



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**JAPAN: MAIN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DRIVERS
OF FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES TO U.S.-CHINA
COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

by

Alycia L. Maurer

March 2022

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Covell F. Meyskens
Wade L. Huntley

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2022	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE JAPAN: MAIN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES TO U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Alycia L. Maurer				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) U.S.- Japan n p p n na p n n n a n a a n . a a n Japan p a a n pa n U.S. an na ap a an n p n n a a n a an n n Japan n p n a U.S. an na p p n n n n n. n a n n p n a a a n an Japan a a p n a a n . Japan n a p p n an n a n n a n n an n n an p n n n U.S. pa a n p U.S. a a a p n a n a pa n . Japan p n n a a n n a a n n a p n n n U.S. an na a n p n n .				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Japan, great power competition			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 107	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**JAPAN: MAIN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF
FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES TO U.S.–CHINA COMPETITION IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

Alycia L. Maurer
Lieutenant, United States Navy
BA, Syracuse University, 2016

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EAST ASIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2022**

Approved by: ~~Adviser~~ F. Meyskens

Wade L. Huntley
Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

a n a n an n Japan n
p p n U.S.— na p n n n a n a
a n . a a n Japan
p a a n pa n U.S. an na ap a an n
p n n. n a a n a an
n n Japan n p n a U.S. an na p
p n n n n n. n a
n n n p n
a a a n an Japan a a
p n a a n n . Japan n a p p n an
n a n n a n n n an n n an p n n n
U.S. pa a n p U.S. a a a p n a
n a pa n . Japan p n n a a n n
n a a n n a p n n n U.S. an
na a n p n n .

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	JAPAN IN U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	6
1.	Relations with the U.S.: Precedence in Security	6
2.	Relations with China: Precedence in Economy.....	9
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS	13
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN	14
II.	JAPAN AND THE COLD WAR ERA.....	17
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	17
B.	1945–1959: POSTWAR JAPAN AND COLD WAR START	17
C.	1960–1979: JAPAN’S “ECONOMIC MIRACLE”	22
D.	1980–1991: END OF THE COLD WAR	29
E.	1992–2010: TRANSITION INTO THE LAST DECADE	33
F.	CONCLUSION	37
III.	JAPAN OVER THE LAST DECADE	41
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	41
B.	2011–2013: ABENOMICS AND THE SURGE OF TENSIONS.....	42
C.	2014–2017: JAPAN’S REFOCUS ON THE MILITARY	49
D.	2018–2021: U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR.....	57
E.	CONCLUSION	62
IV.	JAPAN AND THE COLD WAR ERA.....	65
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	65
B.	OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL FINDINGS	65
C.	ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DRIVERS	71
D.	FUTURE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.....	73
	LIST OF REFERENCES	77
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	93

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
GNP	Gross National Product
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPC	Great Power Competition
JA Zenchu	Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
SCS	South China Sea
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first thank Dr. Covell Meyskens for all of his support as my primary thesis advisor through the writing process of this project. All of your guidance allowed me to think through and organize the information presented here far more effectively than I could have ever done on my own. Your knowledge and expertise were evident throughout your comments and critiques of my research findings and I have no doubt you made this thesis better from all of the insight you've provided. Thank you for all of your time and patience with me on this thesis project!

I would also like to thank Dr. Wade Huntley for acting on my behalf as my second reader. Your insight often allowed me to refocus my research towards the thesis topic and your recommendations were always really helpful in steering the direction of my thesis in a more engaging way. I appreciate all of your support!

Thank you to my mother who always had my back and kept encouraging me while I was in school and to my step-father, who has been an inspiration for my career in the Navy.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. JAPAN IN U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis will examine the main security and economic drivers of Japan's foreign policy responses to U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region from the start of the Cold War period to the present. Tokyo is increasingly evaluating its own national security and threat assessments in terms of the growing competition between the U.S. and China for regional economic, political, and military influence. Beijing's assertive posture towards issues surrounding maritime territorial disputes and economic malpractices have increased tensions with Japan for the shape of international order and regional stability.¹ Yet, China also remains the top trading partner for Japan, which complicates Tokyo's efforts to support international norms of openness and a "rules-based international order" that the U.S. leads.²

These norms provide a basis for the U.S. and its allies to find common interests in preserving the status quo but also challenge China's ability to freely grow as a great power if it does not abide by international institutions and recognized law. By promoting "respect for international rule of law, freedom of navigation, and the rejection of coercion to solve interstate disputes," these institutions provide incentives for economic and security cooperation within the region.³ However, China's close economic partners, Japan included, are cautious of alienating Beijing from participation in international or regional

¹ Mira Rapp-Hooper et al., "Responding to China's Complicated Views on International Order," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified October 10, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021>.

² Rapp-Hooper et al., "Responding to China's Complicated Views on International Order."

³ Mireya Solís, "Japan's Democratic Renewal and the Survival of the Liberal Order," Brookings, last modified January 22, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/japans-democratic-renewal-and-the-survival-of-the-liberal-order/>.

institutions over divisive issues, as compared to the U.S. which often relates to its version of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) “in terms of checking China.”⁴

By studying the main drivers of Japan’s foreign policy responses to U.S.-China competition, this thesis will enhance understanding of the principal factors shaping the conduct of one of the U.S.’ most important allies in East Asia. Namely, this thesis will look at Japan’s security and economic ties to both the U.S. and China by conducting a historical review of their relations. Studying history provides the opportunity to observe trends in countries’ behaviors in response to their perceived economic or security environments. This allows analysis to be conducted on the effects of other state actors’ behaviors on the foreign policy decisions of a particular country.

In Japan’s case, changes in its foreign policies have been strongly linked to the activities of the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region and reflect Tokyo’s balance of interests between upholding its alliance with Washington and maintaining its trade relations with Beijing. The U.S. remains determined to uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in the region while China’s concerted efforts to expand its influence through economic, political, and militaristic means increasingly raise concerns by other regional state actors on the potential for conflict.

B. SIGNIFICANCE

This study is relevant in contemporary times as China grows to hold significant leverage over international supply chains and becomes more influential in existing global institutions that have been historically led by U.S. efforts. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and unfair economic practices are backed by its growing military capabilities and economic weight in the region respectively, making it difficult for other countries to counter China’s activities on their own. In the past decade, China has increased its military activities in the SCS to enforce its maritime territorial claims over areas with significant natural resources, to include natural gas and fishing grounds, antagonizing other

⁴ Shin Kawashima, Mataka Kamiya, and James Schoff, “Managing Risks and Opportunities for the U.S.–Japan Alliance Through Coordinated China Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified October 10, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/managing-risks-and-opportunities-for-U.S.–Japan-alliance-through-coordinated-china-policy-pub-80026>.

regional countries in the process.⁵ China has also used its monopolization of its markets as an economic coercive tool against diplomatic incidents counter to its interests.⁶ Beijing's actions have often been at odds with internationally recognized rules of law pertaining to freedom of navigation and increase the risk of conflict in the region.⁷

Japan has historically been reliant on the U.S. for its national security interests and remains concerned about China's growing military capabilities in light of its own restrictions to conduct any military activities beyond constitutional limits of self-defense.⁸ Territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands remain a contentious point with China in particular; however, Japan perceives China's military activities in their entirety as being dangerous to regional peace and stability. Over the past decade, Japan has stepped up efforts to reinterpret its constitution to permit the expansion of its military forces, even as it defines these efforts under the scope of self-defense.⁹ Japan has also responded to China's economic coercive practices by diversifying its markets to become less dependent on its greatest trading partner and less susceptible to China's diplomatic exploitations.¹⁰ Tokyo is now beginning to broaden its own initiatives in an effort to lead the region's economic affairs to counter China's growing influence as well.

The U.S. and Japan today cooperate with each other in both the security and economic realms, although the U.S. now plays a greater role in the former due to historical relations and due to China's massive economic ties to the region. Japan hosts U.S. military

⁵ "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 14, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>.

⁶ Paul Martyn, "Rare Earth Minerals: An End To China's Monopoly Is In Sight," Forbes, last modified June 8, 2012, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/08/rare-earth-mineralsan-end-to-chinas-monopoly-is-in-sight/?sh=1e0ca218532c>.

⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea."

⁸ Kazuhiko Togo, "Abe's foreign policy legacy," East Asia Forum, last modified September 10, 2020, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/10/abes-foreign-policy-legacy/>.

⁹ Togo, "Abe's foreign policy legacy."

¹⁰ James McBride and Beina Xu, "Abenomics and the Japanese Economy," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 23, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/background/abenomics-and-japanese-economy>.

personnel on its territory and assumes its share of the defense burden costs, while the U.S. benefits from the alliance through its strategic position abroad which allows Washington to extend its deterrence capabilities and saves its own costs in doing so.¹¹ The U.S. recognizes Japan as an important strategic ally in preventing China's rise from shifting the balance of power and as a key actor in preserving the peace and stability of the region.¹² Both countries' national strategic policies towards a FOIP have complemented each other with the same goals for the region, although the U.S. has remained more adamant about "containing" China as compared to Japan.¹³

Japan's history offers a unique case study in which the U.S. has long had a significant impact on its domestic affairs and foreign policy decisions. After the end of WWII and during the start of the Cold War period, the U.S. occupied Japan and completely shifted Tokyo's foreign policies. The Japanese government lacked the autonomy to make its own policy decisions without American intervention, which largely focused on the country's democratization and reduction of conventional military forces. Tokyo's constitution garnered a new theme of peace and security cooperation, which has resulted in a pacifist military stance that the country continues to maintain today. China was gradually gaining momentum in its economy's growth and military capabilities during this timeframe, which increasingly concerned Japanese leadership over its own abilities to counter threats coming from Beijing.

In the post-Cold War era, history shows that the U.S. sought the development of international norms and rules to pacify tensions and promote security and economic safeguards that were in line with American interests.¹⁴ In East Asia, China sees this U.S.-

¹¹ Lindsay Maizland and Nathanael Cheng, "The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified November 4, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>.

¹² Lindsey Ford and James Goldgeier, "Retooling America's Alliances to Manage the China Challenge," Brookings, last modified January 25, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/>.

¹³ Nicholas Szechenyi and Yuichi Hosoya, "Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified October 10, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/working-toward-free-and-open-indo-pacific-pub-80023>.

¹⁴ Michael J. Mazarr et al., *Understanding the Current International Order*, RR1598, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 1, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1598.html.

led international order as self-promoting and as a constraining tool against other states' rise that would otherwise threaten U.S. hegemony, giving rise to modern-day great power competition (GPC). While Beijing benefits from the globalization of economic institutions that exist under this order, and at times takes advantage of them, it arbitrarily rejects elements that it sees as either out of line or directly targeting its own national security interests. An example is China's rejection of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea on the basis of territorial sovereignty rulings in the South China Sea, which the U.S. has responded to through freedom-of-navigation operations in the region.¹⁵

Japan is concerned with China's economic and military activities and strives to maintain U.S. relations due to the security guarantees Washington provides. In turn, the alliance with Japan permits U.S. presence within the region and allows the U.S. to continue promoting its national interests in a way that benefits the region as a whole. Without Japan, China would be better positioned to challenge the international norms that allow for openness and rules-based order as both countries could otherwise be too easily coerced by China's economic and military power to prevent the change of a status quo on their own. U.S. relations with Japan provide a counterweight to China's coercive economic practices and provide security guarantees amidst a growing uncertain threat climate. Yet, Japan is also not readily willing to give up relations with their largest trading partner China despite concerns of economic malpractices.

This thesis will elaborate upon the potential areas in which the U.S. can foster its relations with Japan, encourage multilateral cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, and give credibility to options of pressuring or punishing China when it behaves in a way that is not agreeable to our allies. The increasing competition brought about by China's hegemonic rise presents key U.S. allies in the region with an impending ultimatum to choose between Washington or Beijing should conflict ever break out.¹⁶ It is important to understand Japan in this respect so that its concerns can be navigated in such a way that fosters continued

¹⁵ Mazarr et al., *Understanding the Current International Order*, 21.

¹⁶ Andrew Yeo, "South Korea and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified July 20, 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy>.

support for U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific without impeding its own economic growth and other national interests. Finding areas of agreement will allow the U.S. to find common ground in deterring an assertive China, while understanding diverging interests will allow the U.S. to mitigate current policies that lack the means to encourage multilateral cooperation where tensions may otherwise exist.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Major explanations for Japan's foreign policy reactions to U.S.-China GPC are tied primarily to the security and economic considerations of its relations with these great powers following WWII. Under a security-economic nexus, American and Chinese GPC tensions and pressures towards Japan have brought up concerns of imbalances in these relations and stoked fears of future ultimatums on having to choose between the two sides in the event of a conflict. Japan now faces internal debates on the future of its role within the Indo-Pacific region in line with this growing competition and on how Japan should achieve its national interests without relying too heavily on the U.S. and China for its security and economy respectively.

1. Relations with the U.S.: Precedence in Security

At the start of the Cold War period, the U.S. was a massive financial aid provider for Japan's economic revival. Consequently, Japan quickly became heavily dependent for its economy, though this would not necessarily be the case by the end of the Cold War. From 1946–1952, Japan received roughly \$15.2 billion in loans and grants, mostly through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program that organized U.S. aid at the time.¹⁷ U.S. assistance also came in the form of food-related aid because of Japan's war-torn status.¹⁸ The Korean War was additionally a boon on Japan's economy, as Japan's role in providing supplies and allowing the occupancy of U.S. and UN forces in its

¹⁷ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared*, CRS Report No. RL33331 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 2, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf>.

¹⁸ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared*, 2.

territory allowed the country to significantly bolster its economy through natural laws of supply and demand.¹⁹ By the mid-1960s, the trade balance between Japan and the U.S. would begin to shift with Japan demonstrating a consistent trade surplus in economic relations.²⁰ Roughly a decade later, Japan would outperform the U.S. in terms of “growth, employment, and price stability” and surpass the Soviet Union as the world’s second largest economy in 1981.²¹

Security ties with the United States have been longstanding and significant, particularly after the start of the Cold War when U.S. forces were occupying Japan. From 1945 to 1947, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur led the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) in democratizing and pacifying Japan’s government, convicting war criminals, and establishing economic reforms to rebuild the country.²² By the start of 1948, the spread of communism became a growing fear for U.S. and Japanese leadership, prompting greater economic reform movements that by 1950 to reduce the influence of communism on an already vulnerable Japanese public.²³ Tokyo and Washington became formal allies in 1951 under the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which respected Japan’s pacifist constitution and allowed American troops to remain in-country once Japan regained sovereignty.²⁴ The treaty was later revised in 1960 to allow the U.S. to establish its own bases in Japan to honor mutual defense commitments, but over the next few decades, Japan would gradually lean towards revising its constitution to allow for greater changes in its conventional force capabilities and to participate more broadly in international military affairs.²⁵

¹⁹ Saburo Okita, “Japan’s Economy and the Korean War,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 14 (July, 1951): 141, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024219>.

²⁰ Robert Ozaki, “United States-Japanese Economic Relations,” *Current History* 82, no. 487 (November, 1983): 357, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45315215>.

²¹ Ozaki, “United States-Japanese Economic Relations,” 357.

²² “Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945–52,” U.S. Department of State, last accessed February 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction>.

²³ U.S. Department of State, “Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945–52.”

²⁴ Maizland and Cheng, “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance.”

²⁵ Maizland and Cheng, “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance.”

Despite its origins, U.S.-Japanese relations have since grown to be largely warm and welcoming of an American presence due to the security guarantees the alliance promises, despite some negative perceptions towards military-basing allocation and disagreements over cost-sharing burdens. Japan currently stations roughly 50,000 U.S. troops, paying nearly \$2 billion per year for the costs along with other locality expenses, but has more recently sought greater military autonomy through accelerated reforms in its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and acquisition of greater ballistic missile defense and strike capabilities.²⁶ And yet more than 90 percent of Japan's defense imports come from the U.S. with a five-year defense procurement plan that is intended to extend its defense spending into 2023.²⁷ Coupled with the good relations, mutual concerns of threats regarding China's growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, as well as North Korea's nuclear proliferation, have pushed the two countries to seek security cooperation in retaining peace, stability, and rule-of-law in the Indo-Pacific region.

There nonetheless remain challenges in the U.S.-Japan relationship concerning Japan's pacifist norms, constitutional restraints on the use of force for any purposes other than self-defense, and budgetary restrictions. Public perceptions towards Japan's history and prior militaristic attitudes have shaped the caution in today's political discourse over the use of force and revisions in the constitution. Article 9 in particular has drawn a lot of attention, after it was imposed on Japan by the U.S. in an effort to democratize and pacify the nation post-WWII and which outlawed war as a means to resolve international disputes. It has restricted the SDF in its ability to act as a normal military and has limited the SDF's role to strictly noncombatant operations such as logistical support, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, anti-piracy, and peacekeeping. Constitutional restraints have similarly imposed legal restrictions on Japan's ability to even form alliances with other Indo-Pacific

²⁶ Congressional Research Service, *U.S.-Japan Relations*, CRS Report No. IF10199 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10199>.

²⁷ "U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan," U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/>.

partners.²⁸ Japan's defense budget has continued to increase regardless, particularly under the Abe administration; however, the rates of increase have been too limited to effectuate meaningful changes in Japan's military stance as it remains limited to 1 percent of its GDP.²⁹

China's military activities have become a greater security concern to Japan over the past decade, with disputed territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands being the most contentious point of discussion. Tensions heightened after the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with two Japanese Coast Guard ships and after the vessel's captain was arrested in 2010, which was followed by Chinese patrols near the Senkaku Islands in 2012, and by 2013, escalating military encounters between the two sides became more frequent.³⁰ Under the U.S.–Japan treaty, the U.S. is obligated to come to Japan's aid in the event of a conflict with China over the Senkaku Islands; however, it has maintained a neutral stance on the recognition of Japan's sovereign right over the islands. The U.S., as part of its treaty, also grants protection to Japan under its nuclear umbrella, acting as a security guarantor against the North Korean nuclear threat. China, on the other hand, does not offer these same protection guarantees. These security promises hold historic relevance as they extend all the way back through the Cold War era, when the nuclear threat was first becoming prominent with the nuclearization of both the Soviets and China.

2. Relations with China: Precedence in Economy

Economic ties grew increasingly relevant between Japan and China throughout the Cold War era, but security cooperation was otherwise often limited. Scholars have attributed this strain in security relations to the region's wartime memories of Japan's imperialistic conquests and controversial activities. Additionally, Chinese perceptions of inadequate apologies or acceptance of responsibility by Japan for its part in WWII have

²⁸ Scott W. Harold et al., *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific*, RR3125 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 29, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html.

²⁹ Congressional Research Service, *The U.S.–Japan Alliance*, CRS Report No. RL33740 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 9–10, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33740/25>.

³⁰ Congressional Research Service, *The U.S.–Japan Alliance*, 13.

served to amplify the tensions.³¹ Japan's newfound position under Western powers similarly diminished Beijing's trust in Japan. This would have been particularly true during the Korean War when China acted with the Soviets to fight against the U.S. and UN forces with the latter being supported by Japan. Conversely, Japan was wary of China's growing radical domestic policies and its nuclearization in the late-1960s and 1970s. China increasingly bolstered its military capabilities through the end of the period, when many Chinese analysts feared the inevitable resurgence of a Japanese great power in the region with Tokyo bolstering its alliance with the U.S. through increased defense burden-sharing.³²

Cold War economic relations ebbed and flowed between China and Japan, but were otherwise substantial by the end of the period. From 1946 to 1949, the value of trade between the two countries increased from \$10 million to \$47 million, with trade amounting to 30% of Japan's gross national product (GNP) by 1951.³³ Between 1957 and 1960, Japan's exports decreased from over 21 billion yen worth of goods to less than 1 billion yen worth, but started to pick up again by 1963.³⁴ In 1966, China launched its Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, leading to severe economic repercussions and Beijing closing its doors to the outside world, which included the deterioration of trade relations with Japan.³⁵ However, between 1972 and 1978, China had shifted its domestic policies once more, allowing Sino-Japanese relations to normalize throughout this period as the U.S. similarly reached out to Beijing.³⁶ Sino-Japanese trade relations then on, from 1979 to 1999, "grew more than tenfold" in these two decades.³⁷

³¹ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring, 1999): 52, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294>.

³² Christensen, "China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," 57–58.

³³ Akira Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945–90," *The China Quarterly*, no. 124 (December 1990): 630, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/654640>.

³⁴ Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945–90," 631–632.

