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THESIS

**MEASURING SUCCESS IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN:
REFLECTIONS FROM THE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE**

by

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REFLECTIONS FROM THE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE**

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ABSTRACT

Although the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) has deployed worldwide to combat violent extremism and counter strategic competitors since 2006, it does not have a clear process to measure the effectiveness of tactical-level Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). A lack of measures of effectiveness (MOE) for CAO is due to several basic challenges: 1) Lack of a Civil Affairs doctrinal foundation for MOEs; 2) lack of clear mission statements for deploying teams to help formulate MOEs; 3) lack of effective internal and external Civil Affairs communications to standardize MOEs; and 4) lack of adequate personnel, training, funding, and analytic tools for Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) to monitor and evaluate MOEs. Based on 18 interviews with Civil Affairs practitioners—from senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to field grade officers—this thesis examines the barriers that CATs face in developing and implementing MOEs during mission planning and execution. This thesis also provides recommendations for CATs and the Civil Affairs leadership to address and overcome these barriers by developing MOEs to evaluate tactical and operational mission progress. Furthermore, the authors identify deficiencies in doctrine and recommend the creation of doctrine-specific to SOF Civil Affairs.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOB	Advanced Operating Base
ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
AFRICOM	Africa Command
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
AM&E	Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AS	Al Shabaab
CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CAQC	Civil Affairs Qualification Course
CE	Civil Engagement
CIM	Civil Information Management
CKI	Civil Knowledge Integration
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CME	Civil Military Engagement
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
CNDE	Civil Network Development and Engagement
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONOP	Concept of Operation
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Direct Action
HN	Host Nation
FM	Field Manual
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order

FTN	Force Tracking Number
HVI	High Value Individual
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational
JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process
JP	Joint Publication
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
MOE	measure of effectiveness
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OPORD	Operation Order
OE	Operational Environment
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RIP/TOA	Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority
RFF	Request for Forces
SCA	Support to Civil Administration
SMIB	Staff Mission In-Brief
SO	Special Operations
SOCM	Special Operations Combat Medic
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SR	Special Reconnaissance
STP	Soldier Training Publication
TTP	Tactic, Technique, Procedure
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USJFKSWCS	U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USSOCOM	Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WARNO	Warning Order

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Failure to measure the long-term effects of SOF operations is a systemic problem across the SOF enterprise. This paper focuses on SOF Civil Affairs' short falls in developing MOEs. The premier SOF Civil Affairs unit in the U.S. Army, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (SO) (A), has deployed globally for over a decade in support of steady-state and combat operations. Their success has been recognized at all levels of military command and even by senior ranking U.S. Government officials. While the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (SO) (A) has been "successful," the inability to quantify, measure, and communicate success remains a challenge.

Based upon interviews and research, the authors argue a lack of Civil Affairs' MOE is due to several fundamental challenges: 1) lack of Civil Affairs doctrinal foundation; 2) lack of clear mission statements for deploying teams; 3) lack of effective internal and external Civil Affairs communications; and 4) lack of manpower, training, funding, and tools for Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) to monitor and evaluate MOEs. The commonality among these challenges is a lack of SOF Civil Affairs doctrine.

Support from USASOC, 1st Special Forces Command (SO) (A), USJFKSWCS, and TRADOC is critical to advancing the following recommendations: 1) Authorization and demand from flag-level command for new doctrine applying specifically to SOF Civil Affairs to plan and execute operations in the human domain; 2) establishment of a unified CKI platform for all SOF; and 3) authorization and funding to contract education in the AM&E process for CATs, until formalized instruction can be added to the CAQC. Actioning these recommendations will ensure that SOF Civil Affairs continues to receive the training and funding necessary to support global operations and contribute in a meaningful way to national security. The ability to quantify, measure, and communicate success must be established in order to enhance understanding of SOF Civil Affairs' capabilities and capacity.

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We wish to express our thanks to the former and current members of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (SO) (A) who supported our project. Your firsthand experiences—shared in free-spoken interviews—were the lynchpin to this thesis work. The Command’s willingness to support this project and allow the Brigade to be examined through a critical lens provided us the freedom to give candid feedback and recommendations for the future of our organization.

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CRUX OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

The 95th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade (BDE) (Special Operations [SO]) (Airborne [A]) has a relatively short but impressive history. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) activated the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) in 2006 in response to the Global War on Terror. The Brigade expanded from a single battalion to five battalions supporting each Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) have evolved over the last 15 years from Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) conducting Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan to Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) countering-violent extremism and disrupting strategic competitors in all corners of the globe. Although CAO have contributed to success in several theaters, there is, as of yet, no clear process to measure the effectiveness of tactical-level CAO. The lack of metrics has allowed the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) wide breadth to deem what is and is not successful when conducting CAO, differing from battalion to battalion within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). This ambiguity has left Soldiers serving in the Brigade without a metric to determine and develop consistent measures of effectiveness and performance. This thesis addresses the barriers that CATs face in developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) during mission planning and execution. It also provides recommendations for CATs and Civil Affairs leadership to overcome those issues by developing MOEs to evaluate tactical and operational mission progress.

There are many challenges to this effort. For a start, the effects of CAO are much more difficult to measure than kinetic operations, such as the number of High Value Individuals (HVI) killed by a Hellfire missile, or the number of tanks destroyed on the battlefield; see Figure 1. Operating in the human terrain is nebulous at best due to the complexity of human dynamics. For example, it is extremely difficult to measure a population's sentiment towards a host nation (HN) government following a partner-led medical outreach event. While acknowledging that inherent difficulty, it is imperative to develop MOE to conduct self-assessment and hone best practices.



Figure 1. A CAT SOCM administers an eye exam for orphan school children in Somalia. The team reported that this event discouraged youth from joining violent extremist organizations. This an example of an MOE that is more difficult to demonstrate than that of a kinetic operations.¹

Based upon interviews and research, the authors argue that CATs from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) consistently struggle to develop and quantify measures of effectiveness (MOE) that adequately serve to determine and communicate the success or failure of CAO. A lack of Civil Affairs' MOEs is likely due to several fundamental challenges: 1) lack of Civil Affairs doctrinal foundation, 2) lack of clear mission statements for deploying teams, 3) lack of effective internal and external Civil Affairs communications, and 4) lack of manpower, training, funding, and tools for CATs to monitor and evaluate MOEs.

The stakes are high, strategically and institutionally. The very existence of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) is at stake if CATs are not able to plan, assess, monitor, and evaluate the impacts of their operations. The U.S. Army downsized the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade—only other active-duty Civil Affairs unit—to a single battalion, the 83rd Civil Affairs

¹ Source: Chris VanJohnson, "Defeating Extremism through Community Engagement and Eye Care," *Spirit of America* (blog), November 30, 2016, <https://spiritofamerica.org/blog/defeating-extremism-community-engagement-eye-care>.

Battalion (BN) which is currently under review by the U.S. Army to potentially de-activate. Although the U.S. Army did not publicly explain its decision to de-activate the 85th CA BDE, it can be assumed that the unit failed to demonstrate its value through quantifiable evidence. Should CATs continue to fall short on showing the quantifiable effects of CAO, then it will be difficult to justify the investment to American taxpayers, U.S. Congress, and all echelons of supported military commands.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND PURPOSE

What are the barriers that CATs face in developing MOEs during mission planning and how do CAT members and Civil Affairs leadership overcome those issues and develop MOEs to evaluate tactical and operational mission progress? The purpose of this research is to inform leaders at all levels in the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) of the existing systemic problems regarding the two phases of the MOE process: first planning and second Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate (AM&E). This thesis presents and assesses the challenges facing tactical-level CATs so that the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A), Civil Affairs Proponent and U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USJFKSWCS) can better implement doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and frameworks necessary for CATs to generate MOEs during pre-deployment planning and follow through with the AM&E process to guide future operations.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The authors of this thesis initially sought to research and write a history of tactical level CAO successes and showcase lessons learned for Civil Affairs practitioners and students. In addition, the authors sought to document Civil Affairs case studies to fill a growing void in military history. For instance, Admiral McRaven's *SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, is one of the most well-known histories of special operations but fails to highlight CAO in any way. In fact, McRaven's definition of Special Operations narrowly focuses on direct action (DA) and dismisses Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 definition of Special Operations, which includes Civil

Affairs, Psychological Operations, and reconnaissance.² The authors presented the concept to the Civil Affairs Historian at the USJFKSWSC at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The historian acknowledged that such a piece did not exist.³ He also recommended that the authors narrow the scope of research to give adequate attention to the case studies given limited time and resources. Therefore, the authors narrowed the aperture to focus solely on case studies from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A), specifically the time spanning between the Brigade's re-activation in 2007 to present with a sampling of CAO in each COCOM.

In preparation for case studies, the authors considered the possibility of interviewing Civil Affairs practitioners to glean fresh and candid insights. The team developed a lengthy list of questions focusing on all aspects of a CAT's pre-mission training, deployment, and post-deployment analysis. Once approved, the authors requested assistance from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to recommend current or former members of the Brigade who conducted tactical level CAO.

The authors conducted 18 interviews with current and former Civil Affairs team commanders, team sergeants, Civil Affairs Non-Commissioned Officers (CANCO), and Civil Affairs senior leaders. Senior leadership included a former brigade commander, battalion commander, and battalion executive officer. Interviews revealed that teams were deemed successful but could not quantify the effects of their operations. It should be noted that the 18 interviewees do not represent the official views of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). Furthermore, the interviews are a sample and cannot fully account for all the experiences of all members of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). The research team was restricted to 18 interviews due to three primary factors. First, the amount of time available to conduct interviews. Second, access to active duty SOF Civil Affairs members was limited due to high operational tempo. Third, retired or separated SOF Civil Affairs members at times struggled to recall details of operations that may have been useful; and gaining access to multiple members of deploying teams to fill gaps was challenging. Nonetheless, the

² William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 2.

³ Troy Sacquety, interview with USASOC Historian, February 16, 2021.

interviews are representative of the experiences of much of the larger CA force and offer consistent feedback reinforced by doctrine and special warfare publications.

The authors researched additional case studies and found the same trend in Special Operations journals such as *Eunomia*, *Special Warfare*, and *Veritas*; CATs were able to describe what they did, Measures of Performance (MOP), but could not articulate the effects of what they did, MOEs. For this reason, the authors abandoned the idea of writing a historical body of work on Special Operations Forces (SOF) CAO. Instead, the authors researched and composed this thesis focusing on identifying which barriers teams face in developing MOEs during their mission planning, how CAT members and Civil Affairs leadership can overcome those issues, and how to develop MOEs evaluating tactical and operational mission progress. This shift in direction led the thesis team to conduct an in-depth analysis of current CA doctrine presented in Field Manuals (FM), Army Techniques Publications (ATP), and Soldier Training Publications (STP). This analysis assisted the team in identifying the source of the problems revealed in case studies and interviews.

As a final coda, this thesis respects the opinions and anonymity of interviewees. The authors chose to keep interview responses anonymous to protect active members of the Civil Affairs Regiment from reprisal for their candor and honesty. Additionally, anonymity served to ensure interviewees felt comfortable sharing professional experiences regarding operations and practices.

C. BACKGROUND REVIEW

Tactical-level CATs from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) have conducted countless impactful missions since activation in 2006.⁴ Yet, there is a lack of published in-depth case studies about CATs from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). Upon initial research, there are approximately 15 case studies about CATs from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) published in *Special Warfare*, the official professional journal of U.S. Army Special Operations, from

⁴ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "For U.S. Commandos in the Philippines, a Water Pump Is a New Weapon against ISIS," *New York Times*, April 27, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/world/asia/pentagon-philippines-isis.html>.

2006 to present, in 57 issues.⁵ Likewise, there are three case studies published in *Veritas*, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) official journal of Army Special Operations history, since 2007.⁶ The history of successful CAO certainly exists but most of the operations are not published and available to the wider public. The high operational tempo and classification levels have likely prevented Civil Affairs personnel from publishing accounts of their experiences relating to measuring effects.

Another reason for a lack of attention is imprecise and ambiguous MOEs. While there is no discounting the impact of these mission sets, the Army and Joint Force must rely on measurable metrics to define success for audiences not actively involved in the operations. It is because this need exists that MOPs and MOEs were developed and included in military doctrine.

An MOP, defined by Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0 “The Operations Process,” is “an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.”⁷ In other words, MOPs are a quantification of tasks completed towards achieving an objective. ADP 5-0 states a MOP answers the question, “was the action taken?”⁸ Examples of MOPs are plentiful in Civil Affairs case studies. For example, between March 2007 and January 2008, a Civil Affairs Team (CAT) from F Company, 96th CA BN (SO) (A) deployed to Chad in support of Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahel. The team reported in a *Special Warfare* article that they conducted the first Civil Affairs deployment to Chad as a proof of concept, conducted “numerous” Civil Reconnaissance (CR) missions, and “performed 31 precisely focused and effective projects valued at approximately \$400,000.”⁹ Each of these MOPs likely furthered the Joint Special

⁵ Janice Burton, “Countering Malign Influence in Estonia,” *Special Warfare* 32, no. 3 (September 2019): 56, https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW3203/32-3_JUL-SEP_2019_web.pdf.

⁶ Robert W. Jones Jr., “Civil Affairs in Columbia,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 2, no. 4 (2006): 99, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll7/id/17/rec/3>.

⁷ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, ADP 5-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 5-3, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1007409.

⁸ Department of the Army, 5-3.

⁹ Danford W. Bryant II, “Into Africa: CA Teams Expand Operation Enduring Freedom into Chad,” *Special Warfare* 21, no. 5 (October 2008): 24, <http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8243>.

Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahel and U.S. Country Team objectives. The CAT's MOPs are easily measurable and demonstrate quantifiable progress towards an objective. However, the MOPs do not tell the whole story; they do not demonstrate the result of the tasks, the MOEs. These MOPs show effort, but not necessarily the quantifiable gains.

An MOE, defined by ADP 5-0 is “an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time”.¹⁰ In short, the MOE demonstrates the result of the MOP. ADP 5-0 states an MOE answers the question, “are we doing the right things?”¹¹ For example, in approximately 2010, a Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) from the 96th CA BN (SO) (A) deployed to Pakistan to provide humanitarian assistance. In another *Special Warfare* article, Major Ross Lightsey Sr. asserted that CMSE Pakistan’s “enhanced positive relations with local media are clearly evidenced by the dozens of articles and news interview that show the Pakistani government and military in a favorable light.”¹² The un-stated MOP was likely engagements with the media and the resulting MOE is “dozens” of articles reflecting the Government of Pakistan favorably. MOEs are much more difficult to assess than MOPs because it requires establishing a baseline against which to measure the effect of the operation which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. Effects may transpire over a long period of time, or the effects may not be readily measurable, such as popular sentiment towards a government.

Among the published case studies, the authors defined the MOPs but most case studies lacked clearly articulated MOEs. For example, CAT 122, 96th CA BN (SO) (A) deployed to Afghanistan in 2008 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to one *Veritas* article, the team produced a long list of MOPs such as renovating the local power grid, building a cell phone tower, conducting inoculation, and deworming during a Veterinary Civic Action Programs (VETCAP), renovated an education center, and managed and staffed a health clinic. Regarding the MOEs, the author concluded that:

¹⁰ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 5–3.

¹¹ Department of the Army, 5–3.

¹² Ross F. Lightsey Sr., “Persistent Engagement: Civil Military Support Element Operating in CENTCOM,” *Special Warfare* 23, no. 3 (June 2010): 20, <http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8255>.

The three elements of ARSOF [Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Forces] combined very effectively to significantly reduce the influence of the Taliban in a strategically vital area. With each element complementing the others, the ARSOF teams made major improvements in a district only recently under the sway of the enemy.¹³

While this quote shows that the teams were likely effective, the article did not articulate how they measured their success. Due to a lack of discussion of MOEs in the article, it is not possible to determine if the team developed and utilized valid MOEs.

While the military regards MOEs as important to all operations from tactical to strategic level there is a large gap in doctrine. FM 3-0 “Operations,” FM 3-57 “Civil Affairs Operations,” FM 6-0 “Mission Command,” JP 5.0 “Joint Planning,” and JP 3-0 “Joint Operations” only mention MOEs in passing and provide no clear explanation of how to identify or develop MOEs for operations. While each publication clearly states that they must be developed, none provides any further discussion on the topic. This is not a new problem to the military, but it is a persistent and unsolved one.

