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THESIS

**COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESILIENCE IN MONGOLIA**

by

Bayasgalan Lkhagvasuren

March 2022

Thesis Advisor:

Co-Advisor:

Douglas A. Borer

Shannon C. Houck

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IN MONGOLIA**

Bayasgalan Lkhagvasuren
Lieutenant Colonel, Mongolian Armed Forces
MMAS, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2018

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March 2022**

Approved by: Douglas A. Borer
Advisor

Shannon C. Houck
Co-Advisor

Carter Malkasian
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Mongolia is bordered by two powerful nations that are vying for greater influence on the global stage. As a relatively smaller, democratic nation vulnerable to influence from these prominent neighbors, Mongolia faces increasing challenges in governance. One of the primary challenges is maintaining Mongolian independence, which requires national resilience and resistance in the face of external influence. Specifically, it requires psychological resilience in all sectors and all layers of society as a critical component for comprehensive defense. Mongolian national defense policies have relied on conventional military forces for decades, but those policies do not include the psychological preparation and involvement of the Mongolian population. This thesis looks to Nordic countries and Taiwan for insight. Norway, Finland, and Sweden maintain a comprehensive defense, or “total defense,” approach that systematically invests in social and psychological resilience. This thesis asks, How can Mongolia achieve similar levels of national resilience? To address this question, this research uses NATO’s comprehensive defense model as a framework to explore lines of effort Mongolia can invest in to enhance social and psychological resilience across all areas of society through education, information, and inclusion. Furthermore, the study makes recommendations on how to begin implementing programs to develop Mongolia’s psychological resilience using existing resources.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND APPROACH.....	5
A.	BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND SIMILAR CASES.....	5
B.	APPROACH.....	8
III.	EDUCATION	11
A.	YOUTH.....	12
B.	GOVERNMENT ENTITIES	14
C.	PRIVATE AND CIVIC SECTORS	16
D.	MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES	20
IV.	INFORMATION.....	21
A.	SOCIAL MEDIA VULNERABILITIES	21
B.	EXISTING POLITICAL DEBATES.....	23
C.	PRESS	24
D.	COUNTERMEASURES AND MONGOLIAN EXPOSURES.....	26
E.	CIVIC-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP ON INFORMATION	27
V.	SOCIAL INCLUSION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE	29
A.	WHAT IS SOCIAL INCLUSION?	29
B.	WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?.....	29
C.	WHAT ARE THE CURRENT EFFORTS?.....	30
	1. National Identity and Shared National Values	31
	2. National Language and Script	33
	3. Mongolia and Nomadic Lifestyles	35
VI.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	37
A.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	39
B.	AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY	43
	LIST OF REFERENCES	45
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	53

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Example of Misinformation, a Fake Picture of Mongolian Allegedly Victimized in South Korea in 2021.	23
Figure 2.	Flood and Storm Warning Information Distribution	40
Figure 3.	Integrated Layered Defense	44

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CDH	<i>Comprehensive Defense Handbook</i>
CITA	Communication and Information technology Authority
LDF	Local Defense Forces
MFC	Mongolian Fact-Checking Center
MPP	Mongolian People's Party
NAMEM	National Agency of Meteorology and Environmental Monitoring
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Agency
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Resistance Operating Concept
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

Conquering the world on horseback is easy; it is dismounting and governing that is hard.

—Genghis Khan

Mongolia is bordered by powerful nations that are vying for greater influence on the global stage. As a relatively smaller, democratic nation vulnerable to influence from these prominent neighboring countries, Mongolia faces increasing challenges in governance. One of the primary challenges is maintaining Mongolian independence, which requires national resilience and resistance in the face of external influence. Throughout history many countries have faced similar dilemmas. When faced by potentially threatening neighbors often smaller states will band together in alliances, but also seek to strengthen their internal capacity to maintain independence. Such is the contemporary case in Europe, where the concept of “comprehensive defense” underscores European efforts at resilience and resistance.

The *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook* (CDH) defines comprehensive defense as “an official Government strategy, which encompasses a whole-of-society approach to protecting the nation against potential threats,”¹ the purpose of which is “developing the capability and willingness of all members of society to directly contribute to their safety, security and natural right to self-determination.”² The core pillars of comprehensive defense include: social and psychological, economic and essential services, military, cyber, civil, and internal and border security. As part of the whole-of-society approach, Mongolia must pursue lines of effort within each of these pillars. Consistent with that overall goal, this research focuses specifically on social and psychological resilience.

¹ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, Vol. 1. (Shape, Belgium: Quartier General, 2020), 15.

² NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 15.

Mongolian national defense policies have relied on conventional military forces for decades, but those policies do not include the psychological preparation and involvement of the Mongolian population. Smaller nations in other parts of the world face similar challenges and in response have invested in comprehensive defense efforts. Nordic countries and Taiwan in particular offer important insights that might be useful for Mongolia. Nordic states' (Norway, Finland, and Sweden) comprehensive defense or "total defense" approach systematically invests in social and psychological resilience. Psychological resilience involves "developing and maintaining the will, resolve, and determination to overcome a national crisis and defend the nation ... [as] an element of national pride and mutual respect which contributes to the strength and commitment to overcome a crisis and the faith that it will be overcome."³ Nordic countries have seen success in this domain. For example, in a Gallup Poll in 2015, 74% of Finns said they would fight for their country, which was the highest percentage in Europe.⁴ Moreover, according to a 2018 annual opinion poll, the most recent, by the non-governmental organization (NGO) "People and Defence," 81% of Norwegians support a military defense in the event of an attack, 79% want to retain conscription, and 72% are willing to participate in defense to the extent that they are capable.⁵

How could Mongolia achieve similar levels of national resilience? To examine this question, this research uses NATO's comprehensive defense model as a framework to explore lines of effort Mongolia can invest in to enhance social and psychological resilience across all areas of society through three lines of effort: (1) education, (2) information, and (3) inclusion. This research is focused on national defense, but it is by no means designed to only inform the Mongolian Ministry of Defense (MOD). Successful comprehensive defense planning requires a whole of government approach,

³ Otto Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 1st ed. (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence University, 2019), 3.

⁴ "WIN/Gallup International's Global Survey Shows Three in Five Willing to Fight for Their Country," Center for Public and Political Studies, May 7, 2015, <https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/33483/win-gallup-internationals-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country/>.

⁵ James Kenneth Wither, "Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defense Concepts," *Defense Studies* 20, no. 1 (January 2020): 67, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2020.1718498>.

one that requires an MOD involvement, but can only succeed if all elements of Mongolian governmental and civil society are involved.

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II. THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND APPROACH

One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it, you have no certainty until you try.

—Sophocles, 400 B.C.

A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND SIMILAR CASES

Historically, small nations have struggled to deter and resist aggressive superpowers. However, sometimes the weak and small have defeated the strong and large. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, a U.S. Army electronic warfare and signals intelligence veteran and University of Chicago PhD, argues that when large states attack with a “direct strategic approach and small states defend with an indirect strategy such as preplanned resistance, the weaker actor tends to win.”⁶ Defending against superpower nations like Russia and China, however, small nations would be likely to repeat the outcome of the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, which seemed to demonstrate that a minor country cannot stand up to a superpower in a conventional war. “The defeat of the Georgian Armed Forces, fighting alone against the superior Russian military, was a warning signal to other small nations, not just in eastern Europe, but around the world.”⁷ Arreguin-Toft would argue that Georgia lost because it attempted to fight the superior Russian force with conventional military means: a “direct approach.” It might have fared better by taking an “indirect approach” that would have included guerrilla warfare.

In the article “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” Vicken Cheterian identifies that “Great powers’ military and economic interests did not always work together with the UN [United Nations] and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] diplomatic solutions.”⁸ Cheterian illuminates three

⁶ Ivan Arregun-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 105.

⁷ Bayasgalan Lkhagvasuren, “Book Review: Resistance Operating Concept,” *Small Wars Journal* (June 2021), <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/book-review-resistance-operating-concept>.

⁸ Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” *Central Asian Survey* (July 2009): 165, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930903056768>.

things those small nations need to understand in the modern world. These include (1) never provoke superpowers in a conventional way; (2) never depend on external supports; and (3) without civilian support “total defense” will be useless. Margus Kuul, of the Estonian Defense Force, establishes that “a strategy which combines civil resistance strategy and unconventional military action can be an effective component of a total defense capacity.”⁹ This means not only that Mongolian military personnel need to learn comprehensive defense policies, but the strategic decision-makers also need to understand the “total defense” concept and its key factors.

Since 2018, two important documents on irregular warfare have been published that highlight the need for improved understanding of comprehensive defense or total defense strategies as a means of national deterrence. The first is the *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC) published by the Swedish Defense University.¹⁰ The ROC is important to Mongolian comprehensive defense strategies because it serves as a master text for a whole-of-government approach to national self-defense. The second document is the *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, mentioned earlier¹¹ Volumes I and II of NATO’s CDH are also important to understanding and developing comprehensive defense strategies. The CDH recommends a whole-of-society comprehensive defense and deterrence approach to small nations, and it contains a full training spectrum for asymmetric defense components. Both volumes create greater awareness about psychological resilience concepts and implementation of the key tenets of preparing for comprehensive defense.

The literature used for this research on psychological resilience as a comprehensive defense focuses not only on the ROC and NATO handbook, but also on related case studies about psychological resilience in the policies of Nordic states and Taiwan. With the exception of Denmark, the Nordic states (Norway, Finland, and Sweden) and Taiwan maintain conscription of their personnel, as does Mongolia. One of

⁹ Margus Kuul, “Civil Resistance: An Essential Element of a Total Defense Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 106, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42667>.