³⁵ Katherine Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends* (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, accessed June 12, 2021), 39, <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/china-japan-economic-partnership-political-ends.pdf>.

³⁶ Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*, 40.

³⁷ Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*, 43.

Today, Japan views China as a strategically valuable economic partner, with local scholars and journalists mulling over the uncertain possibility of U.S. abandonment if it were to lose its hegemonic edge or its unreliability to enforce international standards given the drastic polar nature of recent American politics under the Trump Administration. As the largest Asian trading partner, China exerts great influence over regional economic growth and has demonstrated significant innovative capacity in creating institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).³⁸ Additionally, socio-economic ties between China and Japan have been existent for far longer than that with Americans. Dating as far back as the third century B.C., economic interactions between China and Japan “accumulated a wealth of knowledge, adopting the Chinese writing system, learning from China’s advanced technical expertise, and emulating China’s political institutions,” all of which “leaders continue to make official reference to this legacy.”³⁹ Sino-Japanese economic relations saw notable strains during the Cold War era, but would be reinforced by the end of the period as China’s rise became imminent. Based on these longstanding relations, Japan does not seek to exclude China from the creation of an international order that could be conceived under an open, rules-based network of economic partnership; rather it emphasizes inclusivity to ensure China has opportunities to fit into the liberal normative framework, if so willing.⁴⁰

Despite the mostly positive historical economic relations, Japan still perceives China as a competitor for economic influence over the region, such as through China’s creation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even though Japan’s FOIP vision more emphasizes respect for international law and norms, it promotes economic connectivity through infrastructure-building and free trade.⁴¹ As the previous second-largest economy

³⁸ Mireya Solis, *China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2020), 2, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_china_japan_solis.pdf.

³⁹ Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*, 28.

⁴⁰ Solis, “Japan’s Democratic Renewal and the Survival of the Liberal Order.”

⁴¹ Kei Koga, “Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific,” in *Implementing the Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Region Building Initiatives*, ed. Kyle Springer (Perth: Perth USAsia Centre, August 2019), 25, <https://perthusasia.edu.au/events/past-conferences/defence-forum-2019/2019-indo-pacific-defence-conference-videos/keynotes-and-feature-presentations/pu-134-japan-book-web.aspx>.

in the world, Japan seeks to regain momentum as a regional leader by promoting infrastructure growth, sustainable investments, and cooperation among states with a respect for rule-of-law.⁴² This is where many states, including Japan, have come to see China as manipulative and self-serving with regard to its practices of debt traps and economic coercion. As an example, China's monopolization of rare earth minerals, which Japan was heavily dependent upon, allowed Beijing to manipulate export quotas in retaliation to a dispute near the Senkaku Islands in 2010, causing price spikes in the global market and giving unfair advantages to domestic Chinese companies.⁴³ Japan's longstanding economic ties and fears over coercion continue to serve as limitations to Tokyo's relations with Washington to the extent that it does not wish to contain China.⁴⁴

On the other hand, Japan appears to increasingly perceive itself as a regional enforcer of peace, stability, and international order as it encapsulates these concepts through efforts in public diplomacy, rule-making, securing connectivity, capacity-building, and maritime security.⁴⁵ Japan's bilateral trade and economic partnership agreements, most notably with ASEAN and through its 2018 ratification of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), highlight the larger role Japan seeks to gain in the global economy while enhancing its partnerships with its neighbors. Additionally, its affiliation with the U.S., Australia, and India through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) reinforces its role as an enforcer of FOIP values, which stands to threaten China's forceful rise as a hegemony. Tokyo has also more recently joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's largest free trade agreement, with China becoming one of its signatories in November 2020, which the U.S. has yet to do so itself.⁴⁶ Given that Japan views China as its most valuable

⁴² Solis, *China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft*, 2–8.

⁴³ Mary Hui, "Japan's Global Rare Earths Quest Holds Lessons for the U.S. and Europe," Quartz, last modified April 22, 2021, <https://qz.com/1998773/japans-rare-earths-strategy-has-lessons-for-us-europe/>.

⁴⁴ Szechenyi and Hosoya, "Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan's Effort for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific* (Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2021), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf>.

⁴⁶ U.S Department of Agriculture, *Japan Joins Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*, Report No. JA2020-0189 (Tokyo, Japan: Office of Agricultural Affairs, Japan, 2020), <https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/japan-japan-joins-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership>.

economic partner, the situation puts Beijing at an advantage to enhance its diplomatic ties to Tokyo.

Research on Japan's security and economic drivers has broadly emphasized Tokyo's balance of interests in maintaining its relations with the U.S. and China as it pushes for a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Research has also recognized how Japan has more significantly altered its national security policies to incorporate greater security cooperation with the U.S. while retaining a desire for greater cooperation with China, primarily in the economic realm, to pursue regional initiatives that foster economic prosperity and respect for maritime international law.⁴⁷ This thesis will add to the existing research by providing a historically scoped analysis of Japan's responses to U.S.-China competition, which will allow for the detection of patterns in Tokyo's foreign policy decisions through the past several decades. The immediate post-WWII period was chosen as the starting point of this thesis' research due to the substantial change in relations with the U.S., wherein both security and economic relations were vital to the country's revival after its loss in the war. Japan's relations with China through the Cold War era slowly expanded to incorporate greater economic interdependence. Over the past decade, however, Japan has struggled to balance its longstanding economic ties with China owing to the Beijing government's growing assertive military stance and coercive economic policies.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS

Japan's security drivers can best be explained by perceptions of an increasingly hostile or unstable environment and concerns of an over-dependence on the U.S. as an unreliable security partner. Japan's foreign policy decisions often had to be scaled in response to its perceived security environment with limitations based on its fiscal capacity or political flexibility. This was particularly true for the beginning stages of the Cold War, when Japan was economically devastated from WWII. It would make sense that as Japan's economic recovery made progress, it would be increasingly less dependent on the U.S. for

⁴⁷ Ryo Sahashi, "Japan's Strategy Amid US-China Confrontation," *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2020): 232–233, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42533-020-00061-9.pdf>.

its security, but this hasn't necessarily been the case. Japan continues to rely on the U.S. today for its national security interests as its conventional forces remain restricted to self-defense, even with more recent efforts to expand their military roles.

For its economic interests, Japan does not have a common set of drivers that transitions smoothly from the Cold War period to the last decade, but fears of economic over-dependence tends to be a common theme. Initially, Japan was heavily dependent on the U.S. for its economic recovery after WWII. After three decades, Japan became the world's second largest economy in 1981, but three decades after this, China surpassed Japan in 2010. Fears of over-dependence would once again renew as China increasingly became an economic powerhouse for the region using unfair trading practices and economic coercion. In response to situations where over-dependence has become a concern, Japan has sought after greater autonomy in its foreign policy decisions, often seeking to expand its role at either the international or regional scale.

To evaluate these potential explanations, this thesis draws on numerous sources that include official government documents and statements, domestic think tanks, various Asia region-specific journals, and renown research institutes. This thesis conducts extensive analysis on the effects of the Cold War on East Asia over the last few decades to set the stage for the topic. This thesis then focuses on the last decade utilizing various news sources to deliver the research from the perspectives of people who were dealing with the issues of concern in specific timeframes.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis consists of four chapters. This first chapter has provided an introduction to the research question, its significance, a literature review, potential explanations, and research design. U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific was related to Japan's position in a situational context, with brief summaries of Japan's security and economic drivers. Finally, a brief overview of the potential explanations and hypotheses has been discussed.

The second chapter discusses the Cold War era in East Asia and its relevance to Japan's views towards modern U.S.-China GPC. The chapter is broken out into decade

periods, starting off with Japan's situation immediately following its defeat in WWII and the U.S. occupation's effects on Japan's government, its security apparatus, and economic revival. Japan's "economic miracle" during the Cold War altered its perspectives of the U.S. significantly as China's domestic situation provided a stark contrast to Japan's economic growth and social welfare, creating a basis for tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. Relations with both the U.S. and China finally grew through the end of the Cold War period and set the stage for the situation Japan faces today. A brief overview of the period following the Cold War era is discussed, encompassing the 1990s and 2000s to provide a transition into the next decade.

The third chapter discusses Japan's situation over the last decade. First, Japan's Abenomics and the surge in military tensions from 2011–2013 is discussed. The Abenomics initiative set the ground for Japan to reach out and expand its economic ties while military tensions increasingly put into question the efficiency of its military force structure. The following section discusses how, from 2014 to 2017, Japan focused on its national security through redefining its constitution as U.S. relations were put at risk with Washington's withdrawal from the TPP. Finally, from 2018 to 2021, a discussion is held on the U.S.-China trade war and its effects on Japan alongside growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.

The final chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of its major findings, provides an explanation of probable future trends based on the study's findings, and presents a few policy recommendations. The research will hopefully inspire policymakers and strategic decision-makers to consider the perspectives of our closest allies in the Indo-Pacific when it comes to economic or military actions that could impact their relations with China. The U.S. must remain cognizant of the relations Japan retains with China. In doing so, the U.S. will be better positioned to avoid any missteps that could damage trust or confidence in its allies.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. JAPAN AND THE COLD WAR ERA

A. INTRODUCTION

The Cold War era demonstrated a period where Japan largely supported U.S. interests, but later found its own independent path towards attaining a significant regional status that allowed it to pursue lukewarm relations with China. After WWII, the U.S. occupation of Japan not only helped shape its government and remolded its society, but American support during the first decade also helped shape how Japan would later be able to remold its security and economic policies to suit its interests. The U.S. and China were both wary of Japan's rise and its potential remilitarization, but U.S.-Japanese relations weathered such concerns through the Cold War era. Towards the end of the period, China's own rapid economic rise was creating new tensions in Sino-Japanese relations.

This chapter discusses the origins of Japan's post-war foreign policies and outline the trends of its relations with the U.S. and China through Cold War tensions. In doing so, Japan's navigation with these early relations in responding to regional crises will help determine its patterns of behavior over time and highlight common themes in Japanese public perceptions towards its shifts in policies. The chapter is divided into decade periods to hone in on historically relevant security situations Japan faced as it rapidly progressed in reviving its economy through U.S. assistance. Japan's diplomatic and economic relations with China were largely fickle during this timeframe, as China's government underwent major political transitions and eventually closed itself off to the rest of the world. Trade between the two countries would nonetheless persist and underscore the importance of maintaining ties to China for access to its markets.

B. 1945–1959: POSTWAR JAPAN AND COLD WAR START

Following the end of WWII until 1952, Japan was occupied by U.S. forces that sought to democratize and demilitarize the fascist country following its brutal wartime campaigns and massacres. Japan's army and navy were immediately dissolved and roughly 200,000 members were purged from government leadership positions with as many as

6,000 military personnel being charged with war crimes.⁴⁸ The state-sponsored Shinto religion that fostered extreme nationalistic views in society also became disapproved and schools were forced to completely alter their lesson plans and replace narratives of “war and loyalty to the state with teachings of peace and democracy.”⁴⁹ The country additionally suffered from a severe economic recession that was compounded by reparations made to other countries in Asia while widespread starvation and low morale left its society withered.⁵⁰ These conditions would set the foundations for near-term economic collaboration and for more friendly U.S.–Japan relations over time.

While the U.S. occupation was perceived as being largely successful by General MacArthur, who headed the mission, there remained significant concerns from Washington over the state of the Japanese economy after the first couple of years following the war and uncertainty as to when it would be truly ready to take over as its own independent country.⁵¹ By 1949, new threats arose from communist states that nonetheless emphasized the importance of U.S.–Japan relations and reiterated a need to maintain a presence in the region. The Soviets had successfully conducted their first nuclear test and China’s civil war was won by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under its leader Mao Zedong, and while Japan was interested in the idea of trading with China to bolster its economy, its American ally was extremely wary of the prospect as it feared the erosion of capitalist norms, values, and influence within the region.⁵² With the fear of spreading communism growing, Washington’s attention turned towards its own national security interests pertaining to the USSR and China, which limited the relative importance of Japan’s internal affairs, but the

⁴⁸ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 235–236, print.

⁴⁹ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 236–237.

⁵⁰ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 234.

⁵¹ Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 270–271, print.

⁵² LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 278–279.

U.S. nonetheless emphasized bolstering Japan's economy and refining its fiscal policies to reinforce Japan against communist influences.⁵³

Japan's political leadership and public views were divided in how the nation needed to proceed forward, whether to take advantage of U.S. financial aid to revamp the military or to retain U.S.-led pacifistic security policies in Japan.⁵⁴ By 1947, Japan's production levels were barely one third of what they were prior to the war and only with the help of the U.S., through its Government and Relief in Occupied Areas and its supplemental Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas programs, was Japan able to prevent an economic collapse.⁵⁵ Initially, the U.S. State Department only proposed \$500 million in assistance to help Japan recover to self-sufficient levels by 1950, with the aid providing raw materials for production so Japan could rely less heavily on U.S. imports.⁵⁶ However, between 1949 and 1951, Japan was receiving \$2.3 billion worth of financial loans and economic aid from the U.S.,⁵⁷ likely owing to the perceived necessity and effectiveness of the program as U.S. assistance showed immediate results. From 1950 to 1951, industrial production rose by 36 percent, restoring the country's production levels to what they were in 1937.⁵⁸

Despite the extensive assistance, many conservative elites like Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida remained wary of becoming too reliant upon the great power for rebuilding the nation, fearing not only being dragged into another war but also not wishing to alienate one of its only remaining partners in the region with the threat of communism

⁵³ Anthony Best, "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0017>.

⁵⁴ Michael Green, "The U.S.–Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History," *Education About Asia* 12, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 26, <https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/the-us-japan-alliance-a-brief-strategic-history.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 2 (September 1982): 393–397, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1893825>.

⁵⁶ Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," 394–395.

⁵⁷ Xiaobing Li, *The Cold War in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 45, print.

⁵⁸ United Nations, *World Economic Report 1951–52* (New York: UN Department of Economic Affairs, 1953), 69, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/searchable_archive/1952_WESS_Full.pdf.

spreading into an already vulnerable Japanese society risking further instabilities.⁵⁹ Another conservative politician who served as Prime Minister in the late-1940s, Ashida Hitoshi, expressed a desire to increase defensive capabilities and to rebuild the nation's "spirit."⁶⁰ However, Japan also faced a tense security situation in which both China and the USSR still harbored resentment against Japan for its wartime empire activities and viewed American intervention as a gateway for Japan to re-militarize.⁶¹

In 1950, the Korean War became a focal point of the Cold War in the region, as it pitted Soviet-backed North Korea against U.S.-backed South Korea, and similarly brought China into the conflict. China's decision to enter the war was based on the assumption that conflict with the U.S. would be inevitable as American troops prepared to dispatch into the region and after military leadership made "belligerent remarks against China."⁶² It also presumed a lack of participation would diminish the odds of Soviet support should the Americans advance past North Korea into Chinese territory.⁶³ Initially both the Soviets and the Chinese did not believe that the U.S. would become involved, as South Korea was not publicly considered a nation under its defense, and so the Soviets gave the green light for North Korea to invade the south while China created a Northeast China Border Defense Army to secure its territory from western forces.⁶⁴ After U.N. troops arrived on the peninsula to support South Korea and crossed the 38th parallel, China sent roughly 200,000 troops into North Korea to drive them back into the south and captured Seoul alongside the North Koreans.⁶⁵ The situation escalated into a war between China and U.N. forces with

⁵⁹ Green, "The U.S.–Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History," 26.

⁶⁰ Jennifer Miller, "The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in U.S.-Japanese Relations," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (January 2011): 88, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25764610>.

⁶¹ Best, "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview," 3.

⁶² Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly*, no. 121 (March, 1990): 106, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/654064>.

⁶³ Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," 106.

⁶⁴ Ezra Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," in *China and Japan: Facing History* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2019), 304–305, print.

⁶⁵ Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," 305–306.

intensive military campaigns from both sides, but China gradually realized its capabilities fell short of what was necessary for its victory.⁶⁶ Japan continued supporting U.N. forces with forward-basing from its territory, as China and the U.N. negotiated the terms of an armistice agreement until it was reached in 1953.⁶⁷

After the Korean War ended, the U.S. severely restricted its own and other countries' economic relations with China by banning trade, freezing assets, and preventing support for its industries.⁶⁸ Japan's economic relations with Beijing stalled as a result, but it still kept its doors open to diplomacy. Leadership from both countries attempted to improve relations between 1953 and 1957, even though trade was at its low point.⁶⁹ The U.S. had also sought to formalize its relations with Japan through a mutual security peace treaty during the war, both to secure its presence in the region and to counteract against Soviet-China relations, which in turn allowed U.S. forces to continue using Japanese naval and air bases.⁷⁰ The Korean War also helped Japan's economy significantly as American forces placed much of their military equipment and supply orders from local Japanese industries, resulting in roughly \$2 billion, or 60 percent, of all Japanese exports through the war's duration.⁷¹ Prime Minister Yoshida famously referred to this massive demand and resulting economic growth as a "gift from the gods."⁷²

Japanese concerns about the Soviets continued to grow in the mid-1950s. Military personnel and defense officials at the time perceived a "direct Soviet military threat" with fears of an invasion into Hokkaido that were prompted by an increasingly stronger and

⁶⁶ Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, 88.

⁶⁷ Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, 89.

⁶⁸ Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," 306–307.

⁶⁹ Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," 312.

⁷⁰ Best, "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview," 3.

⁷¹ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 249.

⁷² Michael Bosack, "Remembering the Role Japan played in the Forgotten War," Japan Times, last modified July 18, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/07/18/commentary/japan-commentary/remembering-role-japan-played-forgotten-war/>.

emboldened USSR and a newly defense-oriented Japanese military force.⁷³ The Soviets were increasing their military activities in the region, violating Japan's airspace, and had deployed sixteen nuclear-powered submarines to Vladivostok in Southeast Russia by the late-1960s, creating fears for an international nuclear conflict by Japanese defense officials.⁷⁴ Any Chinese threat perception, in contrast, did not appear to be as prominent in the 1950s due to its domestic focus, lack of nuclear threats, and low level of economic development, although Beijing's ties to the Soviets would nonetheless remain a concern.⁷⁵ From 1953 to 1957, China sought to emulate a Stalinist model of economic development to modernize and industrialize its own country, but also sought lessons from Japan's pre-WWII experience in its unparalleled rise from a weak Asian state into one that could compete with western imperial powers.⁷⁶ By 1958, China created its Great Leap Forward initiative which would begin to infuse its policies towards Japan with undertones of anti-imperialistic sentiment.⁷⁷

C. 1960–1979: JAPAN'S "ECONOMIC MIRACLE"

After China launched its Great Leap Forward initiative in 1958, Beijing attacked two islands controlled by Taiwan, prompting a controversial visitation by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and the tear down of one of China's flags on Japanese soil months later, which ultimately led to the complete severance of economic and political ties to Japan.⁷⁸ By 1959, economic relations with Japan dropped in value to only \$23 million, down from \$141 million prior.⁷⁹ From 1960 to 1965, Beijing's relations with the Soviet Union also deteriorated, isolating China from gaining much international support after its Great Leap

⁷³ Eitan Oren and Matthew Brummer, "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 87–88, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00948.

⁷⁴ Oren and Brummer, "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan," 88–89.

⁷⁵ Oren and Brummer, "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan," 91.

⁷⁶ Amy King, *China-Japan Relations after World War Two - Empire, Industry, and War, 1949–1971* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 92–93, print.

⁷⁷ King, *China-Japan Relations after World War Two - Empire, Industry, and War, 1949–1971*, 162–163.

⁷⁸ Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," 317–318.

⁷⁹ Vogel, "Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952," 318.

Forward initiative failed disastrously.⁸⁰ As many as 30 million people died of starvation from 1960–1962, after the Chinese government attempted to radically change its domestic development by collectivizing resources, purging suspected anti-Communists and intellectuals, and forcing its people into communes to consolidate labor.⁸¹ Merely a year later, starvation became widespread after falsified reports of production rates led to the misappropriation of grain collection by the state while poor weather exacerbated the situation.⁸²

As the Great Leap Forward began to show signs of faltering, Chinese leadership needed to rapidly adopt new policy changes to reverse the course of the country's massive economic downfall. In 1959 at the Lushan Conference, Chinese Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai alerted President Mao of the potential risks of the country's radical program that included false reports up the hierarchy chain, but his comments were taken as an affront towards Mao and treated as an example of right-wing dissidence against the communist party.⁸³ Peng's subsequent dismissal created "long-lasting consequences" for China's economic policy reform as it set the tone for anyone else who held opposing viewpoints against CCP and its policies.⁸⁴ By the 1960s, Mao reinvigorated his socialist propaganda efforts with reeducation campaigns, which created new class divisions, prompted outcry by major political opponents like Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, and created the conditions for the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution to take place by 1966.⁸⁵ The revolution effectively hindered any progress towards China's economic correction and instead crippled it further.