Research by practitioners leaves open questions as well. In 2010 U.S. Army Major Shon McCormick, authored a Staff College thesis identifying the U.S. military’s inability to provide a structured framework to its leaders to develop MOEs. MAJ McCormick identified the ability to use programmatic logic to develop MOEs. However, he also acknowledges that some concepts are more difficult and abstract to measure, like security.¹⁴ Things like security, governance, nation building, and various other CAO are difficult to empirically evaluate or measure. An article in *Special Warfare* May-June 2010 issue examines persistent engagement of CMSEs. Within the article the author identifies that MOEs for persistent engagement may be easier to measure over years.¹⁵ While this is a valid argument it also seems to imply that because it is hard to measure short-term

¹³ Kenneth Finlayson, “A Collective Effort: Army Special Operations Forces in Deh Rawod, Afghanistan,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 5, no. 4 (2009), https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n4_collective_effort_page_2.html.

¹⁴ Shon McCormick, “A Primer on Developing Measures of Effectiveness,” *Military Review* 90, no. 4 (August 2010): 60, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/2010-Archive/>.

¹⁵ Lightsey Sr., “Persistent Engagement.”

success it is therefore not possible. This idea must be rejected, FM 3-0, FM 3-57, FM 6-0, JP-5.0, and JP 3-0 all dictate development of MOEs as a specific requirement in the planning process. If short term MOEs are disregarded the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) will default to simple measures like being invited on a return mission or a lack of violence in a region as an MOE. These two factors lack a clearly defined causal relationship that is required for a valid MOE.

The current dearth of research indicates that historically, MOEs are not prioritized in the planning process of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). The limited availability of case studies and gap in doctrine indicate a need to conduct further research to identify if this is a systemic shortcoming. The lack of existing doctrine to inform the development of MOEs leads to neglect on the part of tactical and operational level leaders to develop them at all. Additionally, well intentioned servicemembers develop MOEs that lack metrics that adequately and effectively measure the success of an operation. While long term objectives of many CA operations include maintaining strong relationships, building partner capacity, increasing security, and countering the ability of violent extremist organizations to recruit from vulnerable populations; often the MOEs developed assume causal relationships without any evidence to support causation.

The findings of 18 interviews, combined with the findings of doctrine analysis, and publication reviews resulted in the clear identification of a center of gravity regarding the issue of MOE development within SOF Civil Affairs. The absence of sufficient doctrine and SOPs has left SOF Civil Affairs practitioners without the guidance necessary to establish MOEs and effectively communicate success. This thesis examines the problem at hand and provides recommendations for a way forward.

D. THESIS OUTLINE

The most significant finding derived from 18 interviews conducted is that teams struggle to quantify the effects of CAO. This thesis analyzes the myriad of challenges to assist teams to prove success, beginning with a close review of existing doctrine in Chapter II. This chapter identifies that the lack of CAO MOEs goes beyond the team level, rather, the problem is firmly rooted in the lack of SOF Civil Affairs doctrine. Despite a

revised FM 3-57, the FM falls short of instructing SOF Civil Affairs operators how to plan MOEs prior to deployment and conduct AM&E while deployed. Additionally, the existing doctrine regarding MOEs is outdated and focuses primarily on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Chapter III presents a preponderance of evidence that identifies the systemic problem of CATs deploying without a mission statement. Interviews revealed that the majority of teams deployed absent a mission statement or absent a mission statement that provided a clear task and purpose. The mission statement is the fundamental building block in the Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Without a mission statement, CATs cannot conduct proper planning and therefore the CATs must interpret for themselves their team's mission, task, and purpose.

Chapter IV further builds out the discussion focusing on how weak internal and external communication structures lead to a breakdown in continuity and information flow between teams, thus diminishing efforts to achieve long-term effects. While Chapter III focused solely on failures to provide mission statement, this chapter furthers the discussion surrounding communication to include Civil Knowledge Information (CKI) sharing, Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA), and operational planning. The fundamental failures to communicate effectively further inhibit teams' ability to plan MOEs and execute effectively.

Lastly, Chapter V discusses how a lack of follow-through with Assess Monitor and Evaluate (AM&E) results in a lack of empirical data to support causal relationships between operations and effects making it impossible to deem success as a fact rather than an assumption. This chapter explores how a lack of understanding of the OE leads to faulty baselines and how a lack of a framework to conduct AM&E. Lack of established procedures and manpower continues to deride teams' abilities to execute effectively and efficiently.

This thesis takes a bottom-up approach in research and recommendations with the objective of top-down reform of Civil Affairs doctrine, SOPs, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that are enforced across the Brigade. A primary recommendation of this

thesis is the reform of doctrine. Furthermore, the authors acknowledge the development of new doctrine is complicated by the need to address emerging threats in grey-zone warfare and preparation for largescale combat operations (LSCO).

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II. FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: INCOMPLETE DOCTRINE LEADS TO FAILURE TO ADHERE TO DOCTRINE

U.S. Army doctrine is so fundamental that it has its own Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its own publication establishing the purpose of doctrine: ADP 1-01 “Doctrine Primer.” ADP 1-01 declares that “doctrine is the body of professional knowledge that guides how Soldiers perform tasks related to the Army’s role: the employment of land power in a distinctly American context.”¹⁶ This body of knowledge is dynamic and constantly evolving to meet current and future operational requirements. ADP 1-01 further states that doctrine “is based on lessons learned in current operations and training, from adaptive enemies, and after changes in force structure, technology, and social values.”¹⁷ The bedrock established in ADP 1-01 founds the Army’s development of doctrine across all branches.

By contrast, U.S. Army Civil Affairs doctrine remains an inchoate and evolving project since the activation of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) in 2007. Since the genesis of SOF Civil Affairs, the U.S. Army has revised Field Manual (FM) 3-57 three times. Most recently, in July 2021, the U.S. Army published a revised version of FM 3-57 “Civil Affairs Operations” to meet the demands of an evolving Regiment and emerging threats. In the introduction of the revised FM 3-57, Major General Roberson, U.S. Army Special Operations (USASOC) Commander, declared “the modernization of Civil Affairs doctrine is a crucial step to generate, train, and equip a ready-to-deploy force. The revision of FM 3-57 clarifies the role, tactics, and taxonomy for CAO.”¹⁸

For all this emphasis, however joint, U.S. Army, and even U.S. Army Civil Affairs doctrine falls short of articulating the importance and application of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), which in turn undermines the six basic contributions of doctrine

¹⁶ Department of Defense, *Doctrine Primer*, ADP 1-01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, n.d.), 1-1, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1007418.

¹⁷ Department of Defense, v.

¹⁸ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-57 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1022687.

according to ADP 1-01: “provide a coherent vision of warfare, enhance operational effectiveness, provide a common frame of reference and cultural perspective, provide a common professional language, discuss Army contributions to unified action, state and foster desirable traits in leaders and Soldiers.”¹⁹ This chapter argues that Civil Affairs leaders, planners, and teams fall short of achieving desired effects due to an incomplete body of Civil Affairs doctrine. It examines the three contributing factors to this problem: 1) doctrine that does not provide a framework for planning MOEs; 2) current Civil Affairs doctrine that is not SOF specific; and 3) Civil Affairs supporting Army Technical Publications (ATPs) that are outdated. Exacerbating matters, incomplete Civil Affairs doctrine has resulted in Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) instructors who are forced to fill doctrinal gaps with personal experience. Incomplete doctrine also creates an atmosphere that tolerates partial planning within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) leaving subordinate commanders without clearly defined planning standards along with an inability to enforce doctrine that is not clearly defined for SOF application.

A. CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

The two leading publications on joint and army operational planning—Joint Publication 5-0 “Joint Planning” and U.S. Army ADP 5-0 “The Operations Process”—only provide a superficial understanding of MOEs. They do not equip leaders, planners, or teams to fully understand how to plan, measure, and evaluate MOEs to achieve mission success. ADP 5-0 only cites MOEs six times, each time referencing JP 5-0.²⁰ Major Shon McCormick, instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and author of “A Primer on Developing Measures of Effectiveness,” points out that JP 5-0 makes mere mention of MOEs and fails to provide guidance for MOE development. McCormick advocates rigorously for the necessity of MOE planning, stating that “pragmatic military leaders should care about measures of effectiveness if for no other reason than that the

¹⁹ Department of Defense, *Doctrine Primer*, 1–2.

²⁰ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 5–3.

American people’s representatives in Congress care about them.”²¹ Doctrine acknowledges that MOEs exist, but it neither guides soldiers through their development nor does it provide a framework for MOE evaluation leads one to believe that doctrine makes a false assumption that soldiers know how to plan and assess MOEs.

FM 3-57 “Civil Affairs Operations” also fails to adequately explain MOEs generally or in the context of human dynamics—the milieu of CAO. The manual states:

CA forces enable, synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil information and knowledge into the planning and development of the common operational picture for these missions. CA forces can also provide civil measures of performance or measures of effectiveness to determine the impact on the indigenous populations and institutions.²²

This statement leads supported commanders to believe that all Civil Affairs forces can develop distinct MOEs that are specific to the human domain. Although the doctrine lacks in its ability to clearly define what an MOE specific to the human domain is, or how to develop it, CA doctrine explicitly conveys that developing MOEs is integral to the planning process. Furthermore, the doctrine neglects to provide a framework or recommended steps for CATs to plan and assess MOEs to ensure that all Civil Affairs forces can in fact develop MOEs. This results in CATs failing to develop MOEs or failing to generate MOEs that are specific and measurable.

Research interviews revealed multiple examples of how CATs lacked the doctrinal foundation to objectively assess their mission progress. The following is a vignette of a CAT from the 96th CA BN (SO) (A) operating in Raqqa, Syria, immediately after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated the city from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Figure 2.

²¹ McCormick, “A Primer on Developing Measures of Effectiveness,” 60.

²² Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 4–10.



Figure 2. Aerial view of Raqqa immediately following the defeat of ISIS.²³

The team commander felt that the team had a successful RIP/TOA from the previous operational team. The team commander reported, however, that he did not receive any existing or planned MOEs. The team commander recognized that his team never formally developed MOEs either, but instead the team created a checklist that was compiled of “the major concerns” such as removing debris, re-establishing schools, and providing water and medical care.²⁴ Through engagements with partner forces, the local population, and the supported command, the CAT was able to develop a list of objectives that satisfied each of the stakeholders’ requirements. For example, the team commander referenced their efforts to provide clean drinking water to the population, which the team measured by the number of citizens with access to clean drinking water. As is common with CA operations and their nebulous nature, though, accurate data in a post-conflict zone is difficult, if not impossible, to generate.²⁵

²³ Source: Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria, June 18, 2021.

²⁴ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.

²⁵ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.



Figure 3. Left, the CAT coordinated for multinational partners to provide heavy equipment (bulldozers, bobcats, backhoes) to clear debris from the streets to facilitate reconstruction. Right, through the Raqqa Civil Council, the CAT coordinated neighborhood clean projects and provided funding for clean-up supplies and hourly wages for local hires to support debris removal and sanitation efforts.²⁶

While the team’s checklist served as a guidepost for the team and enabled them to have a “successful rotation,” the team attempted to assess the progress of their mission using their own team’s methodology due to the lack of doctrine to assess MOEs in the human domain. The team’s lack of MOEs during the initial phases of deployment and the team’s struggle to develop MOEs throughout the deployment is not the fault of the team. Rather, Civil Affairs doctrine does not provide adequate instruction on how to develop MOEs, leaving it dependent on ad hoc improvisation and the initiative of Civil Affairs team commanders.

²⁶ Source: Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.



Figure 4. A team from the 96th CA BN (SO)(A) provided the school desks for children to attend school after the defeat of ISIS. The Raqqa Civil Council posted this photo on social media.²⁷

To assist CATs to achieve desired effects, the Civil Affairs Proponent must publish a step-by-step framework to guide CATs to plan and assess MOEs in the human domain. This step-by-step method should align with the U.S. Army’s preferred operational planning methodology: the MDMP. The concluding chapter will propose necessary components for an MOE framework based upon doctrinal requirements, operational needs, and soldier capacity for planning.

B. SAME LANGUAGE, DIFFERENT DIALECT: CURRENT CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE IS NOT SOF SPECIFIC

The most significant doctrinal hurdle preventing CATs from achieving MOEs is that current Civil Affairs doctrine fails to delineate between tactics, missions, and competencies of conventional U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and SOF Civil Affairs.²⁸

²⁷ Source: Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.

²⁸ U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces belonging to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) (A) which supports the Conventional Military and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (SO) (A) belonging to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which conducts Special Operations.

Historically, the Civil Affairs Regiment was almost entirely U.S. Army Reserve forces until the activation of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) in 2007. In the 15 years since the activation of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) mission demand spurred rapid growth of the Brigade from one to five COCOM-aligned battalions. The rapid growth of the force under the USASOC command structure drove the need to rapidly develop recruitment, selection, and CAQC capabilities. With the high demand to establish the SOF Civil Affairs force structure, the mechanisms that support doctrine development were unable to keep pace and evolve appropriately to support the delineation between SOF Civil Affairs and conventional CA capabilities.

On the other hand, U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs are designed to support conventional forces. Major General (ret) Jeffrey A. Jacobs—former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) (A)—made it clear in 2017 that, “Army Reserve civil affairs force is a conventional, not a special operations force. This fact cannot be wished away, much as some would like it to be. USACAPOC’s thirty-two civil affairs battalions and the one additional Army Reserve battalion assigned to U.S. Army Europe are organized and trained to support the conventional force—brigade combat teams.”²⁹ Likewise, in his scathing critique of the state of Civil Affairs, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Captain Peter Dierkes argues that “a lack of SOF CA doctrine leaves a void of specified responsibility. SOF CA and USACAPOC CA elements both provide important—but different—capabilities. Combined doctrine leads to partner confusion, expectation management issues, and diffusion of responsibility.”³⁰ A lack of doctrine distinguishing SOF from Reserve Civil Affairs prevents both forces from having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

The current doctrinal challenge requires a set of doctrine dedicated to SOF Civil Affairs and another set of doctrine dedicated to Reserve Civil Affairs. For example, Civil

²⁹ Jeffrey Jacobs, “No, Sending Civil Affairs Reservists through the Active Duty Training Pipeline Won’t Solve the Army’s Civil Affairs Problems,” Modern War Institute, October 3, 2017, <https://mwi.usma.edu/no-sending-civil-affairs-reservists-active-duty-training-pipeline-wont-solve-armys-civil-affairs-problems/>.

³⁰ Peter Dierkes, “SOF CA: The Things We Think but Do Not Say,” *Eunomia Journal*, August 24, 2021, <https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/post/sof-ca-the-things-we-think-but-do-not-say>.

Affairs Proponent must evaluate and decide whether current Civil Affairs core competencies and missions apply to both SOF and Reserve Civil Affairs or whether SOF Civil Affairs requires a new set of competencies and missions, specific to the capabilities SOF Civil Affairs brings to bear. This would most certainly require additional funding to create a SOF Civil Affairs Proponent with subject matter experts to write and manage evolving doctrine. Although this would require a significant overhaul of doctrine, the return on investment would likely address fundamental problems, not only MOE planning and assessment but also other challenges to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, and Personnel (DOTMLPF-P). SOF Civil Affairs requires specific doctrine to meet the current and future operational requirements.

C. READING A DEAD LANGUAGE: CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORTING ATPS ARE OUTDATED

The third doctrinal challenge impacting Civil Affairs Regiment is that the ATPs for CAO are outdated and therefore not integrated with FM 3-57. According to ADP 1-01, “Army Techniques Publications provide Soldiers with ways or methods to accomplish or complete a mission, task, or function. The technique publications provide Soldiers with the flexibility to accomplish or complete a mission, task, or function without prescribing to them on what they must do.”³¹ The U.S. Army currently has four “active” ATPs for CAO:

- ATP 3-57.20 Multi-Service Technique for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, February 2013,
- ATP 3-57.30 Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance, May 2014,
- ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, April 2014, and
- ATP 3-57.80 Civil Military Engagement, October 2013.³²

³¹ Department of Defense, *Doctrine Primer*, 2–4.

³² Department of the Army, “Army Technical Publications,” Army Publishing Directorate, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/ATP.aspx>.

