Reserve Force: DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles to Reserves Under the Total Force Policy
Abstract
GAO's November 1988 report pointed out that the Department of Defense had not provided guidance for deciding what portions of the force would be in the active and reserve components and what missions the reservists should perform within that mix. In its current review, GAO found the criteria used by the services in decision-making to be largely informal in nature, and there were no clearly established parameters for the use of the reserves. There were indications of a lack of agreement among the services and between active and reserve components on criteria to govern force mix decisions. For example, philosophical differences exist between the Army's active and reserve components on the merits of having less-than-fully resourced reserve units. The reserve components are more willing than the active force to activate new units even if resources are not adequate to fully man and equip them. They believe that even less-than-fully reserves availability should be a fundamental pillar of force mix decisions to better ensure that decisions are made giving appropriate weight to threat, risk, and the capabilities needed in contingencies in which mobilization may be delayed or does not occur. An August 1989 draft Total Force Policy developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognizes the need for force planning to consider various levels of conflict under varying degrees of reserve activation. It also calls for reviews every 4 years of the mix of active and reserve components. GAO believes that such reviews are important to tracking the cumulative effect of changes made on war-fighting capabilities.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1989
- Accession Number
- AD1170044
Entities
People
- Frank C. Conahan
Organizations
- United States Government Accountability Office