⁸⁰ King, *China-Japan Relations after World War Two - Empire, Industry, and War, 1949–1971*, 167.

⁸¹ Clayton Brown, "China's Great Leap Forward," U.S., *Asia, and the World: 1914–2012* 17, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 29–31, <https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/chinas-great-leap-forward-1.pdf>.

⁸² Brown, "China's Great Leap Forward," U.S., *Asia, and the World: 1914–2012* 17, 33–34.

⁸³ Brown, "China's Great Leap Forward," U.S., *Asia, and the World: 1914–2012* 17, 32.

⁸⁴ Keith Schoppa, "Chapter 17: Coming Unglued," in *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History*, ed. Rob DeGeorge and Lauren Aylward (Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011), 335, Print.

⁸⁵ Keith Schoppa, "Chapter 18: Death Dance: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," in *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History*, ed. Rob DeGeorge and Lauren Aylward (Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011), 348–349, Print.

In stark contrast to China, from 1950 to 1973, Japan achieved a record economic growth rate of more than 10 percent annually in its gross national product (GNP) that reached an astonishing \$320 billion by the end of the period.⁸⁶ Various domestic factors contributed to the rapid growth: a younger generation of managers willing to take bold investments in newer technologies, heavy capital flow into private companies, high quality of human capital, growing salaries, and significant government assistance to prevent important industries from sinking.⁸⁷ Although no longer under U.S. occupation by 1952, Japan continued to rely on its American ally into the 1960s for its national security to avoid spending its own resources on military build-up and to prevent domestic political bickering over the topic of militarization.⁸⁸ This allowed Japan to afford the importation of thousands of advanced technologies into the mid-1960s and to expand its markets to the American population to the extent that Japan's export levels grew by an average annual rate of 13.5 percent between 1956 and 1964.⁸⁹ Japan's annual GDP grew exponentially between 1960 and 1975 as well, reaching \$484 billion at the end of this timeframe from roughly \$22 billion at its start.⁹⁰

Despite China's economic troubles, Japanese threat perceptions towards China increased in 1964 as Beijing conducted its first nuclear test and some of Japan's political officials perceived the country as a possible "existential military threat."⁹¹ While China may not have necessarily been anticipated to become militarily involved in Japan's affairs, the fact that it now held nuclear capabilities was disconcerting. In addition, by the early 1960s, CCP chairman Mao Zedong was denouncing the Soviets for their "revisionism" in

⁸⁶ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 253–254.

⁸⁷ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 256–258.

⁸⁸ LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 326.

⁸⁹ Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, 111–112.

⁹⁰ Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, 112.

⁹¹ Oren and Brummer, "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan," 97.

interpretations of Marxist ideologies and “for fearing Chinese Communism.”⁹² In what would famously become known as the Sino-Soviet Split, relations between the two countries would gradually deteriorate as China’s own interpretations and resulting domestic policies became more radical.

Japanese views towards the Sino-Soviet Split were concerned very early on as there was still a desire to maintain cultural connections and to foster trade relations with China.⁹³ Many left-wing Japanese blamed the outside world for provoking China while holding onto deep-rooted regret from its wartime activities and wanted to pursue more autonomy in Japan’s foreign relations.⁹⁴ The threat of communism nonetheless remained a problem for Japanese government leadership and was prominent in public dialogue on the national security of the country, but undertones of a desire to reconnect to its neighbor persisted, under the umbrella of having cultural and historical connections as well as geographical proximity, in order to reduce the risk for confrontation and foster greater security cooperation,⁹⁵ especially as China’s own domestic issues began to unravel.

At the start of the 1970s, relations between the U.S. and Japan soured as the Nixon administration made its first visit to China for the first time since 1949 and with the devaluation of American currency, pressuring the Japanese government to expand its economic ties to other partners in the region, which included Beijing, in an effort to become more independent.⁹⁶ President Nixon negotiated with China at the Shanghai Communiqué in an effort to improve Sino-American relations by lifting its embargo and easing travel restrictions.⁹⁷ Up through the 1970s, the U.S. and China continued to foster relations

⁹² “Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–1984,” Wilson Center, last accessed February, 2022, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/73/sino-soviet-split-1960-1984>.

⁹³ J. A. A. Stockwin, “Japanese Attitudes to the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” *International Journal* 18, no. 4 (Autumn, 1963): 489, <https://doi.org/40198931>.

⁹⁴ Stockwin, “Japanese Attitudes to the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 489–490.

⁹⁵ Oren and Brummer, “Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan,” 98–99.

⁹⁶ Best, “Japan and the Cold War: An Overview,” 11.

⁹⁷ “Rapprochement with China, 1972,” U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian, last modified April 8, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china>.

through institution building and lifting trade barriers.⁹⁸ By 1980, “the total trade between the two nations... [amounted] to \$4.8 billion.”⁹⁹

The need for change in Sino-Japanese relations was only reinforced by President Nixon’s admission that allies in the region would need to start bolstering their own national security under his “Guam Doctrine,” which was welcomed by Japanese politicians who prioritized anti-communism initiatives and wanted to see their defense budgets increased without U.S. constraints.¹⁰⁰ Fears of “entrapment” and being drawn into regional conflicts, particularly as U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was ongoing during this timeframe, became prominent among Japanese leadership and emphasized the need for a more “independent defense posture.”¹⁰¹ Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone sought to revise domestic policies that were limiting Japan’s approaches for greater autonomy and to diminish the role of the U.S. in its alliance with Japan, but he faced significant pushback from the domestic public that wanted to maintain the pacifist constitution and from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which sought to protect and extend the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty.¹⁰²

Various interest groups within Japan saw the potential revival of China’s economy as a new market opportunity source and eagerly sought to follow the U.S. lead in relaxing its policies to foster relations with Beijing.¹⁰³ The Japanese government subsequently removed all Ex-Im Bank credit financing restrictions and signed various trade agreements

⁹⁸ Dong Wang, “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal - Japan Focus* 24, no. 4 (June 2013): 1, <https://apjpf.org/2013/11/24/Dong-Wang/3958/article.html>.

⁹⁹ Wang, “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship,” 3.

¹⁰⁰ Green, “The U.S.–Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History,” 26.

¹⁰¹ Yukinori Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Buildup, 1969–1976,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 3 (Summer, 2014): 97, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924505>.

¹⁰² Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Buildup, 1969–1976,” 98–100.

¹⁰³ Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan’s Foreign Policy under Détente: Relations with China and the Soviet Union, 1971–1973,” in *The Cold War in East Asia: 1945–1991*, ed. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 186, print.

with China.¹⁰⁴ Burns provides a suitable description on economic relations during this time:

bilateral trade increased three-fold between 1972 and 1975, reaching a total of nearly US\$3.8 million, and Japan became China's number one trading partner. Japanese exports during this period consisted of steel, machinery and equipment, chemicals, and synthetic fibers. In turn, China exported crude oil, foodstuffs, minerals, and other primary products.¹⁰⁵

Japan also reached out to the Soviets in an attempt to broker a trade agreement for its natural resources, but the deal was undermined by demands for concessions on long-standing territorial disputes over the Kuril Islands and actually reinforced the importance of Japan's relations to the U.S. for the political weight that Washington held at the international scale, which both Beijing and Tokyo were lacking.¹⁰⁶ Japan therefore made continued strides to sustain its relations with the U.S., even as some members of the Japanese leadership sought to normalize the state of the country's security by redefining its constitution to facilitate greater military preparedness beyond self-defense and to increase defense spending.¹⁰⁷ Japanese public views towards the U.S. in the 1970s remained conflicted, tainted not only by the Nixon administration's approach to China, but by various bilateral trade disputes and the 1970 American invasion in Cambodia.¹⁰⁸

The biggest controversial point between China and Japan that inhibited progression on their relations was the issue over Taiwan's status as an independent country. Taiwan had been governed separately from China since 1949, but Beijing viewed the island as part of its territory and asserted this claim in its "One China" policy.¹⁰⁹ In a 1972 Joint Communiqué, both Beijing and Tokyo sought to normalize relations with each other, but China asserted contingencies on this development that would require the recognition of its

¹⁰⁴ Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*, 40–41.

¹⁰⁵ Burns, *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*, 41.

¹⁰⁶ Best, "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview," 11–12.

¹⁰⁷ Best, "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview," 12.

¹⁰⁸ Douglas H. Mendel Jr., "Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Seventies," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–1972): 521, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2747669>.

¹⁰⁹ Lindsay Maizland, "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 10, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy>.

“One China” policy in regards to Taiwan and recognition that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only Chinese government, as well as the abrogation of Japan’s treaty to Taiwan.¹¹⁰ Tokyo was willing to recognize the PRC as the “sole legal Government of China” and Taiwan as an “inalienable part” of Chinese territory, but only in exchange for the renunciation of Chinese demands for war reparations and continued negotiations on trade relations, implicitly including Taiwan under vague terms of “mutual benefit” and “peaceful co-existence.”¹¹¹

Following the death of Mao in 1976, China started to take a new direction with its economic policies, abandoning many of its former Cultural Revolution policies and importing new technologies to include heavy machinery for industrial growth.¹¹² Under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China’s new open door policy sought to drastically increase foreign investment in its domestic markets, bringing in with it foreign capital and knowledge on western-style management.¹¹³ This same year, China’s new leadership would make its first ever historical visit to Japan, which would markedly demonstrate an alleviation in tensions over the Taiwan issue and Beijing’s desire to resurge Sino-Japanese relations.¹¹⁴ Travel between both countries started increasing profoundly after this, with tourism and foreign exchange student programs significantly rising.¹¹⁵

Under President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. announced it would formally recognize the PRC at the start of 1979 and would cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan.¹¹⁶ Many members of

¹¹⁰ Ezra Vogel, “Chapter 10: Working Together, 1972–1992,” In *China and Japan: Facing History* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2019), 329, print.

¹¹¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>.

¹¹² Vogel, Ezra. “Chapter 10: Working Together, 1972–1992,” 343.

¹¹³ Shigeo Kobayashi et al., “The ‘Three Reforms’ in China: Progress and Outlook,” *RIM* no. 45 (September 1999), <https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/>.

¹¹⁴ Vogel, “Chapter 10: Working Together, 1972–1992,” 337–338.

¹¹⁵ Vogel, “Chapter 10: Working Together, 1972–1992,” 343.

¹¹⁶ Andrew Glass, “U.S. recognizes communist China, Dec. 15, 1978,” Politico, last modified December 15, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/15/us-recognizes-communist-china-dec-15-1978-1060168>.

Congress were highly conflicted with the announcement.¹¹⁷ As such, Congress was successful in passing the Taiwan Relations Act, which sought to undermine the termination of diplomatic relations to Taiwan by highlighting U.S. policy objectives as willing to sustain certain ties.¹¹⁸ The law set an expectation that Taiwan's future with China would be "determined by peaceful means," it continued to allow arms sales to Taiwan, and it maintained that the U.S. had the capacity to respond to a crisis should force be used against Taiwan.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, Japan remained highly ambiguous on its stance towards Taiwan owing to the 1972 Joint Communiqué with China, repeatedly reassuring Beijing that it recognized the island as part of its territory.¹²⁰ The Japanese government would often suppress any politicians who tried to make any public statements in support of Taiwan because it sought to "prioritize the growing economic relationship with China."¹²¹

D. 1980–1991: END OF THE COLD WAR

In the 1980s, Japan's exports to the U.S. skyrocketed and were "valued at more than double the amount of American exports to Japan" by the end of the decade, as U.S. accusations of Japanese unfair trading practices became more loudly voiced.¹²² These accusations set the tone for U.S. relations with Japan in the 1980s, throughout which the U.S. would push for greater structural changes in trade, often using its political leverage to influence the flow of certain Japanese exports.¹²³ Many Japanese viewed these accusations as proof that the U.S. was declining in international economic standing, and by 1985, this

¹¹⁷ Glass, "U.S. recognizes communist China, Dec. 15, 1978."

¹¹⁸ Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96–8 § 2, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter48&edition=prelim>.

¹¹⁹ Taiwan Relations Act.

¹²⁰ Ryan Ashley, "Japan's Revolution on Taiwan Affairs," War on the Rocks, last modified November 23, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/japans-revolution-on-taiwan-affairs/>.

¹²¹ Ashley, "Japan's Revolution on Taiwan Affairs."

¹²² Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 302–303.

¹²³ Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present - Fourth Edition*, 303.

belief became more substantiated as the U.S. trade deficit with Japan started reaching \$50 billion.”¹²⁴

During this same timeframe, U.S. and Japanese discussions on the rearmament of Japan became prominent as Japan’s economy grew to allow for a larger defense budget within the 1 percent allotment of its Gross National Product (GNP), per its constitutional limitations on self-defense.¹²⁵ While some politicians in Washington looked favorably at the idea of Japan putting more resources into its share of its own national security, others remained less optimistic. Just as with the PRC and Soviets in the earlier decades, U.S. officials were concerned about a “resurgent military power” that could seek autonomy “beyond the scope of U.S. Japanese security arrangements.”¹²⁶ The debate grew more popular domestically in Japan and brought to question the possible role Japan would play in the future of the region.¹²⁷

Japanese positive perceptions towards security relations with the U.S. were beginning to wane in 1980, as widespread beliefs that the U.S. would soon no longer be as “tolerant or protective” of Japan were growing and as more people believed Japan wasn’t upholding its end of the alliance in international affairs.¹²⁸ After the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. sought more assistance from its allies abroad and wanted Japan specifically to increase its defense budget past 1 percent of its GNP to increase its share of the burden.¹²⁹ American perceptions during this timeframe otherwise seemed more largely focused on the risks Japan’s economic relations posed, because there were still benefits in containing Japan’s military strength, such as the

¹²⁴ LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 369–371.

¹²⁵ LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 372.

¹²⁶ Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Buildup, 1969–1976,” 89.

¹²⁷ Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Buildup, 1969–1976,” 102.

¹²⁸ Sadako Ogata, “Some Japanese Views on United States-Japan Relations in the 1980s,” *Asian Survey* 20, no. 7 (1980): 702, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643923>.

¹²⁹ Gregg Rubinstein, “U.S.–Japan Security Relations: A Maturing Partnership?” *The Fletcher Forum* 12, no. 1 (1988): 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45331277>.

perseverance of American influence and the prevention of a new arms race in the region.¹³⁰ Americans instead focused on how “one-sided” Japanese business practices were becoming.¹³¹

Despite the tensions brought about by Japan’s rapid economic rise and the possibility for significant changes in its national security posture, U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation became an important theme by the mid-1980s. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and built up its military in its far eastern territory, Japan became easily convinced by the U.S. that its national security could be in jeopardy and that it needed to shift its defense posture to more closely align with that of U.S. strategy.¹³² While Japan believed the Soviet military build-up to be directed towards Tokyo, owing to the proximity of the forces and broader tensions between the two nations, in reality the deployment was intended to be strategic messaging towards U.S. competition in the region.¹³³

From 1980 to 1990, China saw its own economic boom with an average annual growth rate of 9.5 percent, with most of the growth coming from foreign investment by the end of the decade.¹³⁴ China’s rapid economic growth was largely attributed to Beijing’s expanded open door policy, which was made possible through the creation of “special economic zones, open coastal [and border] cities, the economic and technology development zones... and high-tech industry development zones.”¹³⁵ The reforms sought to “decentralize economic policymaking” by giving greater economic control to provincial and local governments, encouraging citizens to start their own businesses, and by offering

¹³⁰ James Fallows, “Containing Japan,” *The Atlantic*, last modified May 1989, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1989/05/containing-japan/376337/>.

¹³¹ Fallows, “Containing Japan.”

¹³² Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Soviet Factor in U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation, 1978–1985,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 72–73, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00338.

¹³³ Hasegawa, “The Soviet Factor in U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation, 1978–1985,” 76.

¹³⁴ Shang-Jin Wei, “Chapter 3: The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth: Evidence from City-Level Data,” in *Growth Theories in Light of the East Asian Experience*, ed. Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 73–74, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=408308>.

¹³⁵ Kobayashi et al., “MThe ‘Three Reforms’ in China: Progress and Outlook.”

trade incentives and reducing trade barriers to increase foreign investment.¹³⁶ Beijing's substantial economic reforms would significantly improve the country's industrial capacity, advancing China's rank as exporter from thirty-second at the start of its open door policy to thirteenth by 1989.¹³⁷

Just before the start of this decade, Beijing and Tokyo signed the Sino-Japanese Long Term Trade Agreement in 1978 to foster economic relations, with Japan being "China's largest trading partner, a principal provider of financial and technical assistance, and a major importer of raw materials and light industrial products" at the time.¹³⁸ By 1983, trade volume between the two countries had amounted to nearly \$10 billion from its initial start of roughly \$5 billion in 1978, after China's open door policy was implemented.¹³⁹ However, Japan held a trade surplus over China throughout the 1980s, with Japan accounting for roughly 30 percent of China's overall trade by the mid-1980s, prompting concern by Beijing that its country was becoming over-dependent on Japan.¹⁴⁰ In response, China continued to seek diversifying its markets with other parts of the region and internationally with its entrance into the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1980.¹⁴¹

Tensions between the two countries grew once more in the 1980s due to a variety of diplomatic incidents. Both China and Japan could recognize the growing Soviet threat in the region, but these diplomatic incidents brought out significant public scorn against one another and inhibited security cooperation.¹⁴² This included textbook controversies

¹³⁶ Wayne Morrison, *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. RL33534 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 4, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33534/98>.

¹³⁷ Wei, "Chapter 3: The Open Door Policy and China's Rapid Growth: Evidence from City-Level Data," 74.

¹³⁸ Hong N. Kim, "Japan and China in the 1980s," *Current History* 84, no. 506 (1985): 426, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315601>.

¹³⁹ Joseph Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944—)* 61, no. 1 (Winter, 1984–1985): 98, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2619781>.

¹⁴⁰ Burns, "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends," 43.

¹⁴¹ Burns, "China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends," 43–44.

¹⁴² Yinan He, "Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese relations," *China Perspectives* 2013, no. 4 (2013): 7–8, <http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6314>.

over the depiction of Japan's wartime memory, Japanese Prime Minister visits to a wartime memorial site that held war criminals, continued disagreements over the legal status of Taiwan, and the Tiananmen Massacre by 1989.¹⁴³ After the Soviet Union finally collapsed, there no longer existed a mutual security threat in the region that would potentially require immediate Sino-Japanese cooperation.¹⁴⁴ By the start of the 1980s, Taiwan increasingly pursued democratic reforms in its government, which also brought about concerns on how China would react and on how Japan would itself interpret obligations to uphold its end of the Japan-U.S. security treaty should conflict arise.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, U.S.-Japan relations in the 1980s were similarly tainted by economic rivalry. Japan's economic growth rate made it appear as though it was ready to overtake U.S. GDP by 2005, while the yen's appreciation allowed Japan to become the top global provider for official development assistance to other countries.¹⁴⁶ Once the Cold War had finally come to a conclusion, Japanese popular sentiment was largely optimistic and confident about their nation's future, especially compared to its bleaker years only a few decades earlier.¹⁴⁷ Many Japanese perceived U.S. political, economic, and military hegemony to be on the decline, but nonetheless retained positive popular sentiment towards U.S.-Japanese relations with polls indicating that the U.S. ranked "highest among countries with which Japan should maintain the closest relations."¹⁴⁸

E. 1992–2010: TRANSITION INTO THE LAST DECADE

Shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan transitioned into a period that would be defined by its initial economic slowdown, issues of an aging population, significant natural disasters, and political scandals that led to multiple prime ministers

¹⁴³ He, "Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese relations," 7–8.

¹⁴⁴ He, "Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese relations," 9.

¹⁴⁵ Togo, "Japan's Foreign Policy under Détente: Relations with China and the Soviet Union, 1971–1973," 193.

¹⁴⁶ Green, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History," 28.

¹⁴⁷ Green, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History," 28.

¹⁴⁸ Ogata, "Some Japanese Views on United States-Japan Relations in the 1980s," 700.

serving within short timeframes.¹⁴⁹ Japan's poor economic performance during the 1990s earned this time period the title of the "Lost Decade." Real GDP growth averaged 1 percent each year during this timeframe, which was assessed to have been caused by a collapse in asset prices and the situation worsened by banks' restrictive lending practices in response to lack of financing.¹⁵⁰ Additional factors that have been considered aggregating sources of the recession include a decline in productivity and insufficient demand caused by excessively high real interest rates.¹⁵¹ The stock markets crashed and real estate prices decreased substantially, while businesses struggled to respond to the situation due to an over-reliance on pre-recession models of commercial practices.¹⁵² Without appropriate fiscal policy management from the government, the Japanese economy was stuck in its recession.