The U.S. Army published each of these ATPs between 2013 and 2014, seven years prior to the current revisions in FM 3-57. These ATPs were focused on CAO in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OER) in Afghanistan. For example, the six-page sub-section on MOEs in ATP 3-57.60 provides several COIN-centric MOE assessment products. In present day, COIN is only one aspect of warfare, Civil Affairs Forces must also be prepared to operate in grey-zone warfare and LSCO with near-peer adversaries. Doctrine needs to reflect full scope of activities and operations beyond COIN. The ATP also presents how MOEs fit into the Civil Affairs Methodology. However, neither the MOE assessment products nor the Civil Affairs Methodology are presented in FM 3-57. This is problematic because ATP 1-01 declares that “these publications [ATPs] fully integrate, nest, and comply with the doctrine contained in Army doctrine publications and field manuals,” which is not currently the case.³³

The remedy to outdated Civil Affairs ATPs is simple: revise existing publications to integrate, nest, and comply with FM 3-57. Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Proponent should create new ATPs to reflect the new Civil Affairs core competencies outlined in FM 3-57: Civil Knowledge Integration (CKI), Transitional Governance, Civil Network Development and Engagement (CNDE), and Civil-Military Integration (CMI). Civil Affairs Proponent should also consider creating ATPs for the newly added Civil Affairs Missions to include Civil Information Evaluation, Transitional Military Authority, and Civil Military Operations Center. Each of these proposed ATPs should focus on how MOEs integrate into the specific core competency/mission. For example, how does the SOF Civil Affairs team commander plan and develop MOEs specific to the human domain for operations focused on transitional governance? The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) will not maximize its potential of achieving desired effects until SOF specific ATPs and FMs are revised to direct CATs in MOE planning, monitoring, and evaluation.

³³ Department of Defense, *Doctrine Primer*, 2–4.

D. DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAULTY DOCTRINE, INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTION, AND COMMAND ENFORCEMENT OF MOES

This chapter outlined three primary causes of a broken foundation of Civil Affairs doctrine. Unfortunately, because one legacy of broken doctrine is a general tendency not to follow it, therefore CATs and planners have problems developing MOEs. The causal mechanism to bad MOEs is insufficient instruction of doctrine during the CAQC and the lack of command enforcement of MOE planning.

Even if the Civil Affairs Proponent rectified the deficiencies of doctrine to reflect the needs of an evolving regiment, it will have zero impact unless the CAQC instructors are armed with updated SOF Civil Affairs doctrine. In his *Eunomia* article Dierkes, reflected that:

While in the course, CAQC instructors frequently reminded us that ‘This is not what SOF CA *really* does—you’ll receive that training at your unit.’ Sadly, this follow-on training rarely materializes and is inconsistent when it does. Battalions then deploy teams armed with their wits, previous branch experience, and Google. If SOF CA continues to erode its legitimacy in this manner, it will destroy the branch.³⁴

The Civil Affairs Branch attempted to solidify the quality of instruction through recruiting higher caliber instructors by labeling the position as a “nominative assignment.” In theory, this means the most qualified individuals are selected from the operational force to become CAQC instructors. While this process is excellent at identifying top performers and ensuring their experiences are shared with newly selected members of the Regiment, it does nothing to prepare these top performers with the doctrine needed to produce students capable of conducting MDMP focused on SOF Civil Affairs mission sets and develop valuable MOEs as part of their planning process.

Second, the deficiencies in doctrine have led to Civil Affairs commanders allowing their teams to skip steps in MDMP, specifically MOE development, prior to deploying. Therefore, insufficient doctrine has become an excuse to cut corners in the planning process. The interviews conducted with Civil Affairs personnel indicate that there are

³⁴ Dierkes, “SOF CA.”

wildly different standards across the battalions; and that the Brigade is not holding the CATs to a standard. For example, a former brigade commander referenced the need for “discovery learning” for one or two rotations before he would expect a team to have a fully defined plan.³⁵ A team commander in the Philippines admitted that “there were so many unknowns...where they [the command] wanted us to go, what they [the command] wanted us to focus on, so we actually did not develop clear MOEs.” These are two of many examples showing the second and third order effects of how a lack of doctrine and instruction results in teams deploying without clear MOEs. Without a doctrinal foundation to enforce, it will remain a challenge for leadership at all levels within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to validate that CATs have conducted a successful planning cycle and present planned MOEs with associated metrics to measure progress prior to deploying.

E. CONCLUSION: REBUILD THE FOUNDATION

The doctrinal foundation of Civil Affairs is insufficient to bear the expanded role of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) To reinforce and expand its doctrinal foundation, the Civil Affairs Proponent should create a separate and revised FM 3-57 for SOF Civil Affairs, develop a framework for planning and assessing MOEs in FM 3-57, revise existing ATPs, and create new ATPs to reflect the newly created Civil Affairs core competencies and missions. The doctrinal and instructional recommendations above will codify MOE planning standards within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) Codified standards will enable the Brigade to hold battalions, Companies, and CATs accountable to the same planning standards. The following chapter will dive further into research interviews and the nuances of insufficient doctrine and practices in mission planning that directly undermine CATs abilities to plan for MOEs and achieve desired effects.

³⁵ Interview with Former Commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A), May 24, 2021.

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III. MISSION STATEMENTS: THE CRUMBLING BEDROCK FOR MOES

The most concerning trend identified while interviewing former and current Civil Affairs Team (CAT) commanders and sergeants is the unanimous absence of clear mission statements from higher headquarters to the CATs prior to deployment. For example, a team commander who deployed to the Philippines recounted that “during pre-deployment, there was no set mission given by our battalion, other than the battalion commander wanted the focus to be on post Marawi siege consolidation and gains.”³⁶ The quip among CATs is that Civil Affairs leaders often tell deploying teams to “go do Civil Affairs and don’t screw up.” While flexibility in the planning and execution of CAO is a necessary characteristic of SOF Civil Affairs, too much range—i.e., a lack of a definable objective—can be a detriment to mission success. JP 3-0 “Joint Operations,” declares that:

The mission statement forms the basis for planning and is included in the commander’s planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, and the concept of operations. The Joint Force Commander should develop clear mission statements and ensure they are understood by subordinates.³⁷

If a CAT does not understand their mission due to an unclear mission statement, then the CAT does not have a firm foundation upon which to plan CAO to achieve the desired end-state, and therefore will lack Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).

As Chapter II discusses, MOEs serve as guideposts for teams as they execute their missions abroad. When teams are forced into planning cycles without mission statements, they are prevented from adequately planning MOEs to evaluate their progress toward mission objectives. ATP 3-57.60 “Civil Affairs Planning” states that “CAO/CMO planners develop CMO MOEs to determine how well or how poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving [CAO/]CMO objectives according to the commander’s mission statement and

³⁶ Interview with 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Philippines, May 25, 2021.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), II-6, <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/3-0-Operations-Series/>.

intent.”³⁸ Mission success hinges upon a clear and complete mission statement. This chapter argues that CATs cannot successfully develop MOEs absent mission statements, and that Civil Affairs doctrine does not provide sufficient tactical mission tasks required for clear mission statements.

A. GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT: POOR OR MISSING MISSION STATEMENTS INFORM POOR PLANNING

According to ADP 5-0, the mission statement answers five basic yet critical questions: “Who will execute the operation? What is the unit’s essential task? Where will the operation occur? When will the operation begin? Why will the force conduct the operation?”³⁹ Without a complete and clearly defined mission statement from higher headquarters, CATs lack a solid base upon which to develop plans and measure the results of CAO. When a Civil Affairs battalion deploys a CAT—likely consisting of recent graduates of the CAQC—without a mission statement, the Civil Affairs battalion is essentially asking the CAT to make assumptions about its task and purpose to support operations. For example, a team commander who served in East Africa stated, “guidance was pretty limited in terms of what we were going to do. It was more up to us as a team to figure out how we could best employ ourselves and where we fit into the Special Operations Command Forward East Africa mission.”⁴⁰ While this CAT was successful in determining their role in an ill-defined mission set, for each success story there is another failure. Although CAO does not lend itself to dramatic failures that make international news like a rogue drone strike or mis-identified High-Value Targets (HVT), instead it manifests in rotations of teams that rarely leave the capital city or forward operating base and achieve few if any tangible results over a six-month rotation. These ineffective rotations are due to misguided planning concepts because ill-informed tactical level CATs make decisions about what they think their mission should be.

³⁸ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Planning*, ATP 3-57.60 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 1–16, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=102888.

³⁹ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 2-19.

⁴⁰ Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – East Africa, n.d.

Moreover, per doctrine a clear mission statement is foundational to operational planning. According to ATP 3-57.60, operational planning is critical because it “produces operational products, MOEs, and MOPs. The goal of the planning process is the achievement of U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war abroad and at home.”⁴¹ The Army’s preferred operational planning methodology is the MDMP. When the Army is serving in a joint environment, the operational planning methodology is the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Recognizing the criticality of planning, as per doctrine, MDMP must be executed deliberately to achieve objectives of U.S. national interest. The first step of Army MDMP titled “Receipt of Mission” and step one of JOPP called “Planning Initiation” requires that higher headquarters issues a mission statement. During this phase, higher headquarters must provide a mission statement to the subordinate unit. Or as the Naval War College’s Joint Operation Planning Process Workbook states: “bottom line, this step sets the conditions for the subsequent JOPP steps.”⁴² During step two of MDMP and JOPP, “mission analysis,” the CATs refine their own mission statement at the tactical level to ensure it nests with higher headquarters’ mission.⁴³ During step three of MDMP and JOPP, “course of action development,” the team establishes MOEs and determines how to monitor and evaluate the MOEs. In short, if step one of MDMP or JOPP produces no mission statement, then a potential slippery slope of failed planning ensues; not only will MOEs be lacking, but so will many other key outputs.

In the absence of mission statements handed down from higher headquarters, CATs spend time and resources to develop their own. Among Civil Affairs leaders, some believe that CATs require multiple rotations to determine and refine the team’s mission statement. A former O-6 Civil Affairs commander reflected, “for the first rotation or two, there’s a lot of discovery learning that’s got to go on for that unit to even understand its OE well enough

⁴¹ Department of Defense, *Civil Affairs Planning*, 4-4.

⁴² JMO Department, Naval War College, *Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2013), 3.

⁴³ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 2-19.

to know what the mission is.”⁴⁴ Given that most CATs lack mission statements, the commander’s response may serve as a reflection of the entire regiment. For example, a team commander who deployed to Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve did not receive a mission statement and commented that to “defeat ISIS was the overarching theme or mission for us.”⁴⁵ A team commander who deployed to Estonia also did not receive a mission statement; he added “as far as a specific task group country level directed mission statement, no, we did not receive one, we just had our own.”⁴⁶ These examples show that when higher headquarters fail to provide mission statements, CATs develop their own to complete necessary pre-mission MDMP and conduct “discovery learning” in an attempt to define viable effects for their supported commands.

The idea that teams must deploy, gain understanding of objectives, and then generate mission statements violate both doctrinal and strategic principles. Tactics serve strategy, which in turn serves a defined political goal. If CATs develop tactical goals in the absence of strategic guidance, relatively junior officers and NCOs will effectively drive U.S. policy on the ground. JP 3-35 “Deployment and Redeployment Operations,” establishes policy for how forces are requested, allocated, deployed, and even trained.⁴⁷ Furthermore, JP 3-35 points out that critical to this policy is the requirement of requesting units to identify the forces required and the tasks for which they are required. In theory, this means, at the very least, a generic mission statement should exist for every force that is requested against any mission set. While the mission statement itself is not an explanation of how the objectives can be achieved, it must clearly define the task and objective. ADP 5-0 specifies that “mission statements can serve as a primary source from which to develop measures of effectiveness.”⁴⁸ The lack of a mission statement all together

⁴⁴ Interview with Former Commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A).

⁴⁵ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Syria.

⁴⁶ Interview with 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Estonia, June 2, 2021.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Joint Publication 3-35 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), I–VI, <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/3-0-Operations-Series/>.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 5-4.

places teams at an immediate disadvantage in the planning process. In the face of missing or ambiguous tasks and objectives, teams cannot develop MOEs.

The Brigade's staff needs to ensure that every Request for Forces (RFF) includes a mission statement. At the brigade level, the staff has the responsibility to examine RFFs for mission statements. To generate an RFF, the supported Commander must identify the required capability and its purpose—in other words, its mission. Therefore, the requesting unit has already laid the groundwork for the mission statement, so it should not be difficult for the Brigade to provide Civil Affairs elements with a mission statement. However, if the RFF does not include a mission, then the Brigade staff should work with the requesting unit to develop a mission statement before fulfilling the RFF.

At the battalion level, battalion commanders must advocate for teams if the Brigade's staff allocates troops against an RFF without supplying a mission statement. Additionally, the battalion command and staff must hold companies and teams accountable to conduct proper MDMP prior to deployment, specifically plan MOEs with metrics to gauge observed effects. In practice, each deploying CAT would receive a mission statement during the Staff Mission In-Brief (SMIB) and back brief the refined mission statement to the battalion and brigade commanders for approval prior to deployment. Furthermore, the CATs must brief planned MOEs and metrics to monitor and evaluate mission progress. Failure to hold all levels accountable to standard Army procedures dictated in doctrine leaves tactical level elements ill prepared to execute CAO.

At the company level, the company commander must serve as the driving force between the echelons of command. The company must pressure higher headquarters to provide adequate mission statements and expectations to its teams. Additionally, company commanders must provide adequate time for teams to conduct MDMP prior to deployment, specifically planning MOEs with metrics to gauge observed change. This is a challenge due to all the other competing pre-deployment training requirements. Company command teams also play a critical role in mentoring and developing the CATs to properly conduct MDMP.

B. ATTEMPTING TO COMMUNICATE GRADUATE LEVEL WARFARE WITH ELEMENTARY VOCABULARY

A potential reason that Civil Affairs commanders struggle to provide missions statements to deploying CATs is that FM 3-57 “Civil Affairs Operations” lacks sufficient doctrine that defines Civil Affairs tactical tasks. When asked “What was your team’s mission statement?,” a former team commander who served with a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan replied, “the mission was to basically provide individual augmentees to a Tier One unit in Afghanistan, our sole mission was to do basically, the non-lethal.”⁴⁹ This is not only a glaring example of a lack of mission statement but also a lack of clearly defined Civil Affairs tactical tasks—doing “non-lethal” is not a tactical mission task, but a commonly accepted substitute.

Currently, Civil Affairs doctrine suffers from a number of limitations. It does not specify enough Civil Affairs tactical tasks to cover the wide range of CAO, nor does it sequentially delineate Civil Affairs tactical tasks, nor does it differentiate between SOF and U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs tasks. This section explores these deficiencies below.

First, tactical tasks. In July 2021, the U.S. Army published a revised edition of FM 3-57 that sought to remedy the Army’s lack of Civil Affairs tactical tasks by establishing three tactical tasks: CR, Civil Engagement (CE), and CNDE.⁵⁰ Each of the three Civil Affairs tactical tasks outlined in FM 3-57 only provides the tactical task symbols, two to three generic examples of how to employ the task, and a description of the symbol, none of which are significantly helpful to CATs’ planning efforts. Although FM 3-57 provides detailed information on CR, CE, and CNDE under Chapter III “Civil Affairs Operations,” only the last three pages of Appendix D, “Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures,” identifies them as tactical mission tasks, which appears to be a doctrinal afterthought. The three tactical tasks are so broad that their possible employment is boundless. Without precise definitions, the tasks themselves are no less ambiguous than

⁴⁹ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Afghanistan, May 13, 2021.

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 1-4.

the lack of a mission statement all together. Tactical tasks should provide planners with a clearly defined list of tasks and the objectives that those tasks achieve.

By contrast, Conventional Army maneuver forces have a list of 15 doctrinal tasks in FM 3-90 “Offense and Defense Volume 1” that have been successfully employed since the birth of modern maneuver warfare. Unlike FM 3-57, FM 3-90 provides additional variables to measure effects of operations for maneuver warfare planners that includes task definitions, symbology, sub-tasks, supplementary instructions, intended application of the task, and required conditions to employ the task.⁵¹ However, it is evident that maneuver tactical tasks such as “attack by fire” or “destroy” do not readily transpose themselves to the non-kinetic nature of CAO in the human domain. In the past, creative Civil Affairs planners attempted to adapt maneuver tactical mission tasks to describe non-kinetic CAO such as “isolate” an insurgent group from the population, “control” a population to follow U.S. desired interests, “suppress” enemy influence over human terrain. The problem is that maneuver warfare tactical tasks have specific definitions within doctrine and do not inherently align themselves with the mission sets of Civil Affairs. Even though maneuver tasks provide more specificity, a conventional maneuver commander may view the Civil Affairs’ interpretation as a kinetic task, which would be far from the CAO’s intent.

To overcome this problem, Civil Affairs Proponent should derive additional tactical tasks from Civil Affairs core competencies and Civil Affairs missions outlined in FM 3-57, chapter 3, “Civil Affairs Operations”; see Figure 5. Potential tasks could include CKI, Transitional Governance, Civil-Military Integration, Support to Civil Administration (SCA), Civil Information Evaluation, CMOC, Transitional Military Authority (TMA).⁵² It should be noted that the tactical task of CR and CE are considered Civil Affairs missions and CNDE is considered a Civil Affairs core competency. Because Civil Affairs Proponent did not recognize other core competencies and Civil Affairs missions as tactical tasks, Civil Affairs leaders are limited in their ability to provide detailed mission statements to CATs.

