systems: Quantitative and qualitative resilience analysis of petrochemical supply chains to a hurricane,” *Process Saf. Prog.*, vol. 30, pp. 280–290, 2011.
- [43] T. Shekari, F. Aminifar, and M. Sanaye-Pasand, “An analytical adaptive load shedding scheme against severe combinational disturbances,” *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, vol. 31, pp. 4135–4143, 2016.
- [44] A. Esmailian and M. Kezunovic, “Prevention of power grid blackouts using intentional islanding scheme,” *IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl.*, vol. 53, pp. 622–629, 2017.
- [45] U. Shahzad, “Resilience in electrical power systems,” *J. Electr. Eng., Electr., Control Comput. Sci.*, vol. 7, pp. 1–6, 2021.
- [46] A. Kwasinski, “Field technical surveys: An essential tool for improving critical infrastructure and lifeline systems resiliency to disasters,” in *IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC 2014)*, San Jose, CA, USA, 2014.
- [47] B. Ayyub, “Systems resilience for multihazard environments: Definition, metrics, and valuation for decision making,” *Risk Anal.*, vol. 34, pp. 340–355, 2013.

- [48] A. Decò, P. Bocchini, and D. M. A. Frangopol, “Probabilistic approach for the prediction of seismic resilience of bridges,” *Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn.*, vol. 42, pp. 1469–1487, 2013.
- [49] C. Nan and G. A. Sansavini, “Quantitative method for assessing resilience of interdependent infrastructures,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 157, pp. 35–53, 2017.
- [50] Future Resilient Systems. [Online]. Available: <https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/frs-dam/documents/FRS-Booklet.pdf>. Accessed August 26, 2021.
- [51] P. Gasser, P. Lustenberger, T. Sun, W. Kim, M. Spada, P. Burgherr, S. Hirschberg, and B. Stojadinović, “Security of electricity supply indicators in a resilience context,” *Saf. Reliab.–Theory Appl.*, vol. 1, pp. 1015–1022, 2017.
- [52] E. Vugrin, A. Castillo, and C. Silva-Monroy, “Resilience metrics for the electric power system: A performance-based approach,” Technical Report; Sandia National Laboratories: Albuquerque, NM, USA, 2017.
- [53] R. Francis and B. Bekera, “A metric and frameworks for resilience analysis of engineered and infrastructure systems,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 121, pp. 90–103, 2014.
- [54] M. Abimbola and F. Khan, “Resilience modeling of engineering systems using dynamic object-oriented Bayesian network approach,” *Comp. Ind. Eng.*, vol. 130, pp. 108–118, 2019.
- [55] P. E. Roege, Z. A. Collier, J. Mancillas, J. A. McDonagh, and I. Linkov, “Metrics for energy resilience,” *Energy Policy*, vol. 72, pp. 249–256, 2014.
- [56] H. H. Willis and K. Loa, “Measuring the resilience of energy distribution systems,” Technical Report; RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, USA, 2015.
- [57] P. Gasser, P. Lustenberger, M. Cinelli, W. Kim, M. Spada, P. Burgherr, S. Hirschberg, B. Stojadinovic, and T. Y. Sun, “A review on resilience assessment of energy systems,” *Sust. Resil. Infrastruct.*, pp. 1–27, 2019.
- [58] S. C. Shandiz, G. Foliente, B. Rismanchi, A. Wachtel, and R. F. Jeffers, “Resilience framework and metrics for energy master planning of communities,” *Energy*, vol. 203, pp. 1–26, 2020.
- [59] G. Kandaperumal and A. K. Srivastava, “Resilience of the electric distribution systems: concepts, classification, assessment, challenges, and research needs,” *IET Smart Grid*, vol. 30, pp. 133–143, 2020.