By 2002 and through 2007, Japan's economy started to pick back up again with an average GDP growth of 2.1 percent due to external demand.¹⁵³ Yet, despite the economic growth, there were some irregular trends developing in the background. Japan continued to experience deflation and fiscal deficits with its Consumer Price Index falling by an average of 0.2 percent and government debt increasing roughly 15 percent into 2007.¹⁵⁴ From mid-2007 to 2008, a global financial crisis ensued, originating from a crash in U.S. housing prices and an increase in borrowers unable to repay large debts, which in turn led to global financial spillovers caused by substantial foreign investments in the U.S. market and influence of U.S. banking systems in other countries.¹⁵⁵ Japan suffered one of its most

¹⁴⁹ Linda Sieg, "Japan's Heisei era: Changes, growth and tragedies," Reuters, last modified April 23, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor-era/japans-heisei-era-changes-growth-and-tragedies-idUSKCN1S00LM>.

¹⁵⁰ Tim Callen and Jonathan David Ostry, *Japan's Lost Decade: Policies for Economic Revival*, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2003) 1–2, <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589061873.071>.

¹⁵¹ Callen and Ostry, *Japan's Lost Decade: Policies for Economic Revival*, 2.

¹⁵² Naoki Abe, "Japan's Shrinking Economy," Brookings, last modified February 12, 2010, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/japans-shrinking-economy/>.

¹⁵³ "Japanese economy in first recession since 2001," The Associated Press, last modified November 16, 2008, <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna27757193>.

¹⁵⁴ Abe, "Japan's Shrinking Economy."

¹⁵⁵ "The Global Financial Crisis," Reserve Bank of Australia, last accessed August 2021, <https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/the-global-financial-crisis.html>.

severe postwar recessions as a result, with a drop in real GDP of 4.9 percent by the start of 2009.¹⁵⁶ The financial crisis drove the Yen to appreciate relative to U.S. currency value, creating a situation where U.S. households saved more and purchased fewer Japanese exports considered inessential.¹⁵⁷ By 2010, China's own rise and Japan's stagnating economy allowed China to surpass the latter as the world's second-largest economy, having had only 12 percent of Japan's gross GDP merely two decades earlier.¹⁵⁸

Japan's security policy during the post-Cold War era still saw Russia as a significant threat due to its arms proliferation and uncertain path forward following the demise of the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹ North Korea was also becoming a greater security threat to Japan in the 1990s, as Pyongyang initiated its own nuclear program and conducted a long-range missile test that flew over Japanese territory in 1998.¹⁶⁰ By 2002, Japanese leadership discovered that North Korea was kidnapping Japanese citizens, completely halting any prospect for improved relations with Pyongyang, as North Korea continued to develop its nuclear capabilities.¹⁶¹ However, China's pursuit of regional hegemony was most alarming to Japan. China was significantly improving its military forces during the 1990s to incorporate greater blue-water power projection capabilities, which included plans to purchase an aircraft carrier from Ukraine and superior Russian fighter aircraft that would expand China's combat radius.¹⁶² China itself was a massive arms exporter to developing countries, particularly in the Middle East where the U.S. invasion of Iraq was

¹⁵⁶ Jun Saito, "Why Was Japan Struck So Hard by the 2008 Crisis?," Japan Center for Economic Research, last modified October 1, 2018, <https://www.jcer.or.jp/english/why-was-japan-struck-so-hard-by-the-2008-crisis>.

¹⁵⁷ Saito, "Why Was Japan Struck So Hard by the 2008 Crisis?"

¹⁵⁸ Xiaoming Zhang, "China's Perceptions of and Responses to Abe's Foreign Policy," *Asian Perspective* 39, no. 3 (2015): 425, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43738125>.

¹⁵⁹ Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5 (May 1994): 432–434, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645056>.

¹⁶⁰ James Goodby, "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away," Brookings, last modified May 1, 2003, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/north-korea-the-problem-that-wont-go-away/>.

¹⁶¹ Goodby, "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away."

¹⁶² Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," 436.

taking place, due to the lower costs that these countries could more easily afford.¹⁶³ Japan's worries about China's military expansion continued into the 2000s, with Beijing continuing to rapidly increase its defense expenditures, expand its capabilities, and create a lack of transparency in its defense budgets.¹⁶⁴ By 2008, after a 17.6 percent increase in defense spending amounting to \$59 billion, China ranked the world's second largest military spender.¹⁶⁵

As a result of the growing threat from China in the 1990s and the remaining post-WWII animosity felt towards Japan in the region, Japanese foreign policymakers were more intensely debating their country's security options, ranging from improving military capabilities to becoming more involved in international peacekeeping operations and regional security architectures, as well as enhancing U.S. security relations.¹⁶⁶ When Iraq invaded Kuwait in late 1990, for example, Japan was heavily criticized by the international community for its lack of participation in providing direct military assistance, which solicited the debates over the role Japan played in international affairs.¹⁶⁷ Ultimately, Japan's leadership felt pressured by its domestic public into providing roughly \$13 billion to support military operations due to fears that its overly pacifist policies might damage relations with the U.S. and shortly thereafter this led to greater support for UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the region.¹⁶⁸ In the 2000s, U.S.-Japanese relations continued to be bolstered in response to China's assertive military actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and North Korea's increasingly concerning nuclear activities. Both countries worked closely together to "improve the operational capability of their alliance as a

¹⁶³ Gerald Segal, "China: Arms Transfer Policies and Practices," in *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Colin McInnes and Mark Rolls (London: Routledge, 1994): 157–158, <https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.4324/9781315037394>.

¹⁶⁴ Hitoshi Tanaka, "A Japanese Perspective on the China Question," *East Asia Insights* 3, no. 2 (May 2008): 2, <https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/3-2.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Tanaka, "A Japanese Perspective on the China Question."

¹⁶⁶ Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," 438.

¹⁶⁷ David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," in *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Colin McInnes and Mark Rolls (London: Routledge, 1994): 46, <https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.4324/9781315037394>.

¹⁶⁸ Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," 46–47.

combined force” while Japan “accelerated reforms to make its military more capable, flexible, and interoperable with U.S. forces.”¹⁶⁹

F. CONCLUSION

Japan’s relations with both the U.S. and China saw turbulent changes throughout the Cold War era. Initially, relations with the U.S. were borne out of a pacifistic commitment to demilitarize and democratize as a result of the aftermath of WWII, but these relations evolved and allowed Japan to mature to develop its own policies for maintaining its security and economic interests within the limits of its constitution. Mutual threat perceptions oriented towards the Soviet Union and the spread of communism allowed the Washington and Tokyo to more effectively cooperate with each other throughout the Cold War era. China remained a lesser threat concern until it acquired nuclear capabilities in the late-1960s, but its pursuit of communism worried Japanese leadership nonetheless. Japan relied heavily on the U.S. for its economic revival from the start of the period and continued to retain considerable economic relations through the 1980s. Meanwhile, China’s severance of economic and political ties until the mid-1970s stagnated progress in fostering relations with Japan.

By the mid-1970s, after Beijing opened its doors, relations with the U.S. started to decline as the Nixon administration caught Tokyo off guard with the sudden extension of an olive branch to Beijing and with the accusation that Japan was conducting unfair market practices. After which, Japan came to view China as a country with great economic potential and market opportunity. Japan nonetheless continued to see the U.S. as an important ally for its national security interests and did not seek to sever its security ties. However, the Japanese public anticipated the possibility of surpassing the U.S. in international economic standing. This optimism was short-lived, as Japan’s economy began to stagnate and as China’s own rise became imminent. China’s new military acquisitions and spread of arms sales, as well as U.S. and Japanese perceptions that Tokyo

¹⁶⁹ Caitlin Campbell, *U.S.–Japan Relations*, CRS Report No. IF10199 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10199>.

was not sharing defense burdens in the alliance, increasingly put pressure on Japanese leadership to commit to greater military activities beyond constitutional limitations.

Japan's main security and economic drivers were heavily influenced by the severe political and fiscal limitations Tokyo faced immediately following WWII, while U.S.-China competition during this period was best described as nothing more than an ideological schism at the beginning stages of the Cold War. Beijing would not hold the same economic or political weight as it does in modern times to have either be a factor in U.S.-China competition at this stage. The growing communist threat and China's own closed door policies only encouraged greater U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation over time, but Japan remained concerned about being too heavily reliant on the U.S. for its security and economy. However, the Korean War would mark a turning point in both respects. Japan was able to rapidly revive its economy by supporting U.S. and UN troops on the Korean peninsula while the U.S. began to view Japan as more self-sustaining. Japan's lack of military participation in the war allowed Tokyo to support its American ally without having to face a direct threat from Beijing. This diminished Japanese threat perceptions of China and allowed Japan to act as a major U.S. security partner without having to use any significant military capabilities.

After the Korean War, Japan may not have been as limited in its economy but it still faced political and military constraints due to its pacifist constitution and resulting over-dependence on the U.S. for its security. China started to grow as a major security threat to Japan with its development of nuclear capabilities, its radical domestic communist policies, and its rapid acquisition of military assets and technologies over the remainder of the Cold War period. However, Japanese leadership maintained that it was important to continue fostering economic relations with Beijing because they perceived China as having an important role in the future of the region given its increasing influence in the world and its proximity to Japan. U.S. policy to develop Chinese relations under the Nixon administration only reinforced these views, since Japanese leadership long perceived the Cold War as pitting the U.S. against communist China. After Tokyo signed onto the Sino-Japanese Long Term Trade Agreement in 1978, Sino-Japanese economic relations would flourish and Japan shortly thereafter would surpass the Soviet Union as the world's second

largest economy, creating a new competition with the U.S. for economic dominance at the international scale. Japan would maintain its pacifist traditions as it otherwise did not seek to surpass the U.S. in terms of conventional military capabilities and still saw the security benefits of their alliance.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. JAPAN OVER THE LAST DECADE

A. INTRODUCTION

The last decade of Tokyo's experiences in U.S.-China great power competition (GPC) is a period where Japan has been able to seek relatively more autonomy in its foreign policy decisions. The latest tensions between these two ideologically divergent countries are owed to their mutual desire to exert the most influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is caught in the middle of this GPC, with the U.S. as its greatest security benefactor and China as its largest trading partner. This chapter will focus primarily on how these tensions became heightened within Japan's economy-security nexus and how Japan has begun pursue a larger economic and political role in the region. Japan today still remains heavily limited in its constitutional provisions to enact much military action beyond self-defense purposes, but this last decade has seen many progressive steps in its reinterpretation to support its U.S. ally and to normalize the nation's military capabilities.

This chapter will discuss the trends in Japan's responses to U.S.-China GPC by observing the last decade more closely in terms of the security and economic environmental factors Japan was facing at the time and the foreign policy decisions that stood out to confront them. In doing so, Japan's navigation through its relations with the U.S. and China will demonstrate how Tokyo has shifted towards greater autonomy. There nonetheless remain common elements from the Cold War era which have restricted Japan's progress in this respect. Namely: its pacifist constitution, coupled with a domestic public that still seeks to preserve the military's self-defense role, which limits Japan's ability to break away from its over-dependence on the U.S. for its national security interests; regional fears of a resurgent Japanese military power and residual Japanese guilt over wartime memories; and concerns of over-dependence on a foreign country's economy, in this case China. Over time, Japan achieved a greater role in the region's economic affairs, but remains caught in the middle of its relations between the U.S. and China in balancing its national security and economic interests.

B. 2011–2013: ABENOMICS AND THE SURGE OF TENSIONS

At the start of the 2010s, Japan turned inwards towards its domestic situation in the aftermath of a massive earthquake and tsunami that struck its territory. The damages from this natural disaster amounted to nearly \$360 billion in economic losses.¹⁷⁰ Even by 2020, roughly 48,000 people remained displaced from their homes, despite reconstruction efforts renovating most of the damage that had been done, and municipalities surrounding the area suffering as much as a 90 percent population decline.¹⁷¹ The natural disaster also heavily influenced public perceptions towards nuclear power and the government's handling of the situation, as public outrage sparked large protests "calling for the abolition of nuclear power in Japan" following the nuclear power plant accident in the Fukushima prefecture.¹⁷²

The U.S. at this time, already having about 40,000 troops stationed in the country, was in a good position to be able to support its ally through the crisis and coordinated with over 100,000 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to respond to the natural disaster.¹⁷³ DOD funding covered roughly \$88.5 million in expenses to provide assistance to Japan and initially prioritized the evacuation of U.S. citizens out of the country.¹⁷⁴ China, for its part, also provided disaster relief to Japan in the form of search-and-rescue assistance, which was considered in part to be reciprocal towards the aid Japan gave when China faced

¹⁷⁰ Elizabeth Ferris and Mireya Solis, "Earthquake, Tsunami, Meltdown – The Triple Disaster's Impact on Japan, Impact on the World," Brookings, last modified March 11, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/03/11/earthquake-tsunami-meltdown-the-triple-disasters-impact-on-japan-impact-on-the-world/>.

¹⁷¹ "What remains undone in the post-3/11 reconstruction," Japan Times, last modified March 12, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/12/editorials/remains-undone-post-3-11-reconstruction/>.

¹⁷² Ferris and Solis, "Earthquake, Tsunami, Meltdown – The Triple Disaster's Impact on Japan, Impact on the World."

¹⁷³ Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response*, CRS Report No. R41690 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41690.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴ Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response*, 1–2.

its own earthquake in Sichuan three years prior.¹⁷⁵ However, despite the humanitarian nature of the disaster relief to Japan, many Chinese citizens remained skeptical of the support due to the historical wartime legacy Japan retained, but nonetheless, the disaster evoked sentiments of empathy and pity towards their situation.¹⁷⁶

In the background, the U.S. increasingly became concerned with China's growing military capabilities. By November 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for increased attention towards the region by focusing on engagement with allies and partners, which in turn materialized through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement shortly after.¹⁷⁷ Japan, meanwhile, remained largely focused on the after-effects of its natural disaster situation. In late 2012, general elections were held and Shinzo Abe became the new Prime Minister. With economic insecurities remaining from the long recession and the aftereffects of the earthquake, Abe was intent on reconstructing the country through two agendas: "to reactivate the long-stagnated economy," later coined as "Abenomics," and "to restore national pride and strength," less popularly referred to as "Abegeopolitics."¹⁷⁸

The Abenomics initiative sought to boost the Japanese economy by targeting sustainable growth through better fiscal management, increasing competitiveness in the market, attracting new investments, and honing in on demographic challenges, in large part addressing the nation's problems of an aging population.¹⁷⁹ Abenomics began in 2013 as an economic recovery stimulus package worth \$210 billion, aimed at rejuvenating critical infrastructure projects, and was followed up with additional stimulus packages in the next year.¹⁸⁰ The Abenomics initiative additionally created changes in monetary policies

¹⁷⁵ Louisa Lim, "China Acts Fast In Aiding Japan Post-Earthquake," NPR, last modified March 15, 2011, <https://www.npr.org/2011/03/15/134567659/china-acts-fast-in-aiding-japan-post-earthquake>.

¹⁷⁶ Lim, "China Acts Fast In Aiding Japan Post-Earthquake."

¹⁷⁷ "U.S. Relations with China: 1949–2021," Council on Foreign Relations, last accessed August 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china>.

¹⁷⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan in 2013: Abenomics and Abegeopolitics," *Asian Survey* 54, no. 1 (2014): 102, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.1.101>.

¹⁷⁹ "Abenomics," JapanGov - The Government of Japan, last accessed August 2021, <https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html>.

¹⁸⁰ McBride and Xu, "Abenomics and the Japanese Economy."

related to the Bank of Japan and created underlying structural reforms aimed at diversifying and liberalizing the market and reviving the country's competitiveness on the international field.¹⁸¹

Meanwhile, TPP negotiations during this period continued to be held with the U.S., Japan, and ten other countries, excluding China, and was anticipated to be the world's largest free trade agreement once executed.¹⁸² The TPP's goals were effectively harmonious with Japan's pursuit of increased trade flows through its Abenomics policy and, as part of Washington's "Asia pivot," the TPP provided the U.S. a venue for enhanced economic ties with Japan.¹⁸³ This "pivot" towards Asia came about under the Obama administration as North Korea's continued nuclear tests and China's increasingly assertive behavior over maritime territorial disputes brought about an opportunity to expand the security role of the U.S. in East Asia.¹⁸⁴ Through the TPP's negotiations, Japan was able to push for major structural reforms in line with its Abenomics policy to include reducing "business regulations, liberalizing the labor market and agricultural sector, cutting corporate taxes, and increasing workforce diversity."¹⁸⁵

Japan's entry into the TPP negotiations caused a stir from the American public on Tokyo's motivations at the international scale. In 2012, American Congressman Dan Kildee wrote about his concerns on the inclusion of Japan in these negotiations, citing a lack of previous commitment to opening its country's economy up to the rest of the globe, a history of unfair trading balances, and currency manipulation practices.¹⁸⁶ His words

¹⁸¹ McBride and Xu, "Abenomics and the Japanese Economy."

¹⁸² James McBride, Andrew Chatzky, and Anshu Siripurapu, "What's Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified September 20, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp>.

¹⁸³ Andre Stein and Miro Vassilev, "The TPP talks are critical for both Japan's future and U.S. Asia policy," The Diplomat, last modified August 6, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/the-tpp-abenomics-and-americas-asia-pivot/>.

¹⁸⁴ Kenneth Lieberthal, "The American Pivot to Asia," Brookings, last modified December 21, 2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>.

¹⁸⁵ McBride and Xu, "Abenomics and the Japanese Economy."

¹⁸⁶ Dan Kildee, "The U.S. Can't Afford to Include Japan in the TPP," HuffPost, last modified September 4, 2012, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-us-cant-afford-to-inc_b_1854359.

resonated with other American conservative politicians that emphasized workers' rights and right-leaning media sources that more popularly fomented these concerns about Japan's economic influence. One long-term objective for the U.S. that had persisted since 1995 was reducing Japan's tariffs on agricultural products, which amounted to 14 percent on average, compared to the U.S. which was only 5 percent.¹⁸⁷ The U.S. sought to reduce these tariffs through the TPP on products such as beef, pork, dairy, fruit, vegetables, wheat, rice, and processed products.¹⁸⁸

From Beijing's perspective, Japan's Abenomics policy was viewed as a significant challenge to China since Japan had been the previous economic giant in the region and had only recently been overtaken as the world's second largest economy, while the TPP similarly drew criticism due to U.S. involvement. In just one year after the announcement of the Abenomics policy, foreign investors financed \$110 billion worth of capital into Japan's stock markets.¹⁸⁹ China's own rise, in direct competition with Japan's economic revival, contributed to negative Chinese perceptions towards Prime Minister Abe's new initiative and consequently created new anxieties, from Japan especially, over the future of Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁹⁰ Chinese public opinion over the TPP was more divided over its benefits and practicality. In early 2013, it was widely believed that the negotiations would "stagnate" over time but with the addition of Japan, new discussions were held on whether Tokyo would attempt to contain China alongside the U.S., whether new focus should be given towards regional initiatives, and whether China should consider joining the TPP itself.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ "FACT SHEET: Trans Pacific Partnership and Japan: Key Outcomes for Agriculture," U.S. Department of Agriculture, last accessed January 2022, <https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2015/11/19/fact-sheet-trans-pacific-partnership-and-japan-key-outcomes>.

¹⁸⁸ U.S. Department of Agriculture, "FACT SHEET: Trans Pacific Partnership and Japan: Key Outcomes for Agriculture."

¹⁸⁹ Peter Tasker, "Shinzo Abe's challenge to China," IRPP, last modified January 6, 2014, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/technology/tasker/>.

¹⁹⁰ Zhang, "China's Perceptions of and Responses to Abe's Foreign Policy," 423-425.

¹⁹¹ Paul Bowles, "China debates the TPP," East Asia Forum, last modified March 20, 2014, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/20/china-debates-the-tpp/>.