⁵¹ Department of the Army, *Offense and Defense*, vol. 1, FM 3-90-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), B-1, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=103287.

⁵² Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 2-1.

It is recommended that Civil Affairs Proponent consider additional tasks from existing doctrine.




Figure 5. This figure from FM 3-57 shows how Civil Affairs missions support Civil Affairs core competencies which support CAO. The inserted red circles highlight the three Civil Affairs tactical mission tasks. The other competencies and missions could also serve as potential tasks.⁵³

⁵³ Adapted from Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 1-5.

Second, not only does doctrine not adequately define and provide sufficient CA tactical tasks, the three ambiguous tactical tasks often occur concurrently in a singular process. FM 3-57 states that “CE is executed throughout all CA core competencies.”⁵⁴ It further states that “CR is executed throughout all CA core competencies....to effectively fulfill its roles of engaging and leveraging the civil component.”⁵⁵ If each tactical task is performed as part of the other tactical tasks, then it becomes difficult for operators to understand their specific mission and explain their mission to military partners. For example, if a CAT receives a task to conduct CNDE, the CAT must conduct CR to determine key influencers while simultaneously conducting CE to develop relationships to engage and develop the network. The blending of these three tasks hinders the ability to derive clearly defined missions from higher headquarters. Further maturation of Civil Affairs doctrine is required to develop and distinguish tactical mission tasks which would provide CATs with additional variables to apply to measuring the effectiveness of operations.

Lastly, the current doctrine fails to provide tactical tasks that are specific to the capabilities of SOF Civil Affairs units within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). Furthermore, FM 3-57—published over a decade after the Army’s establishment of SOF Civil Affairs—fails to recognize the differences in capabilities and mission sets between those of conventional U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and SOF Civil Affairs. In the preface, FM 3-57 states that “FM 3-57 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.”⁵⁶ The doctrine assumes that Reserve Civil Affairs and Active Duty SOF Civil Affairs are equally capable and have the same funding and authorities to conduct the same tasks. Not only does the current FM 3-57 fail to provide adequate Civil Affairs tactical tasks, it fails to determine appropriate tasks for Reserve and SOF CATs respectively. The logical next step is to derive tactical mission tasks from Appendix C in FM 3-57, “Civil Affairs in Special Operations,” relating to Civil Affairs’ tasks in Unconventional Warfare (UW), DA, Special Reconnaissance (SR),

⁵⁴ Department of the Army, 1–7.

⁵⁵ Department of the Army, 1–7.

⁵⁶ Department of the Army, iv.

Counterterrorism (CT), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD), and Civil-Military Engagement (CME). SOF specific Civil Affairs tactical tasks will result in more concise mission statements, thereby allowing CATs to begin MDMP with the appropriate guidance, and therefore generate valuable MOEs during the COA development stage of planning.

The first risk of not further developing Civil Affairs tactical mission tasks is that Civil Affairs practitioners will continue to struggle in communicating CAO support to combined arms operations with conventional, SOF, and joint forces. The Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-01 “Doctrinal Primer,” which establishes the purpose of all Army Doctrine, states doctrine “...provides a common language that allows units to pass a great deal of information quickly and succinctly...This common language should result in clearer, shorter orders, much greater precision in operations, and greater flexibility and speed of operations.”⁵⁷ There is an expectation that all military planners speak a common language of tactical tasks and use commonly understood symbology. If Civil Affairs planners do not have dedicated vocabulary in this shared language, then it will make it more difficult to describe what CATs will accomplish and how CATs will measure their progress.

Second, SOF Civil Affairs mission statements are often vague due to a lack of breadth and depth of Civil Affairs tactical tasks, which leaves too much room for interpretation by the operators. In a master’s thesis, Major Garrett Searle, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer, asserts that:

U.S. forces often build their efforts around binary task-and-purpose statements that do not adequately account for the complexity of the environment or the logical progression from a to b. For example, a component of non-lethal capacity building efforts might be oriented around a statement like the following: *SOF forces build host nation civil-military engagement capacity [in order to] counter violent extremist organizations.* This statement contains several assumptions that are hidden by the phrase ‘in order to,’—what [Dr. Christopher] Paul [in his article titled Foundations

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, *Doctrine Primer*, 1–3.

for Assessment: The Hierarchy of Evaluation and the importance of Articulating a Theory of Change] refers to as “a huge assumptive gap.”⁵⁸

The current state of Civil Affairs doctrine produces the same “huge assumptive gap” between task and purpose. To bridge the “assumptive gap” between task and purpose in a mission statement, Civil Affairs Proponent must provide more tactical tasks supported by robust definitions, symbology, sub-tasks, supplementary instructions, intended application of the task, and required conditions to employ the task. The most significant risk of having amorphous tasks is that CATs have little hope of assessing and measuring how effectively the team has accomplished the task.

C. CONCLUSION: MISSION STATEMENT IS THE FIRST STEP TO SUCCESS

This research suggests that the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) does not adequately require or enforce mission statements for deploying CATs. In practice, as reflected by interview feedback, the broad nature of the tasks limits the development of an effective and descriptive mission statement, therefore decreasing the likelihood that CATs will develop MOEs. While broad tasks allow for flexibility in application, this makes it more difficult to generate effective and clear taskings for teams. Mission statements are the foundation for planning in all steps of MDMP and JOPP and, therefore, mission statements are critical to the development of MOEs. Although Civil Affairs doctrine is evolving, it has not fully addressed the requirement for more breadth and depth of Civil Affairs tactical tasks. All other military communication is irrelevant if Civil Affairs units do not receive and understand their mission statement. Assuming that SOF Civil Affairs rectifies the issues discussed above, the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) has internal and external communication deficiencies and challenges to overcome before excelling at MOE development, execution, monitoring, and evaluation, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁵⁸ Garrett M. Searle, “Impact Assessment in Special Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 38, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56802>.

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IV. BROKEN COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES INHIBIT MOE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The Civil Affairs Regiment prides itself on building relationships with partners critical to U.S. national security, such as allied military forces, host-nation governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and indigenous populations. These valuable relationships enable Civil Affairs Teams' (CAT) access and placement to areas and populations required to achieve USSOCOM and U.S. interagency objectives. Central to maintaining those relationships is effective communication. The U.S. Military places emphasis on effective communications. The following standards of effective communication, set forth by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army, will serve to compare current communication practices with institutional expectations within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). The U.S. Air Force Committee on Strategies to Enhance Air Force Communication compared effective external communication to effective weapon systems: "Akin to weapons deployment, [effective communication] can be described as communication that reaches its target, impacts its audience, and achieves the intended objective for that particular audience."⁵⁹ The U.S. ADP 6-0 on Mission Command defines effective internal communication within the Army and Joint Forces as:

Communication has an importance far beyond exchanging information. Commanders and staffs continuously communicate to learn, exchange ideas, and create sustained shared understanding. Information needs to flow up and down the chain of command as well as laterally to adjacent units and organizations. Separate from the quality or meaning of information exchanged, communication strengthens bonds within a command. It is an important factor in building trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, *Strategies to Enhance Air Force Communications with Internal and External Audiences: A Workshop Report* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2016), 23, <https://doi.org/10.17226/21876>.

⁶⁰ Department of the Army, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, ADP 6-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 3-8, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1007502.

Effective and quality communication within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) is equally paramount to consistent and effective communication directed outside the organization, and when effective and internal and external communication synergize, it leads to better partnership building. Relationships are critical to developing, monitoring, and evaluating Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) of CAO.

Interviews conducted with former and current Civil Affairs team commanders, team sergeants, and commanders indicate that the lack of MOE development and implementation may be due to a deeper problem: lack of effective communication internally and externally to the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). There are four primary deficiencies and barriers: 1) Civil Affairs Regiment lacks foundational doctrine on Civil Knowledge Information (CKI), 2) CATs lack continuity during deployment hand-over, 3) CATs are expected to report to multiple headquarters, and 4) Civil Affairs Forces are constantly challenged to communicate expectation management to supported partners. If the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) can implement communication policies, procedures, and structures that support the clear, direct, and free flow of information, it will enhance their ability to overcome these four barriers. This will improve the likelihood that CATs will be more successful in developing and utilizing MOEs.

A. FAILING TO SHARE: WHY CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INFORMATION PRACTICES FALL SHORT

The first communication barrier to the planning and utilization of MOEs is the lack of Civil Affairs' foundational doctrine for Civil Knowledge Information (CKI). CKI, formally known as Civil Information Management (CIM), refers to, "the actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function."⁶¹ CKI is considered one of the four Civil Affairs core competencies and missions.⁶² Although FM 3-57 *Civil Affairs Operations* explains the CKI process, the FM does not specify types of common operating systems/systems of

⁶¹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-57 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 1-6.

⁶² Department of the Army, 1-5.

record to store civil information, outline required outputs, or standardize methods to conduct CKI.

In addition to the lack of specificity in FM 3-57, the USSOCOM Joint Civil Information Management Handbook and Manual asserts:

Operational challenges for all services and interagency partners include, no common language defining the civil domain, no common reporting standards, no common graphic symbols, no common naming convention, no common data collection procedures, no common data storage procedures and standards, no interoperable systems for storing and transmitting civil information, no common system for Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority data/information transfer, and no common education or training for managing civil information.⁶³

The CIM Handbook further declares that these challenges result in “incomplete situational awareness of civil domain” and “redundant efforts and wasted resources.”⁶⁴ Due to the lack of CKI doctrine, each Civil Affairs unit has its own CKI SOP. A former 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) commander observed that “each battalion and company within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) follows its own SOP and uses different systems of record to process and analyze information.”⁶⁵ Because each Civil Affairs unit has its own SOP, the Brigade lacks continuity, which directly and negatively impacts efficient communication, thereby decreasing CAT’s ability to achieve desired effects.

The most significant risk stemming from a lack of CKI doctrine is that teams and companies are less likely to disseminate critical information such as key leader engagement assessments, contractor assessments, infrastructure assessments, operational summaries, and MOE monitoring and evaluation data, which undermines the attainment and long-term sustainment attainment of desired effects. According to the criteria for effective communication outlined in ADP 6-0, fragmented approaches to conducting CKI prevents the lateral flow of information between Civil Affairs units, which leads to a breakdown in

⁶³ US Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM CIM Manual* (MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2011), iii, <http://www.jte.osd.mil>.

⁶⁴ US Special Operations Command, iii.

⁶⁵ Interview with Former Commander of 95th Brigade (SO) (A), May 7, 2021.

mutual understanding of the wicked problems that CATs confront while forward deployed. The same former brigade commander, quoted in the paragraph above, added:

Teams shouldn't need to plan from scratch, teams should focus on CIM continuity. By focusing on continuity, teams don't do 'discovery learning' for six months; they hit the ground running. This is the only way to have an advantage over the enemy, an enemy that is local and knows the area better than us.⁶⁶

According to the USAF's definition of effective communication, CIM/CKI communication is not reaching its intended target audience—the incoming teams and company—and therefore fails to achieve its intended objective of making progress towards desired effects.

To ensure CIM/CKI communication between teams and between teams and JIIM partners, the Civil Affairs Proponent should identify a single program of record that would be accessible on unclassified and classified systems. A single program of record generates continuity that facilitates analysis of long-term CAO. Major Christopher Tunning, a Civil Affairs Officer, argued in his capstone thesis on the future of Civil Affairs that:

There is sufficient evidence to support the concept of integrating data science into CA analysis capabilities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Central Intelligence Agency both incorporated data science into their organizational capabilities with USAID establishing a data repository named the Foreign Aid Explorer and CIA establishing its Directorate of Digital Innovation in 2015.⁶⁷

Furthermore, The USJFKSWCS should incorporate CKI instruction into the CAQC that corresponds with the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) CKI SOP. 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) should provide refresher training for deploying teams or soldiers returning to the Regiment, implement a CKI SOP for all teams in the Brigade, create a position at the battalion and brigade level to monitor the flow of CKI, and provide recommendations when/where necessary. These measures could significantly increase the flow of effective communication between Civil Affairs units and other important JIIM partners to further progress towards achieving MOEs.

⁶⁶ Interview with Former Commander of 95th Brigade (SO) (A).

⁶⁷ Christopher W. Tunning, "The Analytics Quotient: Retooling Civil Affairs for the Future Operating Environment" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 24, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64891>.

B. WHAT WE'VE GOT HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE

The struggle to maintain continuity between teams and companies is an ongoing topic of concern throughout the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). Members of the Brigade define continuity—as it applies to tactical-level Civil Affairs—as maintaining steady lines of communication between teams currently deployed and teams that will deploy. Based upon this thesis research, five out of six teams interviewed revealed that they did not receive the requisite continuity information during the RIP/TOA process, a continuity hand-over between the outgoing and incoming teams. The problem is three-fold. There is no standard procedure, leaving CATs to their own judgements and devices to determine how, when, or even whether to share information at the changeover. In addition, each Civil Affairs unit places varying degrees of emphasis on RIP/TOA requirements. Furthermore, there is not a required common digital platform/program of record to facilitate communication between teams. A brigade standard for required products and a standardized platform would streamline communication between teams, companies, and battalions, and would contribute to uniformity in outputs and common understanding of mission progress.

Without command-enforced RIP/TOA standards, CATs risk promulgating sub-par continuity products that do not provide the requisite information for an effective transition. A team sergeant serving in the Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR reported during an interview that when his team arrived in East Africa, the outgoing team did not provide a continuity hand-over briefing; rather, the outgoing team commander replied that everything the team needed to know was in the pile of Situational Reports (SITREPS).⁶⁸ The primary drawback to SITREPs as a continuity document is that a SITREP is simply a quick daily snapshot of operations, not an overall summary of the team's progress towards achieving MOEs. In addition, SITREPs are always tailored to the command that the team supports, and each command has different format requirements, making SITREPs an inconsistent product for continuity purposes. This example shows a lack of effective communication according to ADP 6-0 because the incoming team did not receive adequate

⁶⁸ Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) NCO – East Africa, April 15, 2021.

lateral information flow and therefore lacked an understanding of the mission's problem-set.

By contrast, when incoming/outgoing teams properly conduct battle handovers, the incoming team is much more likely to hit the ground running. A team commander deployed to Raqqa, Syria, following the collapse of ISIS, reported during an interview that he had an effective battle hand-over. He noted, "I think we did a pretty good job with mission preparation, the team on the ground is your lifeline. We were communicating with them weekly and asking as many questions as we could just trying to understand the lay of the land and what they were doing."⁶⁹ The team received an overwhelming task of contributing to multinational efforts to restore essential services in Raqqa as 70,000 internally displaced people returned to the city.⁷⁰ The extensive battle handover was necessary to orient the team to immediate priorities, trusted partners, and security concerns. This team was proactive in eliciting information from a cooperative team on the ground, which fulfilled the criteria outlined by the U.S. Air Force's Committee: the continuity information reached the intended target, impacted the incoming team's decision making, and achieved the objective of an efficient battle hand-over. These experiences demonstrate that continuity is situationally dependent and likely determined by the level of engagement of the current and incoming teams to share information and collaborate on achieving planned MOEs.

Robust continuity documents and products are necessary to communicate the status progress using MOEs. In a third RIP/TOA example, a team commander working in Niger reported that when he deployed, he received a lackluster battle handover but rectified the situation for the following team. The team commander declared that "we literally printed out the lines of effort and hung them on the wall of the Operations Center (OPCEN) for the next team to see which included decisive points and measures of effectiveness."⁷¹ This is an excellent example of a team fixing the problem of lack of effective communication. The team developed continuity products that communicated a roadmap to help the next

⁶⁹ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Syria.

⁷⁰ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Syria.

⁷¹ Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Niger, May 19, 2021.

team follow through on commitments with host-nation partners. These continuity products are necessary to monitor and evaluate MOEs over the long-term. After all, Civil Affairs effects come to fruition over the course of months and years, therefore Civil Affairs practitioners must have products in place to monitor and evaluate effects over the long-term.

Even though it is the teams' responsibility to provide continuity for battle handovers, the company and battalions also play critical roles. To remedy the problem of lack of continuity at the battalion level, a former Executive Officer (XO) of the 91st CA BN (SO) (A) used weekly Operations and Intelligence meetings to facilitate and foster open dialogues between deployed and deploying companies. As he recalled:

We made a deliberate effort to improve and reinvigorate deployment order process managed by the battalion S3 and XO. We used the battalion O&I meeting as a continuity builder. It started with the Deployment Order for the next company, 6 months out, build a series of O&I meetings to focus on specific areas to involve the team on the ground and the follow-on company. A total of three companies in the process for continuity at a time.⁷²

The 91st CA BN (SO) (A) approach to facilitating continuity clearly hit all three of the U.S. Air Force's metrics for effective communication: the information reached the company preparing to deploy in addition to the follow-on company, it impacted the intended audience by involving team members in long-term continuity processes, and, therefore, it helped achieve the objective of deployment continuity. According to ADP 6-0, this is also an excellent example of how information flowed up and down as well as laterally within the battalion to build trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding, which also likely fostered a common understanding of long-term MOEs.