¹⁰ Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 13.

¹¹ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, 3.

the significant advantages of conscription is that it guarantees an adequate number of reserves in the military. Also, it boosts the national pride of most citizens. The Nordic states have incorporated psychological resilience into their strategy since 2014, and they are disclosing their national best practices with NATO countries. In terms of psychological resilience, the Finnish government defines it as “the ability of individuals, communities, society and the nation to withstand the pressures arising from crisis situations and to recover from their impacts.”¹² This definition has demonstrated that Finnish national defense policies consider psychological resilience a crucial element. Finnish people believe “their country’s strong public education system, long history of balancing Russia, and a comprehensive government strategy allow it to deflect coordinated propaganda and disinformation.”¹³ Meanwhile, the Sweden Defense Commission has proposed an “inquiry into psychological defence against propaganda and disinformation and distributed an information pamphlet to all households.”¹⁴

In addition to the European countries discussed, Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan are practicing comprehensive defense policies successfully. The Republic of China (Taiwan), which is considered a nation, often depends on economic trade and shares (maritime) borders with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), just as Mongolia does in East Asia. Beijing has been practicing economic sanctions in the last years in order to influence the Taiwanese government and business sectors. But Taiwan shows a positive example of social resilience on this matter. President Tsai Ing-wen’s diversification strategy and alternative investment options for the economy resulted in “the general public becoming more aware of the downsides of dependence on bilateral trade and cautionary sentiment towards China’s assertiveness.”¹⁵

¹² Yhteiskunnan Turvallisuus, *Security Strategy for Society*, Finnish Government Resolution (Helsinki, Finland: The Security Committee, November 2017), 22. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/YTS_2017_english.pdf.

¹³ Reid Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to Fend off Putin’s Information War?,” *Foreign Policy* (March 2017), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/>.

¹⁴ Wither, “Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defense Concepts,” 66.

¹⁵ Christina Lai, “More than Carrots and Sticks: Economic Statecraft and Coercion in China–Taiwan Relations from 2000 to 2019,” *Politics* (February 2021): 12, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720962654>.

B. APPROACH

Most Mongolian national defense documents primarily focus on physical resilience; therefore, further research is needed to examine how small states can prepare and train their civil societies for psychological resilience as a pillar for a whole-of-society defense. While decision makers enhance Mongolian defense forces' readiness, they fail to persuade the Mongolian private and civilian sectors to participate as a component of asymmetric warfare. Namely, the existing defense strategy omits the potential for participation by civilian sectors as a practical strategic alternative that could strengthen Mongolian deterrence capacity.

To fill these gaps, thesis explores how CDH would look in the development of the Mongolian psychological resilience. The study therefore focuses on three lines of effort: (1) education, (2) information, and (3) inclusion. First, this thesis identifies education programs promoting the whole-of-society approach to the Mongolian population, including the public, private, and civilian sectors for enhancing their resilience capabilities. Second, the research explores information programs (e.g., digital literacy) that help ensure society is accurately informed about current conditions or trends that may affect national safety or security. This is a critical problem. According to January 2021 estimates, there are 2.60 million social media users in Mongolia.¹⁶ Linda Sanchez, U.S. special rapporteur to NATO's Committee on Democracy and Security, highlights that "disinformation and propaganda contribute to heightening the polarization of societies and increasing dissatisfaction with democracy."¹⁷ Many Mongolians understand that disinformation and propaganda are used and yet citizens receive and believe widely disseminated false and misleading narratives from domestic and external ill-intentioned actors. For instance, the people who have no basic facts about internet security are targeted by cybercriminal groups. According to local security authorities, "Police in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar have apprehended 800 Chinese citizens and confiscated

¹⁶ Simon Kemp, "Digital 2021: Mongolia," Datareportal, accessed October 17, 2021, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-mongolia>.

¹⁷ Linda Sanchez, Bolstering the Democracy Resilience of the Alliance Against Disinformation and Propaganda," Preliminary Draft Special Report to NATO Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, March 2021), 1.

hundreds of computers and mobile phone SIM cards as part of an investigation into a cybercrime ring.”¹⁸ Therefore, this thesis further identifies the Mongolian population’s social media vulnerabilities, including existing political debates and social grievances, and external threats facing the nation (e.g., weaponized information and other psychological tools used to influence Mongolia). Understanding the information environment in Mongolia will inform ways for developing an underlying social resilience. Third, this thesis examines ways Mongolia can foster inclusion across all sectors of society. Inclusion, or group belongingness, is “a fundamental human”¹⁹ need, and satisfying this need as a valued Mongolian citizen has benefits beyond fulfilling the individual’s need to belong—it also strengthens the group itself by creating members that “strongly identify with the group’s values and goals.”²⁰ Many initiatives that promote societal inclusion overlap with the education and information lines of effort (e.g., bridging the digital divide; teaching Mongolian language, history, and traditions), but research suggests some additional avenues. Some of these include “inclusive leadership styles”²¹ and the use of national narratives that promote unity and strength. Arie Kruglanski, distinguished social psychology professor at the University of Maryland, College Park, suggests governments should create opportunities for citizens to pursue “significance-bestowing occupations” and “create organizations such as the Peace Corps and Doctors Without Borders that take advantage of young people’s desire to be idealistic and to do something for their country.”²²

Finally, this thesis emphasizes the role of partner nations in supporting Mongolian national psychological resilience and future recommendations for Mongolians on psychological resilience. To this end, in recent years the Mongolian government has been

¹⁸ “Mongolia Arrests 800 Chinese Citizens in Cybercrime Probe,” Reuters, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mongolia-crime-china-idUSKBN1XA0NW>.

¹⁹ Roy. F. Baumeister and Mark. R. Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation,” *Psychological Bulletin* 117, no. 3 (1995): 497.

²⁰ H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner, *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, Political Psychology: Key Readings (Chicago: Hall Publishers, 1986), 14.

²¹ Lynn M. Shore and Beth G. Chung, “Inclusive Leadership: How Leaders Sustain or Discourage Work Group Inclusion,” SAGE Publishing (May 2021), DOI: 10.1177/1059601121999580.

²² Zara Greenbaum, “5 Questions for Arie W. Kruglanski,” American Psychological Association, April 2018, www.apa.org/monitor/2019/04/conversation-kruglanski#.

pursuing what is known as the “Third Neighbor Policy.” This multi-lateral approach seeks to build effective ties with actors in states that do not physically border on Mongolia. It is believed that doing so will help further stabilize Mongolia.

III. EDUCATION

Education is the basic tool for the development of consciousness and the reconstitution of society.

—Mahatma Gandhi

According to the NATO handbook, “national resilience begins with the individual.”²³ Therefore, enhancing individual resilience is one of the challenging objectives for any country regarding comprehensive defense policies. Mongolian defense law declares “the basis of Mongolian defense policy is based on participation of government entities and all citizens.”²⁴ Also, the law itself describes the Government of Mongolia as being tasked to train all citizens, as well as government entities, and non-governmental agencies to defend the nation. In this way, the existing defense policy is remarkably conventionally militarized, and the law does not include a psychological defense policy or stipulation for programs against disinformation, misinformation, fake news, and propaganda.²⁵

This vulnerability is not without consequence. Indeed, Mongolia has been a “testing space” for misinformation and disinformation for other nations. According to an article in *Poynter*, Battsetseg Enkhtaivan, lead fact-checker of the Mongolian Fact-Checking Center, and her family encountered misinformation stating that “COVID-19 vaccines were just experimental Chinese treatments being tested on Mongolians without proper safety checks.”²⁶ After hearing that misinformation her mother and sisters refused to get vaccinated, and they got sick with COVID-19. The article goes further by explaining that although “the practice and impacts of misinformation are not new to

²³ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 25.

²⁴ “Батлан хамгаалах тухай” Монгол Улсын хууль, [Defense Law], The State Great Khural - Parliament of Mongolia, October 06, 2016, <https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail/12122>.

²⁵ Sanchez, Bolstering the Democracy Resilience of the Alliance Against Disinformation and Propaganda, 2.

²⁶ Harrison Mantas, “The Mongolian Fact Checking Center Fights Misinformation in a Country where the Word Doesn’t Exist,” *Poynter*, August 2021, <https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2021/the-mongolian-fact-check-center-fights-misinformation-in-a-country-where-the-word-doesnt-exist/>.

Mongolia, the concept can be difficult to translate for everyday people.”²⁷ It is just one of the latest examples of misinformation in Mongolia, and it demonstrates that Mongolian social resilience has not fully developed. Part of the solution requires digital literacy education across all sectors of society.

Just as the NATO CDH outlined that the relevant learning audiences are divided into four groups, this thesis also proposes four groups of audiences within Mongolia: 1) youth; 2) government entities; 3) private and civic sectors; and 4) military and law enforcement agencies. These audience groups are described in the following sections.

A. YOUTH

The Mongolian population trends younger. As of 2019, “the proportion of children, adolescents and young adults was 35 percent.”²⁸ As the future of Mongolia, the youth’s social and psychological resilience education is a crucial part of comprehensive defense policy. Research suggests “Mongolian youth spend an average of 5–6 hours every day on social media,”²⁹ making them especially vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. Therefore, investing in digital literacy programs is key.