Domestically, the Abenomics policy was more widely well-received, not only for the emphasis on Japan's economy, but also because it undermined resistance from the Ministry of Finance which was seeking higher taxes from the public at the time and an influential interest group known as the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (JA Zenchu) which held a protectionist stance over more sensitive agricultural products that inhibited TPP negotiations.¹⁹² The TPP, on the other hand, fostered intense debate and a number of protests by various interest groups within Japan, to include farmers and other employees in the JA Zenchu organization, other stakeholders and civil rights groups, and anti-globalization activists.¹⁹³ Those who supported the TPP otherwise feared being "left behind economically" while opponents maintained that Japan would be relinquishing sovereignty over its agricultural sector despite the multilateral nature of the agreement.¹⁹⁴ The importance of Japan's participation in the TPP, however, would be emphasized by a perceived waning in the World Trade Organization's ability to control rampant economic malpractices by China and the need to become more involved in the international community with regards to rules-making.¹⁹⁵

By 2012, tensions rose between the U.S. and China after the U.S. trade deficit increased from \$273.1 billion in 2010 to \$295.5 billion in 2011.¹⁹⁶ At the time, China was "mining more than 95 percent of the world's production of rare earth minerals," which were used in many developed countries' electronics production and defense manufacturing.¹⁹⁷ The situation brought to the forefront the issue of over-reliance on China for these minerals, as well as its broader monopolization over cheap supplies, and

¹⁹² Terada Takashi, "Assessing Abe's Economic Agenda: Abenomics, TPP, and Domestic Politics," The ASAN Forum, last modified February 5, 2015, <https://theasanforum.org/assessing-abes-economic-agenda-abenomics-tpp-and-domestic-politics/>.

¹⁹³ Ulli Jamitzky, "The TPP Debate in Japan: Reasons for a Failed Protest Campaign," *Asia Pacific Perspectives* (Spring/ Summer 2015): 83–84, https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/arts_and_sciences/app_xiii1_04_jamitzky_08-17-15.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ Corey Wallace, "Japan's confused debate about the TPP," East Asia Forum, last modified November 9, 2011, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/09/japan-s-confused-debate-about-the-tpp/>.

¹⁹⁵ Yamashita Kazuhito, "Points of Controversy Surrounding the TPP," Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, last modified April 2012, https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/rieti_report/141.html.

¹⁹⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Relations with China: 1949–2021."

¹⁹⁷ Martyn, "Rare Earth Minerals: An End To China's Monopoly Is In Sight."

pushed nations to seek alternative sources. In Japan's case, the TPP was one such solution. However, replacing China as the main supplier would be difficult at the time due to the complicated processing methods of the rare earth materials that followed their extraction, which other nations struggled to replicate, particularly those that were underdeveloped.¹⁹⁸ Japan, for example, discovered a rich deposit of rare earth materials near Minami Torishima in 2012, but faced difficulties in finding an efficient means of extracting them, which necessitated these external supply chains.¹⁹⁹

As Japan looked outward from the region to connect to the rest of the globe economically during this period, security issues around the South and East China Seas were also starting to appear more prominently in the forefront. Japan had only recently come into a major confrontation with China in late 2010, when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in vicinity of the Senkaku islands.²⁰⁰ The incident led to mass Chinese protests, restrictions on rare earth mineral exports, and arrests on both sides, which in turn constrained Japan's diplomatic ties with China and highlighted Beijing's ability to leverage other countries' economic dependence to its strategic advantage.²⁰¹ This leverage would provoke scholarly discussions on the durability of Sino-Japanese economic relations and force Japan, as well as other countries that were facing China's economic coercive practices, to expand regional economic ties both bilaterally and multilaterally. Two years later in 2012, tensions rose again when Japan purchased three disputed Senkaku islands for \$26.18 million from a Japanese family that had been leasing them from the government since the 1970s.²⁰² Japan claimed the purchase was for the sake of "stability" in the situation after it was discovered a politician critical of China's activities

¹⁹⁸ June Dreyer, "China's Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why We Should Care," Foreign Policy Research Institute, last modified October 7, 2020, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/chinas-monopoly-on-rare-earth-elements-and-why-we-should-care/>.

¹⁹⁹ Dreyer, "China's Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why We Should Care."

²⁰⁰ "China's Maritime Disputes: 1895–2020," Council on Foreign Relations, last accessed August 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes>.

²⁰¹ Council on Foreign Relations, "China's Maritime Disputes: 1895–2020."

²⁰² Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japan buys disputed islands, China sends patrol ships," Reuters, last modified September 11, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china/japan-buys-disputed-islands-china-sends-patrol-ships-idUSBRE88A0GY20120911>.

intended to use them for development projects, but the incident instead sparked Chinese protests in front of the Japanese embassy in Beijing and in other parts of the country, including on the islands themselves, and prompted the Chinese government to send patrol ships in response.²⁰³

Japan and China designed a “crisis management mechanism tool” in response in order to create a forum for discussion on the maritime territorial dispute, but in 2013, China declared a controversial air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the disputed islands, allowing tensions to reemerge between the two countries.²⁰⁴ This same year, China also began construction of its artificial islands in the SCS, building military facilities, runways, and port amenities in the Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs, and was feared to be looking to expand its operations in four other lagoons.²⁰⁵ This incessant pattern of assertive behavior, in the face of attempted diplomatic talks, led to the rise in Japanese fears towards continued military build-up in the region. Japanese leadership saw the artificial islands as a means for China to extend its reach in the SCS to control sea lines of communication, monitor or disrupt foreign military activities, and to tip the balance of power in regional affairs towards China’s favor.²⁰⁶

The announcement of President Obama’s “pivot” towards Asia as a response to China’s assertive behavior was broadly favored by U.S. partners and allies in East Asia, to include Japan, with the belief that the strategy would lead to greater regional stability by providing a security balance.²⁰⁷ At the same time, most countries in the region still wanted to find opportunities to reduce tensions with China so as to prevent the complete severance of economic ties with Beijing, which often occurred through bilateral engagements with

²⁰³ Takenaka, “Japan buys disputed islands, China sends patrol ships.”

²⁰⁴ “Global Conflict Tracker - Tensions in the East China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 14, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/tensions-east-china-sea>.

²⁰⁵ Yoji Koda, “Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea,” *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (January 2016): 30, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905086>.

²⁰⁶ Koda, “Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea,” 30.

²⁰⁷ Richard Bush, “The Response of China’s Neighbors to the U.S. “Pivot” to Asia,” Brookings, last modified January 31, 2012, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-response-of-chinas-neighbors-to-the-u-s-pivot-to-asia/>.

Chinese leadership.²⁰⁸ Given the rapidly deteriorating situation with China, however, Japan sought to prioritize its security by taking advantage of the newly emphasized American stance on East Asia.²⁰⁹ Japan's engagement with the U.S. during this time aimed to preserve American security guarantees through their alliance while relocating U.S. military forces on Japanese territory due to local opposition of their presence.²¹⁰

C. 2014-2017: JAPAN'S REFOCUS ON THE MILITARY

Chinese military activities in the region gained further traction during this timeframe. By late 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe met for the first time to diffuse tensions and came to a diplomatic security agreement to improve relations, but U.S. and Chinese tensions continued to foment.²¹¹ In 2016, China announced it would conduct regular patrols and military drills in the SCS and proceeded to build aircraft hangars on disputed islands.²¹² Tokyo's diplomatic resolution with Beijing became short-lived by this year, as China's Defense Minister threatened Japan to take action if it increased its own military activities within the SCS, and subsequently by 2017, Japan announced to send its largest warship to train with the U.S. Navy in this area.²¹³ In these few years, China has continued to develop its military, which threaten to block U.S. and U.S.-allied vessels and aircraft with its growing anti-access/area denial capabilities, though Beijing remains cautious in provoking other actors into a significant conflict.²¹⁴

The U.S. position on China's military activities has continuously been in denial of Beijing's self-proclaimed historic rights to its claimed maritime territories. Japan, on the

²⁰⁸ Bush, "The Response of China's Neighbors to the U.S. "Pivot" to Asia."

²⁰⁹ H. D. .P. Envall, "Japan's 'Pivot' Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance," *Security Challenges* 12, no. 3 (2016): 10, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465595>.

²¹⁰ Envall, "Japan's 'Pivot' Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance," 12.

²¹¹ Council on Foreign Relations, "China's Maritime Disputes: 1895–2020."

²¹² Council on Foreign Relations, "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea."

²¹³ Council on Foreign Relations, "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea."

²¹⁴ Benjamin Herscovitch, "A Balanced Threat Assessment of China's South China Sea Policy," CATO Institute, last modified August 28, 2017, <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/balanced-threat-assessment-chinas-south-china-sea-policy#regional-and-global-security>.

other hand, has received continuous support, if only moral at first, when addressing the Senkaku islands. In 2014, the U.S. Department of State first conducted a comprehensive study on the legality of China's maritime territorial claims and possible interpretations of the nine-dashed line.²¹⁵ The findings suggested that in all possible interpretations, with the exception of only claiming islands within the nine-dashed line, that the claims were not following recognized international law, but even then these islands would still be disputed amongst other countries in the SCS and would need international recognition of sovereignty rights over them.²¹⁶ The U.S. has traditionally remained neutral on Japan's claims over the Senkaku Islands, but in 2014, the Obama administration recognized that the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty covered these islands under Japan's “administration.”²¹⁷

In 2013, Japan's government established the National Security Council under Prime Minister Abe, and in the years following its creation, he pushed for a reinterpretation of Japan's Constitution to enable its SDF to work more closely with the U.S. military.²¹⁸ The reinterpretation honed in on Article 9 of the Constitution, which only permits the use of force for self-defense purposes and holds “limited recognition of the right to collective self-defense in situations when threats against the United States constitute a threat to Japan's survival.”²¹⁹ Discussions related to the topic were nothing new, but Abe's lead on the pursuit for expanded use of force were noteworthy due to his broad influence and relative charismatic approaches to government policies and initiatives. Japanese media had been covering the issue for years as a bipartisan fight between the left to retain the Constitution as is and the right who desired changes for expanded self-defense rights, or in more extreme cases, for offensive capabilities similar to any other major power in the

²¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Limits in the Seas*, No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2014), 23–24, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/LIS-143.pdf>.

²¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Limits in the Seas*, 23–24.

²¹⁷ Mark Manyin, *The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations*, CRS Report No. R42761 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 8, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42761/21>.

²¹⁸ Togo, “Abe's foreign policy legacy.”

²¹⁹ Togo, “Abe's foreign policy legacy.”

world.²²⁰ As a step towards this new military stance, Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy underlined the need "for Japan to make more proactive efforts... under the evolving security environment..." but still retained emphasis on maintaining the country's image as a "peace-loving nation."²²¹

Japan also sought to work more closely with the U.S. under these expanded military roles, which Washington reciprocated welcomingly. In 2014, the U.S. and Japan held a joint press conference where Prime Minister Abe described the alliance as united on the issue towards China's assertive military behavior by seeking a path of cooperation on the matter and maintaining a status quo rather than conflict until a resolution could be found.²²² The cautious tone was alluding to President Obama's concern that, while the U.S. would support Japan's "administration" of the Senkaku Islands under the security treaty, that the U.S. still did not take a stance on any sovereignty determination and that a status quo was preferred.²²³ The joint statement reiterated the importance of upholding "regional and global rules and norms" together and towards "respect for international law," sharing the recognition of the need to settle maritime territorial disputes through legal arbitration.²²⁴

While Japan was highly receptive towards working with the U.S. on fostering greater regional stability, it still sought its own autonomy for its national security interests. In 2014, Japan made a major step in reinterpreting Article 9 of its constitution to expand its military force capabilities to include the right to "collective self-defense," which meant

²²⁰ "The slugfest over Article 9 of Japan's constitution," Japan Today, last modified January 19, 2015, <https://japantoday.com/category/features/opinions/the-slugfest-over-article-9-of-japans-constitution>.

²²¹ Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, *National Security Strategy* (Tokyo: Cabinet of Japan, 2013), 3–4, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

²²² "Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan," White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House Archives, last modified April 24, 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan>.

²²³ Manyin, *The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations*, 8.

²²⁴ "U.S.–Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond," White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House Archives, last modified April 25, 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac#>.

that Japan could more easily support U.S. operations in the region so long as there was an immediate threat to Japan's own survival.²²⁵ This action was justified by Japan's leadership who pointed to the increasingly hostile security environment, but the move was highly controversial domestically as support for the constitution otherwise remained very strong and internationally with remnant fears of a remilitarized Japan.²²⁶ By 2015, Japan was also modifying regulations pertaining to official development assistance that would allow sales to bolster other countries' military capabilities.²²⁷ This same year, Japan legalized the military to fight overseas for the first time since WWII, which led to domestic protests and fears that Japan was shying away from its pacifist traditions.²²⁸

News media outlets at the time reported that "tens of thousands of protesters gathered near Japan's parliament building... to oppose legislation allowing the military to fight overseas," with hundreds of other protests spawning nationwide.²²⁹ On the other hand, domestic polls have also indicated public support for military activities that are used for "international non-combative operations and protecting Japanese territory," with the point of contention primarily being activities conducted for anything other than self-defense.²³⁰ The strong domestic response served to restrict Abe's foreign policy flexibility when it came to arranging a stronger military stance within the region and it limited the

²²⁵ Kawasaki Akira and Céline Nahory, "Japan's Decision on Collective Self-Defense in Context," *The Diplomat*, last modified October 3, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japans-decision-on-collective-self-defense-in-context/>.

²²⁶ Jonathan Pollack, "Japan's Defense Policy Revision – Where is Japan Headed?," Brookings, last modified August 17, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/japans-defense-policy-revision-where-is-japan-headed/>.

²²⁷ Lionel Fatton, "'Japan Is Back': Autonomy and Balancing Amidst an Unstable China–U.S.–Japan Triangle," *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 2 (2018): 274, <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.240>.

²²⁸ "Japan to allow military role overseas in historic move," BBC, last modified September 18, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362>.

²²⁹ Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Huge protest in Tokyo rails against PM Abe's security bills," Reuters, last modified August 30, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-protest/huge-protest-in-tokyo-rails-against-pm-abes-security-bills-idUSKCN0QZ0C320150830>.

²³⁰ Cory Madison, "Tracking Public Support for Japan's Remilitarization Policies: An Examination of Elitist and Pluralist Governance," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (2019): 134, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891118764354>.

SDF's ability to act in a supporting role for any U.S. military security arrangements in response to China's growing assertiveness.²³¹

China's response to these major changes in Japan's pacifist policies were largely negative. Chinese news media outlets and the public have often expressed concern over the potential shift from Japan's pacifist stance towards a more aggressive posture akin to what was seen in WWII.²³² Cornerstone to the perceived issue was that the reinterpretation of Article 9 was incredibly vague and broad in what could be considered a threat to Japan and that it lacked few legislative barriers from preventing its implementation or future reinterpretations similar to this one.²³³ From the Chinese perspective, this new behavior from Tokyo also undermined previous Sino-Japanese joint public statements in pursuing peaceful cooperation and resolution towards disputed regional matters and exposed Chinese anxieties of Japan's historic wartime anxieties.²³⁴ China did not appear to take economic punitive measures against Japan's decision, but did attempt to play on domestic opposition to delegitimize the Abe government, suggesting Japan's leadership was willing to "ignore Japanese public opinion," although such exploitive tactics were very limited in their ability to convince the Japanese public that the Japanese government was actively working against their interests due to public wariness of China's manipulative narratives.²³⁵

In April 2015, the U.S. and Japan released a joint statement to reaffirm peaceful intentions of the alliance and to announce the release of "Guidelines for Japan-U.S.

²³¹ Carlos Ramirez, "Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under Abe: From Neoconservatism and Neoautonomy to Pragmatic Realism," *Pacific Review* 34, no. 1 (2021): 167, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1653358>.

²³² Grace Cheng, "China's Response to a Post-Pacifist Japan," E-International Relations, last modified September 14, 2014, <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/14/chinas-response-to-a-post-pacifist-japan/>.

²³³ Pollack, "Japan's Defense Policy Revision – Where is Japan Headed?"

²³⁴ Gui Yongtao, "A Chinese View: The Risks of Changing Japan's Peace Constitution," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 11, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinese-view-risks-changing-japans-peace-constitution>.

²³⁵ Amy King, "China's response to Japan's constitutional reinterpretation," East Asia Forum, last modified July 27, 2014, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/27/china-responds-to-japans-constitutional-reinterpretation/>.

Defense Cooperation” for greater clarity in the responsibilities of the two countries to each other.²³⁶ While not an explicit answer to Japan’s “collective self-defense” threat scope, this document provided some clarity on how the countries would work together to address them while emphasizing the “persistent and emerging” nature of some threats, particularly those of space and cyberspace.²³⁷ These activities would include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air and missile defense, maritime security, asset protection, training and exercises, logistic support, and use of facilities.²³⁸ The joint statement emphasized in particular Japan’s peaceful intentions, likely to repress regional fears of Japanese remilitarization as it sought to expand the scope of its military activities, which in turn benefitted the U.S. in maintaining a presence in the region.²³⁹

Constitutional revisions have also put at stake regional perceptions towards Japan’s sincerity in its apologies for the atrocities it committed during WWII, although Tokyo has made various attempts at reconciliation with countries in East Asia. Even with the U.S., Prime Minister Abe and President Obama made rotating visits to one another’s country in 2015 and 2016 with the common theme of making amends for the wartime damage each country committed to the other during WWII.²⁴⁰ In a similar manner, Abe made a public apology statement to the rest of the region on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII and remarkably came to a compensation agreement with South Korea on the past comfort women system, even though contention with Seoul remains over the issue today.²⁴¹ China has notoriously downplayed the genuineness of Japan’s apologies, in part because there are still older generations of Chinese who retain a stronger resentment based on their

²³⁶ Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, *A Stronger Alliance For a Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* (New York: SCC, 2015), 1, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/js20150427e.pdf.

²³⁷ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2015), 3–4, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf.

²³⁸ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 5–7.

²³⁹ Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, *A Stronger Alliance For a Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1.

²⁴⁰ Togo, “Abe’s foreign policy legacy.”

²⁴¹ Togo, “Abe’s foreign policy legacy.”

experiences, but some scholars also point to Beijing's convenient use of Japan's past to "exert political leverage" over Tokyo by manipulating the country's wartime guilt.²⁴²

By 2015, TPP negotiations had also come to a conclusion and centered on five primary features: comprehensive market access, a regional approach to commitments, addressing new trade challenges, inclusive trade, and a platform for regional integration.²⁴³ The agreement established a set of guidelines for regional trade, recognizing "new and emerging trade issues" to include the digital economy, and sought to address other common grievances related to marketing.²⁴⁴ By the time the negotiations were agreed upon, China had not yet made a decision to join, but most of the countries involved were already wary of China's admission into the TPP anyways.²⁴⁵ In Japan's case, Tokyo likely sought to diminish China's economic influence over the region, to become a larger player in world politics, and for its own economic growth.²⁴⁶

Not long after though, the U.S. dropped out of the TPP under the Trump administration in 2017. Former-President Trump criticized the lack of economic independence from allies and partner nations, preferring instead to seek ways to negotiate bilaterally with individual countries to prevent unfair deals.²⁴⁷ This move to pull out of the TPP was criticized domestically in the U.S. by those who believed that the TPP would have been beneficial to the American economy and assured U.S. allies of the commitment the

²⁴² Shogo Suzuki, "Will Japan's war apologies ever satisfy China?," East Asia Forum, last modified November 5, 2015, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/05/will-japans-war-apologies-ever-satisfy-china/>.

²⁴³ "Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement," Office of the United States Trade Representative, last modified October 4, 2015, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership>.

²⁴⁴ Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement."

²⁴⁵ Terada Takashi, "Japan and the TPP Conclusion: Regional Order, Negotiations, and Domestic Adjustment," The ASAN Forum, last modified October 23, 2015, <https://theasanforum.org/japan-and-the-tpp-conclusion-regional-order-negotiations-and-domestic-adjustment/>.

²⁴⁶ Takashi, "Japan and the TPP Conclusion: Regional Order, Negotiations, and Domestic Adjustment."

²⁴⁷ Mireya Solís, "Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership," Brookings, last modified March 24, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/>.

U.S. maintains towards the Indo-Pacific region.²⁴⁸ Those who criticized the TPP itself argued previous trade agreements with too many concessions had put the U.S. in a trade deficit, which was resulting in the loss of American jobs and allowing other countries to “free ride” on the U.S. market at the American people’s expense.²⁴⁹ In actuality, there were very few U.S. concessions towards the TPP negotiations, but there was still room for improvement in addressing other issues of the deal, such as prohibiting currency manipulation practices and rewriting provisions for controversial dispute settlement processes.²⁵⁰ However, the prominence of attacks on the TPP in the 2016 presidential campaign meant U.S. participation would be determined by domestic politics rather than by strategic value.