A final recommendation for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to ensure proper RIP/TOA continuity is to adopt the USSOCOM's Civil Affairs RIP/TOA Checklist located in the Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook. The checklist for outgoing teams consists of 43 "yes/no" criteria which ensures that outgoing CATs have prepared all necessary continuity information for the incoming CATs. For example:

⁷² Interview with Former 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Executive Officer.

- “Ensure incoming team is aware of all previous commitments.”⁷³
- “Outgoing unit orients the incoming organization to activities and tasks.”⁷⁴
- “Outgoing unit introduces incoming organization to all HN key personnel and elements within the district.”⁷⁵

The checklist also provides 130 “yes/no” criteria for incoming CATs to ensure readiness, for example:

- “Unit understands deployment order.”⁷⁶
- “Unit understands theater directives, operations orders, fragmentary orders, warning orders, force protection, SOP, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and contingency plans.”⁷⁷
- “Unit understands theater directives.”⁷⁸
- “Unit understands Tactical Driving Directive.”⁷⁹

The checklist is Afghanistan-centric, but it can easily be adapted to any operation regardless of COCOM. Not only does the checklist prepare teams for effective RIP/TOA, but it also ensures teams are adhering to Civil Affairs doctrine. By incorporating USSOCOM’s Civil Affairs’ RIP/TOA checklist into brigade SOPs, it will ensure continuity critical to achieving desired MOEs.

⁷³ US Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM CIM Manual*, E-1.

⁷⁴ US Special Operations Command, E-1.

⁷⁵ US Special Operations Command, E-1.

⁷⁶ US Special Operations Command, E-4.

⁷⁷ US Special Operations Command, E-4.

⁷⁸ US Special Operations Command, E-4.

⁷⁹ US Special Operations Command, E-4.

C. SERVING MANY MASTERS: EXPECTATION THAT CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS SERVE MULTIPLE HEADQUARTERS

The current task-organization command structure of forward deployed SOF requires CATs to communicate through multiple levels of headquarters that all have different reporting requirements, which compromises communication effectiveness and jeopardizes the success of MOEs. The moment a CAT leaves Fort Bragg, the team has at least three bosses, none of whom have the same demands, and all of whom expect results. The team is Administratively Controlled (ADCON) by the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) Operationally Controlled (OPCON) by the TSOC or Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Tactically Controlled (TACON) by yet another unit such as a Special Forces Advanced Operating Base (AOB), and accountable to the U.S. Ambassador. This multi-level structure of competing demands presents two primary problems. First, each of these elements maintains varying levels of control over the team, which limits the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) ability to provide continuity between teams. Secondly, this task organization structure burdens the teams to serve multiple masters with potentially differing visions; therefore, communication is not always clear and transparent between CATs and the Combat Command (COCOM)-aligned force-providing battalion. Commanders in garrison need to be able to send and receive communication to shape continuity for the next iteration of deploying teams. Since the force provider has no command authority, the force provider is disadvantaged when attempting to facilitate communications across multi-echelon levels of command.

An example of conflicting demands is reflected in an interview with a team commander who served in the Philippines. The team commander stated that her team deployed under a Counter-Terrorism mission to consolidate gains against ISIS-Philippines in the post-Marawi siege. However, the team also received conflicting guidance from another echelon to focus on strategic competition with China. The team commander reported “the mission became complicated as we were directed from multiple angles to focus on one mission versus the other type of mission.”⁸⁰ She added that one commander

⁸⁰ Interview with 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Philippines.

wanted her team in Marawi, another commander wanted her team in Manilla to focus on strategic competition, and she saw the need to pursue ISIS-P further into Southern Mindanao to accomplish the CT mission. This example demonstrates how a lack of communication between multiple command echelons led to a break down in cohesion and mutual understanding, which are essential elements of effective communication according to ADP 6-0.



Figure 6. The CAT serving in the Philippines conducted partnered sensing sessions with NGOs to determine the most effective location to conduct CAO to counter IS-Philippines.⁸¹

A potential contributing factor to this problem is that the force providing units lack the influence necessary to shape operations in the TSOC. The COCOM-aligned battalions under the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) do not have Force Tracking Numbers (FTN) at the supported TSOC; therefore, the battalions that are responsible for team continuity lack the ability to directly influence TSOC campaign planning to determine desired strategic

⁸¹ Source: Gibbons-Neff, “For U.S. Commandos in the Philippines,.”

effects. On the other hand, each TSOC is assigned a 38S Civil Affairs Governance Officer to serve as the J39 Officer, the Civ-Mil Office on the TSOC Staff, to develop the Civ-Mil aspects of campaign plans. In most circumstances, the J39 has served in the force-providing battalion before serving on the TSOC staff. However, the J39 does not fall under the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) control and, depending on the J39's level of involvement, the J39 is free to make plans that could potentially contradict the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) input. This is problematic because teams look to the battalion for guidance, yet the battalions lack representation on the TSOC staff to shape the campaign plans that their Soldiers must enact.

It is imperative that each battalion build an enduring and positive relationship with its supported TSOC. This can be achieved in a variety of ways; for example, based upon the author's experience, the 96th CA BN (SO) (A) deployed two liaison positions to the Special Operations Command Central (SOCENT) headquarters in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. The ability to embed one to two Civil Affairs personnel within the TSOC to function as liaisons for the 96th CA BN (SO) (A) presents several benefits. First, liaisons can help ensure that the battalion always has a voice to advocate for the needs of the personnel forward and the force provider. Second, battalion personnel can assist the TSOC J39 (Civil Military Operations) with Civil-Military input into TSOC campaign plans to keep companies and teams on track by measuring their success against existing theater-level MOEs. Additionally, this allows all parties to have real-time input into strategic-level civil-military planning to ensure that the TSOC CA forces are best allocated. Liaison officers from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) assigned to the TSOCs would support ADP 6-0 definition of effective communication by promoting a free flow of communication through all echelons to achieve a shared understanding of the OE which strengthens the unit's mission command and ability to achieve results.

A similar option is to assign battalion's Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPT) to the TSOC to advocate on behalf of the battalions and conversely to provide feedback to the force providers on TSOC initiatives. Furthermore, the CAPT can play a critical role in campaign planning, which will facilitate continuity between companies as they rotate in and out of countries. FM 3-57 states that the role of the CAPT is: "developing, integrating,

synchronizing, and coordinating strategic and operational-level CAO into theater campaign and contingency plans in all phases of operations.”⁸² Although it is possible that the TSOC staff would be unwilling to accept that assistance if they perceived it as an attempt to control planning efforts and undermine the TSOC’s autonomy, proper communication and coordination could relieve this potential friction. The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) liaisons or CAPTs could increase the communication between the force provider and force commander to facilitate better continuity between teams and companies as well as support campaign planning.

D. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS: MANAGING EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY

CATs face two primary challenges in managing expectations with supported headquarters: first, team members must articulate what their team can provide to the supported command despite ever-evolving doctrine, and second, team members must articulate the process and time required to obtain permissions and JIIM support to achieve planned MOEs.

Communicating expectations to supported military commanders requires Civil Affairs leaders to clearly articulate Civil Affairs’ ever-evolving doctrine and capabilities to external stakeholders. 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) was established in 2007 and is a young and evolving military unit. As such, the Regiment is still writing doctrine to refine core competencies and missions. There have been multiple revisions to FM 3-57 with the latest draft released May 31, 2021. Another significant innovation is that the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) recently delineated the difference between Reserve Civil Affairs Officers as 38A and Civil Affairs Special Operations Forces Governance Officer as 38S. The Civil Affairs Proponent announced that:

38S will provide the Army with an increased governance capability, enable mission command, and contribute significantly to the consolidation of gains in Multi-Domain Operations. Delineation of AOC 38S creates opportunities for targeted recruiting, as well as enhanced talent management and

⁸² Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2019, 4–8.

professional development models that articulate the skills, knowledge, and attributes required within the Civil Affairs branch.⁸³

The recognition of the new MOS shows the Army's ability to recognize that SOF Civil Affairs brings unique and different skills to bear in comparison to their Reservist counterparts.

As doctrine evolves, it is imperative that CATs communicate their capabilities so Commanders can best leverage Civil Affairs capabilities to achieve mission success. This means that CAT members explain what teams can and cannot do based upon permissions and authorities. For example, doctrine states that CATs are “a valuable information collection and management capability because of their interaction with populations, government institutions, and inter-organizational partners.”⁸⁴ On the other hand, the official FM 3-57 published in April 2019 states in bold text that “Civil Affairs must not be tasked as active collectors of threat information.”⁸⁵ Like any Army unit, CATs are tasked to serve as “utility players” to accomplish U.S. security needs, such as post-strike consequence management, operation fund/Commander's Emergency Relief Program management, and protocol for community relations events, but those types of tasks should not pigeon-hole CATs. Strategic messaging with external stakeholders is important to ensure the best application of Civil Affairs forces to remain on track to achieving desired MOEs.

The second challenge facing a new Civil Affairs team commander and team sergeant is to communicate and manage expectations of senior supported military officers regarding the time required to achieve planned MOEs. Many times, senior military combat arms officers—at all echelons from the AOB to the TSOC—are conditioned to expect instant results from kinetic-focused operations, i.e., raid to kill/capture of an HVI. Naturally, commanders seek to achieve as much as possible during their deployment and want to see the effects of CAO within their deployment timeframe. However, the desire for

⁸³ Civil Affairs Branch, *Persistent Engagement* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 3.

⁸⁴ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2019, 4-5.

⁸⁵ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2019, 1-7.

instant results runs counter to the long-term nature of operations in the human domain and the MOEs that must be developed to monitor them. A team commander who served in Afghanistan in support of a joint task force noted:

Commanders get turned off by Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations because of the amount of time it takes to achieve MOEs. Civil Affairs personnel must lay out for the commanders what they are measuring, show them how they [the Civil Affairs Team] is being effective because it's not likely that the commander has given it much thought.⁸⁶

Applying the ADP 6-0 definition of effective communication to this example, junior Civil Affairs NCOs and Officers have the burden to teach, exchange ideas, and create a shared understanding of the civil-centric MOEs for the supported command.

When CATs deploy in the capacity of a CMSE, the team works to support the U.S. Ambassador's priorities in conjunction with interagency partners. The country team's relaxed timeline and work tempo does not always align with the hard-charging tempo and timeline of deployed military commanders. Regularly it takes longer for Civil Affairs Teams to receive approval for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding requests and permission to conduct CAO, which adds even more time required to achieve desired effects. A former 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) Commander stated that "what we do for the country team, enables freedom of movement that the TSOC Commander requires for SOF."⁸⁷ He added that the "starting MOE is to develop a baseline on what is important to the embassy. It takes time to begin achieving TSOC objectives. But that's tough if you don't have country team trust to gain access to the country."⁸⁸ Therefore, CATs must articulate the requirement for military commanders to exercise patience and understand that developing access and placement with permission from the U.S. Ambassador frequently takes time, sometimes multiple deployments, and should be considered the first desired MOE for CMSEs.

⁸⁶ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – Afghanistan.

⁸⁷ Interview with Former Commander of 95th Brigade (SO) (A).

⁸⁸ Interview with Former Commander of 95th Brigade (SO) (A).

Furthermore, the majority of CAO require a coalition of JIIM partners. Each of these groups has their own objectives, resources, and capabilities. When a CAT is reliant on multiple partners, it is inevitable that CAO will take much longer than expected by the supported commands. A Civil Affairs team commander who supported a major African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) clearing operation as part of a U.S. Army Special Operations Cross Functional Team coordinated with JIIM partners before the operation to fill the governance vacuum once Al-Shabaab (AS) was defeated in the area. The team commander stated:

We planned to have a coalition of non-lethal effects from the host nation, local government, NGOs, and multinational organizations. However, the way it played out was somewhat different. Expectations had to be tampered due to the tyranny of distance and the risk. Some NGOs didn't want to operate when there is an IED threat. Some multinational organizations agreed to have meetings, but they were limited by some of their logistical capabilities and the risk that they would face.⁸⁹

This example depicts the challenges CAT face when attempting to achieve desired effects. Teams require adequate time to reach the point of achieving effective communication with JIIM partners as outlined in ADP 6-0: “building trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding.”⁹⁰ It is critical that Civil Affairs leadership understand and communicate expectation management to military commanders and U.S. Country Team members to ensure a firm understanding of the time required to achieve effects in the human domain with multiple partners.

An additional aspect of expectation management is that each JIIM partner, specifically the Interagency, has its own objectives and desired effects, which further complicates the sought-after whole-of-government approach to achieving DOD objectives. What may be a priority for a TSOC may not even make the list of objectives for the Country Team. However, in most environments—outside of declared areas of armed conflict—permission is required from the Ambassador to conduct operations within his/her

⁸⁹ Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Leader – East Africa.

⁹⁰ Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, 3–8.

respective country. If the ambassador does not perceive proposed CAO as critical to supporting the country team objectives, then he/she will not likely approve the CONOP.

In theory, CATs are supposed to find creative solutions to nest Department of Defense's, Department of State's, and U.S. Agency for International Development's objectives into a streamlined "3D" approach: Defense, Development, and Diplomacy. CA Teams must be savvy in each to communicate and manage expectations between the three major actors to achieve MOEs. According to Beth Cole and Carla Koppell at the United States Institute for Peace in their article titled "Fostering Diplomatic-Defense-Development (3D) Cooperation in Responding to Complex Crisis," when 3D efforts align at the same place at the time, it "will pay dividends for stability and security; programs will be better conceived and more successfully sequences and delivered, with commensurate improvements to the durability and value of projects and investments."⁹¹ Many aspects must align to maximize the whole-of-government approach to achieve MOEs, but it starts with Civil Affairs leaders and teams managing expectations of the amount of time required to align 3D efforts and achieve impacts in the human domain.

As the U.S. re-focuses on strategic competition, it becomes more critical than ever to take a whole-of-government approach to achieving U.S. strategy abroad. Civil Affairs plays a unique role in this process by providing valuable CKI, access, and placement to otherwise denied areas of regions. It would be of a great benefit for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) in conjunction with the TSOC to engage with country teams to develop not just U.S. SOCOM-centric MOEs but work towards developing Joint/Interagency MOEs. This is a lofty goal but the only way to be competitive against predatory and malign actors with streamlined authoritative foreign policy.

E. CONCLUSION: OVERCOMING COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES

Interviews with CAT team commanders, team sergeants, and Civil Affairs senior leaders revealed communication deficiencies and challenges facing the 95th CA BDE (SO)

⁹¹ Beth Cole and Carla Koppell, *Fostering Diplomatic-Defense-Development (3D) Cooperation in Responding to Complex Crises* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2017), 5, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/12/fostering-diplomatic-defense-development-3d-cooperation-responding-complex>.

(A), all of which have a cumulative impact on CAT's ability to measure and achieve desired effects. While communication is a generalized problem within the regiment, it is further narrowed down into the four topics discussed above; CKI doctrinal foundations, continuity SOP failures, multi-pronged command structures, and failure to manage expectations across the JIIM community. Fortunately, most of the challenges can be overcome through modification to, and enforcement of unit SOPs and Civil Affairs doctrine. According to ATP 3-57.60, if Civil Affairs MOEs are thoughtfully planned, then they will drive effective internal and external communication, which results in "enhanced unity of effort between joint, multinational, and interagency organizations, which the CIM process supports."⁹² As stated in Chapter III, Civil Affairs Proponent must create a FM for SOF Civil Affairs to address SOF Civil Affairs specific challenges such as generating a more effective communication structure between force provider (95th CA BDE (SO) (A), supporting force (CAT, CMSE), and supported forces (AOB, SOCFWD, TSOC). At the brigade level and below, leaders must examine their commands retrospectively and assess their level of effective internal and external communication based upon the standards of effective communication laid out in this chapter. It is recommended that commands conduct internal and external surveys as well as analysis of battalion information repositories to establish the state of communications. If Civil Affairs practitioners fail at communication, then it will be nearly impossible for CATs to excel at more advanced tasks such as MOE monitoring and evaluation which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

⁹² Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Planning*, 1–16.

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V. DATA OR IT DIDN'T HAPPEN: ASSESS, MONITOR, AND EVALUATE

Every CAT interviewed for this thesis described their mission as an overall success; and there is no doubt that the teams were successful to varying degrees. However, it is difficult to fail when success is not defined during the planning phase and when CAT's operations are not accurately measured against stated objectives. There are four stages of MOE progression. The first phase is planning, as discussed in the first three chapters. The remaining three stages are AM&E which occur during and after CAO. According to the 18 research interviews, it appears that there is little follow-through after CATs conduct CAO. This practice leaves teams' success undefined as their short rotations often cannot establish causal relationships between operations and effects.