- [60] H. Raoufi, V. Vahidinasab, and K. Mehran, “Power systems resilience metrics: A comprehensive review of challenges and outlook,” *Sustain.*, vol. 121, p. 9698, 2020.
- [61] S. Ahmadi, Y. Saboohi, and A. Vakili, “Frameworks quantitative indicators, characters, and modeling approaches to analysis of energy system resilience: A review,” *Renew. Sust. Energy Rev.*, vol. 144, 2021.
- [62] A. S. Kahnamouei, T. G. Bolandi, and M.-R. Maghifam, “The conceptual framework of resilience and its measurement approaches in electrical power systems,” in *IET International Conference on Resilience of Transmission and Distribution Networks (RTDN 2017)*, 2017.
- [63] A. Ioannou, A. Angus, and F. Brennan, “Risk-based methods for sustainable energy system planning: A review,” *Renew. Sust. Energy Rev.*, vol. 74, pp. 602–615, 2017.
- [64] R. Cantelmi, D. Gravio, G. Patriarca, and R., “Reviewing qualitative research approaches in the context of critical infrastructure resilience,” *Environ. Syst. Decis.*, vol. 41, pp. 341–376, 2021.
- [65] M. Mahzarnia, M. P. Moghaddam, P. T. Baboli, and P. A. Siano, “Review of the measures to enhance power systems resilience,” *IEEE Syst. J.*, vol. 144, pp. 4059–4070, 2020.
- [66] N. Bhusal, M. Abdelmalak, M. Kamruzzaman, and M. Benidris, “Power system resilience: Current practices, challenges, and future decisions,” *IEEE Access*, vol. 8, pp. 18 064–18 086, 2020.
- [67] D. Henry and J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, “Generic metrics and quantitative approaches for system resilience as a function of time,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 99, pp. 114–122, 2012.
- [68] L. Ouyang, M.; Due nas-Osorio, “Multi-dimensional hurricane resilience assessment of electric power systems,” *Struct. Saf.*, vol. 48, pp. 15–24, 2014.
- [69] M. Panteli, P. Mancarella, D. N. Trakas, E. Kyriakides, and N. D. Hatziargyriou, “Metrics and quantification of operational and infrastructure resilience in power systems,” *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, vol. 32, pp. 4732–4742, 2017.
- [70] M. Panteli, D. N. Trakas, P. Mancarella, and N. D. Hatziargyriou, “Power systems resilience assessment: Hardening and smart operational enhancement strategies,” in *Proc. IEEE*, 2017, pp. 1202–1213, 105.

- [71] J. Lu, J. Guo, Z. Jian, Y. Yang, and W. Tang, “Resilience assessment and its enhancement in tackling adverse impact of ice disasters for power transmission systems,” *Energies*, vol. 11, p. 2272, 2018.
- [72] R. Moreno, M. Panteli, P. Mancarella, H. Rudnick, T. Lagos, A. Navarro, F. Ordonez, and J. C. Araneda, “From reliability to resilience: Planning the grid against the extremes,” *IEEE Power Energy Mag.*, vol. 18, pp. 41–53, 2020.
- [73] D. L. Donaldson, M. S. Alvarez-Alvarado, and D. Jayaweera, “Power system resiliency during wildfires under increasing penetration of electric vehicles,” in *International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS)*, 2020.
- [74] E. L. Ratnam, K. G. H. Baldwin, P. Mancarella, M. Howden, and L. Seebeck, “Electricity system resilience in a world of increased climate change and cybersecurity risk,” *Electr. J.*, vol. 33, p. 106833, 2020.
- [75] S. Singh, D. W. Gao, and J. Giraldez, “Cost analysis of renewable energy-based microgrids,” in *Proceedings of the North American Power Symposium (NAPS)*, Morgantown, WV, USA, pp. 17–19, September 2017.
- [76] W. W. Anderson, Jr., “Resilience assessment of islanded renewable energy microgrids,” Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2020.
- [77] M. C. Hamilton, J. H. Lambert, E. B. Connelly, and K. Barker, “Resilience analytics with disruption of preferences and lifecycle cost analysis for energy microgrids,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 150, pp. 11–21, 2016.
- [78] J. Giraldez, S. Booth, K. Anderson, and K. Massey, “Valuing energy security: Customer damage function methodology and case studies at DoD installations,” Technical Report; National Renewable Energy Laboratory: Golden, CO, USA, 2012.
- [79] J. P. Hildebrand, “Estimating the life cycle cost of microgrid resilience,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2020.
- [80] C. D. Bolen, V. Chu, A. Q. Dang, P. T. Kim, C. Proctor, and B. R. Shideler, “Integrating power-flow, resilience, and cost models for naval installation microgrids,” Technical Report; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2021.
- [81] M. R. Grimaila, R. F. Mills, M. Haas, and D. Kelly, “Mission assurance: Issues and challenges,” in *International Conference on Security and Management (SAM10)*, 2010.