By 2018, Trump suggested at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland that the U.S. would be willing to consider rejoining the TPP if the terms of the deal could be renegotiated.²⁵¹ Instead, the remaining countries moved forward and negotiated a new deal: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which was signed and came in to effect by the end of 2018.²⁵² In contrast to its predecessor, which was planned to account for over 30 percent of the world’s GDP, the CPTPP was much smaller at only 13 percent of GDP due to the U.S.’ withdrawal.²⁵³ Japan took the lead in the new negotiations, hoping that it would eventually be able to persuade the U.S. back into joining the agreement.²⁵⁴ While the situation provided Japan with a

²⁴⁸ Solís, “Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.”

²⁴⁹ Jeffrey Schott, “TPP Can Be Fixed If You Know What’s Wrong With It,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, last modified December 5, 2016, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-can-be-fixed-if-you-know-whats-wrong-it>.

²⁵⁰ Schott, “TPP Can Be Fixed If You Know What’s Wrong With It.”

²⁵¹ Adam Taylor, “A timeline of Trump’s complicated relationship with the TPP,” The Washington Post, last modified April 13, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/a-timeline-of-trumps-complicated-relationship-with-the-tpp/>.

²⁵² James Kane, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),” Institute for Government, last modified February 2, 2021, <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/trade-cptpp>.

²⁵³ Kane, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).”

²⁵⁴ Terada Takashi, “How and Why Japan Has Saved the TPP: From Trump Tower to Davos,” The ASAN Forum, last modified February 19, 2018, <https://theasanforum.org/how-and-why-japan-has-saved-the-tpp-from-trump-tower-to-davos/>.

great opportunity to become more internationally involved, at the same time, China was also able to benefit from the situation. Other countries in Asia, such as the Philippines, instead sought better trade agreements with China given the perceived reluctance of the U.S. to engage more proactively with its allies and partners.²⁵⁵ To some extent, Japan was also willing to cooperate more fruitfully with China, suggesting it would be willing to work with China on its Belt and Road Initiative and planning to conduct more state visits to reduce tensions in the region.²⁵⁶

D. 2018–2021: U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR

Since the creation of the CPTPP, the countries involved have experienced mixed results that have “largely paralleled” global trade flows, with Japan experiencing a significant growth in digital trade.²⁵⁷ By September 2021, China also sought to join the agreement to bolster its own economic initiatives in complete contrast to the U.S., although the CPTPP’s standards were considered more in line with liberal institutional values, such as labor rights protection, and potentially could have served as a limitation for China to pursue its own economic interests.²⁵⁸ In the meantime, Japan continued to push for the U.S. to reconsider joining the CPTPP, even extending an invitation to Taiwan at the risk of upsetting China, likely in a move to urge greater security cooperation both in the region and with its long-time ally.²⁵⁹ President Biden was reluctant to join the CPTPP though, expressing concerns over a lack of “stronger labor and environmental standards” and a desire to renegotiate some of the terms, but other countries were already wary of and

²⁵⁵ Timothy Heath, “Strategic Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from TPP,” RAND, last modified March 27, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/03/strategic-consequences-of-us-withdrawal-from-tpp.html/>.

²⁵⁶ Yoichi Funabashi and Harry Dempsey, “Trump Threat Drives Japan and China Closer,” *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2017): 6, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2186179074>.

²⁵⁷ Kati Suominen, “Two Years into CPTPP,” CSIS, last modified August 9, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-cptpp>.

²⁵⁸ Mireya Solís, “China moves to join the CPTPP, but don’t expect a fast pass,” Brookings, last modified September 23, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/23/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/>.

²⁵⁹ Ryo Aibara and Takumi Wakai, “Japan welcomes application by Taiwan to join CPTPP trade deal,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, last modified September 24, 2021, <https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14446813>.

disappointed by Washington's lack of previous commitment for this to occur in any likelihood.²⁶⁰

In the background of these activities, the U.S.-China trade war was beginning to take place. In March 2018, U.S.-China relations took a sharp spiral downward turn as the Trump administration created significant import taxes on steel and aluminum in response to Chinese theft of technology and intellectual property.²⁶¹ Throughout July 2018, the U.S. and China continued their trade war, matching tariffs on hundreds of products valued at about \$34 billion on each side.²⁶² Prime Minister Abe was evidently disappointed by the lack of tariff exemptions for Japan on steel and aluminum imports, yet remained non-confrontational with the U.S. on the matter.²⁶³ Talks between Washington and Tokyo were later delayed towards the end of 2018 after a new set of tariffs was unleashed on Beijing, and with the continued assertive and domineering rhetoric the Trump administration maintained throughout the situation, the Japanese government became more wary of the U.S. seeking stronger bilateral trading relations in an attempt to oust China from a more stable, multilateral arrangement.²⁶⁴

The trade war finds its origins in China's rapid economic rise. In 2019, trade between the U.S. and China amounted to \$559 billion in 2019, but the U.S. fell into a massive trade deficit with China that was nearly \$346 billion that same year.²⁶⁵ Former-President Trump blamed China for unfair trading practices that included "intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, lack of market access for American companies

²⁶⁰ McBride, Chatzky, and Siripurapu, "What's Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?"

²⁶¹ Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Relations with China: 1949–2021."

²⁶² Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Relations with China: 1949–2021."

²⁶³ Kanako Itamae and Lee Jay Walker, "Japan warns about tit-for-tat trade tariffs between America and China," *Modern Tokyo Times*, last modified April 3, 2018, <http://moderntokyotimes.com/japan-warns-about-tit-for-tat-trade-tariffs-between-america-and-china/>.

²⁶⁴ Sawako Uchida and Lee Jay Walker, "US and Japan trade talks set back after fresh tariffs imposed on China: Beijing today, Tokyo tomorrow?," *Modern Tokyo Times*, last modified September 18, 2018, <http://moderntokyotimes.com/us-and-japan-trade-talks-set-back-after-fresh-tariffs-imposed-on-china-beijing-today-tokyo-tomorrow/>.

²⁶⁵ "What is the US-China trade war?," *SCMP*, last modified April 13, 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3078745/what-us-china-trade-war-how-it-started-and-what-inside-phase>.

in China, and... [subsidies that] favoured Chinese companies.”²⁶⁶ Beijing, in turn, believed that Washington was trying to contain China, and it would not be until November 2021 that President Biden and President Xi Jinping would meet with each other for the first time in a show of diplomacy.²⁶⁷

Some Japanese media speculated that the trade relations were having an adverse effect on President Xi Jinping’s ability to maintain authority and control over the situation. According to the Modern Tokyo Times, Xi was “widely seen as failing to thwart what the Chinese Foreign Ministry [called] Trump’s ‘hegemonic’ and *lingba* (‘bullying’) tactics.”²⁶⁸ Despite the loss of credence Xi Jinping may have garnered over the course of the trade war, the overall perception appears to be that the U.S. hurt its own economy without ever having achieved a sustainable solution to China’s economic coercive practices.²⁶⁹ The trade war with China “cost an estimated 0.3 percentage point in U.S. real GDP and almost 300,000 jobs,” with spillover effects damaging the global economy as well.²⁷⁰

Right as the trade war began, Japan was requesting the U.S. find a quick solution to its problems with China, fearing an imminent situation that would escalate and disrupt global supply chains.²⁷¹ The trade war in particular hurt Japan’s exports of cars and car parts to both the U.S. and China, with official data in October 2019 showing a hard 9.2

SCMP, “What is the US-China trade war?”

²⁶⁷ “US-China relations: is there still a trade war under Joe Biden’s presidency?,” SCMP, last modified May 23, 2021, <https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3134191/us-china-relations-there-still-trade-war-under-joe-bidens?module=inline&pgtype=article>.

²⁶⁸ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Xi’s Grip Loosens Amid Trade War Policy Paralysis,” Modern Tokyo Times, last modified August 26, 2018, <http://moderntokyotimes.com/xis-grip-loosens-amid-trade-war-policy-paralysis/>.

²⁶⁹ Ryan Hass and Abraham Denmark, “More pain than gain: How the US-China trade war hurt America,” Brookings, last modified August 7, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/07/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-us-china-trade-war-hurt-america/>.

²⁷⁰ Mark Zandi, Jesse Rogers, and Maria Cosma, “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage Done,” *Moody’s Analytics* (September 2019): 2, <https://www.moodyanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/trade-war-chicken.pdf>.

²⁷¹ Tetsushi Kajimoto, “Japan calls for early solution to U.S.-China trade war,” Reuters, last modified September 17, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-u-s-trade/japan-calls-for-early-solution-to-u-s-china-trade-war-idUSKCN1LY046>.

percent drop in exports.²⁷² Nearly 45 percent of Japanese companies reported lower profits due to the trade war that year, with some business-owners expressing greater concerns of an impending recession.²⁷³ Being the third largest economy in the world, and a significant trading partner to both countries, Japan was inevitably going to be heavily impacted by the trade war.²⁷⁴ But, there was little in the way of Tokyo being able to convince either country of reversing course due to its relative lack of political influence.

Tensions in the South and East China Seas continued to escalate in the background of this deteriorating economic situation. Right at the start of 2018, various incidents contributed to these tensions. An H-6 bomber landed on a reef for the first time ever in the SCS, and near the Spratly Islands a Chinese destroyer nearly collided into a U.S. destroyer, prompting condemnation from both sides.²⁷⁵ That same year, the U.S. had been increasing its military activities in the SCS, most notably its Freedom of Navigation Operations, to demonstrate to China the need for respect towards international maritime rules and norms.²⁷⁶ Tokyo and Beijing at this time sought to create a hotline to communicate better as a preventative tool from escalation, but China flight sorties instead increased in 2018 and were trending upwards into 2019 as well.²⁷⁷ Japan responded by building military bases on nearby islands to monitor China's activities.²⁷⁸ In 2020, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo reiterated the U.S. stance on the region, stating that Beijing's offshore resource claims were "completely unlawful," that there was value in supporting allies and

²⁷² "Japan's exports drop the most in three years as trade war hits," Aljazeera, last modified November 20, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/20/japans-exports-drop-the-most-in-three-years-as-trade-war-hits>.

²⁷³ Tetsushi Kajimoto, "Japan Inc increasingly hit by trade war, but few shifting from China: Reuters poll," Reuters, last modified September 12, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-companies-trade/japan-inc-increasingly-hit-by-trade-war-but-few-shifting-from-china-reuters-poll-idUSKCN1VX2Y2>.

²⁷⁴ Chang Sun et al., "The Impact of the US-China Trade War on Japanese Multinational Corporations," *RIETI Discussion Paper Series 19-E-050* (July 2019): 1, <https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/19e050.pdf>.

²⁷⁵ Council on Foreign Relations. "China's Maritime Disputes: 1895–2020."

²⁷⁶ Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea."

²⁷⁷ Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker - Tensions in the East China Sea."

²⁷⁸ Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker - Tensions in the East China Sea."

partners in search of a “rules-based international order,” and that China has become an “unprecedented threat” to the region.²⁷⁹ In January 2021, VOA News reported on Japan’s submission of a note to the United Nations “rejecting China’s baseline claims and denouncing its efforts to limit the freedom of navigation and overflight.”²⁸⁰ A few months prior, Japan had also conducted anti-submarine exercises in the SCS.²⁸¹

Meanwhile, tensions with China on Taiwan’s status were also boiling over. In recent years, China has sought out various methods of undermining Taiwan’s government, which have included interference in elections, cyber warfare, and diplomatic pressure to assert political influence over the island.²⁸² Beijing makes concerted efforts to undermine Taiwan’s democracy where it can, often by using these methods, to diminish perceptions of a functioning and independent government and to eventually reintegrate Taiwan as a special administrative region from China.²⁸³ Japan has grown concerned over China’s increasingly assertive behavior in this situation, becoming more direct in 2021 by issuing joint statements with the U.S. and holding press conferences where sympathy was extended towards Taiwan.²⁸⁴ Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso also suggested a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be considered an “existential threat” for Japan, which would allow Tokyo to assist the U.S. in responding to China under collective self-defense.²⁸⁵

²⁷⁹ Michael Pompeo, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of State, last modified July 13, 2020, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html>.

²⁸⁰ Zachary Haver, “Japan Latest Nation to Contest Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,” VOA News, last modified January 23, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_japan-latest-nation-contest-beijings-south-china-sea-claims/6201116.html.

²⁸¹ Haver, “Japan Latest Nation to Contest Beijing’s South China Sea Claims.”

²⁸² Lindsay Maizland, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense.”

²⁸³ Richard Bush, “Taiwan’s democracy and the China challenge,” Brookings, last modified January 22, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/>.

²⁸⁴ Brian Waidelich and Elizabeth Barrett, “Japan’s New Defense White Paper Elevates Security Concerns Over Taiwan Strait,” CNA, last modified July 23, 2021, <https://www.cna.org/news/InDepth/2021/07/japans-defense-white-paper-security-concerns-taiwan-strait>.

²⁸⁵ Waidelich and Barrett, “Japan’s New Defense White Paper Elevates Security Concerns Over Taiwan Strait.”

E. CONCLUSION

As China's military activities became more assertive in the last decade, the question of whether Japan would be self-sufficient enough to meet its economic and security interests with diminished support from the U.S. became hotly debated amongst its domestic public. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a prominent figure in leading foreign policy shifts on Japan's stance towards U.S.-China competition, most widely recognized through his Abenomics program and pursuit of constitutional revisions. Japan nonetheless valued its alliance with the U.S. as a long-standing security benefactor and openly welcomed Washington's "pivot" towards the region as discussions continued on the degree to which Japan should become more militarized without undermining its pacifist traditions.

Japan took Washington's new "pivot" strategy as an opportunity to integrate and coordinate its SDF more closely with the U.S. as China continued to become more assertive in its maritime territorial claims in the SCS. However, when the U.S. shied away from the TPP and more adamantly demanded changes in its trade relations with China, Japan had to become more proactive in revising its foreign policies to address its economic and security interests. Tokyo responded by leading the negotiations for the creation of the CPTPP, demonstrating a larger role in the region's economic affairs, and hesitantly remained open to the idea of allowing China to participate in the partnership so long as Beijing was more willing to abide by internationally recognized maritime laws. Japan has also become more active in altering its constitutional provisions to allow for expanded self-defense capabilities, which has become particularly salient in light of growing fears of a potential conflict over Taiwan.

Japan's main security and economic drivers were heavily influenced by the growing competition between the U.S. and China, but Tokyo has gained much greater fiscal and political flexibility in its foreign policy responses since the Cold War era. Japan's entrance into the TPP negotiations demonstrated a willingness to become more involved in interregional affairs as it sought to boost its domestic economic initiatives and to reduce Japanese dependency on the Chinese economy. As China's assertive military stance over the SCS became more prominent and the U.S. shifted more of its attention on the region to counter Beijing's growing influence, Japanese leadership sought more ways to integrate

security cooperation with the U.S. into the interpretation of Japan's pacifist constitution. Japan made significant strides in achieving greater military involvement in regional affairs, to include collective self-defense, but not without major protests from Japanese citizens who wanted to maintain the SDF as is.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. JAPAN AND THE COLD WAR ERA

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis' research has provided a thorough review of Japan's historical relations with the U.S. and China in order to interpret patterns of security and economic drivers for Tokyo's foreign policy responses to the two countries' competition in the Indo-Pacific region. Below, a brief summary of each of the researched decade periods will first be reviewed in order. In the following section, the security and economic drivers will be analyzed over time to determine patterns of behavior by Japan in response to U.S.-China competition. Then, future policy recommendations for the U.S. to cooperate with Japan in response to China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region will be discussed. It is hoped that American policymakers and military leaders will take into account these historical relations in order to determine the best path forward in dealing with an increasingly assertive and manipulative Chinese government.

B. OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL FINDINGS

Starting with the 1940s and 1950s, Japan's security and economic drivers were heavily interlocked. Japan began the Cold War era occupied by U.S. forces after its loss in World War II, which led to its democratization and demilitarization as a former major aggressor of the war. The U.S. was significantly concerned about Japan's economic recovery due to the devastation and a rising communist threat in the region coming from China and the USSR. Domestically, Japan's elite was primarily concerned about its economic revival and relied heavily on the U.S. to kickstart it but remained apprehensive about the possibility of becoming over-dependent on its new partner. Once the Korean War broke out in 1950, Japan found its venue for reviving its economy by fulfilling massive military and logistical supply orders for U.S. forces fighting the war. Meanwhile, China avoided becoming a direct threat to Japan beyond the worry of communism spreading in the region. Japanese threat perceptions were otherwise primarily directed at the Soviet Union by the 1950s, due to its growing communist influence, military strength, and perceived assertiveness.

Japan's security drivers in the late 1940s and early 1950s were highly constrained by Tokyo's fiscal capacity to respond to perceptions of an increasingly hostile environment as Soviet communist influence spread into the Indo-Pacific region and as the Korean War broke out. Japan's economy was too far in shambles from the aftermath of WWII, its national security was too far dependent on the U.S., and its own domestic government was lacking autonomy under U.S. occupation to be able to respond on its own. Similarly, Japan's economic drivers were based on a heavy reliance of U.S. economic assistance to propel its nation back to normality. Although Japan's own initiatives through the Korean War allowed the nation to restore its industrial production levels to what they were prior to WWII, Tokyo still relied on American financial aid. This would be, in part, a secondhand effect of the U.S. restricting Japanese economic relations with China into the late 1950s, even though Tokyo would maintain diplomatic ties to Beijing.

In the 1960s and 1970s, China started to become a more prominent and unpredictable threat to Japan's national security after it acquired nuclear capabilities, attacked Taiwan, and enacted more radical communist policies. Once Beijing launched its Great Leap Forward initiative, China completely severed diplomatic ties to Japan. The U.S. contributed uncertainty to Japan's security situation with the Nixon administration's sudden outreach to Beijing in 1972, after which China pursued a more open-door policy. Washington intended to reinvigorate U.S. relations with China while asserting Japan would need to lift more of its own weight towards its defense budget. This created greater pressures on Japanese leadership and the public to revise its constitution and solicited discussions on the role the U.S. played towards Japan's national security. Japan also attempted to foster diplomatic relations with China once more after Beijing re-opened its doors, even with the Taiwan legal status issue remaining a contentious topic, but retained its relations with the U.S. owing to its political and economic weight in global affairs.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Japan achieved an unprecedented economic growth with American economic assistance through the 1960s being a significant factor. U.S. military protection through the 1960s also freed up Japan's resources to be able to facilitate this economic growth. China, in contrast, turned inwards with its radical domestic economic policies during its Great Leap Forward initiative, putting Beijing in a position

where it could hardly sustain its society's basic needs and isolating its country from fostering economic relations with Japan. However, China's subsequent open-door policy was seen by the Japanese public as a new market opportunity, which helped foster trade relations significantly in a matter of a few years.

Japan's security drivers during the 1980s became more focused on tensions over the legal status of Taiwan and a series of diplomatic incidents in the 1980s that put further strains on Sino-Japanese relations, along with Soviet military build-up in the background. Combined, the threats highlighted the importance of U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation in the region. The discussion of whether Japan should reinforce its security through its own defense budget became prominent once more, both in the U.S. and Japan, soliciting fears of remilitarization but also hopes for a more independent and healthy nation to resurge. However, U.S.-Japanese security relations waned during this period as Japanese people increasingly viewed the U.S. as less willing to protect Japan in the event of a security conflict due to Japan's amassing economic strength and due to a common belief that Japan was not upholding its fair share of the alliance in international affairs.

Japan's massive rise in economic power during the 1980s led to American accusations of unfair trading practices against Tokyo, but even as this situation increased tensions between the two countries, the Japanese public still viewed the U.S. as an important ally for Japan's national security interests. The Japanese public perceived a relative decline in American power as their country experienced an unprecedented growth in the economy, which began wider discussions on the role Japan would have on the future of the region's economic affairs. The situation gave rise to a new economic rivalry, especially as Sino-U.S. relations were developing. China saw its own economic boom in the 1980s after it started its open-door policy, but Japan still held a significant trade surplus over the country. This concerned Chinese citizens of an over-dependence on Japan for its markets, but economic relations otherwise remained substantial between Beijing and Tokyo as trade volume between the two countries increased substantially in the 1980s. The Japanese government was largely willing to overlook the growing number of diplomatic incidents in order to preserve economic relations with China.