This short-sighted approach is likely derivative of six-month long deployment cycles that lead to several independently "successful" operations that lack continuity of effort. As the 2021 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported noted, "the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan could be described as 20 one-year reconstruction efforts, rather than one 20-year effort."⁹³ CPT Peter Dierks in his opinion piece "SOF CA: The Things We Think but Do Not Say" linked SOF Civil Affairs' inability to accurately assess, measure, and evaluate long-term effects, on a smaller scale, to the overall U.S. failure in Afghanistan.⁹⁴ This sentiment was indicative of the statements garnered from the 18 interviews conducted in support of this thesis. This approach inhibits Civil Affairs' ability to achieve long-term effects within strategic level lines of operation and lines of effort. Interviews revealed five primary challenges that inhibit CAT's ability to conduct pre-mission assessment, and post-mission monitoring and evaluation: 1) lack of doctrine and framework, 2) long-term and ill-defined MOEs, 3) misidentification of causation for correlation, 4) lack of understanding of operational environment (OE) to

⁹³ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction," Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons Learned Program, August 2021, <https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html>.

⁹⁴ Dierkes, "SOF CA."

establish a baseline, and 5) lack of manpower. This chapter presents a case study of a CAT operating in Somalia to demonstrate how these five AM&E challenges impacted the CATs ability to quantify the team's effects. In addition, this chapter presents recommendations to remedy the problems facing the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) during the AM&E phase of the MOE process, namely: creating, standardizing, and enforcing an AM&E framework.

A. A THREE STEP PROCESS: ASSESS, MONITOR, AND EVALUATE

The U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 asked the Rand Corporation to assist the U.S. Army to increase its effectiveness in security cooperation. Although CAO does not formally fall under the umbrella of security cooperation, there are several corollaries that make these findings relevant to Civil Affairs; both require depth and breadth of knowledge regarding long-term engagement strategies. Rand's 200-page report recommends a framework for AM&E based upon Theory of Change, a multi-step methodology to achieve desired effects.⁹⁵ Rand identified a key gap in security cooperation sphere of operations is the ability to assess an initial assessment during operational planning, and to monitor and evaluate during implementation of operations. This critical gap exists in CAO, and it is assessed that this same framework can assist in remedying the challenges to developing and utilizing MOES faced by the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A).

Prior to discussing the state of AM&E in the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A), it is important to understand the meaning of AM&E and its correlation to CAO. The report also defines key terms to understand AM&E. First, assessment:

Assessment refers to baseline assessments for leaders and planners that address questions like these: What is the security environment in which these activities will take place? What are the partner's existing capabilities, and what does the United States want to improve? How well aligned are the partner's interests and values with those of the United States?⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Angela O'Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 63, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2165>.

⁹⁶ O'Mahony et al., xi.

An assessment establishes a base level of understanding of conditions prior to conducting CAO. Civil Affairs personnel regularly conduct assessments as part of CR and phase zero preparation of the environment. This is an area where Civil Affairs generally excels.

Monitoring CAO is critical because it generates the data necessary to conduct evaluation. Rand states that “*monitoring* means tracking efforts to determine whether inputs (i.e., money and effort) are translating into outputs (i.e., equipment, training, education, and information). These outputs then serve as the basis for tracking progress toward objectives (i.e., outcomes).”⁹⁷ Translating this into the context of this thesis, the key inputs are the key actions, also known as MOPs, and the key outputs are quantifiable metrics, also known as MOEs. Monitoring is a flexible process based upon the mission requirement, at times MOEs will be instant but most often, CATs must monitor MOEs over the long-term, months to years in duration.

Evaluation is the final step of the AM&E process and quite possibly the most overlooked. Rand states that:

Evaluation examines outcomes and is crucial to understanding what is working and what is not. Success is not ultimately measured by the provision of equipment or training; it is measured by the extent to which... activities help achieve U.S. objectives. Investments require following up to make sure that they yield the full potential benefits that were expected.⁹⁸

This step allows CATs to examine the results of CAO with a critical lens and establish a way forward; to continue, cease, or modify the operation. This step determines if operations are ready for transition to partners which is the desired end-state of CAO.

Considering the U.S. Army Chief of Staff commissioned a report on improving effectiveness of security cooperation, it is reasonable to assess that the expectation Civil Affairs Forces examine the key outputs of CAO against mission objectives exists. Based upon the results of AM&E, ATP 3-57.60 states that CATs must make one of three decisions: “continuing the operation as it is currently planned and reevaluating it at a future date, accepting the results and proceeding with the transition of the operation as planned,

⁹⁷ O’Mahony et al., xi.

⁹⁸ O’Mahony et al., xi.

[or] redefining the mission, using the CA methodology, and developing a new plan with new effects and MOEs.”⁹⁹ Utilizing this methodology and having the capacity to identify those effects have been achieved allows CAO planners to shift focus to the transition phase of operations.

B. MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? FLAWED EXECUTION OF THE ASSESS, MONITOR, AND EVALUATE PROCESS IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN

1. Lack of Doctrine and Framework

A lack of CA doctrine is a systemic problem not only for planning MOEs, reference Chapter II, but also for the AM&E process. Simply put, the U.S. Army and Civil Affairs lack the necessary doctrine to rectify the problem of measuring impact of non-kinetic operations. Currently, Civil Affairs doctrine does not have a standardized framework for AM&E to determine the success of CAO quantifiably and qualitatively. “Monitor and evaluate” is only cited one time in FM 3-57 “Civil Affairs Operations” in support of Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).¹⁰⁰ That reference does not provide the “how to” or where Civil Affairs planners should look for additional information. The U.S. Army’s ADP 5-0 “The Operations Process” has a chapter dedicated to assessments and provides a simple three step “Activities of Assessment” model consisting of monitor, evaluate, recommend, or direct.¹⁰¹ The model serves a baseline for AM&E but falls short of providing actual substance for CATs to assess, monitor, and evaluate effects in the human domain. To echo recommendations from Chapter II, Civil Affairs Proponent must generate doctrine to reflect the operational requirement for SOF CATs to conduct a standard baseline assessment prior to conducting CAO followed by monitoring and evaluation of the effects against the desired outcome. Without established doctrine, it is impossible for senior leaders to enforce standardized expectations of team to conduct AM&E of CAO.

⁹⁹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Planning*, 1–63.

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 5–18.

¹⁰¹ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, 5-2.

2. Long-Term and Ambiguously Defined MOEs

First, CAOs are almost always long-term and ambiguously defined. Depending on the supported operation it may be appropriate for CAO to occur over the long-term, months to years before transition. As discussed in Chapter III, Civil Affairs missions are often unclear, and CATs are left in a position to determine their own mission and end state. This sentiment was echoed by a team commander of the 91st CA BN (SO) (A) who served in Niger:

MOEs are a multiyear measurement for the most part, especially in Niger. It is impossible to get a good measurement in a six-month deployment and handing that off to the next team to keep it going. It is very hard when there is not necessarily an overarching push to maintain focus on MOEs because the battalion and the Special Operations Command – Forward have their own priorities, it is very hard to keep us on track.¹⁰²

Considering MOEs are a multi-year measurement, the process requires patience on the part of higher headquarters, and to ensure continuity from team to team, company to company—discussed in Chapter IV. It is common knowledge within ARSOF that supported AOBs are themselves typically on a six-month rotation that rarely if ever aligns with the CAT's six-month rotation, this further complicates the process of maintaining continuity and measuring effects. This means that each deploying CAT will support at least two different AOB command teams over a six-month deployment. Therefore, the TSOC or SOTF support must maintain a certain level of continuity and consistency in their desired end state and objectives.

It appears that the most reasonable course of action to rectify issues of continuity and consistency in the AM&E process is to place responsibility on the TSOC and the force providing unit to enforce a common standard and articulate the analytical requirements to measure success. However, the responsibility for execution of the AM&E process remains with the CAT. CATs must determine the tactics and methods to collect data that are most appropriate to their AOR and operation.

¹⁰² Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Niger, May 19, 2021.

3. Issues of Causation

There must be a direct causal relationship between the MOP and the MOE to have demonstrable results against objectives.¹⁰³ According to the research interviews, proving this sort of causation is a challenge for CATs. A team commander deployed to Syria reported that his Information Operations Task Force attempted to gather local sentiment using social media. He concluded that it was difficult to prove causation between CAO and the effects using social media reflections because the “likes” and “shares” could be internal to the area of operation or a social media user from a different country.¹⁰⁴ This reinforces the nebulous nature of CAO and the need to clearly define MOEs and how results will be quantified prior to conducting operations.

When CATs fail to deliberately plan MOEs, it becomes significantly more challenging to determine if the effects of the MOPs have causal relationship. According to the STP 41-38II-OFS Officer Foundation Standards II Civil Affairs (38) Officer’s Manual, CATs must be able to answer the following six questions when planning MOEs: “Who will observe the MOE? When will the MOE be observed? How will the MOE be observed? Where will the observations be made? Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE? What actions will be taken when the MOE is achieved?”¹⁰⁵ Fully answering these questions will assist CATs in developing the causal connection between MOP and MOEs.

The difficulties of monitoring operations cannot be understated, and often result in teams establishing definitions of success post mission and passing them off as MOEs. The Rand study notes, “it is difficult to collect data after activity completion and establish a causal relationship between the activity and the desired outcomes.”¹⁰⁶ As a result, many teams define success at the end of their rotation and find creative ways to bolster their claim of success. A former battalion executive officer from the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) declared

¹⁰³ O’Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation*, 71.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.

¹⁰⁵ Department of the Army, *Officer Foundation Standards II Civil Affairs (38) Officer’s Manual*, STP 41-38II-OFS (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 3-34, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=74081.

¹⁰⁶ O’Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation*, xx.

that “motivated officers in the field have an ambiguous mission and do what they think makes sense. They figure out a way to describe it as being successful. It becomes an *ex post facto* MOE to justify the work that they have done.”¹⁰⁷ Likewise, a former team commander who served in Africa declared that teams often use commander’s favorite buzzwords-latest Civil Affairs vernacular-to demonstrate mission success. He added that “buzzwords became a kind of measure of success, the only thing that would get a team leader in trouble is not using the correct buzzwords or the team leader could buzzword his way through the back-brief.”¹⁰⁸ The practice of *ex post facto* MOEs and buzzwords is the result of a lack of Civil Affairs step-by-step methodology to plan, assess, monitor, and evaluate MOEs. *Ex post facto* MOEs are an example of false MOEs. False MOEs are hollow: no baseline, no evaluation criteria, no qualitative or quantitative analysis, just smoke and mirrors.

One component of the solution to this challenge is to establish a framework that enables the planning process. However, this alone will not suffice. Instead, there must be tactical patience employed to truly survey the situation on the ground and establish comparative baselines for comparisons during post operations. This comparative baseline may already exist in the case of missions where their country has been damaged by conflict and the established end state is the pre-conflict capabilities of the country. In cases of enduring presence like CME missions, the data must either be found from an existing component in the country team or it must be generated through long duration analysis of patterns. It is recommended that when teams deploy to establish new CME missions that the CATs should conduct CR during the first 24 months to establish a baseline in support of the TSOC campaign plan. This will require a clear mission statement and expectation management on the part of the 95th BDE CA (SO) (A) and the supported unit. During this process teams must continue to conduct MDMP and establish MOEs that gauge their success in developing a baseline.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Former Battalion Executive Officer, May 6, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – East Africa, n.d.

4. Lack of Understanding of Operational Environment to Establish a Baseline

SOF Civil Affairs claim language and cultural expertise but often fail to deliver on said claims. FM 3-57 flaunts that Civil Affairs forces possess “cultural orientation, regional expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory skills, civil network development expertise, and civilian-acquired professional experience in common government functions distinguish Civil Affairs forces from other enablers.”¹⁰⁹ In the military, CAT’s language and cultural expertise are superior to most service members. The USASOC standard for language competency is a 1+/1+ score on the Oral Proficiency Exam (OPI), this places the operator at “Level 1 Survival.”¹¹⁰ In reality, CAT’s language and cultural expertise is insufficient to have the required breadth and depth to accurately assess the operating environment before conducting an operation to gauge the change in conditions after execution of operations.

The majority of deploying teams lack the language capability necessary to have significant impacts in the AM&E process. The Rand study argues that the “Army’s current foreign language and culture capacity is fairly limited.”¹¹¹ True to that assessment, none of the CATs interviewed reported having above 1+ level in foreign language ability. For example, a team commander who deployed to Niger stated that “I was the only French speaker in a French speaking country. Everybody else was Spanish or Portuguese speakers. Although my Civil Affairs NCO knew enough French from high school to get by, just being out in town, going shopping, or out to eat.”¹¹² Civil Affairs is the business of building relationships, and the foundation of all relationships is communication and human connection, therefore CATs cannot build invested relationships through a third party i.e., an interpreter.

¹⁰⁹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, iv.

¹¹⁰ Defense Language Institute English Language Center, “OPI Level Descriptions,” OPI Proficiency Interview, accessed November 8, 2021, https://www.dlielc.edu/testing/opi_level.php.

¹¹¹ O’Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation*, 22.

¹¹² Interview with 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Niger.

Without a higher fluency in the HN's language, CATs are severely limited in their ability to conduct AM&E. CATs without language fluency are relegated to using interpreters who may or may not convey the required nuanced information. And also create a barrier to rapport? The risk of not establishing higher fluency rates within the regiment are evident as CATs that are currently operational must regularly consider cultural conflicts and needs of the interpreters instead of being able to establish a uniquely American approach that avoids cultural nuances of existing societal groups within countries.

It is unrealistic for CATs to obtain fluency and cultural expertise unless they are provided with opportunities for full cultural immersion. While the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) has progressed toward this by offering short term language and cultural immersion, it still falls short due to lack of available time to execute said training and limitations on who can attend. A former 96th CA BN (SO) (A) Commander proposed executing the permanent change of station for CATs to areas of the world where the U.S. SOCOM requires deep understanding, access, and placement. He explained that:

When the French or the British sent personnel to Africa in the late 1800s, early 1900s, they went there for four to seven years. They truly developed networks, they had close relationships with people on the ground, knew the place and the language. We [Civil Affairs] like to talk about cultural and language skills, I think we are fooling ourselves. Our language and cultural skills and our awareness of what is really going on in the countries is pretty thin. That has been really, really reinforced during my time here in Africa. I hear from the command group down throughout the GCC that there are so many gaps in understanding of what is really happening in this theater.¹¹³

A conceivable way to remedy this problem—much less popular but likely more effective—is to execute a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) for CATs' members to a country for a period of multiple years. The same former Commander stated that this practice would provide the team with the deep knowledge required to develop and monitor long-term CAO MOEs. The Colonel stated that “you can't have MOEs without deep knowledge of the country, culture, and adversary.”¹¹⁴ While acknowledging that there are significant costs

¹¹³ Interview with Former Commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A), May 24, 2021.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Former Commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A).

and manpower limitations, the only way to guarantee cultural and language expertise is exposure to the targeted culture and language.

A second recommendation to assist CATs to improve understanding of the OE is for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to request individual augmentees with native-level linguistic and cultural expertise to train and deploy with CATs. According to FWD.us, a non-partisan immigration advocacy group, there are approximately 45,000 foreign-born immigrants currently serving on active duty.¹¹⁵ However, it is unknown how many of the 45,000 truly possess language and cultural expertise required for operational purposes. For this to be effective the Brigade requires the capability to request forces not just from the U.S. Army but across the joint services. Acknowledging that this process would require new tactical-level and administrative-level processes. This process generates two primary benefits: 1) CATs would deploy with a military subject matter expert to advise on AM&E, and 2) the augmentee would have a broadening experience that would certainly enrich the forces with a greater understanding of Civil Affairs and the value of non-kinetic operations.

5. Lack of Manpower

A further consideration regarding a four-person CAT is a lack of manpower to handle large AM&E initiatives. Furthermore, CATs frequently conduct “split team operations” which divide a four-man team into smaller elements to cover more regions of a country.¹¹⁶ At times four personnel are barely enough to execute the day-to-day tasks at hand let alone monitor and evaluate completed tasks. Manpower is a consistent struggle as undermanned companies and battalions seek to fulfill every request given.

The results are undermanned and overworked teams that strive for success but do so with no definition of it. A team commander deployed to Syria observed that “It’s

¹¹⁵ Andrew Moriarty, “5 Things to Know About Immigrants in the Military,” FWD.us, January 6, 2020, <https://www.fwd.us/news/immigrants-in-the-military/>.