- [82] M. N. Grussing, S. Gunderson, M. Canfield, E. Falconer, A. Antelman, and S. L. Hunter, “Development of the army facility mission dependency index for infrastructure asset management,” Technical Report; Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, Champaign, IL, USA, 2010.
- [83] A. Antelman, J. J. Dempsey, and B. Brodt, “Mission dependency index—a metric for determine infrastructure criticality,” in *International Facility Management Association Facility Management Workshop*, 2008.
- [84] S. Gunderson, A. Antelman, M. Canfield, A. Miller, and B. Brodt, “The NASA Mission Dependency Index (MDI) User Guide,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Washington, DC, USA, 2010.
- [85] C. J. Peterson, “Systems architecture design and validation methods for microgrid systems,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2019.
- [86] D. T. Beaton, “Testing whether distributed energy storage results in greater resilience of microgrids,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2021.
- [87] A. B. Fish, “Overcoming flaws in the mission dependency index (mdi) with network flow analysis,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, 2021.
- [88] E. Kujawski and G. Miller, “The mission dependency index: Fallacies and misuses,” *INCOSE Int. Symp.*, vol. 19, pp. 1565–1580, 2009.
- [89] M. J. A. Nichols, “Delphi study using value-focused thinking for united states air force mission dependency index,” Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, USA, 2015.
- [90] C. W. Smith, “Mission dependency index of air force built infrastructure: Knowledge discovery with machine learning,” Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, USA, 2016.
- [91] Department of Defense, “Metrics and standards for energy resilience at military installations,” Washington, DC, USA, 2020.
- [92] A. Kwasinski, “Quantitative model and metrics of electrical grids’ resilience evaluated at a power distribution level,” *Energies*, vol. 9, no. 93, 2016.
- [93] C. H. Lie, C. L. Hwang, and F. A. Tillman, “Availability of maintained systems: A state-of-the-art survey,” *AIIE Eng.*, vol. 9, pp. 247–259, 1977.

- [94] A. M. Zhivov, A. Stringer, M. D. Fox, P. W. Daniels, T. J. Traver, and J. Benefiel, “Defining, measuring and assigning resilience requirements to electric and thermal energy systems,” *ASHRAE Trans.*, p. 127, 2021.
- [95] V. Krishnamurthy and A. Kwasinski, “Effects of power electronics, energy storage, power distribution architecture, and lifeline dependencies on microgrid resiliency during extreme events,” *IEEE J. Emerg. Sel. Top. Power Electr.*, vol. 41, pp. 1310–1323, 2016.
- [96] Department of Homeland Security, “Supply Chain Resilience Guide,” Washington, DC, USA, 2019.
- [97] C.-Y. Cheng, T.-L. Chen, and Y.-Y. Chen, “An analysis of the structural complexity of supply chain networks,” *Appl. Math. Model.*, vol. 38, pp. 2328–2344, 2014.
- [98] D. Battini, A. Persona, and S. Allesina, “Towards a use of network analysis: quantifying the complexity of supply chain networks,” *Int. J. Electr. Cust. Relatsh. Manag.*, vol. 1, pp. 75–90, 2007.
- [99] H. Wang, T. Gu, M. Jin, R. Zhao, and G. Wang, “The complexity measurement and evolution analysis of supply chain network under disruption risks,” *Chaos Solitons Fractals*, vol. 116, pp. 72–78, 2018.
- [100] C. W. Craighead, J. Blackhurst, M. J. Rungtusanatham, and R. B. Handfield, “The severity of supply chain disruptions: Design characteristics and mitigation,” *Decis. Sci.*, vol. 38, pp. 131–156, 2007.
- [101] D. Ivanov, A. Dolgui, B. Sokolov, and M. Ivanova, “Literature review on disruption recovery in the supply chain,” *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 55, pp. 6158–6174, 2017.
- [102] M. Shekarian and M. M. Parast, “An integrative approach to supply chain disruption risk and resilient management: a literature review,” *Int. J. Logist. Res. Appl.*, vol. 24, pp. 427–455, 2020.
- [103] Y. Fan and M. A. Stevenson, “Review of supply chain risk management: definition, theory, and research agenda,” *Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag.*, vol. 48, pp. 205–230, 2018.
- [104] M. N. Faisal, D. K. Banwet, and R. Shankar, “Management of risk in supply chains: SCOR approach and analytic network process,” *Supply Chain Forum: Int. J.*, vol. 8, pp. 66–79, 2007.
- [105] Department of Defense, “DoD Instruction 5200.44 (Change 3): Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trust Systems and Networks (TSN),” Washington, DC, USA, 2018.