Japan's main security drivers in the 1990s and early 2000s were focused on China's pursuit of acquiring new military capabilities and expanding arms sales were becoming more alarming to Japanese leadership, prompting concern that Beijing was seeking greater regional influence. It was in this same timeframe that debates surrounding Japan's pacifist constitutional limitations on direct military involvement in international affairs came to the forefront, catalyzed by restraints on support for the U.S. response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, which led to a significant shift in Japan's policies to participate more in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping activities. China's increasingly assertive stance in the South China Sea (SCS) also led to stronger political advocacy for military reform and would set the stage for Japanese support towards greater U.S. involvement in the region.

After the Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Japan's economic growth slowed considerably and a variety of growing domestic issues exacerbated its situation. This period of stagnation in Japan's economy coincided with China's rise. In the 2000s, Japan's economy picked back up again until the global recession of 2008, when its growth once again stagnated, and it experienced one of its worst recessions. By 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy as Tokyo was caught grappling with the aftermath of a massive natural disaster in its country the following year. Beijing's new international economic standing fueled Japan's fears of an increasing dependence on China's economy.

From 2011 to 2013, Japan was most focused on its Abenomics program and the surge of military tension rising in the region. After a massive natural disaster struck in 2011, Japan was supported by both the U.S. and China in its time of need, demonstrating the cordial, though often lukewarm, relations Japan was able to maintain with China despite its growing concerns over Beijing's hegemonic aspirations. The natural disaster also forced Japan to reevaluate its economic interests and so the Abenomics initiative was formed to pull Japan out of its financial slump. Abenomics was revered as largely successful by its domestic audience which encouraged Japan to continue seeking other means of economic recovery and growth. At this time, Japan turned to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) program to enhance its initiative. This also allowed Japan to extend its economic ties to avoid an over-reliance on China, but its economic successes would be undermined by an

increasingly tense situation with Beijing over the contentious Senkaku Islands. China's military activities became particularly noteworthy during this period and the U.S. responded with its "pivot" towards Asia, which Japan openly welcomed.

From 2014 to 2017, Japan began to refocus on its military forces and towards the end of the period, relations with the U.S. began to deteriorate under the Trump administration. Japan initially and unsuccessfully tried to diffuse tensions with China as the U.S. asserted Beijing's maritime territorial claims were unlawful. Japan sought to reinterpret its pacifist constitution to incorporate greater military capabilities beyond self-defense as a result of the tensions. These efforts, though relatively small, had a large impact on domestic and international perspectives towards the future role of Japan in the region. Japan also sought to integrate its military more with the U.S., with leadership from both countries warmly welcoming the other's alliance to promote greater peace and stability in the region. Japan's leadership was met with a lot of resistance domestically and in the region for fears of the country's potential remilitarization. As such, the U.S. and Japan made a joint declaration in 2015 in an attempt to alleviate some of these concerns, though China would remain highly skeptical of Japan's intentions. This same year, the TPP negotiations came to a conclusion and was highly anticipated to be successful, but the U.S. dropped out only two years later under the Trump administration. Out of this incident, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement was created with Japan leading its negotiations.

Finally, from 2018 to 2021, the CPTPP continued on without U.S. participation while China sought to join instead. Even under the Biden administration, the U.S. remained unwilling to step back into the agreement without renegotiations. The failure of the U.S. to remain in the TPP was widely criticized as a move that alienated allies and partners in the region and prevented an ideal economic opportunity for everyone involved. In this same timeframe, the U.S.-China trade war began and threatened to undermine the global supply chain. Japanese leadership and media criticized both sides as Japanese businesses began to suffer from the economic tensions. Meanwhile, tensions continued to build in the South and East China Seas with failed efforts to alleviate the situation due to Beijing increasing its military activities in spite of diplomatic efforts from Tokyo. The U.S. also started

conducting more military operations in the region as Japan itself started building military bases on islands nearby. The situation in Taiwan exacerbated tensions between all three nations, raising fears that a conflict could arise out of a Chinese invasion of the island.

Over the last decade, Japan's security responses to regional great power competition (GPC) have pivoted Japanese policies towards greater U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, despite significant economic tensions, and underlined the growing threat of China's military activities in the SCS. Tokyo attempted to manage security tensions with Beijing from the start of China's assertive behavior through their crisis management mechanism tool, but it was undermined by China's increasingly pronounced military activities in the SCS. Japanese leadership progressively sought to circumvent its constitutional limitations to expand its military role in the region and decrease dependence on the U.S. for Japan's national security, which included the significant change in allowing for collective self-defense and the first move since the end of WWII to allow the Japanese military to fight overseas. Tokyo's government faced significant domestic and regional backlash with respect to these moves, which served to limit how progressive Japan could be in altering its constitution, but Japan has nonetheless shown less reluctance in moving forward with gaining greater military capabilities to pursue a more autonomous security strategy. Taiwan has now become the center point of attention with growing fears that a potential conflict could arise between the U.S. and China that would draw Japan into a war and drastically alter its constitutional provisions away from its pacifist origins.

Japan's foreign and domestic policies over the last decade also shifted in response to its relative economic decline. The Abenomics initiative sought to inspire and instill hope in the public that Japan would recover as it once had by encouraging competition, foreign investment, and sound fiscal management. Prime Minister Abe saw Japan's entrance into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement as one means of promoting this domestic initiative. Both Washington and Beijing expressed concerns about Japan's involvement in the negotiations for the TPP, citing a history of unfair trading practices and a potential strategic shift in containing China's rise respectively. The TPP fostered intense debate within Japan as well, but the Abenomics initiative was otherwise widely approved of by the Japanese public, likely reinforcing Japan's pursuit for entrance into the TPP in

the end by buttressing Japan's economic revival. The Japanese public viewed international economic institutions as waning in the capacity to enforce the rule of law in the region as China's economic coercive practices and increasing assertiveness in the SCS became more noteworthy. This similarly had an effect on greater willingness to accept the TPP, but the U.S. decision to drop out of the TPP later put Japan in a new predicament. As the remaining countries scrambled to create a new deal, Japan was able to take a leading role in the development of its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which would signify Japan's rise once more. However, the U.S.-China trade war undermined Japan's ability to make substantial progress on this front.

C. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DRIVERS

Looking at the trends throughout history, there has mostly been consistency in Japan's foreign policy decisions in reaction to the perceived threat level of its security environment, so long as fiscal and political constraints are taken into consideration. There has also been a consistency in trends indicating a fear of over-dependence on the U.S. for Japan's national security. The most evident exception was the beginning of the Cold War era, where Japan had very little autonomy over its government decisions, was faltering to recover economically, and did not yet see China as a major rival or potential adversary. Even as the Korean War started, Japan avoided becoming militarily involved and was much more willing to accept U.S. intervention in its place. This changed by the 1960s, when Japan did economically recover and China was becoming a greater threat in the region with its nuclearization and radical policies. Japan's leadership more fervently sought to revise the constitution to incorporate greater military capabilities in response to a heightened threat perception. However, domestic constraints prevented major changes to the constitution, and so by the 1970s, Japan sought to re-establish diplomatic relations with China to ease those tensions. This was in the midst of a growing fear of over-dependence on the U.S. for Japan's national security as Washington was more willing to negotiate with Beijing on re-establishing economic relations.

Threat perceptions rose once more in the 1980s over the issue of the legal status of Taiwan and various diplomatic incidents between Tokyo and Beijing. The situation

enabled Japan to push for greater U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, but this would still be constrained by constitutional limitations. The Japanese public again displayed fear of over-dependence on the U.S. during this period, when its economy was at its high point and when it was more widely believed Japan was not upholding its end of the alliance. China's pursuit of greater military capabilities in the 1990s and early 2000s allowed for stronger domestic advocacy of military reform, setting a precedence for a major policy shift to allow the Japanese military to perform U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations despite regional concerns of Japan's remilitarization. Yet in 2011, Japan reeled back on its pursuit for military reform after a massive natural disaster struck its territory and forced the government to focus more on its economic recovery in the aftermath.

By 2014, Japan once again focused on revamping its military as China's activities in the SCS became more assertive. Tokyo successfully implemented changes in its national security stance to foster greater U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, such as the reinterpretation of its constitution to allow for collective self-defense. Diplomatic means of resolution over maritime territorial disputes with China have failed in more recent years, resulting in both the U.S. and Japan increasing their security measures through freedom of navigation operations and the build-up of military bases on nearby islands respectively.

There is less consistency in Japan's economic drivers throughout history. However, a common theme of Japanese fears towards economic over-dependence can be seen at various points in time. As with Japan's security drivers, the beginning of the Cold War era was a distinct period in which Japan's economic drivers towards its foreign policy decisions were abnormal due to the circumstances Tokyo was facing. Japan became passive recipient of economic opportunity during the Korean War, allowing for the rapid recovery of its society in the 1960s and 1970s, whereas Tokyo was able to establish more autonomy over its foreign policy decisions. Japan continued to rely on American financial aid and security guarantees to focus more heavily on growing its economy vice expanding its military capabilities at the time. China's open-door policy in the late 1970s also incentivized Japan to pursue new market opportunities separately.

By the 1980s, Japan was no longer as dependent on the U.S. and instead became a significant economic rival to its security ally. Japan was able to surpass the Soviet Union

as the world's second largest economy during this timeframe and even solicited concerns from China of over-dependence on the Japanese economy. Americans accused Japan of unfair trading practices that protected its domestic industries. However, Japan's economy slowed by the 1990s amidst China's own economic rise.

Although Japan's economy began to recover by the 2000s, Japan was severely impacted by the global recession of 2008, which allowed China to surpass it as the second largest economy in 2010. Japan initiated its Abenomics initiative to regain tract on its economic growth, but over the last decade, Japan's economy has become increasingly dependent on China's markets, reviving fears of economic over-dependence on a foreign power. China has also demonstrated a consistent willingness to disregard internationally recognized rules of law and fair economic practices, which has pushed Japan into seeking a larger role in leading the region's economic affairs and to diversify its own markets.

D. FUTURE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Addressing China's growing military and economic capabilities will require a two-pronged effort from both the U.S. and Japan to address. Japan continues to demonstrate a strong willingness to respond to an increasingly hostile or unstable environment with more significant foreign policy changes, but its fiscal and political constraints remain as limitations today. In the economic realm, Japan's high dependence on China's markets continues to emphasize the need to diversify its markets. One such way is through the CPTPP, but this initiative faces limitations in overcoming China's economic power because the lack of U.S. membership in the free trade agreement means that it is much smaller and more vulnerable to China's influence. More problematic is China's own pursuit to join the CPTPP, which would allow Beijing to exert more influence over the region and potentially undermine the free trade agreement. China has attempted to improve some of its standards in the enforcement of foreign investment and intellectual property laws to alleviate concerns about its entrance, but Beijing still faces challenges in meeting the CPTPP's standards relating to "labor, state-owned enterprises, and digital trade."²⁸⁶

²⁸⁶ Jeffrey Schott, "China's CPTPP bid puts Biden on the spot," PIIE, last modified September 23, 2021, <https://www.piiie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/chinas-cptpp-bid-puts-biden-spot>.

The U.S. can support Japan by renegotiating Washington's entrance into the CPTPP and by being supportive of the diversification of markets in the region to reduce Japanese reliance on the Chinese economy. However, the current Biden administration has been caught in between conflicting political interests domestically which debate the viability and fairness of the agreement. The Biden administration itself seeks to renegotiate the U.S. entrance into the agreement, but only under conditions that would improve U.S. competitiveness and uphold higher standards in environmental protection, digital trade, and labor practices.²⁸⁷ In addition to supporting Japan in its initiatives, the CPTPP would provide benefits to the U.S. economy as well. Before the U.S. dropped out of the TPP free trade agreement, it was projected by official sources that the American economy would gain "an added \$130 billion to U.S. GDP by 2030."²⁸⁸ The U.S. should remain firm but flexible in its approach to the negotiations and leverage its own economic strength as a bargaining point to increasing the size of the free trade agreement. If the U.S. waits too long to act, China may soon join unimpeded.

On the military end, continued strides in Japanese constitutional revisions are necessary for Japan to progress in conducting more military activities under the scope of security cooperation. China's assertive behavior in the SCS, as it claims swathes of natural resources, undermines respect for sovereignty and international law while threatening the possibility for a larger conflict to occur. Sea lines of communication are threatened as China attempts to control the passage of maritime vessels transporting goods through economic exclusion zones that are contested with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. China has also stepped up its efforts in bolstering and creating islands for its military activities, fostering regional fears of a disintegrating security situation. The Taiwan situation similarly remains intense, as China threatens to enforce its "One China" policy and annex the democratic island nation. Japan has actively warned against such actions, fearing the economic repercussions of the fallout with Taiwan as its fourth largest export

²⁸⁷ Schott, "China's CPTPP bid puts Biden on the spot."

²⁸⁸ McBride, Chatzky, and Siripurapu, "What's Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?"

destination for Japanese goods.²⁸⁹ As such, Tokyo has been more open to the idea of enacting collective self-defense in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which the U.S. would likely become involved in under the mutual defense treaty.²⁹⁰

The U.S. can facilitate greater regional acceptance by more openly supporting Japan's drive towards normalization while addressing regional concerns of a remilitarizing Japan. Displaying greater solidarity in the peaceful intentions of the Japanese government through joint statements, as has been done in the past, is one way to diminish remaining fears of remilitarization that are gradually fading away with newer generations. U.S. efforts driving international adherence to the norms that facilitate peace and stability in the region would legitimize U.S. support for Japan's constitutional revisions as necessary for its national security and emphasize the need for a standard conventional military capable of defending these international interests. However, such efforts must be incremental by nature so as to prevent the provocation of other allies and partners in the region. South Korea in particular retains high skepticism of any Japanese attempts to modify its pacifist constitution due to residual post-WWII tensions, which has constrained trilateral cooperation between the U.S. and these two countries.²⁹¹ U.S. bilateral talks with South Korea and other regional state actors regarding the topic of Japan's normalization would need to be much more extensive and emphasize the looming threat China poses with Taiwan. These actions would also provide greater legitimacy for Japan's government to convince its citizens of the need for constitutional revisions and alleviate domestic concerns of Japan's over-dependence on the U.S. for its security needs by providing a venue for Tokyo to increase its contributions towards the alliance with a more modern military force.

²⁸⁹ David Sacks, "The United States and Japan Should Prepare for Chinese Aggression Against Taiwan," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 18, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-states-and-japan-should-prepare-chinese-aggression-against-taiwan>.

²⁹⁰ Sacks, "The United States and Japan Should Prepare for Chinese Aggression Against Taiwan."

²⁹¹ Kathryn Botto, "Overcoming Obstacles to Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Interoperability," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified March 18, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/overcoming-obstacles-to-trilateral-u.s.-rok-japan-interoperability-pub-81236>.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Abe, Naoki. "Japan's Shrinking Economy." Brookings. Last modified February 12, 2010. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/japans-shrinking-economy/>.
- Aibara, Ryo, and Takumi Wakai. "Japan welcomes application by Taiwan to join CPTPP trade deal." The Asahi Shimbun. Last modified September 24, 2021. <https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14446813>.
- Akira, Kawasaki, and Céline Nahory. "Japan's Decision on Collective Self-Defense in Context." The Diplomat. Last modified October 3, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japans-decision-on-collective-self-defense-in-context/>.
- Aljazeera. "Japan's exports drop the most in three years as trade war hits." Last modified November 20, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/20/japans-exports-drop-the-most-in-three-years-as-trade-war-hits>.
- Allen, Robert. "The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 34, no. 4 (November 2001): 859–881. <https://content.csbs.utah.edu/~mli/Economics%207004/Allen-103.pdf>.
- Arase, David. "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy." In *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, edited by Colin McInnes and Mark Rolls, 44–64. London: Routledge, 1994. <https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.4324/9781315037394>.
- Ashley, Ryan. "Japan's Revolution on Taiwan Affairs." War on the Rocks. Last modified November 23, 2021. <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/japans-revolution-on-taiwan-affairs/>.
- The Associated Press. "Japanese economy in first recession since 2001." Last modified November 16, 2008. <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna27757193>.
- BBC. "Japan to allow military role overseas in historic move." last modified September 18, 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362>.
- Best, Anthony. "Japan and the Cold War: An Overview." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, edited by Richard Immerman and Petra Goedde, 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0017>.
- Bosack, Michael. "Remembering the Role Japan played in the Forgotten War." Japan Times. Last modified July 18, 2019. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/07/18/commentary/japan-commentary/remembering-role-japan-played-forgotten-war/>.

- Botto, Kathryn. "Overcoming Obstacles to Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Interoperability." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified March 18, 2020. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/overcoming-obstacles-to-trilateral-u.s.-rok-japan-interoperability-pub-81236>.
- Bowles, Paul. "China debates the TPP." East Asia Forum. Last modified March 20, 2014. <https://www.easiaforum.org/2014/03/20/china-debates-the-tpp/>.
- Brown, Clayton. "China's Great Leap Forward." *U.S., Asia, and the World: 1914–2012* 17, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 29–34. <https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/chinas-great-leap-forward-1.pdf>.
- Brown, Eugene. "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options." *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5 (May 1994): 430–446. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645056>.
- Burns, Katherine. *China and Japan: Economic Partnership to Political Ends*. Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, accessed June 12, 2021. <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/china-japan-economic-partnership-political-ends.pdf>.
- Bush, Richard. "Taiwan's democracy and the China challenge." Brookings. Last modified January 22, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/>.
- Bush, Richard. "The Response of China's Neighbors to the U.S. "Pivot" to Asia." Brookings. Last modified January 31, 2012. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-response-of-chinas-neighbors-to-the-u-s-pivot-to-asia/>.
- Callen, Tim, and Jonathan David Ostry. *Japan's Lost Decade: Policies for Economic Revival*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589061873.071>.
- Campbell, Caitlin. *U.S.–Japan Relations*. CRS Report No. IF10199. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10199>.
- Cheng, Grace. "China's Response to a Post-Pacificist Japan." *E-International Relations*. Last modified September 14, 2014. <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/14/chinas-response-to-a-post-pacificist-japan/>.
- Cheng, Joseph. "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944—)* 61, no. 1 (Winter 1984–1985): 91–107. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2619781>.

- Christensen, Thomas J.. "China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring, 1999): 49–80, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294>.
- Congressional Research Service. *South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations*. CRS Report No. IF10165. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10165>.
- Congressional Research Service. *The U.S.–Japan Alliance*. CRS Report No. RL33740. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33740/25>.
- Congressional Research Service. *U.S.–Japan Relations*. CRS Report No. IF10199. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10199>.
- Congressional Research Service. *U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared*. CRS Report No. RL33331. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf>.
- Council on Foreign Relations. "China's Maritime Disputes: 1895–2020." Last accessed August 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes>. Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker - Tensions in the East China Sea." Last modified January 14, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/tensions-east-china-sea>.
- Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker - Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea." Last modified January 14, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>.
- Council on Foreign Relations. "U.S. Relations with China: 1949–2021." Last accessed August 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china>.
- Dreyer, June. "China's Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why We Should Care." Foreign Policy Research Institute. Last modified October 7, 2020. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/chinas-monopoly-on-rare-earth-elements-and-why-we-should-care/>.
- Envall, H. D. P. "Japan's 'Pivot' Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance." *Security Challenges* 12, no. 3 (2016): 5–19. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465595>.
- Fallows, James. "Containing Japan." *The Atlantic*. Last modified May 1989. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1989/05/containing-japan/376337/>.

- Fatton, Lionel P. “‘Japan Is Back’: Autonomy and Balancing Amidst an Unstable China–U.S.–Japan Triangle.” *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 2 (2018): 264–78. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.240>.
- Feickert, Andrew, and Emma Chanlett-Avery. *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response*. CRS Report No. R41690. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41690.pdf>.
- Ferris, Elizabeth, and Mireya Solis. “Earthquake, Tsunami, Meltdown – The Triple Disaster’s Impact on Japan, Impact on the World.” Brookings. Last modified March 11, 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/03/11/earthquake-tsunami-meltdown-the-triple-disasters-impact-on-japan-impact-on-the-world/>.
- Ford, Lindsey, and James Goldgeier. “Retooling America’s Alliances to Manage the China Challenge.” Brookings. Last modified January 25, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/>.
- Funabashi, Yoichi and Harry Dempsey. “Trump Threat Drives Japan and China Closer.” *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2017): 6–7. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2186179074>.
- Glass, Andrew. “U.S. recognizes communist China, Dec. 15, 1978.” Politico. Last modified December 15, 2018. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/15/us-recognizes-communist-china-dec-15-1978-1060168>.
- Goodby, James. “North Korea: The Problem That Won’t Go Away.” Brookings. Last modified May 1, 2003. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/north-korea-the-problem-that-wont-go-away/>.
- Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present – Fourth Edition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Print.
- Green, Michael. “The U.S.–Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History.” *Education About Asia* 12, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 25–30. <https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/the-us-japan-alliance-a-brief-strategic-history.pdf>.
- Harold, Scott W., Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific*. RR3125. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “The Soviet Factor in U.S.–Japanese Defense Cooperation, 1978–1985.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 72–103. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00338.