¹¹⁶ Both thesis authors commanded CATs that conducted split-team operations over combined seven deployments.

difficult to gauge MOEs with three CA guys, two EOD guys, two PSYOP guys, and an infantry guy on security.”¹¹⁷ A team commander deployed to the Philippines described:

The one thing that we struggled with was developing quantitative and qualitative human terrain analysis, but we just did not have the manpower to do it, we only had four team members. We did not have the resources to do it. We attempted to use the reach-back capability with our battalion but that still required a lot of constant communication with limited communication abilities at the outstation.¹¹⁸

Simply put, one reason CA fails to measure effects is because CATS do not have the means to do so.

An analysis of the team commander’s comments leaves only two possibilities to rectify the problems. One, modify team size to provide adequate support to mission sets, or when necessary, assign multiple teams against a single mission set to provide the manpower needed to achieve objectives. Second, the Brigade analyzes the mission requirements and prioritizes them to pull supporting forces from low priority missions when needed for varying amounts of time. Modifying force structure will increase flexibility thereby increasing the team’s capacity and leverage their expertise and skills to gain access, placement, and influence.

The best course of action to overcome the lack of manpower, language capability, and culture expertise is twofold: 1) educate CATs on AM&E framework—which does not exist yet; 2) provide CATs with the authorities and funding to contract third party HN groups to assist in the AM&E process.¹¹⁹ CATs must fully understand the process and be able to conduct it themselves on a small scale. Furthermore, CATs must also learn to manage contractors to conduct the AM&E process to measure the effects of the CATs OAs. The Rand Corporation postulates that those who conduct data collection and analysis must be professionally trained in the task of monitoring.¹²⁰ In the case of CATs,

¹¹⁷ Interview with 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Syria.

¹¹⁸ Interview with 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Philippines, May 25, 2021.

¹¹⁹ Justin Richmond, interview with Impl Founder and Director, May 14, 2021.

¹²⁰ O’Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation*, 150.

this may be a member of the team, a country team representative, or a contracted third party with the appropriate skills, capacity, and access.

Another benefit of contracting a third party to conduct AM&E is objective feedback which would prevent false MOEs as discussed above. However, for this model to be successful CATs must first be educated in the process to enable them to effectively manage contractors and ensure adequate third-party facilitation of monitoring. An examination of the case studies presented below will highlight the challenges associated with AM&E.

C. CASE STUDY: CLAIMING SUCCESS WITHOUT QUANTIFICATION

The following is a vignette focusing on CAT 1X3 and the combined efforts of follow-on CATs from the 91st CA BN (SO) (A) to mitigate inter-clan violent while disrupting AS in the Puntland region of Somalia. This case study will conclude with analysis focusing on the AM&E.




Figure 7. The city of Galkayo is divided in half by the semi-autonomous state of Puntland in the north and the Galmudug Administration in the south.¹²¹

CAT 1X3 and follow-on CATs supported Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) to conduct Counter-Violent Extremism Operations against AS, an Al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate. The team further refined its mission to increase stability in key population centers, develop a friendly network, and maintain persistent engagement with key influencers throughout Africa.¹²²

¹²¹ Source: Zakaria Yusuf and Abdul Khalif, “Galkayo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines,” Crisis Group, December 10, 2015, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/galkayo-and-somalia-s-dangerous-faultlines>.

¹²² Interview CAT 1X3 Team Sergeant, Audio Recording, February 23, 2021.




Figure 8. The city of Galkayo is also divided between the Darod Clan in the North and the Hawiya Clan in the South.¹²³

CAT 1X3 consisted of 4 personnel: a team commander, team sergeant, Special Operations Combat Medic (SOCM), and a Civil Affairs NCO.¹²⁴ CAT 1X3 was the only Civil Affairs unit in the region, responsible for an area approximately size of the eastern seaboard of the United States. Due to multiple operational requirements throughout Somalia, the team conducted split-team operations between four separate locations. CAT 1X3 focused most of its operations in Galkayo, Puntland, in Northern Somalia. Galkayo is divided in half by two federal states under loose control of the central government.¹²⁵ Furthermore, Galkayo is located on an ethnic fault line, its clan division reflects the larger divide between two dominant rival clans in the country: the Darod Clan in North Galkayo and the Hawiya Clan in South Galkayo. Galkayo has been historically divided and

¹²³ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Somalia Ethnic Groups," Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, 2002, https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.jpg.

¹²⁴ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team Sergeant.

¹²⁵ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM, February 22, 2021.

colonization powers kept the city separated to maintain stability while not addressing the core grievances. It is said that if you can solve the clan rivalry in Galkayo then you could solve ongoing civil strife in Somalia.¹²⁶

Upon arriving in Africa, CAT 1X3 Commander met with the HN Special (HN) SOF commander to plan CAO. The HN SOF unit was located in North Galkayo, and the unit consisted of mostly Darood Clan members. The HN SOF Commander described the ethnic tensions and stated that a AS was exploiting the tribal rift by encouraging cross-border ethnic violence. Furthermore, AS established a haven in South Galkayo among the Hawiya Clan to launch attacks against the HN SOF in North Galkayo. The HN SOF commander asked how to gain access to South Galkayo to disrupt AS from launching attacks against HN partners in North Galkayo. Furthermore, he sought ethnic unity between the Darood and the Hawiya clans as a long-term solution to the instability in the region.¹²⁷ The CAT's SOCM stated that if the team could not go to South Galkayo City, then CAT 1X3 would attempt to bring key members of the community from South Galkayo to the HN SOF in the north.¹²⁸

CAT 1X3 and HN SOF Commander decided to focus on unifying the police departments to achieve the end-state of disrupting AS from launching attacks as well as improve ethnic unity. The CAT Commander requested the assistance of the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to lead the law enforcement training focused on best practices for community policing, investigations, defensive tactics, and ethics. The INL Officer had more than 20 years of experience as a police officer in a major U.S. city where he worked routinely with rival ethnic and cultural groups, i.e., gangs. The HN SOF Commander invited 12 members of the South Galkayo Police Force and 12 members of the North Galkayo Police Force to attend the training events. The INL Officer led off with grappling techniques as an "ice breaker" activity by pairing police officers from the north with officers from the south. During the training

¹²⁶ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

¹²⁷ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

¹²⁸ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

event, a real-world crime took place; a criminal stole a vehicle from North Galkayo and drove it to South Galkayo to avoid capture. The police forces worked together to solve the crime and return the vehicle to North Galkayo. The success of the first event led to a second iteration that was tailored for police chiefs and detectives.¹²⁹ This marked the end of the CAT's deployment. Before departing, the HN SOF commander told the CAT, "I have been a Soldier for a long time, but it has been a long time since I have felt like a human being and doing these events reminded me of why I do my job."¹³⁰



Figure 9. The unified Galkayo Joint Police Force posted @UNSomalia on Twitter; "Galkayo's efforts towards safety and security are supported jointly by the UN and AMISOM, and include a Joint Police Patrol: an initiative under Ceasefire Agreement. In this regard, 200 police from north and south Galkayo concluded their training on 19 December 2017."¹³¹

¹²⁹ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

¹³⁰ Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

¹³¹ Source: UNSOM (@UNSomalia), "Gaalkacyo's Efforts towards Safety and Security Are Supported Jointly by the UN and AMISOM, and Include a Joint Police Patrol: An Initiative under the #Gaalkacyo Ceasefire Agreement. In This Regard, 200 Police from North and South Gaalkacyo Concluded Their Training on 19 December," Twitter, December 20, 2017, <https://twitter.com/UNSomalia/status/943486820117024768>.

CAT 1X3 was in communication with the replacement team to seek concurrence for long-term engagements so that the initiatives could continue after the CAT re-deployed. The follow-on CAT continued to conduct law enforcement training events with the INL Officer. Each iteration resulted in greater participation and ultimately joint policing initiatives.¹³² The African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) furthered the joint policing efforts by providing training on joint patrolling, which increased the number of police officers trained.¹³³ The North and South Galkayo City Police Forces established a joint patrol headquarters to coordinate and conduct joint patrols.¹³⁴

However, in response to the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) approach to partnered security, AS detonated a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), targeting the police headquarters, which left it in ruins and killed 20 police officers.¹³⁵ The follow-on team sergeant from CAT 1X4 stated:

Things were working, AS does not attack what you are doing when you are ineffective. It was the north and south working together, it was peace on the horizon, the civil war was not as hot as it was, AS thrives in chaos and anarchy...we are trying to delegitimize, we are trying to degrade their networks, and they realize that, so they use fear and intimidation on their side, its terrorism as a tactic.¹³⁶

The VBIED was a significant set-back. Nonetheless, the follow-on CATs continued to train the police forces. Furthermore, the AU and UN initiated joint police training and formalized the joint police forces.¹³⁷ The UN Somalia Police Commissioner praised the program as an example of putting the police model into practice. The North and South Police Departments demonstrated inter-clan cooperation through cross-border security,

¹³² Interview with CAT 1X4 Team Sergeant, February 3, 2021.

¹³³ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, "Building Bridges: UNSOM and AMISOM Launch Joint Police Patrol Training in Gaalkacyo – Somalia," ReliefWeb, July 18, 2017, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/building-bridges-unsom-and-amisom-launch-joint-police-patrol-training-gaalkacyo>.

¹³⁴ Interview with CAT 1X3 CANCO, Audio Recording, February 22, 2021.

¹³⁵ Interview with CAT 1X4 Team Sergeant.

¹³⁶ Interview with CAT 1X4 Team Sergeant.

¹³⁷ African Union Mission in Somalia, "Two Hundred Officers Complete Joint Police Patrol Training in Gaalkacyo," AMISOM News, December 22, 2017, <https://amisom-au.org/2017/12/two-hundred-officers-complete-joint-police-patrol-training-in-gaalkacyo/>.

synchronization, and information sharing.¹³⁸ Another round of ethnic tensions arose when an air strike targeted AS fighters, but allegedly killed civilians in the South Galkayo region. AS stoked ethnic tension through disinformation, and the civil strife resulted in approximately 50 civilian deaths and delayed progress towards clan unity.¹³⁹

A year later, the UN sponsored a Ceasefire Advisory Team consisting of members of the UN and representatives from North and South Galkayo City who brokered a ceasefire agreement.¹⁴⁰ The agreement formalized joint police training and patrols, removed barriers between the North and South Galkayo, and withdrew forces from the disputed areas. The subsequent CATs continued to conduct joint police training, which resulted in joint police patrols and a joint police headquarters. The police forces have the greatest access to AS' havens in Galkayo.

D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: IF YOU CAN'T MEASURE IT, IT DOESN'T EXIST

This case study of CAT 1X3 and subsequent teams highlights the success of the 91st CA BN (SO) (A) but it also demonstrates the complexity measuring effects of CAO in the human domain. CAT 1X3 and subsequent teams struggled to accurately assess, monitor, and evaluate effects due to three primary challenges all of which were compounded by the team's lack of manpower: 1) developing baselines consistent with timelines required by stake holders, 2) establishing causal relationships between operations and effects, and 3) communicating consistently and effectively over the long-term. Despite the teams' efforts, the CATs could not prove to higher headquarters that the success was a result of CAO.

¹³⁸ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, "Building Bridges."

¹³⁹ Interview with CAT 1X4 Team Sergeant.

¹⁴⁰ Doel Mukerjee and Keelin FitzGerald, "Joint Police Training and Community Outreach Continues to Build Peace in Galmadug and Puntland," ReliefWeb, March 20, 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/joint-police-training-and-community-outreach-continues-build-peace-galmadug-and>.

1. Baselines

CAT 1X3 struggled to establish analytical baselines of their OE prior to conducting CAO. The failure to develop baselines leaves the CATs with an inability to measure progress against a definable starting point. Due to the team's lack of understanding of how to accurately assess and develop a baseline the team lacked analysis of formal and informal networks that potentially existed between the north and south Galkayo police forces, meaning the creation of new links could not be measured against a starting point. Additionally, there was not a baseline testing for police officers slated to participate in the training. For this reason, CAT 1X3 could not adequately measure the increase in network nodes and police competency or analyze gains against initial baselines.

2. Causation

The CATs fell short of establishing a baseline and therefore could not follow-through with proper monitoring and evaluation of CAO progress. In the end, CAT 1X3 and subsequent CATs could only speculate that their CAO contributed towards clan unity and police cooperation, but it cannot be quantified and therefore cannot demonstrate the causal link between CAO and the end-state.

To claim success, the effects of operations must be both measurable and demonstrate a causal relationship, but this becomes significantly more difficult as more parties become involved. In his work "Measuring Social Change: Performance and Accountability in a Complex World," Alnoor Ebrahim addresses the complexities surrounding the measurement of social change and the needs of dynamic systems. Ebrahim notes that these systems become more complex as the number of stake holders increase and the interests become divergent.¹⁴¹ The research could not prove a causal relationship between the CAT's combined joint police training and AU and UN's police training events. Furthermore, it is unclear if there was a causal relationship between CAT's CAO and the UN brokered peace agreement.¹⁴² However, multiple interviewees suggested that the AU

¹⁴¹ O'Mahony et al., *Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation*, 19.

¹⁴² Interview with CAT 1X3 Team SOCM.

and UN built upon the prototype and relationships that CAT 1X3 and subsequent teams established.

A second challenge to establishing the causal relationship between actions and effects faced by the CATs are false MOEs. The follow-on CAT 1X4 team sergeant believed that the VBIED targeting the joint police headquarters was an MOE, due to the lack of doctrine available to assist in the development of MOEs. It is critical to recognize that this is an inferred causal relationship. No data exists to indicate that the VBIED attack would not have happened had the team been entirely absent from the scenario. In this case study the UN, AU, U.S. State Department, U.S. military, and civilian populations all were stakeholders in this dynamic mission set. To satisfy each stakeholder, there must be analytical results for evaluation that supports claimed “success.” The claim that this attack was indicative of success should be examined because the retaliation ultimately led to instability in the area which was counter to objectives. It is probable that AS felt threatened by the civil-military cooperation which undermined AS’s shadow government and networks. However, data does not exist to confirm this assertion.

The misconception that all CAO operations must illicit a response from the enemy to be effective, damages CATs ability to develop MOEs that truly help guide operational development. This may in fact be an indicator of success but not an MOE demonstrating long-term stability. Regardless, the attack forced teams to plan for potential enemy retaliation in the wake of successful CAO. It is necessary to warn HN partners of the possibility and ensure optimal force protection measures against vulnerable targets.

3. Communication

To adequately conduct the AM&E process, there must be enduring monitoring of operations and their effects. The six-month deployment cycles of CATs require an intensive and dependable communications structure to facilitate this process. Chapter IV established that Civil Affairs forces struggle with continuity between teams. However, in this case, maintaining continuity is where CAT 1X3 excelled, through their own initiatives. The team attempted to establish a standard of communication for future teams to follow to mitigate the problems that occur if teams constantly initiate new CAO each deployment

thus changing lines of effort and objectives. Continuity is critical to achieving long-term tactical and operational objectives and enables teams to develop long term MOEs. The establishment of long term MOEs is integral to the AM&E process and drives the direction of ongoing operations. Every team should focus on achieving short-term effects in support of long-term MOEs.

E. CONCLUSION: FOLLOW THROUGH MAKES THE DIFFERENCE

Even if doctrine is revised and updated to reflect SOF Civil Affairs requirements, commanders provide clear mission statements, the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) improves internal and external communications, then it will still be for naught unless CATs are empowered with doctrine that informs the AM&E process in the human domain. CATs must be able to measure their success and provide quantitative and qualitative results to the chain of command, partners, and Congress. Developing a robust framework that applies to multiple mission-sets and areas of operation is the next step for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to meet the requirement for graduate level warfare in the 21st century.

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VI. THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Eighteen interviews with former and current members of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) indicate that CATs struggle to quantify the effects of operations in the human domain. Moreover, the lack of Measures of Effectiveness is due to four significant challenges the Brigade faces: 1) insufficient Civil Affairs doctrine, 2) absent mission statements, 3) ineffective internal and external communication, and 4) failure to assess, monitor, and evaluate effects. Each of these problems requires targeted, realistic, data-driven solutions, which this chapter presents as recommendations to the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). This thesis takes a bottom-up approach in research and recommendations with the objective of top-down reform of Civil Affairs doctrine, SOPs, and TTPs that are enforced across the Brigade.

A. INSUFFICIENT CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

Doctrine serves as the foundation for the Army's body of knowledge on the conduct of operations. Considering that the USSOCOM re-activated the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) in 2007, Civil Affairs doctrine is still evolving. There is a revised version of FM 3-57 "Civil Affairs Operations" published in July 2021 that provides only limited insight into planning MOEs.¹⁴³ Older COIN-centric tactical level doctrine provides slightly more clarity on MOE development. However, doctrine falls short of providing required MOE frameworks and MOE planning knowledge to keep pace with the rapid expansion of SOF Civil Affairs. Furthermore, development of new doctrine is complicated by the need to address emerging threats in grey-zone warfare and preparation for LSCO.

