Game Theory Framework to Evaluate Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

This research game theory framework evaluates the resilience of nuclear deterrence options between two players. We use lexicographic prioritization to value four priorities of political, military, economic, and civilian casualties. The value order may be varied. We demonstrate our approach with six player choices of no nuclear strike, demonstration, counterforce, tactical military, economic, or countervalue strike. We use game theory to construct and analyze the resulting damage matrix. We conclude that credible deterrence requires having at least equivalent offensive damage capabilities.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 24, 2022
Accession Number
AD1170684

Entities

People

  • Michael A Cevallos

Organizations

  • Air Force Institute of Technology

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Engineered Resilient Systems
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Air Force
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Casualties
  • Command Control Communications
  • Computer Science
  • Demonstrations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Deterrence
  • Engineering
  • Game Theory
  • Governments
  • Literature Surveys
  • Mathematical Models
  • Military Operations
  • Nuclear Warfare
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Operations Research
  • Reconnaissance
  • Security
  • United States
  • Ussr

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Systems Analysis and Design