- Hass, Ryan, and Abraham Denmark. "More pain than gain: How the US-China trade war hurt America." Brookings. Last modified August 7, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/07/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-us-china-trade-war-hurt-america/>.
- Haver, Zachary. "Japan Latest Nation to Contest Beijing's South China Sea Claims." VOA News. Last modified January 23, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_japan-latest-nation-contest-beijings-south-china-sea-claims/6201116.html.
- He, Yinan. "Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese relations." *China Perspectives* 2013, no. 4 (2013): 7–16. <http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6314>.
- Heath, Timothy. "Strategic Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from TPP." RAND. Last modified March 27, 2017. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/03/strategic-consequences-of-us-withdrawal-from-tpp.html/>.
- Herscovitch, Benjamin. "A Balanced Threat Assessment of China's South China Sea Policy." CATO Institute. Last modified August 28, 2017. <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/balanced-threat-assessment-chinas-south-china-sea-policy#regional-and-global-security>.
- Hui, Mary. "Japan's Global Rare Earths Quest Holds Lessons for the U.S. and Europe." Quartz. Last modified April 22, 2021. <https://qz.com/1998773/japans-rare-earths-strategy-has-lessons-for-us-europe/>.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. "Japan in 2013: Abenomics and Abegeopolitics." *Asian Survey* 54, no. 1 (2014): 101–112. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.1.101>.
- Iriye, Akira. "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945–90." *The China Quarterly*, no. 124 (December 1990): 624–638. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/654640>.
- Itamae, Kanako, and Lee Jay Walker. "Japan warns about tit-for-tat trade tariffs between America and China." Modern Tokyo Times. Last modified April 3, 2018. <http://moderntokyotimes.com/japan-warns-about-tit-for-tat-trade-tariffs-between-america-and-china/>.
- Jamitzky, Ulli. "The TPP Debate in Japan: Reasons for a Failed Protest Campaign." *Asia Pacific Perspectives* (Spring/ Summer 2015): 79–97. https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/arts_and_sciences/app_xiii1_04_jamitzky_08-17-15.pdf.
- Japan Times. "What remains undone in the post-3/11 reconstruction." Last modified March 12, 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/12/editorials/remains-undone-post-3-11-reconstruction/>.

- Japan Today. “The slugfest over Article 9 of Japan’s constitution.” Last modified January 19, 2015. <https://japantoday.com/category/features/opinions/the-slugfest-over-article-9-of-japans-constitution>.
- Japanese Cabinet Secretariat. *National Security Strategy*. Tokyo: Cabinet of Japan, 2013. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.
- Japanese Ministry of Defense. *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2015. https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf.
- Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>.
- JapanGov - The Government of Japan. “Abenomics.” Last accessed August 2021. <https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html>.
- Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee. *A Stronger Alliance For a Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. New York: SCC, 2015. https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/js20150427e.pdf.
- Jobst, Nina. “Value of goods exported by South Korea to China since Free Trade Agreement (FTA) from 2015 to 2019.” Statista. Last modified March 5, 2021. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/657617/south-korea-exported-goods-value-to-china-since-free-trade-agreement/>.
- Kajimoto, Tetsushi. “Japan calls for early solution to U.S.-China trade war.” Reuters. Last modified September 17, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-u-s-trade/japan-calls-for-early-solution-to-u-s-china-trade-war-idUSKCN1LY046>.
- Kajimoto, Tetsushi. “Japan Inc increasingly hit by trade war, but few shifting from China: Reuters poll.” Reuters. Last modified September 12, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-companies-trade/japan-inc-increasingly-hit-by-trade-war-but-few-shifting-from-china-reuters-poll-idUSKCN1VX2Y2>.
- Kane, James. “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).” Institute for Government. Last modified February 2, 2021. <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/trade-cptpp>.
- Kawashima, Shin, Mataka Kamiya, and James Schoff. “Managing Risks and Opportunities for the U.S.–Japan Alliance Through Coordinated China Policy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified October 10, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/managing-risks-and-opportunities-for-U.S.–Japan-alliance-through-coordinated-china-policy-pub-80026>.

- Kazuhito, Yamashita. "Points of Controversy Surrounding the TPP." Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. Last modified April 2012. https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/rieti_report/141.html.
- Kildee, Dan. "The U.S. Can't Afford to Include Japan in the TPP." HuffPost. Last modified September 4, 2012. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-us-cant-afford-to-inc_b_1854359.
- Kim, Hong N. "Japan and China in the 1980s." *Current History* 84, no. 506 (1985): 426–30, 448. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315601>.
- King, Amy. *China-Japan Relations after World War Two - Empire, Industry, and War, 1949–1971*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Print.
- King, Amy. "China's response to Japan's constitutional reinterpretation." East Asia Forum. Last modified July 27, 2014. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/27/china-responds-to-japans-constitutional-reinterpretation/>.
- Kobayashi, Shigeo, Jia Baobo, and Junya Sano. "MThe 'Three Reforms' in China: Progress and Outlook." *RIM* no. 45 (September 1999). <https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/>.
- Koda, Yoji. "Japan's Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea." *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (January 2016): 29–35. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905086>.
- Koga, Kei. "Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific." In *Implementing the Indo-Pacific: Japan's Region Building Initiatives*, edited by Kyle Springer, 24–37. Perth: Perth USAsia Centre, August 2019. <https://perthusasia.edu.au/events/past-conferences/defence-forum-2019/2019-indo-pacific-defence-conference-videos/keynotes-and-feature-presentations/pu-134-japan-book-web.aspx>.
- Komine, Yukinori. "Whither a 'Resurgent Japan': The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969–1976." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 3 (Summer, 2014): 88–128. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00447.
- LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997. Print.
- Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "Xi's Grip Loosens Amid Trade War Policy Paralysis." Modern Tokyo Times. Last modified August 26, 2018. <http://moderntokyotimes.com/xis-grip-loosens-amid-trade-war-policy-paralysis/>.
- Li, Xiaobing. *The Cold War in East Asia*. New York: Routledge, 2018. Print.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. "The American Pivot to Asia." Brookings. Last modified December 21, 2011. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>.

- Lim, Darren. “Chinese Economic Coercion during the THAAD Dispute.” The ASAN Forum. Accessed June 12, 2021. <https://theasanforum.org/chinese-economic-coercion-during-the-thaad-dispute/>.
- Lim, Louisa. “China Acts Fast In Aiding Japan Post-Earthquake.” NPR. Last modified March 15, 2011. <https://www.npr.org/2011/03/15/134567659/china-acts-fast-in-aiding-japan-post-earthquake>.
- Madison, Cory. “Tracking Public Support for Japan’s Remilitarization Policies: An Examination of Elitist and Pluralist Governance.” *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (2019): 123–40. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891118764354>.
- Maizland, Lindsay. “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense.” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified May 10, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy>.
- Maizland, Lindsay, and Nathanael Cheng. “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance.” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified November 4, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>.
- Manyin, Mark. *The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations*. CRS Report No. R42761. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42761/21>.
- Martyn, Paul. “Rare Earth Minerals: An End To China’s Monopoly Is In Sight.” Forbes. Last modified June 8, 2012. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/08/rare-earth-minerals-an-end-to-chinas-monopoly-is-in-sight/?sh=1e0ca218532c>.
- Mazarr, Michael J., Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, *Understanding the Current International Order*. RR1598. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1598.html.
- McBride, James, and Beina Xu. “Abenomics and the Japanese Economy.” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified March 23, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abenomics-and-japanese-economy>.
- McBride, James, Andrew Chatzky, and Anshu Siripurapu. “What’s Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified September 20, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp>.
- Mendel Jr., Douglas H. “Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Seventies.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–1972): 521–538. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2747669>.

- Miller, Jennifer. "The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in U.S.-Japanese Relations." *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (January 2011): 82–108. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25764610>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan's Effort for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific*. Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2021. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf>.
- Morrison, Wayne. *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. RL33534. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33534/98>.
- Office of the United States Trade Representative. "Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement." Last modified October 4, 2015. <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership>.
- Ogata, Sadako. "Some Japanese Views on United States-Japan Relations in the 1980s." *Asian Survey* 20, no. 7 (1980): 694–706. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643923>.
- Okita, Saburo. "Japan's Economy and the Korean War." *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 14 (July, 1951): 141–144, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024219>.
- Oren, Eitan, and Matthew Brummer. "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 71–112. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00948.
- Ozaki, Robert. "United States-Japanese Economic Relations," *Current History* 82, no. 487 (November, 1983): 357–361, 390–391, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45315215>.
- Pollack, Jonathan. "Japan's Defense Policy Revision – Where is Japan Headed?" Brookings. Last modified August 17, 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/japans-defense-policy-revision-where-is-japan-headed/>.
- Pompeo, Michael. "U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea." U.S. Department of State. Last modified July 13, 2020. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html>.
- Ramirez, Carlos. "Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under Abe: From Neoconservatism and Neoautonomy to Pragmatic Realism." *Pacific Review* 34, no. 1 (2021): 146–175. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1653358>.

- Rapp-Hooper, Mira, Michael Chase, Mataka Kamiya, Shin Kawashima, and Yuichi Hosoya. "Responding to China's Complicated Views on International Order." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified October 10, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021>.
- Reserve Bank of Australia. "The Global Financial Crisis." Last accessed August 2021. <https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/the-global-financial-crisis.html>.
- Rubinstein, Gregg. "U.S.–Japan Security Relations: A Maturing Partnership?" *The Fletcher Forum* 12, no. 1 (1988): 41–54. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45331277>.
- Sacks, David. "The United States and Japan Should Prepare for Chinese Aggression Against Taiwan." Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified January 18, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-states-and-japan-should-prepare-chinese-aggression-against-taiwan>.
- Sahashi, Ryo. "Japan's Strategy Amid US-China Confrontation." *China International Strategy Review* 2 (2020): 232–245. <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42533-020-00061-9.pdf>.
- Saito, Jun. "Why Was Japan Struck So Hard by the 2008 Crisis?" Japan Center for Economic Research. Last modified October 1, 2018. <https://www.jcer.or.jp/english/why-was-japan-struck-so-hard-by-the-2008-crisis>.
- Sanchez-Sibony, Oscar. "Economic Growth in the Governance of the Cold War Divide: Mikoyan's Encounter with Japan, Summer 1961." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 129–154. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00741.
- Santander Trade Markets. "South Korean Foreign Trade in Figures." Last updated June 2021. <https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/south-korea/foreign-trade-in-figures>.
- Schaller, Michael. "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia." *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 2 (September 1982): 392–414. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1893825>.
- Schoppa, Keith. "Chapter 17: Coming Unglued." In *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History*, edited by Rob DeGeorge and Lauren Aylward, 326–345. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011. Print.
- Schoppa, Keith. "Chapter 18: Death Dance: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." In *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History*, edited by Rob DeGeorge and Lauren Aylward, 346–364. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011. Print.

- Schott, Jeffrey. "China's CPTPP bid puts Biden on the spot." PIIE. Last modified September 23, 2021. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/chinas-cptpp-bid-puts-biden-spot>.
- Schott, Jeffrey. "TPP Can Be Fixed If You Know What's Wrong With It." Peterson Institute for International Economics. Last modified December 5, 2016. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpm-can-be-fixed-if-you-know-whats-wrong-it>.
- Schott, Jeffrey, Euijin Jung, and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs. *An Assessment of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement*. PB15-24. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015. <https://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-24.pdf>.
- SCMP. "US-China relations: is there still a trade war under Joe Biden's presidency?" Last modified May 23, 2021. <https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3134191/us-china-relations-there-still-trade-war-under-joe-bidens?module=inline&pgtype=article>.
- SCMP. "What is the US-China trade war?" Last modified April 13, 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3078745/what-us-china-trade-war-how-it-started-and-what-inside-phase>.
- Segal, Gerald. "China: Arms Transfer Policies and Practices." In *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, edited by Colin McInnes and Mark Rolls, 156–173. London: Routledge, 1994. <https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.4324/9781315037394>.
- Shinji, Yokote. "Soviet Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan's Entry into the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 30–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00336.
- Sieg, Linda. "Japan's Heisei era: Changes, growth and tragedies." Reuters. Last modified April 23, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor-era/japans-heisei-era-changes-growth-and-tragedies-idUSKCN1S00LM>.
- Solís, Mireya. "China moves to join the CPTPP, but don't expect a fast pass." Brookings. Last modified September 23, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/23/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/>.
- Solís, Mireya. *China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_china_japan_solis.pdf.
- Solís, Mireya. "Japan's Democratic Renewal and the Survival of the Liberal Order." Brookings. Last modified January 22, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/japans-democratic-renewal-and-the-survival-of-the-liberal-order/>.

- Solís, Mireya. “Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.” Brookings. Last modified March 24, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/>.
- Sohn, Yul. “South Korea Under the United States-China Rivalry: Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in Trade Policymaking.” *The Pacific Review* 32, no. 6 (2019): 1019–1040. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1617770>.
- Stein, Andre, and Miro Vassilev. “The TPP talks are critical for both Japan’s future and U.S. Asia policy.” *The Diplomat*. Last modified August 6, 2013. <https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/the-tpp-abenomics-and-americas-asia-pivot/>.
- Stockwin, J. A. A.. “Japanese Attitudes to the Sino-Soviet Dispute.” *International Journal* 18, no. 4 (Autumn, 1963): 488–500. <https://doi.org/40198931>.
- Szechenyi, Nicholas, and Yuichi Hosoya. “Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified October 10, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/working-toward-free-and-open-indo-pacific-pub-80023>.
- Sun, Chang, Zhigang Tao, Hongjie Yuan, and Hongyong Zhang. “The Impact of the US-China Trade War on Japanese Multinational Corporations.” *RIETI Discussion Paper Series 19-E-050* (July 2019): 1–35. <https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/19e050.pdf>.
- Suominen, Kati. “Two Years into CPTPP.” CSIS. Last modified August 9, 2021. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-cptpp>.
- Suzuki, Shogo. “Will Japan’s war apologies ever satisfy China?” *East Asia Forum*. Last modified November 5, 2015. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/05/will-japans-war-apologies-ever-satisfy-china/>.
- Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96–8 § 2, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter48&edition=prelim>.
- Takashi, Terada. “Assessing Abe’s Economic Agenda: Abenomics, TPP, and Domestic Politics.” *The ASAN Forum*. Last modified February 5, 2015. <https://theasanforum.org/assessing-abes-economic-agenda-abenomics-tpp-and-domestic-politics/>.
- Takashi, Terada. “How and Why Japan Has Saved the TPP: From Trump Tower to Davos.” *The ASAN Forum*. Last modified February 19, 2018. <https://theasanforum.org/how-and-why-japan-has-saved-the-tpp-from-trump-tower-to-davos/>.

- Takashi, Terada. "Japan and the TPP Conclusion: Regional Order, Negotiations, and Domestic Adjustment." The ASAN Forum. Last modified October 23, 2015. <https://theasanforum.org/japan-and-the-tpp-conclusion-regional-order-negotiations-and-domestic-adjustment/>.
- Takenaka, Kiyoshi. "Huge protest in Tokyo rails against PM Abe's security bills." Reuters. Last modified August 30, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-politics-protest/huge-protest-in-tokyo-rails-against-pm-abes-security-bills-idUSKCN0QZ0C320150830>.
- Takenaka, Kiyoshi. "Japan buys disputed islands, China sends patrol ships." Reuters. Last modified September 11, 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china/japan-buys-disputed-islands-china-sends-patrol-ships-idUSBRE88A0GY20120911>.
- Tanaka, Hitoshi. "A Japanese Perspective on the China Question." *East Asia Insights* 3, no. 2 (May 2008): 1–5. <https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/3-2.pdf>.
- Tasker, Peter. "Shinzo Abe's challenge to China." IRPP. Last modified January 6, 2014. <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/technology/tasker/>.
- Taylor, Adam. "A timeline of Trump's complicated relationship with the TPP." The Washington Post. Last modified April 13, 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/a-timeline-of-trumps-complicated-relationship-with-the-tpp/>.
- Togo, Kazuhiko. "Abe's foreign policy legacy." East Asia Forum. Last modified September 10, 2020. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/10/abes-foreign-policy-legacy/>.
- Togo, Kazuhiko. "Japan's Foreign Policy under Détente: Relations with China and the Soviet Union, 1971–1973." In *The Cold War in East Asia: 1945–1991*, edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011. 180–212. Print.
- Uchida, Sawako, and Lee Jay Walker. "US and Japan trade talks set back after fresh tariffs imposed on China: Beijing today, Tokyo tomorrow?" Modern Tokyo Times. Last modified September 18, 2018. <http://moderntokyotimes.com/us-and-japan-trade-talks-set-back-after-fresh-tariffs-imposed-on-china-beijing-today-tokyo-tomorrow/>.
- United Nations. *World Economic Report 1951–52*. New York: UN Department of Economic Affairs, 1953. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/searchable_archive/1952_WESS_Full.pdf.

- U.S. Department of Agriculture. “Fact Sheet: Trans Pacific Partnership and Japan: Key Outcomes for Agriculture.” Last accessed January 2022. <https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2015/11/19/fact-sheet-trans-pacific-partnership-and-japan-key-outcomes>.
- U.S Department of Agriculture. *Japan Joins Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*. Report No. JA2020-0189. Tokyo, Japan: Office of Agricultural Affairs, Japan, 2020. <https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/japan-japan-joins-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Limits in the Seas*. No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2014. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/LIS-143.pdf>.
- U.S. Department of State. “Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945–52.” Last accessed February 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction>.
- U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian. “Rapprochement with China, 1972.” Last modified April 8, 2018. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china>.
- U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation With South Korea.” January 20, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-korea/>.
- U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan.” January 20, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/>.
- Vogel, Ezra. “Chapter 9: The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1952.” In *China and Japan: Facing History*, 286–326. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2019. Print.
- Vogel, Ezra. “Chapter 10: Working Together, 1972–1992.” In *China and Japan: Facing History*, 327–355. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2019. Print.
- Waidelich, Brian, and Elizabeth Barrett. “Japan’s New Defense White Paper Elevates Security Concerns Over Taiwan Strait.” CNA. Last modified July 23, 2021. <https://www.cna.org/news/InDepth/2021/07/japans-defense-white-paper-security-concerns-taiwan-strait>.
- Wallace, Corey. “Japan’s confused debate about the TPP.” East Asia Forum. Last modified November 9, 2011. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/09/japan-s-confused-debate-about-the-tpp/>.

- Wang, Dong. "U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship." *The Asia-Pacific Journal - Japan Focus* 24, no. 4 (June 2013): 1–15. <https://apjjf.org/2013/11/24/Dong-Wang/3958/article.html>.
- Wei, Shang-Jin. "Chapter 3: The Open Door Policy and China's Rapid Growth: Evidence from City-Level Data." In *Growth Theories in Light of the East Asian Experience*, edited by Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger, 73–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=408308>.
- White House Office of the Press Secretary. "Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan." White House Archives. Last modified April 24, 2014. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan>.
- White House Office of the Press Secretary. "U.S.–Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond." White House Archives. Last modified April 25, 2014. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac#>.
- Wilson Center. "Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–1984." Last accessed February, 2022. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/73/sino-soviet-split-1960-1984>.
- Ye, Min. "Understanding the Economics-Politics Nexus in South Korea-China Relations." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 51, no. 1 (2015): 97–118. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909615585179>.
- Yeo, Andrew. "South Korea and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Last modified July 20, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy>
- Yongtao, Gui. "A Chinese View: The Risks of Changing Japan's Peace Constitution." Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified May 11, 2017. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinese-view-risks-changing-japans-peace-constitution>.
- Yufan, Hao and Zhai Zhihai. "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited." *The China Quarterly*, no. 121 (March, 1990): 94–115. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/654064>.
- Zandi, Mark, Jesse Rogers, and Maria Cosma. "Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage Done." *Moody's Analytics* (September 2019): 1–8. <https://www.moodyanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/trade-war-chicken.pdf>.

Zhang, Xiaoming. "China's Perceptions of and Responses to Abe's Foreign Policy." *Asian Perspective* 39, no. 3 (2015): 423–439. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43738125>.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California