Beyond the lack of a doctrinal foundation for MOE planning, current Civil Affairs doctrine does not delineate between SOF Civil Affairs and U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs, which supports conventional forces. This is a problem because the capabilities of SOF Civil Affairs units and those of Reservist Civil Affairs units vary greatly because of mission, authorities, and training. Recent, delineation of the 38S MOS, SOF Civil Affairs

¹⁴³ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021.

Governance Officer, compounds the needs addressed by Major Jennifer Jantzi-Schichter declared in *Special Warfare* journal that:

Despite the emphasis on governance proficiency, CA Soldiers receive very little formal training on advising local authorities on governance. It is not covered in the CAQC, and there are few other opportunities for further professional development....CA Soldiers are expected to take lessons learned from previous teams, conduct on-the-job training and receive rudimentary mentorship from leadership....It is clear there is a gap between what CA is expected to do and what CA is trained to do.¹⁴⁴

The second-order effect of non-SOF specific doctrine is that CAQC instructors and gaining units must fill doctrinal gaps with their own personal experiences on how to plan MOEs and conduct AM&E process. The third-order effect is that commanders are unable to enforce doctrine that is not specific enough for the missions the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) supports.

Recommendations:

- To assist CATs to achieve desired effects, the Civil Affairs Proponent must publish a step-by-step framework to guide CATs to plan and assess MOEs in the human domain. This step-by-step method should align with the U.S. Army's preferred operational planning methodology: the MDMP.
- The current doctrinal challenge requires a set of doctrine dedicated to SOF Civil Affairs and another set of doctrine dedicated to Reserve Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs Proponent must evaluate and decide whether current Civil Affairs core competencies and missions apply to both SOF and Reserve Civil Affairs or whether SOF Civil Affairs requires a new set of competencies and missions, specific to the capabilities SOF Civil Affairs brings to bear.

¹⁴⁴ Jennifer Jantzi-Schichter, "Civil Affairs Transforming Training: A Focus on Governance," *Special Warfare* 31, no. 4 (December 2018): 12, https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW3104/31-4_OCT_DEC_2018_web.pdf.

- The remedy to outdated Civil Affairs ATPs is simple: revise existing publications to integrate, nest, and comply with FM 3-57. Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Proponent should create new ATPs to reflect the new Civil Affairs core competencies outlined in FM 3-57: CKI, Transitional Governance, CNDE, and CMI. Civil Affairs Proponent should also consider creating ATPs for the newly added Civil Affairs missions to include Civil Information Evaluation, Transitional Military Authority, and Civil Military Operations Center. Each of these proposed ATPs should focus on how MOEs integrate into the specific core competency/mission. The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) will not maximize its potential of achieving desired effects until SOF-specific ATPs and FMs are revised to direct CATs in MOE planning, monitoring, and evaluation.

B. MISSION STATEMENTS ARE MISSING IN ACTION

Mission statements are the building block upon which all military operations are developed. A mission statement provides the necessary information to initiate planning, and most importantly, the task and purpose. Research interviews revealed that CATs assigned to the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) regularly do not receive mission statements prior to deploying. This results in a lack of planning, specifically MOE development. If teams do not receive clear mission statements, then the teams are left to their own devices to generate their own mission statements and develop an independent interpretation of their task and purpose. A team commander recently deployed to Eastern Europe recounted that “we had the standard SOCEUR mission statement, but that’s covering the whole of Europe. So as far as a specific Task Group country level directed mission statement, we just had our own [mission statement] that we created.”¹⁴⁵ Even if commanders provide mission statements, the current doctrine only offers three tactical mission tasks—CR, CE, and CNDE—which lack the specificity to generate task and purpose for the tactical unit due to their broad all-encompassing nature. When mission statements do not provide the direction required to

¹⁴⁵ Interview with 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Estonia, June 2, 2021.

conduct proper MDMP, teams fall short in the development of MOEs and lack the ability to communicate operational effects to supported commands.

Recommendations:

- Civil Affairs Proponent should derive additional tactical tasks from Civil Affairs core competencies and Civil Affairs missions outlined in FM 3-57 Chapter III, “Civil Affairs Operations.”¹⁴⁶ Potential tasks could include CKI, Transitional Governance, Civil-Military Integration, SCA, Civil Information Evaluation, CMOC, and Transitional Military Authority. To bridge the “assumptive gap” between task and purpose in a mission statement, Civil Affairs Proponent must provide more tactical tasks supported by robust definitions, symbology, sub-tasks, supplementary instructions, intended application of the task, and required conditions to employ the task.
- The Brigade staff needs to ensure that every RFF includes a mission statement. At the Brigade level, the staff has the responsibility to examine RFFs for mission statements. To generate an RFF, the supported Commander must identify the required capability and its purpose—in other words, its mission. Therefore, the requesting unit has already laid the groundwork for the mission statement, so it should not be difficult for the Brigade to provide Civil Affairs elements with a mission statement. However, if the RFF does not include a mission, then the Brigade staff should work with the requesting unit to develop a mission statement before fulfilling the RFF.
- At the battalion level, battalion commanders must advocate for teams if the Brigade’s staff allocates troops against an RFF without supplying a mission statement. In practice, each deploying CAT would receive a mission statement during the SMIB and back brief the refined mission

¹⁴⁶ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2021, 2-1.

statement to the battalion and brigade commanders for approval prior to deployment.

- The battalion's command and staff must hold companies and teams accountable to conduct proper MDMP prior to deployment, specifically planning MOEs with metrics to gauge observed effects. Furthermore, the CATs must brief planned MOEs and metrics to monitor and evaluate mission progress. Failure to hold all levels accountable to standard Army procedures dictated in doctrine leaves tactical-level elements ill prepared to execute CAO.
- At the company level, the company commander must serve as the driving force between the echelons of command. The company must pressure higher headquarters to provide adequate mission statements and expectations to its teams.
- Company commanders must provide adequate time for teams to conduct MDMP prior to deployment, specifically planning MOEs with metrics to gauge observed change. This is a challenge due to all the other competing pre-deployment training requirements.
- Civil Affairs practitioners studying at the Naval Postgraduate School should research and develop a Graphic Training for CAT Mission Planning Guide, comparable to the Special Forces Mission Detachment Planning Guide – GTA31-01-003. However, the GTA should simplify the planning steps for a four-person CAT compared to a 12-person Special Forces Operational Detachment.
- Civil Affairs Proponent should commission a study to determine if the CAQC provides adequate MDMP training for Civil Affairs NCOs. If not, provide recommendations on course changes to ensure Civil Affairs NCOs are prepared to conduct CAT-level MDMP to plan MOEs.

C. INEFFECTIVE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Communication is essential to developing and maintaining relationships critical to U.S. national security. The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) prides itself on the ability to communicate and share civil information with JIIM partners. However, research interviews revealed that the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) faces internal and external communication deficiencies and barriers that inhibit operational performance. Lack of governing doctrine establishing SOPs for CKI and RIP/TOA generates ill-planned operational handovers and blurred lines of communication between force provider (95th CA BDE [SO] [A]) supporting force (CAT, CMSE), and supported forces (AOB, SOCFWD, TSOC). A former 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) stated in reference to failed internal communications, “CIM [CKI] doesn’t solve any problem but it provides the information to solve the problem. If you start over every 6 months, the enemy has the advantage because he lives there, you don’t. CIM [CKI] is the baseline that helps you to understand where you are at.”¹⁴⁷ Without the ability to communicate effectively internally, CATs are challenged to maintain continuity, which inhibits the planning of MOEs and achievement of long-term effects.

The Brigade’s failure to communicate effectively with external partners may result in a struggle to influence the use of CA forces in operational planning. A team commander deployed to Mindanao, Philippines to counter the spread of the Islamic State reflected that “I had a pretty good idea of our mission, but the battalion commander didn’t want to give a specific mission statement because he lacked TACON/OPCON over our team.”¹⁴⁸ While command relationships and authorities are valid concerns, they cannot become excuses to not communicate necessary information to the teams. The battalion commander did not have a mission statement—a form of communication—for the team that likely reflects ineffective communication between the force providing battalion and the TSOC, which resulted in inadequate mission guidance to conduct MDMP and develop COAs supported by MOEs. This example proves the essential requirement for effective lines of communication between force provider (95th CA BDE (SO) (A)) and supported unit

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Former Commander of 95th Brigade (SO) (A), May 7, 2021.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) Team Commander – Philippines.

(TSOC/SOTF) to define missions and their requirements. The inability to communicate effectively externally yields limited guidance for CATs to conduct MDMP, thereby inhibiting their preparation and ability to deliver the needs of the supported unit. Therefore, the deployment of ill-prepared teams jeopardizes mission success which leaves the Brigade vulnerable to damaging key partnerships with the JIIM community.

Recommendations:

- To ensure CIM/CKI communication between teams and between teams and JIIM partners, the Civil Affairs Proponent should identify a single program of record that would be accessible on unclassified and classified systems. A single program of record generates continuity that facilitates analysis of long-term CAO.
- The USJFKSWCS should incorporate CKI instruction into the CAQC that corresponds with 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) CKI SOP.
- The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) should provide refresher training for deploying teams and/or soldiers returning to the Brigade, implement CKI SOPs for all Teams in the Brigade, and create a position within the battalions and the Brigade to monitor the flow of CKI and provide recommendations when/where necessary.
- The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) should ensure proper RIP/TOA continuity based upon the USSOCOM's Civil Affairs RIP/TOA Checklist located in the Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook.¹⁴⁹ The checklist for outgoing teams consists of 43 "yes/no" criteria, which ensures that outgoing CATs have prepared all necessary continuity information for the incoming CATs. The checklist also provides 130 "yes/no" criteria for incoming CATs to ensure readiness. The checklist is

¹⁴⁹ US Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM CIM Manual*, E-1.

Afghanistan-centric, but it can easily be adapted to any operation regardless of COCOM.

- It is imperative that each battalion build an enduring and positive relationship with its supported TSOC. This may be achieved by creating liaison positions at each TSOC that are filled on a six-month rotational basis aligning with companies' deployments. First, liaisons can help ensure that the battalion always has a voice to advocate for the needs of the personnel forward and the force provider. Second, battalion personnel can assist the TSOC J39 (Civil Military Operations) with Civil-Military input into TSOC campaign plans to keep companies and teams on track by measuring their success against existing theater-level MOEs. Additionally, this allows all parties to have real-time input into strategic-level Civ-Mil planning to ensure that the TSOC CA forces are best allocated.
- Battalions should consider assigning a member CAPT to the TSOC in a temporary duty status (TDY) to advocate on behalf of the battalions and conversely to provide feedback to the force providers on TSOC initiatives. Furthermore, the CAPT can play a critical role in campaign planning, which will facilitate continuity between companies as they rotate in and out of countries. Although it is possible that the TSOC staff would be unwilling to accept that assistance if they perceived it as an attempt to control planning efforts and undermine the TSOC's autonomy, proper communication and coordination could relieve this potential friction.
- As the U.S. re-focuses on strategic competition, it becomes more critical than ever to take a whole-of-government approach to achieving U.S. strategy abroad.¹⁵⁰ Civil Affairs plays a unique role in this process by providing valuable CKI, access, and placement to otherwise denied areas

¹⁵⁰ Donald J. Trump, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 28, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

of regions. It would be of great benefit for the 95th CA BDE (SO)(A) in conjunction with the TSOC to engage with country teams to develop not just U.S. SOCOM-centric MOEs but work towards developing Joint/ Interagency MOEs.

- Civil Affairs Proponent must create a FM for SOF Civil Affairs to address SOF Civil Affairs specific challenges such as generating a more effective communication structure between force provider force provider, supported unit, and tactical level operators.
- At the brigade level and below, leaders must examine their commands retrospectively and assess their level of effective internal and external communication based upon the standards of effective communication laid out in Chapter IV. It is recommended that commands conduct internal and external surveys as well as analysis of battalion information repositories to establish the state of communications.

D. FAILURE TO ASSESS, MONITOR, AND EVALUATE EFFECTS

The failure of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to assess, monitor, and evaluate the effects of CAO has resulted in a lack of empirical data to support causal relationships between operations and effects. This failure to clearly demonstrate causal relationships leaves teams with an inability to communicate internally and externally the value of their efforts while deployed. The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) struggles to develop baseline assessments of the OE due to a lack of AM&E doctrinal framework, limited CAT manpower, limited language, and cultural expertise, as well as stakeholder influence over operations and timing. A former Executive Officer serving in the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) observed that “we [95th CA BDE (SO) (A)] are still deficient where we are not measuring progress against specific goals. The problem with 95th is that we are not working under a specified framework. Teams have a general idea but lack specific guidance.”¹⁵¹ This results in failure to establish baselines and ineffectual monitoring of CAO thereby limiting the teams’ ability to deliver

¹⁵¹ Interview with Former Battalion Executive Officer.

quantifiable results. Due to these failures, CATs tend to claim success without proof of the causal relationships between their CAO and effects observed. Therefore, without rectifying the existing problems, CATs will be left without the means necessary to prove their success.

Recommendations:

- Civil Affairs Proponent must generate doctrine to reflect the operational requirement for SOF CATs to conduct a standard baseline assessment prior to conducting CAO followed by monitoring and evaluation of the effects against the desired outcome.
- Once doctrine is established senior leaders must enforce standardized expectations of teams to conduct AM&E throughout CAO.
- U.S. SOCOM should place responsibility on the TSOC and the force providing unit to enforce a common AM&E standard while retaining the responsibility for execution of the AM&E process with the CAT.
- When teams deploy to establish new CME missions, the CATs should conduct CR during the first 24 months to establish a baseline in support of the TSOC campaign plan. This will require a clear mission statement and expectation management on the part of the 95th BDE CA (SO) (A) and the supported unit. During this process teams must continue to conduct MDMP and establish MOEs that gauge their success in developing a baseline.
- A conceivable but high-cost solution to CATs' challenge of a lack of language and cultural expertise is to execute a PCS for CAT members to a country for a period of multiple years. The authors cannot claim onus for this recommendation as it was proposed by a former battalion commander and current staff member at the O-6 level.¹⁵² While acknowledging that

¹⁵² Interview with Former Commander of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A).

there are significant costs and manpower limitations, the only way to guarantee cultural and language expertise is exposure to the targeted culture and language.

- A lower cost method to improve understanding of the OE is for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) to request individual augmentees with native-level linguistic and cultural expertise to train and deploy with CATs. For this to be effective the Brigade requires the capability to request forces not just from the U.S. Army but across the joint services. Acknowledging that this process would require new tactical-level and administrative-level processes.
- The best course of action to overcome the lack of manpower, language capability, and culture expertise is twofold: 1) educate CATs on AM&E framework—which does not exist yet; 2) provide CATs with the authorities and funding to contract third party HN groups to assist in the AM&E process.¹⁵³ CATs must fully understand the AM&E process and be able to conduct it themselves on a small scale. This ability will facilitate oversight of contractors executing AM&E on behalf of CA forces.

E. CONCLUSION

If you can't measure it, then it doesn't exist. Professionals in the fields of business, engineering, medicine, and countless other analytical-based career fields follow this rule. The same is true for military science. However, the preponderance of evidence derived from interview responses with former and current members of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) demonstrates that CATs regularly fall short when measuring the effects of CAO. Failure to measure success does not mean that operations fail; instead, CATs are ill-equipped from the outset. The lack of doctrine, clear mission statements, continuity, and AM&E framework handicaps teams' ability to accurately measure the effects of CAO. Success

¹⁵³ Richmond, interview with Impl founder and director.

must no longer be a subjective term in the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) but must instead be objective and supported by data proving causation between CAO and desired effects.

The 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) Civil Affairs Proponent, and USJFKWSWCS must build the foundation for CATs to plan MOEs and conduct proper AM&E to win in 21st century warfare. The U.S. Army and USSOCOM are effects-driven organizations that demand quantifiable results to justify a return on investment. The failure to measure and demonstrate effects will result in reduced funding, manning, and ultimately the deterioration of the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A). Fortunately, the inverse is also true: if the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) internalizes the feedback from the force and implements the recommendations to enhance MOE development and the AM&E process, then the successes could lead to an increase in funding, manning, and development. This is graduate-level warfare, and it requires a force prepared with the most up to date education, doctrine, and methods to maximize desired effects. The most effective way for the 95th CA BDE (SO)(A) to trend upward is to provide its force with the ability to quantify and communicate effects of CAO to prove success.

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