Like other successful digital literacy efforts, it is critical to educate youth “to explore digital safety, digital privacy, digital presence, online communication.”³⁰ Notably, Finland and Taiwan have focused on media literacy for youth, and the primary education system in those countries includes relevant training on media literacy. These efforts include the Taiwanese *Curriculum Guidelines of 12-Year Basic Education* (since 2014), which teaches students “to effectively use technology, information, and media of all types, develop competencies related to ethics and media literacy, and develop the ability to analyze, speculate about, and criticize human’s relationships with technology,

²⁷ Mantas, “The Mongolian Fact Checking Center.”

²⁸ “Youth in Mongolia,” *Amicus Travel* (blog), August 13, 2019, <https://www.amicusmongolia.com/youth-in-mongolia.html>.

²⁹ “Сошиал медиа хэрэглээ Монголд,” [Social media usage in Mongolia], Digital and Inbound Marketing Agency, January 2020, <https://dima.mn/2020/01/14/сошиал-медиа-хэрэглээ-монголд/>

³⁰ “Digital Literacy Essentials,” Boys & Girls Clubs of America, accessed November 16, 2021. <https://www.bgca.org/programs/education/digital-literacy-essentials>.

information, and media.”³¹ In a 2019 study of Europe, Finland ranked first in media literacy.³² Mongolian primary schools, and even more importantly, Mongolian universities and colleges did not have this kind of program in their curriculums until most recently. Hence, many youths have become victims of misinformation and crimes on social media due to a lack of media literacy educations.

Out of necessity, the Mongolian National Police has conducted a nationwide campaign called the “unfriend” movement on Facebook to protect teenagers from cybercrimes and abuses. As a result, parents strengthened control over children’s use of social media, and the campaign urged social media users to prevent potential risks. Thus, it is considered an effective campaign oriented not only to improving teenagers’ media literacy but also that of most Mongolians who have now obtained basic knowledge about the risks associated with social media platforms.

Mongolian youth are the driving force of next generation; thus, they should have comprehensive and solid education on psychological resilience. To start with, media literacy education should begin in secondary schools for teens and those education programs can be designed and delivered in conjunction with expert NGOs. For example, the Mongolian Fact-Checking Center could cooperate with schools and expand their practice across Mongolia. What is more, the governmental and non-governmental organizations can engage with teenagers in boy scouts, sport communities, clubs for life skills, science and health associations, and book clubs regarding how to spot fake news on social media platforms. For instance, Lut-Ochir Vanganjil is an active member of the National Network for Media and Information Literacy in Mongolia and is enthusiastic about sharing the critical use of media and information among children and youths. “Together with his colleagues and fellow members of the national network, Lutaa produced and disseminated 17 video tutorials in 2020, to provide knowledge on essential topics related to access to information, critical and responsible use of information, as well

³¹ Ministry of Education, “Curriculum Guidelines of 12-Year Basic Education” (official government training curriculum, Taipei, November 2014), 8.

³² Open Society Institute Sofia, “Finding of the Media Literacy Index 2019: Just Think about It,” November 2019, <https://osis.bg/?p=3356&lang=en>.

as evaluation of information.”³³ His initiative was supported by UNESCO and made significant progress in the last two years in Mongolia.

In addition, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Communications and Information Technology Authority (CITA), and ‘Faro Foundation Mongolia’ (an NGO) agreed to jointly organize in collaboration with Facebook a series of webinars, training, and content on digital literacy, and involve 10,000 people in 2021. The program is labeled “We Think Digital Mongolia” and “aims to teach people how to navigate their privileges and obligations in today’s evolving digital space, how they should decipher and share information online, and most importantly, how they should interact with other people in online communities.”³⁴

B. GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

The Government of Mongolia’s five-year mission to build a digital nation is worth noting. A digital nation’s mission objectives are to enhance the information technology (IT) industry and digital literacy, as well as highlight personal data protection and cybersecurity issues. For instance, “to support the Government of Mongolia’s commitment to become a digital nation, the Accelerator Lab is working with the Communication and Information Technology Authority to develop a National Program on supporting the digital skills and education.”³⁵ Nevertheless, this program “focuses on specific activities to improve the digital access, fill in the digital literacy gaps of the vulnerable groups including people with disabilities, elderly, rural and low-income households”,³⁶ it’s a good start.

At present, the Government of Mongolia does not have an agency or organization to address damaging misinformation or disinformation such as the Taiwanese

³³ “Lutaa’s Journey for Media and Information Literacy in Mongolia,” UNESCO, May 2021. <https://en.unesco.org/news/lutaas-journey-media-and-information-literacy-mongolia>.

³⁴ “Facebook Launches ‘We Think’ Digital Program in Mongolia to Cultivate Responsible Digital Citizens,” News.mn, April 2021, <https://news.mn/en/795665/>.

³⁵ “Bridging the Digital Divide in Mongolia,” UNDP Mongolia’s Accelerator Lat Team, April 2021, <https://www.mn.undp.org/content/mongolia/en/home/blog/2021/bridging-the-digital-divide-in-mongolia.html>.

³⁶ “Bridging the Digital Divide in Mongolia.”

Disinformation Coordination Team, whose mission “includes drafting policies, interacting with major social media platforms, and leading interagency discussion such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the National Communication Commission, to name a few.”³⁷ Dulamkhorloo Baatar, founder and editor-in-chief of the Mongolian Fact-Checking Center has mentioned that “we don’t have a Mongolian word for (misinformation), and when you mistranslate that, it has a negative impact on the awareness-raising we’re trying to do.”³⁸

The Government of Mongolia is establishing the Ministry of Cyber and Cyber Academia in Mongolia in 2022 to educate and train personnel of the national agencies and civic organizations as well as citizens. That effort is needed to bolster agencies’ interoperability, especially for the subject of social resilience. This challenging effort is made even more difficult by a disengagement between the experts and policymakers who develop nationwide projects and programs. According to the study “Assessing E-Resilience in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia,” “in the case of Mongolia, expanded investments and support for fixed broadband may be required to achieve advanced e-resilience and e-readiness of terrestrial networks.”³⁹ The assessment goes further by suggesting “policymakers can consider the following factors: policy regime; regulatory framework; regular trainings for experts; national projects; funding system; and public events or campaign.”⁴⁰ Compared with other government entities of Mongolia, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs pay more attention to national and social resilience nationwide. Thus, those two ministries might be good choices to lead social resilience education programs, along with other government agencies in Mongolia. As the NATO CDH emphasized, “education programs are not intended to simply inform decisions or encourage support, but instead to impart

³⁷ Shih-Shiuan Kao, *Taiwan’s Response to Disinformation: A Model for Coordination to Counter a Complicated Threat*, NBR Special Report no. 93 (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2021), 5.

³⁸ Mantas, “The Mongolian Fact Checking Center.”

³⁹ Aida Karashanova and Elena Dyaknova, “Assessing E-Resilience in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia,” (Working paper, Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway Series no. 03, 2021), 20.

⁴⁰ Karashanova and Dyaknova, “Assessing E-Resilience in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia,” 27.

knowledge that stakeholders can translate into tangible skills and action.”⁴¹ Furthermore, education programs can take the form of situation-based table-top exercises, open seminars with foreign experts, and subject-matter expert exchange programs with other nations. Table-top exercises may sound like a military method, but exercises can be one of the efficient educational program formats for civilian participants who do not already have national level resilience. “Table-top exercises are discussion-based sessions where team members meet in an informal, classroom setting to discuss their roles during an emergency and their responses to a particular emergency situation.”⁴² Also, those exercises are low-cost but highly effective for assessing emergency plans, responses, and more importantly, clarifying roles and responsibilities for other civilian government entities. For example, “Gobi Wolf,” the disaster management table-top exercise, is “aimed at enhancing abilities to respond and recover from emergency situations, disasters and hazards that occur in Mongolia, training corresponding disaster and emergency personnel and sharing experiences with experts of other countries.”⁴³ The main purpose of this exercise was a wider understanding of the concept of crisis management by all agencies and organizations across all levels of government.

C. PRIVATE AND CIVIC SECTORS

As the NATO’s CDH stressed, “achieving military and civil preparedness in comprehensive defense requires close collaboration across all sectors of society.”⁴⁴ Furthermore, “the majority of the population is contained in the two non-governmental categories, the private and civic sectors, sometimes referred to as the 98% of society.”⁴⁵ After the Warsaw Summit of 2016, NATO member states decided “civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective

⁴¹ NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook, 27.

⁴² “Exercises,” Ready, last updated October 12, 2021, <https://www.ready.gov/exercises>.

⁴³ “Mongolia-U.S. Joint Disaster Management Exercise ‘Gobi Wolf-2019’ Underway,” Montsame, September 16, 2019, <https://montsame.mn/en/read/20077>.

⁴⁴ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 20.

⁴⁵ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 11.

defense.”⁴⁶ Accordingly, NATO military forces count on civilian assets such as transportation and communications in peacetime and crises situations. Those actions will strengthen collaboration between civil-military and civic-government relationships. Although Mongolia is not a member of NATO, civil preparedness is the main contributor in matters of national resilience even in non-member countries. In this regard, “a renewed effort to broaden and strengthen pro-democratic values and civic education through a range of educational and other civil society organizations is necessary.”⁴⁷

The government’s effort to strengthen social resilience across the nation has mostly failed the emerging civic-government partnership. On top of that, institutionalized collaboration among the government entities, civic organizations, and the private sector is not fully functional in Mongolia. Compared to other countries, the inadequate civic-government partnership was exposed more than ever during the COVID-19 pandemic in Mongolia. As a result, some civilian NGOs refused to support the government enforcement of vaccinations, and similarly, many private companies went out of business due to the lack of government support for them. In general, the Government of Mongolia is losing the trust of people in all sectors.