- [106] G. Purdy, "ISO 31000: Setting a new standard for risk management," *Risk Anal.*, pp. 881–886, 30 2010.
- [107] U. R. de Oliveira, F. A. S. Marins, H. M. Rocha, and V. A. P. Salomon, "The ISO 31000 standard in supply chain risk management," *J. Clean. Prod.*, vol. 151, pp. 616–633, 2017.
- [108] M. Fattahi, K. Govindan, and E. Keyvanshokoh, "Responsive and resilient supply chain network design under operational and disruption risks with delivery lead-time sensitive customers," *Trans. Res. Part E*, vol. 101, pp. 176–200, 2017.
- [109] C. S. Tang, "Perspectives in supply chain risk management," *Int. J. Prod. Econ.*, vol. 103, pp. 451–488, 2006.
- [110] A. Dolgui, D. Ivanov, and B. Sokolov, "Ripple effect in the supply chain: An analysis and recent literature," *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 56, pp. 414–430, 2018.
- [111] S. Chopra and M. Sodhi, "Reducing the risk of supply chain disruptions," *MIT Sloan Manag. Rev.*, vol. 55, pp. 72–80, 2014.
- [112] Miller, S. Insider Threats Involving Supply Chain Risk. [Online]. Available: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1088906.pdf>. Accessed May 23, 2021.
- [113] M. Crosignani, M. Macchiavelli, and A. Silva, "Pirates without borders: the propagation of cyberattacks through firms' supply chains," Technical Report; Federal Reserve Bank of New York: New York, NY, USA, 2021.
- [114] T. Tsvetanov and S. Slaria, "The effect of the colonial pipeline shutdown on gasoline prices," *Econ. Lett.*, vol. 209, p. 110122, 2021.
- [115] M. N. Khan, P. Akhtar, and Y. Merali, "Strategies and effective decision-making against terrorism affecting supply chain risk management and security: A novel combination of triangulated methods," *Ind. Manag. Data Syst.*, vol. 118, pp. 1528–1546, 2018.
- [116] J. Cho, G. J. Lim, S. J. Kim, and T. Biobaku, "Liquefied natural gas inventory routing problem under uncertain weather conditions," *Int. J. Prod. Econ.*, vol. 204, pp. 18–29, 2018.
- [117] M. C. Wilson, "The impact of transportation disruptions on supply chain performance," *Trans. Res. Part E*, vol. 43, pp. 295–320, 2007.
- [118] X. Bai, H. Jia, and M. Xu, "Port congestion and the economics of LPG seaborne transportation," *Marit. Policy Manag.*, 2021.