It should be emphasized that educating every member of society for whole-of-society defense policies in democratic countries is often difficult to accomplish. More precisely, “with the exception of conscription, members of the private and civic sectors cannot be compelled to participate in defense training beyond that which is included in the nation’s public education curriculum or laws governing business.”⁴⁸ Under such conditions, it is important to consider using all possible education delivery programs to reach the civic and private sectors. In fact, “the civic sector will decide what course the nation follow”;⁴⁹ thus, “they can communicate their position explicitly, through various

⁴⁶ “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO, July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

⁴⁷ J.D. Maddox, Casi Gentzel, and Adela Levis, *Toward a Whole-of-Society Framework for Countering Disinformation* (New York: Modern War Institute at West Point, October 2021), <https://mwi.usma.edu/toward-a-whole-of-society-framework-for-countering-disinformation/>.

⁴⁸ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, 51.

⁴⁹ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 102.

formal mechanisms, or implicitly by demonstrating disinterest.”⁵⁰ Consequently, a strong partnership with the civic sector is a key factor in building psychological resilience.

A “civic-government partnership” could be designed for social resilience as follows. First, enhance or promote civic sectors nationwide, including NGOs such as Mongolian Fact-Checking Center (MFC). Even though the Government of Mongolia cannot afford to provide this kind of support and promotion of policies for civic organizations at this moment, it can be one of the areas for collaboration between the government and civic sectors in coming years. For instance, the Communication and Information Technology Authority (CITA) is the regulatory agency of the Government of Mongolia, and the organization itself can enhance and promote any digital literacy education programs in the civic sector. More specifically, CITA can support Mongolian Fact-Checking Center activities on behalf of the government and help expand their practice across the country. According to the MFC, they “train some of Mongolia’s 500 media organizations in basic fact-checking”⁵¹ by themselves, and if CITA supports it, those numbers could be doubled. In addition, International Fact-Checking Network certification will enable MFC to team up with social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter so MFC could work as a bridge between the government and those social media platforms. Nevertheless, collaboration with social media platforms has limitations, and it requires a certain degree of cooperation. According to experts, the Taiwanese Fact-Checking Center is regarded as a pioneer center among other nations. Dr. Yuan-Hui Hu, one of its founders, describes its purpose in these terms: “we are not asking a platform to act as the ‘arbiter of truth’ who ‘controls the content of speech’ but rather to be a ‘basic online garbage janitor’ who cleans up harmful contents.”⁵²

Taking everything into consideration, if the government takes steps to enhance and promote the private and civic sectors, it does not mean they work as the government’s mouthpiece. In terms of enhancing and promoting the civic sector, the

⁵⁰ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 102.

⁵¹ Mantas, “The Mongolian Fact Checking Center.”

⁵² Kao, “Taiwan’s Response to Disinformation: A Model for Coordination to Counter a Complicated Threat,” 15.

government would make certain decisions/policies to promote the civic sector and support it in all means, while the civic sector maintains its distance from the government and works independent of the government. For instance, the Mongolian NGO law promulgated in 1997 defined NGOs as “not-for-profit, self-governing organizations operating independently from the state and established voluntarily by citizens or by legal persons other than state legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, on the basis of their individual or social interests and opinions.”⁵³ This law focuses on the legal status and the activities of NGOs. But the law itself does not include government support for and cooperation with NGOs. Hence, Mongolian laws and policies regarding the civic and private sectors need to be updated and streamlined, but not at the expense of ensuring the essential freedoms of assembly and open expression.

Second, the government needs to design and promote intensive educational programs on social resilience for NGOs, clubs, civic groups, and private companies. Those programs must focus nationwide, with particular attention on emerging civil societies and private companies and must be conducted by either governmental (such as CITA) or non-governmental organizations (for instance, the MFC). There have been many civil society organizations such as NGOs, clubs, and community groups in Mongolia, not all of them have worked actively. For example, the most well-known and active NGOs are the Mongolian Youth Federation, the Mongolian Women’s Federation, the Mongolian Elders Association, the Mongolian National Federation of Disabled People’s Organizations, and the Mongolian National Olympic Committee, etc. In general, those NGOs have higher capital, human resources, and also have networks of offices nationwide. Therefore, intensive educational programs need to develop and adjust with those civic organizations. When it comes to the private sector, the economy of Mongolia is attached to agriculture, mining, and construction. Therefore, these areas are considered as the most prominent and influential among other private industries. In fact, “opinions and interests will vary widely among members of the private sectors.”⁵⁴ So, social

⁵³ “Төрийн бус байгууллагын тухай” Монгол Улсын хууль, [Non-Governmental Organization Law], The State Great Khural - Parliament of Mongolia, January 31, 1997, <https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail/494>.

⁵⁴ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, 103.

resilience education “cannot be tailored to every company, or even every type of company, but as many interests as possible should be accounted for when seeking support.”⁵⁵ Finally, education programs for the civic and private sectors are most important because “the social and psychological pillar within the comprehensive defense framework further reinforces social harmony and civic responsibility.”⁵⁶

D. MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

While the Armed Forces of Mongolia enhances defense force readiness, it fails to deal with unconventional or hybrid warfare from external sources, namely in the information and cyber domain. The Government of Mongolia has passed the bill for the establishment of Cyber and Special Forces Command in 2020, through which the Cyber command would deal with all kinds of cyber issues including disinformation and misinformation. But the command is only dedicated to Armed Forces (conventional and special forces) service members. Therefore, psychological resilience education programs can be situation-based table-top exercises, open seminars that involve other law enforcement agencies such as Border troops, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Police and Intelligence services, and subject-matter expert exchange programs with other nations. Compared to civilians, uniformed service members have established many regulations, norms, and codes of conduct related to social media or information exchange in the digital domain. Consequently, their education programs should focus more on security awareness regarding disinformation, weaponized information, subjects of cyber and operation security.

⁵⁵ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 103.

⁵⁶ NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 102.

IV. INFORMATION

Social media has created a historical shift from the historically powerful to the historically powerless. Now everyone has a voice.

—Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg

A. SOCIAL MEDIA VULNERABILITIES

As the nature of modern warfare changes, so too does the way nations strategize and operate across the spectrum of conflict and competition. This has become increasingly complex in the present information era where we continue to see rapid technological developments in the information warfare space. In the case of Mongolia, the two powerful states on its northern and southern borders are highly advanced actors in the area of social media capability. As a result, Mongolia is technically highly vulnerable to coercive influence. However, for over a hundred years, in its role as a geographic buffer state, Mongolia has served a very useful purpose for both Russia and China. Mongolia does not threaten its neighbors and generally pursues a policy of neutrality. However, as China's power increases, and tensions between Russia and the West rise, it is a prudent policy for Mongolia to strengthen its resilience to malign influence from other actors in cyberspace.

Freedom of information is a foundational principle in democratic societies. Like other democratic countries, the Government of Mongolia does not control its domestic information environment. It upholds the principles of information freedom. Indeed, Mongolian national security policies encourage the “continuity of the Mongolian state governance and national unity, support for political parties, civil society, free press and media, individual liberties as well as safeguarding public order and social stability.”⁵⁷ While it is a valuable democratic freedom, by promoting inclusive individual liberties,

⁵⁷ “National Security Concept of Mongolia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, (November 2015) <https://mfa.gov.mn/en/documentation/55280/>.

“democracies are more vulnerable to weaponized information,”⁵⁸ which is defined as “a message or content piece that is designed to affect the recipient’s perception about something or someone in a way that is not warranted.”⁵⁹ Of note, not all the weaponized information is false. Some information can be true, but the timing of release or targeting of people can be harmful. For instance, a 13-year-old Mongolian girl who was studying in a high school in South Korea was beaten for six hours by four Korean female high school students, forced to drink alcohol, and locked in a room. “Two of the assailants were handed over to the prosecution on charges of gang violence, but the others were juveniles ... under the age of 14; therefore, they escaped criminal punishment.”⁶⁰ The incident happened in July 2021 in South Korea, but the news reached Mongolia in late November 2021 and triggered a mass anti-Korean movement on social media. This incident also garnered misinformation on Facebook—a fake picture of the Mongolian girl was shared by 200,000 people and had over a million views.

⁵⁸ Nicholas J. Kane, “Defense against Weaponized Information: A Human Problem, Not Just a Technical One,” *InterAgency Journal* 10, no. 3 (2019): 58.

⁵⁹ “Weaponization of Information,” European Center for Populism Studies. (August 2017), <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/weaponization-of-information/>.

⁶⁰ “Four Teenage Girls Assaulted a Mongolian Girl for Six Hours with Her Hands and Legs Tied up,” Allkpop, November 2021, <https://www.allkpop.com/article/2021/12/tw-cw-four-teenage-girls-assaulted-a-mongolian-girl-for-six-hours-with-her-hands-and-legs-tied-up>.



Figure 1. Example of Misinformation, a Fake Picture of Mongolian Allegedly Victimized in South Korea in 2021.⁶¹

In reality, the girl in the picture is not a victim in South Korea; this fake picture was created by someone intentionally. Nevertheless, this misinformation strengthened the spread of the news all over Mongolia. As a result, the mass response on social media impacted South Korea and Mongolian diplomatic ties and prompted national government-level discussion. The incident serves as a powerful example of how social media news significantly influenced the Mongolian population nationwide.

B. EXISTING POLITICAL DEBATES

Though Mongolia enjoys a democratic system of governance, this system does not work as smoothly in Mongolia as it does in other democratic countries. Part of the reason for this is historical. After a bloodless revolution in 1990, multiple parties entered the Mongolian political system, but only the two dominant parties debated with each other in the last 30 years. The Mongolian People's Party (MPP, left-wing) and

⁶¹ Source: "Mongolian Victim Was Beaten for 6 hours, but the Other Side Was Denied and Tried to Evade Punishment," *Monopolnews*, accessed November 28, 2021, <https://monopolnews.com/5230/>.

Democratic Party (DP, right-wing) are the two powerful political parties that hold influence nationwide, usually holding power alternately at government and parliament levels. Moreover, the Mongolian people's voting tendencies are not stable in each election session; political support tends to shift between the two parties. For instance, in the last parliamentary election (2020), the MPP won 62 out of 76 seats in parliament,⁶² and with the large majority of parliament, MPP determines the government policies. Then again, Mongolian people were divided into two groups as usual—supporters and opponents of the government. There is no doubt that this kind of existing political debate will continue as long as two dominant parties hold so much influence over the Mongolian population. To sum up, the relentless political division negatively impacts the information environment undesirably. This strong rivalry influences the press and social media, and some politicians use these avenues as weapons to influence to the mass population.

C. PRESS

After the successful establishment of a democratic system in Mongolia in 1990, freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed in the national constitution. Consequently, enhancing the independence and diversity of the media, educating the professionals, and fact-checking the press are a particularly crucial priority to Mongolia. Domestic press organizations play significant roles in social and psychological resilience. Namely, it is essential to any nation to “promote journalistic standards to safeguard independent, fact-based, investigative journalism and establish and bolster fact-checking standards and norms.”⁶³

At this time, Mongolia, as a small nation has over 500 officially registered press organizations, and Mongolia was ranked 68th out of 180 countries in the Reporters

⁶² Wikipedia, s.v. “2020 Mongolian legislative election,” last modified February 14, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Mongolian_legislative_election

⁶³ Maddox, Gentzel, and Levis, “Toward a Whole-of-Society Framework for Countering Disinformation.”

without Borders’ “2021 World Press Freedom Index.”⁶⁴ Based on the Resistance Operating Concept, one promising way to counter misleading information and external influences while building psychological resilience is by a “public diplomacy campaign using truthful and independent media.”⁶⁵ Reliable media sources can clarify current concerns and expose issues while bolstering national psychological resilience.

Compared to other countries in the region, Mongolia has some minor issues with the press. Essentially, the Mongolian press is inadequate on fact-checking or verification of any information. Thus, media or press may amplify misleading information such as disinformation (which represents “deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead”⁶⁶), misinformation (“false or misleading information spread without the intention to deceive”⁶⁷), and fake news. For example, the press provided misinformation when Mongolian peacekeepers returned from a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan in late November 2021. Specifically, some press outlets titled the news as “Mongolian peacekeepers come from South Africa,” which caused mass panic and fear on social media due to South Africa’s noticeable new Covid-19 (omicron) cases just discovered at the same time. Consider another example of the press disinforming the public through Mongol TV. They distributed fake news regarding McDonald’s opening a branch in the country in 2013 even though there had not been any discussion about McDonald’s opening a branch in Mongolia, and it never did. The planted disinformation was picked up and disseminated by nine major media outlets due to payments they received, and none of them verified the information for themselves. Nomin Chinbat (at present, the Minister of Culture), head of

⁶⁴ “2021 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters without Borders, accessed November 29, 2021, <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>.

⁶⁵ Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 196.

⁶⁶ “NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation: A Focus on COVID-19,” NATO, July 2020, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm>.

⁶⁷ Thomas Colley, Francesca Granelli, and Jente Althuis. “Disinformation’s Societal Impact: Britain, Covid, and Beyond,” *Defence Strategic Communications* (July 2020). <https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/disinformations-societal-impact-britain-covid-and-beyond/36>.

Mongol TV, emphasizes “They won’t check the facts, they’ll just be interested in getting paid to run the story.”⁶⁸

D. COUNTERMEASURES AND MONGOLIAN EXPOSURES

There are those who argue that “false news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it.”⁶⁹ In practice, the misleading information spreads throughout social media, which is then amplified by unknowing digital participants and popular social influencers who do not check the validity of the news. This kind of misleading information threatens one of the pillars of comprehensive defense: social and psychological resilience.

To mitigate this threat, some Western countries have developed approaches to counter misleading information. First, some NATO member states have adopted laws within their legal framework and set up countermeasures to address the spread of misleading information. For example, Germany adopted the Network Enforcement Act in 2017 which made “more than two million users liable for fines of up to €50 million for the failure to delete ‘obviously illegal’ content within 24 hours of its publication.”⁷⁰ According to experts, effective building of resilience is not only focused on digital literacy, but also to “continue to pursue policy and regulation of the commercial sector with regard to protection of citizens’ privacy.”⁷¹

Currently, Mongolia has not adopted laws or regulations to guard against misleading information, except one part of the criminal law of Mongolia emphasizes the penalty of spreading fake information. The legal penalty for spreading fake information is not robust enough. It is worth mentioning the law itself does not define the term “fake information” and does not classify misleading information such as disinformation and

⁶⁸ Gavin J. Blair, “Mongolian TV Network Exposes Media Corruption with Fake Story about McDonald’s,” *The Hollywood Reporter*, December 2013, <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/mongolian-tv-network-exposes-media-665859/>.

⁶⁹ Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” *Science* 359, no. 6380 (2018): 1146.

⁷⁰ Sanchez, Bolstering the Democracy Resilience of the Alliance against Disinformation and Propaganda, 9.

⁷¹ Kane, “Defense against Weaponized Information: A Human Problem, Not Just a Technical One,” 60.

misinformation. In addition, the law itself does not address overseas hostile information activities. While the digital nation is appealing in Mongolia, it is also important to bolster the legal bases against spreading misleading and other malicious information. In addition, national law enforcement agencies should “strive to regain and retain the initiative in the information environment”⁷² to maintain the national society’s stability.

Adopting domestic laws and regulations against the dissemination of misleading information is not generally accepted in Western countries due to freedom of expression, yet some democratic nations are shifting in this direction. For instance, the Latvian Ministry of Culture has initiated financial support (since 2017) for “investigative journalism, deconstruction of lies, development of media literacy, media criticism, support for regional media, and a communication campaign called ‘Media are not comedy’ against the dissemination of disinformation.”⁷³ These two approaches of Western countries to stop the spread of misleading information illustrate efforts that Mongolia could adopt to address its vulnerabilities in the information environment.

E. CIVIC-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP ON INFORMATION

No single press organization and no simple solution can counter misleading information, and no country is immune from it. Like civic or private organizations, the press organizations prefer to keep a distance from government agencies to maintain their independence. Possibly the best way to understand the need for a whole-of-society framework for countering misleading information today is by understanding the cooperation and collaboration of governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well private and civic ones. Then, the Government of Mongolia should cooperate or collaborate with press organizations to combat misleading information by employing supportive policies or providing financial support. Like Latvia, the Mongolian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture can promote and offer professional educational programs to journalists, focusing specifically on fact-checking information. In addition,

⁷² Kane, 60.

⁷³ Klinta Ločmele, “Media literacy in Latvia: The Ministry of Culture’s 6 strands,” *Media and Learning* (January 2019), <https://media-and-learning.eu/type/featured-articles/media-literacy-in-latvia-the-ministry-of-cultures-6-strands/>.

government entities should only work on the development of professionals and should not curtail the freedom of expression and the independence of media.

Regarding the press-government relationship that usually does not work smoothly in any country, the Mongolian Press Institute is among the most important. The Press Institute has been “the leading non-government organization to work with journalists and media users to enhance the skills and knowledge of media in society and as a result, has contributed to the vibrant political, social and economic debate that exists in the public today.”⁷⁴ Also, the Press Institute enjoys a successful collaboration with several international press and aid organizations, so the institute can bring experts from overseas to advise on how to combat misleading information. If the Government of Mongolia can establish a civic-government partnership with the Press Institute of Mongolia effectively, then the institute could work as a bridge between the government and Mongolia’s press organizations. On the other hand, the Government of Mongolia can support and fund the creation of civic society organizations which counter misleading information through efforts like the Estonian website ‘*propastop*’ or the Ukrainian website StopFake.

Based on open-source information, there is no evidence of a direct external threat operating in the Mongolian information environment, but information campaigns are happening overseas that could threaten Mongolia’s information environment in the future. Mongolia has successfully walked tightrope for many years between its two powerful neighbors. It must continue to do so if it wishes to maintain its sovereignty. On one hand, Mongolia might benefit from increased Russian and Chinese economic and political ties by serving as a geographic transit sight for resources, goods and services between the two countries. However, greater involvement also comes with great risk. Mongolia can help mitigate that risk by enhancing the psychological resiliency of its population in the infosphere.

⁷⁴ “Press Institute of Mongolia,” Devex, accessed November 29, 2021, <https://www.devex.com/organizations/press-institute-of-mongolia-77781>.

V. SOCIAL INCLUSION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

Inclusion is not a matter of political correctness. It is the key to growth.

—Jesse Jackson

A. WHAT IS SOCIAL INCLUSION?

The concept of social inclusion is generally described as a society for all. The Government of Mongolia defines social inclusion as “expansion and creation of an equal access and opportunity to those disadvantaged social groups, especially individuals based on low income, age, gender, disability, ethnic minority, sexuality and geographical location who have limited access to social services and participation.”⁷⁵ There is a common understanding that social inclusion is only related to individuals with disabilities or from ethnic or sexual minorities. Against this backdrop, social inclusion is simply defined as “the process of improving the terms of participation in society.”⁷⁶ Thus, this research focuses on social inclusion that fosters youth participation in the whole of society. Greater social inclusion is critical to fostering resilience.

B. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Mongolian youth are the future of Mongolia’s existence in the Russian and Chinese geopolitical environment, and their participation in the whole of society is crucial. Under many circumstances, Mongolian youth (people aged 18–29 years) suffers from a series of problems such as unemployment, low incomes, and the breakdown of family in a rapidly modernizing society. For instance, the Mongolian youth unemployment rate has reached “43,5 percent among all unemployed,”⁷⁷ and since 2020

⁷⁵ “Analysis of Social Inclusion and Gender Dynamic for REDD+ in Mongolia,” UN-REDD Mongolia National Programme, July 2017, 12.

⁷⁶ *Leaving No One Behind: The Imperative of Inclusive Development, Report on the World Social Situation 2016*, Report No. ST/ESA/362 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016), 17.

⁷⁷ Otgontugs Bayasgalan, “COVID-19 and Unemployment of the Youth,” *Ikon*, February 9, 2021, <https://ikon.mn/opinion/24i7>.

it has been constantly increasing due to the COVID-19 induced economic crises. Therefore, the livelihood of many Mongolian young people depends on their parents' and grandparents' pension and other welfare assistance from the government. There are many reasons for youth unemployment such as "a lack of information on vacancies and requirements, high demands for collateral in employment contracts from some employers, and discrimination based on sex and age."⁷⁸ Moreover, youth unemployment renders the country "vulnerable to economic stresses, uninspired, and unable to innovate and contribute to Mongolia's economic growth."⁷⁹ Besides, the mass migration of youth from rural areas to urban areas (particularly to Ulaanbaatar city) is increasing as young people seek education and employment. Those young people who migrate from rural areas are compelled "to reside on the outskirts of the city in ger district, where poor service delivery contributes to air pollution, health problems, as well as high rates of alcoholism and gender-based violence."⁸⁰ These issues make young people disadvantaged group in society, and Mongolian youth are at risk of living lives of continued poverty and social exclusion. This factor undermines resilience and creates vulnerabilities for and comprehensive defense posture.

C. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT EFFORTS?

Many countries have a specific policy on their youth's social inclusion. It is essential to develop the younger generation to be independent by including their participation in decision-making processes at all levels of government with a positive mindset. Such policies focus on developing young people, educating them, providing them with a safe environment to live and work in, and ensuring healthcare wherever they may reside in urban or rural areas. In the context of burgeoning youth unemployment, the Government of Mongolia proposed various policies to target young people for employment, vocational-training programs, and enhancing employment information exchange programs. For example, the National Programme on Promotion of Youth

⁷⁸ Mercy Corps, *Mongolia Strategic Resilience Assessment, Final Report* (Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, April 2017), 32.

⁷⁹ Mercy Corps, 39.

⁸⁰ Mercy Corps, 50.

Development promotes “basic training in business, management, marketing, legal and financial skills for youth and increasing the awareness of youth business incubation services.”⁸¹ This program does not only target government programs for the young but also includes policies for the private and civic sector organizations that employ youths.

Nevertheless, those policies are not addressing psychological and social factors in a manner similar to the European Union (EU). In late 2018 The Council of the European Union passed the resolution for “The EU Youth Strategy 2019–2027.” It promotes youth contribution in the democratic life. For example, the EU’s Youth Strategy offers “new tools for mutual learning, such as peer reviews and peer counseling, high-level forums, analysis, and studies, following the priorities of the EU Youth Strategy at large.”⁸² Also, the strategy captured most of the key issues for youth, and the strategy itself emphasizes “positive change inspired by EU values and a European identity.”⁸³ However, Mongolia has also taken action., The State Great Khural of Mongolia (parliament) implemented the “Vision-2050” long-term development policy of Mongolia in 2020. The policy itself fosters national identity, preserves traditional language and scripts, and acknowledges nomadic civilization as part of the national identity among the youth. A unified national identity is the foundation of social and psychological resilience. Without it, no comprehensive defense strategy can survive for long.

1. National Identity and Shared National Values

Why is national identity so important? David W. Johnson, of the Cooperative Learning Center at the University of Minnesota, stresses “a national identity unites and builds a bond among all members of the society.”⁸⁴ Hence, the participation of youth in nation-building or decision-making processes is important to any nation. The Mongolian policy document “Vision-2050” emphasizes the need to “educate the entire population

⁸¹ “Youth Employment Policy Summary for Mongolia,” International Labour Organization, December 2016, https://www.ilo.org/asia/publications/WCMS_536713/lang--en/index.htm.

⁸² “The European Union Youth Strategy 2019–2027,” Resolution of the Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council on a framework for European cooperation in the youth field: 2018/C 456/01, December 18, 2018, 6.

⁸³ “The European Union Youth Strategy 2019–2027,” 4.

⁸⁴ Lybi Ma, “Need for a National Identity,” *Psychology Today*, September 2, 2019.

with ‘the mother tongue, the history and the heritage’ based on solid facts, and develop shared values that will be the pillar to build a nation-state with a deep sense of national similarities/differences and resilience.”⁸⁵ As a result, Mongolia would flourish as a nation with a deep-rooted sense of national identity and sharing common values by 2050.

What is Mongolian national identity? This question appeared with Mongolia’s peaceful transition from a socialist to a democratic country, and the question remains unanswered. According to “Vision-2050,” nomadic civilization is considered a part of the Mongolian national identity. Mongolians tried to settle the term “national identity” in many ways, but disputes are still ongoing. Some people argue that “Mongolian Blue Spot” (which refers to the “blue-gray spots and congenital dermal melanocytotic, the marks ... often present at birth but [which] may also appear during the first weeks of life”⁸⁶) is a part of national identity. But Mongolian blue spots do not happen only among Mongols and appear in many nations around the world. As William Bloom, occasional lecturer at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, suggested back in the 1990s, “the mass national public will mobilize when it perceives that national identity is threatened.”⁸⁷ Neither nomadic civilization nor Mongolian blue spot would cause the mass of people to mobilize even if those factors were threatened in Mongolia. On the other hand, it is of primary importance to define the national identities of Mongolia and support them with firm policies such as “Vision-2050.” Furthermore, Mendee Jargalsaikhan points out “accepting as a centerpiece in its national identity democratization, Mongolia has gained geopolitical balance and increased its capacity to affirm its distinctiveness versus China and Russia as well as Central Asian states or former Asian communist states (Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam).”⁸⁸ Dr. Mendee argues that Mongolian democracy is in the ranks of electoral democracies of the world

⁸⁵ The State Great Khural Resolution 52/2020, “Vision-2050 Long-Term Development Policy of Mongolia,” May 13, 2020, 1.

⁸⁶ Jennifer Berry, “Recognizing and Treating Mongolian Blue Spots,” *Medical News Today*, August 21, 2020, <https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/318853>.

⁸⁷ William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 79.

⁸⁸ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, “Democratization, National Identity, and Foreign Policy in Mongolia in 2019,” *The Asan Forum*, June 25, 2019, <https://theasanforum.org/democratization-national-identity-and-foreign-policy-in-mongolia-in-2019/>.

beyond its expansionist neighbors. Against this backdrop, Jargalsaikhan Dambadarjaa (known as Jargal DeFacto), who is an independent economist and media representative of Mongolia, explains “the basic values of the Mongolian society are now democracy, human rights, and freedom.”⁸⁹ Undoubtedly, if either democracy or human rights were threatened or violated in Mongolia, it could cause mass protests.

2. National Language and Script

From a subjective point of view, “national identity is based upon the sentiment of belonging to a specific nation, endowed with its own symbols, traditions, sacred places, ceremonies, heroes, history, culture and territory.”⁹⁰ What this means is that each nation is distinctive in its traditional cultures, history, language, and script. According to the Pew Research Center survey, “language far and away is seen as the most critical to national identity.”⁹¹ Moreover, the survey stressed that “it is very important to speak the native language to be considered a true member of the nation.”⁹² Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes survey, conducted in 2016, involved 14 Western countries. Like other Asian countries, Mongolians are struggling to promote their traditional national language and script since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Mongolian language is part of a family within the Altaic language group and is used not only by Mongolians but also in the autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, the PRC, and the Russian Far East (in particular, among the Buryat and Kalmykia ethnic groups). Mongolia’s long history with its language has never been smooth. Specifically, the traditional Mongolian script (written in vertical lines top-down) faded away, “while under Soviet influence, Mongolia adopted the Cyrillic alphabet in 1941, which it uses to this day.”⁹³ Cyrillic has been the standard script for official communications for decades, and nowadays, the Mongolian national

⁸⁹ Jargalsaikhan Dambadarjaa, “The Vision-2050 Criticism 9: Shared National Values,” *Jargal DeFacto*, May 11, 2020, <https://jargaldefacto.com/article/mongolia-s-national-identity>.

⁹⁰ Montserrat Guibernau, “Nation Formation and National Identity,” *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis [Magazine of Belgian Latest History]*, vol. 4 (April 2004): 658.

⁹¹ Bruce Stokes, “What It Takes to Truly Be ‘One of Us,’” Pew Research Center, February 2017, 9.

⁹² Stokes, 9.