- [119] V. Wendler-Bosco and C. Nicholson, "Port disruption impact on the maritime supply chain: A literature review," *Sustain. Resil. Infrastruct.*, vol. 5, pp. 378–394, 2019.
- [120] S. Yeletay,si, "A risk analysis on the continuity of the petroleum supply chain using gis and systems simulation." Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA, 2010.
- [121] S. M. Wagner, K. J. Mizgier, and P. Arnez, "Disruptions in tightly coupled supply chain networks: The case of the us offshore oil industry," *Prod. Plan. Control*, vol. 25, pp. 494–508, 2012.
- [122] C. A. MacKenzie, J. R. Santos, and K. Barker, "Measuring changes in international production from a disruption: Case study of the japanese earthquake and tsunami," *Int. J. Prod. Econ.*, vol. 138, pp. 293–302, 2012.
- [123] F. Haces-Fernandez, "Wind energy implementation to mitigate wildfire risk and preemptive blackouts," *Energies*, vol. 130, p. 2421, 2020.
- [124] R. B. Handberg, G. Graham, and L. Burns, "Corona virus tariffs, trade wars and supply chain evolutionary design," *Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag.*, vol. 40, pp. 1649–1660, 2020.
- [125] J. M. Lee and E. Y. Wong, "Suez Canal blockage: An analysis of legal impact, risks and liabilities to the global supply chain," *MATEC Web Conf.*, vol. 339, 2021.
- [126] L. Zhang and W. Bai, "Risk assessment of China's natural gas importation: A supply chain perspective," *SAGE Open*, no. 10, 2020.
- [127] G. E. Tverberg, "Oil supply limits and the continuing financial crisis," *Energy*, vol. 37, pp. 27–34, 2012.
- [128] M. Christopher and M. Holweg, "Supply chain 2.0 revisited: A framework for managing volatility-induced risk in the supply chain," *Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist.*, vol. 47, pp. 2–17, 2017.
- [129] J. D. Hamilton, "Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007–08," Technical Report; National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2009.
- [130] A. S. Butt, "Strategies to mitigate the impact of covid-19 on supply chain disruptions: A multiple case analysis of buyers and distributors," *Int. J. Logist. Manag.*, 2021.
- [131] S. M. Gholami-Zanjani, M. S. Jabalameli, W. Klibi, and M. S. Pishvae, "A robust location-inventory model for food supply chains operating under disruptions with ripple effects," *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 59, pp. 301–324, 2021.

- [132] V. K. Chauhan, S. Perera, and A. Brintrup, “The relationship between nested patterns and the ripple effect in complex supply networks,” *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 59, pp. 325–341, 2021.
- [133] D. Mishra, Y. K. Dwivedi, N. P. Rana, and E. Hassini, “Evolution of supply chain ripple effect: A bibliometric and meta-analytic view of the constructs,” *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 59, pp. 129–149, 2021.
- [134] T. Nguyen, L. Zhou, V. Spiegler, P. L. Ieromonachou, and Y., “Big data analytics in supply chain management: A state-of-the-art literature review,” *Comp. Oper. Res.*, vol. 98, pp. 254–264, 2018.
- [135] S. Hosseini and D. Ivanov, “Baysian networks for supply chain risk, resilience and ripple effect analysis: A literature review,” *Expert Syst. Appl.*, vol. 161, p. 113649, 2020.
- [136] N. Yodo, P. Wang, and Z. Zhou, “Predictive resilience analysis of complex systems using dyanmic Bayesian networks,” *IEEE Trans. Reliab.*, p. 66, 2017.
- [137] S. Hosseini, D. Ivanonv, and A. Dolgui, “Ripple effect modelling of supplier disruption: Integrated Markov chain and dynamic Bayesian network approach,” *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 58, pp. 3284–3303, 2020.
- [138] S. Perera, M. G. H. Bell, F. Kurauchi, and D. Kasthurirathna, “Absorbing Markov chain approach to modelling disruptions in supply chain networks,” in *Moratuwa Engineering Research Conference (MERCOn)*, 2019.
- [139] S. Dueñas Osorio, L.; Vemuru, “Cascading failures in complex infrastructure systems,” *Struct. Saf.*, pp. 157–167, 2009.
- [140] P. Phattharapornjaroen, V. Glantz, E. Carlström, L. D. Holmqvist, Y. Sittichanbun-cha, and A. Khorram-Manesh, “The feasibility of implementing the flexible surge capacity concept in bangkok: Willing participants and educational gaps,” *Int. J. of Environ. Res. and Public Health*, vol. 18, p. 7793, 2021.
- [141] A. McGregor, “Steady-state theorem,” 2017. Available: <https://people.cs.umass.edu/~mcmgregor/S17/lec15.pdf>
- [142] A. B. Salem, A. Muller, and P. Weber, “Dynamic Bayesian networks in system reliability analysis,” in *6th IFAC Symposium*, 2006.
- [143] N. Khakzad, “Application of dynamic Bayesian network to risk analysis of domino effects in chemical infrastructures,” *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 138, pp. 263–272, 2015.