⁹³ Andrew Warner, “Card Game Aims to Revitalize Traditional Mongolian Script,” *Language Magazine*, December 2020, <https://www.languagemagazine.com/2020/12/10/card-game-aims-to-revitalize-traditional-mongolian-script/>.

script has become almost an ancient script. As result, most Mongolians are poor at reading the traditional script, and while the young learn to read and write it in school, it plays only a small part in modern life. In addition, the old script contains many idiosyncratic spellings that varied to make it harder to read and write. For example, the city of Ulaanbaatar is written the same in English, but “the traditional script writes it as Ulaganbagator.”⁹⁴

In 2020, the Government of Mongolia declared “plans to restore the use of its traditional alphabet by 2025, replacing the Cyrillic script adopted under the Soviets,”⁹⁵ following the shift in other Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. To that end, “Vision-2050” confirmed as one of its objectives the need to “incorporate the Mongolian language and script into national values and foster its proficiency and use by every citizen.”⁹⁶ The decision, however, faced much criticism from the population, but young people, especially, are welcoming the change. An incident happened in Inner Mongolia in September 2020 that strengthened the government’s decision in Mongolia. Thousands of ethnic Mongolians protested in Inner Mongolia, which is part of the PRC, against replacing the Mongolian language with Mandarin Chinese in schools. The *Guardian* emphasized “the official explanation for the change to a bilingual education system was to ensure the curriculum and textbooks were of a high standard, and that government documents cited by analysts also referred to President Xi Jinping’s push for shared language as part of a common identity.”⁹⁷ However, the Inner Mongolian objection to the PRC’s proposal triggered social media movements in Mongolia expressing anti-China sentiments and calling to “Save the Mongolian language,” and it also fostered Mongolian youth’s nationalism. Since then, many Mongolians understand why the Mongolian national script is important, and the

⁹⁴ Anand Nyamdavaa, “How Much Can Mongols Read Traditional Script?,” *Mongolia FAQ*, October 2018, <https://mongoliafaq.com/2018/10/26/how-much-can-mongols-read-traditional-script/>.

⁹⁵ Didi Tang, “Mongolia Abandons Soviet Past by Restoring Alphabet,” *The Times*, March 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mongolia-abandons-soviet-past-by-restoring-alphabet-rsvcgqmxid>.

⁹⁶ “Vision-2050 Long-Term Development Policy of Mongolia,” 3.

⁹⁷ Helen Davidson, “Inner Mongolia Protest at China’s Plans to Bring in Mandarin-only Lessons,” *The Guardian*, September 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/01/inner-mongolia-protests-china-mandarin-schools-language>.

Government of Mongolia promotes some policies that focus on boosting traditional literacy among the young. For instance, “Foremost Traditional Script Writers of Mongolia” is a popular contest conducted annually that attracts participants of all ages. Over 1,500 participants sent their works to the annual contest in 2021, and the Minister of Education and Science, Enkh-Amgalan Luvsantseren, participated and delivered remarks at the award ceremony. Mr. Enkh-Amgalan emphasized, “the Mongolian traditional script is a guarantee for national security, and we have an utmost important duty to protect the culture and history written in Mongolian traditional script as a cultural heritage of humankind and to pass it down to the next generation.”⁹⁸ That was an indication of Mongolia’s progress in preserving this area of national identity. This increased interest and involvement in the traditional Mongolian script is a significant potential source of psychological resilience.

3. Mongolia and Nomadic Lifestyles

Nomadism is defined as the “way of life of peoples who do not live continually in the same place but move cyclically or periodically.”⁹⁹ Long after the supremacy of Genghis Khan, nomadism remained a way of life that continues in modern Mongolia as it does in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Nomad ideology has emerged to become “a strong pillar of Mongolian national identity, [and] it has also divided the Mongol population into distinct groups not only within the present borders of Mongolia, but also in the surrounding territories of Central Asia.”¹⁰⁰ Mass migration from rural areas to cities has been increasing since the 1990s due to many reasons, and consequently, one-third of the population now lives in urban areas. In the rural areas, there is little opportunity for economic activities that would maintain a household’s livelihood at a decent level, except for herding. Today, the Mongolians have increasingly adapted to globalized cultures. The youth find these cultures appealing, especially the South Korean or a Western lifestyle,

⁹⁸ “Winners of 25th ‘Foremost Traditional Script Writers of Mongolia’ Awarded,” Montsame, January 2022, <https://www.montsame.mn/en/read/286540>.

⁹⁹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. “nomadism,” April 2016, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/nomadism>.

¹⁰⁰ Zsolt Szilagy, “Lingering Nomad Ideology in 21st Century Mongolia,” *Acta Ethnographica Hungarica: An International Journal of Ethnography* 61, no. 1 (June 2016): 199.

and urban daily life makes the young willing to dispense with nomadic traditions. Moreover, challenges such as climate change and natural threats such as zuds (an extreme winter), drought, dust storms, earthquakes, and fires (forest and steppe) cause young people to leave rural areas. On the other hand, the Mongolian mindset has changed in recent years, and urban life has been viewed as the only way to live in the modern world. In fact, “Mongolian intellectuals for generations have been taught to regard the herders’ life as non-progressive, old-fashioned, even though the repository of Mongolian heritage.”¹⁰¹

Due to air pollution in Ulaanbaatar city and mass migration to an urban area, the Government of Mongolia is making some attempts to develop rural areas and support nomadic lifestyles as part of the national heritage and as a tourist attraction. For example, “Vision-2050” is aiming to position Mongolia to “become a leading country with preserved nomadic civilization, based on national mentality, heritage, culture, and mindset, and centered on the creative Mongolian citizen.”¹⁰² The policy will adapt to the conveniences of modern society while keeping an ancient and fascinating lifestyle alive. Migrating from an urban to a rural area is challenging for young people, and it requires strong motivation. The policy will require significant investment in providing robust support to herders, particularly during harsh winters, connecting the nomadic lifestyle. There have been some cases of young people migrating from “the opposite” direction. For instance, Batbayar “Baavar,” the President of the Mongolian Hip-hop Association, moved to the countryside with his family in 2019, and his family now lives in the northern part of Mongolia. Mr. Baavar once emphasized “Living in the countryside is wonderful and challenging,”¹⁰³ which inspires many young people on social media today.

¹⁰¹ Alicia J. Campi, “Moving Mongolian Nomadism into the 21st century: Cultural and Ecological Preservation Coupled with Economic Vitality and National Security,” Research thesis, (Washington, University of the District of Columbia, 1997), 7.

¹⁰² “Vision-2050 Long-Term Development Policy of Mongolia,” 2.

¹⁰³ А.Цээсүрэн, “Хөдөөний амьдрал дэндүү сайхан бас сонирхолтой” [Living in the countryside is wonderful and challenging], News.mn, January 2022, <https://news.mn/r/2518672/>.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Victory comes from finding opportunities in problems.

—Sun Tzu

The survival of small democratic nations bordered by superpowers requires constant vigilance, especially as the nature of warfare evolves. Warfare is not limited to the physical domain; it increasingly cuts across psychological and social frameworks as well. Mongolian national defense policies have relied on conventional military capacity for decades, but those policies never included psychological and social preparation against any external influences. This thesis has examined three lines of effort to develop and maintain Mongolia's social and psychological resilience capacities as part of its national defense strategy. Notably, Mongolia must sustain and develop strategic partnerships with its neighbors and enhance its military-to-military cooperation.

Building psychological and social resilience is one of the core pillars of NATO's comprehensive defense posture. Comprehensive defense policies have been based on total defense strategies from Western Europe during the Cold War period and have not been tested since then. Many countries such as the Nordic states (Norway, Finland, and Sweden) and Taiwan are currently applying comprehensive defense policies. Those countries have some similarities with Mongolia such as conscription (mandatory military service), small populations, and borders with superpowers and therefore provide useful insights into the development of Mongolia's comprehensive defense strategic efforts.

Mongolia, a small nation, is located in a significant geopolitical environment. Failing to invest in social and psychological resilience now puts Mongolia at risk, as has been observed elsewhere. Consider Kazakhstan's unrest in January 2022 as an example. The International Crisis Group summarizes Kazakhstan unrest as resulting from "economic stagnation, a sharp rise in predatory consumer debt, rising internal migration, the pandemic, increasing protests and widening inequality," which means that "weakened

institutions faced significant tests.”¹⁰⁴ Authorities in Kazakhstan accused protesters of being “terrorists,” “bandits,” and “foreigner mercenaries,” but those claims were not confirmed officially. According to an Al Jazeera interview, “the main group of protesters—young unemployed people from the regions expressing their frustrations against injustice,”¹⁰⁵ were manipulated by social media and social influencers. Those unemployed youth were victims of information and psychological operations, and many of them ended up in prison. A very similar situation arose in Mongolia in 2008, when “police arrested over 700 people on the night of 1 and 2 July,”¹⁰⁶ an action that resulted in the deaths of five young people. In addition, the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict confirms that military objectives aim not only at the military in combat but also at civilians back home. For example, during this conflict, “military propagandists delivered false and demoralizing messages to Ukrainian soldiers at the front and their family members back home via cyber-electromagnetic means.”¹⁰⁷ These incidents demonstrate just how crucial psychological and social resilience is in today’s world.

When it comes to Mongolia, the current defense law states that defense policy relies on the participation of government entities and all citizens. But the law fails to include participants from the private and civic sectors as the asymmetric defense component. This is the gap where Mongolia should understand, and consider, the concept of the NATO CDH by strengthening integrated layered defense policies. It takes time to change conventional defense posture within the whole-of-government approach as a comprehensive defense. A critical first step of this approach is to bolster social and psychological resilience. Thus, the following recommendations could improve and provide support for the psychological resilience of Mongolia.