- [144] T. Kohda and W. Cui, "Risk-based reconfiguration of safety monitoring system using dynamic Bayesian network," *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 92, pp. 1716–1723, 2007.
- [145] L. Uusitalo, "Advantages and challenges of Bayesian networks in environmental modelling," *Ecol. Model.*, vol. 203, pp. 312–318, 2007.
- [146] S. Rebello, H. Yu, and L. Ma, "An integrated approach for system functional reliability assessment using dynamic Bayesian network and hidden Markov model," *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.*, vol. 180, pp. 124–135, 2018.
- [147] M. Liu, Z. Liu, F. Chu, F. Zheng, and C. Chu, "A new robust dynamic Bayesian network approach for disruption risk assessment under the supply chain ripple effect," *Int. J. Prod. Res.*, vol. 59, pp. 265–285, 2021.
- [148] S. B. A. Kashem, S. De Souza, A. Iqbal, and J. Ahmed, "Microgrid in military applications," in *IEEE 12th International Conference on Compatibility, Power Electronics and Power Engineering (CPE-POWERENG)*, 2018.
- [149] E. W. Prehoda, C. Schelly, and J. M. U. S. Pearce, "Strategic solar photovoltaic-powered microgrid deployment for enhanced national security," *Renew. Sust. Energy Rev.*, pp. 167–175, 2017.
- [150] N. U. I. Hossain, R. Jaradat, and M. Mohammad, "Assessing and enhancing oil and gas supply chain resilience: A Bayesian network based approach," in *Industrial and Systems Engineering Conference*, 2019.
- [151] S. N. Emenike and G. Falcone, "A review on energy supply chain resilience through optimization," *Renew. Sust. Energy Rev.*, vol. 134, p. 110088, 2020.
- [152] A. Hossain, V.-K. Bui, and H.-M. Kim, "Microgrids as a resilience resource and strategies used by microgrids for enhancing resilience," *Appl. Energy*, vol. 240, pp. 56–72, 2019.
- [153] Y. Wang, A. O. Rousis, and G. Strbac, "On microgrids and resilience: A comprehensive review on modeling and operational strategies," *Renew. Sust. Energy Rev.*, vol. 134, p. 110313, 2020.
- [154] M. Deru, K. Field, D. Studer, K. Benne, and B. Griffith, "U.S. Department of Energy Commercial Reference Building Models of the National Building Stock," Technical Report; National Renewable Energy Laboratory: Golden, CO, USA, 2011.

- [155] Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command, “UFC 3-540-01: Engine-Driven Generator Systems For Prime And Standby Power Applications,” Washington Navy Yard, DC, USA, 2019.
- [156] B. M. O’Halloran, N. Papakonstantinou, and D. L. Van Bossuyt, “Assessing the consequence of cyber and physical malicious attacks in complex, cyber-physical systems during early system design,” in *IEEE 16th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN)*, 2018.
- [157] C. M. Girouard, A. G. Pollman, and A. Hernandez, “Modeling and simulation informed conceptual design, analysis, and initial component selections of a supply-side building scale laes system for renewable, islanded microgrid resiliency,” in *MORS Symposium*, 2019.
- [158] P. Siritoglou, G. Oriti, and D. Van Bossuyt, “Distributed energy-resource design method to improve energy security in critical facilities,” *Energies*, vol. 14, p. 2773, 05 2021.

---

---

## Initial Distribution List

---

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California