¹⁰⁴ “Behind the Unrest in Kazakhstan,” International Crisis Group, January 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kazakhstan/behind-unrest-kazakhstan>.

¹⁰⁵ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “Do Kazakhstan’s Protests Signal an End to the Nazarbayev Era?,” Al Jazeera, January 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/11/qa-kazakh-activist-yevgeniy-zhovtis-on-mass-unrest>.

¹⁰⁶ “‘Where Should I Go from Here?’ The Legacy of the 1 July 2008 Riot in Mongolia,” Amnesty International, December 2009, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Aaron F. Brantly, Nerea M. Cal, and Devlin P. Winkelstein, *Defending the Borderland: Ukrainian Military Experiences with IO, Cyber, and EW* (New York: Army Cyber Institute at West Point, December 2017), 28.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

To invest in Mongolia's comprehensive defense strategy, this thesis provides three recommendations for building psychological resilience in Mongolia.

1. A persistent national information campaign, initiated and conducted by the Government of Mongolia in cooperation with civil society and NGOs, would make Mongolians aware of the comprehensive defense concept

Compared to neighboring states, the Mongolian economy, population, and military are relatively small, and there is no direct threat currently. There are, however, many indirect threats that could escalate. For example, a recent case of Beijing's new policy replacing the Mongolian language with the Mandarin Chinese language in Inner Mongolia triggered a protest in Mongolia. The main concern of the Mongol people was "if the traditional written language dies in Inner Mongolia, it would be a massive loss of identity for all the Mongols around the world."¹⁰⁸ As described by the CDH, understanding the strategy is not only for decision-making politicians and military personnel, but requires awareness and participation across all sectors of society. This means that Mongolian citizens should be aware of current and potential future threats to its democratic values.

But the world is changing day by day, and citizens of Mongolia need to be prepared for potential future threats, especially in terms of psychological and social resilience. Today, some malicious acts threaten the safety, security, and sovereignty of superpowers and small nations equally. For example, the Russian disinformation campaign against the U.S. election in 2016 was a significant surprise to the world. That example demonstrates that no country can afford to lack psychological and social resilience in the information era. Such a threat requires that every member of society get a basic knowledge of psychological resilience.

There are already frameworks in place that the Government of Mongolia could adapt for the purpose of education and information. Furthermore, the Government of Mongolia could start by "establishing online and public media-based training and

¹⁰⁸108 "The War You Never Heard of," *Trips@Asia*, (January 2021), accessed on 8 February 2022, <https://www.tripsatasia.com/newsletter-articles/inner-outer-mongolian-language>.

information programs”¹⁰⁹ to promote digital literacy. One example of how this is already being accomplished is Mongolian CITA establishing the “Information Technology Center” in 2022 “to improve citizens’ digital literacy skills and enable youth to have the skills to use modern technologies.”¹¹⁰

Specifically, programs that exist for disaster response and prevention can translate to responses for national security crises. These programs extend nationwide and are not difficult to set up. For example, Sweden’s “If Crisis or War Comes”¹¹¹ contains information about how to respond to natural disasters and malicious acts (such as disinformation, terrorism, physical occupation). Moreover, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has successfully established early warning systems nationwide in Mongolia through the media, internet, national radio, and communication companies to alert the public to potential storms and flooding (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Flood and Storm Warning Information Distribution¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook, 64.

¹¹⁰ Unurzul Majdaa, “Information Technology Center to be Established,” Montsame, November 2021, <https://montsame.mn/en/read/280389>.

¹¹¹ “If Crisis or War Comes,” Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, May 2018, <https://www.msb.se/en/rad-till-privatpersoner/the-brochure-if-crisis-or-war-comes/>.

¹¹² Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, *Mongolia Disaster Management Reference Handbook* (Hickam, Hawaii: Joint Base Pearl Harbor, 2018), 33.

The way information flow is as follows. It begins with Mongolia's National Agency of Meteorology and Environmental Monitoring (NAMEM) and is "disseminated down through the ministries, NEMA, local meteorological offices and through mass media until it makes it was to the herders."¹¹³ This system and structure could also work for disseminating accurate information that may affect national security.

2. A basic education curriculum in elementary and high school should include digital literacy

Section IV of this thesis examined social media vulnerabilities in Mongolia, and these vulnerabilities require a long-term solution. As Section IV mentioned, there is no distinction between "disinformation" and "misinformation" in Mongolia. At this time, Mongolia does not have rock-solid laws or regulations against misleading information or online phishing matters. The misleading information includes not only internal matters in Mongolia, but some information that comes from overseas. Chapters II and III of the thesis covered case studies on misleading information in Mongolia, and it is not going to be stopped in the future.

The Government of Mongolia is enhancing adult education and professional development in certain areas, but this education is not good enough to target the whole of society. Teenagers, youth, and older people are still at risk of being manipulated by misleading information. Therefore, digital or media literacy programs should be included in elementary schools' educational curricula as is done in Taiwan and Finland. In addition, fact-checking norms and digital literacy are essential skills to the student who studies journalists for the press personnel capacity building and professionalism. It's commonly known that media always plays a considerable role in social and psychological resilience. This is not a quick-fix issue but will take some time.

¹¹³ Mongolia Disaster Management Reference Handbook, 33.

3. Mongolia should promote civil society organizations and enhance their capabilities

According to Mercy Corps, “Mongolia’s civil society sector is still small and focuses primarily on environmental and child welfare issues.”¹¹⁴ In fact, civil society organizations are inadequate due to the legal framework that constrains their activities. Furthermore, as Mercy Corps emphasized, “an enabling environment for resilience and development must be supported by citizen demand for good governance through civic engagement and collective action.”¹¹⁵ Consequently, the Government of Mongolia and its entities are hardly influenced by civil society organizations, and NGOs remain out of the circle of political decision-making processes. This is the space for the emerging civic-government partnership, and authorities should adapt proper legal frameworks. For example, the Mongolian Fact-Checking Center can collaborate with the government on media literacy education for the young or effective measures to counter misleading information. The Taiwanese FactCheck Center is considered a model for coordination with the government and to counter disinformation among other centers.

What is more, “targeting civic engagement efforts towards youth will be especially critical, as this helps cultivate a sense of agency and future purpose that underlies resilient individuals and communities.”¹¹⁶ Access to all kinds of information is inadequate, and only civic organizations tend to be effective at reaching and engaging youth. The government’s policies on youth are not always as effective as those of civic organizations, and some countries use this opportunity to promote defense policies in creative ways—for example, the Norwegian NGO People and Defense provides “support for the armed forces and Norwegian defense policies”¹¹⁷ by employing policies aimed at youth. Norwegian practice confirms Mercy Corps’ conclusion that “strengthened social networks have been shown in many contexts to have a multiplier effect on inclusive

¹¹⁴ “Mongolia Strategic Resilience Assessment,” 25.

¹¹⁵ “Mongolia Strategic Resilience Assessment,” 48.

¹¹⁶ “Mongolia Strategic Resilience Assessment,” 48.

¹¹⁷ Nina Graeger, *From ‘Forces for Good’ to ‘Forces for Status’?*, Small States and Status Seeking (New York: Routledge, 2015), 99, 86–108.

decision-making, civic engagement and an overall enabling environment that supports resilience.”¹¹⁸

Similar to Norway, there used to be civic societies in Mongolia that supported the defense force during the Soviet era, called “Community for Defense Support.”¹¹⁹ That community consisted of various sports clubs such as parachuting, shooting, cross-country skiing, and wrestling. Most of the activities were dedicated to youth. The Government of Mongolia can promote such kinds of civic organizations to foster psychological resilience among the youth.

B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Establishing a comprehensive defense is complicated, and it “requires all sectors of society to be capable of integrating into a single, coherent, multi-layered system.”¹²⁰ An example of such a multi-layered system is shown in Figure 3. This thesis outlines education, information, and inclusion efforts to develop psychological resilience, highlighting instruments needed to contribute to comprehensive defense. Furthermore, it identified psychological resilience as a strong foundation for the resistance movement. The outcome of the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine should also be studied closely for potential lessons.

¹¹⁸ “Mongolia Strategic Resilience Assessment,” 49.

¹¹⁹ С.Туул, “Эвлэлээс төв зөвлөл хүрсэн түүх,” [History of the community from council], GoGo.mn, June 2009, <https://gogo.mn/r/55823>.

¹²⁰ Source: NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook, 33.




Figure 3. Integrated Layered Defense¹²¹

Therefore, the thesis focuses on resilience as “the first line of a multi-layered deterrence and response system,”¹²² and primarily aims to strengthen asymmetric defense components. This means the thesis has not discussed the concern of the armed forces and home guards in comprehensive defense policies.

Future research should consider how the inclusion of the Mongolian Armed Forces (particularly the Special Forces Command) and Local Defense Forces (which are equivalent to the Home Guard shown in Figure 3) could contribute to comprehensive defense policies. The latter was established on June 27, 2018, when the Mongolian Parliament passed the law for the “Local Defense Force” (LDF), the purpose of which is to regulate local defense force relations aimed at establishing and strengthening the state defense system. Mongolia’s new LDF is considered to be a paramilitary organization like the Swiss territorial service, Swedish home guard, and the U.S. National Guard. Given its close relationship with local populations, it can be a valuable bridge to the civic sector in developing a comprehensive defense policy.

¹²¹ *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, 33.

¹²² *NATO Comprehensive Defense Handbook*, 34.

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